Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2111 | October 11, 2019 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Christopher Sturgeon

Clark County Public Defender’s Office

Jeffersonville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. Mackenzie

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

D.H.,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

October 11, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JV-2111

Appeal from the Clark Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Vicki L. 

Carmichael, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

10C04-1712-JD-314

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2111 | October 11, 2019 Page 2 of 8

Statement of the Case

[1] D.H. appeals the juvenile court’s adjudication of him as a delinquent on one 

count of child molesting, as a Level 4 when committed by an adult. D.H. 

presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court violated 

his right to confrontation under the federal and state constitutions. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 4, 2017, thirteen-year-old D.H. was at his seven-year-old cousin 

A.G.’s house in Memphis, Indiana and the two of them were in a hot tub 

together. D.H. asked A.G. to come over to where he was sitting in the hot tub

and, after he “got his [penis] out of his trunks,” D.H. “started bouncing” A.G.

on his lap, and he put his penis “in [between her] legs.” State’s Ex. 11 at 40. 

After a short time, A.G.’s father, J.G., approached the hot tub and saw D.H. 

bouncing A.G. up and down on his lap. J.G. found this suspicious and pulled 

A.G. out of the hot tub. When A.G. was out of the water, J.G. observed that 

A.G.’s bathing suit bottom was pulled to the side, exposing her genitals.

[3] J.G. confronted D.H. about what was going on. D.H. proceeded to move his 

hands around underwater near his lap and, when D.H. stood up, J.G. observed 

that D.H.’s underwear was askew and his penis was erect. J.G. became 

enraged and shoved D.H. to the ground. D.H. then ran off, called his mother, 

and told her that J.G. had battered him. D.H.’s mother called law 

enforcement, and Officer Mark Grube with the Clark County Sheriff’s Office 
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arrived at J.G.’s residence. Officer Grube questioned J.G.; A.G.’s mother, 

J.H.; D.H.; and other family members.

[4] Detective James Haehl soon arrived at the scene and advised A.G.’s parents to 

take A.G. to a local hospital for an examination. They complied, and a nurse, 

Misty Carroll, who examined A.G. found “nothing that would confirm or deny 

that any sexual activity had taken place.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 71. In 

addition, Detective Haehl took a brief video-recorded statement of A.G. at the 

hospital. During that interview, A.G. did not say much, but she told Detective 

Haehl that D.H. had put “it” in between her legs and told her not to tell anyone 

or else he would get in trouble. State’s Ex. 9.

[5] On November 21, A.G. underwent an extensive video-recorded interview with 

Rebecca Sanders at the Child Advocacy Center. A.G. told Sanders that D.H.

exposed his “private” from inside his trunks and bounced her up and down on 

his lap. State’s Ex. 2. A.G. also explained that her swim bottoms had fallen 

down to her thighs or knees and that D.H.’s penis had touched her in between 

her legs.

[6] On December 22, the State filed a petition alleging that D.H. was a delinquent

for committing child molest, as a Level 4 felony when committed by an adult. 

On April 4, 2018, the juvenile court held a protected person hearing and 

determined that A.G. would not have to testify at the factfinding hearing. In 

addition, the juvenile court ordered that D.H. could not be present for his 

counsel’s ensuing video-recorded deposition of A.G. The factfinding hearing 
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occurred over the course of three days in May and June. Over D.H.’s 

objections, the court admitted into evidence the two video-recorded interviews 

with A.G. The trial court also admitted, without objection, A.G.’s videorecorded deposition with A.G.’s counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 

juvenile court adjudicated D.H. a delinquent. Following a dispositional 

hearing, the juvenile court placed D.H. on a suspended commitment to the 

Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] D.H. contends that the juvenile court erred when it admitted into evidence 

A.G.’s out-of-court statements to Carroll, Detective Haehl, and Sanders. In 

particular, D.H. asserts that he was denied any opportunity to cross-examine 

A.G. during those prior statements and, therefore, the admission of those 

statements violated his right to confront A.G. under both the federal and state 

constitutions. D.H.’s arguments raise questions of law we review de novo. 

Redfield v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1104, 1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

[8] Initially, we note that D.H.’s primary argument on appeal is that the juvenile 

court violated Indiana Code Section 35-37-4-6, the “Protected Person Statute,”

when it admitted the challenged evidence at the factfinding hearing. However, 

D.H. did not object to any of the challenged evidence on the basis of a violation 

of that statute. It is well-settled that a defendant may not argue one ground for 

objection at trial and then raise new grounds on appeal. D.G.B. v. State, 833 

N.E.2d 519, 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding defendant waived argument 

under Protected Person statute for failing to object on that ground at factfinding 
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hearing). Accordingly, D.H.’s argument under the Protected Person Statute is 

waived. See id.

[9] D.H. also asserts that the trial court violated his right to confrontation under the 

Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution when it 

admitted A.G.’s out-of-court statements. The Sixth Amendment’s 

Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. 

Const. amend. VI. In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court 

held that this clause prohibits “admission of testimonial statements of a witness 

who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the 

defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 541 U.S. 36, 53-

54 (2004). “Though leaving ‘testimonial statement’ undefined, the Court stated 

that the label ‘applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, 

before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.’” Cardosi 

v. State, 128 N.E.3d 1277, 1286 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68). 

Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution similarly provides that, “[i]n 

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to . . . meet the 

witnesses face to face.”

[10] We agree with D.H. that A.G.’s statements to Carroll, Detective Haehl, and 

Sanders were testimonial statements. And at no point was D.H. permitted to 

cross-examine A.G. regarding those statements, either at the protected person 

hearing or at the factfinding hearing. But our analysis does not end there.
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[11] First, D.H. did not object at all to the admission into evidence of A.G.’s 

statements to Carroll. Thus, he has not preserved any errors with respect to 

that evidence for appellate review. And he does not argue fundamental error. 

The issue is waived.

[12] Second, a denial of the right of confrontation may be harmless error. As our 

Supreme Court has explained:

A “primary interest” secured by the Confrontation Clause is the 

right of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 

S. Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). A criminal defendant’s Sixth 

Amendment right to confront witnesses is nevertheless subject to 

reasonable limitations placed at the discretion of the trial court. 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Violations of the right of cross-examination 

do not require reversal if the State can show beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. See Arsdall, 

475 U.S. at 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431; see also Smith v. State, 721 

N.E.2d 213, 219 (Ind. 1999) (“[V]iolations of the right to crossexamine are subject to harmless-error analysis.”).

In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 

705 (1967), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that all 

federal constitutional errors, regardless of their nature or the 

circumstances of the case, require reversal of a judgment of 

conviction. The Court reasoned that in the context of a 

particular case, certain constitutional errors, no less than other 

errors, may have been “harmless” in terms of their effect on the 

fact-finding process at trial. As the Supreme Court has stressed, 

and we too have expressed, the Constitution entitles a criminal 

defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one. E.g., United States v. 

Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 

(1983); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 
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20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); Riley v. State, 489 N.E.2d 58, 61 (Ind.

1986).

The Supreme Court has explained that a Chapman harmless error 

analysis turns on a number of factors available to the reviewing 

court:

These factors include the importance of the witness’

testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the 

testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of 

evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony 

of the witness on material points, the extent of crossexamination otherwise permitted and, of course, the 

overall strength of the prosecution’s case.

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431.

Since Chapman, we have reaffirmed the principle that an 

otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the 

reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that 

the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

See Debro v. State, 821 N.E.2d 367 (Ind. 2005); Reed v. State, 748 

N.E.2d 381, 391 (Ind. 2001).

Koenig v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1271, 1273-74 (Ind. 2010). Likewise, in regards to 

violations of State constitutional rights, the Indiana Supreme Court has held 

that “trial court error, even of constitutional dimension, does not necessarily 

require reversal of a conviction. Rather, if the error is such that it would not 

affect the outcome of the trial, we deem it harmless.” Bush v. State, 775 N.E.2d 

309, 311 (Ind. 2002).

[13] Here, A.G.’s out-of-court statements to Detective Haehl and Sanders were 

merely cumulative of the testimony A.G. gave in her video-recorded deposition, 
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which was admitted without objection at the factfinding hearing.

1 Moreover, 

A.G.’s father testified at the factfinding hearing that he had witnessed D.H.’s 

molestation of A.G. in the hot tub, including having found A.G.’s genitals 

exposed and having observed D.H. with an erect penis. Finally, while D.H. 

was not present at A.G.’s deposition, his attorney was able to thoroughly crossexamine her. We can say with confidence that the error, if any, in the 

admission of the challenged evidence in this case was harmless. See id.

[14] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.

1

 D.H. did not object to the admission into evidence of A.G.’s video-recorded deposition at the factfinding 

hearing. Accordingly, he has not preserved for our review his contention that the admission of that evidence 

violated his right to confront witnesses under the Indiana Constitution. And we reject D.H.’s attempt to 

argue fundamental error on this issue for the first time in his reply brief. Our Supreme Court has held that 

where, as here, a party does not allege fundamental error in his principal appellate brief but, instead, raises it 

for the first time in his reply brief, consideration of that claim is waived. See Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 

1174, 1179-80 (Ind. 2016).