19-1807

Singh v. Garland

BIA

Navarro, IJ

A206 086 480

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 12th day of May, two thousand twenty-one.

PRESENT:

DENNIS JACOBS,

ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

GERARD E. LYNCH,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

DALER SINGH,

Petitioner,

v. 19-1807

NAC

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Esq., Richmond 

 Hill, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 

Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad, 

Assistant Director; Julia J. 

Tyler, Trial Attorney, Office of 
2

Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED.

Petitioner Daler Singh, a native and citizen of India, 

seeks review of a June 6, 2019, decision of the BIA affirming 

a January 9, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 

denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). In re Daler Singh, No. A206 086 480 (B.I.A. June 

6, 2019), aff’g No. A206 086 480 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 

9, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts and procedural history.

Under the circumstances, we have considered both the IJ’s 

and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” 

Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528 

(2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well 

established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. 

Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). 

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 
3

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 

determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s 

or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal 

consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of 

such statements with other evidence of record . . . without 

regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 

goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other 

relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer 

. . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the 

totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable 

fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” 

Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); 

accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence 

supports the agency’s determination that Singh was not 

credible as to his claim that individuals, who were Jat Sikhs, 

attacked him in India on account of his membership in the 

Dera Sacha Sauda.

The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between 

Singh’s account of his alleged June 2013 attack and the 

accounts provided in the affidavits from family and neighbors 

that he submitted to corroborate his claim. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 
4

137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency 

might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled 

to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so 

preclude even more forcefully.”). Singh testified that he 

and his attackers were on foot, while the five affiants stated 

that his attackers drove a van into Singh while he was riding 

a motorcycle. Singh initially could not explain this 

inconsistency, but later asserted first that the affiants 

were not educated and then that the affiants had members of 

his attackers’ ethnic group prepare the affidavits for them. 

The agency was not compelled to credit Singh’s evolving 

explanation. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d 

Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible 

explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; 

he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be 

compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotations 

omitted)). 

Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency 

reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his 

testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. See Biao 

Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An 

applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may 
5

bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in 

general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony 

that has already been called into question.”). The agency 

reasonably declined to credit the affidavits from Singh’s 

family and neighbors in any respect because, in addition to 

the significant inconsistency discussed above, the affidavits 

were almost identical in their descriptions of the June 2013 

attack and his wife’s and neighbors’ affidavits were 

identical (including grammatical errors) in describing his 

alleged October 2013 attack. See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t 

of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 524 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]his court 

has . . . firmly embraced the commonsensical notion that 

striking similarities between affidavits are an indication 

that the statements are ‘canned.’”). Further, Singh did not 

submit any evidence of his injuries, such as medical records 

or photographs, and the letter from Dera Sacha Sauda does not 

mention his alleged attacks. The agency was not compelled 

to conclude that general evidence of tensions and clashes 

between Sikhs and Dera Sacha Sauda members rehabilitated 

Singh’s credibility regarding his own alleged attacks. 

Given the inconsistency and corroboration findings, the 

agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by 
6

substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 

That determination was dispositive of asylum (including 

humanitarian asylum), withholding of removal, and CAT relief

because all three claims were based on the same factual 

predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d 

Cir. 2006). 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk of Court