INITIATIVES AND CHALLENGES IN 

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 

AFTER A WMD ATTACK 

by 

Bruce W. Bennett 

Richard A. Love 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 26 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Initiatives and Challenges in 

Consequence Management after a WMD Attack 

Bruce W. Bennett 

Richard A. Love 

August 2004 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 26 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 26 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm 

Contents 

Page 

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii 

The Authors ............................................................................................... iii 

I. Introduction.........................................................................................1 

II. History of WMD Consequence Management.....................................2 

III. Mandate for Consequence Management in the National 

Security Strategy ..................................................................................7 

IV. WMD Threats and Their Potential Effects .........................................9 

V. Methods for Managing the Consequences of WMD Use.................14 

VI. Toward a Capabilities-Based Approach ...........................................31 

Notes..........................................................................................................33 
ii

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 
iii

The Authors 

Dr. Bruce W. Bennett is the research leader for strategy, force planning, 

and counterproliferation within RAND’s International Security and Defense 

Policy Center. He focuses on the future of warfare and military analysis, 

especially in light of new threats, operational concepts, and technologies as 

envisioned in “Asymmetric threats.” He is examining possible chemical and 

biological weapon threats in Korea and the Persian Gulf and the character of 

the U.S. strategy required in response, with a focus on deterrence. He 

facilitated the Coral Breeze seminars on CBW for CINC Combined Forces 

Command (Korea), the Desert Breeze seminars on CBW for USCENTCOM, 

and parts of USCENTCOM’s Eagle Resolve exercises with the Gulf States. 

He has worked on defenses against biological weapons in the RestOps ACTD 

(Restoration of Operations at airfields after CBW attack) and the subsequent 

Biological Weapons Countermeasures Initiative for the Commander of 

USPACOM. He is the Policy Working Group chair for the CASPOD ACTD 

(Contamination Avoidance at Sea Ports Of Debarkation). He has also 

worked on the future of warfare and military analysis. Dr. Bennett received 

his B.S. in economics from the California Institute of Technology and his 

Ph.D. in policy analysis from the Pardee RAND Graduate School for Public 

Policy Analysis. 

Dr. Richard A. Love is a Research Professor at the National Defense 

University in Washington, D.C. where he teaches Combating the 

Proliferation of WMD at the National War College and conducts 

counterproliferation and consequence management research. Richard 

lectures on WMD threats and proliferation in the NATO staff officers’ 

course, the Reserve Components National Security Course, and in the CBRN 

focus study at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. He is an 

adjunct professor of law and politics at Catholic University where he teaches 

National Security Law, International Law of Armed Conflict, International 

Organizations and Law, and Security in the Information Age. He serves as 

counsel for the Financial Crimes and Security Project at the Brookings 

Institution and as an advisor on homeland security for the Council on Foreign 

Relations. He holds a Juris Doctor and LL.M. in international law. 
iv
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 1 

Initiatives and Challenges in 

Consequence Management after a WMD Attack 

Bruce W. Bennett 

Richard A. Love 

I. Introduction 

In the past decade, as the threat from rogue states and terrorist groups 

has increased, the U.S. and its allies have devoted far greater attention to 

how to manage the consequences of prospective uses of weapons of mass

destruction (WMD). Consequence management1

 is a process to mitigate 

the effects of the use of weapons of mass destruction, including: 

• detecting and characterizing weapons of mass destruction attacks; 

• measures that protect public health, ensure safety, and protect the 

environment; 

• measures to medically counter the effects of weapons of mass 

destruction attacks; 

• measures that restore essential services to government, businesses, 

and individuals; and 

• planning, training, and equipping to coordinate/synchronize the 

civil-military response.2

A thorough review and discussion of U.S. plans for consequence 

management will include the following: 

• The history of consequence management of the effects of weapons 

of mass destruction, with particular focus on the period since 1993. 

• The mandate for consequence management in the recent U.S. 

National Security Strategy and National Strategy to Combat

Weapons of Mass Destruction.

3

 These strategies direct U.S. efforts 

both in the homeland and in support of U.S. forces and allies

overseas, though these efforts are organized differently. 
2 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

• The potential effects of weapons of mass destruction, including 

the types of weapons of mass destruction threats and the kinds of 

damage such weapons could cause to military forces and civilian 

society. 

• Current concepts of consequence management, how it would be 

organized, and how the capabilities for consequence management

have changed since 1993. 

• The potential ability to improve consequence management in the 

future, especially in response to developing threats. 

II. History of WMD Consequence Management 

When the late Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the Defense 

Counterproliferation Initiative on December 7, 1993, a formal concept of a

coordinated response to deal with the consequences of a weapons of mass

destruction event did not exist. While the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) would likely have taken the federal lead 

due to its disaster relief mandate, it was not until 1995 that consequence

management as a concept developed within the U.S. government 

counterterrorism community. Consequence management in many ways

originated from the dispute over the drafting of Presidential Decision 

Directive 39 (PDD 39), signed on June 21, 1995. It established the 

Clinton administration’s counterterrorism policy. In particular, it 

addressed the potential for mass casualty terrorism resulting from weapons 

of mass destruction. A dispute developed regarding the responsibilities of 

various federal agencies, specifically between the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), which had the lead for domestic counterterrorism, and 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which had the lead for 

managing federal agency responses to disasters. To clarify the situation, 

PDD 39 distinguished between crisis management, where the FBI had the 

lead to prevent an incident or to conduct law enforcement investigations, 

and consequence management, where the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency was the lead federal agency.

4

 

PDD 39 also focused attention on the need to respond to the threat of

chemical, biological, and nuclear terrorism, stating that, “The United 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 3 

States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to 

detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological 

or chemical materials or weapons used by terrorists.”5

Although PDD 39 was a significant step, efforts to implement the 

new policy highlighted certain key problems. First, responsibilities were 

diffused throughout the government. There was no senior government 

official who had clear authority over the many agencies with a legitimate 

role in consequence management. As a result, the Clinton administration 

discovered that it was difficult to resolve interagency disputes or to ensure 

that agencies were taking the steps needed to fulfill their responsibilities in 

this arena. 

Second, efforts to develop responses in the area of chemical, 

biological, and nuclear terrorism revealed that the division of authority 

between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency failed to resolve many of the bureaucratic 

difficulties entailed in managing responses to terrorism incidents. 

Specifically, the distinction between crisis and consequence management

proved less clear in practice than it seemed in theory. There was no 

obvious timeline to define when crisis management would transition to 

consequence management. Indeed, it became apparent that both sets of 

activities might be underway at the same time. Thus, PDD 39 failed to 

provide clarity over the issue of who, within the federal government, 

would have the overall lead. 

Additionally, it became obvious that there was a need to coordinate 

crisis activities taken by law enforcement agencies with consequence 

management efforts under the supervision of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency. Thus, it was extremely plausible to believe the site 

of a terrorism incident would be a crime scene that the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation would need to manage to protect evidence, investigate leads, 

and prosecute perpetrators. Yet, at the same time, other agencies might 

need access to the site to assist victims of an attack. 

Widespread concerns about the inadequacy of PDD 39 generated 

considerable support within the administration for another presidential 

decision that would resolve some of these bureaucratic obstacles. 

Unfortunately, it proved extremely difficult to negotiate a solution 

satisfactory to all the parties. 
4 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

In 1996, Congress passed the “Defense Against Weapons of Mass

Destruction Act” also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act. The 

purpose of this Congressional initiative was to prepare local first 

responders for a biological, chemical or nuclear attack in the interval

before federal resources become available. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 

Act called on the Department of Defense to develop and provide training 

and equipment for first responders in 120 U.S. cities. 

In 1998, the President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 

62, in part to rectify the shortcomings of PDD 39. The new Presidential

Decision Directive, PDD 62, made substantial changes in the federal 

government’s bureaucratic structure for counterterrorism. The new 

directive clarified organizational responsibilities and strengthened the 

authority of the National Security Council over those agencies. Second, 

the President asked Congress to provide $294 million in additional 

funding—above funding levels requested when the budget was submitted

earlier in the year—for programs enhancing responses to biological and 

chemical terrorism.

PDD 62 was adopted to resolve widely recognized bureaucratic 

problems. It detailed a new and more systematic approach to fighting 

terrorism by bringing a program management approach to U.S. 

counterterrorism efforts. The directive created a National Coordinator for 

Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism, who had the

responsibility to oversee a broad variety of relevant policies and programs, 

including areas such as counterterrorism, protection of critical 

infrastructure and consequence management for weapons of mass 

destruction. In addition, the National Coordinator could provide advice on

the counterterrorism budget and was to coordinate guideline development 

for crisis management. The National Coordinator position was added to 

the National Security Council staff.6

The National Coordinator position was a compromise solution. One 

group of advocates argued that the administration needed to establish a 

czar who would control the federal budget for counterterrorism and could 

thus exert considerable control over the activities of the many agencies 

involved in counterterrorism. In contrast, other agencies opposed the 

creation of a position with such broad authority, and at least some are 

believed to have not concurred with the final proposal that was approved 

giving the National Coordinator more limited powers. 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 5 

Responding to biological terrorism was the primary focus of the 

President’s $294 million supplemental funding request. These funds were

directed into three areas: 

• $94 million for Department of Health and Human Services to

create a pharmaceutical stockpile of antidotes and antibiotics to 

treat the victims of biological attack and to enhance public health 

surveillance and detection systems for disease outbreaks resulting

from these weapons.7

• $10 million for the National Institutes of Health to conduct 

research on biological agents and possible treatments. 

• $190 million to the Department of Health and Human Services, the 

Department of Justice, and the Federal Emergency Management

Agency for efforts to enhance chemical and biological terrorism 

response capabilities. The bulk of these funds were to go to state 

and local governments, and the rest was directed to the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation to enhance its capabilities.8

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) expressed the official 

views of the Secretary of Defense, and carries considerable weight within 

the Defense Department. The QDR9

 discussed the need to counter 

asymmetric threats, reflecting concerns that hostile states, bent on 

countering the overwhelming conventional power of the United States, 

might focus on responses that exploited U.S. vulnerabilities using 

weapons that differed from those relied upon by the U.S. military or

against which the U.S. military was not well prepared to respond. 

The strategic implications of chemical, biological, radiological, or

nuclear (CBRN) weapons, including in terrorist-like operations, were 

drawn out in a November 1997 study commissioned by the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, Assessment of the Impact of Chemical and 

Biological Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010 (also known as the CB

2010 Study).10 This report focused on the impact that chemical and

biological weapon use could have on the ability of the United States to

project military power. The sponsors of the report were specifically

interested in the impact of chemical and biological (CB) weapon use on 

the ability of the United States to prosecute major theater wars. They 

wanted to draw attention to the U.S. military’s reliance on force projection 
6 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

from the continental United States, which could be targeted by CBRN. 

The study examined a baseline scenario, which involved Iran and Iraq 

conducting a coordinated campaign against U.S. interests in the Persian 

Gulf arena in the 2010 timeframe. 

The study team concluded that the United States could frustrate the 

campaign if the adversaries used only conventional warfighting 

capabilities. When the attackers also employed chemical and biological 

weapons against key power projection nodes, the results changed 

dramatically.

11 The most significant conclusion reached by the study 

group was that, “our military must be able to counter and cope with

limited, localized CB attacks,” but “massive battlefield use of chemical 

and biological weapons...is no longer the most likely threat.”12

Comparing the baseline and the excursion involving chemical and 

biological weapons use, the study participants concluded, “The chemicalbiological scenario resulted in delays, mispositioning of forces, and severe

degradation of operational tempo.”13 Based on this result, the study team

concluded, “Our nation’s ability to project power is vulnerable to limited 

chemical/biological intervention in the force projection phase, including 

employment in the continental United States.”14 The study also emphasized 

the vulnerability of civilian, contractor, and host nation support personnel.

Finally, the study worried about the potential impact of attacks on civilian 

populations. 

Finally, it should be noted that President Clinton’s direct interest in 

WMD threats and the need for an adequate consequence management 

response had a large impact on the progress made in the 1993-2000 

period. His reading of The Cobra Event and subsequent discussion with a 

small panel of experts motivated not only staff on the National Security 

Council, but also those in the Department of Defense and other agencies. 

It was during this time that for a period, the Defense Department 

created a new post, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil 

Support, who led DoD efforts in the interagency process and who 

integrated internal DoD consequence management efforts. This position 

later morphed into what today is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense. The Department of Defense also began to help in the 

planning that led to the setting up of what became the crisis responder unit 

now named the WMD civil support teams. Despite the lines of 

demarcation now laid out about who is responsible for what in responding 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 7

to a WMD crisis in the United States, there is still some disagreement 

about the role that the Department of Defense personnel will be called 

upon to play should the United States suffer from an attack in the 

homeland with very large or widespread consequences. In such cases 

other departments or agencies with the formal consequence management

responsibility might be overwhelmed, leaving the DoD as the only 

department with enough resources to do the job. 

III. Mandate for Consequence Management in the National 

 Security Strategy 

Until recently, the role of WMD consequence management in U.S.

national security strategy has been somewhat vague, but several recent 

documents clarify this role. The 2002 United States’ National Security 

Strategy identifies one major element of U.S. strategy as, “Prevent our

enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of 

mass destruction.”15 In turn, one of the three components of this strategy 

element is defined as: “Effective consequence management to respond to 

the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states.”16 The

National Security Strategy states that: 

Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will 

help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade 

those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that 

they cannot achieve their desired ends. The United States 

must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD 

use against our forces abroad and to help friends and allies 

if they are attacked.17

Three major roles for consequence management against WMD effects 

are stated in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction. First, “Defending the American homeland is the most basic 

responsibility of our government. As part of our defense, the United 

States must be fully prepared to respond to the consequences on our soil, 

whether by hostile states or by terrorists.”18 The United States, “...will

develop and maintain the capability to reduce to the extent possible the 

potentially horrific consequences of WMD attacks at home.”19 Second, 
8 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

“We must be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our 

forces deployed abroad, and to assist friends and allies.”20 Third, these

capabilities will help deter adversary WMD use and dissuade some 

adversaries from even acquiring weapons of mass destruction. 

Part of the responsibility for the first two of these three roles is 

defined in the same document. “The White House Office of Homeland 

Security will coordinate all federal efforts to prepare for and mitigate the

consequences of terrorist attacks within the United States, including those 

involving the continental United States...These issues, including the roles 

of the Department of Homeland Security, are addressed in detail in the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security.”21

Presumably, the White House Office of Homeland Security will also 

coordinate consequence management in the United States in response to 

attacks by hostile states. Meanwhile, “The National Security Council’s 

Office of Combating Terrorism coordinates and helps improve U.S. efforts 

to respond to and manage the recovery from terrorist attacks outside the 

United States. 

In cooperation with the Office of Combating Terrorism, the 

Department of State coordinates interagency efforts to work with our 

friends and allies to develop their own emergency preparedness and 

consequence management capabilities.”22 However, this document does 

not specify who coordinates consequence management outside the United 

States against a hostile state attack, though it likely would not be the 

Office of Combating Terrorism, especially in the context of a war. In 

wartime, it would be the responsibility of the U.S. State Department 

together with the host nation that would take the lead in consequence 

management after any weapons of mass destruction attack, though the 

State Department would likely rely heavily on assistance from the 

Department of Defense. 

The National Strategy for Homeland Security argues that the 

consequences of a weapons of mass destruction attack on the United 

States, “could be far more devastating than those we suffered on 

September 11—a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorist 

attack in the United States could cause large numbers of casualties, mass

psychological disruption, contamination and significant economic damage, 

and could overwhelm local medical capabilities.” It indicates that existing 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 9 

responses to terrorism, “...are based on an artificial and unnecessary 

distinction between ‘crisis management’ and ‘consequence management.’ 

Under the President’s proposal, the Department of Homeland Security 

will consolidate federal response plans and build a national system for 

incident management in cooperation with state and local government.”23 

It later indicates that a national incident management system will be

created as one of the major homeland security initiatives. 

IV. WMD Threats and Their Potential Effects 

Weapons of mass destruction are not a single category of weapons. 

The term weapons of mass destruction includes chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear weapons, and there are major differences in 

effects between them. There are also some major differences even within 

these categories. The variety of weapons of mass destruction threats we 

face are described in Table 1,24 which indicates how rapidly these 

weapons usually affect people, the relative potential for mass casualty 

events, and examples of the specific agents or weapons that fit into each 

class. These are the threats against which consequence management is

designed in 2004; relatively little effort has yet gone into consequence 

management of advanced chemical or biological weapons. 

Table 1. Different Kinds of WMD Threats25

Class of WMD Speed 

Of Effect 

Potential 

for Mass 

Casualtiesa

Example of Specific 

Agent/element 

Chemical weapons 

 Choking Secs-Hours Low Chlorine, Phosgene 

 Blood SecsMinutes Modest Hydrogen cyanide

 Blister Hours-Days Modest Mustard, Lewisite 

 Nerveb SecsMinutes High Sarin, VX, Soman, 

Tabun 
10 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

 Riot control SecsMinutes Very low Tear gas 

 Toxic industrial 

 chemicals Secs-Days Low-High Ammonia, Malathion, Parathion 

Biological weaponsc

 Bacteria Days-Weeks Very High Anthrax, Plague, 

Tularemia 

 Toxins Hours-Days High+ SEB, Botulinum

 Viruses Days-Weeks Very High Smallpox, 

Hemorrhagic fevers 

Radiological HoursWeeks Low-Modest Cesium, Strontium,

Cobalt 60 

Nuclear effects

 Blast ≤ Seconds Very High Fission (Plutonium, 

 Crater ≤ Seconds High Uranium), and Fusion 

 Prompt radiation Immediate Very High (Tritium, Deuterium)

 Thermal radiation Immediate Very High 

 Fallout HoursWeeks High

 EMP/TREEd Seconds Low

a Describes the relative potential for mass casualties per quantity of WMD used. Thus, 

 compared to nerve agents, the effects of chlorine are low, while the effects of biological 

 weapons can be very high. b Some nerve agents are persistent (e.g., VX), others are not (e.g., sarin). c Some viral and bacterial biological agents are contagious (e.g., plague and smallpox). 

 There are some other forms of biological agents, but these are the most commonly 

 considered for biodefense. 

d EMP means electromagnetic pulse and TREE means Transient Radiation Effects on 

 Electronics. Both are radiation effects created by a nuclear explosion. 

With most nuclear effects (blast, heat, prompt radiation) and most 

chemical weapons, the effects occur very rapidly, before mitigating 

intervention can occur. In these cases, consequence management is 

largely limited to acting in the aftermath of the onset of effects unless

personnel have strategic and/or tactical warning and are prepared before 

the attack. Biological weapons give time after exposure to begin 

prophylaxis that can prevent the disease effects, at least with bacterial 

diseases and others for which treatments have been developed. With 

radiological weapons and fallout, the key is detecting the threat and then 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 11

staying away from it. Radiation and some chemical weapons tend to be 

very persistent, remaining in an area long after initially being spread. On 

the other hand, many other nuclear effects are transient and most 

biological weapons decay fairly quickly in the air, especially in sunlight. 

Dr. Ken Alibek, a former deputy director of the 30,000 technicians 

and scientists of Biopreparat, making up half of the Soviet biological

weapon program, has stated that biological weapons can be employed in 

three ways: 

• Contaminating water or food (water purification systems tend to 

protect water, but contaminated food can affect a modest number 

of people). 

• Releasing infected vectors like mosquitoes or fleas (inefficient and

can affect the attackers).

• Creating an aerosol cloud (can affect masses of people, depending 

upon how the cloud is produced, what agent is used, and the wind 

and weather). 

Of these three, the aerosol cloud is the most effective in causing mass

casualties.26 Chemical weapons and toxic industrial chemicals can also be 

spread as an aerosol cloud, and fallout and radiological weapons can be 

dispersed similarly. But most nuclear effects are generated by a nuclear 

explosion and radiate in a circular pattern from that explosion.

Characterizing the Damage that WMD Could Cause 

To illustrate weapons of mass destruction effects, Table 2 compares 

prompt nuclear, biological, and chemical effects from quantities of WMD 

that might be available, suggesting the areas that would be covered and the 

fatalities that might result if people are not medically treated. The 

chemical and/or biological weapons effects here assume delivery as an 

aerosol, presumably coming as a line source produced by an aircraft or 

vehicle with a sprayer. The areas affected would therefore differ by 

atmospheric conditions. In contrast, the prompt nuclear effects are 

roughly constant across these conditions. A biological agent like anthrax 

covers a larger area than a greater quantity of a chemical agent like sarin 
12 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

because the biological agents tend to be far more toxic, by several orders 

of magnitude.27 A biological weapon like anthrax might even affect a 

larger area than a nuclear weapon of the size that a terrorist or new nuclear 

power might possess. But nuclear casualties would occur promptly 

whereas the biological casualties would develop over time and could, for

some agents, including anthrax, be more easily prevented by proper 

treatment after the attack is recognized. 

Table 2. Comparing the Potential Lethality of 

(Untreated) WMD Attacks28

Area Affected, Fatalities* 

Weapons Clear, Sunny 

Day Overcast Day Clear, CalmNight 

Nuclear: 

12.5 Kt, blast effects 

7.8 km2, 

23,000-80,000 

Biological: 

10 kgs of anthrax 

4.6 km2

, 

13,000-

46,000 

14 km2

, 

42,000-

140,000 

30 km2

, 

100,000-

300,000 

Chemical: 

1,000 kgs of sarin 

0.74 km2, 

3,000-7,000 

0.8 km2, 

4,000-8,000 

7.8 km2, 

30,000-80,000 

*Assuming an aerosol release of sarin and anthrax, with 3,000 to 

10,000 unprotected people per km2

. 

In practice, weapons of mass destruction use does not just cause 

casualties and fatalities. Such use can cause various disruptions to 

military operations and society, and it would be expected to cause 

particularly large-scale psychological disruptions. These impacts 

combined could lead to serious operational and strategic effects. For 

example, an examination of the casualties in the Tokyo sarin subway event

showed that about 4,000 “worried well”29 and only about 1,000 actual 

casualties sought hospital care. In turn, this behavior led to overwhelming 

the medical care system; a really large-scale weapons of mass destruction 

attack as depicted in Table 2 could cause so many casualties that the 

health care system would fail, and people might take action against the

government because of this failure. 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 13

Indeed, if hundreds of thousands of people are just seeking antibiotic 

treatment, local supplies could be exhausted for some period of time. The 

impact of weapons of mass destruction persistence was illustrated by the 

efforts to decontaminate the Senate Office Building and their high cost, as

well as the duration of work disruption associated with the attack. 

Secondary effects on the economy as occurred after the 9/11 attacks would 

almost certainly cause crippling effects from events of the magnitude 

suggested here.

Delivering Weapons of Mass Destruction

The potential delivery means for weapons of mass destruction are 

described in Table 3. As indicated earlier, chemical and biological 

weapons would typically be sprayed as an aerosol and carried by the 

wind.30 A large quantity (hundreds of kilograms or more) of chemical 

weapons would be required to cause a mass casualty event, making an 

aircraft or large missile the likely source for creating the spray, though 

artillery could also be used if enough rounds are fired. Most nuclear 

weapons are also large and would normally be delivered by a missile or 

aircraft. Because individuals such as special operations forces (SOF) can 

only deliver a small quantity, they are not a primary delivery means of 

chemical weapons unless the objective is to cause very selective and 

limited damage. A release from toxic industrial storage tanks is another 

way to cause mass casualties, as happened in Bhopal, India.31 

Because much smaller quantities of biological weapons are required

to cause mass casualties, special operations forces or terrorists could 

deliver these weapons. Radiological weapons would usually be carried by 

the wind after an explosion disperses the radiation, and these would tend 

to pose persistent threats in the areas where the radiation settles. 

Radiological materials could also be used without being dispersed, though 

they would affect a much smaller area and number of people. 
14 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

Table 3. Delivery Means for WMD32

Kind of WMD Expected Delivery 

Means 

Likely 

Covert?

Other Delivery 

Means 

Chemical 

weapons 

Artillery, 

ballistic/cruise 

missiles, aircraft 

No SOF*

Toxic industrial 

chemicals 

SOF attack storage 

tanks Yes? SOF attack tankers 

Biological 

weapons 

SOF with sprayers, 

cruise missiles, 

UAVs** 

Yes 

Ballistic missiles, 

aircraft, ships, SOF in 

food/water 

Radiological SOF with bombs Maybe SOF deposit 

Nuclear Ballistic missiles No

Cruise missiles, aircraft, 

ships, SOF 

*

SOFs are special operations forces; terrorists could also fill this role. **UAVs are unmanned aerial vehicles 

In terms of consequence management, the delivery means for weapons 

of mass destruction affects the ability to detect such weapons of mass

destruction attacks and to attribute them. The delivery means also help

determine the area and number of people affected. 

V. Methods for Managing the Consequences of WMD Use 

This section addresses the requirements of WMD consequence 

management, and how far consequence management has progressed in the 

decade from 1993 to 2003. Because there was little capability for 

consequence management of weapons of mass destruction incidents in 

1993, most of the current capabilities represent advances, especially 

outside of the nuclear area. 

Detection, Warning, and Confirmation 

The steps in detection, warning, and confirmation are first, 

recognizing that a weapons of mass destruction attack has occurred, 

second, determining what type of WMD was used, third, warning potential 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 15

victims of the attack, and fourth, confirming the detection and identifying 

the type(s) of weapons of mass destruction involved. 

Considering detection, there are three basic ways in which an adversary 

weapons of mass destruction attack could be observed: (1) detection of the

delivery vehicle, (2) detection of the weapons of mass destruction and/or 

its immediate effects, and (3) detection of the effects of weapons of mass

destruction on people. Detection of a delivery vehicle, at most, provides a 

cue to one of the other forms of detection, because the vehicle might not 

carry weapons of mass destruction; detection is most likely when a 

delivery vehicle has only military applications (e.g., a ballistic missile). 

The ability to do this has advanced only a little in the last ten years. 

Detection of the effects of a nuclear explosion is the easiest to achieve

because of how dramatic those effects are. Detection of the effects of 

chemical, biological, and radiological attacks requires the appropriate kind 

of detector. Radiation detectors are and have been the most commonly

available; detectors of the presence of chemical weapons have become far

more available and capable, and detectors for biological weapons have 

emerged that did not even exist in 1993. Still, biological agent detectors 

are not yet widely available, perform only point detections, and are 

relatively slow to achieve a detection. The roughly 30 minutes required 

generally does not allow action to be taken soon enough for people in the 

vicinity of the detector to protect themselves after being warned. Thus 

biological weapon detectors are usually referred to as “detect to treat” 

rather than “detect to protect” systems. 

The relative unavailability of biological weapons detectors makes it 

fairly likely that victims of a biological warfare (BW) attack will seek

medical care before a detector gives warning of the attack. This was the 

situation with the anthrax letters in late 2001. At that time, the medical 

personnel dealing with the first cases failed initially to recognize the 

symptoms of anthrax. It is now more likely (though far from certain) that 

small numbers of biological weapon cases would be recognized because of 

enhanced education and improved diagnostic procedures for detecting 

these symptoms, especially for anthrax. 

Once sensors or observers signal that a WMD attack has been 

launched and/or its effects have been detected, the community must be 

warned immediately about the threat. This warning should encourage 
16 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

people to seek shelter or other protection when possible, to avoid exposure 

to weapons of mass destruction effects. The warning should also alert 

medical personnel to be looking for certain effects, and encourage those 

who were likely exposed to seek appropriate medical care. Warning 

should be supported by appropriate information of the weapons of mass

destruction effects, seeking to reduce panic and other psychological 

effects. It should also reach out to the affected community, but not far 

beyond, to limit the number of “worried well” who would otherwise

become psychosomatic casualties. Most U.S. cities were ill prepared to 

provide such warning in 1993 and are not much better prepared today. 

Once chemical, biological, or radiological weapons effects are detected, 

it is essential to confirm the detection and identify what type(s) of weapons 

of mass destruction are involved. Some detectors (especially for biological

weapons) are prone to false positives that could lead to unnecessary and 

potentially harmful treatment, and there is not a universal procedure for

treating all WMD victims. Confirmation and identification is generally a 

laboratory process. Laboratory confirmation and identification of biological 

weapons was very limited in 1993, with only two reference laboratories 

available in the United States for most forms of biological weapons, one at 

the Centers for Disease Control and another at the U.S. Army Medical 

Research Institute for Infectious Diseases. In the aftermath of the 2001 

attacks involving the anthrax letters, laboratory capabilities have been more 

widely disseminated and improved (quicker options are now available),

allowing for more rapid confirmation and identification. 

Assessment 

After a weapons of mass destruction attack has been confirmed, the 

assessment process determines who has been affected and what resources 

will be required for managing the consequences of the attack. It also seeks 

to attribute the attack to the responsible parties. With any weapons of 

mass destruction use, one of the first actions is to determine the area

affected. This is relatively easy to do for most nuclear effects because of 

the physical evidence of damage, but more difficult for chemical weapons, 

biological weapons, and various forms of radiation including fallout, 

because of the lack of a visual damage pattern. For prompt nuclear effects
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 17

and chemical nerve agents, this area determines both where most of the 

casualties will be located and where residual contamination may also be. 

With weapons of mass destruction that cause delayed effects (more than a 

few minutes, especially with biological weapons and radiation weapons), 

it will also be essential, albeit potentially very difficult, to determine when 

the attack occurred, and to provide this as a reference to determine who 

was likely in the affected area at the time. While it is usually assumed that 

the casualties will promptly seek health care, some may be incapacitated, 

and medical care may need to enter the affected and surrounding areas to 

seek out these people. 

The ability to estimate the time of the attack and the area affected was

relatively poor in 1993. There were some simple models of WMD effects 

that required information on the quantity and characteristics of the

weapons of mass destruction, how and where it was disseminated, and the 

wind and other atmospheric conditions at that and subsequent times during 

the dissemination process. Unfortunately, little of this information would 

be known in the aftermath of a WMD attack. 

The United States has sponsored at least one effort to develop a 

system that would estimate the attack timing and area affected based upon 

post-attack observables, but that effort has not yet led to a completed

system. Thus, even today this aspect of assessment would be difficult to 

accomplish. At best, a rough approximation of the affected area would be 

developed over time. 

The next step is to determine who was in the area affected, and how 

seriously they were each affected by weapons of mass destruction. This is 

more difficult to do with weapons that have a delayed effect like

biological weapons, because it may be days before the attack is detected 

and many people who were in the area attacked will have moved to other

locations. At the very least, the assessment needs to estimate the number 

of people potentially affected, though the limited databases on population 

location (largely census-based, and thus not showing population 

fluctuations by time of day) made this a difficult process in 1993, and this 

is only marginally easier today. 

Even today, there is no basic system available to determine who was 

in an affected area at the time of an attack; improvisation and broad 

questioning could provide at least some of this information. Whether 

people will be affected is in part a function of where they were located and 
18 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

what they were doing at the time. For example, some people might have 

been relatively protected, having been indoors or in an underground

location. Moreover, some people may have greater resistance to weapons 

of mass destruction. There is relatively little information of this type 

available to help adjust raw estimates of the people affected. 

The third step is to determine the requirements for treating those who 

have been affected. If one knew the degree to which each person was 

exposed to weapons of mass destruction effects, one could roughly 

estimate medical requirements. Naturally some people have more

resistance to WMD effects, and some have less.33 Some computer models 

that did not exist in 1993 exist today to help make such estimates,34 but 

even these produce only very rough estimates. 

The final step is attribution of the attack. The victim will normally 

want to identify who was responsible for the attack. If the attacker has used

a delivery system like a ballistic missile, the origin of the attack can be

easily determined, though the country of origin could claim that a renegade 

group was responsible. Otherwise, unless the attacker is apprehended or 

other intelligence information is available on the culprit, it is very difficult 

to attribute the attack. Some laboratory analysis may be able to determine a 

unique country or area of the world from which a particular chemical or 

biological weapon originated, though this is still not definitive in providing 

attribution. While some advances have been made in attribution since 1993 

(e.g., the entire genome effort relative to different kinds of biological 

weapon agents), capabilities in this area are still very poor. 

Medical Resolution 

In addition to public health efforts, medical resolutions of weapons of

mass destruction threats can be divided into five categories: (1) prevention, 

(2) pretreatment, (3) post-attack prophylaxis, (4) immediate treatment, and 

(5) long-term treatment. To begin any of these interventions, the nature of 

the medical challenge must first be determined. For example, peoples’ 

symptoms may be quite similar from various biological agents, yet the 

medical intervention would be quite different depending upon the disease. 

There are also significant differences in medical interventions required, 

depending upon the type of WMD effect to which the person was exposed. 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 19

In addition, it is normally assumed that affected people will seek

medical care on their own. However, many people may be incapacitated 

or unaware that they are being affected; a more proactive effort to find 

casualties may be required, especially in a mass casualty event. Yet many 

of the personnel who might perform such a search would be involved with 

the treatment of casualties. In addition, the affected area may not be well 

known. It is therefore unclear when and how such a search would be 

initiated. 

Before most people exposed to weapons of mass destruction can 

receive medical treatment, they must be decontaminated. Personnel 

decontamination relative to chemical and radiological agents is relatively 

easy because detectors can promptly define areas on the body requiring

decontamination. It is more difficult to decontaminate people exposed to 

biological weapons because of the lack of a prompt detector for them. 

Prevention. Most prevention actions are actually not a part of

consequence management, but are, rather, a part of passive defenses. 

Nevertheless, because all medical interventions are often included in

consequence management, we discuss these actions briefly. Usually, there 

are not preventive medical actions against chemical or nuclear weapons, 

though good health condition is a preventive means with some

effectiveness against all forms of weapons of mass destruction. 

With biological weapons, vaccines are the key preventive means. In 

1993, while there were various vaccines in use to protect researchers in the 

biological defense program, no vaccines against biological weapons were 

applied to broader populations. In the last few years, the vaccines for 

anthrax and smallpox have been applied more broadly as preventive 

means. However, for a number of biological agents that could be 

weaponized, there still does not exist a means of disease prevention for the

broader military and civilian populations. Many in the community are 

also concerned that the evolution of threats, new or modified diseases, is 

outpacing the development of new vaccines 

Pretreatment. Pretreatments are used to prepare personnel for 

treatment, making treatment eventually effective. For example, the nerve 

agent soman requires pretreatment with pyridostigmine bromide tablets 

within 8 hours prior to nerve agent exposure for the nerve agent antidote 

kit (NAAK—discussed under immediate treatments below) to work 

properly. Pyridostigmine bromide tablets were used for pretreatment 
20 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

during Operation Desert Storm, but became a potential cause of Gulf War

Syndrome, and thus the military plans use of these tablets only in very 

specific situations. Only if a clear soman threat or some other threat 

requiring pyridostigmine bromide treatment is part of the established 

chemical weapons threat is it likely that these tablets would be issued 

today. This may leave some U.S. and allied forces unprepared if soman 

use is not appropriately anticipated. 

Post-Attack Prophylaxis. Post-attack prophylaxis is treatment of 

people who might be exposed to a disease or medical hazard but who have 

not yet shown symptoms. For example, in response to the anthrax letters 

in late 2001, antibiotics were given to thousands of people who might 

have been exposed to the anthrax. Because antibiotics can defeat bacterial

diseases like anthrax, the use of antibiotics before the development of 

symptoms was intended to prevent people from getting sick at all, a clear 

preference with a disease as serious as anthrax. Prophylaxis is most 

appropriate for diseases that have incubation periods of at least a few days, 

and which can be cured by the use of one or more medicines. Thus, 

prophylaxis applies primarily to biological agents. 

In 1993, it was understood that antibiotics could defeat bacterial 

diseases, but the procedures for prophylaxis were not well developed. 

Indeed, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) did not approve the use 

of antibiotics before the development of disease symptoms. Nevertheless, 

many experts felt that personnel exposed to anthrax, for example, would 

die if not provided antibiotics prior to the development of symptoms.

35

Interestingly, some experts still feel this way despite the survival of

anthrax letter victims who did not receive antibiotics until days after the 

development of symptoms.

36 Since 1993, procedures for prophylaxis have 

been identified,37 and the Food and Drug Administration has approved

some drug uses for post-exposure prophylaxis. From a military perspective, 

military commanders can now order the use of antibiotics for prophylaxis in

the aftermath of a presumed biological weapons exposure. Nevertheless, 

the lack of medicines to cure many kinds of biological weapons, especially 

the toxins and viruses, and the potential antibiotic resistance of even 

bacterial agents leaves post-exposure prophylaxis an incomplete response. 

Nuclear explosions create a radioactive iodine threat. This iodine can 

be absorbed in the human body. Potassium iodide pills can be used to block 

the absorption of the radioactive iodine if given as a prophylaxis. Since
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 21

1993, the U.S. government has developed supplies of potassium iodide for

just such a use.

Immediate Treatment. With some chemical weapons, especially 

nerve agents, treatment must begin extremely promptly after exposure. As

indicated in Table 1, effects occur in seconds to minutes. Therefore, the 

initial treatment must usually be self-administered with on-hand supplies. 

Because of the focus of the chemical defense community on the nerve 

agents, this early treatment has been packaged for military purposes in a 

nerve agent antidote kit, which has self-injectors carrying atropine, 2-

Pralidoxime chloride, and diazepam.

38 These treatments are only effective 

against nerve agents, and against the nerve agent soman, they are only 

effective after the pyridostigmine bromide pretreatment discussed above. 

In 1993, only some of the U.S. military personnel serving in the forward 

area had nerve agent antidote kits; today, these kits are generally available

for forward deployed personnel, though normally they are kept in central 

storage until a specific threat is perceived to reduce what troops must carry 

and prevent use of the nerve agent antidote kits in inappropriate

circumstances. 

With biological agents, immediate treatment usually begins after the 

disease is recognized, which could be as long as days after the 

development of symptoms. As noted above, bacterial diseases are 

normally susceptible to treatment with antibiotics, though in the case of 

anthrax it is now recommended that multiple antibiotics be given

simultaneously.39 Some toxins can be treated with anti-toxins, and some

viruses may be treated with anti-virals, though often only supportive

treatment is available for these diseases. In 1993, the anti-virals were not 

available, and the national antibiotic stocks had not been acquired. These

are significant advances today. But there is still much to do in treatment, 

as the difficulty in treating the viral illness Severe Acute Respiratory 

Syndrome (SARS) has shown. 

With nuclear weapons, there is a combination of effects that require 

medical treatment. Medical injuries associated with blast effects usually 

require typical trauma treatment familiar to hospitals. But with small 

nuclear weapons the size that terrorists or new nuclear states may possess 

prompt radiation will tend to be the primary source of injury and fatalities.

This prompt radiation is released in the first minute after an explosion; 

while it consists of many components, the principal ones in terms of 
22 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

radiation effects are gamma rays and neutrons. The weapon also will 

release fission products that decay over time, causing the radiation that can 

contaminate downwind areas in the form of nuclear fallout. Immediate 

medical treatment against such injuries is critical, and United States 

capabilities are relatively advanced, as shown in the 1986 Chernobyl case. 

Advances in U.S. radiation treatment and trauma care since 1993 make the 

United States better prepared to deal with such threats, though the number

of expected casualties from even small nuclear weapons used in a city 

would likely overwhelm locally available hospital care, even today. 

Long-Term Treatment. We refer to long-term treatment as care 

required after the initial medical crisis-causing injury has been addressed. 

Much of long-term care is supportive. For nerve agents, this care should 

begin within hours of exposure; for many biological agents, this care will 

begin within several days after symptoms develop. With nuclear weapons, 

this care would also likely begin within days. 

An example of this kind of care was the hospital treatment given to 

the anthrax letter victims. Five of the six survivors who developed 

anthrax symptoms remained hospitalized for 18 to 25 days after symptoms 

initially developed, and even when released from the hospital they

required follow-up care. 

U.S. capabilities for long-term care have advanced since 1993, 

providing better abilities to return weapons of mass destruction victims to

health. Nevertheless, many victims will have protracted care requirements, 

which very likely would challenge the U.S. medical system in a mass

casualty environment. With regard to military populations, it is likely that 

many weapons of mass destruction victims will need to be evacuated even

for parts of the immediate treatment and certainly for most long-term 

treatment, making an early return to duty unlikely. 

Protecting Public Health and Preventing Panic 

Medical treatment is only a part of the medical requirements for 

consequence management. Additional action is required to contain 

whatever contamination exists, including the potential requirement for

quarantine or other movement restrictions. Also, human remains must be 

properly handled. Finally, both because many casualties will be selfdiagnosed and because the psychological effects of weapons of mass
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 23

destruction use can be severe, efforts are required to provide appropriate

information to the public and use this information to establish calm and 

control. 

Quarantine and Isolation.40 Quarantine involves separating people

or products that might have been exposed to a disease or other form of 

WMD contamination from people and products that are not exposed. 

Quarantine continues until: (1) decontamination can be accomplished; 

(2) the incubation period of a disease has passed and it can be confirmed 

that the people will not develop symptoms; or (3) the people develop 

symptoms and are moved to isolation. Quarantine seeks to prevent the 

spread of disease or other weapons of mass destruction contamination. 

Isolation involves separating people who have disease symptoms to

prevent the spread of that disease. Quarantine and isolation are usually 

applied in the case of contagious human disease but could be applied more 

generally to reduce fear or other psychological reactions. 

U.S. procedures for quarantine and isolation exist and are practiced 

with various endemic diseases. The World Health Organization has defined 

diseases that it monitors and could take action to control.41 In addition, 

President Bush has recently issued an executive order that updates the list of 

diseases where quarantine should be applied in the United States.42 

However, the Defense Department regulation on quarantine is dated and 

mainly focused on preventing the spread of agricultural diseases.43 The

military medical system normally assumes that military casualties will be 

stabilized in forward conflict areas and then moved for most treatment to

major medical centers in the United States. But it does not establish rules 

for when biological casualties or those who may have been exposed to BW 

can be moved or procedures for moving them. 

The United States Transportation Command developed (March 25, 

2003) an interim policy on how to handle such movements, but it applies to 

only seven diseases with bioterrorism potential and focuses mainly on 

isolation during movement of those already showing symptoms. But there is

a developing sense that it would be best not to move contagious casualties, 

and some concern about properly applying quarantine and prophylaxis in 

moving those who may have been exposed to contagious disease. 

Thus, while some progress is being made, there remain many issues 

for resolution, such as how to move patients back into the United States or

through foreign countries en route to the United States, or how to apply 
24 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

mass quarantine/isolation to the tens of thousands of non-combatants who 

may be evacuated to the United States in some future contingency which 

involves biological weapons use. 

Travel Restrictions. Even in cases where quarantine or isolation is

not called for, weapons of mass destruction contamination may require 

some forms of travel restrictions. Some travel restrictions are applied on a 

normal basis with endemic diseases, and could be extended to other kinds 

of contamination, including biological agents. For example, when the 

SARS virus developed in China and other countries, travel warnings were 

issued to limit the people going to those areas and potentially exposing 

themselves to a contagious disease. Similarly, travel restrictions could be 

established around an area contaminated with residual radiation by a 

radiological or nuclear weapon. 

With biological agents, some further procedures may be required to 

limit psychological reactions. For example, if an anthrax attack were 

detected in area A, it may be appropriate to “quarantine” the entire area A 

to prevent people who may have been exposed from traveling to area B 

where they could become sick with anthrax and create anxiety that an 

attack had also occurred in area B. Neither the requirements nor the 

procedures for these travel restrictions are well developed. 

Dealing with Human Remains. Human remains contaminated with

chemical, biological, or radioactive agents pose a hazard that must be dealt 

with. Unless these remains are promptly interred, they could lead to other

outbreaks of disease. Proper interment requires decontamination of the 

remains (especially for those chemically and radiologically contaminated), 

cremation, or sealing the remains in pouches that will leak neither liquids

nor gases. Otherwise, ground water and soil could also become

contaminated. 

Without individual protection for those performing these functions, it

may be difficult to handle these remains. These efforts may be very

difficult to complete after a mass fatality attack. Consider, for example, the 

difficulties of burying tens of thousands of fatalities in crowded urban areas

or on a battlefield. Mass graves may be required at least as an interim 

solution, but finding a location for such graves may require moving the

fatalities out of an urban area. An alternative health measure may be to 

cremate the remains, especially to destroy the disease infested dead. 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 25

Recent work in the RESTOPS ACTD (Restoration of Operations

Advanced Concept Technology Development) program has helped to 

develop procedures for handling remains and examined appropriate 

remains pouches, though it did not find a fully acceptable candidate.

Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Defense Department examined 

alternatives to returning U.S. military weapons of mass destruction 

fatalities to the United States, but an acceptable solution was not found.44 

Thus, considerable work is still required in this area. 

Public Information. The effects of some weapons of mass 

destruction attacks will be obvious (e.g., a nuclear crater, or thermal and 

blast effects). In other cases, people will not understand that they have 

been exposed. And in either case, people may not know what to do about

casualties or when/how to apply prophylaxis or medical treatment. Thus, 

one function of public information is to help people self-diagnose their 

exposure or potential exposure to weapons of mass destruction effects and 

take appropriate action in response. The reverse of this is information that 

would help people conclude that they have not been exposed and do not 

need prophylaxis or treatment—essential to limiting chaos and panic and 

the consumption of scarce medical services and supplies, thereby reducing 

the size of the “worried well” population. Even as late as the anthrax 

letters in 2001, it was clear that the United States did not have standard 

public information packages to fulfill these functions, though the U.S. 

Centers for Disease Control and other web sites have now posted some

information to help in these areas. The Department of Homeland Security 

is working more on these functions. 

In the aftermath of a weapons of mass destruction attack, public 

information also needs to provide a more general, calming function and 

seek to sustain governmental control in the affected area. This 

information should be synchronized with efforts to provide adequate 

medical assistance, resolve contamination, and restore services.

Experience with the anthrax letters suggests that the inconsistent 

instructions provided by multiple sources undermined the credibility of

those sources, and caused employees to question whether they could trust 

their bosses. A coherent and consistent response plan is needed; the 

United States government has not at this time published such a plan. 
26 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

Resolving Contamination and Restoring the Environment 

Each form of weapons of mass destruction leaves a different kind of 

contamination residual. Some chemical agents, such as hydrogen cyanide, 

chlorine, and phosgene, rapidly become gases in most weather conditions,

and disperse fairly quickly, leaving negligible residual contamination. 

Even the nerve agent sarin is like water, evaporating and dispersing within 

minutes in many weather conditions, depending upon the particle size. 

Many biological agents decay rapidly when aerosolized, within an hour or 

so, including plague, tularemia, and botulinum toxin. And most nuclear 

effects, such as cratering, blast, thermal radiation, and prompt radiation, 

are over very quickly. But other forms of weapons of mass destruction 

persist for a long time, including chemical agents like VX nerve agent 

which has an oily consistency, biological agents like anthrax which forms 

spores resistant to decay, and some forms of nuclear fallout/radiation.

These longer-term threats generally require some form of decontamination 

effort to restore the ability of people to live and work in contaminated

areas.45 Indeed, it is reported that there are places in France that still show 

signs of chemical contamination from World War I. 

Before decontamination can begin, it must be determined what areas 

have been contaminated. Decontamination of chemical and biological 

weapons effects can then be done with various liquids and foams. Most of 

these decontaminants can damage sensitive electronics, and some are toxic 

and/or can cause damage to metals and other surfaces. A wider range of

decontaminants are available today compared to 1993, but the damage that 

they can cause still limits their potential use. Moreover, the waste products

from decontamination require special handling so as not to damage the 

environment, including soil and water tables. While there has been some

progress on addressing these issues, much yet needs to be done.46

Restoring Services and Confidence 

If the weapons of mass destruction attack were to happen on the 

territory of the United States, some unique challenges would need to be 

faced. Certainly, one of the most difficult challenges to state and federal 

authorities following a weapons of mass destruction event is the timely 

restoration of government services and the need to retain confidence in the 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 27

government’s ability to manage the event effectively. Affected 

populations must see government elements quickly moving to contain 

damage, provide real and immediate services to ease suffering, and make 

assurances that plans and procedures are being implemented for prompt 

restoration of critical services. 

According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, recovery 

includes all types of emergency actions dedicated to the continued 

protection of the public or to promoting the resumption of normal 

activities in the affected area.47 The Federal Emergency Management 

Agency definition encompasses a broad array of activities, crossing many 

functional areas and intergovernmental jurisdictions. Emergency actions 

range from attributional forensics and intelligence, to law enforcement and

police activities to ensure the functioning of services, to logistics actions 

to enhance survivability of affected populations to medical 

countermeasures. However, it is important to note that the jurisdictional 

component does not stop at the public sector. Large private sector 

ownership of critical infrastructures also requires that plans and policies

for recovery take their interests as stakeholders into account. Indeed, 

involving the private sector in response plans can enhance the reach of 

essential services and buttress the likely strained resources of state and 

local actors as they respond to a weapons of mass destruction incident. 

Essential to restoring services and thus promoting government confidence 

is developing robust intergovernmental plans across federal, state, and 

local authorities that are flexible, adaptable, and tested and retested 

through training exercises. 

Planning and Coordination 

While the federal lead agency for crisis management is the FBI, the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency is the federal lead agency and 

integrator for consequence management operations. State governments 

remain the lead authority for consequence management activities, with 

federal support coordinated through the Federal Emergency Management

Agency, whose consequence management role is to manage and marshal

federal support provided by other agencies in a coordinated manner to 

support recovery efforts underway by state and local authorities. 
28 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

During crisis management operations, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation has the federal lead since these activities consist of primarily 

law enforcement functions. However, consequence management is an 

emergency management function and includes measures to protect public 

health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide 

emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by 

the consequences of a weapons of mass destruction event. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency organizes its federal 

consequent management response based on the Federal Response Plan. 

These efforts include support missions as described in other federal 

operations plans, and include decontamination efforts, simulation and 

modeling, and developing recommendations for population protection. 

Pursuant to the Federal Response Plan, state and local governments 

submit requests for federal consequence management assistance through 

established channels. Requests for federal assistance by state and local 

governments, as well as those from owners and operators of critical 

infrastructure facilities, are coordinated with the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency and its liaisons assigned to coordinate requests to 

ensure consequence management plans and actions are consistent with 

overall priorities. 

Domestic vs. Overseas Consequence Management 

Overseas consequence management operations have significant 

political-military implications for the Department of Defense, even though 

the State Department is the lead agency for the conduct of overseas 

consequence management operations in support of foreign governments or 

to assist U.S. civilians. The reason is simple: the State Department has 

virtually no response capabilities of its own, and relies on other agencies 

to provide assets needed for consequence management operations. 

Thus, the Department of Health and Human Services would provide 

expert medical advice to State in the event of a chemical or biological

incident, while the Environmental Protection Agency would assume a 

similar role when addressing chemical incidents. The Office of Foreign 

Disaster Assistance in the Agency for International Development would 

provide critical support in coordinating international responses to an
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 29

incident, as well as providing access to certain resources needed on a timesensitive basis. 

Despite the significant role that non-DoD agencies may play in U.S. 

government responses to a consequence management operation in support 

of a foreign government, the U.S. military will probably be the most 

important single source of resources. Thus, the Department of Defense 

airlift capabilities will probably be responsible for transporting response 

assets to the scene of the incident. Depending on the nature of the 

incident, DoD personnel, supplies, or units could provide a significant 

portion of the deployed response capabilities. 

Limited DoD Ability to Assist Overseas Civilian Populations.

This capability is always constrained, and is likely to become even more 

limited in the context of contingency operations in a chemical or

biological environment. DoD has relatively few consequence management 

capable units, the time required to deploy such units to distant incident 

scenes is excessive, and there is likely to be a high demand for such units

in prosecuting a warfight and protecting the homeland. 

DoD Depends Heavily on Host Nation Consequence Management 

Capabilities. The Department of Defense has limited consequence 

management resources to support its military forces deployed overseas. 

Only during periods of crisis is the U.S. military likely to expand its 

overseas force deployments with significantly enhanced consequence 

management capabilities. As a result, under many circumstances, U.S. 

military forces operating overseas must rely on host nation capabilities. 

For example, in many countries the United States has limited medical 

facilities, and must rely on host nation hospitals for treating mass 

casualties. Most U.S. installations have only limited ability for chemical 

defense or dealing with hazardous materials. In addition, reliance on host 

nation resources may be a preferred option to enhance the timeliness of 

response and minimize the impact of the same constraints that limit 

Department of Defense support for overseas civilian populations. 

Nevertheless, host nation populations (both military and civilian) will 

usually be affected in large numbers by a weapons of mass destruction 

attack that also targeted U.S. forces overseas. In such cases, the host 

nation will tend to focus on taking care of its own people, leaving little 

resources available for taking care of U.S. personnel. 
30 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

Support to Coalition Partners Often Seen as Secondary to 

Warfighting. Many people in the Department of Defense tend to believe 

that consequence management activities in support of coalition partners 

should be a lower priority than domestic responses or support of combat

operations. From many perspectives, this attitude is perfectly

understandable. The Department of Defense faces many constraints in its 

consequence management activities, partially due to the extent to which its 

capabilities depend on assets that are in short supply or that are needed to 

support warfighting capabilities. The cost of diverting such assets could 

be a significant threat to the ability of the United States to prosecute wars 

against adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction. 

Consequence management capabilities would become even more

limited in the context of contingency operations in a chemical or

biological environment. The Department of Defense has relatively few 

units trained, organized, and equipped to perform consequence 

management. The time required to deploy such units to distant incident 

scenes is excessive, and there is likely to be a high demand for such units

in prosecuting a warfight and protecting the homeland. 

At the same time, some officials with responsibility for managing 

alliance relationships point out that circumstances may not permit the 

United States to ignore requests for consequence management support. 

Access rights and coalition solidarity would likely depend upon the United 

States responding to requests for protection against weapons of mass

destruction and providing consequence management assistance. There are 

numerous recent examples of the United States diverting scarce, high 

value, high demand military assets for such reasons. In 1991, the United

States supplied Patriot missile batteries to Israel as part of a campaign to 

convince the Israeli government that it should stay out of the war against 

Iraq even if attacked with Scud missiles. Similarly, in February 1998, the 

Department of Defense reportedly provided Israel with chemical and 

biological defense supplies at a time when the United States was preparing 

to initiate hostilities against Iraq. More recently, this kind of support was 

provided during the conflict in Iraq by a NATO deployment of Patriot air 

defense missile systems to Diyarbakir and Batman in South Eastern 

Turkey. 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 31

VI. Toward a Capabilities-Based Approach

Much has been done to improve consequence management

capabilities since 1993. Nevertheless, even against existing threats, 

current capabilities are clearly inadequate, and against some threats (like 

aerosolized hemorrhagic fevers), current capabilities are seriously 

inadequate. Investments by the United States and its allies to create 

defenses for these areas will gradually enhance U.S. and allied 

capabilities. However, to complicate matters even more, the threat is also

evolving. Key concerns include: 

• New kinds of chemical weapons are being developed. One

example is the Russian fourth generation agents, about which the 

Pentagon has said, “...since 1992, Russian scientists familiar with 

Moscow’s chemical warfare development program have been 

publicizing information on a new generation of agents, sometimes 

referred to as ‘Novichoks.’ These scientists report that these 

compounds, some of which are binaries, were designed to 

circumvent the Chemical Weapons Convention and to defeat 

Western detection and protection measures. Furthermore, it is 

claimed that their production can be hidden within commercial

chemical plants. There is concern that the technology to produce 

these compounds might be acquired by other countries.”48

• The genetic revolution raises many new possibilities for the 

evolution of biological weapon threats. Even before the recent 

advances in genetics, before the demise of the Soviet Union, their 

biological weapons program was pursuing a variety of antibiotic 

resistant strains of biological agents, and also strains that would 

suppress the immune system. They also worked on variants of 

serious diseases that would potentially thwart existing vaccines or 

treatments.49 Further advances in these and other areas can be 

expected. 

While some ongoing defensive efforts may help to counter these 

evolving threats, it appears to be the case that the offensive weapons of 

mass destruction capabilities are both well ahead of the 

defensive/consequence management capabilities, and in some areas 

moving even further ahead. 
32 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

Part of the challenge in this area is the requirement that defenses 

focus on established threat lists. For example, Defense Department

counters to biological weapons are focused on an established threat list of 

biological agents that intelligence sources have sufficient information to 

confirm. This approach focuses new defensive efforts on the offensive

threats that emerged usually two or more decades ago. Moreover, this 

approach is inconsistent with the strategy laid out in the Defense 

Department’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, which called for 

capabilities-based, as opposed to threat-based, planning. 

In a capabilities-based planning framework, one focuses more on the 

most serious threats that could plausibly exist, for example, smallpox or

some hemorrhagic fevers, and fields defenses prioritized against those 

threats.50 Indeed, the Quadrennial Defense Review includes a strategy

component referred to as “Dissuasion,” which seeks to develop 

capabilities against the most serious threats before adversaries can even 

develop those threats in an effort to dissuade adversaries from pursuing 

the threats in the first place.51 In terms of military competition, dissuasion

seeks to put the United States in the lead of the “challenge and response 

cycle,”52 giving it a leading rather than a trailing role. But such an

approach is generally not allowed or followed today. 

To pursue a capabilities-based approach, sufficient funding must be 

applied to enhance the capabilities needed for consequence management 

of weapons of mass destruction attacks. While this funding has been 

increasing significantly in recent years, especially in terms of homeland 

security, the funding is still well short of being adequate. As Secretary of

Defense Rumsfeld has said, “It would be reckless to press our luck with 

false economies or gamble with our children’s future. This nation can 

afford to spend what is needed to deter the adversaries of tomorrow and to 

underpin our prosperity. Those costs do not begin to compare with the 

cost in human lives and resources if we fail to do so.”53
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 33

Notes 

1. This analysis considers passive defenses and protective concepts of operation 

only in the context of protecting personnel who are otherwise performing consequence

management activities and not the broader applications of these approaches to preventing

damage in the first place. It also considers preparation, training, and coordination with

allies, only in the context of performing consequence management. 

2. This definition is a modification of the definition agreed to by representatives of

the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Bahrain, Kuwait, 

Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) in the Eagle Resolve 2000 conference 

sponsored by USCENTCOM (U.S. Central Command). That conference focused on 

consequence management as one of its two key issues. Major Mike Warmack of

SOCCENT (Special Operations Command Central) initially proposed this definition.

While the original definition also included the use of high explosives and

natural/industrial disasters, which the Gulf States considered an integral part of their 

consequence management efforts, the scope is limited here to weapons of mass 

destruction uses. 

3. “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The White House,

December 2002, 5. 

4. A redacted version of PDD 39 is widely available. Specifically, PDD 39 directed

FEMA to update the Federal Response Plan to ensure that the federal government was 

prepared to respond to the consequences of terrorist attacks directed at “large”

populations in the United States. The Terrorism Annex to the Federal Response Plan was 

released on February 7, 1997. 

5. National Security Council, Subject: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, June 21, 

1995. An unclassified version of the document provided to the Pentagon Library on 

February 24, 1997, was used here. Significant portions of the document were excised. 

6. “Fact Sheet: Summary of Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63,” May 22,

1998, and “Fact Sheet: Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62,” Office

of the Press Secretary, The White House, 22 May 1998. On-line, Internet, 11 May 2004,

available from http://www.whitehouse.gov. 

7. This program is now referred to as the Strategic National Stockpile (formerly the 

National Pharmaceutical Stockpile). On-line, Internet, 11 May 04, available from 

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/index.asp.

8. “President Requests Additional Funding for Protection against Biological and

Chemical Weapons,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 8 June 1998. Online, Internet, 1 July 2004, available from http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/ 
34 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

news98/980608-wh3.htm; “Press Briefing by Richard Clarke, National Coordinator for

Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, and Jeffrey Hunker, Director

of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White 

House, 22 May 1998. On-line, Internet, 1 July 2004, available from http://www.fas.org/

irp/news/1998/05/980522-wh3.htm.

9. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and

the Next QDR, McNair Paper No. 62 (Washington, D.C., National Defense University

Press, 2000), 1. 

Although the concept was implicit in some earlier post-Cold War thinking about

threats to U.S. security, the QDR represented the first official use of this terminology. 

10. Office of the Assistant to the Secretary for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

Matters, and the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Assessment of 

the Impact of Chemical and Biological Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010: A

Summary Report, November 1997, Booz-Allen & Hamilton; McLean, Virginia. The

report was funded by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (including the Office of Net 

Assessment and the Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Counterproliferation and Chemical/Biological Defense), the U.S. Army Chemical and

Biological Defense Command, and the Executive Office of the Joint Service Materiel

Group. However, the study report explicitly notes that it “is not to be considered an

official position of the Department of Defense.” 

11. Among the attacks postulated was an aerosol release of encapsulated cholera

against the U.S. forces deployed at Diego Garcia, the use of mustard gas against air and 

sea ports of embarkation used by U.S. forces deploying to the Persian Gulf, mustard

attacks on air and sea ports of debarkation and on prepositioned equipment in the Persian 

Gulf arena, and a mustard attack on the Pentagon. See CB 2010, 12-18. 

12. CB 2010, 23.

13. Ibid., 18. 

14. Ibid., 1. 

15. President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States 

of America, The White House, September 17, 2002, 1.

16. Ibid., 14. 

17. Ibid. 

18. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, The White House,

December 2002, 5. 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 35

19. Ibid., 2. 

20. Ibid., 5 

21. Ibid. 

22. Ibid. 

23. Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, The

White House, July 2002, x. 

24. Some sources associated enhanced high yield explosives (like full-air

explosives) with WMD; see, for example, the 2001 QDR discussion of CBRNE, page 4.

This chapter does not address enhanced high yield explosives. 

25. Table was developed by Bruce Bennett using various sources. 

26. Alibek Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee Oversight Panel on

Terrorism, May 23, 2000. 

27. While in theory each gram of anthrax contains 100 million lethal doses, in

practice a much smaller number of people would be affected because of atmospheric

dispersal. Thus, the several grams of anthrax contained in the anthrax letters mailed in

late 2001 infected only 11 people to the point of showing symptoms before wide-spread 

antibiotic prophylaxis was begun. 

28. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, U.S.

Congress Office of Technology Assessment, August 1993, 53-54; adapted by Bruce

Bennett to a smaller amount of anthrax and corrected for sarin coverage (which is an

order of magnitude too low in the original.) The numbers for chemical casualties printed 

by OTA were off by an order of magnitude (a multiplication error?), as confirmed by

Steve Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat?

What Should Be Done?” International Security, (Summer 1991): 21-27. The area 

affected by anthrax and the quantity of anthrax used were both reduced by a factor of ten 

to put them more in the range of a quantity that an adversary would likely use. The 

biological fatalities assume that all of the lethal area is urbanized. Because the biological

cloud could be very long and narrow, (unless the attacker is very well prepared and very

skilled) going well beyond the urbanized area, these fatalities should be considered an

upper bound.

29. The “worried well” are people who think they have been exposed to WMD

effects but have not been, yet they seek medical care. 

30. Chemical and biological weapons could also be put in food/water and could

contaminate a location, though these are not likely means to cause mass casualties. 
36 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

31. The 1984 incident in Bhopal, India involved the release of 20 to 30 tons of

methylisocyanate. The accident caused 2,500 immediate fatalities and approximately 

100,000 casualties requiring some form of medical treatment. There were also several

thousand animals injured and roughly 1,000 killed.

32. Table was developed by Bruce Bennett.

33. For example, there has been considerable speculation that the woman in

Connecticut who died from the anthrax letters likely received a very low dose of anthrax. 

At least one expert claims that even a few spores could cause death in some people, even

though the dose required for a 50 percent chance of getting anthrax is about 8,000

retained spores. See C.J. Peters and D.M. Hartley, “Anthrax Inhalation and Lethal 

Human Infection,” The Lancet, February 23, 2002, 710-711.

34. One example is a model called NBC Crest. 

35. “Almost all inhalational anthrax cases in which treatment was begun after 

patients were significantly symptomatic have been fatal, regardless of treatment.” 

USAMRIID, Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, February 2001, 

23. This reference does not clarify what “significantly symptomatic” means. One 

example of the view which held prior to the anthrax letters cases is: “Unless there has 

been prior immunization, once symptoms appear, treatment invariably is ineffective, 

although there are anecdotal reports of patients surviving after very early confirmation of 

exposure and extremely aggressive antibiotic and supportive therapy.” Lieutenant

Commander Pietro Marghella, “The Second, Silent Attack on Pearl,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings, May 1999, 61. 

36. All six of the patients who received antibiotics during the first phase of the

disease, starting from 1 to 7 days after symptoms began, survived. See Jernigan, John A., 

et al., “Bioterrorism-Related Inhalation Anthrax: The First Ten Cases Reported in the 

United States,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 7 (Nov/Dec 2001). On-line, Internet, 11 

May 2004, available from http://www.cdc.gov/ ncidod/EID/vol7no6/jernigan.htm.

37. For anthrax, see Thomas V. Inglesby, et. al., “Anthrax as a Biological Weapon,”

JAMA, May 12, 1999, 1735-1745. On-line, Internet, 11 May 2004, available from 

http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/281/18/1735.pdf; Thomas V. Inglesby, et. al., 

“Anthrax as a Biological Weapon, 2002: Updated Recommendations for Management,” 

JAMA, May 1, 2002, 2236-2252. On-line, Internet, 11 May 2004, available from

http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/287/17/2236.pdf.

38. A replacement to the NAAK, the Antidote Treatment Nerve Agent Autoinjector

(ATNAA), is in the process of being fielded. This new kit combines the atropine and 2-

Pralidoxime chloride for delivery from a single needle, delivering antidotes faster from a

more compact package. 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 37

39. This change in procedures apparently made a significant improvement in the

survival of the anthrax letter cases, per Jernigan, 942. 

40. The CDC draws the distinctions made here between quarantine and isolation.

On-line, Internet, 8 May 2004, available from http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/isolation 

quarantine.htm.

41. See the World Health Organization website. On-line, Internet, 8 May 2004, 

available from http://www.who.int/csr/disease/en. 

42. See “Executive Order 13295: Revised List of Quarantinable Communicable

Diseases.” On-line, Internet, 8 May 2004, available from http://www.cdc.gov/

ncidod/sars/executiveorder040403.htm. 

43. See Headquarters, Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,

“Quarantine Regulations of the Armed Forces,” Army Regulation 40-12, 24 January

1992. 

44. In February 2003, it was reported that a DoD panel had made recommendations

on how to handle human remains contaminated by WMD. See: Erin Q. Winograd, “DoD 

Given Guidelines for Dealing With Soldiers Killed by CBN Agents,” Inside the Army, 

Feb. 2003. 

45. With chemical agents like VX, which persists for days to weeks on glass 

surfaces depending upon the temperature, there is a debate on the degree to which they

absorb into surfaces like concrete, asphalt, and paint, and whether they are then benign. 

This subject, referred to as “agent fate,” is being studied by the DoD to determine the

nature and duration of the residual threat, and the need for avoidance or decontamination. 

46. In 2002, the defense community fielded a series of new decontaminants

(especially several foams), but subsequent testing showed that these agents could fail to 

decontaminate some CBW agents, and still had the corrosive drawbacks of traditional 

decontaminants like bleach solutions. As of 2004, the community is still seeking a better 

form of decontaminant.

47. United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of

Operations Plan, January 2001, p. B-4. DoD’s definitions of recovery and reconstitution 

are, “1. Those actions taken by one nation prior to, during, and following an attack by an 

enemy nation to minimize the effects of the attack, rehabilitate the national economy,

provide for the welfare of the populace, and maximize the combat potential of remaining 

forces and supporting activities. 2. Those actions taken by a military force during or after 

operational employment to restore its combat capability to full operational readiness.”

Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms, 12 April 2001 (As amended through 5 June 2003), 444. 
38 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management

48. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 

2001, 57. 

49. Dr. Kenneth Alibek, “Biological Weapons,” briefing presented to the USAF Air

War College, November 1, 1999, slide 9. 

50. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30,

2001, iv. 

51. Ibid., 12. 

52. The term “challenge and response cycle” was coined by Sam Gardiner and Dan

Fox as part of RAND’s early 1990s work on Revolutions in Military Affairs. 

53. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, vi. 
Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management . . . 39

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1999 to provide 

education and research to the present and future leaders of the USAF, to assist them in 

their activities to counter the threats posed by adversaries equipped with weapons of mass 

destruction 

Barry R. Schneider, Director 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427 

Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell.af.mil

Jo Ann Eddy, Associate Editor 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Email: JoAnn.Eddy@maxwell.af.mil

(334) 953-7538 (DSN 493-7538)
40 . . . Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management