a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2005 SECURITY 

ASSISTANCE

Efforts to Secure 

Colombia’s Caño 

Limón-Coveñas Oil 

Pipeline Have 

Reduced Attacks, but 

Challenges Remain

GAO-05-971
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-971.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-971, a report to 

congressional requesters 

September 2005

SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

Efforts to Secure Colombia's Caño 

Limón-Coveñas Oil Pipeline Have 

Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain 

Since fiscal year 2002, the United States has provided about $99 million in 

equipment and training to the Colombian Army to minimize terrorist attacks 

along the first 110 miles of the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline, mostly in 

the Arauca department. U.S. Special Forces have provided training and 

equipment to about 1,600 Colombian Army soldiers. However, the delivery 

of 10 helicopters purchased for the program was delayed—arriving mid 2005. 

Without the helicopters, the Colombian Army’s ability to respond rapidly to 

pipeline attacks has been limited. Additionally, some equipment, such as 

night vision goggles, has not arrived due to the long lead-time required to 

obtain these items because of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and 

Iraq. 

Despite the delays in equipment deliveries, the number of attacks on the 

Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline has declined and security in the area has 

improved. In addition, the Colombian Army and Colombian National Police 

have improved relations with the civilian population and new oil exploration 

is occurring in the area due to the improved security. However, challenges 

to securing the pipeline remain. More attacks are occurring on the Caño 

Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline outside the 110-mile long area originally 

addressed. Most of the Colombian Army stationed in these other areas has 

not received U.S. training. In addition, the insurgents have attacked the 

electrical grid system that provides energy to the Caño Limón oilfield. 

Without electricity, oil cannot be pumped. Because the U.S. funds provided 

for the program will be depleted by the end of September 2005, sustainability 

of the progress made is uncertain. Colombia cannot fully operate and 

maintain the helicopters provided without continued U.S. support; and due 

to U.S. commitments in other parts of the world, U.S. Special Forces will be 

reducing personnel in Colombia, which will limit future training. 

Caño Limón-Coveñas Oil Pipeline Attacks, 1996–July 2005 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

July

2005

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Attacks 

44

77

64

79

96

170

41

34

17 13

Year

Source: Occidental Petroleum Corporation.

Oil is one of Colombia’s principal 

exports. The Caño Limón-Coveñas 

oil pipeline transports almost 

20 percent of Colombia’s oil 

production. The pipeline originates 

in the Department of Arauca in 

northeast Colombia. It carries oil 

nearly 500 miles to the Caribbean 

port of Coveñas. The pipeline has 

been a principal infrastructure 

target for terrorist attacks by 

Colombia’s insurgent groups. 

During 2001, attacks on the 

pipeline cost the Colombian 

government an estimated 

$500 million in lost revenues for the 

year. The United States agreed to 

assist Colombia in protecting the 

first 110 miles of the pipeline where

most of the attacks were occurring. 

We examined how the U.S. funding 

and resources provided to 

Colombia have been used, and 

what challenges remain in securing 

the pipeline. 

What GAO Recommends

We recommend that the Secretary 

of State, in consultation with the 

Secretary of Defense, develop a 

plan for transitioning the pipeline 

security program to Colombia. 

State commented that the report 

was an accurate assessment of the 

program and concurred with our 

recommendation. 
Page i GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 4

Helicopters and Other Equipment Were Delayed 10

Improved Security and Governance in the Department of Arauca, 

but Challenges Remain 14

Conclusions 20

Recommendation for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 22

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 24

Table Table 1: U.S. Support for Protecting the Caño Limón Pipeline, 

Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 10

Figures Figure 1: Map of Colombia and Caño Limón Pipeline 6

Figure 2: Oil Spill from Pipeline Attack 8

Figure 3: State-Constructed Facilities on an Army Base near the 

Town of Saravena 12

Figure 4: Caño Limón Pipeline Attacks, 1996–July 2005 15

Figure 5: Electrical Grid System Attacks that Have Affected 

Occidental, 2000–July 2005 17

Abbreviations

MilGroup Military Group, U.S. Embassy, Bogotá

NAS Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Bogotá

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

September 6, 2005 Letr

The Honorable Tom Davis

Chairman, Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Mark E. Souder

Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control

United States Senate

Oil is one of Colombia’s principal export commodities. The Caño LimónCoveñas oil pipeline1

 originating in the Department of Arauca transports 

almost 20 percent of Colombia’s oil production, approximately 100,000 

barrels of oil per day. Since 1986, however, the Caño Limón pipeline has 

been a principal infrastructure target for terrorist attacks2

 by Colombia’s 

insurgent groups.3

 During 2001, attacks on the pipeline reduced production 

by an estimated 70,000 barrels of oil per day, and cost the Colombian 

government an estimated $500 million in lost revenues for the year. This 

loss crippled the Arauca department’s government, which receives 90 

percent of its revenue from the pipeline oil royalties. In response to these 

attacks, Colombia developed an infrastructure security strategy. For the 

first phase of the strategy, Colombia requested equipment and military 

training from the United States to secure the first 110 miles of the Caño 

Limón pipeline primarily in Arauca, which was the portion most often 

1

For the purpose of this report, we refer to the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline as the Caño 

Limón pipeline or simply the pipeline. 

2

The Caño Limón pipeline is approximately 3 meters underground. Usually when the 

pipeline is attacked, a hole must be dug and explosives placed near the pipeline, which 

results in a dent or rupture.

3

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the National Liberation Army, and the 

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia are designated as terrorist organizations by the 

United States.
Page 2 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

attacked.4 Prior to 2001, the Arauca department, a remote and sparsely 

populated area, held little interest for the Colombian government. As a 

result, insurgent groups infiltrated all aspects of the department, 

threatening its governance and security. 

In 2002, the United States agreed to assist Colombia in phase one of its 

infrastructure security strategy. The Department of State’s (State) Bureau 

of Western Hemisphere Affairs and State’s Bureau for International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and various components of the 

Department of Defense (Defense)5

 developed a program to assist the 

Colombian Army in regaining control of Arauca; defending the pipeline and 

civilian population; and preventing, interdicting, and disrupting insurgents 

before they attack the pipeline and nearby communities. The pipeline 

security program called for the delivery of helicopters, equipment, 

logistical and infrastructure support, and training. Since fiscal year 2002, 

the United States has provided $99 million for this program.

In response to your request, we examined (1) how the U.S. funding and 

resources provided have been used to secure the first 110 miles of the Caño 

Limón pipeline and (2) what progress has been made in securing the 

pipeline and what challenges remain. In order to address these objectives, 

we examined State and Defense project information and budget 

documents, and interviewed knowledgeable officials involved in the 

program. We traveled to Colombia and met with cognizant officials from 

the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá; the Government of Colombia; and Ecopetrol 

and Occidental Petroleum Corporation, which operate the Caño Limón 

pipeline and oilfield. We traveled to Arauca and met with the local 

commanders of the Colombian Army and Colombian National Police, and 

spoke with U.S. Special Forces who were training the Colombian Army. We 

also toured a State-constructed facility in Arauca that will house 

helicopters to help the Colombian Army move more rapidly throughout the 

area. We conducted our review from January 2005 to July 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

4

The strategy originally consisted of three phases. Phase two was to protect the rest of the 

pipeline and phase three was to secure other infrastructure throughout Colombia. However, 

State officials told us the infrastructure security strategy has been incorporated into 

Colombia’s National Security Strategy, which was finalized in June 2003.

5

U.S. Southern Command and the Military Group at the U.S. Embassy, Bogotá.
Page 3 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

Results in Brief In 2002, the United States agreed to provide equipment and military 

training to the Colombian Army to help minimize terrorist attacks along 110 

miles of the Caño Limón pipeline. Since fiscal year 2002, the United States 

has provided about $71 million for 10 helicopters6

 and related logistical 

support and ground facilities, and about $28 million for training and other 

equipment. 

• To station the helicopters in Arauca, State built facilities on a Colombian 

Army base near the town of Saravena. The helicopters, which were to 

arrive in Colombia as early as May 2004, started arriving in April 2005 

and the last delivery occurred in June 2005. State attributed some of the 

delay to negotiations over the type of helicopters to purchase and 

transportation problems. Without the helicopters, the Colombian Army’s 

ability to respond rapidly to pipeline attacks has been limited and has 

put them at risk for ambushes. 

• Defense also provided U.S. Special Forces training and equipment for 

about 1,600 Colombian Army soldiers. Because the helicopters only 

arrived recently, U.S. Special Forces have extended training through 

fiscal year 2005 to overlap with their arrival. Additionally, some 

equipment, such as ammunition, night vision goggles, and medical 

supplies, has not arrived due to the long lead-time required to obtain 

these items because of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Despite the delays in the arrival of the helicopters and other equipment, the 

number of attacks on the pipeline has declined and governance and 

security in Arauca has improved. State and Defense officials attributed the 

decrease in attacks to strong Colombian leadership; U.S. Special Forces 

training; and better coordination among the Colombian Army, police, and 

Colombian Ministry of Justice prosecutors (known as fiscalia). In addition, 

the Colombian Army and police have improved relations with the civilian 

population, and arrests and prosecutions of insurgents have occurred. New 

oil exploration is also occurring due to improved security in the area. 

However, several challenges remain. Attacks on the pipeline continue—

though at a reduced rate—and the insurgents have changed their tactics. 

6

The helicopters are State assets and are provided under a no-cost lease to the Government 

of Colombia.
Page 4 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

• Attacks have increased on the Caño Limón pipeline in the neighboring 

Department of Norte de Santander, which is outside the 110-mile range 

of the first phase of the original infrastructure security program. Most of 

the Colombian Army stationed in Norte de Santander has not received 

U.S. training. 

• The nature of attacks on oil production in Arauca has changed. In recent 

years, the insurgents have attacked the electrical grid system that 

provides energy to the Caño Limón oilfield. Without electricity, the oil 

wells cannot operate. 

Finally, the Colombian Army does not have the capacity to fully operate 

and maintain the helicopters it possesses without continued U.S. support.7

According to the U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, Colombia will not have a sufficient 

number of trained pilots and mechanics to operate all the U.S.-provided 

helicopters it has until fiscal years 2008 and 2010, respectively. In addition, 

due to U.S. commitments in other parts of the world, U.S. Special Forces 

will be reducing training in Arauca and throughout Colombia. 

We recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 

Secretary of Defense, develop a plan for transitioning the pipeline security 

program to Colombia. The plan should delineate (1) how the helicopters 

will be used and maintained, (2) how progress to date will be sustained, 

and (3) an expected completion date for U.S. involvement. In commenting 

on a draft of this report, State said it was an accurate assessment of the 

program and concurred with our recommendation, but expressed some 

concern that the report overemphasized the time required to deliver the 

helicopters.

Background In 2004, Colombia was the fourth largest Latin American supplier of crude 

oil and petroleum-related products to the United States and the 16th 

leading supplier worldwide. One of Colombia’s largest oilfields—Caño 

Limón—was discovered in 1983 in the Department of Arauca and today 

accounts for almost 20 percent of Colombia’s oil production. The oilfield is 

7

In 2000 and 2003, we reported that Colombia has limited capacity to absorb the U.S. 

assistance. See GAO, Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to 

Produce Results, GAO-01-26 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2000) and GAO, Drug Control: 

Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia 

Have Not Been Developed, GAO-03-783 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003).
Page 5 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

located in north-central Arauca about six miles south of the Venezuelan 

border. The Caño Limón pipeline carries oil from the oilfield northwest 

about 477 miles, though seven departments8

 to the Caribbean port of 

Coveñas (see fig. 1). The Caño Limón oilfield is operated by an association 

comprised of Colombia’s state-owned oil company, Ecopetrol; a United 

States company, Occidental Petroleum Corporation; and a Spanish oil 

company, Repsol. Between 1986 and 2002, the Caño Limón oilfield 

generated $800 million in national royalties and another estimated $1.2 

billion in regional royalties for the seven departments it traverses. In 

particular, the oilfield provides Arauca with 90 percent of its total 

revenues—about $40 million a year. 

8

The Caño Limón pipeline traverses the Departments of Arauca, Boyaca, Norte de 

Santander, Cesar, Magdalena, Bolivar, and Sucre.
Page 6 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

Figure 1: Map of Colombia and Caño Limón Pipeline

Sucre

Bolivar

Norte

de

Santander

Cesar

Pipeline

Magdalena

Arauca Boyaca

110 miles

0 mile

Sources: Occidental Petroleum Corporation (data); Map Resources (map).

Arauca City Saravena

Caribbean Sea

Panama

Venezuela

Ecuador

Peru

Brazil

0 200 miles

Colombia

Venezuela

Miles of pipeline

110 miles

450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

Elevation in feet

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000
Page 7 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

Throughout Colombia’s history, the Department of Arauca has been a 

remote area that held little interest for the Colombian government and 

lacked an effective police presence. Over the past 25 years, the discovery of 

oil and the establishment of the illegal drug trade have brought the 

department a measure of wealth and attracted the attention of Colombia’s 

insurgent groups. These groups had infiltrated all aspects of the Arauca 

government and conducted a variety of illegal activities, such as extortion 

of oil revenues; terrorist attacks on economic infrastructure;9

 drug 

trafficking; and attacks against citizens, department officials, and military 

and police forces.10 Civilians caught between the insurgent groups and 

government forces, often sided with the insurgent groups out of fear. 

In Arauca, the pipeline has been the principal economic infrastructure 

target of attacks. During 2001, the Caño Limón pipeline was attacked 170 

times,11 resulting in the pipeline shutting down for over 200 days, costing 

Colombia approximately $500 million in lost revenues and considerable 

environmental damage (see fig. 2). For example, in early November 2001, 

one attack resulted in 7,000 barrels of oil spilling over a 50-mile area—

including the Arauca River—which greatly affected agricultural production 

in the area. However, despite the frequency of attacks, between 1986 and 

2001 Colombia’s fiscalia—prosecutors—arrested only three people of 

attacking the pipeline. 

9

Economic infrastructure includes roads, bridges, power lines, telephone towers, reservoirs, 

and pipelines.

10For example, according to Defense, insurgent groups killed more than 40 municipal 

legislators and nine reporters in the department in 2002.

11When the pipeline is attacked, Occidental’s instrumentation will sense a drop in the 

pipeline’s pressure. It then notifies the Colombian Air Force, which flies over the location to 

confirm the attack. Once confirmed, the Colombian Army is notified and soldiers are sent to 

the location to sweep the area of landmines and make it secure for Occidental employees to 

repair the damage.
Page 8 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

Figure 2: Oil Spill from Pipeline Attack

Infrastructure Security 

Strategy

To regain control of Arauca and decrease economic infrastructure attacks, 

the Government of Colombia developed a three-phased infrastructure 

security strategy. The initial phase focused on securing the first 110 miles of 

the pipeline, which was the section most often attacked. The second phase 

was proposed to protect the remaining 367 miles of the pipeline, and phase 

three called for protecting 338 other critical economic infrastructure 

targets throughout the country.12 To help implement the first phase of the 

strategy, Colombia asked the United States to provide military training and 

equipment to its army, and a memorandum of agreement was signed 

between the two countries in 2003. As stipulated in the agreement, a 

bilateral working group was formed, and it developed a plan to protect the 

Caño Limón pipeline. The Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in the U.S. 

Embassy, Bogotá, administers the day-to-day aviation components of the 

pipeline

oil spill

oil spill

rupture 

from attack

Sources: State (photo); GAO (presentation).

12According to State officials, Colombia incorporated the infrastructure security strategy 

into its National Security Strategy, which was finalized in June 2003.
Page 9 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

program, and the Military Group (MilGroup) in the U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, 

administers the day-to-day nonaviation components of the program.

U.S. assistance was directed toward Colombia’s 18th army brigade 

headquartered in the Department of Arauca, whose area of responsibility 

includes all of Arauca and parts of the Boyaca and Norte de Santander 

departments to the northwest. The 18th army brigade is charged with 

providing roadway security, controlling Colombian-Venezuelan border 

traffic, conducting counternarcotic operations, ensuring public order, and 

securing the Caño Limón pipeline and other infrastructure.

In addition to U.S. assistance in Arauca, Ecopetrol and Occidental have 

contributed financial support to the Colombian armed forces, as well as 

community programs. In particular, each year Ecopetrol and Occidental 

contribute about $8.65 million to help secure the Caño Limón pipeline, 

according to Ecopetrol. This money supports the army, air force, and 

fiscalia in the department and has been used for housing, food, land and air 

transportation, communication equipment, gasoline, and medical 

assistance. In addition, Occidental has built barrack facilities for soldiers 

on an army base near the town of Saravena, and has established a 

foundation to promote community development programs throughout the 

region. 

Future of Colombia’s Oil 

Production

From 1999 to 2004, Colombia’s oil production steadily declined. Much of 

this was due to the depletion of Colombia’s mature oilfields and the lack of 

new major oilfield discoveries. Security for Colombia’s oil industry 

infrastructure, however, is an ongoing concern due to the threats posed by 

insurgent groups operating in Colombia’s oil production areas. With a 

decreasing pool of proven oil reserves, industry experts have stated that 

Colombia may become a net importer of oil by 2008. In an effort to attract 

private investors to Colombia, the Colombian government implemented 

regulatory and institutional reforms to create a more conducive climate for 

the exploration of oil reserves.13

13For example, in 2003 it moved regulatory responsibilities from the state-owned oil 

company, Ecopetrol, to a newly created agency. Under the new arrangement, Ecopetrol no 

longer has a mandatory share in joint ventures, and oil companies may now assume up to 

100 percent of investment and risk activities in all exploration and production contracts. In 

2003, Colombia surpassed its exploratory goal to drill 28 wells, but in 2004 drilled only 21, 

short of its target of 25.
Page 10 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

Helicopters and Other 

Equipment Were 

Delayed

In fiscal year 2002, the Congress provided $6 million to initiate training of 

the Colombian Army units in Arauca, and in fiscal year 2003 an additional 

$93 million was provided.14 Of this funding, State used $71 million to 

acquire two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, eight UH-II helicopters, and 

related logistical support and ground facilities. However, the helicopters 

were not delivered on schedule. The lack of airlift capabilities has put the 

army at-risk for insurgent attacks and limited the Colombian Army’s ability 

to quickly respond to infrastructure attacks. Defense used the remaining 

$28 million for U.S. Special Forces training and equipment for the 

Colombian Army (see table 1); however, much of this equipment has not 

arrived.

Table 1: U.S. Support for Protecting the Caño Limón Pipeline, Fiscal Years 2002 and 

2003

Sources: State and Defense (data).

a

Funds were used for converting the building contractors’ living quarters and related facilities for use by 

State’s aerial eradication program. 

142002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response to 

Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820, 855, and Consolidated 

Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 176.

Dollars in millions

Items purchased Cost

Helicopters

Two UH-60 Helicopters $26.8

Eight UH-II Helicopters 20.1

Helicopter facilities 14.3

Helicopter maintenance and equipment 8.8

Training

Equipment, ammunition, and parts 15.4

U.S. Special Forces training 12.7

Aerial eradication programa 0.9

Total $99.0
Page 11 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

Helicopter Facilities Were 

Built, but the Helicopters 

Arrived Late

State built helicopter and barrack facilities on a Colombian Army base near 

the town of Saravena to support the 10 helicopters. The facilities were 

completed in December 2004, but remained vacant for 5 months awaiting 

the arrival of the helicopters. The UH-60 Black Hawks and four of the UH-II 

helicopters were delivered to Colombia in April 2005. They were moved to 

Arauca in May for training and air operations. In late June 2005, the 

remaining four UH-II helicopters arrived in Colombia and were moved to 

Arauca in August. 

The helicopter facilities include helicopter pads, a hangar, training rooms, 

equipment storage, and building security. State also built barracks with 

exercise rooms, kitchen and laundry facilities, and conference rooms (see 

fig. 3). While the 10 helicopters will be stationed at the new facilities and 

routine maintenance will occur at this location, depot-level15 maintenance 

will be done at the Colombian Army base in Tolemaida.16

15Depot-level maintenance primarily entails rebuilding and overhauling equipment.

16Tolemaida is approximately 50 miles from Bogotá and the headquarters for the Colombian 

Army Aviation Battalion.
Page 12 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

Figure 3: State-Constructed Facilities on an Army Base near the Town of Saravena

Although the helicopters recently arrived in Colombia, they were expected 

to arrive as early as May 2004.17 However, some State officials said the 

helicopters were always planned to arrive in December 2004. They noted 

that the lead time to order the helicopters precluded an earlier delivery 

Heliport facility.

Barracks and helicopter pads.

Source: GAO.

17Several State and Defense documents listed a number of dates for the scheduled arrival of 

the helicopters, with the earliest being May 2004.
Page 13 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

date. State officials did not provide any planning documents that detailed 

timeframes and milestones associated with the helicopter delivery, but did 

provide documents coordinating the construction of facilities with the 

arrival of the helicopters in late 2004. According to State officials, 

negotiations over what type of helicopters to purchase caused some delay, 

and problems with transportation and delivery accounted for the 4 to 6 

month delay from the December 2004 timeframe. 

Nevertheless, in the absence of the helicopters, the Colombian Army did 

not move any of its other air assets, including similar helicopters, to Arauca 

to assist in infrastructure security training18 and operations. As a result, the 

army in Arauca responded to pipeline attacks using the roads, placing them 

at greater risk for ambushes by insurgents and taking more time to reach an 

area of an attack. According to Defense officials, Colombian Army soldiers 

have been killed traveling on the roads in the Arauca department.

U.S. Special Forces 

Provided Training, but Much 

of the Equipment Is Delayed

U.S. Special Forces provided training and equipment for about 1,600 

Colombian Army soldiers to improve their ability to act quickly in 

minimizing terrorist attacks along the Caño Limón pipeline. In November 

2002, a team of U.S. Special Forces traveled to Arauca to assess the area 

and determine the training needs of the Colombian Army. In January 2003, 

U.S. Special Forces started training in Arauca and planned for training to 

continue through December 2004.19 U.S. Special Forces focused on helping 

the Colombian Army take a more proactive and aggressive approach to 

defend the pipeline; regain control of the area around the pipeline; and 

prevent, interdict, and disrupt the insurgents before they attack the 

pipeline. Training included developing quick reaction capabilities, small 

unit tactics, planning and conducting operations, reconnaissance, 

collecting and analyzing timely intelligence, and medical support. 

U.S. Special Forces also facilitated joint and combined operations between 

the Colombian Army and police to restore public confidence and security 

throughout Arauca. The U.S. Special Forces’ civil affairs and psychological 

operations officers helped the Colombian Army improve relationships with 

the civilian population by hosting local events and developing radio 

18In April and November 2004, about 75 Colombian Army soldiers from Arauca went to 

Tolemaida to conduct air assault training, however, it was only for a 2-week period. 

19Additionally, prior to training, the army unit was vetted for human rights issues.
Page 14 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

broadcasts and leaflets. For example, officers assisted in providing medical 

and dental exams and vaccinations to over 1,760 individuals during a 2-day 

event. 

Because the helicopters did not arrive until mid-2005, U.S. Special Forces 

extended their training in Arauca to overlap with their arrival. In a March 

2004 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, officials recognized that if the 

U.S. trainers did not overlap with the arrival of the helicopters in Arauca, 

the Colombian Army units would not receive the appropriate training. 

According to a MilGroup official, to extend the original training funds 

through September 2005, the U.S. Special Forces had to reduce the number 

of trainers and support staff in Arauca. Since the helicopters have just 

arrived, U.S. Special Forces will only have 3 months to provide the 

necessary operational training. A MilGroup official said they would have 

liked to have had 6 to 9 months of training to ensure the Colombian Army 

was fully capable of employing the helicopters to support infrastructure 

protection and related combat operations. Again, however, State could not 

provide us any documentation that coordinated the planned arrival of the 

helicopters with the necessary training. 

Defense also purchased equipment for the Colombian Army for use in 

Arauca, but much of it has not arrived. Equipment purchased includes night 

vision goggles, ammunition, weapons, helmets, and medical supplies. 

According to the MilGroup, the delivery time for some items is now almost 

2 years because of the demand for supplies created by U.S. military 

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, night vision goggles for 

the Colombian Army were ordered in late 2003 and a partial shipment 

arrived in July 2005. 

Improved Security and 

Governance in the 

Department of Arauca, 

but Challenges Remain

Despite the delays in the arrival of the helicopters and other equipment, 

attacks on the Caño Limón pipeline have declined. Additionally, 

governance and security in Arauca has improved, and new oil exploration 

is also occurring due to improved security conditions. However, despite 

these improvements, challenges remain, particularly as more attacks on the 

pipeline are occurring in the neighboring Department of Norte de 

Santander. In addition, insurgents are attacking the electrical grid system 

that provides energy to the Caño Limón oilfields. Finally, because nearly all 

the $99 million in U.S. assistance will be obligated or expended by the end 

of September 2005, and Colombia’s capability to operate and maintain the 

helicopters without U.S. support is limited, sustainability of the progress 

made is uncertain. 
Page 15 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

Attacks on the Caño Limón 

Pipeline Have Decreased 

Attacks on the pipeline have declined since 2001, until recently. As 

illustrated in figure 4, attacks on the Caño Limón pipeline reached a high of 

170 in 2001. In 2002, the attacks dropped to 41; and in 2004, dropped even 

further to 17. However, in the first 7 months of 2005, attacks on the pipeline 

are almost equal to all of 2004. State and Defense officials said they were 

not sure why pipeline attacks were apparently increasing.

Figure 4: Caño Limón Pipeline Attacks, 1996–July 2005 

Attacks in Norte de 

Santander Have Increased

While attacks are decreasing on the Caño Limón pipeline in Arauca, more 

attacks are occurring in the neighboring Department of Norte de 

Santander. In the first 7 months of 2005, of the 13 attacks that occurred 

along the pipeline, 9 were in Norte de Santander. About 200 miles of the 

pipeline passes through Norte de Santander, and much of it is in rough 

mountainous terrain. This makes getting to the affected areas difficult, 

which delays repairs. Occidental officials said that in some cases, it takes 

up to 8 days to access, secure, and repair the damaged pipeline. In addition, 

according to Occidental, attacks on the pipeline in the mountains are hard 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

July

2005

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Attacks

44

77

64

79

96

170

41

34

17

13

Year

Source: Occidental Petroleum Corporation.
Page 16 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

to contain as spilled oil runs down the mountains, causing environmental 

problems.

Additionally, most of Norte de Santander is secured by a different 

Colombian Army brigade, which has not received U.S. infrastructure 

security training. According to the MilGroup, U.S. Special Forces are trying 

to determine if they can train additional soldiers in Norte de Santander. 

However, no military training facilities exist in the department. In 

commenting on this report, the MilGroup stated that NAS is studying the 

feasibility of deploying some of the helicopters to this region to support 

operations as required. 

Insurgents Are Attacking 

the Electrical Grid System

In addition to pipeline attacks, insurgents are attacking the electrical grid 

system that provides energy to the Caño Limón oilfield. Occidental is able 

to produce 50 percent of its energy requirements; however, the remaining 

50 percent is purchased from the nation’s electrical grid system. According 

to a Colombian Army official, attacking the electrical grid can shut down 

oil pumping completely.20 In 2002, eight towers were destroyed within 

Arauca. Attacks on the electrical grid system spiked upwards in 2003 to 23 

and are increasing again as the electrical attacks in the first seven months 

of 2005 have surpassed attacks in all of 2004 (see fig. 5). According to 

Occidental, as of July 2005 the attacks on the electrical grid system have 

cost $117 million in lost production since 2002.

20When the Caño Limón oil pipeline is shut down because of an attack on the pipeline, oil 

can still be pumped into storage tanks that have a 7-day holding capacity. However, when 

the electrical grid system is attacked, the oil wells cannot pump oil into the storage tanks, 

shutting down oil production. 
Page 17 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

Figure 5: Electrical Grid System Attacks that Have Affected Occidental, 2000–July 

2005

Strong Colombian 

Leadership and U.S. Special 

Forces Training Contributed 

to Increased Security in 

Arauca 

The Colombian government has made security and the re-establishment of 

state presence in Arauca a priority. According to a State official, before the 

United States provided any equipment or training to the Colombian Army in 

Arauca, many changes were already occurring due to interventions by the 

Colombian government. For example, in January 2003, the Colombian 

government stripped the Arauca department of control over its oil royalties 

to restore fiscal responsibility to the department. Additionally, in order to 

disrupt systemic corruption, in November 2003, the government arrested 

about 30 public officials, including a city mayor, who were connected to 

insurgent groups. 

To strengthen the army in Arauca, the Colombian government changed its 

leadership. Historically, according to the MilGroup, the army had been 

passive and reactive in part because Colombia’s military structure holds 

leaders personally responsible for the loss of soldiers and equipment. The 

MilGroup and State officials noted that President Uribe replaced some of 

the army commanders in Arauca with others who were more aggressive 

0

5

10

15

20

25

July 

2005

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Attacks

4

8

0

23

10

11

Year

Source: Occidental Petroleum Corporation.
Page 18 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

and proactive against the insurgent groups, and he extended the current 

Brigadier General’s term in Arauca because of his strong leadership 

abilities. 

In addition to improvements made by the Colombian government, U.S. 

Special Forces training has improved the Colombian Army’s capabilities. In 

the past, the Colombian Army lacked tactical and operation planning, 

civilian-military programs, and ground mobility. According to the 

Colombian Army Colonel in Saravena, due to U.S. Special Forces training, 

his troops are better able to infiltrate areas, react to situations, and work 

with the civilian population while respecting human rights. For example, in 

April 2005, the Colombian Army unit near the town of Saravena captured 18 

insurgents, and an additional 5 insurgents turned themselves in during the 

first 4 months of 2005. 

Moreover, better coordination exists among the Colombian Army, police, 

and the fiscalia. Both army and police officials acknowledged they have 

established a good working relationship, which has helped in neutralizing 

the insurgent groups. The Colombian Army and police perform daily foot 

patrols and carry out joint missions. Because of this teamwork, the army 

and police have been able to seize rockets and landmines, and capture 

insurgents. In 2001, the fiscalia were incorporated into the Colombian 

Army operations and now accompany units on investigations. Since 2002, 

the fiscalia have prosecuted 597 individuals, compared to only three arrests 

between 1986 and 2001. 

Finally, interactions between the Colombian Army and the civilian 

population have dramatically improved. In 2001, neither the civilian 

population nor the army would travel along the roads or in the town of 

Saravena because it was not safe. Today, however, the Colombian Army 

holds meetings with various communities, provides entertainment, 

administers medical care, and performs daily foot patrols in Saravena.

New Exploration Is 

Occurring

New oil exploration is occurring in Arauca due to increased security. Prior 

to 2004, Occidental did not look for additional oil reserves due to safety 

concerns, even though the Caño Limón oilfield will probably only produce 

oil near its current rate for a few more years. Today, Occidental is able to 

increase its exploration within Arauca, by working with the Colombian 

Army and police. According to Occidental, it drilled 40 new wells in the 

Caño Limón oilfield this year and is making an effort to find new oil 

reserves. Additionally, according to Occidental, the Colombian Army’s 
Page 19 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

protection of the Caño Limón pipeline makes it possible for their 

employees to safely repair the pipeline and get it operational quickly. The 

safety of Occidental employees has been a concern in the past. For 

example, in 2002 a bus carrying 30 Occidental employees was attacked by 

insurgents, leaving 2 dead, 12 injured, and 3 missing.

Occidental acknowledged that while exploration is becoming more 

attractive in Colombia, challenges remain. For instance, according to 

Occidental, some of the best prospective locations for oil in Arauca are 

located in coca-growing areas controlled by insurgents. The U.S. Embassy, 

Bogotá also reports that although oil companies have stated they are 

concerned about the financial losses and damage caused by ongoing 

attacks to the oil sector, the problem is now being contained, and security 

concerns no longer outweigh profit possibilities in the country.

Sustainability of Progress 

Uncertain

As we reported in 2000 and 2003, the Colombian Army did not have the 

capability to fully operate and maintain the U.S.-provided helicopters it 

had. At that time we recommended that the Secretary of State, in 

consultation with the Secretary of Defense, examine U.S. assistance 

programs to the Colombian Army to (1) establish clear objectives for the 

programs and (2) estimate future funding requirements for U.S. support.21

The Secretary has not addressed our recommendation. We added that this 

analysis should designate specific performance measures for assessing 

progress, define the roles of U.S. personnel and contractors, and develop a 

timeline for achieving the stated objectives. On our visit to Colombia in 

April 2005, a NAS official told us Colombia will not have a sufficient 

number of trained helicopter pilots until fiscal year 2008, and this assumes 

that none leave or fail the training program.22 In addition, NAS and Defense 

officials estimate Colombia will not have enough trained mechanics until at 

least 2010. 

Additionally, the reduction in U.S. Special Forces trainers will slow 

training. Due to commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Special Forces 

will be reducing personnel throughout Colombia by over 50 percent 

21See GAO-01-26 and GAO-03-783. In 2003, we noted the start of the infrastructure security 

program and discussed the implications of providing additional helicopters to Colombia.

22According to a U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, cable to State, the helicopters provided to help 

protect the pipeline require 50 pilots and additional mechanics to maintain them.
Page 20 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

starting in October 2005. According to a MilGroup official, training will be 

suspended in Arauca until early 2006 when U.S. Special Forces is planning 

to deploy a training team to Arauca for about 10 weeks. The MilGroup told 

us that training for the Colombian Army units in Arauca ideally should 

occur through fiscal year 2010. 

Conclusions Colombia’s original plan to secure a 110-mile portion of the Caño Limón 

pipeline is nearing completion. The helicopters have arrived, the 

Colombian Army protecting the pipeline has received training, and the 

Colombian government has improved security and governance in Arauca. 

Pipeline attacks in Arauca have decreased since 2001 and new oil 

exploration is occurring. 

Despite these improvements, more attacks are occurring on the pipeline in 

Norte de Santander and on the electrical grid system in Arauca, and State 

has not addressed how it will help Colombia sustain the progress made. As 

we reported in 2003, Colombia does not have the capacity to sustain the 

U.S. helicopters provided to the Colombian Army without continued U.S. 

support. The 10 helicopters provided for the pipeline security program will 

exacerbate this problem. Moreover, because the U.S. Special Forces are 

reducing the number of trainers throughout Colombia, training additional 

personnel for infrastructure security and sustaining the training already 

provided to units in Arauca will be problematic. 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Because Colombia continues to face serious obstacles in its long-standing 

insurgency and in protecting the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline, we 

recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary 

of Defense, develop a plan for transitioning the pipeline security program 

in Arauca to the Government of Colombia. The plan should delineate (1) 

how the helicopters provided for pipeline security will be used and 

maintained, (2) how the progress made to date will be sustained, and (3) an 

expected completion date for U.S. involvement. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. II). 

State commented that the report provided an accurate assessment of the 

program and agreed that challenges remain and the Government of 

Colombia will need continued assistance to support the program. State 

concurred with the report’s recommendation to develop a plan for 
Page 21 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

transitioning the pipeline security program to the Government of 

Colombia, including the aviation component. State stated this plan should 

be incorporated into a larger United States government strategy to 

transition responsibilities for key U.S. funded programs to the Colombian 

government. 

However, State expressed some concern that we overemphasized the time 

required to deliver the helicopters, but it did not provide any additional 

information for us to modify our discussion. The point is that the planned 

rapid reaction capability for the pipeline security program was not 

available until almost 2-1/2 years after the program began. 

Defense did not comment on this report, but along with State, provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the 

date of this letter. We are sending copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees and the Secretaries of State and Defense. We 

will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call 

me at (202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report 

were Al Huntington, Hynek Kalkus, Kerry Lipsitz, and Summer Pachman. 

Contact Points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Jess T. Ford, Director

International Affairs and Trade 
Page 22 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To determine how the U.S. funding and resources provided to secure the 

first 110 miles of the Caño Limón pipeline were used, we reviewed 

Departments of State and Defense project information, reports, budget 

documents, memoranda, cables, and related documents. We assessed 

budget and funding documentation regarding the uses of the assistance, 

and found the data sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We interviewed 

knowledgeable officials involved in the program in State’s Bureau for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Bureau of 

Western Hemisphere Affairs. We also interviewed officials from the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency and U.S. Southern Command. 

To determine what progress has been made and the challenges that remain 

for securing the Caño Limón pipeline, we examined reports, cables, and 

related documents prepared by cognizant State and Defense officials. 

Specifically,

• To determine the reliability of the data provided on pipeline and 

electrical grid system attacks, we interviewed officials from the U.S. 

Embassy, Bogotá; Ecopetrol; and Occidental Petroleum Corporation to 

determine how they collected and verified the data. We also reviewed 

State, Ecopetrol, and Occidental documents related to infrastructure 

attacks and cross-referenced the information with comments made by 

officials. We found the documents and officials reported similar 

numbers. Based on this review, we concluded that these data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

• We discussed challenges of the program with officials in State’s Bureau 

for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Bureau of 

Western Hemisphere Affairs. We also spoke with Defense officials from 

the U.S. Southern Command. On our visit to Colombia in April 2005, we 

interviewed Colombian government officials from the Ministries of 

Defense and Justice, and the National Planning Department. We also 

interviewed officials from Ecopetrol and Occidental Petroleum 

Corporation, which operate the Caño Limón pipeline and oilfield. 

• We traveled to Bogotá in April 2005 and met with State and Defense 

officials at the U.S. Embassy, including the Narcotics Affairs Section and 

the Military Group. We also spoke with the Ambassador, the Deputy 

Chief of Mission, and staff from the economic and political affairs 

offices. 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 23 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

• Finally, we also traveled to Saravena, Arauca, and toured the Stateconstructed facility for stationing the helicopters and met with various 

U.S. officials involved in the pipeline security program. We interviewed 

the local commanders of the Colombian Army and Colombian National 

Police, and spoke with U.S. Special Forces trainers who were 

conducting training. 
Page 24 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 25 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

(320323) Page 26 GAO-05-971 Infrastructure Security
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