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25–259 PDF 2006

DOE/ESE SECURITY: HOW READY IS THE

PROTECTIVE FORCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 26, 2005

Serial No. 109–104

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

J. VINCENT CHASE, Chief Investigator

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

ANDREW SU, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on July 26, 2005 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Aloise, Gene, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government

Accountability Office, accompanied by James Noel, Assistant Director

of Natural Resources and Environment, and Jonathan M. Gill, Senior

Analyst, Natural Resources and Environment; Gregory H. Friedman,

Inspector General, Department of Energy; Glenn S. Podonsky, Director,

Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, Department of

Energy; Dr. Lawrence Brede, Wackenhut, DOE Operations; Dr. Glenn

Adler, Security Policy, Service Employees International Union; and

Robert Walsh, Security Manager, Office of Energy, Science and Environment, Department of Energy .................................................................. 7

Adler, Dr. Glenn ........................................................................................ 73

Aloise, Gene ............................................................................................... 7

Brede, Dr. Lawrence ................................................................................. 62

Friedman, Gregory H. ............................................................................... 27

Podonsky, Glenn S. ................................................................................... 40

Walsh, Robert ............................................................................................ 86

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Adler, Dr. Glenn, Security Policy, Service Employees International Union,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 76

Aloise, Gene, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government

Accountability Office, prepared statement of ............................................. 10

Brede, Dr. Lawrence, Wackenhut, DOE Operations, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 64

Friedman, Gregory H., Inspector General, Department of Energy, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 29

Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a Senator in Congress from the State of

Iowa, prepared statement of ........................................................................ 5

Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance

Assurance, Department of Energy ............................................................... 43

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 3

Walsh, Robert, Security Manager, Office of Energy, Science and Environment, Department of Energy:

Followup question and response .............................................................. 110

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 89

(1)

DOE/ESE SECURITY: HOW READY IS THE

PROTECTIVE FORCE

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING

THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Turner, Shays, Burton, Marchant, Dent, Maloney,

Kucinich, and Ruppersberger.

Staff present: Laurence Halloren, staff director and counsel; J.

Vincent Chase, chief investigator; Robert Briggs, clerk; Sam Raymond and Eric Vaughn, interns; Andrew Su, minority professional

staff member; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. TURNER. The hearing of the National Security, Emerging

Threats, and International Relations hearing entitled, ‘‘DOE/ESE

Security: How Ready is the Protective Force?,’’ is called to order.

This hearing continues the subcommittee’s examination of security programs at Department of Energy nuclear sites. Previous testimony described substantial institutional, technical and fiscal

challenges confronting efforts to develop and implement a strengthened post-September 11th security standard called the design basis

threat [DBT].

Today we focus on the substance and pace of DBT implementation at five sites outside the active weapons complex managed by

the Department’s Office of Energy, Science and Environment.

Without question, ESE research labs and decommissioned sites are

attractive targets for terrorists determined to turn our technology

against us and willing to die while doing so.

The materials at these facilities pose a threat and can be used

either as part of a weapon or a health threat directly. As DOE succeeds in hardening weapons production facilities and labs, ESE

sites form the next tier of soft targets for nuclear terrorists following the path of least resistance.

But as we have heard before, ESE facilities housing substantial

quantities of nuclear materials face unique problems implementing

and sustaining enhanced security programs. The already vexing

measure of how much security is enough against an uncertain

threat becomes only more difficult when evaluating the costs and

benefits of capital improvements and protective force enhanceVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:22 Jan 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\25259.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ments at decommissioned facilities DOE hopes to close sooner rather than later.

At the request of our chairman, Christopher Shays, the Government Accountability Office assessed the current readiness of protective forces at ESE sites and the steps still needed to defend those

facilities against the larger, more capable attackers postulated in

the DBT. Their findings, released today, point to a generally proficient guard staff prepared to meet existing standards. But the

way forward to meet the higher DBT threat level is far less clear.

Efforts to deploy an elite protective force, utilize new security

technologies and effectively manage ESE security initiatives require coordination and resource commitments that GAO is not sure

will materialize. Plans to blend down and consolidate nuclear materials appear stymied by bureaucratic stovepipes and uncertain cost

projections. Even under the best assumptions, security enhancements demanded by the 2004 DBT will not be completed before

2008, if then. The new security imperative demands implementation of a denial strategy to thwart access to nuclear materials, not

just contain or catch intruders.

But in many ways, ESE seems stuck in denial about organizational and fiscal demands of a DBT-compliant strategy. Tactical

training on assault scenarios lack vigor or realism. Communications equipment may be unreliable. Exceptions to training and

equipment standards create inconsistencies and gaps in ESE safeguard systems. A diffused ESE security management structure

frustrates efforts to implement and coordinate DOE-wide security

policy securities.

Almost 4 years later, the undeniable realities of the post-September 11th world are not yet fully reflected in ESE security policies

or practices. Our witnesses this morning will describe plans to implement the more stringent DBT and the steps needed to sustain

those efforts against an undeniable dynamic threat. We appreciate

their contribution to our ongoing oversight of DOE nuclear security, and we look forward to their testimony.

Gentlemen, as you are aware, it is the policy of this subcommittee to swear in our witnesses. If you would please stand and raise

your right hands for the oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TURNER. Please note for the record that the witnesses have

responded in the affirmative.

And I will acknowledge that Mr. Ruppersberger was in attendance at the commencement of this hearing. And I ask unanimous

consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to

place any opening statement in the record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statements in the record. Without objection, it is so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent to place a statement from Senator Grassley, a co-requester on the GAO study to be discussed

today, in the hearing record. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The prepared statements of Hon. Christopher Shays and Hon.

Charles E. Grassley follow:]

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Mr. TURNER. Our witnesses today for this panel include Mr.

Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Mr. James Noel,

Assistant Director of Natural Resources and Environment; and Mr.

Jonathan M. Gill, Senior Analyst, Natural Resources and Environment.

We also have Mr. Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General, Department of Energy; Mr. Glenn S. Podonsky, Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, Department of Energy;

Dr. Lawrence Brede, Wackenhut, DOE Operations; Dr. Glenn

Adler, security policy, Service Employees International Union

[SEIU]; and Mr. Robert Walsh, Security Manager, Office of Energy,

Science and Environment, Department of Energy.

And if I have mispronounced any of your names, please correct

the record when you give your testimony.

We will begin our testimony with Mr. Aloise.

STATEMENTS OF GENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES NOEL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, AND JONATHAN M. GILL, SENIOR ANALYST, NATURAL

RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT; GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN,

INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; GLENN S.

PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND SAFETY

PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; DR.

LAWRENCE BREDE, WACKENHUT, DOE OPERATIONS; DR.

GLENN ADLER, SECURITY POLICY, SERVICE EMPLOYEES

INTERNATIONAL UNION; AND ROBERT WALSH, SECURITY

MANAGER, OFFICE OF ENERGY, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

STATEMENT OF GENE ALOISE

Mr. ALOISE. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I

am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on nuclear security at DOE’s Energy, Science, and Environment sites. A terrorist

attack on one of these sites, containing weapons-grade nuclear material could have devastating consequences for the site and nearby

communities.

Mr. TURNER. Excuse me. These mics are relatively directional.

Could you pull the mic forward? And if you would twist it just a

bit so that it is pointed directly at you, that would help us.

Mr. ALOISE. These consequences could include theft of nuclear

material, explosion of an improved nuclear device, and use of the

material in a dirty bomb. To protect these sites, an effective security program is essential.

DOE’s security program begins with a document known as the

‘‘design basis threat,’’ which identifies the size and capabilities of

potential adversaries. The 2004 design basis threat identified a

much larger terrorist threat than before, and it could cost between

about $400 million and $600 million to develop the force necessary

to defeat this larger threat.

DOE is allowing its sites until October 2008 to fully meet the

new design basis threat. My remarks, which are based on the reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:22 Jan 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\25259.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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port we are issuing for the subcommittee today, will focus on

whether ESE protective forces are meeting current readiness requirements and what actions are needed to defend against a larger

October 2004 design basis threat.

Regarding readiness, we found that protective forces at the five

ESE sites, with weapons-grade nuclear material, generally meet

readiness requirements. Specifically, protective forces at the Savannah River site, Hanford site, Idaho, and Argonne West, and Oak

Ridge National Lab generally comply with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness and equipment, and had the required training programs and facilities.

However, we did find weaknesses that could impact the protective forces’ ability to defend their sites. For example, most officers

we spoke with were concerned about the quality and realism of

their training. Further, because DOE neither sets standards for,

nor tracks individual participation in force-on-force exercises, it

was difficult to determine how many officers had this important

training.

Another weakness identified by protective force officers at all five

sites concerned problems with their radios. Some said that the radios could not be relied on in the event of a terrorist attack.

In addition, although most protective forces are required to have

access to body armor, at one site we found that body armor had not

been issued for most officers. Another site did not have its own special response team. In the event of an attack, one of the jobs of a

special response team would be to recover stolen nuclear material.

In addition, the capability of some of the protective forces to fight

during a chemical or biological attack varied. Specifically, two sites

expected and provided equipment for most of their forces to fight

in contaminated areas. Another site did not provide any equipment.

Indeed, it expected its teams to evacuate the site with other workers. Yet another site expected its forces to fight in a chemically contaminated area, but did not provide protective gear.

Another weakness we observed was that only one of the five sites

had armored vehicles. In contrast, all six NNSA sites with weapons-grade nuclear material have armored vehicles.

Now regarding actions needed to meet the 2004 design basis

threat. In our view, DOE needs to develop and implement a comprehensive Department-wide plan which addresses, among other

things, the transition to an elite fighting force, investments in

emerging security technologies, and the consolidation of weaponsgrade nuclear material. Further, DOE needs to establish a centralized security office within ESE to help meet the challenges of implementing the new design basis threat.

While I am pleased to note that DOE has accepted our report

recommendations, DOE’s response to our recommendation to develop a comprehensive plan to meet the new design basis threat

does not go far enough. DOE has cited only individual efforts to address the new threat, and not the larger plan we are calling for.

Without such a plan, DOE may not be successful in meeting the

requirements of the 2004 design basis threat by October 2008.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I would be happy to

respond to any questions you or members of the subcommittee may

have.

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[NOTE.—The July 2005 GAO report entitled, ‘‘Nuclear Security,

DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the

New Design Basis Threat, GAO–05–611,’’ may be found in subcommittee files.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise follows:]

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Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Mr. Friedman.

STATEMENT OF GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,

I am pleased to be here, at your request, to testify on recent reviews conducted by the Office of Inspector General regarding security programs of the Department of Energy. This is the latest in

a series of testimonies that we have provided to the Congress on

this important subject. The issues addressed have included training, physical security, and performance testing. A number parallel

those addressed in GAO’s just issued report.

Between 2003 and 2005, we identified issues regarding protective

force overtime and training. In one review, which included five Department sites, we found the Department faced significant increases in unscheduled protective force overtime. Further, we noted

protective force morale and retention problems due to mandatory

overtime and reduced training opportunities.

In a review with the Department’s Oak Ridge Reservation, we

found that contractor protective force personnel spent, on average,

about 40 percent less time on combat readiness refresher training

than that specified in the training plan approved by Federal site

managers, and that the personnel worked in excess of the Department’s optimum 60-hour per week threshold.

In a third review we found that 10 of the 12 sites made significant modifications to the Department’s established protective force

core curriculum. This raised questions about the effectiveness of

the training received by the affected protective force personnel, as

well as the validity of the core curriculum.

In June 2005, we examined physical security at two DOE facilities. In the first review we found that foreign construction workers

using false identification documents gained access to the Oak Ridge

Y–12 National Security Complex. During our field work, management issued a revised access policy. Nonetheless, we were concerned, and are concerned, that similar conditions may exist at

other sensitive Department sites. Therefore, we recommended that

management determine whether agency-wide actions are warranted.

The second review concerns security at the Strategy Petroleum

Reserve. The Reserve, which the Department has designated as

part of its critical infrastructure, contains about 695 million barrels

of oil valued at about $36 billion. We concluded that physical security at the Reserve could be improved.

Specifically, we found that 87 percent of the non-protective force

contractor employees of the Reserve, some with the ability to access

sensitive areas unescorted, had never been processed for any level

of security clearance. Therefore, in our judgment, the Reserve’s

level of protection against the ‘‘insider threat’’ may not be consistent with its critical infrastructure designation. We also found the

Reserve’s deadly force policy may also not be consistent with the

Reserve’s critical infrastructure designation; and, finally, we identified opportunities to make site protective force performance tests

more realistic.

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Protective force performance testing was also the subject of a

January 2004 report, where we found that a performance test at

Y–12 was compromised as a result of certain protective force personnel being allowed to view computer simulations of the test scenarios prior to the test, and there was an apparent pattern of actions by Oak Ridge Reservation security personnel going back to

the mid-1980’s that may have negatively affected the reliability of

site performance tests.

In another 2004 report concerning Oak Ridge, we identified that

the two local Department management offices, the Oak Ridge office

and the Y–12 site office, were developing separate radio communications projects. The two projects as designed would have created

gaps in radio coverage and would have prevented Y–12 protective

forces from maintaining communications with the rest of the Oak

Ridge Reservation and their own dispatcher.

These findings were similar to an earlier review at four other Department sites, in which we found that three of the four sites did

not have direct radio communication with local law enforcement

agencies. These agencies would have been called upon to assist in

the pursuit of suspected felons or terrorists fleeing Department

sites.

We also have a number of ongoing and planned security reviews

relevant to the topics discussed during this hearing. This includes

an intensive effort to review the Department’s security program

and its progress in meeting the threat posed in the revised design

basis threat document.

The Department is working to address many security concerns

and is doing so at a substantial cost. The Office of Inspector General will continue to examine the Department’s security apparatus

with the goal of providing recommendations to enhance efficiency

and effectiveness.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes

my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Friedman follows:]

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Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Mr. Podonsky.

STATEMENT OF GLENN S. PODONSKY

Mr. PODONSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify regarding the readiness of protective force to defend Office of Energy, Science and Environment facilities in light of the GAO’s recent report on their examination of protective force training and equipment at five ESE

sites.

I will highlight relevant aspects of the GAO report from the perspective of the Office of Independent Oversight within my Office of

Security and Safety Performance Assurance. These issues are addressed in greater detail in my written statement.

The Department considers its responsibilities to protect national

security assets in our custody to be crucial. Secretary Bodman and

Deputy Secretary Sell have demonstrated an intense interest and

strong support for our security programs, and have continued the

significant initiatives begun by their predecessors. This support includes the policy of holding line managers responsible for security

program implementation and effectiveness, to include achieving established milestones for meeting the requirements of the Department’s design basis threat.

While ESE site missions are generally associated with basic and

applied scientific research and environmental remediation, rather

than with national security matters, some ESE sites and, in particular, the five sites addressed in the GAO report—currently possess significant quantities of special nuclear material.

We agree with the GAO’s general conclusion that protective

forces at ESE facilities visited are adequately trained and equipped

to protect the facilities under the current requirements. But there

are some weaknesses that must be addressed.

This conclusion is consistent with our own previous independent

oversight inspections of these facilities. We believe that ESE line

managers and security professionals at all ESE organizational levels will move quickly and effectively to address the protective force

training and equipment shortcomings outlined by the GAO, and

will likely respond positively to recommendations contained in the

draft report.

We anticipate efforts to do so will be integrated with many other

actions necessary to meet the requirements of the design basis

threat. We are confident that the new Under Secretary, Dave

Garman, together with the newly appointed ESE Director of Security, Bob Walsh, will provide the immediate and sustained high

level of attention necessary for these efforts to be successful.

We are currently pursuing a number of Department-wide initiatives designed to assist ESE in meeting its security challenges and

obligations. Two, in particular are aimed at achieving affordable security upgrades to meet the design basis threat requirements. One

of these is the Elite Force Initiative, by which we intend to enhance

the tactical capabilities of those protective elements responsible for

protecting our most critical national security assets.

We believe that to effectively defeat current and future threats,

we need protective force elements possessing the advanced trainVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:22 Jan 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\25259.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ing, weapons, equipment, and tactics that will enable them to conduct a coordinated and intense offensive and defensive tactical operation at skill levels comparable to those of elite military units.

While achieving this goal will require some modified training and

some upgraded equipment, together with policy changes, it should

not require significant changes in manpower levels. Many of our

current special response team personnel already possess high levels

of tactical skills and are well armed and equipped. And this initiative is more about changing how we use some protective force resources than it is about adding more resources.

Further, this initiative will not directly involve protective forces

at all ESE sites, especially those that do not possess critical national security assets, and may involve only a portion of the forces

at sites protecting such assets. We have a number of activities

under way to determine required changes in policy, defensive strategy and tactics, training, weapons, equipment, and supporting

technologies that will enable us to effectively implement the elite

force concept as envisioned on schedule.

Intertwined with the Elite Force Initiative is another complementary initiative, involving the increased use of security technologies to effectively and efficiently upgrade our protection systems. Through the prudent application of appropriate technologies,

we expect increased use of those security technologies to provide

cost savings and improved effectiveness over manpower intensive

alternatives.

It is important to clarify that when we refer to security technologies, we do not refer exclusively to expensive, high technology

and delicate electronic sensors. While such devices are certainly included, security technologies also include many other categories of

items, such as improved barrier systems, materials that provide

ballistic protection, advanced protective force weapons and equipment, and improved construction techniques. We expect the security technologies initiative to benefit all of our facilities.

The application of appropriate security technologies can improve

effectiveness and efficiency of any protection system. Therefore, we

believe all ESE sites are candidates for security technology upgrades, although we would expect more intensive investment in the

benefits of such technologies at sites protecting our more critical

assets.

I wish to note that the Idaho site within ESE has actually been

extremely proactive with our security technology deployment initiatives and has recently submitted an impressive design basis threat

implementation plan.

Through our technology deployment program, our site assistance

visit effort, and our development activities, we are making progress

in identifying and evaluating new technologies for site-specific applications.

In summary, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we

agree with the general results, conclusions, and recommendations

of the GAO report, and believe that ESE line managers under the

new ESE leadership will address the issues identified by the GAO

and the IG as they address the challenges associated with implementing the design basis threat.

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We believe that our elite force, security technology, and other security initiatives will assist ESE meeting those challenges within

the parameters established by Secretary Bodman and Deputy Secretary Sell. But they are challenges, and the ultimate success of

the effort will in fact require the attention and support of ESE line

managers at every level.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky follows:]

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Mr. TURNER. Dr. Brede.

Also, I want to acknowledge that Carolyn Maloney has joined us.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you.

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Brede.

Dr. Brede, I don’t think your mic is on.

STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE BREDE

Dr. BREDE. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to offer

my views on the readiness of Department of Energy Office of Energy, Science and Environment protective forces to meet the terrorist threats identified by the intelligence community.

The perspective I bring to the table is that of a senior contract

manager for a protective force and a soldier. Until recently, I

served as General Manager of the Savannah River site protective

force contract, one of the five sites recently reviewed by the GAO.

I served in that capacity for more than 12 years. And prior to my

DOE service, I spent 26 years as an Army officer with three combat

tours, including service with elite units.

Let me say up front, for the record, that our protective forces are

well trained and, as a group, are as capable as any of the military

units with which I have served. In fact, the majority of protective

force officers with whom I am familiar come from a military background and bring with them the skills necessary for the protection

of critical DOE assets.

Anecdotally, the winner of two annual recent National Level Tactical Competitions comes from a DOE ESE site. In these competitions, they scored consistently higher than military, law enforcement, and Federalized forces in tests of shooting, physical fitness,

and tactical skills.

With reference to the GAO report, I believe it provides a balanced assessment of ESE protective force readiness to defend their

respective sites. The report’s conclusions, that protective forces generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements and comply

with DOE standards, firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels,

and equipment standardization are accurate ones.

At the same time, the report’s identification of possible weaknesses and actions needed to correct these could serve to enhance

our abilities to defend against the 2004 design basis threat. Because it matters not how capable we are today, we ought to work

at being better than we are. Our sites can and are addressing the

weaknesses in training and equipment identified in the GAO draft

report.

I would submit if the GAO would conduct a review today on force

readiness at ESE sites, the results would be significantly different

than the snapshot taken when the last review began in March

2004. Today’s picture would reflect more tactically focused training,

the employment of more advanced weapons systems, communications, and armored vehicles, and a host of other actions related to

meeting the 2004 DBT.

Similarly, I believe that site contractors understand the necessity

to take our protective force readiness and capabilities to the next

level. That is, we need to transform certain segments of our legacy

force to an elite force. Based on secretarial guidance and Office of

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Security and Safety Performance Assurance initial efforts, some

sites—and the Savannah River site among them—have already

taken actions to transition to this elite force with challenging training, increased performance standards, and tactical reorganization.

I also believe that the transformation to an elite force can be facilitated by policy considerations in four areas: more challenging

physical fitness qualification standards; introduction of height,

weight, and body composition standards; identifying appropriate

safety performance expectations; and considering a uniform retirement plan to allow for cycling of human capital through elite force

units.

In conclusion, I believe that ESE protective forces are sufficiently

trained and equipped to meet existing DOE readiness requirements. Site implementation plans identifying how sites will meet

the increased challenges presented by the October 2004 DBT have

been provided to DOE ESE and are being reviewed for approval.

Meanwhile, my experience indicates we are being provided the resources necessary to support the phased implementation of measures to meet 2004 DBT protective force requirements.

While addressing certain policy issues will certainly enhance our

force readiness, I have confidence in our protective forces’ ability to

counter today’s and future threats. Simply stated, I am as proud

to serve as these forces as I was to serve with America’s sons and

daughters in my military experience.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brede follows:]

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Mr. TURNER. Dr. Adler.

STATEMENT OF DR. GLENN ADLER

Dr. ADLER. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,

thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Glenn Adler,

and I work for the Service Employees International Union. I have

submitted a statement for the record and will summarize the main

points.

We have three main concerns. The best standards in the world

will not improve security if contractors elude them if DOE’s oversight is weak, or if DOE lacks the will to weed out poor performers

or to avoid choosing them in the first place in the procurement

process.

SEIU is one of the largest trade unions in the United States,

with more than 1.8 million members. We are the largest union of

security officers in the country. I am responsible for coordinating

research and policy work in the Federal sector, including in DOE

nuclear facilities and NRC regulated commercial nuclear power

plants.

On September 11th, our security officers and janitors at the

World Trade Center, were among the first responders to that terrible tragedy, working side by side with the NYPD and the firefighters in a cause to which many of our members gave their lives.

But well before the horrible events of September 11th, SEIU had

been raising the issue of security standards, most notably for airport security screeners. We have partnered with responsible contractors, building owners, mayors, and Governors, to raise standards and improve performance.

We know DOE’s regulations for training and performance are, as

they should be, far beyond the standards in the commercial office

world. But the GAO report, on the table today, tells us that contractors are in significant ways not living up to them. Consider one

failure identified in the report and then echoed in the fine presentation by the Inspector General, undependable radio communications. This may sound like a minor matter to some people, but it

may contribute to serious problems. In fact, one may have already

occurred.

According to the New York Times, in 2004, poor radio communication played a role in the confusion of a near friendly fire incident at the Y–12 plant in Tennessee. Officers are courageous people, people doing difficult and important work. They are heavily

armed, and they go out into the night and we learn that perhaps

their radio communication doesn’t allow them to talk to each other.

To what extent is DOE’s multibillion dollar security budget compromised by poor radios and dead batteries? A chain is only as

strong as its weakest link.

This problem is directly connected to issues that are not directly

addressed in the GAO’s report, the oversight and accountability of

contractors’ behavior. SEIU believes security should be of the highest standard, whether performed by public authorities or by private

companies. We are not opposed to privatization. But contractors’ interest in the bottom line may encourage cheating and cutting corners.

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In response, we expect government to check and balance their behavior, and to change the incentives that may lead to cutting of

corners. But the Department sometimes contributes to these irresponsible outcomes. The GAO has consistently warned DOE about

problems, for example, with their award fees. Yet, these problems

persist today.

You are all familiar with last year’s IG report on cheating by the

foreign-owned contractor Wackenhut during a security drill at Y–

12. The incident cost the contractor about $200,000 in fees. But the

company still received a good performance grade from DOE and a

$2.3 million award fee. Rather than a multimillion dollar award

fee, such outrageous practices demanded serious sanctions from the

DOE, including the consideration of canceling the contract, suspension, or debarment. Remember, this is cheating at a facility that

contains special nuclear material.

We have heard from multiple security employees at other DOE

ESE sites that these practices are not confirmed to Y–12. And some

security officers told us the motto is ‘‘if you ain’t cheating, you ain’t

competing.’’

Oversight exercised by the Inspector General is critical to corralling this sort of behavior, but their oversight has been subject to

continuous public criticism by contractors. After the recent IG report on training problems at Oak Ridge, which is referenced in the

GAO report and which was mentioned by the representative from

the IG, a Wackenhut spokesman mocked the IG as ‘‘bean counters

who didn’t understand security practices.’’ Such comments indicate

contempt for the agencies, including Congress, to whom the IG reports, who are charged with oversight of these facilities. They create an impression, in the minds of the public, at least—at odds

with expectations of oversight and accountability.

To us, the conditions described by the GAO report are shocking

but not entirely surprising, since we encounter very similar problems in other contexts: NNSA sites, commercial nuclear power

plants, and U.S. military bases. However, today’s report and other

GAO and IG investigations tend to mirror the structure of DOE

itself, taking a piece of the puzzle and looking at it in depth.

We believe it is important to complement these perspectives by

assessing the contractors, and not just the agencies, and looking at

their entire record across different settings to learn whether a

problem reported at one facility is an isolated event or part of a

broader problem and pattern of poor performance. This will help in

oversight of current contractors and, if applied during the procurement process, will help weed out poor performances before they are

even awarded a contract.

In conclusion, the best standards in the world will not improve

security if contractors elude them, if DOE’s oversight is weak and

if DOE lacks the will to get rid of poor performers or to avoid

choosing them in the first place.

We make a few recommendations: One, that DOE urgency implements an effective process to monitor performance and weed out

poor performers, rather than reward them; a review of award fees

and the robust use of penalties to enforce compliance; DOE must

have a dramatically lower tolerance for cheating and cutting corners, making it too expensive for a contractor to risk this kind of

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behavior; and, faintly, DOE acquisition processes should be

strengthened to ensure contracting officers do the proper due diligence by assessing security contractors’ past performance and their

record of business integrity and ethics. This is already in the Federal acquisition regulars, but is not always applied in practice.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Adler follows:]

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Mr. TURNER. Mr. Walsh.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. WALSH

Mr. WALSH. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee. On behalf of Under Secretary David Garman, I

would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you

this morning to discuss the readiness of DOE protective forces at

facilities which are under the operational oversight of the Energy,

Science, and Environment programs.

My name is Robert Walsh. I am currently the Director of Security for Energy, Science, and Environment programs for the Department of Energy. This position was created last year by former

Deputy Secretary Kyle McSlarrow, pending the nomination and

confirmation of an Under Secretary. The purpose of creating this

position was to bring focus and management oversight to security

programs on the ESE side of the Department, similar to what the

Office of Nuclear Security provides for the National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA], and to ensure that ESE interests are

appropriately represented in the security management decisions of

the Department.

Subsequent to his confirmation on June 15th, and his swearing

in approximately 1 month ago, on June 23rd, Under Secretary

Garman directed that this position be formalized as a permanent

part of the staff of the Office of the Under Secretary. The objective

and intent of this position is to provide executive management

focus for DOE security initiatives as they apply to ESE programs,

and to ensure participation and coordination, together with Mr.

Podonsky’s organization and NNSA, in security decisions and management oversight of DOE security programs.

Although ESE security directors have had two informal meetings

since last October, we have taken advantage of the scheduling of

this hearing to convene our first official meeting of the ESE Security Management Team since Under Secretary Garman’s confirmation last month. In that regard, I am pleased to have with me

today security representatives from each of the ESE programs—

Environmental Management, Science and Nuclear Energy, Science

and Technology—and ESE sites, including Idaho, Savannah River,

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Richland, which specifically

were the subjects of the most recent Government Accountability Office report regarding ESE protective force readiness.

Mr. Chairman, we are here before you today to discuss the readiness of protective forces at DOE’s ESE sites. The Government Accountability Office has indicated that they believe that ESE security forces generally do meet readiness requirements as defined by

DOE policy directives, and we agree with this assessment.

We are extremely proud of the men and women who comprise the

protective forces which are responsible for protecting DOE facilities

on a daily basis. These officers are our first line of defense against

any active aggression from any number of malevolent sources, and

we believe they do an excellent job.

One indication of the overall readiness of protective forces at

ESE sites is the fact that special police officer teams from two ESE

sites placed first and second at this year’s annual Security Protection Officer Training Competition [SPOTC], which was held last

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month in Albuquerque, NM and was previously referenced in Dr.

Brede’s testimony.

Our team from Savannah River finished first among 11 teams,

representing ESE and NNSA sites from across the country, with

the Hanford Patrol team taking second place in the overall competition. In addition, this year’s Police Officer of the Year, Ryan

Strader, hails from Savannah River, as does Ryan’s colleague,

Allen Ford, the second place finisher in the overall individual competition. We are very proud of Ryan and Allen, and the teams from

Savannah River and Hanford for their outstanding showing in this

year’s competition, and I am pleased to recognize them here this

morning.

The GAO also identified a number of areas which they felt needed to be addressed, and DOE has either corrected or is working to

correct the weaknesses that GAO has identified. I would like to

take a moment to briefly summarize our efforts with regard to

GAO’s specific findings in this report.

First, GAO identified that current DOE policy does not require

all protective force officers to participate in every force-on-force exercise, and that sites were not required to formally track individual

officer participation in those exercises. GAO recommended that

DOE develop policy requirements to ensure officer participation

and to require sites to track individual officer involvement.

DOE agrees with these recommendations, and Mr. Podonsky’s office has committed to developing and issuing DOE-wide policy to

address both issues by the end of this calendar year. We plan to

work closely with Mr. Podonsky and his staff to ensure that this

is completed.

It should be noted that some ESE sites are already requiring this

participation in force-on-force exercises and are keeping track of

that participation.

Second, GAO found weaknesses or deficiencies at some ESE sites

with regard to equipment issuance or operability, including radio

communications, body armor, chemical protective gear, and availability of armored vehicles. We have conducted a comprehensive review of each identified category at each ESE site. We have corrected, or are in the process of correcting each weakness, and we

believe that each ESE site is currently in compliance with DOE

policy requirements in each case.

Mr. Chairman, we can provide more specific information regarding protective force equipment at your convenience.

GAO has also recommended that ESE develop Department-wide

multi-year fully resourced implementation plans to meet the requirements of the new design basis threat. Three of the four ESE

sites have participated in the jointly conducted site assistance visits to determine current and future resource requirements of the

current DBT. The fourth site, Hanford, is scheduled to be completed in September.

In addition, together with staff from Mr. Podonsky’s office, we

are currently reviewing the DBT implementation plans from each

ESE site. These plans include projected resource requirements and

specific timelines, and we believe we are currently meeting all requirements as they have been defined. We expect to complete our

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review and submit the plans to the Deputy Secretary for his approval by the end of this week.

Last, GAO recommended that the Under Secretary for ESE establish a security organization to provide management oversight

and coordination for security initiatives within ESE programs. As

stated earlier, Under Secretary Garman has formalized the position

of Director of Security for ESE as a formal part of his management

team. We believe that this initiative is responsive to GAO’s recommendation in this area.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the

committee for the opportunity to appear before you this morning,

and I would be happy to answer any questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walsh follows:]

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Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

We will begin questions for the panel with our chairman, Chairman Christopher Shays. We will begin with a 10 minute round of

questions.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the chairman for giving me this opportunity

to ask questions and to say I was in Iraq 24 hours ago, so I am

trying to listen, but it is a little difficult.

We have had three hearings with the Under Secretary for the

National Nuclear Security Administration, and this is our second

hearing on the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment. There are only two Members here. I don’t know that is an

indication that people think we are doing well or whether there are

just so many things to focus on.

However, I happen to think this is a hugely important hearing,

and I thank you all for being here. I am not sure if the chairman

and I will direct questions to everyone, so I have no problem with

others jumping in if they want to respond to questions.

Mr. Podonsky, you seem to come to either hearings we have,

given that you are involved in both areas, is that correct?

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. How would you evaluate ESE’s efforts to implement

the design basis threat denial of access security strategy?

Mr. PODONSKY. Until Under Secretary Garman was confirmed

and until Director Walsh was put into his position, I would characterize ESE as being somewhat slower in what we had anticipated

or hoped for implementation of the DBT. Part of that we believe

is because the ESE organization was made of very strong, sincere

individuals for their security programs within ESE, science, nuclear energy, environmental management, fossil energy.

The reality is they were all doing what they thought was prudent

for their particular sites. We did not see the rapidity that we felt

that was needed to implement the design basis threat, but they all

had their individual perspectives on what their priorities were. I

don’t want to speak for what their priorities——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me get to the next question.

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. How do you evaluate the ESE? Are you optimistic

that they are going to meet their 2008 deadline on the design basis

threat?

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir, we are guardedly optimistic that they

will because they have the new leadership that they have not had

in the history of the ESE before. And that guarded optimism comes

from the implementation plans that we have recently read from

Idaho and one of the other sites within ESE. We hadn’t seen that

enthusiasm before.

Mr. SHAYS. What kind of program office resistance have you encountered regarding the implementation of the design basis threat?

Mr. PODONSKY. If I said resistance, I misspoke. I think what we

have seen is extremely careful analysis of what the design basis

threat was and how it applied to their sites. The other thing that

I think, in all respect to the Department, the design basis threat

from May 2003 changed in October 2004. So we would expect that

ESE sites, like the NNSA sites, should be moving toward completion of the 2003 DBT numbers in 2006 for completion.

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Mr. SHAYS. I have a sense that the Department is reluctant to

implement the design basis threat. You don’t think there is a reluctance?

Mr. PODONSKY. We have seen a hesitancy in terms of the

Department——

Mr. SHAYS. That is called a reluctance.

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So you have seen that.

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Why did DOE change the design basis implementation deadline from October 2007 to October 2008?

Mr. PODONSKY. I am not familiar with the October 2007 deadline

being changed to 2008. There was a review that former Deputy

Secretary McSlarrow asked for to be conducted at the end of a series of this committee’s hearing and the GAO report on the NNSA

facilities.

Mr. SHAYS. I will throw this out to you and then anyone else who

wants to answer. The design basis threat, if it isn’t met until 2008,

we are basically stating that we are vulnerable. That is what it

says to me. In other words, we can’t meet what we believe is the

threat. So I guess what I have a hard time understanding is why

does it have to take 3 years? It doesn’t seem like it is rocket science

to me. It seems to me it is just a matter of doing it.

And I am going to throw this out to anyone else who wants to

answer.

Mr. PODONSKY. Mr. Shays, if I could start off, if my colleagues

here at the table will permit me. From an NNSA perspective, my

organization, that has both policy and oversight of the Department,

safeguarding security and cybersecurity, to name a few subjects, we

don’t disagree with the perception and the reality that if you have

a threat today, how can you not meet it until 2008 and beyond.

What we believe has been a great distraction for this body, as

well as the executive branch, is the focus on the policy of the design basis threat, when in reality it should be about implementation: the application of new technologies, the elite force that we

have mentioned in our testimonies here today, how we apply our

security strategies at our sites, and, equally as important, nuclear

material consolidation.

It gets confused between both the legislative arm and the executive branch on focusing on the policy and the threat, when in fact

we need to have our sites implement a more robust security posture than we currently have if we are going to meet today’s challenges that we see throughout the world.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t really feel that you have given me an answer

to the question, though. Why does it have to take so long?

Mr. PODONSKY. I don’t have an answer why it should take so

long.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. Walsh.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add is, and

I spent some time in intelligence and working on postulated threat

and design basis threat. The design basis threat is, and we have

to be careful that we don’t wind up getting into anything classified,

and make sure we don’t. But the design basis threat is a generic

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threat on which you design your protective forces and your protection strategy over a very long period of time, usually 15 or 20

years. For many years the design basis threat was fairly stable. I

think post-September 11th, realistically, we have to take a very

close look at that.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, you had to take a close look. For instance, if

you believed that people who came in to get one of the resources

that we were protecting, if you believed that they didn’t want to

lose their lives, were willing to risk losing lives, but didn’t want to

lose their lives, you believed that they also had to get out with the

material. So you had a design basis threat that said, well, maybe

they can get in, but they are not going to get out.

Mr. WALSH. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. But if you, all of a sudden, realize that they don’t

care if they get out, if they are willing to blow themselves up onsite, the design basis threat changes, correct?

Mr. WALSH. Parts of it change. The strategy may change.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, wouldn’t it mean that you might have accepted

their getting in, but now you can’t even let them get in? And

doesn’t that mean, then, that your whole resources have to change

and your whole strategy has to change?

Mr. WALSH. Well, they do. But it is more than just the strategy

of your adversary; it is the numbers of adversaries and numbers

of other things, and their capabilities that go into——

Mr. SHAYS. Right. But if you feel, for instance, that the design

basis threat was that they were only going to have one insider who

is helping, and you decide that there is going to be two out of the

logic that there could be two——

Mr. WALSH. That would change it.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. Then your design basis threat has

changed, correct?

Mr. WALSH. That would change it.

Mr. SHAYS. My question, though, is given that this is an incredible resource that we are trying to protect, why would we tolerate

having to wait 2, 3, 4, or 5 years? That is what I don’t understand.

Mr. WALSH. I know I am not understanding your question,

but——

Mr. SHAYS. But you aren’t answering the question. But why?

What is so difficult about a design basis threat that it has to take

4 or 5 years?

I will leave that on the table and go to the chairman. I am going

to come back to that.

Mr. WALSH. OK.

Mr. TURNER. Well, to pick up where the chairman has left off,

Mr. Podonsky, you made a statement that troubled me. You said

that this body has a design basis threat focus. And I was just conferring with counsel here. My recollection is the design basis threat

process is not one that Congress has imposed upon you. You have

just acknowledged that is the case. So we are left in doing an evaluation of whether or not you are sufficiently protecting these very

dangerous assets.

In reviewing your bureaucratic processes—and that is what concerns me most, is that we are talking about a bureaucratic process—you come up with a design basis threat and you determine

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whether or not you are going to meet it. You go through a process

to assess what it is going to take to meet it.

And I think that sometimes people don’t get their heads up from

their desks enough to look out of the window and say if you are

actually sitting in front of this body and saying you are not going

to meet the design basis threat until 2008, and it is a threat that

we all acknowledge exists today, not in 2008—Mr. Walsh, I disagree with your statement of a 15 or 20-year time period. You are

not projecting what the threat is in 2008; you are projecting what

the threat is today, and you are trying to meet it by 2008. Is that

correct?

Mr. WALSH. You are making an assessment of the most likely or

representative threat that you need to protect against and you

need to design your protection strategy against that. Because of the

nature of the design basis, it should stay fairly stable over a long

period of time.

Mr. TURNER. Does the design basis threat that you are currently

trying to meet in 2008 represent a capacity for a threat at these

facilities today? That is a pretty easy question.

Mr. WALSH. Well, not really.

Mr. TURNER. I mean, either you believe that what is currently

in your design basis threat that you are projecting to meet in 2008

is not a threat that is lurking out there today or you think it is.

And if you think it is, and you are saying that you are going to

meet it by 2008, then what you are saying is that DOE is not currently meeting the threat that is out there today.

Mr. WALSH. Well, first let me say that we on the ESE side, as

well as NNSA, are committed to meeting the design basis threat,

as it is presently laid out for us in the 2004 policy that we have;

and that is what we are moving toward meeting. Now, the question

of validity, what I can tell you is——

Mr. TURNER. Well, perhaps let me ask it again. Are you telling

me, then, that you do not believe that the design basis threat that

you are attempting to meet by 2008 represents the threat that exists at these facilities today?

Mr. WALSH. The most likely or most representative threat?

Mr. TURNER. Does it meet a threat that you are facing today? It

is either yes or no.

Mr. WALSH. No, I am sorry, Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. If you don’t believe it is out there, then that is a

whole other issue for us to pursue. Do you believe that the design

basis threat, that you are trying to meet by 2008, represents a

threat that exists to these facilities today?

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, it is more than a yes or

no answer. It has a lot to do with the numbers and the capabilities

and the strategies that you address with the numbers of people

that you assume are going to come at you. It is not really a yes

or no answer. And it is based on intelligence assessments and postulated threats. So I apologize, but it is more than a yes or no answer.

Mr. TURNER. Well, I disagree. And I am very disappointed in the

position that you have for security in DOE, that you would say that

you can’t answer yes or no. So we will just go down the panel.

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Mr. Aloise, do you believe that the design basis threat that they

are attempting to meet by 2008 represents a threat that exists to

these facilities today?

Mr. ALOISE. In our view, that is DOE’s criteria, and that is what

we measure them against.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Friedman.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is my understanding of the criteria for the

construction and development of the design basis threat essentially, yes.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Podonsky.

Mr. PODONSKY. It was written by my office, so my answer is yes.

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Brede.

Dr. BREDE. That is a policy question from an implementation

standpoint. We are preparing to deal with that threat today.

Mr. TURNER. That is not an answer.

Dr. BREDE. We posit that threat exists today. That is my opinion.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Dr. Adler.

Dr. ADLER. I will pass and say the last time I looked the DBT

was classified information, and I lack a security clearance, so I am

not capable of answering it.

Mr. TURNER. It is just an opinion as to whether or not you think

that the threat is out there today.

Dr. ADLER. Again, the specifics of what the DBT consists of are

not something that is shared with ordinary citizenry. What I would

say is what is put out in the news about what this could consist

of isn’t something that will happen in the future, it has already

happened. We have already been attacked by such force.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Walsh.

Mr. WALSH. Yes, sir.

Mr. TURNER. Do you want to change or supplement your answer,

or is your answer still so complex that I can’t decide if it is yes or

no?

Mr. WALSH. Well, two of the previous answers said that it is the

criteria that they measure to.

Mr. TURNER. That is why I found your answer confusing, because

my understanding of what the design basis threat was based on today’s threat, not a projection of the threat in 2008. And your answer was that it was the threat 10, 15 years out in the future.

Mr. WALSH. It is a generic threat by which you design your protective forces and your protective strategies that you hope will be

static for a number of years, 15 or 20 years. Now, you have to adjust that, and we have a review process for that every year. But

the design basis threat is your most likely or most representative

threat over a long period of time. I agree with two of the——

Mr. TURNER. So does it represent a threat that these facilities

have today? Does that long period of time that you are describing

to us include today?

Mr. WALSH. If you are asking if the design basis threat is the

most representative or most likely threat against DOE facilities

today, I would have to say I am not sure. We are going through

a review right now.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Walsh, you are trying to answer honestly, but I

feel like you are Mr. Ford, telling us well before Eastern Europe

was free, that it is free. And I would like you to kind of catch your

breath a second.

Mr. WALSH. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. It is not a difficult question to answer. The design

basis threat is the threat we believe exists today and will exist in

the future. We constantly are changing the design basis threat. The

fact that we can’t be ready until 2008 means that we are not ready.

And that gets to a question that I am going to pursue again.

But, frankly, your answer is alarming. Or it just shows that you

don’t believe in the design basis threat. In other words, obviously,

in the end, it is an opinion. It is an opinion, with a lot of different

people, that this is the threat that we have to protect against. If

you, in your mind, think that it doesn’t represent an accurate

threat, that is an answer that you can say, and you disagree with

the design basis threat. So let us go there.

Do you agree with the design basis threat or do you disagree

with the design basis threat, that is, we are not going to talk about

what it is, but do you agree with it?

Mr. WALSH. Once again, let me state for the record that we are

committed to the design basis threat as it is stated and we are

moving toward preparing for that through 2008.

Mr. SHAYS. I hear you.

Mr. WALSH. Because that is the Department policy. The Deputy

Secretary has asked us to review that right now, and we are undergoing an internal review of the DBT. But to restate it, if you are

asking me if I think the design basis threat right now, as it is stated, is the most likely or most representative threat against a DOE

facility——

Mr. SHAYS. I didn’t really ask it that way, because the design

basis threat isn’t necessarily the most likely.

Mr. WALSH. It is the most representative.

Mr. SHAYS. No. The most likely, it also has to be what we believe

we ultimately have to protect against.

Mr. WALSH. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. It may mean that the design basis threat includes

what we think is not as likely as something else, but we at least

have to get up to that level. We may think it is more likely that—

and since I haven’t looked at the design basis threat, the numbers

I am throwing out right now these numbers are made up.

But, for instance, if we thought the design basis threat involved

the fact that you could have two people on the inside working with

people on the outside, but we think it is more likely it will be one,

but we still have to prepare for two, yes, it is more likely that it

may be one, but we still believe that we have to have our design

basis threat to deal with two because it is still a possibility that

we know we have to protect against.

So when you say what is most likely, that is not really what I

am asking. I am asking you a question: are you working in this administration and are you on that side of the equation that disagrees with the design basis threat, and is that shaping your response? Because that is the only way I can justify your answer.

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Mr. WALSH. Well, the only thing I can say, sir, is that I think

that it is worth it to make sure that whatever the design basis

threat is, that it is right, that we get it right.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. WALSH. And we are in the process of reviewing it now. It

might very well——

Mr. SHAYS. And the question I have is do you disagree with the

present design basis threat? That is not top secret, you can say yes

or no. I haven’t asked you what it is.

Mr. WALSH. No, I understand that.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So are you on that side of the equation that disagrees with it?

Mr. WALSH. I am not totally convinced that the current intelligence foundation that really does go into developing a design

basis threat supports where we are right now.

Mr. SHAYS. That is a fair question. Now, if that is shaping your

response to the first question——

Mr. WALSH. I believe it is.

Mr. SHAYS. OK, but it shouldn’t, because the real question is, in

terms of policy, the design basis threat—the answer to the question

is the design basis threat is what we believe, based on what we

have agreed to, is a threat that we have to protect ourselves

against; not necessarily the most likely, it is a threat we have to

be able to protect ourselves against, and we test ourselves against

that.

Mr. WALSH. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. Then the answer to the question is a single yes, it

exists today. That is the simple answer to the question. The design

basis threat is the threat we believe exists today. Is that not true?

Mr. WALSH. That is true.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. And that is the better answer.

Mr. WALSH. That is true.

Mr. SHAYS. So we are going to sort out all your past answers and

that is an——

Mr. WALSH. OK. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And we are not badgering you into giving us that answer; that is the answer.

Mr. WALSH. I appreciate that.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And I appreciate your disagreement with the design basis threat, and that is fair. You have a right to disagree.

And you have a responsibility to tell us if you disagree. So that is

an honest dialog.

But what I am having trouble with is given that we think the

design basis threat is the threat we believe exists today, waiting

until 2008 or 2007 to protect ourselves against it is a little unsettling.

My question, and I will go with GAO and our Inspector General

to start us off in this—it seems to me that obviously, if you change

the design basis threat and you say that it is two insiders instead

of one, all of a sudden everything changes. Isn’t that correct? I

mean, if you are protected against one, and now you have changed

it so you have two insiders, then you have a different task? Can

both of you agree?

Mr. ALOISE. Yes.

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Friedman.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, I agree, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Or you may decide that if you said it was going

to be 15 people, and now we think potentially 20 people might attempt in some way to come in, that may change the design basis

threat. Is that correct?

Mr. ALOISE. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. A nodding of the head doesn’t get recorded. Mr.

Friedman.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. If you believe that someone might use

aircraft in a way that we didn’t anticipate, but now we say they

may use aircraft, that changes the design basis threat as well, is

that correct?

Mr. ALOISE. That is correct.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think it does, yes.

Mr. SHAYS. OK, both responded in the affirmative.

Now, given whatever caused us to change it, tell me what I need

to know beyond this: you may need more people or you may need

those people trained differently; you may need some technical capabilities that you didn’t have in the past; or you may have to do

structural things just with the site.

In other words, candidly, when we were looking at Mr. Brooks’

operation and one of the sites there, we thought a lot of old buildings, not a lot of clear sight lines. You need to get rid of some of

these buildings; there are a lot of places to hide.

So is there anything other than structural, technical, or people

that go into responding to a design basis threat? And I am not saying that there isn’t; what other ones out there? I am just trying to

understand why it is difficult, why you have to take 3 years. That

is what I am trying to understand. So you want to give me a——

Mr. ALOISE. That about sums up a lot of what you would need

to do.

Mr. SHAYS. Is your mic on, sir?

Mr. ALOISE. Excuse me?

Mr. SHAYS. Is your mic on?

Mr. ALOISE. Yes. One thing would be also the consolidation of

materials in fewer places would increase security, and you could

develop your design basis threat around that as well.

Mr. SHAYS. And that could take time to consolidate.

Mr. ALOISE. Sure. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. But it is also true that in the short-run you might

over-utilize people to compensate for the fact that in the future you

can consolidate and even use less people than you are using presently. In other words——

Mr. ALOISE. You would use less people, of course, at the places

where you took the material from.

Mr. SHAYS. When you consolidate, that enables you to focus your

attention; collectively you are using less people. But in the shortrun, until you consolidate you may have to use more people.

Mr. ALOISE. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. Even more than exists right now. In other words, you

look at it and say we have this number of people and they are

trained, but the challenge is we think that we are vulnerable with

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this new design basis threat. We can do it two ways: one is we can

add more people or we can take these three sites, make them one

site, or two sites and make them one, and even use less people. But

one takes longer, so you might have a short-run solution until you

get to the long-run solution. Which gets me to this basic point: Why

does it have to take 3 years to protect ourselves?

I will throw that open to anyone.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mr. Shays, can I? I come here as an IG, of course,

wearing several hats, but one of which is ensuring that we spend

our money prudently and in the right way. While I agree the ideal

is once you have an agreed upon, approved design basis threat that

is based on sound intelligence and all the rest, the ideal is to have

virtually an instantaneous defense for the threat that has been

postulated in the design basis threat. That is, where we should be

looking for. And I am not sure that the time that we have currently

have in mind is an acceptable level, and I agree with your point

on that.

But we want to make sure, as well, that we spend the money

wisely and get the money. We have to get the money, we have to

spend it wisely, and make sure it is spent in the right locations and

it is prioritized properly. And there are some time constraints that

are involved there.

I was going to mention the consolidation of material as well.

That is not an overnight process, and you have analyzed that quite

properly, I think.

So while I am not here defending the Department, I am here trying to make sure, as well, that we spend the money appropriately,

we award contracts properly and do all the things that have to be

done in Government——

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Friedman, let me just be very clear. As Inspector

General, I don’t ever view that your job is always to criticize the

Department. Sometimes you criticize it and sometimes you defend

it. And you should never be embarrassed by defending the Department, helping us understand.

Mr. Podonsky.

Mr. PODONSKY. Mr. Shays, if I could offer an alternate view, and

it goes back to my earlier statement that Mr. Turner responded to.

If I might go there first, because of my bringing in the legislative

arm and the executive branch. I was not criticizing either body; I

was making an observation that we are focused on a policy that is

important, but I too don’t have the responsibility for programmatic

implementation.

So it is easy for me to criticize, as an independent overseer, and

my criticism from my organization is the following: It shouldn’t

take enormous sums of money to meet the threat that we think we

are dealing with if we start out with changing our protective strategies, if we start applying new technologies that are actually some

off-the-shelf, if we begin changing the way we train our elite force

that we already have in place—not our elite force, but we already

have our special operation forces that are trained to be responsive

to different events. We need to start training them differently,

similar to the way my oversight trains its composite adversary

team.

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The nuclear material consolidation piece is in fact probably the

more daunting challenge because of State requirements and regulations, and where we are going to put all the material. But I would

offer to you we also, in SSA, share the same concern about the

length of time that it takes to implement the new DBT, which is

connected to budgetary cycles because people think that they need

an enormous amount of more money.

My colleague in the Inspector General’s office thinks it is going

to take an enormous amount of money; our colleague at GAO

thinks it is going to take a lot more money. And I would offer to

you that, yes, there will be more money, but not the amount of

money that everybody is talking about if we use the resources we

have at our sites today and use them in the 21st century.

Mr. SHAYS. My time has run out for this line, but let me just say

the feeling that I get when I think that a design basis threat can

take 3 to 4 years to get up to, it really says to me that it is almost

the attitude that Mr. Walsh has, that, you know, the design basis

threat almost represents the extreme and not the unlikely; and,

therefore, we don’t mind if it takes 3 years. That speaks volumes

to me about the attitude. It is really a statement that says that we

can do that and take that lump.

Mr. TURNER. I recognize Mr. Dent from Pennsylvania.

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Podonsky, my question is directed to you. GAO believes that

the ESE will not be able to field an elite force by the October 2008

DBT implementation deadline. You disagree. Why is that?

Mr. PODONSKY. I disagree that the Department will not be able

to have the elite force requirements and policies in place as scheduled. The elite force concept was a concept that was born last year

under previous Secretary Abraham’s security initiatives, and the

concept originally started out as whether we should Federalize the

forces or have them as contract guards.

And through an evolution of discussions with both ESE and

NNSA and field implementers, it was determined that what is really needed at our sites is the capability to respond differently to the

different events at our sites. Specifically, whether it be NNSA sites

or ESE sites, the traditional response by this Department has been

more of a law enforcement ‘‘respond to the bank robbery’’ response

as opposed to more of a military tactical response. We are moving

toward that tactical implementation now.

For the last year, since the anouncement of the initiative of the

elite force became a reality in terms of the initiative taking hold,

there have been multiple meetings and policy implementation

changes, and by the end of the year the part that I own and am

responsible for the Department, in terms of issuing policy, putting

out new standards, that will be done. Now, whether or not ESE

and NNSA step up to the requirement, I can’t speak for the implementers; that would be better answered by Mr. Walsh or by Mr.

Desmond from NNSA.

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Podonsky.

Mr. Aloise, I have a question for you. How would you evaluate

ESE efforts to implement the DBT denial of access security strategy, and do you think we can make the 2008 deadline for the DBT

implementation?

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Mr. ALOISE. Not by business as usual. We are calling for a comprehensive plan that outlines how they are going to develop the

elite force, how they are going to consolidate materials, how and

where they are going to develop and deploy technologies. We believe that this is a big endeavor, and you need a very smart plan

to show Congress and others how you are going to get there.

Mr. DENT. Thank you.

No further questions.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the Chair. Sorry I wasn’t in earlier; there

was a trade bill on the floor I was in debate on. So I appreciate

the chance to ask some questions.

I would like to begin with Mr. Podonsky. There have been hundreds of news stories over the last year related to security incidents

at the Department of Energy facilities guarded by Wackenhut, specifically the Nevada test site and Y–12. There have been at least

four Inspector General investigations in the past year relating to

Wackenhut’s performance.

And I understand the Nevada test site security contract, currently held by Wackenhut, is out to bid right now. I also understand from recent news reports that the two security contracts held

by Wackenhut in Oak Ridge are to be put out to bid together this

summer.

In the face of questions over Wackenhut’s performance, what is

the tolerance at DOE for a security contractor that creates an

image problem, if not a security risk?

Mr. PODONSKY. I think that question would be more appropriate

for Mr. Walsh, but let me start out with giving you the perspective

from the SSA. We oversee the Department in terms of its performance, and the performance tests that we have run over the many

years have demonstrated a mixed review on the capabilities of the

Wackenhut guard force. But when we have done these inspections,

like at Nevada test site, the corrective actions we have seen taken

by both the Federal and the contractor, have been appropriate to

resolve our concerns, and then we go back and retest them.

Mr. KUCINICH. So you are telling this subcommittee you really

don’t have any concerns about Wackenhut right now?

Mr. PODONSKY. We don’t look at Wackenhut as a corporation for

concerns. We look at the performance at each site.

Mr. KUCINICH. About their performance. Well, of course. That is

what I am talking about.

Mr. PODONSKY. But as a corporation or as a contractor, that

would be better answered by Mr. Walsh.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK, Mr. Walsh. Thank you, Mr. Podonsky.

Mr. Walsh.

Mr. WALSH. I am sorry, Mr. Kucinich, I wouldn’t have any information on that. We work on the ESE side, and you mentioned the

Nevada test site, which I don’t really have any knowledge of. I can

only say that the few times that I have been involved with direct

oversight of Wackenhut contracts, for instance, at headquarters, I

felt that they performed in more than an adequate way. So that

would be the only information I have.

109

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, let me ask you this, either you or Mr.

Podonsky, if you could answer this question. You had the recent IG

report on training and overtime problems at Oak Ridge.

Mr. WALSH. Right.

Mr. KUCINICH. And it recommended that the managers of Oak

Ridge and Y–12 site officers, ‘‘evaluate the impact of the issues discussed in this report on Wackenhut’s award fee.’’ Can you or Mr.

Podonsky inform this subcommittee of the progress of this recommendation since the report was issued?

Mr. PODONSKY. I can tell you relative to answer your question.

Our inspection team went down to Y–12 recently, in the last couple

months, and we saw a vast improvement over the last three inspections of the performance at Y–12. Specific to the recommendation,

I couldn’t give you a current status, but I can tell you that the performance of the protective force that we saw at Y–12 far exceeded

the last 6 years of our inspections.

Mr. KUCINICH. You say you can’t give us an evaluation in current

performance?

Mr. PODONSKY. No, I gave you the evaluation of the performance

of the protective force in performing their duties through the forceon-force test that we conducted and the training that we reviewed.

But relative to award fee and any other recommendations, I

couldn’t tell you where the program office is on that.

Mr. KUCINICH. Is there any way you can get that information

and get it to the committee? Is anyone here responsible for that

who could get that information to this committee?

Mr. WALSH. We can take it for the record, sir, absolutely.

Mr. KUCINICH. Can you do that?

Mr. WALSH. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I just want that acknowledged.

And, finally, Mr. Podonsky, many of the Department’s security

upgrades could be limited by consolidating the nuclear materials.

Indeed, a few weeks ago a DOE task force proposed just that for

DOE nuclear weapons research sites, moving all sensitive nuclear

materials to a new manufacturing site. What are your views on the

report of the task force and have you considered similar consolidation removal of Category I nuclear materials at ESE sites?

Mr. PODONSKY. Again, Mr. Kucinich, from our perspective, from

oversight, we think consolidation of nuclear materials is a must for

the Department if we are going to change our safeguards posture

and if we are going to continue to meet the evolving and potential

threat against the Department.

Mr. KUCINICH. It is my understanding, though, if I may, that according to a GAO report, neither ESE nor DOE has developed a

comprehensive or coordinated plan. Are we going to see one forthcoming?

Mr. PODONSKY. Again, I am not the program office, but I will attempt to give you an answer from my perspective, and that is that

the Secretary of Energy, Secretary Bodman, has in fact put together a nuclear material consolidation task group to take a look

at where the possibilities are for consolidation across both ESE

sites and NNSA sites. So I have every expectation that, between

the two Under Secretaries and the Secretary’s focus, that the Department will come up with a plan.

Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to ask the GAO, have you heard any

feedback from the Department that they are anticipating bringing

a plan to you?

Mr. ALOISE. Not specifically, but we are aware of the task force.

We think the plan, again, is what is needed, because we have

looked at individual plans and, in some cases, they conflict with

each other, site-to-site.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK.

Mr. Friedman, the reaction to your June 2005 report that raised

concerns about the excessive oversight of security officers at Y–12,

the Oak Ridge, TN facility, was strong. One employee of a contractor, Wackenhut, called your inspectors a bunch of bean counters

who didn’t understand security practices. Would you care to comment on the reaction by the NRC and Wackenhut officials to the

June report? And, also, do you believe security guards are as effective if they work more than 75 hours per week? And is hiring more

guards the only solution?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mr. Kucinich, I knew three of my grandparents

who were immigrants and didn’t have a great deal of formal education. They all told me to be the best. Whatever I did, they were

satisfied to be the best that I could be. So if I am a good bean

counter, I accept that manifold from Wackenhut. And I would rather not comment on it. I think our reports speak for themselves, and

I think that comment speaks for itself.

With regard to your second question as I understood it, clearly

the Department itself—and this is its criteria, not mine—has said

there are a maximum number of hours that a protective force officer can work before they become ineffective. They are just too tired

physically. And we found, in a disproportionate number of cases,

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that the guards were working beyond the maximum threshold that

the Department had established, and the risks, I think, are fairly

obvious.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, they are not obvious. What are the risks?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The risks are that physically and mentally they

are not capable of performing their duties.

Mr. KUCINICH. And what does that mean? Please, help this subcommittee understand what the implications are.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I think the implications are fairly clear, and

that is if the guard force, which is there to protect the facility and

protect the material, if the guards are tired, if they are overextended, then I think there is a potential degradation of the security of the facility and the material.

Mr. KUCINICH. So the greater the stress that is put on the

guards, the more there is a possibility of a breach of security? Is

it possible to say that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I am not a physiologist, so I can’t speak

with authority in that regard, but I think that is the conclusion I

would reach, yes.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK.

I guess that is it for now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Walsh.

Mr. WALSH. Yes, sir.

Mr. TURNER. In your discussion with Chairman Shays——

Mr. WALSH. Yes, sir.

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. I understood your answer to be that

you have some disagreement with the current design basis threat

based upon available intelligence. And if my understanding is incorrect, could you please tell me what a correct understanding

would be?

Mr. WALSH. What I hope to have said was that ESE programs

are committed to implementing the design basis threat as provided

to us, as it currently stands. We are committed to moving out and

doing the things necessary to make sure that we protect against

that design basis threat. I think whether or not the——

Mr. TURNER. Let me ask it again. I have to get back to this because your answers concern me because I have a followup question

I want to ask you. What I was asking you is the design basis threat

a threat that the facilities are experiencing today, is the threat that

is out there. And you did not give a yes or no answer, and Chairman Shays said to you, I believe, that one reason why you could

not believe that you could give a yes or no answer is if you disagreed with the current design basis threat, that you thought that

the current design basis threat was either insufficient or incorrect.

Mr. WALSH. Right.

Mr. TURNER. And I thought I heard you say that you did have

some concerns about the current design basis threat.

Mr. WALSH. I said that I was not 100 percent certain, and I believe that it is very important for us to make sure we get that

right, we get the DBT right, no matter what it is. But I am not

100 percent certain at this time that the fundamental intelligence

that supports and that goes into the process of deciding what the

design basis threat is is sufficient, in my mind, that I have seen

so far. And there might be other things out there that I haven’t

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seen. But what I have seen, I am not sure it supports the level that

we currently have as what I consider to be the most representative

threat against DOE facilities or nuclear facilities in general.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Which gets me to my question.

Mr. WALSH. OK.

Mr. TURNER. Do you believe that the current threat is higher or

lower than the current design basis threat?

Mr. WALSH. It is very difficult, until we do a more complete review, including a review of all the intelligence that is there. I

would really be going out on a limb as to whether I thought it was

higher or lower. I would really like to take part in the internal review that we are currently conducting at the request of Deputy

Secretary Sell and get that done, and then I will come back and

give you a good answer.

Mr. TURNER. Fair answer.

Mr. Friedman, you referenced in your written testimony the nonU.S. citizens that were improperly allowed access to leased facilities at Y–12. Your testimony references it in the plural. Could you

tell us how many, if you know?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mr. Turner, I know the answer to the question,

and it doesn’t come to me to recall. It was between 20 and 30.

Mr. TURNER. Non-U.S. citizens——

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is correct.

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. That used false identification.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is right.

Mr. TURNER. Can you say the number again?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It was about 30.

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Brede, one of the issues that has come up in

this hearing as a point to discuss is Wackenhut’s foreign ownership. Could you please go over the current foreign ownership structure of Wackenhut and also, if you will, tell us what businesses the

parent corporation and affiliate corporations to Wackenhut are engaged in internationally?

Dr. BREDE. Yes, sir. The parent organization is currently British

owned. We formed essentially a separate government services organization with a firewall between WSI, which is Wackenhut Services

Inc., the government arm of Wackenhut, and the remainder of

PWC, or the Wackenhut Corp. In doing so, we went through the

FOCI, or foreign owned and controlled process implemented by the

Department—not only the Department of Energy, but the Department of Defense—to meet the specific requirements for parent organizations like ours.

We are essentially in the security and emergency services business. We provide firefighting and emergency medical and security

services throughout the world.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Podonsky, in the number of hearings that we

have had on these issues, of DOE security, I have always appreciated your forthcoming positions on both concerns and issues

where you believe that DOE is performing. And in the materials

that we have concerning the GAO report there are a number of references to surveys that have been taken of the officers that are actually providing the security services.

I am just going to review a few of those and then I would like

your thoughts on this, because when the GAO sites the issue of moVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:22 Jan 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\25259.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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rale, and then when you look at these specific survey statistics,

they do not rate well. And I will give even the positive ones and

the negative ones.

Specifically, 102 of the 105 officers GAO interviewed say that

they believe that they understand what was expected of them.

Sixty-five of the 105 officers rated the readiness of their site’s protective forces high, while 20 officers rated their protective forces

somewhat or moderately ready to defend the site. Only a minority

of the officers, 16 of the 105, rated the readiness of their force to

defend their sites as low.

Then when you go to the other numbers, when you look at the

critique of the force-on-force analysis, 23 of 84 protective force officers that had participated in these exercises believed that they

were realistic. While 23 said they were somewhat realistic, in contrast, 38 officers believed they were not realistic.

Then on the communication equipment, 66 of the 105 protective

force officers reported that they did not always have dependable

radio communications, with 23 officers identifying sporadic battery

life, 29 officers reporting poor reception at some locations on the

site as the two most important problems.

And when you go to the issue of protective force vehicles, 14 out

of 30 of the protective force officers interviewed at two sites reported patrol vehicles were old, in poor physical condition, and not

suitable for pursuit and recovery missions.

On the creation of an elite force, 74 out of 105 reported that they

are not at all confident in their current ability to defeat the new

threats contained in the design basis threat.

Could you comment on the officers’ survey responses?

Mr. PODONSKY. The responses from the individuals interviewed

by the GAO are often alarming to me in my role in the Office of

Oversight and Policy. First and foremost, the elite force, we do believe that the training is important, that we get that to those identified to play that role at their particular sites. Our national training center in Albuquerque, NM is setting up new curricula for that

purpose so that we do get the training out to the sites.

In terms of equipment, we have experienced ourselves, during

our inspections, that there have been equipment issues, both in

protective gear as well as radios, and we have seen that the sites

have acknowledged that and are in the process of procuring equipment to fix those issues that were identified.

Relative to the lack of confidence that the force-on-force exercises

are realistic, having done force-on-force exercises for my organization for 20 years, I would tell you that the exercises that are our

independent oversight runs have a balance between safety and security. But they are as realistic as humanly possible, considering

the safety constraints. We don’t use real bullets; we use laser.

But we have employed in our organization former Navy Seal Op

6, Delta Force, Army Rangers. We bring people in from real world

who—Mr. Shays just came back from the Middle East. We employ

people who have served time there so that we can put into place

a realistic testing of the forces.

Now, whether the sites, when they do their force-on-force exercise, follow all that same realism, you are probably going to get a

mixed story there.

115

So we don’t disagree with the findings or the interviews that the

GAO has. We take that on from my policy organization and my

oversight organization as the challenge to fix the problems; get out

there and find out why the implementation isn’t taking place in

terms of robust force-on-force. Or, if it is, then let us see how better

we can fix it.

Further, make sure that the equipment is provided to the security officers. Obviously, I sit in an interesting situation because we

don’t implement the policy, we don’t fund the equipment; we just

criticize what sometimes needs to be criticized, very similar to the

Inspector General’s Office, but from a different perspective.

But one thing I would also add, the commitment that we have

in SSA that I would like this subcommittee to know, we have put

in our budget the deployment of new technologies at four sites,

both two at NNSA and two at ESE. And the reason we have done

that, using money that the Congress has given me for technology

deployment and technology development, is to get it out there now

and to demonstrate to the program officers that it can be done.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, once

again, I want to thank the Chair for calling to the American people’s attention some of these very serious security issues. Thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

Of course, we are here to talk about what the actions are must

be taken that are needed by the DOE to improve security of weapons grade nuclear material at our Energy, Science, and Environmental sites. And it is necessary to focus in on those who are providing the security in order to come to some kind of a conclusion

about how secure these sites are. So in that regard I would like to

focus some questions on Dr. Brede from Wackenhut, first of all, to

kind of get an idea, for those people who aren’t as familiar with

Wackenhut as certainly you are.

What are Wackenhut’s annual sales and their revenue? There

was a profit last year. Could you tell us a little bit about the financial strength of the Wackenhut Corp.?

Dr. BREDE. I cannot. I can certainly take that for the record. Initially, in my opening statement, I indicated that I had just come

from, as the general manager of the Savannah River site. And I

can speak to those financials, but I am not prepared, sir, to address

those. However, I am willing to take it for the record.

Mr. KUCINICH. Because I think, as a matter of record, if we have

a corporation that is charged with providing security at these sites,

we certainly want to know what kind of financial condition that

corporation is in. We not only want to know their ownership; we

want to know if they are vulnerable to takeover; we want to know

if they are making a profit, if they are experiencing a loss; we want

to know what their partnerships are. Because we are talking about

security, and we have to look at the architecture of security.

Can you tell the subcommittee, Dr. Brede, the security guards

who are the subject of some of the discussions here in front of the

committee, how much do they make an hour? What is their hourly

pay?

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Dr. BREDE. It varies. At the Savannah River site they earn some- thing like $19 an hour, with overtime differentials and that sort of

thing.

Mr. KUCINICH. That is every security personnel who is working there makes $19 an hour?

Dr. BREDE. No, sir. It is based on—we have unarmed——

Mr. KUCINICH. What is the lowest that a security guard would

make?

Dr. BREDE. Somewhere in the range of $12 to $13 an hour.

Mr. KUCINICH. Is the lowest. And do these individuals also have

full health benefits?

Dr. BREDE. Yes, they do.

Mr. KUCINICH. And are there any deductibles or co-pays? I mean,

is it fully paid health benefits, is that what you are saying?

Dr. BREDE. There are some minor co-pays.

Mr. KUCINICH. And are these people who get paid time and a

half for overtime, double time for holidays, and things like that?

Dr. BREDE. Shift differentials, yes, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. They get that? Are these people who have retirement benefits, do you know?

Dr. BREDE. Essentially, their retirement plan at the Savannah

River site is a two-pronged plan. One is there is an annual contribution made to a pension plan and, second, there is a 401(k)

matching plan.

One of the things that I pointed out in my opening testimony is

that as we build this elite force, one of the things that needs to be

looked at is a uniform benefit and retirement plan across the complex, if we are going to effectively recycle human capital through

the elite force.

Mr. KUCINICH. And how long have you been with Wackenhut?

Dr. BREDE. I have been with Wackenhut for 12 years, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. And what about these security guards, do you

know generally how long these security guards have been with the

Wackenhut Corp.? How long the security guards who are the subject of some of the discussions today, how long they have been with

Wackenhut?

Dr. BREDE. I cannot speak to those at other sites. I can say that

those at the Savannah River site have been with us anywhere from

21 years, as long as 21 years. More recently I believe our last class

was run less than 2 years ago.

Mr. KUCINICH. Because I think it would be instructive for the

subcommittee to see what the length of service is of the people that

we are talking about so we could be able to make some kind of a

determination as to whether or not some of the difficulties that

may be experienced at some of these facilities might happen to be

with a work force that perhaps is not as well trained.

Now, I would like to ask what is your doctorate in?

Dr. BREDE. It is in criminal justice.

Mr. KUCINICH. Criminal justice, OK. OK, that is important for

this next question. What about this issue of guards who are routinely working in excess of 60 hours per week? And that is in direct

violation of DOE policy. Do you think that is appropriate?

Dr. BREDE. Actually, what the DOE manual really says is that

it imposes a limit of 60 hours, but goes on to say unless there are

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alternate arrangements based on collective bargaining agreements

between management and the unions, which in the case cited, Oak

Ridge, there does happen to be an agreement between the unions

there and management.

Mr. KUCINICH. So which unions are you talking about here?

Dr. BREDE. The IGUA and the SFPFA, Security, Police, and Fire

Professionals of America.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK. So you are saying you have an agreement

with this organization and they say 60 hours is OK. Well, as someone who is a Ph.D. with a background in criminology, do you think

having guards working in excess of 60 hours per week is a sound

policy?

Dr. BREDE. Our preference would be that they work less than 60

hours a week. However, beginning with the situation we found ourselves in following September 11th, we actually, in some cases,

worked much more than that to meet what we perceived as the increased threat. We are hiring additional officers at that particular

site, incidentally, to minimize the necessity for overtime.

Mr. KUCINICH. Do you think guards who are working that many

hours are as effective as guards who work, let us say, a 40 hour

week? What is your experience in that as a criminologist?

Dr. BREDE. Well, I think my more pertinent experience perhaps

is my military experience. Are they as effective? I believe the answer is no. But are they sufficiently effective to provide a defense

against the threat? I believe they certainly can be based on their

training.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, this subcommittee, at least staff, has provided information that says that these guards are working in excess of 60 hours a week, week after week, month after month.

What can you tell this subcommittee about Wackenhut’s determination to make sure that these facilities are receiving optimum

protection from a work force that is not being ground up?

Dr. BREDE. I would submit to you, sir, that this is not necessarily

a Wackenhut issue, but, rather, a protect——

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, let us talk about it in terms of Wackenhut,

though.

Dr. BREDE [continuing]. A protective force issue. We are saying

we saw the same difficulty across the board at many of our sites

following September 11th. One of the problems that we experienced, again, througout the complex, is that when an officer goes

through his or her basic training and are employed, we must wait

on security clearances.

So there is not an immediate resolution to the overtime problem.

We await security clearances and human reliability program clearances before we can always put an officer to work. That does operate to alleviate the problems that we are experiencing with overtime.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, let me just say this becomes critical to the

concerns of this subcommittee about improving security at these

nuclear facilities, because if we have a work force that is overextended, that is tired, that doesn’t get relief, is working long hours

week after week, month after work, you have a work force that is

not going to be as alert.

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Now, it occurs to me that, notwithstanding Wackenhut’s desire

to be of service to the United States of America, that it might be,

Mr. Chairman, based on the record, that you have an overextended

work force here in a contractor who may desperately want to be

holding onto a contract, keep working the workers, put in more

hours and more hours, but not really be able to meet the terms

which we expect to protect. I mean, either you need more people

doing it or you need a whole different arrangement that isn’t reflected by what Wackenhut is doing, with all due respect.

I have one more question before we move on, and that is for Dr.

Adler. Given the number of security problems and other incidents

that have been revealed in the last 15 months at DOE facilities

guarded by Wackenhut, do you believe that DOE could be better

served by hiring a different security contractor or providing security through another kind of protective force or protective force

structure? Could you just give us an opinion?

Then I will yield to the chairman.

Dr. ADLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Kucinich. Our comments

don’t go to the security force structure per se; it goes to the way

things are organized at present. No contractor is a saint. Everyone

makes mistakes. And if they didn’t make mistakes, you wouldn’t

test. We test to find the mistakes and correct them. The question

that I have is what do you do when you find a mistake. Do you

admit it honestly? Do you try to discover the roots? Do you attempt

to redress the problems and resolve them and move forward?

What we see, however, here is not just a mistake, one or two, a

snapshot, as my fellow panel member said. We see something more

like a full-length motion picture; and it is not a comedy. What we

see here are a series of problems, often on the same themes, that

are not being adequately addressed. They are not being adequately

addressed by the contractor, nor by those directly responsible

for——

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, that is why we are having this hearing.

Dr. ADLER. Yes. And I think the oversight that is being provided

by this hearing here is to air these problems.

Let us take, for example, the training issue. There is nothing

new in the fact that training is not realistic. The IG made a comprehensive review of this over a year ago and identified training

cutbacks and deviations from policy at a number of DOE facilities.

We would think that would get people alert, that the practice

would be stopped and people would conform with policy or indicate

where they are not in conformance.

Well, the IG now reports in June that, in fact, at Y–12 and at

Oak Ridge, both facilities, there are deviations from the training.

They said in excess of 40 percent of the planned hours are not actually being used for training. Now, why is that the case now? What

we would expect is for those careful reports to be acted on and for

heads to roll, frankly. For a regime to be set up where there is no

tolerance for this sort of behavior, and those who are responsible

for it to be appropriately punished so that it is too expensive for

them to do it.

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank the gentleman.

I want to thank the Chair for his indulgence, and appreciate the

committee. Thank you very much.

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Mr. TURNER. Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. I understand that this hearing is not about the

question that I am going to ask, but maybe somebody can answer

it anyhow. And I apologize for my tardiness.

I understand we have 65 nuclear power plants, and I was just

told by our staff that there are 103 nuclear reactors. Can anybody

tell me what measures are being taken to protect those facilities

from either a ground attack or an air attack?

One of the reasons I ask that question is not too long ago, well,

twice in the last couple months, we have had scares here in the

Capitol, where they had to evacuate the Capitol and other facilities

around the Capitol because they thought there might be a plane

heading toward the Capitol.

And I would just like to know, with the nuclear exposure we

have at these facilities, what measures are being taken to protect

those facilities so that if a plane does try to go in there, or they

make an attack on one of these power plants, that we don’t have

a nuclear disaster that spreads nuclear material all over the place.

So anybody that can answer that for me, if you can, I would really appreciate it.

Mr. PODONSKY. Mr. Burton, I don’t think any of us could directly

answer that question because the facilities you are talking about

are licensed under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. And while

we have some relationships with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in terms of our exchange on material control accountability,

and we are looking at physical security now, I shouldn’t speak for

everybody, but we could not give you a direct answer.

Mr. BURTON. Who would I address that question to? Does GAO

have any information on that? Has GAO looked into that?

Mr. ALOISE. Currently, we do have some work going on now looking at it. We have not finished our work, it is ongoing. NRC has

its own DBT, design basis threat, by which it guards its facilities,

similar to DOE’s design basis threat, although it is not exactly the

same.

Mr. BURTON. Maybe I could just ask the chairman, because the

chairman is up on all this.

Mr. SHAYS. I would say to the gentleman that what the GAO is

doing is a request of ours. Maybe others have requested it as well.

We will be having a hearing on the GAO report. We encounter a

lot of different issues when we are looking at our nuclear electrical

generations plants, whether the security there—for instance, the

very people who are defending it also have contracts to try to infiltrate on both sides of the equation, and that is of concern to us.

We have a lot of concerns, frankly.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I would like to talk to you about that, because

that has been one of my concerns. That is one of the reasons I came

down today. Maybe we could do a hearing down the road on that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. SHAYS. We are almost done here.

We had a hearing one time about whether our troops were exposed to chemical weapons, and we asked the question and DOD

said there has been no offensive use of chemicals in Iraq. This was

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in the first Gulf war. We then learned and had films of how our

troops were exposed in Camassia.

And when we contacted DOD, they came back to us and said,

well, our troops hadn’t been exposed to offensive use, they were exposed to defensive use. And it made me realize sometimes how you

almost get in a word game. I mean, they knew the intent of the

subcommittee. And that is why we tend to focus a little bit on how

you are answering these questions to understand really what are

you saying.

Dr. Brede, when you said that your company is currently owned,

you weren’t trying to imply that it won’t be currently owned in the

future? It is in fact owned by——

Dr. BREDE. Absolutely.

Mr. SHAYS. And it just raises the question your people are

aware—let me ask you this. Do some of your folks have security

clearances or do all of them have security clearances?

Dr. BREDE. The majority of our people do have security clearances.

Mr. SHAYS. And that is because they are in a facility where, if

they were on the wrong side of the equation, could do tremendous

harm, correct?

Dr. BREDE. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. So we care greatly about their capabilities. We care

about how much they are paid, because we want to make sure you

are able to attract good people; people that might want to go somewhere else, but they are paid so well they stay there. Do you have

a significant turnover rate?

Dr. BREDE. No. In fact, we do not. At the Savannah River site,

for example, the turnover rate there is somewhere in the neighborhood of 2 percent. At the Oak Ridge site, if I may——

Mr. SHAYS. Two percent over what period of time?

Dr. BREDE. Sorry?

Mr. SHAYS. Over what period of time? Is there a time relating

to the 2 percent? Two percent means what?

Dr. BREDE. Two percent means we average about 2 percent turnover per year.

Mr. SHAYS. Per year. OK.

Dr. BREDE. And if I recall correctly, at the Oak Ridge site, it is

in the neighborhood of 3 to 5 percent. There was an up-tick back

in 2001, 2002, where the air marshals were hiring, and some of our

officers left to go there. But that has since dissipated and the numbers are much lower now.

Mr. SHAYS. And there is obviously logic to wanting people to

have expertise. I mean, if we are training them, to have them leave

after they have been trained is not a great use of our resources,

or yours.

Dr. BREDE. No, it is not.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Adler, your employees work both as government

employees and for private contractors, both?

Dr. ADLER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Do any of them work for Dr. Brede’s company?

Dr. ADLER. A small number.

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Mr. SHAYS. Is there anything, before this hearing ends, that you

would like to add about the employees you represent and the concerns they have?

Dr. ADLER. I think the key point would be that our union has

been seeking partnerships with employers, with mayors, Governors, and their clients on consistent ways to raise standards in

the security industry, and we have been doing it for a long time.

And we do this with the biggest security companies in the country.

The kinds of problems we are talking here today, some of them

are large-scale, but the lion’s share of them, particularly, I think,

around an elite training force, are problems that can come right

through consultation with the people involved, if there is a willingness to admit the difficulties and work hard to overcome them.

What I have heard today—and I should say I have heard it from

both sides, from the contractors and those responsible—is, to some

extent, denial; to another extent I think it is not wishing the problem away, but pretending that the problems have solved themselves. What we have been presented by the GAO and the IG are

serious problems. We have encountered these in the private sector,

and they are surmountable problems. But it is not a resource problem; the officers aren’t poorly paid, and Mr. Podonsky has seconded

this. The problem is a matter of will.

Mr. SHAYS. Is what?

Dr. ADLER. The problem is a matter of will, of a willingness to

confront these problems and overcome them in consultation with

those most directly involved, and in this case I mean the guards.

I don’t see that emerging from this discussion or from the practices

of the Department over the last number of years.

Mr. SHAYS. Is there a difference of approach when the government hires the employees and when the contractor, or is it pretty

much similar?

Dr. ADLER. Well, I think the pressure on the private contractor

to cut costs is greater than it is in government, particularly if they

have to report to a foreign owner who is publicly traded. I think

that pressure is there anyway, but I think it is very sharp in the

private world. We encounter it all the time in the commercial office

world. And those pressures can only be lifted, I think, in an effective regime of oversight that punishes those kinds of cost cuttings.

Mr. SHAYS. GAO has said in their statement, ‘‘However, DOE

neither sets standards for individual protective force officers participation in these exercises, nor requires sites to track individual

participation.’’ This is under the heading ‘‘Performance Testing and

Training.’’ In your statement it is not that much different, you said

‘‘Most officers we spoke with were concerned about their quality

and realism of their training,’’ which gets me to your point. ‘‘Further, because DOE neither sets standards for nor tracks individual

participation for its exercises, it was difficult to determine how

many officers had this important training.’’

I am asking the question why not, and I think it goes to you, Mr.

Podonsky, and it goes to you, Mr. Walsh. Why does DOE neither

set standards for, nor track individual participation for its exercises? So I will start with Mr. Walsh first.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Shays, we do need to track that, and we agree

100 percent with those recommendations. We are going to work

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with Mr. Podonsky’s office. We have already been in contact with

each other to commit to develop policy requirements to do that by

the end of this year on both of those cases.

Mr. SHAYS. Good. Thank you.

Mr. Podonsky.

Mr. PODONSKY. Mr. Shays, I would tell you candidly I am embarrassed that 17 months ago I took over the policy group and I did

not know until the GAO report that the individual tracking of participants in DOE was not taking place. I will tell you that I was

under the wrong assumption for 20 years, when my oversight was

conducting these tests, that all the sites were tracking and following the performance of each individual. We are changing that.

Mr. SHAYS. That is one reason we have the GAO and an Inspector General, and my attitude is if they point out things that need

correction and there is a willingness to jump right in and deal with

it, that is when I think the system works the best. We never can

make an assumption that they are not going to find things that

need work.

So I am happy to end on that note as far as my questions.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. First of all, I don’t want to belabor this point and

discuss something that is not on the agenda today, but about 21⁄2

years ago, I think, according to the staff, you had a hearing on one

of the nuclear plants and how they protect them. And according to

what your staff expert said was that nuclear plant could withstand

an air attack of some magnitude without disbursing a lot of nuclear

material into the atmosphere.

I have a television show I do about every couple months, and I

had Curt Weldon on, Congressman Weldon, who is an expert in a

lot of areas on the National Security Committee. And he brought

on a briefcase that the Soviet Union—it was a replica of a briefcase

the Soviet Union had made. There were 65 or 70 of them manufactured, and there were nuclear weapons in a briefcase; they weighed

about 50 pounds. And I was told by him and other experts that

would destroy an area of about five city blocks if it was ever detonated.

Now, several of those briefcase nuclear devices have never been

accounted for by the Russians, and there may be others that have

been manufactured. So what I would like for GAO to find out is—

and I understand from staff that the FAA has some real problems

with creating areas around these nuclear power plants where

planes can’t fly, I guess because of the air lanes that we have.

But it seems to me if a nuclear device can be put in a briefcase,

it can certainly be put on a small plane. And if it would destroy

five square blocks, it certainly could penetrate and do a lot of damage to a nuclear power plant.

I would like to find out if there is anything we could do to protect

those nuclear power plants from that kind of air attack. Because

if there is an air attack and you do have something like Chernobyl

take place because of that air attack, you are going to have tens

of thousands of people dying of radiation poisoning or ancillary diseases, cancer or whatever it happens to be. So I don’t know if you

guys have ever looked at that at GAO, but I would like—I understand you are doing a research project right now.

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Could you include that in your research project? Also, I would

like to, in that research project, if you could, there may be some

air restrictions by FAA that we could live with, but when you are

talking about low-flying aircraft that gets down below, say, 1,000

or 2,000 feet, there might be some way to protect that nuclear facility against that, if it gets within a certain radius that might endanger that area.

There is no question in my mind that small nuclear devices could

be produced and put on a small aircraft that could penetrate those,

no matter how strong they are, if what I have been told in the past

is accurate. And I would just like to find out if there is any way

to protect those 60-some nuclear power plants and those 100-some

reactors we have from that kind of an attack.

So, Mr. Chairman, I would really like to look into that. And if

we could have that study expanded to include that, I would really

appreciate it.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. If the gentleman would yield.

Mr. BURTON. I will yield to my colleague.

Mr. SHAYS. My understanding is the NRC is looking at flight

zones right now and are looking at the vulnerability. But maybe

you could be responsive to the issue, without delving into too much,

to say whether, in this mix of looking at the postulated threat and

the design basis threat, whether we obviously take a look at aircraft and the possibility of their being able to do damage. Maybe

you could respond, someone, to that question.

Mr. PODONSKY. At 1:45 today we are meeting with Deputy Secretary Sell to have the detailed discussion on the latest review of

the design basis threat, and part of that is looking at not only the

numbers that we have talked about, around, but also in looking at

all that encompasses and what kind of threats are realistic today

that we really need to protect against.

Mr. SHAYS. Including——

Mr. PODONSKY. Including aircraft and what can we do.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Friedman, you indicated you wanted to respond?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I appreciate the courtesy, Mr. Chairman. You

asked an important question before about the number of illegal

aliens and regarding Y–12, and I misspoke. I wasn’t sure that I recalled the answer, and I recalled it incorrectly. The correct answer

is 16, and I would like to correct that for the record, if you don’t

mind. And I thank you and I apologize.

Mr. TURNER. I thank you for that number, and I appreciate your

trying to accommodate us with an estimate. So thank you for the

correction.

Dr. Brede, Dr. Adler was raising the issue, when we have security that is being provided by a private company, that, unlike in

the operations of government-provided security, you have the issue

of the bottom line that is more prevalent and, therefore, pressures

to cut costs. My thought is that you also have the pressure to increase revenue.

And with the series of questions and concerns that have been

raised about the extensive time that some security personnel are

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working it made me wonder about the current construct of your

contract. The contract under which you are paid for the services,

is it a cost-plus contract?

Dr. BREDE. It varies with each site. At Oak Ridge I believe it is

a fixed price contract; at the Savannah River site it is a cost plus

award fee contract.

Mr. TURNER. And the award fee, is that a percentage of your expenses? Obviously, if you are encouraged to——

Dr. BREDE. It is not a percentage, sir, it is an agreed-upon figure

agreed upon at the initiation of the contract, and adjusted based

on as missions are added or, in some cases, go away.

Mr. TURNER. OK. Well, for the record, if any of you, Mr. Walsh,

Mr. Podonsky, or Dr. Brede, want to supplement the answer, what

I am looking for is any financial incentive that you might have as

a private contractor to encourage overtime such that the government’s expenses go up and therefore your profit goes up, I would

be interested in knowing, because it doesn’t seem to me, in reading

this information about the work week of these security officers,

that it makes a whole lot of sense that, certainly, security is not

served by officers working in excessive hours.

So I would like to know what else might be at play here. And

if there is any increase in revenue to your company as a result of

excessive hours of security guards, I would like to know it.

Dr. BREDE. There is not in the two contracts with which I am

familiar.

Mr. TURNER. In that, we are going to close, and I will just give

everyone an opportunity if there is anything that you want to add

to the record before we close.

Mr. PODONSKY. I would, Mr. Chairman. We have talked about

the DBT extensively, and I just want to make it clear for the

record, from the SSA perspective, that the DBT is in fact the current threat, and it should be met as soon as possible utilizing all

the areas that I have talked about previously, to include elite force,

training, technology application, nuclear material consolidation, as

well as strategies.

And we believe that while we need to meet that as soon as possible, we also recognize hiring new guards, you have to hire cleared

guards, and cleared guards take some time. Putting in technology

costs some money. But there is no reason in the world that we

shouldn’t be further along than we are right now.

Dr. BREDE. Yes, I would also offer a statement in closing.

Throughout this hearing we have heard allegations of poor performance, of cheating and so on by protective force contractors. I

would point out that these have been investigated by the DOE, and

refuted in writing and, indeed, in previous testimony by both DOE

and contractors. I would submit to you our forces are not perfect.

They do make mistakes. But our training is designed so that these

human errors are the exception rather than the rule. And I believe

their demonstrated performance in competitions, in reviews by Mr.

Podonsky’s organization prove that out.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. TURNER. I would just like to note, Dr. Brede, I don’t think

that anyone questioned the individual security officers. I think they

questioned the management and the effective management and the

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effective providing of resources, which would be your company, and

not the individuals who are providing the services. I think the GAO

report speaks for itself as to the areas of criticism that it identifies.

Thank you. With that, we will be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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