### The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District 1 

### Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. _____________ No. 96-1664

_____________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff/Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri. Craig Walker, * * Defendant/Appellant. *

_____________ Submitted: September 12, 1996 Filed: October 3, 1996

_____________ Before FAGG, BEAM, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

_____________
MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Craig Walker was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit mai l fraud, mail fraud, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and subornation o f perjury. The district court sentenced him to thirty-three months i n 1 prison and he appeals from the judgment. We affirm. The convictions stem from Walker's participation in a scheme de signed to ensure the reelection of Vivrus Jones, the Comptroller of the City of St . Louis. Jones, who is African-American, was opposed by Jame s Shrewsbury, who is white. Based on past elections, it was expected that Jones would receive the vast majority of the votes of African-Americans, and Shrewsbury would

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receive most of the votes of whites. In order to ensure his reelection, Jones and others devised a scheme in which a sec ond white candidate, Penny Alco tt, would enter the race in order to draw votes from Shrewsbury
. Alcott's campaign focused on wards in the south side of St. Louis, where the population was predominantly white. Walker was a personal friend of Jones wh o had represented St. Louis in bond deals. Part of the schem e involved his providing funds for Alcott's campaign. The true source of th e funds was hidden by having a friend of his in Chicago, John Runyan, make a contribution and a loan to the Alcott campaign with money Walker ha d provided. The basis for his mail fraud conviction was a false campaig n finance disclosure report that was sent through the mail. Walke r contends that the district court improperly instructed th e jury regar ding the conspiracy to commit mail fraud and the mail frau d charges, denying him the right to a unanimous ju ry verdict. See Andres v. United States , 333 U.S. 740, 748, 68 S.Ct. 880, 884, 92 L.Ed. 1055 (1948). The indictment stated that the objects of the mail fraud and the conspirac y were to deprive the people of the State of Missouri and the City of St
. Louis of both the Com ptroller's salary and the intangible right to honest services. The court instructed the jury that in order to convict Walker of either conspiracy to commit mail fraud or mail fraud, at least one of the ob jects of the fraud had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
. Walker argues the instructions were defective be cause they did not require the jury to agree unanimously on the same object.
The court instructed the jury that "in order to return a verdict of guilty, you must unanimously agree upon which of the objects or purposes was the subject of the conspiracy." She also provided the jury with a special verdict form that contained independent questions on each of the objects of the fraud. The first question asked whether Walker knowingly participated in a scheme to defraud the people of the honest services of Jones and Alcott. Th e second asked whether Walker knowingly participated in

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a sc heme to defraud the people of the Comptroller's salary and othe r benefits of a fair election. The jury answered yes to each of thes e questi ons. The jury was adequately instructed on the unanimit y requirement, and the instructions were not constitutionally defective.
Walker as serts that the district court erred by not instructing the jury that the testimony of a perjurer should be treated with caution
. According to Walker, John Runyan was the government's key witness against himand had pleaded guilty to perjury. Walker cites United States v
. Partin , 493 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974), in support of his position that a special instruction was needed on the credibility of a perjurer.
The court instructed the jury on the testimony of someone who ha s testified falsely: If a person is shown to have knowingly testified falsely concerning any important or material matter, you obviously have a right to distrust the testimony of such an individual concerning other matters. You may reject all of the testimony of that witness or give it such weight or credibility as you may think it deserves.
Jury Ins truction 6A. This was sufficient guidance, and a separat e instruction on perjury was not required. The pa rticular wording contained in the in struction does not matter so long as it adequately covers "th e substance of the requested instruction." United States v. Rankin , 902 F.2 d 1344, 1347 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ridinger , 805 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Reda , 765 F.2d715, 719 (8th Cir. 1985). Here the district court gave an instruction dealing with false testimony which was not the case in Partin
. Walker also complains that the gover nment's cross-examination of him about income not reported on his tax returns was

### These claims are that the district court erred by (1) 2 

### limiting testimony relating to Penny Alcott's decision to enter the race; (2) maintaining bond conditions on him that affected his ability to represent himself; (3) excluding expert testimony on past election schemes in St. Louis; (4) not granting judgment in his favor; (5) rejecting his claim of selective prosecution; (6) not dismissing the indictment; and (7) imposing a sentencing enhancement for an offense involving a public official. 4 inflammatoryand prejudicial. Walker had claimed on direct examinatio n that he had cash flow problems and therefore could not have been the sourc e of the funds Runyan contributed to Alcott's campaign. The government late r asked Walker whether he had income not mentioned on his tax return. The cross-examination was not improper because it related to his testimony on direct examination ab out his available funds. The testimony was relevant and probat ive, and the district court did not abuse its discretion i n permitting it.
Walker also raises a number of other claims which we have reviewe d and find without merit. 2 The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.