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GERMANY AFTER THE ELECTION:

IMPLICATIONS FOR GERMANY, EUROPE AND

U.S.–GERMAN RELATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 9, 2005

Serial No. 109–111

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS

ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

PETER T. KING, New York, Vice Chairman 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

TED POE, Texas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

RICHARD MEREU, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Jackson Janes, Ph.D., Executive Director, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies ....................................................................................... 4

Karen Donfried, Ph.D., Senior Director for Policy Programs, The German 

Marshall Fund of the U.S. ................................................................................... 9

Mr. Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Washington Bureau Chief, Die Zeit ................... 16

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging 

Threats: Prepared statement .............................................................................. 3

The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 3

Jackson Janes, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 6

Karen Donfried, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 11

Mr. Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff: Prepared statement ............................................. 17

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GERMANY AFTER THE ELECTION: 

IMPLICATIONS FOR GERMANY, EUROPE AND 

U.S.–GERMAN RELATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:10 p.m. in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I call to order the Subcommittee on Europe and 

Emerging Threats. Today, the Subcommittee on Europe and 

Emerging Threats is holding a hearing on the results of the recent 

German Federal election of September 18th of this year. 

Now, before we go any further, perhaps I should clarify the 

meaning of the word ‘‘results.’’ Fifty-two days after the election, 

Germany still does not have a new coalition government. The two 

major parties have engaged in an intense process of negotiations to 

establish a so-called ‘‘Grand Coalition.’’ As of this week it looks like 

they are on track to finalize a coalition agreement, and establish 

a new coalition government in the next 2 weeks, perhaps by November 22nd; that is, if all goes well. 

There still could be some surprises along the way. But, it seems 

that we now have enough clarity to hold this hearing today. The 

purpose of this hearing is to assess what the German electorate decided almost 8 weeks ago, and the resulting coalition government 

which is emerging. We would like to consider the implications of 

this election for Germany and, particularly, Germany’s prospects 

for economic reform. We would also like to assess the implications 

of this election for Germany’s role in Europe and Germany’s foreign 

policy, and especially the consequences for United States-German 

relations. 

One further comment on the status of the election ‘‘results’’; the 

Subcommittee invited Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, the German Ambassador to the United States, to participate as a witness 

in this hearing and provide us with testimony. However, due to the 

sensitivity of the ongoing coalition negotiations and the lack of finality, the Ambassador had to decline. We certainly appreciate his 

consideration, and we thank him for his willingness to help the 

Subcommittee as we move ahead. 

One final thought. As fate would have it, today is November 9, 

2005. It was 16 years ago today, on November 9, 1989, that the 

2

Berlin Wall fell. It is hard to believe that 16 years can go by so 

fast, and it is almost hard to imagine how momentous this event 

was for Germany, for Europe, and, for that matter, the rest of the 

world. 

Germany has achieved much since 1989, and the results of the 

2005 election testify to those achievements and to what the people 

of Germany still would like to achieve. We are here to consider all 

of these results and all of these implications, and consequences for 

United States-German relations, and the important relationship 

between the people of Germany and the people of the United 

States. 

It is also my hope that we will explore specific issues, such as 

the impact of the election on Turkey’s relationship with Europe and 

potential accession into the European Union, the role Germany will 

be playing in Afghanistan and Iraq, your assessments of German 

public opinion toward the United States, and the challenges for 

United States public diplomacy in Germany and Europe. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I apologize for the 

Floor schedule, we had a series of votes. We do have Members on 

their way, but in their absence I would like to introduce our panel 

today. 

I would like to introduce our first witness, Dr. Jackson Janes, the 

Executive Director of the American Institute for Contemporary 

German Studies of Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC. 

He has been engaged in German-American and European affairs 

for more than three decades, beginning with his studies in Germany in the late 1960s. In 1989, Dr. Janes joined the American Institute of Contemporary Studies as Deputy Director and was appointed Executive Director in 1994. 

Our second witness is Dr. Karen Donfried, Senior Director for 

Policy Programs at the German Marshall Fund of the United 

States. Prior to her current position, Dr. Donfried worked on the 

Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State from 2003 

until May 2005 and was a key adviser on European issues and 

transatlantic relations in the Office of the Secretary of State. She 

previously served as the German Marshall Fund’s Director of Foreign Policy and, prior to that, worked as a European Affairs specialist at the Congressional Research Service. She has also lived 

and studied in Germany. 

Our third witness is Herr Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Washington 

Bureau Chief for Die Zeit, Germany’s first national weekly newspaper. He has held that position since 2002, and has worked with 

Die Zeit since 1989. He has studied and worked in both Germany 

and the United States. His fields of expertise include domestic German politics, United States foreign and domestic policy since September 11, 2001, and Central and Eastern European transitions to 

democracy since the fall of the Berlin Wall. 

I apologize for the lack of support on both sides up here, but it 

is no indication or reflection on you folks; it is just the agenda of 

the day and the timing. So with that, Dr. Janes, the microphone 

is yours. Unfortunately, because we started late, if you could try 

to stick to the 5-minute rule, I would appreciate it. Welcome. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Gallegly and Mr. Wexler follow:]

3

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS

Today, the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats is holding a hearing 

on the results of the recent German federal election of September 18, 2005. 

Now, before I go any further, perhaps I should clarify the meaning of the word 

‘‘results’’. Fifty two days after the election, Germany still does not have a new coalition government. The two major parties (the CDU/CSU and the SPD) have been engaged in an intense process of negotiations to establish a so-called ‘‘Grand Coalition’’. As of this week, it looks like they are on track to finalize a coalition agreement, and establish a new coalition government in the next two weeks, perhaps by 

November 22nd, if all goes well. 

There still could be some surprises along the way. But, it seems that we now have 

enough clarity to hold this hearing today. The purpose of this hearing is to assess 

what the German electorate decided almost eight weeks ago, and the resulting coalition government which is emerging. We would like to consider the implications of 

this election for Germany, and particularly Germany’s prospects for economic reform. We would also like to assess the implications of this election for Germany’s 

role in Europe and Germany’s foreign policy, and especially the consequences for 

U.S.—German relations. 

One further comment on the status of the election ‘‘results’’. The Subcommittee 

invited Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, the German Ambassador to the United 

States, to participate as a witness in this hearing and provide testimony. However, 

due to the sensitivity of the ongoing coalition negotiations, and the lack of finality, 

the Ambassador had to decline. We appreciate his consideration, and we thank him 

for his willingness to help the Subcommittee in any way. 

One final thought. As fate would have it, today is November 9th, 2005. Sixteen 

years ago, on November 9th, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. It is hard to believe that 

sixteen years could go by so fast, and it is almost hard to imagine how momentous 

this event was for Germany, for Europe, and for the world. 

Germany has achieved much since 1989. And the results of the 2005 election testify to those achievements, and to what the people of Germany still would like to 

achieve. We are here to consider all of these results and all of these implications, 

and the consequences for U.S.—German relations, and the important relationship 

between the people of Germany and the people of the United States. 

It is also my hope that we will explore specific issues, such as the impact of the 

election on Turkey’s relationship with Europe and potential accession into the European Union, the role Germany will be playing in Afghanistan and Iraq, your assessments of German public opinion toward the United States, and the challenges for 

U.S. public diplomacy in Germany and Europe. 

I look forward to hearing from our three expert witnesses, and I will now turn 

to Mr. Wexler for any remarks he may wish to make. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

I want to thank you for holding today’s hearing on the German elections and its 

implications for the European Union as well as the United States. I also want to 

thank all of the witnesses who are testifying before the committee today. 

Mr. Chairman, it is apparent that negotiations are still ongoing in Berlin and that 

a new government headed by Angela Merkl leader of the Christian Democrats in 

coalition with the Social Democrats will be formed shortly. I am confident that my 

colleagues in Berlin will move beyond this impasse and address difficult economic 

and domestic reforms. 

At the center of Europe, a new German government must continue its strong leadership role in the EU which has suffered serious setbacks this year including the 

French and Dutch ‘‘no votes’’ against the constitution and a serious budget stalemate. In addition, while the overall transformation of whole, free and democratic 

Europe has been largely successful, recent rioting in France which has spilled over 

into Germany and Belgium has exposed the need for the EU and its member states 

to revamp integration policies to address growing frustrations of inequality and discrimination in Muslim communities across the continent. 

The EU which has grown to twenty-five and is on the cusp of admitting Bulgaria, 

Romania and beginning accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia needs an 

engaged and focused Germany in order to address enlargement, economic, security, 

political and foreign policy issues. In particular it is important that the new government which has been divided on the issue of Turkey’s accession efforts carefully conVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:03 Feb 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EET\110905\24518.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
4

sider the extraordinary economic and security benefits in supporting Ankara’s accession negations. Having played a significant role in the Middle East, the Balkans and 

Eastern Europe, Berlin must take an even greater role in stabilizing and promoting 

trade liberalization, democracy and peace in these regions. 

Although relations between Washington and Berlin have at times been strained 

following differences over Iraq—in terms of US interests globally few partnerships 

are as important as our relations with Germany. As Europe’s leading economic engine and the world’s third largest economy Germany is one of America’s most important trading partners and will be for the foreseeable future. 

In the context of US-German intelligence, security and military cooperation—Berlin has been an indispensable transatlantic ally and it is in the interest of both nations’ that this multifaceted collaboration continues at the highest levels. There are 

two specific examples, among many, where the US-German partnership has been 

paramount. First, Germany has been an integral part of the EU3’and US efforts to 

thwart Iran’s nuclear program. It is my hope that the common position that the U.S. 

and EU have shared as it relates to thwarting Iran’s development of nuclear weapons will continue in the critical months ahead, especially as we look toward the possibility of sanctions at the UN. 

Second, sharing America’s goal of a free, stable and democratic Afghanistan, Germany has contributed several thousand troops and resources to the International 

Security Assistance Force and currently has 100 elite combat troops working alongside American counterinsurgency forces. Furthermore, NATO’s effort to expand operations in Afghanistan could not have occurred without German support and leadership and Berlin should be praised for their role in promoting the establishment 

of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Additionally, I want to thank the members of 

the German Bundestag who just yesterday voted overwhelmingly in favor of extending by one year the mandate of German troops operating in the U.S.-led global campaign against terror in the Mediterranean, Horn of Africa and in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Chairman, Germany’s economic success benefits the United States and greater intelligence and military cooperation between Washington and Berlin is primary 

to guaranteeing both nations’ security and that of our allies in Europe and globally. 

The challenges ahead are stark for the new German government, however, I am 

hopeful that a new coalition government led by Angela Merkl will follow in the footsteps of previous administrations and maintain strong US-German relations as well 

as Berlin’s leadership at the forefront of international economic and foreign matters. 

More than ever, given the myriad of challenges facing the US including the war on 

terror and preventing the proliferation off WMD it is critical to have reliable and 

like-minded partners in Berlin and Europe—prepared to expend greater economic, 

military and political capitol.

STATEMENT OF JACKSON JANES, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY GERMAN 

STUDIES 

Mr. JANES. Thank you very much. I will be very disciplined in 

my presentation. I wanted to say that I am particularly honored to 

be here, precisely for the reasons that you said, Mr. Chairman, the 

9th of November. Every time I walk through the Brandenberg 

Gate, having started my career in Germany in 1966, I always get 

a little shiver down my spine to know how far we came and how 

much of a common stake that Germany and America had in that 

great accomplishment. So it is a wonderful day to mark that milestone. 

I am going to talk a little bit about the economic consequences 

of the election and the projection for the future. Despite the 

changes in the global strategic environment since 9/11, there is no 

greater bond than the one that the United States shares with its 

allies across the Atlantic. That bond remains of vital importance to 

the United States in meeting the challenges of the 21st century. 

Within that framework, relations between Germany and the 

United States certainly make up one of the most important links. 

5

Germany’s role in Europe is of central importance to its neighbors, to the United States, and to the world economy. In Europe, 

Germany is the largest populated country, with the largest economy, the largest standing army, and one-third of the economic output of the Eurozone. This makes it a major influence in Europe. 

The site of enormous levels of American economic investment and 

the largest European exporter to the United States, Germany remains a vital economic partner for the United States. Germany’s 

future matters to us all. 

I, therefore, would like to address very briefly two questions in 

that regard. What is the problem with Germany? What is the problem with its economy, and what are the prospects that the new 

government will address these weaknesses? 

First, Germany’s current economic and political course is a cause 

for worry. For the last decade, Germany has been experiencing a 

sluggish rate of domestic growth, which is projected to continue 

into the immediate future. It has seriously high levels of unemployment and public debt, both of which are undercutting the strength 

of the Germany economy, which is so important to the rest of Europe. 

Germany faces serious demographic problems in the coming decades which will make the cost of the social system that much more 

difficult to maintain. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has introduced 

and undertaken some reforms. While some have positive effects, 

more must be done. 

The root of the problem lies in politics and attitudes. The German political system is a very consensus-based system, but there 

is no consensus at the moment on how much change, how much 

market, and how quickly. The German public is ambivalent and divided and lacks confidence in the country’s future. The result is political stalemate. 

The results of the election on September 18th mirror that split. 

German voters presented their political leaders with the necessity 

of forming a government between the two largest parties, Christian 

Democrats and Social Democrats, exactly the two parties which 

fought tooth and nail against each other in the campaign. 

As it now looks today, Angela Merkel will be voted in as chancellor on November 22nd, providing that the two sides agree on a 

platform for the coalition. 

Second, what are the prospects that the new government can and 

will address these weaknesses? At first glance, the signs for reform 

and renewal are not promising. The two coalition partners are 

themselves ridden by conflicts over the direction and leadership of 

the party. The foundation for cooperation within the coalition, 

therefore, will be a brittle one, vulnerable to arguments over budgetary issues and bickering over priorities. How much fiscal adjustment can be not only presented but also accepted by anxious voters 

remains to be seen. 

The danger is that the coalition will reach for the lowest common 

denominator without facing up to the difficult changes Germans 

must make if their social and economic system is to become resilient and vibrant. That includes making changes in unemployment, 

healthcare, Social Security policies; all of which have become enormously burdensome on the society. 

6

There has been one previous grand coalition—I happened to be 

in Germany at that time—40 years ago. It lasted 3 years, managed 

to get a few things done, and gave way to a productive decade 

afterwards. That outcome is still possible for this coalition. 

If she reaches the chancellory, Angela Merkel will need to set 

some specific goals regarding tax reforms, cuts in government subsidies, measures to control the budget deficit, reduction of unemployment, and job creation. That is a tall order for any government, 

but the fact is that many of Germany’s neighbors have been doing 

just that in the past decade, be it Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Holland, or Austria. Germany simply needs to catch up now. 

If this is to succeed, attitudes in Germany must change. More 

positive investments in the future on the part of politicians, on the 

part of corporate leaders, and on the part of citizens will be needed 

to generate the steam for growth, investment, innovation, and confidence. Germany has all of the requisites to do that: An educated 

labor force, a modern infrastructure, a key location in the largest 

open market in the world, and a stellar reputation for producing 

the world’s best products. The preconditions are present, but leadership will be critical. 

Angela Merkel will be trying to help Germany break through an 

institutional and attitudinal logjam. It is not certain she will succeed, but as a veteran of four decades of the former German Democratic Republic and the transformation in 1989, which we mark 

today, wrought by German reunification, Mrs. Merkel knows what 

change and transition really mean in very real and practical terms. 

If she can communicate to a divided and anxious public the promise and opportunity that change can bring, she may be able to effect significant progress and the development of a consensus for reform and renewal. The potential gains are important not just for 

Germany but also for Europe and, in many ways, the United 

States. 

What, if anything, can we do? We can recognize that Angela 

Merkel’s attention must and will be focused on economic reform. 

Germany’s ability to undertake new foreign commitments will, 

therefore, be somewhat constrained for the foreseeable future. We 

do not anticipate any major changes in Germany’s foreign policy direction. And, finally, Germany is in a transition, as are all of transatlantic relations. We need patience, and we need understanding 

on both sides of the Atlantic to help each other. Thank you very 

much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Janes follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACKSON JANES, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN

INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY GERMAN STUDIES

GERMANY’S CHALLENGES: RENEWAL AND REFORM

On November 9, 2005, Germany will mark the sixteenth anniversary of the fall 

of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of an eleven-month rush to unification on October 3, 1990. It is therefore particularly meaningful to be offered a chance to provide 

commentary today on the occasion of this historical milestone in German history 

with a focus on what Germany has achieved, what challenges it still faces today, 

and what significance Germany’s responses to those challenges holds for the United 

States. 

There is no greater bond than the one the United States shares with its allies 

across the Atlantic. Comprised of economic, political, social and cultural shared experiences, the foundation of transatlantic relations today is deep and strong as anyVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:03 Feb 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EET\110905\24518.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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where in the world and the transatlantic relations remain of vital importance to the 

United States in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. 

The transatlantic relations between Germany and the United States make up one 

of the most important ties across the Atlantic. It is in the interest of the United 

States to understand the nature of Germany’s political and economic strengths and 

weaknesses are, what expectations we can direct at the Federal Republic during the 

immediate future, and how we should best manage relations with this important 

European partner. 

Germany has the largest population in the European Union with the largest economy, and with one of the largest fielded armies in Europe, and it enjoys a role today 

in Europe which is unique in its long history. Within the European Union, Germany 

has developed a leadership role which is a result of constant nurturing of relations 

with its European partners, big and small. The addition of ten new members from 

Eastern Europe has only enhanced Germany’s central role in the EU because of its 

traditional relations with many of these states, politically and economically. Germany’s economic weight is reflected in the fact that it makes up one third of the 

economic output of the 12 nations which are currently part of the Eurozone. Germany is the largest contributor to the European Union providing nearly a quarter 

of the annual budget. 

As the third largest economy in the world after the U.S. and Japan, Germany also 

is a world leader in the global marketplace. It is the world’s leading exporter and 

shows no signs of slacking with a foreign trade surplus of over one hundred billion 

dollars. Exports make up one third of Germany’s national output. 

The United States is Germany’s second largest trading partner, and Germany is 

the largest European exporter to the U.S. The United States has investments totaling over 110 billion euros, not counting the wave of private equity investments to 

the tune of thirty billion euros in the last few years. Over 2000American companies 

are located in Germany with almost double that number of German companies located in the United States. 

Germany is also the location of the second largest overseas deployment of U.S. 

forces after Iraq. Despite the conflict between Washington and Berlin over the Iraq 

war, Germany has in the last decade also assumed new responsibilities in the foreign policy and defense arena, with large troop contingents in Afghanistan and in 

the Balkans. Germany is the third largest contributor to the United Nations. 

In short, Germany is a significant power in Europe, in international trade and 

finances and in the global strategic arena. For that reason, Germany and its future 

matters to the United States. 

It is for all these reasons that the last few years in Germany have been a cause 

for worry both in and outside of the country, due to its lagging domestic economy. 

Germany has had a sluggish rate of domestic growth for the last decade and is projected to continue along that path in the immediate future at less than 1% in 2006. 

It has a seriously high unemployment rate which translates into five million people 

unemployed, and two million more are in subsidized job training programs. The increasing government debt (the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product) is 1.5 

trillion Euros, three times the amount at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall. 

The interest on that amount is more than 68 billion Euros this year, a figure which 

is sucking strength from Germany’s future. 

The problems burdening Germany’s domestic economy are the result of taxation 

and regulatory policies, as well as generous unemployment expenditures, which 

have caused the individual and the corporate citizen to become discouraged from 

taking initiatives and risks. High taxes and expensive added costs to salaries have 

decreased incentives for companies to add jobs. Small and medium size firms often 

forgo hiring new employees due to the difficulty of downsizing because of restrictive 

labor laws. Others are simply moving operations a hundred kilometers or less to 

Eastern European states which have significantly less labor costs. High unemployment benefits have undercut the urgency among the unemployed to seek new jobs. 

Additionally, German economic performance has been affected by the drag of German unification and the continuing laggard growth in Eastern Germany despite the 

eastward transfer of over a trillion dollars in the last fifteen years. After more than 

a decade, these subsidies have done little to ease East German unemployment 

which is double that of Western Germany. 

Demographic trends are additional problems constraining German growth. The 

dramatic decline in birth rates in Germany and the rapidly aging—and retiring—

generations are about to make their demands on the social security and health care 

systems. Very few other countries in the world show the number of births relative 

to the population as low as in Germany. Those born in 1964—part of the baby boom 

generation—are now forty years old and they did not have many children, a trend 

which will have a negative impact on the retiree/worker ratio in the coming decades. 

8

As in the United States, the pension system will need to introduce a combination 

of a later retirement age, higher contributions, more contributors, and lower benefits. Even then, public pensions will not suffice to maintain accustomed living standards for most retirees, requiring an increased reliance on supplemental private retirement savings, something to which Germans are having to adjust. 

The combination of high unemployment rates and uncertain social security futures is making nervous consumers keep their wallets firmly closed, further depressing domestic consumer demand. Indeed, the German savings rate is approximately 

11%, hard to imagine from an American perspective. 

The initiatives taken by Chancellor Schro ̈der to address these challenges in the 

past three years have shown some initial impact. Labor markets for skilled workers 

have become more flexible, partly through legal reforms, and through negotiation 

flexibility on the part of both employers and unions. Germany has been reducing 

tax levels and curtailing its unemployment benefits. Wage negotiations have seen 

a leveling off of salaries as well as increasing flexibility in reaching agreements between labor and employers throughout the country. Opening up the job market for 

low skilled workers remains more problematic, however. Additional reforms aimed 

at the structural and incentive problems contributing to high unemployment in this 

group are still needed for employers and employees. 

After her expected election on November 22, Chancellor Merkel will need to continue where Schro ̈der’s reform left off, even though those reforms contributed to his 

defeat and to the poor results Ms. Merkel achieved in her campaign, which stressed 

that even more reforms are needed. The same public that delivered both those messages will be waiting anxiously to see what she presents after her government is 

finally formed. 

The coalition team forming around Angela Merkel is a promising one. Both she 

and the recently elected head of the Social Democrats, Matthias Platzeck, represent 

the next generation of German leadership, following the generation of Gerhard 

Schro ̈der. While both leaders are East Germans, the fact that they are trained scientists and share a common background lays the basis for constructive cooperation. 

They are not products of the 1968 generation in West Germany but more the products of the fifteen years since the Berlin Wall fell, seeking pragmatic answers to political challenges. 

A major danger for the coalition is that, to the normal voter, the government 

might appear to be too focused on pain, rather than gain, on reducing expectations 

rather than producing real gains through reform and renewal. Taxes will go up; 

benefits down and the specter of unemployment will remain divisive. 

To date, Merkel has not distinguished herself as a great communicator, and she 

will be challenged to mobilize support for a set of common goals beyond the sacrifices. If she cannot do that, she may find that the debate over reform and renewal 

might deteriorate into a blame game among the parties, leaving the voters without 

much incentive to accept change. 

The process of reform and renewal will take time as can be seen from the experiences in Japan. In both cases structural change is less impeded by economic weaknesses than by insufficient political will. 

As the election campaign illustrated, the public debate has often emphasized the 

extremes, a choice between wholesale dismantling of the social safety net or stalwart defense of the status quo. The German public is caught between these two extremes and uncertain of the way forward. 

Yet, Germany has the basic requirements to confront these challenges: an educated labor force, a modern infrastructure, a key location in the largest open market 

in the world, and a stellar reputation as an export champion. Moreover, Germany 

is also not unique. The problems of high labor costs, structural rigidities, and organized political opposition to cuts in fiscal subsidies have all been dealt with by Germany’s European neighbors without a full-scale demobilization of the social welfare 

contract Europeans have come to treasure during the past half century. Change is 

possible, yet not without some short-term pain for longer-term gain. 

Can Angela Merkel as Chancellor in the so-called grand coalition with the Social 

Democrats achieve these goals? Will the Germans be willing to follow Chancellor 

Merkel as she seeks to guide them through the reforms and renewals Germany 

needs and to restore confidence in the society at large? Will the opposition parties 

in the Parliament play a constructive role in dealing with these issues or will they 

seek to block more than facilitate change? 

Much of that will depend on how much support and patience the public is willing 

to lend the government. The benchmarks for the new government in Berlin will be 

the success of labor market reforms, the continuing constructive cooperation between labor unions and employers, and the creation of a business climate that is 

more favorable to creating and running small-scale firms, the source of most job creVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:03 Feb 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EET\110905\24518.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ation. If a vigorous effort in this direction expands the labor force, both the fiscal 

and the demographic challenges could be met more successfully. A few years of increased growth in turn would enhance the confidence missing in the society at large. 

Significant obstacles to success remain. For most Germans, the need to for significant changes has not been fully grasped in a country that looks and feels so 

wealthy. There is no political consensus for rapid and far-reaching change. In a culture that values consensus over conflict, the lack of consensus translates into a political logjam. The obstacles to reform therefore are more political than they are economic. They are more attitudinal than institutional. 

For Angela Merkel, the challenge will be to identify a specific set of goals that 

can be achieved during the expected legislative period of four years. That agenda 

will include a continued effort to enable corporate tax reform, weed out unnecessary 

government subsidies, find common ground on a budget including reductions in the 

debt, reducing non-wage labor costs and probably increasing the mandatory retirement age to 67. Whether all this can be accomplished with a coalition partner that 

was her adversary during the campaign will depend on the willingness of the leaderships on both sides of the aisle to agree on these goals. 

The success of Germany’s reforms will have important implications for Europe 

and the United States. The ability of Germany to meet its foreign policy responsibilities in terms of defense allocations, its presence in regional hot spots like the Balkans and the Middle East, and its role in the international financial institutions will 

depend on achieving a sustainable level of economic growth. 

Germany is going through a transition phase, which Angela Merkel as Germany’s 

first female Chancellor will lead. As a veteran of four decades of the German Democratic Republic and the transformation of 1989 wrought by German unification, Ms. 

Merkel knows what real change and transition mean. If she can communicate to a 

divided and skeptical public the promise and opportunity that change can bring, she 

may be able to effect significant change in attitudes and create a new consensus for 

reform. 

The United States has a vested interest in Germany’s success in achieving reform 

and renewal. Germany’s capacity for partnership in leadership with the United 

States is a distinct advantage for American interests not only in Europe but also 

on the global stage.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Dr. Janes. 

Dr. Donfried? 

STATEMENT OF KAREN DONFRIED, PH.D., SENIOR DIRECTOR 

FOR POLICY PROGRAMS, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF 

THE U.S. 

Ms. DONFRIED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee. I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify here today. I will be speaking about German foreign policy. My remarks assume the ongoing coalition negotiations 

will be successful, and will result in a grand coalition of the Social 

Democrats with the Christian Democrats/Christian Social Union 

under CDU Chancellor Angela Merkel. 

The key question for all of us, in thinking about German foreign 

policy, is whether Angela Merkel will be an agent of change or an 

agent of the status quo. The conventional wisdom is that we should 

not expect major changes in German foreign policy under this new 

government. While I would agree that the broad parameters of 

German foreign policy are unlikely to change, I think that in some 

key areas we will see important changes because of the highly personalized style of the outgoing chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder. 

Let me give you two quick examples. First, Schroeder’s relationship with French President Jacques Chirac, a relationship that was 

deepened and forged through their common opposition to the Iraq 

war, has had implications for many other areas as well. I am 

thinking not only about European Union policy, but also about the 

relationship with China. Chirac has been the main proponent withVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:03 Feb 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EET\110905\24518.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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in the EU for lifting the arms embargo on China, and Schroeder 

supported him, even though, if you look at the German landscape, 

Schroeder’s own party, his coalition partner, the Greens, and certainly the opposition CDU and Free Democrats opposed a lift. So 

I think, on that specific issue of the China embargo, we will see a 

difference. 

As a second example, take Schroeder’s relationship with Russian 

President Putin. I think all of us have in our memories the enduring image of Schroeder and Putin with their wives in that sleigh 

ride during orthodox Christmas in January 2001. It has become a 

symbol of a very special German-Russian friendship that we saw 

perhaps last with the Sauna Summits between Helmut Kohl and 

Boris Yeltsin. That relationship, I think, is destined to change 

under Angela Merkel. 

When we talk about Merkel, we always focus on the fact that she 

will be the first woman chancellor, which, of course, is a milestone. 

However, she also will be Germany’s first chancellor from the eastern, formerly Communist, part of the country. Angela Merkel understands that Germany’s relationship to Russia is important and 

that 30 percent of German energy needs—gas, oil—comes from 

Russia, but she is much more concerned about the views of Germany’s central and eastern European partners, so you will see a 

very different emphasis in her relationship with Russia. 

What about the German-American relationship? What can we 

here in Washington expect? During the campaign, the Christian 

Democrats were explicit in saying that they wanted to reinvigorate 

the traditionally warm transatlantic relationship. What do those 

words really mean if you look at the German political landscape? 

There are constraints on Merkel. Certainly, one of them is being 

in a coalition government with a partner that is very close in size. 

Another is public opinion. If you look at just about any public opinion poll, you will see that the Bush Administration and the United 

States in general are not very popular. 

The German Marshall Fund, the organization for which I work, 

has done an annual survey since 2002 of public opinion in the 

United States and Europe on foreign policy. One of the questions 

we ask is, how desirable is it that the United States exert strong 

leadership in the world? This year, 2005, 60 percent of Germans 

said it was undesirable, and only 39 percent said it was desirable. 

Now, if that is not depressing enough, what is very striking is if 

you look back to 2002 at that very same question, you had exactly 

the opposite response. In 2002, 68 percent of German respondents 

thought that United States leadership was desirable. We have seen 

this tremendous slip in opinion over the past 4 years, and this is 

going to be a constraint for any German chancellor. That said, I 

think you will see a change in style and rhetoric that will make 

a difference across the Atlantic. 

If you think about Schroeder, he came in, of course, not as a foreign policy chancellor. Kohl was not a foreign policy chancellor 

when he came in, and certainly Merkel will not be one. That said, 

Schroeder made a major contribution on foreign policy; he showed 

tremendous leadership in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Germany 

fought its first wars in the post-war period. 

11

What happened on Iraq is that Schroeder’s rhetoric was quite 

different from German policy. Schroeder was content, in the domestic political context, to say that Germany was not going to follow 

America on military adventures, and German foreign policy would 

be made in Berlin, not in Washington. But on the ground, Schroeder was sending more German troops to Afghanistan, leaving 

American troops to go to Iraq. Schroeder forgave $5 billion in Iraqi 

debt. The Germans were training Iraqi police and soldiers, albeit 

not in Iraq but in the UAE. I have had Germans come to me and 

say, ‘‘Come on, let us be honest. We are doing more for you than 

some of your coalition partners.’’ But this disconnect between the 

style and rhetoric of Schroeder and his government’s actual policy 

helped this precipitous decline in public opinion about the United 

States. If Merkel takes office and simply talks differently about the 

relationship, that could have an important impact on substance. 

On what specific substantive areas? I think democracy promotion 

is one of those areas. If you look at Transatlantic Trends, the public opinion survey mentioned earlier, 78 percent of Germans say a 

role of the European Union is helping to establish democracy in authoritarian states. This also happened to be a cornerstone of the 

Bush Administration’s second term policy. There is an opportunity 

to deepen cooperation between the United States and the EU in 

that area. 

My bottom line is that a change in style and rhetoric can make 

a critical difference in German-American relations. Such a change 

can establish the foundation for concrete policy initiatives. If Angela Merkel can close that gap between German rhetoric and German actions, I think she can contribute to rebuilding the trust that 

existed before between Washington and Berlin. And for those of us 

like me, who continue to believe that there is more that unites us 

than divides us, I think that would be a very good thing. Thank 

you so much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Donfried follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KAREN DONFRIED, PH.D., SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR POLICY

PROGRAMS, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE U.S. 

Mr. Chairman, I wish to begin by thanking you for the opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee on the subject of ‘‘Germany After the Elections.’’ It is a distinct pleasure for me to be here today and to share with you my thoughts on German foreign policy under a new government. I would like to request that my statement be placed in the record. 

Germany is now in its second month of limbo following an unexpectedly close, inconclusive election on September 18. The large, right-of-center Christian Democrats 

(CDU), together with their smaller sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), 

were expected to sail to victory by forming a coalition with their preferred partner, 

the Free Democrats (FDP). The CDU/CSU, however, garnered only 35.2% of the 

vote, a 3.3 percentage point drop from 2002. Despite the good showing of the FDP 

with 9.8%, the parties did not have enough combined support for the expected governing coalition. The large, left-of-center Social Democrats (SPD) of sitting Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder also ‘‘lost’’ the election with only 34.3% of the vote, representing a drop of 4.2 percentage points from the 2002 election. The coalition of 

SPD and Greens had been voted out of office. What was less clear is what political 

constellation 78% of the German electorate intended to vote into office. 

Despite some rough sledding since the elections, Germany’s two major parties, the 

CDU/CSU and the SPD, appear now to be on a solid path to forming a government, 

a so-called ‘‘Grand Coalition,’’ by the end of this month under a CDU Chancellor, 

Angela Merkel. It is possible that this process could be derailed over the coming 

weeks, but the analysis that follows is premised on such a government taking office. 

12

1 ‘‘Schroeder: Russia Visit Not the End,’’ Deutsche Welle, Oct. 8, 2005. 

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER SCHROEDER

On the foreign policy front, the central question is whether a Merkel government 

will be an agent of the status quo or an agent of change. The conventional wisdom 

is that we should expect no major changes in German foreign policy going forward. 

In part, this view is based on the structure of a coalition government. While there 

has been a ‘‘Grand Coalition’’ only once before (from 1966–69 in West Germany), coalition governments are in fact the norm in German politics. Within those coalitions, 

the largest party traditionally has named the Chancellor and the smaller partner, 

the Foreign Minister. 

In the current case, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Schroeder’s closest aide in the 

Chancellery, has been named to serve as Foreign Minister in a Merkel government. 

The relative consensus on foreign policy across party lines is illustrated by the fact 

that, in the ongoing coalition negotiations, the party representatives were able to 

conclude their discussions on foreign policy with relative ease. The negotiators readily reached agreement on every issue save Turkey’s relationship with the European 

Union, with the parties holding open the question of whether explicit reference 

should be made to the fact that Turkey’s membership negotiations with the EU 

could end in some sort of ‘‘privileged partnership,’’ rather than full membership. The 

CDU/CSU has been promoting the view that full membership for Turkey would 

overburden the EU politically, economically, and socially and thus they advocate 

something short of full membership and stress the ‘‘open-ended’’ nature of the accession talks. The Social Democrats have been stalwart defenders of Turkey’s quest for 

full membership. 

While I agree that the broad parameters of Germany’s foreign policy are unlikely 

to change, I believe that—contrary to the conventional wisdom—we will see important differences on a few key issues as a result of the significant impact outgoing 

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s personalized style of conducting foreign policy had 

on U.S.-German relations. Let me offer two examples. 

First, Schroeder gave a whole new meaning to the Franco-German partnership by 

throwing his lot in with French President Jacques Chirac, to a large extent, as a 

counterweight to U.S. policy. The bond between Schroeder and Chirac was solidified 

and strengthened as they joined forces in opposing the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Beyond 

the dramatic case of Iraq, that Franco-German alliance had broad implications in 

other areas, for example, on China policy. France was the EU member state leading 

the charge to lift the EU’s arms embargo on China and Schroeder gave Chirac his 

unflagging support in that effort. One motive underlying Schroeder’s stance was 

what he saw as Germany’s key economic interests in China, but another clearly was 

the importance he placed on his partnership with Chirac. The opposition CDU/CSU, 

as well as the Free Democrats, opposed what they saw as Schroeder’s rush to lift 

the embargo and voiced sympathy with U.S. concerns about the human rights situation in China and about the strategic balance in the Taiwan straits. Notably, 

Schroeder’s support for an embargo lift was shared neither by his own party, the 

Social Democrats, nor by his coalition partner, the Greens. In fact, the SPD and the 

Greens introduced a parliamentary motion on October 28, 2004 in favor of maintaining the embargo that received majority support. Thus, with Schroeder gone, the new 

German government appears poised to oppose a lift of the EU’s China arms embargo. That change in German position will have a significant impact on EU policy, because France has lost its key ally in pushing for a lift and because any member 

state, in this case a Germany under Angela Merkel, can veto a lift. 

Second, Schroeder struck up such a close friendship with Russian President Putin 

that his sleigh ride with Putin for Orthodox Christmas in January 2001 has come 

to rival the ‘‘sauna summits’’ former Chancellor Helmut Kohl was famous for holding with Boris Yeltsin as a symbol of a special Russo-German relationship. Just last 

month, following the German election, Schroeder visited the Russian President in 

Saint Petersburg to celebrate Putin’s 53rd birthday. That October visit marked the 

eighth meeting between the two leaders this year.1 Angela Merkel clearly indicated 

during the election campaign that she would pursue a different policy toward Russia. The most basic reason for Merkel’s approach results from her personal biography. Much of the press comment on Merkel has focused on the fact that she will 

be Germany’s first female chancellor. Equally notable, however, is the fact that she 

will be Germany’s first chancellor from the eastern, formerly communist, part of the 

country. Merkel’s experience and her attitudes towards the countries bordering Germany’s east, most notably Poland, have led her to criticize Schroeder’s actions in 

dealing with Russia as disregarding the interests of Germany’s central European allies. Germany has strong economic interests governing its relationship with Russia, 

13

2 ‘‘Key Issues in the Campaign for Germany’s Parliamentary Election,’’ Associated Press, Sept. 

16, 2005. 3 In a pre-election public opinion survey in September 2005, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen asked 

Germans what the most important problems facing Germany were. A striking 85% of respondents said ‘‘unemployment,’’ a full 71 percentage points ahead of the next most important problem (costs and pay). 

particularly in the energy field (Germany imports roughly 30% of its oil and natural 

gas from Russia), and Merkel will be as attentive to Russia as Schroeder was. It 

seems clear, however, that she will also factor in the interests of the central Europeans and will be much more inclusive in discussing Germany’s Russia policy with 

them. Germany has traditionally looked out for the interests of the smaller EU 

member states, a tradition that Schroeder eschewed and Merkel seems likely to restore beyond the specific issue area of Russia. 

THE WASHINGTON-BERLIN CONNECTION

The Bush Administration will welcome a new German approach to China and 

Russia, as well as a more inclusive German approach to its smaller, and particularly 

eastern, EU partners, countries that are also strong U.S. allies. The larger question, 

however, is whether Washington can expect a restoration of the traditionally warm 

and close U.S.-German relationship, which was so badly damaged over the Iraq war. 

During the election campaign, Merkel’s Christian Democrats pledged to ‘‘reinvigorate the trans-Atlantic cooperation with the United States.’’ 2 When Merkel sent veteran CDU parliamentarian and foreign policy expert Wolfgang Schaeuble, now slated to be Interior Minister in a ‘‘Grand Coalition’’ government, to visit the White 

House during the campaign, he said: ‘‘We will try to be a more reliable European 

partner for the U.S.’’ But what are those words likely to mean in practice? 

Some analysts have expressed concern that those words will mean little in practice. They worry that Merkel’s explicit opposition to full Turkish membership in the 

EU, a longstanding U.S. goal, will be a thorn in the side of improved U.S.-German 

relations. I believe this concern is misplaced. In light of the start of EU accession 

negotiations with Turkey on October 4 of this year, the issue has lost its political 

saliency and immediacy. Merkel has given no indication that she intends to disrupt 

the ten to fifteen year process of negotiation between the EU and Turkey and obviously she will not be chancellor at the end of that negotiation process. Thus, while 

it is true that a fundamental disagreement exists between the Bush Administration 

and the CDU/CSU on Turkey’s relationship to the EU, there is no obvious reason 

for this issue to return to the front burner during the life of the incoming Grand 

Coalition. 

CLOSER U.S.-GERMAN TIES? THE CONSTRAINT OF PUBLIC OPINION. 

Much as Angela Merkel and her CDU/CSU may desire warmer relations between 

Berlin and Washington, one inescapable constraint will be German public opinion. 

The Bush Administration is not popular with most Germans and the new government is likely to proceed with caution. The dominant issue in the September election was economic reform. Germany’s high unemployment and stagnant economy 

were the inescapable focus.3 Progress on this economic agenda will determine the 

success or failure of a ‘‘Grand Coalition’’ government. While the German public 

clearly recognizes, in general, the necessity of implementing reforms, a Merkel government will need political capital to get through reforms that many Germans fear 

will threaten specific social welfare benefits. The devil is in the details of making 

abstract economic reforms concrete. Given that political capital is precious and indispensable for an economic reform agenda, the new government will likely be cautious in expending its limited capital on getting closer to Washington. 

The depth of Germans’ negative feeling about U.S. foreign policy is visible in poll 

results from Transatlantic Trends, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the 

United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo. Transatlantic Trends surveyed public opinion on foreign policy in the United States and ten European countries, including Germany, in June 2005. Transatlantic Trends is an annual survey, begun 

in 2002, and the data underscores how German attitudes toward the United States 

have deteriorated over the past four years. 

When asked how desirable it is that the United States exert strong leadership in 

world affairs, 60% of Germans said this year that it was undesirable and 39%, desirable. The numbers in 2002 were almost exactly reversed: 68% of German respondents said U.S. leadership was desirable and only 27% called it undesirable. 

Another question focused specifically on President Bush, asking ‘‘do you approve 

or disapprove of the way the President of the United States George W. Bush is hanVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:03 Feb 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EET\110905\24518.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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4 In September 2005, the German Defense Ministry announced that the Cabinet had agreed 

to boost troop levels by up to 750 soldiers to a total force of up to 3,000 soldiers. Germany was 

already the leading contributor to the International Security Assistance Force with about 2,250 

troops working to secure peace and stability in Afghanistan. 

dling international policies.’’ Of the 1,000 German respondents, 83% in the recent 

survey said they disapproved, while only 16% approved. In 2002, 62% disapproved 

of President Bush’s handling of international policies and 36% approved. 

When you look at these two questions side by side, it suggests that Germans, from 

the start, were more skeptical of Bush foreign policy than of U.S. leadership generally. German respondents have been consistently critical of Bush foreign policy, 

with a majority registering disapproval already in 2002 and with that majority 

growing stronger through this year’s survey. When you look at the responses to the 

question about U.S. leadership, you see that the majority of German respondents 

has flipped from embracing U.S. leadership to rejecting it. This data suggests that 

what we defined as anti-Bush sentiment during the first term has deteriorated into 

a broader anti-Americanism in the second term. 

On the so-called ‘‘thermometer’’ question, in which German respondents were 

asked to rate their feelings toward various countries by reference to the temperature 

on a thermometer, the United States scored only 51 degrees in 2005, as compared 

to 63 degrees in 2002. When the question was asked, those surveyed were told that 

fifty means not particularly warm or cold. Thus, in 2005, it seems the best we can 

say is that Germans have a tepid or neutral feeling toward the United States. 

These data on German public opinion reveal two significant realities. First, the 

Bush Administration faces an enormous public diplomacy challenge in Germany. 

Second, Angela Merkel confronts obvious constraints from her public as she seeks 

to ‘‘reinvigorate’’ cooperation with the United States. 

CLOSER U.S.-GERMAN TIES? WHY STYLE AND RHETORIC MATTER. 

Given the unambiguous, negative view among the German public of U.S. foreign 

policy and the Merkel government’s need to have domestic backing for its economic 

and social reforms, it is difficult to see the new Chancellor blazing new foreign policy paths together with Washington. Yet this situation, rife with limits, also holds 

within it an opportunity. The deep skepticism of the German public toward the 

Bush Administration means that a positive change in style and rhetoric on one or 

both sides has the potential to begin to change attitudes. 

Part of the downturn in German public opinion concerning the U.S. role in the 

world is no doubt related to concrete U.S. actions, such as the war in Iraq, opposition to the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol. It may also reflect 

the deep freeze that immobilized German-American relations from the run-up to the 

Iraq war until 2004, when Schroeder’s Washington visit in February indicated the 

first sign of a thaw. The re-election of President Bush in November 2004 led to a 

full-court press on the U.S. side to reach out to Europe. In the case of Germany, 

this was highlighted by the President’s visit to Mainz in February 2005. At the joint 

Bush-Schroeder press conference, the President highlighted the significance of Europe being the destination of his first trip after his inauguration. He went on to say 

that in order for the United States to have ‘‘good relations with Europe,’’ it needed 

to have ‘‘good relations with Germany.’’

Beyond what the Bush Administration is saying or doing, it is equally important 

to take stock of how Chancellor Schroeder has played the U.S. card. Arguably, negative German views of the United States have been reinforced by the way in which 

Chancellor Schroeder chose to characterize, for domestic political purposes, those 

U.S. policy choices. 

Schroeder, like Helmut Kohl before him, did not come into office as a foreign policy chancellor. That said, he showed tremendous leadership in winning support to 

send the German military into Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001—in the latter case, calling a vote of no confidence in the Bundestag.4 He led a reluctant German public to fight its first wars in the post-war period. 

Some would argue that Schroeder showed similar leadership on Iraq. This time 

German opinion backed his opposition to the war, but he stood up to his big ally, 

the United States and, together with Chirac and Putin, was able to prevent a second 

U.N. resolution, even if he and his allies were unable to prevent the war itself. 

On Iraq, however, unlike on Kosovo and Afghanistan, there has been a notable 

tension between Schroeder’s rhetoric and the reality of German actions. Schroeder’s 

drum beat of comment, even after the war, about Washington’s military ‘‘adventure’’ 

in Iraq and foreign policy decisions being ‘‘made in Berlin’’ suggested a much greater distance between Berlin and Washington than, in policy terms, there in fact was. 

15

5 ‘‘German Rivals Make One Last Push,’’ BBC News, Sept. 17, 2005. 

6 ‘‘Schroeder Confirms Exit; Slams Bush,’’ Deutsche Welle, Oct. 12, 2005. 

7This likely reflects the fact that democracy promotion is such a central part of the second 

Bush Administration’s agenda. As the President said in his inaugural address in January of this 

year: ‘‘The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world . . . 

So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements 

and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our 

world.’’

Germany has, in reality, done much to support the United States and its coalition 

partners in Iraq, including training Iraqi police and troops, albeit outside Iraq, writing off $5 billion in debt owed to Germany by Iraq, and deploying greater numbers 

of German troops to Afghanistan to free up U.S. soldiers. Schroeder’s consistent, 

public opposition to U.S. policy on Iraq has masked effectively for the German public the help his government is providing on the ground. 

In Schroeder’s final campaign appearances this fall, apparently wanting to remind 

voters of his opposition to the war in Iraq, he said Germans must decide ‘‘whether 

someone is able to withstand pressure from outside and stand up for what is Germany’s best interest.’’ His negative references to the United States were not limited 

to Iraq. He told supporters ‘‘you only need to look to America to see what poverty 

in old age is.’’ 5 Or, following the election, as he addressed union members in his 

home city of Hanover, he criticized ‘‘Anglo-Saxon’’ economic policies, saying they had 

‘‘no chance’’ in Europe. Then, in an apparent reference to Hurricane Katrina, 

Schroeder said: ‘‘I can think of a recent disaster that shows what happens when a 

country neglects its duties of state towards its people. My post as chancellor, which 

I still hold, does not allow me to name that country but you all know that I am 

talking about America.’’ 6 When it came to discussing or portraying U.S. policy, 

Chancellor Schroeder was torn between being the statesman and being the populist 

politician. 

Some in the Bush Administration maintain that the best way to put the profound 

disagreements of 2002–2003 behind us is for the Germans and the French to make 

substantial, new commitments to Iraq. Let’s be honest: Angela Merkel will not send 

German troops to Iraq. Nor should the Bush Administration present that choice to 

her. Rather, both sides of the Atlantic can focus on, first, changing the tone of the 

relationship and then, moving on to change the substance. President Bush and Secretary of State Rice have begun to do this on the U.S. side and must continue to 

do so. A new German government is likely to do the same. 

One substantive area that might be ripe for enhanced German-American cooperation is democracy promotion. The Transatlantic Trends survey referenced earlier 

found, in June 2005, that 78% of Germans think it should be the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in other countries, as compared to 51% of 

Americans who saw this as a role for the United States. The lower number in the 

United States reflects the fact that democracy promotion is seen through a partisan 

prism here with 76% of Republicans and only 43% of Democrats supporting a U.S. 

role in helping establish democracy elsewhere.7 When asked about concrete measures, such as supporting independent groups like trade unions and human rights 

associations or imposing political and economic sanctions, support on both sides of 

the Atlantic was roughly similar. In fact, Europeans and Americans are already 

working closely together to foster democratic transitions in places like Afghanistan, 

Ukraine, and Lebanon. When Angela Merkel assumes the chancellorship, deepening 

and widening German-American cooperation on democracy promotion, either bilaterally or in the European context, would be an ideal agenda item for her first meeting with President Bush. 

A change in style and rhetoric can make a critical difference. Such a change can 

establish the foundation for concrete policy initiatives. If Angela Merkel can close 

the gap between German rhetoric and German actions, she could go a long way to 

rebuilding trust across the Atlantic. For those of us who continue to believe that 

more unites us than divides us, this would be a welcome change.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you Dr. Donfried. 

Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff. Is it Brockhoff? 

Mr. KLEINE-BROCKHOFF. Yes, it is Kleine-Brockhoff, a very long 

name. 

16

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS KLEINE-BROCKHOFF, 

WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF, ‘‘DIE ZEIT’’

Mr. KLEINE-BROCKHOFF. Well, it is an honor for me to be here. 

Thank you very much for inviting me and giving me this opportunity. 

It is not a secret that a grand coalition of the parliamentary system is a pretty delicate structure. It is governance by perpetual 

conference committee, probably somewhat unstable, transitional in 

nature. ‘‘Grand coalition’’ means gradualism, constraint, limited 

agenda, and usually its limited agenda is domestic. That is exactly 

what we see here. If and when Angela Merkel is elected chancellor, 

she is a chancellor of a domestic agenda. 

The question is, how can you conduct foreign policy under such 

circumstances? The answer is, you can as long as neither partner 

wants a foreign policy revolution. You have to rely on time-tested 

policy fundamentals, and you will have to agree to disagree on the 

rest. 

That is exactly what we are seeing happening during these negotiations now. The cornerstones of German foreign policy will be untouched. They remain to be strengthening of the European Union 

by promoting further integration, transatlantic security partnership in NATO, and promotion of a rules-based international order. 

But there is a level of foreign policy that is somewhat below grand 

design, and those are questions of tone, of style, and of balance, 

and it is here that conservatives criticize the outgoing Social Democrat-led government. They feel that Germany is in danger of giving 

up its balance between Atlanticism and Europeanism as well as its 

traditional position as a mediator in the middle of Europe. This critique translates into an agenda. It is the recalibration of Germany’s 

relationships. And since I am a journalist, I will give you a couple 

of headlines: ‘‘Less France, More America’’; ‘‘Less Russia, More Poland.’’

What does that mean? Conservatives are the stalwarts of German Atlanticism, but, post 9/11, they faced a double irritation: 

About America and about Schroeder. They did not understand why 

the United States preferred coalitions of the willing over NATO 

when dealing with al-Qaeda, and many of them did not understand 

the Bush Administrations’ reasoning for going to war with Iraq, 

but, at the same time, they found Chancellor Schroeder’s reaction 

overblown. They believe Schroeder’s coalition of the unwilling with 

France and Russia created or deepened the European division. It 

alienated America unnecessarily. It made Germany look like a 

French subcontractor. All of that, they contend, is contrary to vital 

German interests. They want to correct it. 

The rule-of-thumb has always been that Berlin should be halfway between Paris and Washington. That means, first of all, improve relations with the United States. That is exactly what Angela 

Merkel intends to do, first item on her foreign policy agenda. However, I do not think she will do what many in this town hope for. 

She will not reverse the course on Iraq. She will not send German 

troops. Why? Because the coalition would blow up in her face immediately. 

On Iraq, we have an all-party foreign policy consensus in Germany. In other words, she needs to make Iraq a no-go zone for GerVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:03 Feb 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EET\110905\24518.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
17

man-American relations and yet improve this relationship. She will 

likely do something like an anything-but-Iraq approach. 

The second complication, as Karen Donfried mentioned, is public 

opinion. Schroeder’s foreign policy is wildly popular because people 

think he got the big questions right. He led German forces into the 

right wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan and kept them out of the 

wrong war, which is Iraq. He gave up Germans’ military abstinence 

after World War II while standing up to the United States when 

necessary. The public, roughly at a margin of 80 to 20 percent, does 

not want the incoming chancellor to give up that posture. 

The suspicion this majority holds about Angela Merkel is that 

she may be blindly obedient to Washington. So the challenge for 

the leaderships on both sides of the Atlantic is to use the opening 

that this change of government presents while winning over a public that remains to be very skeptical of the Bush Administration. 

Conservatives believe there is no successful German leadership 

in Europe when Germany does not win over the smaller countries 

and champions their causes. Only when Germany does that will it 

have enough leverage in Europe. They contend Schroeder has violated that principle of German foreign policy. Merkel wants to return to that balance, which means, first of all: Do not alienate Poland by cozying up to Russia. And with regard to Russia, her most 

important foreign policy adviser says: No more special relationships, just good relations. 

Turkey is the one issue that the coalition is at odds about. Social 

Democrats want Turkey in; the European Union Christian Democrats do not. Since the partners do not agree on Turkey, they will 

agree to disagree. That is easy because membership talks, which 

just started, will last at least 10 years, and no decisions will have 

to be taken in the half life of this coalition. So that also means, for 

German-American relations, Turkey does not need to be a stumbling block in German-American relations. 

In closing, what you will see is no foreign policy revolution but 

a slight retraditionalization of German foreign policy, and if orchestrated right, it is a new opening to move beyond Iraq and overcome 

the recent division in United States-German relationships. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS KLEINE-BROCKHOFF, WASHINGTON BUREAU

CHIEF, ‘‘DIE ZEIT’’

If Angela Merkel had her way as Chancellor, she would leave the cornerstones 

of German foreign policy untouched, but alter its tone and most importantly the 

delicate balance of Germany’s vital relationships. In short, the ingredients of 

Merkel’s preferred foreign policy would include:

• less France and more United States

• less Russia and more Poland

• no EU-Membership for Turkey

But Angela Merkel will not have her way, at least not completely. And if change 

does come, it is not likely to be announced with fanfare. Indeed, there are several 

domestic constraints on Merkel’s agenda. If elected Chancellor by the Bundestag, 

she will be leading a grand coalition that includes the most important component 

of the current government, the center-left Social Democrats. While Merkel and her 

center-right Christian Democrats want to engineer some changes, their Social Democrat partners will see to it that she guarantees enough continuity in policy areas 

dear to them. The Social Democrats will want to protect what they regard as the 

18

core foreign policy achievements of the current Schro ̈der government. At the same 

time, Social Democrats will likely work hard not to be seen as obstructionists inside 

the coalition. However, the very nature of such a grand coalition creates constraints. 

It is governance by perpetual conference committee—probably somewhat instable, 

transitional in nature, with a limited agenda focused on domestic policy. It will lack 

a clear mandate for a distinct foreign policy agenda. In such a volatile political climate, public opinion may become another source of constraint on policy makers. 

This situation poses a particular challenge to American foreign policy: How does 

one deal with a German chancellor who wants less change than many in Washington hope for, yet more change than she can implement or even advocate for? 

I will try to address all three topics here: first, the approach to foreign policy that 

Angela Merkel and her conservative advisors favor; second, the grand coalition and 

the domestic constraints on it; and third, the resulting challenges for American foreign policy. In addition, I will offer a few observations about the personalities involved. 

1. THE FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA OF GERMAN CONSERVATIVES

a. Less France, more United States 

When Angela Merkel appeared before the media to announce that talks with the 

Social Democrats had led to the decision to form a grand coalition under her leadership, she briefly outlined the agenda of the new government. She mentioned foreign 

policy only in passing, citing only one such agenda item: to improve the relationship 

with the United States. There is, of course, a deeper meaning to this brief announcement. It is the central importance that she attaches to this relationship. Indeed, the 

rest of her agenda revolves around it. 

Merkel’s Christian Democrats built their foreign policy on a long tradition of 

Atlanticism, initially with the first West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who 

helped bring West Germany into the Atlantic Alliance, and most recently with 

Helmut Kohl, who cooperated with the first President Bush to negotiate German 

unity within NATO. The tradition of Atlanticism in Merkel’s party is alive and well. 

But during the post-9–11 years German conservatives faced a double irritation. 

It seemed only normal to Christian Democrats (and consistent with NATO’s common defense clause) that the Alliance offer help to the United States after the attacks of 9–11. To their surprise, this help was rejected. Building the response to terrorism on coalitions of the willing rather than on NATO confounded conservatives. 

The run-up to the Iraq War found the majority of Christian Democrats, who had 

after all been the stalwarts of German Atlanticism, in the mainstream of public 

opinion—which became increasingly critical of the Bush administration’s plans for 

war. Few Christian Democrats publicly supported the war; some openly opposed it; 

many simply remained silent; hardly anyone advocated a military contribution to 

the war effort. The war itself has only hardened those positions. And the fact that 

no weapons of mass destruction have been found has rendered the war indefensible 

even to the most ardent German Atlanticists. To this day, Christian Democrats do 

not advocate German military contributions to stabilize Iraq, even though they regard a stable Iraq as in the interest of Germany. There would be no majority for 

such a policy within the party, within the Bundestag, or among the German public. 

Such a proposal would definitely lead to the collapse of the governing coalition. 

The second irritation for conservatives was Chancellor Schro ̈der’s reaction to the 

changed American behavior in the run-up to the Iraq war. Christian Democrats regarded his stance as overblown and contrary to vital German interests. While many 

agreed with Schro ̈der’s characterization of the war as ‘‘an adventure,’’ they were 

puzzled by the attempt to form a coalition of the unwilling with France and Russia. 

While many Christian Democrats believe President Bush’s strategy to build a coalition of the willing has helped to split Europe, they also believe that Schro ̈der’s ‘‘coalition of the unwilling’’ has exacerbated the problem. Specifically, they contend that 

it forced Europe’s smaller nations to decide between the two blocks. Angela Merkel 

has, on numerous occasions since 2003, criticized Schro ̈der for giving up Germany’s 

balance between Atlanticism and Europeanism as well as its traditional position as 

a mediator in the middle of Europe. 

In the post-1989 environment Christian Democrats see two vital interests for Germany. First of all, they advocate strengthening the European Union by promoting 

further integration. German Christian Democrats are soundly rooted in Europe’s 

federalist camp: Helmut Kohl was one of the architects of the Euro. Conservative 

foreign policy experts Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Scha ̈uble invented the controversial idea of a ‘‘core Europe’’ that would speed up its integration process while others 

would be allowed to lag behind. Christian Democrats supported the European Constitution that the Dutch and the French electorates rejected. They now favor ‘‘resVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:03 Feb 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EET\110905\24518.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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cuing’’ those parts of the project that can be salvaged. In this type of Europeanist 

thinking, a policy that does not use German power to avoid splits in Europe is contrary to the core national interest of the country. 

Conservatives see the trans-Atlantic relationship as Germany’s second vital national interest. In their thinking NATO remains Germany’s security guarantee, especially in an age of terrorism. Beyond the security partnership, the United States 

is seen as the guarantee power for Germany’s first national interest: European integration. That is why President Bush’s reaffirmation of America’s commitment to a 

strong and united Europe (during his visit to Brussels earlier this year) has been 

greeted with a sigh of relief by German Conservatives. It helped rebuild Atlanticism 

inside the party and led to a more pointed critique of Schro ̈der’s foreign policy and 

to the rationale for the recalibration of German foreign policy under conservative 

leadership. As Karl-Heinz Kamp, one of Merkel’s foreign policy advisors, puts it, 

Germany must try to ‘‘return to trans-Atlantic balance’’. In Kamp’s view, ‘‘Mr. 

Schro ̈der’s shift towards Paris has destroyed this equilibrium and impaired the 

international weight of Germany.’’ Only in a ‘‘mediating role’’ Germany can ‘‘exert 

a large degree of influence in the European Union.’’ Kamp, security policy coordinator at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, also asserts: ‘‘Germany can and will 

loosen itself from the French grip without becoming blindly obedient to Washington.’’ Inside NATO, Kamp wants Germany to ‘‘cease applying the brake’’ and instead ‘‘direct its political energies toward the further development of the alliance.’’ 

A new German government, Kamp declares, ‘‘will promote the development of a European security identity founded on European-Atlantic synergy, rather than one focused on European emancipation from American dominance in the political, economic and military spheres’’. However, these words represent ‘‘pure’’ conservative 

foreign policy thinking. They were written before the grand coalition became a political necessity. 

b. Less Russia, more Poland 

Correspondingly, Christian Democrats feel uneasy about what they see as an alltoo-cozy relationship with Russia. Vladimir Putin has been Chancellor Schro ̈der’s 

best friend on the international stage—a personal relationship that paid off for both 

countries, Schro ̈der claims. Schro ̈der and Putin have met countless times. For orthodox Christmas 2001, they attended a service in Moscow. For his 60th birthday, 

Schro ̈der invited Putin to his home in Hanover as the only foreign guest. Putin understands German. His daughters went to German School in Moscow. Schro ̈der has 

adopted a Russian girl. Both leaders come from a humble background. They moved 

up the social ladder in their respective societies. They are, as one Schro ̈der advisor 

puts it, ‘‘brothers in biography’’. 

Russia and Germany have cooperated in the conflict with terrorism and in the 

conflict with President Bush over Iraq. All the while, Schro ̈der has abstained from 

criticizing the growing democracy deficit in Russia. At the heart of the strategic 

partnership, however, is energy policy. In 2003, no less than 38 % of German natural gas imports were supplied by Russia. New joint explorations of gas fields in 

northern Siberia have recently been agreed upon. Shortly before the German election, Chancellor Schro ̈der and President Putin announced that a new natural gas 

pipeline would be installed on the bottom of the Baltic Sea, not coincidentally circumventing Lithuania and Poland. As German foreign policy analyst Michael 

Thumann writes, Mr. Schro ̈der has made ‘‘a choice for his country: in energy affairs, 

he focuses solely on Russia.’’ Schro ̈der’s ‘‘distinctive brand of Ostpolitik,’’ Thumann 

goes on to write, ‘‘represents a clear break with West Germany’s foreign policy traditions since 1949.’’

Christian Democrats wish to re-balance Germany’s Russia policy. In October 

2004, Angela Merkel chided Schro ̈der for a policy that ‘‘increases Germany’s dependence on Russian natural gas beyond a prudent limit.’’ While a clean break with this 

policy is unlikely because of German energy needs, a conservative government 

would like to pursue a diversification strategy. German conservatives, rooted in the 

realist school of foreign policy thinking, are unlikely to start confronting Russia 

about questions of democracy inside Russia. However, Chancellor Merkel’s relations 

with the Russian leader are unlikely to be as personal as those of her two predecessors. Helmut Kohl even went to the sauna with Boris Yeltsin. Conservatives attribute Kohl’s closeness to him to the demands of a unique historical situation rather than with a more general strategic analysis. That unique situation, they contend, 

was the fall of the Berlin wall, German reunification, and the fact that Russian 

troops remained stationed on German territory for years even after reunification. 

Conservatives point to the fact that Kohl managed to balance this relationship with 

President Yeltsin with a close relationship to President Bush and unwavering support of Polish membership in the European Union. It is this lack of balance that 

20

Christian Democrats criticize today. As Wolfgang Scha ̈uble, Merkel’s most experienced foreign policy advisor, put it in June 2005, there will be no more special relationship, just good relations. 

The conservative notion that the Schro ̈der government disturbed the balance of 

Germany’s vital relationships extends to relationships with the smaller countries in 

Europe—even with Poland, the biggest of the smaller nations. Being the most populous and economically most powerful country in the EU, West Germany had initially 

met some skepticism from its neighbors when it assumed a leadership role inside 

Europe. The burden of the Nazi past also played its part. Consecutive governments 

have successfully addressed these concerns by making Germany a champion of 

smaller EU countries. The conservative critique of the Schro ̈der government claims 

that Schro ̈der has diminished German influence in Europe by neglecting those 

smaller countries. According to this thinking, Poland has been unnecessarily alienated by the Schro ̈der government’s cozy relationship with President Putin’s Russia. 

As the Adenauer Foundation’s Karl-Heinz Kamp writes about a prospective conservative government: ‘‘By showing respect, Germany will win back the small countries 

within the EU whose trust was lost over the last few years.’’

c. No EU-membership for Turkey 

Ever since the EU started talking about possible Turkish membership some 40 

years ago, German conservatives have had misgivings about this prospect. Chancellor Helmut Kohl voiced them most prominently and bluntly when he said that 

Europe ‘‘is a Christian Club’’. Christian Democrats argue that Europe has borders. 

They see Turkey outside of these borders. They mention cultural incompatibility. 

And increasingly they claim the EU is not ready for a big country like Turkey. Instead of exporting stability, the EU would import instability. Under Angela Merkel’s 

leadership as party chairman, Christian Democrats have committed to derailing the 

membership process. They insist that the process is ‘‘open-ended’’ and hope that in 

the end Turkey will not meet the EU membership criteria. And even if Turkey were 

to qualify, they express confidence that the French and some other European electorates which have to approve of Turkish membership will ultimately resist. As an 

alternative to membership, Merkel proposes what she calls a ‘‘privileged partnership.’’ However, under criticism from Social Democrats (who support Turkish membership) Ms. Merkel has a hard time explaining how a ‘‘privileged partnership’’ improves the current legal status of Turkey vis-a-vis the European Union. 

2. THE GRAND COALITION AND DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS

Grand coalitions are transitory in nature. All participants know that a grand coalition is not a long-term governing project. The stability of this particular grand coalition seemed to be guaranteed by the fact that all three party chairpersons (the Social Democrat as well as his colleagues from the two conservative sister parties) 

committed their own careers to the project by becoming cabinet members. Yet about 

a week before this testimony, political upheaval left only one chairperson as a cabinet member. That person is Angela Merkel, the prospective Chancellor. This turn 

of events adds to the doubt that a stable coalition with a forceful agenda is in the 

making. 

A feature of any German coalition is the tradition that the larger partner names 

the chancellor, while the smaller partner names the foreign minister. In a grand coalition, however, the office of the Foreign Minister may be used to groom a prospective party leader, possibly a future chancellor. That may create a sense of rivalry 

between the chancellor and her most important cabinet member. It also means that 

the chancellor of a grand coalition has a hard time forcing her foreign policy agenda 

on the partner (which has happened numerous times under conventional coalition 

governments). 

Grand coalitions work well in foreign affairs when they have a distinct policy 

project. That was the case in the first Grand Coalition (1966–1969), which paved 

the way for detente. In the absence of such a project, grand coalitions have to rely 

on time-tested policy traditions. That is the case here. The cornerstones of German 

foreign policy enjoy multi-partisan support. They remain European integration, 

trans-Atlantic security, partnership in NATO, promotion of rules-based multilateral 

conflict resolution, and military engagement in the Balkans and Afghanistan—but 

not in Iraq. Beyond these fundamentals Ms. Merkel’s agenda of ‘‘re-balancing’’ Germany’s relationships will be part of day-to-day governing. It was also part of the 

coalition negotiations. (They are ongoing at the time of this writing. The foreign policy portion is completed and not yet public.) But Christian Democrats did not insist 

on putting every word of Merkel’s agenda into writing. They tried to avoid provocations to their new coalition partner. As one observer joked, conservatives wanted 

21

to see a lot of NATO in the document, while Social Democrats wanted to read about 

peace. Most likely, they both will be satisfied. 

But the real issues were debated. First among them: Turkey. Here the partners 

disagree on principle. Social Democrats want Turkey inside the EU, Conservatives 

do not. During the negotiations they agreed to disagree and leave the issue to the 

future. That is easy to do, because the European Union has only recently agreed 

to start membership talks. The new coalition will not have to take responsibility for 

that decision. Membership negotiations will likely conclude in ten years—beyond the 

half-life of this coalition. 

Social Democrats do not agree with the conservative critique that Germany’s relationships with Europe’s smaller countries have been strained under their watch. But 

they do agree with the underlying principle that Germany should exert influence 

by championing the causes of smaller nations. That makes it easy for them to agree 

to Merkel’s proposition: work more closely with Poland and smaller countries. Likewise, Social Democrats do not agree that Germany has been too close to Putin’s Russia. But they do agree that Germany should not become overly dependent on Russian energy. While conservatives will probably not insist on annulling the treaty on 

the Baltic natural-gas pipeline, Social Democrats will not complain when the new 

chancellor behaves in a more business-like manner than her predecessor. It is in 

questions of style and tone where Chancellor Merkel will have her wiggle room. But 

of course over time style easily translates into substance. 

This is also true when it comes to German-American relations. Social Democrats 

agree to build on the improvements of the last year. While Chancellor Schro ̈der’s 

foreign policy has had little or no opposition from inside his party, some found the 

strained personal relations between Chancellor Schro ̈der and President Bush unfortunate and unnecessary. They regret the demise of Gerhard Schro ̈der, but welcome 

the opportunity to overcome differences with new players. Social Democrats and 

Christian Democrats can find common ground on these questions because their leaders are foreign policy realists. However, there is a gulf between the policy elites and 

a sizeable segment of the population. Public attitudes and perceptions may well become a constraining factor, especially in an inherently unstable grand coalition. 

Chancellor Schro ̈der’s foreign policy has been wildly popular because a large majority of Germans believe he got the big questions right. He sent German soldiers 

to Kosovo and Afghanistan, but kept them out of Iraq. He abandoned the post-war 

notion that the German military should be used only in pure self-defense. At the 

same time, he seemed to show that decisions about the use of the military would 

be made on a case-by-case basis. He would cooperate with the United States when 

prudent and stand up to the US when necessary. The key word of this policy is ‘‘normalization’’. The public does not want Angela Merkel to abandon this posture. As 

a candidate she quietly acknowledged this fact. She broke with the tradition of German candidates for chancellor and avoided coming to Washington. She did not want 

to be seen as preparing to change German policy towards Iraq. She did not make 

foreign policy a campaign issue. When Chancellor Schro ̈der challenged her during 

the TV debate, she tried to change the subject. Flash polls evaluated this segment 

of the debate: Schro ̈der came out ahead by a margin of 81 to 17. 

The factors that drive public perceptions remain in place today: President George 

Bush continues to be unpopular. His standing among the German public seems virtually beyond repair. The ongoing Iraq war supplies the German public with a 

steady diet of pictures that show death. It reminds them of the reasons why they 

objected to the war in the first place. The ongoing debate about prisoner abuse, torture, and secret CIA-prisons in Europe continues to undermine America’s moral 

stature in Germany and, thus, its ability to lead. As long as these factors remain 

in place, large portions of the public will watch Chancellor Merkel’s demeanor visa-vis the United States closely. She will have to counter the impression of ‘‘blind 

obedience,’’ as the Adenauer Foundation’s Karl-Heinz Kamp puts it. This segment 

of the public will look toward the Social Democrats to safe guard Chancellor 

Schro ̈der’s foreign policy legacy. In sum, Chancellor Merkel will need a lot of sensitivity to get this one right. 

3. THE NEW PERSONNEL

Angela Merkel grew up in a religious household in East Germany. She has a PhD 

in the natural sciences and worked as a scientist until shortly before the fall of the 

Wall. The democracy movement which she joined brought her into politics. During 

her 15 years in politics, she has seldom dealt with foreign policy. She first learned 

about the international arena in 1994 when she became Minister for Environmental 

Protection in Helmut Kohl’s Cabinet. A wider foreign policy agenda became part of 

her portfolio when she assumed the role of party chair in 2000. 

22

While there is no long paper trail about her foreign policy positions, it is possible 

to discern some basic convictions from her life in East Germany. She grew up under 

authoritarian rule and Soviet occupation. In short, she knows why she speaks Russian and why Vladimir Putin speaks German. He was stationed only a few hundred 

kilometers from her home—as a KGB officer. Judging from her background, it is extremely unlikely that she will see as close a partner in Russia or as close a friend 

in President Putin as her predecessor did. It is harder to get a read on her personal 

perspective on the United States. Dissidents in Soviet-occupied Central and Eastern 

Europe looked to the United States as a potential liberator; East Germans looked 

across the wall to their West German brethren. This difference helps to explain policy attitudes even today. Yet Angela Merkel has shown a remarkable interest in and 

openness towards the United States. To use Secretary Rumsfeld’s parlance: she is 

as much ‘‘New Europe’’ as one would find in Germany. Furthermore, her foreign policy advisors are traditional West German Atlanticists, Wolfgang Scha ́uble and 

Friedbert Pflu ̈ ger being the most important among them. 

Angela Merkel has built a career on being underestimated. She has shown astonishing staying power and political toughness. She perseveres. It is likely that her 

foreign policy agenda is genuine and unlikely that the special constraints of this 

Grand Coalition will cause her to give up the core of that agenda. 

Frank-Walter Steinmeier, her designated foreign minister, is an unknown quantity in German foreign policy. For the past six years he has been Gerhard Schro ̈der’s 

chief of staff. He rose through the ranks of the state administration in Lower Saxony and was never elected to public office. He came to Berlin with Chancellor 

Schro ̈der. Steinmeier has an unassuming personality and an excellent reputation as 

a manager of the daily business of running a government. Even conservatives praise 

him and feel confident that they can work with him. They see him as a pragmatist. 

He is closely associated with Chancellor Schro ̈der’s agenda for economic reform, but 

not with his foreign policy agenda. To many observers his ascension to the most important cabinet post came as a surprise. 

Public knowledge about Steinmeier’s foreign policy thinking is scant. However, his 

few public remarks show a man who does not think about foreign policy merely in 

terms of traditional diplomacy. He is concerned with the structural changes of the 

international environment in the age of globalization: ethnic and religious violence, 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, asymmetric threats, rogue and failing 

states, demography, immigration, non-state actors. We have hints about 

Steinmeier’s mindset, but not about his answers to his own questions. 

4. CHALLENGES FOR US FOREIGN POLICY

The question that many in Washington foreign policy circles ask is this: If 

Schro ̈der was the problem, is Merkel the solution? There are other questions. For 

example, how does one deal with a new government that seems to downplay the 

changes that it wants to implement? 

Inevitably, foreign partners of this new German government will have to know 

about and accept its basic parameters to be able to do business with it. First of all, 

it is only half new. To yield to the temptation of working with the new part and 

ignoring the old will create problems rather than solutions. From an American perspective, the need to win over Social Democrats has not changed. Once they are won 

over, Chancellor Merkel can avoid the impression of subservience to America (which 

outcome should be very much in the American interest). 

It will be hard or impossible for the United States to make progress on two fronts: 

Turkey and Iraq. The former because the coalition is divided about strategy; the latter because the coalition is united about strategy. On Turkish EU-membership the 

coalition will not want to reevaluate its decision not to decide what its position is. 

On Iraq, it represents the German consensus not to get involved militarily. 

Actually, this coalition offers the opportunity to finally move beyond Iraq. The 

new coalition will not want to use cooperation on Iraq as a barometer to measure 

the quality of German-American relations. Given the history of the past few years, 

this new government will be eager to find new areas of cooperation. 

Angela Merkel is more than she seems—just as this new government. It may appear to be quiet and soft-spoken, but it has a foreign policy agenda. And that agenda has Washington at its top.Given the constraints of a grand coalition, that is an 

opening.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff. 

Before I yield to the gentleman from Florida, my good friend, Mr. 

Wexler, I would like to welcome our friend, Congressman Bill 

Delahunt from the State of Massachusetts, who is the incoming 

23

Chair of the Congressional Study Group on Germany. Welcome 

today, Bill. 

With that, Mr. Wexler, the microphone is yours. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much. I thank the three witnesses 

for allowing us to benefit from your expertise. It is very interesting 

to both listen and learn from you. 

Sometimes I think that the division is a bit exaggerated, which 

is reflected in your remarks, between the United States and Germany. The division regarding Iraq, which obviously we all witnessed played out in the most prominent of terms. Yet, ironically, 

the cooperation in Afghanistan, as all of you spoke about, is actually quite remarkable in terms of the intensity of German involvement with American troops and entirely consistent with American 

objectives, and yet that gets very little examination in terms of 

even defining who Schroeder was and what his foreign policy was 

and what his relationship with Washington was. 

Also, the other aspect, at least since President Bush’s trip to Europe after President Bush’s reelection, is American cooperation 

with the EU–3, of which Germany is obviously a part, regarding 

Iran; which also, in my view, is a high mark of transatlantic cooperation which I believe everyone perceives will continue under 

this new government or new coalition. 

I am curious if you might comment. Taking not a worst-case scenario regarding Iran, but as we move forward to a more 

confrontational posture at the UN, or potentially more 

confrontational posture at the UN, given Iran’s more bellicose attitude of late, do you foresee any changes in German posture relative 

to the ultimate issue of sanctions regarding Iran by virtue of the 

coalition? 

Ms. DONFRIED. I agree with you that Iran has been an extremely 

positive example of transatlantic cooperation, and I think we have 

done a very good job up until this point of being united: U.K., 

France, Germany, United States, and Javier Solana representing 

the EU. The strength and weakness of our Iran policy is that the 

threat of referral to the UN Security Council has proven to be very 

effective with the Iranians. They actually cared. They do not want 

to be referred to the UN Security Council. But if we exercise that 

threat and actually do refer Iran, then the question is, what happens next? It seems very unlikely that we would be able to get 

sanctions from the UN. I would imagine that there would be a Russian veto or a Chinese veto. 

So then the question is, could we have sanctions within the West, 

United States and Europeans? And I am very dubious that we 

would be able to get agreement on that within the European 

Union. 

Mr. WEXLER. Is that because of French reluctance or German reluctance? I do not suspect it would be British reluctance. 

Ms. DONFRIED. Yes, there would be French reluctance. There 

would also be German reluctance. I think, in the European Union, 

there is not a consensus to move in that direction. Where we are 

now is a desire on all parts to try to drag it out for as long as possible because every day that Iran is not enriching uranium and 

moving closer to having a nuclear bomb, that is a win for us. But 

as you point out, the new Iranian Government has been using exVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:03 Feb 01, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EET\110905\24518.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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tremely bellicose rhetoric, and it is not obvious they will allow us 

to play this long. 

So if Iran puts us in a position of needing to respond, what are 

our policy options? Right now, the only one we are talking about 

is sanctions at the level of the Europeans, and I am dubious that 

you will get support there, but let me turn it over to Jack and 

Thomas. 

Mr. KLEINE-BROCKHOFF. The problem with Iran in my home 

country is there has been little strategic thinking about the hard 

choices. What do we do in the end? We, of course, liked the fact 

that the Bush Administration has changed its perspective, has 

come on board with the EU–3, but over the past months, we have 

also seen this bellicose rhetoric that brings us closer to these hard 

choices. The quote, ‘‘Extermination of Israel,’’ used in the new Iranian President’s speech, has resonance certainly in the German 

public and also in the German leadership. 

So the question, ‘‘Where do we go from here?’’ is very much—I 

agree with Karen—playing for keeps. As long as they do not enrich, 

as long as we talk, that is fine, but I do not think the German leadership is at a point where they have made a commitment to go a 

step further. 

Mr. JANES. I would simply add that I think, in contrast to the 

Iraq situation, the threat in Iran is real and is visible, and I think 

the Germans understand that in a different way than Iraq was 

ever visible. So in that respect, it will be an interesting test not 

only of the political leadership but of the public at large as to what 

they are willing to accept their government to do. They know where 

those nuclear plants are. They know this is not a hide-and-seek 

game. They know that this is there. This is very different from the 

weapons of mass destruction that were not there. So I think that 

is something that will make a very big difference in terms of how 

the public and the leadership decide what their position will be. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Likewise, I appreciate all 

three of you being here. On my mother’s side, a bunch of Prussians 

came to Texas in the early 1800s, and I am very proud of the fact 

that that is my heritage, and so I welcome all of you here. 

With the current unrest going on in France regarding immigrant 

population, how will the issue of large numbers of immigrants in 

Germany sit with this new government, how do you think that will 

play out? Will we see violence? What will we see? What is your prediction, and how is the government going to handle this situation 

if it becomes a problem? 

Mr. KLEINE-BROCKHOFF. First of all, the demographic situation 

of the immigrant population in France and in Germany is very different, so, at least from what I can tell from here, and you do not 

get a really good feeling of what the situation is from here, the 

Muslim population that we have in Germany is mostly Turkish and 

is not Arab. It is very unlikely that you will see a burning BerlinKreuzberg in the same way, and that is also for the reasons that 

we do not, in Germany, have the same type of suburban structure 

that certainly exists around Paris. So you do not have that same 

type of social component that sparks some of that violence. 

25

But in the long term, of course, the fact that we have a sizable 

Muslim minority in Germany is part of any coalition’s political future to address. Germany has done, and everybody agrees to that, 

a fairly poor job in integrating these people over the past two generations, so that will be a job, and it is a wake-up call for German 

politics, as in any European country: How do we deal with the 

question that we will have a growing Muslim minority in our country? How do we ensure equal rights and a glass ceiling, which is 

one of the issues at stake in France? 

Mr. JANES. It is interesting to note that in France, of course, you 

have this high concentration around Paris of people that basically 

do not feel they have a stake in the system. I think that the last 

several years in Germany have shown that people are making a big 

effort to let them have a stake in the system. The Turk issue, with 

regard to their possible membership in the EU, has been a part of 

that discussion. 

As you know, Chancellor Schroeder came out very forcefully for 

supporting Turkey’s membership in the EU, and I think, to some 

extent, that is a factor that plays into German politics as well. Beyond that foreign policy dimension, I think the real work is involved in making sure that the individuals that are there, not only 

from Turkey, but most of them are from Turkey, feel like they have 

a stake in the system. I think that that is more so the case in Germany than it is in France. The question is that it is a continual 

effort and a process that has to be worked on constantly. 

To my understanding, there has been no significant outbreak of 

violence in Germany. I think there were some copycat crimes in 

Berlin and Bremen recently in terms of torching of cars, but there 

is not that outbreak at the moment. I think the government is 

quite conscious of the fact of not wanting to let off of their effort 

to make sure that that effort of integrating this group—this is a 

large group—into society continues, regardless of the regime in 

Berlin. 

Ms. DONFRIED. I think that while the situation in Germany is 

different, this tells us about a Europe-wide problem. If you look at 

the ‘‘No’’ vote on the Constitution in France and in the Netherlands, there were many reasons why those votes rejected the European Constitution, but one of them clearly was this fear of societies 

that were changing thanks to higher immigration and different 

peoples coming to the Netherlands and to France. This sense, I 

think, permeates Europe in part because even if no new immigrant 

came to, say, the Netherlands as of today, you go down the road 

20 years and Amsterdam will be a majority Muslim city. The reality of demographics in Europe is that Germany needs immigrants, France needs immigrants, so there is this duality between 

the reality of demographics and the fear of immigration that Europe cannot escape. 

I think that you, as a Member from Texas, who understands well 

this reality in the United States of needing a labor force and the 

challenges that immigration brings with it, can help deepen and 

enrich the conversation across the Atlantic on this enduring reality. 

Thanks. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

26

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Poe, I know that you had a statement that 

you would like to enter for the record, and, without objection, we 

will make sure that all Members statements will be made a part 

of the record of the hearing. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Poe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Leading up to the September 18th elections in Germany, many of us hoped that 

Christian Democrat candidate Angela Merkel would decisively win and be a breath 

of fresh air to the economic, social, and foreign policies of the Schroeder-led cabinet. 

Unfortunately, the elections did not produce a clear winner. Mrs. Merkel is from 

former communist, East Germany which should give anyone a healthy respect for 

the freedoms, market economics and Western values that is much needed in today’s 

Germany. She has been compared to Margaret Thatcher in that her platform would 

rebuild relations with the United States (taking the focus off of France), introduce 

a flat tax, and open up the German economy. I am interested in hearing your opinion on whether a compromise can be worked out between Merkel and Schroeder—

especially since they come from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I will throw this out for Dr. Janes to start with, 

and if anyone else wants to contribute, I welcome it. Given the seriousness of the economic situation and the need for economic reforms, will this new coalition government, in your opinion, have the 

capability to institute the necessary economic and social welfare reforms? 

Mr. JANES. I hope so. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I am supposed to be the politician. [Laughter.] 

Mr. JANES. Let me be, then, more specific. I do not know. I think 

that basically there is every opportunity for them to kick start this 

engine into place. There is, as I indicated in my statement and in 

my written statement, a great deal of infrastructural prerequisites 

in Germany that would allow this to happen, and my sense is that 

there is also a recognition throughout the country that there is a 

need to move forward. 

Let me just say, Germany is an interesting situation where, on 

the one hand, you have an enormous, powerful economic force. The 

German exports are world leaders. The major German companies 

are doing extremely well around the world. On the other hand, the 

problem is at home. The problem is, as we say in the trade, the 

‘‘two-speed economy,’’ the larger corporations doing very well, but 

the smaller companies and the smaller firms hamstrung. I think 

that what the two sides of this coalition are going to have to do is 

to realize that what is at stake here is not just the initial pain that 

has to be taken by virtue of making these changes for the immediate future but for the long-term future. 

So I guess my response to you is that I think they have the prerequisites there. I think they have the opportunity. My only concern, as I said, is that I feel that there is probably going to be the 

possibility that the coalition itself may not be able to agree sufficiently, and so the force of progress might be incremental rather 

than perhaps the kind of reform it really needs. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Dr. Donfried? 

Ms. DONFRIED. It has been interesting to watch the analysis of 

the German election. One faction was saying, what this election 

tells us is that even though the election is ambiguous in terms of 

27

the coalition government that will come out of it, 80 percent of the 

German electorate voted for reform; 80 percent voted for parties 

that are talking about economic reform. I do not think that is the 

message of this election. I think the message of this election is Germans were scared by the reforms that Angela Merkel was trumpeting. So you have a situation where every German knows you 

need to put in place these tough reforms, but they do not want 

those reforms to affect them. They do not want their own benefits 

to be cut. 

I think the grand coalition can go in one of two ways: Either the 

two big parties can say, ‘‘Let us steel ourselves, do this together, 

and then we both take the blame,’’ which would be constructive. Or 

the two big parties will decide that the politics are overwhelming, 

and they would rather toss the political football back and forth 

rather than put in place serious reforms. The hope right now is 

they will opt for the former, and we will see at least a modest economic reform package moving forward, but it easily could be the 

latter. 

Mr. KLEINE-BROCKHOFF. I am a little disturbed, the last weeks, 

by the doom-and-gloom commentary about what this German election has been all about and what the outcome, especially on the 

economic front, is supposed to be. First of all, Germans did not 

have the choice between reform and no reform; they had the choice 

between reform and more reform, and they chose some hybrid. So, 

in the end, I think this coalition, while a grand coalition is always 

something limited in duration and also on agenda, it has a couple 

of distinct advantages. It has a two-thirds majority in one house 

and a workable majority in the other. 

So in traditional coalition governments, you have huge agendas, 

and in the end, the output of it will be small because you do not 

get majorities in the second house. Here, you have a limited agenda, and this agenda is very likely to go through. 

So I believe this is part of a multiyear reform process, a very sustained, very gradual process, and I am one of those who believes 

that there will be a German comeback; it just is not around the 

corner, and you can see and grab and hang onto it right here, right 

now. So we should not despair about the fact that there is no huge 

agenda on the table of this grand coalition; by nature, it cannot. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I would like to change the pace here for a second. 

I would certainly welcome an opportunity for my good friend, Bill 

Delahunt, although we are going to have to wrap this up in about 

10 minutes. 

Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff, where will the political challenge to the 

new chancellor, Angela Merkel, come from? 

Mr. KLEINE-BROCKHOFF. What challenge are you envisioning? 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Political challenge. Is it going to come from the 

coalition partner, the Social Democrats? Do you see a challenge 

there? 

Mr. KLEINE-BROCKHOFF. Well, first of all, since the grand coalition is not a future governing structure, it has to come from within. 

It has to come from the Social Democrats. So they are sitting at 

the table with their next challenger, and part of the setup of this 

grand coalition is that her most important colleagues at the cabinet 

28

table will be her challengers tomorrow. The question is only when 

that process will happen and over what it will be going on. 

There are other things going on in the political spectrum. The 

grand coalition is not only stagnation; on the fringes of the political 

spectrum as well as in other parties, you will see new structures 

emerging. So the challenge will be from within, and it will probably 

be something economic where it comes to an end, where she wants 

to go further than the Social Democrats will likely go. That is the 

political challenge that is foreseeable. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Dr. Janes or Dr. Donfried, would you like to add 

to that? 

Ms. DONFRIED. I was just going to say, do not underestimate Angela Merkel. Part of the key to her success has been that she has 

been consistently underestimated. She learned at the feet of a master—she was in Helmut Kohl’s cabinet—and the fact that she is 

very likely to be Germany’s next chancellor shows both her staying 

power and the fact that she understands the political gain. 

Mr. JANES. I think, finally, a very specific thing. I think what 

will make or break this thing is budgetary discussions over the 

next year or two. That will probably be the minefield that is out 

there that might then result in new elections earlier than the 4-

year term that would be foreseen. That is the major landmine that 

is out there. 

But, again, to point to what Karen just said, this is a woman, 

as I indicated, that knows what change is about and knows how 

to understand transformation. She came from that side of Germany 

and is now leading with her counterpart in the other party, who 

is also an eastern German, together. It is an odd thing, 16 years 

after the Wall came down, two eastern Germans are leading the 

Federal Republic of Germany into one of its more significant challenges in terms of domestic affairs. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. It sounds like two, if not all, of you agree that 

she understands the political maze pretty well. 

In the absence of having other Committee Members here, I would 

certainly invite my good friend from Massachusetts, the incoming 

Co-Chair of the Congressional Study Group on Germany, Bill 

Delahunt, if you would like. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess one message 

that I would suggest that ought to be taken from the German elections is do not trust the pollsters. [Laughter.] I think we all can 

share that particular experience. 

I have to concur with the observations of Mr. Wexler. I think we 

have got to be very careful in not overstating the strain on the relationship between Germany and the United States. We have problems in terms of our image in the world not just with the Germans, 

but with the Irish and the Canadians. There was a recent poll in 

Latin America among the economic elite in five countries there. It 

was done by Zogby, and, again, the sample reflected upper-middleclass; wealthy Latin Americans that one would suspect would have 

a good feeling about this Administration. This is not Chavez and 

Fidel and the Shining Path. The President got an 86 percent negative rating. So we will work through these things. I do not think 

there is any particular animus. We have a lot of disagreements 

29

among ourselves in terms of Iraq, so I think we are past that little 

blip. 

Much of what you were saying, Dr. Donfried, is that we are having the same discussions here about growth. Yes, we have a higher 

rate of growth, but our median income is down, so we are looking 

at these problems of disparity of wealth and income. People are 

nervous here in this country. Defined benefit pensions, for example, 

are a thing of the past. There is a healthcare crisis going on for 

some people in this country, so we are still sharing, in many respects, political experiences where we can learn from each other. 

Again back to immigration; you indicated earlier that both the 

Chairman and Congressman Poe are people that are engaged in 

that issue, and there is great diversity on that issue here in the 

United States between the Administration and Members of the Republican Party in Congress. So we understand because the issues 

that have to be addressed here and in Germany are not necessarily 

dissimilar, and I think it is important to understand that. I think 

we are past much of the passion that went on. 

Immigration; again, you are right about the demographics; you 

had better grow because you are not going to be around very much 

longer if you do not. Look at Italy. They have got about another 

100 years to go and then they will not exist. These are issues that 

we all really have to address. Our growth here in this country, in 

many respects, is predicated on immigration, so tough issues, a lot 

of tough issues. 

As Elton indicated, I am the incoming Chair of the Congressional 

Study Group on Germany, and I have seen the benefit of interparliamentary dialogue and interparliamentary relations. What 

happens, of course, is that they are done on an infrequent, ad hoc 

basis. They still have some benefit, but I think we ought to consider expanding it to make it a permanent, ongoing exchange, 

maybe with some kind of a mechanism where Congress, as an independent branch of Government that oftentimes will disagree with 

the Executive, has a permanent office, if you will, probably in Brussels because of the EU, and, obviously, Germany has a key role in 

that, because many Americans do not really understand the concept of the EU. 

I would dare say, and, Elton, you might agree with this, there 

are a lot of Members here in Congress, that it gets a little complicated. You have got councils, you have got ministers, you have 

got all of these kinds of things, but I really do believe that it has 

some merit, this idea of a permanent mechanism with an office 

where there is a constant communication, an ability to communicate ideas, between parliamentarians because we restrict our relationships all too often to just simply executive to executive. We 

can have a much more full relationship and avoid misunderstandings and agree more quickly on issues such as a common policy toward Iran. 

Any thoughts or observations? 

Mr. JANES. Yes. Absolutely. I think that is extremely important 

largely because I think that the internal makeup of the Parliaments in Europe and in Germany, in particular, and by the way, 

there was an enormous infusion of new blood into this Parliament, 

and a lot of them will not know, because they are new, about these 

30

kinds of tracks, the relationships. Many of them might not have 

even been in the United States. I think that the sociology, if I can 

say it this way, of the two bodies certainly indicates that Berlin 

and Washington are in enormous need of that exposure, but I think 

it is worthwhile, in transatlantic terms, in every dimension. I am 

a big supporter of what you just said. 

Ms. DONFRIED. Just two comments. First, on your overall point 

about the state of the relationship, I absolutely agree with you, and 

I think it is a fabulous perspective for you to be bringing to the 

Congressional Study Group on Germany. Looked at from the foreign policy side, I think the big challenge for us across the Atlantic 

is defining the strategic purpose of this relationship. We understood what it was during the Cold War. We had lots of down-andout disagreements on policy, but at the end of the day, we worked 

them out because we shared the same enemy. 

Now, post-11/9, post-fall of the Berlin Wall, and post-9/11, the 

issues that are front-and-center are issues we have never agreed 

on. We did not have a common policy on the Middle East or China 

or India during the Cold War, and these are now front-and-center 

on the agenda. We are trying to craft common policies, and that is 

a challenge. I think we will sort it out, but that is part of what is 

causing the friction. Iraq came on top of that, but it would have 

been a difficult time for us anyway, given the——

Mr. DELAHUNT. That is why my suggestion about a mechanism 

to ratchet up the intensity of the consultation process. 

Ms. DONFRIED. Exactly. I think there are two important aspects 

of that idea. One is what you said about the diversity of opinion: 

In the United States, there is a debate on all of these issues; it is 

not just a debate across the Atlantic. But often in the European 

press—of course, this is not true of Thomas’s writings—there is a 

caricature of the United States and of United States policy. So, 

more discussion is beneficial. 

Your other point, though, was an educational point, that we do 

not understand the EU all that well. What you are going to have 

to think through is where you base this because if the educational 

piece is the most important piece, it might be Brussels, but if it is 

influencing the policy debate by sharing diversity of opinion, it may 

be national capitals because the European Parliament plays a very 

different role than, say, the German Bundestag does. Thus, I am 

not sure of the answer, but clearly the more engagement you have, 

the better. I agree. 

Mr. KLEINE-BROCKHOFF. I can do nothing but concur. Just one 

little thought. In 1989, we thought of the end of history also in the 

sense that we have no more issues to discuss transatlantically, and 

networks that existed collapsed or just faded generationally and 

were not built up into a new generation. 

Also, one would have to say that these institutions were intense, 

but they were limited in scope. They were in NATO, they were in 

defense, and they were in foreign policy. But as both of you have 

just mentioned, now the breadth of issues at stake, from global 

warming to the Middle East, from trade issues to I do not know 

what, has expanded dramatically, and there are no institutions nor 

no sort of exchange mechanism of the type that you are advocating, 

I believe. 

31

Mr. GALLEGLY. I want to thank all of our three witnesses, thank 

our guest for his participation, and, again, reiterate my apology for 

the schedule on the Floor and causing us to get started about 40 

minutes late. I think that we had a meaningful dialogue today, and 

I appreciate your participation. I look forward to continuing to 

work with you on this Committee. Thank you very much. The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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