STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PATRICK YOUNG

(AC 37995)

(AC 37997)

Alvord, Keller and Beach, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of assault in the first degree and

carrying a pistol without a permit in connection with an incident in

which the defendant shot the victim, the defendant, whose probation

was revoked in connection with his conviction, appealed to this court.

The defendant’s girlfriend, Z, had stolen a $6500 check, and she and the

defendant asked the victim and M to assist them in cashing it. The

victim and M were able to obtain $200 by depositing the check into an

automated teller machine, but when they notified the defendant, he

questioned whether they had received the full amount of the check and

kept the remainder of the money. Z and the defendant thereafter picked

up the victim and M in Z’s car, and the defendant repeatedly questioned

them regarding the money. Z drove to a wooded area and stopped the

car. The defendant then retrieved a silver .38 caliber revolver from the

car’s glove compartment, again asked about the money, forced the victim

to exit the car, and pointed the revolver at her head. At some point, the

victim was able to flee into the woods, and the defendant returned to

the car, told M to exit the car, and he and Z drove away. While the

victim and M walked down the road to search for help, the defendant

emerged from behind some bushes, pointed the revolver at the victim’s

head, and shot her with multiple bullets. At trial, the court permitted

the state to introduce evidence of the names of certain felony convictions

of which the defendant, who testified at his trial, previously had been

convicted. The court permitted the admission of the evidence only for

the purpose of impeaching the defendant’s veracity. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction of assault in the first degree because

of inconsistencies between the trial testimony of the victim, M and Z,

and their statements to the police, there having been ample evidence

from which the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant

had caused serious physical injury to the victim by means of a deadly

weapon and that he had intended to cause such injury: the victim testified

and the evidence established that the defendant had pointed a silver

revolver at her head, that he had shot her in her hand and that the bullet

existed through her wrist, that he had shot her under her arm, near her

rib cage, that Z had directed the police to a the location in a marina

where the defendant had discarded the revolver, that a silver .38 caliber

revolver was recovered in that location, and that a .38 caliber bullet

was surgically removed from the victim’s torso.

2. There was no merit to the defendant’s claim that the trial court had

abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the names of certain

of his prior felony convictions for the purpose of impeachment; the

defendant’s prior convictions for larceny and robbery related to his

untruthfulness, and, therefore, they were relevant to the jury’s evaluation

of his veracity, the dissimilar nature of the crimes charged in the present

case, as compared to the nature of the prior felony convictions, minimized the chance that the jury would view the prior convictions as

propensity evidence, and this court could not conclude that the evidence

of those convictions was likely to arouse the emotions of the jurors.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving a supplemental charge

to the jury in which it named the defendant’s prior felony convictions,

thereby highlighting those convictions, the charge having protected the

defendant from the jury’s improper use of his prior convictions as evidence that he had committed the charged crimes: the court, in its supplemental charge, properly instructed the jury that the defendant’s prior

convictions were to be used only for assessing the defendant’s credibility, as the court in its main charge inadvertently had omitted to emphasize to the jury that the convictions were admitted for that limited

purpose; moreover, contrary to the defendant’s claim, the court did not
improperly marshal the evidence by naming the defendant’s prior felony

convictions in its supplemental charge, as the names of the convictions

already were in evidence, and the court’s reference to them properly

guided the jury in understanding the limitations on how such evidence

could be used and, when viewed in context, served to protect the defendant against the improper use of the evidence rather than to highlight

adverse evidence.

Argued January 31—officially released July 18, 2017

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven, B. Fischer, J.)

Procedural History

Substitute information, in the first case, charging the

defendant with the crimes of assault in the first degree,

attempt to commit assault in the first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit, and substitute information, in the second case, charging the defendant with

violation of probation, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of New Haven, where the first case

was tried to the jury before B. Fischer, J.; thereafter, the

court denied the defendant’s motion to preclude certain

evidence; verdict of guilty of assault in the first degree

and carrying a pistol without a permit; subsequently,

the second case was tried to the court; judgment in

accordance with the verdict and judgment revoking the

defendant’s probation, from which the defendant filed

separate appeals with this court; thereafter, this court

consolidated the appeals. Affirmed.

Mary Boehlert, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(defendant).

James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Patrick Griffin, state’s attorney, and John Doyle, senior assistant state’s attorney,

for the appellee (state).
Opinion

BEACH, J. In this consolidated appeal, the defendant,

Patrick Young, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault in the first

degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1)

and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of

General Statutes § 29-35, and the judgment revoking

his probation. The defendant claims that (1) there was

insufficient evidence to support his conviction for

assault in the first degree, (2) the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting into evidence the names of his

prior felony convictions, and (3) the court abused its

discretion by giving a supplemental charge to the jury

in which it named the defendant’s prior convictions.

We disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts, as reasonably could have been

found by the jury, and procedural history are relevant to

this appeal. The defendant’s girlfriend, Maria Zambrano,

worked as a home health care aide and stole a $6500

check from one of her patients. After Zambrano told

the defendant about the stolen check, the defendant,

who did not have a bank account, approached Diane

Turner, his cousin, and Jessica McFadden, Turner’s

roommate, for assistance in cashing the check. Zambrano, Turner, McFadden, and the defendant rode

together in Zambrano’s car in order to cash the check.

McFadden was unable to cash the check at the first

bank that she tried because the check was postdated;

the defendant then had Zambrano alter the date on the

check. At a second bank, McFadden was able to obtain

$200 by depositing the check into an automatic teller

machine. The bank later informed McFadden that the

check was stolen and that she would be arrested if she

did not repay the bank $200. The defendant became

angry when he was told that the check would not be

cashed for its entire amount. He thought that Turner

and McFadden had lied to him, cashed the check, and

kept for themselves the full amount of $6500.

On the night of the following day, June 24, 2013,

Zambrano and the defendant picked up Turner and

McFadden at their New Haven residence under the

guise of driving to Hamden to retrieve $200 so that

McFadden could repay the bank. While Zambrano

drove, the defendant repeatedly questioned Turner and

McFadden about what they did with the $6500 and why

they had not given it to him. Zambrano stopped the

vehicle on a dark road near a wooded area. The defendant again asked Turner and McFadden about the location of the money. The defendant reached into the car’s

glove compartment, retrieved a silver revolver, waved

the revolver in the direction of the backseat where

Turner and McFadden were seated, and again asked

where the money was.

The defendant forced Turner to exit the car. The
defendant pointed the revolver at Turner’s head, and

she pleaded for her life. At some point, Turner ran

into the woods and yelled for McFadden to follow. The

defendant then returned to the car, pointed the revolver

at McFadden, told her to exit the car, and he and Zambrano drove away. McFadden found Turner in the

woods, and they hid. They then left the wooded area and

walked down the road to search for help. The defendant

jumped out from behind bushes and pointed the gun

at Turner’s head; Turner raised her hands. The defendant said that Turner was throwing him under the bus.

He then shot Turner in her left palm, and the bullet

exited by her wrist. The defendant fired more shots,

and one bullet hit Turner under her right arm near her

rib cage. The defendant then ran away, and McFadden

and Turner hid in the woods before flagging down a

work crew for assistance.

Turner was taken to Yale-New Haven Hospital and

treated for her injuries. Doctors were unable to remove

a .38 caliber bullet at that time, but it was surgically

removed months later when it migrated near her spine.

Zambrano informed the police that she had accompanied the defendant to a marina where he threw the

revolver off the dock. A police dive team recovered the

revolver, which was a .38 caliber stainless steel Smith &

Wesson revolver.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of

assault in the first degree and carrying a pistol without a

permit.1 The defendant was on probation at the time,

and the court found him to be in violation of his probation. The defendant was sentenced to a total effective

sentence of thirty-one years incarceration, execution

suspended after twenty-four years, with five years of

probation. This consolidated appeal followed.2

I

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction of assault in the first

degree. We disagree.

‘‘In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we

apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.

Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom

the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the

cumulative force of the evidence established guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . This court cannot

substitute its own judgment for that of the jury if there

is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. . . .

Moreover, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable

view of the evidence that would support a reasonable

hypothesis ofinnocence. We ask, instead, whetherthere

is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the

jury’s verdict of guilty.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Revels, 313 Conn. 762,
778, 99 A.3d 1130 (2014), cert. denied, U.S. , 135

S. Ct. 1451, 191 L. Ed. 2d 404 (2015).

General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1) provides in relevant

part: ‘‘A person is guilty of assault in the first degree

when . . . [w]ith intent to cause serious physical

injury to another person, he causes such injury to such

person . . . by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (6)

defines ‘‘deadly weapon’’ as ‘‘any weapon, whether

loaded or unloaded, from which a shot may be discharged . . . .’’ Thus, the state was required to prove

that the defendant (1) intended to cause Turner serious

physical injury and (2) caused such injury to her by

means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.

The defendant argues that the state’s case rested

largely on inconsistent and unreliable testimony of

three witnesses—Turner, McFadden, and Zambrano.

He argues that the trial testimony of Turner, McFadden,

and Zambrano differed from statements that each had

given to the police regarding the number of shots fired,

whether the defendant left and then returned to the

crime scene, whether the defendant ordered Turner

onto her hands and knees rather than to put her hands

behind her back, whether the defendant pulled Turner

out of the car or ordered her to do so herself, whether

McFadden alone received the check from the defendant

and Zambrano rather than Turner and McFadden

together receiving the check, and whether the defendant fired shots at Turner and then left or whether

Turner and McFadden ran into the woods before the

defendant fired a shot and only upon Turner and McFadden leaving the woods did the defendant fire the gun

at Turner. The defendant further contends that, because

of the inconsistencies in the evidence presented by the

state, the state failed to present sufficient evidence to

sustain his conviction.

The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient because of inconsistencies between the trial testimony of Turner, McFadden, and Zambrano, on the one

hand, and their police statements, on the other hand.

Such inconsistencies do not undermine the sufficiency

of the evidence but more aptly affect the credibility of

the witnesses.3 See, e.g., State v. Franklin, 115 Conn.

App. 290, 292, 972 A.2d 741, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 929,

980A.2d 915 (2009).Credibility determinations rest with

the jury. ‘‘[E]vidence is not insufficient . . . because

it is conflicting or inconsistent. . . . It is the [jury’s]

exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence

and to determine the credibility of witnesses. . . . The

[jury] can . . . decide what—all, none, or some—of a

witness’ testimony to accept or reject.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rodriguez, 133 Conn. App.

721, 726, 36 A.3d 724 (2012), aff’d, 311 Conn. 80, 83 A.3d

595 (2014).

There was ample evidence from which the jury rea-
sonably could have found that the defendant caused

serious physical injury to Turner by means of a deadly

weapon and that he intended to cause such serious

physical injury. Turner testified that the defendant

pointed a silver revolver at her and that she pleaded

for her life. She further testified that the defendant shot

her on the top of her left hand and that the bullet exited

near her wrist. She stated that the defendant also shot

her under her right arm near her ribcage. Zambrano

showed the police the location in a marina where the

defendant had discarded the revolver, and the police

recovered a .38 caliber stainless steel snub nose Smith &

Wesson revolver from that location. Subsequently, a .38

caliber bullet was surgically removed from Turner’s

torso. The jury reasonably could have inferred from the

defendant’s conduct of pointing the revolver at Turner

and pulling the trigger,4 and from the resultant injury

to Turner’s wrist and torso, that the defendant intended

to cause serious physical injury to her. See State v.

Papandrea, 120Conn. App. 224, 230, 991A.2d 617 (2010)

(intent may be inferred from conduct and jury may infer

defendant intended natural consequences of actions),

aff’d, 302 Conn. 340, 26 A.3d 75 (2011). Accordingly,

there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s

conviction of assault in the first degree

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court abused

its discretion by admitting the names of his prior felony

convictions into evidence.5 We disagree.

At the close of the state’s case, the defendant’s attorney referred to an in-chambers discussion and objected

to the state’s proposed admission into evidence of the

names of the defendant’s prior felony convictions during the cross-examination of the defendant. The court

noted that, pursuant to § 6.7 of the Connecticut Code

of Evidence, evidence of a felony conviction may be

admissible for the purpose of impeachment. The court

reasoned that it would allow the felonies to be named

because the names of three felonies provided more

specific guidance as to the defendant’s veracity. In the

course of his direct examination, the defendant testified

that, in March, 2009, he was convicted of two felonies

arising from one incident and that, in 2012, he was

convicted of a third felony. On cross-examination by

the state, the defendant testified that he had been convicted of conspiracy to commit larceny in the second

degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first

degree, and criminal attempt to commit robbery in the

first degree. He further testified that he was aware that,

as a result of his felony convictions, he was not permitted to possess a firearm.

‘‘It is well settled that evidence that a criminal defendant has been convicted of crimes on a prior occasion

is not generally admissible. . . . There are, however,

several well recognized exceptions to this rule, one of
which is that [a] criminal defendant who has previously

been convicted of a crime carrying a term of imprisonment of more than one year may be impeached by the

state if his credibility is in issue. . . . In its discretion

a trial court may properly admit evidence of prior convictions provided that the prejudicial effect of such

evidence does not far outweigh its probative value. . . .

[Our Supreme Court] has identified three factors which

determine whether a prior conviction may be admitted:

(1) the extent of the prejudice likely to arise; (2) the

significance of the commission of the particular crime

in indicating untruthfulness; and (3) its remoteness in

time. . . . A trial court’s decision denying a motion to

exclude a witness’ prior record, offered to attack his

credibility, will be upset only if the court abused its

discretion. . . . Those three factors have been incorporated in [the Connecticut] [C]ode of [E]vidence.

Conn. Code Evid. § 6-7 (a).’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ciccio, 77 Conn. App.

368, 385–86, 823 A.2d 1233, cert. denied, 265 Conn. 905,

831 A.2d 251 (2003).

There is no doubt that if evidence of a felony conviction is otherwise admissible, the name of the crime is

generally also admissible. See Conn. Code Evid. § 6-7

(c) (‘‘[i]f, for purposes of impeaching the credibility of

a witness, evidence is introduced that the witness has

been convicted of a crime, the court shall limit the

evidence to the name of the crime . . . except that

. . . the court may exclude evidence of the name of

the crime . . . .’’ [emphasis added]). As indicated in

§ 6-7, the court has discretion to admit the prior conviction as an unnamed felony. Factors to consider include

whether the prior crime reflects directly on credibility

and whether the prejudice inherent in the name of the

crime outweighs the probative impeaching value. See

State v. Crumpton, 202 Conn. 224, 232–33, 520 A.2d

226 (1987); State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 16, 480 A.2d

489 (1984).

‘‘[I]n evaluating the separate ingredients to be

weighed in the balancing process, there is no way to

quantify them in mathematical terms. . . . Therefore,

[t]he trial court has wide discretion in this balancing

determination and every reasonable presumption

should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s

ruling . . . . Reversal is required only where an abuse

of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to

have been done. . . . The burden lies with the party

objecting to the admission of evidence of prior convictions to demonstrate the prejudice that is likely to arise

from its admission. . . . The test for determining

whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether

it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will

improperly arouse the emotions of the jury.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Muhammad, 91 Conn. App. 392, 397–98, 881 A.2d 468,

cert. denied, 276 Conn. 922, 888 A.2d 90 (2005).
The defendant argues that the admission into evidence of the names of the three priorfelony convictions

was more prejudicial than probative, and that the court

thus abused its discretion in allowing the names of the

felonies to be admitted into evidence. He contends that

the theory of his defense was that he did not intentionally pull the trigger, but, instead, Turnerinitiated a struggle with him over control of the revolver, which caused

Turner to be shot. He further argues that evidence

regarding the convictions did not provide a material

benefit to the jury and misled the jury to believe that

he was more likely to have committed the crimes at

issue in the present case because he had committed

three felonies in the past.

Assault in the first degree and carrying a pistol without a permit, the crimes alleged in this case, are not

strikingly similar to the crimes of conspiracy to commit

larceny in the second degree, conspiracy to commit

robbery in the first degree, and attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, the names of the prior convictions with which the defendant’s credibility was

impeached. Indeed, the defendant acknowledges in his

appellate brief that the prior convictions bore ‘‘no similarity’’ to the crimes for which he was charged. The

dissimilar nature of the crimes charged, as compared

to the nature of the prior convictions, minimized the

chance that the jury would view the convictions as

propensity evidence. Cf. State v. Nardini, 187 Conn.

513, 522, 447 A.2d 396 (1982) (‘‘[w]here the prior crime

is quite similar to the offense being tried, a high degree

of prejudice is created and a strong showing of probative value would be necessary to warrant admissibility’’).

The crimes involving larceny and robbery6

for which

the defendant was convicted on prior occasions were

significant in indicating untruthfulness. ‘‘[Our Supreme

Court] has recognized that crimes involving larcenous

intent imply a general disposition toward dishonesty or

a tendency to make false statements. . . . [I]n common

human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or

stealing . . . are universally regarded as conduct

which reflects on a [person’s] honesty and integrity

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Banks, 58 Conn. App. 603, 616, 755 A.2d 279, cert.

denied, 254 Conn. 923, 761 A.2d 755 (2000). ‘‘[C]rimes

involving larcenous intent imply a general disposition

toward dishonesty . . . . Convictions of this sort obviously bear heavily on the credibility of one who has

been convicted of them. The probative value of such

convictions, therefore, may often outweigh any prejudice engendered by their admission.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Geyer, 194

Conn. 1, 12, 480 A.2d 489 (1984).

The defendant argues that the naming of his prior

convictions was of no material benefit to the jury.
Because the prior convictions related to untruthfulness,

however, the names of the prior convictions were relevant to the jury’s evaluation of the defendant’s veracity.

See State v. Crumpton, supra, 202 Conn. 233. The court,

therefore, did not abuse its discretion in allowing into

evidence the names of the prior convictions. ‘‘Although

the probative value of evidence of his prior convictions

is certainly damaging to [the defendant’s] credibility,

that does not necessarily impart an undue degree of

prejudicial effect as well. . . . The test for determining

whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether

it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will

improperly arouse the emotions of the jury.’’ (Citation

omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Muhammad, supra, 91 Conn. App.

398. We are not persuaded that the evidence of the

prior convictions was likely to arouse the emotions of

the jurors.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting evidence of the names of the

defendant’s prior convictions involving larceny and robbery for the purpose of impeachment.

III

The defendant last claims that the trial court abused

its discretion by giving a supplemental charge to the

jury in which it named the defendant’s prior felony

convictions after deliberations had begun, thus unduly

highlighting the prior convictions. The defendant also

argues that the court’s supplemental charge unfairly

prejudiced him by marshaling the evidence.7 We

disagree.

After the state rested, the defendant’s attorney

informed the court that the defendant decided to testify.

Following closing arguments and outside the presence

of the jury, the court invited comment from counsel on

its draft jury charge, which had been sent to counsel

by e-mail days earlier; the draft charge contained no

instruction regarding the use of prior convictions. Later

that day, the court instructed the jury, and the jury

began deliberating. The next morning, the court

informed counsel that it intended to supplement the

jury charge by instructing the jury that it could consider

the defendant’s prior convictions only for the purpose

of assessing the defendant’s credibility. The defendant’s

attorney objected, arguing that the supplemental charge

was prejudicial because it marshaled the evidence and

because it would emphasize the prior convictions after

deliberations had begun. The court stated that because

the defendant’s prior convictions were in evidence, it

wanted to make clear to the jury that the prior convictions were to be used only for the purpose of assessing

the defendant’s credibility. The court did not want the

jury to infer from the prior convictions that the defendant was likely to have committed the crimes charged.

The court stated that the supplemental charge was ‘‘for
. . . the protection of the defendant . . . .’’

The court then instructed the jury as follows: ‘‘I have

one more page of a charge that I inadvertently did not

give you yesterday, a charge meaning this is the law

that you’re to apply to the facts that you find, and I’m

going to read that to you now. It’s going to be—It is

part of the charge. We literally are going to plug it into

the charge you have in there, its going to page 20a, and

it’s as follows, and this is the law. Impeachment, prior

convictions of a witness. Evidence that one of the witnesses, [the defendant], was previously convicted of a

crime or crimes is only admissible on the question of

the credibility of that witness, that is, the weight that

you will give the witness’ testimony. The witness’ criminal record bears only on this witness’ credibility and

the one witness was [the defendant] and the convictions

are as follows: conspiracy to commit larceny in the

second degree, attempt to commit robbery in the first

degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first

degree. It is your duty to determine whetherthis witness

is to be believed wholly or partly or not at all. You may

consider the witness’ prior convictions in weighing the

credibility of this witness and give such weight to those

facts that you decide is fair and reasonable in determining the credibility of this witness.’’

‘‘The standard of review for claims of instructional

impropriety is well established. [I]ndividual jury

instructions should not be judged in artificial isolation,

but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.

. . . The pertinent test is whether the charge, read in

its entirety, fairly presents the case to the jury in such

a way that injustice is not done to either party under

the established rules of law. . . . Thus, [t]he whole

charge must be considered from the standpoint of its

effect on the [jurors] in guiding them to the proper

verdict . . . and not critically dissected in a microscopic search for possible error.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Peeler, 271 Conn. 338, 360–61,

857 A.2d 808 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 845, 126 S.

Ct. 94, 163 L. Ed. 2d 110 (2005). ‘‘In evaluating the

propriety of a supplemental charge, we must examine

both the main and supplemental charge as a whole.’’

State v. Miller, 36 Conn. App. 506, 514, 651 A.2d 1318,

cert. denied, 232 Conn. 912, 654 A.2d 357 (1995).

Practice Book § 42-24 provides in relevant part that

‘‘[t]he judicial authority . . . upon its own motion . . .

may recall the jury to the courtroom and give it additional instructions in order to . . . [i]nstruct the jury

on any matter which should have been covered in the

original instructions.’’ The decision whether to add a

supplemental instruction lies within the sound discretion of the court; State v. Fletcher, 10 Conn. App. 697,

703, 525 A.2d 535 (1987), aff’d, 207 Conn. 191, 540 A.2d

370 (1988); and the additional instruction, like any other

instruction, is to be read in the context of the charge
as a whole. State v. Wokoma, 37 Conn. App. 35, 39,

656 A.2d 226, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 905, 657 A.2d

645 (1995).

The supplemental charge informed the jury of the

proper use of evidence of the defendant’s prior felony

convictions. The court had admitted the evidence of

the defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes only. Section 4-5 (a) of the Connecticut Code

of Evidence provides that ‘‘[e]vidence of other crimes,

wrongs or acts of a person is inadmissible to prove the

bad character or criminal tendencies of that person.’’

The main charge apparently had inadvertently omitted

the instruction emphasizing the limited purpose for

which this evidence could be used. The court’s supplemental charge, however, properly instructed the jury

that the defendant’s prior convictions were not to be

used as evidence that he committed the crimes charged

but, rather, were only to be used in assessing his credibility. The supplemental charge protected the defendant

from the jury’s use of his prior convictions as evidence

of his guilt of the current charged offenses; giving the

charge, therefore, was well within the court’s discretion.

Further, the court did not improperly marshal the

evidence by naming the defendant’s prior convictions.8

The names of the three prior convictions were in evidence. The court’s reference to them properly guided

the jury to understand the limitations on how such

evidence could be used and, viewed in context, was

part of an instruction to protect the defendant against

improper use of the evidence, not an instruction merely

to highlight adverse evidence. Accordingly, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in giving its supplemental charge.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The jury found the defendant not guilty of attempt to commit assault in

the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a59 (a) (1).

2 The defendant filed two separate appeals. Pursuant to Practice Book

§ 61-7 (3), this court sua sponte ordered that the appeals in AC 37995 and

AC 37997 be consolidated. The appeal from the violation of probation raises

no independent issues.

3 The defendant also argues that, according to his own testimony, Turner

reached for the revolver, initiated a struggle during which the revolver fired

a shot, and the defendant did not intend that Turner be shot. The existence

of contrary testimony does not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the conviction. Credibility determinations are within the sole

province of the jury. See State v. Rodriguez, 133 Conn. App. 721, 725–28,

36 A.3d 724 (2012), aff’d, 311 Conn. 80, 83 A.3d 595 (2014).

4 There was testimony that a minimum of ten to twelve pounds of pressure

was required to pull the trigger.

5 The defendant’s attorney objected at trial only to the naming of the three

prior felony convictions. There was no objection to the admission of those

convictions without naming them. We review only the preserved claim of

evidentiary error. See, e.g., State v. Francis D., 75 Conn. App. 1, 11, 815

A.2d 191, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 909, 819 A.2d 842 (2003).

6 Larceny generally is an element of robbery. See, e.g., General Statutes

§ 53a-133.

7 The defendant also argues that the court abused its discretion in reading
the supplemental charge without reading the entire charge again and

inserting the additional language. The defendant did not raise this issue

before the trial court, and we decline to review it. See, e.g., State v. Francis

D., 75 Conn. App. 1, 11, 815 A.2d 191, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 909, 819 A.2d

842 (2003).

8

‘‘A trial court has broad discretion to comment on the evidence adduced

in a criminal trial. . . . A jury trial in which the judge is deprived of the

right to comment on the evidence and to express his opinion as to the facts

. . . is not the jury trial which we inherited. . . . A trial court often has

not only the right, but also the duty to comment on the evidence. . . . The

principal function of a jury charge is to assist the jury in applying the law

correctly to the facts which they might find to be established . . . and

therefore, we have stated that a charge must go beyond a bare statement

of accurate legal principles to the extent of indicating to the jury the application of those principles to the facts claimed to have been proven. . . . The

purpose of marshalling the evidence, a more elaborate manner of judicial

commentary, is to provide a fair summary of the evidence, and nothing

more; to attain that purpose, the [trial] judge must show strict impartiality.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hernandez,

218 Conn. 458, 461–63, 590 A.2d 112 (1991).

In this case, the only ‘‘marshaling’’ was a recitation that the defendant had

testified and that the named convictions had been introduced into evidence.