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21–700 PDF 2005

THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM: WHAT ARE WE PREPARING

FOR?

(109–12)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

TRANSPORTATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 14, 2005

Printed for the use of the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

(
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice-Chair

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

SUE W. KELLY, New York

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

GARY G. MILLER, California

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

TED POE, Texas

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

CONNIE MACK, Florida

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana

VACANCY

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

BOB FILNER, California

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado

(II)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas, Vice-Chair

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York

DON YOUNG, Alaska

(Ex Officio)

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

(Ex Officio)

(III)

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY

Page

Buckman, Chief John, Past President, International Association of Fire

Chiefs, Fire Chief, German Township, Indiana ................................................. 22

Gruber, Corey, Associate Director, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security ................................................................................. 5

Jamieson, Gil, Director, National Incident Management System Integration

Center, Department of Homeland Security ....................................................... 5

Liebersbach, David E., President, National Emergency Management Association, Director, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management,

State of Alaska ..................................................................................................... 22

Mascelli, Armond, Vice President of Domestic Response, American Red Cross 22

Salle, Captain John P., International Association of Chiefs of Police ................. 22

West, Dewayne, Vice Chairman, Emergency Management Accreditation Program Commission, and President, International Association of Emergency

Managers, Director of Emergency Management, Johnson County, North

Carolina ................................................................................................................ 22

PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY A MEMBER OF CONGRESS

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 127

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Buckman, Chief John .............................................................................................. 30

Gruber, Corey ........................................................................................................... 43

Jamieson, Gil ........................................................................................................... 55

Liebersbach, David E. ............................................................................................. 63

Mascelli, Armond ..................................................................................................... 68

Salle, Captain John P .............................................................................................. 131

West, Dewayne ......................................................................................................... 136

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Mascelli, Armond, Vice President of Emergency Response, American Red

Cross:

NRP Fact Sheet American Red Cross ................................................................ 74

Public Preparedness, A National Imperative Symposium Report ................... 75

(V)

(1)

THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM:

WHAT ARE WE PREPARING FOR?

Thursday, April 14, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION

AND INFRASTRUCTURE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in Room

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Shuster [chairman

of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. SHUSTER. The Subcommittee will come to order. I’d like to

welcome the subcommittee to this important oversight hearing entitled, ′′The National Preparedness System: What are We Preparing

For?′′

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Nation has been

focused on its ability to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the

next terrorist attack. However, well before the attacks of that terrible day, the Federal Government, in partnership with responders

nationwide, was working to ensure that should an attack happen,

we would be prepared to deal with the consequences.

For example, FEMA was developing and delivering courses on

dealing with weapons of mass destruction, especially those involving hazardous materials. The Department of Defense was providing

specialized training to National Guard units nationwide; a terrorism annex was added to the Federal Response Plan; A governmentwide agreement about who would do what in the event of a disaster; and the Office For Domestic Preparedness was providing assistance to first responders to train and equip to deal with the crisis of terrorism. These actions were on top of those efforts being

undertaken to help prepare communities for the natural disasters

they face every day.

What was missing before 9/11 was not a government-wide interest in preparing for disasters of all types, but the consensus that

this preparation needed to occur in a coordinated and comprehensive manner. Then, as now, the debate carried on over the question

of what is the best way to prepare for all the disasters that we will

face as a Nation.

Some argued that preparing for and responding to natural and

accidental disasters is very different than preparing for terrorism,

and therefore must occur on a separate track. Others, including

this committee, advocate the position that while certain characteristics of each disaster may differ, the general framework is the

same regardless of the disaster, and therefore the preparation and

response should be coordinated.
2

In releasing Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5, 7 and

8, the President established the framework for such a system and

a roadmap for achieving it. Collectively, these directives require the

creation of a National Preparedness System, one that establishes

a national preparedness goal, outlines the targeted capabilities required to meet that goal, lays out the tasks necessary to reach the

targeted capabilities, establishes a common incident command system to utilize these capabilities to the greatest potential, and then

puts together an operational plan for how all of these parts come

together when they are needed, the National Response Plan.

It is my belief that preparing for national and man- caused hazards are not competing interests. If we create a system that looks

at all the hazards that the Nation will face, identify universal capabilities that are needed in various scenarios, establish minimum

preparedness levels, and provide guidance to communities on how

to reach those preparedness levels, and support so that they may

do so, then we will have truly created a National Preparedness

System.

The large question that remains: What exactly are we preparing

for? With the creation of these foundational documents, we must

ask: Do these documents create an all- hazard system that will

allow communities to cross prepare for the many disasters they will

face. Or have we become so focused on terrorism that we’ve lost

sight of the hazards we are most likely to face.

For example, the Department is using 15 planning scenarios as

a basis for all of its preparedness documents. Twelve of fifteen are

terrorism and only two are natural disasters. Why the disparity?

By only including two natural disasters, are we truly preparing for

all the challenges we face?

The biggest risk we run in failing to adequately address this

issue is the creation of a false sense of security that we are prepared for the next disaster. By focusing on how much we have

spent to prepare the Nation since 9/11, we run this very risk. The

question should not be how much have we spent, but how are we

spending it and are we doing so in a way that truly prepares us?

There are two additional issues I would like to raise. First, this

new preparedness system will require a whole host of new documents, including planning standards and assessments. Will these

be building on what is already out there or are States going to have

to start all over again? Second, I was very surprised not to see any

mention of mitigation in any of these preparedness documents, despite the fact that it is the one way of preparing that we know will

save lives, property, and money.

I am very interested to hear from today’s witnesses who are both

on the front line of preparing for a disaster and in the back room

ensuring that we are prepared to do so, all experts in their field,

who can shed light on these as well as many other issues that are

out there.

With that, I would like to recognize the ranking member, Ms.

Norton from the District of Columbia, for an opening statement if

she wishes.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Chairman Shuster. I am

going to read part of my statement, if you will, and submit the rest

for the record.
3

I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, on the name of this hearing: The National Preparedness System: What are We Preparing

For? I’m on two other committees, of course, who appropriately

have been focused on preparing for terrorism, the Select Committee

on Homeland Security and the Committee on Government Reform,

and one can understand why the country since 9/11 has been in the

throes of all the start-up and train-up work that would be required.

I want to associate myself with your remarks, though, Mr. Chairman, about the all-hazards approach for preparing for whatever

hazard comes to us. If you ask a firefighter whether there is any

difference between a hazard when a building explodes, for example,

because of a gas leak, or when it explodes because it has been hit

by a terrorist bomb or some other device, and I have asked about

this, indeed I have just come from a Homeland Security hearing

where firefighters were testifying, he will tell you absolutely not.

And what you are doing, Mr. Chairman, is refocusing us, rebalancing us so that we understand what firefighters and other first

responders are likely to face.

The chances are overwhelming that they will face some natural

disaster of the kind they have faced every day, God willing. So we

cannot let 9/11, for all its horror and tragedy, distract us from

keeping our people safe against the most likely hazards they will

face. So I very much appreciate this hearing, Mr. Chairman.

I note that the two Chairs of the committees who have been particularly involved, our own committee and the Committee on Government Reform are now also on the Select Committee on Homeland Security. So that might also help us achieve balance.

As we are all aware, following the terrorist acts in Oklahoma

City and New York increased emphasis, efforts, and resources have

been put into developing a consolidated, comprehensive national

preparedness and response plan. I note that we are examining the

status and direction of national preparedness today when the National Response Plan, which seeks to ′′integrate Federal Government domestic prevention preparedness response and recovery

plans into one all- discipline all-hazards plan,′′ is to be totally implemented.

When the Office of State and Local Government Coordination

and Preparedness at DHS began working on these initiatives, initially the process got off to a rough start. Many stakeholders, including State, local and preparedness- related organizations were

not sufficiently included in the process. Over time, it appears that

the process has become more open, yet a number of questions remain.

First, while HSPD-8 allows a special emphasis to be given to terrorism, the National Preparedness System is supposed to be an allhazards system. Many of the initiatives that support the EMPS,

however, are heavily focused on terrorism and spend little or no effort preparing for natural disasters.

The chairman just noted that only two disasters, earthquakes

and tornadoes, are included in the scenarios. What about hurricanes and floods, which are annual occurrences in our country, I

am sorry to say?

This subcommittee is on record as a strong supporter of mitigation of hazards other than terrorism. For the past several years, we
4

have been trying to reauthorize the Predisaster Mitigation Program

and to make sure that there is enough funding for the Hazard Mitigation Program. Mitigation is proactive. It is preventive. It is mitigation and prevention that saves lives, money, and property. It

doesn’t clean up after an event, it keeps an event from happening

or helps us to prepare for events so that the harm is far less serious.

Moreover, in recent years, there has been a decline in support by

the administration for mitigation programs and a reduction in

funding, thus further diminishing its importance. This leaves a gap

in our preparedness system. Many stakeholders have concerns

about the new guidance that will be released with the NPS.

For example, will it build upon well-established industry standards or will they have to develop new plans and procedures? Further, funding is tied directly to compliance with new requirements,

and many localities are concerned they will not have sufficient

budgets or manpower to comply with the new mandates.

The President was granted broad authority to implement a National Preparedness System in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

Many of the actions taken by the administration to further these

efforts have been done by executive order and presidential directive. These documents are not law and cannot supercede existing

restrictions or existing authority. It remains unclear under what

authority the President will impose the requirements of the NPS,

and under what authority and circumstances he will invoke some

of the authorities and procedures of a National Response Plan, especially when declaring an incident of national significance.

It is our responsibility to make sure that a National Preparedness System is effective, efficient, and that it appropriately balances potential threat and magnitude of all our hazards with the

resources available to prevent, respond and recover from them, to

quote from the statute in the plan.

Are we going in the right direction? Are we asking our communities to keep inventing the wheel? I hope we will explore these

ideas today, and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

I thank them in advance for their testimony, and I thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Ms. Norton.

I ask unanimous consent that all our witnesses’ full statements

be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

Since your written testimony has been made a part of the record,

the subcommittee would request you limit your summary to five

minutes.

We have two panels of witnesses with us here today. We have

two witnesses, both from the Department of Homeland Security,

but who each have a very different and important role in our National Preparedness System.

Corey Gruber is the Assistant Director of the Office For Domestic

Preparedness, which is part of the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, and Gil Jamieson is the

Director of the National Incident Management System Integration

Center.
5

TESTIMONY OF COREY GRUBER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, OFFICE FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS, DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY; AND GIL JAMIESON, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM INTEGRATION

CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. SHUSTER. We will hear from both of our witnesses on this

panel before opening for questions, and Mr. Gruber, you may proceed.

Mr. GRUBER. Mr. Shuster, Ms. Norton, my name is Corey

Gruber, with the Department of Homeland Security, sir. It is my

honor and pleasure to appear before you today to discuss in detail

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on national preparedness, the Interim National Preparedness Goal and the National

Preparedness Guidance.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Department continues to aggressively implement HSPD-8. The President issued the directive

in December 2003 in order to establish policies, procedures and

goals to strengthen the Nation’s preparedness to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

Specifically, HSPD-8 calls for a domestic all-hazards preparedness

goal that establishes measurable priorities and targets, creates

mechanisms to improve delivery of preparedness assistance to

State, local, and tribal governments, and outlines actions to

strengthen their preparedness capabilities.

DHS consulted extensively with stakeholders from all levels of

government, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations

to ensure the implementation was truly national, not solely Federal. DHS invited over 1,500 entities to comment, including 398

municipalities, 112 State agencies, and 94 national associations.

The Department’s commitment to stakeholder engagement reflects

the principle that preparedness and domestic incident management

are shared national responsibilities.

HSPD-8 complements and supports HSPD-5 on management of

domestic incidents.

Together, these directives establish a common approach to preparedness and response through NIMS, through the NRP, and

through our National Preparedness Goal. The goal enables entities

across the Nation to pinpoint capabilities that need improvement

and sustain these capabilities at levels needed to manage major

events using the protocols established by NIMS and NRP.

On March 31, 2005, DHS released the Interim Goal. The Goal reflects the Department’s progress to date and represents the first

major step in transforming the way the Nation prepares and develops capabilities to prevent, respond, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. It will guide Federal, State, local, and tribal entities in determining how best to devote limited resources to most effectively and efficiently strengthen

preparedness. It transforms the way we think about preparedness

by defining agile and flexible capabilities that must be in place at

all appropriate levels to prevent and respond to current and future

threats and hazards. The Goal establishes measurable targets and

priorities in a systematic approach for determining how prepared

we are, how prepared we need to be, and how to prioritize efforts

to close gaps.
6

To help achieve the Goal, DHS, in coordination and consultation

with national stakeholders, has developed a set of detailed planning tools. These include the National Planning Scenarios, which

illustrate the Nation’s strategic risk in the form of the potential

scope, magnitude, and complexity of representative major events; a

comprehensive library of homeland security tasks, called the Universal Task List; and a compendium of 36 capability templates,

called the Target Capabilities List. Every entity across the country

will not be expected to develop and maintain every capability to the

same level. These will vary based on risk, resource base and needs

of different jurisdictions.

Over the coming months, DHS will continue to work with stakeholders to establish target levels and apportion responsibility for

developing capabilities among levels of government. DHS will issue

updated target levels in conjunction with the final National Preparedness Goal in October 2005.

In addition to the planning tools, the interim goal describes

seven consensus national priorities. They fall into two categories:

Overarching priorities that contribute to the development of multiple capabilities, and capability-specific priorities that build selected capabilities for which the Nation has the greatest need.

The overarching national priorities are: Implementing the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System,

expanding regional collaboration, and implementing the interim

national infrastructure protection plan. The capability-specific priorities are strengthening information sharing and collaboration,

strengthening interoperable communications, strengthening chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive detection, response, and decontamination, and, finally, strengthening medical

surge and mass prophylaxis.

To help implement the goal and priorities, DHS and its partners

will shortly issue National Preparedness Guidance, with specific

step-by-step instructions on implementing the goal and for updating State and urban area homeland security strategies. DHS will

hold regional roll-out conferences in the upcoming months for the

Goal and Guidance, and deploy State-by-State training teams comprised of experienced senior State and local experts.

Building the right preparedness system for the Nation and

achieving these target levels of capability will take time, and the

full benefits will not come overnight. Many benefits have already

been realized, such as the requirement and directive to establish a

national exercise program and lessons learned system. More will be

recognized shortly, such as a streamlined process for determining

needs, a clear role for stakeholders in shaping the system, and a

more realistic picture of where we now stand in terms of national

preparedness and where to make the most cost effective investments with homeland security dollars.

In summary, our approach to implementing the guidance of the

President and Congress has centered on two key principles: First,

that preparedness and domestic incident management are shared

national responsibilities; and, second, that our strategic analysis

must be risk based, considering current and emerging threats, our

potential vulnerabilities, and the consequences of major events that

pose the greatest potential threat to our national interests.
7

We live in a world transformed by September 11, 2001. The 9/

11 Commission wrote that a rededication to preparedness is perhaps the best way to honor the memories of those we lost that day.

The publication of the goal brings us a significant step closer to fulfilling this pledge.

Mr. Chairman and members, thank you for your continuing support in this transformational effort, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Gruber.

Mr. Jamieson, you may go ahead and proceed.

Mr. JAMIESON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. And good

afternoon to other members of the subcommittee. My name is Gil

Jamieson, and I am the Acting Director of the National Incident

Management System Integration Center. Because the National Response Plan and the NIMS are inextricably linked, the Undersecretary For Emergency Preparedness and Response, Michael Brown,

has asked me to coordinate implementation of the NRP both within

FEMA and across the Nation. It is my pleasure to be with you here

today.

Everyday there are events in the United States that require action by emergency responders. Whether those responders come

from different parts of the same local jurisdiction or from State and

Federal agencies, they need to be able to work together effectively.

In Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, management of domestic incidences, the President directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a new approach to domestic incident management based on the National Incident Management System and

the National Response Plan.

The NIMS, released by the Department in March of 2004, established standard incident management practices, protocols and procedures that will allow responders to work together more effectively. The NRP, or the National Response Plan, released by the

Department on January 6, 2005, uses the comprehensive framework of NIMS to provide the structure and mechanisms for the coordination of Federal support to State and local tribes.

The NRP development process included extensive coordination

with Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private sector entities, and the first responder and

emergency management communities across the country. Many

State and local associations, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the International Association of Fire Chiefs,

the National Association of Counties, the Fraternal Order of Police,

the National Emergency Management Association have issued

press releases announcing and praising the completion of the National Response Plan.

The National Response Plan incorporates best practices from a

wide variety of incident management disciplines to include fire, rescue, emergency management, law enforcement, public works, and

emergency medical services. Mr. Chairman, the NRP is an all-discipline and an all-hazard plan. Both the NRP and the NIMS reflect

the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and the intentions of

Congress as expressed in the intelligence reform bill. The NRP applies to all actual and potential incidences of national significance.
8

All major disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act are

incidences of national significance.

The NRP uses and builds on the emergency support function

structure that was a proven and successful element of the former

Federal response plan. To ensure full integration and consistent

approach to domestic incident management, a new joint field office

fully incorporates and replaces the traditional concept of a disaster

field office. The Homeland Security Operations Center serves as a

24/7 hub for coordination within the Department, to include coordination with FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center and

our Regional Response Coordination Centers.

The Homeland Security Operations Center also maintains 24/7

coordination with external components, including the National

Counterterrorism Center and the Bureau’s Strategic Information

and Operations Center.

The NRP includes processes for coordination between the principal Federal official, the joint field office, the Homeland Security

Operations Center, and the Interagency Incident Management

Group, or IIMG, at the headquarters level. The NRP integrates and

rolls the responsibilities of all Federal departments and agencies,

and was crafted to ensure that nothing in the plan alters or impedes the ability of Federal, State, local, or tribal governments or

agencies to carry out their responsibilities under their own specific

authorities.

During the months of April and May, the Department will host

seven one-day NRP seminars across the country. In fact, we held

our first workshop here yesterday in Washington, D.C. for our partners and stakeholders in the national capital regions. These events

will help educate Federal, State, and local incident managers on

the provisions of NRP, the concept of operations, the operational

framework, and how this new approach will improve domestic incident management and response capabilities across the Nation.

FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute led the development

of an on-line independent study course to provide NRP awareness,

that is IS 800, Mr. Chairman, and had previously developed NIMS

awareness training, IS 700. These courses provide an extraordinary

opportunity to build an understanding of the NIMS and the NRP,

and to date 140,000 folks have completed these courses on line.

The NRP is being implemented through a three-phase process.

Phase I and II provide opportunities for departments and agencies

and organizations to modify training, designate staffing of NRP organizational elements, and become familiar with the NRP structures, processes, and protocols, modify their existing interagency

plans to align with the NRP, and to conduct the necessary training.

The Department will be working closely with our Federal interagency partners on several implementation actions, including the

development of standard operating procedures. The SOPs will help

ensure that the NRP is executed in an efficient and consistent

manner. Over time, the standard operating procedures will become

the basis for field operations guides and specific job training for

anyone expected to perform under the National Response Plan.

During the third phase, the Department will conduct assessments of the NRP, coordinating structures, processes, and protocols. And at the end of this period, we will conduct a review and
9

make some recommendations to the Secretary on what is working

and what needs to be modified and changed.

Today is a very important day, and Congresswoman Norton, I

note it is an important day not just for opening day of the Washington Nationals, but today is also the day that the NRP becomes

fully effective. Up to this point, we have been operating on the Interim National Response Plan. Today, it becomes effective. So the

domestic terrorism concept of operations plans and the Federal radiological emergency response plan are superceded and the NRP is

fully operational and ready to be implemented, if necessary.

HSPD-5 called for the establishment of a single comprehensive

approach to domestic incident management. Together the NIMS

and the NRP provide a more efficient and effective way for the Nation to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from any emergency. This is accomplished by the elimination of duplicative and

sometimes conflicting Federal plans, and a clear articulation of the

relationship that should exist between Federal, State, and local

concerning the prevention, preparedness and response elements.

I would like to thank members of the committee for the opportunity to testify today, and I too look forward to your questions

that you may have.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Jamieson. I am going to start off

the questioning with Mr. Gruber.

We have heard from a number of stakeholders that this is not

a National Preparedness System, it is not comprehensive, because

it does not fully account or address nonterrorism events. How

would you address that?

Mr. GRUBER. Let me talk a little first about the scenarios and

the reason they were selected and how they were used. The concept

that the scenario working group used was to select the minimum

number of scenarios that covered the spectrum of threats and hazards, to use those to define specific tasks and then to develop capabilities.

We used a planning methodology that is, in fact, and we state

that in the National Preparedness Goal, an all-hazards approach.

It is called capabilities-based planning. It is designed to develop

agile and flexible capabilities that are designed to meet any threat

or hazard.

We selected that set of scenarios with, as you pointed out, twelve

attack scenarios for two reasons. One, everyone that participated

on the scenario working group has extensive experience with natural hazards given the 40 or more disaster declarations we have

every year. We had a great body of experience and knowledge

about natural hazards and man-made accidents. So we benefited

from that.

We used these WMD attack scenarios because we understand

these are some of the areas where the Nation is least prepared. So

that was part of the reason why they were a focus of this effort.

For the natural hazards, we have great experience and actuarial

data. We benefit from the experience of our responders. Some of

those have regulated requirements. So that was the reason we took

that approach to the planning scenarios that we used.

We developed from that a comprehensive task library of over

1,700 tasks. Some of those, for example, like performance and man-
10

agement, obviously apply to any threat or hazard you would face.

So, again, the scenarios were benchmarks, but we believe the capabilities and tasks cover the full range of hazards, including natural

hazards.

Mr. SHUSTER. When you use the term risk when determining the

capabilities, is that also determining how the funding is going to

be allocated, when you look at the allocation of funds?

Mr. GRUBER. Yes, sir. As, obviously, the Secretary has testified,

and he testified as recently as yesterday, he talked about using this

strategic mix of looking at the threats and hazards, looking at specific vulnerabilities, and looking at the consequences. Our directive,

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, specified that we needed to look at the magnitude and scope of the events. And, of course,

the National Strategy for Homeland Security told us to look at the

events that posed the greatest threat to our population, to our

property, and to our way of life.

So those are all part of a risk-managed system that the Secretary

again has clearly stated will be the driving force for how we apportion resources.

Mr. SHUSTER. It seems to me, though, when I hear folks from

DHS talk you are focusing on terrorism and not on the other risks,

and I’m concerned about that, that that is where the focus is, when

over the last, well, since FEMA has been created, there has been

something like 1,300 or 1,400 disasters, and only four of them have

been terrorism. I certainly don’t downplay the risk of terrorism, but

the reality is we are going to have a hurricane that is going to

damage or decimate some town or region of the country next year,

and the probability is great that we will have that happen.

Mr. GRUBER. Yes, sir, that’s an excellent point. Again, I think if

you look at the list of our target capabilities, you will see that they

are broad operationally stated templates that apply across that

range of hazards.

For example, we have a template for planning, for all-hazards

planning. We have a template for interoperable communications.

Those apply regardless of the threat or hazard. So we think, even

though this suite of scenarios reflected these 12 attack scenarios,

that the output, both in that task library that is going to help us

with our training and exercise events, and ultimately those 36 capabilities, do adequately cover the whole range of threats and hazards that our Department and State and local responders are responsible for.

Mr. SHUSTER. The other question I have is the National Preparedness System requires a State to possess 36 target capabilities,

I believe it is. Will the Department guarantee a minimum level of

funding to States? Because with 50 States, I have to believe they

are all at different levels of the funding that they have.

Mr. GRUBER. The Secretary has talked about that, and there is

a baseline of funding that is proposed, and I know Congress is

making a determination about what is appropriate. Again, what we

are doing is not a funding formula. We are trying to provide planning tools to State governors, to homeland security advisers and

emergency managers that are going to allow them to do three

things. One is to achieve the integration we all know we need and

is part of the protocols in the NPR and NIMS; secondly, to achieve
11

the interoperability that is very important for all these threats and

hazards; and then, finally, to make the most cost effective investments we can to get the most out of our homeland security dollars

and to get that ability to provide dual use, that it serves requirements for threats and hazards.

Mr. SHUSTER. At some point are you going to require States, I

mean these are the capabilities you must have? I think that is a

big concern of the States, that the Federal Government is going to

say you must have this and you must have that.

Mr. GRUBER. Yes, sir. In the statement, I mentioned that one of

the most important tasks we have left to do, and that is why this

is called an Interim Goal, is we have to work with the community,

as we have done up to this point, to begin to determine what are

the appropriate base-line capabilities; what are the right structures. Because, as I said, jurisdictions and States differ in terms

of their risk and in terms of their resource base.

One of the reasons why we strongly advocate, and I hope other

panelists will as well, this approach with expanded regional collaboration, is to make sure we are drawing from the resource pool

of the broadest area. Because all the threats and hazards we have

talked about, regardless of whether they are terrorism or natural

hazards, have no respect for a jurisdiction’s boundary. They are

going to be regional and national events.

So our approach again was to make sure that these capabilities

can be drawn from a regional area through mutual assistance, or

an assistance compact to provide the support we need.

Mr. SHUSTER. When will you finalize the target capabilities list?

Mr. GRUBER. By the 1st of October of 2005. And we will work

again. We can always do better, but we have worked very hard. We

made a commitment to the Secretary when we started this process

that we would strive mightily to make this a model of cooperation

and consultation. We have worked hard, and we have had great advice and counsel from our stakeholders when we have not done

that correctly.

So we are going to work very hard on this next set of establishing these target levels of capability to get the input from the people

that have to make the decisions about applying these resources,

and that is at the State and local level.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you.

Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gruber, I want to see if I can understand how natural hazards fit into the risk analysis that I’m working on frankly in my

other committees. Yes, I heard Judge Chertoff testify yesterday,

and as you know, we are in the process of authorizing the first

Homeland Security bill and there is a lot of concern about the distribution of funds. I realize that is not your bailiwick, but everyone

agrees that a risk analysis is necessary.

The Senate is going through that process even in advance of us,

but also right now simultaneously. Judge Chertoff testified that

there should be a risk analysis. And he, helpfully, broke that word

down so that it wasn’t so much jargon. He said it is consisting of

threats—I’m trying to recall—vulnerability and consequences. And

good lawyer that he is, he gave an example; that the bridge down
12

the street from him, there might be a terrorist attack on it, and

the consequences of that could be very severe. But using this formula, threat and vulnerability, it would probably not be considered

a substantial risk to guard against.

I don’t have the slightest idea of how, what your office is doing

fits into this risk analysis, particularly given the fact that every jurisdiction will get some funds. But there is a tremendous push, I

certainly am among those who are pressing for these funds to be

distributed on a risk basis, so that there would be some objective

formula against which to measure how a majority of the funds are

to be allocated.

Could you, by way of example or somehow make me understand

how the hazards analysis that you certainly would be doing right

in conjunction, indeed at the very same agencies would be involved? I’m thinking of the Coast Guard. Here is an example of an

agency that I would bet 99 percent of its time has to do with pulling people out of the water, or whatever you do to make sure that

things are well and good at home. But they are learning for the

first time that there may be an attack on us.

So whoever is working with the Coast Guard on what the risk

is will also have to go through, according to Judge Chertoff, this

notion of threat, vulnerability and consequence. If you could give

me an example of how that would work on your side of the fence,

it would be very helpful to me.

Mr. GRUBER. Yes, ma’am. I think you made two important

points: One is that it is not one entity that is going to formulate

our understanding of risk. It has to be a partnership. And, in fact,

we are working very closely with the Coast Guard, for example, on

our targeted infrastructure protection programs, on the port security grants, because we have to have the benefit of their experience

both with, again, natural hazards, with oil spills, with security for

ports, and that is all helping us to understand risk.

We rely on our partners within the Department that have responsibilities for making those determinations using a variety of

information, as you well know: Population, population density, law

enforcement cases that are underway. But, of course, most importantly, we have an advantage for natural hazards in that we have

great volumes of actuarial data and experience every year, as you

pointed out, with perhaps 40 disaster declarations every year.

So the advantage is that we have, I think, a very good understanding of probabilities, frequency, seasonality of natural hazards,

where we don’t have the same advantage with these terrorist

threats. And so as we look at understanding risk, we always have

to understand that one set of risks is a morally neutral nonadaptive problem, meaning natural hazards. The other way we look at

risk is through something that is perpetrated by a human architect, that is an adaptive threat.

So as we make determinations about risk, we have to deal with

both of those events, and that all has to weigh into our calculations. So we work with all our partners in the Department, we

work with our community, our constituents at the State and local

level, and the rest of the interagency to help us make those determinations.
13

Ms. NORTON. What you are saying is both kinds of risks are to

be included in, let us say, what the final number is. What the final

funding number is. All I can say is I do not think there is wide understanding of that.

For example, parts of the Midwest or the far west people think

are not as vulnerable. In fact, if you look at the intelligence, New

York City gets mentioned over and over and over again. But in almost none of the discussion we are having in Homeland Security

is there any discussion of the money going for anything except the

terrorist risks.

Now, maybe there is a separate pot of money, but it says to me

you may be in a flood area where there are no nuclear facilities or

where you may be land locked. And we know how al-Qaeda works.

It wants to do maximum damage somewhere. But you may indeed

be in some kind of floodplain. And when we are distributing money,

we will take into account that risk along with the risk of a terrorist

event. Is that the way it is going to happen?

Mr. GRUBER. Ma’am, you have pointed out the problem and you

have also talked about the solution. Yes, you were right in the fact

that there are different components of funding that go out to the

community; the Fire Act Grant, emergency management grants

that are distributed to help communities address problems that are

not particularly related to terrorism but that we can get dual use

out of for both those kind of risks.

Ms. NORTON. So people should understand that is coming out of

a different pot.

Mr. GRUBER. Well, it is all integrated now in this one- stop shop

in the provision of the grant funding.

Ms. NORTON. Yes, but it is a different—that is a much more complicated thing to do, frankly. We thought it was complicated

enough to try to do a risk assessment for terrorism, now when you

put into the equation that the assessment must, and we certainly

on this subcommittee believe it certainly must include these natural hazards, all I can say is I do not envy you, but I do not think

that is well understood. And I think it should be better understood

and people would not be so afraid they are not going to get any

money because they are not in New York City and they are not in

Washington, D.C.

Mr. GRUBER. May I just mention, Ma’am? You pointed out a very

good point, and I only alluded to it in the statement. We have, I

think, a very comprehensive communications and outreach program to help. If we are not communicating that message, and to

do a better job, we have three regional conferences that we will be

conducting.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Gruber, I think the problem is with the Congress. It is not the first responders who are saying I am not going

to get any money. I am hearing it from my colleagues sitting on

my committees and in the Senate, who keep pointing out that there

could—I mean, I heard a Member talk about a shopping mall, a

Senator talk about a shopping mall, their biggest shopping mall.

Hey, the last time I heard, the shopping mall ought to take care

of the shopping mall and terrorist events at the shopping mall. I

do not think that is the business of the United States Government.
14

You see how out of hand the thinking on this is? If he were to

focus, though, on natural disasters there, I think he would have a

better chance.

Let me ask why mitigation against hazards, other than terrorism

is not included in the NPS? Everybody talks about prevention and

nobody does anything about it?

Mr. GRUBER. Again, ma’am, it may not be spelled out in the specificity that we need, and we can make those corrections as we improve these documents, but in fact, it is a component of some of our

grant programs. There are other programs that are being developed

that will address mitigation and prevention from the perspective

again of mitigation for building codes and fire hazards, but also

prevention in terms of buffer zone protection for particular facilities, chemical facilities and others.

So that is a component of the grant offerings, and you have made

a good point. If we haven’t spelled it out adequately in our current

version of the Goal, then we need to correct that by the time we

publish the final Goal.

Ms. NORTON. I wish you would take another look at that.

Mr. GRUBER. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask you to take another look at something

else? And here I put on my legal hat.

I want to commend the President for the action he took under

executive order, but I am very, very concerned, given the fact that

we have a Federal republic and a separation of powers, that we

could have a national emergency, and if we are working only under

this executive order and presidential directives, I am wondering if

you can assure us that Federal emergency response authorities,

like yourself, would have the authority to legally require local authorities to take certain kinds of actions.

Now, you may be the prototype for what to do, because we have

had hazards all along. but there have been so many of these presidential directives, I wonder if your counsel has looked closely at

that issue so that we will not have somebody saying I do not think

the national government has the authority to do this or that.

Mr. GRUBER. I would have to defer to Mr. Jamieson to answer

that.

Mr. JAMIESON. Congresswoman, I can assure you, and the whole

National Response Plan is, as is the National Incident Management System, built on the notion that we are going to respond and

we are going to find the lowest level of governance that we can

find, the incident commander. All of the resources that would be

coming down, all of the support that would be available through

the National Response Plan are there to support the incident commander. There is absolutely no intent in any of our plans, even the

catastrophic supplement to the National Response Plan, to erode

the prerogatives of State and local government.

Ms. NORTON. I am talking about something like an incident of

national significance. We haven’t had anything like that until after

9/11. All I am asking is, have lawyers scrubbed that so that somebody says, oh, my God, here is the Federal Government telling

somebody at the State and local they must do that, but local statutes say this? That could get real complicated, by simply declaring

the President may do this.
15

Again, here is this committee ready to do what is necessary, but

one wonders whether or not you would meet some Federal problem.

Mr. JAMIESON. Let me talk about the issue.

Ms. NORTON. I am not talking about resources now. I am talking

about whether or not anyone has looked at this incidence of national significance, which could be a hazard of a kind we have had

for some time and covering large sections of the country, or it could

be a terrorist event.

Mr. JAMIESON. The incident of national significance is described

in the National Response Plan and in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, there are five conditions that the President has

delegated to the Secretary of the Department. But the incident of

national significance is putting in motion the coordination mechanisms of the National Response Plan. It does not, for instance, trigger the Stafford Act in and of itself.

There are conditions, as you know, for the natural disaster portion of this where we have to get a request coming up from local

government, from the State and the governor asking for disaster

assistance. So the incidence of national significance finding, what

it is doing is putting in motion the coordination mechanisms to

make sure that all the moving parts are now coordinated and understood.

It is allowing us to set up a joint field office. It is allowing us

to put in motion the authorities of the other Federal departments

and agencies. But it is not, it is not a trigger, in and of itself, for

any of that Federal assistance. It is just putting the Federal Government in a forward mobilized posture so that we can respond

when these requests, when this situation assessment comes up

from the incident commander.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I know you want to go on now. I just wanted to

let you know, Mr. Chairman, when there was that incident at the

Pentagon Postal Service, I would have to ask you to have your

counsel look at it, because we have Virginia coming back and saying only the Department of Health of Virginia could do certain

things, like order that—what is the medicine that is given, Cipro

be given. And all we have to do is substitute a natural disaster for

that and you can see what I mean.

I did not have any indication that there was something that we

had in hand at the Federal level that we could do. As you know,

there was no proper coordination there at all. Thank you very

much.

Mr. SHUSTER. This Stafford Act, the States and localities have to

be overwhelmed before the Federal role comes in. Did the Federal

Government step in to that incident at the Pentagon?

Ms. NORTON. No, but the coordination that Mr. Jamieson is talking about did not occur as he said should occur. Because he is saying it is just a coordination mechanism. If so, and if that was a

test, it certainly did not work.

Mr. JAMIESON. Obviously, there are ongoing reviews for that situation at the State and also at the Federal level, but I am quite

comfortable characterizing it. I think the communication there was

not as good as it could have been, and we need a better commu-
16

nication to the State and local authorities in terms of what the situation was and what the appropriate response was.

Mr. SHUSTER. Who makes the decision to activate the NRP, National Response Plan?

Mr. JAMIESON. If there is a disaster declaration that is coming

in, a disaster declaration, in and of itself, would constitute an incident of national significance. But if another Federal agency, EPA,

who may be dealing with a hazardous material spill is out there,

and they are saying it is escalating, this event is going, another

Federal agency can go to the Secretary of the Department and ask

for assistance, which would connote an incident of national significance.

So any of those four circumstances that are spelled out, and I do

have those and I can provide those for the record, Mr. Chairman,

as opposed to going through them here. But the important point

that I want to emphasize is that that designation itself of an incident of national significance is not serving as a trigger for any of

the other authorities that the Federal agencies have. There are

conditions and criteria that need to be met under Stafford, there

are conditions under the national contingency plan, there are conditions of the Bureau in terms of threats that they have to deal

with.

So what they are doing, as signatories to the National Response

Plan, they are saying they are going to bring their authorities, but

they are going to organize themselves within the construct of this

National Response Plan. So it is a far more coherent and coordinated effort than it has been.

Mr. SHUSTER. If something would occur here on Capitol Hill, that

becomes a tricky problem because now turning the authority over

to the executive branch, under the Constitution there is a separation there. How would something like that work; like the anthrax

scare we had here?

Mr. JAMIESON. Well, there are constitutional issues there, and I

will try not to speak to them, but on a very practical standpoint

if there was a suspicious person who had a baggage that looked

like it was a bomb or whatever it might be, local law enforcement

and the Capitol Hill police are going to respond to that. What they

are also going to do is contact the Bureau in the Strategic Information Operations Center. And there is going to be no hesitation

whatsoever in terms of the Bureau coming in there and determining what the situation is.

There then, automatically, the Bureau’s operation center is notifying the Department of Homeland Security. And if that situation

escalates, then an incidence of national significance can be declared. We will go out and merge with the joint operations center

that the Bureau establishes. But at the same time, if it turns into

nothing; that there is nothing in the suitcase, it is just a suspicious

character, then there would obviously not be that designation.

But I think the key point is that that designation of an incident

of national significance, nobody is waiting for that. We are forward

marching out there in terms of the Bureau’s deployment, the Capitol Police’s deployment to investigate the case and the situation

that they have. If it does escalate, what we are saying by the National Response Plan, is we are putting together a common mecha-
17

nism so that the Bureau, the Department, EPA, if necessary, HHS,

if they are required, we are going to come together and fight as one

team. That is what the National Response Plan does. It provides

that coordination structure.

Mr. GRUBER. Mr. Chairman, could I just add that we would be

remiss if we did not mention that just a week ago we completed

the TOPOFF for top officials, exercise, the third exercise of its kind

that we had done. One of the most important objectives of that exercise was, in fact, to put the National Response Plan into action,

to be able to test it. We did that with the State of New Jersey and

the State of Connecticut.

So we are confident that we will have many lessons that get to

Congresswoman Norton’s points about the relationship with the

States and local jurisdictions that will help us better understand

how to apply these protocols.

Mr. JAMIESON. If I may, Mr. Chairman, to that point, one of the

areas that was really discovered during the exercise itself, and creatively so, was why was there not a declaration in one of these instances. Well, quite frankly, the answer to that question is that

there was not a request from the State and local government for

a declaration under the Stafford Act.

So we are always going to be deferring to the State and local interests to make sure we are not unilaterally riding over their capabilities and that they need us.

Mr. SHUSTER. I think that is very important that you are paying

attention to their situation and their thoughts.

I want to now recognize Mr. Dent.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I think you started to answer this, but

I will ask the question anyway. I attended that TOPOFF exercise

up in New Brunswick at the Robert Wood Johnson Hospital, and

for the seemingly biological attack on North Central Jersey. And as

I understood it, the Stafford Act, it was not possible to implement

the Stafford Act because of that incident, the TOPOFF; is that correct?

Mr. JAMIESON. No, it is not a correct characterization of that. We

have authority under the Stafford Act to declare—

Mr. DENT. A major disaster declaration.

Mr. JAMIESON. A major disaster declaration is a different issue.

There is not provision for a major disaster declaration within the

Stafford Act. But there is provision in the Stafford Act for an emergency declaration that can be made that would permit us to do

anything we need to do to save lives and protect property. The authority, however, on that biological event is that that clearly is an

HHS lead on that, so it would be HHS using their authority to respond to that particular incident.

Mr. DENT. So the answer then is, you could not, under the Stafford Act, declare that incident a major disaster declaration?

Mr. JAMIESON. We could not have declared it a major disaster

declaration without a request coming up from the governor. Then,

if there were collateral issues associated with that, in other words

you do not want the Department going in under Stafford on a biological event when it is clearly an HHS lead. But if there were collateral issues coming up associated with that, a need for temporary
18

housing assistance or what have you, we could do what we needed

to do under our emergency authorities of Stafford.

Mr. DENT. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHUSTER. Ms. Norton?

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just one

more question.

Mr. Gruber, in your testimony, you spoke of the many partners

with whom you were working, State, local, tribal, private sector,

and nongovernmental. I really have a question about that.

It occurs to me that private industry has a huge incentive on its

own to move probably well in advance of some of us. They, for example, are in touch, have long been in touch with their counterparts in Europe and in the Mid East and in South America. It occurs to me they know a lot more about some of this than any of

us in the Federal Government and that they may be some distance

ahead of us, at least in some valuable respects.

I wonder whether these standards and tasks, capabilities that

you are in the process of developing are consistent with existing industry standards, such as the Emergency Management Accreditation Program. I note, for example, that my own city is one of only

four jurisdictions that have this EMAC certification, yet this comes

out of private industry.

Can we do better than that, or are we trying to meet that standard?

Mr. GRUBER. Ma’am, that is an excellent question, and MFPA

1600 or Emergency Management Accreditation Association is an

excellent model. Former Secretary Ridge was a great proponent of

EMAP, as is Secretary Chertoff.

We have been talking to EMAP program staff. Just yesterday,

Gil and I were at the rollout for the NIMS/NRP talking with Tom

Lockwood about a collaboration to look at that, because it is a great

model for us to use. We certainly don’t want to reinvent something

when we have a proven standard that has been well tested and

validated. Of course, we will look and adopt where we have a great

standard to use. We want to capitalize on that.

Ms. NORTON. I certainly want to encourage consistency between

what I understand to be very highly regarded industry standards

and Federal Government standards, and I hope you read off of

their playbook, because I know people who answer to stockholders

and have their own private resources at stake have had an incentive that perhaps none of us have had. I would hate to see us going

and inventing our own wheel, except insofar as we are tailoring

what we do to the special circumstances of the public sector.

Mr. GRUBER. Ma’am, if I might add, I am sure you will hear a

lot more about TOPOFF in the future, but our recent experience

with TOPOFF3, if my numbers serve me right, that we had about

156 corporations or businesses that participated in TOPOFF3. This

was unprecedented.

One of the things we learned from that was exactly the point you

made, that in terms of agility and speed of decisionmaking, there

are plenty of lessons we could learn from those participants. And

we have businesses that were playing from the corporate level.

Their CEOs were participating during the course of that week. So,
19

I am confident, as we go through all the data from the exercise,

that there will be some great lessons for us to adopt as well.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much.

Before I came to Congress, I served on the board of three Fortune 500 companies, and I do not for a moment think that they

were not prepared, they were worldwide, to deal with whatever

they had to deal with. So I urge us to look closely at what industry

has done.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Dent.

Mr. DENT. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I serve on the Homeland Security Committee, and I just left a

few hearings today dealing with H.R. 1544, the Smarter Funding

For First Responders Act, which tends to allocate our first responder dollars out on a risk assessment or vulnerability basis as

opposed to a greater minimum or straight population criteria.

Could you just give me your thoughts and perspectives on that

legislation? Is that compatible or dovetail with what you are advocating here today?

Mr. GRUBER. Well, obviously there are great discussions underway, sir. It would probably be inappropriate for me to comment on

that because I know there is still a dialogue underway. But you

raise a great point, and that is the Secretary, of course, has affirmed every time he has testified to that.

We have to look at that, as he calls it, a strategic mix of threat,

vulnerability and consequence, as the best means to ensure that we

allocate our resources and make the most cost-effective investments

with our homeland security dollars, and get the most payoff, the

most leverage from those in terms of whether it is terrorist events

or natural hazards.

So we are committed. Again, we are not—what we are talking

about with HSPD-8 is not a funding formula, it is really a way to

help decisionmakers make smarter and more informed decisions

about their capability investments.

Mr. DENT. Finally, I know I mentioned TOPOFF a few moments

ago. I apologize for not being here to hear your opening testimony.

Were you actively involved in TOPOFF exercises in Connecticut or

New Jersey?

Mr. GRUBER. Both of us were.

Mr. DENT. You were on site?

Mr. GRUBER. No, sir, I was in the master control center here in

Washington.

Mr. DENT. Okay. You were both down here in Washington for

that exercise?

Mr. JAMIESON. Yes. I was here in Washington also and actively

involved in the advanced distance learning exercises that led up to

that for both NRP and the NIMS.

Mr. DENT. Are you permitted to comment on what your thoughts

and perspectives were on how that exercise has gone? I know there

will be a lot of review and analysis of what occurred, but can you

give us any preliminary indication of how you felt that exercise

went?

Mr. GRUBER. I think he will talk about the plan. I can just give

you some background on the overall exercise.
20

Mr. JAMIESON. Yes, the exercise did do the National Response

Plan. I think it is important that when we comment here, these exercises are important to tell us what we don’t know, what is working well and what is not working well.

What did come out of that is the fact that the National Response

Plan stood tall. It worked. The coordination mechanisms that were

there, the fundamental underpinnings of the National Response

Plan worked very well. Are there issues that need to be worked on

to improve communication awareness in terms of these core national structures and how they work better, what the connection

points are to State and local governments? Absolutely. But from a

systemic standpoint, and from the concept of operations of the National Response Plan, it worked very well.

Mr. DENT. Just my own comment to you, just as an observer, it

seemed like the real success of that whole operation was not what

occurred during those few days of the actual exercise, but all the

planning that led up to it.

Mr. JAMIESON. Yes, I agree.

Mr. DENT. That hopefully you would find out from those 3 or 4

days that here is your plan, and then you can just kind of look back

on the process, what you could do better. But I think the success

was just going through the exercise, all the steps that were required. I was impressed by all the numbers of people—just at the

hospital—I only saw one little piece of the puzzle and, I was just

impressed by the level of detail, professionalism of all the people

involved and how well orchestrated and planned this was. Just the

number of people involved was just overwhelming in the private

sector, the hospitals and from the various departments.

Mr. JAMIESON. I appreciate those remarks.

Mr. GRUBER. I might just add in terms of context—and, again,

these are preliminary numbers because, as you can well imagine,

we had literally hundreds of data collectors out there at every part

in this exercise. So we are talking about file cabinets full of information that we got. But our preliminary numbers, we are looking

at somewhere in the neighborhood of 23,000 people that participated in this exercise. That doesn’t include the people we reached

through our collaborative Web tools and the distance learning that

Gil talked about.

Mr. DENT. It is very impressive. Thank you.

Mr. SHUSTER. I have one more question. The Homeland Security

Presidential Directive-8 specifically excludes broader law enforcement efforts to prevent terrorism. But in the NIMS, the national

preparedness goal, the target capabilities list and universal task

list include activities such as heightened inspection, improved surveillance and security operations, deterrence operations, activities

that seem to fall squarely within that exclusion category.

How do you sum that up? How do you justify that?

Mr. JAMIESON. I can do that, sir. HSPD-8 obviously talks about

that in the context of some portions of that that are exclusively the

domain of other departments and agencies. So the whole process of

development. For example, we formed the senior steering committee to help guide us through the course of this implementation of

HSPD-8.
21

The Department of Justice was a member of the senior steering

committee. We are working with the Department of Justice, the

Bureau, other elements of the Intelligence Community, all—what

we have to do is make sure that the capabilities we are developing

support their mission requirements as well and support what State

and local officials have told us are very high and urgent needs that

they have in terms of information-sharing and collaboration in the

intelligence arena as well.

So while we fully understand what the directive told us to do,

and we are staying in our lane, we also understand we have an obligation to support our partners.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you.

Before you leave, I would just like to say I think you are on the

right track. I think you have done a good job. I know the timetable

is very tight. I am especially impressed with NIMS and the NRP.

But I think that there is more work to be done on the national preparedness goal, especially, I think, it needs to be comprehensive. At

this point I don’t believe it is comprehensive. We would like to—

I would like to and this committee would like to help you move forward on that. I think, as I said, you are moving in the right direction.

Again, thank you very much for being here, and you are excused.

Mr. GRUBER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. JAMIESON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHUSTER. We are going to have to go into a recess here. That

second panel can—well, you can take your seats or just relax. We

are going to have to go vote. It is going to probably be about 25

minutes to half an hour we will be on the floor. I apologize for that.

I guess that is the hazards of having to vote and pass laws. So we

will be back at around 3:30, my good guess. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. SHUSTER. I will call the meeting back to order. I was off by

about 15 minutes. I am sorry about that.

I will welcome the second panel today, which is comprised of a

number of State and local officials as well as representatives from

the NGO sector, each of whom individually on behalf of their respective organizations has significant responsibilities during disasters of all types.

Joining us today are Mr. David Liebersbach. How is that?

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. Great.

Mr. SHUSTER. President of the National Emergency Management

Association, as well as being the director of the State of Alaska’s

Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management; Chief

John Buckman, representing the International Association of Fire

Chiefs, as well as being the fire chief of German Township, Indiana; Captain John Salle—

Mr. SALLE. Salle, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHUSTER. Pronounce it again.

Mr. SALLE. Salle.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you—representing the International Association of Chiefs of Police; Mr. Armond—

Mr. MASCELLI. Mascelli.

Mr. SHUSTER. My Italian is not very good—Mascelli, vice president of emergency response for the American Red Cross; Mr.
22

Dewayne West, who is here wearing several hats as vice chairman

of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program, president of

the International Association of Emergency Managers, and as the

director of emergency management for Johnston County, North

Carolina.

Welcome to you all.

Since your written testimony has been made part of the record,

the subcommittee would request that all witnesses limit their oral

testimony to 5 minutes, and there will be time for questions after

the witnesses have offered their prepared remarks.

We are going to start with Mr. West, because I understand you

have a flight to catch.

So go ahead, Mr. West.

TESTIMONY OF DEWAYNE WEST, VICE CHAIRMAN, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACCREDITATION PROGRAM COMMISSION, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGERS, DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, JOHNSON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA; DAVID E.

LIEBERSBACH, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, STATE OF

ALASKA; CHIEF JOHN BUCKMAN, PAST PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE CHIEFS, FIRE CHIEF, GERMAN TOWNSHIP, INDIANA; CAPTAIN JOHN P. SALLE, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE; AND

ARMOND MASCELLI, VICE PRESIDENT OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE, AMERICAN RED CROSS

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Chairman Shuster.

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon and

to talk about some recent Federal preparedness initiatives. I am

Dewayne West, vice chairperson of the Emergency Management

Accreditation Program Commission, commonly known as EMAP,

and director of Johnston County’s emergency management program, and have currently had the pleasure of serving as president

for the international association. But today I am wearing the

EMAP Commission hat, which is the governing board of the only

national assessment and accreditation process for local and State

emergency management.

EMAP is a nonprofit accrediting body dedicated to the improvement and excellence in public sector emergency management. On

behalf of the EMAP Commission, thank you for the opportunity to

be part of the committee’s examination of the work done to date on

HSPD-5 and HSPD-8.

We recognize that significant work has been accomplished in

these areas. The National Response Plan, while still being implemented, is a step in the right direction to strengthen coordination

of response activities across Federal agencies.

With the potential to improve Federal response and assistance,

the National Incident Management System, or NIMS, is a positive

step as well to address the need for a more consistent approach to

incident management. While many State and local governments already use an incident management system, EMAP assessments
23

have confirmed the need for greater consistency in the use of and

terminology within incident management.

We note, however, that there appears to be gaps in the coordination across HSPD-5 and 8 projects, the question being how core

concepts of one document work with the features of the other.

Because assessment, benchmarking, and continuous improvement in comprehensive preparedness and emergency management

are EMAP’s focus and mission, my comments today will be largely

directed towards HSPD-8 implementation activities.

EMAP, the Emergency Management Accreditation Program,

started as a concept in the late 1990s when State and local emergency managers, with support from their Federal partners, identified the need for national standards and a consistent assessment

methodology for State and local government emergency management.

EMAP assesses a jurisdiction’s system for dealing with natural

and human-caused disasters and has conducted baseline assessments using its national standards in 35 States and territories. In

my comments today, I will touch on a couple of areas related to the

National Preparedness Goal and Target Capabilities List, or TCL,

and our concerns about potential impacts of this initiative as it is

currently outlined.

First and perhaps most directly, if the expectation is that HSPD8 materials, the Target Capabilities List, National Preparedness

Goal and planning scenarios, will provide a comprehensive assessment of preparedness, we would simply say, no, that objective or

expectation has not yet been achieved.

Next I encourage you to seek ways to ensure that proposed solutions support progress in balance with the burden that they impose

on your constituents at the local and State level.

There are several points at which we are concerned that HSPD8 implementation activities assume a start-from-scratch approach

to preparedness. There are multitudes of State and local plans, procedures and programs throughout the Nation, and as we have communicated to colleagues at DHS, an attempt to recreate all of them

would not be a wise or effective use of time and resources.

For our communities and States and, therefore, the Nation, to be

prepared for a terrorist attack, the foundation for preparedness

must be strengthened rather than distracted. A strong foundation

that includes hazard identification and a multidisciplinary, multiagency approach to resource management, planning, communications, training, exercising and public education must be supported

and strengthened to ensure preparedness. This foundation is vital,

whether the community experiences spring flooding or a radiological dispersal device. It is these foundation capabilities that are

evaluated through the EMAP standards and process.

The fact that the Federal Government has created a large Department of Homeland Security may foster somewhat of a misconception that I am sure you are aware of from your work with

State and local leaders. While there are departments and individuals at the State and local levels who handle prevention, preparedness, response and recovery functions, and there may even be a few

new offices or positions labeled ′′homeland security,′′ there is no

substantial new bureaucracy available to handle the increased
24

workload and requirements of evolving and demanding Federal

homeland security initiatives. These are by and large the same people and the same offices, retasked or multitasked, as those responsible for emergency management, law enforcement, public safety or

emergency response.

We ask that this reality be understood and that you seek to improve preparedness in ways that build on existing capabilities, filling gaps and strengthening systems rather than reinventing the

wheel. We are concerned that promulgation of HSPD-8 compliance

requirements will occur before the potential for duplication and dilution of existing State and local practices and plans have been

considered.

We suggest that our Federal agency partners focus first on the

seven national priorities outlined in the National Preparedness

Goal, and encourage State and local governments to evaluate capabilities in these areas of urgent need using the Target Capabilities

List as a tool. Then we need to make sure that both the capabilities

in these areas are coordinated and dovetailed with existing plans

and systems. On this key issue, we hope DHS understands that it

does not need to create an entirely new preparedness assessment

methodology, but it can and should do what makes sense, and that

is to build upon existing standards and assessment processes such

as EMAP, using State and local governments throughout the country.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to talk with you for your

help in building stronger and more sustainable preparedness capabilities.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. West. Feel free any time you have

to excuse yourself, go ahead. We appreciate your being here. Sorry

we didn’t get this started earlier.

Next, Mr. Liebersbach, you may go ahead and proceed.

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. Thank you, Chairman Shuster, for allowing

me the opportunity to testify before your committee.

I am Dave Liebersbach, director of the Alaska Homeland Security Emergency Management, but today I am here as president of

NEMA, whose members are the directors of emergency management for the 58 States and territories and the District of Columbia.

I have three issues that I bring before you today to discuss regarding the state of our Nation’s preparedness: organization of the

preparedness system; development of the National Response Plan

or requirements for State and local governments; and development

of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on preparedness

and our concerns for the timelines and requirements.

On our Nation’s preparedness system, last year DHS proposed

creation of a one-stop shop for homeland security funding, which

led to some preparedness grants to be moved to the newly created

Office of State and Local Coordination and Preparedness. Some

preparedness functions were also moved out of FEMA.

While many of these changes have improved some of the Nation’s

preparedness functions, changes that separate preparedness functions once in FEMA from FEMA’s response and recovery function

will complicate and compromise our Nation’s ability to respond to

and recover from disasters.
25

Preparedness means personnel, planning, training and exercise

for all aspects of a disaster. Preparedness functions cannot be isolated from response and recovery because they are linked together.

As Congress and DHS review the organization and functions of the

Department, we ask that preparedness not be separated from

emergency response and recovery functions.

Additionally, as the fiscal year 2005 funding has been proposed,

NEMA has been working alongside the Office of State and Local

Coordination and Preparedness to ensure that the all-hazards intent of the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program,

the EMPG, is not changed with the creation of the one-stop shop.

EMPG is the only all-hazard source of Federal funding for State

and local emergency management capacity building.

Integrating the EMPG funding into the homeland security grant

program has resulted in a bureaucratic grant system where none

existed previously. Only half of the Nation’s emergency managers

serve as the State administrative agency, which receives all the

homeland security grants for disbursement. This has caused significant delays and financial hardship for State and local emergency management agencies. NEMA hopes to work in partnership

with Congress and DHS to resolve these issues in the coming year

to ensure swifter grant awards in fiscal year 2006. Specifically, we

ask Congress to decouple EMPG funds from the homeland security

grant program.

National Response Plan. NEMA supports the National Repose

Plan released by DHS as the comprehensive all-hazards tool for domestic incident management across the spectrum of prevention,

preparedness, response and recovery.

The NRP comes as a result of Federal, State and local government partnership. NEMA was actively involved in the State and

local working group that reviewed drafts of the NRP and proposed

changes as the NRP was developed by the Department.

The process used for developing the NRP initially was not an

easy road. State and local governments had no input into the early

version of the NRP, which led to significant outcry from the emergency preparedness community when the draft was released.

NEMA commends DHS for listening to the concerns we have with

the initial process and then adapting the process in progress.

NEMA calls on Congress to ensure that DHS continues to maintain

consultation with stakeholders as they develop critical national policy and implementation strategies.

A key component of the NRP requires State and local governments to update their emergency response plans to reflect the new

National Response Plan. However, no dedicated Federal funding is

provided to update these plans. At a time when all resources are

taxed to meet the new threat environments, State and local governments are forced to utilize current funding streams to address additional new mandates.

On HSPD-8, another critical component to improving the Nation’s preparedness was the release of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 on national preparedness. NEMA supports efforts to develop national preparedness goals and accompanying

standards that help the Nation to work towards common levels of

preparedness.
26

HSPD-8 is another process where NEMA is assisting with input

in developing the system, yet we continue to have to concerns regarding the process and the final product. The opportunity to impact real change is limited due to the rigid timelines required of

DHS. Increased State and local government involvement in the national preparedness guidance, metrics on performance, adoption of

the goal, and implementation, must be a critical component of the

Federal Government’s objective with HSPD-8 if the process is to

avoid a situation similar to what initially occurred at the time of

the NRP.

There are five other areas regarding HSPD-8 that must be addressed as the National Preparedness Goal moves forward. One,

only 3 of the 15 national planning scenarios are not terrorist attacks. Changing the focus of preparedness to weigh heavily on terrorism could hamper the ability of State and local governments to

respond to the wider range of all hazardous events which have a

higher likelihood of occurrence.

Two, development of HSPD-8 and the guidance for implementing

the new National Preparedness Goal must take into account existing standards programs such as the EMAP.

Three, timelines for implementation of HSPD-8 are very tight

and must be seriously considered, reconsidered for not only practical application, but also for buy-in for the personnel and stakeholders who will be required to implement the goal.

State and local governments will be required to conduct comprehensive assessments and update their statewide homeland

strategies by the end of the current year in order to be available

for fiscal year 2005 Federal preparedness assistance funds. That is

a mere 6 months to accomplish these major tasks.

Four, baseline funding for emergency management capability or

capacity building to ensure national preparedness against all hazards must be maintained.

Finally, five, mutual aid must be considered a critical component

of State and local preparedness, as evidenced by last year’s hurricanes. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact enabled

38 States to provide assistance in the form of more than $15 million in human, military and equipment assets to over—and over

800 personnel to support the impacted States for over 85 days of

continuous response operations.

In conclusion, as we continue to build national preparedness efforts through the Department of Homeland Security, we must not

forget about the need for a balanced all-hazards approach.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you.

Chief Buckman, go ahead and proceed.

Chief BUCKMAN. Chairman Shuster, I am John Buckman, Chief

of the German Township Volunteer Fire Department in Evansville,

Indiana. I appear today on behalf of the International Association

of Fire Chiefs in my role as a past president of that organization.

I am also a member of the State, Tribal and Local Working Group

for the Department of Homeland Security that since August of

2003 has been involved in reviewing the development of the new

national preparedness system.
27

On December 17, 2003, the President issued HSPD-8, which purpose is to strengthen the preparedness of the United States by creating a national all-hazards preparedness goal for facilitating cooperation among all levels of government.

The IAFC is generally supportive of the national preparedness

system that has at its core a new partnership between all levels

of government, including the private sector. I represent the IAFC

in the development of the NF process and would like to commend

the DHS staff for their diligent work to address the concerns of

first responders. This system represents a new philosophy on the

part of Federal, State, tribal and local governments and the private

sector, with roles and responsibilities clearly defined for each. All

of these stakeholders must embrace their new roles and responsibilities in order to make this system truly effective.

The IAFC strongly supports a number of specific priorities in the

Interim National Preparedness Goal, including strengthening interoperable communications capabilities. The lack of interoperable

communications is one of the greatest threats to our public safety.

At both Oklahoma City and the Pentagon, incident commanders

had to use human runners to communicate with each other. The

9/11 Commission report details how the lack of interoperability

communications proved fatal for 343 firefighters in the World

Trade Center towers.

I would urge the members of this committee to support legislation to set a certain date for clearing the 700 megahertz spectrum

for public safety use.

We also support the implementation of NIMS and the National

Response Plan and expanding regional collaboration. The NIMS is

a multidisciplinary document that provides direction, organization

and control to any agency responding to a disaster, not just police

and fire.

The NIMS/NRP provide a badly-needed template for Federal,

State, local and tribal government to coordinate their response to

a disaster. By using the NIMS and NRP, local jurisdictions can

work together to develop regional mutual aid agreements.

We also support strengthening information-sharing between the

Federal, State and local governments. DHS should develop a system to communicate instantly with the fire chief in times of threat

or increased risk to our community. The local fire department, the

local fire chief must have better information to prepare for the

threats that they face.

I would like to raise a few issues about the National Preparedness System for the committee’s consideration. One of the most

critical aspects of the National Preparedness System is its focus on,

or what may be a lack of focus on, an all-hazards response.

While the firefighters responded to acts of terror against the

World Trade Center in 1993, Oklahoma City in 1995, the horrendous events of 9/11, 2001, we also responded to numerous major accidents and natural disasters each and every day in the intervening years. To be truly effective, the National Preparedness System

must be designed to address the response by all agencies to these

events.

Unfortunately, only 2 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios are

for natural disasters, planning and funding for training and organi-
28

zational structure will be impacted by this limitation. Ideally these

scenarios would include tornadoes, wildfires and flooding. Without

the inclusion of all types of hazards, the National Preparedness

System will be biased towards terrorism response and run the risk

of being inadequate for dealing with more frequent natural disasters.

In addition, the National Preparedness Policy and guidance documents should be written so that they could be easily understood by

the firefighter in the field.

The IAFC believes that fire chiefs and other senior fire officials

should be appointed to positions within the Office of Homeland Security and in other key positions within the Department to ensure

that the fire service continues to be involved in the development of

the National Preparedness System. An example where the fire

service is missing is at the Homeland Security Operating Center.

We have a table of managers from a variety of organizations, but

the fire service is not there. The fire service is one of the first responders to a disaster, and we are not sitting at the table where

a Federal policy will be decided and implemented.

The IAFC would also encourage the Office of State and Local

Government Coordination Preparedness to consult with the national—with the United States Fire Administration and other agencies. USFA will conduct most of the training of the fire service on

NIMS and NRP, and it collects data that will play an important

role in the National Preparedness System.

Mr. Chairman, the United States Fire Administrator Dave

Paulison needs to be intimately involved. In 2002, we asked that

the U.S. Fire Administrator be at the assistant secretary level. We

have never accomplished that. But we believe that the Fire Administration and the needs of the fire service, because of the position

of our Fire Administrator, are not always being adequately addressed.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this

hearing. The National Preparedness System is in its formative

stage and will require congressional and public support to become

a reality.

Thank you.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Chief.

Next up, Captain Salle.

Mr. SALLE. Salle.

Mr. SHUSTER. Salle, sorry.

Mr. SALLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. On behalf of the International Association of Chiefs of

Police, I am pleased to join you here this afternoon to discuss the

National Preparedness System and its application to the threats

posed to our community, whether they are posed by terrorists or

by natural hazards or major accidents.

As you may know, the IACP, with more than 20,000 members in

over 100 countries, is the world’s oldest and largest association of

law enforcement executives. Founded in 1893, the IACP has dedicated itself to the mission of advancing the law enforcement profession and aiding our members in their efforts to protect the citizens

they serve.
29

Over the past 3 years, the IACP has worked very closely with a

number of Federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau

of Investigation. This work has been done to ensure that the needs,

capabilities and concerns of the Nation’s law enforcement agencies

were taken into consideration as our Nation responded to the menace of terrorism.

For the past 32 years, I was privileged to serve as a member of

the Oregon State Police. Upon my retirement in February of this

year, I was the director of the Oregon State Police Office of Public

Safety and Security. In addition to that function, I served as the

deputy director for the Oregon Office of Homeland Security. In addition to those functions, I have the privilege to be a part of the

Department of Homeland Security’s State, Local and Tribal Working Group. Through this working group, the IACP has been intimately involved in the development of the NIMS, National Incident

Management System, and the NRP and various components of

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8.

This group, this State, Local and Tribal Working Group, has

been meeting on a consistent basis for the past 2 years. Its membership consists of a number of national organizations, and in the

interest of time, it is in the written testimony, and I will refrain

from listing all of those organizations.

But as you examine that roster, you can certainly tell that the

working group encompassed a wide variety of public safety agencies. This ensured that our efforts were well balanced and represented the concerns of many disciplines.

As a result of this balance, the working group was able to incorporate the views of actual practitioners into the drafts of national

policies that have been developed. In this fashion, we have worked

closely with DHS to ensure that the policy documents they have

produced are comprehensible, not being overly prescriptive in dictating a one-size-fits-all approach to State, local, public and tribal

safety agencies.

Through my participation in this group, and in my experience

with the Oregon State Police, I witnessed that the coordinated Federal policies implemented as a result of HSPD-5, 7 and 8 have indeed resulted in a significant increase in cross-discipline planning,

training and exercising. In addition, noticeable progress has been

made in equipping public agencies with interoperable communications equipment. It is important to note that these efforts on the

Federal, State, tribal and local level, although somewhat focused on

terrorism, are creating a level of preparedness that applies to any

hazard.

Simply put, if first response agencies plan together, train on a

common command and control structure, and jointly exercise those

capabilities, the creation of a better, more unified response to any

catastrophe or hazard is inevitable.

The next step in this critical process is combining the National

Response Plan and the NIMS with a national credentialing and

equipment typing protocol. In this way we can assure that Federal,

State, tribal and local public safety agencies not only have the

proper command and communications structure in place, but that

all components will be properly trained and equipped.
30

For example, under this scenario, a SWAT team or a bomb squad

could travel to the next city or region, assume the appropriate function within the existing incident command system, set to work in

a terrorism situation or in any situation requiring the skills set

that they bring. At the same time, because of national credential

and equipment typing protocols, the incident commanders would

know exactly what capabilities and assets this unit provides.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe that for the last 3 years,

we have made significant progress at our efforts to integrate and

coordinate the activities of tens of thousands of Federal, State, local

and tribal public safety agencies that operate within the United

States. But it is important to remember that we are far from finished. The policies that have been crafted to date are dynamic, living works that will improve over time with lessons learned and the

establishment of best practices. The IACP firmly believes that the

benefits to be gained through the establishment of common command and communications that will allow for a coordinated, collective response to disasters, whether natural or manmade, make

these efforts extremely worthwhile.

Thank you.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Salle.

Next, Mr. Mascelli.

Mr. MASCELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your gracious invitation to testify at this hearing.

Mr. SHUSTER. Will you pull your microphone a little closer to

you.

Mr. MASCELLI. My name is Armond Mascelli, and I am vice

president for domestic emergency response for the Red Cross. In

the interest of time and priority attention, I will limit my remarks

to the role of the Red Cross in prepared disaster response and some

related concerns and recommendations, the National Incident Management System, the National Response Plan and the National

Preparedness Goal.

Chartered by Congress in 1905, the Red Cross provides a unique

community-based network to support all-hazard disaster preparedness and response throughout the United States and within your

district on an everyday basis. As a key member of the first responder community with expertise in meeting human needs caused

by disasters, the Red Cross is integrated into State and local government disaster planning, exercises and response efforts. While

systems and strategies are important, the public is our client to

whom we ultimately direct our services.

Mr. Chairman, this hearing is timely as the Red Cross has completed the TOPOFF 3 exercise. We have participated in all three

TOPOFF exercises to date. While we remain concerned that the

overall exercises have not yet addressed the long-term human

needs of disaster victims, TOPOFF 3 did effectively test the critical

role that the Red Cross plays in enhancing the Nation’s disaster

preparedness and response capabilities under the National Response Plan.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a moment to elaborate on our

work with the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal

agencies during the development of the National Response Plan

and the National Incident Management System, or NIMS.
31

As for NIMS, we believe it can be an effective tool for communicating, a consistent nationwide approach for governments at all

levels, the private sector and nongovernmental organizations.

NIMS has the potential to foster greater efficiency and effectiveness within the disaster community to prepare for and to respond

to and recover from domestic incidents.

Building on Red Cross responsibilities under the old Federal Response Plan, we are actively engaged in policy decisions with the

Department of Homeland Security throughout the development of

the National Response Plan. A comprehensive list of our roles in

the National Response Plan is respectfully submitted for the

record. Specifically, the Red Cross serves as a primary agency for

mass care, which involves a provision of food, emergency shelter,

first aid, welfare or inquiry information and the bulk distribution

of emergency relief items.

The Red Cross also serves as a support agency to the Department of Health and Human Services for public health and medical

services. This involves providing blood, blood products in coordination with the American Association of Blood Banks, and also the

provision of mental health and disaster health services.

We have also undertaken and expanded function under the National Response Plan with respect to public information to help disseminate accurate and timely information to those affected during

an incident.

Under the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident

Annex, the Red Cross is responsible for providing mass care during

an incident that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties

or severe population disruptions.

In short, we are partnering with the Department of Homeland

Security to move beyond the day-to-day and annual natural disasters to address scenarios previously unimaginable.

To fully execute our responsibilities, the Red Cross developed the

Mass Care Catastrophic Planning Initiative, which outlines a

three-phased strategy to address individual community catastrophic disaster mass care planning, preparedness and capacity

building. During phases 1 and 2, the Red Cross can help establish

the necessary mass sheltering and feeding plans in the 30 largest

United States Metropolitan Statistical Areas, which cover the 50

Urban Area Security Initiative cities designated by the Department

of Homeland Security. In phase 3 we can initiate the necessary activities to enhance and sustain the systems and measures established during the first 2 years.

While we welcome the challenge of this important role, we remain concerned that unlike other signatories of the National Response Plan, the Red Cross is not included in any Federal budget

request submitted to Congress. The Red Cross has the expertise,

experience, and commitment and organizational structure to implement the Mass Care Catastrophic Planning Initiative, but it is not

the responsibility of the charitable public to fund the responsibilities associated with the National Response Plan Catastrophic

Annex the government requires and the American public will need.

We believe that an immediate investment by our Federal partners now will sharply reduce both the level of potential human suffering and the expenditure of significant government resources
32

postincident. The Red Cross must have adequate levels of funding

for catastrophic planning activities to fully execute our responsibilities under the National Response Plan.

We remain a willing partner and welcome the challenge of our

expanded role in the National Response Plan. We will continue to

work closely with the Department of Homeland Security as it conducts its 1-year review and implementation plan of the National

Response Plan, and will continue to work closely with the Department of Homeland Security as it undertakes its National Response

Plan 4-year review and reissuance cycle.

With respect to the National Preparedness Goal, we commend

the work of the Department of Homeland Security as it creates effective public policy stemming from Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, in particular the development of the standardized approach to preparedness that assesses needs and defines priorities.

Recognizing the experience of the Red Cross, our president and

chief executive officer Marty Evans was named in November by the

Department of Homeland Security to the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 Senior Steering Committee.

This past July the Red Cross, Department of Homeland Security,

George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute

and the Council for Excellence in Government partnered to convene

a symposium of recognized leaders in disaster preparedness, response and recovery. A copy of the symposium report for the subcommittee’s review is respectfully submitted for the record.

Undoubtedly enabling the public to know what to do in a disaster

event will lessen the burden that the first response community and

government at all levels will require. Limiting preparedness to

operational capability, thereby excluding public preparedness, runs

counter to the July 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security,

which affirms that homeland security is a shared national responsibility with the American people. Accordingly, we have strongly

recommended during the development of the goal that public preparedness be thoroughly addressed. To our delight, the vision outlined in the Interim National Preparedness Goal now includes the

general public as an active participant to achieve risk-based target

levels of capabilities.

Additionally, the American Red Cross urged the inclusion of nongovernment organizations in the National Preparedness Goal as

partners with government in developing homeland security capabilities. Nongovernment organizations are now repeatedly listed

throughout the Interim National Preparedness Goal. Through our

numerous memorandums of understandings, affiliations and other

strategic partners, the American Red Cross looks forward to helping integrate and leverage the nongovernment organization community in implementation of the goal.

In conclusion, we value the close relationship and partnership

with our government partners, and we appreciate your continued

interest in these very important issues. Like the other panel members, I stand ready to answer any questions you may have.

Thank you.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much.
33

My first question is about the National Preparedness System as

it is currently set up. I think I heard, and I read your testimony,

there is a mixed bag in there, about the—is it adequately comprehensive to help prepare for all hazards? So I would like each of

you to briefly—do you think it is comprehensive enough, and where

does it fall short? Like I said, be brief, if you could, so that I could

get an answer from each of you.

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. Mr. Chairman, Dave Liebersbach.

I think that one place that it does fall short, as has been mentioned before, is there is no reference to mitigation. There is reference to prevention, which is a very terroristcentric reference. The

one place that it is applicable in natural disasters, of course, is

wildfires, as we are familiar with Smokey the Bear and fire prevention. But there is no mitigation in the National Response Plan.

I think the second piece of the National Response Plan that I

have some concern about, and a lot of us do, is that it is primarily

a National Response Plan for Federal agencies, and not at this

point truly a National Response Plan. I think it is working its way

there, and we have made that point fairly strongly, and we are

being heard better that the national capability is there. It has just

not been completely integrated like it needs to be done. That is

why we encourage both Congress and DHS to continue to have the

Department include State and local stakeholders in the development and the revisions of this plan to make sure it does become

truly a national plan.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you.

Chief Buckman.

Chief BUCKMAN. I think he mentioned the mitigation aspect.

That has been a significant debate within our State, Tribe and

Local Working Group because mitigation seemed to be one of those

words that we used to use, but now we don’t want to use. But we

have missed a significant portion of providing protection for critical

infrastructure, which is different than prevention activities. So I

think that is probably the biggest thing that is missing.

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Salle.

Mr. SALLE. Mr. Chairman, I think my best response to that is

I, as I have testified, was as an Oregon State Police officer for—

Mr. SHUSTER. Can you talk into the mike a little more?

Mr. SALLE. As an Oregon State Police officer a lot of years, the

last 3 years I have a better idea of what my brothers in the emergency management business do and how they do it. I could go right

down the row of disciplines that are involved in this arena.

As I testified, there is planning going on, exercising going on,

joint training going on. The bottom line is, I think, as the question

that is posed, as is currently set up, is it adequate? It is more adequate than it was. It will be more adequate in the future than it

is today.

Thank you.

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Mascelli.

Mr. MASCELLI. Yes, briefly, I can understand some of the emphasis on the terrorism, the WMD types of focus, basically new territory in many cases, and a lot of unknowns, and the sort—the need

to sort that out—gets smarter on that.
34

I would hope that as that comes about, there is an evolution and

there is a balance in terms of the right way. I am not sure what

that balance is between the day-to-day natural events that we face

and also the terrorism, the WMD events.

Mr. SHUSTER. That is of the things I am concerned about, is it

comprehensive enough? I don’t believe it is at this point. I hope, as

you have said and as Mr. Salle said, it gets better as we move on,

because FEMA has been around for 25 or so years. They have responded to 13- to 1,500 natural disasters. Only four of them have

been terrorism. I think, again, we have to focus on terrorists to a

degree, but there are a lot of other things going on out there.

That brings me to the—did any of you participate officially or unofficially in the creation of the 15 planning scenarios? You can each

answer that, starting with Mr. Liebersbach.

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. Mr. Chairman, Dave Liebersbach.

I know we did not participate in the creation of those scenarios.

We gave some pretty adamant input after they came out. I think

when they first came out, there was only one that was aimed at

natural hazards, and we did get an additional one put in, but we

weren’t involved officially or unofficially.

Mr. SHUSTER. Your association was not involved at all?

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. No.

Mr. SHUSTER. All right. Mr. Buckman.

Chief BUCKMAN. Mr. Chairman, John Buckman.

I would basically second what Mr. Liebersbach said, that, no, the

International Association of Fire Chiefs was not invited to participate.

It was pretty obvious to me, when I read the first draft, that it

was written by people who had not been in the field. It was written

by nonpractitioners, that is what I define them as; that they received an assignment and they wrote it, but they did not have any

idea what reality was.

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Salle.

Mr. SALLE. Mr. Chairman, International Association of Chiefs of

Police did not participate in the drafting of those.

Mr. MASCELLI. Yes, sir. We were provided copies of the scenarios

and on several occasions iterations providing comments back on

them.

Mr. SHUSTER. What do you think the mix should be on the 15

training centers? Should we have more, 20 scenarios and 5 more

for natural disasters? Would anybody care to comment on that?

Chief BUCKMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman—John Buckman. I am not

sure that there is a number. But I think that we sometimes—we

may be losing sight of the fact that all disasters begin and end locally, and that all disasters begin small and, depending on the size,

quickly escalate to something that could be more than State or

local, or could be local or regional, could be State or even Federal.

And that is where we—I think that we have a potential for losing

the funds to do the training, because we have spread it out over

so many instead of narrowing it down to a fewer number.

Mr. SHUSTER. All right. Mr. Liebersbach.

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. Mr. Chairman, Dave Liebersbach again.

I don’t know that I have a magic number for the number, but it

needs to be better balanced.
35

Mr. SHUSTER. What natural disasters do you think we need to

include in there?

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. Well, we haven’t addressed tornadoes. A big

one that recurs annually and is the largest annualized loss for economics in this country is flooding, and nowhere in there we

brought flooding in. Now, it doesn’t always have the dynamics of

a hurricane, but in terms of annualized loss over 20-year, 10-year,

5-year periods, both in my State and across the United States, that

is the largest costs to the American people.

Mr. SHUSTER. What do you think about Mr. Gruber’s statement

that they have focused on terrorism because there has been so

much training on these other areas? It doesn’t seem to be the way

that you want to look at it.

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. My concern is there is a lot of focus on those

other areas, the all-hazards. I think we have done a lot there.

My concern is we are not going to be able to maintain. I honestly

believe—and I won’t say it is necessarily the association’s position,

but it is Dave Liebersbach’s position that if the hurricane scenario

of September 2004 that occurred in the Southeastern U.S., the first

5 years from now, we will fail the way we are going, because the

success of that response of that hurricane season was based on the

programs that had come before the legacy created in the all-hazards and the true work of all-hazards and what was left over.

As we are moving forward, that legacy is going to drop if we

don’t pay attention to dealing with that. We were very close to the

edge when these hurricanes were going on, and Mount St. Helens

began to have a seismic swarm up there, and we have a 6.7-plus

earthquake right in Southern California right in the middle of that.

As it turns out, neither became problems, but that would have

pushed the Federal system to its limits in terms of response, if not

over.

Mr. SHUSTER. As the folks in DHS continue to tell us that they

are listening, I know they have listened to State and local views.

Mr. SALLE. I can’t answer that across the spectrum. I can speak

to the State, Local and Tribal Working Group that did a huge

amount on NIMS and NRP over the last 2 years, and our answer

was yes. Our input was solicited and listened to. Had it not been,

we certainly would have some iteration of an NRP that doesn’t look

like it looks today.

I think—

Chief BUCKMAN. Chief, from the International Association of Fire

Chiefs, we would agree that they have listened, they have responded. We haven’t won everything we have asked for, but they

have been reputable in giving us reasons why they would not and

could not do what we asked.

Mr. MASCELLI. I have to agree with that. Looking at the first

draft of the preliminary response plan and then the successive

drafts, you can now tell each draft that they were getting better at

soliciting local input into—and there is a marked difference between the first and the final draft.

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. Mr. Chairman, Dave Liebersbach.

I will agree with my colleague in the NRP after the first draft

came out, as my testimony said, they were responsive in listening
36

to us on that. I have concern—and we have concern that this is not

happening with HSPD-8.

One of the reasons is the compressed timeline that DHS is being

driven under, I think, needs to be looked at pretty hard to when

we get our product. Well, it is better to be approximately right than

precisely wrong, and we are moving fast, but we may be moving

fast up the wrong ladder.

Mr. SHUSTER. How much more time do you think you need to

adequately respond?

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. I would have to get back to you on that, Mr.

Chairman. I would have to talk to my membership, who has been

more intimately involved in working with HSPD-8 representing

NEMA. But the feedback I get back from them is that two things

are happening. The compressed timeline is not allowing for an adequate look at all the needs that need to be looked at. Because they

are in such a rush, they are not taking into account and have been

unable to take into account what is already there to address this.

We are beginning to duplicate and recreating the wheel in a lot of

cases that is already out there.

Mr. SHUSTER. That is a concern, reinventing the wheel instead

of taking what is already out there, existing standards, and incorporating them into the plan, system. Do you feel that they are trying to reinvent the wheel in many cases, or is that just something

that happens just on a few things?

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. Well, under HSPD-8, I think in many things

they are that way, and I have read letters and gotten nice responses, but the effectiveness of what is really happening is changing—again comes to this compressed timeline. They are directed to

get things to the President, the directive, so obviously they are

driven to do that and have very little time to take into account,

what we, on the ground, whether it is state and/or local, are trying

to get back to them about the reality of what is needed out there

on the front line.

Mr. SHUSTER. Can you get your association, your members to

give us some specifics on what they think that they haven’t listened to or how they are trying to reinvent the wheel in certain

cases?

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. Yes, I think we can.

Mr. SHUSTER. I appreciate that.

Anybody else care to share the views of your association, where

the members believe they are trying to reinvent the wheel or they

are incorporating existing standards or programs into the system?

Mr. SALLE. Again, Mr. Chairman, I can speak to my non-acrossthe-spectrum work that we have done with the DHS, but that was

one of the issues that has been alluded to with the initial draft of

the NRP, was that, you know, you are asking this country and

every emergency manager out there to recreate their plan. So this

will not work.

And, again, the response was, well, apparently you folks are

right, so you tell us how to do it and provide input, and that is

what we did. Beyond that, I am not aware of a situation on behalf

of IACP.

Mr. SHUSTER. Chief, do you have any comments on that?

Mr. BUCKMAN. No.
37

Mr. SHUSTER. That is straightforward enough. I know I do not

have any other questions, and Ms. Norton did not make it back,

unfortunately. I know she had some other business that she had

to attend to.

Seeing there are no further questions, first I will ask unanimous

consent for members to be permitted to submit their statements in

the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

I would also like to thank again each of you for coming here

today and spending your time. It has been very informative. These

committee hearings are to educate us as we move forward and try

to figure out what is really happening in the real world out there.

A lot of times we are getting sometimes a different story. As I said

to the folks that were here from Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security, I think they have done a good job. I

know the time frame has been short, but I still think there needs

to be some work done to improve it.

With that, I ask unanimous consent that the record of today’s

hearing remain open until such time as all the witnesses have provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in

writing; and unanimous consent that during such time as the

record remains open that additional comments offered by individuals or groups may be included in the record of today’s hearing.

Without objection, so ordered.

Again, I want to thank you all very much for traveling here.

Sorry we took so long today, but thanks again. Appreciate it. And

the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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