UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4528

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LAVONTA JONES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:10-cr-00140-RJC-1)

Submitted: March 29, 2012 Decided: April 2, 2012

Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Henderson Hill, Executive Director, Elizabeth A. Blackwood, 

Research and Writhing Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Asheville, North Carolina; Melissa Louise Rikard, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Lavonta Jones pled guilty to possession of a firearm 

by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), and, 

because Jones qualified as an armed career offender under 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (2006), the district court sentenced him to 

the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months’ 

imprisonment. Jones’ attorney has filed a brief in accordance 

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that 

there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning the 

reasonableness of Jones’ sentence. Jones was informed of his 

right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. 

We affirm.

Because Jones did not object to the Guidelines 

calculations in his presentence report, argue for a sentence 

different from the one imposed, or challenge the adequacy of the 

district court’s explanation of its sentencing decision, we 

review it for plain error. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 

577-78 (4th Cir. 2010). Our review of the record reveals no 

procedural error in the district court’s determination of Jones’ 

sentence. The district court properly noted the applicable 

statutory minimum and adopted the proper Guidelines range 

calculations for Jones’ conviction. The district court also 

properly considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

and explained Jones’ sentence in light of this consideration. 
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We next consider the substantive reasonableness of the 

sentence, taking into account the “totality of the 

circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the 

Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). Where, as here, the government has not moved for a 

departure from the Guidelines range due to the defendant’s

substantial assistance, the district court lacks discretion to 

impose a sentence below the statutory minimum. United States v. 

Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the 

imposition of a statutory mandatory minimum sentence is per se 

reasonable. United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th 

Cir. 2008). In Jones’ case, his 180-month sentence was the 

minimum sentence required by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 

Accordingly, we find that the sentence was substantively 

reasonable, and conclude that the district court committed no 

error in its imposition. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Jones. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED