Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 12, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00479-CR

ROBERT ANDREE BAXTER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 180th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1375893

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant, Robert Baxter, waived his right to jury trial and pleaded guilty to 

possession of a controlled substance. He was sentenced by the trial court to 180 

days’ confinement. In one issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by 

denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by indictment with possession of a controlled 

substance. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence he claimed was illegally 

obtained. The parties entered into a Stipulation of Evidence. When viewed in the 

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the evidence reveals the following 

progression of events.

Lt. Crowson of the Houston Police Department observed appellant driving 

from one hotel to another in an area known for narcotics, prostitution, and high 

crime. Appellant was in the company of a known prostitute. Lt. Crowson asked 

the hotel management to identify appellant. Upon inquiry, Lt. Crowson discovered 

appellant had an outstanding municipal warrant, and he called for an unmarked 

unit to observe appellant’s activity. Two plain clothes Houston Police Department 

officers, Nguyen and Ryan, arrived in an unmarked unit. Officers Nguyen and 

Ryan observed appellant’s actions and found them to be consistent with 

involvement in transactions involving narcotics and prostitution. 

Lt. Crowson and Officers Satterwhite and Hartman proceeded to the hotel 

where appellant was located in order to serve the arrest warrant. When appellant 

answered the door, the officers smelled a chemical odor emanating from the room 

“consistent with PCP.” Appellant was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the back 

seat of Officer Satterwhite’s vehicle. Lt. Crowson then called Officers Carroll and 

Duncan to speak with appellant and ask for his consent to search the hotel room. 

Appellant was removed from the back of the vehicle before Officer Duncan 

spoke with him. Officer Duncan advised appellant that the officers were not 

focused on the arrest warrant, and that he would be released if he consented to a 

search of the hotel room and no narcotics were found. Officer Duncan allowed 

appellant to read the consent form and explained that appellant was not required to 
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give his consent. Appellant was asked once to sign the consent form, and the 

conversation regarding consent lasted two to three minutes. None of the other 

police officers asked appellant to sign the form. At no time did any of the officers 

have their weapons drawn, nor did they use force on appellant. Officers Carroll 

and Duncan were approximately three feet from appellant as they spoke with him; 

Lt. Crowson and Officers Satterwhite and Hartman were about 15-20 feet from 

appellant; and Officers Ryan and Nguyen were approximately 15 yards from 

appellant.

The consent form signed by appellant states that he was informed of his 

constitutional right to require that the officers obtain a search warrant and his right 

to voluntarily consent to a search.1 The consent form also recites that appellant 

gave consent “freely and voluntarily and without threats or promises of any kind

and is given with my full and free consent.”

The trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of 

its determination that consent was voluntary. The findings set forth the facts 

outlined above. Specific to consent, the trial court found that police officers 

informed appellant the main purpose of their investigation was to determine if 

there were narcotics in the hotel room and they advised appellant he would be 

released “if he signed the Voluntary Consent for Search and Seizure form and no 

narcotics were found in his hotel room.” (Emphasis in original). The trial court 

further found that appellant was forty-six years old at the time he signed the 

consent form.

The trial court concluded the arrest was lawful, the arresting officers had 

probable cause for the arrest, there was clear and convincing evidence that consent 

was “voluntarily given, positive and unequivocal,” the conditional promise did not 

 

1

The handcuffs were removed to allow appellant to sign the form.
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render the consent invalid, and the evidence obtained pursuant to the lawful search 

was admissible.

II. ANALYSIS

In his sole issue, appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his pre-trial 

motion to suppress. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress 

evidence under a bifurcated standard. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88–89 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1997)). We give almost total deference to the trial court’s 

determination of historical facts that depend on credibility and demeanor. See 

Kelly v. State, 331 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. 

ref’d). Where a trial judge makes express findings of fact, we view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to his ruling and determine whether the evidence supports 

these factual findings. See State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2006). We review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts. See 

Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

Whether a suspect has given voluntary consent to search must be established 

by clear and convincing evidence. See Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 460 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The ultimate question is whether the person’s “will ha[s] 

been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired,” such 

that his consent must have been involuntary. Id. (citing United States v. Watson, 

423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)). The trial court must 

review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement of consent to 

determine whether consent was voluntary. 

The consent to search must be positive and unequivocal and not the product 

of duress or coercion either express or implied. See Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 

813, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Voluntariness is determined by a consideration 
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of the following factors: the defendant’s age, education, and intelligence; the 

length of detention; any constitutional advice given to appellant; the repetitiveness 

of questioning; and the use of physical punishment. Id.; see also Cadoree v. State, 

331 S.W.3d 514, 520 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). 

The standard is objective reasonableness—what the typical reasonable 

person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the 

suspect. See Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). An 

officer’s testimony that consent was given voluntarily can be evidence sufficient to 

establish that the consent was voluntary. See Johnson v. State, 226 S.W.3d 439, 

443 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Appellant argues consent was not voluntary because the State proffered no 

evidence at the hearing addressing his intelligence or education; there were several 

officers present; appellant was arrested and handcuffed; he did not receive

Miranda warnings;

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and he was promised he would be released from custody if no 

drugs were found in his hotel room. Yet, in the Stipulation of Evidence, appellant 

does not contend he was unable to read the consent form, and his signature appears 

on the form. There is no evidence of any coercion, threats, or harassment by the 

police officers. Appellant’s statement that he could see the officers in the room 

before he signed the consent form did not constitute evidence of such factors. 

Finally, appellant’s assertion that he was “coerced” into signing the consent form 

because he was “promised” he would be released is inconsistent with the officers’ 

statements that he was “promised” he would be released only if no narcotics were 

discovered. The trial court’s finding stated: 

Officer Duncan informed the Defendant that the main purpose of the 

investigation was to determine whether the Defendant had narcotics in 

 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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his hotel room, stating that the municipal warrant was not their focus, 

and that the Defendant would be released if he signed the Voluntary 

Consent for Search and Seizure form and no narcotics were found in 

his hotel room. 

(Emphasis in original).

We afford great deference to the trial court’s factual finding believing the 

officer’s testimony. See Cadoree, 331 S.W.3d at 519 (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d 

at 89).

Viewing the record and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable 

to the trial court’s ruling, we conclude the record contains clear and convincing 

evidence supporting the trial court’s ruling that appellant’s consent was voluntary. 

See Reasor, 12 S.W.3d at 818; see also Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 654 (concluding 

defendant’s consent was voluntary even though in he was in custody and not 

provided Miranda warnings).

We overrule appellant’s sole issue and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ John Donovan

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Donovan.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).