[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-14531

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00256-RWS

MOLLIE H INGMIRE, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TARGET CORPORATION, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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 (May 29, 2013)

Before CARNES, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Mollie Ingmire appeals the dismissal of her employment discrimination 

complaint against Target Corporation as time-barred. In March 2011, Ingmire 

voluntarily dismissed a previous complaint alleging employment discrimination 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), and 

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 

623(a), 626(c), as well as asserting various state law claims. Ingmire filed the 

present complaint nearly six months later, on September 20, 2011, alleging 

substantially the same claims. On appeal, Ingmire argues that her second 

complaint was timely filed within the applicable 90-day limitations period, because 

she properly renewed her initial, timely filed complaint within 6 months as 

permitted under the Georgia renewal statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61. After careful 

review, we affirm.

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting the 

allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). Similarly,

when the appellant raises a question of law, we review the issue de novo. Phillips 

v. United States, 260 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2001). A party abandons all 

issues on appeal not plainly and prominently raised in the initial brief. United 

States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003).

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We look to state law to determine a limitations period for a federal cause of 

action “only when Congress has failed to provide a statute of limitations.” Phillips, 

260 F.3d at 1318 (quotations omitted). Federal statutory law provides for a 90-day 

limitations period for a claim under the ADEA, which runs from the date of the 

plaintiff’s receipt of a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e); 

Kerr v. McDonald’s Corp., 427 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2005). The ADA also 

provides for a 90-day statute of limitations, as it expressly incorporates the 

enforcement mechanisms contained in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. See 42 

U.S.C. § 12117(a); see also Zillyette v. Capital One Financial Corp., 179 F.3d 

1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999).

Georgia law provides for the renewal of a case that has previously been 

dismissed, allowing for a new complaint to be filed outside of the applicable 

statute of limitations, so long as it is filed within six months of the original 

dismissal. See O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61. In Phillips, we held that § 9-2-61 did not apply 

to extend the limitations period for causes of action brought under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act (“FTCA”). 260 F.3d at 1317, 1319. We reasoned that Congress 

established the statute of limitations for FTCA claims to ensure uniformity, and the 

incorporation of diverse state renewal provisions would undermine the uniform 

application of the limitations period. Id. at 1319.

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As applied here, Congress has established a 90-day limitations period for 

claims under both the ADA and ADEA, so Georgia’s relevant limitations period is 

inapplicable. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); Kerr, 427 F.3d at 951; 

Phillips, 260 F.3d at 1318; Zillyette, 179 F.3d at 1339. As in Phillips, the 

application of the Georgia renewal statute and other state renewal statutes would 

undermine the uniformity intended by Congress’s adoption of the 90-day 

limitations period for filing claims under the ADA and ADEA. See 260 F.3d at 

1319. Furthermore, Ingmire has abandoned any appeal of her state law claims by 

failing to address them in her brief. Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1283 n.8. Accordingly, 

we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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