22-6107

Singh v. Garland

BIA

Lurye, IJ

A202 144 088

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 

Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of May, two thousand twentyfour. 

PRESENT: 

REENA RAGGI,

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

BETH ROBINSON,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

DALJIT SINGH, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 22-6107 

 NAC 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 
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FOR PETITIONER: Jana Junuz, Esq., Law Offices of Jana Junuz, 

P.C., S. Richmond Hill, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General; Kohsei Ugumori, Senior 

Litigation Counsel; Krishana Patel, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 

Petitioner Daljit Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a 

decision of the BIA affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying 

his application for asylum under § 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

(“INA”), withholding of removal under § 241 of the INA, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Daljit Singh, No. A202 144 088 (B.I.A. 

Feb. 8, 2022), aff’g No. A202 144 088 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 12, 2018). We 

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. 

We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions, including the 

portions of the IJ’s decision not explicitly discussed by the BIA. See Yun-Zui Guan 

v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 
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(2d Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s factual findings, including an adverse 

credibility determination “under the substantial evidence standard,” and we 

review questions of law and the application of fact to law de novo. Hong Fei Gao 

v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]he administrative findings of fact 

are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude 

to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a 

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or 

responsiveness of the applicant . . . , the consistency between the applicant’s or 

witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under 

oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), 

the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements 

with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such 

statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 

goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from 

the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could 

make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 
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167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Here, substantial evidence 

supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. 

The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Singh’s written 

and oral statements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). First, Singh’s written and 

oral statements were inconsistent as to when the police pushed his father versus 

when they slapped his father. When confronted with the inconsistency, Singh 

simply repeated the testimony that was inconsistent with his own affidavit as well 

as statements from his father and a neighbor. His explanation that he used the 

terms pushed and slapped interchangeably is not compelling because he used 

distinct terms in describing the incidents in his affidavit. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 

430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible 

explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate 

that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Second, Singh’s testimony and documentary 

evidence was inconsistent regarding whether a neighbor went to the village elders 

on his behalf. The agency was not compelled to accept Singh’s multiple, 

competing explanations for this inconsistency. See id. Third, Singh was 

inconsistent regarding who went to the police on his behalf. And the IJ was not 
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required to accept his explanation that he had suffered from memory issues since 

childhood, as he had no medical evidence and he claimed that his memory failed 

only when confronted with inconsistencies. Id.

This adverse credibility determination is bolstered by the IJ’s finding that 

Singh’s allegations of memory and competency problems were indicative of 

evasiveness. We give “particular deference” to that finding because the IJ is “in 

the best position to evaluate whether apparent problems in the witness’s

testimony suggest a lack of credibility or, rather, can be attributed to an innocent 

cause such as difficulty understanding the question.” Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006). As noted above, Singh had no evidence of 

medical or memory problems, and he did not have problems recalling details and 

answering questions on direct examination.

Finally, the IJ reasonably determined that Singh’s documentary evidence 

merited minimal weight and failed to rehabilitate his claim or otherwise satisfy his 

burden of proof. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may 

bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an 

applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into 

question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency 
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reasonably gave minimal weight to the affidavits because they contained 

information that conflicted with Singh’s own testimony, the declarants were not 

available for cross-examination, and some of the declarants were interested 

parties. Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020) (deferring to IJ’s decision 

to accord “little weight” to letters from declarants who were “interested parties” 

and not available for cross-examination); Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 

2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded 

an applicant’s documentary evidence.”). 

Taken together, the inconsistencies, the IJ’s demeanor finding, and the lack 

of consistent and reliable documentary evidence provide substantial evidence for 

the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145 n.8 

(“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude [a non-citizen] from showing that 

an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so 

preclude even more forcefully.”); Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 77 (noting that agency 

may rely on “cumulative effect” of minor discrepancies (quoting Xiu Xia Lin, 534 

F.3d at 167)); Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. The adverse credibility determination is 

dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three 

forms of relief were based on the same facts. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. 
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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court