Filed 8/27/21 In re J.A. CA4/1

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re J.A., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

 D078876

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (San Diego County

 Super. Ct. No. J519822B)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Marian F. Gaston, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with 

directions. 

Marisa L. Dersey Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant. 
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Lonnie J. Eldridge, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel, and Lisa M. Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent. 

A.A. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to 

her child, J.A., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. 

A.A. contends the juvenile court erroneously found the Indian Child Welfare 

Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) did not apply. Counsel for Mother and 

the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency, 

collectively the parties) have conferred and agree that the Agency’s 

investigation under the ICWA was inadequate. The parties have filed a joint 

stipulation seeking a limited reversal and remand with directions to the 

Agency and the juvenile court to ensure compliance with the ICWA. We 

accept the stipulation and conditionally reverse the order terminating 

parental rights. 

DISCUSSION

Mother submitted an ICWA-020 form in October 2019 indicating that 

she had no Indian ancestry. Father then submitted an ICWA-020 form in 

November 2019 indicating that he, too, did not have Indian ancestry. On 

February 6, 2020, the juvenile court held that reasonable inquiry had been 

made to determine whether J.A. is an Indian Child and found that it had 

reason to know that J.A. is not an Indian child. 

On or around February 2021, the Agency learned that the paternal 

grandmother was claiming Native American heritage with the Cherokee 

Nation. When Father was asked about this, he denied such heritage and 

stated that, if there was any Indian ancestry, it would be “little to none.” 

There is no indication in the record that the Agency conducted any further 

inquiry. 
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At the contested hearing in March 2021, the Agency informed the 

juvenile court about the paternal grandmother’s claim of Indian heritage and 

stated that it “has since conducted further investigation and has found that 

there is no further information that would lead the court to believe ICWA 

would apply.” Based thereon, the juvenile court confirmed its previous 

finding that the ICWA does not apply “as there is no reason to believe that 

[J.A.] may be an Indian child.”

Before reversing or vacating a judgment based upon a stipulation of the 

parties, an appellate court must find “both of the following: [¶] (A) There is 

no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be 

adversely affected by the reversal. [¶] (B) The reasons of the parties for 

requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from 

the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated 

reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 128, subd. (a)(8).) 

The present case involves reversible error because the parties agree, 

and we concur, that the Agency failed to comply with the ICWA’s inquiry 

requirement and related California provisions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

5.481(a)(4); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1 et seq.) Because this case would be 

subject to reversal to permit compliance with the ICWA and corresponding 

California statutes and rules absent the parties’ stipulation, a stipulated 

remand advances the interests identified by Code of Civil Procedure section 

128, subdivision (a)(8). (See In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376, 

379–382.) 

DISPOSITION

The March 18, 2021 order terminating parental rights under Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 366.26 is conditionally reversed and the matter 
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is remanded with directions for the juvenile court to order the Agency to 

make a proper inquiry into possible Indian ancestry in J.A.’s paternal lineage 

to ensure compliance with the ICWA and related state statutes and rules. If, 

after further inquiry, the Agency obtains information showing a reason to 

know that J.A. is an Indian child, the juvenile court must provide notice in 

accordance with ICWA. If the juvenile court finds that J.A. is an Indian 

child, it shall proceed in conformity with the ICWA. If the court finds that 

J.A. is not an Indian child, the order terminating parental rights shall be 

reinstated. In all other respects, the order is affirmed. The remittitur shall 

issue forthwith. 

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

GUERRERO, J.