NO. 07-10-00212-CV 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL B 

APRIL 29, 2011 

REBECCA TERRELL AND 

CHANDRASHEKHAR THANEDAR, APPELLANTS 

v. 

PAMPA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, APPELLANT 

 FROM THE 223RD DISTRICT COURT OF GRAY COUNTY; 

NO. 35621; HONORABLE LEE WATERS, JUDGE 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

OPINION 

Appellants, Rebecca Terrell and Chandrashekhar Thanedar,1

 are appealing the 

granting of a summary judgment in favor of PISD, Pampa Independent School District, 

regarding appellants’ action alleging violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act 

(TOMA)2

 and a request to void all actions of PISD taken as a result of alleged illegal 

meetings. We will reverse and remand. 

 1 Appellants are husband and wife.

2 See TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. §§ 551.001-.146 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
2 

Factual and Procedural Background 

Appellant Terrell was a first-year teacher in the PISD whose probationary 

contract of employment was terminated by action of the PISD School Board on March 

26, 2009. On May 29, 2009, appellants filed their original petition alleging numerous 

violations of TOMA and requesting that the trial court issue a temporary restraining 

order against PISD, issue a temporary and permanent injunction against PISD, and 

enter an order declaring that all meetings of the School Board held between certain 

specified dates to be void and that all actions taken by the School Board at those 

meetings to be void, specifically identifying the termination of Terrell’s employment. 

Further, appellants requested that the trial court enter a writ of mandamus ordering the 

School Board to reinstate Terrell. Appellants requested an unspecified amount of 

damages, costs of court, and attorneys fees. PISD duly filed an answer to the 

allegations contained in appellants’ original petition. 

Appellants obtained a setting for a hearing on the application for a temporary 

injunction and, in connection with the setting, caused to be issued a subpoena duces 

tecum for PISD employee, Karen Linder. PISD filed an objection to the subpoena 

duces tecum and to certain of the documents requested. Appellants subsequently filed 

a motion to “show cause and strike defendant’s original answer.” The trial court granted 

PISD’s objections to the subpoena duces tecum and denied appellants’ motion to show 

cause and strike PISD’s original answer by order dated June 10, 2009. After the trial 

court refused to enter a temporary restraining order, appellants requested the trial court 

to vacate a setting on the temporary injunction. 
3 

On June 15, 2009, appellants filed a traditional motion for summary judgment 

and a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a; 166a(i). 

After PISD had filed a response to the motions, appellants subsequently filed objections 

to PISD’s summary judgment evidence. The trial court denied appellants’ motion for 

summary judgment by order dated October 12, 2009. Appellants then filed a motion 

requesting the trial court to reconsider its ruling on the summary judgment and to enter 

a ruling on appellants’ objections to PISD’s summary judgment evidence. The trial court 

denied both the motion to reconsider and the objections to PISD’s summary judgment 

evidence by order dated December 23, 2009. On that same day, PISD filed a traditional 

and no-evidence motion for summary judgment. On May 14, 2010, the trial court 

granted PISD’s motion for summary judgment without specifying upon which ground the 

motion was granted. 

Appellants appeal the order of the trial court, asserting an extensive number of 

reasons why the trial court’s judgment was in error. The issues presented may be 

broken down into allegations that the trial court erred in not finding that PISD violated 

the provisions of TOMA regarding: 1) posting of notice of meetings, 2) requirements for 

specificity in the notice of meetings and the place of the meetings, 3) internet posting 

provisions, 4) requirement that all deliberations of the type involved be held in a public 

meeting, 5) allegations that the notices posted were not posted by a person with 

authority to post notices of meetings. In addition to the alleged violations of TOMA, 

appellants allege that the trial court erred in: 6) ruling on various objections to some of 

PISD’s summary judgment evidence, 7) in granting PISD’s motion for summary 

judgment, and 8) in denying appellants’ motion for summary judgment. Because one of 
4 

the issues appellants raise regarding violations of TOMA is dispositive of this matter, we 

will address it first. 

Standard of Review 

We review the granting or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo. 

See Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). When both 

parties file a motion for summary judgment, as in this case, and one is granted and one 

is denied then we, as the reviewing court, must determine all questions presented and 

render the judgment that should have been rendered by the trial court. See HCBeck, 

Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349, 352 (Tex. 2009). 

Internet Posting of Notices 

TOMA requires a school district, among other governmental bodies, to 

concurrently post notice of a School Board meeting on the school district’s internet 

website. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.056(b) (West 2010).3 Section 551.056 provides 

that a good faith attempt to comply with the requirements is not affected when the 

failure to comply with the requirement is due to a technical problem beyond the control 

of the school district. § 551.056(d). 

The record before us clearly demonstrates that, for the period of time between 

January 15, 2009, and May 19, 2009, the notices of the School Board meetings could 

not have been posted on the PISD website. Further, summary judgment evidence 

proves that the failure to post was due to a cutting of the link between the software 

 3 Further references to the Texas Government Code Annotated will be by 

reference to “section ___”, “Section ___” or “§ ____.”
5 

program used to post the notices, BoardBook, and the website. PISD contends, 

through Linder’s affidavit, that, although the link was cut to the website, the notices 

continued to be posted as required. They simply did not appear on the website. 

According to PISD’s theory, the failure to post was due to a technical problem 

beyond its control and, therefore, PISD’s failure to post is excused under the good faith 

exception of the statute. Appellants, however, contend that the missing notices, when 

produced by PISD, reflect that they were “created” not around the time of the original 

meeting, but after PISD was notified of the failure of the connection between the 

software and the website. Under appellants’ theory, this summary judgment evidence 

establishes a material fact issue regarding the good faith attempt of PISD to post the 

notices on its website as required by the statute. See § 551.056(d). 

A review of the summary judgment evidence does, indeed, reflect that the 

notices in question show to have been “created” after PISD was notified of the failure to 

post the required website notices. Neither party offered any summary judgment 

evidence as to what the term “created,” as it appears under the properties tab of the 

notice, means. Both parties have opined as to what it means. Appellants contend it 

means the notices were not prepared and entered until after the notification that PISD 

had failed to post notices of the School Board meetings as required. PISD contends 

“created” means the date the particular notice was printed for delivery to appellants. 

We, however, have no evidence to support either interpretation. 

In our analysis of the summary judgment under the de novo standard of review, 

evidence favorable to appellants must be taken as true and every reasonable inference 
6 

must be indulged in favor of appellants. See Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 

185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005). Accordingly, we find that there is a material fact 

issue about whether PISD actually attempted to post the notices and, therefore, met the 

good faith exception to the requirement to concurrently post notices of the School Board 

meetings on its website. 

PISD argues that this case is similar to the allegations in Argyle Indep. Sch. Dist. 

v. Wolf in which the Fort Worth court determined that there was no evidence of bad faith 

on the part of the school district. See 234 S.W.3d 229, 248-49 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 

2007, no pet.). However, in Argyle the parties had a stipulation of evidence that the 

webmaster had, in fact, received the notice of the meeting in question and attempted to 

post the same on the school district’s website. See id. at 248. Further, the parties 

stipulated that the failure of the notice to appear was beyond the control of the school 

district and the problem was corrected a few hours before the meeting. See id. The 

evidence in Argyle is factually distinguishable from the summary judgment evidence in 

this case and does not control our disposition of this matter. 

Conclusion 

Because the issue of concurrently posting notices on the PISD’s website involves 

a genuine issue of material fact not established as a matter of law, we reverse the 

judgment of the trial court. We remand this matter for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

 Mackey K. Hancock 

 Justice