UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ TROY L. THOMPSON, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. JUDGE KAREN ROMEO, Fifth Judicial District of Colorado; JOSEPH PICCINETTI, Clerk, Fifth Judicial District of Colorado; JUDGE EDWARD CASIAS, Fifth Judicial District of Colorado; FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF COLORADO; SENIOR JUDGE THOMAS OSSOLA, ✝ Fifth Judicial District of Colorado; JUDGE JEFFREY D. WAIT, Family Court of NY, Defendants - Appellees. No. 17-1384 (D.C. No. 1:17- CV-02040-LTB) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , MATHESON , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________

✝ The caption in this case misspells Judge Thomas Ossola’s name. It has been corrected here and in the body of this order and judgment.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 20, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Plaintiff-Appellant Troy L. Thompson pursues this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and other Supreme Court “precedents.” 1 Thompson challenges Colorado stat e court proceedings regarding the dissolution of his marriage and allocation of parental rights in a parenting plan, as well as a Colorado state court order vacati ng findings of contempt against his exwife. Under the parenting plan, Thompson’s ex-wife and children relocated to the State of New York. Thompson also chal lenges New York state court proceedings regarding the same. On September 28, 2017, the district court dismissed Thom pson’s claims for lack of jurisdiction and entered judgment . The district court concluded that Thompson’s suit is subject to dismissal under the: (i) Younger, a nd/or (ii) RookerFeldman abstention doctrines. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see also Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Alte rnatively, if the district court had jurisdiction, the court held that the complaint would be dismissed nonetheless, as the named defendants—Judges Karen Romeo, Edward Casias, Thomas Ossola, and Jeffery D. Wait—are absolutely immune from suit for acti ons taken in their judicial capacity, and the remaining defendants are immune under the Eleventh Amendment. Thompson timely appeals. Exercising ju risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

1 Thompson lists, among others, Oberge fell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).3 I Thompson—appearing pro se —seems to raise two issues on appeal. See Aplt. Br., at 1–3 (noting “point[s]” 1 and 2). First, Thompson ar gues that defendants in the State of Colorado have engaged in “extr eme dishonesty and corruption,” attempting “to knowingly thwart justice.” Id. at 1. Here, Thompson clai ms defendants have, among others, (i) “cause[d]” him to have a “run-in with law en forcement . . . to weaken [his] position in cour t”; (ii) “altere[d]” a “maili ng list,” so his ex-wife “did not receive notice” of contem pt hearings; and (iii) late r “altered the mailing list” again, but this time “so that [he] was not notified of important j udicial acts.” Id. Next, Thompson takes issue with the Co lorado state court’s grant of his exwife’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction to the family court of Warren County, New York. See id. The Colorado state court relinquished juri sdiction more than two years after Thompson’s ex-wife relocated with th e children, and upon de termining it was in the best interest of the ch ildren. See ROA, at 56. Here, Thompson details alleged wrongs that he has suffered as a result. Thompson contends that “just as” the Co lorado state court judges had “hoped,” the New York state court desire d “to maintain the status quo,” resulting in a “sham” hearing, which “allow[ed] [his ex-wife] to continue . . . brainwashing . . . the children and keep [him] out of their lives.” Aplt. Br ., at 2. Thompson further believes justice is not being served, as New York state cour t Judge Wait “refuses to hold contempt of court trials against [his] ex[-wife] for . . . vacated contempt [findi ngs] in [C]olorado.” Id. at 3. Thompson also dislikes that New York state cour ts disallow telephonic4 appearances. Id. Finally, Thompson claims that the New York state court “assigned an attorney to the children,” who spoke “to the[m] about the case and litigation,” which was “against . . . Colorado orders.” Id. The relief Thompson seeks from us is to “order th e Colorado and New York law and or agreements and the respective cour ts to conform to Article 4 clause 2 of the U.S. constitution and conform to Brown v. Board of [E]duca tion and other cases that clarify the meaning of the U.S. c onstitution.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
II The district court dismissed this case fo r lack of subject ma tter jurisdiction, concluding Thompson’s claims are barred by the Younger and/or Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrines. 2 We agree. To the extent that state court proceed ings are pending, th e district court correctly applied Younger. Under the Y ounger abstention doctrine, “a federal court [must] abstain from hearing a case where . . . (1) state judici al proceedings are ongoing; (2) state proceedings implicate an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings offer an adequate opportunity to litigate federal cons titutional issues.” Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Stovall, 3 41 F.3d 1202, 1204 (10t h Cir. 2003). Of course, the state proceedings at issue in this case implicate important state interests: “[t]he whole subject of dom estic relations of husband a nd wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not th e laws of the United St ates.” Akenbrandt

2 Our review is de novo. Woodmen of World Life Ins. So c’y v. Manganaro, 342 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2003).5 v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 692 (1992) (q uoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890)); see Morkel v. Davis, 513 F. App’ x 724, 728 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (“This court and other circuits have consistently applied Younger to child custody cases.” (collecting cases)). And, Thom pson does not allege facts to support any contention that the state pro ceedings do not allow an ade quate opportunity to litigate federal constitutional issues (nor does he allege any cogn izable federal constitutional claims). To the extent that state court proceedings have conc luded, the district court correctly applied the Rook er-Feldman doctrine. Under the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine, “a party losing in st ate court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate re view of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994). Thompson argues that his fe deral civil rights have been violated by state court proceedings and orders. If st ate court matters have conc luded, the district court correctly noted, for Thompson to prevail, it “would have to review, and ultimately reject, the state determinations .” ROA, at 90. However, the district court properly held, it “lack[s] jurisdicti on to adjudicate claims seek ing review of state court judgments.” Id. at 89; see Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006) (“ Rooker–Feldman precludes federal district courts from effectively exercising appellate jurisdiction over claims ‘actually decided by a state court’ and claims ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a prior state-court judgment.”) (citation6 omitted). Review of stat e court rulings should be pur sued through the appellate courts of the involved state and not th rough a § 1983 action in federal court.
III We therefore affirm the district court.

Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge