a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

August 2005 NASA TRAVEL

Passenger Aircraft 

Services Annually 

Cost Taxpayers 

Millions More Than 

Commercial Airlines

GAO-05-818
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-818.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gregory Kutz at 

(202) 512-9505 or kutzg@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-818, a report to the 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

August 2005

NASA TRAVEL

Passenger Aircraft Services Annually 

Cost Taxpayers Millions More Than 

Commercial Airlines 

NASA-owned and -chartered passenger aircraft services provide a perquisite 

to employees, but cost taxpayers an estimated five times more than flying on 

commercial airlines. While the majority of NASA air travel is on commercial 

airlines, NASA employees took at least 1,188 flights using NASA passenger 

aircraft services during fiscal years 2003 and 2004. 

Example of NASA Passenger Aircraft 

Source: NASA.

Use of NASA passenger aircraft services can save time, provide more 

flexibility to meet senior executives’ schedules, and provide other less 

tangible and quantifiable benefits. However, GAO’s analysis of available 

reported data related to NASA passenger aircraft services during fiscal years 

2003 and 2004 showed NASA reported costs were nearly $25 million 

compared with estimated commercial airline coach transportation costs of 

about $5 million. Further, this relative cost comparison, based on available 

NASA reported costs, did not take into account all applicable types of costs 

associated with its passenger aircraft services, including, for example, 

depreciation associated with the estimated $14 million NASA paid in 2001 to 

acquire several aircraft used for passenger transportation. Consequently, 

NASA’s passenger air transportation services are much more costly than 

indicated by available data. Further, NASA is currently considering 

additional expenditures of about $77 million to upgrade and expand its 

existing passenger fleet. 

NASA’s ownership of aircraft used to provide passenger transportation 

conflicts with federal policy allowing agencies to own aircraft only as 

needed to meet specified mission requirements, such as prisoner 

transportation and aeronautical research. GAO’s analysis of NASA 

passenger aircraft flights for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 showed that an 

estimated 86 percent—about seven out of every eight flights—were taken to 

support routine business operations specifically prohibited by federal policy 

regarding aircraft ownership, including routine site visits, meetings, 

speeches, and conferences. Further, agencywide oversight and management 

of its passenger aircraft services was not effective. NASA’s ability to make 

informed decisions on continued ownership of its passenger aircraft fleet 

and on flight-by-flight justifications was impaired by the lack of reliable 

agencywide data on aircraft costs and other weak management oversight 

practices. 

Since its creation, the National 

Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) has 

operated passenger aircraft 

services. These operations have 

been questioned in several prior 

audit reports. GAO was asked to 

perform a series of audits of 

NASA’s controls to prevent fraud, 

waste, and abuse of taxpayer 

dollars. In this audit, GAO 

assessed (1) the relative cost of 

NASA passenger aircraft services in 

comparison with commercial costs, 

(2) whether NASA aircraft services 

were retained and operated in 

accordance with governmentwide 

guidance, and (3) the effectiveness 

of NASA’s oversight and 

management of this program. 

What GAO Recommends

Because NASA management has 

been largely unresponsive to 

similar prior recommendations, 

this report includes a matter for 

congressional consideration 

concerning legislation to restrict 

NASA’s ownership of passenger 

aircraft and funding for passenger 

aircraft services to those needed 

solely to meet valid mission 

requirements. To the extent 

Congress determines NASA should 

retain passenger aircraft services, 

GAO makes recommendations to 

improve program management. 

NASA concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations and outlined 

various planned actions. 

Depending on NASA actions, 

additional congressional action 

may also be needed. 
Page i GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

NASA Passenger Aircraft Costs Are Substantially More Than 

Commercial Airline Costs 13

NASA Passenger Aircraft Ownership to Support Routine Business 

Not Justified 16

Ineffective Oversight and Management of Passenger Aircraft 

Services 24

Conclusions 33

Matters for Congressional Consideration 34

Recommendations 34

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 37

Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 43

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44

Tables Table 1: Comparison of Commercial and NASA Passenger 

Transportation Costs by Location or Charter Provider for 

Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 14

Table 2: Summary of Examples of Routine Business Flights Using 

NASA Passenger Aircraft during Fiscal Years 2003-2004 21

Table 3: Examples of Passenger Flights Not Included in 

Submissions NASA Certified as Complete 27

Figures Figure 1: Overview of NASA-Owned Passenger Aircraft Type and 

Location 8

Figure 2: Percentage of NASA Passenger Aircraft Flights by 

Purpose 19

Figure 3: Percentage of NASA Passenger Aircraft Flights by 

Purpose (Excluding Flights Related to the Columbia 

Accident) 20

Figure 4: Overview of NASA Methodology for Comparing Its 

Flight-by-Flight Variable Costs with Commercial Flight 

Costs 30
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

August 26, 2005 Letr

The Honorable Susan M. Collins

Chairman

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

United States Senate

Since its creation in 1958, the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) has owned and operated a small fleet of aircraft to 

provide passenger transportation. These aircraft are in addition to 

approximately 80 aircraft that NASA reported using in its research and 

development and program support operations. NASA also contracted with 

charter carriers or had interagency agreements with other federal agencies 

to obtain additional passenger air transportation services. Collectively, 

these NASA-owned and -chartered aircraft constitute NASA’s passenger 

aircraft services. 

As we have previously reported, NASA is now contending with urgent fiscal 

challenges pressuring discretionary spending—requiring it to do more with 

fewer resources--as it seeks to carry out its new vision for space 

exploration.1

 In this context, you asked us to focus on controls to prevent 

wasteful or abusive activity with respect to resources allocated to NASA’s 

passenger aircraft services. In general, federal policy provides that 

agencies should operate aircraft only as necessary to meet mission 

requirements, such as prisoner transportation or aeronautical research. 

Federal agencies’ use of aircraft has been the subject of numerous audit 

reports over the years, including a 1977 GAO report2

 that concluded that 

agencies should determine whether aircraft are “essential or merely nice to 

have” and whether essential work could not be accomplished some 

1

GAO, Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain Its Workforce 

through Retirement, GAO-05-230 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2005).

2

GAO, Improvements Are Needed in Managing Aircraft Used By Federal Agencies, LCD77-430 (Washington, D.C: Dec. 22, 1977).
Page 2 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

cheaper way. In this regard, you requested that our audit address (1) the 

relative cost of NASA passenger aircraft services compared with 

commercial coach costs, (2) whether NASA’s retention and operation of 

aircraft for passenger transportation was in accordance with applicable 

governmentwide guidance, and (3) the effectiveness of NASA’s oversight 

and management of its passenger aircraft services. 

To determine and assess the relative costs of NASA’s passenger aircraft 

with comparable commercial airline costs, we relied primarily on available 

NASA cost data. However, wherever feasible we validated NASA’s cost 

data with comparable independent data sources, including industry data 

from the manufacturers of both the Gulfstream and Beechcraft aircraft 

NASA used to provide passenger transportation services. Specifically, we 

validated the cost estimates used in our analysis with cost metrics the 

manufacturers reported related to their aircraft. In addition, because 

NASA did not maintain centralized agencywide data, we obtained available 

flight-by-flight NASA passenger aircraft cost and usage data from source 

documents maintained at NASA centers and compiled the information into 

our database of agencywide information. We did not attempt to determine 

the validity or appropriateness of the travel, nor did we assess whether the 

type and number of personnel using NASA passenger aircraft services were 

appropriate given the stated flight purposes. 

Further, while our audit focused on overall management controls in place 

to prevent waste concerning NASA’s passenger aircraft services, it was not 

designed to, nor did it include, investigations of any specific instances of 

potentially abusive activity associated with travel on NASA’s passenger 

aircraft. Nonetheless, based on our work, it is clear NASA’s current policies 

and practices result in significant waste of taxpayer funds. Furthermore, 

given the weaknesses we found in the agency’s controls over its passenger 

aircraft services, significant abuse of such services is possible. As a result, 

we are planning a separate forensic audit and investigative review in this 

regard and will report separately when it is completed. Further details on 

our scope and methodology are included in appendix I. We performed our 

work from November 2004 through June 2005 in accordance with U.S. 

generally accepted government auditing standards and our investigative 

work in accordance with investigative standards prescribed by the 

President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. We received written 

comments on a draft of this report from the NASA Administrator which are 

reprinted in appendix II. 
Page 3 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Results in Brief NASA’s passenger aircraft services—including aircraft owned by NASA and 

chartered through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the 

Department of Defense (DOD), and private charter services—cost 

taxpayers at least five times more per passenger than flying on commercial 

airlines. While the majority of NASA air travel is carried out using 

commercial airlines, NASA-provided data showed that NASA employees 

took at least 1,188 flights using NASA passenger aircraft services during 

fiscal years 2003 and 2004. 

An analysis of available data on the cost of these NASA passenger aircraft 

flights showed NASA passenger aircraft services were about $20 million 

more costly than comparable commercial coach ticket costs. Costs 

associated with NASA’s passenger aircraft services were in the order of $25 

million, while commercial coach tickets for the same number of travelers 

would have been approximately $5 million. This cost comparison is based 

primarily on available NASA cost reporting. However, NASA’s passenger 

air transportation services are much more costly than reported because 

NASA’s cost reporting did not take into account all costs applicable to 

NASA’s passenger transportation services, including costs associated with 

acquiring NASA’s existing fleet of passenger aircraft, liability insurance 

costs, and costs associated with capital improvement. For example, NASA 

aircraft costs disclosed in its annual reporting did not reflect depreciation 

associated with NASA’s 2001 aircraft acquisition of at least $13.9 million. 

Further, NASA’s costs of owning and operating passenger aircraft may 

increase significantly in the near future with about $77 million that it is 

considering spending to upgrade and expand its passenger aircraft fleet. 

These costs include costs associated with new aircraft to replace its 

existing aging fleet and installation of noise abatement packages. If NASA 

incurs these additional passenger transportation service costs, the extent 

to which NASA’s passenger air transportation service costs exceed 

commercial costs will increase further in the near term. 

While costly, using NASA-owned and -chartered passenger aircraft provides 

a perquisite to NASA employees. Passenger aircraft services can save 

NASA employees’ time, afford greater flexibility in meeting senior 

executives’ schedules, and provide opportunities for other less tangible and 

quantifiable benefits over using commercial airlines. Interviewed 

passengers stated that, while the travel could have been completed using 

commercial airlines, travel on NASA-owned or -chartered aircraft avoided 

airport delays and facilitated conducting NASA business while in-flight.
Page 4 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Further, NASA’s ownership of aircraft to provide passenger transportation 

supporting routine business operations is not consistent with OMB policy 

guidance.3

 OMB’s governmentwide guidance directs agencies to acquire 

and retain only the number and size aircraft needed to meet direct mission 

requirements (such as counter-narcotics activities, troop transportation, 

and aeronautical research). OMB’s guidance expressly provides that 

routine site visits, meetings, conferences, and speeches are not within its 

definition of mission-required activities. In contrast, while NASA’s 

implementing guidance reiterates the OMB policy prohibition on using 

aircraft supporting routine business operations as a basis for continuing 

aircraft ownership, its guidance also provides that mission-required use of 

aircraft includes support for activities “directly related to approved NASA 

programs or projects.” This guidance has been interpreted to allow 

acquiring and retaining aircraft for any official travel related to NASA’s 

programs or projects, regardless of whether the travel was mission 

required.

Our analysis of available documentation on flight purposes shows that 

NASA’s implementation of the provision in its guidance related to using 

aircraft in direct program or project support is inconsistent with OMB 

policy against owning aircraft to support meetings, conferences, and 

speeches. Specifically, our analysis of NASA passenger air transportation 

services for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 showed that about 86 percent of the 

flights were taken to support the types of routine business operations 

expressly prohibited by OMB’s guidance for aircraft ownership. In effect, 

NASA’s implementation of its guidance has resulted in NASA owning 

aircraft to provide passenger transportation for any purpose related to 

NASA programs or projects, regardless of whether it could have been as 

efficiently and effectively carried out using commercial airline services.

With respect to oversight of its passenger aircraft services, NASA lacked 

agencywide data on costs and usage. This limited the agency’s ability to 

provide complete, reliable cost and usage data to NASA top leadership and 

congressional decision makers for consideration in decisions on acquiring, 

operating, and retaining aircraft in support of direct mission requirements. 

Because all applicable agencywide costs associated with NASA’s passenger 

aircraft services are not accumulated and visible to agency managers for 

day-to-day decision making, NASA program directorates requesting use of 

3

 OMB Circular No. A-126 (Revised), Improving the Management and Use of Government 

Aircraft (May 22, 1992).
Page 5 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

the aircraft may consider them as a “free” resource because the costs are 

not directly assessed against their budgets. 

Because NASA did not maintain agencywide data on passenger aircraft 

usage and costs for day-to-day management, we attempted to develop our 

own database capturing available NASA data on the costs and purposes of 

flights taken using NASA passenger aircraft services during fiscal years 

2003 and 2004. However, while NASA certified to us that it provided 

complete data on all passenger flights, a comparison with FAA records 

showed that NASA records were missing data on 97 passenger flights. 

Further, our database did not include passenger flights by at least two other 

NASA aircraft—aircraft NASA classified as “program support” aircraft. 

Additionally, NASA’s process for overseeing and managing flight-by-flight 

justifications was flawed. OMB policy requires agencies to compare 

applicable agency flight-by-flight variable costs for proposed flights to 

commercial airline costs, and to only use its own aircraft services for 

passenger transportation if such proposed usage is cost effective. Our 

analysis showed that although NASA flight-by-flight justifications were 

shown as and approved as cost beneficial to the government; in fact, in the 

majority of the cases the flights were not cost effective. Available flight-byflight documentation showed that NASA systematically understated the 

variable costs associated with its passenger aircraft and overstated 

commercial costs through use of cost data that were 6 years out of date and 

use of a largely unsupported multiplier of 2.5 applied to salary costs for the 

additional time required to fly on commercial airlines. In addition, we 

found weaknesses in the processes in place at NASA centers to identify and 

collect reimbursements from nonofficial travelers on NASA-owned or 

chartered aircraft. 

Because NASA management has taken only limited action in response to 

similar prior audit recommendations in this area, this report includes a 

matter for congressional consideration concerning legislation to ensure 

that (1) NASA disposes of all passenger aircraft not used in accordance 

with OMB’s explicit policy prohibition against owning aircraft to support 

travel to meetings, speeches, conferences, and routine site visits; and 

(2) funding for future NASA passenger aircraft purchases and operations is 

restricted to the minimum amount necessary to meet mission requirements 

consistent with OMB policy guidance restrictions. In addition, to the 

extent Congress determines NASA needs to continue to retain the ability to 

own or charter aircraft to provide passenger transportation services, we 

recommend NASA take a number of actions directed at establishing 
Page 6 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

policies and procedures necessary to ensure that such services are carried 

out efficiently and effectively, including maximizing use of flexible costeffective arrangements to obtain passenger air transportation to meet 

mission requirements.

In its comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with the 

recommendations directed at NASA and outlined various ongoing and 

planned actions, including a comprehensive study of its passenger aircraft 

program to be completed by October 31, 2005. If NASA's study referred to 

above is carried out effectively and fully considers the various matters 

discussed in this report, it should provide the Congress valuable 

information for deciding whether legislation may be needed on this matter. 

Background Under the provisions of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 

NASA is authorized to acquire aircraft.4 Since its creation, NASA has 

operated a small fleet of aircraft, primarily to provide passenger 

transportation. According to the 2004 General Services Administration’s 

Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting System, NASA is one of six civilian 

agencies5

 that reported operating aircraft primarily for the purpose of 

passenger transportation. 

NASA’s Aircraft Inventory In fiscal year 2003, NASA reported owning and operating a fleet of 85 

aircraft valued at $362 million, including aircraft dedicated to program 

support, research and development, and passenger transportation.

Program Support NASA reported owning 53 aircraft that were used to provide support to 

programs such as the Space Shuttle, International Space Station, and 

Astronaut programs. The majority of these aircraft are located at the 

Johnson Space Center. For example, shuttle trainers are one type of 

program support aircraft. These aircraft have been modified to duplicate 

the shuttle’s approach profile, cockpit cues, and handling qualities so that 

4

 42 U.S.C. § 2473 (c) (3). This authorization is subject to Congress making available 

appropriations.

5

The other five civilian agencies that reported to GSA that they owned and operated aircraft 

in fiscal year 2004 primarily for the purpose of passenger transportation were the 

Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, Interior, and Transportation. 
Page 7 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

astronaut pilots can see and feel simulated approaches and landings before 

attempting an actual shuttle landing. 

Research and Development NASA reports owning 25 aircraft to support its research and development 

efforts. These aircraft have been modified to support the agency’s mission 

to conduct aeronautical research at varying altitudes and atmospheric 

conditions. For example, NASA operates a modified Learjet 23 as a 

research platform for the Airborne Terrestrial Land Application Scanner.

Passenger Transportation NASA owns seven aircraft that are used to provide passenger 

transportation.6 In fiscal year 2004, NASA reported its seven passenger 

aircraft carried nearly 10,000 passengers and logged nearly 4 million 

passenger miles. Figure 1 provides an overview of the aircraft owned and 

operated by NASA to provide passenger transportation and their location.

6

 Three of NASA’s seven passenger aircraft are classified as program support because they 

were acquired as backups for existing shuttle trainer aircraft. However, since shortly after 

their acquisition (one in 1991 and two in 2001), these aircraft have been used primarily to 

provide passenger transportation. In addition, one aircraft, a Gulfstream I aircraft operated 

by the Johnson Space Center, was retired from active service in March 2005.
Page 8 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Figure 1: Overview of NASA-Owned Passenger Aircraft Type and Location 

Dryden Flight

Research Center

Beechcraft 200

Johnson Space

Center

Gulfstream I

Johnson Space

Center

Gulfstream II

Kennedy Space

Center

Gulfstream II

Wallops Flight

Facility

Beechcraft 200

NASA

Headquarters

Gulfstream III

Marshall Space

Flight Center

Gulfstream II SP

Source: GAO.
Page 9 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

In addition, NASA obtained passenger transportation services through the 

Economy Act,7

 a cooperative agreement, and a fractional ownership 

contract with DOD, FAA, and Flexjet, respectively. 

• DOD–-Under provisions of the Economy Act, NASA acquired additional 

passenger aircraft services from DOD using Gulfstream V aircraft. DOD 

provided documentation for three NASA flights of more than 60 flight 

hours during fiscal years 2003 and 2004. DOD billed NASA 

approximately $290,000 for these services.

• FAA—During fiscal years 2003 and 2004, NASA and FAA entered into a 

shared-use cooperative agreement for four aircraft, three of which were 

owned by FAA and the other by NASA. All four aircraft were housed at 

Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C. In exchange for 

contributing its one aircraft and $1.1 million annually during 2003 and 

2004, NASA received the right to 450 total flight hours per year on any of 

the four aircraft. Under this agreement, NASA could schedule flights on 

these aircraft with a minimum of 24 hours advance notice. FAA agreed 

to pay routine maintenance, fuel, and personnel costs associated with 

the NASA aircraft. NASA was also allowed to purchase additional 

hours, beyond the agreed 450 hours, at the hourly rate for the specific 

aircraft used. During the 2-year period, NASA utilized the four aircraft 

in this arrangement for approximately 1,600 flight hours for a reported 

cost of $4.5 million, which included charges for the original 900-hour 

agreement plus charges for additional hours.

• Flexjet–-In October 2000, conferees on the NASA fiscal year 2001 

appropriation bills directed NASA to prepare a plan that considers 

whether fractional ownership of passenger aircraft may be beneficial.8

 

In July 2002, pursuant to the conferee guidance, NASA awarded a 

contract with Flexjet for a 2-year demonstration program to determine 

the viability of using fractional ownership to meet NASA’s administrative 

air transportation requirements. Under the 2-year demonstration NASA 

reported cost of approximately $3.5 million in return for a total of 

approximately 800 flight hours of passenger transportation services. 

7

 31 U.S.C. § 1535. Under the Economy Act, federal agencies are permitted to obtain services 

from other federal agencies when such services cannot be provided as conveniently or costeffectively from commercial sources, and reimburse the other agencies for the cost of the 

services obtained. 

8

 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-988, at 164 (2000) accompanying Pub. L. No. 106-377.
Page 10 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Federal Guidance on 

Aircraft Acquisition, 

Operation, and Retention

OMB Circular No. A-126 (Revised), Improving the Management and Use of 

Government Aircraft (May 22, 1992), prescribes policies for executive 

agencies to follow in acquiring, managing, using, accounting for the costs 

of, and disposing of government aircraft. This circular applies to all 

government-owned, leased, chartered, and rental aircraft and related 

services operated by executive agencies, except for aircraft while in use by 

or in support of the President or Vice President. OMB Circular No. A-126, 

section 6, a., provides that the number and size of aircraft acquired and 

retained by an agency and the capacity of those aircraft to carry passengers 

and cargo should not exceed the level necessary to meet the agency’s 

mission requirements. OMB Circular No. A-126, section 5, b., defines 

mission requirements to include activities related to the transport of troops 

and/or equipment, training, evacuation (including medical evacuation), 

intelligence and counter narcotics activities, search and rescue, 

transportation of prisoners, use of defense attaché-controlled aircraft, and 

aeronautical research and space and science applications. OMB Circular 

No. A-126, section 5, b. explicitly states that mission requirements do not 

include official travel to give speeches, attend conferences or meetings, or 

make routine site visits. 

In addition to the policies prescribed by OMB Circular No. A-126, agencies 

must also follow the guidance of OMB Circular No. A-769

 before 

purchasing, leasing, or otherwise acquiring aircraft and related services, to 

assure that these services cannot be obtained from and operated by the 

private sector more cost effectively. Further, agencies must review 

periodically the continuing need for all of their aircraft and the cost 

effectiveness of their aircraft operations in accordance with the 

requirements of OMB Circular No. A-76 and report the results of these 

reviews to GSA and OMB. Agencies are to report any excess aircraft and 

release all aircraft that are not fully justified by these reviews. 

Once an agency has justified that it has a valid mission requirement for 

owning aircraft, OMB Circular No. A-126, section 8, a., permits agencies to 

use aircraft for official, but nonmission-required travel when: 

• no commercial airline or aircraft service is reasonably available (i.e., 

able to meet the traveler’s departure and/or arrival requirements within 

9

 OMB Circular No. A-76, (Revised), Performance of Commercial Activities (May 29, 2003) 

establishes policies for competition of agency commercial activities including the use of 

aircraft. 
Page 11 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

a 24-hour period, unless the traveler demonstrates that extraordinary 

circumstances require a shorter period) to fulfill effectively the agency 

requirement; or 

• actual cost of using a government aircraft is not more than the cost of 

using commercial airlines. 

OMB Circular No. A-126, section 14, also provides that agencies maintain 

systems that will enable them to: (1) justify the cost-effective use of 

government aircraft in lieu of commercially available air transportation 

services, and the use of one government aircraft in lieu of another; (2) 

recover the costs of operating government aircraft when appropriate; (3) 

determine the cost effectiveness of various aspects of their aircraft 

programs; and (4) conduct the cost comparisons required by OMB Circular 

No. A-76 to justify in-house operation of government aircraft versus 

procurement of commercially available passenger aircraft services. 

Attachment B of OMB Circular No. A-126 also provides that agency systems 

must accumulate and summarize costs into the standard passenger aircraft 

program cost elements. For example, standard cost elements would 

include items such as fixed and variable crew costs, maintenance costs, 

fuel costs, and overhaul and repair costs.

GSA Implementing 

Regulations

In addition, the General Services Administration (GSA) established 

governmentwide policy on the operation of aircraft by the federal 

government—including policies for managing the acquisition, use, and 

disposal of aircraft that the agencies own or hire. GSA publishes its 

regulatory policies in the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.).10 GSA also 

publishes a number of other guides and manuals to help agencies manage 

the acquisition, use, and disposal of aircraft. These publications include 

the U.S. Government Aircraft Cost Accounting Guide, which contains 

information on how agencies should account for aircraft costs, and the 

Fleet Modernization Planning Guide, which provides guidance on 

developing cost-effective fleet replacement plans. 

10 41 C.F.R. pt. 102-33 (2002).
Page 12 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Past NASA Inspector 

General Reporting on NASA 

Passenger Aircraft

NASA’s Inspector General (IG) issued two reports on NASA’s passenger 

aircraft, one in 1995 and another in 1999.11 Both NASA IG reports were 

critical of NASA’s management of these aircraft, identifying weaknesses in 

NASA’s accounting and justification for its passenger aircraft. In its 1995 

report, the NASA IG reported that NASA passenger aircraft cost an 

estimated $5.8 million more annually when compared with commercial 

airline transportation. The IG recommended actions with respect to 

NASA’s (1) compliance with many of the provisions of OMB Circular Nos. 

A-126 and A-76 (including fully considering commercial airlines as an 

alternative to NASA operations of passenger aircraft services), (2) use of 

outdated and incomplete cost data to justify trips and approval of some 

trips without adequate justifications, and (3) use of passenger aircraft that 

were more expensive to operate than using commercial airline services. 

The IG’s 1999 report focused on one passenger aircraft located at NASA’s 

Marshall Space Flight Center and estimated that the cost of commercial 

airlines in comparison with the NASA-owned aircraft was $2.9 million less 

over a 5-year period. Similar to the 1995 report, the 1999 report was also 

critical of NASA’s implementation of guidance in OMB Circular Nos. A-126 

and A-76. Further, the report noted that the agency had not effectively 

addressed actions recommended in the 1995 report concerning the need to 

more fully and effectively evaluate the use of commercial airlines. The IG 

recommended that NASA management dispose of the passenger aircraft at 

Marshall and instead use commercial airlines to satisfy Marshall’s air 

transportation requirements. NASA management disagreed with the 

findings of both IG reports, stating that commercial airlines cannot 

effectively meet all the mission requirements and the capability of NASA 

aircraft outweighs the marginal costs savings of total reliance on 

commercial airlines.

11NASA Office of the Inspector General, Final Report, NASA Aircraft Management, LA-95-

001 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 1995) and NASA Office of the Inspector General, A-76 Study 

of NASA 3 Aircraft, IG-99-057 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 1999).
Page 13 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

NASA Passenger 

Aircraft Costs Are 

Substantially More 

Than Commercial 

Airline Costs

An analysis of NASA’s reported costs for its passenger aircraft services 

shows they are an estimated five times more costly than commercial airline 

coach tickets. For purposes of this aggregate comparative cost analysis, 

we considered available NASA reported data on costs applicable to its 

passenger aircraft services—both variable and fixed costs--in comparison 

with commercial airline service costs. Specifically, to assess the aggregate 

costs associated with NASA-owned and -chartered passenger aircraft, we 

accumulated available NASA annual report passenger aircraft services cost 

data for fiscal years 2003 and 2004, validated to the extent feasible with 

industry standards, and compared these cost estimates with total estimated 

commercial airline costs based on the cost of an average coach ticket. We 

determined that NASA’s reported costs for the aircraft it owned or 

chartered were on the order of about $20 million more costly over a 2-year 

period than if NASA had used commercial airline services to carry out the 

same number of business trips. Specifically, estimated costs associated 

with NASA’s passenger aircraft operations during fiscal years 2003 and 2004 

were almost $25 million, while we estimated the cost of commercial coach 

tickets for the same number of travelers would have been approximately $5 

million—about $20 million more to provide NASA passenger aircraft 

services than if commercial airlines were used to provide passenger 

transportation over the 2-year period. 

Table 1 summarizes our analysis of commercial and NASA passenger 

transportation costs by types of NASA-owned or -chartered aircraft. We 

identified the number of passengers from NASA’s aircraft request forms and 

NASA annual performance reports.12 We then multiplied the identified 

number of passengers by our estimate of NASA’s average commercial 

coach round-trip ticket cost. We determined the average coach round-trip 

ticket cost of approximately $426 by analyzing all airfares purchased with 

NASA’s travel cards in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Specifically, we identified 

approximately $49,776,000 in round-trip airfare tickets in NASA travel card 

purchases during fiscal years 2003 and 2004, and divided this dollar amount 

by the number of tickets purchased (116,865) to determine an average 

ticket cost of approximately $426. Finally, we compiled an estimate of 

NASA’s passenger aircraft service costs, which included costs related to 

personnel, maintenance, and fuel, from annual cost reports and budget 

information provided by NASA.

12When request forms did not include data on passengers, we used other NASA reports to 

identify the number of passengers on flights. 
Page 14 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Table 1: Comparison of Commercial and NASA Passenger Transportation Costs by Location or Charter Provider for Fiscal Years 

2003 and 2004

Source: GAO analysis based primarily on NASA’s costs disclosed in various annual reports. 

a

Passenger numbers were taken from aircraft request forms provided by NASA.

b

Costs for Johnson Space Center aircraft were taken from annual reports and budget information when 

passenger aircraft costs were not separated from program support aircraft costs.

c

Costs associated with the use of NASA’s Gulfstream III and FAA aircraft at Reagan National Airport 

were taken from NASA Headquarters cost reports. 

d

Aircraft costs were taken from 2003 and 2004 annual aircraft cost reports.

e

Flexjet costs were taken from NASA’s Report on the NASA Fractional Aircraft Demonstration 

Program, July 2004.

f

Passenger numbers were taken from 2003 and 2004 annual aircraft performance reports.

g

Costs for flights on DOD aircraft were taken from NASA’s aircraft request forms used to justify these 

flights.

This calculation of the difference between the relative cost of NASAprovided passenger transportation services and commercial airline costs 

does not consider per diem, in-transit salary and benefits, and other factors 

associated with using NASA passenger services. NASA officials believe 

that a comparison of NASA and commercial airline passenger services 

should include estimates of such cost savings shown in its passenger 

aircraft request forms. We recognize that, to the extent that all passengers 

on the aircraft had a valid purpose for travel, there may be personnelrelated cost savings associated with use of NASA’s passenger aircraft 

services; however, it was not feasible for us to reliably identify such costs 

using independent (non-NASA) sources. Further, as discussed in a 

subsequent section of this report, we have concerns about the reliability of 

some of NASA’s cost and associated savings data captured in its flight 

Location or charter provider (type of aircraft)

Passengers

flown

NASA’s

reported cost

Estimated

average coach

ticket costs Difference

Johnson Space Center (Gulfstream I & Gulfstream II) 2,009a $5,069,000b $856,000 $4,213,000

NASA Headquarters (NASA Gulfstream III, FAA chartered 

Gulfstream IV, and two FAA chartered Citation Excels) 

 2,109a 4,532,000c 898,000 3,634,000

Marshall Space Flight Center (Gulfstream IISP) 2,374a 4,463,000d 1,011,000 3,452,000

Flexjet Chartered Aircraft (Learjet Models 31A and 60) 1,337a 3,551,000e 570,000 2,981,000

Dryden Flight Research Center (Beechcraft 200) 1,404f 3,380,000d 598,000 2,782,000

Kennedy Space Center (Gulfstream II) 1,675a 2,548,000d 714,000 1,834,000

Wallops Flight Facility (Beechcraft 200) 884a 856,000d 377,000 479,000

DOD Chartered Aircraft (Gulfstream V) 34a 290,000g 14,000 276,000

Total 11,826 $24,689,000 $5,038,000 $19,651,000
Page 15 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

request documentation. In addition, we also identified questionable 

savings attributed to non-official travelers.

However, NASA’s cost estimates do serve to provide indicators of general 

ranges of costs that may be avoided by using NASA passenger aircraft 

services. Using available NASA documentation of costs that would have 

been incurred if commercial airlines were used would increase the 

estimated commercial airline costs to approximately $11 million, and 

reduce the difference between NASA’s passenger airline services and 

commercial airlines to about $13 million over the 2-year period.13 

Specifically, available NASA passenger aircraft services flight request 

documentation generally included estimated costs associated with not only 

airline tickets, but also estimates for salary and benefit costs associated 

with lost work time, per diem expenses, and rental car costs associated 

with the additional time required if commercial airlines were used to 

provide passenger transportation. Consequently, even when available 

NASA estimates of costs associated with commercial airline transportation 

services were included, a comparison with the costs of its passenger air 

transportation services shows that they are nearly 2.3 times more costly 

than commercial airlines. 

Additional Costs Associated 

with NASA Passenger 

Aircraft May Be Substantial

Our cost analysis, based primarily on data included in NASA’s annual 

reporting on its aircraft operations, did not include data on all relevant 

types of costs attributable to NASA’s passenger aircraft services.14 

Consequently, the full cost of continued operation of NASA’s passenger 

aircraft fleet in comparison with commercial airline services would be 

substantially more than the $20 million estimate for fiscal years 2003 and 

2004. Specifically, the following types of costs were not accounted for in 

NASA’s various annual reports on its passenger aircraft services. 

Acquisition and Capital Costs NASA’ s current inventory of seven passenger aircraft is valued at more 

than $33 million, including two Gulfstream II aircraft purchased in 2001 for 

a total of about $13.9 million. An allocable portion of the acquisition and 

13Reported costs for NASA passenger aircraft services totaled $24,689,000, and estimated 

commercial costs provided by NASA totaled $11,311,000, yielding a difference of 

$13,378,000 between commercial and NASA passenger aircraft costs.

14Statement 4 of the Statements of Federal Financial Accounting Standards defines full cost 

as the total cost of direct and indirect support used to produce an output.
Page 16 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

associated capital improvements to these assets is part of NASA’s annual 

cost of operating its passenger aircraft services. In addition, these costs 

may increase in the near future. A July 2004 fleet plan prepared for NASA 

recommended upgrading and expanding its passenger aircraft fleet as soon 

as possible with an initial investment of $75 million. Further, NASA is 

considering an investment of an estimated $1.5 million in a noise restriction 

package for its Gulfstream III aircraft during fiscal year 2008, making the 

total investment that NASA is currently considering about $77 million.

Hangar Costs NASA aircraft received hangar and maintenance services even though they 

were housed on government property. Industry data on hangar costs show 

that they total about 5 percent of total aircraft operation costs.

Liability Insurance Costs Although the government operates under a self-insurance policy, the 

liability associated with operation of passenger aircraft is a cost factor that 

must be considered given the significant number of passenger flights taken 

using NASA-owned aircraft over the last 2 years. Industry estimates show 

liability insurance costs represent approximately 2 percent of total aircraft 

operating costs. 

NASA Passenger 

Aircraft Ownership to 

Support Routine 

Business Not Justified

Not only were NASA’s passenger aircraft services significantly more costly 

than commercial airlines, but NASA’s continued ownership of aircraft to 

provide air transportation supporting routine NASA business operations 

was not in accordance with OMB guidance. OMB guidance (1) limits the 

number and size of aircraft acquired and owned by an agency to carry 

passengers to the level necessary to meet mission requirements, including, 

for example, use of aircraft for prisoner transportation, intelligence and 

counter narcotics activities, and aeronautical research; and (2) explicitly 

prohibits owning aircraft to support routine business functions, including 

providing air transportation to attend meetings, conferences, and routine 

site visits. In contrast, NASA’s implementing guidance, while generally 

consistent with OMB guidance, was interpreted to allow acquiring and 

retaining aircraft for any official travel, regardless of the mission-required 

nature of the travel. Our analysis of available flight data showed that an 

overwhelming majority (86 percent) of the flights taken during fiscal years 

2003 and 2004 using NASA passenger aircraft services were to support 

routine business operations, including attending meetings, conferences, 

and site visits. Excluding flights related to the Columbia accident, routine 

business flights accounted for about 97 percent of NASA passenger aircraft 

flights. Further, although OMB guidance required NASA to periodically 
Page 17 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

prepare studies to determine if continued ownership of passenger aircraft 

was justified, the agency’s studies were either incomplete or did not 

consider commercial airline service alternatives. 

Implementation of NASA 

Guidance Inconsistent with 

OMB Policy on Aircraft 

Ownership 

NASA implementation is not consistent with OMB policy on aircraft 

ownership. OMB Circular No. A-126, the governing federal policy guidance 

in this area, provides that agencies should own aircraft only to the extent 

needed to meet mission requirements, such as troop transportation, 

prisoner transportation, intelligence and counter narcotics activities, and 

aeronautical research. OMB’s policy guidance further provides that 

agencies should not own aircraft to provide transportation to meetings, 

routine site visits, and speeches. However, NASA implementing guidance, 

while generally consistent with OMB policy, does not clearly and uniformly 

address the federal policy limiting aircraft ownership to those assets 

needed to meet mission requirements. NASA Procedural Requirements 

(NPR),15 section 3.3.2, reiterates the OMB policy prohibition on using 

passenger aircraft to provide transportation supporting routine business 

operations as a basis for continuing to own aircraft. However, in the 

following sections (sections 3.3.2.1 through 3.3.2.5), NASA’s guidance 

provides that mission-required use of aircraft includes support for activities 

“directly related to approved NASA programs and projects.” These 

elaborating sections were mistakenly operationally determined to mean 

that all travel using NASA passenger aircraft services was directly related 

to NASA programs or projects, regardless of whether they were of a 

routine, nonemergency nature.

The NASA IG’s 1999 report16 on NASA’s passenger aircraft at its Marshall 

Space Flight Center also questioned whether that aircraft’s use was 

consistent with the OMB limitation on owning aircraft only for missionrequired purposes. The audit report recommended that NASA change the 

definition of mission requirements in its policy guidance to conform to the 

definition of mission requirement stated in OMB guidance. However, in its 

response to the audit report, NASA management stated that there was no 

difference between its guidance and the OMB guidance and therefore it 

would not take any action to clarify its policy guidance. 

15NPR 7900.3A, effective April 1999, expires December 2005.

16NASA Inspector General Report, IG-99-057.
Page 18 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Most Flights on NASA 

Passenger Aircraft Do Not 

Meet OMB Definition of 

Mission Requirements 

Our analysis of available documentation on flight purposes shows that 

NASA’s implementation of its guidance related to using aircraft in direct 

program or project support has resulted in owning aircraft to support 

meetings, conferences, and speeches in direct conflict with OMB’s policy 

prohibition in this area. In effect, NASA circumvented the OMB policy on 

restricting aircraft ownership to those needed to carry out mission 

requirements by operationally determining that nearly all travel using 

passenger aircraft services was directly related to NASA programs or 

projects. Our analysis of NASA passenger air transportation services for 

fiscal years 2003 and 2004 showed that about 86 percent of the flights were 

taken to support the types of routine business operations that are expressly 

prohibited by OMB’s guidance for aircraft ownership. 

Specifically, we categorized the documented flight purpose listed on 1,188 

NASA aircraft request forms for NASA passenger aircraft usage during 

fiscal years 2003 and 2004 into 10 categories in order to determine the 

frequency of different uses for NASA’s passenger aircraft services.17 In 

conducting our analysis, we categorized any flight as mission required if it 

could be linked to OMB’s definition of mission requirements, regardless of 

its apparent, non-emergency nature. As a result, some flights we 

categorized as mission required may have actually been routine in nature. 

For example, in response to the 1999 NASA IG report, NASA management 

stated that launch support flights were required to transport NASA 

emergency response teams to launch sites within hours to help resolve 

unexpected launch-related problems. However, most launch support 

flights during our audit period were scheduled more than 24 hours before 

the flight departure date. Of the 19 flights we identified as directly 

supporting NASA launches, only 7 were scheduled less than 2 days prior to 

the flight, and overall the flights were scheduled an average of 

approximately 3 days prior to departure. In one example, on July 29, 2003, 

Kennedy Space Center requested the use of a NASA passenger aircraft to 

fly from Florida to California as launch support for the joint Canadian 

Space Agency/NASA Scientific Satellite Atmospheric Chemistry 

17We were unable to identify a purpose for and categorize all flights because of (1) missing 

documentation and (2) incomplete data. For example, flights for Dryden Flight Research 

Center’s Beechcraft 200 passenger aircraft were not included because descriptive flight 

data, such as flight purposes, were not consistently listed on request forms. In addition, we 

excluded flights on two other program-support aircraft that were occasionally used to 

transport passengers. In addition, request forms for approximately 97 flights were not 

provided by NASA until after we identified the flights through a review of FAA flight 

tracking records, and were therefore not provided in time for our analysis.
Page 19 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Experiment Mission. The flight was requested on July 29, 2003, 12 days 

before the flight’s August 10, 2003, departure and 14 days before the August 

12, 2003, launch. We categorized this flight as being related to launch 

support. However, the fact that the flight was scheduled nearly 2 weeks in 

advance of the flight departure brings into question whether the flight was 

time sensitive and indicates that commercial coach service could have 

been used.

Figure 2 presents the results of our analysis and categorization of NASA’s 

use of owned and chartered aircraft over fiscal years 2003 and 2004 into 10 

categories.

Figure 2: Percentage of NASA Passenger Aircraft Flights by Purpose

As shown in figure 2, available data showed that about 14 percent of the 

flights taken using NASA passenger aircraft had a stated purpose that 

appeared to comply with OMB Circular No. A-126’s definition of mission 

required. As shown in figure 3, excluding flights related to the Columbia 

External affairs

Columbia accident related

Total flights: 1,188

External meeting

2% Launch support

1% Other mission-required

3% Launch viewing

3% Training

3% Executive retreats

1% Other routine business

8%

56%

12%

11%

Source: GAO analysis of NASA Aircraft Request Forms. 

Mission-required flights (14%)

Routine business flights (86%)

Internal meeting
Page 20 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

accident investigation, only 3 percent of NASA’s passenger aircraft activity 

was related to mission-required travel. 

Figure 3: Percentage of NASA Passenger Aircraft Flights by Purpose (Excluding 

Flights Related to the Columbia Accident)

Table 2 highlights examples of flights in which NASA passenger aircraft 

services were used to support non mission-critical NASA business 

operations that are not consistent with OMB’s definition of missionrequired use necessary to justify continued passenger aircraft ownership.

External affairs

Total flights: 1,058

External meeting

2% Launch support

1% Other mission-required

3% Launch viewing

3% Training

3% Executive retreats

1% Other routine business

9%

64%

14%

Source: GAO analysis of NASA Aircraft Request Forms. 

Mission-required flights (3%)

Routine business flights (97%)

Internal meeting
Page 21 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Table 2: Summary of Examples of Routine Business Flights Using NASA Passenger Aircraft during Fiscal Years 2003-2004 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA aircraft request forms and other NASA reports. 

a From NASA aircraft request forms. 

b Calculated by taking NASA’s total reported costs, dividing by NASA reported flight hours for each 

aircraft, and then multiplying by the number of flight hours for the specific flight. NASA reported costs 

were taken from NASA’s 2003 and 2004 Aviation Financial Reports and Johnson Space Center’s 

Usage category Flight purpose description Flight itinerary

Estimated

commercial ticket

costsa

NASA-reported

flight costb

Internal meeting Budget reviews for space shuttle and 

space station at the Johnson Space 

Center

Dulles, VA to Houston, TX 

and return

$3,000 $11,000

Internal meeting Senior management budget meetings 

at NASA headquarters

Johnson Space Center, 

TX to Washington, DC 

and return

3,000 24,000

External affairs Attendance at Pearl Harbor 60th 

anniversary ceremony, attendance at 

heads of agency meeting

Reagan National, VA to 

Anchorage, AK to Tokyo, 

Japan to Honolulu, HI and 

return

28,000 59,000

External affairs Attendance at the 2003 inauguration 

ceremony for the governor of Florida

Kennedy Space Center, 

FL to Tallahassee, FL and 

return

2,000 5,000

External meeting Travel by the Presidential Commission 

on Implementation of U.S. Space 

Exploration Policy (PCSE) to conduct 

required public hearings on the 

exploration policy

Dulles, VA to San 

Francisco, CA and return

8,000 51,000

External meeting Attendance at an annual Engineer of 

the Year Awards Conference

Kennedy Space Center, 

FL to Baltimore, MD and 

return

3,000 14,000

Launch/landing 

viewing

Attendance at the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory to observe the Cassini 

landing on Saturn

Reagan National, VA to 

Burbank, CA and return

3,000 11,000

Executive retreat Attendance at the NASA Enterprise 

Council Retreat in Blue Mountain 

Lake, NY and attendance at the 

Space Shuttle 112 Crew Ceremony at 

Johnson Space Center

Kennedy Space Center, 

FL to Washington, DC to 

Saranac Lake, NY to 

Johnson Space Center, 

TX to Washington, DC 

and return to Kennedy

8,000 32,000

Executive retreat Participate in NASA Leadership 

Council retreat

Johnson Space Center, 

TX to Austin, TX to 

Washington, DC and 

return

3,000 23,000

Training E-Payroll training at Marshall Space 

Flight Center

Kennedy Space Center, 

FL to Marshall Space 

Flight Center, AL and 

return

2,000 18,000
Page 22 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Budgeted Costs for Mission Management Aircraft Operations. NASA aircraft flight hour usage 

numbers were taken from NASA’s 2003 and 2004 Annual Aircraft Performance Reports. For aircraft 

not owned by NASA, the reported cost includes the amount billed to NASA as listed on the aircraft 

request form. 

The results of our interviews with passengers on such flights showed that, 

while use of the NASA aircraft was more convenient, better accommodated 

busy NASA SES-level staff schedules, and was more productive, the trip 

purposes could have been accomplished through travel on regularly 

scheduled commercial airlines. 

Flawed Implementation of 

OMB Guidance on Use of 

Government vs. Commercial 

Resources

OMB Circular No. A-126 policy guidance instructs agencies to periodically 

conduct OMB Circular No. A-76 cost comparisons to determine whether 

commercial activities should be conducted using government resources or 

commercial sources. NASA’s A-76 studies conducted to date have asserted 

that because not all flight purposes could be achieved using commercial 

airlines, commercial airlines are not a viable alternative and were not 

considered in any of the studies. However, as discussed previously, our 

analysis of NASA passenger aircraft flights taken during fiscal years 2003 

and 2004 as well as our discussions with passengers on those flights 

disclosed that the vast majority of the flights could have been 

accomplished using commercial airlines. As a result, NASA’s A-76 studies 

inappropriately excluded potentially more cost-effective commercial 

airline services from consideration. 

Little supporting documentation is available for four of the seven aircraft in 

NASA’s passenger aircraft fleet that were acquired decades ago. 

Consequently, it was difficult to determine how these aircraft acquisitions 

were justified and if there was a mission requirement justifying aircraft 

ownership at that time.18 

The five NASA A-76 studies on NASA-owned aircraft did not include a 

comparison of NASA’s passenger aircraft costs with commercial airline

18 NASA acquired two of the aircraft in 2001 to serve as replacements for two of the agency’s 

four shuttle trainer aircraft. Those aircraft were used for passenger transportation during 

the period of our review. Another aircraft was acquired in 1991 to serve as a shuttle trainer, 

but was never modified to serve in that role. 
Page 23 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

costs.19 NASA’s studies compared its aircraft ownership costs against costs 

of NASA leasing aircraft to provide passenger transportation services 

because “commercial airlines cannot effectively meet all mission 

requirements.” For example, NASA’s March 2004 A-76 study was based on 

the assumption that NASA aircraft would be required to support mission 

requirements of an estimated 400-450 flight hours a year--essentially the 

total number of flight hours flown by that NASA center’s passenger aircraft 

during 2003 and 2004. While NASA may continue to require access to some 

mission-required passenger aircraft services for which commercial airlines 

would not be a viable alternative, assuming that all prior flight hours were 

mission required without first examining the purpose for these flights is not 

consistent with the OMB guidance. 

In addition to NASA-owned aircraft, as discussed previously, NASA 

obtained passenger aircraft services through interagency agreements with 

DOD and FAA, and a fractional ownership pilot demonstration contract 

with Flexjet. These alternative approaches offer ready access to passenger 

aircraft without the fixed cost investment and the need to fund aircraft 

maintenance, pilot training, and other costs associated with aircraft 

ownership. For example, under NASA’s contract with Flexjet, NASA had 

guaranteed availability to passenger air transportation services. 

Specifically, the contract with Flexjet allowed NASA to schedule flights 

with a minimum of 8 hours advance notice. According to a NASA 

contractor’s December 2004 study, such arrangements to obtain passenger 

transportation services provide a cost-effective alternative to agency 

ownership of aircraft when demand is highly variable or less than 150 to 

200 hours a year. Such flexible arrangements could provide NASA with 

quick-turnaround access to air passenger transportation services, and 

appear to have the ability to have met NASA’s limited mission-required 

needs during the period of our review. 

Further, NASA has not performed any A-76 studies for three of its aircraft 

that were used as passenger aircraft. NASA purchased two Gulfstream II 

aircraft in 2001 as contingency backups to, and eventual replacements for, 

its existing shuttle trainer aircraft fleet. However, since purchasing the 

aircraft, NASA has been using these aircraft as part of its passenger aircraft 

19 Aviation Services Studies: Johnson Space Center, NASA 2 Mission Management Aircraft, 

March 2004; Johnson Space Center, NASA 2 Gulfstream G-1, December 1999; Dryden Flight 

Research Center, NASA 7 King Air 200, February 2000; Goddard Space Flight Center – 

Wallops Flight Facility, NASA 8 King Air 200, February 2000; NASA Headquarters, NASA 1 

Gulfstream III, February 2000.
Page 24 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

services fleet. Subsequent changes in NASA’s long-term strategy for space 

flight now show that shuttles will not be used after about 2010. As a result, 

the continuing mission-required need to retain these aircraft is 

questionable. 

In its 1995 and 1999 reports, the NASA IG20 expressed concern over NASA’s 

exclusion of commercial airline transportation from its A-76 studies. In 

both reports, the IG reported that the A-76 studies NASA management 

performed with respect to its passenger aircraft improperly excluded a cost 

comparison with commercial airlines. While the IG recommended that 

NASA program offices responsible for passenger aircraft operations 

perform A-76 studies to include consideration of accomplishing air travel 

needs using commercial airlines, NASA management contended that 

because of isolated travel destinations and extremely short advance notice, 

commercial airlines could not meet its travel needs. However, our analysis 

of available documentation supporting flights taken during fiscal years 

2003 and 2004 shows that most were requested more than 24 hours in 

advance of flight departure and most NASA centers are located within an 

hour’s drive of commercial airports. 

Ineffective Oversight 

and Management of 

Passenger Aircraft 

Services 

NASA’s oversight and management controls over its passenger aircraft 

operations were ineffective. NASA lacks the systems or procedures to 

accumulate and use agencywide usage and cost data needed to provide the 

transparency and accountability necessary to effectively support day-today management of its passenger aircraft service operations. Specifically, 

NASA did not

• Maintain agencywide records on the purposes for which its passenger 

aircraft are used and their costs. Such data are critical to 

(1) determining whether usage is consistent with OMB guidance limiting 

aircraft ownership to those agencies with mission requirement needs, 

and (2) maintaining visibility and accountability for the full costs 

associated with its passenger aircraft operations. Lacking such full cost 

visibility and passenger accountability, NASA’s passenger aircraft 

services are sometimes viewed as a “free” resource by NASA project and 

program officials. 

20NASA Inspector General Report, IG-99-057 and NASA Inspector General Report, LA-95-001.
Page 25 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

• Correctly justify the cost effectiveness of individual flights. These 

justifications were flawed in that they relied on (1) inaccurate cost data 

and (2) other unsupported factors used in the cost-justification 

calculation.

• Have processes in place to obtain reimbursements from nonofficial 

passengers flying on NASA-owned or -chartered aircraft. This may 

include NASA employee spouses and relatives, contractors, or other 

federal agency personnel.

Flawed Procedures for 

Accumulating and Using 

Passenger Aircraft Usage 

and Cost Data

NASA systems or procedures in place to accumulate detailed usage and 

cost data related to its passenger aircraft services were flawed. Other than 

data compiled once a year to meet external reporting requirements, neither 

NASA management nor congressional oversight officials had agencywide 

aircraft usage and cost data needed to provide the transparency and 

accountability needed to make informed decisions on continued ownership 

of passenger aircraft.

Costs associated with ownership and operation of NASA’s passenger 

aircraft services were usually included in center overhead accounts that 

were allocated to programs based on the number of personnel assigned to 

programs without regard to the extent to which program personnel actually 

used NASA passenger aircraft services. Therefore, it is not surprising that 

some NASA personnel expressed the view that use of NASA-owned or

-chartered aircraft is a “free” resource to them in that they did not have 

visibility or accountability over associated costs as part of their program or 

project budget execution reporting. 

Because NASA lacked a system for routinely collecting agencywide usage 

and cost data, it could not provide us with the complete and accurate 

agencywide information on aircraft usage and cost that we requested as 

part of this audit. Although each center that possesses and manages 

passenger aircraft is required to maintain a flight justification and manifest 

for each trip, the flight usage data contained in these documents are not 

compiled or analyzed on an agencywide basis to support decisions related 

to mission-required needs. Specifically, NASA data on the purposes and 

costs of its passenger aircraft services during fiscal years 2003 and 2004 

were contained in paper flight justifications and manifests maintained at 

six different locations. We created a database of descriptive cost and usage 

data for approximately 1,200 flights using NASA-owned or -chartered 

aircraft for which sufficiently complete data were available. Although, as 
Page 26 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

mentioned previously, we obtained evidence that NASA also utilized at 

least two additional program support aircraft to meet its passenger air 

transportation needs, the limited data on use and costs associated with 

flights using these aircraft did not allow us to include data on these flights 

in our database. Further, data on passenger aircraft services for about 200 

flights at one center was missing most of the data elements on the flight 

request justification forms, including flight purpose and cost-justification 

calculations. Without agencywide data on flight purposes and costs related 

to its passenger aircraft services, NASA managers and Congress lack 

critical information they need to make key aircraft ownership decisions.

In addition to the limited agencywide usage and cost data, we also found 

that the data provided by NASA, although certified by NASA management 

as complete and accurate, were not always complete or accurate. Our 

comparison of NASA-supplied data on flights taken in fiscal years 2003 and 

2004 with FAA data showed that (1) data on 97 passenger flights were not 

included in the aircraft usage data NASA certified as complete; and (2) as 

discussed in a subsequent section, NASA-supplied data did not always 

include all legs of trips taken using NASA passenger aircraft. After our 

identification of the flights, while not complete in all cases, NASA was able 

to provide some form of supporting documentation showing these flights 

occurred, including proof of authorization, approval, or a determination of 

cost effectiveness. Examples of some of the flights not included in the data 

NASA officials certified as complete are summarized in table 3. 
Page 27 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Table 3: Examples of Passenger Flights Not Included in Submissions NASA Certified as Complete

Source: GAO analysis, based on NASA Aircraft Request forms and annual reporting. 

Note: We used NASA aircraft request forms to identify estimated commercial ticket costs. We 

estimated NASA passenger aircraft costs by dividing NASA’s total reported costs by NASA’s reported 

flight hours for each aircraft. We then multiplied the result by the number of flight hours for the specific 

flight. We used NASA’s 2003 and 2004 Aviation Financial Reports and Johnson Space Center’s 

Budgeted Costs for Mission Management Aircraft Operations to identify NASA reported costs. NASA 

aircraft flight hour usage numbers reflect usage hours shown in NASA’s 2003 and 2004 Annual Aircraft 

Performance Reports. 

Further, we identified a breakdown in controls over flight data record 

integrity at one center. Specifically, when we inquired about provided 

documents that did not appear to be originals, NASA officials told us that 

flight requests and approvals related to a 1-year period covering parts of 

fiscal years 2003 and 2004 were lost and recreated after flights took place. 

NASA officials stated that the loss of these important aircraft usage data 

was apparently not discovered until after our initial request for 

documentation as part of this audit. NASA officials did not inform us that 

documents were recreated until after we questioned inconsistencies in the 

documentation. 

Cost data compiled by NASA did not disclose all passenger aircraft cost as 

travel costs. First, the costs related to the operation of passenger aircraft 

were not directly assigned to users, but were allocated through center 

overhead accounts. These accounts, which include other expenses such as 

facilities maintenance and auditing services, are usually allocated to each 

NASA program based on the number of employees. This allocation, which 

Stated flight purpose Destination

Number of

passengers

NASA’s

estimated

commercial

costs

Estimated

NASA flight

cost

Hurricane evacuation for select Kennedy Space 

Center personnel and their families and parents, and 

aircraft pilots and maintenance personnel and their 

families

Two trips from Kennedy 

Space Center, FL to 

Washington, DC and return

9 $3,000 $29,000

Presentation of a plaque to the city of Shreveport, LA 

in appreciation for help during the Columbia disaster

Kennedy Space Center, FL 

to Shreveport, LA and return

7 4,000 22,000

Two-day trip to Las Vegas to meet with a contractor for 

a “technical interchange”

Johnson Space Center, TX 

to Las Vegas, NV

11 8,000 22,000

Participation in Brookhaven National Laboratory 

ceremony dedicating a new NASA space radiation 

laboratory

Johnson Space Center, TX 

to Long Island, NY

10 15,000 27,000

University research and affairs at Texas A&M 

University

Johnson Space Center, TX 

to College Station, TX

11 3,000 4,000
Page 28 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

does not relate to use of aircraft and does not reduce program travel 

budgets, essentially provides a free resource to users, and does not 

encourage efficient use of the aircraft. In commenting on air travel using 

NASA-chartered aircraft, one NASA traveler stated, 

“Although everything about the flight was very positive – convenience, shorter trip time, 

professional service, etc. – the cost was considerably more than flying a commercial airline. 

... As much as I enjoyed the door to door service, if the travel costs had been coming out of 

my project I would have chosen to fly commercial.”

This statement summarizes how NASA decision making on aircraft 

operations is distorted by the lack of complete data on the cost of using this 

resource. Second, NASA does not classify costs related to passenger 

aircraft services in its annual financial and budget reports to Congress as a 

cost of transportation of persons. In annual reports, one specific object 

expense class, object class 21, is designed to capture and disclose agencies’ 

costs for transporting passengers. Instead, the cost of NASA passenger 

aircraft services are included in overhead cost accounts, which understates 

the true cost of transporting NASA passengers. 

Weaknesses In Justification 

Process for Individual 

Passenger Aircraft Flights 

As discussed previously, our analysis of available estimates of NASA’s 

aggregate costs associated with its passenger aircraft services in 

comparison with commercial airline ticket costs showed that NASA’s 

passenger aircraft services cost about $20 million more than commercial 

airlines. In addition, NASA’s individual flight cost justification process for 

its passenger aircraft services was flawed. Our analysis of cost-comparison 

documentation supporting passenger aircraft flights taken during fiscal 

years 2003 and 2004 revealed critical flaws, including variable cost data 

that were 6 years out of date and unsupported cost factors. Available 

NASA documentation supporting NASA’s individual flight justifications for 

flights taken during 2003 and 2004 showed a total estimated savings of $6 

million over the 2-year period. However, if these justifications had included 

up-to-date NASA variable costs and excluded unsupported cost factors 

attributed to the additional time required to use commercial airline flights, 

most flights would not have been approved because they would have been 

more costly than commercial air travel. 

Policy guidance in OMB Circular A-126 provides an agency may use aircraft 

on a flight-by-flight approval basis for routine business purposes to the 

extent that a comparison between the agency’s specified variable costs and 

the costs of commercial travel shows the proposed flight is cost effective. 
Page 29 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Specifically, OMB Circular A-126, Attachment A, provides that costs of 

commercial travel must be compared with the variable costs of operating 

the agencies’ passenger aircraft21 and that proposed flights using agencies’ 

passenger aircraft for routine business purposes should only be approved if 

they result in a cost savings to the government. Further, OMB guidance 

provides that variable cost estimates used in flight-by-flight cost 

justification calculations are to be updated annually. This policy on flightby-flight variable cost justification does not replace the agencies’ need to 

first establish a valid mission requirement for owning aircraft, and overall 

cost effectiveness. As discussed previously, our analysis of flight purposes 

showed that about seven of every eight flights were for routine business 

travel.

Consistent with OMB policy guidance, NASA regulations provide that 

individual cost justifications comparing estimated commercial airline 

travel costs with estimated variable costs associated with using NASAowned or -chartered aircraft should be prepared prior to all passenger 

aircraft flights. Figure 4 provides an overview of the methodology NASA 

used to compare NASA and commercial costs for its flight-by-flight 

justifications.

21OMB Circular No. A-126, Attachment A, defines commercial cost to include estimates of 

commercial tickets, additional per diem and rental cars, and estimates of lost work time 

costs due to the extra time it takes to travel commercially. OMB Circular No. A-126, 

Attachment B, defines variable costs to the agency to include variable crew costs, 

maintenance costs, labor, parts, contracts, engine overhauls, fuel, and landing and tie down 

fees.
Page 30 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Figure 4: Overview of NASA Methodology for Comparing Its Flight-by-Flight Variable 

Costs with Commercial Flight Costs 

Several NASA centers had not updated the variable costs used in their 

flight-by-flight cost-comparison calculations for over 6 years. Such out-ofdate variable costs significantly understated NASA’s flight-by-flight costs. 

For example, at two centers, the $964 variable cost per flight hour used for 

flight-by-flight justifications during fiscal years 2003 and 2004 was over 6 

years out of date. According to NASA aircraft management officials, this 

hourly rate was last adjusted in 1998. At one center, a recent recalculation, 

done in 2005 pursuant to our audit, increased the center’s variable cost rate 

from $964 to $1828 an hour, almost a 90 percent increase. Further, even 

this 90 percent higher rate may understate NASA’s actual variable costs. 

For example, the aircraft manufacturer for the aircraft in use at that center 

reported a direct cost per flight hour rate of approximately $3,000 a flight 

hour, including estimated fuel costs alone in excess of $1,300 an hour. 

NASA variable costs were also understated at one center because the flightby-flight justifications included only variable cost estimates for one round 

trip when the aircraft actually made two round trips to meet passengers’ 

transportation requirements. Our analysis of FAA flight information and 

flight documentation obtained from the center showed that the flight 

request data we were provided included estimates related to only two of 

four flight legs flown to complete 14 flight requests over the 2-year period 

of our review. For example, on August 6, 2003, NASA’s passenger aircraft 

transported passengers from Houston, Texas, to Pueblo, Colorado, and 

then returned without passengers to Houston the same day. Three days 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA Aircraft Request Forms. 

Average salary

Hours saved

Number of passengers

2.5 (multiplier)

×

×

×

Variable cost per

flight hour

Flight hours

×

In-transit salary costs

Ticket costs

Additional per diem

Additional rental car costs

Other costs

+

+

+

+

NASA costs Commercial costs vs.
Page 31 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

later, pilots flew an empty aircraft to Pueblo to pick up passengers and 

return them to Houston. Center officials stated that additional round trips 

were necessary to return the flight crew to their home station where they 

could be more productive performing other duties. Center officials stated 

that they did not include the two extra flight legs in their calculations of the 

variable costs associated with NASA’s passenger transportation because 

they classified these legs as crew training flights. Nonetheless, the costs 

incurred by these additional flights should be considered among the costs 

related to NASA’s passenger air transportation services. 

In addition to understatements of NASA’s variable costs, NASA’s flight-byflight cost comparisons were also flawed in that they increased the cost 

associated with flying commercially by using a largely unsupported 

multiplier of 2.5. NASA could not provide any specific NASA-related 

empirical evidence to validate use of the multiplier in its flight-by-flight 

justification process. NASA used this multiplier in addition to factors for 

time and salary costs accounted for in its cost-justification calculation. The 

use of a multiplier to increase the value of an employee’s time beyond his or 

her salary and fringe benefits is not expressly provided as part of OMB’s 

Circular No. A-126 guidance. Further, cognizant OMB officials told us that 

it was not their intent that agencies use any such multiplier (beyond the 

salary and fringe benefits associated with any time savings) in determining 

whether proposed flights were cost effective. They also stated they were 

not aware of any agencies using such a multiplier in their flight justification 

calculations. While NASA officials informed us that they had been using 

this multiplier for a number of years and that they believed it was a 

conservative factor, they did not provide any documentation demonstrating 

the appropriateness of the multiplier as it applies specifically to the 

experiences of NASA personnel who used these aircraft. Consequently, 

lacking such documentation, NASA’s use of a 2.5 multiplier improperly 

overstates the costs of commercial alternatives. 

The overall effect of understating NASA costs and overstating commercial 

costs in NASA’s flight-by-flight justifications was that NASA incorrectly 

approved individual flights as cost effective. For example, NASA justified 

one round trip from Kennedy Space Center, FL to Burbank, CA as cost 

effective, calculating a savings of $4,800. NASA calculated a cost savings 

for the flight because it used a 1998-based variable cost factor for the NASA 

plane of $964 per hour and also multiplied the travelers’ salary costs 

savings by the unsupported 2.5 multiplier. If the variable cost was updated 

to NASA’s 2004 estimate of $2,528 per hour for that aircraft and the 

unsupported multiplier was removed, the estimated variable costs 
Page 32 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

associated with the proposed NASA passenger aircraft flight would have 

exceeded estimated commercial airline costs by $17,408. Further, even 

after incorporating NASA’s unsupported estimate that employee fringe 

benefits increase employee direct salary costs by an additional 50 percent, 

the NASA aircraft variable costs for this flight would still have exceeded 

commercial costs by about $16,000.

NASA Procedures Not 

Effective in Consistently 

Identifying and Collecting 

Reimbursements from 

Nonofficial Travelers

NASA lacks procedures to consistently and effectively identify and recover 

the applicable costs of operating government aircraft when nonofficial 

passengers fly on NASA-owned or -chartered aircraft. As a result, 

nonofficial travelers were provided free transportation using NASA’s 

passenger aircraft services. However, because of the lack of procedures 

and documentation in place concerning the determination of the official 

status of travelers, we could not determine, and more importantly NASA 

could not determine, if any of the travelers should have, but did not, 

reimburse the government for the cost of their transportation.

According to OMB Circular No. A-126, travelers flying on a space-available 

basis on government aircraft for a purpose other than the conduct of 

official agency business generally must reimburse the government for the 

full coach fare.22 Reimbursement for travel at the government rate for the 

cost of coach tickets would have covered about one fifth of NASA’s 

reported costs associated with the use of NASA’s passenger aircraft 

services. 

However, NASA has not implemented agencywide policies and procedures 

to ensure that such travelers reimburse the government for the 

corresponding coach cost. Processes in place at each of the six centers to 

obtain reimbursements ranged from none at all to ad hoc procedures that 

essentially relied on individual travelers to identify and submit payments. 

For example, at one center, NASA’s procedures consisted of notifying 

NASA travelers of the need to obtain reimbursement from nonofficial 

travelers flying on the aircraft, but did not provide for any follow-up to 

monitor and collect the requisite amount from non-NASA travelers. 

For example, between September 2, 2004, and September 6, 2004, several 

Kennedy Space Center employees and their families and contractors and 

22Exceptions to required reimbursements are listed in section 9,c.
Page 33 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

their families used the center’s Gulfstream II aircraft to fly to Washington, 

D.C. in advance of Hurricane Francis. According to center officials, the 

center was required to evacuate the aircraft from the path of the 

approaching hurricane, and a decision was made to transport the 

contractor pilots, mechanics, and their families over 800 miles north to 

Washington. After flying the contractors and their families out of the area, 

the aircraft then returned to pick up other center management personnel, 

personnel associated with the aircraft management, and their families and 

flew them to Washington. A NASA official stated that at least one of the 

passengers on these flights should have reimbursed the government for a 

portion of the cost of their transportation. However, the official did not 

know if such reimbursement was obtained. 

NASA officials at two other centers stated that they have not obtained 

reimbursements or they had no documentation showing the extent to 

which reimbursements from nonofficial passengers on NASA flights were 

identified and obtained. In addition, we identified over 100 other travelers 

that NASA classified as dependents flying on NASA passenger aircraft that 

may have been nonofficial travelers. These passengers may have been 

required to reimburse NASA for a portion of the costs of their 

transportation. 

Conclusions As NASA strives to carry out its new vision for the future of the agency, 

using its resources as efficiently as possible will be a growing fiscal 

challenge. Operating what is essentially its own small passenger airline 

service, while potentially providing certain benefits to the agency and its 

employees, costs an estimated five times more than if commercial airlines 

were used to provide these services. Further, NASA’s ownership of aircraft 

to support essentially routine business operations is in direct conflict with 

OMB’s policy prohibition on such uses and passenger interviews which 

showed that in almost all cases, the travel could have been accomplished 

using commercial airlines.

NASA management has disagreed with, and taken only limited action with 

respect to similar prior audit recommendations in this area and insufficient 

management attention and agencywide oversight has allowed NASA to 

continue this costly program for decades. The cumulative effect has been 

failures in effectively justifying the extent to which such passenger aircraft 

services are needed to address critical, time-sensitive mission 

requirements, as well as effectively determining the extent to which these 

services could be accomplished without incurring the substantial, fixed 
Page 34 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

operation and maintenance costs associated with aircraft ownership. 

Immediate actions to dispose of all aircraft not needed to address mission 

requirements and adoption of more flexible, less costly alternatives to 

satisfy future mission requirements would best position NASA to meet its 

stewardship responsibilities for taxpayer funds it receives, and better 

enable it to meet its current fiscal challenges. 

Matters for 

Congressional 

Consideration

Congress should consider whether legislation is necessary to ensure that 

(1) NASA disposes of all of its passenger aircraft not used in accordance 

with OMB’s explicit policy prohibition against owning aircraft to support 

travel to routine site visits, meetings, speeches, and conferences; and (2) 

funding for future NASA passenger aircraft purchases and operations is 

restricted to those necessary to meet mission requirements consistent with 

OMB guidance. 

Recommendations To the extent that Congress determines that NASA should continue to 

retain aircraft or passenger aircraft charter services to provide passenger 

transportation, we recommend that the Administrator of NASA take the 

following six actions: 

• Establish policies and procedures for accumulating and reporting on its 

passenger aircraft services to provide complete and accurate 

agencywide cost and utilization data to support oversight and decision 

making on operating and retaining such aircraft services. 

• Clarify policies and procedures applicable to aircraft acquisition and 

retention to limit the number and type of aircraft owned and chartered 

for passenger transportation to those necessary to meet the “missionrequired” criteria in OMB guidance.

• Periodically assess the extent to which NASA has a continuing need to 

own aircraft to provide passenger transportation in support of mission 

requirements in accordance with OMB guidance.

• Maximize the use of flexible, cost-effective arrangements to meet 

mission-required passenger air transportation service needs in lieu of 

aircraft ownership.
Page 35 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

• Revise existing policies and procedures used to determine if individual 

flights are justified to include use of up-to-date variable costs and limit 

commercial cost estimates to include airfare, in-transit salaries and 

fringe benefits, and other costs directly related to reasonable estimates 

of delays incurred in meeting commercial airline flight schedules in 

accordance with OMB and GSA guidance. 

• Establish agencywide policies and procedures for identifying and 

recovering applicable costs associated with nonofficial personnel 

traveling using NASA passenger aircraft services on a reimbursable 

basis.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In its written comments, the NASA Administrator concurred with our 

recommendations and set out several actions to address identified 

deficiencies. Specifically, he said NASA would review its policies and 

procedures related to aircraft management to ensure they are aligned with 

OMB requirements and conduct a comprehensive study of the agency’s 

passenger aircraft operations to be completed by October 31, 2005. These 

actions are consistent with the intent of our recommendations to NASA 

and if carried out fully and effectively will help address the deficiencies we 

found.

If NASA's study referred to above is carried out effectively and fully 

considers the various matters discussed in this report, it should provide 

the Congress valuable information for deciding whether legislation may be 

needed on this matter. NASA’s comments on a draft of this report are 

reprinted in appendix II.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to interested 

congressional committees. We will also send copies of this report to the 

Office of Management and Budget and the General Services 

Administration. We will make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions regarding this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
Page 36 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Gregory D. Kutz

Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations
Page 37 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To assess reasonableness of costs, use, and agency oversight and 

management of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s 

(NASA) passenger aircraft services, we met with officials of NASA’s Office 

of Infrastructure and Administration Aircraft Management Office and 

appropriate officials at the Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas; 

Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama; Kennedy Space Center, 

Cape Canaveral, Florida; Wallops Flight Facility, Wallops Island, Virginia; 

and Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, California. We reviewed 

aircraft utilization and management reports prepared by NASA and its 

contractor and aircraft operations budget/cost information, including 

annual Aviation Financial Reports for fiscal years 2003 and 2004, Annual 

Aviation Report: Aircraft Performance for fiscal years 2003 and 2004, and 

NASA’s 2004 Mission Management Aircraft Fleet Plan. At each center, we 

observed and assessed the process for managing passenger aircraft 

services and scheduling and justifying costs for individual flights. We also 

reviewed available documentation supporting the various cost-justification 

factors and multipliers NASA used to estimate the variable costs of using 

its passenger aircraft as well as the alternative costs of using commercial 

airline transportation.

As part of our effort, we collected and compiled available flight-by-flight 

NASA passenger aircraft cost and usage data from NASA mission 

management aircraft request forms. These forms provided such 

descriptive data as dates and purpose for travel, itinerary, passengers, 

levels of approval, and cost justification for aircraft use. We asked for all 

documentation maintained at NASA centers for flights flown using NASA’s 

passenger aircraft services during fiscal years 2003 and 2004. We selected 

the most recently completed 2-year period because NASA’s regulations 

specify retaining source documents related to passenger aircraft usage for 

at least 2 years. While incomplete, we ultimately obtained some type of 

documentation indicating that NASA passenger aircraft services during this 

2-year period included about 1,500 flights. However, because of the limited 

amount of supporting documentation available for several hundred flights, 

we included only 1,188 flights in our analysis. For example, we could not 

use any of the approximate 200 flights from the Dryden Flight Research 

Center in our analysis because few of the requested documents included all 

the required usage and cost data necessary for such an analysis. To 

independently verify the reliability and completeness of individual flight 

source documentation maintained at NASA centers, we compared the 

NASA-provided flight information with information on NASA aircraft 

flights maintained by the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) 

Enhanced Traffic Management System and reconciled differences. Further, 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

while not included in our analysis, we obtained documentation showing 

that 2 of NASA’s aircraft classified as program support aircraft were also 

used to provide passenger transportation, we did not attempt to determine 

if any of NASA’s other program support or research aircraft may have also 

been used to provide passenger transportation as part of this audit. Also, 

we did not review the effectiveness of safety or maintenance programs 

related to NASA’s passenger aircraft services.

To analyze the relative costs of NASA’s passenger aircraft services 

compared to commercial airline costs, we relied primarily on available 

NASA cost data from NASA Aviation Financial Reports. We validated this 

data wherever feasible with comparable independent data sources 

including industry data. For example, we contacted the manufacturers of 

both types of passenger aircraft used by NASA to validate that the cost 

estimates used in our analysis were similar to the manufacturers’ cost 

metrics for operating those aircraft. We used fiscal year 2003 and 2004 cost 

data in annual Aviation Financial Reports reported by each center that 

operated one or more of NASA’s passenger aircraft and the costs NASA 

incurred for chartering passenger aircraft from other government agencies 

or contractors. At one center where reported cost data for passenger 

aircraft in the Aviation Financial Report were combined with data for other 

agency aircraft, we used annual budget data that were limited to passenger 

aircraft operations. At NASA headquarters, we used annual cost data 

provided by NASA because their annual Aviation Financial Reports did not 

contain costs associated with NASA’s use of Federal Aviation 

Administration aircraft. Finally, costs from NASA’s Report on the 

Fractional Aircraft Demonstration Program were used to determine the 

total cost of Flexjet flights. We used NASA Mission Management Aircraft 

Request forms to determine the estimated cost for flights taken on 

Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft. We then compared reported costs 

of NASA aircraft operations and aircraft charter costs with our estimates of 

travel costs that NASA would have incurred had the passengers who flew 

on NASA’s aircraft during our 2-year test period used commercial airline 

transportation instead. To estimate the commercial transportation costs of 

NASA employees who traveled using NASA’s passenger aircraft, we used 

the average commercial airline round-trip fare of $426 for all flights flown 

by NASA employees during this same time period as reported in a database 

of travel card transactions for NASA provided by NASA’s contractor, Bank
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

of America.1 This average commercial round-trip air fare estimate is 

intended to approximate NASA’s passenger transportation costs if it had 

used commercial airline services instead of its own services. As such, it 

may reflect amounts that in some cases would exceed NASA’s actual 

commercial costs. For example, to the extent to which unofficial travelers 

were included in estimates of passengers, commercial costs would be 

overstated. Conversely, in other cases our estimate may have 

underestimated NASA’s costs. For example, costs may have been 

understated to the extent that such travel involved passenger aircraft 

services to remote locations or locations with limited commercial air 

service.

To determine the number of travelers who flew on NASA-owned and 

-chartered aircraft during the 2-year period, we used the number of 

passengers identified on individual hard-copy flight manifest 

documentation NASA provided to us. During the course of our review, we 

became aware of additional flights flown at some centers for which we 

were not provided flight manifest documentation. However, we were 

unable to obtain and analyze documentation for these additional flights in 

time to complete our analysis. To the extent that the number of passengers 

on flights for which individual flight documentation was not provided to us, 

the estimate of commercial airfare costs is understated. At the Dryden 

Flight Research Center, where individual hard-copy flight documentation 

did not contain complete information, we used the number of passengers 

the center reported to NASA headquarters for inclusion in annual aircraft 

performance reports.

We did not use the numbers of passengers reported for all centers because 

the centers reported their passenger counts inconsistently and we were 

unable to validate them. Although the number of passengers reported on 

individual flight manifests often included passengers who flew only one 

way or on one or more legs of the trip, we counted these partial-trip 

1

 To compute an average commercial round-trip air ticket cost, we used Bank of America’s 

Travel Card Air Transactions database for NASA to develop a population of round-trip 

commercial nonpremium class airline ticket purchases (debit transactions) during the 

period covering October 1, 2002, through September 30, 2004. In total, the nonpremium 

class airline ticket population consisted of 116,865 tickets, totaling approximately 

$49,775,733. Using this amount, we computed the average cost of a commercial, round-trip, 

nonpremium class airline ticket to be approximately $426 per ticket. We validated the 

Bank’s transaction database with comparable data reported by publicly available GSA travel 

card information and found the data, both in numbers of transactions and value, to be 

sufficiently reliable.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

passengers as having flown round-trip for purposes of estimating the 

commercial costs of passengers flown on NASA’s aircraft. Consequently, in 

this respect, our estimated savings are likely to be understated in that 

including these partial-trip passengers in the total number of passengers 

overstated our estimate of airfare costs that NASA would have incurred 

had the passengers traveled on commercial airlines. Conversely, our 

estimated savings may be overstated because our estimated commercial 

travel costs did not include additional lodging and other incidental costs 

that travelers would periodically incur and salary costs for additional lost 

work time.

To estimate the lost work time associated with commercial airline travel, 

including salary and benefit costs, per diem, rental cars, commercial 

tickets, and other costs, we utilized cost estimates included in NASA 

individual flight request forms. For the 1,188 flights for which we received 

data, we used NASA’s estimates for salary costs multiplied by lost work 

hours, number of travelers, and NASA’s benefit factor of .5. Because 

accounting for fringe benefit costs was recognized in OMB guidance, while 

unsupported, we used NASA’s estimated fringe benefits factor of .5 to 

increase passengers’ salary costs. In addition to salary costs, we also 

included available NASA estimates for additional per diem, commercial 

tickets, rental cars, and other travel costs associated with lost work time 

from using commercial airline services. For one aircraft, we did not 

receive any flight justification cost estimates. Instead, the location 

operating the aircraft had developed standard calculations for the average 

commercial cost for their two common flight patterns. We averaged the 

estimated commercial cost for the two flight patterns to determine the 

average cost savings per traveler for the aircraft. We then multiplied the 

commercial cost by the number of travelers NASA reported for the aircraft 

during fiscal years 2003 and 2004 to determine the total commercial cost of 

transportation for travelers on the aircraft. 

To assess whether NASA aircraft were operated and retained in accordance 

with applicable governmentwide guidance, we primarily reviewed the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-126, Improving 

the Management and Use of Government Aircraft; and Circular No. A-76 

(Revised), Performance of Commercial Activities. We also reviewed 

applicable governmentwide guidance in OMB Circular No. A-11, 

Preparation, Submission and Execution of the Budget Part 7: Planning, 

Budgeting, Acquisition and Management of Capital Assets (Revised June 

2005); General Services Administration’s (GSA) Federal Property 

Management Regulations, 41 C.F.R. Subtitle C; and Federal Travel 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Regulations, 41 C.F.R. Subtitle F. We also reviewed NASA’s implementing 

publications, NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 7900.4B, NASA Aircraft 

Operations Management (April 2004); NASA Policy Regulation (NPR) 

7900.3A, Aircraft Operations Management (April 1999); and centerspecific implementing instructions. We held discussions regarding these 

policies and procedures with officials of OMB’s Office of Federal 

Procurement Policy, Transportation/GSA Branch, and Science and Space 

Branch; GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy; and NASA’s Office of 

General Counsel and NASA Center and program managers. 

At each center, while we observed the process for managing aircraft 

operations and scheduling and justifying individual flights, we interviewed 

managers and program officials to discuss the importance to which they 

assessed the need and justification for owning/leasing passenger aircraft. 

We analyzed the purpose cited by NASA for individual flights flown during 

our 2-year test period to determine whether NASA’s stated purpose 

complied with criteria established in OMB and GSA guidance. We 

interviewed agency personnel who requested, approved, and/or were 

passengers on approximately 80 flights during our 2-year test period to 

ensure that we understood the purpose for the flights and the basis for 

utilizing NASA’s aircraft. We did not assess the adequacy of safety or 

maintenance programs related to NASA’s passenger aircraft. Further, we 

did not attempt to determine the validity or appropriateness of travel using 

NASA’s passenger aircraft, nor did we assess if the type and number of 

personnel on the NASA passenger aircraft were appropriate given the 

stated flight purposes. 

To assess the effectiveness of NASA’s oversight and management of its 

passenger aircraft operations, we held discussions with appropriate 

aircraft management officials at NASA headquarters and centers operating 

passenger aircraft. We also identified and assessed (1) NASA’s 

implementing policies and procedures with respect to OMB and GSA policy 

guidance, (2) the process used to approve and document passenger aircraft 

utilization, (3) associated aircraft management reports, (4) other recent 

assessments and studies done with respect to NASA passenger aircraft 

services, and (5) the extent to which accurate, current agencywide data 

were available to agency managers for day-to-day decision making on 

passenger aircraft usage and costs. 

We briefed NASA officials on the details of our audit, including findings and 

their implications. On June 28, 2005, we requested comments on a draft on 

this report. We received comments on July 28, 2005, and have summarized 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 42 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

those comments in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section of 

this report. NASA’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. We conducted 

our work from November 2004 through June 2005 in accordance with U.S. 

generally accepted government auditing standards and quality standards 

for investigations as set forth by the President’s Council on Integrity and 

Efficiency. 
Page 43 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Appendix II

Comments from the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration ApendxiI
Page 44 GAO-05-818 NASA Aircraft

Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Gregory D. Kutz

Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Mario L. Artesiano, James D. Berry, 

Fannie M. Bivins, Latasha L. Brown, Matthew S. Brown, Harold J. Brumm, 

Carey L. Downs, Richard T. Cambosos, Francine M. Delvechio, Francis L. 

Dymond, Dennis B. Fauber, Geoffrey B. Frank, Diane G. Handley, Alison A. 

Heafitz, Christine A. Hodakievic, Jason M. Kelly, Jonathan T. Meyer, George 

J. Ogilvie, James W. Pittrizzi, Kristen M. Plungas, John J. Ryan, Sidney H. 

Schwartz, Joan K. Vogel, and Leonard E. Zapata also made key 

contributions.

(192163)
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