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24–536 PDF 2005

S. HRG. 109–178

NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM IN THE

MARSHALL ISLANDS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

EFFECTS OF U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM IN THE MARSHALL 

ISLANDS

JULY 19, 2005

(

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, Chairman 

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho 

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

RICHARD M. BURR, North Carolina, 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey 

KEN SALAZAR, Colorado

ALEX FLINT, Staff Director 

JUDITH K. PENSABENE, Chief Counsel 

BOB SIMON, Democratic Staff Director 

SAM FOWLER, Democratic Chief Counsel 

JOSH JOHNSON, Professional Staff Member 

AL STAYMAN, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS 

Page

Akaka, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii .............................................. 1

Faleomavaega, Hon. Eni, Delegate from American Samoa .................................. 16

Krawitz, Howard M., Director of Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Island 

Affairs, U.S. State Department ........................................................................... 2

Lum, Thomas, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service ...... 47

Mabuchi, Dr. Kiyohiko, Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics, National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health, Department of 

Health and Human Services ............................................................................... 6

Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska ................................................ 11

Palafox, Dr. Neal A., MD, MPH, Professor and Chair, Department of Family 

Medicine and Community Health, John A. Burns School of Medicine, University of Hwaii .................................................................................................... 40

Plasman, James H., Chairman, Nuclear Claims Tribunal, Republic of the 

Marshall Islands .................................................................................................. 33

Simon, Steven L., Ph.D., Scientist ......................................................................... 51

Yamamura, Hiroshi V., Senator, Republic of the Marshall Islands .................... 30

Zackios, Gerald M., Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Marshall 

Islands ................................................................................................................... 21

APPENDIXES 

APPENDIX I 

Responses to additional questions .......................................................................... 61

APPENDIX II 

Additional material submitted for the record ........................................................ 85

(1)

NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM IN THE 

MARSHALL ISLANDS 

TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room SD–

366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. AKAKA,

U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII 

Senator AKAKA. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources will be in order. 

I regret that Senators Domenici and Bingaman are unable to attend our hearing this afternoon because of the House Senate Conference Committee on National Energy Legislation which is now 

underway. And I was there and was able to come back here to 

chair this hearing. 

I would like to welcome all of you here on their behalf and to extend their apologies for this unavoidable conflict. 

I know that many of you have traveled very, very far to be here 

and I am sure you all agree that this is important that we proceed 

with the hearing so that the committee can move forward on this 

important issue as soon as possible. 

The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program in the Marshall Islands has caused major damage in Enewetak and Bikini, contaminated other northern atolls, and caused cancers and other illnesses 

among hundreds of Marshall islanders. 

While there was a legal settlement of claims approved under the 

Compact of Free Association in 1986, that agreement left open the 

opportunity for the Marshall Islands to seek additional compensation if there are changed circumstances that render that settlement 

inadequate. 

In addition, Congress authorized further ex gratia assistance as 

authorized by section 105(c) of the Compact and has provided over 

$215 million for further health care, agricultural assistance, cleanup, and resettlement. 

Since the 1960’s, this committee has worked with the Marshall 

Islands and the administration to respond to the legitimate needs 

of the communities affected. And I hope that today the committee, 

administration, and Marshall Islands will establish a basis to continue to work together to address the legitimate needs of those affected. 

2

In the year 2000, the Marshall Islands submitted a petition to 

the Congress seeking additional assistance in five areas: Health 

care; personal injury; loss of use; cleanup; and expanded program 

assistance in areas of health and environmental monitoring. 

I thank our witnesses for coming today. We have several world 

experts on conditions in the Marshall Islands and others who have 

traveled thousands of miles to be here. 

I particularly want to thank those from the CRS who have assisted the committee in analyzing the enormous amount of technical information. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Our first panel will 

be the representatives from the Departments of State and Energy 

and our witness from the National Cancer Institute. I ask that 

these witnesses remain until the end of the hearing to be available 

to respond to questions. 

I ask that all witnesses summarize their statement to 5 minutes 

or less. Your entire statements will be made a part of the record. 

I would like to start with Mr. Krawitz. 

STATEMENT OF HOWARD M. KRAWITZ, DIRECTOR OF AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND PACIFIC ISLAND AFFAIRS, U.S. 

STATE DEPARTMENT 

Mr. KRAWITZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting 

me here today. It is a pleasure to be able to speak with you on this 

issue. 

As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the United States carried out 

67 nuclear tests in the northern Marshall Islands between 1946 

and 1958. The United States greatly regrets the damage this testing caused, especially the 1954 BRAVO action that affected some 

253 people. 

The United States was and still is concerned about the health 

and well-being of the Marshall Islands people and the environment. 

In the 1950’s, the United States began programs to monitor and 

remediate the effects of these tests. We added programs in the 

1960’s, the 1970’s, the 1980’s which continue to address these problems today. 

Since the 1950’s, we have spent hundreds of millions on environmental and health problems related to nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands. The administration report to Congress describes in 

detail money spent on environmental remediation, past and 

present, and medical care for Marshall Islanders. 

Section 177 of the 1986 United States/Republic of the Marshall 

of Islands Compact of Free Association, which is still in force today, 

fully settled all claims, past, present, and future, related to our nuclear test program. 

As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, article 9 of the section 177 settlement, the changed circumstances provisions, so called, defines 

conditions under which the Republic of the Marshall Islands government may ask Congress to consider additional compensation for 

nuclear test-related injuries. Article 9 neither guarantees additional compensation nor commits Congress to authorize or appropriate funds. 

In 2000, the Marshall Islands government asked for $3 billion in 

additional compensation. Congress asked the administration to 

3

evaluate this request. The State Department convened a working 

group of some ten U.S. Government department and technical 

agencies to review existing scientific studies of nuclear testing’s impact on the Republic of the Marshall Islands. 

The group concluded that the submission does not meet the 

changed circumstances criteria defined in article 9 and that there 

is no legal basis under the settlement for considering additional 

payments. State reported the administration’s conclusions to Congress in January 2005. 

I want to end my brief testimony with a very important point. 

The administration was asked to evaluate a specific issue, does the 

request of the Marshall Islands government qualify as changed circumstances under article 9 of the section 177 settlement agreement. 

Our report addresses only that issue. It does not look at overall 

United States/Marshall Islands’ relations, our shared history, or 

the common values that make our friendship strong. Nuclear issues 

are but one aspect of our relationship. 

The Republic of the Marshall Islands received hundreds of millions in Compact dollars during the first 18 years of free association, roughly 1986 to 2004. The amended Compact makes health 

care a primary focus. The United States and the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands will spend some $16 million in Compact funds on 

health care in 2005 and similar amounts in each of the next several years. 

The amended Compact set up a trust fund to give the Republic 

of the Marshall Islands a source of income after grant assistance 

ends. The United States will provide over $1.2 billion in direct assistance and trust fund contributions over the next 20 years. 

The administration recognizes there are serious and continuing 

public health and medical challenges. The Republic of the Marshall 

Islands is eligible for many health and human services, departments of public health grant programs just as U.S. States and territories are. 

The Interior Department provides targeted assistance. The Energy Department provides monitoring and specialized medical care. 

The State Department stands ready to serve as the foreign policy 

bridge that unifies these and other elements in cooperation on 

issues of mutual concern. 

The Republic of the Marshall Islands is our global partner and 

valued friend. We remain committed to building a better future for 

the people of the Marshall Islands. We look forward to continuing 

to work together on a host of issues of mutual concern to both our 

nations. 

This concludes my brief testimony for today. I will be happy to 

take questions now or at the end of Dr. Mabuchi’s remarks if you 

would like me to wait till then. 

Unfortunately, I am afraid I am going to have to ask the committee to dismiss me after Dr. Mabuchi’s remarks and any other 

questions that you might have for the two of us. However, one of 

my staff will remain behind to take any additional questions and 

we will endeavor to get back to you in writing within 24 hours. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to make this brief 

statement today. 

4

[The prepared statement of Mr. Krawitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HOWARD M. KRAWITZ, DIRECTOR OF AUSTRALIA, NEW

ZEALAND AND PACIFIC ISLAND AFFAIRS, U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

Chairman Domenici, Senator Bingaman, distinguished Senators, thank you very 

much for the chance to speak with you today about the important topic of the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ Changed Circumstances Request 

and the Administration’s report prepared at the request of the Congress. 

I will start with a brief historical overview. The United States carried out sixtyseven underwater, surface and atmospheric nuclear tests on and near the Bikini 

and Enewetak atolls in the northern Marshall Islands between 1946 and 1958, 

while they were part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The United States 

still deeply regrets the 1954 ‘‘Bravo’’ accident that harmed 253 downwind islanders. 

We remain concerned about the damage done to the people and environment of the 

Marshall Islands caused by the nuclear tests in the 1940’s and 1950’s. 

The U.S. Government established programs for the people of the Marshall Islands 

to monitor and remediate the effects of those tests beginning in the 1950’s, with additional programs created in the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s. We remain engaged in 

addressing these problems. The United States has spent more than $531 million for 

health and environmental remediation specifically related to the nuclear testing program since the 1950’s. That assistance is worth over $837 million in 2003 dollars. 

Our colleagues in the Department of Energy continue to provide a superior level of 

health care service for those people directly affected by the nuclear tests, and have 

in fact provided health care to other populations as well for many years. The Administration’s report in January outlines in great detail in an appendix the hundreds 

of millions of dollars the United States has spent in past and present U.S. remediation efforts. 

In the 1980’s, the United States and the Marshall Islands negotiated the Compact 

of Free Association, which went into effect on October 21, 1986 (PL 99-239 Stat. 

1770). The Compact included a ‘‘full settlement of all claims, past, present and future’’ resulting from the U.S. nuclear testing program. This Section 177 Settlement 

Agreement provided $150 million to the Marshall Islands to establish a Nuclear 

Claims Fund and an independent Nuclear Claims Tribunal to adjudicate all claims. 

Article IX of the Section 177 Settlement Agreement, entitled ‘‘Changed Circumstances,’’ is the only provision for the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) to request the United States Congress to consider additional 

compensation for injuries resulting from the nuclear tests. In order to be the subject 

of such a request to Congress under Article IX, an injury:

1. must be loss or damage to property and person of the citizens of the Marshall Islands; 

2. must result from the Nuclear Testing Program; 

3. must arise or be discovered after the effective date of the Agreement (October 21, 1986); 

4. must be injuries that were not and could not reasonably have been identified as of the effective date of the Agreement; and 

5. such injuries must render the provisions of the Section 177 Settlement 

Agreement manifestly inadequate.

In Article IX, the Governments of the Marshall Islands and the United States also 

noted: ‘‘It is understood that this Article does not commit the Congress of the United 

States to authorize and appropriate funds.’’

In 2000, citing Article IX of the Section 177 Settlement Agreement, the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands submitted to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a request that certain claims 

totaling over $3 billion be considered by the Congress for compensation. In March 

2002, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the House Resources Committee formally asked the Administration to evaluate the RMI’s request. Over the following months, the State Department convened a working group 

of U.S. Government departments and technical agencies that carefully and methodically reviewed the request and the existing scientific studies of the impact of nuclear 

testing in the Marshall Islands. 

On January 4, 2005, the State Department submitted the Administration’s evaluation to Chairman Domenici, Senator Bingaman, Chairman Pombo and Congressman Rahall. The RMI’s submission to Congress did not meet the criteria of ‘‘changed 

circumstances’’ as required by Article IX of the Section 177 Settlement Agreement, 

and there is therefore no legal basis under the Settlement Agreement for considVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:44 Nov 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 R:\DOCS\24-536 SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
5

ering additional payments. I am submitting a copy of the complete Administration 

report as an attachment to this testimony for the record. 

Let me briefly address the major areas in which the RMI argues ‘‘changed circumstances.’’ First, the RMI asserts that exposure to radioactive fallout significantly 

affected an area well beyond the northern atolls and islands. The vast majority of 

scientific evidence, however, documents that the elevated levels of radiation are limited to the most northerly atolls and islands, and that even many historically inhabited northern islands can be resettled under specific conditions. At the time of the 

Section 177 Settlement Agreement, the Marshall Islands acknowledged that, within 

the northern atolls, some islands would be less habitable than others and some 

would only have limited use. The Government of the Marshall Islands took the responsibility to control the use of areas in the Marshall Islands affected by nuclear 

tests. 

Second, the RMI seeks comprehensive primary, secondary and tertiary health care 

systems to serve all the people of the Marshall Islands for fifty years. This argument draws an unsubstantiated link between current public health and medical 

problems in the Marshall Islands and the U.S. nuclear testing program. In fact, the 

United States has provided extensive medical care to the populations living on the 

atolls where testing occurred. The Section 177 Settlement Agreement provided $2 

million per year for 15 years from the Nuclear Claims Fund to provide medical care 

to the people of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrik atolls. The estimated population of the four atolls in 1954 was approximately 500 people. That program currently serves 13,460 people, fully one-quarter of the national population. Due to subsequent Congressional action, these communities are receiving similar services 

through a grant from the Department of the Interior through September 30, 2005. 

In addition, starting in 1954, Congress mandated a special medical program for 

the members of the population of Rongelap and Utrik who were exposed to radiation 

resulting from the 1954 ‘‘Bravo’’ test (253 people). This program is run by the Department of Energy. Neither the Section 177 Settlement Agreement nor the larger 

Compact envisioned the United States providing comprehensive health care for all 

the people of the Marshall Islands indefinitely, and there is no basis under Article 

IX to request such a program. 

Regarding three other categories personal injury, loss of land use and hardship, 

and atoll rehabilitation the RMI claims as ‘‘changed circumstances’’ the fact that the 

Nuclear Claims Fund has had a mixed earnings record and that the Nuclear Claims 

Tribunal, set up and run by the Marshall Islands, has chosen to award more funds 

than generated by the Nuclear Claims Fund. The Tribunal’s decisions to set award 

amounts well above the amount of funds available in the Nuclear Claims Fund do 

not constitute ‘‘changed circumstances’’ under Article IX of the Section 177 Settlement Agreement. 

The final broad category of RMI claims includes occupational safety, nuclear stewardship and education. The Governments of the Marshall Islands and the United 

States decided not to include those types of programs in the Section 177 Settlement 

Agreement. The lack of those programs and the desire to have such programs are 

not ‘‘changed circumstances’’ as defined in the Settlement Agreement. 

I would like to close by underscoring an important point. The Administration’s report evaluated the specific question of whether the Government of the Republic of 

the Marshall Islands’ submission qualified as ‘‘changed circumstances’’ under Article 

IX of the Section 177 Settlement Agreement. The Administration’s report does not 

describe the overall relationship between the United States and the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands. Shared history and common values make our friendship with the 

Marshall Islands one of the strongest in the world. 

The history of the nuclear testing program and the settlement of claims arising 

from that program are but one facet of the unique and longstanding friendship our 

two nations enjoy, a relationship of mutual understanding and shared values that 

remains strong today. The Compact of Free Association of 1986 and the amendments that went into effect just last year link our two nations together for the foreseeable future and guarantee direct U.S. assistance to the RMI for twenty years. 

Under the amended Compact, our two nations have established a trust fund to provide an ongoing source of income for the RMI after Compact assistance ends to be 

used for the same purposes as current assistance. The amended Compact highlights 

health care as one of the two primary focus areas out of six sectors for assistance 

grants. For 2005, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the United States have 

agreed to spend nearly $16 million on health care using Compact funds, and we 

project similar amounts for each of the next several years. Hundreds of millions of 

dollars in Compact funds flowed to the RMI during the first eighteen years of free 

association (1986-2004), and over the next twenty years under the amended Compact, the United States is committed to spend over $1.2 billion in direct assistance 

6

and trust fund contributions. The RMI also remains eligible for a number of categorical and competitive public health grant programs administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in the same way as U.S. states and territories. 

The Administration recognizes serious and continuing public health and medical 

challenges in the Marshall Islands and supports the Government’s efforts to meet 

those challenges. The Republic of the Marshall Islands is a global partner and a valued friend, and the United States will, through the Compact and other means, remain engaged and committed to building a better future for the people of the Marshall Islands. We look forward to continuing to work together on a host of issues 

of mutual concern to both our nations. 

Thank you very much for this opportunity.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Krawitz, for your 

statement. And just so others know, you are the acting assistant 

secretary for East Asia and Pacific in the U.S. State Department. 

And I would like to now call on Dr. Kiyohiko Mabuchi from the 

National Cancer Institute, U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services. 

Would you please proceed with your statement. 

STATEMENT OF DR. KIYOHIKO MABUCHI, DIVISION OF CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY AND GENETICS, NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT 

OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

Dr. MABUCHI. Senator Akaka and members of the Committee on 

Energy and Natural Resources, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify on behalf of the National Cancer Institute, of the National 

Institutes of Health, and Agency of the U.S. Department of Health 

and Human Services. 

My testimony will describe the findings from the October 2004 

correspondence with this committee and some of the scientific uncertainties associated with our findings. I have submitted my full 

statement for the record. 

Last summer, this committee asked NCI for its expert opinion on 

the estimated number of baseline cancers and radiation-related illnesses from nuclear weapons testing in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. The NCI provided this committee with the following 

estimates: 

About 5,600 baseline cancer cases, that is those which are expected to occur in the absence of exposure to fallout, may develop 

within the lifetime of the cohort alive during the test years 1946 

to 1958, within an estimated population size of about 14,000. And 

half of those baseline cases have already occurred. 

In addition, about 500 cancers may develop as a result of exposure to fallout radiation. Hence, exposure to fallout could result in 

about a 9-percent increase in the total number of fatal and nonfatal 

cancers to be expected. 

We estimate that the thyroid gland was the most heavily exposed 

organ because it is the target for radioactive iodines, a major component of fallout. Of the estimated additional 500 fallout-related 

cancers, approximately 260 are expected to be thyroid cancers. 

We expect that about 400 of the estimated additional 500 radiation-related cancers will occur in 35 percent of the population who 

were under 10 years of age when exposure occurred. 

It should be recognized that the estimated numbers of cancers to 

be expected are highly uncertain because, one, dose estimates are 

uncertain; two, baseline cancer rates are approximate; and three, 

7

organ-specific doses estimated for some atolls are so high that simple extrapolations based on experiences of other irradiated population may not be appropriate. 

However, the doses were estimated so as to avoid significant 

underestimation of the number of radiation-related cancers expected to occur. 

I would like to bring to your attention the assumptions and uncertainties that were factored into our estimates. 

First, in the absence of population-based baseline cancer rates for 

the Republic of Marshall Islands, the baseline rates representative 

of native Hawaiians were used as a surrogate. 

Two, the dose models were developed in an unrefined fashion. 

They are based, however, on our years of experience and understanding of radiation dosimetry and weapons fallout. We used as 

input data that were available to us, including monitoring data 

from the 1950’s. 

While nearly one-third of the excess radiation- related cancers 

projected for the entire Republic of Marshall Islands could be attributed to cancers on Rongelap and Ailinginae, we must emphasize that because of the extremely high radiation doses received at 

those two atolls, current risk-projection models are likely to overpredict incidence. 

What NCI did was first perform the dose reconstruction for the 

entire Marshall Islands from available exposure data, and then develop risk assessment from mathematical tools not refined until 

2003. 

Nevertheless, there are a large number of uncertainties associated with our estimates, only some of which could be reduced in 

the framework of a more comprehensive study. In the long run, 

this will require a large, multidisciplinary effort undertaken over 

several years at considerable cost. 

The decision whether to move forward with such a study must 

be made with the understanding that the likelihood of reducing significantly the uncertainty regarding the total number of excess cancers is quite small. 

The incremental information thus gained will be of little practical significance in terms of public health management in the Marshall Islands. The NCI, therefore, does not believe that a comprehensive study should be conducted. 

In the short term, NCI plans to submit the dosimetry and epidemiologic methods used to obtain this set of estimates to peer review for publication in the scientific literature. In this way, our 

work can be verified, refined, and employed by others who take an 

interest in the welfare of the islanders. 

I hope this information about the development of NCI’s estimates 

for baseline cancer incidence and radiation-related cancer risk in 

the population of the Marshall Islands has been helpful to you. I 

would be pleased to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mabuchi follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KIYOHIKO MABUCHI, M.D., DR.P.H., DIVISION OF CANCER

EPIDEMIOLOGY AND GENETICS, NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Chairman Domenici and Members of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the National Cancer 

8

1SEER: NCI’s Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results (http://seer.cancer.gov/about/) currently collects and publishes cancer incidence and survival data from 14 population-based cancer 

registries, including the state of Hawaii, and three supplemental registries covering approximately 26 percent of the U.S. population. 

Institute (NCI) of the National Institutes of Health, an agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. I am Kiyohiko Mabuchi, M.D., Dr.P.H., an Expert with the NCI’s Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics Radiation Epidemiology Branch. My testimony will describe the findings from NCI’s October 2004 

correspondence with this Committee, discussed below, and will describe some of the 

scientific uncertainties associated with our findings. 

Last summer, this Committee asked NCI for ‘‘its expert opinion’’ on the estimated 

number of baseline cancers and radiation-related illnesses from nuclear weapons 

testing in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Our Division was tasked with developing this response because of our robust research program in radiation epidemiology, dose reconstruction, and risk estimation. 

We developed unrefined estimates of radiation doses and numbers of radiationinduced cancers, based on: (1) measurements of Iodine-131 (I-131) in the urine of 

adults from two islands, Rongelap and Ailinginae, collected after the test BRAVO 

in 1954; (2) measurements of the contents of Cesium-137 (Cs-137) and other radionuclides in the body of inhabitants of Rongelap and of Utrik who returned to their 

atolls in 1954 and 1957; and (3) environmental measurement data on radionuclide 

deposition provided for all atolls by the Marshall Islands-sponsored radiological survey completed in 1994. We combined these elements with a standard analytic approach to develop basic answers about cancer incidence. This is, to our knowledge, 

the first time radiation doses and numbers of radiation-induced cancers have been 

estimated in a systematic manner over the entirety of the territory of the Marshall 

Islands. 

The NCI Director, Dr. Andrew von Eschenbach, sent his reply to this Committee 

with the following estimates:

• About 5600 baseline cancer cases (i.e., those which are expected to occur, in the 

absence of exposure to fallout) may develop within the lifetime of the cohort 

alive during the test years 1946-1957, with an estimated population size of 

13,940. About half of those baseline cases, approximately 2800, have already occurred. 

• In addition, about 500 cancers may develop as a result of exposure to fallout 

radiation. Hence, exposure to fallout could result in about a 9 percent increase 

to about 6100 in the total number of fatal and nonfatal cancers expected. 

• We estimate that the thyroid gland was the most heavily exposed organ because 

it is the target organ for radioactive iodine, a major component of fallout. Of 

the estimated additional 500 fallout-related cancers, approximately 260 cases 

are expected to be thyroid cancer. 

• We expect that about 400 out of the estimated additional 500 radiation-related 

cancer cases will occur in the 35 percent of the population who were under 10 

years old when exposed to fallout. Since members of this age group are now between ages 50-60, almost all of those cancers are likely to have occurred by the 

end of the next few decades. 

• Higher excess cancer rates are expected in the populations exposed to the highest doses that lived in the northern atolls.

Estimation of diseases other than cancer has not been made. Such work would 

require expertise and data not readily available in NCI. 

To obtain the cancer risk figures I have presented, three calculations had to be 

made: we estimated doses, then baseline cancer rates, and derived radiation risks 

from epidemiologic studies of various irradiated populations. It should be recognized 

that the estimated numbers of cancers to be expected are highly uncertain, because: 

(1) dose estimates are uncertain; (2) baseline cancer rates are approximate; and (3) 

organ-specific doses estimated for some atolls are so high that simple extrapolations 

based on the experiences of other irradiated populations, such as A-bomb survivors, 

may not be appropriate. However, the doses were estimated so as to avoid significant under-estimation of the numbers of radiation-related cancers expected to occur. 

I would like to bring to your attention the assumptions and uncertainties factored 

into our estimates:

• In the absence of registry-based baseline cancer rates for the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands, the NCI Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results Program (SEER) 1 rates representative of native Hawaiians were used as a surrogate. 

9

• Dose models were developed in an unrefined fashion. They are, however, based 

on our years of experience and understanding of radiation dosimetry and weapons fallout. We used as input data all that were available to us, including monitoring data from the 1950s. 

• To present the best figures for this particular request, we made assumptions 

that likely have led to over-estimates of the average doses received and of the 

number of projected radiation-related cancers. For example, we assumed a population size from the 1958 census, even though most of the exposure was received years before when the population is believed to have been smaller. Lifetime cancer risks from radiation exposure were then estimated using risk projection models developed over many years at the NCI. 

• While nearly one-third of the excess radiation-related cancers projected for the 

entire RMI could be attributed to cases on Rongelap and Ailinginae, we must 

emphasize that, because of the extremely high radiation doses received at those 

two atolls, current risk-projection models are likely to over-predict incidence. 

Since lifetime risk is generally proportional to dose, the assessment of lifetime 

risk for persons who received particularly high doses generates an estimate that 

all such persons will develop a radiation-related disease. Since we cannot say 

for certain that will be the case, the estimated numbers of radiation-related cancers over the whole nation should be treated as an upper limit of cases.

As NCI wrote in its response to this Committee’s questions, there is a large library of published scientific literature and estimation tools, many of which we used 

to develop unrefined dose and risk estimates for the exposed populations. What NCI 

did last summer was to perform the first dose-reconstruction for the entire Marshall 

Islands from available exposure data, and then develop risk assessment from mathematical tools not refined until 2003. Nevertheless, there are a large number of uncertainties associated with our estimates, only some of which could be reduced in 

the framework of a comprehensive study. In the long run, this would require a 

large, multidisciplinary effort undertaken over several years at considerable cost. 

The decision whether to move forward with such a study must be made with the 

understanding that the likelihood of reducing significantly the uncertainty regarding the total number of excess cancers is quite small. The incremental information 

thus gained would be of little practical significance in terms of public health management in the Marshall Islands. The NCI, therefore, does not believe that a comprehensive study should be conducted. 

In the short term, NCI plans to submit the dosimetry and epidemiologic methods 

used to obtain this set of estimates to peer-review for publication in the scientific 

literature. In this way, our work can be verified, refined, and employed by others 

who take an interest in the welfare of the Islanders. 

I hope this information about the development of NCI’s estimates for baseline cancer incidence and radiation-related cancer risks in the population of the Marshall 

Islands has been helpful to you. I would be pleased to answer your questions.

ESTIMATED ROUNDED NUMBERS OF CANCERS IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE 

MARSHALL ISLANDS 

Time period 

1946-2003 2004 and 

future years Lifetime 

Thyroid cancers 

Without fallout .............................................. 100 30 130

Due to fallout ................................................. 160 100 260

Total ............................................................ 260 130 390

Increase due to fallout ............................... 160% 330% 200%

All cancers 

Without fallout .............................................. 2,740 2,860 5,600

Due to fallout ................................................. 240 290 530

Total ............................................................ 2,980 3,150 6,130

Increase due to fallout ............................... 9% 10% 9%

10

ESTIMATED EXCESS (RADIATION RELATED) CANCERS BY ATOLL GROUP AND ORGAN 

Rongelap, 

Ailinginae Utrik 

Other 

northern 

atolls 2

Southern atolls Totals (number 

of baseline cancers in parentheses) Low expo- sure atolls 3 Very low exposure atolls 4

Population size 1 ................................................................................ 82 157 2,005 3,834 7,862 13,940

Leukemia ........................................................................................... 1.5 0.61 2.1 0.44 0.27 5 (123) 

Thyroid ............................................................................................... 5 43 46 132 26 15 262 (127) 

Stomach .............................................................................................. 8.4 1.4 4.4 0.69 0.37 15 (326) Colon .................................................................................................. 5 64 31 49 9.2 4.0 157 (470) Other cancers ..................................................................................... 31 8.5 39 8.6 5.9 93 (4550) All Cancers combined (rounded totals) ............................................ 6 148 87 227 44 26 532 (5596) 

1 Estimated from 1958 census (except for evacuated populations) as described in text. 2 Ailuk, Mejit, Likiep, Wotho, Wotje, Ujelang. 3Lae, Kwajalein, Maloelap, Namu, Arno, Mili. 4Lib, Aur, Ailinglaplap, Majuro, Ujae, Kili, Jaluit, Namorik, Ebon. 5 Based on linear-model estimates applied to doses far higher than those in other studied populations, and therefore the estimate of excess cases is likely to be 

a rough upper bound (see text). This caveat is less applicable to estimates for Utrik, and does not apply to the other atolls (see Table 1 for average doses by atoll). 6 Estimated number of cancers exceeds number of exposed. 

11

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Dr. Mabuchi. 

Before we ask you questions, I would like to have Senator Murkowski make any remarks that she may have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR

FROM ALASKA 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Senator AKAKA. I appreciate 

the opportunity and I do not want to take a lot of time because we 

do have other members to the panel. 

This is my first hearing as a member of the Senate Energy Committee on these issues that stem from U.S. nuclear testing in the 

Marshall Islands, but it is something that as an Alaskan, we have 

been following as we have worked through certain of our issues as 

they related to testing in Alaska, specifically on Amchitka Island. 

And as we have gone through our efforts to provide compensation 

for those who were exposed to radiation at the time, we have found 

that, quite honestly, the benefits that were provided were insufficient. And so we have passed legislation recently to provide for additional assistance to Americans who had suffered these illness 

caused by radiation as a result of these weapons tests. 

So my presence here today is to indicate to you certainly a level 

of interest in terms of what is going on, whether or not we here 

in Congress are providing compensation that is adequate. I am 

truly here in a listening mode today to determine what it is that 

we need to do, whether our level of compensation is insufficient at 

this point in time, what else remains. 

And so I appreciate the testimony from both of you gentlemen. 

And, again, to you, Mr. Chairman, as you are conducting this 

hearing, as we move forward, I think it is important that we make 

sure that we do right by those residents who were exposed to the 

levels of radiation that were conducted at the test times. 

So I am sure we are going to be spending a lot more time on this 

and appreciate your leadership and interest on it as well. Those of 

us in the Pacific should take the time to follow with close attention 

what is happening. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski. 

I have some questions for you, Dr. Krawitz. The 1986 settlement 

agreement provided $2 million per year for the so-called 177 

Health Care Program. This program served the four northern-most 

atolls communities where the U.S. believed health effects resulted 

from the tests were limited. 

However, funding for that program expired in 2003. And we have 

now heard that the National Cancer Institute estimates that more 

than half of the additional cancers have yet to develop and many 

of those will occur in the communities outside of the four atolls. 

If the committee decides to provide additional health care assistance using the ex gratia authorization under section 105(c) of the 

Compact, the question is, is the administration prepared to work 

with Congress and the Marshall Islands in developing a consensus 

approach? 

Mr. KRAWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me begin by saying I think it is premature for me to try to 

speak about the National Cancer Institute correspondence with 

12

this committee because it has not yet as I understand been publicly 

vetted through peer review or publication. 

Therefore, it would be inappropriate for me to even begin to discuss this yet since it falls outside of the administration’s report and 

my own area of knowledge. 

To answer your second question, obviously the State Department 

would not make and cannot make any decision in and of itself. This 

is an administration issue. The administration issued the report, 

not the State Department. And we would need to consult with all 

our sister agencies who were involved in programs in the Marshall 

Islands. 

As I mentioned in my testimony, you have the Interior Department, the Energy Department, the Health and Human Services Department. So this would have to be something that would have to 

be discussed in the administration and come to a consensus opinion 

in the interagency process. 

However, I would like to say, as I mentioned in my testimony, 

the State Department which is not involved in programs—we do 

not do science, we do not have money, we do not run programs—

we are the bridge, I would hope, that would help people to engage 

in dialog. 

And we are always ready to listen to the concerns about health 

care delivery and other issues through the legitimate process of the 

Joint Economic Management and Financial Accountability Committee which we now have with the Marshall Islands which I participate in and my colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary Cohen, 

and others participate in, and I believe that this is a very proper 

venue in which to talk about health care concerns, public health 

care concerns. 

I mean, across the board, we have a number of areas where there 

is targeted assistance. So I would say we are always ready to listen. We are ready to engage, but I can make no comments concerning the science or the administration position at this time. 

Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Let me further followup with a question by asking, if Congress comes to a point where it provides additional funds 

for whatever the program is, will the administration or State Department work with us on that? 

Mr. KRAWITZ. Again, sir, I regret I cannot speak for the administration as a whole until the administration has had a chance to discuss it. 

I can only say that the State Department as part of its foreign 

policy role exists to talk to our friends and neighbors throughout 

the world and we will continue to do that. But I cannot make any 

comment concerning the administration position at this time. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. I would like to ask a question to Secretary Cary and Dr. Mabuchi. The reports by NCI, DOE, and the 

Nationwide Radiological Survey each generally found that there 

was a decrease in the amount of radioactive contamination as you 

move south from the test sites. 

Two questions. First, is that a fair summary of your findings? 

And I am going to ask Dr. Mabuchi to answer that first. But here 

is the second. Was there a scientific basis for the tribunal to reach 

this same conclusion in 1987 with the analytical tools available to 

13

develop a way to discriminate among the nearly 14,000 people living in the Marshall Islands in 1958? And these figures were gathered from some of the data that was provided, Dr. Mabuchi. 

So, Dr. Mabuchi, will you answer first and I will ask Dr. Cary 

following you. 

Dr. MABUCHI. As I understand, your first question is, Is it generally correct to assume that radiation doses decrease with increased distance from the weapons test site? Yes, I think it is generally correct that the farther you go away from the nuclear test 

site the doses decrease. 

The second question is whether an estimate could have been 

made in 1986 similar to that made in this correspondence. If someone had attempted the similar exercise or calculations using dose 

and risk data that are available from some of the populations, that 

sane estimate could have been made, with the exception that our 

estimates are based on more recent models and mathematical tools 

that have been developed in only the last 2 years. 

Since 1986, the understanding of how the cancer risk associated 

with radiation changes with age, time, gender, and how the risk 

data from other population can be applied to other populations, has 

greatly improved, and we now have a better understanding of the 

relationship of radiation with risk than 10, 20 years ago. 

We also are using exposure data that are more recent. So the results would have been different. But if one had attempted similar 

calculations, one could have obtained an estimate that might/might 

not be similar to what we estimated. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Dr. Mabuchi. 

Dr. Steve Cary is a Deputy Assistant for Health with the U.S. 

Department of Energy. You may proceed, Dr. Cary. 

Dr. CARY. Yes, sir. There is a correlation between the amount of 

radioactive contamination and distance from the test site. That is 

a fair summary of the DOE work that has been done in their area 

of radiologic and photographic surveys. So I can answer affirmative 

there. 

I would like to elaborate a little more within the context of that 

gradient, the Office of Health and the Department of Energy has 

specific authority for the high-risk areas within that gradient. We 

have the medical patients from Rongelap and Utrik with the highest levels of exposure. Congress gave that program to us. We have 

been running that program for many decades now. 

In addition, we do environmental monitoring on the four atolls 

at the highest risk within the context of that gradient that you 

mentioned in your question. Those are Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, 

and Utrik. 

So within the context of that gradient, DOE’s work has been defined and that is what we have been undertaking, sir. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Senator Murkowski, do you have any further questions? 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Yes, thank you. 

Dr. Mabuchi, in listening to your testimony this afternoon, you 

have indicated that it is difficult to predict. There is a great deal 

of uncertainty in terms of how we predict additional numbers of individuals that may contract the cancer. 

14

You have indicated, though, in your testimony that exposure to 

fallout could result in about a 9-percent increase over what was estimated above and beyond the baseline; is that correct? 

Dr. MABUCHI. That is correct. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Nine percent sounds like you have really 

taken the analysis and this is about as exact as you can get even 

though you have couched that and say that this is uncertain. 

Recognizing that we find over a long period of time that we 

might find other types of cancers that present themselves, you have 

indicated that predominantly the individuals have been exposed to 

or have contracted a thyroid cancer. 

Is it possible that we would see these numbers increase with perhaps different cancers that might present themselves? How much 

of a factor was perhaps women that were pregnant at the time 

whose unborn were exposed? How many variables are out there 

that could change this number and, if so, do you believe it would 

change it with any significance? 

Dr. MABUCHI. Are there any other cancers that might be increased in the future? We cannot answer that question. The projection is based on the most recent evidence from many epidemiological studies. 

Regarding your question about pregnant women, the pregnancy 

per se does not affect radiation risk, but if you are referring to the 

fetus exposed in utero, we have not estimated excess cancers or any 

deleterious effects to fetuses in this correspondence. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. You have indicated, Doctor, that you do not 

feel that if you were to go forward with, I guess, additional modeling, the incremental information gained is going to be of little 

practical significance in terms of the public health management. 

And are you able to make the statement simply because of the 

amount of time that has lapsed and what you have seen so it is 

your conclusion that we are at that point where we are going to 

know pretty well the numbers that we are dealing with at this 

point? 

Dr. MABUCHI. The primary reason for that statement is that the 

greatest uncertainty on dose estimates come from the exposure in 

southern atolls where the exposures are very low. 

So even if we come up with a better estimate, the expected number of excess cancer cases will be little changed. So the 9 percent 

we estimated would be changed very little. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Krawitz, the administration has argued that the U.S. compensation under the Compact has been sufficient. Obviously that is one of the purposes of this afternoon’s 

hearing is to determine if, in fact, it is sufficient, you know, as we 

learn of additional numbers that are exposed, individuals that are 

exposed to the cancer. 

Can you address the five areas where the Marshall Islands are 

seeking additional compensation and explain the State Department’s position about whether or not they should receive any more 

for health care, for the personal injury awards, for the property 

damage, both because of the high cost of cleanup expenses, the program expenses, as well as the environmental and monitoring. 

Mr. KRAWITZ. Senator, thank you. Bear with me, I did not bring 

my glasses. 

15

We have submitted—this is the full text of my testimony today. 

I gave an abbreviated text because I realized time was short. This 

has been submitted for the record and copies should be available 

to you. 

Let me start from the second part of your question, I think, first. 

I cannot answer your question concerning whether—about what 

the administration’s position would be and whether this is sufficient, insufficient, or anything else. That was not something we 

were asked to look at. 

As I said in my testimony, we were only asked to evaluate 

whether or not this specific request sent in at this specific time 

based on the evidence that was available at the time of the writing 

of our administration report justified the request made under article 9. And our conclusion is that it does not. I cannot address anything outside of that specific task. 

And, again, I need to say for the record this is not the State Department’s report. It is the administration’s report to Congress in 

response to a request that the Congress made to the administration 

in, I believe, 2001. I might be incorrect in that. 

As far as the areas, we stated in the submitted testimony. Just 

very quickly, one of the questions is whether there was anything 

that has come to light since the 1986 agreement that could not 

have been well and reasonably known at that time or that should 

have been known at that time or that was otherwise overlooked or 

ignored at that time. 

And the vast majority of the body of scientific evidence was examined by the roughly ten-member interagency group that are 

mentioned. And the consensus was that, no, it does not meet the 

test. There is nothing that has come to light since that would warrant a revisiting under the changed circumstances provision. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. What about if Dr. Mabuchi’s predictions 

are accurate and we see a 9-percent increase in the numbers of individuals that will contract cancer based on his analysis? Does that 

qualify? 

Mr. KRAWITZ. I regret, Senator, I cannot speak to that because, 

again, it is not appropriate for me—first of all, I am not a scientist, 

so I would not speak to the science anyhow. But it is not appropriate for me to comment on correspondence that has not yet been 

through the normal scientific process of peer review and publication which I believe is the way that the scientific community comes 

to a consensus about whether the science is acceptable to them or 

not. I can make no statement one way or other about that. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Okay. Well, we do not need to go into the 

theoretical or the scientific modeling. But if we clearly establish 

that we have additional numbers that have been exposed and have 

contracted the cancer, does that not change the equation? 

Mr. KRAWITZ. Again, I cannot answer that because you are asking the State Department. As I said earlier in my testimony, we 

do not do the science. This would have to be set up again for review 

by the interagency——

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, it is not science if somebody contracts 

cancer. I mean, they are either verifiable or not. 

Mr. KRAWITZ. That may or may not be, Senator. That may be, 

Senator, but the fact is that the departments that handle health 

16

programs and radiological problems and energy programs would be 

part of the administration body that would weight on whatever evidence might come to light if some evidence were to come to light, 

which I am not acknowledging. 

So, again, I have to say it would have to be, as with committees, 

it would have to be an interagency process in which all of those 

who were involved would have a chance to weigh in, vent the 

issues, and come to a consensus. And at that time, an opinion 

would have to be issued under the name of the administration. It 

would not be the State Department. I cannot speak to that. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Okay. Thank you, Senator AKAKA. Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski. 

I would like to followup with Dr. Mabuchi on what Senator Murkowski was asking about and ask you the question, how long would 

peer review take? 

Dr. MABUCHI. We have not started writing papers. We are planning to write three papers, one on internal exposure, one on external exposure, and the third on radiation risk. 

Paper writing is time consuming. I cannot say how long it would 

take. I have to talk with my colleague and see how long it might 

take. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

I also want to followup with Dr. Cary on a question. Dr. Cary, 

was there a scientific basis for the tribunal to reach the conclusion 

in 1987 there is decreasing contamination as you move south from 

the test site? 

Dr. CARY. Sir, as Dr. Mabuchi mentioned, there are many variables involved in the illness that would develop from various doses. 

The Department of Energy has not done an analysis of the claims 

tribunal process because we have been specifically excluded from 

that process. It is actually one of the provisions in the Compact of 

Free Association. 

So I am not prepared to respond to that at this time. It has been 

an independent process. It was set up that way. And we have no 

comment on that, sir. 

Senator AKAKA. Let me thank this panel for your responses and 

call on the next panel. But before I do that, I would like to ask for 

any remarks from our Congressman from Samoa. And let me just 

thank this panel for your responses. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ENI FALEOMAVAEGA, DELEGATE FROM 

AMERICAN SAMOA 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me 

to make a presentation of this important hearing. I certainly would 

like to commend you and your colleagues and this distinguished 

committee for holding this oversight hearing. And I really appreciate the opportunity. 

Mr. Chairman, as the ranking member of the International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific and as a Pacific Islander, 

I feel that I have a special responsibility to safeguard the interests 

of our Pacific Islanders from the Marshall Islands who have sacrificed greatly for our common good. 

From 1946 to 1958, the United States detonated 67 nuclear 

weapons in the Marshall Islands representing nearly 80 percent of 

17

all atmospheric tests ever conducted by the United States. If one 

were to calculate the net yield of these tests, it would be the equivalent to the detonation of 1.7 Hiroshima bombs exploded every day 

for 12 years. 

These tests exposed the people of the Marshall Islands to severe 

health problems and genetic anomalies for generations to come. 

The U.S. Nuclear Testing Program in the Marshall Islands continues to devastate the Marshall Islands and the funds provided by 

the United States under the Compact of Free Association are grossly inadequate to provide for the health care, environmental monitoring, personal injury claims, or land and property damage. 

Pursuant to the Compact and the accompanying Section 177 

Agreement, the United States accepted responsibility for the damage to the property and environment of the Marshall Islands and 

the health of its people. 

This agreement did not constitute a final agreement as evidenced 

by the inclusion of article 9 authorizing the government of the Marshall Islands to petition the U.S. Congress in the event of a, quote, 

‘‘changed circumstances that render the provisions to this agreement manifestly inadequate.’’

Mr. Chairman, the government of the Republic of the Marshall 

Islands has submitted a request to Congress based on a changed 

circumstances claim. The administration, however, as represented 

by the State Department in its recent report evaluated the Marshall Islands request, rejected the arguments made in the Marshall 

Islands petition contending that the claims did not constitute 

changed circumstances as defined in the agreement. 

For the record, Mr. Chairman, I want to make it clear that I take 

issue with the State Department’s position on this matter. While 

the State Department denies that there is a legal basis for Congress to hear this petition, the fact remains that we in Congress 

should decide this for ourselves. 

As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, the State Department issued 

a report in November of last year evaluating the Marshall Islands 

petition, concluding that the Marshall Islands request does not 

qualify as changed circumstances within the meaning of the agreement, so there is no legal basis for considering additional payments. 

Mr. Chairman, the State Department fails to explain how the declassified documents released a decade after the agreement was 

reached indicating a wider extent of radioactive fallout than previously disclosed or a National Cancer Institute study indicating 

that more cancers will surface do not constitute a legal basis for 

Congress to consider their circumstances. 

Mr. Chairman, I submit this is much larger than a legal issue. 

This is a moral issue. The fact is the people of the Marshall Islands 

are still suffering severe adverse health effects directly related to 

our nuclear testing program. And they are still unable to use their 

own lands because of the radiation poisoning. 

We have a moral obligation to provide for health care, environmental monitoring, personal injury claims, and land and property 

damaged in the Marshall Islands. This is the best we can do considering the historic contribution the people of the Marshall Islands 

18

have made in the cold war struggle to preserve international peace 

and promote nuclear disarmament. 

Mr. Chairman, the people of the Marshall Islands have brought 

their ongoing health, environmental, and loss of land issues to Congress for our consideration. While we may find that we cannot provide the amount of money requested, I do believe we do have an 

obligation to examine fully the application they have submitted to 

ensure that we live up to our responsibility that we embraced over 

50 years ago when we began nuclear testing in the Pacific. 

We should not be looking for ways to sidestep this responsibility, 

Mr. Chairman. We should ask ourselves if we have done everything 

we can possibly do to make things right for the people of the Marshall Islands who have sacrificed their lives, their health, and their 

lands for the benefit of our nation. 

Mr. Chairman, I am probably one of the few members who has 

actually visited the nuclear test sites not only in the Marshall Islands, but I also was privileged to visit the nuclear test site of 

Motodoa where the French government conducted for 30 years, 

they detonated some 220 nuclear bombs in the atmosphere, on the 

surface, underground, under island. And now we have some 10,000 

Tahesians who have been seriously exposed to nuclear radiation. 

The French government now is trying to do everything they can 

not only of the dangers of leakages of the explosions that they have 

detonated in these two islands of Motodoa and Fangatoufa. To this 

day, the people cannot even go back to the island of Motodoa where 

they conducted these tests. 

Last August, I was also invited by the President of Kasakhstan 

to visit his country. And only to my surprise, Mr. Chairman, I 

found out that this is where the former Soviet Union conducted 

their nuclear testing program. Now, Mr. Chairman, some 1.5 million Kazaks were exposed to Soviet Union nuclear testing where 

they exploded some 500 nuclear devices. 

In our own testing program, we exploded what is known as the 

BRAVO shot that was done in 1954. It is described as a 15 megaton nuclear device equivalent to 1,000 times the bombs that we 

dropped in Hiroshima. Now, the Russians also exploded their hydrogen bomb and it was 50 megatons. 

To all this, Mr. Chairman, I do not like gross pictures, but I 

think sometimes—this is not 50 years ago, Mr. Chairman. This is 

right now. The babies are still being born in the Marshall Islands 

deformed as they are. And the environment, the trees are still 

growing in the same way simply because of the presence of nuclear 

radiation. 

And I would like to submit these for the members of the committee this afternoon. As the saying goes, Mr. Chairman, a picture 

is worth a thousand words. And when I look at this, it just makes 

me sick. I sincerely hope that our government will bear our responsibility. 

This picture that was taken, Mr. Chairman, as you see here, is 

a mother that is still living. She bore these unfortunate children. 

As you notice how deformed they are. 

The other photos that I want to share with members of the committee are the results of the Soviet Union Russian nuclear tests 

19

and some of the babies that were born among the Kasak people. 

Not a very pretty sight. 

But I wanted to make this to emphasize my point, Mr. Chairman. We owe a very special responsibility to the people of the Marshall Islands. 

When some of these documents were declassified, at the time of 

our nuclear testing program, we said that there were only about 

three or four islands that were exposed to nuclear radiation. Well, 

after declassifying these documents, Mr. Chairman, we found that 

the whole Marshall Islands was exposed to nuclear testing. 

And one of the things that I have always wondered if some people have asked, well, why did we stop our nuclear testing program 

in the Marshalls. Well, we found out that this nuclear cloud that 

came all the way from the Pacific ended up in Minnesota and Wisconsin. They found out that milk products coming out of Minnesota 

and Wisconsin had strontium 90 as a result of our nuclear testing 

programs in the Pacific. That is why we ended up in Nevada conducting underground nuclear tests. 

So, Mr. Chairman, again, I want to express my deepest appreciation for you and your distinguished colleagues in holding this oversight hearing. It is my sincere hope that we will not only examine 

the merits of what the Marshall Islands government has requested 

for us to do, but the fact that we do what is fair and reasonable 

to the needs of the people, especially the conditions of health, the 

environment, the lands, I think is the least that we could do. 

If we are able to expend a billion dollars a week in waging the 

War in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mr. Chairman, I am sure that somewhere somehow we have got to find some sense of creativity to see 

how we can at least give—this problem has been going on for 50 

years and we still have not adequately addressed the issues affecting the health, the conditions of these people. 

We owe it to them, Mr. Chairman. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank 

you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Congressman 

Faleomavaega, for your comments. And I know that you have been 

very passionate about what has been happening in the Pacific in 

regards to the nuclear testing. 

And since you mentioned your visit to Bikini, I want to mention 

that, and especially to Senator Murkowski, that I did travel with 

her father to these islands in the Marshalls and I would encourage 

her to try to travel out there to the Marshall Islands one of these 

days. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, I look forward to taking that trip 

with you as well. 

I want to thank you, Representative, for reminding us of the 

moral responsibility that we have to the Marshall Islanders out 

there. It is one thing to talk about just the raw numbers and this 

person has this type of cancer and we move on. 

But as we know, oftentimes it is not just at the time of the exposure that you happen to be right there on this particular island and 

you see those consequences. We learn that the exposure, the devastation that happens can take a period of years. 

You have referred to in your testimony genetic abnormalities for 

years to come. We would like to think that that is not the case. But 

20

if that is the case, we as a country need to take the responsibility 

what we did in exposing the islanders to the risk of radiation without really appreciating the risk that they were being exposed to. 

That is what we are finding in Amchitka now. The workers that 

went out there at the direction of this government had no understanding about the risk that they were taking. So we have got a 

concurrent obligation after the fact to make sure that we do the 

monitoring that is necessary and to make sure that we do provide 

for those who have been injured and exposed. 

So I appreciate your efforts on this and yours as well, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If I may, Senator, I just want to say it was 

my privilege to accompany the good Senator from Hawaii and your 

father, Senator Murkowski, to the islands. 

And this has always been a very difficult situation for members 

to travel to the islands because when you mention islands, it is 

sun, fun, and tan, and think that it is a junket. And the media always plays on this every time members go out. 

And it is really unfortunate because when you are there to see 

it for yourself, and perhaps this is the reason why I am so moved 

and committed to this, because I have seen the devastations of 

what these nuclear devices can do. 

And the nuclear madness that goes on right now, Senator, our 

ability not just to kill other people but now to vaporize other people 

by the use of these weapons of mass destruction, if you will. 

As the good chairman had said earlier, it would really be wonderful if as many members and yourself as well would visit the islands 

and see for yourself and how great these people have been, been 

so patient for all these years. And we are still dragging our feet 

and not doing what we should be doing. 

And, again, I really want to thank the distinguished chairman 

and you, Senator, and the members of the committee and look forward in working with you in the future and hopefully to develop 

some kind of legislation that will be helpful to the people of the 

Marshall Islands. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Congressman 

Faleomavaega. 

Now, I would like to excuse the panel. Mr. Krawitz, Dr. Mabuchi, 

and Dr. Cary, thank you very much. You are excused. If there be 

any further questions, we will put it in the record for your responses. Thank you. 

And now I would like to call the second panel forward. Mr. Gerald Zackios is the minister of foreign affairs, Republic of the Marshall Islands; Mr. James Plasman, chairman of Nuclear Claims 

Tribunal; Dr. Steven Simon of Washington, D.C.; Mr. Thomas Lum, 

specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service; Dr. 

Neal A. Palafox, professor, John A. Burns School of Medicine, University of Hawaii; and a senator from Utrik, Hiroshi Yamamura. 

Will you please take your seats at the desk. 

Thank you very much. I would like to remind our witnesses that 

we would like for you to testify for 5 minutes or less and that we 

would place your full text in the record of the committee. 

21

And I would like to first ask Foreign Minister of Affairs of the 

Republic of Marshall Islands to begin, Gerald Zackios. 

STATEMENT OF GERALD M. ZACKIOS, MINISTER OF FOREIGN 

AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS 

Mr. ZACKIOS. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, ladies and 

gentlemen, I would like to request that statements and remarks by 

atoll representatives be included in the hearing record as well as 

copies of documents cited in my written testimony. 

Senator AKAKA. Without objection. 

Mr. ZACKIOS. I would also like to ask that the hearing record remain open for a period of time for additional submissions. 

I appear before you today as a representative of a nation with 

an abiding friendship with the United States, a nation in a very 

precarious position. 

Despite our best efforts to jointly address the damages and injuries resulting from the U.S. Government’s testing of 67 atmospheric 

weapons in our country, the Marshall Islands is unable to manage 

its radiological burdens. 

People are gravely sick and people are dying from radiogenic diseases because the RMI Health Care System and U.S. programs are 

not adequate to meet our health care needs. 

We are committed to working together with the administration 

and Congress to address these ongoing issues. 

In May of this year, the House conducted a hearing on the nuclear legacy which established that; one, more than just the four 

atolls were exposed to significant amounts of radiation; two, hundreds more cancers linked to the nuclear weapons testing program 

are anticipated in the future; and, three, there are ongoing needs 

and liabilities resulting from the nuclear testing program that 

needs to be addressed. 

It is now 25 years since the United States established policies regarding the testing program. The RMI believes it is time for the 

U.S. Government to update its policies to incorporate new understanding about the effects of radiation exposure on human health 

and the environment. 

My government has specific requests to Congress that are outlined in my written statement. 

One, assistance to the Nuclear Claims Tribunal can pay existing 

personal injury awards; two, assistance to replenish the nuclear 

claims trust fund so the tribunal can continue to pay personal injury awards in the future; three, assistance so the tribunal can pay 

for private property awards or Congress referral of these awards to 

the U.S. Federal Courts for review; four, assistance to build adequate infrastructure for the delivery of health care needs stemming 

from the testing program; five, assistance in future years to provide 

health care services including comprehensive cancer care; and, six, 

assignment of responsibility for monitoring the Runit Dome to a 

U.S. agency. 

While our changed circumstances petition includes specific requests for the radiological burdens we face, the RMI is certainly 

willing to explore all avenues of remedy. 

In the 177 Agreement, our nations agreed that an independent 

tribunal would consider claims for personal injury and property 

22

damages. The tribunal fulfilled its mandate by determining personal injury claims based on similar U.S. programs and by adjudicating property claims. 

Former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh determined 

that the tribunal operates in a manner consistent with U.S. law 

and that the tribunal is unable to pay its awards because its funding is manifestly inadequate. 

Our nations intended in the 177 Agreement for the populations 

exposed to significant amounts of radiation to receive medical monitoring and care for their illnesses related to the testing program. 

The NCI report that this committee requested tells us that hundreds more cancers linked to the testing program will develop in 

the future. This is devastating new information as every family in 

the RMI knows the anguish of losing loved ones. We thought most 

of our cancer burdens were behind us. 

The RMI lacks the capacity to detect and treat these cancers. We 

have a national crisis on our hands. There is an urgent need to put 

monitoring capabilities in place even while we explore other areas 

for remedy in the upcoming months. Monitoring is imperative so 

cancers can be detected early before they become untreatable. 

Since the hearing in May, another important report regarding radiation exposure has emerged, information that constitute yet another changed circumstance. The BEIR VII report by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences focuses on low-level radiation exposure 

that can cause DNA damage and lead to cancer and other illnesses. 

Like the NCI report, the BEIR VII report increases our concerns 

about several populations, including those exposed to radiation 

during weapons testing, resettlement, contract work for DOE, or 

when born and raised on an island with residual contamination. 

New information compels us to address the full range of 

radiogenic burdens to all affected populations not just those recognized in the 177 Agreement. 

Again, despite our best efforts—we are thankful for the assistance that has been provided to date—populations exposed to radiation lack adequate health care and the standard of health care 

they receive is far below the standard provided to U.S. citizens for 

similar situations. 

We are not looking for anything excessive. We just want the 

means to manage our health care needs linked to the testing program. The amended Compact does not take into account our radiological health care burdens. In fact, these issues were specifically 

excluded from our Compact negotiations with the United States at 

the insistence of the State Department. 

The case for equity is not some abstract legal argument. It is 

based on the real needs of the Marshallese people today, the same 

needs as those of U.S. citizens exposed to radiation. Medical monitoring, diagnosis, and treatment needs resulting from radiological 

burdens do not differ based on whether a person is a Marshallese 

or a U.S. citizen nor should radiation protection and cleanup standards differ. 

Mr. Chairman, the RMI government hopes to work with this and 

other committees to develop appropriate language in the upcoming 

year. We hope that funding for future medical care will be mandatory rather than discretionary because past fluctuations in moneys 

23

resulted in disruptions of health care delivery to patients with critical needs. 

I want to thank this committee for its continued willingness to 

address radiological issues in the Marshall Islands. We hope that 

today’s hearing is the beginning of a process to jointly address the 

RMI’s inability to respond to its radiation-related needs. 

There is a continued responsibility to address the burdens of 

Marshallese citizens resulting from the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program. The well-being of the Marshall Islands depend on our 

action. 

On a personal note, Mr. Chairman, I was born after the end of 

the nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands. Nonetheless, I learned 

at a young age. While I was growing up, I witnessed the suffering, 

uncertainty, and sickness that the people suffered from the nuclear 

testing and their desire to find resolution. 

Today I believe it is my solemn duty to do all within my power 

to address these issues and bring resolution to these problems that 

continue to affect the lives of the Marshallese people today. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zackios follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GERALD M. ZACKIOS, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, ladies and gentlemen, with me here today 

are two Cabinet Members from President Kessai H. Note’s administration, Alvin T. 

Jacklick, the Minister of Health, and Donald F. Capelle, the Minister of Justice. I 

also want to recognize our traditional leaders, Senators, Mayors, and citizens from 

the Marshall Islands in attendance today—the distance, time, and expense that it 

took for these people to join us underscores how important nuclear issues are to 

communities throughout the RMI. 

The Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands thanks the Committee 

for convening a hearing to examine the legacy of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing 

program in the RMI, and to consider the RMI’s Changed Circumstances Petition 

(CCP) to Congress. As you are aware, in the 177 Agreement of the Compact of Free 

Association, Congress gave the RMI the right to petition Congress for additional assistance related to the nuclear weapons testing program if it can demonstrate that: 

1. it has new and additional information about the damages and injuries from 

the testing program; 

2. this information could not have been reasonably known when the RMI and 

the U.S. negotiated the Compact, and; 

3. this information renders the $150 million settlement for all past, present 

and future damages and injuries manifestly inadequate. 

The RMI government believes it has met these criteria for changed circumstances 

and looks to you, the Congress, to respond to our requests for additional assistance 

to address the enduring radiological problems resulting from the U.S. testing of 67 

atmospheric weapons in our nation between 1946-1958. 

The 4 atolls and other populations require continued and new U.S. assistance My 

testimony does not provide a history of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program 

because I believe that is a matter of Congressional record from previous hearings, 

but I do want to emphasize that what we now know—and did not know when the 

177 Agreement was negotiated—is that more people and islands in the RMI were 

exposed to significant radiation than was understood when the Compact was negotiated, and that smaller doses of radiation cause more harm than previously believed. The U.S. government position regarding radiation-related damages and injuries is based on the premise that only 4 atolls were adversely affected by the testing 

program, and that only the 2 populations of Rongelap and Utrik were exposed to 

levels of radiation sufficient to warrant medical monitoring and care. When we look 

at the cumulative levels of radiation exposure from as many of the 67 tests that 

we have radiological exposure data for, we see significant exposure to people and 

islands beyond the confines of the 4 atolls. These radiation levels are higher in the 

north where populations suffered the brunt of damages and injuries, but radiation 

levels are significant for other atolls throughout the nation. 

24

As stated in my testimony last month to the House Resources Committee and the 

Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific of the House International Relations Committee, 

we are confident that we have met the requirements for changed circumstances and 

we are anxious to hear Congress’ reactions to our petition. I would like to ask that 

my testimony to the House be included as part of this hearing record so we can 

build on that discussion. We believe the House hearing established that radiation 

exposures allowable under U.S. standards have been significantly reduced since the 

Compact came into effect, and that the RMI should expect hundreds of cancers to 

appear in the future for Marshallese alive during the testing program. We want to 

thank this Committee for requesting the National Cancer Institute’s report on future cancer rates in the RMI related to the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program, 

as the RMI lacks the resources to undertake this type of analysis. 

AN UNEQUALED STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

As you know, all of what we are discussing today takes place in the context of 

the RMI’s longstanding commitment to its strategic partnership and historical 

friendship with the United States. The RMI is extremely proud of the role it played 

in contributing to the end of the Cold War, despite its radiological burdens. We are 

thankful that America’s nuclear deterrence has curtailed the global use of nuclear 

weapons. 

Today, the RMI is pleased to be a partner with the U.S. in the development and 

testing of its missile defense systems on Kwajalein Atoll, which will hopefully reduce the likelihood of any future missile attacks. In addition, we know that our consent to the U.S. Navy’s use of our airspace and sea lanes helps promote security 

in the Asia-Pacific region. 

The RMI is extremely proud, too, of its sons and daughters who currently serve 

in every branch of the U.S. armed forces and are deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Our commitment to you as a strategic ally goes beyond words; we have contributed our most precious and sacred resources: our sovereign lands, our territorial 

waters, and most importantly our young men and women. 

House Concurrent Resolution 410, adopted by the Senate on July 12, 2004, makes 

specific reference to our unique, enduring, and strong bilateral relationship, and 

notes:

Whereas the United States has no closer alliance with any nation or 

group of nations than it does with the Republic of the Marshall Islands 

under the Compact of Free Association, which continues the strategic partnership and role of the Marshall Islands in United States strategic programs based in the Marshall Islands, which began at the end of World War 

II and has continued under the trusteeship and Compact to promote the 

mutual security of the United States and the Marshall Islands . . . 

Whereas the Republic of the Marshall Islands has remained one of the 

staunchest allies of the United States during the cold war and the war on 

terrorism, and the voting record of the Republic of the Marshall Islands as 

a member state in the United Nations General Assembly is unparalleled by 

any other country, further demonstrating the shared commitment of the 

two nations to promote democracy and global peace[.]

Given the subject of H. Con. Res. 410, I would like to ask that it be included in 

its entirety as part of this hearing record. We seek your continued partnership to 

cope with the serious problems that remain as a result of the U.S. nuclear weapons 

testing program in our country. 

SPECIFIC REQUESTS TO THE U.S. CONGRESS

In the Petition to Congress, the RMI government laid out specific requests for 

remedies to address the on-going radiological burdens that are a direct result of the 

U.S. nuclear weapons testing program. We ask for your assistance to address these 

damages and injuries because we lack the human and financial resources to provide 

the remedies that are required. Although the RMI government has proposed specific 

remedies, we are certainly willing to explore any ideas that will bring relief from 

our radiological burdens. Our specific requests to Congress are: 

1. $15.7 million so the Nuclear Claims Tribunal can pay existing personal injury 

awards. As of December 31, 2004, 45% of personal injury awardees with radiological 

illnesses have died without receiving full compensation for their injuries because the 

Tribunal does not have sufficient funding to pay the full amount of its awards. $15.7 

million represents the shortfall in funds to pay current awards. In the case of the 

program for U.S. Downwinders, the Attorney General requires that 100% of compensation be paid within 6 weeks of the time an award is made. The RMI agreed 

25

to the 177 Agreement of the Compact of Free Association because it provides compensation for the people of the Marshall Islands who contract radiological illnesses. 

The Nuclear Claims Tribunal created a compensation program based on U.S. programs for Downwinders and Veterans exposed to radiation, but the Tribunal’s program is unique because the people of the Marshall Islands were exposed to more 

radiation than any other population in the world. As the U.S. National Cancer Institute recently noted in its report to Congress, ‘‘[m]ost of our understanding of the 

biological response to radiation exposure pertains to doses that are much lower than 

those of the more highly exposed Marshallese’’ such as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 

A-bomb survivors. 

2. Replenish the Nuclear Claims Trust Fund so the Nuclear Claims Tribunal can 

continue to make personal injury awards in the future. The preceding shortfall from 

request number 1 represents the current balance on personal injury awards as of 

June 24, 2005, and does not take into consideration the U.S. National Cancer Institute’s prediction of several hundred more radiation-related cancers in the future. 

The RMI government believes that the Nuclear Claims Trust Fund needs to be replenished to provide compensation for future radiation-related injuries—such as the 

cancers the NCI has told us to expect—as the intent of the 177 Agreement is for 

the Tribunal to create and maintain, in perpetuity, a means to address past, present 

and future consequences of the nuclear weapons testing program. The intent of the 

177 Agreement is for the Tribunal to have the future means to pay awards for personal injury but the Tribunal does not have funding to make the future awards 

agreed to in the 177 Agreement. 

3. $1.1 billion so the Nuclear Claims Tribunal can pay for the Enewetak and Bikini private property awards. Like the personal injury awards, the 177 Agreement 

provides for claimants to receive compensation for private property damages. Since 

the Tribunal funding is manifestly inadequate and the Tribunal does not have the 

ability to pay for awards it has made, the intent of the 177 Agreement has not come 

to fruition. Recognizing that the dollar amounts needed for the private property 

claims are quite high, the RMI would welcome consideration by Congress to moving 

the land claims to the U.S. federal courts to review the decisions and the right of 

claimants to receive awards. It is important to note that the funding of private property awards would enable affected Marshallese to rid their land of radiological contamination, rehabilitate the soil, re-vegetate the land, resettle their home islands, 

and provide the means to establish a local economy in the fishing and tourism sectors. Thus, the funding would provide the affected communities with the means to 

return to self-reliance. 

4. Establishment of similar consideration for future private property claims. The 

RMI also requests that a similar mechanism to request number 3 be adopted for 

pending private property claims. The Tribunal is expected to rule on several private 

property claims in the near future for atolls such as Rongelap, Utrik, Ailuk, Likiep, 

and others. Private property claims will become meaningless if the Tribunal is unable to pay out its rewards. 

5. $50 million to build adequate infrastructure for the delivery of radiation-related 

healthcare. The RMI currently lacks the infrastructure to respond to radiation-related illnesses. We believe that infrastructure is a critical component of building the 

RMI’s capacity to address its radiation-related healthcare needs. We envision a scenario where we establish facilities and services that are reasonable to provide in the 

RMI, including the ability to monitor exposed populations, diagnose radiological illnesses, and provide treatment for most conditions. When it is not cost effective or 

practical to provide treatment in the RMI we would like to send our patients to Hawaii to purchase the care we cannot reasonably provide. 

6. $45 million each year for 50 years to provide healthcare delivery. Once infrastructure is in place, the RMI needs funding to hire doctors, purchase medication 

and some services in Hawaii, and to deliver healthcare for patients exposed to radiation. Building the healthcare capacity of the RMI will benefit Marshallese citizens 

exposed to radiation and provide the capacity to deliver more timely care for radiation-related illnesses, with the hope of identifying medical problems when they are 

still treatable (before they reach the tertiary stage) and extending the lives of the 

patients. 

7. Assignment for the monitoring of the Runit Dome to a U.S. agency. The portion 

of the Enewetak population that has resettled one of its home islands needs assurances that its health is not adversely affected by living adjacent to a nuclear waste 

storage facility. Currently, no U.S. agency has responsibility to monitor the integrity 

of the Runit Dome. The Defense Nuclear Agency used to have responsibility for this 

work, but the agency was abolished and responsibility for the Runit Dome was not 

transferred to another agency. 

26

FOCUS ON THE NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND HEALTHCARE NEEDS

Our requests obviously focus on the Nuclear Claims Tribunal and radiation-related healthcare needs. It is appropriate for the RMI to focus two of its major requests on the Tribunal. In lieu of an assessment of damages by the Federal courts, 

the RMI government accepted the U.S. proposal that it espouse and settle the 

claims of the Marshallese people arising from the nuclear weapons testing program 

in conjunction with the establishment of a claims tribunal. The U.S. expressly recognized that its technical assessment of radiological damage to persons and private 

property in the RMI was limited to a ‘‘best effort’’ at the time of the Compact, and 

was based on limited disclosure of available information and incomplete scientific 

knowledge. As a result, further adjudication of claims by an internal RMI nuclear 

claims tribunal was agreed to by the U.S. 

During the U.S. nuclear testing program from 1946 to 1958, the U.S. was the only 

recognized government in the Marshall Islands. The U.S. federal government exercised absolute power, including eminent domain, by federal edict. The federal government took the private property of our people without legal or political restraint. 

The right of our people to protection under the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was not recognized in the U.S. federal courts until after the nuclear tests were 

done. 

Some of our homelands were destroyed forever, vaporized in land, air and waterbased nuclear tests. Some are still too contaminated for resettlement. The loss and 

damage to land, the dislocation of peoples, the cost of clean-up and resettlement, 

were only partially compensated through the Nuclear Claims Trust Fund. Full and 

just compensation was promised by Congress in the Compact, but could not be 

quantified until the land claims were adjudicated by the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. 

Under the Compact, Congress removed our claims from the federal courts, and the 

Nuclear Claims Tribunal was created as an alternative forum for just compensation. 

The awards of the Tribunal are substantially greater than the compensation that 

has been paid. The U.S. refused to discuss this problem during the Compact renegotiations. This is a legal matter, not just a political question. For that reason, the 

RMI and the land claimants propose that the Tribunal awards be reviewed by the 

federal courts in the same manner as judgments of RMI courts against the U.S. 

under Compact Section 174(c). 

The RMI government appears before you today to inform you that the Nuclear 

Claims Tribunal in the RMI is not able to perform the role that Congress intended 

because of inadequate funding. The independent assessment of the Tribunal made 

by former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh in 2003 confirmed that the 

Tribunal adhered to American standards of jurisprudence, and concluded that the 

funding available to compensate for private property damage and personal injury is 

‘‘manifestly inadequate.’’ I would like to enter the executive summary of the 

Thornburgh report as part of this hearing record. I would also like to note that Congress has provided additional appropriations for U.S. Downwinders and DOE employees when supplemental funding was needed to make awards for claimants. 

The RMI has also focused on healthcare delivery because this is an area where 

an urgent need exists. People in the RMI with radiological conditions are dying. We 

are certainly appreciative of the DOE medical monitoring and care program for a 

small segment of our population, and for the U.S. contributions to the 177 Health 

Care Program for the 4 atolls. I would also like to thank this Committee for referring these issues to the Appropriations Committee, and to Mr. Domenici and Mr. 

Burns for their leadership on that Committee, and hope that they will support full 

funding this year in conference with the House. However, despite our best intentions to date, these programs do not address the full range of radiological healthcare 

burdens in the RMI. 

One of the measures adopted under the Section 177 Agreement to compensate the 

people and government of the Marshall Islands was a healthcare program for 4 of 

the atoll populations impacted by the testing program, including those who were 

downwind from one or more test, and the awardees of the personal injury claims 

from the Tribunal who manifest radiation-related illnesses in their tertiary phases. 

The medical surveillance and healthcare program established under the Section 177 

Agreement has proven to be manifestly inadequate given the healthcare needs of 

the affected communities. 

The 177 Health Care Program—the only other radiation-related healthcare program besides the DOE program for less than 120 acutely exposed patients from 

Rongelap and Utrik—was asked to deliver appropriate healthcare services within an 

RMI health infrastructure that was not prepared or equipped to deliver the necessary level of healthcare. The program’s funding—$2 million per year for 17 years 

(from January 1987 to January 2004), and $500,000 for February to September 

27

* Material attached to this statement has been retained in committee files. 

2004, was drawn down from the Nuclear Claims Fund provided by the U.S. in fulfillment of its commitment under the 177 Agreement. This program never included 

an inflation adjustment, and resulted in the equivalent of less than $12 per patient 

per month compared to an average U.S. expenditure of $230 per person per month 

for similar services. The unstable and inadequate funding in recent years creates 

a healthcare crisis for our nation, particularly at a time when the people alive during the testing program are becoming older and are more likely to develop or have 

significant radiation-related illnesses, such as the cancers that the NCI study reports. 

An example of a population that slipped through the cracks of U.S. assistance include the 401 people residing on Ailuk Atoll during the Bravo test on March 1, 

1954—a population that U.S. government documents concede should have been 

evacuated after the Bravo test because of significant exposure to radiation. The U.S. 

government decided not to evacuate the Ailukese because its population—almost 4 

times as large as the evacuated population from Utrik—was considered too large 

and cumbersome to relocate. Consequently, the people of Ailuk have never been eligible for medical monitoring and care, and the residents of that atoll continued to 

live in a highly contaminated environment after the Bravo test, while the downwind 

populations of Rongelap and Utrik were evacuated by the U.S. government. I would 

like to request that the U.S. government document regarding Ailuk’s evacuation 

post-Bravo be included as part of the hearing record.* 

Similar cases can be made for other atoll populations alive during the testing program (such as exposure levels on Kwajalein included in the RMI’s CCP), for those 

born and raised in radiologically contaminated environments, and for workers from 

atolls all over the Marshall Islands and who worked as DOE contractors to support 

clean-up efforts on Bikini and Enewetak. This latter group is not eligible for U.S. 

compensation or healthcare programs for DOE workers exposed to occupational 

sources of radiation as part of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act (EEOICPA) because they are not U.S. citizens. In this regard, we 

want to thank Mr. Bingaman for including the Marshall Islands in the list of locations where DOE workers exposed to radiation could receive medical care and compensation. The interpretation of the Executive Branch is that non-Americans such 

as former citizens of the U.S. trust territory are not eligible for the program because 

they are not U.S. citizens. We request that citizens of the former U.S. trust territory 

employed by DOE be eligible for inclusion in this program since neither funding nor 

healthcare are available to these workers through other means. 

The RMI lacks the ability to provide the healthcare that is warranted for the populations exposed to radiation. During the May, 2005 joint hearing of the House Resources Committee and the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific of the House International Relations Committee, the National Cancer Institute representative told us 

that the RMI should anticipate hundreds more radiation-related cancers in the future—these are cancers that would not exist in the RMI if the U.S. nuclear weapons 

testing program did not take place. As we told the House committees, this news is 

devastating to the RMI as we lack the infrastructure, and the human and financial 

resources to respond to these cancers. Every family in the RMI has a first-hand understanding of the pain and suffering cancer patients and their loved ones endure, 

so it is difficult for us—even from an emotional standpoint—to anticipate several 

hundred more cancers linked to the testing program. We thought most of the 

healthcare burdens were behind us, but it is clear that we now need to adjust our 

thinking and plan for the future. The NCI also tells us that these cancers will not 

be limited to just the 4 atolls, yet the 4 atolls are the only populations in the RMI 

that receive any radiation-related healthcare. All of our citizens who contract cancers will need healthcare—healthcare that we are currently unable to provide. 

PROVISIONS OF THE COMPACT, AS AMENDED

During the House hearing in May, witnesses from the U. S. Administration suggested that the RMI had the ability to deal with healthcare or other issues arising 

from the nuclear testing program by allocating a portion of its Compact sector 

health care grants for these needs. First, as I noted during the House hearing, this 

suggestion is contrary to the position taken by the Administration during the 

amended Compact negotiations. During those negotiations, the Administration was 

adamant that issues concerning residual problems relating to the Section 177 Agreement would not be addressed during those talks despite efforts by the RMI to raise 

these issues at that time. This is evidenced by U.S. Compact Negotiator Al Short’s 

letter to me dated March 27, 2002, stating the Administration’s position on the matVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:44 Nov 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 R:\DOCS\24-536 SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
28

ter. I would like to include that letter as part of the hearing record. As noted in 

that letter, the RMI was told that these issues would be considered and dealt with 

by the Congress under the Changed Circumstances Petition that was pending at 

that time. 

Thus, it is clear from the record that the amended Compact does not take into 

account or include funding necessary to address the healthcare or other continuing 

needs of the RMI to address the ongoing consequences of the nuclear testing program. If the RMI were to allocate funds necessary to address these issues from 

funds available under the Compact, as amended, it would result in a substantial reduction in other essential healthcare services to the people of the Marshall Islands 

and would also adversely affect other priority Compact sector grant assistance such 

as education. 

The RMI was told that issues related to the consequences of the nuclear testing 

program would be addressed by the U.S. Congress within the framework of the 

changed circumstances petition as authorized by Article IX of the Section 177 Agreement, which is why we are here before you today. 

CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES CONTINUE TO EMERGE

Between the House hearing in May and today’s hearing still more information 

about the health effects of radiation exposure has come to light—information that 

represents changed circumstances because it was unknown when the U.S. and the 

RMI negotiated the Compact of Free Association and the 177 Agreement. This new 

information renders past assistance manifestly inadequate, since that assistance 

does not include healthcare designed to address these newly identified needs. Specifically, there is a new study from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) about 

the effects of low doses of radiation, including an important discussion about cancer 

risks for women and children. The Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) 

series of reports by the NAS are regarded as the most authoritative basis for radiation risk estimation and radiation protection regulations in the United States. 

The latest report on radiation risk, called the BEIR VII report, was sponsored by 

the U.S. departments of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and concludes that low levels of exposure to ionizing radiation may cause harm in human 

beings and are likely to pose some risk of adverse health effects. The report specifically focuses on low-dose, low-LET—‘‘linear energy transfer’’—ionizing radiation 

that can cause DNA damage and eventually lead to cancers, and calls for further 

research to determine whether low doses of radiation may cause other health problems, such as heart disease and stroke, which can occur with high doses of low-LET 

radiation. What is most clear from the review of available data is that the smallest 

dose of low-level ionizing radiation has the potential to cause an increase in health 

risks to humans. As stated by the chairman for the report, Richard R. Monson, associate dean for professional education and professor of epidemiology, Harvard School 

of Public Health:

The scientific research base shows that there is no threshold of exposure 

below which low levels of ionizing radiation can be demonstrated to be 

harmless or beneficial . . . The health risks—particularly the development 

of solid cancers in organs—rise proportionally with exposure. At low doses 

of radiation, the risk of inducing solid cancers is very small. As the overall 

lifetime exposure increases, so does the risk.

This finding is extremely significant to the RMI as everyone alive during the testing program was exposed to radiation from the 67 atmospheric tests, and thousands 

more people were exposed to environmental sources of radiation when they were 

born and/or raised on radiological contaminated islands. 

Interestingly, survivors of atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, 

were the primary sources of data to estimate the risks of most solid cancers and 

leukemia from exposure to ionizing radiation, yet the U.S. National Cancer Institute 

acknowledges that because radiation exposure in the RMI exceeds other locations, 

exposure and outcomes in the RMI cannot be compared to other locations such as 

Japan. We are left to conclude, therefore, that any findings in the Japanese population are likely exacerbated in the RMI. The BEIR VII report is also important because it notes that adverse hereditary health effects that could be attributed to radiation have not been found in studies of children whose parents were exposed to radiation from the atomic bombs in Japan, but studies of mice and other organisms 

have produced extensive data showing that radiation-induced cell mutations in 

sperm and eggs can be passed on to offspring. The report states that there is no 

reason to believe that such mutations could not also be passed on to human offVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:44 Nov 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 R:\DOCS\24-536 SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
29

spring, as the failure to observe such effects in Hiroshima and Nagasaki probably 

reflects an insufficiently large survivor population. 

The BEIR VII report also updates the risk of dying from cancer for women and 

men, and for children compared to adults. According to the report, the risk of dying 

from cancer due to radiation exposure was believed in 1990 to be 5% higher for 

women compared to men; this latest report now updates the risk to 37.5% higher 

for women than for men. Furthermore, the risks for all solid tumors, like lung, 

breast, and prostate, added together are almost 50 percent greater for women than 

men. 

The BEIR VII report estimates that the differential risk for children is even greater. For instance, the same radiation in the first year of life for boys produces three 

to four times the cancer risk as exposure between the ages of 20 and 50. Female 

infants have almost double the risk as male infants. This information is obviously 

of concern to us, and we seek the assistance of the U.S. government to apply these 

findings to the Marshallese context. 

LOOKING FOR EQUITY

The RMI is in a very precarious position. We have very significant radiological 

burdens in the RMI that we lack the resources, knowledge, or capacity to address. 

These radiological burdens—including the need to clean-up private property and return populations to their home islands, and the need to provide adequate healthcare 

and monitoring to all communities exposed to significant levels of radiation—are expensive. Despite the costs of remedies, we are simply asking the U.S. government 

for the same assistance, services, and compensation that it extends to its own citizens exposed to radiation or whose private property is contaminated. 

The RMI is extremely worried about the well-being of the people in the Marshall 

Islands who were exposed to radiation from the 67 atmospheric atomic and thermonuclear weapons tests in the RMI, as well as the populations resettled on contaminated islands, including children who were born and raised in environments laced 

with radiation from the U.S. nuclear weapons tests. 

More than ever, it is clear to us that the U.S. government’s position regarding 

radiation exposure in the RMI is antiquated, and needs to be updated. The U.S. position maintains that radiation exposed only the populations of Rongelap and Utrik 

to levels of radiation sufficient to warrant U.S.-provided healthcare for radiation related illnesses. Estimated numbers by the NCI for future radiation-related cancers 

are higher than the current number of patients currently enrolled in the Department of Energy’s medical monitoring and care program and higher than the total 

populations for Rongelap and Utrik alive during the testing program. The NCI’s predictions for cancers include likely occurrence for atolls throughout the RMI, not just 

the northern-most atolls. The BEIR VII conclusions that low doses of radiation increase risk of harm to human beings, and that there is a substantially greater risk 

of dying from cancer for women and children, compels us to take further action, and 

requires our nations to rethink radiation-related healthcare in the RMI. Remedies 

are clearly needed, but without U.S. assistance the RMI will continue to lack the 

capacity to respond to the urgent radiation-related healthcare needs confronting us. 

Since the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program was conducted at a time when 

the United States governed the Marshall Islands with the same authorities extended to the United States itself, we believe the same standard of care, safety, redress of grievances and justice that Congress has adopted with respect to U.S. citizens exposed to radiation should be honored for the Marshallese people. In particular, we think there should be equity in terms of healthcare standards and delivery, environmental clean-up, radiation protection standards for the public, and compensation. The RMI government hopes to work with this Committee and the House 

committees that convened a similar hearing in May to develop appropriate authorizing and appropriations language in the upcoming year. The well-being of our citizens depends on our action. 

Finally, I want to thank this Committee for its continued willingness to address 

radiological issues in the RMI since the termination of the trust territory, and for 

the Committee’s creativity in addressing our needs. The RMI is grateful measures 

adopted in the past to address healthcare, resettlement, trust funds, and clean-up. 

We hope that today’s hearing is the beginning of a process to address—together—

the fundamental inadequacies of our ability to manage on-going and future radiological burdens in the RMI.

Senator AKAKA. Senator Yamamura. 

30

STATEMENT OF HIROSHI V. YAMAMURA, SENATOR, REPUBLIC 

OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS 

Mr. YAMAMURA. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the 

committee, on behalf of the four atolls, I want to thank you for this 

opportunity to testify here today. I am here to share with you the 

story of the four atolls and nuclear testing program. 

Utrik, Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap are the four north island 

atolls whose people are recognized by United States law as victim 

of the nuclear tests. Our people in our homeland have been exposed 

to higher levels of radiation than any other people or any other 

place on earth. 

Our physical, emotional, psychological, cultural suffering and 

hardship has been documented by the United States and international science. And it has been greater than anything experienced by any other human population affected by the radiation exposure from nuclear weapons. 

However, we do not want to be seen forever merely as victim. It 

is hard to talk about ourselves only as victims and keep our dignity. We also have learned that people get very uncomfortable 

hearing the truth about what really happened to our people. 

So now we want to be seen as survivor and we want to tell our 

story as survivor. The difference between being a victim and being 

a survivor is justice. The difference between victims and survivor 

is recovery. And to recovery, we need more than resources. We also 

want and need truth and fairness. 

This is the American way. The United States has been more just 

and humane and generous than any other nuclear power has been 

with victims of their nuclear testing programs. But we have not 

been given the full measure of justice we deserved. We have not 

been treated with the same degree of respect as the victim of the 

U.S. testing in the American mainland. This is not the American 

way. 

We are not U.S. citizens, but we are governed by the United 

States during the nuclear testing program. Because of our land’s 

shared history, we cast our fate with the United States and the 

world. We are your allies and friends. We never want our grievances to be seen as anti- American. This is never our heart which 

is why we went to the U.S. court for justice. Instead the U.S. department proposed a political settlement. 

Now the first phase of the program under political settlement 

need to be continued and adapted to meet ongoing needs. But the 

State Department is saying the United States should walk away 

because the legal claims are ended. But the full and final settlement of claims the State Department imposed included changed 

circumstances and the Nuclear Claims Tribunals. 

So Congress needs to make a political decision about the health 

needs of the four atolls and any other atolls found to be exposed. 

Congress also needs to make a political decision about the Nuclear 

Claims Tribunal awards. 

If the political process is a dead end, if Congress has lost political 

will to take actions to sustain political settlement, then the Congress should return the claims to the legal process in the U.S. 

courts to determine if further compensation is owed. 

31

This is what the Congress has done for judgment of the RMI 

courts against the United States. So this is fair thing to do to ensure the political settlement do not turn out to be devised to prevent test and full compensation as promised by the Congress in 

Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, please allow me to introduce just four 

of the people whose life tell our story. Senator Ismajon of 

Enewetak, Senator Tomogachura of Bikini, Mary Jo Sol of Utrik, 

and Lejon Aknigram of Rongelap, a survivor who saw the ravages 

of radiation to their loved ones from the day fallout came to their 

homelands. They are the ones who live with the fear and random 

tragedy every day since. Their statements will be submitted for the 

record. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamura follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HIROSHI V. YAMAMURA, SENATOR, REPUBLIC OF THE

MARSHALL ISLANDS

Chairman Domenici, Ranking Member Bingaman, and distinguished members of 

the Committee. On behalf of the Four Atolls, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify here today. I am here to share with you the story of the Four Atolls 

and the Nuclear Testing program. 

Utrok, Bikini, Enewatak, and Rongelap are the four Northern Marshall Island 

atolls whose people are recognized by United States law as victims of the U.S. nuclear tests. Our people and our homelands have been exposed to higher level of radiation that any other people or any other place on earth. U.S. and international 

science have documented our physical, emotional, psychological, cultural suffering 

and hardship, and it has been greater than experienced by any other human population affected by radiation exposure from nuclear weapons. 

However, we do not want to be seen forever merely as victims. It is hard to talk 

about ourselves only as victims and keep our dignity. We, also, have learned that 

people get very uncomfortable hearing the truth about what really happened to our 

people. So now, we want to be seen as survivors, and we want to tell our story as 

survivors. The difference between being a victim and being a survivor is justice. The 

difference between victims and survivors is recovery, and to recover we need more 

than resources. We, also, want and need truth and fairness. 

That is the American way. The U.S. has been more just, humane, and generous 

than any other nuclear power has been with victims of their nuclear testing programs. However, we have not been given the full measure of justice we deserve. We 

have not been treated with the same degree of respect or concern as the victims of 

U.S. testing in the American mainland. That is not the American way. 

We are not U.S. citizens, but we were governed by the U.S. during the nuclear 

testing program. Because of our shared history, we cast our fate with the U.S. in 

the world. We are your allies and friends. We never want our grievances to be seen 

as anti-American. That is never our hearts. 

It is just the opposite, which is why we went to the U.S. courts for justice. Instead, the U.S. State Department proposed a political settlement. Now the first 

phase of the programs under the political settlement need to be continued and 

adapted to meet on-going needs, but the State Department is saying the U.S. should 

walk away because the legal claims are ended. But the full and final settlement of 

claims the State Department imposed included changed circumstances and the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. So Congress needs to make a political decision about the 

health care needs of the four atolls and any other atolls found to be exposed. Congress, also, needs to make a political decision about the Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

awards. 

If the political process is a dead end, if Congress has lost the political will to take 

actions to sustain the political settlement then the Congress should return the 

claims to the legal process in the U.S. courts to determine if any further compensation is owed. That is what the Congress has done for judgments of RMI courts 

against the U.S. that were not settled politically. So that is the fair thing to do, to 

ensure that the political settlement does not turn out to be a device to prevent just 

and full compensation as promised by Congress in Section 177 of the Compact of 

Free Association. 

32

In closing, please allow me to introduce just four of the people whose lives tell 

out story. Senator Ishmael John of Enewetak, Senator Tomaki Juda of Bikini, 

Mayor Joe Saul of Urtok, and Lijon Eknilang of Ronelap are survivors who saw the 

ravages of radiation to their loved ones from the day fallout came to their homelands. They are the ones who lived with the fear and random tragedy every day 

since. Their statements will be submitted for the record. Thank you! 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR HIROSHI V. YAMAMURA AND MAYOR JOE SAUL

I. INTRODUCTION

The impact of the Nuclear Testing Program on Utrok Atoll has been devastating. 

The lands of Utrok were blanketed by deadly radioactive ash from bombs ignited 

at the nearby Pacific Proving Grounds. The people of Utrok were exposed to levels 

of radiation several thousand times greater than that permitted in the United 

States under current Environmental Protection Agency regulations. The result was 

tragic. An epidemic of cancer, thyroid disease, birth defects and other health related 

complications swept through the Utrok community. Today the people of Utrok seek 

funding for medical monitoring and healthcare. Such services are essential for the 

affected population, as well as remuneration for clean up of the Atoll. Additionally 

the people of Utrok seek either payment of its pending award from the Nuclear 

Claims Tribunal or the opportunity to take this award to the Appellate Division of 

the Federal Courts. 

II. THE HISTORY OF UTROK AND THE NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM

On the morning of March 1, 1954, the people of Utrok were without warning 

thrust into the Nuclear age. In the nearby Pacific Proving Grounds, the largest device ever tested by the United States was detonated. Deadly radioactive particles 

from the thermonuclear test, code named ‘BRAVO’ rained down upon the Utrok people within hours of the explosion. These particles looked like a very thick fog or mist 

and blanketed the entire atoll. No warning was given, nor were the people told that 

this ‘fog’ was in fact deadly radioactive ash. Unaware of the danger, the people went 

about their daily lives. They consumed food and water laced with radiation. 

Breathed air with deadly particles suspended in it, slept in houses covered with nuclear ash. 

Three days after the test, the U.S. navy ship, the USS Renshaw came to evacuate 

the Utrok people. They were told that they were being evacuated because the mist 

that fell on Utrok was ‘‘poison’’ and they needed to leave. Over the next three 

months 5 more thermonuclear weapons were tested as part of the Castle series of 

tests, and more radioactive ash fell on Utrok atoll. Seven days after the last test, 

the people were returned to their badly contaminated atoll with assurances that it 

was a safe place to live. It is doubtful that these representations were sincere. In 

1956, at a classified meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission Advisory Committee 

on Biology and Medicine a highly respected U.S. scientist, Dr. Merril Eisenbud, said 

Utrok was ‘‘the most contaminated place in the world . . .’’ and ‘‘it will be very interesting to go back and get good environmental data, and determine what isotopes 

are involved, so as to get a measure of the human uptake when people live in a 

contaminated environment.’’ His view of the Utrok people was revealed in his statement that ‘‘while it is true these people do not live, I would say, the way Westerners 

do, civilized people, it is nevertheless also true that these people are more like us 

that the mice.’’

In the decades that were to follow, this pre-mature return to Utrok was to have 

devastating consequences. Most all members of the community have felt the deadly 

effects of the radioactive fallout. Most every family has lost a member to cancer. 

Miscarriages and stillbirths ravaged the community. Before the bomb stillbirths 

were almost unknown, with only 1 recorded case. After 1954, 15 cases were reported. Miscarriages were also rare in the years prior to the testing. Only three miscarriages were known to have occurred before the testing. After 1954, that number 

increased to 41, well over ten times the pre-testing number. 

The mutations that occurred after the testing had never been experienced on 

Utrok in earlier years. Bella Compoj, in a 1981 interview about life after Bravo stated:

I recall seeing a woman named LiBila after our return and her skin 

looked as if someone had poured scalding water over her body, and she was 

in great pain until she died a few years after ‘‘the bomb.’’ LiBila had a son 

two years after ‘the bomb’ who died a few months after birth, and I remember that his feet were quite swollen and his body was burning—the AEC 

33

(Atomic Energy Commission) doctors said he died because of the ‘‘poison’’ 

(‘‘radiation’’). Also, after our return to Utrok, Nerik gave birth to something 

like the intestines of a turtle, which was very sticky like a jellyfish. Soon 

afterwards, many other women would be pregnant for about five months 

and then they turned out not to be pregnant after all. I too thought that 

I was pregnant and after three months I found I was not. This was quite 

new for the women here, and this never happened before the bomb.

The nightmare of severely deformed babies is not yet over on Utrok. In 2005, five 

babies were born with terrible mutations, such as swollen heads, no ears, and other 

malformations. All of these children died within weeks of their birth. 

Today Utrok remains contaminated at levels in excess of those required under 

U.S. EPA guidelines for clean up of radioactive sites. Many members of the Utrok 

community are too fearful to reside on Utrok and have abandoned their homes. The 

dread of knowing that they are living on contaminated land and may at any moment suffer the fate of so many of their friends and loved ones is a nightmare not 

yet over. 

III. REMEDIATION NEEDED FOR THE PEOPLE OF UTROK

Today many of the harms caused by the Nuclear Testing Program remain unresolved. Three specific remedies are sought to resolve the nuclear legacy. 

1. A comprehensive and inclusive medical monitoring and treatment program for 

the people of Utrok. Unlike the existing programs, the entire population should be 

included in a unified program designed to service the needs of the patients, and include all those who have been exposed, not just those present on March 1, 1954. 

2. A clean up of Utrok Atoll should be undertaken to once and for all end the ordeal of further radiation exposure, and to assure the community that future generations will be free from the nuclear horror. 

3. For Utrok’s claim before the Nuclear Claims Tribunal, remanded to the Appellate Division of the United States Federal Courts for review and final determination. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Utrok community has borne the brunt of the Nuclear Testing Program. Residing on one of the northern most atolls ‘downwind’ of the Test cites the people of 

Utrok suffered exposure to very high levels of radiation. The consequence was an 

epidemic of health consequences, which have forever scarred the community. Today, 

adequate healthcare, clean up, and referral of the Tribunal’s pending award to the 

U.S. Federal Appellate Courts are needed to conclude once and for all the dreadful 

experience of Utrok Atoll and the Nuclear age.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator, for your testimony. 

And now I will hear from chairman of the Claims Tribunal, 

James Plasman. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES H. PLASMAN, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR 

CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, REPUBLIC OF MARSHALL ISLANDS 

Mr. PLASMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members. 

The Nuclear Claims Tribunal was created pursuant to the Section 177 Agreement to determine all claims of the people of the 

Marshall Islands which are related to the nuclear testing program. 

The tribunal has dealt with property claims on a class action adjudicatory basis while individual personal injury claims have been 

addressed through an administrative structure based upon U.S. 

programs designed to compensate radiation-related injuries to U.S. 

citizens. 

We view these personal injury claims in the context of the current knowledge about the health effects of the testing program. 

From the continuing development of scientific knowledge, particularly the recent report to this committee by the National Cancer InVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:44 Nov 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 R:\DOCS\24-536 SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
34

stitute, it is clear that the number and distribution of cancers and 

other health effects resulting from the nuclear testing program in 

the Marshall Islands greatly exceeds what was known at the effective date of the 177 Agreement. 

The tribunal system for personal injury claims uses the same 

presumption of causation approach established by the ‘‘U.S. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act’’ of 1990. By assuming causation 

if an eligible claimant develops a radiogenic disease, the difficult 

task of proving legal causation is eased. 

In discussing the appropriate response for radiation-caused injuries to those downwind of the Nevada test site, Senator Grassly of 

Iowa commented on the floor of the Senate nearly 15 years ago ‘‘the 

litigation solution works as a cruel hoax on the intended beneficiaries. It holds out the prospect for recovery but frustrates the 

victims by delay and expense.’’

He went on to say ‘‘if the Government is responsible, and the evidence strongly suggests that it is, then let us create a compensation system outside of the courts to provide relief faster without 

litigation expenses, without having to prove fault, and without 

lengthy appeals.’’

There are several studies and reports cited in my written statement which document that fallout extended beyond the four atolls 

identified in the Section 177 Agreement. These provide a compelling basis for the tribunal’s determination to pattern its personal 

injury compensation program on the presumption of causation approach adopted by the Congress for those downwinders. 

While the tribunal has made awards to nearly 2,000 individuals, 

these awards are not all for past cancers. More than 1,000 are for 

radiogenic nonmalignant thyroid conditions and another 144 are 

for noncancerous acute radiation sickness and beta burns diagnosed in 1954. 

It must be understood that there are no clinical features distinguishing a cancer caused by radiation from one caused by other 

factors. This central fact lies at the heart of the presumption of 

causation approach used by the tribunal and by the United States. 

As a result, compensation may be awarded more broadly than if 

proof of causation were required. However, built in to these presumptive programs is a limit on the amounts of compensation. 

If the causal connection of the claimant’s condition to radiation 

exposure were proven to the satisfaction of a court, the majority of 

damages would be far higher than the awards provided either 

under the ‘‘Radiation Exposure Compensation Act’’ or under the 

Tribunal’s Personal Injury Compensation Program. 

In floor comments on the ‘‘Radiation Exposure Compensation 

Act’’ in 1990, Representative James of Florida remarked ‘‘the limitations in this bill are only $50,000 for the downwinders. That is 

hardly tantamount to a large torque claim award which could be 

in the millions.’’

He further noted ‘‘similar comments can be made about the miner’s $100,000. That is insignificant compared to a judgment that 

might be awarded if clear liability were found. 

‘‘So this is not like giving the full amount that a jury might give. 

It is only a fractional part to ease some of the pain economically 

to these miners.’’

35

While it has been suggested that a probability of causation approach to compensation would provide a more precise means of targeting compensation to those actually affected by the testing program, there is simply insufficient information to recreate individual 

doses of people in the Marshall Islands for the purposes of a probability of causation analysis. The $150 million nuclear claims fund is virtually exhausted. Now it stands at less than $3.5 million. $15.7 million are needed to pay 

off personal injury awards made to date. With more than half the 

cancers estimated by the National Cancer Institute yet to develop, 

that amount does not reflect future awards. 

The significant number of future cancers and other medical conditions caused by the testing program will require resources for 

surveillance and treatment of these conditions. In addition, appropriate treatment of tribunal property awards is necessary. 

Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to this committee for its request to the NCI regarding the cancer effects of the 

nuclear testing program in the Marshall Islands. This request and 

the resultant study give hope to the people of the Marshall Islands 

that when the resources of this great Nation are directed to resolving problems, justice can be achieved. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared stated of Mr. Plasman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES H. PLASMAN, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR CLAIMS

TRIBUNAL, REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

The number of cancers and other health effects resulting from the nuclear testing 

program in the Marshall Islands greatly exceeds what was known at the time the 

Section 177 Agreement became effective in 1986. While there were grounds for an 

argument of changed circumstances under the terms of the Section 177 Agreement 

even before the recent study by the National Cancer Institute (‘‘Estimation of the 

Baseline Number of Cancers Among Marshallese and the Number of Cancers Attributable to Exposure to Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Testing Conducted in the Marshall Islands,’’ prepared for Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 

September 2004,) the results of the NCI study firmly establish the existence of 

changed circumstances. 

The baseline of what was known about radiation health effects may be established 

by a paper, presented in October 1987 to the Japanese Nuclear Medicine Society by 

Jacob Robbins (Clinical Endocrinology Branch, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland) and William H. Adams (Medical Department, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York), two well established scientists with significant 

experience in the Marshall Islands (Brookhaven National Laboratory was the institution charged with observing and reporting on the health of the affected 

Marshallese people.) This paper, ‘‘Radiation Effects in the Marshall Islands,’’ was 

later published in Radiation and the Thyroid: Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting of the Japanese Nuclear Medicine Society, Nagasaki, Japan, October 1—3, 1987, 

Shigenobu Nagataki, editor, Excerpta Medica, Amsterdam-Princeton-Hong KongTokyo-Sydney, 1989. 

In terms of early radiation effects, they reported on Rongelap ‘‘about two-thirds 

of the people developed anorexia and nausea and one-tenth had vomiting and diarrhea . . . skin burns appeared after 12-14 days in about 90% of the Rongelap inhabitants.’’

In regards to late effects, they noted: ‘‘It has become evident that thyroid abnormalities—which include benign and malignant thyroid tumors and thyroid failure—

are the major late effects of the radiation received by the exposed Marshallese.’’ 

They found the following thyroid effects, through 1986: 2 cases of profound growth 

failure in two boys due to radiation related thyroid atrophy; 12 cases of 

hypothyroidism not related to thyroid surgery; 51 observed thyroid nodules (16 expected, 35 excess;) 9 observed thyroid cancers (2 expected, 7 excess.) 

36

They observed three fatal cancers (leukemia, stomach cancer, and cranial meningioma) and six ‘‘nonlethal’’ tumors (a neurofibroma, a breast cancer, a colon cancer, 

and three pituitary tumors) as other ‘‘late radiation effects—or possible radiation effects.’’

It should also be acknowledged that the U.S. Department of Energy in 1982 (‘‘The 

Meaning of Radiation for Those Atolls in the Northern Part of the Marshall Islands 

That Were Surveyed in 1978’’) estimated an additional two cancers would result 

from exposures in the thirty years following the Radiological Survey of the Northern 

Marshall Islands, conducted in 1978. 

These findings establish what was known about health effects of the nuclear testing program at the time of the Section 177 Agreement. 

The NCI study establishes a basis for what we know now about these test related 

health effects, and reveals the following comparisons of radiation induced cancers:

Cancer 1986 (Adams/Robbins) Current 

(NCI) 

Leukemia ...................... 1 ........................................................................... 5

Stomach ........................ 1 ........................................................................... 15

Colon ............................. 1 ........................................................................... 157

Thyroid ......................... 7 ........................................................................... 262

Other ............................ 6 (includes non-lethal tumors) ........................... 93

16

+2 (DOE future cancers).

Total ...................... 18 ......................................................................... 532

If the same ratio of radiation excess thyroid nodules (35) to excess thyroid cancers 

(7) that appears in the Adams/Robbins paper is applied to the NCI estimate of 262 

excess thyroid cancers, the number of radiation caused thyroid nodules would be 5 

x 262 = 1310. These thyroid disorders, attributable to the nuclear testing program, 

are health effects suffered by the Marshallese people in addition to the cancers estimated by the NCI. 

The stark contrast of what was known at the time of the Section 177 Agreement 

about the health effects resulting from the testing program and what is known now 

in light of the NCI study must be regarded as a changed circumstance. 

While the Petition as originally filed included a request of $26.9 million for the 

unpaid balance of personal injury awards, that amount now stands at $15.7 million. 

However, with more than half the cancers estimated by the NCI yet to develop, that 

amount reflects only the current balance due and does not reflect future awards. 

THE TRIBUNAL WAS JUSTIFIED IN ADOPTING THE PRESUMPTION OF CAUSATION

APPROACH

In adopting a presumption of causation approach, the Tribunal primarily relied 

upon the precedent set by the Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 

1988, Public Law 100-321, and by the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act 

(RECA) of 1990, Public Law 101 426, particularly with its application to the 

Downwinders—those residents in the areas around the Nevada testing grounds who 

were affected by fallout from the tests. A primary source of scientific support for 

these programs was the work of the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on 

the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation. Passage of the Veterans Compensation 

Act in 1988 relied primarily upon the Committee’s third report, so-called BEIR III, 

while RECA had the benefit of BEIR V. The BEIR V Committee made heavy reference to the work of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), a bilateral 

undertaking of Japanese and American scientists to study the human health effects 

of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Committee also used data 

from other well studied human populations exposed to radiation and referred to experimental studies on laboratory animals. Of particular importance, supporting the 

use of a presumption of causation, was the determination that there was no threshold dose below which stochastic effects such as the development of cancer would not 

occur. To the extent that these U.S. programs relied upon this body of work as the 

scientific basis for compensation, by extension, the Tribunal made similar reliance. 

In adopting the Veterans Compensation Act and RECA, Congress was clearly motivated by the perception that the government had wronged these victims of radiation exposure and that unreasonable standards of proof should not stand in the 

way of compensating deserving individuals. 

37

* Retained in committee files. 

Both of these compensatory programs rely upon a presumption of causation to determine eligibility for compensation. In both situations there was a desire on the 

part of Congress to enact a system that was fair and reasonable, in light of the difficulties in proof of causation, but also that was efficient and cost effective. The use 

of the presumption of causation addressed this desire. In speaking against an 

amendment to remove the immunity from law suit of governmental contractors involved in atomic weapons development (floor debate on NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991, Congressional Record—August 03, 

1990, p. S12117,) Senator Grassley of Iowa articulated these concerns:

The litigation solution works as a cruel hoax on the intended beneficiaries; it holds out the prospect for recovery, but frustrates the victims 

by delay and expense. The Justice Department testified that radiation cases 

take much longer to prepare and try than do most other types of litigation; 

a typical case would take more than 5 years to resolve. Worse, simply repealing the Warner amendment will do nothing to solve the enormous proof 

problems that plaintiffs will face, attempting to link their exposure to current disease. 

A straight repeal of the Warner amendment may give some a warm feeling, and it will surely bring a smile to a lawyer’s face, but it will mean 

scant little for those who need help the most. 

Mr. President, these people don’t need lawyers, they need money to pay 

their medical bills, to care for their sick or terminally ill. 

If the Government is responsible, and the evidence strongly suggests that 

it is, then let’s create a compensation system outside of the courts to provide relief—faster, without litigation expenses, without having to prove 

fault, and without lengthy appeals. 

In recent years, we have shown a preference for compensation over litigation, with enactment of the child vaccine compensation legislation, the Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988, and the Veterans 

Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Act (Public Law 98-542) among others.

The motivation for a simple, reasonable administrative system was strengthened 

by the perception that the government had not only harmed these victims of radiation exposure, but had done so in a significantly wrongful manner. In floor comments on the Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act 1988 (see Congressional Record—Senate for April 25, 1988, pgs. 4637 4641), Senator Cranston of California said, ‘‘Science has clearly proven that ionizing radiation can produce serious 

adverse human health effects. While we do not have all the answers as to how much 

radiation exposure is necessary before the various adverse effects appear, there is 

a long list of cancers for which radiation has been established as a risk factor.’’ He 

went on to say that ‘‘these veterans were not informed of the risks associated with 

their participation in the nuclear weapons testing program, nor was their health 

status systematically monitored thereafter. Accordingly, I strongly believe that we 

have the responsibility to ensure that these veterans finally are treated in an evenhanded and compassionate way with respect to their claims for VA benefits.’’

The Marshallese people were never informed of the risks associated with their 

participation in the nuclear tests in the Pacific. Their health status was never systematically monitored until after the tragic events following the BRAVO test in 

1954, and then, only a small fraction of the exposed population was covered. These 

similarities between the U.S. affected populations and the Marshallese affected population provide compelling justification for following U.S. precedent in adopting a 

presumption of causation. 

The Tribunal provided an in-depth discussion of the reasons for believing the extent of fallout in the Marshall Islands went beyond the four atolls identified in the 

Section 177 Agreement, on March 18, 2005 in Majuro, to two senior staff members 

of this committee and to the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Attached is a written statement which addresses the points made at that oral 

presentation.* 

In summary of that discussion, the Tribunal felt there was ample information 

available, even before the NCI study, to support the extension of the presumption 

of causation throughout the Marshall Islands. First, is an article which appeared 

in the Journal of the American Medical Society (Hamilton, T. E.; van Belle, G.; 

LoGerfo, J. P.; ‘‘Thyroid Neoplasia in Marshall Islanders Exposed to Nuclear Fallout,’’ Journal of the American Medical Association, 258:629 636; 1987), which investigated the appearance of thyroid nodules in 12 atolls previously thought to be unexVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:44 Nov 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 R:\DOCS\24-536 SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
38

posed to fallout from the testing program. The investigators not only found a higher 

than expected incidence of thyroid nodules in these atolls, but also found the incidence rate showed an inverse linear relationship with distance from Bikini, strongly 

suggesting that the nodules were caused by radiation from the tests. 

Secondly, the findings of the Marshall Islands Nationwide Radiological Study 

issued in 1994, reported Cesium 137 levels two to 11 times greater than global fallout at 15 atolls that were not included in the Section 177 Agreement. 

The release in 1994 of a previously classified Atomic Energy Commission report 

from 1955 (Breslin, A.J.; Cassidy, M.E.; ‘‘Radioactive Debris from Operation Castle, 

Islands of the Mid Pacific,’’ New York: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, New York 

Operations Office, Health and Safety Laboratory; NYO 4623; 1955) provided significant support for the nationwide application of the presumption of causation by the 

Tribunal. That report was based on aerial monitoring conducted during the Castle 

series throughout the Marshall Islands and indicated external radiation exposures 

to every atoll of the Marshall Islands, in contradiction to the DOE position that only 

the northern four atolls received fallout from the tests. Internal exposures would 

have increased the level of exposure even higher than those reported by Breslin and 

Cassidy. 

During the testing program, a monitoring station was maintained on Kwajalein 

Atoll. Although the gummed film methodology utilized there provided only a crude 

measurement of fallout, ‘‘The clear indication from the monitoring station was that 

deposition of fresh fallout occurred at Kwajalein Atoll within a single day following 

every one of the detonations over 1 megaton explosive yield’’ (Simon, S.L.; ‘‘STATEMENT OF STEVEN L. SIMON, PhD, Director, Nationwide Radiological Study, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Submitted to the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in respect to United States Weapons Testing in the Marshall Islands,’’ February 24, 1994.) These findings were reiterated in a 1997 report (Takahashi, T., et 

al.; ‘‘An Investigation into the Prevalence of Thyroid Disease on Kwajalein Atoll, 

Marshall Islands,’’ Health Phys. 73:199 213; 1997) that stated the data showed that 

‘‘all eighteen of the large Marshall Islands tests (those >1 MT explosive yield) were 

detected at Kwajalein at about 100 X the background radiation level (Simon and 

Graham 1996). Presumably, other mid latitude atolls in the Marshall Islands received similar amounts of early fallout as did Kwajalein.’’

These studies, and those cited in the attachment, provide an ample basis for the 

extension of the presumption of causation throughout the Marshall Islands. 

THE TRIBUNAL HAS NOT ‘‘OVERCOMPENSATED’’

While the Tribunal has made awards to 1,941 individuals, it would be a 

misstatement to say that all these awards are for past cancers, because in fact more 

than 1,000 are for non-malignant thyroid conditions. As noted by Robbins and 

Adams in their 1987 paper, ‘‘It has become evident that thyroid abnormalities—

which include benign and malignant thyroid tumors and thyroid failure—are the 

major late effects of the radiation received by the exposed Marshallese.’’ Although 

the full extent of those effects was not recognized at the time of the paper’s presentation, the sensitivity of the thyroid gland to radiation, beyond the development of 

cancer, has long been recognized. 

The NCI study addresses only cancers and states, ‘‘Estimation of diseases other 

than cancer is more problematic . . . and would require access to expertise and data 

not readily available at the National Cancer Institute.’’

As noted above, based on the Robbins and Adams findings on the relationship between thyroid nodules and thyroid cancer, and based on NCI’s estimate of 262 excess radiation related thyroid cancers, 1,310 radiation related thyroid nodules could 

be expected to occur in the Marshall Islands. Another 144 of the Tribunal awards 

are for radiation sickness and beta burns, both of which are directly related to radiation exposure, but are not cancerous conditions. 

It should be noted that these non-malignant conditions are awarded compensation 

at levels significantly less than award levels for cancers. The most lethal and serious cancers are awarded up to $125,000 by the Tribunal (with downward adjustments based upon the age at which the condition manifests,) while a benign thyroid 

nodule not requiring surgery is awarded $12,500. 

It must be understood that while the Tribunal has made more awards for cancer 

than the NCI estimate of radiation excess cancers, there are no clinically distinguishing features of a radiation related cancer to differentiate such cancers from 

non-radiation caused cancers. 

This central fact of radiation related cancers lies at the heart of the presumption 

of causation utilized by the Tribunal and by Department of Justice for Downwinders 

39

in the United States under the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act and by the 

Veterans Administration for its statutory program for radiation exposed veterans. 

In order to meet the goals of the programs to compensate the victims of radiation 

exposure, it is deemed better to compensate broadly than to neglect compensation 

for those who are unable to prove with scientific certainty that their conditions were 

in fact caused by their radiation exposures. Built into such programs is the limitation of awards to set amounts which recognize the over-inclusive nature of the compensatory scheme. Surely if an individual awardee, whether a Downwinder, or a 

Marshall Islander, were able to prove to the satisfaction of a court the causal connection of the awardee’s condition to radiation exposure, the measure of damages 

would be far higher than the awards provided either by RECA or by the Tribunal. 

This aspect of these programs was clearly recognized in comments on the floor of 

the House during discussion of the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act on June 

5, 1990, as Representative James of Florida remarked (p. H3144, Congressional 

Record):

Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out in this bill; I do not think it has 

been said yet, or, if it has, it has not been emphasized as much as it might, 

but the limitations in this bill are only $50,000 for the downwinders. That 

is hardly tantamount to a large tort claim award, which could be in the millions. 

It also has a savings aspect to it to the Government. It saves the attorneys fees, the expenses and the costs, a portion of which we are awarding 

would be consumed anyway. So, there is actually a substantial savings, 

probably to the Government, maybe not to the tune of the total amount of 

the judgments. 

Similar comments can be made about the miners’ $100,000. That is insignificant compared to a judgment that might be awarded if clear liability 

were found. 

So, this is not like giving the full amount that a jury might give. It is 

only a fractional part to ease some of the pain economically to these miners.

If the award levels were based on the value of a statistical life, as utilized by regulatory agencies for cost-benefit analysis, the award levels would likewise be much 

higher. For instance, it has been reported (‘‘Valuation of Human Health and Welfare 

Effects of Criteria Pollutants,’’ Appendix H, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air 

Act, 1990 to 2010, EPA, 1997) that while values differ from program to program, 

the mean value of a statistical life for regulatory purposes is $4.8 million. Even acknowledging that not all cancers in the NCI study are fatal, the level of compensation determined under such a methodology would far exceed what the Marshall Islands received under the Section 177 Agreement for all damages, not simply personal injuries. 

It has been argued that a probability of causation or ‘‘assigned share’’ approach 

to compensation would provide a more precise means of targeting compensation to 

those actually affected by the testing program. One of the dangers in such approach 

is that by its nature, it looks only at the probabilities in a case and does not provide 

an answer to causation in fact. As a result, a claimant whose cancer was caused 

in fact by exposure to radiation could fail to qualify for compensation because the 

probabilities were against him or her. A further difficulty is the cost of implementing such a system. One expert estimates the cost of each reconstruction, based 

on EEOICPA experience could run as high as $30,000 to $40,000. 

More importantly, there is simply insufficient information to recreate individual 

doses for people in the Marshall Islands for the purposes of a probability of causation analysis. As noted in the NCI study: ‘‘Following the nuclear tests that took 

place some 50 years ago in the Marshall Islands; measurements were sparse and 

generally uncertain. The little data now available to reconstruct doses at many different locations present difficult challenges for dosimetrists.’’

In the compensation program established for U.S. Department of Energy employees exposed to radiation (EEOICPA), a probability of causation approach is utilized. 

Energy employees worked in a closely monitored environment where many wore dosimetry badges which provide a basis for precise dose reconstructions. Even in these 

controlled situations, EEOICPA provides for a presumption of causation approach 

when there is insufficient information to adequately reconstruct doses and where 

there is a reasonable likelihood of exposure to harm. The level of data for Energy 

employees far exceeds that available in the Marshall Islands. The NCI report shows 

excess cancers throughout the Marshall Islands, even in the southern-most atolls 

characterized by NCI as ‘‘very low exposure.’’ This excess presents a reasonable likelihood of harm to the entire Marshall Islands. Under these circumstances and the 

40

precedent set by EEOICPA, the extension of the presumption of causation throughout the Marshall Islands is reasonable. 

WHAT IS NEEDED

While the Petition as originally filed included a request of $26.9 million for the 

unpaid balance of personal injury awards, that amount now stands at $15.7 million. 

However, with more than half the cancers estimated by the NCI yet to develop, that 

amount reflects only the current balance due and does not reflect future awards. At 

the end of 2003, the Tribunal had awarded $83 million. The NCI reports: ‘‘About 

56% of the total radiation-related cases have yet to develop or to be diagnosed, compared to about 50% of the baseline cancers. This temporal distribution reflects the 

generally young age structure of the exposed population and the greater sensitivity 

at younger ages to radiation carcinogenesis.’’ (p. 16) Assuming the NCI estimate of 

past and future cancers reflects the same ratio of overall health conditions compensated by the Tribunal past and future, and assuming the Tribunal compensation 

scheme is fair and reasonable, then the $83 million awarded at the end of 2003 represents 44 percent of the level of fair and reasonable compensation for personal injuries. Assuming 56% of conditions will need to be compensated after 2003, then another $105.6 million will be necessary for personal injury compensation (56/44 x 83 

= 105.6.) 

The significant number of future cancers and other medical conditions will also 

require assistance for surveillance and treatment of these conditions. Finally, appropriate treatment of Tribunal property awards is necessary, through referral to the 

federal courts.

Senator AKAKA. May I call on Dr. Neal Palafox. 

STATEMENT OF DR. NEAL A. PALAFOX, MD, MPH, PROFESSOR 

AND CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY MEDICINE AND COMMUNITY HEALTH, JOHN A. BURNS SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, 

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII 

Dr. PALAFOX. Senator Akaka, Senator Murkowski, cancers and 

thyroid disease have long been linked to radiation exposure. The 

2004 NCI report estimates 530 cancers were generated from all 

parts of the Marshall Islands due to weapons testing. Half of the 

530 cancers will develop after 2004. 

The 2005 BEIR VII report from the National Academy of 

Sciences also links radiation to noncancer illness including heart 

disease, stroke, blood disease, and genetic effects. 

The entire testing program caused 50 years of social-cultural disruption such as alienation from the land, destruction of traditional 

diets and lifestyle which are associated with adverse health outcomes. 

Psychic trauma from loss of culture, fear of developing cancer, inability to get appropriate health care affects well-being. Many 

health effects have yet to be quantified. 

The 2004 NCI report quantifies a risk of cancer for Marshallese 

between 1946 and 1958. What is the risk of cancers in the populations who lived in radiation-contaminated environments after 

1958? 

Of 300 Marshallese and Micronesian workers who participated in 

the cleanup of contaminated and nuclear debris in Bikini and 

Enewetak, what is their cancer risk? 

How should radiation-related stroke, heart disease, and genetic 

disease be treated in changing health circumstances? 

How are health problems for displacement of people, social-cultural upheaval, and psychic trauma to be handled though these 

health effects are very difficult to quantify? 

41

The health effects of nuclear testing cannot be distilled to cancer 

alone. The health system needed to address the health effects of 

nuclear testing must be comprehensive. 

The present health care environment of the Republic of the Marshall Islands reflects an infant mortality three to four times that 

the United States. Marshallese live 10 years less than the people 

of the United States. Kidney failure is commonplace, yet their is 

no dialysis available. 

The 15-year Marshall Islands Health Plan describes a health system that is financially not sustainable. The annual health care 

budget of 12 million coupled with a contribution from the Ebeye 

special fund totals $15 million annually. 

For comparison purposes, the Commonwealth of the North Marianas with the same population as RMI has an annual budget of 

$45 million annually. The CNMI has no health impacts from weapons testing. 

There are two fairly funded medical programs for people affected 

by the weapons testing program, the DOE Medical Program and 

the 177 Program. The DOE program is provided to the populations 

present on Rongelap and Utrik during the 1954 BRAVO test for 

about $2 million annually. The funding for the program participants, now about 200, is adequate. However, program policy limits 

care likely to cancer and thyroid illness. 

The 177 Health Care Program was designed to provide comprehensive health care to the people of Enewetak, Bikini, Rongelap, 

and Utrik. The program with an annual budget of $1 million attempts to operate a comprehensive health care system for 14,000 

participants. That is about $7.00 per person per month. 

In comparison, U.S. comprehensive health programs spend between $200 and $700 per person per month. Funding is grossly inadequate to provide health care under this 177 Program. 

The national RMI health system’s 177 Program and DOE program are unable to care for the expected burden of cancer. There 

is no mammography to detect breast cancer or colonoscopy equipment to detect colon cancer in Ebeye. There is no operational CAT 

Scan in the Marshall Islands, no chemotherapy, no oncologists, and 

no cancer registry. 

Comprehensive cancer requires prevention screening, pathology 

service, lab services, and issues related to quality of life. None of 

these systems are fully operational and some are nonexistent. 

Many cancer patients who enter the medical system in Hawaii 

and Guam, enter medical systems in Hawaii and Guam, those who 

are not supported by the RMI government referral process levy a 

heavy, significant financial stress on Hawaii and Guam. 

What can be done? Firstly, a U.S. standard comprehensive cancer care system with the highly specialized parts of cancers treatment purchase in Hawaii that could handle the NCI projected cancers would cost about $9 million annually for a ten-bed cancer facility and would include prevention, screening, and monitoring. Capital costs would be in the order of $6 million. This system would 

be limited to cancer care. 

Second, the 177 Health Care Program could be brought to a U.S. 

standard. At a cost of $300 per person per month, this comprehenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:44 Nov 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 R:\DOCS\24-536 SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
42

sive health care system would cost $50 million annually. This program would be limited to the four atoll population. 

Third, the existing RMI National Health System could be enhanced. Building a comprehensive system to provide high standards of health care for all Marshallese affected by nuclear testing 

can be accomplished for an operations cost of about $45 million annually with $50 million in capital costs. This program would be 

better prepared for the health consequences of a nuclear testing in 

a cost-effective, capacity-building manner. 

Health consequences of nuclear testing are not limited to cancer. 

Some of the health consequences have yet to be quantified. The 

health system required to care for health consequences of the U.S. 

Nuclear Testing Program must provide comprehensive care and 

health care for all affected. 

The RMI has gone 50 years without adequate health care. There 

is ongoing suffering in the Marshall Islands today. Action must be 

now. 

Thank you very much for supporting the CCP petition. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Dr. Palafox. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Palafox follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NEAL A. PALAFOX, MD, MPH, PROFESSOR AND CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY MEDICINE AND COMMUNITY HEALTH, JOHN A. BURNS

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this testimony is to speak to the health consequences of the U.S. 

Nuclear Weapons Testing Program (USNWTP) in the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the health system that is needed to address those consequences. The current status of the health care services of the RMI and the medical programs designed for those who were adversely affected by the USNWTP (177 Health Program/ 

DOE Medical Program) will be discussed. Finally, the cost and rationale for three 

health system solutions to address the varied health consequences of the nuclear 

weapons testing program will be presented. . 

HEALTH EFFECTS OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING PROGRAM

Health, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), is ‘‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well being, and not merely the absence of disease 

or infirmity.’’ The health consequences of USNWTP are acute medical conditions, 

chronic medical conditions, cultural impacts, mental health impacts, and social impacts. 

A holistic approach to health must be part of any discussion on health consequences of nuclear testing because ‘‘health’’ in nuclear testing is often distilled to 

ionizing radiation and cancers. Health consequences of nuclear testing are a product 

of the bomb blast and the effect the process of testing had on the humans living 

in that environment. Utilizing a holistic approach is crucial in health care systems 

affecting indigenous Pacific populations. 

Cancers, hypothyroidism and thyroid nodules are clearly linked to ionizing radiation exposure. The 2004 NCI report estimates 530 excess cancers from the 

USNWTP in the RMI. Half of the 530 excess cancers have yet to manifest themselves in the Marshall Islands population because of the length of time (latency) it 

takes for a cancer to manifest itself following the deleterious effects of ionizing radiation. 

The latest scientific information on the biological effects of low dose ionizing radiation 2005 BEIR VII report from the National Academy of Sciences adds that exposure to even extremely low doses of ionizing radiation may place individuals at a 

risk for cancer. BEIR VII also notes that intergenerational (hereditary) genetic effects may be possible in humans since intergenerational effects caused by ionizing 

radiation have been noted in mice and insects. 

Cultural and social disruptions from the USNWTP are associated with adverse 

health outcomes and illness. Alienation from the land and critical natural resources 

through radioactive contamination or forced evacuation destroyed the physical and 

43

cultural means of sustaining and reproducing a self-sufficient way of life. It also destroyed community integrity, traditional health practices and sociopolitical relationships. Furthermore, community history and knowledge is destroyed when there is 

no lineage land from which to pass on knowledge about the local environment. 

Food supplementation became necessary for those who were displaced from their 

land and for those whose lands and food sources were contaminated with radiation. 

For many years, the U.S. Government has provided USDA foods, mostly white rice 

and other processed foods, to the people of the four atolls. Although some atoll communities are now using U.S. funding to purchase and ship their own foods rather 

than USDA foods, several adverse health impacts of USDA food supplements are 

evident in the recipient communities, as noted below:

1. The natural diet has been altered. 

2. The available Western diet is high in fat, high in carbohydrates, low in 

fiber, and lacks Vitamin A and iron. 

3. There has been a loss of the cultural activities and norms surrounding food 

gathering and preparation. 

4. The loss of the physical activities surrounding food preparation has resulted in a more sedentary lifestyle. 

5. Diseases such as diabetes, atherosclerotic diseases, and hypertension have 

been exacerbated by the Westernized diet and more sedentary lifestyle. 

6. The industriousness and work ethic needed to prepare local foods from 

coral atolls with few natural resources has been stifled. 

7. Dependency on food supplementation has become a norm destroying the 

fabric of a once self-reliant community.

Bodily harm is a tragedy that affects an individual for a finite period of time, 

whereas cultural destruction adversely affects the health of entire communities for 

generations. Cultural, mental and social impacts are difficult to quantify and measure and so it becomes easy to pretend they do not exist. The cancer burden that 

was generated from the nuclear testing program was quantified by the NCI 50 years 

after the insult. Other health consequences will likely be quantified soon. 

HEALTH CARE ENVIRONMENT AND SERVICES IN THE RMI

RMI Ministry of Health and Environment 

The present health care environment of the Republic of the Marshall Islands is 

brittle. Many unnecessary illnesses and deaths occur because the health care system 

cannot systematically respond to the health needs of the people. The health situation will get worse as the population expands, as the proportion of elderly increases, 

as the burden of costly chronic illnesses grows, and as the limited health dollars and 

finances wane. The infant mortality rate is 3-4 times that of the U.S., and the longevity of Marshallese is 12 years less than people in the U.S. Hansen’s disease (leprosy) and TB are commonplace. 

The 15-year RMI Strategic Health Plan (2001-2015) describes a health system 

that is not financially sustainable with its present resources. According to the RMI 

Health Plan, the Ministry of Health is projected to lose an equivalent of $21 million 

dollars in services over the next 15 years under present funding and levels of health 

care. The RMI pays nearly $2 million dollars a year, a significant portion of all its 

annual health expenditures, for medical cases sent out of the country for treatment 

because of lack of health infrastructure. The monies spent in referral health centers 

abroad are not directed towards the RMI health infrastructure. 

Compact funds are the primary source of healthcare dollars and resources. Funding from the Compact represents nearly half of the Gross National Product of the 

RMI and 40% of all health care funding (direct Compact funds, Section 177 funds, 

U.S. Federal Grants) in the RMI. Another 23% of the health care dollars have been 

derived from the RMI General Fund. Less than 1 % of health dollars has been derived from local user fees. 

The total amount of all the sources of health revenue for fiscal year 2005 is about 

$14 million dollars. As a comparison, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas 

is struggling with an annual health budget of $45 million annually. The populations 

of these two Pacific countries are similar, 55 thousand people. 

The 2004-2005 Budget Portfolio of the RMI Health Services describes some 

changes in health allocations with the amended Compact. There is now a Ebeye 

Special Needs fund in the amount of $3.1 million of which $1.5 million is allocated 

to the Ebeye hospital. While this special fund is being added to the health care 

budget, the amount for the 177 Health Program has decreased by 1 million annually. On balance there has been a modest gain in finance. 

44

In Majuro Hospital there are sometimes no oxygen supplies for the operating 

room and critical patients, there are no reagents for many simple laboratory tests, 

and there are no biopsy needles for examination of common cancers. Renal failure 

is commonplace because of high rates of diabetes, yet there is no dialysis unit in 

the RMI. 

Federally Funded Medical Programs for Marshallese affected by the USNWTP 

There are two Medical care programs for people affected by the USNWTP, the 

DOE Medical Program and the 177 Health Program. 

DOE Program 

Section 103(h) of the Compact ‘‘provide(s) special medical care and logistical support’’ to the populations present on Rongelap and Utrik during the Bravo test on 

March 1, 1954. The Department of Energy program also provides medical care to 

a comparison population. Members of the comparison group were not exposed to the 

Bravo fallout in 1954. However, they were resettled on Rongelap with the Bravo victims at a time when radiation contamination of the atoll was still an issue. 

Between the mid 1950’s until 1997, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) was 

contracted by the DOE (for $1.1 million annually) to provide medical care to those 

exposed to the Bravo detonation and to the comparison group. BNL healthcare consisted of monitoring and treating the designated population for radiogenic illnesses 

on a biannual basis. 

From 1998 to 2004, the RMI and the DOE jointly developed a more comprehensive health care program for the USNWTP affected population. Clinics on Kwajalein 

and Majuro were established to deliver year round healthcare and adjunct programs 

were instituted to develop the health capacity and infrastructure of the RMI. 

In 2005, the DOE redirected the medical program towards focusing largely on cancer care. Capacity building with the RMI Ministry of Health and more comprehensive health care elements for the affected population are now being eliminated. 

The funding for the program participants is adequate; however utilization of 

health services is limited by the design of the program. Funding for this program 

could be used more effectively in the RMI for maintaining the primary care services, 

capacity building, as well as the cancer care aspects of the program. 

177 Health Care Program 

The 177 Health Care Program provided in the 177 Agreement is designed to provide primary, secondary and tertiary medical services to the people of Enewetak, Bikini, Rongelap and Utrik islands who were affected by the USNWTP. This includes 

most of the people enrolled in the DOE medical program. The 177 Health Care Program’s design was developed through the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) in 

1985. The design of the program by the USPHS is laudable, having essential elements of primary, secondary and tertiary medical care. However, delivery of what 

was proposed by the USPHS has been impossible because of limitations in funding 

and the RMI health care infrastructure. 

The chart below illustrates the cost per person per month (PPPM) to achieve basic 

levels of primary, secondary and tertiary health care in the United States as compared to the 177 Health Care Program. These figures, calculated by Mercy International, are based on 1997 Health Care Dollars and do not reflect increased health 

care costs during the past seven years.

Program (PPPM) 

U.S. 

Commercial Population ................................................................................ $135

Medicare (Nebraska) ..................................................................................... $221

Medicare (New York) .................................................................................... $767

Medicaid (Michigan) ..................................................................................... $120

HCFA ............................................................................................................. $293

RMI 

Section 177 .................................................................................................... 1 $13.60

1The PPPM for the RMI is calculated as follows: $2 million dollars annually, divided by 12,259 patients, divided by 12 months equals $13.60 PPPM. 

The funding for the 177 program in 2005 has dropped from 2 million annually 

to 1 million annually. In 2003, the program operated only on $500,000. Each fiscal 

year the tertiary care budget for 177 patients is consumed within the first three 

months. 

45

RMI ABILITY TO ADDRESS THE HEALTH CARE CONSEQUENCES OF THE USNWTP

The ability for health services in the RMI to systematically address the daily medical encounters is limited. The RMI health system, although improving, struggles to 

provide adequate routine health care for its citizens. The 177 program is severely 

under funded and contributes modestly to the overall health care needs of the 177 

participants. The DOE program is adequately funded for its patient base and 

present mandates, however, the program design lacks comprehensive care and lacks 

a proactive stance towards building the capacity of health services. 

Cancer 

There were 530 excess cases of cancer generated by the USNWTP. Is the present 

RMI Health Services able to care for the burden of cancer? From October 1, 2004 

through June 6, 2005 there were 26 Marshallese patients with cancer who were presented to the medical referral committee which determines if they would benefit 

from off-island referral to a tertiary care center. Eleven of the 26 cases were denied 

referral because the cancers were too far advanced. 

Far advanced cases suggest that the health system is unable to provide timely 

screening, early medical interventions and that the patients are not aware of their 

risks and conditions There is no mammography unit to detect breast cancer or 

colonoscope to detect colon cancer in Ebeye, no operational CT scanner in the RMI, 

and no operational dermatome in the lab to process cancer specimens. When there 

is no medical oxygen in the hospital due to medical equipment problems, major surgery, which many cancer patients require, is not an option. And if the oxygen does 

arrive, there is no way to process the specimen without a dermatome. 

The fact that 26 cancer patients were referred suggests that necessary medical 

care could not be provided in the RMI. Chemotherapy is not given in the RMI because of deficiencies in qualified laboratory, nursing and pharmacy staff. 

Comprehensive cancer care requires local health systems to address prevention, 

screening, biopsies. pathology services, surgical expertise, intensive unit care, chemotherapy expertise, scanners, lab support, palliative care and issues of survivorship 

and quality of life. None of these systems are fully operational, and some are nonexistent. In 2003, only 9% of women who were in the age category to receive cervical 

PAP smears (to screen for cervical cancer) actually received a PAP smear. There is 

neither an oncologist nor a cancer registry in the RMI. 

The inability to handle difficult medical problems, such as cancer, places a burden 

on surrounding areas that have cancer services. Many of the folks who are not supported by the RMI health system as a referral find their way to Hawaii or Guam, 

and enter the medical systems there. These patients have no resources for the very 

expensive cancer care in Hawaii and or Guam. Although all RMI medical debts have 

now been paid, in the past there has been difficulty keeping up with payments because of a lack of RMI funds. Such interactions place a strain on the good will and 

medical / business relationships of the RMI, Hawaii and Guam. 

BUILDING A HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR CANCER: (SYSTEM 1)

The costs of a health system to care for cancer patients are dependent on the answer to several questions which will determine the system design.

1. What is standard of health care that we are trying to provide? Are we 

building a U.S. level of health care system and facility or designing a different 

type of system? 

2. What standard of health care will be provided to cancer patients with other 

illnesses (diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure, asthma, complications 

from treatment)? 

3. Can all services/ components be sustained in the RMI or will some services/

components to be provided at another center or site? 

4. How many cancer patients will be treated? 

5. Should the patients deserve to have most of the cancer care in their home 

environments? 

6. Over what period of time will the system need to be intact? 

7. Is the objective to build the capacity of the RMI to care for cancer patients?

The components of a comprehensive cancer care system are well known.

• Data tracking including a cancer registry, medical records 

• Screening (mammography, colonosocopy , colposcopy, ultrasound) 

• Diagnostic testing (CT scanning, x-ray, laboratory tests) 

• Treatment (surgical intervention, chemotherapy, pharmaceuticals, radio-therapy) 

46

• Medical support (intensive care, nursing, transfusion, antibiotic support, pain 

management) 

• Prosthesis support 

• Social services and health education services 

• Administrative support

Comprehensive cancer care requires access to high functioning primary, secondary 

and tertiary health systems. 

Costs 

Using the following assumptions:

1. That a U.S. Standard of care be provided for the cancer patients because 

the USNWTP caused the excess cancer rates. 

2. That the system is capable of providing a U.S. Standard of health care for 

other health problems in cancer patients, especially at the time of cancer treatment. 

3. That the system will provide comprehensive cancer services, with some specialized needs being met in Hawaii or other tertiary health care sites. 

4. That there will be a minimum of 265 (.5 times 530) cancers resulting from 

nuclear testing and some 2800 (.5 times background 5600 cancers) over the next 

30 years as extrapolated from the 2004 NCI report. The 265 excess cancers will 

be indistinguishable from cancers which have occurred as part of the background cancer rate. 

5. That an appropriate system of cancer care would deliver as much care as 

possible in Majuro and Ebeye. 

6. That capacity building is the best approach as it is one of the objectives 

of the amended Compact and makes the most economic and developmental 

sense.

The comprehensive cancer care system requires an intact primary care system, 

screening system, cancer registry, mammography, colonoscopy, medical laboratory, 

pharmacy, surgical capabilities, intensive medical care capabilities, supplies, prosthesis, pharmaceutical, CT scanner, x-ray unit, ultrasound, and the medical expertise to staff and run the system. A sophisticated hospital is needed with these capabilities. In the RMI adequate screening should be available to the people of the 

outer islands. They should be brought to the urban hospitals to get recommended 

cancer screening. 

The facilities, infrastructure, and manpower required to provide comprehensive 

cancer care, and provide the medical care of cancer patients who are suffering from 

other illnesses during times of cancer care will be significant. The recurrent operations costs for such a 10 acute bed facility at the base cost of about $1300 / acute 

bed / day would be about 5 million dollars annually. Kwajalein Military Hospital 

(USAKA) has 11 acute beds and the annual budget is about $5.5 million. 

The outer island screening and primary care as well as the specialty referral services to Hawaii would be another 2.5 million dollars in cost annually. 

The total operations health care costs for a comprehensive cancer system would 

be in the order of 8 million dollars annually. Capital costs would be in the order 

of 6 million dollars. Notably, a separate cancer facility and cancer system would 

have to be built to make this system functional. Adding 8 million dollars to the existing RMI system would dilute the effort and not allow the comprehensive cancer 

system to reach a U.S. standard of health care. 

177 HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (SYSTEM 2)

The 177 Health Care program serves about 14,000 Marshallese. The 177 Program 

was designed to provide primary (prevention), secondary (hospital), and tertiary (referral) care for the program participants. It is unfortunate that the level of funding 

did not support the program design to any reasonable standard of care. Assuming 

a U.S. Standard of Health Care System to provide primary, secondary, and tertiary 

care would cost about 50 million dollars ($300 per person per month X 12 months 

x 14,000 participants) annually. 

The four atoll membership bears the largest proportion of cancers that was generated from the USNWTP. Except for the DOE subset of patients (200 people), the 

remaining 14,000 program participants have no better access to adequate cancer 

screening, treatment, and services than the rest of the RMI patients. The 177 members should have U.S. Standard cancer health services. 

The 177 Program in particular suffers from the difficulty of quantifying social, 

cultural and mental health impacts. Caring for the participants with a 50 million 

47

* The report has been retained in committee files. 

dollar primary, secondary, and tertiary health care system would address cancer 

and the other health consequences for this population. 

ECONOMY OF SCALE (SYSTEM 3)

Building a comprehensive cancer health system, providing a high standard of 

health care for the 177 health care recipients, and managing the DOE Medical Program can be done for an operations cost of 45 -50 million annually. The system and 

facilities that would be constructed would have the absorptive capacity to provide 

a high level of health care for the RMI, in general. The Common Wealth of the 

Northern Marianas, which supports a similar population to the RMI (55,000 people), 

has an annual operations budget of 45 million dollars annually. Capital costs would 

be in the order of 50 million dollars. 

Building such a system could provide comprehensive cancer care to all 

Marshallese while meeting their comprehensive health care needs. The NCI report 

suggests that the ionizing radiation which caused cancers reached beyond the four 

atolls and even beyond the northern atolls of the Marshall Islands. The lack of a 

defined boundary of who was affected and who was not affected by nuclear fallout 

makes a nation-wide system ideal. 

A program which provides high standard comprehensive health care for all 

Marshallese would address the health consequences of the USNWTP in a cost effective, capacity building manner. This system would also address the health care 

needs of over 300 Marshallese and other indigenous Pacific islanders who participated in the clean-up of Bikini and Enewetak atolls who live in the RMI. This subgroup has little access to extra health care services. 

CONCLUSION

Developing a health care system to address the health consequences of the 

USNWTP in the RMI is related to the illness(es) that must be addressed, the burden of that illness, and the standard of care to be applied for that illness. 

The cancer burden has been clearly defined by the NCI. Other health consequences are more difficult to quantify or have yet to show themselves (genetic effects). All three systems of health above are structured to address the cancer burden 

in the RMI. The 177 Program and the economy of scale program, as defined above, 

are designed to address the cancer burden and the other health effects of nuclear 

testing.

Senator AKAKA. And now we will hear from Thomas Lum who is 

a specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS LUM, SPECIALIST IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, 

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. LUM. Senator Akaka and members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to represent the Congressional Research 

Service at today’s hearing. 

In March of this year, a team of CRS analysts examined the 

Marshall Islands changed circumstances petition in a report for 

Congress. Today I will summarize some of the main issues and 

findings discussed in our report. This statement and the CRS report are submitted for the record.* 

According to some estimates, the United States has spent between $520 and $550 million in the Republic of the Marshall Islands nuclear test-related compensation. Some of these moneys remain in trust funds in the nuclear test-affected atolls. 

So far, the largest effort to settle claims was provided by Section 

177 of the Compact of Free Association enacted in 1986 which authorized the nuclear claims fund of $150 million for nuclear testrelated compensation. 

The fund was expected to earn $270 million in investment returns while the original $150 million would remain as principal. 

48

However, by 2004, the fund was nearly depleted. The RMI attributed this to unanticipated costs and to lower than expected returns 

on investments. 

In 2003, the ‘‘Compact of Free Association Amendments Act’’ authorized continued Marshall Islands’ eligibility for many U.S. Federal programs and services, including some health, food, and agricultural programs for the atolls affected by the nuclear weapons 

tests. However, negotiations to renew the Compact did not include 

consideration of the changed circumstances petition. 

The Compact of Free Association established the Nuclear Claims 

Tribunal or NCT to adjudicate personal injury and property damages claims. The Compact allocated approximately $45 million out 

of the nuclear claims fund for payment of personal injury awards. 

The tribunal’s compensation system is based upon the ‘‘U.S. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act,’’ also know as RECA, which 

provides payments to U.S. individuals who lived downwind from 

the Nevada nuclear test site. 

As with RECA, the Nuclear Claims Tribunal does not require the 

claimant to prove a causal link between his or her disease and exposure to radiation. The claimant must simply provide proof of residency in the Marshall Islands during the years of nuclear testing 

and have one of the listed compensable diseases or presumed illnesses. 

As of June 2005, the NCT had granted personal injury awards totaling $87 million and paid out $71 million to 1,941 individuals. 

Some analysts have suggested that the eligibility pool, amounts of 

awards, and lists of conditions compensated exceed those provided 

by RECA. 

In April 2005, the National Research Council released a report 

on the RECA program in which they recommended that individual 

claims be based on the probability of causation. 

In September 2004, the National Cancer Institute estimated that 

nuclear testing raised the cancer rate in the Marshall Islands by 

about 9 percent above the norm or baseline among the population 

exposed to testing. This would translate to about 530 additional 

lifetime cancers above the baseline of 5,600. 

The NCI report estimated that about half of the total cancers 

projected were yet to develop or be diagnosed. Based on the study, 

the RMI government projects an additional 100 million in future 

NCT personal injury awards. 

The CRS report suggests that the NCT’s application of the methodology for calculating the loss of use of properties resulted in 

claims that may be overstated. One possible factor, for example, 

was the use of average rents per acre that largely reflected government influenced prices rather than competitive free market ones. 

RMI representatives respond that real estate appraisals adopted 

by the Nuclear Claims Tribunal reflected overall market activity in 

the Marshall Islands and that government rental rates were widely 

accepted in real estate transactions. 

The RMI government argues that the 15 milligram annual dose 

limit, which is used to estimate the degree and extent of cleanup, 

is the same level of public protection that is provided in the United 

States and that it therefore should be applied to the cleanup of the 

Marshall Islands. 

49

However, as explained in the CRS report, the 15 milligram 

standard is not an enforceable Federal regulation. Rather, the 15 

milligram limit is an EPA recommended guideline that is applied 

on a case-by-case basis depending on the feasibility of attaining it 

at a particular site. 

Consequently, it is uncertain whether the 15 milligram standard 

would be applied if the Marshall Islands were located in the United 

States. 

The CRS report also discussed the debate regarding the extent 

of contamination. In 1989, the RMI government commissioned a 

nationwide radiological survey, a comprehensive effort to determine 

levels of radioactivity in the soil on islands potentially affected by 

fallout. 

Completed in 1994, the survey’s results suggested that unsafe 

levels of radiation existed primarily in four northern atolls. These 

atolls would require limited remediation and/or the dietary restrictions. 

The RMI disagreed with these findings and claimed that the extent of contamination and health risks were understated. 

Finally, the CRS report identifies four broad policy options for 

Congress; one, grant or reject the changed circumstances petition’s 

request in whole or in part on the basis of changed circumstances; 

two, provide assistance through ex gratia congressional appropriations measures; three, enact legislation that would provide for a 

full and final settlement of claims; and, four, through an amendment to the Compact of Free Association, turn jurisdiction over the 

petition’s claims to the U.S. Federal Courts. 

My colleagues and I can respond to specific questions related to 

our report. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lum follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS LUM, SPECIALIST IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, 

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to represent the Congressional Research Service (CRS) at today’s hearing. In March of 

this year, a team of CRS analysts from four divisions examined the Marshall Islands’ Changed Circumstances Petition in a report for Congress. Today I will summarize some of the main issues and findings discussed in our report. This statement 

and the CRS report are submitted for the record. 

According to various estimates, the United States has spent between $520 million 

and $550 million in the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) on nuclear test-related compensation. This funding has been used for health care, environmental 

monitoring, cleanup of contaminated sites, and resettlement efforts. Some of these 

monies remain in trust funds of the nuclear test-affected atolls. So far, the largest 

effort to settle claims was provided by Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association and the Agreement for the Implementation of Section 177. The Compact, authorized by the Compact of Free Association Act (P.L. 99-239) and enacted in 1986, 

established the Marshall Islands as a ‘‘freely associated state’’ with special economic 

and security ties to the United States. 

Section 177 authorized $150 million for nuclear test-related compensation. The 

agreement, as stated, constituted ‘‘the full settlement of all claims, past, present and 

future,’’ including claims by inhabitants of Bikini, Enewetak, and other atolls pending in the United States Court of Claims. The investment returns on the Fund were 

expected to generate $270 million between 1986 and 2001 while the original $150 

million would remain as principal. However, in 2005, the Fund is nearly depleted, 

which the RMI attributes to unanticipated costs and lower than expected returns 

on investments. Section 177 stipulated that additional compensation may be requested by the RMI if the following conditions were met: loss or damages to persons 

50

1 U.S. Department of State, Report Evaluating the Request of the Government of the Republic 

of the Marshall Islands Presented to the Congress of the United States of America, November 

2004. 2 CRS Report RL32811, Republic of the Marshall Islands Changed Circumstances Petition to 

Congress. 

or property arose or were discovered that could not reasonably have been identified 

as of the effective date of the Compact; and such injuries rendered the provisions 

of the Compact ‘‘manifestly inadequate.’’ In September 2000, the Marshall Islands 

government submitted to the United States Congress a Changed Circumstances Petition pursuant to the Compact. In 2003, the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act (P.L. 108- 188) authorized continued Marshall Islands eligibility for many 

U.S. federal programs and services. These included some health, food, and agricultural programs for nuclear test-affected atolls. However, negotiations to renew the 

Compact and to extend economic and other assistance did not include consideration 

of the Changed Circumstances Petition. 

The Petition justifies its claims of ‘‘changed circumstances’’ largely upon ‘‘new and 

additional′′ information since the Compact’s enactment. The RMI refers to more 

stringent U.S. radiation protection standards, issued in 1997 and 1999, and to Department of Energy records, declassified in the early 1990s, that indicate a wider 

extent of radioactive fallout than previously known or disclosed. The RMI contends 

that this new information warrants further cleanup of contaminated soil as well as 

cleanup over a wider area. Furthermore, Marshall Islands representatives assert 

that the Nuclear Claims Fund constituted a provisional, ‘‘political settlement’’ rather 

than a final determination based upon a conclusive, scientific assessment of costs. The Petition originally requested a total of $3.3 billion including:

• unpaid Nuclear Claims Tribunal (NCT) personal injury awards of $15.7 million • unpaid NCT property damages awards to Enewetak Atoll and Bikini Atoll totaling $949 million • $50 million for medical services infrastructure • $45 million annually for 50 years for a health care program for those exposed 

to radiation

In November 2004, the U.S. Department of State released a report compiled by 

an interagency group evaluating the legal and scientific bases of the Petition.1 The 

report concluded that ‘‘the Marshall Islands’ request does not qualify as changed circumstances’ within the meaning of the Compact.’’ The report also disputed some of 

the main scientific claims of the Petition regarding the geographical extent of radioactive fallout, radiation dose estimates, and the applicability of U.S. standards to 

conditions in the RMI. 

The CRS report on the Changed Circumstances Petition analyzes issues related 

to the Petition’s requests.2 The report examines nuclear test compensation programs 

in the United States, the health effects of ionizing radiation in the Marshall Islands, 

the Petition’s property damages claims, and the possibility of further action in U.S. 

courts. Today, I would like to touch briefly upon them. Another question, which has 

yet to be analyzed in depth, is how to assess and fund nuclear test-related health 

care needs in the Marshall Islands. 

The Compact of Free Association established the Nuclear Claims Tribunal (NCT) 

to adjudicate personal injury and property damages claims. The Compact provided 

$45.75 million out of the $150 million Nuclear Claims Fund for payment of personal 

injury awards. The Tribunal’s system of personal injury compensation is based upon 

the U.S. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, also known as RECA. RECA provides payments to U.S. individuals who lived in a specified area ′′downwind’’ from 

the Nevada test site and who have contracted certain cancers that are presumed 

to be the result of their exposure to radioactive fallout. As with RECA, the Nuclear 

Claims Tribunal does not require the claimant to prove a causal link between his 

or her disease and exposure to radiation. The claimant must simply provide proof 

of residency in the Marshall Islands during the years of nuclear testing (1946 to 

1958) and have one of the listed compensable diseases. As of June 2005, the NCT 

had granted personal injury awards totaling $87.3 million and paid out $71.6 million to 1,941 individuals. Some analysts have argued that the eligibility pool, 

amounts of awards, and list of conditions compensated, exceed those provided by 

RECA. 

In September 2004, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) estimated that nuclear 

testing raised the cancer rate in the Marshall islands by about 9% above the norm 

or baseline among the population exposed to the testing. This would translate to 

about 530 additional lifetime cancers above the baseline of 5,600. The NCI report 

estimated that about half of the total cancers projected were yet to develop or be 

51

3 U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National Cancer 

Institute, Estimation of the Baseline Number of Cancers Among Marshallese and the Number 

of Cancers Attributable to Exposure to Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Testing Conducted in the 

Marshall Islands, September 2004. 4 National Research Council, Assessment of the Scientific Information for the Radiation Screening and Education Program (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2005). 5Steven L. Simon and James C. Graham, ‘‘Findings of the Nationwide Radiological Study,’’ 

1994.3

diagnosed, so additional compensation claims were likely.3 Based upon this study, the RMI government projects an additional $100 million in future NCT awards. 

On April 28, 2005, the National Research Council (NRC) released a report on the 

RECA program, in which it recommended against adding any additional diseases to 

the list of cancers for which downwinders and on-site participants may be compensated. The NRC also recommended that individual claims be based on probability of causation. This method employs a formula to determine whether an individual’s estimated radiation exposure is likely the cause of his or her specific cancer. 

The NRC report may provide alternative models for the Nuclear Claims Tribunal’s 

system of compensation.4

The CRS report states that the methodology used by the Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

to estimate the value of the lost use of claimants’ properties is viewed as reasonable 

and appropriate. However, the report suggests that the application of the methodology resulted in loss-of-use calculations that may be overstated. One possible factor, 

for example, was the use of average rents per acre that largely reflected inflated, 

government-influenced prices rather than competitive, free-market ones. RMI experts counter that real estate appraisals adopted by the Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

were representative of overall market activity in the Marshall Islands and that government rental rates were widely accepted in real estate transactions. 

The RMI government argues that the 15 millirem annual dose limit, which it used 

to estimate the degree and extent of cleanup, is the same level of public protection 

that is provided in the United States and that it therefore should be applied to the 

cleanup of the Marshall Islands. However, as explained in the CRS report, the 15 

millirem standard is not an enforceable federal regulation. Rather, the 15 millirem 

limit is an EPA recommended guideline that is applied on a case-by-case basis, depending on the feasibility of attaining it at a particular site. Consequently, it is uncertain whether the 15 millirem standard would be applied if the Marshall Islands 

were located in the United States. 

The CRS report also discusses the debate regarding the extent of contamination. 

In 1989, the RMI government commissioned the Nationwide Radiological Survey, a 

comprehensive effort to determine levels of radioactivity in the soil on islands potentially affected by fallout. The study was funded by the U.S. government and completed in 1994. The Survey results suggested that unsafe levels of radiation existed 

primarily in the four northern atolls of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and, to a lesser 

extent, Rongerik. These atolls would require limited remediation and/or dietary restrictions.5 The RMI disagreed with these findings and claimed that the extent of 

contamination and health risks were understated. 

The CRS report identifies four broad policy options in considering whether to provide additional financial compensation to the Marshall Islands. These options include:

• Grant or reject the Changed Circumstances Petition’s requests, in whole or in 

part, on the basis of changed circumstances; 

• Provide assistance through ex gratia congressional appropriations measures 

(primarily through the Department of the Interior); 

• Enact legislation that would provide for a ‘‘full and final settlement’’ of claims; 

• Through an amendment to the Compact of Free Association, turn jurisdiction 

over the Petition’s claims to the U.S. federal courts.

My colleagues and I can respond to specific questions related to our report. Thank 

you.

Senator AKAKA. Now I will call upon Dr. Steven Simon. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN L. SIMON, Ph.D., SCIENTIST 

Dr. SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and honored members of 

this committee for your invitation to speak today. I am Steven 

Simon. I am presently employed by the National Cancer Institute, 

National Institutes of Health. 

52

But I am here today solely in a personal capacity. I am only representing myself. My statement has not been prepared or influenced by my present employer nor has it been reviewed at the 

NIH. Hence, it does not represent their opinion. 

I would first like to present my credentials today relevant to this 

hearing, Mr. Chairman, not to impress you, but because I am the 

only independent scientist here without an institutional reference. 

In addition to a Ph.D. in radiological health sciences, I have approximately 28 years in the field of radiation epidemiology, radiation treatment of cancer, and radiation protection. 

I was employed by the government of the Marshall Islands from 

early 1990 through mid 1995 as the sole radiation scientist in residence. In that position, I directed the Marshall Islands Nationwide 

Radiological Study funded under Section 177 of the Compact of 

Free Association from its inception through its completion. And I 

designed and oversaw the construction of the first permanently 

based radiological measurements laboratory in the Marshall Islands. 

During that time, I was a member of the three-man scientific 

management team for the Rongelap resettlement project and was 

director of the Nationwide Thyroid Disease Study. 

I have an extensive publication resume and I have authored 18 

peer-reviewed papers, 19 reports or book chapters and one book, all 

on issues related to radiation in the Marshall Islands. 

The primary purpose of my testimony is to provide this committee with accurate and unbiased scientific and technical information related to the effects of nuclear testing. My purpose does not 

include taking a side in the discussion for the need or for the justification for additional compensation. It is my goal to provide information so that neither incorrect nor incomplete information is 

used to make such decisions. 

There are three subject areas that I primarily want to convey information to this committee about. These are the Nationwide Radiological Study, the Nationwide Thyroid Disease Study, and to correct various testimonies provided by others at the House hearing 

in May 2005 that I personally thought were lacking in accuracy, 

completeness, or transparency. 

The findings of the Nationwide Radiology Study are relevant, I 

believe, to a discussion about nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands. Though they are not the only data available on the levels of 

contamination, they are the most complete in terms of geographic 

coverage. 

As you might imagine, I am gratified to see some recognition of 

this data, though I personally find it disconcerting that still more 

than 10 years after the study was completed, the RMI government 

has not publicly acknowledged the study or its findings. 

I have to say I find that to be disingenuous considering that government sponsored the research and the findings subsequently met 

all levels of peer review. 

The primary goal of the Nationwide Radiology Study was to document the geographic distribution of residual radioactivity from 

nuclear testing and to assess the present and future levels of that 

activity. The study was designed to be scientific, objective, and was 

designed and conducted without political purpose. 

53

The Nationwide Radiological Study was extremely successful in 

documenting the radiological conditions over the entire nation. In 

addition to being published in the scientific peer-reviewed literature, the data were judged to be valid by three international expert panels, including one appointed by the RMI government. 

Any claim today that there might still be unidentified hot spots 

unfound by that study is unlikely to be true due to comprehensive 

sampling. I believe that if one could find a location with higher radiation levels than was recorded by the Nationwide Radiological 

Study, it would be of inconsequentially small size. 

One of our areas of emphasis was measurement of cesium 137 

in the terrestrial environment. That means soil and locally grown 

foods. Cesium has been measured worldwide as a marker of fallout 

contamination. We found it to be detectable at all atolls. But this 

is hardly surprising since it is detectable virtually everywhere on 

the planet earth as a consequence of nuclear testing conducted 

worldwide, even outside this very building. 

We compared the levels of cesium at each atoll to that from global fallout in the mid Pacific to discern those atolls where there was 

evidence that locally produced fallout was in excess of the background. 

At this point, I would like to now refer to figure 1 of my statement. I see that there is a poster of this figure which presents our 

measurements of cesium in soil ordered from left to right by increasing latitude. 

The light gray horizontal band represents the amount of cesium, 

at least as of 1994, deposited in the mid Pacific from global fallout, 

and it is provided as a basis for comparison. 

The Nationwide Radiological Study found that atolls located 

south of 9 degrees north latitude, that is south of Kwajalein, had 

nearly equal levels of residual radioactivity and that it was at a 

level indistinguishable from that from global fallout. 

In the study’s summary report to the RMI government, I reported that there were ten atolls for which the study could not conclusively determine whether any local fallout had been received 

there. I later learned from a public statement from the claims tribunal that they interpreted that to be a failing of the study as a 

result of inadequate funding. 

That is not the interpretation that was intended nor was it a failing. The intended interpretation was the following. If there is any 

locally produced fallout contamination at those locations today, it 

is very, very small, so small, in fact, that it is indistinguishable 

from global fallout that originated from tests conducted worldwide. 

At locations north of 9 degrees north latitude, that is north of 

Kwajalein atoll, we observed an increase in the level of cesium at 

each atoll and it reached its greatest value on the northern end of 

Rongelap, on Bikini atoll, and the north end of Enewetak atoll. 

Our measurements did not appreciably differ from those of Department of Energy, at least where the two studies overlapped. 

Hence, I have to say there was not a great deal of new information 

obtained for the northern atolls except we did validate DOE measurements and we obtained much more detail about Rongelap, the 

contamination there, that is, during the course of the Rongelap resettlement project. 

54

These findings have implications for future radiation protection 

requirements. But due to time constraints, I refer you here to my 

written statement. 

I would like to briefly turn quickly to the Nationwide Thyroid 

Disease Study that I conducted in collaboration with medical specialists from England and Japan. Part of the motivation for that 

study stems from the well-known sensitivity of the thyroid gland 

of young children to ionizing radiation. 

In addition to providing a public health service by free examinations and followup medical care, we set out to examine the hypothesis of Hamilton, et al. concerning the prevalence of thyroid nodules among those born before the infamous 1954 BRAVO test. 

His finding was that the prevalence of nodules decreased with increasing distance from Bikini. His interpretation was that exposure 

to radio-iodines in fallout was likely much broader than believed 

prior to his publication of 1987. 

Our study examined about twice as many people as did Hamilton 

and it used high-resolution ultrasound whereas the Hamilton study 

only used palpation, which is a feeling of the neck with the fingers. 

Of relevance here is that the observations of the Nationwide Thyroid Disease Study did not confirm the hypothesis of Hamilton, 

that is we did not find a significant decrease in nodule prevalence 

with increasing distance. 

I would like to note here that because our study did not confirm 

Hamilton’s study, it did not disprove it. However, replication of scientific findings is considered part of the gold standard in scientific 

research. And our study that was larger and used more sensitive 

techniques to detect nodules could not replicate his findings. 

Now, following the main body of my statement, I provide an appendix to you that addresses seven specific areas in which others 

provided testimony at the House hearing. As I explained, some testimony in my opinion appeared to be either incorrect or incomplete. 

The purpose of that appendix is to provide additional information 

to you that should have been provided in that testimony but was 

not. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I hope you found 

this information to be useful. And I would be pleased to answer 

your questions. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Thank you very much, Dr. Simon. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Simon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN L. SIMON, PH.D., SCIENTIST

Thank you, Mr. Domenici, for your invitation to appear today before the Senate 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. I am Steven L. Simon, PhD. I am employed by the National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health (NIH), but 

I am here today solely in a personal capacity. I am only representing myself. My 

statement today has not been prepared or influenced by my present employer, nor 

has it been reviewed at the NIH. Hence, this statement does not necessarily represent the opinion of the NIH. I request that my statement be entered into the 

record. 

I would first like to present my credentials relevant to this hearing. In addition 

to a B.S. and M.S. degree in Physics and Radiological Physics, respectively, and a 

Ph.D. in Radiological Health Sciences, I have approximately 28 years experience in 

the field of radiation epidemiology, radiation treatment of cancer, and radiation protection. My primary fields of expertise are radiation measurement and radiation dosimetry. I was employed by the Government of the Marshall Islands from early 1990 

through mid-1995 as the sole radiation scientist in residence in the RMI. In that 

55

position, I directed the Marshall Islands Nationwide Radiological Study from its inception through its completion and designed and oversaw the construction of the 

first permanently based radiological measurements laboratory in the Marshall Islands. During that time, I was also a member of the 3-person scientific management 

team for the U.S.-funded Rongelap Resettlement Project and was director of the Nationwide Thyroid Disease Study. Since leaving the RMI, I directed the radiological 

survey of Johnston Island, another U.S. Pacific nuclear test site. I was a member 

of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) survey teams of the French nuclear test sites in Algeria and in French Polynesia. I was the lead dosimetrist in 

the well known epidemiologic studies of downwinders conducted by the University 

of Utah and am presently the lead dosimetrist in the NCI’s current study of thyroid 

disease in areas adjacent to the former Soviet nuclear test site in Kazakhstan. I formerly have had research and academic faculty appointments at the University of 

New Mexico, University of Utah, and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 

Presently, I hold adjunct faculty appointments at Colorado State University and 

Baylor College of Medicine. I am an elected member of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. I am a member of the editorial board of 

Health Physics, the most prestigious journal in this country in the field of radiation 

protection and have been on that editorial board for the last 13 years. I have an 

extensive publication resume and have authored 18 peer-reviewed papers, 19 reports or book chapters and 1 book, all on issues related to radiation in the Marshall 

Islands. 

The primary purpose of my testimony is to provide this committee with accurate 

and unbiased scientific and technical information related to the effects of nuclear 

testing in the Marshall Islands. My purpose does not include taking a side in the 

discussion for the need or justification for additional compensation. In my view, that 

is a political decision that should consider sound scientific data. It is my goal to provide information so that neither incorrect nor incomplete information is used to 

make such decisions. 

There are three subject areas that I primarily want to convey information to this 

committee about. These are: (1) The Nationwide Radiological Study that I directed, 

(2) Nationwide Thyroid Disease Study that I also directed, and (3) to correct various 

testimonies provided by others at the House hearing in May 2005 that I thought 

were lacking in accuracy, completeness, or transparency. 

The findings of the Nationwide Radiological Study (NWRS) are relevant to this 

discussion about the effects of nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands. Though they 

are not the only data available on levels of contamination, they are the most complete in terms of geographic coverage. Other data and information collected for 

many years under sponsorship of the Dept. of Energy is also highly valuable and 

credible. See the website of the Dept. of Energy Marshall Islands Program [1] for 

a wealth of data and publications. In particular, the Dept. of Energy sponsored a 

radiological survey of the northern Marshall Islands in 1978 [2] that included an 

aerial survey [3] as well as ground sampling. The measurements of Cs-137 (cesium137) in the environment from the DOE sponsored survey agreed well with measurements made by the NWRS many years later [4]. 

Despite my gratification at seeing the recognition of the NWRS data, I find it disconcerting that more than 10 years after the study was completed, the RMI Government has not publicly acknowledged it or its findings. This curious situation stems 

back to events in early 1995 following the completion of the NWRS. After the study 

report was delivered to the NCT, the Nitijela (parliament) of the Marshall Islands 

invited me to present the findings to them while they were in session, but upon arriving at their chambers on more than one occasion, they never actually allowed me 

to make the presentation. Near to that time, Mr. Bill Graham of the Nuclear Claims 

Tribunal provided in-person oral testimony to the Nitijela to discredit the study. 

Whether that testimony was a legitimate undertaking for an official of the NCT 

seems relevant to this discussion, though it is of little personal concern to me at 

this late date. Following Mr. Graham’s testimony, the Nitijela enacted a resolution 

to formally reject the findings of the NWRS. Neither the Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

website nor the RMI Embassy website acknowledges the study or has made its findings available. 

Findings of publicly funded scientific investigations should be published and the 

information made available. To that end, I went to great effort to publish the findings of the NWRS without any salary or financial support. In 1997, I was one of 

two appointed editors of a special issue of the journal, Health Physics, completely 

devoted to the radiological consequences in the Marshall Islands. The issue included 

23 papers by 60 authors in addition to me. The Marshall Islands Government, for 

reasons never apparent to me, tried to stop publication of that issue. This issue has 

been available in its entirety on the internet [5] since a short time after publication, 

56

courtesy of Health Physics and the Department of Energy. In addition, I have made 

the summary report of the NWRS available for the last 8 years online [6], courtesy 

of the Baylor College of Medicine that maintains the website. 

The primary goal of the NWRS was to document the geographic distribution of 

residual radioactivity from the nuclear testing conducted in Bikini and Enewetak 

and to assess the present and future levels of residual radioactivity. The study was 

designed to be scientific in nature, objective in its conclusions, and was designed 

and conducted without any political purposes in mind. The NWRS was extremely 

successful in documenting the radiological conditions over the entire nation [7,8]. In 

addition to being published in the scientific peer reviewed literature, the data was 

reviewed either in its entirety or in parts, by three expert international groups, including the RMI Government appointed Scientific Advisory Panel and the IAEA 

panel to review the radiological situation of Bikini atoll. There has not been a single 

scientifically based challenge to its quantitative findings or to its degree of comprehensiveness. Despite that there are over 1,000 islands of varying size in the RMI; 

there is not a single island larger than a bare sandbar where at least one radiation 

measurement was not made. Moreover, the largest and most important islands in 

the 29 atolls were the sites of dozens of radiation measurements. Any claim made, 

that there might still be unidentified hotspots, is unlikely to be true due to comprehensive sampling based on the relative land area of each atoll and the typical 

variability of measurements, and use of systematic grid-based sampling plans. I 

make the claim, that if one could find a location with higher radiation level than 

was recorded by the NWRS, it would be of inconsequentially small size. 

One of our areas of emphasis was measurement of Cesium-137 (Cs-137) in the terrestrial environment, e.g. soil, fruits, etc. Cs-137 has been measured worldwide as 

a marker of fallout contamination since it is only produced by nuclear fission. It has 

a 30-year half-life and modern instruments conveniently detect it. The NWRS documented the average as well as the range of contamination at all atolls of the Marshall Islands, even those islands and atolls traditionally uninhabited. We measured 

all other detectable gamma emitting radionuclides as well, though, in general, they 

are of low concentration and of little interest from a dosimetric point of view. In 

addition, we measured fallout plutonium in soil. 

Cs-137 was detectable at all atolls, but this is hardly surprising since it is detectable virtually anywhere in the world as a consequence of fallout from atmospheric 

nuclear tests conducted throughout the world. We compared the measured levels of 

Cs-137 to the value expected in the mid-Pacific region from the deposition of global 

fallout to discern the atolls where locally produced fallout was in excess of the background from global fallout. At this point, I would now like to refer to Fig. 1 which 

presents the measurements of Cs-137 in soil from the NWRS, ordered from left to 

right by the highest observed value at each atoll. You will note that the vertical 

scale is logarithmic, meaning that each major horizontal line is 10-fold greater than 

the horizontal line below it. The light gray horizontal band represents the range of 

values of Cs-137 (as of 1994) deposited in this region of the Pacific from global fallout and is provided as a basis for comparison. 

The NWRS study found that atolls located south of nine degrees north latitude 

had nearly the same levels of residual fallout activity and that it was at a level 

indistinguish-able from that expected from global fallout. In the study’s summary 

report to the RMI Government, I reported that there were 10 atolls for which the 

study could not conclusively determine whether they had received fallout from the 

tests conducted in the Marshall Islands. I later learned from a public statement by 

the now-deceased NCT Chairman, Oscar de Brum, that the NCT interpreted that 

to be a failing of the study as a result of inadequate funding. That is not the interpretation that was intended, nor was it a failing of any kind. The intended interpretation was the following: if there is any locally produced fallout contamination at 

those locations, it is very, very small so small, in fact, that it is indistinguishable 

from the global fallout that originated from nuclear testing worldwide. Our inability 

to detect any excess fallout was a result of the diminutive amount of local fallout 

deposited there. Here, it should be noted that we did not use crude instruments that 

lacked sensitivity. Our measurements relied on gamma spectrometry with liquid-nitrogen cooled high-purity germanium detectors. These devices represent, even today, 

the state-of-the-art gamma radiation detection instrument. 

At locations north of 9° north latitude, we observed a moderately smooth increase 

in the average and maximum level of Cs-137 measured and reached a maximum 

value on the northern end of Rongelap Atoll, on Bikini Island, and the north end 

of Enewetak Atoll. That there was a uniform degree of contamination at latitudes 

south of 9° N, and that it was about the same magnitude as that from global fallout 

may not have been a surprise to some knowledgeable scientists, though in all honVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:44 Nov 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 R:\DOCS\24-536 SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
57

esty, I did not have preconceived expectations since there were few historical measurements on which to base an a priori opinion. 

The observable increase in residual fallout activity above the global background 

level, at latitudes between 9° and 10° north (i.e., at Erikub [uninhabited] and at 

Wotje) can be considered to be new information, though one could have deduced it 

from the 1955 AEC report by Breslin and Cassidy [9] that followed the CASTLE 

series of tests. Atolls located north of Wotje (latitude of 9.5° N) were included in 

the 1978 Department of Energy (DOE)-sponsored aerial radiological survey. Since 

the NWRS measurements did not appreciably differ from the DOE measurements 

(except at the lowest contamination levels where the NWRS had somewhat greater 

sensitivity [4]), there was not a great deal of new information for the northern atolls 

obtained, except that the DOE measurements were validated, and much more detail 

about the contamination at Rongelap was obtained during the course of the 

Rongelap Resettlement Project. But the fact that residual fallout contamination increased north of Wotho to a maximum at Bikini, northern Enewetak and northern 

Rongelap, had been documented in the DOE survey of 1978. 

Before moving on, I would like to comment on the relationship of the NWRS data 

to estimating past radiation doses, as well as the value of dose estimation to the 

changed circumstance petition. In my view, the data obtained in the NWRS, supplemented with other information, can be used for estimating past radiation doses with 

the understanding that individual estimation is highly uncertain. It is also my view, 

however, that estimates of radiation dose, new or old, while not totally irrelevant, 

are not terribly pertinent to the discussion of changed circumstances. My reasoning 

is two-fold. First, the compensation plan, as developed by the NCT, has no criterion 

for admissibility based on radiation dose. That makes dose, largely irrelevant from 

their standpoint. Second, the radiation-related cancer burden for the nation as a 

whole is likely to be relatively small compared to that from naturally occurring cancers. Hence, a well-budgeted compensation plan of the sort implemented by the NCT 

primarily needs to plan to pay for naturally occurring cancers. The number of radiation related cases, which can only be predicted from estimates of radiation dose, 

adds only a modest increment to the naturally occurring cases [10]. 

Now let me briefly address what the measurements of the NWRS imply in terms 

of future radiation protection requirements. First, it should be realized that measurement of any amount of fallout radioactivity should not be cause for alarm; everyone in the world lives with it today. As a comparison, here in Washington, DC, the 

amount of Cs-137 per unit area of ground that is attributed to global nuclear testing, is about five-times that in the Marshall Islands [11]. 

The data of the NWRS was translated into terms of annual whole-body external 

effective dose and into annual external plus internal dose assuming that 

Marshallese eat a diet of 75% locally grown food, a scenario that is unlikely today 

for most Marshallese. The external dose is received from gamma rays emitted from 

fallout that is still in the soil, while the total dose calculation includes the dose from 

Cs-137 that would be ingested from fruits that can absorb Cs-137 from the soil via 

plant roots. 

According to the calculations of the NWRS in 1994, the external annual effective 

dose might exceed 100 mrem per year at only a few locations: on northern Enewetak 

Atoll, northern Rongelap Atoll, and on some islands of Bikini Atoll. The value of 100 

mrem per year is accepted internationally as guidance for limiting exposure to the 

public. It is about equal, for example, to the amount of radiation we receive in the 

U.S. from natural terrestrial and cosmic ray radiation. Those findings are not different than predicted from the 1978 DOE-sponsored aerial survey of the Marshall 

Islands. 

Including the dose contribution from ingestion of Cs-137 in locally grown foods 

might lead to a total annual effective doses in 1994 (though would be 22% to 50% 

lower today due to radiological decay and ecological elimination) in excess of 100 

mrem per year on Rongerik, Enjebi Island of Enewetak, northern Rongelap, and Bikini Island. These findings do not differ from findings available from the 1978 DOE 

survey except possibly in assuming a diet so highly reliant on local food. These various findings are the basis of the statements by the NWRS and its Scientific Advisory Panel that:

. . . the current levels of radioactive contamination of the territory of the 

Marshall Islands pose no risk of adverse health effects to the present generation. Similarly, on the basis of current genetic knowledge, we judge the 

risk of hereditary diseases to future generations of Marshallese to be no 

greater than the background risk of such diseases characteristic of any population. 

58

* The appendix and figure 1 have been retained in committee files. 

Four atolls have been identified where exposure rates are elevated to the 

extent that remedial actions are indicated for some of the islands . . . [7].

Now, I would like to briefly turn to the Nationwide Thyroid Disease Study 

(NWTDS) that I directed in collaboration with medical specialists from England and 

Japan. Part of the motivation for that study stems from the well-known sensitivity 

of the thyroid gland of young children to ionizing radiation. Studies elsewhere indicate that exposure to radioactive iodine released from nuclear tests might be responsible for an increase in thyroid cancer. In addition to aiming to provide a public 

health service by providing free examinations, we set out to examine the hypothesis 

put forth by Hamilton et al. [12] concerning the prevalence of thyroid nodules 

among 2273 inhabitants of 14 of the 24 inhabited atolls born before the 1954 

BRAVO test. His finding was that the prevalence of nodules decreased among that 

group with increasing distance from Bikini. His interpretation was that exposure to 

radioiodines was likely much broader than believed prior to his publication of 1987. 

The NWTDS examined 4762 Marshallese born before the end of nuclear testing in 

the Marshall Islands. Our examinations used palpation (feeling of the neck), as did 

Hamilton, though we also used high-resolution ultrasound that Hamilton did not. 

We found a relatively high frequency of thyroid cancer and benign thyroid nodules 

and we provided written medical evidence of each finding to each person examined, 

the Majuro Hospital, and the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. The high frequency of nodules and thyroid cancer is consistent with observations by other investigators for island locations throughout the Pacific where there is no evidence of exposure to radioactive iodine. Of more relevance here, is that the observations of the NWTDS did 

not confirm the hypothesis of Hamilton et al., i.e., we did not find a significant decrease in nodule prevalence with increasing distance [13, 14]. Though our data suggested that the occurrence of thyroid cancer might be related to our preliminary estimates of radiation dose, there was no such evidence when the observations from 

Utrik atoll were removed from the data set. I would like to note here that because 

our study did not confirm Hamilton’s hypothesis, it does not disprove it. However, 

replication of scientific findings is considered part of the gold standard in scientific 

research and our study that was larger and used more sensitive techniques to detect 

nodules, did not replicate his findings. 

Following the main body of my statement, I provide an Appendix * that addresses 

seven specific areas in which others provided testimony at the House oversight 

hearing on March 19, 2005. As I explain in the Appendix, some testimony provided 

to the House committee appeared to me to be either incorrect and/or incomplete and 

hence, provided a biased view. The purpose of the Appendix is to provide additional 

information that should also have been provided by those testifying but was not. 

This concludes my statement. I hope you find this information to be useful. 

REFERENCES

1. http://www.eh.doe.gov/health/marshall/env—docs.html 

2. Robison W.L., Noshkin V.E., Conrado C.L., Eagle R.J., Brunk J.L., Jokela T.A., 

Mount M.E., Phillips W.A., Stoker A.C., Stuart M.L., Wong K.M. The northern Marshall Islands radiological survey: data and dose assessments. Health Physics 

73(1):37-48, 1997. 

3. Tipton W.J., Meibaum R.A. An aerial radiological photographic survey of eleven 

atolls and two islands of the northern Marshall Islands. Las Vegas, NV: EG&G, 

EG&G-1183-1758, 1981. 

4. Simon, S.L, Graham J.C. A comparison of aerial and ground level spectrometry 

measurements of 137Cs in the Marshall Islands. Environmental Monitoring and Assessment—An International Journal 53(2): 363-377, 1998. 

5. http://www.eh.doe.gov/health/marshall/marsh/journal/

6. http://radefx.bcm.tmc.edu/marshall—islands/

7. Simon SL, Graham JC. Findings of the Nationwide Radiological Study: Summary Report, submitted to the Cabinet of the Government of the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands. December 1994. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the 

Republic of the Marshall Islands, Majuro, Marshall Islands, 96960. 1994. 

8. Simon SL, Graham, JC. Findings of the First Comprehensive Radiological Monitoring Program of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Health Physics 73(1):66-

85, 1997. 

9. Breslin, AJ, Cassidy, ME. Radioactive debris from Operation Castle, islands of 

the mid-Pacific. New York: New York Operations Office, Health and Safety Laboratory, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. NYO-4623 (Del.), 1955. 

59

10. Estimation of the Baseline Number of Cancers Among Marshallese and the 

Number of Cancers Attributable to Exposure to Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Testing Conducted in the Marshall Islands. National Cancer Institute report to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, September 2004. 

11. Beck HL, Bennett, BG. Historical overview of atmospheric nuclear testing and 

estimates of fallout in the continental United States. Health Physics. Health Physics 

82(5):591-60885, 2002. 

12. Hamilton TE, van Belle G, LoGerfo JP. Thyroid neoplasia in Marshall Islanders exposed to nuclear fallout. JAMA 258:629-636, 1987. 

13. Takahashi T, Trott, K, Fujimori K, Nakashima N, Ohtomo H, Schoemaker MJ, 

Simon, SL. Thyroid Disease In The Marshall Islands, Findings from 10 Years of 

Study. Tohoku University Press, Sendai, Japan. 2001. 

14. Gilbert E.S., Land C.E., Simon S.L. Health Effects from Fallout. Health Phys 

82(5): 727-735, 2002.

Senator AKAKA. Foreign Minister Zackios, generally what is it 

that you are asking the committee to do in response to your nation’s petition? 

Mr. ZACKIOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think it is important that the committee works with the Marshall Islands government and in particular with the U.S. administration on issues relating to the nuclear testing program. 

I was saddened earlier today to hear the refusal of the U.S. administration on your question to work together to find resolution 

to the issues of the nuclear testing program. 

But I request that your committee continue to seek the assistance of the U.S. administration for us to work this very important 

issue of the nuclear testing program. 

In our negotiations with the U.S. Government, as I stated in my 

testimony, there was a great refusal by the negotiators to deal with 

the issue of the nuclear testing program. 

Having said that, I hope that your committee—and I thank you 

for the ex gratia method that your committee has been able to provide in the past and currently in dealing with these issues. But I 

truly hope that the committee can get the administration and the 

Marshall Islands government working together in addressing these 

issues. 

I also think it is very important for your committee to take oversight responsibility in our joint efforts to deal with the issue of the 

nuclear testing program. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, I thank you Minister Zackios, for your responses. 

And to all of the witnesses, I want to thank you for your testimonies. May I ask, Senator Murkowski, whether you have any 

final questions or comments. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. I have just one very quick 

question that I would like to direct to Mr. Zackios. 

You are here before this committee today basically to petition 

your case. What is it specifically that you would like this committee 

to do? What is it specifically that you would like this Senate to do? 

Mr. ZACKIOS. Thank you, Senator Murkowski. 

I have just tried to answer the question by Chairman Akaka. But 

I think it is important for the committee to use its authority to direct the administration to work with the Marshall Islands government under the guidance of the committee and without preconditions to deal with the issues that we have identified in the 

60

changed circumstances petition in finding the way forward with respect to resolutions of the nuclear testing program. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. So you want everybody to sit down? 

Mr. ZACKIOS. I think that is the way forward. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. I want to thank Senator Murkowski for your 

comments and for your care of this region. 

We do not have time to get to all of the questions that the committee has, so we will submit those for the record. We look forward 

to your responses so that the committee can consider future action. 

And I want to thank all of you witnesses for appearing here and 

especially for those that traveled such a great distance to talk with 

us. The committee will take your testimonies and deal with that in 

our deliberations. 

Again, thank you very much for coming. And the committee 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(61)

APPENDIXES 

APPENDIX I 

Responses to Additional Questions 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 

CONGRESSIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC, November 7, 2005. 

Hon. PETE V. DOMENICI, 

Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Washington, 

DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On July 19, 2005, a Department of Energy official accompanied the State Department at this hearing to answer questions regarding the effects of the U.S. nuclear testing program on the Marshall Islands. 

Enclosed are the answers to five questions that were submitted by Senator Bingaman to complete the hearing record. 

If we can be of further assistance, please have your staff contact our Congressional Hearing Coordinator, Lillian Owen, at (202) 586-2031. 

Sincerely, 

JILL L. SIGAL, 

Assistant Secretary. 

[Enclosures.] 

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BINGAMAN

HEALTHCARE COST

Question 1. Under DOE’s existing medical monitoring and treatment program of 

the acutely exposed residents of Rongelap and Utrik, how much is currently spent 

on healthcare (total and per patient), on healthcare logistical support, and how do 

you expect costs to increase or decrease in the future as this population ages? 

Answer. In Fiscal Year 2004, the total cost of the two atoll program was $2.2 million for 196 eligible persons; or an average cost of $11,000 per patient. Of the $2.2 

million, $1.3 million was spent on logistical costs, including housing and per-diem 

in Honolulu for the patient and a family member. As the population ages, although 

natural mortality will reduce the number of patients, the average cost per patient 

will increase. 

HEALTHCARE ASSISTANCE

Question 2. If Congress provides additional healthcare assistance to the Marshall 

Islands, are you prepared to work with Congress and the Marshall Islands in developing the most effective way to deliver that assistance? 

Answer. The Department of Energy (DOE) will continue to work as part of the 

interagency working group (Department of State, the Department of Health and 

Human Services, the Department of the Interior), with Congress, and with the Marshall Islands to develop the most effective way to deliver medical assistance. DOE 

has a long history of working closely with other agencies to accomplish this goal and 

working with the government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the 

two atoll governments to coordinate our program with the RMI national health care 

program and the four atoll health care program. 

62

1Prepared by C. Stephen Redhead, Specialist in Life Sciences. 

RUNIT DOME MONITORING

Question 3. How often does DOE currently monitor the Runit dome; do you have 

a regular schedule for such monitoring; and what is the cost of such periodic monitoring? 

Answer. While DOE is not assigned responsibility for monitoring Runit dome, the 

DOE radiological monitoring program has conducted periodic missions to Enewetak 

Atoll to collect and analyze water, sediments, fish and biota from different locations 

around the lagoon, including sites adjacent to the Runit dome. Since 2000, a DOE 

contractor has conducted two site specific environmental missions to Enewetak Atoll 

to survey both the terrestrial and marine environments around Runit Island. 

RESETTLEMENT EFFORTS

Question 4. Briefly describe what activities DOE has undertaken to support resettlement at Enjebi, Bikini and Rongelap and what the current status of those resettlement efforts are? 

Answer. DOE provides individual radiation protection monitoring, environmental 

characterization and dose assessment to establish existing and potential future radiation related health risks to selected populations of Bikini, Enewetakc, Rongelap 

and Utrok Atolls. The core activity of resettlement support is providing whole body 

counters and clean space for collecting bioassay samples from the community members and temporary workers on the islands. The whole body counting and plutonium 

bioassay program have been developed for the Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrok communities. 

POTASSIUM TREATMENT

Question 5. Given the U.S. policy of reducing radiation to levels that are ‘‘as low 

as reasonably achievable (ALARA),’’ are potassium treatments of Utrok island reasonable? That is, what would the costs and benefits be of such treatments? 

Answer. ALARA is commonly used as a guiding principle in radiation protection, 

particularly in the work place. Whole body counts of Marshall Islanders indicate an 

already low level of exposure, less than the 15 mrem per year criterion established 

by the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal. 

DOE has not conducted a cost estimate for spreading potassium fertilizer on 

Utrok. The total cost for this soil treatment would largely be driven by shipping 

charges and labor costs. 

RESPONSES OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE TO QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR BINGAMAN

Question 1. On page 34 of its report on the Republic of the Marshall Island 

(RMI)’s Changed Circumstances Petition, the Administration suggests that the Tribunal overcompensated for personal injuries due to factors such as: the inclusion of 

the entire 1958 RMI population in the eligibility pool; inclusion of injuries not recognized as radiogenic; and the inclusion of children of the 1958 population. Would you 

comment on whether these or other factors would contribute to significantly greater 

compensation by the Tribunal as compared to compensation under the U.S. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA)? 

Answer.1 The Nuclear Claims Tribunal has elected to provide more generous compensation compared to that provided to downwinders (i.e., U.S. civilians who lived 

in specified counties downwind from the Nevada Test Site during the 1950s and 

early 1960s) under RECA. Whereas RECA pays the same amount ($50,000) for each 

of the 19 types of cancer for which it provides compensation, the Tribunal awards 

varying and typically larger amounts for a broader range of medical conditions (see 

Table 1). For example, the Tribunal compensates individuals with non-malignant 

thyroid conditions that are linked to ionizing radiation. In expanding its list of compensable diseases beyond those covered under RECA, the Tribunal also has chosen 

to include certain cancer types and other medical conditions for which the evidence 

of a link with radiation exposure is less well established. Moreover, the Tribunal 

has made the decision to award the children of women present during the testing 

50% of the amounts paid to first-generation claimants. In its most recent review of 

the biological effects of low-level ionizing radiation, the National Research Council 

(NRC) noted that extensive studies of atomic bomb survivors in Japan have shown 

no adverse effects in their children that could be attributed to radiation exposure. 

63

In comparing personal injury compensation under RECA and the Nuclear Claims 

Tribunal, two additional points should be borne in mind. First, Marshall Islanders 

inhabiting all but the southernmost atolls were exposed to larger amounts of radiation than were the U.S. civilians living downwind from the Nevada Test Site 

(NTS). The inhabitants of Rongelap and Ailinginae, who were the most exposed, received extremely high radiation doses for which there is little experience in health 

risk assessment. Second, the Tribunal treats all cases the same by including the entire 1958 RMI population in the eligibility pool. In contrast, RECA is often criticized 

because it arbitrarily limits compensation to individuals who lived in certain specified counties in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah. The NRC recently recommended establishing new scientific criteria for awarding compensation under RECA, noting that 

fallout from the NTS above ground tests covered a wide geographic area and that 

people living far beyond the RECA-designated counties may have been exposed to 

higher levels of radiation.

Table 1.—COMPARISON OF RADIATION COMPENSATION AMOUNTS 

Compensable disease RECA 

downwinders RMI nuclear claims tribunal 

Leukemia (except chronic 

lymphocytic leukemia).

$50,000 ............... $125,000

Cancer of the lung ...................... $50,000 ............... $37,500

Multiple myeloma ....................... $50,000 ............... $125,000

Lymphomas (except Hodgkin’s 

disease).

$50,000 ............... $100,000

Cancer of the thyroid .................. $50,000 ............... $75,000 (recurrent 

$50,000 (non-recurrent) 

Cancer of the breast ................... $50,000 ............... $100,000 (recurrent/mastectomy) 

$75,000 (nonrecurrent/

lumpectomy) 

Cancer of the esophagus ............ $50,000 ............... $125,000

Cancer of the stomach ................ $50,000 ............... $125,000

Cancer of the pharynx ................ $50,000 ............... $100,000

Cancer of the small intestine ..... $50,000 ............... $125,000

Cancer of the pancreas ............... $50,000 ............... $125,000

Cancer of the bile ducts ............. $50,000 ............... $125,000

Cancer of the gall bladder .......... $50,000 ............... $125,000

Cancer of the salivary gland ...... $50,000 ............... $50,000 (malignant) 

$37,500 (benign, surgery) 

$12,500 (benign, no surgery) 

Cancer of the urinary bladder ... $50,000 ............... $75,000

Cancer of the brain ..................... $50,000 ............... $125,000

Cancer of the colon ..................... $50,000 ............... $75,000

Cancer of the ovary .................... $50,000 ............... $125,000

Cancer of the liver (except if cirrhosis or hepatitis B is indicated).$50,000 ............... $125,000

Cancer of the central nervous 

system.

not covered ........ $125,000

Cancer of the kidney .................. not covered ........ $75,000

Cancer of the rectum .................. not covered ........ $75,000

Cancer of the cecum ................... not covered ........ $75,000

Cancer of the bone ...................... not covered ........ $125,000

Tumors of the parathyroid gland not covered ........ $50,000 (malignant) 

$37,500 (benign, surgery) 

$12,500 (benign, no surgery) 

Meningioma ................................. not covered ........ $100,000

Non-malignant thyroid nodular 

disease.

not covered ........ $50,000 (total thyroidectomy) 

$37,500 (partial thyroidectomy) 

$12,500 (no thyroidectomy) 

Unexplained hypothyroidism ..... not covered ........ $37,500

Severe growth retardation due 

to thyroid damage.

not covered ........ $100,000

Autoimmune thyroiditis ............. not covered ........ $12,500

64

2 CRS Report for Congress #RL32811, republic of the Marshall Islands ‘Changed Circumstances Petition’ to Congress. 3Prepared by Salvatore Lazzari, Specialist in Public Finance. 

4The CCP petition considers the personal hardships endured by the affected RMI population—famine, near starvation, and death—part of the property damages because they were 

caused by the severe limitations of the resources available on alternate habitation atolls. 5 CRS Report for Congress #RL33029, Loss of Use Damages from U.S. Nuclear Testing in the 

Marshall Islands: Technical Analysis of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal’s Methodology and Alternative Estimates, by Salvatore Lazzari. 6 According to one estimate, since 1954, the United States has provided $531 million to the 

Marshall Islands for nuclear test damages, including compensation payments, environmental 

cleanup and restoration, and resettlement programs. This total also includes an estimated $138 

million in Department of Energy (DOE) radiological and health monitoring in the four affected 

atolls and medical programs for the residents of Rongelap and Utrik through 2002. The Compact 

of Free Association established a Nuclear Claims Fund (NCF) of $150 million for personal injury 

and property damages claims, health care, medical surveillance and radiological monitoring, 

trust funds for the four atolls, and quarterly distributions to the peoples of the four atolls for 

hardships suffered. Beyond the broad guidelines under the Compact, there are no specific rules 

on how the $150 million was to be spent. A U.S. State Department report suggests that lack 

of funds is due to excessive damage awards by, for example, awarding damages to citizens 

throughout the RMI although the incidence of nuclear damages appear to be more limited. See: 

Table 1.—COMPARISON OF RADIATION COMPENSATION AMOUNTS—

Continued

Compensable disease RECA 

downwinders RMI nuclear claims tribunal 

Unexplained bone marrow failure.not covered ........ $125,000

Radiation sickness diagnosed 

between June 30, 1946, and 

Aug. 18, 1958.

not covered ........ $12,500

Beta bums diagnosed between 

June 30, 1946, and Aug. 18, 

1958.

not covered ........ $12,500

Severe mental retardation (provided born between May and 

Sept. 1954, and mother on 

Rongelap or Utirik any time 

in Mar. 1954.

not covered ........ $100,000

Unexplained 

hyperparathryoidism.

not covered ........ $12,500

Non-melanoma skin cancer in 

individuals diagnosed with 

beta burns (see above).

not covered ........ $37,500 

Question 2. Page 4 of the CRS report 2 states that the data, assumptions and some 

statistical procedures applied by the Tribunal in its calculations of loss-of-use ‘‘result 

in past and future loss-of-use estimates that appear to be overstated, which leads 

to possibly excessive total damages claimed and awarded by the Tribunal.’’ Can you 

quantify or estimate a range of the Tribunal’s overstatement of land values? 

Answer.3 In September 2000, the RMI submitted its CCP to the U.S. Congress 

requesting $3,300 million in additional compensation for U.S. nuclear testing on 

Enewetak and Bikini atolls during the 1940s and 1950s. In 2000 and 2001, the Nuclear Claims Tribunal (NCT), which adjudicates damage claims filed by RMI citizens, awarded the claimants that amount as judgment for personal injury and property damages. The $3,300 million judgment includes unpaid property damages 

awards for the atolls of Enewetak and Bikini totaling $949 million, of which $522 

million is for the lost use of property ($278 million for Bikini and $244 million for 

Enewetak) from the date of evacuation in the 1940s to the date of return, which 

is projected to be in 2026 (for Enewetak) and 2027 (for Bikini). The remaining $427 

million ($949 million less $522 million) is for other property damages: soil remediation and land restoration, and hardship. 4 The award for $522 million, which is 

15.8% of the total judgment, is in addition to amounts already paid for loss-of-use, 

which, through the year 2000, the NCT reports as about $129 million for both atolls. 

Based on the economic model that CRS 5 developed, it appears that the $522 million awarded by the NCT for loss-of-use of Enewetak and Bikini but unpaid due to 

lack of funds, may be significantly overstated.6 The primary source of this overstateVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:44 Nov 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 R:\DOCS\24-536 SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
65

U.S. Department of State, Report Evaluating the Request of the Government of the Republic of 

the Marshall Islands Presented to the Congress of the United States of America. November 2004. 7 CRS Report for Congress #RL33029, op. cit. 

8 Another illustration is the case of Runit Island of Enewetak atoll. This island has been indefinitely quarantined because it is used to store nuclear waste, and should thus be compensated based on its value at the time it was rendered unusable (plus interest). 

ment is that the NCT’s estimation methodology—the sample rent data, assumptions, and statistical procedures (i.e., the sampling technique and the use of the exponential regression model)—are likely to overestimate the per-acre rental rate for 

land on Enewetak and Bikini, the key variable in the loss-of-use calculation. 

The CRS 7 calculation indicates that the appraisers’ analysis done for the NCT appears to have overestimated rents on Enewetak and Bikini because Enewetak and 

Bikini are non-urban and land was used largely for agricultural purposes. The analysts applied an exponential regression model to rents established not in a competitive, free market for agricultural land on Enewetak and Bikini, but rather to government-established, and predominantly commercial, rents on the more urbanized, 

and densely populated, Majuro and Kwajalein atolls. Most land in the RMI is leased 

at ‘‘the official government rate’’ established by the RMI cabinet. This rate, which 

was set by the RMI government at $2,500/acre on January 1, 1979, and increased 

to $3,000/acre on October 1, 1989, serves as the benchmark for all lease transactions. 

The RMI government is not only the lessee in over 40% of the leases and a major 

source of the demand for RMI land. In many of the sample leases cited in the analysis, key government officials are also effectively the landlords of much of the land, 

which means they are also a supply source. The applicability of the resultant estimated average rentals from Majuro and Kwajalein to the distant, more agrarian, 

and less populated atolls of Enewetak and Bikini is open to question. Applying an 

exponential regression model to noncomparable and unrepresentative sample rent 

data leads to projected rents of $112,995/acre for the year 2027, which is equivalent 

to land value of nearly $1,774,024/acre. 

The appraiser’s methodology also assumes that more land is lost to use, and for 

longer periods, than is actually the case (such as when vaporized islands are treated 

as not having been vaporized). The NCT’s justification for making this assumption 

was twofold. First, it argued that Enewetak and Bikini are ‘‘part of the environmental whole’’ and should not be separated into islets. However, this assumption 

results in an inconsistency: Enewetak and Bikini atolls are treated as individual 

land masses for purposes of 1) calculating the annual rental values on unvaporized 

portions of the atolls, 2) adjusting for alternative habitation, and 3) adjusting for 

prior loss-of-use compensation already paid by the U.S. government. But, Enewetak 

and Bikini atolls are treated as collective land masses for the purposes of excluding 

the vaporized portions of the atolls. 

The second reason given for including the vaporized land portions in the loss-ofuse calculation is that there are problems in determining the value of the vaporized 

and otherwise unusable portions of Enewetak and Bikini. There should be no more 

problems in valuing vaporized land than in valuing unvaporized land. Given the 

equivalency between the value of land and the rentals earned on that land, an appropriate methodology would consider the vaporized land areas as being tantamount 

to a permanent taking of property, and estimate the capitalized land value based 

on the projected streams of rentals, using the estimated rentals from the time of 

pulverization. In this way, past loss-of-use estimates would include the rental value 

of the vaporized portions up to the time of pulverization, and thereafter based on 

the capitalized value of these portions of the land as assets, with interest. This is 

the same as calculating future rents foregone, but it does so at the time of the destruction of the land, whether from vaporization or any other cause.8 The NCT 

methodology also may undervalue the rentals on alternative atoll habitation, and 

assumes that recipients of rental proceeds, as consumers and savers, would have 

saved 100% of the rental proceeds. 

The NCT’s estimated average rents/acre used in the loss-of-use calculation—

$4,105/acre in 1996—also appears high when compared to average agricultural rents 

in the United States: $17.50/acre in Montana, $115/acre in Oregon, $210/acre in 

California, $ 88/acre in New Mexico (1995), and $66.50/acre for the United States 

generally (1998). Using an alternative economic methodology, and applying it to 

RMI’s national income and product accounts data, CRS has calculated alternative 

estimates of agricultural land rents for Enewetak and Bikini for the period 1982-

1990, which are more consistent with the underlying real (agricultural) use of the 

two atolls (and the RMI economy), as well as with agricultural rents observed in 

66

9The NCT’s estimated 1997 rental of $4,167/acre, discounted at 8% for 30 years, is equivalent 

to land valued at $46,911/acre, which is nearly 2,000% greater than the $2,405/acre average 

price for Hawaiian land, and 5,000% more than the $926/acre average price of farmland in the 

continental United States generally. In 1997 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service purchased 5,300 

acres of land in the South Kona district of the Hawaiian Islands at a total cost of $7.78 million, 

or $1,468/acre, which translates into an estimated annual rent per acre of $130. In June 2002, 

the average price of crop-land in Brazil was reported at $355/acre. In April 2005, 100,725 acres 

of New Zealand forest land went on sale for $42/acre in New Zealand dollars (which, at the April 

2005 exchange rate, converts to about $30/acre in U.S. dollars). 10 Uncertainty would make many of the determining variables in the model random, which, 

although it would add realism, it would also add an unnecessary level of complication and, in 

any event, is beyond the scope of this memorandum. 11 CRS Report for Congress #RL33029, op. cit. 12Prepared by David Bearden, Analyst in Environmental Policy. 13Federal Register 1092, January 9, 1986. 14 56 Federal Register 23360, May 21, 1991, codified at 10 C.F.R. 20.1301. 15Department of Energy. Office of Environment, Safety, and Health. Radiation Protection of 

the Public and the Environment. DOE Order 5400.5. February 8, 1990, amended January 7, 

1993. 16 62 Federal Register 39088, July 21, 1997, codified at 10 C.F.R. 20.1402. 17 Environmental Protection Agency. Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, and Office 

of Radiation and Indoor Air. Memorandum: Establishment of Cleanup Levels for CERCLA Sites 

the United States and in regions in the Pacific.9 The methodology is founded on a 

neoclassical microeconomic model that assumes that land values, and therefore land 

rents, derive primarily from agricultural productivity, but also from proximity to the 

major urban areas (Majuro).10 The value of agricultural land, and equivalently, the 

rental price of that land, reflects the value of the crops produced. 

Based on this model, CRS 11 estimates rents/acre at $115/acre for the year 1982 rising to $258/acre for 1990, as compared with the NCT’s estimates of $1,902 for 

1982 rising to $2,939 for 1990. Based on these rental rates, CRS estimates gross 

loss-of-use rentals for 1982-1990 (before adjustments and interest) of $6.4 million, 

about 10% of the $64 million estimated by the NCT for the 1982-90 period. Note 

that these are gross rentals, unadjusted for the value of alternative lands provided 

as habitation, prior loss-of-use compensation already provided by the U.S. Government, and interest. CRS estimates also exclude the value of environmental amenities (as do the NCT estimates) of the non-usable ecosystem. 

Thus, in conclusion, based on 1) an analysis of the NCT’s loss-of-use methodology, 

2) empirical evidence of agricultural land rents in the continental United States, 

Hawaii, and selected areas of the Pacific, and 3) estimates based on an alternative 

economic methodology—one consistent with the real underlying productivity of agricultural lands on Enewetak and Bikini—the $522 million figure appears to be overstated, perhaps significantly. 

Question 3. In it’s Petition for additional compensation from the United States, 

the Marshall Islands contends that the safety standard for cleanup has become 

more stringent since the 1986 settlement agreement was concluded—that the safety 

standard has been reduced from 100 millirem to the 15 millirem now used at such 

U.S. sites as Hanford, Washington and Rocky Flats, Colorado. Do you agree or disagree that U.S. cleanup standards have changed? 

Answer.12 U.S. standards for the cleanup of radioactive contamination at certain 

types of sites have changed since 1986. However, whether these standards would 

be applied to the cleanup of the Marshall Islands if it were in the United States 

is uncertain. In 1986, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposed a standard to protect the general public from annual exposure to radiation in excess of 100 

millirems above the natural background level.13 The NRC promulgated this standard in federal regulation in 1991.14 This standard applies to the operation of facilities licensed by the NRC, such as civilian nuclear power plants, but not to cleanup. 

In 1990, the Department of Energy (DOE) adopted this same standard for the cleanup of radioactive contamination at former nuclear weapons production and testing 

sites, and civilian nuclear energy research sites, in the United States. DOE adopted 

this standard in a department ‘‘order.’’ 15 As such, it is an internal administrative 

directive, rather than an enforceable federal regulation. 

In 1997, the NRC promulgated a stricter standard of 25 millirems in federal regulation that applies to the cleanup of radioactive contamination at facilities that the 

NRC licenses for operation.16 It does not apply to DOE nuclear weapons production 

and testing sites, which are not under the jurisdiction of the NRC. Subsequently 

that same year, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued non-binding 

guidance for the cleanup of Superfund sites in the United States that specifies a 

stricter standard of 15 millirems, differing from the NRC as to how stringent an 

exposure standard should be to protect human health.17 Unlike the NRC standard, 

67

with Radioactive Contamination. OSWER No. 9200.4-18. August 22, 1997. CERCLA is the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, which authorized EPA to 

establish the Superfund program to respond to releases of hazardous substances in the United 

States to protect human health and the environment. CERCLA also authorized EPA to develop 

a National Priorities List (NFL) of the nation’s most hazardous sites, commonly referred to as 

Superfund sites. Many former nuclear weapons sites in the United States are listed on the NPL. 18 65 Federal Register 76748, December 7, 2000, codified at 40 C.F.R. 141.66. 19Prepared by David Bearden, Analyst in Environmental Policy. 20 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq. 21 RCRA amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act. The amendments were so comprehensive that 

the statute is commonly referred to as RCRA. As amended, the Solid Waste Disposal Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. 22 42 U.S.C. 9621. 23 42 U.S.C. 6924(v). 

the EPA standard is not an enforceable federal regulation. However, EPA did promulgate an enforceable drinking water standard of 4 millirems in 2000 that applies 

to the cleanup of radioactivity in groundwater that is a current or potential source 

of drinking water.18

The Republic of the Marshall Islands argues that the same level of public protection in the United States should be provided in the Marshall Islands, and that 

EPA’s more stringent standard of 15 millirems would be applied to the cleanup of 

contaminated soil in the Marshall Islands if it were in the United States. However, 

this standard is not an enforceable regulation applied uniformly at all contaminated 

sites. Rather, it is a recommended guideline applied on a case-by-case basis, depending on the economic and technological feasibility of attaining it at a particular site. 

Therefore, it is uncertain whether the 15-millirem standard would be applied to the 

cleanup of the Marshall Islands if it were in the United States. Although there is 

precedent for the application of EPA’s standard at Hanford and Rocky Flats, other 

nuclear weapons production and testing sites in the United States typically are 

cleaned up according to DOE’s less stringent standard of 100 millirems. 

Question 4. For contaminated areas in the U.S. or its territories, how are decisions 

made about what areas are to be cleaned-up, for what uses, to what standard, and 

what are some typical outcomes? For example, are there situations in the U.S. similar to the situation on Runit Island in Enewetak Atoll? 

Answer.19 Two federal laws govern the cleanup of environmental contamination 

in the United States: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 

and Liability Act (CERCLA) 20 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

(RCRA).21 Neither statute indicates the degree of cleanup that is required at individual sites nor the specific actions that must be taken to remediate contamination. 

Rather, CERCLA identifies numerous factors that must be considered in the selection of remedial actions, including cost-effectiveness, and requires that actions to 

protect human health and the environment comply with any applicable, relevant, 

or appropriate requirements in federal or state law.22 RCRA more generally specifies that ‘‘corrective action’’ must be taken to clean up contamination that is needed 

to protect human health and the environment.23

Under both statutes, decisions regarding which areas are in need of environmental remediation, and to what standard the remediation will be performed, are 

made on a site-specific basis. EPA and the state in which the site is located are responsible for determining what cleanup standards are used and for overseeing and 

approving specific remedial actions. Cleanup decisions primarily depend on the risk 

of human exposure to contamination that could occur as a result of how the land 

is used and whether there is the potential for contamination to migrate, through 

groundwater for example, and present a risk of human exposure in other locations. 

Land uses involving a greater human presence, such as residential purposes, generally require a greater degree of cleanup than land uses involving less human presence, such as industrial purposes. 

At privately owned sites where contamination is present, the owner of the land 

primarily determines how the land is used. In the case of abandoned sites, EPA and 

the state consider the preferences of the local community in deciding the reasonably 

anticipated land uses. At publicly owned sites, the agency with jurisdiction over the 

contaminated land determines the use. Federal agencies consider the preferences of 

communities in deciding how contaminated land would be used if it is slated for 

transfer out of federal ownership, such as lands on a closed military base. Whether 

a site is privately or publicly owned, land use maybe restricted if there are economic 

or technological limitations to cleaning up the land to make it safe for certain uses, 

or if certain types of waste may remain present on the site as a result of containing, 

rather than removing, the waste to prevent human exposure. 

68

24 Authority for citizen suits against any person, including federal agencies, for violation of 

cleanup requirements is provided in CERCLA [42 U.S.C. 9659] and RCRA [42 U.S.C. 6972]. 25Federal regulations for the land disposal of radioactive waste are codified at 10 C.F.R. 61. 26 A half-life is the time in which one half of the atoms of a radioactive substance disintegrate 

into another nuclear form, or the time to halve its radioactive strength. 27The Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the Department of Defense is responsible for administering the cleanup of radioactive contamination on Johnston Atoll. Some of the contaminated soil and debris has been removed off-site, but the remainder is slated for disposal in an 

on-site capped landfill. The decision document is available online at: [http://www.dtra.mil/about/

media/historical—documents/environmental/j a—decision.cfm#dec]. 

The outcomes of cleanup decisions vary among individual sites. Complete removal 

of contamination to allow unrestricted use of the land maybe economically and technologically feasible at some sites, whereas containment of waste and restrictions on 

land use maybe the only feasible option at others. Applicable cleanup standards also 

can vary among sites due to differing circumstances. For example, federal drinking 

water standards apply to the cleanup of contamination of groundwater only if the 

groundwater is a current or potential source of drinking water. A state standard 

also maybe used in the absence of a federal standard, or a site-specific standard 

maybe developed if one does not exist. The selection of specific remedial actions to 

attain an applicable standard also may vary among individual sites due to differing 

geophysical characteristics. For example, containment of surface waste maybe 

deemed sufficiently protective in areas where groundwater contamination is unlikely, because of the depth of the aquifer, porosity of the soil, and annual rainfall. 

If there is disagreement among the parties involved, reaching a consensus on the 

degree and type of remediation may be difficult and result in delaying the cleanup 

for a significant amount of time, especially if litigation is involved.24

According to DOE, past cleanup decisions in the Marshall Islands resulted in the 

removal of over 100,000 cubic yards of surface soil from six islands of Enewetak 

Atoll in the late 1970s. The soil had been contaminated from radioactive fallout 

from U.S. nuclear weapons tests. There were no waste disposal facilities located in 

the Marshall Islands to receive the contaminated soil. Filling a detonation crater on 

Runit Island with the removed soil, and other radioactive debris, was deemed a 

more economically feasible option than shipping it for disposal elsewhere. This disposal method also avoided the potential risk of an accidental release of contaminated material into the ocean during transit. The crater was capped with a cement 

dome to contain the waste and to prevent human intrusion. The contained soil covers a substantial portion of the island, making that area unsuitable for other uses 

for the foreseeable future. 

Nuclear detonation craters also are being used as waste disposal sites in the 

United States. DOE is disposing of certain types of radioactive waste in craters 

formed as a result of underground nuclear weapons tests at the Nevada Test Site. 

The waste disposed of in craters at the Nevada Test Site is primarily a by-product 

of nuclear weapons production, rather than soil contaminated from radioactive fallout from weapons tests. Relatively little removal of soil is planned at the Nevada 

Test Site. Rather, restrictions on the use of the majority of the land will be used 

to prevent human exposure. Similar types of radioactive wastes are also disposed 

of through shallow land burial and containment with concrete caps at commercial 

waste disposal facilities in the United States.25

Although shallow land burial of certain types of radioactive waste is permitted in 

the United States, it is not commonly practiced in ocean settings similar to Runit 

Island. Residents of the Marshall Islands have expressed concern about the potential aquatic impacts of the radionuclides entombed in the crater on Runit, and the 

possibility of the release of contaminated material into the surrounding ocean if the 

concrete structure were to decay or be damaged. Some scientists have estimated 

that the concrete dome should remain structurally sound for approximately 300 

years. However, the material contained in it will continue to be radioactive for thousands of years because of the long half-lives 26 of the radionuclides. Consequently, 

the long-term effectiveness of the concrete cap to safely contain the radioactive material is uncertain. There are similar concerns about the burial of some of the radioactive soil and debris at Johnston Atoll, located several hundred miles southwest 

of Hawaii, where aborted missile launches used in atomospheric nuclear tests by the 

United States in the 1960s resulted in radioactive contamination.27

If the Marshall Islands were in the United States, the outcome of decisions to perform further cleanup of contamination remaining in the soil is uncertain, as the residential and agricultural land uses that the government of the Marshall Islands has 

proposed are less restrictive than at other sites in the United States with similar 

contamination. As noted above, the use of the majority of the land at the Nevada 

Test Site will be restricted to prevent human exposure, resulting in relatively little 

69

28Department of Energy, Remedial Design Report/Remedial Action Work Plan for the 100 

Area, June 2002, p. 2-41, and Remedial Design Report/Remedial Action Work Plan for the 300 

Area, April 2003, p. 2-20. 29Sanford Cohen & Associates, Inc. (SCA), Statement before the Nuclear Claims Tribunal Regarding the Potential Radiation Doses and Health Risks to a Resettled Population of Enewetak 

Atoll and an Evaluation of the Costs and Effectiveness of Alternative Strategies for Reducing the 

Doses and Risks, March 23, 1999, p. ii. SCA recommended a single soil concentration standard 

of 0.32 pCi/gm that it argued would attain a 15-millirem exposure standard. 30 Enviropro, Inc., Cleanup Standards and Conceptual Remediation Alternatives of Nuclear 

Waste at Enewetak Atoll the Republic of the Marshall Islands, March 30, 1999, p. 1. Enviropro 

recommended two soil concentration standards: 0.35 pCi/gm in areas where only locally grown 

food is consumed, and 0.71 pCi/gm in areas where a mixed diet of locally grown and imported 

foods are consumed, which it argued would attain a 15-millirem exposure standard. 31Prepared by Thomas Lum, Specialist in Asian Affairs. 32 (italics mine) The Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Marshall Islands for the Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free 

Association, Article IX. 33 Howard Hills, Attorney at Law, ‘‘Historical Information Regarding the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Settlement,’’ Testimony before the House Committee on Resources, May 11, 1999. 

removal of soil. Although the exposure standard of 15 millirems that the Marshall 

Islands has selected to govern further cleanup also has been applied at Hanford and 

Rocky Flats, the land uses at these two latter sites are significantly more restrictive 

than that proposed in the Marshall Islands. 

Rocky Flats will serve as a National Wildlife Refuge with human access limited 

to refuge personnel and visitors in certain areas. Hanford is not planned for unrestricted use, but will continue its function as a waste treatment and disposal facility 

into the foreseeable future, even after cleanup is complete. Residential and agricultural land uses in the Marshall Islands would necessitate a significantly greater degree of cleanup than is planned at Hanford and Rocky Flats to attain the same exposure standard. For example, the soil concentration standards for cesium at Hanford, a radionuclide common to both Hanford and the Marshall Islands, are significantly less stringent than the standards proposed by the Marshall Islands, despite 

the application of the same exposure standard. The soil concentration standard at 

Hanford is 6 picocuries per gram (pCi/gm) at the ‘‘100 Area’’ located adjacent to the 

Columbia River where the potential migration of contamination in groundwater is 

of particular concern, and is 25 pCi/gm at the ‘‘300 Area’’ located further from the 

river and intended for industrial use.28 The Marshall Islands has proposed substantially stricter soil concentration standards ranging from 0.32 29 to 0.71 pCi/gm 30 depending on whether only locally grown foods, or a mix of locally grown and imported 

foods, are consumed. Due to the more extensive remediation that would be required 

on a proportional basis in the Marshall Islands, it is uncertain whether the same 

decision would be made to apply the 15-millirem standard to the Marshall Islands 

if it were in the United States. 

RESPONSES OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE TO QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR SALAZAR

Question 1. Who bears responsibility for deciding if the changed circumstances 

have been met? Is that spelled out in the Compact (of Free Association)? 

Answer.31 Congress bears responsibility for deciding if ‘‘changed circumstances’’ 

have been met. The Compact of Free Association states: 

If loss or damage to property and person of the citizens of the Marshall 

Islands, resulting from the Nuclear Testing Program, arises or is discovered 

after the effective date of this Agreement, and such injuries were not and 

could not reasonably have been identified as of the effective date of this 

Agreement, and if such injuries render the provisions of this Agreement 

manifestly inadequate, the Government of the Marshall Islands may request that the Government of the United States provide for such injuries 

by submitting such a request to the Congress of the United States for its 

consideration.32

Some experts state that when the Compact was being negotiated and formulated, 

the congressional committees with jurisdiction over the matter urged the Carter and 

Reagan administrations to formulate the agreement so as to ‘‘preserve the residual 

authority of Congress’’ over nuclear test damages claims.33 In addition, Congress 

has the possible option of granting jurisdiction of some of the Petition’s claims to 

the U.S. Court of Claims. 

Question 2. Why, as you understand it, has the Administration already responded 

to the Petition? 

70

34Prepared by Thomas Lum, Specialist in Asian Affairs. 35 United States Department of State, ‘‘Report Evaluating the Request of the Government of 

the Republic of the Marshall Islands Presented to the Congress of the United States of America.’’ November 2004. 36 RMI letter to the Senate Energy Committee and House Committees on Resources and International Relations, January 18, 2005. 

Answer.34 The Bush Administration addressed the Petition in response to a request from Congress. In March 2002, the Senate Energy Committee and House Resources Committee requested that an interagency group (Departments of State, Energy, and Defense) evaluate the Petition and provide Congress with an assessment 

of its legal and scientific merits. According to the Marshall Islands government, in 

December 2001, the RMI had also requested that the Bush Administration prepare 

a response to the Petition. The Bush Administration released its report in November 

2004.35

During 2003, Congress considered the Amendments to the Compact of Free Association, and passed the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act in November 

2003 (signed into law by President Bush in December 2003 (P.L. 108-188). The Compact, as amended, extended financial assistance to the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia but did not address the Changed Circumstances Petition. Both Congress and the Bush Administration expected to review the Petition following completion of bilateral negotiations on the Compact 

amendments and passage of the authorizing legislation. The report was intended to 

offer the Administration’s position on the Petition, based upon the knowledge and 

expertise of U.S. government agencies who had long been involved in the U.S. nuclear testing, health monitoring, and cleanup on the Marshall Islands. However, the 

Administration, by making the report, did not supersede the principal role of Congress in responding to the Petition. The RMI government stated that the report was 

an ‘‘advisory opinion’’ and a ‘‘preliminary step in creation of a record that will enable Congress to make informed decisions with respect to disposition of the petition.’’ 36

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 

Bethesda, MD, August 23, 2005. 

Hon. PETE DOMENICI, 

Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR SENATOR DOMENICI: Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Senate Committee on Natural Resources on July 19th and for the opportunity to respond to Senator Salazar’s question for the record. Provided below is my response. 

Senator Salazar has asked:

In your report you note that your estimate of additional cancer illnesses 

of about 530 is an over-estimate. What is the confidence level of that assessment? In other words, is this the very upper bound, or is there potential 

for even higher numbers?

We tried to avoid making assumptions that could lead to underestimating the true 

risk of radiation-related cancer. 13y doing so, we probably developed dose estimates 

that are too high. We also assumed that risk is proportional to dose. This is a reasonable assumption for exposures received on atolls other than Rongelap and 

Ailinginae, but one that has not been tested before on people exposed to the extremely high doses estimated for Rongelap and Ailinginae. Thus, for both of these 

reasons, our overall risk estimate probably errs on the high side. 

Our estimate, however, is not a confidence bound. For example, if we combined 

atolls other than Rongelap and Ailinginae, and assume that the average doses are 

reasonably correct, a rough 95% upper confidence bound of twice the central estimate in our report, or about 770 excess lifetime cancers, is appropriate. Stated another way, we think there is only a 1 in 20 chance that there could be more than 

770 radiation-related cancers among the approximately 14,000 exposed residents of 

those atolls. 

We can’t give an upper confidence bound for risk to the populations exposed on 

Rongelap and Ailinginae. Although we are reasonably sure the exposure levels were 

very high, we don’t have enough data on radiation-related cancer risk in any populations with such high exposures. As a practical matter, with such high estimated 

doses for thyroid, stomach, and colon cancer, it would be difficult to argue that any 

of these cancers occurring in a member of the small population (about 80 persons) 

71

1 Eisenbud, M. Radioactive debris from Operation IVY. New York: New York Operations Office, Health and Safety Laboratory, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. NYO-4522 (Del.), 1953. 2 Breslin, AJ, Cassidy, ME. Radioactive debris from Operation Castle, islands of the mid-Pacific. New York: New York Operations Office, Health and Safety Laboratory, U.S. Atomic Energy 

Commission. NYO-4623 (Del.), 1955. 3 Radioactive contamination of certain areas of the Pacific Ocean from nuclear tests, a summary of the data from radiological surveys and medical examinations. G.M. Dunning, ed. Washington, DC: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1957. 4Simon, S.L. A brief history of people and events related to atomic weapons testing in the 

Marshall Islands. Health Physics 73(1):5-20, 1997. 5 Harley, J.H, Hallden, N.A., Ong, L.D. Summary of gummed film results through December 

1959. New York: U.S. Health and Safety Laboratory, HASL-93, UC-41, TID-4500, 1960. 

exposed on Rongelap or Ailinginae was not radiation-related. To a lesser extent, the 

same is true of leukemia and many other cancers as well. 

Please do not hesitate to contact NCI should you have any additional follow-up 

questions. 

Sincerely, 

KIYOHIKO MABUCHI, MD. 

RESPONSES OF STEVEN SIMON TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BINGAMAN

Question. The reports by NCI, DOE, and the Nationwide Radiology Survey each 

found, generally, that there was a decrease in the amount of radioactive contamination as you move south from the test sites. (a) Was there a scientific basis for the 

Tribunal to reach this same conclusion in 1987, and (b) analytical tools available 

to estimate risks of illness on a regional basis among the nearly 14,000 people living 

in the Marshall Islands in 1958? 

Answer. (a) In 1987, there were various sources of data available on the degree 

of contamination and/or exposure across the Marshall Islands. None of the data sets 

were as comprehensive, in geographic terms, as that that become available in 1994 

upon completion of the Nationwide Radiological Study. However, there were data 

available in 1987 and all showed lower levels of contamination both with increasing 

distance and with more southerly location. In response to this question, I will identify some of these publications and/or sources of data. Since it has been several 

years since I have reviewed these reports and due to time constraints in providing 

this testimony, I will not summarize the quantity or quantity of information provided in each. 

In 1952, the Health and Safety Laboratory (HASL) of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) began conducting radiological monitoring following nuclear tests conducted in the Marshall Islands. HASL issued reports after the 1952 IVY series 1 and 

a more comprehensive report following the 1954 CASTLE series—the now well 

known report of Breslin and Cassidy 2 (see my statement of July 19, 2005 for evidence concerning that report’s availability). That report, in particular, provided aerial monitoring data for 28 atolls as well as data at more distant locations of Hawaii, 

Midway, Guam, and Palau. In 1957, the AEC issued a summary of radiological 

data 3 collected to that date. 

There were many reports issued in the early years following the nuclear tests concerning surveys made of the nuclear test site atolls. See Simon (1997) 4 for a listing 

of many of those documents. Most, if not all, of those can be found on the Dept. 

of Energy’s archival document website (http://worfeh.doe.gov/). 

During many of the years when nuclear testing was conducted, the HASL monitored remote locations from the test sites through the use of a collection device 

using gummed film (a type of sticky paper) that would retain fallout deposited on 

it. The paper collection devices were submitted to the HASL for laboratory analysis. 

That program was extremely successful partly because of the numerous locations 

where the collection devices were stationed. In addition, the gummed film was 

changed and collected daily, thus allowing the temporal pattern of the deposition 

to be observed at each site. From the daily measurements, one could also develop 

an estimate of the monthly or annual deposition of fallout by summing the daily 

values. During certain periods of the testing program, gummed film was collected 

at Kwajalein and Majuro and those data were reported in 1960.5

Focused on northern atolls of the Marshall Islands, but highly detailed in their 

analysis of samples and with related dose projections, were the reports on the DOEVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:44 Nov 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 R:\DOCS\24-536 SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
72

6 Robison, W.L., Conrado, C.L., Eagle, R.J., Stuart, M.L., The northern Marshall Islands radiological survey: sampling and analysis summary. Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory, UCRL-52853, Parts 1-4, 1982. 7Tipton, W.J., Miebaum, R. An aerial radiological and photographic survey of eleven atolls 

and two islands within the northern Marshall Islands. Las Vegas, NV: EG&G, EGG-1183-1758, 

1981. 8 Hamilton, T.E., van Belle, G. LoGerfo, J.P. Thyroid neoplasia in Marshall Islanders exposed 

to nuclear fallout. Journal of the American Medical Association, 258:629-636, 1987. 9Though the risk of leukemia has a curvature in the dose-response relationship, for the purposes of discussion here, the risk is still proportional to the whole-body dose received. 10 Risks are generally higher when exposure occurs at young age, but the average person could 

be defined in whatever age groups were deemed of interest. 

sponsored Northern Marshall Islands Radiological Survey conducted in 1978.6,7 That 

survey included Rongelap, Taka, Utrik, Bikar, Rongerik, Ailinginae, Likiep, Ailuk, 

Wotho, Jemo and Mejit Islands, Ujelang, Bikini, and Enewetak. 

Finally, the report of Hamilton et al.8 (1987), while not reporting measurements 

of environmental contamination, made inferences about the geographic distribution 

of exposure to Iodine-131 released by the tests. The inferences made by Hamilton 

et al. were drawn from their observation of the incidence of benign thyroid disease, 

i.e., nodules. 

[Note to Senator Bingaman: While the Nationwide Thyroid Disease Study, conducted in the mid-1990s (as discussed in my statement of July 19, 2005) could not 

replicate the findings of the Hamilton study, the Nationwide Thyroid Study did not 

disprove the Hamilton findings. The Hamilton findings, though they have not been 

replicated, seem to be in general agreement with the all other data that show that 

the radiation exposures were much lower at southern atolls than at more northern 

locations.] 

The various reports and sets of data noted here are, at least, qualitatively consistent in that all showed a much lower contamination at atolls in the Marshall Islands that are distant from the test sites, and/or that are located in more southerly 

locations. The contamination at the most distant locations approached or were equal 

to background levels. Given the short time frame for me to develop this response, 

I cannot say if the above list is totally comprehensive, though assuredly it contains 

the most important historical data sets relevant to the question from Senator Bingaman. (b) In response to the inquiry regarding the state of analytical tools in 1987 to 

estimate risk of radiation related illnesses on a regional basis in the Marshall Islands, I can only answer within the limits of my expertise. Since I work in the field 

of radiation dose and risk assessment, my answer is informed, though my individual 

expertise is more in dosimetry than in risk estimation. 

To the first approximation, the risk of developing radiation related cancers in individual organs or tissues is linearly related to the cumulative radiation dose received by those tissues. Similarly, the total risk of developing cancer in any of the 

body’s tissues is linearly related to the whole-body dose received (assuming for simplicity here, the body is exposed uniformly).9 Within those approximations, it seems 

evident that the risks to Marshallese (at least on a regional basis as the question 

was framed), could have been estimated from estimates of the whole-body or organspecific exposures received by the average person living in those regions.10 The 

point of these statements is the following: even with rough estimates of doses received in regions of the Marshall Islands, as provided by data available in 1987, it 

would have been possible to roughly estimate the relative degree of risk of developing cancers among those exposed in different regions of the Marshall Islands. 

Without conducting any analysis here, but only relying on my recall about the 

data revealed in the reports noted above, most experts would have roughly categorized the Ailinginae and Rongelap experience as unique, i.e., these atolls very 

highly exposed, but similarly high exposures did not occur anywhere else in the 

Marshall Islands. Furthermore, there is near universal agreement (based on several 

aerial surveys) that the exposures at Utrik were about 10-20% of those received at 

Rongelap—but were higher than those at any other northern atolls. In a very rough 

estimation, the cancer risk at Utrik could have been scaled down proportionately 

from that observed at Rongelap even though the doses were so high at Rongelap 

that proportionality between dose and risk would not be precisely valid. 

Regarding the rest of the Marshall Islands, some scientists might say that information was too sketchy to make dose or cancer risk projections in 1987. Nevertheless, there would have been no reason to assume that doses received at distant locations were as high as at Utrik since fallout clouds inevitably broaden as they travel 

and become more dilute. Moreover, the additional time required to travel greater 

distances inevitably results in more radioactive decay. Hence, even in 1987, one 

73

could argue on fairly firm scientific grounds that the most distant (and southerly) 

atolls would have received lower doses and lower risks. It would have been hard 

to argue against that conclusion for whole-body dose, but maybe less so, concerning 

exposure to radioactive iodine (e.g., Iodine-131). Any conclusion other than lower 

doses would have been received at distant and southern atolls seems contradictory 

to physical principles. 

Dose received at the mid-latitude atolls, roughly defined for this discussion as 

those north of Majuro but south of Ailuk, would have been more difficult to intuit 

in 1987, especially without some data analysis. However, it seems possible that geographic partitioning of the risks could have been as follows: Rongelap and 

Ailinginae, Utrik, south of Utrik to Majuro, and south of Majuro. Finer distinctions 

might have also been possible from the data of Hamilton et al. Given these distinctions on dose, rough distinctions on risk could have been made by assuming the cancer risk as proportional to dose. This might have allowed, for example, a compensation scheme where the dollar amount of the reward was related to the geographic 

area where the predominant exposure (if there was any) took place. 

More quantitative calculations that individual cancers that developed were a result of the doses received could have been made using the probability of causation 

tables developed by the NIH and published in 1985. Admittedly, this might have 

been difficult without some expertise and effort in estimating doses received in the 

regions, though it would have been eminently possible to develop ‘‘representative 

doses’’ for the regions, to have interpreted the risk to have been related to those 

representative doses, and to have developed an award system that reflected the representative doses and risks of those geographic regions. 

Question. On March 18, 2005 the NCT presented material to Committee staff in 

support of their contention that contamination from the tests was more wide-spread 

than previously understood. Would you provide comment on these additional materials to the extent that you have not otherwise done so in your statement and appendix? 

Answer. I have very briefly reviewed the materials submitted by the NCT in 

March 2005 and I will attempt to briefly comment on them relative to your question 

concerning the degree of evidence they provide that contamination was more widespread than previously understood. 

Before responding to your question, I reiterate a main point I made in the Appendix to my statement of July 19, 2005: the ability of the NCT to successfully complete 

the compensation plan it implemented was not negatively impacted by the quality 

of information on the geographic extent of contamination. The financial commitment 

of the NCT’s compensation program is by and large to naturally occurring cancers. 

The analysis of the NCI showed that the increase in the cancer rate amongst 98% 

of the population alive at the time of testing, i.e., all but the people of Rongelap, 

Ailinginae, and Utrik was about 5%. Hence, outside of the cancers from those atolls, 

about 95% of the cancers from which claims could arise would be naturally occurring, that is, they would occur even in the absence of exposure to fallout. 

A brief review of NCT materials submitted: 

The document ‘‘A Discussion of Relevant Information Regarding the Personal Injury Compensation Program of the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal’’ covers many topics, some of which I have addressed in my July statement. 

In regards to the 1987 publication of Hamilton et al., the NCT did not provide 

a complete portrayal of the findings of Hamilton et al. I discussed this in the Appendix to my July statement. While Hamilton did make the statement that exposure 

seemed broader than previously believed, his data indicate that the incidence of thyroid nodules decreased about 10-times from the value at Utrik to the most distant 

atolls. This dramatic decrease hardly supports the presumption that risk should be 

considered equal across the Marshall Islands and could be viewed as a definitive 

argument against such a notion. 

The well known report of Breslin and Cassidy (AEC 1955) is also mentioned, however, here again, the data are viewed as confirmation of extensive exposure at distant locations rather than correctly viewed as diminishingly small at distance locations. For example, the NCT correctly state that the report gave a dose of 594 mrem 

at Arno. That, however, is only 0.3% of the value for Rongelap Island and is only 

about two-times the annual background radiation dose in the Marshall Islands. 

Here again, these data argue rather strongly against the presumption of equal risk 

across the Marshall Islands. 

I found the citation of the report of Noshkin et al. (1975) on plutonium levels in 

fish to be interesting, but to have little if anything to do with radiation risk. The 

measurements reported by Noshkin are in units of femtocuries, which are extremely, extremely, small units of radioactivity, equal to 0.0000000000000003 curies. Such levels of radioactivity are too small to be of real consequences for risk. 

74

I cannot comment in detail on the dose and risk estimates of Behling et al. that 

are referred to in the NCT paper, as I do not know the details of the methods used 

in his estimation. I do note that the excess number of cancers predicted by Dr. 

Behling for locations other than Rongelap and Utrik is in fairly good agreement 

with the value reported by the NCI. 

RESPONSES OF NEAL PALAFAX TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BINGAMAN

Question 1. On Page 8 of your testimony, you state ‘‘The NCI report suggests that 

the ionizing radiation which caused cancers reached beyond the four atolls and even 

beyond the northern atolls of the Marshall Islands. The lack of a defined boundary 

of who was affected and who was not affected by fallout makes a nation-wide system 

ideal’’. 

However, NCI suggests a boundary. They estimated the likelihood of excess cancer in the northern atolls to be up 20.6 percent and in the southern atolls to be up 

to 0.6 percent. Assuming cost is a consideration, isn’t it reasonable to focus supplemental health care effort on the populations at risk? 

Answer. Yes, however there are several key points to consider in this question. 

1. Defined Boundaries 

2. Supplemental Health Care Effort on the Populations at risk 

3. Determining background cancers 

DEFINED BOUNDARIES

The NCI study does not suggest a boundary of who was affected and not affected 

by nuclear fallout. The NCI was tasked by the Senate Committee on Energy and 

Natural Resources to: 

‘‘1(a) Please provide an estimate(range) of the expected numbers of cancers and 

radiogenic illnesses (both fatal and nonfatal cases) expected among the people of the 

Marshall Islands as a result of their exposure to radioactive fallout from U.S. weapons testing in the Marshall Islands ’’. 

The NCI study limited the parameters of its study. The NCI study only addressed 

radiogenic cancers and did not address other potential radiogenic illnesses (heart 

disease, strokes, genetic effects, hypothyroidism, etc). Also the NCI study limited its 

study to the effects of radiation exposure to Marshallese living during 1946-1958. 

It did not include the expected numbers of cases of cancer or other radiogenic illness 

in Marshallese who were exposed after 1958. 

Cancers that may be linked to agricultural land and food chains contaminated by 

nuclear fallout after 1958 was not addressed in this study. Marshallese who were 

moved back to Rongelap while it was still contaminated with radioactive fallout and 

Micronesian workers who worked on the nuclear waste clean up crews in Bikini and 

Enewetak are examples of populations whose cancer risk (and other radiogenic illnesses) is not quantified. 

SUPPLEMENTAL HEALTH CARE EFFORT ON THE POPULATIONS AT RISK

Cancers may be induced or caused by many factors. Each factor places the individual or population at a particular statistical risk for developing cancer. The NCI 

study determined the statistical risk of Marshallese alive from between 1948-1958 

who would develop cancer from the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing. This type of 

study is a population study of cancer risk. This type of study does not determine 

which individuals in the population under study will develop cancer. 

The patterns of nuclear fallout placed the Northern atolls at risk for 87% of the 

530 expected radiogenic cancers (461 cancers) and 13% (69 cancers) would be generated from other parts of the RMI. From the NCI study one cannot know which 

461 individuals in the northern atolls or 69 individuals in other atolls will develop 

cancer. For illustrative purposes, if there were 21 radiogenic cancers out of 100 

background cancers in the Northern atolls, in most instances, there would be no 

way to know which individuals in the Northern atolls would develop radiogenic or 

background cancers. This would also be true in the other atolls of the RMI. 

Stomach, colon, and other radiogenic cancers cannot be differentiated from 

nonradiogenic causes of these cancers. Individuals who could have the potential of 

developing cancers from the nuclear testing should be cared for. As a health issue, 

there is no other way to justly rectify this situation. 

It is reasonable to concentrate cancer prevention, screening, treatment and quality of life issues in populations where there are higher rates of cancer such as the 

Northern atolls. It is not reasonable to neglect cancers caused by nuclear testing in 

75

other areas such as the Southern atolls, no matter how few radiogenic cancers occur 

in that population. 

DETERMINING BACKGROUND CANCERS

The NCI study utilized Native Hawaiian seer data to determine the background 

rate of cancers in the RMI between 1948 and 1958. The number of cancers expected 

from the nuclear weapons program was compared to the predicted background rate 

indicating there is an expected 9% increase in the total number of cancers from nuclear testing. It is probable that the magnitude radiogenic cancers from the nuclear 

weapons testing program was far greater than 9%. 

Cancer rates in developing nations are largely dependent on when that nation enters the ‘‘epidemiologic transition’, i.e., the period of time where mortality patterns 

shift from infectious diseases to non-communicable diseases (cancer, heart disease, 

diabetes, strokes). The shift through the epidemiologic transition is largely determined by westernization. The Native Hawaiians westernized, went through the epidemiologic transition, much earlier than Marshallese. The Marshall Islanders during 1948-1958 were largely subsistence fisherman and farmers, whereas a large proportion of Native Hawaiians were already urbanized. This means that the actual 

background cancer rate during 1948 to 1958 in the Marshall Islands was probably 

much less than the predicted cancer rate utilizing Native Hawaiian data. If this is 

true the relative impact of 530 cancers would be greater than 9%. 

This point is germane, as the impact of radiogenic cancers on the Marshallese 

population was likely far greater than the NCI study predicted. 

Question 2. On Page 8 of your testimony, regarding ‘‘System 2,’’ you apparently 

calculated the $50 million annual cost for the RMI’s healthcare request by multiplying $300 per person per month, by 12 months, by the 14,000 persons enrolled 

in the Section 177 Healthcare Program. However, the committee’s understanding is 

that most of the Section 177 enrollees are not members of the 1958 population, 

which the Nuclear Claims tribunal considers the ‘‘affected’’ population. Is that correct? 

Answer. Many of the 177 enrollees are not members of the cohort of Marshallese 

living before 1958 in the Marshall Islands. However, living before 1958 in the Marshall Islands does not necessarily define whether or not their health was affected 

by the U.S. nuclear testing program. As mentioned in my written and oral testimony of July 19, 2005, the health consequences of the nuclear testing program include many areas of health which were not quantified by the NCI study. Many of 

the negative health effects of the nuclear weapons testing program were generated 

from disruption of land tenure systems, social structure, dietary structure, and lifestyle changes—which is a basis for having health monitoring and care. 

The Nuclear Claims tribunal definition of the ‘‘affected population’’ should be addressed by them. The knowledge and science of radiation and health has significantly evolved since 1986, as exemplified by the NCI report and BEIR VII report 

from the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. Policy, health programs, and research 

should adjust with the new information. 

Question 3. On page 7 of your testimony, regarding ‘‘System 1’’, you point out the 

need for a comprehensive cancer care system at an estimated annual cost of $5 million, and outer island screening and primary cost of $2.5 million? Are these estimates based on treatment for the 1958 ‘‘affected’’ population, and if so, how is this 

estimate reconciled with the $50 million estimate developed for System 2? 

Answer. System 1 estimates are based on several assumptions of the ‘‘affected’’ 

population: 

1. All Marshallese living in the RMI before 1958 have potential risk to develop radiogenic cancers from the U.S. Nuclear weapons testing program. These 

individuals should have access to primary, secondary, and tertiary cancer care 

at U.S. standards. 

2. All Marshallese who lived and ate food produced by nuclear contaminated 

environments after 1958 have a potential to develop radiogenic cancer. These 

individuals should have access to primary, secondary, and tertiary cancer care 

at U.S. standards. 

3. All Marshallese and Micronesian workers who participated in nuclear 

waste cleanup of Enewetak and Bikini atolls have the potential to develop 

radiogenic cancer. These individuals should have access to primary, secondary, 

and tertiary cancer care at U.S. standards. 

4. Radiogenic and non-radiogenic cancers cannot be differentiated in the 

Marshallese population. 

5. System 1 is designed only to take care of cancer. It does not deal with other 

radiogenic illnesses or health problems. 

76

* Table 7-2 and letters submitted by Judge Plasman have been retained in committee files. 

System 2 is a comprehensive health care system. It would be designed for all 

radiogenic illnesses including comprehensive cancer care for the people of the RMI 

and potential health consequences of nuclear testing (cultural and social disruptions 

for the cancers). This health care system would be able to deliver a U.S. level of 

health care. If system 2 is built there would be no need for system 1. If system 1 

is built, system 2 would still require development. 

Question 4. On page 8 you state, ‘‘Capital costs would be in the order of 6 million 

dollars’’ Alternatively, couldn’t it be more efficient to provide certain secondary and 

tertiary care at the U.S. Military healthcare facilities at Kwajelein and Hawaii? 

Answer. There are several key elements in designing an efficient health care system; Efficiency is often defined from a particular perspective. In this case one may 

take a U.S. of RMI point of view, or a point of view of how to deliver the best health 

care in a cost effective manner. 

As an example of U.S. perspective of efficient care, the Department of Energy through its subcontractors spent $1.1 million annually in medical care costs and another $800,000 annually in logistics cost for the last 50 years. These expenditures 

were for the people of Rongelap and Utirik who were exposed to the fallout of the 

Bravo 1954 hydrogen bomb detonation. Much of the care provided was for cancer. 

From an RMI perspective, after 50 years of DOE operations and close to 100 million dollars expended, there is no cancer screening or treatment infrastructure in 

the RMI that can be attributed to the DOE operation. The DOE utilized Kwajelein 

and Hawaii; therefore, the system was efficient for the DOE, however it was a tragedy for the RMI. $2 million annually would have gone a long way to build cancer 

care infrastructure in the RMI. There are many unanswered question regarding all 

the health consequences of the nuclear testing program in the RMI. 

Building the capacity of the RMI to care for the present and future effects of the 

U.S. Nuclear weapons testing program is the most efficient and cost effective use 

of the money. Kwajelein and Hawaii should be adjunctive health care sites, used 

in very specific and as needed situations. The focus of health care dollars should 

be in building the RMI infrastructure. 

RESPONSES OF JAMES PLASMAN TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BINGAMAN

Question 1. On page 8 of your testimony you state that the NCIs estimate of excess cancers, ‘‘presents a reasonable likelihood of harm to the entire Marshall Islands.’’ However, the NCI report states, ‘‘Higher excess cancer rates are expected 

in the populations exposed to the highest doses that lived in the northern atolls.’’ 

More specifically, NCI estimated the likelihood of excess cancers in the 1958 population at over 100 percent in Rongelap, 55 percent at Utrik, 11 percent at the six 

other northern atolls, and 0.6 percent in the rest of the Marshall Islands. Do you 

agree with the NCI that the risk of excess cancer is highest in the northern atolls 

and declines as you move south? 

Answer. As a general proposition, and based on our current understanding, I 

would agree that the risk of excess cancer is higher in the northern most atolls as 

compared to the southern most atolls of the Marshall Islands. This pattern of risk 

(assuming a linear relationship between dose and risk) is suggested independent of 

the NCI report, in external dose estimates by Sanford Cohen and Associates (SC&A) 

in a study commissioned by the Office of the Public Advocate of the Nuclear Claims 

Tribunal, ‘‘Radiation Exposures Associated with the U.S. Nuclear Testing Program 

for 21 Atolls/Islands in the Republic of the Marshall Islands’’ (see Table 7-2, attached).* 

However, I would also caution that there is the potential for risk to vary for atolls 

at the same latitude and that some northerly atolls probably exhibit lower risk than 

some to their south. For example, Wotho Atoll, (Latitude 10 degrees, 1 minute to 

10 degrees, 11 minutes) is estimated by SC&A to have an average per capita total 

exposure (for individuals present during the testing period to present) of 31.50 person-rems (derived from attached Table 7-2, by dividing final column, ‘‘Total Doses’’ 

by second column, ‘‘Population Size.’’) Kwajalein, to the south of Wotho (Latitude 

8 degrees, 48 minutes to 9 degrees, 22 minutes) is estimated by SC&A to have an 

average per capita total exposure (for individuals present during the testing period 

to present) of 40.92 person rems. This comparison is supported by the 1955 AEC 

Breslin-Cassidy report (Radioactive Debris from Operation Castle, Islands of the 

Mid-Pacific, Breslin, A.J.; Cassidy, M.E.; New York: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, New York Operations Office, Health and Safety Laboratory; NYO-4623; 1955) 

which showed external exposures from the CASTLE series for Wotho to be 784 

77

mrem, compared to 1,235 mrem for Kwajalein. Perhaps more striking, Lae Atoll 

(Latitude 8 degrees, 54 minutes to 9 degrees, 2 minutes) has a lower estimated average per capita total exposure (8.83 person-rem) than each of the dozen or so atolls 

south of it, including the southern most atoll of the Marshall Islands, Ebon (Latitude 4 degrees, 34 minutes to 4 degrees, 42 minutes) with an SC&A estimated average per capita total exposure of 17.71 person-rem. Breslin and Cassidy similarly report Ujae at 114 mrem compared to Ebon at 353 mrem. NCI identifies Wotho as 

a ‘‘northern atoll,’’ while it identifies Kwajalein as a ‘‘low exposure atoll.’’ Similarly, 

NCI identifies Lae as a ‘‘low exposure’’ atoll, while Ebon is identified as a ‘‘very low 

exposure atoll.’’

These groupings of atolls are on the basis of estimated exposures, which are based 

on very little direct data. The NCI acknowledges ‘‘Even though we made estimates 

for all inhabited atolls and all age groups, it is important to keep in mind that the 

dose estimates are uncertain, and in some cases, uncertain to a high degree.’’ (p. 

11.) 

Further, within an individual atoll, there could be considerable variation in dose. 

Breslin and Cassidy note differences in measurements of radiation of four to ten 

times within a single atoll (p. 9-10):

At Rongelap, approximately ninety miles from ground zero, a difference 

of an order of magnitude in gamma radiation was noted between two opposite ends of the atoll, a distance of about 20 miles. This evidence was substantiated by ABLE flights repeated on B+3 and B+18 during which measurements were made over several islands in each of eight atolls. Tenfold 

differences between island intensities were measured at Rongelap and fourfold differences at several other atolls. 

These gradients were not anticipated prior to BRAVO and scintameter 

operators had not been cautioned to identify the individual island surveyed 

within each atoll. 

To standardize subsequent aerial surveys, a specific island in each atoll 

was selected for measurement. All radiation reports beginning with 

ROMEO are in reference to the same island in each atoll.

The report does not indicate if the specific island selected in each atoll was at the 

high end or low end of spectrum of radiation intensity for that atoll. Consequently, 

additional uncertainty is introduced into the dose estimates, as the Breslin-Cassidy 

report is one of the sources of information utilized to derive these NCI estimates 

(NCI, p. 7). NCI acknowledges (p. 9-10) ‘‘the assignment of atolls to the two groups 

most distant from the Bikini test site is uncertain, as are the estimated doses at 

any individual atoll.’’

Because differences in weather patterns, nature of detonation (over land/water, 

height), yield and other variables can affect the pattern of fallout deposition significantly, a gradient based on north south latitude or based upon distance from the 

test site provides only a crude approximation of the relative excess risk of cancer 

resulting from radiation exposure from the tests. 

In any case, based on the precedent set by the Downwinders Program under the 

Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, the Tribunal generally utilizes a presumption of causation approach to compensation, which does not incorporate the relative 

level of risk based upon highly uncertain dose estimates. 

Question 2. Article IV of the Section 177 Agreement states that ‘‘the Claims Tribunal shall be independent of the Legislative and Executive powers of the Government of the Marshall Islands.’’ Nevertheless, the RMI Legislature passed several 

laws and resolutions including Resolution 151 and P.L. 1995-141 that had an impact 

on the Tribunal’s processes and decisions. Do you believe that passage of these laws 

and resolutions was consistent with Article N of the 177 Agreement? 

Did any members of the Tribunal or its staff testify against, or for, passage of 

these or other laws and resolutions that affected the Tribunal’s independence? 

Answer. In January 2003, former U.S. Attorney General Dick Thornburgh released a report commissioned by the RMI government entitled ‘‘The Nuclear Claims 

Tribunal of the Republic of the Marshall Islands: An Independent Examination of 

its Decision-making Processes.’’ That report concluded ‘‘The Tribunal’s Independence 

Has Not Been Compromised.’’ Neither Resolution 151 nor P.L. 1995-141 had an impact on the Tribunal’s processes and decisions. 

Resolution 151. This resolution, ‘‘To declare formally that the Republic does not 

accept as valid or accurate the findings of the Nationwide Radiological Study as contained in the study’s Summary Report presented to the President and the Cabinet 

in December 1994,’’ was adopted in 1995. Funding for this study was made available 

under the Section 177 Agreement, Article II, Section 1(e), which provided money for 

‘‘medical surveillance and radiological monitoring activities.’’ The results of ‘‘such 

78

medical surveillance and radiological monitoring activities shall be filed with the 

Claims Tribunal.’’ The Summary Report was presented to the Tribunal on December 

1, 1994. Furthermore, the data developed by the Study was utilized by experts for 

both claimants and the Defender of the Fund in the presentation of claims before 

the Tribunal. The conclusions of the Tribunal with regard to radiological conditions 

in the subject claims are based on the facts and law established in the case at issue, 

as documented in the Tribunal’s decisions. The Tribunal’s decisions are not inconsistent with the levels of Cesium found by the Nationwide Radiological Study. The 

Tribunal was under no obligation to accept or reject the findings of the study in its 

adjudications, either before or after the passage of the resolution. 

While this resolution had no effect on the Tribunal’s independence, no member 

of the Tribunal testified either for or against this resolution. By a memorandum 

dated 22 September 1995, the Chairman of the Nitijela Committee on Health, Education and Social Affairs requested the Chairman of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

to appear before the committee at a public hearing that day to testify on Resolutions 

No. 151 and 156. During the hearing, Tribunal Chairman Oscar deBrum declined 

to comment on Resolution No. 151. However, he did read for the record a prepared 

statement in Marshallese opposing Resolution No. 156, which requested the Tribunal to issue new regulations to include all types of cancer as presumed medical 

conditions. 

At the same hearing, Public Advocate Bill Graham was asked for his comments 

on Resolution No. 151. He testified in support of certain ‘‘Whereas’’ statements in 

the resolution, including those relating to the focus of the study on the present extent of radiological contamination in the Marshall Islands and of the dose reconstruction on the period from 1959 until the present rather than during the 1946-

58 period of testing. In part, his comments were based on a report on the Nationwide Radiological Study (NWRS) prepared by an independent radiation protection 

consultant retained by his office. Graham also offered his own perspective that the 

hundreds of thyroid nodules diagnosed by the Nationwide Thyroid Study carried out 

in 1993 and 1994 appeared to contradict the statement in the NWRS Summary Report that ‘‘Radiation illness is actually very rare, even among Marshallese.’’

P.L. 95-141. The Thornburgh report documents the enactment of P.L. 94-78 in 

1994 by the Nitijela. This law extended the presumption of causation to those born 

after the period of nuclear testing. The Chairman and officers of the Tribunal testified in opposition to the bill in more than one hearing, arguing there was insufficient scientific basis to extend the presumption in the manner proposed. When P.L. 

94-78 became law, the Tribunal adopted regulations reducing the award to these 

‘‘underage’’ claimants by fifty percent, reflecting the reduced probability that the 

conditions of such claimants were caused by the testing program. Subsequently, P.L. 

95-141 was adopted by the Nitijela, with no public hearing and no opportunity for 

Tribunal testimony, and amended the Nuclear Claims Tribunal Act to provide at 

Section 23(19):

For any eligible claimant who was physically present (including in utero) 

in the Marshall Islands at any time after June 30, 1946, or who is the biological child of a mother who was physically present (including in utero) in 

the Marshall Islands at any time after June 30, 1946, a causal relationship 

between a presumed medical condition and the United States Nuclear Testing Program will be presumed, and the presumed medical condition shall 

be treated equally in all respects, including compensation.

Because of Tribunal concerns with the new law, as noted in the 1995 Annual Report to the Nitijela, no action was taken to implement the law and the fifty percent 

reduction of awards to ‘‘underage’’ awardees remained in place. Consequently, it 

cannot be said that the passage of the law impacted Tribunal processes and decisions. Prior to the passage of P.L. 95-141, the Tribunal’s policy and process was to 

reduce awards to underage claimants. After the passage of the law, the Tribunal’s 

policy and process remained unchanged. 

Question 3. The Tribunal’s 1991 Annual Report states: ‘‘1990 proved to be a difficult year, with much of the Tribunal’s energies expended on dealing with the consequences of several disputes concerning its independence.’’ Page 26 of the 

Thornburgh report notes that this initial period of conflict between the Tribunal and 

the Nitijela resulted in the resignations of Chairman Piggott and Tribunal Member 

Paul Devens. Please provide copies of their resignation letters or other records that 

would help the Committee understand the reasons for their resignations. 

Answer. The resignation letters of Tribunal Member Paul Devens are provided. 

The resignation letter of Chairman Piggott is not in the files of the Tribunal. Additionally, copies of the legislation referenced in the NCT 1991 Annual Report 

79

(Nitijela Bills 108, 114 and 132, and Resolutions 61 and 71) are attached and a brief 

legislative history of each is provided. 

Bill No. 108. This bill was prefiled on December 29, 1989. It was introduced, 

passed on first reading and referred to the Committee on Judiciary and Governmental Relations on January 3, 1990. The Tribunal submitted a written statement 

on this and Bill No. 114 asserting the principle of Tribunal independence. The committee held a hearing on January 4; and on January 5 issued Standing Committee 

Report No. 133 recommending that the bill be amended. The bill came up for second 

reading on January 12 and was recommitted to the committee, which was the last 

action on record. 

Bill No. 114. This bill was prefiled on January 5, 1990. It was introduced, passed 

on first reading and referred to the Committee on Judiciary and Governmental Relations on January 8. A committee report was issued and the bill came up for second 

reading on January 12 at which time it was ‘‘filed,’’ the last action on record. 

Bill No. 132. This bill was prefiled on February 1. It was introduced, passed on 

first reading and referred to the Committee on Judiciary and Governmental Relations on February 2. That was the last action on record. 

Resolution No. 61. This resolution was prefiled on December 29, 1989. It was introduced and assigned to the Committee on Judiciary and Governmental Relations 

on January 4. A public hearing was conducted on January 10 and on January 19 

the Nitijela accepted Standing Committee report #145 and adopted the Resolution 

on second and final reading. 

Resolution No. 71. This resolution was prefiled on January 17, 1990. It was introduced, passed on first reading and assigned to the Committee on Judiciary and Governmental Relations on January 18. On that same date, the procedural rules were 

suspended and the Resolution was adopted on second and final reading. 

Question 4. On page seven of your testimony you state that ’’. . . there is simply 

insufficient information to recreate individual doses for people in the Marshall Islands for the purposes of a probability of causation analysis. However, did the Tribunal consider estimating doses on a regional basis, as the NCI has done? 

Answer. The Tribunal has not considered estimating doses on a regional basis, as 

the NCI has done, but has received atoll-by-atoll dose estimates from SC&A. As presented in written and oral testimony to this Committee, the Tribunal adopted a presumption of causation for the entire Marshall Islands, following the precedent set 

by RECA for Downwinders. Just as there are variations in exposure for claimants 

in the Marshall Islands, there are likewise such variations in the Downwinder population. These ‘‘gradients’’ for Downwinders are revealed in a chart contained in an 

article in the 1990 issue of the Journal of Health Physics. (Anspaugh, et al., ‘‘Historical Estimates of External y Exposure and Collective y Exposure from Testing at 

the Nevada Test Site. II Test Series After HARDTACK II, 1958, and Summary,’’ 

Health Physics Vol. 59, No. 5, pp. 525-532, 1990 See attachment.) It shows a wide 

variation of external exposures for the Downwind population and groups them by 

the range of exposure. No adjustment is made to payments or to eligibility for an 

award based upon the level of exposure for Downwinders. Nor has the Tribunal considered such for claimants in the Marshall Islands. 

Question 5. Please comment on the fact that the more rigorous 2001 study of thyroid nodules was unable to replicate the findings of the 1987 Hamilton study, and 

what impact the 2001 study had on Tribunal policies and decisions? 

Answer. A report on the findings of the Marshall Islands Nationwide Thyroid 

Study, Thyroid Disease in the Marshall Islands: Finding from 10 Years of Study by 

Takahashi, et al., was published in 2001. It reported the findings ‘‘do not provide 

support for an inverse relationship of the prevalence of benign nodules with increasing distance from Bikini, as found by Hamilton, et al. (1987).’’ This conclusion must 

be taken in the context of the position of this report in the development of knowledge about the effects of radiation on the thyroid gland and the self-acknowledged 

shortcomings of the report itself. As noted in the title, this report covers ten years 

of study by the Marshall Islands Nationwide Thyroid Disease Study. A previous report of the study in 1997 found ‘‘The results of statistical analysis and hypothesis 

testing for the population in this study are suggestive of relationships similar to 

that observed by Hamilton et al. (1987)’’ (p. 212) and suggested the desirability of 

further study (Takahashi, T., et al.; ‘‘An Investigation into the Prevalence of Thyroid 

Disease on Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands,’’ Health Phys. 73:199-213; 1997.) 

The 2001 Takahashi report, although not finding support for the Hamilton study, 

notes, ‘‘More than any other component of the Nationwide Thyroid Disease Study, 

the dosimetry requires improvement’’ (p. 87.) In the final chapter, ‘‘Summary Statement and Planned Future Investigation,’’ the report specifically notes the need for, 

and intention to devote, further attention to dose reconstruction issues. Because dosimetry and resultant dose reconstructions are at the heart of the report’s findings 

80

on the Hamilton thesis, these findings deserve to be subjected to continued review. 

The findings of the 2001 report must be regarded as a step in the process of understanding the effects of radiation on the thyroid in the Marshall Islands, not the final 

statement. 

Indeed, the 2004 NCI report provides considerable evidence that more has been 

learned. The 2001 Takahashi report states: ‘‘Therefore, the lack of a dose-response 

relationship without Utrik seems to suggest there is no evidence that thyroid cancer 

on other atolls is due to radiation exposure.’’ (p. 111) Three years later, the NCI 

report estimates that there would be 173 radiation caused thyroid cancers outside 

of Rongelap, Alinginae, and Utrik. Of these, 62% would have occurred by the end 

of 2003 and fifteen are estimated to occur in the atolls the NCI characterizes as 

‘‘very low exposure atolls.’’ This difference deserves further attention. The 2001 

Takahashi report suggests several areas where the study could be improved to 

‘‘draw a more conclusive answer to the question of whether radiation-induced thyroid cancers have occurred on other atolls.’’ (p. 111) These areas of concern presumably would also apply to the question of thyroid nodules. 

The finding that there seems to be no correlation between distance from Bikini 

and incidence of thyroid nodules seems to be taken by the 2001 report authors as 

evidence that thyroid nodules are not due to radiation. However, the reverse of this 

proposition could also be true, that the levels of exposure from radioactive iodine 

are more uniform in the Marshall Islands than we currently understand them to 

be. There is ample evidence that exposure to radiation can cause thyroid nodules. 

While the existing levels of cesium are indicative of past levels of cesium fall-out, 

they are not necessarily indicative of radioactive iodine deposition. The patterns of 

radioactive iodine fallout from the Nevada Test Site in the U.S., as revealed by the 

NCI report published in 1997, suggest that this is a possibility that cannot be dismissed out of hand, although it is not consistent with our current understanding 

of exposures in the Marshall Islands. 

The 1997 report of the nationwide thyroid study suggested a possible link between 

diet and thyroid nodules: ‘‘Either iodine deficiency or excess might be responsible 

for unusual thyroid responses in island inhabitants.’’ (p. 212.) However, the 2001 

report found ‘‘there was no difference in the frequency of iodine deficiency between 

females with and without palpable nodules.’’ (p. 68) Other researchers (SC&A, ‘‘Reassessment of Acute Radiation Doses Associated with BRAVO Fallout at Utrik 

Atoll’’) have suggested an iodine deficient diet could affect the thyroid in two ways: 

1) by stimulating the production of excess thyroid stimulating hormone, it enhances 

the risk of thyroid disease and 2) by causing a greater intake of radioactive iodine 

by the thyroid, increasing the concentration of the radio-iodines in the thyroid and 

thus increasing the risk of thyroid cancer and other disease. 

As noted above, the 2001 report is only the most recent report of the Nationwide 

Thyroid Disease Study. This study originated in the early 1990’s and had an immediate impact on Tribunal policies and decisions. Of concern to the Tribunal was that 

the ‘‘more rigorous’’ diagnostic methods utilized by the study, primarily the use of 

ultrasound, would detect small, clinically insignificant ‘‘occult’’ nodules. The relationship observed by Hamilton between thyroid nodules and distance from Bikini (as 

a proxy for exposure) was for non-occult, ‘‘palpable’’ nodules. Indeed the ultrasound 

used by the Nationwide Thyroid Disease Study could detect nodules as small as 2 

mm, while it has been estimated that only about 50% of 1.0 cm nodules could be 

palpated and 80-90% of 1.5 cm nodules could be palpated. These occult nodules are 

relatively common, being found in as much as 40-50% of the general population unexposed to radiation, the prevalence increasing with age. The Tribunal, having recognized benign thyroid nodules as a compensable medical condition (at the lowest 

award level of $12,500), was faced with the question of how to address the additional benign thyroid nodules, which would be detected by ultrasound. At issue was 

whether the relationship to radiation accepted by the Tribunal for ‘‘palpable’’ nodules applied to these ‘‘occult’’ nodules and whether, because of their size and general 

insignificance in the clinical sense, such nodules should even be considered for compensation. The Tribunal resolved these questions by limiting compensation to ‘‘palpable’’ nodules. 

The Nationwide Thyroid Disease Study, and the 2001 report on the progress of 

the study, have a valuable place in the development of knowledge about radiation 

and thyroid disease in the Marshall Islands. The report demonstrates the tremendous complexity and technical nature of the issues involved in the continuing development of our understanding of radiation effects on human health. However, the 

2001 report is not the final word on these issues. The report itself acknowledges the 

need for additional study and its shortcomings. The 2004 NCI report shows the 

state of knowledge in this area is continuing to evolve. 

81

RESPONSES OF GERALD ZACKIOS TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR AKAKA

Question 1. You cite the NCI report at several points in your testimony as supporting the Marshall Islands’ contention that the effects of the testing program are 

more widespread than had been previously believed. That report also found that the 

likelihood of excess cancer was concentrated in the north. Specifically, that 87 percent of the excess cancers are expected to occur in 16percent of the population that 

was living on the eight northern-most atolls in 1958. 

Does the RMI accept the NCI finding that there is a greater likelihood of excess 

cancers in the north—and if so—is the RMI prepared to work with the U.S. on an 

approach to healthcare that would take into account the fact that the health effects 

of the tests are concentrated in the north? 

Answer. There is no question that the atolls in the northern part of the Marshall 

Islands received higher doses of radiation from the U.S. nuclear weapons tests than 

atolls further south. What is dramatic about the findings of the NCI study, however, 

is the acknowledgment of cancers beyond the 4 atolls. Article VIII of the Section 177 

Agreement refers to the 1978 Northern Marshall Islands Radiological Survey as ‘‘the 

best effort’’ of the U.S. to evaluate radiological conditions and says that the survey 

can be used for ‘‘estimating radiation-related health consequences of residing in the 

Northern Marshall Islands after 1978.’’ A bilingual book published by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in 1982 (The Meaning of Radiation for Those Atolls in 

the Northern Part of the Marshall Islands That Were Surveyed in 1978) ‘‘explains 

the results of the 1978 measurements’’ for 12 atolls and gives scientists’ estimates 

as to the number of people at each of those atolls who ‘‘may die in the future from 

cancers caused by radiation received in the coming 30 years from the atomic bomb 

tests.’’ By adding up the high-end fractional potential for each of those 12 atolls, a 

total high-end estimate of 2.06 such ‘‘future’’ cancers was derived. 

The NCI prediction of cancers beyond the 4 atolls represents a changed circumstance. Table 3 of the NCI report indicates that most (297) of the 532 estimated 

excess cancers will occur in populations other than those who were on Rongelap, 

Ailinginae or Utrik in 1954. 

We believe that assigning dose and health consequences on a north-south gradient 

oversimplifies an extremely complex issue because this distinction artificially confines the radiation burden to specific space and time parameters. Most Marshallese 

retain land rights on several atolls in the Marshall Islands and it is customary for 

people to move from island to island depending on family and cultivation needs. 

People moved throughout the Marshall Islands during and after the testing period. 

Assigning a north-south distinction at a given point in time (1954 for the Bravo test 

or 1958 as the end of the testing period) is inappropriate because it does not include 

individual residential histories. Similarly, we believe that U.S. policy should not artificially limit the time of exposure. For example, current U.S. programs to address 

the needs of communities affected by the testing program are limited to exposures 

between the years of 1946-1958. This qualification of time fails to consider that populations were exposed to radiation released by those tests in subsequent years. Radiation contamination continues for thousands of years; human exposure to radiation did not take place just during the detonations. For instance, radiation produced by the testing between 1946-1958 exposed Marshallese laborers employed by 

the U.S. Department of Energy to clean-up Bikini and Enewetak. However, because 

their exposure was environmental exposure rather than exposure to fallout these 

workers are not eligible for any U.S.-provided healthcare monitoring or care programs. We also have people who were born on or prematurely resettled on Rongelap 

and Bikini atolls—populations that were exposed to dangerous levels of residual 

contamination. Yet because their exposure occurred after the 1958 cut-off period 

they are not eligible for the healthcare programs they need, or able to apply for a 

claim with the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. 

We believe that the NCI report justifies the urgent establishment of a medical 

monitoring program to detect cancers at an early stage so there will be hope of 

treating the illnesses, and reducing patient suffering. Any medical monitoring program should consider that exposures to significant radiation took place beyond the 

confines of the 4 atoll and 1946-1958 boundaries. It is also important to take into 

consideration the recent National Academy of Science Biological Effects of Ionizing 

Radiation (BEIR) VII report concluding that the lowest doses of radiation exposure 

can cause health risks. With these points in mind, we are prepared to work with 

the U.S. to formulate a program to address the health consequences of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program taking into account the findings of the NCI Study 

and the NAS BEIR VII report. 

Question 2. In its views, the Administration expressed its concern regarding overenrollment in the 177 program. I understand that exposure to radiation is not a conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:44 Nov 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 R:\DOCS\24-536 SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
82

sideration for enrollment in the 177 Programs. Is that correct, and is over-enrollment a concern shared by the RMI? 

Answer. The Section 177 Agreement provides that the healthcare program be ‘‘related to the consequences of the Nuclear Testing Program and contemplated in 

United States Public Law 95-134 and 96-205.’’ Those laws specifically identified the 

four atolls as well as others affected by the testing program as the beneficiaries for 

these programs. 

Approximately two years prior to the effective date of the Compact, the U.S. Government implemented what is referred to as the Burton Health Care Bill where a 

U.S. contractor under the supervision of the U.S. Government set up a healthcare 

program which allowed each of the four atolls to make their own determinations as 

to eligibility for healthcare under the program. The U.S. Government did not impose 

any requirement that the individuals enrolled in the program demonstrate that they 

were ‘‘exposed’’ to radiation, nor would such a requirement have been realistic as 

a prerequisite to delivering healthcare. The atoll leadership concludes that the nuclear weapons testing program created a web of health-related issues for the community including, but not limited to, those resulting directly from radiation exposure. When the Compact came into effect, Section 177 healthcare funding was administered on the same basis. That is, the RMI Government allowed each of the four 

atolls to identify members of their community for eligibility in the program under 

the management of a reputable medical provider. This is consistent with prior legislation that remains in effect and identifies the four atolls as communities that were 

‘‘affected by the Nuclear Testing Program.’’

Specific radiation doses (which the RMI lacks the capacity to obtain) were never 

a basis for enrollment in the Section 177 healthcare program, nor was it required 

in the law. The RMI Government is concerned about the numbers currently enrolled 

in the program, but believes that this issue needs to be resolved in the context of 

addressing the overall health consequences of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program. 

It is also important to note that there are both direct and indirect healthcare consequences of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program as Dr. Neal Palafox (from 

the University of Hawai’i, John Burns School of Medicine) testified. The detonations 

themselves exposed many people to radioactive fallout from the tests, but this is not 

the only way that people are exposed to radiation or experience healthcare issues 

related to the testing program. The 4 atolls communities have also been resettled 

on atolls with residual radiation from the testing program. The BEIR Committee 

of the National Academy of Sciences now states that even the lowest levels of radiation exposure may cause adverse health conditions. Beyond the exposure during 

the testing program and during resettlement, there are numerous indirect consequences of the testing program that affect the health and well-being of the people 

of the 4 atolls. For example, communities that cannot live on their home islands because of lingering contamination do not have the same rights to cultivate resources 

on other peoples’ land where they are forced to live. This causes dietary changes 

and a reduction in the consumption of local foods, and an increase in imported foods 

that are higher in fat and salt. Dr. Palafox also testified about the psychological effects of living in an environment with lingering radiation—a poison that people fear 

because they know that it causes illness, but one that they cannot see and remain 

constantly afraid of. These psychological burdens have healthcare consequences as 

documented in the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

The RMI government wants the 177 HCP to be an effective program that can 

meet the needs of its target population. If, as the 177 Agreement states, the purpose 

of the program is to provide healthcare for needs related to the testing program, 

then the program must acknowledge the full range of healthcare needs related to 

the testing program, not just those that derive from direct exposure to radioactive 

fallout. Taking into account the findings of the NCI study and the NAS BEIR VII 

report, there is an urgent need to expand and restructure the 177 healthcare program or implement a healthcare program that will address the healthcare needs of 

all populations who have been directly and indirectly affected by the U.S. nuclear 

weapons testing program. 

Question 3. In your testimony you request $45 million per year for 50 years ‘‘to 

deliver healthcare for patients exposed to radiation.’’ How does the RMI define ‘‘patients exposed to radiation’’—is this the 1958 population of the RMI of 13,940 assumed by the Tribunal as eligible for compensation? 

The RMI government would like to work with the U.S. government to define the 

parameters of the populations exposed to radiation in the Marshall Islands. We believe that the following populations have healthcare needs related to the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program:

83

* The file has been retained in committee files. 

• the people who resided on Rongelap, Rongerik, Ailinginae and Utrik on March 

1, 1954; • the people of other atolls exposed to significant levels of radiation on March 1, 

1954, such as the people of Ailuk, Likiep, Kwajalein and other mid-range atolls; • the people exposed to significant levels of radiation from the cumulative impacts 

of all 67 tests, and not just the one test on March 1, 1954; • the people who resettled on Rongelap and Bikini when those atolls still contained high levels of radiation—both of these communities had to relocate a second time from their home islands because they ingested dangerous amounts of 

radiation from their environments. The Rongelap population that resettled its 

home islands prematurely is not the same population that was exposed to the 

Bravo test although there is some overlap; • the ‘‘control’’ group that was placed in Project 4.1 to understand the effects of 

radiation on human beings (including those acknowledged by the White House 

Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments to have taken part in 

U.S. government-sponsored human radiation experiments); • referrals from the Nuclear Claims Tribunal with radiogenic illnesses; • the populations of Enewetak and Utrik who need assurances their health is not 

compromised by their decision to return to previously contaminated locations, 

and particularly the people who live adjacent to the Runit Dome on Enewetak; • workers employed by DOE to assist with the clean-up of Bikini and Enewetak 

after the testing activities commenced; • Marshallese working for DOE who collected soil, plant and animal samples from 

highly contaminated areas for U.S. government researchers; • special needs situations that arise for individuals, such as a Reverend and his 

wife who are from Arno but resettled with the Rongelapese and were exposed 

to high levels of radiation, or the families that accompanied their spouses to Bikini and Enewetak during the clean-up effort on those atolls (in both of these 

examples people died from cancer but were ineligible to participate in 

healthcare programs for people affected by the testing program because they are 

not from the 4 atolls);

Question 4. Would you please provide the RMI’s 1958 population, broken down by 

atoll. 

Answer. I believe the RMI’s total population for 1958 was 14,163. Please see the 

attached PDF file and specifically the 1958 atoll by atoll numbers in Table 3 on 

page 4.* 

Again, the 1958 population is a starting point for considering which people were 

exposed to radiation from the testing program, but in the years after 1958 many 

people were exposed to radiation released by those tests. 

Question 5. You cite the report by Richard Thornburgh in support of the RMI position that the 177 settlement is ‘‘manifestly inadequate.’’ However, that report 

states, on page 66, ‘‘we are not qualified to review or critique the appraisal methods 

used by the Hallstrom Group or Lesher, or the results of their analysis . . .’’ In addition, the Thornburg report did not review or critique the critical issue of how the 

Tribunal determined the extent of the area ‘‘affected’’ by the tests. How do you believe these omissions affect the conclusions of the Thornburgh report? 

Answer. Former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh was commissioned to 

provide an independent assessment of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal, in order to ascertain whether the Tribunal’s procedures and decisions were fair, reasonable, and 

consistent with its mandate under the Section 177 Agreement. In this respect, Attorney General Thornburgh concluded at page 77 of his Report: ‘‘However, based on 

our examination and assessment, it is our view that the personal injury and property damage awards rendered thus far by the Nuclear Claims Tribunal were the result of reasonable, fair and orderly processes that are entitled to respect.’’

With regard to the quote from the Report pertaining to appraisal methodologies, 

the entire sentence reads: ‘‘We are not qualified to review or critique the appraisal 

methods used by the Hallstrom Group or Lescher, or the results of their analysis, 

but observe that their joint report appears to be the kind of thorough and professional work product we would expect from well-qualified experts asked to calculate 

damages in a matter of significant importance.’’

In connection with the appraisal methodology issue, we understand that the Defender of the Fund from the Nuclear Claims Tribunal has provided the Committee 

with a response to the report of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) explaining how experts who have appeared before the Tribunal conducted their analysis 

and responding to some of the statements made by the CRS on this issue. Under 

84

the circumstances, we believe that it would be inappropriate for the RMI Government to express any views of its own, as we believe that the record speaks for itself. 

The Thornburgh Report takes into account the Tribunal’s presumption of exposure 

throughout the Marshall Islands with respect to its personal injury compensation 

program. It also notes that in addition to seeking expert advice and examining radiological studies, ‘‘[t]he Tribunal also looked to other countries compensation systems 

that might be appropriate to the Marshall Islands (p. 28).’’ This process led the Tribunal to consider and pattern its program after the regime established by the U.S. 

Congress in the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, also known as the 

‘‘Downwinders’ Act.’’ In comparing the affected areas, the Thornburgh Report notes 

in footnote number 109, ‘‘[t]he ‘affected area’ in the Marshall islands was much larger than that defined in the Downwinders’ Act. Moreover, the total yield of the tests 

in the Marshall Islands (108,496 kilotons) was approximately 99 times that of the 

atmospheric tests in Nevada (1,096 kilotons).’’ Although the Thornburgh report does 

not specifically critique this issue in great detail, the RMI believes that the Report’s 

conclusion that awards made by the Tribunal ‘‘were the result of reasonable, fair 

and orderly processes that are entitled to respect’’ supports the validity of the Tribunal’s program for personal injury awards and the presumption of exposure throughout the Marshall Islands. 

(85)

APPENDIX II 

Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

July 19, 2005. 

Hon. PETE V. DOMENICI, 

Chairman, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, 364 Dirksen, Washington, DC. 

DEAR CHAIRMAN DOMENICI: Thank you for convening the hearing today about 

needs related to the U.S. nuclear weapons testing in the Republic of the Marshall 

Islands (RMI). Although we are not testifying today, we will be in attendance at the 

hearing and want to thank you in advance for your leadership in supporting a discussion of needs beyond the 4 atolls. 

We are greatly appreciative that your Committee requested the National Cancer 

Institute report regarding cancer incidence in the RMI related to the U.S. nuclear 

weapons testing program. We are concerned that our populations—as well as other 

atolls beyond the 4 atolls that are not present today—are in need of medical monitoring to detect cancers and other radiation-related illnesses that the NCI tells us 

to expect. Medical monitoring is critical so our people can identify their illnesses before they become untreatable. Most of our people live on the outer islands where 

they do not have access to medical monitoring and treatment. 

Our communities also have property claims pending with the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. We are concerned that if the Tribunal makes awards there are insufficient 

funds to pay for our claims. We hope that if Congress identifies a mechanism to address the property claims for the 4 atoll communities that have already received 

awards that Congress will extend these same rights to other atolls in the RMI. 

We have many documents in our possession about radiation exposure to our atolls 

and other atolls outside of the 4 atolls that we would be happy to share with you 

if you are interested. The RMI national governnment’s Changed Circumstances Petition includes a significant discussion of radiation exposure to Kwajalein and Ailuk 

atolls. Minister Gerald M. Zackios’ statement to you today also acknowledges the 

needs of the atolls beyond the 4 atolls, particularly with regard to healthcare. We 

look forward to continuing to work with the RMI national government and with 

your Committee to address these needs and to provide appropriate services to the 

populations beyond the 4 atolls that we now know are exposed to radiation levels 

sufficient to warrant attention.

Alvin T. Jacklick, Minister of Health (Jaluit Atoll); Donald F. Chapel, 

Minister of Justice (Likiep Atoll); Michael Kabus, Senato (Kwajalei 

Atoll); Christopher Loeak, Senator (Ailinglaplap Atoll); and Maynard 

Alfred, Senator(Ailuk Atoll) 

EMBASSY OF THE

FEDEERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA, 

Washington, DC, August 10, 2005. 

Hon. PETE V. DOMENICI, 

Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy and Resources, SH-328 Hart Senate Office 

Building, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In light of the Committee’s hearing focusing on the inadequacies of the United States Government’s response to the nuclear legacy in the 

Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Government of the Federated States of 

Micronesia (FSM) wishes to call attention to the residual effects of the nuclear testing on our islands and people as well. Evidence disclosed since 1986 reveals that 

radioactive fallout from the testing also reached most, if not all of the FSM. In addition, many FSM citizens were recruited to assist in the cleanup efforts on the Bikini 

and Enewetak atolls. Many of them later have developed cancer. 

86

A recent study published by the National Academy of Sciences confirmed that the 

effects of prolonged exposure to relatively low-level amounts of radiation are more 

severe than was generally believed at the time of the original Compact negotiations. 

New research has shown that with exposure to as little as 0.1 sieverts of radiation, 

the rough equivalent of 10 CT scans, one out of a hundred people will likely develop 

some form of cancer. To this day, the level of radiation in the RMI and FSM is exponentially greater than this baseline cancer-causing amount. Such recent findings 

underscore our concern that the harmful effects of the nuclear testing program were 

not confined to the RMI. 

In Section 177(a) of the Compact of Free Association the Government of the 

United States ‘‘accepts the responsibility for compensation owing’’ to citizens of the 

FSM as well as to those of the RMI and Palau for damage or injury resulting from 

the nuclear testing program. This responsibility was not changed or diminished by 

the recent Compact amendments. Lacking adequate information, the FSM has not 

previously sought to assert a claim under Section 177 on behalf of its citizens. 

At this time we seek only to initiate a dialogue with the United States Government to begin addressing our concerns. We believe that through such a constructive 

process the necessary channels can be opened to move toward resolving this matter 

of growing urgency. 

Mr. Chairman, we extend our thanks to you and to the Committee Members for 

the recent hearing on this grave issue. We respectfully request that this letter be 

included in the hearing Record. 

Sincerely yours, 

JAMES A. NAICH, 

Charge d’Affaires, ad interim. 

STATEMENT OF U. HANS BEHLING, PH.D., MPH, SENIOR HEALTH PHYSICIST,

S. COHEN & ASSOCIATES

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The enclosed response addresses specific statements presented by Steven L. 

Simon, PhD, in oral and written testimony to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Hearing on July 19, 2005. 

Response to Dr. Simon’s Testimony to the Senate Energy and Natural

Resources Committee 

For ease of verification, each statement made by Dr. Simon is first identified by 

page and quoted then followed by a response, as presented in the written testimony 

below. 

Statement #1 (page 3): 

The primary purpose of my testimony is to provide this committee with accurate 

and unbiased scientific and technical information related to the effects of nuclear 

testing in the Marshall Islands. My purpose does not include taking a side in the 

discussion for the need or justification for additional compensation. [Emphasis 

added.] 

Response to Statement #1. 

Although scientists are expected to be objective, we scientists are also mere humans and subject to the same emotional influences as others. Thus, the degree to 

which Dr. Simon can truly render unbiased scientific and technical information pertaining to issues addressed in the Changed Circumstance Petition must be viewed 

in context with Dr. Simon’s personal feelings as openly acknowledged in the following statements contained in page 3-4 of his testimony: 

Despite my gratification at seeing the recognition of the NWRS data, I find it disconcerting that more than 10 years after the study was completed, the RMI Government has not publicly acknowledged it or its findings. This curious situation stems 

back to events in early 1995 following the completion of the NWRS. After the study 

report was delivered to the NCT, the Nitijela (parliament) of the Marshall Islands 

invited me to present the findings to them while they were in session, but upon arriving at their chambers on more than one occasion, they never actually allowed me 

to make the presentation. Near to that time, Mr. Bill Graham of the Nuclear Claims 

Tribunal provided in person oral testimony to the Nitijela to discredit the study. 

Whether that testimony was a legitimate undertaking for an official of the NCT 

seems relevant to this discussion, though it is of little personal concern to me at 

this late date. Following Mr. Graham ’s testimony, the Nitijela enacted a resolution 

87

to formally reject the findings of the NWRS. Neither the Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

website nor the RMI Embassy website acknowledges the study or has made its findings available. [Emphasis added.] 

Statement #2 (page 3 as already quoted above and repeated below): 

. . . the RMI Government has not publicly acknowledged it [i.e., the NWRS data] 

or its findings. 

Response to Statement #2. 

Between 1999 and 2002, Dr. John Mauro and I served as principal investigators 

to the Local Governments of Enewetak, Bikini, Rongelap, and Utrik Atolls, as well 

as the Nuclear Claims Tribunal’s Public Advocate in behalf of all other atolls. In 

total, five separate reports were issued to the Nuclear Claims Tribunal, which assessed current-day radiological conditions and remediation strategies (Mauro, 

Behling and Anigstein 1999a; Mauro, Behling and Anigstein 1999b; Mauro and 

Behling 2000; Mauro and Behling 2002a; Mauro and Behling 2002b). The contents 

of these reports were also presented in oral testimonies to the Nuclear Claims Tribunal and are part of the public record. Of relevance here is the fact that each of 

these reports made extensive use of and fully acknowledged the scientific contribution of Dr. Simon’s Nationwide Radiological Study (NWRS). For example, the following acknowledgement appears in Mauro and Behling (1999a): 

Finally, this . . . [report] . . . would not have been possible without the vast 

amount of radiological data, data analyses, and reports prepared over the years by 

Dr. William Robison and his associates at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and Dr. 

Steven Simon and the researchers of the RMI Nationwide Radiological Study. [Emphasis added.] 

Statement(s) #3 (pages 5-7) 

One of our areas of emphasis was measurement of Cesium-137 (Cs-137) in the terrestrial environment, e.g. soil, fruits, etc. Cs-137 has been measured worldwide as 

a marker of fallout contamination . . . 

. . . At this point, I would now like to refer to Fig. 1 which presents the measurements of Cs-137 in soil from the NWRS, ordered from left to right by the highest 

observed value at each atoll. 

Response to Statement #3. 

By means of these statements, Dr. Simon implies that the NWRS Cs-137 study 

data obtained in the 1990s (or 40 to 50 years after the 1946-1958 testing period) 

provide accurate data on localized fallout patterns in behalf of more than 100 radionuclides that would have contributed to acute exposures following each of the 67 

nuclear tests of which 44 were conducted at or near Enewetak Atoll and 23 were 

conducted at Bikini Atoll. 

A thorough discussion that quantifies the limitations of using Cs-137 as the ‘‘indicator’’ radionuclide for more than 100 other radionuclides present in fallout is beyond the scope of this document and at best can only be briefly summarized herein. 

Radionuclide Heterogeneity. Nuclear fission of uranium or plutonium creates 

more than 100 radionuclides that have the potential to be present in local fallout 

that results in acute radiation exposures. Due to the extreme high temperatures created at time of detonation, essentially all radionuclides are initially vaporized as 

they are carried upward by the suction of the fireball. Because these radionuclides 

represent a wide range of elements, they differ physically and chemically, which affect their distribution in the mushroom cloud by a process known as fractionation. 

Radionuclides with high vaporization temperatures will condense early and primarily distribute themselves as fallout particles in the stem of the mushroom cloud 

at lower altitudes. Such radionuclides will be the first to descend to the surface as 

local fallout. 

Conversely, radionuclides with low vaporization temperatures will rise to much 

higher altitude within the mushroom cloud before condensing onto particles that ultimately descend to the ground as fallout. The longer time interval before condensing and higher initial altitudes that the particles must descend allows these 

radionuclides to travel longer distances before reaching the surface. Prominent 

among this category of radionuclides are radioiodines, which can even exist in vapor 

form at room temperatures. Lastly, a significant number of radionuclides exist as 

radioactive gases of xenon and krypton, which neither condense nor deposit on the 

ground but may, nevertheless, be present in the traveling radioactive cloud that contributes to human exposure. 

Besides fractionation, the heterogeneity of these radionuclides in local fallout is 

further enhanced by meteorological, radiological, and chemical factors. Meteorological factors involve highly variable wind directions and wind speeds at discrete altiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:44 Nov 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 R:\DOCS\24-536 SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
88

* Exhibits 104 have been retained in committee files. 

tudes (i.e., wind shear). For example, radionuclides that may initially reach altitudes of 50,000 feet will descend through successive layers of air in which both the 

wind direction and speed may vary drastically and affect their relative distribution 

in local fallout. Equally, radiological properties affect the distribution of individual 

radionuclides. For example, most of the radionuclides in localized fallout have relatively short physical half-lives that range from minutes to hours, to days and 

weeks and will, therefore, decay more rapidly than those with longer half-lives. 

Thus, with time, a traveling radioactive cloud will markedly change in radionuclide 

composition. 

Lastly, variations in chemical properties of fallout particles will affect their rate 

of deposition onto ground surfaces that these particles may encounter. 

In summary, there are many complex variables that affect the distribution of individual radionuclides in fresh local fallout that gives rise to potentially large exposures. For this reason, residual contamination levels for a single radionuclide (i.e., 

Cs-137) taken several decades later, cannot be viewed as a reliable indicator for 

evaluating the distribution and resultant radiation doses from a complex and heterogeneous mixture of radionuclides. 

To illustrate the limitations of Dr. Simon’s assertion (i.e., that present-day Cs-137 

can serve as a reliable indicator for assessing the potential of acute radiation exposures more than fifty years ago), I would like to make reference to Figure 1 on page 

10 of his written testimony submitted to the Senate Committee. For convenience, 

this figure is reproduced herein as Exhibit #1.* Figure 1 identifies maximum Cs137 levels as measured in the NWRS for 37 atolls/locations in the Marshall Islands. 

The figure identifies locations #32, #34, and #35 as having the highest present-day 

contamination levels of Cs-137 and corresponding to Northern Rongelap Atoll, Bikini Atoll, and Northern Enewetak Atoll, respectively. Because Cs-137 levels are 

presented on a ‘‘log-scale,’’ maximum contamination levels at #32, #34, and #35 are 

fully one-thousand times higher than values at other locations in the RMI where 

present-day levels are within the range of ‘‘global fallout’’ and are assumed to have 

been unaffected by fallout with no significant radiation exposures. 

It should be noted that Figure 1 was taken directly from reference 8 cited in Dr. 

Simon’s testimony. Reference 8 identifies Dr. Simon as the principal author of a 

publication entitled ‘‘Findings of the First Comprehensive Radiological Monitoring 

Program of the Republic of the Marshall Islands,’’ in Health Physics Vol. 73(1): 66-

85, 1997. 

While the data shown in Figure 1 are not disputed, they are, nevertheless, an incomplete and highly biased presentation of the larger NWRS study data that is cited 

in the 1997 study (Simon and Graham 1997). Concurrently with Figure 1 data, 

Simon and Graham in their 1997 study also provided a more detailed evaluation 

of Cs-137 for each of the three maximally contaminated atolls that include locations 

identified in Figure 1 as #32, #34, and #35. These expanded assessments are reproduced herein as Exhibits #2, #3, and #4 and show present-day dose-rate levels 

(which are directly correlated to residual Cs-137 contamination levels) on an islandby-island basis. Of significant are the following observations shown in Exhibits #2, 

#3, and #4. 

1. Contamination levels among individual islands for a given atoll varied by as 

much as ten-thousand-fold. For illustration, Exhibit #2 provides data for the island 

of Bokombako and the island of Ribewon of Enewetak Atoll. 

2. In spite of the fact that Enewetak Atoll and Bikini Atoll served as ground zero 

for 66 nuclear tests and Rongelap Atoll was heavily contaminated from BRAVO 

Shot, a significant number of islands at each of the three atolls showed present-day 

contamination levels that were only slightly above, within, and below the range of 

values judged as unaffected/global fallout locations. 

3. On Dr. Simon’s premise that present-day Cs-137 levels can reliably predict past 

radiation exposures, one would have to conclude that a person could have lived at 

select locations on Enewetak, Bikini, and Rongelap Atolls for the entire 12-year testing period without having received any significant amount of radiation above that 

contributed by global fallout. The fallacy of this premise needs no additional explanation. 

Statement #4 (page 7): 

In my view, the data obtained in the NWRS, supplemented with other information, can be used for estimating past radiation doses with the understanding that 

individual estimation is highly uncertain. It is also my view, however, that estimates of radiation dose, new or old, while not totally irrelevant, are not terribly pertinent to the discussion of changed circumstances. My reasoning is two fold. First, 

89

the compensation plan, as developed by the NCT, has no criterion for admissibility 

based on radiation dose. That makes dose, largely irrelevant from their standpoint. 

Second, the radiation-related cancer burden for the nation as a whole is likely to 

be relatively small compared to that from naturally occurring cancers. Hence, a 

well-budgeted compensation plan of the sort implemented by the NCT primarily 

needs to plan to pay for naturally occurring cancers. The number of radiation related cases, which can only be predicted from estimates of radiation dose, adds only 

a modest increment to the naturally occurring cases [10]. 

Response to Statement #4. To summarize, in this statement, Dr. Simon implies the 

following: 

1. that acute radiation doses received in the aftermath of 67 individual nuclear 

tests from fresh fallout between 1946 and 1958 can be adequately quantified by 

means of his NWRS environmental survey measurements involving Cs-137 levels in 

soils and plants taken in the 1990s; 

2. that the compensation plan developed by the NCT has no criterion for admissibility based on radiation dose; and 

3. that the radiation related cancer burden for the nation as a whole is likely to 

be relatively small compared to that of naturally occurring cancers. 

While the NWRS data provide valuable insight about present-day radiological conditions throughout the RMI, they provide no credible scientific basis for dose reconstruction when used in compensating radiation injury claims. When used to adjudicate claims of radiation injury, dose reconstruction requires comprehensive monitoring data and their robust scientific analyses, as summarized below. 

REQUIREMENTS FOR DOSE RECONSTRUCTION IN RADIATION CLAIM COMPENSATION

The use of dose reconstruction in compensating claims of radiation injury by 

means of showing a probability of causation in excess of 50% requires that the individual claimant was monitored continuously for all potential external and internal 

radiation exposures. Monitoring requires that the individual was continuously assigned either a film badge dosimeter or thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD), which 

measures all external radiation exposure. For internal exposures, monitoring is considerably more complex and may involve routine bioassays, which measure the 

amount and distribution of radionuclides within the body. Acceptable bioassay techniques include routing whole-body counting and laboratory analysis of urine and 

fecal samples for a given individual. 

Even when an individual has been provided complete monitoring, dose reconstruction for a specific tissue/organ that has become cancerous is, nevertheless, scientifically complex, time consuming, and costly. 

A current example of dose reconstruction for adjudicating radiation injury claims 

involves the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act 

(EEOICPA) of 2000 and Federal regulations defined under Title 42 CFR Part 82, 

Methods for Radiation Dose Reconstruction Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000. 

In behalf of EEOICPA, dose reconstructions are currently only performed for 

claimants whose personal external and internal monitoring records are judged to be 

sufficiently complete and accurate. Independent of whether the claim is compensated, such dose reconstructions are very time consuming with cost estimates 

well in excess of $10,000 per case. EEOICPA also makes provisions to compensate 

workers who were either inadequately monitored or where dose reconstruction 

yields estimates that lack scientific credibility or suffer a high degree of uncertainty. 

Thus, under 42 CFR Part 83, Procedures for Designating Classes of Employees as 

Members of the Special Exposure Cohort Under the Energy Employees Occupational 

Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, claimants who worked at facilities designated as Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) are afforded compensation without a dose 

reconstruction. 

With exception of a limited amount of group monitoring of inhabitants exposed 

on Rongelap, Ailinginae, and Utrik Atolls following exposure to BRAVO Shot fallout, 

there was no attempt to monitoring any other inhabitants of the RMI during the 

12-year period. Therefore, the nearly total absence of individual monitoring data 

precludes any likelihood of meaningful dose reconstruction, as suggested by Dr. 

Simon. 

UNDERSTANDING THE NCT COMPENSATION PROGRAM

In order to understand the technical basis of the NCT compensation program, it 

is important to understand the following facts and associated difficulties: 

90

* Under the current Energy Employee Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act 

(EEOICPA), the average cost for a dose reconstruction of an ‘‘energy employee’’ (who in most 

cases was formally monitored for internal and external radiation and for whom all monitoring 

records are available from the DOE), the average administrative cost of a dose reconstruction 

is estimated at $10,000 to $20,000 per case. 

1. Cancers (and nearly all other health effects) associated with radiation exposure 

are not unique to radiation. 

2. Even for a heavily exposed population, the vast majority of cancers that will 

occur are admittedly not due to radiation but are the result of ‘‘natural’’/other 

causes. This is due to the relatively high natural incidence rate of cancer in the normal population. 

Thus, as the recent NCI study (NCI 2004) correctly pointed out, cancer is a ubiquitous disease that may have a baseline incidence rate of up to 40% and involve 

cancers that are clinically indistinguishable from cancers induced by radiation. 

Also acknowledged in the recent NCI study of the exposed Marshallese, estimates 

of population doses, (let alone doses for any specific individual that address both internal and external exposures over the 12-year period of time) were described as 

‘‘crude.’’

In order to avoid the technical difficulties, limitation, and high cost * of a riskbased (i.e., dosereconstruction-based) compensation program, the NCT elected to employ a more achievable program that closely paralleled the U.S. Downwinder Compensation Program. Under such a program, it was understood (and accepted) that 

(1) a credible dose reconstruction is not possible and (2) the number of claims/compensations would clearly exceed the actual number of radiation-induced health effects due to the simple fact that neither claimants nor scientists could distinguish 

‘‘baseline’’ cancers from radiation-induced cancer. 

To illustrate the difficulty of dose reconstruction of an unmonitored population 

group, a limited parallel can be drawn between the exposed Japanese A-bomb survivor cohorts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Marshall Islanders. Of relevance are 

the following observations as reported in Radiation Research (Pierce et al. 1996), 

which may be compared to the recent NCI Study (NCI 2004). 

1. In the absence of monitoring data, scientists are still debating/refining estimates of the exposed Japanese for a relatively ‘‘simple event.’’ This ‘‘simplicity’’ is 

represented by a single detonation for which exposure occurred in a split-second of 

time and was almost exclusively confined to external radiation with no significant 

contribution from internal exposure. In contrast, Marshallese were potentially exposed externally and internally to 67 nuclear tests conducted at Enewetak/Bikini 

Atolls. 

2. Table 1 identifies the fact that, as of 1990, a total of 4,863 fatal cancers were 

observed in the exposed Japanese cohort. 

3. Of the 4,863 observed fatal cancers, it is estimated that 428 fatal cancers were 

the result of radiation exposure. This implies that 4,435 or 91% of the fatal cancers 

were not the result of radiation exposure. However, it would not be possible to identify the 428 cancers—thought to be radiation induced—from among 4,863 total observed cancers. 

4. Table 2 defines another critical parameter that correlates distance from 

hypocenter with the relative risk that an observed cancer among the exposed Japanese was due to radiation versus all other factors: with increased distance, the likelihood that an observed cancer was due to radiation (as opposed to other factors) 

diminishes. This is to be expected since the radiation dose falls off as a function of 

distance. 

Consistent with this observation is the NCT’s full understanding that the magnitude of radiation doses varied substantially among RMI’s population groups; however, in the absence of monitoring data and due to uncertainties about the true distribution of fallout, the NCT could not exclude any population group from having 

received significant exposures.

91

Table 1.—SUMMARY OF CANCER DEATHS IN ATOMIC-BOMB SURVIVORS, 

1950-1990

Cause of death Total number of deaths 

Estimated number of deaths 

due to radiation 

Percentage of 

deaths attributable to radiation 

Leukemia ............................................... 176 89 51%

Other types of cancer * ......................... 4,687 339 7%

Total ................................................... 4,863 428 9%

* Solid cancers, such as stomach, lung, breast, and colorectal cancers. 

Table 2.—CANCER DEATHS AMONG ATOMIC-BOMB SURVIVORS, 1950-1990, 

BY DISTANCE FROM HYPOCENTER 

Distance from hypocenter 

(km) 

No. of persons 

Leukemia Other cancers * 

No. of 

deaths 

Percent attributed to 

radiation 

No. of 

deaths 

Percent attributed to 

radiation 

<1 ...................................... 810 22 100% 128 42%

1 - 1.5 ............................... 10,590 79 64% 1156 18%

1.5 - 2.0 ............................ 17,370 36 29% 1622 4%

2.0 - 2.5 ............................ 21,343 39 4% 1781 0.5%

* Solid cancers, such as stomach, lung, breast, and colorectal cancers. 

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

The genesis and justification of the Tribunal’s non-quantitative approach have 

also been thoroughly described in Attachment IV of the RMI’s Changed Circumstance Petition and reflect the following limitations/uncertainties, objectives, 

and legal precedents: 

Data Limitations and Uncertainties. Traditional personal injury claims (that are 

adjudicated on an individual adversarial basis) require claimants to demonstrate 

that their injuries were the direct result of an exposure in excess of a 50% probability of causation dose value. Since no attempt was ever made to monitor RMI 

persons for external and internal exposures for the 12-year period, there could be 

no credible scientific basis for individuals to demonstrate the magnitude of their exposure and the probable likelihood that radiation was the etiologic agent of their 

medical condition/claim. 

Program Objectives. It is a matter of record that the traditional adversarial approach that employs quantitative dosimetry data and probability of causation requires months to years of extensive research and analysis even when the claimant 

has had the benefit of being monitored. The required level of effort rises dramatically (1) for incomplete monitoring data, (2) for long exposure periods, and (3) for 

complex exposure conditions that include multiple pathways (external, ingestion, inhalation) and potentially more that 100 radioactive fission and activation products. 

The objectives of the Tribunal’s compensation program were to resolve claims in 

a timely, efficient, and cost effective manner due to the fact that decades had 

elapsed since the claimants’ exposures and many claimants were of advanced age 

or had already passed away. 

A key scientific advisor to the Tribunal and architect of the NCT’s compensation 

program was Dr. Robert W. Miller. At the time, Dr. Miller was Chief of Clinical Epidemiology at the National Cancer Institute. In a paper he authored for the Tribunal 

(Radiation Effects Among the Marshallese), Dr. Miller stated:

My objective is to advise on diseases that are known to be related to radiation exposure. It is obvious that without exposure, there can be no effect. 

One should err toward leniency, but should not accept impossible claims of 

exposure. [Emphasis added.]

He further stated that the list of radiogenic health impacts ‘‘. . . should apply to 

Marshallese who were on the Islands at some time between July 1, 1946 and September 30, 1958, including those in utero at the ending date.’’

92

In adopting Dr. Miller’s recommendations for a presumptive administrative claims 

process, the Tribunal acknowledged the fact that the U.S. had failed to monitor the 

Marshallese population who to varying extent were exposed to nuclear fallout from 

67 nuclear tests whose combined explosive yield (and production of radioactive fission products) was nearly 100 times that of all atmospheric tests conducted at the 

Nevada Test Site. 

Legal Precedents for a Presumptive Administrative Process. Attachment IV of the 

CCP identifies the Radiation Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988 and the 

1990 Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, which among others compensates 

American civilians who were physically present in any ‘‘affected area’’ downwind 

areas during the periods of atmospheric testing at the NTS. 

For purpose of comparison, external exposures to downwinders in the most affected countries surrounding the Nevada Test Site have been estimated for three 

time periods as summarized in Table 3 below:

Table 3.—AVERAGE CUMULATIVE EXTERNAL DOSES FOR THREE MAJOR 

TIME PERIODS 

[Source: Anspaugh et al. 1990] 

Time period 

1951-1958 1961-LTBT* LTBT-1975 

Average individual** dose (R) ............. 0.472 0.0034 0.0018

* Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) signed 5 August 1963. 

** Exposed persons are those living in the counties of Clark, Lincoln, Nye, and White Pine in 

Nevada and the counties of Iron and Washington in Utah. 

Inspection of Table 3 reveals that compensation was granted to downwinders for 

doses that were extremely small. It is safe to say that exposures even to the least 

affected population groups in the Marshall Islands were likely to be many times 

higher than those experienced by downwinders who were compensated under RECA. 

REFERENCES

Anspaugh, L.R., Y.E. Ricker, S.C. Black, R.F. Grossman, D.L. Wheeler, B.W. 

Church, V.E. Quinn, 1990, ‘‘Historical Estimates of External Gamma Exposure and 

Collective External Gamma Exposure from Testing at the Nevada Test Site. II. Test 

Series After Hardtack II, 1958, and Summary.’’ Health Physics 59(5): 525-532. 

Behling, U.H., J.J. Mauro, and K. Behling, 2002a, ‘‘Reassessment of Acute Radiation Doses Associated with BRAVO Fallout at Utrik Atoll,’’ prepared for Utrik 

Local Government Council, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Majuro, MH. 

Behling, U.H. and J.J. Mauro, 2002b, ‘‘Statement Before the Nuclear Claims Tribunal Regarding the Potential Radiation Doses and Health Risks to the Current and 

Future Population of Utirk, Taka, Bikar, and Taongi Atolls and An Evaluation of 

the Costs and Effectiveness of Alternative Strategies for Reducing the Doses and 

Risks,’’ Majuro, MH. 

Mauro, J.J., U.H. Behling, and R. Anigstein, 2000, ‘‘Statement Before the Nuclear 

Claims Tribunal Regarding the Potential Radiation Doses and Health Risks to a Resettled Population on Rongelap Atoll, Rongerik Atoll, and Ailinginae Atoll and An 

Evaluation of the Costs and Effectiveness of Alternative Strategies for Reducing the 

Doses and Risks,’’ Majuro, MH. 

Mauro, J.J., U.H. Behling, and R. Anigstein, 1999a, ‘‘Statement Before the Nuclear Claims Tribunal Regarding the Potential Radiation Doses and Health Risks 

to a Resettled Population on Enewetak Atoll and An Evaluation of the Costs and 

Effectiveness of Alternative Strategies for Reducing the Doses and Risks,’’ 2-volume 

Technical Background Document prepared for the Enewetak/Ujeland Local Government Council, Majuro, MH. 

Mauro, J.J., U.H. Behling, and R. Anigstein, 1999b, ‘‘Statement Before the Nuclear Claims Tribunal Regarding the Potential Radiation Doses and Health Risks 

to a Resettled Population on Bikini Atoll and An Evaluation of the Costs and Effectiveness of Alternative Strategies for Reducing the Doses and Risks,’’ Majuro, MH. 

National Cancer Institute (NCI), 2004, ‘‘Estimation of the Baseline Number of 

Cancers Among Marshallese and the Number of Cancers Attributable to Exposure 

to Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Testing Conducted in the Marshall Islands.’’ National Cancer Institute Report to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 

93

Pierce, D.A., Y. Shimizu, D.L. Preston, M. Vaeth and K. Mabuchi, 1996, ‘‘Studies 

of the Mortality of Atomic Bomb Survivors. Report 12, Part I. Cancer: 1950-1990,’’ 

Radiation Research 146(1): 1-27. 

Simon, S.L. and J.C. Graham, 1997, ‘‘Findings of the First Comprehensive Radiological Monitoring Program of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.’’ Health Physics 

73(1): 66-85. 

STATEMENT IN RESPONSE OF PHILIP A. OKNEY, DEFENDER OF THE FUND, NUCLEAR

CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

CRS Report for Congress March 14, 2005—Republic of the Marshall Islands 

Changed Circumstances Petition to Congress 

Congressional Research Service Memorandum May 16, 2005—Loss-of-use Damage 

Estimates: Analysis of NCT Methodology and Comparison with Alternative 

(CRS) Methodology 

NCT PROCEDURES

This discussion responds to the CRS loss of use report and memorandum on the 

methodology for determination of the loss of use dollar value of property damages 

resulting from the U.S. nuclear testing program in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Property damage claims filed against the claims fund come before the NCT 

as a class action by the respective atoll populations and the Defender of the Fund 

argues against the claim in defense of the fund. Never is the U.S. government a 

party to any matters adjudicated before the NCT. 

The Defender takes issue with the assertion by the CRS that the loss in use methodology ‘‘was developed by a consulting firm under contract for the NCT’’. Enewetak 

Claimants and the Defender were the parties in the Enewetak claim and likewise 

were are two parties in the Bikini claim. The parties entered into contracts with 

their respective expert appraisers while the NCT authorized payment of the expert 

fees as a cost of proceedings. The NCT did not retain its own expert appraiser nor 

did it consult with either of the experts for the parties outside the proceeding of the 

claims. While the NCT reviews the evidence reflecting the opinion of the appraisers, 

it is the work of the appraiser and not the NCT that fashions the methodology for 

arriving at the loss of use value. 

CONSIDERATION OF METHODOLOGY

While the appraisers applied an analysis of annual rental rates from transactions 

within the Marshall Islands to calculate claimants’ damages for lost use, the Defender contests the CRS notion that the appraisers failed to consider ‘‘alternative 

methodologies’’ and that the NCT ‘‘provided many of the estimation parameters and 

assumptions.’’ In regard to the former, the Enewetak appraisers, both of whom were 

experienced in appraisal work in the Pacific region of Micronesia, from the beginning recognized the existence of ‘‘several unique factors’’ that served to cloud any 

attempt to ‘‘superimpose traditional American-based valuation theories on cultural 

landownership patterns in the Marshall Islands.’’ Prohibitions against the sale of 

land rights, traditional land tenure attitudes and systems, along with ‘‘concept[s] of 

market value’’, all served the ‘‘absence of a real estate market’’ as it is known in 

the U.S. Hallstrom-Lesher joint Appraisal Report (1996) at p. 15. For these reasons 

the appraisers settled on leases and use agreements as the basic comparable representing market value. 

Additionally, the appraisers did consider ‘‘capitaliz[ation] of a ‘value’ for the islands at the time of the U.S. intervention and then bring that amount forward to 

a current date’’ in response to a request from the NCT. Hallstrom/Lesher letter to 

the NCT dated January 31, 1997, response number 5; letter dated March 28, 1997, 

response number 4; Hallstrom letter to Mr. Pevec and Mr. Weisgall dated May 20, 

2005, vaporized land discussion. (Mr. Lesher passed away in June 2000.) This alternative methodology was rejected by the appraisers. 

The CRS use of an income approach in its model of agricultural rents is considered by the Defender to be inappropriate for the Marshall Islands. Early in the proceedings the NCT rejected use of this approach observing that the Marshall Islands 

is basically a subsistence rather than a cash economy for most of the period of loss 

of use under consideration. At best we could characterize the economy as an emerging cash economy. As such the income methodology for valuing these atolls does not 

historically fit in the Marshall Islands nor does the approach reflect the reality of 

the economic picture. In its decision the NCT noted that ‘‘Mr. Hallstrom...testified 

at the loss of use hearing that...while consideration was given to including values 

94

from outside the Marshall islands, this approach was rejected because it would have 

required a considerable degree of subjective adjustments for location. Only Marshall 

Island transactions were considered as they were more directly germane.’’ In the 

Matter of the People of Enewetak, et al., NCT No. 23-0902, p. 8, lines 1-5 (April 

13, 2000). 

That the NCT influenced ‘‘estimation parameters and assumptions’’ applied by the 

appraisal methodology is misconstrued by the CRS in the view of the Defender. It 

is important to understand that the Enewetak appraisal report was offered into evidence prior to the completion of the Bikini report. The Enewetak report discussed 

the sales comparison approach, income capitalization use, extent of land transactions, size, entirety of land and water, economic use, interest rates, and taking 

of property (the so-called ‘8 points’ in the Bikini appraisal) and their application in 

the determination of loss of use value. At the commencement of the Bikini appraisal 

work the NCT was familiar with the discussion in the Enewetak report and for purposes of consistency suggested to the parties that their appraisers use the same 

methodology. Of the eight points the parties agreed on the use of six. It is at that 

time that the NCT ordered use of the remaining two points, after the parties had 

full opportunity to brief and present the reasons for their positions. 

REASONABLE APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY

The Defender disagrees with the CRS that ‘‘. . . specific application of the methodology, . . . much of the critical data used, some of the assumptions, and certain 

statistical procedures applied (i.e., the sampling technique and the regression 

model)—produce estimated rentals that appear to be significantly overstated . . . 

[resulting in] excessive total damages claimed and awarded by the NCT.’’ Mr. 

Hallstrom’s May 2005 letter responds with detailed reasons for the data used, assumptions made, and statistical procedures applied in the methodology. The 

Hallstrom/Lesher 1997 letters provide detailed reasons for the choices made in these 

areas as well. Reflected in the appraisers’ reasoning are the distinguishing aspects 

of the Marshall Islands property markets. Since there is a lack of sequential transactions from year to year throughout the atolls, this trend alerted the appraisers 

to be as objective in their final opinion as the empirical data would permit. Obviously the lack of data would cause any observer to make certain assumptions in the 

methodology that in appraising other markets would not be necessary. 

TAKING OF VAPORIZED ISLANDS

CRS concluded that there was a permanent taking of vaporized islands by the 

U.S. government in these claims. In the opinion of the Defender the given facts of 

the situation dictated the NCT finding of a temporary taking of lands. To reach this 

conclusion considerable weight was given to the U.S. government promise to the island populations at the time of their evacuation from their homelands that the 

atolls would be returned to them upon completion of the tests. Moreover the absence 

of market data (no fee simple sales) for valuing the permanent taking of land makes 

it inappropriate to use a capitalized value. Further support for a temporary taking 

of land is found in the U.S. Supreme Court decision Kimball Laundry Co. vs. United 

States (1949), 338 U.S. 1, 93 L.Ed. 1765, 69 S.Ct. 1434 (7 ALR2d 1280, 1287-8), 

where the temporary taking of a laundry facility by the U.S. military during wartime resulted in damages to the owner in that ‘‘. . . the proper measure of compensation is the rental that probably could have been obtained. . . .’’ Where there 

is a temporary taking of land, loss of use damages are appropriate. It was the decision of the NCT that found the vaporized lands to be a ‘temporary taking’ and, thus, 

this approach was incorporated in the appraisal methodology. 

USE OF COMPARABLE PROPERTY VALUES

Liberal use of comparable property values in the U.S. and globally to measure 

value of land in the Marshall Islands, as put forward by the CRS, is rejected by 

the Defender. Use of comparable lease values outside the Marshall Islands has been 

rejected by the NCT, observing that land is unique in the Marshall Islands. The 

Marshall Islands Constitution emphasizes this component of land mandating that 

‘‘a court shall have due regard for the unique place of land rights in the life and 

law of the Marshall Islands’’, Article II, Section 5(9), and further recites that ‘‘Nothing in Article II shall be construed to invalidate the customary law or any traditional practice concerning land tenure or any related matter in any part of the Marshall Islands, including, where applicable, the rights and obligations of the 

Iroijlaplap, Iroijedrik, Alap and Dri Jerbal. Article X, Section 1 (1). Due to the scarcity of land, prohibition against its sale (other than between citizens) and ownership 

customs attached to the land, property values of the islands cannot be meaningfully 

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compared to land values in other parts of the world. The appraisers elaborated on 

the wisdom of using comparables from outside the Marshall Islands by expressing 

their fear of being overly subjective in property transaction adjustments. They concluded that to do so would introduce subjectivity into the adjustment scheme for 

comparing transaction variables and the resulting comparison would be meaningless. 

DEFINING PERIOD OF LOSS OF USE

The belief by CRS that possession of Bikini from 1969-1978 by a minority of the 

Bikinian population constituted use of the atoll is false. Where the facts identified 

the return of the Bikinians to their home islands (1969-1978) and the use had by 

their inhabitants, the NCT was fully apprized of events before ruling that occupation of the lands during this time frame did not amount to free and unrestricted 

use of the property. In its decision the NCT considered that the U.S. removed the 

island population (for a fourth time) observing that ‘‘people residing in Bikini were 

receiving excessive doses of cesium-137, strontium-90, and plutonium which necessitated their immediate removal . . . endangering the health and welfare of the 

Bikinians who returned to Bikini.’’ Hence the NCT concluded that ‘‘mere physical 

presence on land which remained highly contaminated does not result in a restoration of use during this period.’’ In the Matter of the People of Bikini, NCT No. 23-

04134, p. 11 lines 1-7, and 14-16. 

Again the CRS view that the return of the Bikinians to their home islands in the 

1970’s ‘‘should not be counted as loss-of-use’’ implies that ‘‘rentals on these two occupied islands . . . would be lower (or zero) owing to this contamination and that the 

corresponding value of their stay on alternative atolls should not be deducted from 

the overall rental.’’ In fact only a small minority of the islanders returned to Bikini 

Atoll in the 1970’s. The vast majority remained on alternative lands and refused to 

return to their home islands until the lands were declared safe for habitation by 

the U.S. government If the state of contamination reduced the value of the islands 

to zero, then, the NCT had no other choice than to award full loss of use value as 

part of the damages, which it did. If the property value was simply diminished by 

the contamination, then, the difference between fair market value before the contamination and the value after contamination would be the correct amount of the 

damages. Adjustment to the loss-in-use value for use of alternative lands, being 

used by the majority of the islanders, would be appropriate. This approach was used 

by the NCT and acts to safeguard against inflation of the damage estimates. 

ACCURACY OF AFFECTED LAND AREAS

Coral atolls vary in size over the years due to tides, storms, and other natural 

events as well as acts by mankind. While the parties to the Bikini claim did not 

agree on the acreage of Bikini atoll, the difference amounted to 41 acres out of a 

total of 1,800 plus acres. The NCT found that ‘‘[b]oth Claimants and Defender of 

the Fund provided a credible basis for their acreage figures based on past surveys.’’ 

But due to the lack of direct testimony from the surveyors, those being the AEC 

(1968), EG&G (1978), Holmes and Narver (various years) as amply described in the 

legislatively enacted Bikini Atoll Rehabilitation Committee (BARC) reports of the 

1980’s, and for purposes of consistency, the NCT adopted the figures provided by 

the Bikinians. In the Matter of the People of Bikini, NCT No. 23-04134, p. 17 lines 

10-20, March 5, 2001. 

Attention has been drawn to the difference in acreage figures applied in the 

Enewetak report and the NCT award concerning the vaporized islands as well as 

the amount of acreage unavailable for use as of 1980. Instructions were given to the 

appraisers after the filing of their report to revise the acreage figures downward 

(lowering the damage award) by agreement of the parties. 

VALUATION OF USE OF ALTERNATIVE LANDS

CRS suggests that the use value of alternative lands is best determined by appraisal experts. The Defender points out that CRS ignores the reality that the use 

value for alternative lands applied by the NCT was the direct result of a stipulation 

between the contesting parties regarding damages after the parties consulted with 

their respective appraisal experts. In the Enewetak claim both appraisers recognized that the per acre value of Ujelang Atoll was lower than Enewetak Atoll because of vast physical disparities between the atolls, the ability to sustain habitation, and the very limited resources and remoteness of Ujelang Atoll, This stipulation is an agreement between the parties to the claim and reflects their desire to 

settle their differences on that particular subject. It is not a matter for appraiser 

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methodology. To accept the stipulation and approve its use as part of the calculation 

of damages is entirely within the discretion and authority of the NCT. 

APPLICABILITY OF PRIOR COMPENSATION

The CRS fails to understand that the deduction of prior compensation received by 

claimants from any NCT award must (1) be part of the original claim for damages 

and (2) require actual proof of payment of a specific amount of such prior compensation. In response to Appendix A., List of Major Compensation Programs and Authorizations, 1964-2004, CRS Memorandum pages 36-38, all items listed, but for the following item below, were either deducted (to be deducted in the claims of Rongelap 

and Utrik) from personal injury or property damage awards, were not claimed as 

part of a damage award, or lacked sufficient proof of payment of a specific amount 

so as to be deductible. Item 3, 1976, Enewetak, radiological cleanup, $20M plus military equipment and personnel, P.L. 94-367 was not claimed. The Enewetak claim 

asked for damages in an amount to restore and rehabilitate the land for any current 

contamination above and beyond the DNA cleanup from 1972 to 1980. In response 

to Appendix B: Estimates of U.S. Nuclear Testing-Related Assistance and Compensation, CRS Memorandum page 15, fn. 29, all items listed, but for the following 

items below, were either deducted (to be deducted in the claims of Rongelap and 

Utrik) from personal injury or property damage awards, were not claimed as part 

of a damage award, or lacked sufficient proof of payment of a specific amount so 

as to be deductible. Bikni Project, 1964, $2M, Defense/Settlement for Use of Bikini; 

1981, $400,000, Energy/Health plan radiation exposure; and 1988, $2.3M, Interior/

Bikini conception plan were not made known to the Defender by the U.S. government. 

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS, 

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Majuro, Marshall Islands, August 19, 2005. 

Hon. DANIEL AKAKA, 

U.S. Senate, 141 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC. 

DEAR SENATOR AKAKA: Once again, I would like to thank you for your tremendous 

leadership on issues related to the legacy of the US, nuclear weapons testing program in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. The RMI’s current Changed Circumstances petition to the U.S. Congress is s. request for U.S. assistance to respond 

to the burdens of the nuclear legacy that the RMI lacks the financial and human 

resources to address. 

It is my hope that the Petition will strengthen the enduring friendship and close 

relationship between the Marshall Islands and the State of Hawei’i. As you know, 

our Petition requests funding to build the RMI’s capacity to address those aspects 

of the nuclear legacy that make sense to provide in-country. At the same time, it 

also requests funds to purchase healthcare services from the State of Hawai’i when 

it is not prudent for us to do so locally. I also believe that improving the healthcare 

services for people most affected by the U,S. nuclear weapons testing program will 

decrease the emigration of Marshallese to your state as many people leaving the 

Marshall Islands are in search of better healthcare. 

Again, thank you for your continued commitment to assist the people of the Marshall Islands with our efforts to address its problems related to the U.S. nuclear 

weapons testing program. The answers to your post-hearing questions follow. 

Respectfully, 

GERALD M. ZACKIOS, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

STATEMENT OF BILL GRAHAM, PUBLIC ADVOCATE, MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR

CLAIMS TRIBUNAL

The purpose of this statement is to provide information which I believe has relevance to the Committee’s consideration of the written testimony submitted by Dr. 

Steve Simon in connection with the formal hearing conducted on July 19, 2005. 

Dr. Simon states that the purpose of his testimony ‘‘does not include taking a side 

in the discussion for the need or justification for additional compensation.’’ That 

thought seems to contradict a statement that he made in a letter dated 7 November 

1999 and addressed to the Chairman of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal:

I understand from Mr. Mauro that the NCT now wants to depend on the 

data of the Nationwide Radiological Study for their use in making addiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:44 Nov 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 R:\DOCS\24-536 SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
97

tional claims to the U.S. Government. It is nonsensical for the Marshall Islands Government to reject the data on one hand, and on the other to use 

it as the basis for additional compensation requests. If that were to happen, 

I would have no misgivings about testifying to the U.S. Congress against 

such a practice.

That communication from Dr. Simon was prompted by a call to him from Dr. John 

Mauro of S. Cohen & Associates, who inquired about the availability of the detailed 

measurements from the Nationwide Radiological Study (NWRS). Dr. Mauro sought 

that data in order to determine the need for and to estimate the cost of radiological 

cleanup and remediation in connection with a claim before the Tribunal. 

In earlier letters to the Tribunal Chairman dated 14 November 1995 and 30 April 

1996, Dr. Simon had offered to provide a report containing all of the radiological 

data collected by the Nationwide Radiological Study. In both of those letters, he proposed that the Tribunal pay $4,000 for the time spent by him and his assistant in 

producing the report plus nominal printing costs. At those times, however, neither 

the Tribunal itself nor any claimants before it had an immediate need for the data 

so no further communication transpired until Dr. Mauro’s inquiry. 

In response to that inquiry, Dr. Simon’s November 1999 letter to the Tribunal put 

forth the following demands in order to provide the data: 

1. The NCT petitions the RMI national government to formally accept the 

findings of the Nationwide Radiological Study and provides to me adequate 

written proof of its acceptance, and 

2. the NCT provides payment to me in the amount of $25,000. 

Those demands seem to contradict the comment in Dr. Simon’s written statement 

to the Committee that ‘‘Findings of publicly funded scientific investigations should 

be published and the information made available.’’

Dr. Simon is to be commended for the large body of data collected by the Nationwide Radiological Study. He is also to be commended for his altruism in going ‘‘to 

great effort to publish the findings of the NWRS without any salary or financial 

support’’ in the July 1997 special issue of the journal Health Physics devoted to the 

consequences of nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands between 1946 and 1958. 

To my understanding, however, he is misinformed when he states that ‘‘The Marshall Islands Government, for reasons never apparent to me, tried to stop publication of that issue.’’ To my knowledge, the facts regarding that special issue are as 

follow:

• The U.S. Department of Energy contributed financial support to get the issue 

published and/or disseminated on a wide basis. The normal practice is for the 

author’s organization to pay for publication costs. However, given that Dr. 

Simon was no longer affiliated with the RMI, it is understood that he sought 

funding from DOE in order to publish his findings. 

• In late April 1997, the RMI embassy contacted the Health Physics Journal and 

learned from Managing Editor Mr. Leland Perry that the special issue had been 

sent to the printer and that $10,000 had been contributed by DOE to finance 

the publication and was ‘‘looking for more funding’’ to contribute. When advised 

that there were ongoing contract and property disputes between Dr. Simon and 

the RMI government, Mr. Leland referred the call to his superior, Dr. Kenneth 

Miller. Dr. Miller stated that he was also unaware of Dr. Simon’s controversial 

association with the Marshall Islands. 

• This unfortunate situation resulted in U.S. Representative Robert Underwood 

writing a letter to then Secretary of Energy Frederico Pena requesting that he 

consider withholding publication of the special issue because Dr. Simon ‘‘may 

not be dispassionate in his research.’’

Since Dr. Simon left the Marshall Islands in 1995, hundreds of documents relating to the nuclear testing program have been declassified. Review and analysis of 

many of those documents by independent experts have raised serious questions regarding the reliability of earlier dose reconstructions and, as an obvious consequence, about the extent to which the damages caused by the testing program had 

been understood previously. Much more remains to be done. 

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* Retained in committee files. 

KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART NICHOLSON GRAHAM, 

Washington, DC, July 15, 2005. 

Hon. PETE V. DOMENICI, 

Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed please find a report I prepared and submitted to 

the government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (‘‘RMI’’) in January of 2003, 

entitled ‘‘The Nuclear Claims Tribunal of the Republic of the Marshall Islands: An 

Independent Examination and Assessment of Its Decision-Making Processes.’’ * At 

that time I provided copies of the report to congressional committees for general informational purposes, but the RMI Embassy has requested that I submit it to you 

specifically in connection with the hearing scheduled before your Committee on July 

19. 

In June 2002, I agreed to undertake an evaluation of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

(NCT), which the RMI legislature created pursuant to the Section 177 Agreement 

between the RMI and the United States, because I was convinced the RMI government sincerely wanted an impartial and objective assessment of the NCT and its 

processes for adjudicating claims seeking compensation for personal injuries and 

property damages suffered as a consequence of the U.S. nuclear testing program 

that took place in the Marshall Islands during the middle of the twentieth century. 

In my meeting with RMI President Kesai Note prior to accepting this project, it became clear to me that the RMI wanted what amounted to a ‘‘reality check’’ on 

whether the NCT’s awards merited respect by the U.S. Congress. The report that 

I prepared, and that I have enclosed, represents my best effort to provide an independent examination and assessment for that purpose. 

Consistent with the need for this to be commissioned as a truly independent 

project, the fees and expenses incurred by my law firm in connection with our research, analysis and preparation of the report were paid before the contents, findings and conclusions of the report were revealed to RMI officials. 

My conclusions are set forth in the report’s executive summary. Simply stated, the 

report finds that the NCT fulfilled the basic functions for which it was created in 

a reasonable, fair and orderly manner, and with adequate independence, based on 

procedures, closely resembling legal systems in the United States, that are entitled 

to respect. Further, based on our examination and analysis’ of the NCT’s processes, 

and our understanding of the dollar magnitude of the awards that resulted from 

those processes, it is my judgment that the $150 million trust fund initially established in 1986.by Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association between the RMI 

and the United States is manifestly inadequate to fairly compensate the inhabitants 

of the Marshall Islands for the damages they suffered as a result of the U.S. nuclear 

tests that took place in their homeland. 

In support of the Committee’s oversight of these important issues, I respectfully 

request that you include the executive summary from our report and other relevant 

portions, as you deem appropriate, in the record of the hearing and that the entire 

report be made available to Committee Members and staff. 

Sincerely, 

DICK THORNBURGH. 

STASTEMENT OF ISMAEL JOHN, SENATOR, NITIJELA OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS AND

JACKSON ADING, MAYOR OF ENEWETAK ATOLL

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this Committee: 

Thank you for providing this opportunity to the people of Enewetak to describe 

issues that relate to the challenges we face as the only population ever resettled on 

a nuclear test site. 

Our statement is intended to supplement the joint four atoll statement submitted 

by Jonathan Weisgall on behalf of the four atolls of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and 

Utrok. We will not directly address the issues described in that joint statement; 

rather, we offer a perspective on our unique experiences which resulted from the 

use of our land for nuclear testing and what needs to be done so that we become 

once again self-reliant and self-sufficient. 

As you know, our ancestral homeland, Enewetak Atoll, was the site of forty-three 

of the sixty-six nuclear tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands 

between 1946 and 1958. One of the tests at Enewetak was especially significant as 

it was the first test of a hydrogen bomb. This test occurred on October 31, 1952 and 

99

was known as the ‘‘Mike’’ test. The test had a yield of 10.4 megatons (750 times 

greater than the Hiroshima bomb). The destructive power of the Mike test was exceeded only by the Bravo test (15 megatons) in all the nuclear tests conducted by 

the United States anywhere. The Mike test vaporized an island, leaving a crater a 

mile in diameter and 200 feet deep. The Mike test detonation and the detonation 

of the other 42 nuclear devices on our land resulted in the vaporization of over 8% 

of our land and otherwise devastated our atoll. The devastation is so severe that 

to this day, forty-seven years after the last nuclear explosion, over half of our land 

and all of the lagoon remain contaminated by radiation. The damage is so pervasive 

that we cannot live on over 50% of our land. In fact, we can’t even live on any part 

of our land without the importation of food. 

How was it that the most powerful country on earth used our land for its nuclear 

weapons tests? Well, the United States had full control over the Marshall Islands 

after World War II, and it decided that Enewetak Atoll would be a better nuclear 

test site than Bikini Atoll. There was a problem however; we lived on that land and 

we owned that land. In fact, it was the only land we ever owned. Generations after 

generations of our ancestors worked the land, planted food crops, built homes, and 

otherwise made the land productive. So, how could we be removed? 

The Untied States removed us from our homeland because it had the power to 

do so. But, the U.S. recognized that we had rights and it had responsibilities and 

obligations to us as a result of that removal. 

These rights, responsibilities and obligations were described in the memorandum 

attached to the Directive of President Harry Truman providing for our removal from 

our land. President Truman’s Directive to the Secretary of Defense, dated November 

25, 1947, reads as follows:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You are hereby directed to effect the evacuation of the natives of Eniwetok Atoll preliminary to the carrying out of tests of atomic weapons early 

in 1948, and in accordance with the enclosed memorandum addressed to me 

by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman

The memorandum attached to President Truman’s Directive described the rights 

we had and the responsibilities and obligations to us assumed by the United States. 

The memorandum reads in relevant part as follows:

1. They will be accorded all rights which are the normal constitutional 

rights of the citizens under the Constitution, but will be dealt with as 

wards of the United States for whom this country has special responsibilities. 

2. The displacement of local inhabitants will be kept to a minimum required for their own safety and well being and will not be accomplished 

merely for considerations of convenience. 

3. The displacement of local inhabitants will be effected by agreements 

reached with them regarding resettlement, including fully adequate provisions for their well being in their new locations.

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Secretary of Defense will undertake to supply to the State Department evidence sufficient to demonstrate 

in an international forum that in conducting such experimentation in Eniwetok, the United States is not thereby subjecting the local inhabitants of 

the Trust Territory of the Pacific to perceptibly greater danger than, say, 

the people of the United States.

In a dispatch from Admiral Ramsey, the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 5 December 1947, our rights and the responsibilities and obligations of the United States 

were summarized as follows:

Pursuant to orders from the President the Secretary of Defense has directed SECNAV to effect the evacuation of the natives of Eniwetok. 

In recommending this action the Atomic Energy Commission stated that 

the inhabitants of the Atoll would be accorded the normal constitutional 

rights accruing to U.S. citizens under the Constitution and treated as wards 

of the United States; and that adequate provision would be made for them 

in their new location.

So, the U.S. recognized that we had constitutional rights. That means that we, 

as the owners of property used by the U.S., were entitled to just and adequate compensation for the use and damage of our land. 

100

In addition, we were promised that we would be taken care of while exiled from 

Enewetak and that we would be placed in no greater danger than the people of the 

U.S. 

None of these promises were kept by the U.S.: We were not taken care of during 

our 33 year exile from Enewetak; we were placed in greater danger than people in 

the U.S.; and we have yet to receive the just and adequate compensation to which 

we are entitled under the Constitution. 

To better understand these unkept promises, we believe that it is useful to review 

the history of the use of Enewetak by the United States, our experiences as a result 

that use, the effect of that use on us and our land, and the unfinished obligations 

of the U.S. 

U.S. USE OF ENEWETAK FROM 1947 TO 1980

The U.S. used Enewetak for a variety of purposes between 1947 and 1980. U.S. 

use consisted of nuclear weapons testing, intercontinental ballistic missile testing, 

high energy rocket testing, cratering experiments, the study of marine biology, and 

radiological remediation and soil rehabilitation efforts. 

Nuclear Weapons Testing. The U.S. Department of Energy described the devastating effects of the 43 nuclear tests on Enewetak as follows:

The immense ball of flame, cloud of dark dust, evaporated steel tower, 

melted sand for a thousand feet, 10 million tons of water rising out of the 

lagoon, waves subsiding from a height of eighty feet to seven feet in three 

miles were all repeated, in various degrees, 43 times on Enewetak Atoll.

About 8% of the land mass of the atoll was vaporized, numerous nuclear bomb 

craters doted the land mass, and much soil and most vegetation was either removed 

or severely disturbed. In addition to such physical damage, the testing left most of 

the atoll contaminated by radiation. 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Testing. During the 1960’s, Enewetak was the 

target and impact area for tests of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles fired from 

Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. 

High Energy Upper Stage (HEUS) Rocket Tests. In 1968 and 1978, two test 

firings of a developmental HEUS rocket motor were conducted on Enjebi Island. The 

rocket motors tested each contained 2,500 pounds of propellant of which 300 pounds 

was beryllium. Beryllium is toxic to man when inhaled and lodged in the lungs. The 

first test, in April 1968, resulted in an unexpected explosion which scattered propellant, including beryllium, over the western tip of Enjebi. The second test in January 

1970 fired successfully scorching the land but did not result in an explosion. 

Pacific Cratering Experiments. This program occurred in the 1970’s and involved 

the detonation of charges of high explosives to provide a means of predicting the 

impact of nuclear detonations upon strategic defense installations. This resulted in 

twelve detonations of 1,000 pound charges, drilling of over 190 holes into various 

islands of the atoll from 200 feet to 300 feet in depth, movement of 185,000 cubic 

yards of soil, and the digging of 86 trenches on various islands each 7 feet deep. 

Marine Biology Research Laboratory. The laboratory began operations in 1954 

under the auspices of the Division of Biology and Medicine of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Research supported by the laboratory was chosen by an advisory 

committee which evaluated written proposals concerning a broad spectrum of marine and terrestrial science. This activity continued into the early 1980’s. 

Radiological Remediation and Resettlement Activities. The United States undertook a radiological remediation and resettlement program that took place from 1977 

to 1980. Unfortunately, this effort left half the atoll contaminated, left the habitable 

parts without vegetation or topsoil, prevented the Enjebi island members of our 

community from resettling on their land in the northern part of the atoll, left the 

lagoon contaminated with plutonium, left a concrete waste storage site filled contaminants radioactive for thousands of years, and left the heavily contaminated island of Runit without any radiological remediation whatsoever. 

While this use of Enewetak was going on, we lived on Ujelang Atoll. 

REMOVAL TO UJELANG ATOLL

A few days before Christmas in 1947, the U.S. removed us from Enewetak to the 

much smaller, resource poor, and isolated atoll of Ujelang. We were told by the U.S. 

that our removal would be for a short time. In fact, Captain John P. W. Vest, the 

U.S. Military Governor for the Marshall Islands told us that our removal from 

Enewetak would be temporary and last no more than three to five years. Unfortunately, we were exiled on Ujelang for a period of over thirty-three years. 

101

HARDSHIP ON UJELANG

The exile on Ujelang was particularly difficult for us leading to hopelessness and 

despair. During the 33 year exile on Ujelang we endured the suffering of near starvation. We tried to provide food for ourselves and our children, but one meal a day 

and constant hunger was the norm. Malnutrition caused illness and disease. Children and the elderly were particularly vulnerable. Health care was woefully inadequate. In addition, our children went largely uneducated in the struggle for survival. We became so desperate that in the late 1960’s we took over a visiting government field-trip ship, demanding that we be taken off of Ujelang and returned to 

Enewetak. 

Our suffering and hardship while on Ujelang was eventually acknowledged by the 

US. The U.S. Department of Interior in a letter to the President of the US Senate 

dated January 14, 1978 said in relevant part:

The people of Enewetak Atoll were removed from their home atoll in 1947 

by the US. Government in order that their atoll could be used in the atomic 

testing program. The people were promised that they would be able to return home once the U.S. Government no longer had need for their islands. 

During the thirty years that the Enewetak people have been displaced 

from their home atoll they have suffered grave privations, including periods 

of near starvation, in their temporary home on Ujelang Atoll. The people 

have cooperated willingly with the US. Government and have made many 

sacrifices to permit the United States to use their home islands for atomic 

testing purposes.

The physical difficulties experienced on Ujelang were made more difficult by the 

loss of our ancestral homeland. We have close ties to our land. These close ties were 

forged by centuries of making a life on our land. Our ancestors worked the soil and 

nurtured the plants. We buried our dead on our land. We feel that we are a part 

of the land and it is a part of us. Our connection with our land is spiritual in nature. It is something of great meaning because it was the one place in the world 

given to us by God. And this was taken away from us causing us to live lives of 

hardship, neglect, and isolation on Ujelang. It is no surprise that after years of 

hardship, neglect and isolation we became increasingly insistent that we be returned home. Eventually, the U.S. said it would attempt to make our homeland habitable. 

INITIAL CLEANUP ATTEMPT OF ENEWETAK ATOLL

In 1972, the U.S. said that it would soon no longer require the use of Enewetak. 

The U.S. recognized that the extensive damage and residual radiation at Enewetak 

would require radiological cleanup, soil rehabilitation, housing and basic infrastructure before we could resettle Enewetak. An extensive cleanup, rehabilitation and resettlement effort was undertaken between 1977 and 1980. 

Unfortunately, the cleanup left over half of the land mass of the atoll contaminated by radiation confining us to the southern half of the atoll. This has prevented 

the Enjebi island members of our community from resettling their home island, and 

has prevented us from making full and unrestricted use of our atoll. In addition, 

the cleanup and rehabilitation was not effective in rehabilitating the soil and revegetating the islands. An extensive soil rehabilitation and revegeatation effort is 

still required to permit the growing of food crops. The cleanup also left us with a 

radioactive waste site on the island of Runit. Over 110,000 cubic yards of radioactive 

waste, which consist of radiation contaminated dirt scrapped off the islands, are 

stored in a nuclear test-created crater on Runit Island. 

ENEWETAK CLAIMS IN THE U.S. CLAIMS COURT

When we resettled on the southern half of our atoll, we recognized that the land 

required further restoration (radiological remediation, soil rehabilitation, and revegetation), that the Enjebi island members of the Enewetak community needed to 

be resettled on their home island, and that we were never adequately compensated 

for the loss of use of our land and the hardships we endured during our exile. To 

accomplish restoration, resettlement of the northern islands, and to be justly compensated for the 33 years we were denied use of our land, we filed an action against 

the U.S. for damages in the U.S. Claims Court in 1982. 

In addition to the Enewetak lawsuit, thirteen other lawsuits were filed in the U.S. 

Claims Court by our fellow Marshall Islanders seeking compensation from the U.S. 

for damages as a result of the nuclear testing program. 

102

After the Compact of Free Association went into effect, the U.S. moved to dismiss 

our claims. We opposed dismissal on several grounds, most notably on the ground 

that the compensation provided under the Compact was inadequate and did not constitute just compensation under the Constitution. In 1987, the Claims Court dismissed these cases holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these 

claims because the consent of the U.S. to be sued on those claims had been withdrawn by Congress pursuant to the Compact and in conjunction with the establishment of a Marshall Islands Claims Tribunal to provide just compensation. The 

Claims Court recognized that the adequacy of the amount provided to claimants 

under the Compact was yet to be determined by the Claims Tribunal 

ENEWETAK CLAIMS IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL

After our claims were dismissed by the U.S. courts, the only forum available to 

hear our just compensation claims was the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. Our claims before the Tribunal were for the loss of use of our land, for the costs to restore our 

land to a condition of full and unrestricted use, and for the hardship and suffering 

we endured while in exile on Ujelang. The evidence presented to the Tribunal on 

these three categories of damages is summarized and briefly described below: 

1. Loss of Use. Enewetak Atoll is private property. The use of such private property by the United States was temporary. We are entitled to compensation for the 

loss of use, occupancy and enjoyment of the entire atoll from the period 1947 to 

1980, plus loss of use, occupancy and enjoyment of those portions of the atoll which 

remain unavailable from 1980 until the people once again have full use of those portions. Loss of use was computed by two different appraisal firms in Honolulu, Hawaii each of whom has substantial experience in valuations of Pacific island properties. The appraisers utilized a market comparison approach. Loss of use was computed on the basis of estimated historical annual rents plus interest. Subtracted 

from this loss of use was the prior compensation received by us under the Compact 

and other payments received plus the use value of Ujelang for the period 1947 to 

1980. The net loss of use amounted to an award of $244 million. 

2. Cost to restore. Over half the land area (approximately 1000 acres) of Enewetak 

atoll remains unavailable for full use because of radiation contamination. In addition, all the land of the atoll was severely damaged as a result of the weapons tests, 

bulldozing and scrapping activities both before and after each of the tests, the construction of support facilities (concrete building pads, asphalt runways and roads), 

and the scrapping and soil removal activities of partial cleanup that occurred between 1977 to 1980. Also, it must be noted that our community consists of two 

groups. One group, the people of Enjebi Island, has not been able to resettle their 

island because it remains contaminated. We argued that the construction of housing 

and necessary infrastructure is another element of the cost to restore damages. 

Thus, we argued that cost to restore can be best described as those costs necessary 

to accomplish three objectives: remediation of radiologically contaminated land, soil 

and plant rehabilitation and restoration, and resettlement of Enjebi Island. 

a. Radiological remediation: The Nuclear Claims Tribunal of the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands in its ruling of December 21, 1998 adopted the U.S. standard of 

15 millirems per year for cleanup of radiation contaminated land. The rationale for 

the adoption of the standard was that the Marshallese people are entitled to the 

same level of protection from radioactive contamination created by the U.S. nuclear 

weapons and testing program as is provided to U.S. citizens. This rationale is consistent with a guidance issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency which 

states:

As a basic principle, policies and criteria for radiation protection of populations outside national borders from releases of radioactive substances 

should be at least as stringent as those for the population within the country of release.

The rationale is also consistent with the declaration of the U.S. made in 1947, 

and contained in the memorandum described above, which states:

[I]n conducting such experimentation in Eniwetok, the United States is 

not thereby subjecting the local inhabitants of the Trust Territory of the Pacific to perceptibly greater danger than, say, the people of the United 

States.

Although the establishment of a cleanup standard is necessary, the next question 

is how to effect the necessary radiological remediation. To answer that question, we 

asked the firm of Sanford Cohen & Associates, Inc. (SC&A) to research, evaluate 

and describe the following: (1) the current radiological conditions at Enewetak, (2) 

103

the current doses and health risks to the people of Enewetak if one were to do no 

cleanup using U.S. methodologies, (3) collective health impacts under various remedial alternatives, (4) cleanup alternatives to permit full use of the land using U.S. 

standards, and (5) the costs of such alternatives. SC&A provided a thorough two volume report addressing the above. In addition, Dr. John Mauro and Dr. Hans 

Behling, the principal authors of the SC&A report, testified before the Nuclear 

Claims Tribunal addressing all aspects of the report. After analyzing 30 different 

cleanup options, Drs. Mauro and Behling recommended an approach ‘‘consisting of 

a combination of soil removal and application of potassium to soil as an integral 

part of a self-sustaining, agricultural rehabilitation program.’’ The total cost of the 

recommended remediation strategy was estimated at $100 million. 

b. Soil and Plant Rehabilitation. All of the land of Enewetak was severely damaged as a result of the nuclear testing program. What was once a productive atoll 

providing food and sufficient surplus production for export of coconut products, became a land with soil devoid of any nutrients unable to support food bearing plants. 

This removal of the rich atoll topsoil was the result of the nuclear tests, the pretest and post-test activities that involved the bulldozing and clearing of land and 

laying of asphalt on the land; the construction of support facilities to provide housing, infrastructure, runways, roads, buildings, etc.; the bulldozing, clearing, scrapping and soil removal activities of the 1977-80 partial cleanup. These activities devastated the ecology of Enewetak Atoll. The dark rich organic matter that takes centuries to build up to levels of two to four feet in depth was gone. Food bearing plants 

could not survive in such an environment. An agriculture program was initiated 

after the 1977-80 cleanup. However, that program only recently initiated an effective soil and plant rehabilitation method. The method requires the digging of ditches 

and the placing of layers of organic matter in the ditches along with a chicken manure and copra cake compost. This is followed by the planting of both food bearing 

plants and salt and wind spray protecting plants. This is a very labor intensive program. All of the land in the northern part of the atoll requires such full rehabilitation, including long-term monitoring, nurturing, and routine applications of potash, 

biomass and manure. The cost of such full rehabilitation was estimated at $29,000 

per acre. The southern islands of the atoll require similar although less intensive 

rehabilitation, because of some prior rehabilitation and because of the recent implementation of a more effective rehabilitation program on those islands. The total cost 

for soil and plant rehabilitation of all the islands of the atoll was estimated at $18 

million. 

c. Resettlement Costs. As described above, one group of our community, the people 

of Enjebi Island have not been able to return to their home island. Enjebi was 

ground zero for a number of tests. In addition, it underwent bulldozing, scrapping 

and soil removal during the 1977-80 partial cleanup activities. In order to make the 

island habitable again, the radiological remediation and soil and plant rehabilitation 

described above are required. In addition, the people require the housing, infrastructure, and other buildings necessary to permit them to live on the island while the 

rehabilitation is ongoing. The housing, rehabilitation support buildings, infrastructure, and community center, are consistent with resettlement housing, buildings, 

and infrastructure currently underway for the communities of Bikini and Rongelap. 

Enjebi Island was estimated at $30 million. In addition, the housing on Enewetak, 

Medren, and Japtan islands constructed during the 1977-80 partial cleanup requires 

upgrades, and the islands require infrastructure such as power and water, to make 

the living conditions consistent with those currently underway for Bikini and 

Rongelap. The cost for such upgrades was estimated at $20 million. The above-described resettlement costs were developed by Mr. Earl Gilmore of E.P.G. Corporation, a construction consultant, who has extensive experience and expertise in construction costs in the Marshall Islands. 

The Tribunal did not award any resettlement costs saying that such costs should 

be paid from the loss of use portion of the award. 

3. Consequential or Hardship Damages. As described above, we suffered greatly 

during our exile on Ujelang atoll. From the very beginning, we were told that our 

removal from Enewetak would be temporary and that they would be taken care of 

on Ujelang. 

Neither event occurred. The exile from Enewetak lasted for a period of thirtythree years and the U.S. failed to take care of us while we were on Ujelang. 

Unfortunately, the hardships and sufferings did not end with our return to 

Enewetak in 1980. The severe damage to the land, the residual radiation contamination on over half the land of the Atoll, the inability to resettle Enj ebi, the inability to grow adequate food crops for local consumption, the inability to use our land 

for productive economic purposes, the required reliance on canned imported foods, 

all continued to cause difficulty and hardship. 

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We believe that these past and continuing hardships deserve compensation in addition to compensation for loss of use and cost to restore. This Congress has had 

occasion to address compensation for the relocation of other peoples. For example, 

in 1988 the Congress enacted the Civil Liberties Act, Pub. L. 100-383 to compensate 

(1) the persons of Japanese ancestry living in the U.S. who were forcibly relocated 

to internment camps from March 1942 to January 1946; and (2) the Aleutian islanders who were relocated from their home islands during and after World War II. The 

range of hardships damages per year can be calculated as between $7,000 per year 

per person to $10,000 per year per person. We argued that such and other comparisons demonstrate that the Enewetak people should receive $10,000 per year for each 

of the years they lived on Ujelang. 

The Tribunal awarded $4,500 per year per person resident on Ujelang for 16 of 

the most difficult years; and $3,000 per year per person resident on Ujelang for the 

remaining 17 years. 

NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AWARD TO THE ENEWETAK PEOPLE

The Total award to for damages we suffered as a result of the nuclear testing program is $386 million. This includes the original award of $325 million plus an 

amendment to include $16 million for soil rehabilitation and revegetation that was 

inadvertently omitted from the original award, and a subsequent amendment to include $45 million for interest at the rate of 7% per annum on the past loss of use 

portion of the award to the date of the award. 

To summarize, the Tribunal awarded the following as full and just compensation:

Millions 

1. Cost to restore: .................................................................................... $108

2. Loss of Use: .......................................................................................... $244

3. Hardship: ............................................................................................. $34

Total .................................................................................................. $386

Unfortunately, the Tribunal does not have the money to pay the award. 

CONCLUSION

Although the $386 million award is a significant amount, it is only a fraction of 

the amount that was expended to create the damage at Enewetak. It is also a fraction of the amount necessary to cleanup sites in the U.S. contaminated as a result 

of the nuclear weapons testing program. The U.S. DOE recently revised its cleanup 

estimates upwards to $168 billion to $212 billion for the cleanup of U.S. sites contaminated as a result of the nuclear weapons testing program. 

It is also noteworthy that a few years ago the U.S. Congress appropriated over 

$400 million for the cleanup of Kahoolawe Island, yet that site is affected by material that is non-nuclear and non-toxic. 

The citizens of the U.S. benefited greatly by having the nuclear testing conducted 

far from the U.S. mainland thereby avoiding the damaging health and environmental consequences of radioactive fallout. Enewetak’s land, lagoon and reef were 

sacrificed for the benefit of the people of the United States. We bore, and continue 

to bear, the burden of a damaged and radiation-contaminated homeland. We also 

endured suffering and hardship the consequences of which continue to affect our 

community to this day. The U.S. accepted responsibility for the damages it caused 

at Enewetak, and it agreed that the Tribunal was to determine just compensation. 

It has done so. Now the award must be addressed. Fairness and justice require that 

the Tribunal award of $386 million be addressed by the U.S. Congress. 

The award could be addressed by funding it through the Changed Circumstances 

Petition process that has been presented to the Congress. Alternatively, the Congress could direct the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit to review and 

certify, or to reject in whole or in part, the award of the Tribunal similar to an existing Congressional provision that deals with judgments of the Marshall Islands 

courts against the U.S. arising from its administration of the Marshall Islands 

under the U.N. Trusteeship. 

Funding of the award would permit us to rid our land of radiological contamination, rehabilitate the soil, re-vegetate the land, resettle the Enjebi people on their 

home island, and provide the means by which we could establish a local economy 

in the fishing and tourism sectors. The funding would permit us to once again become self-reliant and self-sufficient. 

It is only by addressing the award that the U.S. can satisfy its obligations to us 

that were so clearly described in the memorandum attached to President Truman’s 

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1 Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974), quoting 

Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railroad Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890). 2Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, 61 Stat. 3301, 80th 

Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), Art. 6, Sec. 2. 

directive removing us from Enewetak and causing use of our atoll for nuclear weapons testing. 

Thank you for permitting us to submit this statement. 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN M. WEISGALL ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLES OF BIKINI, 

ENEWETAK, RONGELAP AND UTROK

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving the peoples of the four atolls of Bikini, 

Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrok the opportunity to testify on issues relating to the 

changed circumstances petition contained in the Compact of Free Association. I have 

served as legal counsel to the people of Bikini Atoll since 1974, but I am submitting 

this joint statement on behalf of the four atolls that were most directly affected by 

the U.S. nuclear testing program in the Marshall Islands. 

For decades, Congress has recognized and addressed the special needs of the peoples of the four atolls, and we are pleased to submit our written testimony to supplement the oral testimony of Utrok’s Senator Hiroshi Yamamura in order to make 

this hearing record more complete, especially with respect to factual and legal issues 

involving the Compact Section 177 Agreement. 

Our issue is simple: We all filed lawsuits against the United States in the 1980s 

for the property damage inflicted on our atolls and, in some cases, for personal injuries as well. Those claims were dismissed by U.S. courts as part of the overall Compact Section 177 Agreement, pursuant to which the United States and the Republic 

of the Marshall Islands (RMI) governments established the Nuclear Claims Tribunal 

to hear these claims. The Tribunal has made awards to the peoples of Bikini and 

Enewetak, and will issue ones soon to Rongelap and Utrok, but it lacks the funds 

to pay any of these awards. 

Those lawsuits are property rights protected by the takings clause of the Fifth 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which has been found to apply to the Marshall 

Islands. Under well established Supreme Court decisions going back to 1890, Congress has every right to close the doors of U.S. courts to lawsuits and take away 

those property rights as long as it provided for an alternative method of compensation and provided that at the time of the taking there is ‘‘reasonable, certain and 

adequate provision for obtaining compensation.’’ 1

The Tribunal has paid out less than one-half of one percent of these judgments 

because it lacks the necessary funds. For the United States to throw these lawsuits 

out of U.S. courts, to establish such a Tribunal to resolve these claims, and then 

to fail to fund the Tribunal adequately constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the nuclear victims’ property, makes the establishment of the Tribunal a 

hoax, makes a mockery of the Compact, and arguably renders the Compact null and 

void. 

The executive branch of the U.S. Government refused to negotiate with the RMI 

on this issue in the recent Compact talks. There is a clear and simple solution to 

the problem if Congress is willing to implement it. If not, the four atolls will have 

no choice but to return to court to continue what in some cases has been more than 

a 30-year history of suing the United States to force it to own up to the damage 

it caused to the citizens of the Marshall Islands in the course of spending trillions 

of dollars to win the Cold War. 

II. BACKGROUND ON NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

In the 12-year period from 1946-1958, after moving the peoples of Bikini and 

Enewetak off their atolls, the United States conducted 67 atomic and hydrogen atmospheric bomb tests there, with a total yield of 108 megatons. This is 98 times 

greater than the total yield of all the U.S. tests in Nevada. Put another way, the 

total yield of the tests in the Marshall Islands was equivalent to 7,200 Hiroshima 

bombs. That works out to an average of more than 1.6 Hiroshima bombs per day 

for the 12-year nuclear testing program in the Marshalls. During these years, the 

Marshall Islands was a United Nations Trust Territory administered by the United 

States, which had pledged to the United Nations to ‘‘protect the inhabitants against 

the loss of their land and resources.’’ 2

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3See, e.g., Peter Pringle and James Spigelman, The Nuclear Barons (Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1981) pp. 243-59. 4 New York Times, March 25, 1954, pp. 1, 18. 5 Jonathan M. Weisgall, Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll (Naval Institute Press 1994), pp. 304-05. 6Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1978, p. 3. 7 Edwin J. Martin and Richard H. Rowland, Castle Series (Defense Nuclear Agency Report No. 

6035F 1954), pp. 3, 235; Robert A. Conard et al., A Twenty-Year Review of Medical Findings 

in a Marshallese Population Accidentally Exposed to Radioactive Fallout (Brookhaven National 

Laboratory 1974), pp. 59-76, 81-86). 8 Compact Section 177 Agreement, Article I, Section 2. 

Radioactive fallout from one of those tests—the March 1, 1954 Bravo shot at Bikini—drifted in the wrong direction and irradiated the 236 inhabitants of Rongelap 

and Utrok Atolls as well as the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel. Bravo, the largest 

U.S. nuclear test in history with an explosive force equal to nearly 1,000 Hiroshimatype atomic bombs, touched off a huge international controversy that eventually led 

to the U.S. moratorium on atmospheric nuclear testing and the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.3 President Eisenhower told a press conference that 

U.S. scientists were ‘‘surprised and astonished’’ at the test, and a year later the 

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) admitted that about 7,000 square miles downwind of the shot ‘‘was so contaminated that survival might have depended upon 

prompt evacuation of the area. . . .’’ 4 Put another way, if Bravo had been detonated 

in Washington, DC, and the fallout pattern had headed in a northeast direction, it 

would have killed everyone from Washington to New York, while near-lethal levels 

of fallout would stretch from New England to the Canadian border.5

The statistics 59 years after testing began:

• The Bikinians have been exiled from their homeland since 1946, except for a 

brief period after President Johnson announced in 1968 that Bikini was safe. 

Many of the islanders returned and lived there until 1978, when medical tests 

by U.S. doctors revealed that the people had ingested what may have been the 

largest amounts of radioactive material of any known population, and the people were moved off immediately. It turned out that an AEC scientist made a 

careless mathematical error, throwing off by a factor of 100 the radioactive dose 

the returning Bikinians would receive. ‘‘We just plain goofed,’’ the scientist told 

the press.6

• Approximately half the Enewetak population cannot return to their home islands in the northern part of the atoll, where radiation still renders the islands 

too radioactive. The Runit Dome, containing over 110,000 cubic yards of radioactive contaminants, remains on Enewetak Atoll. • At least four islands at Bikini and five at Enewetak were completely or partially vaporized during the testing program. • Although they were over 100 miles from Bikini, the people of Rongelap received 

a radiation dose from Bravo equal to that received by Japanese people less than 

two miles from ground zero at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They suffered from radiation poisoning, all but two of the nineteen children who were under ten at 

the time of Bravo developed abnormal thyroid nodules, and there has been one 

leukemia death.7 The people were moved off the islands for three years after 

the Bravo shot, and they moved off again in 1985 amid concerns about radiation 

dangers. • The people of Utrok were returned to their home atoll a mere three months 

after Bravo and were exposed to high levels of residual fallout in the ensuing 

years. This unnecessary exposure led to thyroid problems and other cancers. • The inhabitants of Rongelap and Utrok were the subjects of a medical research 

program designed to understand the effects of ionizing radiation, and they continue to suffer from radiation-related diseases. Indeed, recent Department of 

Energy whole body counting data has shown that the people living on Utrok are 

still exposed to radioactive cesium-137. 

III. 1980S COURT CASES AND THE COMPACT

In the 1980s, the peoples of the four atolls and other Marshall Islanders brought 

lawsuits against the United States for property and other damages totaling more 

than $5 billion. During the litigation, the U.S. and RMI governments signed the 

Compact and the subsidiary Section 177 Agreement, which established a $150 million Nuclear Fund, income from which was earmarked for the peoples of the four 

atolls ‘‘as a means to address past, present, and future consequences of the Nuclear 

Testing Program.’’ 8 Income was also earmarked to fund a Nuclear Claims Tribunal, 

which was established with ‘‘jurisdiction to render final determination upon all 

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9 Id., Article IV, Section 1(a). 10 Id., Articles X and XII. 11Juda v. United States, 13 Cl.Ct. 667, 688 (1987). He repeated this point later: ‘‘Plaintiffs 

are not deprived of every forum. An alternative tribunal to provide compensation has been provided.’’ Id. at 689. 12 As the noted constitutional scholar Gerald Gunther wrote, ‘‘[A]ll agree that Congress cannot 

bar all remedies for enforcing federal constitutional rights.’’ Gunther, ‘‘Congressional Power to 

Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate,’’ 36 

Stan.L.Rev. 895, 921 n. 113 (1984). 13 Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974), quoting 

Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railroad Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890). 14 453 U.S. 654, 689 (1981). 15Juda v. United States, supra, 13 C1.Ct. at 689. 16People of Enewetak, Rongelap and other Marshall Islands Atolls v. United States, 864 F.2d 

134, 136 (Ct. App. Fed. Cir. 1988). 

claims past, present and future, of the Government, citizens, and nationals of the 

Marshall Islands which are based on, arise out of, or are in any way related to the 

Nuclear Testing Program.’’ 9

The Section 177 Agreement also provides that it constitutes the full settlement 

of all claims, ‘‘past, present and future,’’ of Marshall Islanders and their government 

against the United States arising out of the testing program, and another section 

provides that all such claims pending in U.S. courts are to be dismissed.10

Faced with these provisions, Judge Harkins of the U.S. Claims Court dismissed 

the nuclear cases after the Compact went into effect, but he emphasized that ‘‘in 

none of these cases has Congress abolished plaintiffs’ rights. The Compact recognizes the United States obligations to compensate for damages from the nuclear 

testing program and the Section 177 Agreement establishes an alternative tribunal 

[the Nuclear Claims Tribunal] to provide such compensation.’’ 11 Judge Harkins recognized the obvious point that Congress cannot close the doors of U.S. courts to a 

constitutional taking claim unless it provides for an alternative method of compensation.12 However, the exercise of this power, as noted by the U.S. Supreme 

Court, is subject to the overriding requirement that ‘‘there must be at the time of 

taking ‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation.’ ’’ 13

A situation nearly identical to this one arose in Dames & Moore v. Regan, in 

which the United States dismissed pending claims against Iran under the agreement for the release of the U.S. hostages. The plaintiff, which owned one of these 

claims, argued that the alternative forum provided by that agreement, the U.S.-Iran 

Claims Tribunal, would not provide ‘‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision for 

obtaining compensation,’’ because its claim might not be paid in full. The Supreme 

Court found that the Tribunal was an adequate alternative forum and therefore 

upheld the agreement, noting, however, that the Claims Court remained open ‘‘to 

the extent petitioner believes it has suffered an unconstitutional taking by the suspension of the claims.’’ 14

Applying this same standard, Judge Harkins found that the ‘‘settlement procedure, as effectuated through the Section 177 Agreement, provides a ‘reasonable’ and 

‘certain’ means for obtaining compensation.’’ However, he was not so sure about 

whether the procedure would provide adequate funding: ‘‘Whether the compensation 

in the alternative procedures . . . is adequate is dependent upon the amount and 

type of compensation that ultimately is provided through these procedures.’’ In essence, he imposed an ‘‘exhaustion of remedies’’ test for the claimants: Because the 

Nuclear Claims Tribunal was not yet in existence, he held that ‘‘[w]hether the settlement provides ‘adequate’ compensation cannot be determined at this time. . . . 

This alternative procedure for compensation cannot be challenged judicially until it 

has run its course.’’ 15

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reached a similar 

conclusion: ‘‘Congress intended the alternative procedure [the Nuclear Claims Tribunal] to be utilized, and we are unpersuaded that judicial intervention is appropriate at this time on the mere speculation that the alternative remedy may prove 

to be inadequate.’’ 16

Seventeen years have passed since that court’s decision, and history has shown 

that the peoples of the four atolls were right: The Nuclear Claims Tribunal has ‘‘run 

its course,’’ to use Judge Harkins’ phrase, and it cannot pay these claims. After 

lengthy trials, it awarded $386 million to the people of Enewetak for loss of use, 

restoration, and hardship, and $563 million to the people of Bikini, but it has paid 

out less than one-half of one percent of these awards. Unlike the Dames & Moore 

case, where the alternative system of relief—the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal—was 

108

17Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 687. 18See also Justice Powell, concurring, id. at 691: ‘‘The Court holds that parties whose valid 

claims are not adjudicated or not fully paid may bring a ‘taking’ claim against the United States 

in the Court of Claims, the jurisdiction of which this Court acknowledges. The Government must 

pay just compensation when it furthers the Nation’s foreign policy goals by using as ‘bargaining 

chips’ claims lawfully held by a relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of our 

courts.’’ 19Dick Thornburgh et al., ‘‘The Nuclear Claims Tribunal of the Republic of the Marshall Islands: An Independent Examination and Assessment of its Decision-Making Process’’ (Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, LLP 2003), p. 2. 20Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Brookings Institution Press 1998), pp. 101-03. The dollar figures in this book, 

expressed in 1996 dollars, have been updated through 2004 using a cumulative Consumer Price 

Index increase of 21.9% from 1996-2004. See http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm#tables. 21 Id. at 61-62. 22 Id. at 63. 23 Id. at 65-75. 24 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Thirteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission (1953), p. 18. 

appropriate because it was ‘‘capable of providing meaningful relief,’’ 17 the remedy 

here was simply not adequate.18

IV. BONA FIDES OF THE NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND SIZE OF ITS AWARDS

Before discussing a possible Congressional solution to this dilemma, it may be 

useful to address head-on two contentious questions: First, was the Nuclear Claims 

Tribunal process valid or did the ‘‘home field’’ advantage result in skewed and inflated awards? Second, how should Congress deal with what some describe as the 

‘‘sticker shock’’ of these awards? 

As to the first question, we direct your attention to a May 20, 2005 letter to 

Chairman Pombo from former U.S. Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, who conducted an independent investigation of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. ‘‘Simply stated,’’ Attorney General Thornburgh writes, ‘‘the report finds that the [Nuclear Claims 

Tribunal] fulfilled the basic functions for which it was created in a reasonable, fair 

and orderly manner, and with adequate independence, based on procedures, closely 

resembling legal systems in the United States, that are entitled to respect.’’

The Thornburgh report also concluded that property damage claims before the 

Tribunal have been asserted through class action vehicles similar to those used in 

the United States, with litigation ‘‘characterized by the kind of legal briefing, expert 

reports, and motion practice that would be found in many U.S. court proceedings,’’ 

and hearing procedures and rules of evidence that resemble those used in administrative proceedings in the United States.19

As to the second issue—the amount of the Tribunal’s awards—we wish to bring 

the following points to the attention of this Committee:

• The people of Bikini presented cleanup options that ranged as high as $1 billion. The option selected by the Tribunal, with a cost of just over $250 million, 

is the same cleanup method recommended by the U.S. Department of Energy’s 

contractor, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 

• These cleanup costs must be considered in the context of the cost of the tests 

themselves. Defense Department costs for all nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands exceeded $5.2 billion.20 Civilian costs are harder to calculate, but in 

transferring its materials, facilities and properties to the new AEC in 1946, the 

Manhattan Project spent $3.8 billion to manufacture nine new atomic bombs 

and continue research.21 The AEC spent over $4.3 billion from July 1, 1946 

through June 30, 1947,22 and from 1948-1958, the AEC spent nearly $130 billion on production research, development, and testing of nuclear weapons.23

• The United States never questioned the cost or value of the nuclear tests at Bikini and Enewetak, because they assured U.S. nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union and led to immediate savings of billions of dollars in the Defense 

Department budget in the late 1940s and 1950s. As the AEC told Congress in 

1953: ‘‘Each of the tests involved a major expenditure of money, manpower, scientific effort and time. Nevertheless, in accelerating the rate of weapons development, they saved far more than their cost.’’ 24

• Although the Compact Section 177 Agreement states that it constitutes the full 

settlement of all claims arising out of the nuclear testing program, other sections of the Compact make clear that Congress intended to leave the door open 

for other funding programs for the four atolls. For example:

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25Status Report on Path to Closure (U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental 

Management) (March 2000) at 11 (http://web.em.doe.gov/closure/fy2000/index.html); Closure 

Planning Guidance (U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management) (June 

1, 2004) at 14; http://www.em.doe.gov/vgn/images/portal/citl1819/26/34/94385 

VolllFinallPrintedlVersionlWord4.pdf. 26 Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure (U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental 

Management) (June 1998) at 2, 5-8. See also Environmental Management: Program Budget Totals (FY 1998 - FY 2000) and Environmental Management’s FY 2000 Congressional Budget Request. 27 Environmental Management: Progress & Plans of the Environmental Management Program 

(November 1996) (DOE/EM-0317) at 120; Closure Planning Guidance, supra n. 25, at 35, 65-

66. 28See http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/omp/omi/TrelSysClaimsToDateSum.pdf. 29Thornburgh Report, supra n. 17 at 3. 30Thomas Lum, et al., ‘‘Republic of the Marshall Islands Changed Circumstances Petition to 

Congress,’’ Congressional Research Service Report RL32811 (March 14, 2005) at 6 (hereinafter 

‘‘CRS report’’).

• Section 103(h)(2) of the Compact of Free Association Act (Pub. L. 99-239) established the Enewetak Food and Agriculture Program, which Congress has 

funded for 19 years at an annual amount of between $1.1 and $1.8 million 

because it recognized the challenge of providing food to the Enewetak people. • Section 103 (i) authorized funding for the radiological cleanup of Rongelap Island, and Congress subsequently appropriated $45 million for a Rongelap resettlement trust fund. • Article VI of the Section 177 Agreement ‘‘reaffirms’’ the U.S. ‘‘commitment to 

provide funds for the resettlement of Bikini Atoll,’’ and Section 103 (1) of the 

Compact declares that ‘‘it is the policy of the United States . . . that because 

the United States . . . rendered Bikini Atoll unsafe for habitation . . ., the 

United States will fulfill its responsibility for restoring Bikini Atoll to habitability. . . . Congress subsequently appropriated $90 million for the radiological cleanup of Bikini Atoll. See Pub. L. No. 100-446.

• The Department of Energy’s budget for the cleanup of radioactive, chemical and 

other hazardous waste at 53 U.S. nuclear weapons production and development 

sites in 23 states dwarfs the numbers under consideration here. That cleanup 

program has been estimated to cost between $168-$212 billion.25 Congress ap- propriated an average of $5.75 billion annually for the program in the late 

1990s, and it is anticipated that this funding level will continue at this rate indefinitely.26

• The U.S. Government spent more than $10 billion at the Hanford, Washington 

nuclear weapons site without removing one teaspoonful of contaminated soil.27

That is what DOE has spent on studying radiation problems at an area exposed 

to a miniscule percentage of the radiation that was unleashed in the Marshall 

Islands. 

• The U.S. Government has already approved compensation claims of more than 

$917 million to claimants were on-site at Nevada nuclear tests, those downwind 

from the testing, and those working in radioactive mines.28 The nuclear tests 

in Nevada were nearly 100 times smaller in magnitude that the tests conducted 

in the Marshall Islands.29

V. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

As suggested by the March 14, 2005 Congressional Research Service report on the 

changed circumstances petition listing Congress’ policy options, the RMI government and the four atolls urge you to adopt the legislation to ‘‘[a]llow the federal 

courts . . . to review the judgments of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal and potentially 

to order the United States to pay these awards, in whole or in part.’’ 30 The legislation would read as follows: 

Section 103(g) of United States Public Law 99-239 (99 Stat. 1775) is 

amended by adding a new paragraph (3) as follows: 

Judgments of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal established pursuant to Article IV of the Section 177 Agreement with respect to claims for loss or damage to property or person that have not been fully paid or otherwise satisfied may be presented for review and certification to the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or its successor court, which shall 

have jurisdiction therefor, notwithstanding the provisions of Article X, XI, 

and XII of the Section 177 Agreement or 28 U.S.C. 1502, for the limited 

purposes set forth in this paragraph only, and which court’s decisions shall 

be reviewable as provided by the laws of the United States. The United 

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31See ‘‘Opening Statement of Hon. Gerald M. Zackios, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chief 

Compact Negotiator, 4th Round of RMI-U.S. Compact Negotiations, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 

28-29, 2002 at 8-9: See also March 27, 2003 letter from Albert V. Short, U.S. Compact Negotiator, to Republic of the Marshall Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs Gerald Zackios: ‘‘We cannot. . . address requests for any additional assistance related to the Nuclear Testing Program 

since this issue is on a separate track. It is now before Congress via the RMI’s request submitted under the changed circumstances provision of the Agreement between the U.S. and the 

RM.I for the implementation of section 177 of the Compact . . . [A]n interagency group will 

study the request and respond to Congress separately from the Compact negotiations.’’ 32See U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Report Evaluating the Request of the Government of the 

Republic of the Marshall Islands Presented to the Congress of the United States of America,’’ 

November 2004. 33See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492 and 2509. See also Rule of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Appendix D (Procedure in Congressional Reference Cases), p. 6. 

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall review such judgments, certify them and order payment thereof pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1304, 

unless such court finds, after a hearing, that any such judgment is manifestly erroneous as to law or fact, or manifestly excessive. In either of such 

cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have 

jurisdiction to modify such judgment. In ordering payment, the Court shall 

take into account any prior compensation made by the Nuclear Claims Tribunal as a result of such judgment. In any such certification proceeding the 

Government of the United States shall stand in the place of the Defender 

of the Fund and shall be a party to and may oppose certification or payment of judgments of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal.

This legislation would:

• Put the major component of the ‘‘changed circumstances’’ petition—property 

claims—back where they started, in the courts, which, on a daily basis, deal 

with factual and legal issues concerning damage claims. • Resolve the outstanding legal flaw in the Compact 177 scheme set forth at pp. 

3-5, above, that has resulted from the inability of the Tribunal to pay awards. • Restore to the federal courts the same jurisdiction they have over other claims 

from the Trusteeship era. The proposal closely tracks the language of Section 

174 (c) of the Compact, under which the United States waives sovereign immunity for all claims arising from its previous actions as Administering Authority 

of the Trust Territory, other than those claims settled by the Section 177 Agreement. • Relieve Congress of its traditional role of dealing with these nuclear legacy 

issues. The Section 177 Agreement imposed a political settlement on a legal 

matter. Congress is ill-equipped to resolve these issues, given the need for a detailed review of scientific, medical and legal questions, but courts deal with 

them all the time. • Would provide a source of funding for the nuclear legacy issues other than the 

appropriations process, because any award upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit would be paid from the Claims Court Judgment Fund 

established for awards against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1304. • Would protect the role of the executive branch by ensuring that the Justice Department can appear to oppose payment or offer modifications to any proposed 

award. In addition, any new awards would be discounted by amounts already 

paid under the Compact. • Would be consistent with other Compact provisions (see p. 7, above) that show 

the Section 177 Agreement was not intended to provide total compensation tot 

the peoples of the four atolls.

There are three venues the four atoll groups can pursue to seek redress for this 

issue. The executive branch refused to negotiate the matter during the recent Compact negotiations 31 and ignored the issue in its long-overdue response to the 

changed circumstances petition in January 2005.32 We are now before the legislative 

branch with our proposed legislation, but the clock is running on the judicial front. 

(Another short-term legislative solution may be for Congress to refer these cases to 

the Court of Federal Claims under its congressional reference authority.) 33

The third option is to go to the judicial branch without any enabling legislation. 

Whether—and when—that occurs depends in part on the reaction of this committee 

to our legislative proposal but also on the various timetables the four atolls face in 

bringing legal actions. For example, the Nuclear Claims Tribunal issued its award 

to Enewetak in April 2000. Viewing that judgment as a property claim and facing 

a six-year statute of limitations in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for bringing 

such claims again the United States, Enewetak’s counsel must file a case within 

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34 CRS report at 4, 18, and 21. 35 Id. at 22. 36 Id. 37 Id. 

eleven months at least to protect his clients’ interests. Bikini’s six-year period will 

expire in March 2007, while the other two atolls have yet to receive Tribunal 

awards but expect to be in the same legal posture as Bikini and Enewetak once 

their awards are granted. 

In one sense, payment of the Tribunal’s awards can be seen as part of the 

changed circumstances petition, because no one assumed at the start of the Compact 

that the United States would fail to discharge its responsibility. On the other hand, 

this dilemma stands on its own outside the petition, because it represents an attempt by the United States to wash its hands of legal obligations to people it damaged and other people who, with no real options, gave up their lands to help the 

United States win the Cold War. 

VI. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT

Although we disagree with some of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report’s conclusions, we welcome the report as a significant contribution to the record 

before this committee. In fact, it represents the most conscientious effort of any federal entity to define the legal and policy issues under the Section 177 Agreement 

that Congress must address. That said, the merits of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal’s 

awards—and the inability of the Tribunal to pay them—cannot be dismissed in staff 

reports for Congress. They are real and must be dealt with. 

This testimony is not the appropriate means to respond to the detailed analysis 

and discussion in the CRS study, but the peoples of the four atolls are concerned 

with several key points. We have concerns about the report’s conclusions regarding 

radiation dose estimates in the Marshall Islands as well as the appropriateness of 

U.S. standards for the cleanup of radioactive contaminants in the Marshalls to protect human health and the environment. Those issues, however, are well covered by 

Dr. John Mauro in the testimony he is presenting to you today, so this testimony 

will cover just a few of the key issues concerning the report’s comments on the loss 

of use methodology adopted by the Tribunal in its property claim awards. 

We also have concerns about the report’s conclusions concerning the appraisals of 

Enewetak and Bikini. In general, the CRS report praises the Tribunal’s methodology 

and the appraisal reports it relies on. On not one, but three separate occasions, the 

CRS report states that ‘‘the methodology used by the Nuclear Claims Tribunal to 

estimate the value of the lost use of the claimants’ property is considered to be reasonable and appropriate.’’ 34 It also embraces the methodology of the appraisal report relied on by the Tribunal as ‘‘rooted in sound economic and financial theory, 

and the methodology itself is standard methodology used by economist, as well as 

the courts, in solving similar problems.’’ 35

Nevertheless, the CRS report raises a number of questions about the appraisals 

of Bikini and Enewetak. The appraisers employed by those atolls have responded 

to these criticisms and questions with a six-page letter, which we look forward to 

sharing with the CRS staff, especially as the report states on page 2 that this report 

will be updated. A few of the issues are covered below:

• The report criticizes the appraisals for using ‘‘lease transactions from distance 

atolls which may not reflect the rents on Enewetak and Bikini.’’ 36 In fact, there 

were no leases from these two atolls, so the appraisers prepared the most comprehensive database of real estate transactions ever compiled in the Marshall 

Islands, and later refined these 500-plus transactions to 196 after eliminating 

non-arms-length deals, non-cash considerations, duplicates, and records without 

adequate documentation. This database is: nondiscriminatory; representative of 

overall market activity in the Marshalls; accepted by numerous other appraisal 

organizations; and the best information available. 

• The report criticizes the resulting data as reflecting ‘‘rents set by government 

decree rather than as the equilibrium of supply and demand for the use of land 

in a competitive real estate market.’’37 However, this rate has been the dominant factor in the marketplace, as more than half the transactions studied involve leases between private parties who by mutual agreement adopted the 

then-existing government rate, and many leases actually indexed the government rate for future escalations and renewals. 

• The report questions the use of comparables in commercial centers as opposed 

to more remote locations in the Marshall Islands. In fact, the appraisers considered—and rejected—good faith payments made to Kwajalein Atoll landowners 

112

for use of Kwajalein as a U.S. military based, which would have increased the 

average rental in the appraisers’ database by about 32 percent. 

• The report argues that vaporized lands should be treated as permanent takings, 

and their values calculated that way, but fee simple doesn’t exist in the Marshalls; no one can sell their birthright ownership in land. These cases involved 

loss of use, not loss of ownership.

Again, we appreciate your willingness to consider our views, and we and our legal 

representatives are available at any time to work with you and your staff. 

Thank you, and we welcome any follow-up questions from staff. 

INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH

[Press Release] 

CANCER RISKS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN DUE TO RADIATION EXPOSURE FAR

HIGHER THAN FOR MEN

NEW NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPORT RAISES MAJOR ISSUES FOR RADIATION

PROTECTION, INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE CLAIMS

Takoma Park, Maryland, July 7, 2005: The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 

latest report on radiation risk, called the BEIR VII report, issued June 29, has 

major implications on how radiation protection regulations are made and enforced, 

according to the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER). ‘‘BEIR’’ 

stands for the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation. The NAS report issued this 

week updates the BEIR V report issued in 1990. The BEIR series of reports are the 

most authoritative basis for radiation risk estimation and radiation protection regulations in the United States. 

‘‘In 1990, the NAS estimated that the risks of dying from cancer due to exposure 

to radiation were about five percent higher for women than for men,’’ said Dr. Arjun 

Makhijani, president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. ‘‘In 

BEIR VII, the cancer mortality risks for females are 37.5 percent higher. The risks 

for all solid tumors, like lung, breast, and prostate, added together are almost 50 

percent greater for women than men, though there are a few specific cancers, including leukemia, for which the risk estimates for men are higher.’’ (Summary estimates are in Table ES-1 on page 28 of the BEIR VII report prepublication copy, on 

the Web at http://books.nap.edu/books/030909156X/html/28.html.) 

Unlike the 1990 NAS report, BEIR VII estimates risks for cancer incidence rates 

as well as mortality and also provides detailed risk figures according to age of exposure for males and females, by cancer type. This is a great advance over the previous report. The BEIR VII report has thoroughly reviewed available human and 

animal cancer data and scientific understanding arrived at using cellular level studies. Cancer risk incidence figures for solid tumors for women are also about double 

those for men. 

The BEIR VII report estimates that the differential risk for children is even greater. For instance, the same radiation in the first year of life for boys produces three 

to four times the cancer risk as exposure between the ages of 20 and 50. Female 

infants have almost double the risk as male infants. (Table 12 D-1 and D-2, on 

pages 550-551 of the prepublication copy of the report, on the Web starting at http:/

/books.nap. edu/books/03090915 6X/html/5 50.html).

Æ