SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0250-19

DESHONDA RENFRO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

and EVA'S VILLAGE, INC.,

Defendants-Respondents.

__________________________

Argued April 27, 2021 – Decided May 13, 2021

Before Judges Haas and Natali.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of 

Labor, Docket No. 185,241.

Deshonda Renfro, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Sean Patrick Havern, Deputy Attorney General, argued 

the cause for respondent Board of Review (Gurbir S. 

Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Dipti Vaid 

Dedhia, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Appellant Deshonda Renfro appeals from the August 28, 2019 decision of 

the Board of Review (Board) affirming a decision of the Appeal Tribunal

(Tribunal) that she was disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits 

under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because she left her job voluntarily without good 

cause attributable to the work. We affirm.

Appellant was employed as a case manager by Eva's Village Inc. from 

February 1, 2018 until she quit her job on May 22, 2019. Prior to resigning from 

her position, appellant sent an email to her supervisor on April 24, 2019, "which 

detailed allegations of bullying, harassment and hostile working conditions 

between" August 1, 2018 and April 18, 2019. According to the employer's 

grievance policy, an employee is required to report incidents of this nature 

within five days of their occurrence. Even though appellant did not comply with 

this requirement, the supervisor and the employer's Human Resources (HR) 

representative met with appellant on April 26 to discuss her concerns.

At the meeting, appellant stated she felt that she was being bullied 

because, among other things, a group meeting she was assigned "to facilitate" 

was cancelled ninety minutes before it was to take place; appellant's supervisor 

once asked her if she "was okay"; two colleagues allegedly sent text messages 

to each other during a meeting; and her colleagues did not respond 
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enthusiastically when one of appellant's clients did well on her culinary school 

report card. Appellant also complained that two of her co-workers were not 

cooperating with her requests for information she needed to complete written 

reports.1

The HR representative told appellant that the company would investigate 

her allegations, prepare a report, and let her know the outcome. The 

representative explained she would begin the investigation on May 1, but that 

appellant's manager was scheduled to be out of the office on vacation for two 

weeks and the investigation would have to be halted during that period. 

Appellant indicated she understood the situation.

However, appellant sent an email to the HR representative on May 7 and 

asked for the status of the investigation. The representative did not immediately 

respond. On May 8, appellant submitted a resignation letter to the 

representative.2 In the letter, appellant stated Eva's Village was "a wonderful 

organization" and she "truly had a wonderful experience doing what I love." 

Appellant did not refer to her allegations of bullying in the letter and stated she 

1

 Appellant testified that she first brought the problem with the reports to her 

supervisor's attention in April 2018.

2

 Appellant gave two weeks' notice and stated that her resignation would be 

effective on May 22.
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had a "deep love for Newark, New Jersey, Essex County" and was leaving to 

seek work there rather than in Paterson, where Eva's Village is located.3

Appellant filed an application for unemployment benefits, which was 

denied by the Director of Unemployment Insurance because she had left work 

voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. Appellant appealed and 

the Tribunal affirmed the denial of benefits following an administrative hearing. 

The Tribunal found that even though appellant had not followed company 

policy by promptly reporting the alleged bullying incidents, Eva's Village took 

immediate steps to address her allegations after she raised them at the April 26, 

2019 meeting. The HR representative began an investigation of appellant's 

complaints and had already interviewed two of the employees by the time 

appellant's supervisor left for her scheduled vacation. 

Rather than await the supervisor's return and the completion of the 

investigation, appellant resigned from her position. Under these circumstances, 

the Tribunal concluded that appellant "voluntarily quit and has not demonstrated 

3

 Prior to leaving employment, Eva's Village sent a "corrective action 

memorandum" to appellant on April 26, 2019 after appellant forwarded "an 

inflammatory email" sent to her by a former employee to some of her coworkers. The memorandum reminded appellant that as required by the 

employer's policies, she should refrain from "spreading rumors" or "[m]alicious 

gossip" in her "verbal and written communications."
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she took reasonable and necessary steps to preserve her employment prior to 

quitting." Therefore, the Tribunal found that appellant was disqualified for 

unemployment compensation benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The Board 

thereafter affirmed the Tribunal's decision.

This appeal followed. Before us, appellant contends the Board erred in 

finding he was disqualified for benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). We 

disagree.

Our review of an administrative agency decision is limited. Brady v. Bd. 

of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "[I]n reviewing the factual findings made 

in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] 

would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to 

make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the 

proofs." Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. 

Div. 1985)). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible 

evidence, [we] are obligated to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of 

Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). Only if the Board's "action was arbitrary, 

capricious, or unreasonable" should it be disturbed. Ibid.

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

For the week in which the individual has left work 

voluntarily without good cause attributable to such 
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work, and for each week thereafter until the individual 

becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in 

employment . . . and has earned in employment at least 

ten times the individual's weekly benefit rate. 

[N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).]

"Under this section, the threshold question is whether an applicant for 

unemployment compensation benefits left [the] job 'voluntarily.'" Lord v. Bd. 

of Review, 425 N.J. Super. 187, 190-91 (App. Div. 2012). An employee has left 

work "voluntarily" within the meaning of the statute when "the decision whether 

to go or to stay lay at the time with the worker alone." Campbell Soup Co. v. 

Bd. of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 435 (1953). An employee who has left work 

voluntarily has the burden of proving that she "did so with good cause 

attributable to [the] work." Brady, 152 N.J. at 218.

Here, the determination that appellant left work without good cause 

attributable to the work is amply supported by substantial credible evidence in 

the record as a whole and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. After 

appellant brought her concerns to her employer's attention on April 24, 2019, 

the HR representatives met with appellant and began an investigation. At that 

time, appellant knew there would be a two-week delay in the completion of the 

inquiry until her supervisor returned from a scheduled vacation. Rather than 
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waiting that short period of time to obtain a resolution of the matter, appellant 

abruptly quit her position.

Accordingly, the record simply does not support appellant's current 

contention that she was forced to resign due to a "hostile work environment" 

caused by the alleged incidents she described at the April 26 meeting. It is wellestablished that "[m]ere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not 

shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for 

leaving work voluntarily." Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 

288 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Medwick v. Bd. of Review, 69 N.J. Super. 338, 

345 (App. Div. 1961)). "The decision to leave employment must be compelled 

by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances . . . attributable to the work." 

Shuster v. Bd. of Review, 396 N.J. Super. 240, 244-45 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting 

Fernandez v. Bd. of Review, 304 N.J. Super. 603, 606 (App. Div. 1997)). "[I]t 

is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order 

to remain employed." Domenico, 192 N.J. Super. at 288.

Appellant failed to abide by this requirement. Because appellant 

precipitously quit her job before the investigation could be finished, she did not 

take the reasonable steps necessary to remain employed. Under these 

circumstances, the Board's determination that appellant left her position without 
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good cause attributable to the work is amply supported by substantial credible 

evidence in the record as a whole, and is not arbitrary, capricious, or 

unreasonable. Brady, 152 N.J. at 210.

Appellant's remaining contentions also lack merit. Appellant asserts that 

the Appeals Examiner incorrectly prevented her from calling two witnesses at 

the administrative hearing. Appellant described one of these witnesses as "a 

very, very close . . . friend" and roommate. Because this individual had no firsthand knowledge of the matters at issue in this matter, the Appeals Examiner 

advised appellant that this witness was not necessary. 

Appellant stated that the other witness was a former co-worker who was 

present at a meeting where two employees allegedly commented on the fact that 

appellant was friendly with the witness and worked cooperatively with her 

because of that friendship. Appellant, who stated she did not believe she was 

needed at the meeting, took offense at this comment and stated she "felt[] 

personally demeaned by the friendship assertion during the meeting, that I did 

not belong in." Because appellant was fully able to supply the information 

underlying this allegation to the Tribunal, the Appeals Examiner told appellant 

there was no need to call a witness to corroborate her account.
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We discern no error in the Appeals Examiner's rulings. As discussed 

above, the key issue in this matter was whether appellant did what was necessary 

to remain employed after she brought her concerns to the attention of her 

supervisors. Appellant provided all the information that was needed about the 

alleged bullying incidents and her employer's decision to promptly investigate 

them to the Tribunal. Thus, the key issue was whether appellant did "what [was] 

necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed" when she quit her job 

rather than await the completion of the inquiry. Domenico, 192 N.J. Super. at 

288. Neither of appellant's proposed witnesses was able to address that issue 

and, therefore, the Appeals Examiner correctly declined to hear from them.

Appellant also claims that the Appeals Examiner did not read the written 

materials she submitted in advance of the hearing and, therefore, she was not 

prepared to conduct the proceeding. However, the record reveals that the 

Appeals Examiner had a firm handle on the issues presented and gave both 

parties the opportunity to fully present their factual and legal assertions. 

Therefore, appellant's contention lacks sufficient merit to warrant further 

discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Finally, appellant argues that she was required to leave her job for medical 

reasons caused by the stress of the alleged bullying she encountered at Eva's 
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Village. However, it is well established that "[w]hen an individual leaves work 

for health or medical reasons, medical certification shall be required to support 

a finding of good cause attributable to [the] work." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(d). 

Appellant did not provide the Tribunal with a medical certification to support 

her current claim that she was suffering from a medical condition that required 

her to leave her job.4 Therefore, we reject appellant's contention on this point.

To the extent that any of appellant's remaining contentions are not 

specifically addressed herein, we have concluded they lack sufficient merit to 

warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

4

 In the appendix to her reply brief, appellant included an MRI report taken 

approximately four months after she voluntarily quit her job at Eva's Village. 

Because this report was not submitted to the Tribunal, we do not consider it here.