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22–470 PDF 2005

S. HRG. 109–71

STRENGTHENING ENFORCEMENT AND BORDER SECURITY: THE 9/11 COMMISSION STAFF REPORT

ON TERRORIST TRAVEL

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, BORDER 

SECURITY AND CITIZENSHIP

AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND 

HOMELAND SECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 14, 2005

Serial No. J–109–6

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

DAVID BROG, Staff Director 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Chief Counsel 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY AND CITIZENSHIP

JOHN CORNYN, Texas, Chairman 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

JAMES HO, Majority Chief Counsel 

JIM FLUG, Democratic Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

JON KYL, Arizona, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

STEPHEN HIGGINS, Majority Chief Counsel 

STEVEN CASH, Democratic Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Page

Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas ............................... 1

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of California ................. 6

Kennedy, Hon. Edward M. a U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts .... 8

Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona .................................... 4

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 82

WITNESSES 

Dezenski, Elaine, Acting Assistant Secretary for Border and Transportation 

Security Policy and Planning, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. ........................................................................................................... 10

Kephart, Janice L., former Staff Counsel for the 9/11 Commission, and Senior 

Consultant, Investigative Project on Terrorism, Mount Vernon, Virginia ...... 27

Meissner, Doris, former Immigration and Naturalization Commissioner, and 

Senior Fellow, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C. .......................... 25

Walters, Thomas J., Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Training and 

Development, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland 

Security, Washington, D.C. ................................................................................. 11

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Elaine Dezenski to questions submitted by Senators Kyl and 

Kennedy ................................................................................................................ 40

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Benesch, Susan, Refugee Advocate, Amnesty International USA, New York, 

New York, statement ........................................................................................... 60

Dezenski, Elaine, Acting Assistant Secretary for Border and Transportation 

Security Policy and Planning, and Thomas J. Walters, Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Training and Development, Customs and Border 

Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., statement ...................................................................................................................... 69

Kephart, Janice L., former Staff Counsel for the 9/11 Commission, and Senior 

Consultant, Investigative Project on Terrorism, Mount Vernon, Virginia, 

statement .............................................................................................................. 78

Meissner, Doris, former Immigration and Naturalization Commissioner, and 

Senior Fellow, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., statement ....... 84

Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Katherine Culliton, 

Legislative Staff Attorney, Washington, D.C., statement ................................. 92

Visa applications of 9/11 hijackers ......................................................................... 105

(1)

STRENGTHENING ENFORCEMENT AND BORDER SECURITY: THE 9/11 COMMISSION 

STAFF REPORT ON TERRORIST TRAVEL 

MONDAY, MARCH 14, 2005

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND

CITIZENSHIP, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY

AND HOMELAND SECURITY, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE

JUDICIARY

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in 

room SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Cornyn, 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security 

and Citizenship] presiding. 

Present: Senators Cornyn, Kyl, Kennedy and Feinstein. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Chairman CORNYN. Good afternoon. This Joint Hearing of the 

Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship, and Senator Kyl’s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology 

and Homeland Security shall come to order. 

First I want to thank Chairman Specter for scheduling this hearing, but I also want to particularly thank Senator Kyl, who chairs 

the Terrorism and Homeland Security Subcommittee, for allowing 

us to meet jointly. The Subcommittee that I chair is the Immigration and Border Security Subcommittee, and there seem to be so 

many common themes and intersections that we thought it would 

just be more efficient to have these two Subcommittees meet together. I look forward to continuing to work with Senator Kyl on 

these issues as we debate immigration reform and security enforcement in the months ahead. 

I also want to express my appreciation to Senator Kennedy, the 

Ranking Member of my Subcommittee on Immigration and Border 

Security, and Senator Feinstein, the ranking Subcommittee member on the Terrorism Subcommittee, and obviously also all the staff 

that have worked so hard to make this hearing possible today. 

Last year I was honored to serve as the Chair of the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights Subcommittee and work 

closely with Senator Feingold, the ranking member. Although we 

parted company on some issues, I found that Senator Feingold was 

always a principled, courteous and devoted Ranking Member of the 

2

Subcommittee and I will certainly miss working with him and his 

staff in that capacity. 

But, I am particularly looking forward to this new responsibility 

on the Immigration and Border Security Subcommittee and working with Senator Kennedy, whose devotion and commitment to immigration issues is longstanding and well known. I think it is especially gratifying to serve on this Immigration Subcommittee at this 

time in our Nation’s history. 

President Bush has articulated to the Nation a vision for comprehensive reform of our immigration laws, in the interest of our 

Nation, in the interest of our security, in the interest of our economy, and in the interest of the rule of law. I am sympathetic to the 

President’s vision and I look forward to the critical role that this 

Subcommittee will play in the coming Congressional debate. 

But before we debate the need for reforming immigration law, we 

should ask ourselves why it is that we have so miserably failed to 

enforce current law. Is it due to lack of resources? Is it due to a 

lack of will? Is it because our current laws are out of sync with economic reality? Or is it for other reasons entirely? No doubt, whatever the reasons, our current immigration system is badly broken. 

It breeds disrespect for the law and imposes serious risks to our 

National security. 

As an American, I am deeply troubled by our chronic inability, 

even our unwillingness at times to do what is necessary to enforce 

our immigration laws. And, although I am proud that we are sometimes called a Nation of immigrants, but I am concerned because 

we are also first and fundamentally a Nation of laws. 

As an American I believe our immigration laws can be designed 

to be both compassionate and humane. At the same time I believe 

our immigration laws must be designed to protect U.S. sovereignty 

and further U.S. interests. 

As an American I understand that our immigration policy can be 

reformed to better serve our National security and our National 

economy. At the same time I understand that unless we can ensure 

enforcement of the law, it is futile to discuss reforming it. 

Toward that end, today’s hearing is just the first in a series of 

hearings on strengthening enforcement, the first in a series of 

hearings to focus attention on the challenges that we face when enforcing our immigration laws. I hope that the series will serve at 

least two purposes. First, the hearings should help us identify 

those challenges to enforcing immigration laws that we can address, such as additional resources and legal tools. Second, the 

hearings may help us consider whether comprehensive immigration 

reform would be helpful to the cause of stronger enforcement of our 

laws. 

Future hearings will look at interior enforcement and the need 

to strengthen our deportation system, because we need to review 

our immigration system from top to bottom. Today’s hearing will 

examine the challenges to enforcement we face at the border. 

It will examine the analysis and recommendations from the border security staff report of the 9/11 Commission, entitled ‘‘9/11 and 

Terrorist Travel.’’ The 9/11 Commission and their staff performed 

a tremendous public service by providing a comprehensive review 

of the facts and circumstances surrounding the attacks of SepVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:06 Dec 19, 2005 Jkt 022470 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\22470.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
3

tember the 11th. I hope that those of us in Congress will never tire 

of reviewing the lessons learned from the failures that led to that 

terrible day. As that report makes clear, defects in our ability to 

enforce our laws and to secure the border pose a threat not only 

to the rule of law, but to the security of our Nation as well. 

Specifically, the border security staff identified several deficiencies in the training of border personnel and several defects 

with regard to our visa policy. The report noted that our immigration inspectors, now called CBP officers, received little 

counterterrorism and behavioral science training, no cultural training, and rarely received follow-up training. They also wrote that 

‘‘critical continuing education on document fraud was rare.’’

The report also recognized that our visa process allowed terrorists to exploit our system and gained extended stays within our 

country. Recognizing this defect, terrorists concentrated on ways to 

exploit legal entry into our country, whether by lying on entry 

forms or using manipulated or fraudulent documents. All but two 

of the nonpilots involved in the 9/11 attacks were admitted as tourists and were granted automatic six-month stays. This allowed 

them to maintain a legal immigration status through the end of the 

9/11 attacks. We should examine the process by which length of 

stay is determined to ensure that inspectors grant an appropriate 

time period to those seeking to enter our country. 

And we should make no mistake, this type of exploitation continues. Just last week FBI Director Mueller testified that he was 

aware of people going to Brazil, assuming false identities and making their way through Mexico to cross the U.S. border with their 

new identities and documents. And recent news reports, as recently 

as today, cite intelligence officials who believe that Al Zarqawi has 

considered plans to enter the United States in this very fashion. 

The border security report makes clear all of the 9/11 attackers 

entered our country through a legitimate port of entry, passing 

through border security 68 times prior to carrying out their deadly 

attacks. These border encounters are the time to detect and arrest 

those who use document fraud and manipulation to enter. Immigration inspectors must receive periodic updated training about 

document manipulation, fraud and other illicit methods used to 

enter our country because these inspectors are in the best position 

to stop those who come here to do us harm. 

But we also know that al Qaeda and other terrorists plot their 

attacks and modify their plans over long periods of time. Undoubtedly they will attempt to gain entry to the United States undetected between ports of entry. 

I recently flew with the border patrol over the Texas-Mexico border around Laredo, Texas, and I must tell you, from what I saw 

there and reported back to my colleagues, I am concerned that our 

expansive and porous border leaves our country vulnerable still 

today. 

This vulnerability was highlighted by Deputy Homeland Security 

Secretary Admiral James Loy in recent testimony before the Intelligence Committee. He said: ‘‘Recent information from ongoing investigations, detentions and emerging threat streams, strongly suggest that al Qaeda had considered using the Southwest border to 

infiltrate the United States. Several al Qaeda leaders believe 

4

operatives can pay their way into the country through Mexico and 

also believe that illegal entry is more advantageous than legal 

entry for operational security reasons.’’

It is imperative that we find a solution to this exposure. Clearly, 

a part of the ultimate resolution is well-equipped, trained and 

funded border patrol agents and inspectors. 

Our front line border personnel are highly dedicated and loyal 

public servants. They process visitors in a timely fashion to avoid 

legitimate travel and commerce backlogs, while simultaneously 

identifying those who should not be allowed to enter into our country. This is a high stress job, particularly in the post 9/11 environment. 

Yet we will never have effective enforcement at our borders unless we adequately train the people we task with carrying out this 

job, and the thought that inspectors may unwillingly facilitate the 

introduction of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction or illegal 

drugs into this country because they have not received the information or training they need is simply unacceptable. 

That is why we have to do everything in our power to ensure 

that these front line defenders have all that they need in order to 

get the job done. 

I hope to hear today how the Department of Homeland Security 

has enhanced their training programs to reflect the increased importance of our front line inspectors’ role in the defense of our 

country, and how the Department of Homeland Security considers 

and grants visas to ensure the system is not exploited. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Cornyn appears as a submission for the record.] 

With that, let me turn the floor over to Senator Kyl, and then 

to Senator Kennedy and Senator Feinstein for any remarks they 

may have. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA 

Chairman KYL. Thank you very much, Senator Cornyn. 

I too want to welcome all of you to this hearing in which we will 

examine the work of the Department of Homeland Security and its 

efforts to ensure that terrorists are not permitted to travel to this 

country posing as legitimate visitors. 

I too recently visited our border in Arizona, and it is very clear 

that our border control continues to face enormous challenges in 

keeping out the people who cross illegally. 

Our hearing today is going to try to focus more on how people 

get documents to come into the country legally, and the reasons 

that we know this was a problem is because of the 9/11 hijackers, 

which I will get into in just a moment. But we are very interested 

in the work that the Department of Homeland Security is performing in our consulates abroad because this is often the first 

place that our United States representatives have to encounter foreign nationals who seek to enter our country, and it is there that 

we begin the process of ensuring the integrity of the visa application and issuance process. 

We count on professionals staffing our consular offices to extend 

our welcome to the world, but also to keep a watchful eye on travVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:06 Dec 19, 2005 Jkt 022470 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\22470.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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elers who seek to exploit the system in order to do us harm or violation to our immigration laws. 

The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 

2002 added safeguards to ensure that visa applicants were better 

screened, first by mandating specialized training for the consular 

officers to recognize terrorists or terrorist threats; second, requiring 

the State Department to electronically share information on visa 

applicants with the Department of Homeland Security; and third, 

by mandating that travel documents and passports contain biometric identifiers and features whereby we can authenticate the person 

applying for the particular kind of visa, and that these identifiers 

by machine readable and tamper resistant. 

We have expressed grave concern with the way that the consular 

officers in the past screened or even sometimes failed to screen 

would-be travelers to the United States, and with the guidance 

that they receive from the State Department. 

I authored an amendment for inclusion in last year’s intelligence 

reform legislation that was prompted by a finding of the 9/11 Commission and its recommendation that most foreign nationals should 

be personally interviewed by consular officers before they are 

issued visas. The personal interview is an important part of the 

process of determining whether a foreign national may pose a security risk. The amendment that I authored last year also required 

that visa applications be completely and accurately filled out by the 

applicants in order to be considered for approval. 

Chairman Cornyn, I am going to insert in the record at this point 

a copy of each of the forms that the 9/11 hijackers submitted, 

which reveal clearly the failure to provide information that should 

have been provided to our consular officers, and that should have 

alerted them to the necessity of conducting oral interviews with 

these applicants. 

Chairman CORNYN. Without objection. 

Chairman KYL. All 15 of the visa applications filed by the 9/11 

hijackers contained significant inaccuracies or omissions that 

should have prevented them from obtaining visas, and only two of 

the hijackers were personally interviewed by the State Department 

on their applications. The remainder were simply approved sight 

unseen. 

Now, the Department of Homeland Security has been given the 

responsibility for visa policy and oversight of the visa issuance 

process, so we are interested in learning what progress has been 

made in the security of visa operations, and in particular, look forward to Acting Secretary Dezenski’s testimony on this matter. 

A second line of defense against terrorists trying to enter our 

country is located at the ports of entry. The 9/11 Commission noted 

that no Government agency has systematically analyzed terrorist 

travel strategies, even though our security would have been greatly 

enhanced by such analysis, and that as many as 15 of the 19 hijackers were potentially vulnerable to interception by border authorities, but were not picked up because of the lack of analysis of 

characteristic travel documents and travel patterns. 

The Commission staff report added that Immigration and Naturalization Service inspectors were inadequately trained in the essentials of identifying terrorists, that they had received no 

6

counterterrorism training, were remarkably undertrained in conducting primary inspections and in recognizing fraudulent documents, and that they were not taught the content and value of the 

numerous databases at their disposal, which might have helped 

them identify members of the 9/11 terrorist group. 

We know that DHS has made effort to improve the awareness 

and efficiency of the officers who oversee our borders, and I expect 

that Chief Walters will give us details on the training of those officers. 

Finally, Chairman Cornyn, I am looking forward to the testimony 

of Janice Kephart, who actually worked on my staff for this Subcommittee before she became a member of the 9/11 Commission 

staff. So we have a good hearing today, and let me just say in advance that because a leadership meeting was scheduled over the 

top of this hearing, I will have to leave at just a little bit before 

3:30, but will look forward to the testimony of all of the people who 

provide that testimony after I m gone. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you, Senator Kyl. 

Senator Feinstein, would you care to make any opening remarks? 

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I would. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate this opportunity and I certainly thank 

the witnesses for being here. 

I want to address my remarks to the catch and release program, 

the Visa Waiver Program and stolen immigration related documents, specifically with respect to the Southwest border. 

In 2003 there were 30,147 other than Mexican intrusions. In the 

next year, 2004, which is the latest year for which we have figures, 

there were 44,617. That is a 48 percent increase, which indicates 

that other than Mexicans are seeing the Southwest border as a 

point of vulnerability, going to Mexico and stealing into our country 

through that border. 

In February of 2004, during a Judiciary Immigration Subcommittee hearing, Under Secretary for Border and Transportation 

Security, Asa Hutchinson, responded to questions by Senator 

Grassley regarding the catch and release policy for other than 

Mexicans, or as we will say, OTMs, as follows. His response, and 

I quote, ‘‘At present DHS has no specific policy regarding OTMs apprehended at the Southern border. Well, OTMs, as well as Mexicans, are permitted to withdraw their applications for admission 

and can be returned voluntarily to their country of nationality. As 

a practical matter, this option is not readily available to them as 

it is for Mexicans, whose government will accept them back into 

the Mexican territory. Thus, when apprehended, OTMs are routinely placed in removal proceedings under Immigration and Nationality Act 240. It is not practical to detain all noncriminal OTMs 

during immigration proceedings, and thus most are released.’’ End 

of quote. 

Now it is my understanding that a majority of OTMs later fail 

to appear for their immigration proceedings and simply disappear 

into the United States. So you can look back and say that the likeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:06 Dec 19, 2005 Jkt 022470 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\22470.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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lihood is, in 2004, some 44,000 people other than Mexicans came 

across the border and just disappeared. 

I have looked at the statistics for each country, and the so-called 

countries of concern, Syria, Iran and Iraq, the numbers are up of 

penetrations through our Southwest border. Clearly we are deficient in a mechanism to deal with these. Thus, it seems to me if 

I were a terrorist and I wanted to come into the United States, this 

is the way I would do it. 

The next issue, lost and stolen passports and the Visa Waiver 

Program. I cannot go into great detail, but in the Intelligence Committee I have learned a lot about international drivers license, Geneva Convention travel documents, stolen passports, how they are 

changed, et cetera. I have sent those information bulletins to Mr. 

Chernoff, and so I have brought that to the attention of the Homeland Security Department. I did this last year as well. 

I happen to believe that this is a real problem and the only true 

opportunity we have to screen visa waiver travelers also is through 

the US-VISIT program. In many cases, particularly if the terrorists 

would use airplanes as weapons against us, this would clearly be 

too late. 

I want to give you a quote from Former Inspector General Clark 

Kent Irvin. He stated best in his testimony before the House Committee on International Relations in June of last year when he 

said, and I quote, ‘‘The fundamental premise of the Visa Waiver 

Program is that millions of persons about whom we know little can 

be exempted from Department of State’s ever more rigorous visa 

procedures and permitted to board United States bound planes. As 

we said in our report, the visa is more than a mere stamp in a 

passport. It’s the end result of rigorous screening the bearer must 

undergo before travel.’’ End quote. 

I could not agree more. The Visa Waiver Program involves 28 

countries and 13 million who have come into this country every 

year. The 9/11 report documents the use of the Visa Waiver Program by terrorists, and we have a real problem in that program. 

Let me quote from the April—and I have the December report—of 

the OIG on Visa Waiver Program management. Quote: ‘‘All of the 

officials we spoke to told us that the Visa Waiver Program is not 

properly organized or managed. When INS disbanded it was reassigned to other responsibilities and several officials filled in on an 

interim basis or shared responsibility for Visa Waiver Program requirements. Since the establishment of DHS responsibility is unclear. One CBP official described the Visa Waiver Program as being 

on autopilot in an orphaned status with no designated manager or 

overseer.’’

And then I go on. ‘‘Department of State officials told us, Department of Health, DHS needs to identify who will be responsible for 

the programs. Lines of communication since the reorganization are 

unclear.’’ And this report on pages 13, 14 and 15, is a serious indictment of this program which is really the soft underbelly of our 

Nation’s immigration system because this would allow a terrorist 

to come into this country from any Visa Waiver Program, I think 

with alacrity. 

In my questions, I will ask questions which I think will demonstrate this, but I am most interested to see since these reports 

8

what actions have been taken to tighten up this program. I understand for the biometric passports that the Department is going to 

be coming in for another extension. I put a hold on it for last year. 

I held it up till the very last minute of the Senate, and I was assured that it would be done for this year. I will do the same thing 

in this session if it does not get done, because I truly believe this 

is a dominant weakness with respect to terror in this country, and 

year after year after year the Department has been requested to 

get the computer programs in shape, and hopefully you have been 

able to achieve that now. In any event, I will find out. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

We have been joined now by the Ranking Member of the Immigration and Border Security Subcommittee, Senator Kennedy, and 

we would be happy to hear any opening remarks you might have, 

Senator. 

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let 

me congratulate you on chairing these hearings, and say that all 

of us on this side look forward to working with you on a lot of very 

important issues that are of first importance to families, to our National security and to the kind of country that we are. 

I thank you for calling the hearing and also for having the 9/11 

Commission staff report on terrorist travel, and I commend the 

Commission and staff for their thoughtful analysis of the events 

leading up to 9/11 and for their recommendations for reducing our 

vulnerability to attacks in the future. 

We have made a number of significant improvements since 9/11, 

but no one would argue we have adequately repaired the broken 

system of intelligence, border security and immigration. Better information sharing and training are essential to enable our front 

line officers and inspectors to detect and intercept potential terrorists before they do us harm. 

The Intelligence Reform Act Congress passed last December calls 

for a strategy to combine travel intelligence, operations and law enforcement in a joint effort to intercept terrorists and identify those 

who facilitate their travel. It also requires improvements in technology and training to assist border, consular and immigration officers in this mission, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the progress being made. 

A survey by the American Federation of Government Employees 

last summer found that a majority of the 500 custom and border 

protection officers say they do not have the tools, training or support to stop potential terrorists from entering the country. According to the 9/11 Commission staff report, al Qaeda altered passports 

in four ways: by substituting photos, by adding false entry/exit 

stamps, by removing visas and bleaching stamps, and counterfeiting passports and substituting pages. 

I am also interested in hearing about ways to improve training 

and expedite access to specialists to obtain useful real-time intelligence about the terrorist organizations and operations. We also 

need to respect the civil rights and civil liberties. As the 9/11 ComVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:06 Dec 19, 2005 Jkt 022470 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\22470.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
9

mission stated, we advocate a system for screening, not categorical 

profiling. A screening system looks for particular identifiable suspects or indicators of risk. It does not involve guesswork about who 

might be dangerous. 

Our goal is also to strengthen the security of our borders without 

unduly impeding the legitimate flow of people and commerce. More 

than 30 million foreign nationals enter the United States legally 

each year as tourists, students or temporary workers. And over 400 

million visitors a year cross legally from Canada or Mexico to conduct daily business or visit family members. The goal of our border 

security is to keep out those who pose risks to our security in a 

way that does not seriously undermine the efficient flow of legitimate border traffic that is an essential part of our National economy. 

Persons who obtain tourist visas to enter the U.S. can stay here 

for 6 months even if they only plan to stay for two weeks. Most of 

the 9/11 hijackers entered with tourist visas, and some have argued that routine six-month stays is related to security concerns. 

But limiting the amount of stay in the U.S. could lead to longer inspection lines and discouraging tourism without substantially deterring terrorism. 

So I look forward to learning more from our witnesses about the 

many aspects of the critical issues of border security, and how Congress can be helpful in accumulating the best possible improvements. 

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for conducting the hearings. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. 

We have two distinguished panels this afternoon. The first is 

composed of Elaine Dezenski and Tom Walters. Elaine Dezenski is 

the Acting Assistant Secretary for Policy at the Bureau of Transportation Security for the Department of Homeland Security. She 

was appointed to this position in October of 2004 and works closely 

with the various Department of Homeland Security components 

and other Federal, State and local agencies, as well as foreign governments and industry stakeholders to make the Nation’s border 

and transportation network secure while protecting free movement 

of legitimate goods and people across our borders. 

Joining Assistant Secretary Dezenski on our first panel is Chief 

Tom Walters, the Acting Assistant Commissioner of the Office of 

Training and Development for Customs and Border Protection. 

Chief Walters is a long-time border patrol official with almost 30 

years of border patrol experience. He began his career as a border 

patrol agent in 1975 in El Paso, and I know he got a lot of experience there. He is also a graduate of the first border patrol tactical 

unit class in 1984. BORTAC, as this unit is known, is a highly successful tactical team within CBP that is frequently summoned for 

high risk and difficult missions. BORTAC is tasked with anything 

from suppressing riots and tracking terrorists to intercepting 

human smugglers and drug traffickers. Chief Walters remains associated with that unit today. 

I want to welcome again both of you here in our first panel, and 

why do we not begin with Deputy Dezenski, and then turn to Chief 

Walters. If I could get you to limit your opening statement to about 

10

5 minutes, and then we will proceed with questions from the panel 

and explore both what you have talked about and maybe some 

things you did not have time to talk about during your opening 

statements during the Q&A. 

Ms. Dezenski? 

STATEMENT OF ELAINE DEZENSKI, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

POLICY AND PLANNING, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Thank you very much, Chairman Cornyn, Chairman Kyl, Ranking Member Kennedy, Ranking Member Feinstein. 

On behalf of Secretary Chertoff thank you for the opportunity to 

be here today. As you noted, I am fairly new to my position and 

I look forward to working with both you and your staff, moving forward on border and transportation issues. I am joined by my colleague, Chief Walters, who, as you know, will be talking to you 

today about training of our officers. 

Our goal today is to provide additional visibility into the Department’s efforts to stop the movement of terrorists across our borders. 

I would like to request that my written testimony be submitted 

for the record. 

Chairman CORNYN. Certainly, without objection. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Thank you. 

As a Nation we are proud of our history of immigration and of 

being a destination for visitors across the globe. DHS embraces the 

belief of open doors and secure borders. It captures this common 

sense notion that we should keep criminals and terrorists out of 

the country while we quickly and easily process those who are 

known or low risk. 

Building a system that supports this goal requires the optimal 

use of policy, technology, biometrics, intelligence and operational 

experience, all of which contribute to a layered system that will 

stop terrorists. 

I would like to outline three major elements of this multi-layered 

strategy that we are building. The first is using information more 

effectively. The second is leveraging Government resources, and the 

third is increasing our operational efforts or what we call boots on 

the ground. 

It is no secret that pre-9/11 pertinent intelligence and information was not being shared in a way that would deter the terrorist 

threat. As a result, a multi-layered system to prevent terrorist 

travel into the U.S. that is supported by the collection, storing and 

application of intelligence and information sources throughout the 

Government is a top priority, it must be. Improvements include the 

integration of databases that include terror watchlists, visa 

issuance information and immigration status information, as well 

as the ability for our border patrol to more readily access certain 

types of databases. 

DHS has taken the lead in using biometrics at home and abroad. 

It is part of this information roadmap that we are trying to build. 

The VISIT program is the largest daily use biometric program in 

the world with 100,000 people processed every day, and it is workVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:06 Dec 19, 2005 Jkt 022470 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\22470.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
11

ing. Since January of 2004 the U.S. has denied admission at ports 

of entry to more than 450 individuals based on biometric information alone. 

Leveraging Government resources is another important component of our strategy and one that supports the idea of open doors 

and secure borders. The implementation of visa policy in the U.S. 

has been delegated to the Secretary of DHS, but our work at DHS 

is a close partnership with our colleagues at the State Department. 

Together we are working to secure the system while at the same 

time combating the perception that post 9/11 security measures 

have made it too difficult for legitimate travelers to come to the 

U.S. 

One important example of our efforts to improve the way we 

make decisions about visa applicants is related to what we call the 

Visa Mantis program. These are visas that are issued to scientific, 

business and research travelers. The average processing time for a 

Visa Mantis decision has been reduced from 67 days to 15 days, 

and the percentage of Mantis cases pending more than 60 days has 

been reduced by 8 percent. These are the types of improvements 

that we need to continue to make in our processing of visas. 

We have also made improvements in the area of visa reciprocity. 

The U.S. and China recently agreed to a 12-month visa validity period for business and tourism visas. 

Another element to the multi-layered strategy’s operations or 

boots on the ground, we have focused our available resources and 

high priority initiatives in high threat areas of the world. DHS visa 

security officers in Saudi Arabia reviewed over 20,000 visa applications last fiscal year. This year we are on track within the next 60 

days to deploy our permanent delegation to two locations in that 

country, half of whom are trained in the local language. We are 

also moving in 2005 with the deployment of visa security officers 

to five additional locations, consistent with our threat-based approach. 

Boots on the ground also applies to our border patrol and various 

border initiatives that we are employing such as expedited removal 

at parts of the Southern border, deployment of additional border 

patrol agents, and the implementation of the Arizona Border Control Initiative or the ABC Initiative. 

Under the umbrella of a multi-layered system we are working to 

use information more effectively, leverage Government roles and 

resources, and focus our operational activities on high priority initiatives. We know that this will require resources allocated appropriately so that we do in fact get it right every time. 

Thank you, and now I would like to turn it over to Chief Walters. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thanks very much. 

Chief Walters, if you care to make an opening statement? 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. WALTERS, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR THE OFFICE OF TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT, 

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. WALTERS. Chairman Cornyn, Ranking Member Kennedy, I 

am happy to be here today to testify about how we train our border 

12

officers to do their jobs on the border, both at the ports of entry 

and between the ports of entry. 

As part of the Department of Homeland Security and BTS, Customs and Border Protection combine the personnel and functions of 

four different agencies, most of Customs, all Immigration inspectors, Agriculture border inspectors and the entire United States 

Border Patrol under one Agency, an Agency to manage, control and 

secure our Nation’s borders. 

As CBP celebrates our second birthday, CBP is no longer an 

amalgam of parts, but a single Agency united to a common mission 

and a common top priority, to prevent entry into this country of 

terrorists and terrorist weapons. CBP is new, our mission is new, 

our priority is new. We have designed training to fit our new organization. 

CBP now recruits, hires and trains its enforcement officers at the 

ports of entry as CBP Officers. Our new officers begin their careers 

with a 20-day training and orientation program at a new duty post, 

followed by 73 days of training at the CBP Academy. After graduation the new officers return to their duty posts and begin a formal 

program that includes 37 distinct modules of specific training and 

supervised application in the workplace of the training and the 

skills that they have acquired. 

Our existing workforce, with its Customs, Immigration and Agriculture heritage and knowledge played a key role in developing 

CBP’s operational concepts, and the training programs that support those concepts. We train our workforce to become complete 

CBP officers. Our veteran CBP officers participate in training that 

addresses the Immigration, Customs and Agriculture functions 

that were not part of their former Agency. In addition, every CBP 

officer, new or old, participates in training that addresses areas 

where previous training programs were weak or nonexistent, such 

as antiterrorism training, fraudulent documents training, and 

training how to identify weapons of mass destruction. 

CBP is very active in preparing its front-line officers to do their 

jobs properly. In a recent article a private research group reported 

that the top 10 learning organizations in private industry provide 

employees with an average of 77 hours of training per year. CBP 

Office of Field Operations—this is where our people at the ports 

come from, the Office of Field Operations—by way of comparison 

recorded 3.3 million hours of training for its 23,400 employees in 

fiscal year 2004, for an average of just over 140 hours per employee. Top ten 77 hours per employee per year, CBP OFO, Office 

of Field Operations, 140 hours of training per employee. 

CBP continues to research and develop new and more sophisticated antiterrorism training for our front line officers. Informed by 

our front line officers, our supervisors, managers, leadership in the 

organization and the work of the 9/11 Commission, CBP develops 

and distributes new courses and improves existing courses in detecting chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. CBP, 

for example, has trained 100 of its front line officers to conduct exercises built around terrorist and critical incident response scenarios through FEMA’s Master Exercise Practitioner Program, and 

these fine officers are now distributed around the country to do just 

that. 

13

CBP has developed a counterterrorism response protocol that 

tells front line officers—it takes them through the various steps in 

identifying possible terrorists and what steps to follow when they 

are encountered. Included in this newly developed training are the 

cultural backgrounds of likely source countries, and how to detect 

deception, and how to detect and elicit responses from possible terrorist operatives. Experienced subject matter experts and experienced role players play an important part in this new training. 

I thank the Subcommittees for the opportunity to present this 

testimony today. I would be happy and pleased to take any questions you may have. 

Chairman CORNYN. Chief, I am advised you have a one- or twominute video you wanted to show us. This is in conjunction with 

your opening statement or does this relate to some other subject? 

Mr. WALTERS. I believe that has been scrubbed, sir. 

Chairman CORNYN. That has been scrubbed, okay. 

With that, Senator Kyl, I know has to leave, and so to make sure 

he has an opportunity to ask questions of the witnesses, we will go 

to him first. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you very much, Chairman Cornyn. 

I was just down, as I said, on the Arizona border, visited with 

the new border patrol chief there, Chief Nicely, who was very positive about the CBP program there and said that everybody was 

working well together, and he was very optimistic that it would 

continue to work very well. So that is just one little field report, 

in any event. 

I think probably most of these questions, Ms. Dezenski, are for 

you, but either one of you who would like respond, feel free. The 

questions that I raised earlier about the visas that were issued in 

Saudi Arabia; we had a Visa Express Program there. That is different now. Perhaps you could discuss how that is different, how 

the oral interview process is different, and the screening, and then 

perhaps the training as well. 

In addition, I know she is going to ask, and you might as well 

anticipate the question on the biometric identification program, because I am with her, it is time to move on with that. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. We have made substantial progress in terms of 

implementing some of the requirements under section 428 of the 

Homeland Security Act, specifically the provisions to enhance a 

visa security program, and let me just give you a couple statistics 

that I think will give you a sense for what we have done. 

After the legislation was passed, we immediately started working 

on developing a training program and developing a system, if you 

will, to start moving visa security officers out to the field, and of 

course the legislation was very specific about sending people to 

Saudi Arabia, and that was our first activity. We have obtained program funding in 2005 in the amount of $10 

million. We have selected permanent visa security officers for 

Saudi Arabia, and they will be deploying, as I mentioned in my testimony, within the next 60 days. Half of that delegation does have 

language training, which we think will facilitate their activities 

there. We have already been working with the consular staff in 

both locations in Saudi Arabia. And we reviewed over 20,000 visa 

applications last year. 

14

We are now able to delve into databases. We have biometric information available at all of our consular locations, so our officers 

are able to access that along with the state’s consular officers to 

be able to make a better determination on whether to issue a visa. 

So we have made some progress and we do expect that we will 

continue to expand that program. We have five additional locations 

identified in 2005. There are also areas that we would consider to 

be high threat, so we are moving out our folks just as quickly as 

we can. 

Chairman KYL. Do you want to respond to the other questions 

regarding the Visa Waiver Program? And by the way, the processing did involve oral interviews; is that correct? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. In some cases, yes. I can get back to you on 

whether that was all. I do not know. 

Chairman KYL. You do need to get back to us on the oral interview because that was a key part of our finding, a key problem before and something we wanted to ensure would be resolved. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Absolutely. 

Chairman KYL. Can you give us the status of the Visa Waiver 

Program right now, particularly with respect to any countries of 

particular interest from a terrorism standpoint? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Absolutely. We have been undergoing a very comprehensive review of our Visa Waiver Program countries. In fact, 

within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate we set 

up a special office, specifically to deal with Visa Waiver Program 

reviews. We are actually finalizing that report. It will be sent to 

Congress very shortly, and we did have several countries—although we cannot go into specifics about them—we did have several countries where we were concerned about the number of lost 

and stolen passports. We were concerned about some of the other 

factors that we look at when we review countries and determine 

whether they should stay in the program, so we will be making 

some recommendations in that final report as to the status. But we 

are heartened that Visa Waiver Program countries are now providing to us lost and stolen passport data, which is entered into our 

database systems and available to both consular officers and to our 

border patrol. So we have been able to implement some additional 

activities that we think are very important and are making a difference. 

Chairman KYL. I might note that at the hearing that we held in 

June of 2004, I asked the Department of Homeland Security and 

the State Department to provide us with periodic updates on the 

progress of the 27 Visa Waiver Program countries were making to 

come into compliance with out October 26, 2005 deadline. We have 

received no updates that I am aware of, and I think if you would 

please check on that and get back to us as soon as possible, that 

would be appreciated. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. I actually could give you a couple updates right 

now, sir. We have been working very diligently, both within DHS 

and with foreign governments to move towards meeting the deadlines. As you know, last year we did ask for an extension. At this 

point we think that of the Visa Wavier countries, about two will 

be actually ready to meet that October 2005 deadline. So we think 

there is more work to do. We do not think this is because countries 

15

are not trying to meet the requirements. We think there has been 

a significant amount of progress, but we are running into technical 

issues and operational issues that are taking some time to work 

through. 

So we continue to work diligently. The Visa Waiver Program 

countries continue to work diligently. We are moving forward as 

fast as we can to meet those requirements. 

Chairman KYL. You need to get us an update in writing, please. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Okay, be happy to. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you, Senator Kyl. 

Chief Walters, let me ask you just a general question to start out 

with about morale and conditions for our border patrol agents generally. The USA Today reported that border patrol agents felt overwhelmed by their job in at least some instances. I do not know if 

we have a percentage reported. But another article, this one in the 

Washington Post, reported on a poll that found a high percentage 

of border patrol agents were not satisfied with the tools and the 

training and the support they received. 

I would just, by way of anecdote, give you the benefit of my observation in a small portion of the border that we ask our border 

patrol agents to patrol, and what they tell me is they feel outmanned and under-equipped. While they do have technology like 

ground sensors, cameras and the like, that in the event an intrusion is identified that there is a very good chance, in other words, 

and no doubt in most if not all cases, they are not able to assure 

that they apprehend every single person that tries to come across 

the border. Is that as a result of a lack of technology, a lack of 

training, that they do not have the equipment they need, or that 

they are simply overwhelmed by the numbers that are trying to 

come across our borders? 

Mr. WALTERS. We are trying to give them all the tools that they 

need and train them up, and we do spend a great deal of time and 

energy preparing them for that. This is a classic example. I cannot 

think of any year since 1975, when I came in, where there were 

fewer aliens to apprehend than there were border patrol agents to 

apprehend them, and that is still the case. But I like to think, and 

I think we could probably give you a more involved answer or more 

succinct answer on paper, but my instincts tell me that we have 

never paid more attention to our borders than we are paying to 

those borders right now, that if we are not quite there yet, we are 

on the way. We have increased the number of border patrol agents. 

We have increased the technology on the ground. We have increased the amount of training and the kinds of training we are 

giving. We have changed the entire organization, including the border patrol, to focus on preventing the entry of terrorist weapons 

and terrorists first, as the first priority of all their traditional missions. 

So, yes, I can understand. I am a member of the club that understands why border patrol agents feel like they are overwhelmed, 

and we have not given them everything they need, but we are 

working it, and I think we are energetically pursing it. 

Chairman CORNYN. Chief, just by way of follow up, let me ask 

you what is it that you think that our border patrol agents need 

16

that they do not have that will allow them to successfully detect 

and prevent incursions across our border? 

Mr. WALTERS. Well, they need a good mix. They need a good mix 

of the technology. They need a good mix of training. They need a 

good mix of border patrol agents and all the things that go with 

it, the support, the buildings, and they need the work of this body 

to help them with the laws and regulations that inform what they 

do, enable what they do on a border if it take place. 

Chairman CORNYN. My understanding is that once detained, 

there are criminal background checks and other checks performed 

on these people that are coming across, and if they are not wanted 

on criminal charges or have a criminal record, that they are eligible 

for what Senator Feinstein has called the catch and release program, in other words, to report back for a later hearing. Is that 

generally accurate, what I have just stated? 

Mr. WALTERS. It is true that we do a record check on every individual on the border patrol side; every individual that the border 

patrol catches has gone through some sort of a two-print or a tenprint, and we get some sort of a feedback record on that unless 

they are a new entrant of course, this is the first time. 

I forget the rest of your question. Is that responsive? 

Chairman CORNYN. The problem is, what I was getting at, while 

you do screen for people with criminal records or criminal histories 

and perhaps those who have tried to make repeated trips across 

and been caught, the vast majority of people that you do catch, the 

border patrol catches, are eligible for a release program to return 

for a later hearing; is that not correct, sir? 

Mr. WALTERS. It is true that of all the people we catch we do 

take a lot and give them a voluntary return back to contiguous territory like Mexico. But on the other hand, their record has been 

taken and then the next time they get caught we will know if they 

came in once or twice. This helps us discern whether this is a routine traveler coming across to work the fields or someone who is 

going to try and enter the United States to do us harm. There is 

a difference between those and we are trying to discern that difference, because we can expect to apprehend and have apprehended close to a million or slightly over a million aliens every 

year. 

Chairman CORNYN. My understanding—and this is my last question for this first round—is that while the border patrol does apprehend on the order of a million people a year, that there may be as 

many as another half million that are able to come across undetected. Do you agree with that figure or do you dispute it? Do you 

have another figure that you believe is more accurate? 

Mr. WALTERS. I do not have a substitute figure for that. I think 

everyone is entitled to their own view on it. Statistics indicate that 

it is a fairly large number, but we just do not really know, and I 

do not personally have any better information than what you have 

seen, sir. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you, Chief. 

Senator Kennedy. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. 

Ms. Dezenski, let me ask you, on these visas, for example, in 

Saudi Arabia part of the problem, going back to 9/11 is that the 

17

Central Intelligence Agency was not working with the Immigration 

Service. They were not sharing the list. They thought if they 

shared the list that they would lose their sources on this. 

Now in the development of the watchlist, it is working now. CIA 

is talking, FBI is talking, the watchlist is updated every single day. 

Tell me what is happening out there just quickly if you could. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Absolutely. Senator, it has gotten much better. A 

lot of those databases that you mentioned have been integrated primarily through the US-VISIT process as we have begun the collection of biometrics. That is also combined with terror watchlist information, immigration information, sources from all over the Government, and that is absolutely the right way to do things. 

Senator KENNEDY. When is your watchlist upgraded? Is it sort of 

daily now? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. It is, it is. 

Senator KENNEDY. It used to be a couple of weeks or three 

weeks. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. It is updated on a very regular basis. It is daily. 

And the information comes from different sources within the Government. We get some information from agencies within the Department. We get other information from the FBI. So all of this is 

compiled and utilized. 

Senator KENNEDY. And there is harmony with all the agencies, 

the FBI, the CIA and others? How would you characterize? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. I think it has gotten better. 

Senator KENNEDY. Better, well that is——

Ms. DEZENSKI. I do not know if I would go as far as saying that 

everyone is in perfect harmony, but we have made some progress 

and we will continue to. 

Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Chertoff is going to make sure that 

they are. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. absolutely. 

Senator KENNEDY. Let me ask you, just on the timing—again I 

want to move along—on the visa waiver. The two countries I understand is Japan and Australia are the two countries. There may 

be others. But how are we doing? I mean if we are going to have 

these other countries, if we set the deadline, Japan and Australia 

evidently have indicated they can meet October of 2005. Where are 

we, just quickly on that, being able—if they do develop it, are we 

going to have the sense and the ability to be able to read these and 

to be responsive? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. That is certainly our intention. We are well aware 

of the October 2005 deadline, and we have——

Senator KENNEDY. What is your estimate now? This has been a 

continuing process, and we know that you—what is your own kind 

of sense about it? Do you think you are going to make it within a 

couple of months or what is the——

Ms. DEZENSKI. I think it is going to be difficult to make October 

2005. We are probably looking at some point in 2006. I hate to be 

more specific than that, but we could certainly follow up with 

something in writing. 

Senator KENNEDY. Fine, okay. I might come back to you just sort 

of as a general—it would be useful, if the Japanese and the Australians are able to do this, whether they are sharing it with these 

18

other countries, their information, or how they are able to try and 

do this. 

Mr. Walters, just on the training programs, I was trying to write 

down as you were reading the number of hours. I heard 140 hours 

a couple of times, and I was looking at 40-hour weeks, 3-1/2 weeks. 

What is the situation? You train these people. This is an anti-terrorism passenger processing, agricultural fundamentals. You know, 

we have problems in terms, as we heard from the former Secretary 

of HHS, of the dangers. You have immigration documentation examination, customs cargo processing, let alone the weapons of mass 

destruction. How in the world are we going to be able to get all of 

that done? I went to 16 weeks basic training in the infantry just 

to learn how to fire some weapons, but we did not have that kind 

of a complexity I do not think that these agents have. Can that 

really be done in that short a period of time? 

Mr. WALTERS. We give ourselves that in basic training of course. 

What we are trying to do, and the goal that I train to, is to build 

a complete CBP officer. And so our new recruits, the first batches 

have slightly less than 18 months service, and we are building 

them towards becoming a complete CBP officer. That will take 

time. It takes years and experience. From my own experience, I 

was not really a very good border patrol agent until I had about 

7 years under my belt. 

Senator KENNEDY. In terms of the freshmen customs or border 

agents, what is their basic training before they are out? 

Mr. WALTERS. Their basic training is 73 training days at the border patrol—I am sorry—at the CBP Officer Academy. 

Senator KENNEDY. This is a raw recruit, get into there and then 

out on the job. So that is how many—just give it to me quickly because my time is almost up. 

Mr. WALTERS. What is it that you——

Senator KENNEDY. The question is—I have my wife’s nephew 

over in Mosul. He is a tail gunner on a striker. he had 12 weeks 

at Fort Benning, 4 days at Fort Lewis to get his equipment and is 

in Mosul as a tail gunner. I am asking you how many weeks for 

just a raw recruit to be on the border patrol down on the border? 

Mr. WALTERS. For a CBP officer, they have 20 days in their port 

before they go to the academy, and then 73 days, which usually 

works out to be about 14 weeks or training at the CBP Officer 

Academy. Then they go out to the CBP duty post and they get modules of training one after the other, sir. 

Senator KENNEDY. I will come back because I just want to ask 

you a final question. My time is up. I would like to get a little 

more, go into that a little bit more. 

Senator KENNEDY. I have heard some disturbing reports of vigilantes planning to converge in Arizona in April to start making arrests of suspected immigrants. This is obviously a potential dangerous situation. Are you familiar with this at all? 

Mr. WALTERS. Yes, I am, sir. 

Senator KENNEDY. And you are monitoring this? Is there anything we ought to know? Is there anything you ought to tell us 

about? 

Mr. WALTERS. I do not have anything special to offer. I just want 

to remind the Committee that——

19

Senator KENNEDY. I mean if it is classified or whatever, you can 

do whatever way, you can tell the Chair. 

Mr. WALTERS. I will be glad to come back to you with that information. 

Senator KENNEDY. Could you give us a report on that? 

Mr. WALTERS. I can certainly do that. 

Senator KENNEDY. Please? I would like to share that with the 

members of the Committee. My time is up. 

Thank you, Chair. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Yes or no answer, please. Are we still catching and releasing OTMs, other than Mexicans? 

Mr. WALTERS. Yes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I think that points out something 

very clear, and that is that coming over the Southwest border is 

clearly the way somebody is going to penetrate the country because 

they are caught and they are released, and there are 48,000 this 

past year. So I would just leave the record with that. 

Is it still the policy that a fraudulent or stolen passport is returned to the individual? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. No, it is not. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. What is the policy? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. The policy is to take those documents at the point 

of entry, which we have been doing since January. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And that is 100 percent of the time? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. That is my understanding. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. What happens to the individual? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Well, I think it depends on what might be associated with that individual. If they are coming up as a hit, they may 

go into secondary. If they are not coming up as having anything of 

interest to us, then they may be able to leave. It just depends on 

whether there is reasonable suspicion to keep that person. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I appreciate that. But it seems to me in this 

day and age that use of a fraudulent or stolen passport should be 

a ‘‘go to jail card.’’ And I am introducing legislation to make it an 

aggravated felony simply to get people to pay attention to it. I 

think we have really got to put a stop to the use of fraudulent and 

stolen passports. What I have learned is these passports are very 

cleverly manipulated. They are stolen by large numbers, which 

only means they are going to be used for illegal entry into the 

country one way or another, as are international driver’s licenses, 

again, stolen in large numbers, Geneva Convention travel documents, again, stolen in large numbers. 

I think it is a very serious problem. I would call your attention 

to pages 25, 26 and 27 of the April 2004 OIG report on the security 

implications of the Visa Waiver Program. 

May I ask if you have both read these reports? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. I have read them, yes. 

Mr. WALTERS. I have not. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. It might be a good thing to read. They are 

very informative reports, and it almost seems to me that this report or this process of investigation should be carried out every 

year because it is really the OIG that goes through on the otherthan-Mexicans permeating the border, and lists the countries and 

20

the numbers. If it were done on an annual basis I think it would 

give you a very good indication of the countries where this is really 

a problem. In any event, I intend to ask that it be done. 

Now, let me ask you about the biometric passport deadline. Last 

year, as I mentioned, the administration came and asked us to extend by 1 year the biometric passport deadline for the Visa Waiver 

Program. Since you could not meet the deadline of—not you, but 

the Departments could not meet the deadlines of October 26, 2004 

for complying with the 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa 

Entry Reform Act, are you going to ask for another extension? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. We have not made a formal determination on that 

at this time. But as I stated earlier, we are working through a lot 

of technical and operational issues right now. We are working 

through them as quickly as we can, and our intention is to come 

as close to that deadline as we can. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. You mean to get the system up and running 

before that deadline? Is that your goal? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Absolutely, yes. Whether we will make that is dependent on how quickly we can get through these challenges, these 

remaining challenges, procurement challenges, operational, technical. We are still testing readers. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Could you tell me what the problem is or tell 

us what the problem is? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Absolutely. It is really on a number of fronts. We 

are dealing with new territory here in terms of requirements to put 

readers at all points of entry. We need readers that will be able to 

recognize documents from many different countries. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me stop you there. How many points of 

entry? The OIG found that there were many points of entry where 

this program was not in place. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. I cannot give you the exact number, but I would 

be happy to follow up with that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I would appreciate that very much. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Sure. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And what else? So it is readers at the points 

of entry. So the bottom line is that the points of entry are not covered. Therefore, there is no way of knowing about the passport or 

whether it is biometrically——

Ms. DEZENSKI. Senator, there are other issues with countries not 

being able to manufacture and distribute the machine-readable biometric passports within the time frame, the current time frame as 

well. So along with the concerns that we have internally, and 

again, we are moving as quickly as we can to get those deployed, 

there are also concerns coming forward from the waiver countries 

with meeting the deadline for actually putting the passport out. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I know this is a difficult area because I know 

countries do not want to comply, but if you would send us a list 

of those countries that are not in compliance or have refused to 

comply, I think the question comes then whether they should continue under the Visa Waiver Program. I know they say tit for tat, 

that they want to do the same thing to the United States. I mean 

my view in this world today is that we ought to know who is coming into our country with reasonable certainty, and I do not think 

21

that is too much to ask of a Visa Waiver country. And we also want 

to know when they leave. 

So let me ask this question. Do we know when visa waiver individuals leave the country? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. No, we do not, because we have not completed the 

US-VISIT exit portion of the system. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. We have 13 million people coming in. We do 

not know whether they ever leave or no. And although they are 

from friendly and very often closely allied countries, it is not hard, 

and we saw where Richard Reid, Padilla, others, used the Visa 

Waiver Program to come into this country, and there is no way of 

knowing if the individual ever leaves yet. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

I have just a couple more questions for Secretary Dezenski, and 

I am afraid, Senator Feinstein, the more questions you ask, the 

story just does not get much better. It seems to reveal the depth 

and the breadth of the challenges that we have. 

My question, Assistant Secretary Dezenski, has to do with the 

different ways we treat different visitors. For example, the Border 

Security Staff Report identified the visa length of stays as a potential security issue. They compared the length of stays granted to 

business travelers, visa waiver participants and tourists. Can you 

explain why business travelers receive stays tailored to their purpose, visa waiver participants receive 90 days, and tourists automatically receive a six-month extension even if their trip is for only 

a few weeks? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. With respect to the first category of Visa Waiver 

Program country participants, we have a reciprocal agreement that 

is actually in statute. It is a 90-day reciprocal agreement on the 

stay, so that explains how we have that category and why it is different. For the B-1 business visa it is tailored to the amount of 

time that is reasonably allowed for that person to complete their 

business in the U.S. With regard to the B-2, it is valid maximum 

admission actually for 12 months, but it is generally admitted for 

6 months. It is up to the admitting officer to make the final determination in those categories. We do afford that to our border patrols, to be able to make that decision based on other information 

that they might have. 

Chairman CORNYN. Would it make sense to you that we ought 

to have a uniform policy tailoring the length of a visa to the stated 

purpose for which someone enters the country, as opposed to arbitrary deadlines extending months and even a year or more into the 

future? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. I do think it is something that we need to look 

at as part of a broader visa policy review within the Department. 

The question has come up many times and I do think it is something we need to take a look at. 

Chairman CORNYN. My understanding is that roughly 40 percent 

of the illegal immigration in the United States now comes from 

people who have entered the country legally, but have just merely 

overstayed their visa. I believe you answered Senator Feinstein 

that we have no means, that is zero means of identifying where 

22

those people are or actually making sure that they leave the country when their visa expires. Is that correct? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. It is, but that is the other part of the US-VISIT 

program. It is an entry program and an exit program, and now our 

focus is on building the exit piece of the system because we recognize that in fact that has been a vulnerability and it needs to get 

fixed. So that really is a focus over the next 12 months, to get the 

exit system up and running at all ports of entry. 

Chairman CORNYN. Well, if I can press you just a little bit on 

that point. US-VISIT, the exit feature of US-VISIT, when it is implemented—it is not yet implemented—will allow us to know when 

somebody leaves, right? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. That is correct. 

Chairman CORNYN. But for somebody who does not leave, it is 

not going to tell us where they are or how to find them, will it? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. No, that is a very difficult problem. I mean we 

have tried some things at the Southern border with our border 

crossing cards, where we actually have an RFID technology in the 

travel card, which is one way of being able to validate ID and use 

a little bit of technology to try to do a better job at it. Once visitors 

are in the country if they are not exiting at any given time, it 

seems like we would have a big problem on our hands to try to locate millions—potentially thousands of people I would think. So we 

need to do a better job on the up-front piece of the process to make 

sure that when we are issuing visas, for example, that we are 

doing so for people who have legitimate business and intend to 

leave during their stated time. 

Chairman CORNYN. I agree with you. We need to do a better job 

of making sure people leave when their visa expires. But the problem is the same for people who come into the country legally and 

overstay their visa, thus making their presence here illegal, and 

those who come in illegally in the first place, right? Estimates of 

somewhere around 10 million people are illegally in the United 

States and the fact is we do not know where they are, and we do 

not know how to enforce the law, and deport them back to their 

country of origin even if we wanted to. Is that a correct statement? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. I think you have accurately characterized the 

problem. I think it is a balance for us though as the Government, 

to be able to secure the borders and have an open-door policy. 

Sometimes people overstay their visas for reasons that are completely legitimate, they are in the hospital, they missed their flight. 

There are lots of real-world reasons. Now, that is not to say that 

people should be overstaying their visas. We want people to adhere 

to those requirements, but I think we need to make sure that we 

have a balanced process. 

Chairman CORNYN. I am sure you are absolutely right that there 

are some people who cannot help but overstay their visas, but I 

would suggest that it does not approach 10 million in number. But 

we will get to that, perhaps, at our second hearing we have scheduled on April the 6th, where we are going to talk more about interior enforcement and those issues. 

Senator Kennedy. 

Senator KENNEDY. Just quickly on the exit. That is true for the 

visa waiver, but it is also true on granting the visas in any event, 

23

is it not? Do we not have this problem if it is a visa waiver country 

or it is non-waiver country. I mean it is a general kind of problem, 

is it not? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Yes. 

Senator KENNEDY. I thought that at least in some areas when 

you get the visa you had to demonstrate, you know, either that you 

had a return ticket or that you had the resources to be able to return. I mean these people and the places where they are granting 

the visas, they just do not do it out of the goodness of their heart, 

do they? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. You are right. There are some requirements when 

people go through the visa issuance process. A return ticket sometimes can be a good indicator, sometimes it is not. So there are 

some limitations there. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. 

Chairman CORNYN. Senator Feinstein? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Just a comment. The problem with all of this 

is there is enormous pressure from commercial sources, you know, 

to allow in a sense a lax system, that people can come in and go 

out at will, and yet that becomes the soft underbelly because it becomes easy to use a fraudulent passport or a stolen passport, and 

the other countries in the Visa Waiver Program, if we do it to 

them, they will do it to us. I mean my view of that is everybody 

should do it in this day and age. But that is just me. 

I would like to ask this question. You mentioned that since January the passports in all cases are removed from the individual. I 

assume the individual is let go, or is allowed to go home. No? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. No. It depends. I mean normally if you have—and 

Chief Walters may be able to add to this, but if our border agents 

are detecting a fraudulent document, that is usually enough to get 

you into secondary. And then when you go into secondary, there is 

a lot more work done in terms of understanding what the potential 

threats might be, checking additional databases, et cetera. So the 

idea that people are presenting fraudulent documents and then 

simply walking away, I think is probably not the right characterization. 

Now, once we proceed with secondary, there may be grounds for 

additional action, there may not be. 

Chief Walters, do you have anything to add? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, certainly they would not walk away. I 

would think they would be deported. I mean you are not going to 

let somebody come in with a fraudulent passport, remove the passport and let them go into the country, right? 

Mr. WALTERS. In fact, you are correct, if I may. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Please. 

Mr. WALTERS. There are codes in the immigration laws that 

allow for us to prosecute for fraudulent document entry using a 

fraudulent document or using fraud to enter the country. At the 

very least the person that perpetrates the fraud loses potential immigration access to the United States for years at a time, and I 

would have to get back to you on what the exact code is, but it is 

not without penalty. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. It is not without? 

24

Mr. WALTERS. It is not without penalty completely. There are 

some certain parts of the code that will allow us to prosecute, and 

we do find that grounds. We do take it in front of the assistant attorney ask for a prosecution on it when we can. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. We have draft legislation of a bill which I 

would like to ask my staff to show both of you and get your input 

on, if you would, please. But I assume you do not let anyone come 

into the country with a fraudulent or stolen passport; is that correct? 

Mr. WALTERS. That is correct. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Then most would then be deported or would 

go back to where they came from. What do you give them to go 

back with if you take the passport? 

Mr. WALTERS. We have a letter. We actually take a Xerox copy 

of the passport, retain the passport for ourselves and do a letter. 

There is a technical term for that letter that escapes me at the moment. But this letter goes with the individual back to his home 

country whether it is for an expedited removal case or after a prosecution. Eventually they go back and we use this letter to transfer 

them back to their country of origin. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Would it be possible for you to give us some 

statistical analysis of that program, say in the first 6 months since 

you have been doing it since January and it is now March, say by 

July, that we might have some analysis of how many passports you 

have taken; how many people have been tried or had charges 

brought against them; how many go to jail; how many are let loose, 

because I bet there are some; and how many go back? 

Mr. WALTERS. As I understand the question you would like a statistical report from January when this new policy went into effect 

and show the effects of that policy and how many were prosecuted, 

how many went back, and what we did with——

Senator FEINSTEIN. Right. In other words, take a look at the first 

6 months, so give you a lot of advance notice so it will not be a 

problem to set it up and do it. 

Mr. WALTERS. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I appreciate that very much. 

Mr. WALTERS. Yes, Senator, we can do that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

Secretary Dezenski and Chief Walters, thank you very much for 

appearing here before us today. We know you were asked some 

tough questions, and I think it reveals the scope and nature of the 

challenge that lies before all of us. We certainly appreciate your 

service. Thank you very much. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Thank you. 

Mr. WALTERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dezenski and Mr. Walters appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman CORNYN. If we could have our second panel of witnesses step up here momentarily. If you will forgive me, I am going 

to start introducing you while we are clearing a place for you to 

sit. 

25

We are pleased to have a distinguished second panel today, and 

I want to thank them as well for their appearance. 

Doris Meissner currently serves as a Senior Fellow with the Migration Policy Institute. Notably she served as the Immigration 

and Naturalization Commissioner from October 1993 to November 

of 2000 during the Clinton administration, and has extensive immigration experience, including reforming the Nation’s asylum system, creating new strategies to manage U.S. borders in the context 

of open trade, and improving services for immigrants. 

Also with us this afternoon is Janice Kephart, a Senior Consultant for the Investigative Project. She has recently served on the 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon America, otherwise known as the 9/11 Commission, where she served as counsel 

on the immigration, nonimmigrant visas and border security team. 

She is a key author of the 9/11 Commission Staff Report, ‘‘9/11 and 

Terrorist Travel,’’ released in August of 2004. This is only one of 

two staff reports published by the Commission and the only one to 

be published in print, and serves as the basis for our hearing 

today. 

Welcome to both of you, and we are pleased to have you here 

with us. Again, if you would do what sometimes we forget to do, 

and that is turn your microphone on when you speak so we can all 

hear you, and we would like to give you a chance to make any 

opening statement you would like. 

Ms. Meissner, we would be happy to start with you. thank you 

for being with us. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DORIS MEISSNER, FORMER IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION COMMISSIONER, AND SENIOR 

FELLOW, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. MEISSNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members. Thank 

you for inviting me to participate. 

You have designated two issues for this hearing, training and 

length of admission on visitor visas. I will focus on the second question, the length of admission on visitor visas. 

The background for what I call the six-month policy dates from 

the early 1980’s. The policy was established at that time as part 

of a broad effort to better manage the adjudications workload of the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service. It is, as you probably 

know, a change that is in regulation, it is not statutory, and it 

arose from a survey that was done at that time of the workload in 

the district offices around the country. 

We learned that in looking at the adjudications workload in 

those district offices, the largest share of the work in those offices 

was extensions of stay, applications that people who were here on 

visitor visas were making to stay here longer than the time that 

had been designated by the inspector at the port of entry. 

So in looking at that workload and trying to understand why 

there were so many extension of stay applications being made, we 

found out several things. First of all, that the inspectors were basically making decisions that were arbitrary and inconsistent around 

the country with regard to people’s stay. Secondly, that almost all 

of the extensions that were being requested were being granted by 

the district offices. And finally, that typically the norm fell at the 

26

six-month period, that people were given 6 months to stay and that 

largely met the needs that they were articulating to the examiners 

in the district offices. So we set up 6 months as the norm. 

The result of doing that was that it eliminated this situation of 

one part of the Agency, the inspectors at the ports of entry creating 

a workload for the examiners in the district offices. It freed up very 

high-skilled or expert resources of examiners in district offices to 

focus on the most sensitive of the adjudications, which are the adjustments to permanent residents and the naturalization applications, which really go to the heart of the integrity of the immigration system, and of course it does not or did not preclude inspectors 

from designating less than the six-month period. It was to be a 

guideline. 

I think in the years since, it has been viewed as a successful policy, but it was developed 20 years ago, and that is or course a long 

time ago, not only in years but in experience, and I am unaware 

that there has been any serious review of the policy in the time in 

between. And even if we had attempted to do a serious review of 

the policy, we would not have had the data available to reach any 

sound conclusions. 

So given the fact that it is old, and given the fact that a lot has 

changed since most particularly 9/11, I think it is absolutely appropriate to review the policy. Moreover, we have now the tools to 

begin to understand a little bit more how these things are working, 

most particularly the US-VISIT program. When the exit portion of 

the US-VISIT program actually is put into place, we will be able 

to understand how a policy like this works, what its implications 

are. 

At the same time, I think it would be a serious mistake to rush 

to judgment and to simply make a linkage between the 6-month 

policy and vulnerability to terrorism. We do not have any information really that tells us that one leads to the other. The critical 

thing is that we start to understand this and recognize that it 

needs to be analyzed. 

Now, in analyzing it, there are a couple of things that are very 

important. First of all, there are enormous workload implications 

to changing a policy like this. If you look at the numbers, we granted 28 million visas in 2003, non-immigrant visas. I have given you 

the math in the statement, but the bottom line is that almost a 

third of those visas of that 28 million are subject to this 6-month 

policy or guideline. 

In addition to that, of course, given those numbers and the uses 

of the B-2 visa, there are a huge range of stakeholders and very 

compelling public policy interests that are encompassed in that B2 visa grant where the 6-month policy applies. I think a very good 

illustration of that is regulations that were put out in the spring 

of 2002 to try to reduce the 6 months to a 30-day policy. There was 

an enormous storm of opposition to those proposed regulations, and 

they have been set aside. 

So changing it really requires doing some homework, and in 

doing that homework, the critical question, of course, is: Is there 

any relationship between 6 months or 3 months or 30 days and a 

vulnerability to terrorism? We do not know the answer to that. I 

think that the systems are in place that can begin to answer that, 

27

but in addition to that, a whole range of other very important 

changes have been made that do move us in the right direction, 

that have been proven to be effective in thwarting terrorism. They 

are not complete. They need to be more—they need to be finished. 

But there is an agenda that is moving us in the right direction, and 

that should serve us as the tools to learn and understand whether 

something like the 6-month policy in addition would need to be 

shifted. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Meissner appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Kephart, we would be glad to hear from you. 

STATEMENT OF JANICE L. KEPHART, FORMER STAFF COUNSEL FOR THE 9/11 COMMISSION, AND SENIOR CONSULTANT, 

THE INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT ON TERRORISM, MOUNT 

VERNON, VIRGINIA 

Ms. KEPHART. Yes, thank you. Thank you for holding this hearing and giving me the opportunity to discuss terrorist travel with 

you today. On a personal note, it is an honor for me to be back before the Committee that gave me my start in terrorism and border 

security. It is also an honor to share a panel with Commissioner 

Meissner, who held one of the most difficult jobs in this city for 

over 7 years and did so with dignity and dedication. 

I would like to submit my written testimony into the record, if 

I may. 

Chairman CORNYN. Certainly. Both your written statements will 

be made part of the record, without objection. 

Ms. KEPHART. Thank you. 

We are all here today because September 11 taught us an invaluable lesson: that border security is national security. Effective border security is perhaps our best hope of preventing another terrorist attack on American soil. 

From the outset, let me make it clear that I share the conviction 

that immigration is a potent asset to our strength as a Nation. 

Achieving full integrity of our border strengthens us, facilitating 

legal immigration of the most talented and motivated people in the 

world, while lowering the risk of entry by those who seek to do us 

harm. 

Foreign terrorists carefully plan their attempts to enter the U.S. 

based on a relatively sophisticated understanding of our border system. A CIA analysis described in our staff report stated that, ‘‘A 

body of intelligence indicates that al Qaeda and other extremist 

groups covet the ability to elude lookout systems using documents 

with false identities and devoid of travel patterns that will arouse 

suspicion.’’

The 9/11 Commission border security investigation found numerous examples of such planning, several of which I provide in my 

written testimony, and many more of which are provided in this 

book, in our staff report. 

As the Commission staff monograph on terrorist travel points out 

over and over again, the 9/11 terrorists exploited vulnerabilities 

from visa issuance to admission standards at our ports of entry, to 

28

our immigration benefits adjudication system. Let me give you two 

examples which I believe are still relevant today. 

As far as I am aware, critical intelligence on terrorist travel indicators is still not being declassified and distributed to front-line officers three and a half years after 9/11. One specific indicator 

which was present on five passports used by three of the 9/11 hijackers would, without a doubt, keep al Qaeda terrorists out of our 

country if distributed to consular officers and immigration inspectors. It remains classified today. 

Second, tourist visas automatically confer a 6-month length of 

stay which likely exceeds the needs of most tourists and is something we certainly need to discuss and vet. By comparison, tourists 

from visa waiver countries receive only 3 months. 

A question I was constantly asked while on the Commission was 

whether my team had come across any evidence of terrorists’ illegally entering the U.S. While the hijackers chose to acquire visas 

and enter legally, other foreign terrorists have entered the U.S. illegally. For example, Abdul Al-Marabh, a likely al Qaeda member 

who told authorities he had often crossed back and forth over the 

Northern border illegally, was finally caught in the back of a tractor-trailer crossing the Northern border around February 2001. 

During his time in the U.S., he had received five U.S. driver’s licenses in 13 months, including a commercial driver’s license and a 

permit to haul hazardous materials. 

Mahmoud Kourani, a known Hizballah operative now in Federal 

custody on terrorism charges, crossed the Southwest border in a 

car trunk in June 2001. He goes to trial in Detroit in April. 

Political asylum and naturalization are the two immigration benefits most rampantly abused by terrorists in my studies. I have 

found 22 separate incidents of indicted or convicted terrorists who 

abused our political asylum system. Nine of these terrorists did so 

after the 1996 revision of our immigration laws. Members of 

Hamas, al Qaeda, and Egyptian and Pakistani terror groups have 

all used claims of political asylum to stay longer in the U.S. 

As the Committee knows well, the 9/11 hijackers’ use of American identification documents has been widely discussed in recent 

months. The hijackers acquired a total of 34 U.S. IDs, 13 driver’s 

licenses, two of which were duplicates, and 21 USA- or State-issued 

ID cards. The ease with which the 9/11 hijackers acquired Government-issued IDs highlights the importance of verifying identities 

and immigration status when issuing those documents. It is also 

valuable to emphasize the deterrent effect on criminals and terrorists alike if we tighten the vetting procedures and security features 

associated with these cards. 

We know that terrorists are creative and adaptable. Yet we have 

the ability to counter them. Our front-line officers are talented, and 

they are eager to do everything they can to protect this country. 

They are our border system’s biggest asset and our best weapon 

against terrorist travel. But they need better tools—information, 

resources, and the ability to enforce the law better within a departmental structure wholly supportive of their mission. 

My written testimony lays out a series of recommendations purely for your consideration that address these issues, which I believe 

29

can make our borders more secure and more efficient than ever before. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kephart appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you, Ms. Kephart. We will have 5-

minute rounds, and as long as you and members of the Committee 

want to stay here and ask questions, but hopefully we will not detain you long. 

Ms. Kephart, in your testimony you talk about the fact that terrorist indicators on a passport are sometimes classified and in 

many instances, whether classified or not, are not communicated to 

the people most in need of that information when determining 

whether to issue a visa or not. 

Did you find a valid reason to keep that kind of information classified? Or is there a better way that that could be handled that 

gives the required personnel access to what they need to make a 

good decision but at the same time maintain the secrecy of the document so that the bad guys cannot necessarily know what it is we 

are looking for? 

Ms. KEPHART. Well, I can tell you that we tried very hard for our 

staff report to get the, quote-unquote, terrorist indicators and the 

fraudulent manipulation declassified for the staff report so that the 

public could know. It was very odd to me, while I was working on 

the Commission, that I actually had access to more information 

about terrorists’ travel and terrorist indicators than our front-line 

officers did. 

The indicator that I referred to in my testimony, both oral and 

written, is one that is extremely obvious. If you told a front-line officer what it is, he could check for it. And I think that is probably 

all I can say about it in open testimony here. But in terms of getting that to front-line officers, we believed, me and my colleagues, 

my other four colleagues who helped produce the staff report, that 

it was something that could be declassified. 

So I guess I do not really have terms to say what we need to do 

to get it declassified because I think it probably should be. 

Chairman CORNYN. Well, of course, we have been talking today 

about people who at least try or at least appear to try to come into 

the country legally but, nevertheless, manipulate the process to 

enter into the country and to do us harm. But I think as several 

others have noted, terrorists could try to come in the way that the 

9/11 terrorists did using fake documents and through ostensibly a 

legal process, or they can try to come in across one of our unprotected borders without any pretense at trying to come in legally or 

the like. 

I continue to be concerned about the fragmentation of responsibilities when it comes to both border protection and immigration, 

and I have noted, Ms. Kephart, with interest your recommendation 

that the U.S. Government create a Department of Immigration and 

Border Protection separate from the Department of Homeland Security. Could you explain your justification for that recommendation, given the fact that we just moved it from DOJ to DHS in 

2002? 

30

Ms. KEPHART. I understand that is a big one to swallow under 

the current circumstances when we just created a new Department 

of Homeland Security. But the fact of the matter is, as Commissioner Meissner—and I would love to hear what she has to say 

about this as well. 

Chairman CORNYN. I am going to give her a chance. 

Ms. KEPHART. Our country was based on immigration. We now 

have a situation where border security is considered a national priority. What we have had in the past is Commissioners dedicated, 

like Commissioner Meissner, who didn’t have direct access to the 

President and did not, even more importantly, perhaps, have direct 

access to the intelligence they needed to make good decisions. 

By creating a separate department where you focus wholly on 

immigration and border security, we can have policies created by 

a Secretary who focuses completely on an incredibly complex, politically and legally complex set of laws and policies. We have right 

now over 40,000, I believe, employees in immigration. That far exceeds at least five departments that exist in the Federal Government already. There is enough there—it is a big distraction for the 

Secretary of DHS to deal with the very intricate and delicate process of immigration. And I think if it was pulled out separately, it 

would be perhaps helpful to our policies and our rules on immigration, help us enforce our laws better. 

Chairman CORNYN. Ms. Meissner, I did ask Secretary Chertoff, 

after he was confirmed, what his plans were to appoint someone to 

succeed Asa Hutchinson in the Department of Homeland Security, 

and he advised me that they are looking at organizational issues 

before moving on to that. But do you have any reaction or any advice you would like to give either us or Secretary Chertoff or reaction to perhaps Ms. Kephart’s suggestion of the creation of a new 

Department of Immigration and Border Protection? 

Ms. MEISSNER. I cannot resist saying this is deja vu all over 

again. These issues, you know, have been debated and debated. 

If you were making the Government over, you would not have it 

be this way where immigration is concerned. But we are not making the Government over. And we have, as you said, gone through 

this enormous shift now just within the last 2 years. I think that 

it would be—I think it is just impractical and unwise to think 

about further upheaval where this kind of a massive structural 

change is concerned. 

That being said, I also believe that there are a set of what I 

think of as second-generation changes that need to be made within 

DHS in the immigration arena in order for things to work more effectively. You know, the original idea obviously was to separate enforcement and service, and I see now that there is discussion about 

CBP and ICE being reconnected. And I think that is probably 

worth considering because I think one of the major problems right 

now is fragmentation. But I think that it is much more important 

in DHS at this point that there be more capability at the department-wide level to deal with immigration where policy is concerned. And I think that the best—I have made a suggestion in my 

testimony that the best solution I have heard is to establish an 

Under Secretary for Policy office in DHS. 

31

The Secretary and the Deputy Secretary in DHS just do not have 

department-wide staff capability to do their work. And if you take 

the model at HHS, for instance, that is not such a dissimilar agency, of a major Under Secretary for Policy position that can advise 

the Secretary on all of these different things, immigration would be 

one of the key issues in that portfolio. There would have to be analysis done, and you could deal with issues like this. This B-2 visa 

issue, for instance, is the kind of an issue that is very unlikely to 

come up from the constituent bureaus because they only all have 

just a piece of it. There needs to be overview. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Kennedy? 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, and I welcome you to 

our committee, and I thank Doris Meissner for changing her schedule to be with us. I appreciate very much all of your continued 

ideas on these issues. 

Let me ask you, on the basic issue on the immigration, we have 

dramatically expanded the resources on the border, yet illegal immigration has soared. And we have pushed people, I think, further 

underground since 9/11, and we have wound up keeping more migrants here because they fear if they leave, they will not be able 

to get in here. And we are now increasing the number of people 

that are dying out in the deserts, and we are in danger of getting 

these vigilante groups that are beginning to say that they are going 

to come down to our border. 

What do you think we need to be doing differently in order to get 

a better handle on the undocumented immigration? Is enforcement 

by itself a viable option? What else should we be thinking about? 

Ms. MEISSNER. Well, I was pleased to hear the Chairman in his 

opening statement use the terminology that is becoming, I think, 

very well accepted, and that is that the immigration system is broken. I mean, you are pointing to one set of examples, but there are 

many, many examples. And so I am very, very pleased that you 

have held this hearing and that you are seeing this hearing as the 

beginning of a set of discussions, because we have to have a really 

focused public debate, and it has to happen in the Congress on how 

to fix it. How to fix it has to do, obviously, with recognizing what 

the reality is in the country today, and that is that we are a country that is aging. We are not from our own population creating a 

number of workers that our job market needs. We are dealing with 

a border enforcement structure that has cost us billions of dollars. 

I feel very close to that border enforcement activity. I believe 

strongly in doing border enforcement. But you cannot deal with the 

immigration system and controls on the immigration system just at 

the Southwest border or, actually, just at our borders all around. 

I mean, I agree with Janice that border enforcement is extraordinarily important, but if there is always the pressure and the 

availability of a job in this country for people who are able to get 

past the border, no matter what you do at the border, it is not 

going to be sufficient. 

I will be interested in your interior enforcement hearings. Interior enforcement is very important, but I would submit at this 

point that it is not possible to do it effectively with our current 

laws. 

32

So coming up with an enforcement regime that is strong, effective border enforcement but backed up by accountability within the 

country, where work is concerned, where documents are concerned, 

and then, of course, dealing with the issue of a large population of 

people here who do not have legal status, whom we need as demonstrated by the market, but who are right now absolutely, arguably, a security weakness because it is a large number and we do 

not know who they are. And then, finally, the question of the labor 

market for the future. How do we regulate the flows of people coming to the country for a variety of reasons that are in our National 

interest? It is a very, very big portfolio, but it has to be addressed. 

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I want to thank you for your very 

thoughtful response, and we will be continuing to draw on your experience as we go along with these hearings. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CORNYN. Senator Feinstein? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much. 

Doris, it is great to see you again. 

Ms. MEISSNER. Same here. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. You look wonderful. A little grayer than I remember you, but I think that happens to all of us. 

Ms. MEISSNER. So it goes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And, Janice, it is great to see you, too, but 

particularly Doris because I have served on the Immigration Subcommittee now for 13 years, and you are a big part of it. So it is 

wonderful to see you again. 

Ms. MEISSNER. Thank you. Very nice to see you, too. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I have been perusing the staff report here, 

and I wanted to ask you about a part of it because I think there 

is a tendency for us to throw up our hands and say we really cannot do anything and that, oh, you know, this is America and we 

all believe in the freedom and all of this. 

And yet when you read this report and you see how sophisticated 

al Qaeda was—and I want to give you one example, and that is 

their use of document travel facilitators, Abu Zubaida, Riyadh, the 

African facilitator, how they came together, how they are able to 

take each terrorist and work out a suitable way of entry for that 

individual. 

I went over each of the terrorists. Some of them married to come 

in. They used all kinds of different visa entries. But it was so 

smart and so studied. 

And I want to just read a part of this to you and ask you to comment. ‘‘al Qaeda relied heavily on a small cadre of operatives and 

their assistance to facilitate travel for their network. Chief among 

them were Abu Zubadyah, a facilitator we will call the African 

facilitator in Riyadh. Broadly speaking, a terrorist travel facilitator 

assisted operatives in obtaining fraudulent documents, of which the 

world abounds; arranging visas, real or fake; making airline reservations, purchasing airline tickets, arranging lodging and ground 

transportation, and taking care of any other aspect of travel in 

which his expertise or contacts were needed.’’ And then they profile 

each one of these men and how they got together and how they 

worked and the amount of money. You know, one facilitated the 

flow of funds to al Qaeda, allegedly passing half a million dollars 

33

in late 2001 from Saudi donors to extremists and their families in 

Pakistan. 

Then they relied on outsiders. ‘‘Document vendors provided al 

Qaeda with a wide range of bogus and genuine documents and 

were valued for their forgery skills. Through these vendors, al 

Qaeda operatives had access to an impressive range of fraudulent 

travel, identification, and other documents, including passports 

from countries in almost every region of the world—travel caches, 

blank visas, foils, stamps, seals, laminates, and other materials.’’ 

And it goes on and on and on. 

And so, often people say, you know, we are trying to do things 

and there is no real need to do them. I wish I believed that. I believe there is every need to do them and every need to look at our 

programs, and maybe even cancel some and go into a strict program. And, Doris, I wish I agreed with you that the border cannot 

be enforced. I actually believe it can. You were here when we—

when you put forward, I think, Operation Gatekeeper, and it has 

worked. The problem is it has moved people from the San Diego, 

California, border into the Arizona-Texas border. But where it existed, it worked—works still. 

My question is this: When you see the sophistication of the terrorist movement of today, the facilitators, the outside travel vendors, how they really look at all of the various aspects, wouldn’t 

you say that the visa waiver program offers them an enormous opportunity, when you look at the numbers of stolen fraud-proof passports from visa waiver countries in the thousands, that this is the 

way they can easily come in, get lost, and remain here? 

Ms. MEISSNER. Well, first, let me be absolutely clear about border enforcement. I believe in border enforcement. I think that we 

must do border enforcement, and we do know how to do border enforcement. I just don’t think it can be the only thing, and that is 

essentially what we have done, is we have—and until 9/11, we 

were not serious even about ports of entry. We were serious only 

about the land border between the United States and Mexico. 

So what I am saying where border enforcement is concerned is 

don’t rely solely on border enforcement in order to combat terrorism, or illegal immigration, for that matter. There need to be a 

series of things in place because, as the 9/11 Commission work 

clearly showed, wherever the weaknesses are, it is the weaknesses 

that will be exploited. So the issue is to put a whole set of things 

into place, and even to have some redundancies. 

You know, I want to return the compliment to Janice. She 

worked brilliantly on the staff of the 9/11 Commission. We worked 

together for many hours of deposition and debriefing, et cetera, in 

order to try to figure out really, you know, what would be the proper approaches, and I think the 9/11 Commission report is very, 

very, thoughtful. And what——

Senator FEINSTEIN. If you could change one thing, both of you, 

what would it be? 

Ms. MEISSNER. You mean where the border is concerned? If I 

could change one thing where the border is concerned, what it 

would be is accountability on the part of our interior enforcement 

and primarily accountability with employers, a way to verify who 

is working and a way to follow up to be sure that that employment 

34

relationship is according to law, because that is what—the weakness there and the need for those people in our labor market without being able to regulate it effectively is what is putting undue 

pressure on all of these other things, where we are actually doing 

quite well. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Janice, if you could change one thing, what 

would it be? 

Ms. KEPHART. Senator, I have four pages of recommendations. 

Let me pick something. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. No, pick the key thing that you think would 

make a difference. 

Ms. KEPHART. I think that although we are talking a very good 

talk right now about border security being national security, we 

have it very buried in DHS right now. 

My second choice would be what Commissioner Meissner stated, 

which would be the Under Secretary of Policy position at DHS. It 

is something we talked about amongst our staff while I was at the 

Commission, and it is something that Secretary Ridge was considering when we interviewed him. I don’t know if Secretary Chertoff 

is considering the same. But we need homogeny in the policy process. We need homogeny as we create better rules, standard operating procedures, electronic libraries of fraudulent documents at 

our ports of entry, so our programs are consistent. 

We have, for example, right now—and Interpol has created at 

the cost of millions of dollars a huge database of lost and stolen 

passports, Senator. That is available to us, but only in secondary 

inspections right now. It is not available——

Senator FEINSTEIN. What does that mean? 

Ms. KEPHART. Well, what that means is that when you have your 

immigration inspector come in and that passport gets swiped, the 

number on that passport is not being automatically queried into 

Interpol’s lost and stolen passport database. They have dozens of 

countries in it now, millions of documents in it, and if we had it 

swiped, then it would not be up to the immigration inspector trying 

to figure out if that document has a problem. He would automatically know something once that document was swiped. 

What you have, as my understanding is, at DHS in Science and 

Technology—and maybe this has changed in recent months—is 

that they were going and creating their own bilateral agreements 

with visa waiver countries to get their lost and stolen passport 

database. On the database created here in the U.S., while we are 

also cooperating with Interpol, I think that is a duplication of resources perhaps. We have so many other needs. We have interior 

enforcement still at 2,000. We have Border Patrol needs that are 

very strong. So, you know, there are discrete things that we can 

do at our ports of entry, programmatic, cost-effective. Some of them 

could just be rule changes that I think we can do sort of across the 

board. But I think the overall problem is that we have got a situation where people are talking about deck chairs at ICE and CBP. 

We are not talking about the ship it is in. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay. Let me ask this question: When we 

have got—I guess it is US-VISIT set up on entry and exit——

Ms. KEPHART. Not on exit, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. No, no. When we get it set up. 

35

Ms. KEPHART. Oh, when we do. I am sorry. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Now, as I understand it, it is not set up on 

exit and it is partially set up on entry. But assuming they can get 

it, what kind of security do you think that will provide? 

Ms. KEPHART. Do you want to start? 

Ms. MEISSNER. It will provide information. It will provide very 

important information, which will allow us to do what in the 9/11 

Commission is talked about as analysis of trends and patterns. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Should that be our goal to see that get done? 

Ms. MEISSNER. That is critical. Absolutely. In order to know what 

is happening, you have to have that. But that is not enough. What 

nobody has figured out—and it was alluded to by the earlier witnesses—is what do you do when you know that certain people have 

not left, because having the information is one thing, being able to 

act on the information is another thing. Having the information for 

analytic purposes is extremely important. That is feedback that we 

need. It is also a basis for then, you know, the people that have 

not left, you run them first. The most important thing you would 

do is run them against your terrorist watchlist and so on. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But, Doris, if we cut down the entry period—

Senator Kennedy asked the question, I think Senator Cornyn dealt 

with it, I had it. I did not do it because they did it, that if you want 

to come in for 2 weeks you get a 6-month visa. 

Ms. MEISSNER. Unclear. Until we look at that data and find out 

how long most of those people actually stay, it is entirely possible 

that most of them are only staying 2 or 3 weeks. We do not even 

know. 

But as I said, if you start to——

Senator FEINSTEIN. Wouldn’t it be common sense—wouldn’t it be 

common sense to have a 30-day visa or 3-week visa? 

Ms. MEISSNER. It is easy to say that it is common sense, but 

when you see all of the circumstances of the almost 10 million people that have that visa and have to deal with each one of them person by person at a port of entry in order to decide should it be 2 

weeks, should it be 1 month, should it be 6 weeks, I am not sure 

that is a very good use of resources. The length of time in the country may not be nearly as important as other characteristics about 

the people. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, it is like if you go to China. You get a 

visa, and it is for a specific period of time. There are very few—

they give some multiple-entry visas. 

Ms. MEISSNER. Right. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But you get a 30-day visa. You know, I have 

visas, 5 days. I do not feel insulted——

Ms. MEISSNER. There is no question we—there is no question we 

could do it. Whether it would make any difference at all, we don’t 

know. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But it is not done at the port of entry. 

Ms. MEISSNER. Yes, it is. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. It is done by the—no, when I get a Chinese 

or another visa from another country, the visa comes to me from 

them like that. 

Ms. MEISSNER. That is the way they originally issued it, but our 

system is one where, as you know, whatever is originally issued by 

36

the consulate is also then independently validated by the port of 

entry inspector. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Oh, I see. I see. 

Ms. MEISSNER. You have a slightly different statutory set-up. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Maybe we need to change that process. Why 

does it have to go to the port of entry? 

Ms. MEISSNER. Because that is where the people enter, and there 

can be——

Senator FEINSTEIN. But don’t you have—you have your visa 

when you come in. 

Ms. MEISSNER. Right. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And it says the length of time on it. Can’t it 

just come from our offices abroad? 

Ms. MEISSNER. It could. It could, but, you know, you would have 

to change the statutes for that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I think that is something to think about. 

Ms. MEISSNER. Well, actually, that is an area of redundancy that 

is probably in our favor. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Why? We don’t——

Ms. MEISSNER. As a country. Well, because people apply for the 

visa now, they might come a month from now. In the meanwhile, 

you can get information, something may have happened. You want 

them checked at the port of entry. You don’t want to just be a rubber stamp. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, we need to talk about this because I 

think I have got a misunderstanding or something. But, anyway, 

thank you very much. 

Ms. MEISSNER. Anyway, I am not against changing it. I am simply saying we should know whether there is a connection, and we 

don’t know whether there is a connection between length of stay 

and terrorism or illegal stay. We just don’t. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, you can look at the terrorists, and you 

can make some——

Ms. MEISSNER. No, you can’t, because they were, by and—they 

were within the bounds. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Yes, but they had visas for extended periods 

of time, too. 

Ms. MEISSNER. That was not necessarily what was connected to 

their terrorism. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, the question comes——

Ms. MEISSNER. They could be independent——

Senator FEINSTEIN. Why not—well, all right. You know, if you 

are going to give somebody a visa and let them come in for 6 

months and you know very little about them, you might as well 

give it to them practically forever, because they can come in, they 

can have time, they open the bank accounts, they get the fraudulent driver’s license, the fraudulent Social Security number, all of 

which takes time. They open their bank accounts. They get their 

banking scheduled. They become respectable in the neighborhood. 

And then, bing, you turn your back and you are hit. 

I am one that believes that some of that planning is probably 

going on today. And I think the longer the visa, it gives you the 

time to do all these things. That is my only point. 

37

Ms. MEISSNER. That could very well be possible. As I say, we 

really don’t know. 

Chairman CORNYN. Ms. Kephart, would you like to comment on 

this? 

Ms. KEPHART. I sure would. 

Chairman CORNYN. Do you have any different views? 

Ms. KEPHART. Yes, please. First, the value of US-VISIT, Senator 

Feinstein, is, I believe, as I have looked at it closely, it is to integrate the databases and provide biometric information at the border so that our front-line officers can make better decisions when 

they are seeking to admit folks. 

It also does something else which the other staff and I on the 9/

11 Commission thought was extremely important, and that was 

creating terrorist—the beginning of creating of terrorist travel histories. You can begin, as we begin to integrate our databases, and 

something we strongly recommended to the Commissioners, was 

that we need to have an integrated knowledge of our travelers. We 

need to create histories for them. It starts at the consular office if 

they are asking for a visa. If they are visa-waiver, it starts at the 

ports of entry. Therefore, if they come and they ask for more favors 

from the U.S. Government in terms of immigration, we have that 

in the US-VISIT and we can return to it as they seek immigration 

benefits. We can cut out a lot of the issues with fraud from that 

vantage point, and I think US-VISIT is probably the best and 

strongest thing we have done as a Government. 

The second thing in terms of the issues brought up, that you 

brought up, Senator, was the length of stay. One thing that we can 

do that would perhaps be helpful for consideration would be simply 

initially, as we are vetting the process and figuring out exactly 

what the best solution would be for the length of stay in the U.S., 

would be to simply match those who are getting visas from visa 

countries to the visa waiver length of stay. The visa waiver length 

of stay when you get here is 3 months, period. You have got to go 

at the end. There is no discretion there. There is also really—even 

though I heard DHS folks say differently, there is really no discretion on the 6-month length of stay for tourists from visa countries 

either. 

When I interviewed 26 of 38——

Senator FEINSTEIN. What do you mean when you say there is no 

discretion? What does that mean? 

Ms. KEPHART. The admitting officer, your inspector who looks at 

your passport and admits you, really does not have the ability to 

say you get any less time than 6 months. He has to actually go to 

his supervisor, which he is not going to do when he has got, you 

know, 45 second to a minute to adjudicate somebody, go to his supervisor and get approval to give less. It is not encouraged. It was 

a customer-oriented system before, on the front lines. It is becoming, from what I understand, a customer-oriented system again. 

And so, therefore, we could keep that discretion away and just simply match it to visa waiver. Visa waiver folks are supposed to be 

our better friends, anyway. You know, people from visa-issuing 

countries, we perhaps need to match that. That could be a simple 

first solution, perhaps. 

38

The other thing is that we do know that terrorists abuse the 

length of stay. It is something that was established in the staff report. They do abuse it. Mohammed Atta, after coming in twice in 

the spring of 2000 and then again in January 2001, knew very well 

that he would get 6 months if he claimed he had visitor/tourist 

needs here. It became clear. And believe me, it only came clear to 

us as staff after I actually had put together the chronology in here, 

we put together the consular officer activity and the immigration 

inspector activity, the actual applications for visa and the entries. 

And we realized that, yes, indeed, these people had a travel operation. The terrorists had a terrorist travel operation. That is where 

our title comes from. But it took us 14 months to get there. 

And so Atta knew what he was doing when he brought those 

folks in the spring and summer of 2001. He knew he had 6 months 

for them, and he used it. And so I think we do have evidence, and 

it is not guesswork at this point. 

Chairman CORNYN. Ms. Kephart, the staff report notes that inspectors receive no behavioral science training and no cultural 

training and no regularly updated training. You also noted that the 

9/11 hijackers encountered U.S. border security 68 times. 

Ms. KEPHART. Yes. 

Chairman CORNYN. What role do you think these deficiencies 

played in failing to deter the hijackers from entering the country? 

Ms. KEPHART. Well, I cannot say what it deterred, but I can say 

where it helped. And where it helped was the situation of the 20th 

hijacker. The 20th hijacker was Mohammed Al Kahtani. On August 

4, 2001, he sought entry into the U.S. He was the only hijacker to 

try to enter without a buddy. That might have made his situation 

particularly worse. But he was referred to secondary. He didn’t 

speak any English, and he appeared arrogant to the inspector. Fortunately, the primary inspector had experience and so she noted 

these small anomalies. 

He went into secondary and, perhaps, we shall say, by the grace 

of God, encountered somebody who had been trained in behavioral 

science in the Army. And so this individual knew what he was 

doing, and he spent about an hour and a half with Kahtani, found 

grounds of intending immigrant to deny him entry, would have 

sought expedited removal, was supported by his superiors because 

he was a well-respected inspector. 

But his knowledge and understanding of behavior allowed us to 

keep out the 20th hijacker—one of the 20th hijackers. There were 

others who were trying to get in as well. But there is a positive 

spin, perhaps, on what we can do and the value of behavior. 

The others, there was a whole range of immigration inspector experience amongst the others I interviewed. Some had been immigration inspectors for 15 years. Others had been immigration inspectors for a year. You had immigration inspectors who were 15 

years in the making being actually more lenient, not paying attention to the behavioral cues as much as the younger ones who were 

newer and fresh. 

So behavioral cues I think are important. They are definitely 

hard to teach, but I think it is something that we need to pay attention to. 

39

Chairman CORNYN. In your opening statement, you mentioned 

Director Mueller’s statements and Admiral Loy’s in your written 

testimony. Based on your experience while working for the 9/11 

Commission, how has the training for those most likely to initially 

encounter special interest aliens improved since 9/11? 

Ms. KEPHART. You know, sir, I don’t have the answer to that because I am no longer privy to what is going on inside DHS. I had 

lovely access while on the Commission. I have no access now. So 

I have to deflect that question because I simply cannot answer it. 

Chairman CORNYN. We will follow up with someone else who still 

has access to that information. 

Ms. Meissner and Ms. Kephart, thank you very much for participating in this. I think we have all—we have certainly benefited 

from this exchange, and on behalf of both Subcommittees, I would 

like to thank all of the witnesses for their time and their testimony. 

We will leave the record open until 5:00 p.m. next Monday, 

March 21, for members to submit any additional documents into 

the record and ask questions in writing of any of the panelists. 

Right now I have a statement from Senator Leahy and from the 

Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, which will 

be made part of the record, without objection. But if there are others between now and then, the deadline is March 21st at 5:00 p.m. 

next Monday. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. Thank you so much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.] 

[Additional material is being retained in the Committee files.]

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