COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Fitzpatrick 

SAMPSON PRICE TERRY 

v. Record No. 1896-94-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA FEBRUARY 13, 1996 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

Samuel M. Hairston, Judge 

 Rickey G. Young (Law Office of Rickey G. 

Young, on brief), for appellant. 

 Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Sampson Price Terry appeals his conviction for possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine, second or subsequent offense. 

 He argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to suppress the 

cocaine as evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to 

support his conviction. We affirm his conviction. 

 On January 24, 1994, an investigator from the Henry County 

Sheriff's Department informed the Pittsylvania County Sheriff's 

Department that a capias had been issued for the arrest of 

Sampson Terry, described as a black male about 5'11" tall, with a 

medium build, medium complexion, a short hair cut, and a bad eye. 

 The investigator stated that Terry would be participating in a 

drug transaction near a particular house, and that a grayish-blue 

Honda with 30-day tags would be involved. Investigator Ingram of 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
- 2 - 

the Pittsylvania County Sheriff's Department corroborated much of 

this information and received additional details through an 

informant. During the trial the informant was revealed to be 

Eric Williams, who lived in the house where the drug deal was to 

take place. 

 Based on the information they had received, Investigators 

Ingram and Baggerly set up surveillance of Eric Williams' house. 

 A grayish-blue Honda arrived at the house, and the driver, 

Alexander Coleman, got out and went inside the house. Williams 

then came out of the house and got into the vehicle, returning 

with Terry in the front seat. On his way to pick up Terry, 

Williams motioned for Ingram to follow him, and stopped at a 

nearby intersection to speak with Ingram. After the vehicle 

returned to the house, Williams got out and went into the house, 

and Coleman came out and joined Terry in the car. Terry was in 

the front passenger seat. 

 The car, with Coleman driving, headed onto the highway. 

Ingram pulled out onto the same road, activated his emergency 

equipment, and stopped the vehicle. Baggerly, stationed at a 

different location nearby, assisted Ingram. Ingram approached 

the car and ordered the men to put their hands up. Coleman 

complied immediately, but Terry looked at Ingram through the 

window and did not comply. Ingram could see Terry's shoulders 

moving as if he were doing something with his hands. After the 

second or third order that he put his hands up, Terry did so. 

While looking at Terry through the window, Ingram noticed that he 
- 3 - 

had a "lazy eye." Ingram removed Terry from the vehicle, and 

handcuffed and arrested him. 

 After Terry was handcuffed and arrested, Ingram searched him 

and found a pocket knife and over $500.00 in cash. Ingram then 

searched the car, which did not belong to Terry, and found two 

pill bottles lying beside the passenger seat between the seat and 

the door. Each of the bottles contained small white rocks, which 

laboratory analysis proved to be cocaine. The knife and the 

money also carried traces of cocaine. 

 Ingram had used Williams as an informant on a number of 

occasions in the past, had obtained two or three search warrants 

based on his information, and on other occasions had used his 

information and found it to be accurate. On one occasion some 

years ago, Williams had given Ingram information that was not 

accurate, and he was charged with giving false information. 

Also, Ingram testified that Williams' attitude toward him had 

deteriorated several months prior to trial. Ingram believed this 

change occurred because he had executed a search warrant at 

Williams' house, and drug charges were brought against Williams 

based on the fruits of that search. These charges were brought 

after Terry's arrest. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, granting it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom. The verdict of the jury will not be 

disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 
- 4 - 

S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). 

 I 

 We first consider the suppression issue. Terry argues that 

the investigators lacked probable cause to stop the car in which 

Coleman and Terry were riding. A police officer may stop a motor 

vehicle, even without probable cause, for investigatory purposes 

if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the 

vehicle or its occupants are subject to seizure for violation of 

law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); Bulatko v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 135, 136-137, 428 S.E.2d 306, 307 

(1993); Stroud v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 633, 636, 370 S.E.2d 

721, 723 (1988). Here, the police were looking for Terry in 

order to execute the capias from Henry County. They had reliable 

information that Terry would be traveling in a grayish-blue Honda 

with temporary tags, to a house where the informant, Williams, 

lived, and would be participating in a drug transaction. This 

information was sufficient to establish probable cause for the 

stop and search of the Honda at Williams' house. 

 In determining whether information from an informant is 

sufficient to establish probable cause, the court must evaluate 

the informant's reliability, veracity, and basis of knowledge. 

See Boyd v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 179, 186-187, 402 S.E.2d 

914, 918, 919 (1991). Williams had proven to be a reliable 

informant in the past. Williams knew the participants in the 

drug transaction. Coleman and Terry arrived and left just as 

Williams had predicted. Williams' information, along with the 
- 5 - 

 

information from the police in Henry County, provided a 

sufficient basis for the stop on two grounds.1

 First, the 

information was sufficient to provide probable cause that Terry, 

for whom they had a capias, was in the vehicle. Secondly, the 

information was sufficient to provide probable cause that a drug 

deal was in progress. 

 We hold probable cause existed to stop the vehicle because 

the investigators had reliable information that the occupants of 

the car were engaging in a drug transaction and Terry for whom 

they had a capias was in the vehicle. This same information gave 

the officers probable cause to search the vehicle. Also, 

probable cause to search the vehicle was strengthened by 

additional circumstances. When the car was stopped, the police 

confirmed that Terry was in the car. Terry then refused to put 

his hands up and moved his arms in a manner that suggested he was 

hiding something. When he was searched, he was carrying a knife 

and a large sum of cash. These circumstances gave the officers 

even greater cause to believe that the car contained drugs or 

other evidence of a crime. Given such probable cause, the right 

 1At the trial, Williams testified for the defense, denying 

that he had provided any information about Terry's involvement in 

a drug deal, and accusing Ingram and Baggerly of improper 

conduct. Williams' change in attitude toward Ingram took place 

after Terry was arrested, and had no bearing on the existence of 

reasonable suspicion for the stop. As for the effect of 

Williams' testimony on the sufficiency of evidence for the charge 

of possession, the jury as trier of fact was entitled to accept 

Ingram's and Baggerly's testimony and reject that of Williams. 

Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304, 429 S.E.2d 477, 479 

(1993). 
- 6 - 

to conduct a warrantless search extended to the entire car, 

including any closed containers within the car. United States v. 

Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-822 (1982); Westcott v. Commonwealth, 216 

Va. 123, 126, 216 S.E.2d 60, 63, (1975).2

 An automobile may be searched without a warrant where there 

exist both probable cause to believe the car contains evidence of 

a crime and exigent circumstances. McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 

Va. 219, 227-228, 321 S.E.2d 637, 641 (1984). An automobile's 

mobility and the likelihood that evidence will be lost or 

destroyed if the automobile is permitted to leave the scene 

constitute exigent circumstances. Id. The warrantless search of 

the car was valid, and therefore the trial judge did not err in 

denying the motion to suppress. 

 II 

 The defendant's conviction was based on constructive 

possession. "To support a conviction based on constructive 

possession, `the Commonwealth must point to evidence of acts, 

statements, or conduct of the accused or other facts or 

 

 2The Commonwealth argues that Terry cannot contest the 

illegality of the search because he was merely a passenger in the 

car and therefore had no legitimate expectation of privacy. In 

Arnold v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 313, 437 S.E.2d 235 (1993), 

we held that a passenger lawfully present in the vehicle had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in a shopping bag located at 

his feet. The Court distinguished that case from Josephs v. 

Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 390 S.E.2d 491 (1990)(en banc), 

where the Court held that the defendant had no reasonable 

expectation of privacy because she was riding in a stolen car. 

Here, although the car did not belong to Coleman or Terry, there 

is no evidence that it was stolen, and the record suggests that 

it was borrowed. We therefore permit Terry to raise his Fourth 

Amendment claim with respect to the search. 
- 7 - 

circumstances which tend to show that the defendant was aware of 

both the presence and character of the substance and that it was 

subject to his dominion and control.'" McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 

Va. App. 317, 322, 357 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1987) (quoting Drew v. 

Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986)). 

Where the Commonwealth's case for constructive possession is 

based on circumstantial evidence, such evidence must be 

sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis 

except that of guilt. Shurbaji v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 415, 

423, 444 S.E.2d 549, 553 (1994); Hairston v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. 

App. 183, 186, 360 S.E.2d 893, 895 (1987) (citations omitted). 

 Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 

evidence showed that the sheriff's investigators had been 

informed that there would be a drug transaction between Terry and 

Coleman. Terry and Coleman came to the location as predicted, 

and cocaine was found on the passenger side of the vehicle, where 

Terry was riding. Terry appeared to attempt to hide the cocaine. 

 He had in his possession a large quantity of cash and a knife, 

both of which carried traces of cocaine. These circumstances 

together warrant the reasonable inference that the cocaine found 

in the car belonged to the defendant and had been possessed by 

him. Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 100-102, 390 

S.E.2d 491, 498-499 (1990)(en banc). At a minimum, the evidence 

showed joint possession of the drugs by Terry and Coleman. Id.

at 99, 101, 390 S.E.2d at 497, 499. 
- 8 - 

 For these reasons, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.