J-S62036-17

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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MARIE CHAVANNES,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 472 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 15, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-SA-0000119-2016

BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED OCTOBER 17, 2017

Marie Chavannes (Appellant) pro se appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed on February 15, 2017, after her summary appeal was 

dismissed for her failure to appear at the hearing. We affirm.

The trial court provided the following background.

Appellant ... is the owner of a residential property located 

at 813 Spring Street in Wyomissing, Berks County, 

Pennsylvania. On August 18, 2015, Appellant [] was given 

notice of three code violations on her property. On September 

28, 2015, Reading Codes enforcement officer Guido Marte [reinspected] the property and issued three citations for noncompliance with local ordinances [(L.O.)]. The citations charged 

Appellant with violating:

L.O. § 304.2 Failure to maintain or repair gutters and 

downspouts

L.O. § 304.7 Failure to repaint or repair front porch

L.O. § 304.10 Failure to install handrail on steps

On February 25, 2016, Magisterial District Judge Alvin B. 

Robinson found Appellant guilty in absentia of all three code 
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violations. Each violation carried a fine and costs totaling 

$335.50 each. Appellant has paid $190.00 toward the fines and 

costs owed.

On March 29, 2016, Appellant filed an appeal with the 

Court of Common Pleas in Berks County. A summary appeal 

trial was scheduled on June 6, 2016, but had to be continued 

until August 1, 2016. On August 1, 2016, the trial was again 

continued until November 7, 2016. On November 7, 2016, the 

summary appeal trial was once again continued to December 14, 

2016. On December 14, 2016[,] the summary appeal trial was 

rescheduled for February 15, 2017. Each continuance was at the 

request of or on behalf of Appellant. Each continuance order, 

including the order dated December 14, 2016[,] states, “No 

motion for continuance will be considered within three business 

days of the scheduled hearing, except for an emergency 

occurring within that time.”

On February 15, [2017,] Appellant’s counsel, John 

Fielding, appeared to represent her at the summary appeal trial. 

Appellant’s counsel did inform the [trial c]ourt of Appellant’s 

health issues, however, counsel did not express any emergency 

situation which would bar Appellant from appearing as 

scheduled. Appellant’s counsel was not prepared to proceed 

with the trial without Appellant and requested yet another 

continuance on behalf of Appellant. On February 15, 2017, the 

[trial] court dismissed the appeal for failure of Appellant to 

appear.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/2017, at 1-2.

Accordingly, the aforementioned judgment of sentence against 

Appellant was entered on that date. Appellant timely filed pro se a notice of 

appeal, and both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

On appeal, Appellant presents three issues for our consideration.

1. Did the [trial] court err[] in dismissing [A]ppellant[’s] 

de novo trial while counsel was present on behalf of [Appellant]?
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2. Did the trial court determine whether [Appellant] had 

adequate cause for her absence?

3. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion by not granting 

a continuance sua sponte?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (suggested answers omitted).

We consider Appellant’s issues together, as they are interrelated. In 

doing so, we bear in mind the following.

Our standard of review is limited to whether the trial court 

committed an error of law and whether the findings of the trial 

court are supported by competent evidence. The adjudication of 

the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest 

abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion may not be found 

merely because an appellate court might have reached a 

different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or 

such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous.

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 462 governs de 

novo trials following the appeal of a summary conviction. That 

rule states, in pertinent part, the following:

Rule 462. Trial De Novo

(A) When a defendant appeals after the entry of a 

guilty plea or a conviction by an issuing authority in 

any summary proceeding, upon the filing of the 

transcript and other papers by the issuing authority, 

the case shall be heard de novo by the judge of the 

court of common pleas sitting without a jury. 

* * *

(D) If the defendant fails to appear, the trial judge 

may dismiss the appeal and enter judgment in the 

court of common pleas on the judgment of the 

issuing authority.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 462.
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The Comment to Rule 462 explains that “[p]aragraph (D) 

makes it clear that the trial judge may dismiss a summary case 

appeal when the judge determines that the defendant is absent 

without cause from the trial de novo.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 462, cmt. 

Therefore, before a summary appeal may be dismissed for 

failure to appear, the trial court must ascertain whether the 

absentee defendant had adequate cause for his [or her] 

absence. In the event that good cause is established, the 

defendant is entitled to a new summary trial. 

Commonwealth v. Dixon, 66 A.3d 794, 796 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some 

citations and quotation marks omitted).

 In Dixon, the Court held that a new trial is required when: “(1) a 

trial court dismisses a summary appeal without considering whether the 

absentee defendant had cause to justify the absence; and (2) the absentee 

defendant presents an affidavit on appeal that (assuming the assertions 

delineated in the affidavit are true) presents at least a prima facie

demonstration that cause existed for the absence, rendering that absence 

involuntary.” Id. at 797.

Here, Appellant contends that she had a “health emergency” 

preventing her appearance at court. Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant has 

included with this appeal an affidavit where she asserts that she is “a 67 

year old elderly woman” suffering “from multiple health problems.” 

Appellant’s Brief at Appendix G. She states that on February 15, 2017, she 

was “suffering from high blood glucose[] and hypertension” and was also 

“experiencing nausea[] and dizziness.” Id. She suggests that the trial court 
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erred by dismissing her appeal without determining whether she had “good 

cause.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. 

The trial court offered the following rationale for the dismissal of the 

appeal in its opinion.

In this case, Appellant had requested several 

continuances. The de novo trial was continued four times. 

Appellant’s failure to appear on February 15, 2017 was not 

excused by the appearance of counsel, where counsel was 

present[] only for the purpose of requesting yet another 

continuance. Counsel notified the [trial c]ourt that Appellant has 

health issues, but could not point to a specific cause of 

Appellant’s absence that day. Appellant’s counsel presented no 

explanation to the [trial c]ourt that Appellant had an emergency 

or was in such ill health that she could not be present to try her 

case.

The [trial c]ourt considered the cause for Appellant’s 

absence, but the vague excuse of “health issues” was not 

convincing where[] Appellant had proper notice of the hearing 

and the [o]rder states that continuance requests will only be 

considered on an emergency basis within three business days of 

the scheduled hearing, and Appellant had requested multiple 

continuances prior to February 15, 2017.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/2017, at 4.

The trial court reached these conclusions after extensive discussion at 

the summary appeal hearing. Attorney Fielding represented to the trial 

court that he was with Appellant the day before and “she did not have health 

issues.” N.T., 2/15/2017, at 2. The trial court also requested that Appellant 

be reached by phone. Attorney Fielding was able to reach Appellant’s son, 

who stated that his mother’s “health is preventing her from being [at court] 

or speaking on the phone.” Id. at 3. Additionally, the Commonwealth 
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attempted to enter into a settlement agreement, but Appellant did not 

authorize Attorney Fielding to accept such an agreement.

The trial court recognized that it did not have a benefit of an affidavit. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/2017, at 4. However, this Court’s review of 

the affidavit provided on appeal reveals no information that was not 

available to the trial court at the time it decided to dismiss the appeal rather 

than continue the matter. Appellant relates her various health issues, but 

does not explain why she was unable to attend the hearing even by 

telephone.

Based upon the trial court’s long history with this case, including the 

numerous continuances requested by Appellant, as well as the extent of the 

inquiry into why Appellant could not appear, we conclude that the trial court 

neither erred nor abused its discretion by dismissing the summary appeal for 

Appellant’s failure to appear. Accordingly, we affirm her judgment of 

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/17/2017