Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-SC-785 | December 18, 2019 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

DeAnn Graham

Elkhart, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Matthew A. Yeakey 

Jonathan R. Slabaugh 

Elkhart, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

DeAnn G. Graham,

Appellant-Defendant,

v. 

UMH in Holiday Village, LLC, 

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

December 18, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-SC-785 

Appeal from the Elkhart Superior 

Court

The Honorable Dean O. Burton, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

20D06-1806-SC-3112 

Tavitas, Judge. 

Case Summary

[1] DeAnn Graham appeals the small claims court’s judgment for UMH in

Holiday Village, LLC (“Landlord”). We affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-SC-785 | December 18, 2019 Page 2 of 9

Issues

[2] Graham raises numerous issues, which we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether the small claims court properly granted Landlord’s

claim for breach of contract.

II. Whether the small claims court properly denied Graham’s 

counterclaim for emotional distress.

Facts

[3] In 2013, Graham entered into a lease agreement with Landlord. The lease 

provided:

PETS. TENANT may have one (1) registered “domesticated”

pet per household with the prior written approval of 

LANDLORD. A monthly charge, as contained in the section of 

this Lease entitled “Additional Charges”, will be assessed to 

TENANT for the approved pet. TENANT is solely and totally 

responsible for the behavior of their pets. Noisy, unruly, or 

dangerous pets, those commonly known for aggressive behavior 

(i.e. Dobermans, Rottweilers, Pit Bulls, Wolf Breeds, etc.) as well 

as exotic pets (snakes, wild animals, etc.) will not be allowed in 

the Manufactured Home Community. Management shall have 

the final determination as to the acceptability of any pet. Failure 

to abide by the Rules and Regulations of the Community will 

result in the loss of this privilege.

Exhibits Vol. III p. 5. The lease was later amended to add the following:

DOGS: Dogs will be limited to house-type dogs with a fullgrown weight of 50 lbs. or less. No Resident(s) shall be allowed 

to erect or install dog compounds, dog runs, dog shelters or 

houses within the Community.
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Id. at 9.

[4] On June 18, 2019, Landlord’s former regional manager, Karen Wills, and 

Landlord’s property manager, Chris Waters, were driving through the 

community and saw a pit bull on a leash held by Graham’s daughter in a yard 

next to Graham’s residence. As Wills was discussing the pit bull with 

Graham’s daughter, Graham came outside. Graham and Wills had a verbal 

argument. The pit bull lunged at Wills and bit Wills on her right breast, 

resulting in bruising. Landlord requested that Graham remove the dog from 

the premises, and Graham refused. Graham argued that the dog was a golden 

retriever mix named Kane and that the dog was her daughter’s emotional 

support animal.

[5] On June 28, 2018, Landlord filed a small claims court notice of claim for breach 

of lease agreement against Graham. Landlord alleged that Graham breached 

her lease by having an unregistered pit bull. An evidentiary hearing was held 

on July 19, 2018, regarding possession and eviction, and the small claims court

entered an order granting Landlord possession of the premises. Graham moved 

out of the residence at the end of July 2018. 

[6] On August 1, 2018, Graham filed a counterclaim against Landlord. Graham 

claimed that she was a “victim of racial bias and racial profiling” by Landlord

and that Landlord’s conduct had caused her emotional distress. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II p. 56. A hearing was held on January 28, 2019, regarding 

Landlord’s damages and Graham’s counterclaim. At the hearing, Landlord 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-SC-785 | December 18, 2019 Page 4 of 9

requested damages for attorney fees and alleged cleaning fees and damages to 

the residence. Graham testified that she did not own a pit bull; that her dog 

was a golden retriever mix; that the dog was her daughter’s emotional support 

animal; that she had previously provided Landlord with documentation of the 

emotional support animal; and that the emotional support animal did not bite 

Wills.

[7] The small claims court issued an order finding for Landlord and awarding 

damages to Landlord and denying Graham’s counterclaim. Regarding 

Landlord’s claims, the small claims court found that “more likely than not the 

Defendant’s dog was a prohibited breed, to wit, a pit bull, (likely an addition to 

the Defendant’s dog, [K]ane) and that the dog was not properly registered as an 

emotional support animal in accord with the Lease.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II 

p. 10. The small claims court, thus, found “that the Plaintiff has established by 

a preponderance of evidence that the Defendant violated the Lease by 

maintaining a pit bull dog and that the same was not registered with the 

Plaintiffs mandated by the Lease and park rules.” Id. at 11. The small claims 

court awarded attorney fees and the outstanding account balance1 to Landlord 

but declined to award cleaning or damage fees. As for Graham’s counterclaim, 

the small claims court found:

1 The damage award included $1,850.00 for attorney fees, and $424.55 for the account balance ($386.00 due 

on the account as of July 12, 2018, plus $38.55 for a utilities reimbursement). 
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The Defendant appears to claim that the Plaintiff engaged in 

racial profiling in bringing its eviction claim against the 

Defendant; however, the Plaintiff’s evidence reflects that all of its

tenants were treated equally. The Plaintiff established that 

Notices were sent to all residents with unregistered animals or 

pets that were not permitted by the Lease. (Exhibit 4) While this 

Court finds that the Defendant, and her daughters, likely, and 

unfortunately, suffered emotional stress from the eviction and 

relocation, it appears that the eviction was primarily due to the 

Defendant’s failure to abide by the Terms of the written Lease 

Agreement and again, unfortunately, due to the Plaintiff’s loss of 

her employment. This Magistrate must, therefore, find that the 

Defendant should take nothing by way of her Counterclaim.

Id. at 12. Graham now appeals this order.

[8] We note that, separately, in June 2018, Graham filed a housing discrimination 

complaint with the Elkhart Human Relations Commission and alleged: (1) 

“Discriminatory terms, conditions, privileges, or services in rental;” and (2) 

“Failure to make reasonable accommodation.” Ex. Vol. III p. 39. On 

September 27, 2018, the Elkhart Human Relations Commission issued a “No 

Probable Cause Finding” and closed the action. The Commission found there 

was “no supporting evidence to conclude that a violation of the Federal Fair 

Housing Act has occurred.” Id. at 43. The notice noted that the decision was 

the “final determination” and was subject to judicial review in accordance with 

Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-5. Id.
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Analysis

[9] Graham appeals the small claims court’s judgment. We review facts from a 

bench trial under the clearly erroneous standard with due deference paid to the 

trial court’s opportunity to assess witness credibility. Branham v. Varble, 952 

N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ind. 2011). “This deferential standard of review is 

particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are informal, ‘with 

the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice’ between parties according to the 

rules of substantive law.” Id. (quoting Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 

(Ind. 2008)). We review questions of law de novo. Id. In determining whether 

a judgment is clearly erroneous, we do not reweigh the evidence or determine 

the credibility of witnesses. City of Dunkirk Water & Sewage Dep’t v. Hall, 657 

N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ind. 1995). 

[10] Before addressing Graham’s arguments, we note that “a pro se litigant is held to 

the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency 

simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 

266 (Ind. 2014). “An appellant who proceeds pro se is held to the same 

established rules of procedure that trained legal counsel is bound to follow and, 

therefore, must be prepared to accept the consequences of his or her action.” 

Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), 

trans. denied, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 227 (2015). Although we prefer to decide 

cases on their merits, arguments are waived where an appellant’s 

noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial it impedes 

our appellate consideration of the errors. Id. We will not consider an assertion 
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on appeal when there is no cogent argument supported by authority and there 

are no references to the record as required by the rules. Id. We will not become 

an advocate for a party or address arguments that are inappropriate or too 

poorly developed or expressed to be understood. Id. 

[11] Landlord argues that we should affirm the small claims court because Graham

repeatedly failed to comply with our appellate rules. We agree that Graham 

has largely failed to comply with the Indiana Appellate Rules. We will, 

however, address Graham’s arguments to the extent they are discernible. 

I. Breach of Lease Claim

[12] Graham appears to argue that the small claims court erred by finding that her

dog violated the lease provisions. We construe a lease in the same manner as 

any other contract. Youell v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 117 N.E.3d 639, 641 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2018). Graham does not appear to contest that the lease did not allow pit 

bulls and required dogs to be registered. Rather, Graham argues that her dog, 

Kane, was a golden retriever mix and that it was registered with the Landlord 

as an emotional support animal. Wills, however, testified that she was bitten by 

a pit bull and that Kane was not the animal that attacked her. Landlord also 

presented evidence that its records did not contain any information about 

Graham’s emotional support animal. The small claims court specifically found 

that “more likely than not the Defendant’s dog was a prohibited breed, to wit, a 

pit bull, (likely an addition to the Defendant’s dog, [K]ane) and that the dog 

was not properly registered as an emotional support animal in accord with the 

Lease.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 10. There is evidence to support the small 
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claims court’s finding, and Graham’s argument is merely a request that we 

reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which we 

cannot do. We cannot say that the small claims court’s judgment that Graham 

breached her lease is clearly erroneous.2

II. Counterclaim

[13] Next, Graham appears to argue that the small claims court erred by denying her 

counterclaim. We note that Graham’s counterclaim presented a claim for 

emotional distress due to racial profiling and racial bias by Landlord. On 

appeal, Graham mainly argues that Landlord violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 3604, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. These 

arguments, however, appear to have been presented to the Elkhart Human 

Relations Commission, not this small claims court. It is unclear from the 

record whether Graham appealed the Commission’s decision; regardless, issues 

raised before the Commission must be appealed through an appeal of the 

Commission’s decision.

3

 Only issues raised before the small claims court can 

be considered in this appeal. See GKC Ind. Theatres, Inc. v. Elk Retail Inv’rs, LLC., 

2 Graham also argues that she did not leave the residence damaged or in a dirty condition. The small claims 

court, however, did not award Landlord such damages. As a result, we do not address this issue. Graham 

seems to argue that Landlord failed to give her a $200.00 promotion for referring a friend. The ledger entered

as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3, however, shows a $200.00 credit to her account for “Promotion Rent.” Ex. p. 12. 

Finally, Graham seems to argue that she was overcharged for the site rental charge for several years. The 

small claims court declined to find for Graham on this point and noted that “the Defendant continued to pay 

the rent as billed by the Plaintiff.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 12. The small claims court’s finding is not 

clearly erroneous. 

3 Graham appears to make arguments concerning the Commission’s decision. See Appellant’s Br. p. 14

(discussing claims against the Elkhart Human Relations Department). Graham, however, must exhaust her 

administrative remedies and cannot raise these arguments in this appeal. See Ind. Code Chapter 4-21.5-5.
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764 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“As a general rule, a party may not 

present an argument or issue to an appellate court unless the party raised that 

argument or issue to the trial court.”).

[14] In her counterclaim, Graham argued that she sustained emotional distress due 

to racial profiling and racial bias by Landlord. Landlord, however, presented 

evidence that the pet policy was enforced regardless of race. Landlord also 

presented evidence that the pit bull at issue was not a registered emotional 

support animal. The small claims court rejected Graham’s argument, finding 

no racial bias and finding that the dog at issue was a pit bull and was not a 

registered emotional support animal. Graham’s argument, again, is merely a 

request that we reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses, 

which we cannot do. We cannot say the small claims court’s denial of 

Graham’s counterclaim is clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[15] The small claims court’s judgment is not clearly erroneous. We affirm.

[16] Affirmed.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.