[Cite as Dixon v. Bowerman, 2019-Ohio-4435.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LUCAS COUNTY 

William Dixon Court of Appeals No. L-19-1155 

 

 Petitioner 

v. 

Warden Bowerman DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Respondent Decided: October 28, 2019 

* * * * * 

 William Dixon, pro se. 

 Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and William H. Lamb, 

 Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. 

* * * * * 

OSOWIK, J. 

{¶ 1} In this original action, William Dixon petitions the court for a writ of habeas 

corpus against respondent, Sean Bowerman, warden of the Toledo Correctional 

Institution. The state has responded with a motion to dismiss the action, pursuant to 

Civ.R. 12(B)(6), which Dixon opposes. Also pending are Dixon’s motions for leave to 
2.

file commitment papers, leave to file judicial notice, and to proceed in forma pauperis. 

As set forth below, the state’s motion is well-taken, and Dixon’s petition is dismissed. 

Procedural History 

{¶ 2} Dixon is imprisoned pursuant to a 2006 conviction in the Montgomery 

County Court of Common Pleas for complicity to commit aggravated robbery, in 

violation of R.C. 2911.01, a felony of the first degree (Count 1); complicity to commit 

aggravated burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.11, a felony of the first degree (Count 2); 

and complicity to commit felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11, a felony of the 

second degree (Count 3). Dixon was also convicted of three firearm specifications, 

pursuant to R.C. 2941.145, one for each count. The trial court sentenced Dixon to an 

aggregate term of 21 years in prison. 

{¶ 3} Dixon appealed, and the Second Appellate District affirmed Dixon’s 

conviction and sentence in toto. State v. Dixon, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21823, 2008-

Ohio-755, ¶ 50; appeal not accepted for review, 119 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2008-Ohio-755, 

891 N.E.2d 773; (“Dixon I”). 

{¶ 4} Over the years, Dixon has filed many motions for postconviction relief. 

Following adverse trial court judgments, Dixon pursued five separate appeals, all of 

which were unsuccessful. See State v. Dixon, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27991, 2019-

Ohio-230, ¶ 2-12 (“Dixon VI”) for a synopsis of Dixon II, Dixon III, Dixon IV, and Dixon 

V. 
3.

{¶ 5} Dixon simultaneously pursued habeas relief.1 On March 6, 2018, Dixon 

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against a former warden of the Toledo 

Correctional Institution. State ex rel. Dixon v. Coleman, Warden, 6th Dist. Lucas No. 

L-18-1042 (Mar. 13, 2018). Dixon asserted claims relating to the length of his sentence, 

appointment of trial counsel, trial judge bias, discovery errors and misconduct by the 

prosecution. We denied the writ, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed our decision. 

State ex rel. Dixon v. Bowerman, Slip Opinion No. 2018-0621, 2019-Ohio-716, ¶ 5. 

{¶ 6} On March 28, 2019, Dixon filed another petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

in this court. We described Dixon’s claims as follows: 

 Dixon’s petition begins with three specific grounds for relief 

(ineffective assistance; prosecutorial misconduct; and abuse of discretion 

by all judges), and he also asserts he was unlawfully restrained because of 

his “actual innocence.” Furthermore, he asserts the following errors 

occurred during his trial and at sentencing which he alleges resulted in his 

unlawful conviction and sentence: instances of prosecutorial misconduct 

during trial; trial judge bias; disparity in sentencing; a failure to merge his 

convictions for allied offenses; his inability to select appointed counsel of 

choice; ineffective assistance of appointed counsel at trial, on appeal, and in 

 

1

 Dixon also pursued habeas relief in federal court. In Dixon v. Warden, Southern Ohio 

Correctional Institute, 940 F. Supp.2d 614 (S.D.Ohio 2013), the district court dismissed 

Dixon’s petition. In 2018, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Dixon’s motion for 

leave to file a second, successive federal habeas petition.
4.

prior habeas corpus actions; and a denial of due process and equal 

protection in the resolution of his postconviction relief petitions, motions, 

and original actions because of repeated denials or dismissals of these 

actions on res judicata or procedural grounds. Dixon v. Bowerman, 6th 

Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1066, 2019-Ohio-1711, ¶ 6. 

{¶ 7} We dismissed the petition, finding that “all of [Dixon’s] claims could have 

been or were raised at trial, after trial by motion or postconviction relief petitions, or in an 

appeal of the individual judgments.” We also based our dismissal on Dixon’s failure to 

verify the petition under oath, as required by R.C. 2725.04. Finally, although not a basis 

to dismiss the petition, we noted that Dixon failed to enumerate the paragraphs within his 

petition, as required by Civ.R. 10(B). Id. at ¶ 4-6. 

{¶ 8} Undeterred, Dixon filed another petition on July 30, 2019, and it is this 

petition that is before us today. In it, Dixon raises the very same claims that he has 

attempted to relitigate since his unsuccessful direct appeal. First, Dixon alleges his 

“actual innocence” because “no aggravated robbery took place * * *. [Rather], it was a 

failed robbery [and] nothing was stolen.” Second, Dixon argues that his three-year 

sentence as to the gun specifications was illegal because “the only one who brandished a 

gun” was his co-conspirator. Third, Dixon argues that the state knowingly offered 

perjured testimony from his co-conspirators, who “changed [their] stories 3 times to 

secure [their] deals.” Finally, Dixon argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial 

and appellate counsel. As with the previous petition, Dixon failed to enumerate the 
5.

paragraphs in contravention of Civ.R. 10 and failed to attach the commitment papers, 

although, as stated, he did seek leave to correct the latter issue. 

Law and Argument 

{¶ 9} Habeas corpus relief is an available remedy only in “certain extraordinary 

circumstances where there is an unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty, notwithstanding 

the fact that only nonjurisdictional issues are involved, but only where there is no 

adequate legal remedy, e.g., appeal or post-conviction relief.” State ex rel. Jackson v. 

McFaul, 73 Ohio St.3d 185, 186 (1995), citing State ex rel. Pirman v. Money, 69 Ohio 

St.3d 591, 593 (1994). 

{¶ 10} Res judicata bars a petitioner from filing successive habeas corpus 

petitions. Bevins v. Richard, 144 Ohio St.3d 54, 2015-Ohio-2832, ¶ 4 (“Bevins could 

have argued any cognizable claim that he had in [his previous] habeas action; therefore, 

res judicata bars his successive habeas corpus petition.”). Here, too, Dixon could have 

raised any cognizable claim in his previous habeas actions, and indeed, the instant 

petition mirrors his most recent petition. For that reason, res judicata bars the instant 

action. 

{¶ 11} Second, habeas corpus is not available when there is an adequate remedy at 

law. Adequate remedies include a motion for postconviction relief and a direct appeal. 

See, e.g., Jones v. Kelley, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2010-T-0020, 2010-Ohio-3682, ¶ 11 

(Manifest weight and sufficiency claims cannot be reviewed as part of a habeas corpus 

proceeding because both issues can be raised via direct appeal); Accord Kneuss v. Sloan,

146 Ohio St.3d 248, 2016-Ohio-3310, 54 N.E.3d 1242 (Actual innocence and ineffective 
6.

assistance of counsel claims are not properly raised in a petition for habeas corpus); Keith 

v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470, 2008-Ohio-1443, 884 N.E.2d 1067 (perjured testimony 

claims), Dunkle v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 148 Ohio St.3d 621, 2017-Ohio-551, 71 

N.E.3d 1098 (Sentencing error claims). Because Dixon had an adequate remedy at law 

as to each claim set forth in his petition, he has failed to assert a claim upon which relief 

may be granted. Therefore, Dixon is not entitled to the extraordinary and extreme form 

of relief requested, i.e. immediate release from the custody of the state. 

{¶ 12} Based on the face of the petition, we find Dixon has not stated a claim 

entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Therefore, the petition is ordered dismissed. 

Dixon’s pending motions are rendered moot and are denied. The costs of this action are 

assessed to petitioner. 

{¶ 13} The clerk is directed to serve upon all parties, within three days, a copy of 

this decision in a manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B). 

Writ denied. 

Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

_______________________________ 

Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.