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IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.

Cite as 306 Neb. 127

In re Interest of Vladimir G., a child 

under 18 years of age.

State of Nebraska, appellee, v.

Abigail G., appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed June 12, 2020. No. S-19-645.

1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile court’s findings. When the evidence is in conflict, 

however, an appellate court may give weight to the fact that the lower 

court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over 

the other.

2. Constitutional Law: Self-Incrimination: Appeal and Error. A court’s 

decision to allow a witness to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment right 

against self-incrimination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

3. Statutes: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The meaning of a statute is a 

question of law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the 

trial court.

4. Constitutional Law: Self-Incrimination. The state and federal 

Constitutions provide that no person shall be compelled to give evidence 

against himself or herself of an incriminating nature.

5. ____: ____. The Fifth Amendment privilege not only permits a person 

to refuse to testify against himself or herself during a criminal trial in 

which he or she is a defendant, but also grants him or her the privilege 

to refuse to answer questions put to him or her in any other proceeding, 

civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might tend to 

incriminate him or her in future criminal proceedings.

6. Juvenile Courts: Constitutional Law: Self-Incrimination. In a juvenile adjudication hearing, as in any other civil proceeding, a parent may 

invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to answer questions put to him or her where the answers might tend to incriminate him 

or her in future criminal proceedings.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

08/14/2020 01:10 AM CDT
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Cite as 306 Neb. 127

7. Constitutional Law: Self-Incrimination: Testimony. The Fifth 

Amendment must be accorded a liberal construction in favor of the 

privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and thus the analysis 

under the Fifth Amendment ordinarily examines an entire line of questioning to determine whether to exclude the testimonial evidence based 

on privilege.

8. Constitutional Law: Witnesses: Self-Incrimination. The Fifth 

Amendment privilege not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction but likewise embraces those which would 

furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant. 

It need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an 

explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because 

injurious disclosure could result.

9. ____: ____: ____. While a witness may invoke the Fifth Amendment to 

avoid answering questions, the witness’ assertion of the privilege does 

not by itself establish the risk of incrimination; instead, the court must 

make inquiry to determine itself whether answering the questions would 

raise Fifth Amendment concerns.

10. ____: ____: ____. A trial court is required, in the exercise of sound 

discretion, to determine whether the witness’ claims of the Fifth 

Amendment privilege are justifiable.

11. ____: ____: ____. The trial judge necessarily is accorded broad discretion in determining the merits of a claimed Fifth Amendment privilege. 

Whether a witness’ claim of privilege against self-incrimination is 

justified is a decision which rests within the trial court’s exercise of 

sound discretion under all the circumstances then present, including 

the setting in which a question is asked and the nature of the testimony sought.

12. Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In a civil case, the admission or 

exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced 

a substantial right of the complaining party.

13. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights: Notice. The factual allegations of 

a petition seeking to adjudicate a child must give a parent notice of the 

bases for seeking to prove that the child is within the meaning of Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2016).

14. Juvenile Courts: Proof. The State has the burden to prove the allegations of a petition seeking to adjudicate a child by a preponderance of the evidence, which is the equivalent of the greater weight of 

the evidence.

15. Evidence: Words and Phrases. The greater weight of the evidence 

means evidence sufficient to make a claim more likely true than not 

true.
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IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.

Cite as 306 Neb. 127

Appeal from the County Court for Sioux County: Russell 

W. Harford, Judge. Affirmed.

Amy L. Patras, of Crites, Shaffer, Connealy, Watson, Patras 

& Watson, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.

Joe W. Stecher, Deputy Sioux County Attorney, for appellee.

Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and 

Freudenberg, JJ.

Miller-Lerman, J.

NATURE OF CASE

Abigail G. appeals the order of the county court for Sioux 

County, sitting as a juvenile court, which adjudicated her 

son, Vladimir G., to be a child within the meaning of Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2016). Abigail claims, inter 

alia, that the court erred when it required her to testify despite 

her invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights. We conclude 

that although Abigail could invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege in this adjudication, any error on the part of the court in 

requiring her testimony was not reversible error. We further 

conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the 

adjudication. We therefore affirm the county court’s order 

of adjudication.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The State filed a petition alleging that Vladimir, born in 

July 2016, was a child within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a) 

on the basis that he “lack[ed] proper parental care by reason 

of the fault or habits of his parent, guardian, or custodian” 

or that he was “a juvenile who is in [a] situation dangerous 

to life or limb or injurious to [his] health.” The petition was 

prompted when in March 2018, Vladimir was examined in 

a hospital and was found to have suffered injuries including 

abusive head trauma, a large abrasion to the back described as 

“rug burn,” bone fractures, and multiple bruises throughout his 

face and body.
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Cite as 306 Neb. 127

Vladimir’s mother, Abigail, told a law enforcement officer that the injuries described above had all occurred while 

Vladimir was under the care of her boyfriend, Thomas Joseph 

Boyd. Prior to the hospital visit in March 2018, on or about 

February 24, Abigail had taken Vladimir to a hospital for an 

examination because she was concerned that Boyd might have 

sexually abused Vladimir. In the February examination, the 

doctor did not find evidence of sexual abuse but told Abigail 

that there were not always physical signs of sexual abuse. 

After the February examination, Abigail told medical and law 

enforcement personnel that she would no longer allow Boyd 

to have contact with Vladimir. After the examination in March 

that disclosed the injuries set forth above, Abigail told medical personnel that the injuries had occurred after the February 

hospital visit and that they had occurred while Vladimir was 

under the care of Boyd.

The adjudication hearing was held on March 6, 2019. The 

first witness called by the State at the hearing was Abigail. 

Abigail objected to testifying based on Fifth Amendment 

grounds. The State argued that there was nothing it would 

be questioning Abigail about that would incriminate her; the 

State further argued that because there were relevant matters to which Abigail could testify that would not incriminate 

her, she could not make a blanket objection to testifying and 

instead would need to “plead[] the Fifth” as to specific questions. The court overruled Abigail’s objection after it cited 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-279(1)(c) (Reissue 2016), which requires 

the court in an adjudication to inform the parties “[o]f the 

privilege against self-incrimination by advising the juvenile, 

parent, guardian, or custodian that the juvenile may remain 

silent concerning the charges against the juvenile and that 

anything said may be used against the juvenile.” The court 

reasoned that the focus of the statute was the juvenile’s, and 

not a parent’s, right to remain silent. Prior to Abigail’s testimony, rather than requiring Abigail to object to specific questions, the State stipulated that Abigail had a continuing objection to testifying on Fifth Amendment grounds.
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Cite as 306 Neb. 127

Thereafter, Abigail generally testified to the effect that, 

notwithstanding her suspicions in February 2018 about Boyd’s 

conduct regarding Vladimir, she continued to leave Vladimir 

in Boyd’s care during March when all the serious injuries 

occurred. Abigail testified regarding three specific injuries 

that occurred in March while Vladimir was in Boyd’s care 

and what Boyd told her after she noticed the injuries. Abigail 

testified that Boyd told her that a bruise around Vladimir’s eye 

was caused when Vladimir threw a tantrum and hit himself on 

a bedpost; that a rug burn was caused when Boyd’s son, who 

is near in age to Vladimir, dragged Vladimir across the carpet; 

and that an injury to Vladimir’s arm occurred when Vladimir 

and Boyd’s sons were playing together and Boyd’s dog got 

involved in the play and knocked Vladimir over and into a 

piece of furniture. On cross-examination, Abigail testified that 

she believed the reasons given by Boyd regarding how the 

injuries occurred and that she did not believe that Boyd had 

caused the injuries.

Abigail also testified regarding the concerns that prompted 

her to seek the medical examination in February 2018. She 

testified that she was concerned Vladimir had been sexually 

abused and that she thought Boyd might have been involved 

because Boyd “was up in the middle of the night with” 

Vladimir and Boyd’s two sons. She testified that she talked 

with medical and law enforcement personnel regarding her 

concerns in February 2018, but she did not recall that anyone 

had told her not to allow Boyd to have contact with Vladimir; 

nor did she recall telling the law enforcement officer that she 

would not allow Boyd to have further contact with Vladimir. 

Abigail also testified that at the time of the hearing, she continued to have a sexual relationship with Boyd; Abigail had 

objected to the question that prompted this testimony on the 

basis, in addition to the continuing Fifth Amendment objection, that the petition for adjudication had not given her notice 

that her continuing relationship with Boyd was a basis for 

the adjudication.
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Cite as 306 Neb. 127

At the conclusion of Abigail’s testimony, the court indicated 

that it had given further thought to its earlier ruling regarding 

Abigail’s invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights. The court 

referred to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-279.01 (Reissue 2016), which 

provides in relevant part:

(1) When the petition alleges the juvenile to be within 

the provisions of subdivision (3)(a) of section 43-247 or 

when termination of parental rights is sought pursuant 

to subdivision (6) of section 43-247 and the parent, custodian, or guardian appears with or without counsel, the 

court shall inform the parties of the:

. . . .

(d) Right to remain silent as to any matter of inquiry 

if the testimony sought to be elicited might tend to prove 

the party guilty of any crime.

The court stated that based on its reading of § 43-279.01, 

parents in an adjudication hearing might have a Fifth 

Amendment or at least a statutory right to remain silent in 

response to questions that might implicate them in a crime. 

The court, however, doubted that any of Abigail’s testimony 

was of that sort, and the State, represented by the county 

attorney, stated it did not intend to file charges against Abigail 

and that it “would grant any immunity for that testimony for 

any charges.” Abigail moved to strike her testimony on Fifth 

Amendment grounds and argued that the county attorney’s 

offer of immunity was insufficient because other authorities 

could prosecute Abigail and because immunity should have 

been granted prior to her testimony. The court overruled 

Abigail’s motion to strike her testimony and stated: “I think 

that if anybody tries to prosecute [Abigail], that there would 

be a defense based on both what [the county attorney] said and 

what I — how I ruled today on the bench that — that she does 

have that right [to remain silent].”

Other evidence at the hearing included the testimony of 

the sheriff’s deputy who had spoken with Abigail in February 

2018 regarding her concern that Boyd had sexually abused 
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Vladimir. The deputy testified, inter alia, that at that time, 

Abigail told him that she would never again allow Boyd 

to have contact with Vladimir. He also testified that he did 

not further investigate Abigail’s concerns because the medical examination did not reveal evidence of sexual abuse and 

because Abigail had stated that she would no longer allow 

Boyd to have contact with Vladimir.

Prior to Abigail’s testimony, the court had received into evidence two depositions offered by the State—depositions of a 

doctor and of a nurse who had examined and treated Vladimir 

in March 2018. The State described the depositions as being 

offered by “joint motion,” and Abigail did not object to admission of the depositions. Both the doctor and the nurse agreed 

that Vladimir’s injuries were as alleged in the petition for 

adjudication. The doctor stated that he suspected nonaccidental trauma based on “multiple fractures on different sides of 

the body” in combination with “the whole story with all of his 

injuries.” The nurse stated in her deposition that Vladimir’s 

injuries were consistent with abuse and that she suspected 

abuse based on the “constellation” of injuries. The nurse also 

stated, contrary to Abigail’s testimony at the hearing, that 

she did not think Boyd had caused the injuries and that in 

March 2018, Abigail had stated to the nurse that she had not 

talked to Boyd since the injuries to Vladimir, that she did not 

want Boyd around, and that she had concerns that Boyd had 

hurt Vladimir.

After the adjudication hearing, the county court filed an 

order in which it found Vladimir to be a child within the 

meaning of § 43-247(3)(a). Based on the testimony and depositions received at the hearing, the court found that the injuries to Vladimir would not have occurred in the absence of 

abuse or neglect, that the injuries occurred when Vladimir was 

with Boyd, and that the injuries occurred when Vladimir was 

under the control of Abigail, who had left him with Boyd in 

March 2018 despite concerns that prompted her to seek the 

medical examination in February. Based on these findings, 
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the court concluded that “Abigail’s interest in maintaining her 

relationship with . . . Boyd, or her lack of concern about the 

safety and well[-]being of Vladimir, or both, caused Vladimir 

to have been placed in the position of sustaining on multiple 

occasions the injuries he suffered.”

In the adjudication order, the court also briefly addressed 

the Fifth Amendment issue. The court recognized Abigail’s 

assertion that her right to remain silent had been violated. 

However, the court stated that it was “important to note” that 

her testimony at the hearing was “for the most part” consistent 

with things she had said to both the doctor and the nurse and 

were set forth in their depositions and in medical records that 

were made exhibits to those depositions. The court further 

stated that “Abigail’s counsel introduced those [depositions 

and attached] exhibits into evidence before Abigail was called 

to testify.”

Abigail appeals the order adjudicating Vladimir.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Abigail claims that the county court erred when it (1) violated her constitutional and statutory right to remain silent by 

forcing her to testify at the adjudication hearing and (2) found 

that there was sufficient evidence that Vladimir was a child 

within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a).

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

[1] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the 

record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile court’s findings. In re Interest of Giavonni P., 304 Neb. 

580, 935 N.W.2d 631 (2019). When the evidence is in conflict, 

however, an appellate court may give weight to the fact that 

the lower court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over the other. In re Interest of Jordan B., 300 

Neb. 355, 913 N.W.2d 477 (2018).

[2] A court’s decision to allow a witness to invoke his 

or her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is 
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reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Phillips, 286 Neb. 

974, 840 N.W.2d 500 (2013).

[3] The meaning of a statute is a question of law, which an 

appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. In re 

Interest of Giavonni P., supra.

ANALYSIS

Abigail Could and Did Invoke Fifth Amendment 

Privilege, but Any Error in Requiring Her 

Testimony Was Not Reversible Error.

Abigail first claims that the county court violated her constitutional and statutory right to remain silent by forcing her 

to testify at the adjudication hearing. We conclude that Fifth 

Amendment rights may be invoked by a parent in an adjudication proceeding; however, we conclude that any error 

in requiring Abigail to testify over such invocation was not 

reversible error.

We first address whether Abigail was entitled to invoke 

the Fifth Amendment privilege in this adjudication hearing. 

The court initially appeared to determine that Abigail’s Fifth 

Amendment rights were not implicated in this adjudication 

because § 43-279(1)(c) addressed only the right of the juvenile to remain silent. However, after Abigail had testified, the 

court appeared to recognize that Abigail’s Fifth Amendment 

rights were implicated in this adjudication, and the court 

cited § 43-279.01, which refers to informing the “parties” to 

an adjudication of their “[r]ight to remain silent.” We note 

that for purposes of the juvenile code, “[p]arties means the 

juvenile as described in section 43-247 and his or her parent, 

guardian, or custodian.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-245(18) (Supp. 

2019). Although the court appeared to credit § 43-279.01 as 

the source of a parent’s right to remain silent in an adjudication, we clarify that § 43-279.01 requires the juvenile court 

to inform the parties to an adjudication of the right to remain 

silent, which right stems from other sources, primarily the 

Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See, also, Neb. 
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Const. art. I, § 12 (“[n]o person shall be compelled, in any 

criminal case, to give evidence against himself [or herself]”), 

and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1210 (Reissue 2016) (“[w]hen the 

matter sought to be elicited would tend to render the witness 

criminally liable or to expose him or her to public ignominy, 

the witness is not compelled to answer . . .”). We note that in 

this case, Abigail does not assert that the court failed in its 

duty under § 43-279.01 to inform her of her right to remain 

silent, and we further note that she was not prejudiced by any 

such failure to inform because she did assert the right and was 

therefore clearly aware of the right.

There is appellate authority in Nebraska indicating that 

parents may claim a Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination in termination proceedings. See In re Interest of 

Clifford M. et al., 6 Neb. App. 754, 577 N.W.2d 547 (1998). 

We conclude that the privilege may also be invoked by a parent 

in the adjudication phase of a juvenile proceeding.

[4-6] The state and federal Constitutions provide that no 

person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself 

or herself of an incriminating nature. See State v. Phillips, 

286 Neb. 974, 840 N.W.2d 500 (2013). The Fifth Amendment 

privilege not only permits a person to refuse to testify against 

himself or herself during a criminal trial in which he or she is 

a defendant, but also grants him or her the privilege to refuse 

to answer questions put to him or her in any other proceeding, 

civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might 

tend to incriminate him or her in future criminal proceedings. 

State v. Phillips, supra. See In re Interest of Clifford M. et al., 

supra (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 

92 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1986)). See, also, Behrens v. Blunk, 280 

Neb. 984, 992, 993, 792 N.W.2d 159, 166 (2010) (privilege 

applies “‘“‘at any stage of the proceeding’”’” and “‘“therefore applies not only at trial, but at the discovery stage as 

well”’”), modified on denial of rehearing 281 Neb. 228, 796 

N.W.2d 579 (2011). We therefore conclude that in a juvenile 

adjudication hearing, as in any other civil proceeding, a parent 
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may invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to 

answer questions put to him or her where the answers might 

tend to incriminate him or her in future criminal proceedings.

Although the court in this case initially appeared to base its 

ruling that Abigail could not refuse to testify on an erroneous 

understanding that she could not invoke her Fifth Amendment 

privilege in this juvenile adjudication, the court ultimately 

appeared to recognize that she could invoke the privilege. 

However, the court denied Abigail’s motion to strike her testimony because it determined that her testimony was not of 

the sort that would be subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege. That is, the court agreed with the State’s argument that 

Abigail’s testimony was not incriminating and would not subject her to criminal prosecution. We therefore review the standards a court must consider when assessing whether to honor 

an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege.

[7,8] We have stated that the Fifth Amendment must be 

accorded a liberal construction in favor of the privilege against 

compulsory self-incrimination, and thus the analysis under 

the Fifth Amendment ordinarily examines an entire line of 

questioning to determine whether to exclude the testimonial 

evidence based on privilege. See State v. Phillips, supra (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S. Ct. 814, 

95 L. Ed. 1118 (1951)). We have further explained that the 

privilege “‘not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction . . . but likewise embraces those 

which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to 

prosecute the claimant.’” State v. Phillips, 286 Neb. at 985, 

840 N.W.2d at 512 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, supra). 

It need only be evident from the implications of the question, 

in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to 

the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered 

might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. 

State v. Phillips, supra.

Abigail argues that her testimony in this case was subject 

to the Fifth Amendment privilege because the allegations in 
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Cite as 306 Neb. 127

support of adjudication were “almost identical” to statutory 

language criminalizing child abuse. Brief for appellant at 21. 

She notes that in the petition for adjudication, it was alleged 

that Vladimir “lack[ed] proper parental care by reason of the 

fault or habits of his parent” or that he was “in [a] situation 

dangerous to life or limb or injurious to [his] health.” She 

compares this to the language of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-707(1) 

(Reissue 2016), which provides that a “person commits child 

abuse if he or she knowingly, intentionally, or negligently 

causes or permits a minor child to be . . . (a) [p]laced in a 

situation that endangers his or her life or physical or mental 

health.” She argues that if the evidence in this case could support the allegations in the petition for adjudication, then they 

could also support a prosecution under § 28-707(1)(a).

[9,10] While a witness may invoke the Fifth Amendment 

to avoid answering questions, the witness’ assertion of the 

privilege does not by itself establish the risk of incrimination; instead, the court must make inquiry to determine itself 

whether answering the questions would raise Fifth Amendment 

concerns. State v. Phillips, 286 Neb. 974, 840 N.W.2d 500 

(2013). A trial court is required, in the exercise of sound discretion, to determine whether the witness’ claims of the Fifth 

Amendment privilege are justifiable. See State v. Robinson, 

271 Neb. 698, 715 N.W.2d 531 (2006). On appeal, the court’s 

decision in this regard is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

See State v. Phillips, supra.

[11] The trial judge

necessarily is accorded broad discretion in determining the merits of a claimed Fifth Amendment privilege. Whether a witness’s claim of privilege against 

self-incrimination is justified is a decision which rests 

within the trial court’s exercise of sound discretion under 

all the circumstances then present, including the setting 

in which a question is asked and the nature of the testimony sought.

81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 123 at 255 (2015).
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The court in this case overruled Abigail’s motion to strike 

her testimony, because after hearing the entirety of her testimony, the court determined that her testimony was not incriminating and it doubted that a prosecutor could “charge [Abigail] 

with anything based on her testimony [that day].” The county 

attorney who was representing the State agreed that he had “no 

reason to believe there’s any crime that has been committed 

by [Abigail],” and he further stated that he had “no . . . intention of filing” any charges against Abigail and “would grant 

any immunity for that testimony for any charges.” On appeal, 

the State repeats its argument that Abigail’s testimony was 

not incriminating, and it further argues that her testimony was 

“not only not incriminating, but rather exculpatory.” Brief for 

appellee at 4. The State characterizes as “completely exculpatory” Abigail’s testimony that “she was not present when three 

of the significant injuries occurred,” that “she did not know 

how other injuries had occurred,” and that “Boyd was taking 

care of Vladimir when all three of the significant injuries happened.” Id.

In this case, the court had broad discretion to determine 

whether Abigail’s testimony was incriminating and therefore 

subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege. Reviewing such 

decision for an abuse of discretion, we note that the court 

had valid reasons for its determination under all the circumstances present. The general tone of Abigail’s testimony was 

to deflect blame from herself for Vladimir’s injuries and in 

that sense could be considered exculpatory. Furthermore, the 

court needed to consider whether there was a real threat that 

Abigail would be prosecuted based on her testimony, and 

in addition to the court’s own assessment that the testimony 

was not incriminating, the county attorney assured the court 

that he agreed with that assessment and that he had no plans 

to prosecute Abigail. The court and the county attorney also 

agreed that Abigail would have “immunity” of some sort in 

any potential criminal prosecution.
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Abigail notes, however, that although she denied that 

Vladimir was in her care when he sustained his injuries or that 

she knew what caused his injuries, she testified that the injuries occurred when Vladimir was in Boyd’s care and that she 

had left Vladimir in Boyd’s care. It is arguable that at a minimum, Abigail’s testimony could provide a link in the chain 

of evidence to prove that under § 28-707(1), she “negligently 

caus[ed] or permit[ted Vladimir] to be . . . (a) [p]laced in a 

situation that endanger[ed] his . . . life or physical or mental 

health.” Abigail further argues that although the county attorney assured the court he had no intention to prosecute Abigail 

and would give her “immunity” for her testimony, there were 

other authorities who could prosecute her; that the promise 

of immunity was not effective, because it occurred after her 

testimony; and that the authority of the court to grant such 

immunity in a juvenile proceeding was questionable.

[12] We determine that in order to resolve the appeal 

of the adjudication order, we need not conclusively decide 

whether the court abused its discretion in its determination that 

Abigail’s testimony was not incriminating. We determine that 

even if the court erred in determining that Abigail’s testimony 

was not subject to her invocation of the Fifth Amendment 

privilege, in this adjudication proceeding, such error was not 

reversible error. In a civil case, the admission or exclusion of 

evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced 

a substantial right of the complaining party. Weyh v. Gottsch, 

303 Neb. 280, 929 N.W.2d 40 (2019). We determine that 

the admission of Abigail’s testimony in this adjudication did 

not unfairly prejudice a substantial right of Abigail’s for two 

main reasons.

First, we determine that the testimony did not unfairly 

prejudice Abigail’s rights with respect to the adjudication of 

Vladimir because, as we discuss in connection with Abigail’s 

assignment of error regarding sufficiency of the evidence, 

there was sufficient evidence to adjudicate Vladimir even 

if Abigail’s arguably incriminating testimony were stricken. 
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Second, admission of the testimony in this adjudication did 

not unfairly prejudice Abigail’s Fifth Amendment rights 

because the Fifth Amendment is not violated unless and until 

a person’s self-incriminating statements are used to prosecute 

that person in a criminal proceeding. If the court in this adjudication erred in determining that Abigail’s testimony was 

not incriminating, the use of such testimony in a criminal 

proceeding would be subject to challenge in that criminal proceeding on Fifth Amendment grounds. We further explain this 

second reason.

In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 

155 L. Ed. 2d 984 (2003), a four-judge plurality of the U.S. 

Supreme Court said that although the Fifth Amendment’s 

self-incrimination privilege may be asserted in a civil proceeding, “a violation of the constitutional right against selfincrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be 

a witness against himself in a criminal case.” In a separate 

concurrence, two judges did not join the entirety of the plurality’s analysis but agreed that “the core of the guarantee 

against compelled self-incrimination is the exclusion of any 

such evidence” in a criminal prosecution. Chavez v. Martinez, 

538 U.S. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring; Breyer, J., joins). The 

four-judge plurality noted that courts had created certain “prophylactic rules” that were not in themselves rights protected 

by the Fifth Amendment but were “designed to safeguard the 

core constitutional right protected by the Self-Incrimination 

Clause.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. at 770. Such prophylactic rules included rules allowing invocation of the Fifth 

Amendment in noncriminal cases to refuse to provide testimony “unless that testimony has been immunized from use 

and derivative use in a future criminal proceeding before it 

is compelled.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. at 770-71. The 

plurality stated that in order to prevent waiver of the right 

against self-incrimination, “it is necessary to allow assertion 

of the privilege prior to the commencement of a ‘criminal 

case’ to safeguard the core Fifth Amendment trial right,” and 
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that “insistence on a prior grant of immunity is essential to 

memorialize the fact that the testimony had indeed been compelled and therefore protected from use against the speaker in 

any ‘criminal case.’” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. at 771-72. 

As part of this analysis, the plurality in Chavez v. Martinez

cited, inter alia, an earlier decision of the Court in which 

it stated:

[A] witness protected by the privilege may rightfully 

refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least 

against the use of his compelled answers and evidence 

derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in 

which he is a defendant. . . . Absent such protection, if 

he is nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are 

inadmissible against him in a later criminal prosecution.

Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78, 94 S. Ct. 316, 38 L. Ed. 

2d 274 (1973) (citations omitted).

Based on the precedent of Chavez v. Martinez and Lefkowitz 

v. Turley, we determine that even if the court abused its 

discretion when it determined Abigail’s testimony was not 

incriminating and not protected by her invocation of the Fifth 

Amendment privilege, Abigail’s Fifth Amendment rights were 

not violated by requiring her to testify in this civil proceeding, and instead a Fifth Amendment violation would occur 

only if the testimony were used in a criminal proceeding. 

Also, as we read this authority, Abigail memorialized her 

invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, and whether 

or not her testimony was adequately protected by promises 

of immunity made by the State and the court, her testimony, 

if incriminating, would be inadmissible against her in a later 

criminal prosecution.

We conclude that Abigail could and did invoke her Fifth 

Amendment privilege in this adjudication. However, we further conclude that any error on the part of the court when it 

determined her testimony was not incriminating and therefore 

not subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege is not reversible 

error in this adjudication.
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Even Without Abigail’s Arguably Incriminating 

Testimony, There Was Sufficient Evidence 

to Support the Adjudication.

Abigail next claims that the evidence in this case was not 

sufficient to support the adjudication of Vladimir. We conclude 

that the evidence was sufficient.

The State in its petition alleged that Vladimir was a child 

who “lack[ed] proper parental care by reason of the fault or 

habits of his parent, guardian, or custodian” or that he was “a 

juvenile who is in [a] situation dangerous to life or limb or 

injurious to [his] health.” Both are statutory bases for adjudicating a child to be under the jurisdiction of a juvenile court 

pursuant to § 43-247(3)(a). In the adjudication order, the court 

concluded that based on the evidence, “Abigail’s interest in 

maintaining her relationship with . . . Boyd, or her lack of 

concern about the safety and well[-]being of Vladimir, or both, 

caused Vladimir to have been placed in the position of sustaining on multiple occasions the injuries he suffered.” We read 

this as finding that both asserted bases for the adjudication 

were present—that is, Vladimir was “in [a] situation dangerous 

to life or limb or injurious to [his] health” because he had suffered injuries on multiple occasions, and he “lack[ed] proper 

parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his parent” 

because Abigail had placed him in such situation when she 

left him in Boyd’s care and in doing so demonstrated a lack of 

concern about his safety and well-being.

[13-15] The factual allegations of a petition seeking to 

adjudicate a child must give a parent notice of the bases 

for seeking to prove that the child is within the meaning of 

§ 43-247(3)(a). In re Interest of Jeremy U. et al., 304 Neb. 

734, 936 N.W.2d 733 (2020). And the State then has the burden to prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance 

of the evidence, which is the equivalent of the greater weight 

of the evidence. Id. The greater weight of the evidence means 

evidence sufficient to make a claim more likely true than not 

true. Id.
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As we indicated above, even if Abigail’s testimony that was 

arguably incriminating were excluded, there was sufficient evidence to support the adjudication. The evidence indicated that 

in February 2018, Abigail had sought a medical examination 

of Vladimir based on concerns that Boyd had abused him, and 

that thereafter in March, she left Vladimir in Boyd’s care and 

on at least three occasions he had suffered injuries that medical personnel believed to be the result of abuse. This evidence 

was sufficient to adjudicate Vladimir to be under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court on either or both statutory bases. 

The court could find by the greater weight of the evidence 

that Vladimir was “in [a] situation dangerous to life or limb 

or injurious to [his] health” because on multiple occasions, he 

had suffered injuries consistent with abuse. The court could 

also find by the greater weight of the evidence that Vladimir 

“lack[ed] proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits 

of his parent” because Abigail had placed him in that situation 

by putting him in Boyd’s care despite indications that Boyd 

had abused him.

The court addressed the Fifth Amendment issue in its order 

and stated that Abigail’s testimony was generally consistent 

with the depositions of the doctor and the nurse, which depositions were admitted into evidence without objection prior to 

Abigail’s testimony. We note that the testimony of the sheriff’s 

deputy was also generally consistent with Abigail’s testimony. 

The court’s discussion of the Fifth Amendment issue in its 

order indicates that the court’s decision was not dependent on 

the content of Abigail’s testimony and that the court thought 

adjudication was supported by the other evidence. We agree 

that it was.

The court noted in its order that where Abigail’s testimony differed from the testimony and depositions was whether 

Abigail had told the deputy in February 2018 that she would 

no longer leave Vladimir in Boyd’s care and whether she suspected that the injuries in March 2018 were caused by Boyd. 

The deputy testified that she had said she would no longer 
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leave Vladimir in Boyd’s care, and Abigail testified that she 

did not recall saying that. The nurse’s notes attached to her 

deposition indicate that Abigail had made statements to the 

effect that she had concerns that Boyd had hurt Vladimir; 

Abigail testified that she believed Boyd’s explanations for how 

the injuries occurred and that she did not believe the injuries 

were the result of abuse. To the extent Abigail’s testimony 

varied from the other evidence, the court apparently found the 

other evidence more credible.

Abigail makes two specific arguments regarding sufficiency of the evidence. First, she argues that the court applied 

a “strict liability” standard by holding her responsible for 

anything that happened to Vladimir while he was in another 

person’s care. Brief for appellant at 32. We do not read the 

court’s order as finding that Abigail was “responsible” for the 

injuries in the sense that she directly caused them. To find that 

Vladimir was in a dangerous or injurious situation, it was not 

necessary to show a parent caused the injury, just that he was 

in a situation wherein he was at risk for such injury. And to 

find lack of proper parental care, it was also not necessary to 

show Abigail was responsible for the injury; instead, it was 

enough to show she had put him in the situation that placed 

him at risk.

Abigail also argues that it was unfair to base the adjudication in part on her testimony that at the time of the hearing, 

she was still in a relationship with Boyd. She argues she was 

not given notice that the continuing relationship would be 

a basis for the adjudication. However, we read the court’s 

findings to be based on the circumstances that existed in 

February and March 2018 and that were alleged in the petition rather than on Abigail’s continuing relationship with 

Boyd at the time of the hearing. We further determine that the 

evidence of circumstances that existed in February and March 

2018 was sufficient to support the adjudication and that evidence of the continuing relationship was not necessary to the 

court’s ruling.
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CONCLUSION

We conclude that Abigail could invoke her Fifth Amendment 

privilege in this juvenile adjudication and that she did so. 

We further conclude that even if the court erred in failing 

to determine that at least part of Abigail’s testimony was 

incriminating and therefore protected by her invocation of 

her Fifth Amendment privilege, such error was not reversible error; Abigail did not suffer unfair prejudice, because 

there was sufficient evidence to support the adjudication without such testimony and because her Fifth Amendment rights 

were not violated in this civil proceeding. We further conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the adjudication that Vladimir was a child within the meaning of 

§ 43-247(3)(a). We therefore affirm the county court’s order 

of adjudication.

Affirmed.

Heavican, C.J., not participating.