1 D ist ri ct Ju d g e Jo h n G leeso n o f th e U n it ed S tate s D is tr ic t C o u rt fo r t h e E astern * 2 D i s t r i ct of N ew Y or k, s i t t i ng by des i gnat i on.

09-0124 -cv Whit e v . C ant o r

F it z g e r al d 1 UNI TED S TATES CO URT O F AP PEALS 2 F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT 3 4 S UM M ARY OR DER 5 6 R U L I N G S B Y S U M M A R Y ORD E R DO N OT HA V E P R E C E D E N T I A L E F F E C T . C I T A T I ON T O A 7 S UM M ARY ORDE R F I L E D ON OR AF T E R J ANUARY 1 , 20 0 7 , I S P E RM I T T E D AND I S GOVE RNE D BY 8 FED ERA L RU LE O F AP PELLA TE PRO C EDU R E 32 . 1 AN D TH I S C O U R T’ S LO C A L RU LE 32 . 1. 1. W H EN 9 C I TI N G A S U M M A R Y O R D ER I N A D O C U M ENT FI LED W I T H T H I S C O U R T, A PA R TY M U ST C I TE 10 E I T HE R T HE F E D E R AL AP P E N D I X OR A N E L E C T R ON I C D A T A B A S E ( W I T H T HE N OT A T I ON 11 “ S UM M ARY ORDE R” ) . A PA RT Y CI T I NG A S UM M ARY ORDER M US T S E RVE A COPY OF I T ON ANY 12 PA R TY N O T REPR ESENTED BY CO U N SEL. 13 1 4 A t a s t at ed t er m of t he U ni t ed St at es C our t of A ppeal s for t he Second Ci r cui t , hel d at 1 5 t he D ani el Pat r i ck M oy ni han U ni t ed St at es C our t hous e, 500 Pear l St r eet , i n t he C i t y of N ew 1 6 Y or k, on t he 22 day of Sept ember , t w o t hous and t en. nd 17 P R E S E N T : P IE R R E N . L E V A L , 18 1 9 R E E N A R A G G I, 20 C i r cui tJudges , 2 1 J OHN GL E E S ON, * D i s t r i ct Judge

. 22

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- 23 2 4 A .J . W H IT E , 25 P l ai nt i f f

- Appel l ant , 26 27 2 8 v. 09- 0124- cv 29 3 0 C A N T O R F IT Z G E R A L D , L .P ., B G C P A R T N E R S , L .P ., 3 1 B G C C A P IT A L M A R K E T S , L .P ., D A N IE L M

. 3 2 L a VE CC HI A, KE VI N M c NUL T Y, 33 34 D ef endant s - Appel l ees . 3 5

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - - - - - --- - 36 37 38 392 1 A P P E A R I N G F O R A P P E L L A N T : M I CH AE L H. OC H S ( J a s o n A. 2 S tern , on t he br i ef ) , A nder s on & 3 O ch s, L L P , N ew Y o rk, N ew Y o rk 4 5 A PPEA RI N G FO R A PPELL EES: W I L L I A M C

. B A T O N , S a u l 6 E w i ng L L P, N ew ar k, N ew J er s ey 7 8 9 A ppeal fr om t he U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct C our t for t he Sout her n D i s t r i ct of N ew 1 0 Y o rk (B att s, J. ). 11 1 2 UP ON DUE CO NS I DE RA T I ON, I T I S HE RE BY OR DE RE D, ADJ UDGE D, 1 3 AND DE CR E E D t h a t t h e j u d g me n t o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s VAC AT E D AND 1 4 RE M ANDE D. 15 Plaintiff A.J . Whit e appe als from a judgme nt dismi ssing he r employ ment discrimination 16 claims broug ht pursuant to Title VI Iof the 1964 Civil Ri g hts Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et. seq. 17 (“ Ti tle VI I ” ), and re late d s tate and

c ity laws , a nd c omp e lli nghe r t o a

rb itr ate tho se c la ims . Wh ite 18 argue s th at th e g ov e rn ingarb itr atio n p ro vis ion do e s n ot c ov e r h e r c la ims of se x disc ri min atio n in 19 the workpla ce. F or the most part, a s discussed more f ully below, we agree . Acc ording ly , we 20 vacate the judg ment and re mand so that Whit e may pursue he r cla ims of discrimination in the 21 district court to the extent she alleg es violations of the anti-discr imination laws occurr ing a fter 22 J anuar

y 1, 2005. 23 “The question of ar bitrability is undeniably

an issue for

judicial deter

mination . . . .” N

. Y. 24 He alt

h &Hu ma n S

e rv . U nio n v . NYU H

os ps . Ctr

. , 343 F.3d 117, 119 ( 2d Cir. 2003). We review 25 a fina l district court order compellingarbitration de novo

. Abram Landau Real Estate v. Be vona, 26 123 F.3d 69, 72 ( 2d Cir. 1997).BG C is one of fiv e d ef en d an t s , all of whom ar e appe llees her e. The others ar e Cantor 1 F itzg e ra ld, L .P. , B GC Ca

pti a l Ma rk e ts, L .P. , D anie l M. L aVe c c hia and Ke vin Mc Nu lty . T ho ugh th is order ref ers only to BGC, all of the defe ndants-appe llees jointly ad v an ce the same a rguments on a pp e a l. 3 1 “ Th e re is a str on gfe de ra l po lic y

fa vo ri ngarb itr atio n a s a

n a lte rn ativ e me ans of

dis pute 2 resolution.” Oldroyd v. Elmira Sav . Bank, FSB, 13 4 F .3 d 7 2, 76 (2 d Ci r. 19 98 ). “ Stil l, i t 3 rema ins the case that arbitra tion ‘is a matter of c onsent, not coer cion.’” J LM In du s. , I nc . v . S tol t4 Nielsen SA, 3 8 7 F. 3 d 1 6 3 , 1 7 1 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of L eland 5 Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). In deter mining whe ther the pa

rties conse nted 6 to arbitrate the claims of e mploy ment discrimination here at issue, we e x amine two ar bitration 7 pr ov isi on s. 8 Whit e wa s first employ ed as a broker by Appellee BG C Partners, L .P. (“B GC”) in May 1 9 2004, and she r emained e mploy ed ther e until J anuar y 17, 2006, when, she claims, she wa s 10 constructively

discharg ed. At the outset, White was an at-will employ ee who agree d to be bound 11 by

BG C’s Employ ee H andbook (the “Ha ndbook”). The Handbook manda tes arbitration of 12 any and all cla ims . . . of any kind involving [the employ ee] and a ny Cantor 13 Fitzge rald Gr oup Company . . . including . . . those related to . . . employ ment 14 discrimination . . . [ under] Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964 . . . and a ny 15 sim ila r f e de ra l, s tate , o r l oc a l st atut e , r e gulatio n, or or din anc e and

any and a ll 16 claims under the common law of a ny state or other

wise. 17 Handbook Ar

bitration Ag ree ment and Policy at 2. The H andbook’s a

rbitration provision further 18 states that if an at-will employ ee e x ecute s an employ ment agree ment with BGC, “the arbitration 19 of

any dis pute s sh a ll b e a s se t f

or th i n your wri tte n e mpl oy me nt a g re e me nt. I f [the e mpl oye e ’s ] 20 ag ree ment makes no provision for the ar bitration of disputes, then this Arbitration Ag ree ment4 1 and Policy

shall g overn.” Id. at 6. 2 After

less than eig ht months on t he job, White entere d into an employ ment agree ment 3 wi th B GC . T he a g re e me nt i s d ate d Jan ua ry 1, 20 04 , b ut t

he pa rt ie s a g re e it w a s a c tua lly 4 executed in 2005, not 2004. Refer red to he re a s the “Employ ment Ag ree ment,” it contains an 5 arbitration clause, whic h provides that “a ny disputes, differ ence s or controve rsies ar ising unde r 6 this Agr eeme nt shall be settled and f inally deter mined by arbitration . . . . I t is ex pressly agree d 7 that arbitration as provided her ein shall be the e x clusive mea ns for de termination of all matter s 8 arisingin connec tion with thi s Ag ree ment . . . .” Employ ment Ag ree ment at 7. 9 B GC argue s th at bo th arbitration provisions currently bind Whi te, and that the one in the 10 Employ ee H andbook re quires ar bitration of all claims in this case. Spec ifically , BG C contends 11 that the ar

bitration provisions serve se parate purposes: the one in the Employ ee H andbook 12 “explicitly

applies to Plaintiff’s discrimination claims,” B rief f or Appe llees at 13, whe rea s “[t] he 13 arbitration provision in t he Employ ment Ag ree ment was mer ely intended to ac count for disputes 14 that may

arise out of

the new written contra ct, which the H andbook Ar bitration Ag ree ment may 15 not encompass,” id. at 14 & n.6 (statingthat the Employ ment Ag ree ment arbitration clause, “ rea d 16 as an e ntirety , ref ers to the a

rbitration of a

ny disputes involving the ter ms of the written 17 contra ct”; only

the “c omplementary” ar

bitration clause in the E mploy ee H andbook includes the 18 “ la

un dr y lis t” of a dd iti on a l di sp ute s, inc lud inge mpl oy me nt d isc ri min atio n, tha

t are su bje c t to 19 arbitration). Indeed, B GC argues that ce rtain impermissible features of the Employ ment 20 Ag ree ment arbitration provision – including a pr ohibition on t he aw ard of punitive damag es or 21 attorney s’ fe es to Whit e – should not conce rn this Court because that arbitration provision5 1 g overns only

contra ct disputes, and is inapplicable to claims of discrimination in the workplac e. 2 Id. at 14 n.7. 3 We rejec t this argument, and hold that the only arbitration provision to which W hite was 4 bound once she enter ed into the Employ ment Ag ree ment is the one in the Employ ment 5 Ag ree ment. The Ha ndbook arbitration provision provides that if an at-w ill employ ee is off ere d 6 employ

ment pursuant to an e mploy ment agree ment, “the a

rbitration of a

ny disputes shall be as 7 set forth in your written e mploy ment agree ment. I f [the employ ee’ s] writt en agree ment makes no 8 pr ov isi on

fo r t he arb itr atio n o f d isp ute s, the n th is Arb itr atio n A g re e me nt a nd Pol ic y sh a ll 9 g overn.” Handbook Ar bitration Ag ree ment and Policy at 4. The H andbook thus contemplate s 10 the c ontin

ue d a pp lic atio n o f i ts b ro a d a

rb itr atio n c la

us e on ly if a late r employ ment agree ment 11 does not contain a n arbitration provision. S ince White’s Employ ment Ag ree ment contains such a 12 provision, the express terms of the pa rties’ a g ree ments require the conc lusion that the Employ ee 13 Handbook’ s arbitration provision cease d to apply once White and B GC entere d into the 14 Employ

ment Ag ree ment. 15 BG C also advanc es a ba ck-up a rgument: even if the only applicable arbitration provision 16 is the one in the Employ ment Ag ree ment, Whit e still mustarbitra te all her claims of sex 17 discrimination. This is an ag g ressive a rgument. As discussed above , BG C’s principal ar gument 18 is that it di d not intend the Employ ment Ag ree ment’s ar

bitration provision to embrace 19 employ

ment discrimination claims beca use the “ complementar

y” ar bitration provision in the 20 Ha

nd bo ok c ov e rs the m. And

it d e fe nd s th e no -p un iti ve -d ama g e s a nd no -a tto rn e y s’ -f

e e s a sp e c ts 21 of the Employ

ment Ag ree ment’s ar

bitration provision by

arguing that such limit ations are6 1 unobjectionable in a n arbitration provision int ended only “to apply to contract

disputes,” not 2 employ

ment discrimination claims. Br ief for Appellee s at 14 n.7 (empha sis in original). 3 Neve rtheless, B GC contends in the alter native that eve n if that argument fails, i.e., eve n if we 4 h o l d

th atth e H an d

b o o k ar b i tr at i o np r o v i s i o ni s i n a

p p l i c a b l e , w e s h o u l d

o r d e r ar b i tr at i o nanyw ay, 5 pursuant to the ver y arbitration provision itconce des wa s neither intende d nor worde d to require 6 it. 7 We disag ree . We acknowle dg e that the a rgument is made possible by the strongfede ral 8 policy

favor ing a

rbitration, and in par

ticular by our own pre cede nts that acc ord a pr esumption of 9 arbitra

bility when the pla intiff has agree d to arbitrate disputes “ar ising unde r” or “in conne ction 10 with” an e mploy

ment ag ree ment. Oldroyd, 134 F.3d at 76 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed). 11 B ut t

hat pr e sumpt ion

is r e butta ble , a nd we ho ld t hat it ha s b e e n r e butte d h e re . F ir st, B GC its e lf 12 say s th e Em

plo y me nt A g re e me nt’ s arb itr atio n p ro vis ion wa s n e ith e r i nte nd e d n or dr a ft e d to 13 include employ

ment discrimination claims; indeed, it admits that the opposite is true. And 14 se c on d, Whit e ’s his tor y wi th h e r e mpl oye r d ist inguis he s th is c a se fr om Oldroyd . Wh e n Wh ite 15 wa s f

ir st h ir e d, sh e wa s su

bje c t to an e xpans ive arb itr atio n p ro vis ion tha t r e qu ir e d h e r t o a

rb itr ate 16 any

dispute arisingunder or

in connec tion with her employm ent , e x p r e s s l y i n c l u d i n gT i t l e V II 17 and discrimination claims. B ut when she later be came a contr act e mploy ee, the arbitration 18 pr ov isi on

in t he Em plo y me nt A g re e me nt a

ba nd on e d th is l angua g e and c a lle d f or arb itr atio n o nly 19 of “disputes, diff ere nces or

controve rsies ar ising unde r this Agreeme nt ,” Employ ment Ag ree ment 20 at 7 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) , whic h s ay s n oth inga bo ut c la ims of

e mpl oy me nt d isc ri min atio n. Whit e 21 the re fo re we nt f

ro m an at- wi ll e mpl oye e wh o w a s r e qu ir e d to arb itr ate any dis pute , e xpre ssl y7 1 inc lud ingan e mpl oy me nt d isc ri min atio n c la im, to a c ontr a c t e mpl oye e wh o w a s r e qu ir e d to 2 arbitrate only

disputes arisingout of her c ontrac t. Whatever mig ht be said about the sc ope of the 3 Employ

ment Ag ree ment’s ar

bitration provision if that were the only such provision Whit e and 4 BG C had agree d to, beca use White gr aduate d from the Employee H andbook to the Employ ment 5 Ag ree ment, we c an conc lude “with positive assura nce that the arbitration clause is not 6 susceptible of a

n interpre tation that it covers” c laims of sex di scrimination. Oldroyd, 134 F.3d at 7 76 (interna l quotation marks, brac kets, and e mphasis omitt ed) ( descr ibing whe n presumption of 8 arbitra

bility is rebutted). A ccor dingly , we hold that the Employ ment Ag ree ment’s ar

bitration 9 provision does not cover Whit e’s e mploy

ment discrimination claims. 10 We reiterate that our holdingis rooted in the par ticular fa cts of this case ; we nee d not and 11 do not addre ss whether Whit e’s c laims of employ ment discrimination would be ar bitrable unde r 12 the terms of the Employ ment Ag ree ment if that wer e the only agree ment she had w ith her 13 employ er. 14 Finally , we must addre ss the possibili ty that Whit e may

be asse rtingboth arbitrable and 15 nonarbitra

ble claims. White’s tenure a t BGC beg an in May

2004 and extended to J anuar y 17, 16 2006, when she alleg es she wa s constructively discharg ed. She wa s subject to the Handbook’ s 17 arbitration provision unti l J anuar y 1, 2005, when she signe d the Employ ment Ag ree ment. 18 Whit e’s c laim that she was c onstructively discharg ed in J anuar

y 2006 is plainly

not arbitrable for 19 the re asons set for th above. Similarly , her c laim that she was subjec ted to a hostile work 20 environment be tween January 1, 2005 and January

17, 2006, as we ll as most of the instances of 21 dis pa

rate tr e atme nt a lle g e d in

he r c omp la int , a

re no t arb itr a

ble . H ow e ve r, the c omp la int a lle g e s a 22 hostile work environme nt and ac ts of disparate treatment in 2004. To the ext ent that White seeks8 1 a jury

findingof liability

based solely

on acts that oc curr ed in 2004, the Ha ndbook 2 unambiguously

subjects such c laims to arbitration. 3 Whit e su g g e sts that any su c h c la ims are fa c tua lly int e rt wi ne d w iththe no na

rb itr a ble 4 c la ims and

fo r t hat r e a so n s ho uld

no t be re le g ate d to arb itr atio n. B GC c onte nd s th at w e no t on ly 5 mus t c omp e l th e arb itr atio n o f a ny 20 04 c la ims , b ut a lso mus t di re c t th e dis tr ic t c ourt to s tay a ll 6 proce eding s below pendingthe outcome of the ar bitration. We think neither side is corre ct. 7 Whit e is wrongbeca use the Supreme Court has made c lear that the Arbitration Act require s 8 district courts to compel ar bitration of ar

bitrable c laims even whe re doingso produce s the 9 ineffic iencies a ssociated with litigating similar cla ims in separate proce eding s in differe nt 10 fo rums. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4; De an W itte r R e y no lds, I nc . v . B y rd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985). 11 B GC is wro ngbe c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

is n ot r e qu ir e d to sta

y the lit ig atio n o f t

he no na rb itr a ble 12 claims befor e it on rema nd pendingthe outcome of any arbitrated claims. Se eCha ng v . Li n , 824 13 F .2 d 2 19 , 2 22 (2 d Ci r. 19 87 ) ( statin gthat “ we have pr e vio us ly a llo we d c ourt s gre at di sc re tio n in 14 staying nona

rbitrable state and f

eder al claims pendingarbitration of relate d claims” a nd citing 15 c a se s) ; Castro v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. , 695 F. Supp. 1548, 1552 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 16 (dec lining to orde r stay of litigation of fede ral c laims until completion of ar bitration of re lated 17 claims). Our

revie w of the c omplaint revea ls that W hite is predominantly advanc ing 18 nonarbitra

ble claims, that is, claims based pr incipally on events oc curr ing in 2005 a nd 2006. 19 Ind e e d, on

re mand sh e may c ho os e to a

ba nd on any c la ims ba se d s ole ly

on 20 04 e ve nts , a

nd to 20 rely

on such eve nts solely

to the extent they

constitute evidenc e of the nonarbitra ble claims. 21 Ev e n if

sh e do e s n ot a

ba nd on he r a rb itr a ble c la ims , th e dis tr ic t c ourt may c on c lud e tha

t it is 22 fea sible to compel arbitration of those claims while allowingsimult aneous litig ation of the9 1 nonarbitra

ble claims. See Chang , 8 24 F .2 d at 22 2; see also Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v . Sud’s of 2 Peoria, Inc

. , 4 74 F .3 d 9 66 , 9 71 (7 th C ir . 2 00 7) ; Kla yv . A ll D e

fe nd an ts , 389 F.3d 1191, 1204 3 (11th Cir. 2004). We leave that deter mination to the discretion of the district cour t. 4 Ac co rd i n gl y , we v ac at e t h e j u d gm en to f t h e d i s tri ctco urtan d re m an d fo r p ro ce ed i n gs 5 consistent with this opi nion. 6 7 FOR TH E CO UR T: 8 C A T H E R IN E O ’H A G A N W O L F E , C lerk o f C o u rt 9 10 11 12 13