NO. 07-11-0235-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL B 

JUNE 8, 2012 

JERREMIE JASON WILLIS, 

 Appellant 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

 Appellee 

_____________________________ 

FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY; 

NO. 21,278-C; HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ, PRESIDING 

Memorandum Opinion 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

 Appellant Jerremie Jason Willis was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a 

child and aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced to twenty-five years 

imprisonment for each offense. He now contends the trial court erred in 1) failing to 

instruct the jury on aggravated sexual assault as being a lesser-included offense to 

continuous sexual abuse, and 2) cumulating his sentences. We affirm the judgments. 
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Background 

After his divorce in January 2008, appellant had primary custody of his two 

daughters, S.G., who was nine years old, and H.W., who was seven years old. Soon 

after, he began to have vaginal, oral, and anal sexual relations with S.G. over a twoyear period.1

 At some point, he also had vaginal intercourse with H.W. After two years, 

S.G. made an outcry to her mother and grandmother. 

Issue 1 – Instruction on Lesser Offense 

Appellant requested that the trial court inform the jury about the possibility of 

finding him guilty of aggravated sexual assault as a lesser-included offense to 

continuous sexual abuse. The request was denied. That decision was purportedly 

wrong because aggravated sexual assault should always be submitted as a lesser 

offense when one is being tried for continous sexual abuse. We overrule the issue. 

 A person is entitled to a charge on a lesser-included offense if 1) the elements of 

the lesser offense are included within the proof necessary to establish the greater 

offense, and 2) some evidence appears of record that would permit a jury to rationally 

conclude that if appellant is guilty of anything, it is only of the lesser offense. Rousseau 

v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Furthermore, the “some 

evidence” alluded to is not satisfied when the defendant simply denies the commission 

of any crime. Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Here, 

appellant did just that, he defended himself by indicating he committed no offense. For 

instance, he attacked the credibility of the complaining witnesses, the forensic 

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The sexual assault nurse examiner testified that S.G. had wearing down of her hymen consistent 

with repeated long-term penetration. 
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interviewer, and the sexual assault nurse examiner. He also suggested that another 

male in the house, who had access to the children, committed the assaults. Given the 

nature of his defense and his failure to cite us to any evidence suggesting that his 

assaults against his daughter were not continuous or multiple, he was not entitled to the 

requested instruction. 

Issue 2 – Cumulation of Sentences 

In his next and last issue, appellant argues that the portion of the judgment 

cumulating his two sentences should be removed. This is purportedly so because the 

trial court did not specify, when pronouncing sentence in open court, which sentence 

would run first. We overrule the issue. 

 The two offenses at issue were charged via the same indictment and tried 

together. After the guilty verdicts were returned and the punishment derived by the jury, 

the trial court expressly pronounced appellant’s guilt and sentence applicable to count 

one first. Then it pronounced guilt and the sentence applicable to count two. And, upon 

hearing argument regarding whether to stack the sentences, it orally pronounced that 

the State’s motion to so stack them was granted and that the sentences would be 

cumulative. Those circumstances were akin to the ones in Madrigal-Rodriguez v. State, 

749 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1988, pet. ref’d) and deemed a legally 

sufficient pronouncement of the court’s intent to cumulate the sentences. Id. at 580. 

But, unlike the situation in Madrigal-Rodriquez, we need not reform the judgment here 

to reflect the trial court’s intent. The latter was already incorporated into the pertinent 

decree. 

 
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Having overruled each issue, we affirm the judgment. 

 Brian Quinn 

 Chief Justice 

Do not publish.