[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 17-14802

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-00085-JES-MRM

MICAH L. LAWSON, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

Respondent-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(August 28, 2019)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, GRANT and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Micah L. Lawson, a Florida prisoner, appeals the denial of his petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Lawson succeeded in having two 

convictions vacated on direct appeal as barred by the statute of limitation in a 

decision of first impression, but he was denied state postconviction relief on his 

claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to make a similar timeliness argument 

before trial, see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. We issued a certificate of appealability to 

address “[w]hether trial counsel’s failure to move for a dismissal of the charge of 

lewd or lascivious battery upon an elderly person and the charge of abuse of an 

elderly person resulted in Lawson receiving a longer sentence for his conviction of 

burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery.” Because the Florida courts 

reasonably concluded that Lawson suffered no prejudice from counsel’s 

performance, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 2003, a burglar sexually assaulted a 76-year-old female in her 

home in Lee County, Florida. Detectives collected biological evidence from the 

victim, but her assailant remained unknown for several years. In November 2008,

the Florida Department of Law Enforcement matched a specimen collected from 

Lawson with the biological evidence collected during the investigation.

In 2004 and 2006, the Florida Legislature amended the statute imposing time

limitations in criminal cases to allow the state to prosecute specific sex crimes after 

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identifying the offender using biological evidence. The 2004 amendment provided 

that “a prosecution for . . . [a]n offense of sexual battery under chapter 794 [and 

for] [a] lewd or lascivious offense . . . may be commenced within 1 year after the 

date on which the identity of the accused is established . . . through the analysis of 

deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 775.15(8)(a). That 

“subsection applie[d] to any offense that [was] not otherwise barred from 

prosecution on or after July 1, 2004.” Id. § 775.15(8)(b). The 2006 amendment

retained the one-year extension so long as the offense was “not otherwise barred 

from prosecution between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2006.” Id. § 775.15(15)(b). 

The 2006 amendment also provided that the prosecution of eight specific offenses, 

including the two identified in the earlier amendment, could “be commenced at any 

time after” the offender was identified using biological evidence, id.

§ 775.15(16)(a), so long as the offense was “not otherwise barred from prosecution 

on or after July 1, 2006,” id. § 775.15(16)(b).

On November 20, 2008, the State Attorney filed a three-count information 

charging Lawson for burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery, a first-degree 

felony punishable by a sentence of up to life imprisonment, id. § 810.02(2); lewd 

or lascivious battery of an elderly person, a second-degree felony, id.

§ 825.1025(2), and abuse of an elderly person, a third-degree felony id.

§ 825.102(1). After a Florida jury found Lawson guilty of the three crimes, the 

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trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 65 years of imprisonment for 

burglary, 15 years of imprisonment for lewd or lascivious battery, and 5 years of 

imprisonment for elder abuse.

On direct appeal, Lawson succeeded in having his convictions for the two 

lesser offenses vacated. Lawson v. State, 51 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 

The appellate court found that the three-year statute of limitation applicable to 

Lawson’s offenses of lewd or lascivious battery and of elder abuse, Fla. Stat. 

§ 775.15(2)(b) (2002), expired on January 25, 2006. Lawson, 51 So. 3d at 1288. 

The appellate court concluded that the amendments to section 775.15 did not 

extend the time within which to prosecute Lawson’s battery offense because the

statute of limitation expired “between July 1, 2004, and July 30, 2006,” under 

subsection 15 and before “subsection (16) took effect on July 1, 2006.” Id. The 

appellate court also concluded that the amendments did “not apply to the offense of 

abuse of an elderly person” and could not extend the limitation period to prosecute 

Lawson for that offense. Lawson, 51 So. 3d at 1289.

Lawson moved pro se for state postconviction relief and argued that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss his charges for lewd or 

lascivious battery and for elder abuse. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. Lawson alleged 

that he told his two attorneys that the statute of limitation barred his prosecution 

for the two offenses, but they disagreed. Lawson also alleged that, “[h]ad [he] only 

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been facing count one [for burglary] he would not [have gone] to trial and counsel 

could ha[ve] pursued a more favorable plea bargain than the 25 years initially 

offered the day of trial.”

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Lawson’s motion. Lawson 

testified that attorney Christopher Whitney “never really responded” to his 

concerns about the statute of limitation and that attorney Tiffany Chewing told him 

that the biological evidence extended the limitations period to prosecute his 

offenses. Attorney Whitney testified that the state offered for Lawson to plead 

guilty to his three charges in exchange for a sentence of 25 years of imprisonment, 

but Lawson was disinterested in the plea offer. Trial counsel also testified that his 

“research of the statute led [him] to believe that because of the DNA . . . there was 

no time bar” to Lawson’s prosecution.

The trial court denied Lawson’s postconviction motion. Fla. R. Crim. P. 

3.850. The trial court ruled that trial counsel’s representation was neither deficient 

nor prejudicial under the two-part standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). The trial court found that trial counsel did not act deficiently by failing 

to move to dismiss the charges because the amendments to 775.15 could be 

interpreted as giving “the State . . . one year from the date that [Lawson’s] identity 

. . . had been established, . . . until November 4, 2009, in which to prosecute” him.

The trial court also found that, even if Lawson’s two lesser charges had been 

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dismissed, it could have “imposed a life sentence for the conviction of burglary 

with assault or battery” and “would have imposed the same sentence of 65 years 

for [the] conviction . . . .” Lawson appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed 

summarily. Lawson v. State, 182 So. 3d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).

Lawson filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus and repeated his 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district 

court denied the writ. The district court ruled that Lawson’s claim “clearly fails to 

satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong” because the trial court “has already told us 

what would have happened if Counsel had successfully moved to remove counts 

two and three from the information—Lawson would have still received a sixty-five 

sentence on count one.”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Gissendaner v. Seaboldt, 

735 F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner is entitled to a writ of 

habeas corpus only if the state court reached a decision that was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or 

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). The “determination of a factual issue . . . by a State court [is] presumed 

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to be correct” unless the state prisoner can rebut the presumption with “clear and 

convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1). “A state court’s determination that a claim 

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could 

disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Woods v. Etherton, 136 

S. Ct. 1149, 1151 (2016) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)).

III. DISCUSSION

Lawson argues that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland in 

denying his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Lawson contends that 

trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he would have succeeded in 

having Lawson’s charges for lewd or lascivious battery and for elder abuse

dismissed, as evidenced by Lawson’s success in having the convictions vacated on 

direct appeal. Lawson also contends that he was prejudiced because he would have 

received an offer from the state to plead guilty to the remaining charge of burglary 

of a dwelling with assault or battery, Fla. Stat. § 810.02(2), in exchange for a 

sentence less than 25 years of imprisonment. We need not address whether 

counsel’s conduct was deficient because the ruling of the state court that Lawson 

failed to prove prejudice did not constitute an unreasonable application of 

Strickland or an unreasonable determination of fact. 

Lawson must “[s]urmount[] [a particularly] high bar” to obtain a writ of 

habeas corpus based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 

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U.S. 356, 371 (2010). He must prove that his attorney’s performance was deficient 

and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 446 U.S. at 687. To 

prove prejudice, Lawson has to establish that the outcome of the plea process 

would have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance. Lafler v. 

Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012). Lawson must prove “there is a reasonable 

probability that [a] plea offer would have been presented to the court . . ., that the 

court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, 

under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and 

sentence that in fact were imposed.” Id. at 164.

Lawson cannot satisfy the first and last elements of the Lafler test. Lawson’s 

argument that he would have received an offer to plead guilty to his charge of 

burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery, Fla. Stat. § 810.02(2), is wholly 

speculative. “[A] defendant has no right to be offered a plea . . . .” Missouri v. 

Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148 (2012). Lawson also assumes that the state would have 

offered a sentence less than what it offered in exchange for his pleas of guilty to 

burglary and two other offenses. Not only is it impossible to predict what sentence 

the prosecutor might have offered, it is quite possible that the state would have 

recommended a sentence equal to or longer than 25 years of imprisonment. 

Lawson’s burglary crime was a first-degree felony for which he faced a sentence of 

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up to imprisonment for life. See Fla. Stat. § 810.02(2). Prejudice cannot be based 

on speculation and conjecture.

Lawson also cannot establish that the trial court would have accepted an 

agreement recommending that he receive a sentence of 25 years of imprisonment

or less. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164; see also Frye, 566 U.S. at 148 (“a defendant 

has no . . . federal right that the judge accept” a plea agreement). The trial court 

stated, when it denied Lawson’s motion for state postconviction relief, that it 

would have “imposed the same sentence of 65 years” for his burglary crime even if

his lesser offenses had been dismissed. And the nature of Lawson’s crime and his 

background would have supported a harsh sentence. See Imbert v. State, 154 So. 3d 

1174, 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a trial court can consider uncharged 

conduct in selecting a sentence); Fla. Stat. § 921.231(1)(c) (providing that a 

presentence investigation report “shall include . . . [t]he offender’s prior record of 

arrests and convictions”). The victim, a 76-year-old woman, called 911 and 

reported that she had been raped, and the semen collected from her identified 

Lawson as her assailant. In addition to that, trial counsel stated during the state 

postconviction hearing that Lawson had made a statement to law enforcement 

about the crime “[t]hat would not have been favorable to his case at all” and that 

Lawson had a “prior criminal history that would be used to impeach his 

credibility.” 

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The district court correctly denied Lawson federal habeas relief. The Florida 

courts reasonably determined that Lawson failed to establish prejudice. Lawson

failed to prove that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the plea 

process would have been different had counsel succeeded in having his charges for 

lewd and lascivious battery and for elder abuse dismissed. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 

164. Lawson offered no evidence that he would have received what he deemed an 

acceptable offer to plead guilty that the trial court would have accepted.

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the denial of Lawson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

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