Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

August 2005 IMMIGRATION 

ENFORCEMENT 

Weaknesses Hinder 

Employment 

Verification and 

Worksite Enforcement 

Efforts 

GAO-05-813 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-813.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Richard M. 

Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-813, a report to 

congressional requesters 

August 2005

IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

Weaknesses Hinder Employment 

Verification and Worksite Enforcement 

Efforts 

The current employment verification process is based on employers’ review 

of documents presented by new employees to prove their identity and work 

eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they have reviewed 

employees’ documents and that the documents appear genuine and relate to 

the individual presenting them. However, various studies have shown that 

document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud 

(fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others) have 

made it difficult for employers who want to comply with the employment 

verification process to hire only authorized workers and easier for 

unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers. The large 

number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility 

have also hindered verification efforts. In 1997, the former Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (INS), now part of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), issued an interim rule on a reduction in the number of 

acceptable work eligibility documents and, in 1998, proposed a further 

reduction, but this proposal has not yet been finalized. DHS is currently 

reviewing the list of acceptable work eligibility documents, but has not 

established a target time frame for completing this review. The Basic Pilot 

Program, a voluntary program through which participating employers 

electronically verify employees’ work eligibility, has potential to help 

enhance the verification process and substantially reduce document fraud. 

Yet, current weaknesses in the program, such as the inability of the program 

to detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data into its databases, and 

some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements could, if not 

addressed, have a significant impact on the program’s success. Furthermore, 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officials stated that the current 

Basic Pilot Program may not be able to complete timely verifications if the 

number of employers using the program significantly increased. 

Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs 

that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now under ICE, 

worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. Consistent with 

DHS’s mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS and then 

ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly on removing 

unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites to help address those 

sites’ vulnerabilities. Since fiscal year 1999, the numbers of employer notices 

of intent to fine and administrative worksite arrests have generally declined, 

according to ICE, due to various factors such as document fraud, which 

makes it difficult to prove employer violations. ICE has not yet developed 

outcome goals and measures for its worksite enforcement program, which, 

given limited resources and competing priorities for those resources, may 

hinder ICE’s efforts to determine resources needed for the program. 

The opportunity for employment is 

one of the most important magnets 

attracting illegal immigrants to the 

United States. Immigration experts 

state that strategies to deter illegal 

immigration require both a reliable 

employment eligibility verification 

process and a worksite 

enforcement capacity to ensure 

that employers comply with 

immigration-related employment 

laws. This report examines (1) the 

current employment verification 

(Form I-9) process and challenges, 

if any, facing verification; and 

(2) the priorities and resources of 

U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement’s (ICE) worksite 

enforcement program and any 

challenges in implementing the 

program. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security set 

a target time frame for completing 

the department’s review of the 

Form I-9 process and issuing final 

regulations on the process, assess 

the feasibility and costs of 

addressing the Basic Pilot 

Program’s current weaknesses, and 

establish additional output goals 

and measures and set a target time 

frame for developing outcome 

goals and measures for the 

worksite enforcement program. In 

written comments on a draft of this 

report, DHS agreed with our 

recommendations. 
Page i GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5 

Background 8 

Various Weaknesses Have Undermined the Employment 

Verification Process, but the Basic Pilot Program Shows 

Potential to Enhance the Process 14 

Competing Priorities and Lack of Outcome Goals and Measures 

May Hinder Worksite Enforcement Efforts 30 

Conclusions 42 

Recommendations for Executive Action 44 

Agency Comments 44 

Appendix I Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9) 46 

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 49 

Appendix III Information on the Electronic Form I-9 54 

Appendix IV Data on Employer Participation in and Use of the 

Basic Pilot Program 55 

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 57 

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 59 

Figures 

Figure 1: Basic Pilot Program Verification Process 12 

Figure 2: Number of Queries Authorized by DHS through the 

Automated Check and the Immigration Status Verifier 

Check 26 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Figure 3: Investigative Agent Work-years Spent on Worksite 

Enforcement Efforts and Agent Work-years Spent on 

Other Investigative Areas for Each Fiscal Year from 1999 

through 2003 33 

Figure 4: Number of Notices of Intent to Fine Issued to Employers 

for Each Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2004 35 

Figure 5: Number of Worksite Enforcement Arrests for Each Fiscal 

Year from 1999 through 2003 36 

Figure 6: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries Run by 

Participating Employers for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 

through 2004 55 

Figure 7: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries that Resulted in 

Employment Authorizations for Each Fiscal Year from 

2000 through 2004 56 

Abbreviations 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IIRIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 

 Act 

INS U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 

IRCA Immigration Reform and Control Act 

SSA Social Security Administration 

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

August 31, 2005 

The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr. 

Chairman 

Committee on the Judiciary 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John N. Hostettler 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims 

Committee on the Judiciary 

House of Representatives 

According to the final report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration 

Reform, immigration contributes to the U.S. national economy by helping 

to keep viable segments of certain labor-intensive industries, expand 

foreign trade, provide valuable language and cultural expertise to U.S. 

companies, and contribute to the economic revitalization of some 

communities.1

 Yet, the commission also noted that immigration, 

particularly illegal immigration, has adverse consequences, such as 

helping to depress wages for low-skilled workers and creating net fiscal 

costs for state and local governments. Aliens, including temporary foreign 

workers, legally enter and reside in the United States through a variety of 

channels, such as immigration and work visa programs, but aliens also 

illegally enter or overstay visas and reside in the United States. The former 

U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimated that about 

7 million unauthorized aliens resided in the United States by January 2000, 

and other organizations estimated that the unauthorized alien population 

was about 10 million in 2004.2

 1

U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration and 

Immigrant Policy (Washington, D.C: September 1997). 

2

In March 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was merged into the 

Department of Homeland Security. The service’s immigration functions were divided 

between U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement is responsible for managing and implementing the worksite enforcement 

program. 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets 

attracting illegal aliens to the United States. To help reduce the attraction 

of this magnet, in 1986 Congress passed the Immigration Reform and 

Control Act (IRCA),3

 which made it illegal for individuals and entities to 

knowingly hire, continue to employ, or recruit or refer for a fee 

unauthorized workers. The act established a two-pronged approach for 

helping to limit the employment of unauthorized workers: (1) an 

employment verification process through which employers verify newly 

hired employees’ work eligibility and (2) a sanctions program for fining 

employers who do not comply with the act. Under the employment 

verification process, employees and employers must complete the 

Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9) to certify that the 

employees are authorized to work in the United States.4

 Those employers 

who do not follow the verification process can be sanctioned for 

knowingly hiring, continuing to employ, or recruiting or referring for a fee 

unauthorized workers or for improperly completing Forms I-9. Efforts to 

enforce these sanctions are referred to as worksite enforcement. 

In the nearly 20 years since the passage of IRCA, the employment 

eligibility verification process and worksite enforcement program have 

remained largely unchanged. Following the passage of the act, the U.S. 

Commission on Immigration Reform and various immigration experts 

concluded that deterring illegal immigration requires, among other things, 

strategies that focus on disrupting the ability of illegal aliens to gain 

employment through a more reliable employment eligibility verification 

process and a more robust worksite enforcement capacity. In particular, 

the commission report and other studies have found that the single most 

important step that could be taken to reduce unlawful migration is the 

development of a more effective system for verifying work authorization. 

Yet in the 8 years since the commission’s final report, few substantial 

enhancements have been applied to the employment verification process, 

and the approach continues to rely on the Form I-9, a procedure of which 

the commission was roundly critical because of its vulnerability to fraud 

and potential to cause discrimination. Moreover, in previous work, we 

reported that employers of unauthorized aliens faced little likelihood that 

INS would investigate, fine, or criminally prosecute them, a circumstance 

 3

P.L. 99-603, 8 U.S.C. 1324a et seq. 

4

See appendix I for a copy of the Form I-9. 
Page 3 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

that provides little disincentive for employers who want to circumvent the 

law.5

You asked us to review the federal government’s policies and programs 

aimed at enforcing immigration laws in the workplace. This report 

addresses the following questions: (1) How does the current employment 

verification process function and what are the challenges facing 

verification? (2) What are the priorities and resources of U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) worksite enforcement program and 

what challenges, if any, has the agency faced in implementing the 

program? 

To address these objectives, we interviewed officials from the Department 

of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(USCIS) and ICE, and officials from the Social Security Administration 

(SSA) in headquarters and selected field locations. We obtained from them 

information on the Form I-9 process and the Basic Pilot Program, a 

voluntary program through which participating employers verify 

employees’ work eligibility by electronically checking information on 

employees’ Forms I-9 with information in SSA and DHS databases. We 

analyzed information from these agencies, as well as related laws and 

regulations, to determine how the current Form I-9 process functions, 

identify any challenges in the current Form I-9 process, and examine DHS 

plans to modify the process. We also interviewed representatives of 

23 employers;6

 12 employer, employee, and advocacy groups;7 and 

 5

GAO, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment 

Exist, GAO/GGD-99-33 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999). 

6

One of the 23 employers we interviewed did not participate in the Basic Pilot Program. As 

a result, when we discuss the views of employers on the Basic Pilot Program, we refer to 

the views of the 22 employers we interviewed that participated in the program. The 

23 employers we interviewed were located in the following states: California, Illinois, 

Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. They were part of the following industries: 

meatpacking, transportation, health care, landscaping, manufacturing, accommodation, 

food services, agriculture, janitorial and maintenance, temporary employment, critical 

infrastructure, local government, and newspaper. According to Department of Labor data, 

there were about 5.6 million employer firms in the United States in 2002. The most current 

data available on the number of employers in the United States were from 2002. 

7

We interviewed officials from 9 employer and employee associations in the following 

industries: construction, agriculture, accommodation, food services, retail, health care, and 

meat. We interviewed officials from three advocacy groups that represent a range of views 

on immigration-related issues. 
Page 4 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

6 immigration experts8 to obtain their views on the Form I-9 process and 

the Basic Pilot Program. We selected the employers to interview based on 

a mix of criteria, such as the number of employers’ pilot program queries 

and geographic location. We selected the employer, employee, and 

advocacy groups to interview based on a mix of criteria, such as industry 

representation and range of views on immigration issues. In addition, we 

examined USCIS and SSA guidance, instructions, and agreements for the 

Basic Pilot Program and the results and methodology of an independent 

evaluation of the program completed by the Institute for Survey Research 

at Temple University and Westat in June 2002.9

 We analyzed data on 

employer participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program to determine 

how participation and use have changed since fiscal year 2000. We 

assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing them for accuracy and 

completeness, interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data, 

and examining documentation on how the data are entered, categorized, 

and verified in the databases. We determined that the independent 

evaluation and these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our 

review. 

To obtain information on the worksite enforcement program priorities and 

resources, we interviewed officials from ICE, the SSA Office of the 

Inspector General, the Department of Labor, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, and the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related 

Unfair Unemployment Practices. We also interviewed officials from 12 of 

the 26 ICE Special Agent in Charge field offices10 and 4 U.S. Attorney’s 

Offices11 that were located in the same areas as 4 of the field offices we 

visited. We selected the 12 field offices based on a mix of criteria, such as 

number of investigations conducted by field offices, number of 

 8

The 6 immigration experts we interviewed have a range of views on immigration-related 

issues. 

9

Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Basic Pilot Program 

Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: June 2002). 

10We met with officials from the following 8 field offices: Los Angeles and San Diego, 

California; Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; Newark, New Jersey; New York City, New 

York; and Houston and San Antonio, Texas. We spoke with officials from the following 4 

field offices over the telephone: Denver, Colorado; Miami, Florida; Buffalo, New York; and 

Seattle, Washington. 

11We met with officials from the following 3 U.S. Attorney’s Offices: the Southern District of 

New York U.S. Attorney’s Office; the Southern District of Texas U.S. Attorney’s Office; and 

the Western District of Texas U.S. Attorney’s Office. We spoke with the Southern District of 

California U.S. Attorney’s Office over the telephone. 
Page 5 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

investigators in each field office, and geographic location. We analyzed 

ICE headquarters and field office guidance, memos, and other documents 

on worksite enforcement to evaluate ICE’s priorities for and management 

of worksite enforcement efforts. In addition, we analyzed ICE data on 

worksite enforcement and assessed the data reliability by reviewing data 

for accuracy and completeness, interviewing agency officials 

knowledgeable about the data, and examining documentation on how the 

data are entered, categorized, and verified in the databases. We 

determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

our review. For more detailed information on our scope and methodology, 

see appendix II. We conducted our work from September 2004 through 

July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

The employment verification process is primarily based on employers’ 

review of their new employees’ work eligibility documents, but various 

weaknesses, such as the process’ vulnerability to fraud, have undermined 

this process. Employers certify on the Form I-9 that they have reviewed 

documents presented by their employees and that the documents appear 

genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. However, various 

studies have shown that document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) 

and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information 

belonging to others) have made it difficult for employers who want to 

comply with the employment verification process to ensure that they hire 

only authorized workers and have made it easier for unscrupulous 

employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers. The large number and 

variety of documents included in the list of acceptable documents for 

proving work eligibility have also undermined the process. We have 

previously reported on federal government efforts to reduce the number of 

acceptable work eligibility documents and make the remaining acceptable 

documents more secure. In 1997, the former INS issued an interim rule on 

reductions in the number of acceptable work eligibility documents and, in 

1998, proposed a further reduction. However, DHS has not yet finalized 

the proposal, and the 1997 interim rule remains in effect. Although 

department officials told us that the agency is currently assessing 

modifications to the list of acceptable work eligibility documents, the 

department has not established a target time frame for completing this 

assessment and issuing final regulations on the list of acceptable 

documents. In addition, the Basic Pilot Program has potential to enhance 

this process and help to significantly reduce document fraud. According to 

ICE officials, access to Basic Pilot Program information could help the 

agency better target its worksite enforcement efforts at those employers 

Results in Brief 
Page 6 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

who do not follow program requirements. If the program is expanded, 

however, several current weaknesses in the program, including its inability 

to detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data into its databases that 

may lengthen the pilot program verification process, and some employer 

noncompliance with pilot program requirements intended to protect 

employees from discriminatory practices, could become more significant 

and adversely affect a greater number of employers and employees, if not 

addressed. Additionally, USCIS officials told us that the current Basic Pilot 

Program may not be able to complete timely verifications of work 

eligibility if the number of employers using the program were to 

significantly increase, primarily because of limited program funding and 

the growth in other verification programs. These officials said that USCIS 

is planning to fund an evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program to assess, 

among other things, the program’s current costs, any improvements in 

DHS data accuracy, and employers’ compliance with program 

requirements. Although the results of this evaluation should help provide 

information on the pilot program’s weaknesses, without information on 

the feasibility and costs of addressing those weaknesses, USCIS and 

Congress cannot effectively assess possibilities for future implementation 

of the program, including increased program usage. 

Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement 

programs that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now 

under ICE, worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. 

Consistent with the DHS mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 

2001, INS and then ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly 

on identifying and removing unauthorized workers from critical 

infrastructure sites, such as airports and nuclear power plants, to help 

address vulnerabilities at those sites. We previously reported that if 

businesses at such sites were to be compromised by terrorists, this would 

pose a threat to domestic security.12 In fiscal year 1999, INS devoted about 

9 percent of its agent investigative work-years to worksite enforcement, 

and in fiscal year 2003 ICE devoted about 4 percent, although ICE has 

proposed increasing resources for worksite enforcement. The number of 

notices of intent to fine issued to employers for knowingly hiring 

unauthorized workers or improperly completing Forms I-9 and the number 

of administrative worksite arrests have also generally declined. For 

 12GAO, Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration Enforcement 

Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning Requirements, GAO-05-66 (Washington, 

D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004). 
Page 7 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

example, the number of notices of intent to fine generally decreased from 

417 in fiscal year 1999 to 3 in fiscal year 2004. ICE has attributed this 

decline to various factors including the widespread use of counterfeit 

documents that make it difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers 

knowingly hired unauthorized workers. In addition, INS and ICE have 

faced difficulties in setting and collecting fine amounts from employers 

and in detaining unauthorized workers arrested at worksites. According to 

ICE, pursuit of civil settlements with employers rather than administrative 

fines could help address some of the difficulties faced in the fines process, 

but it is too early to tell what effect, if any, use of civil settlements will 

have on worksite enforcement efforts. Furthermore, although ICE has 

identified two output measures for the worksite enforcement program, 

these measures address only two elements of the program. Without 

additional output goals and measures for the worksite enforcement 

program, ICE’s ability to effectively determine resources needed for the 

program may be hindered, especially given ICE’s limited resources and 

competing priorities for those resources. Although ICE is developing 

outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement program, until 

it finalizes these goals and measures, the agency may not be able to 

effectively evaluate the results of program efforts. 

To strengthen the current employment verification process, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security set a specific time 

frame for completing the department’s review of the Form I-9 process, 

including an assessment of the possibility of reducing the number of 

acceptable work eligibility documents, and issuing final regulations on 

changes to the Form I-9 process and an updated Form I-9. To assist 

Congress and USCIS in assessing the possibility of increased or mandatory 

use of the Basic Pilot Program, we are recommending that the Secretary of 

Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to include, in the planned 

evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an assessment of the feasibility and 

costs of addressing the Basic Pilot Program’s current weaknesses, 

including its inability to detect identity fraud, delays in entry of 

employment authorization information into databases, and employer 

noncompliance with program procedures, and resources that would be 

needed to support increased or mandatory use of the program. To help 

evaluate the results of worksite enforcement program efforts and 

determine resource levels needed for the program, we are recommending 

that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for 

ICE to establish additional output goals and measures for the worksite 

enforcement program, and set a target time frame for completing the 

assessment and development of outcome goals and measures for the 
Page 8 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

program. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS agreed with the 

recommendations. 

IRCA provided for sanctions against employers who do not follow the 

employment verification (Form I-9) process. Employers who fail to 

properly complete, retain, or present for inspection a Form I-9 may face 

civil or administrative fines ranging from $110 to $1,100 for each employee 

for whom the form was not properly completed, retained, or presented.13

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 

of 1996 limited employer liability for certain technical violations of Form 

I-9 paperwork requirements.14 According to the act, a person or entity is 

considered to have complied with the employment verification process if 

the person or entity made a good faith attempt to properly complete the 

Form I-9.15 Employers who knowingly hire or continue to employ 

unauthorized aliens may be fined from $275 to $11,000 for each employee, 

depending on whether the violation is a first or subsequent offense. 

Employers who engage in a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring or 

continuing to employ unauthorized aliens are subject to criminal penalties 

consisting of fines up to $3,000 per unauthorized employee and up to 

6 months imprisonment for the entire pattern or practice. 

ICE is primarily responsible for enforcing the employer sanction 

provisions of IRCA as well as many other immigration-related laws. ICE 

has approximately 5,000 investigative agents in 26 Office of Investigations 

field offices that are headed by special agents in charge. ICE’s Worksite 

Enforcement/Critical Infrastructure Unit oversees programs to protect 

U.S. critical infrastructure, including military, economic, industrial, and 

transportation infrastructure, and manages the agency’s worksite 

 13In 1999, the Department of Justice increased the amounts of the civil penalties from those 

established in IRCA to the current levels to reflect a ten percent adjustment for inflation. 

8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b). Under the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act 

of 1990, as amended, federal agencies are to make regular adjustments for inflation of civil 

monetary penalties that they are charged with enforcing. 28 U.S.C. 2641 note. 

148 U.S.C. 1324a(b). IIRIRA of 1996 was enacted within a larger piece of legislation, the 

Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, P.L. 104-208. 

15According to IIRIRA, a person or entity with certain Form I-9 paperwork violations 

must be informed of the violation and provided with a period of not less than 10 business 

days to correct the violations. If the person or entity does not correct the violations within 

the specified time period, the person or entity would not be considered to have made a 

good faith attempt to comply with the Form I-9 requirement. 

Background 
Page 9 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

enforcement efforts. Prior to the creation of ICE in March 2003, INS 

enforced IRCA and other immigration-related laws. 

IIRIRA required INS to operate three voluntary pilot programs to test 

electronic means for employers to verify an employee’s eligibility to work: 

the Basic Pilot Program, the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot Program, 

and the Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program. The three pilot 

programs were to test whether pilot verification procedures could improve 

the existing Form I-9 process by reducing (1) document fraud and false 

claims of U.S. citizenship, (2) discrimination against employees, 

(3) violations of civil liberties and privacy, and (4) the burden on 

employers to verify employees’ work eligibility. IIRIRA established the 

three pilot programs to be in effect for 4 years, but Congress extended 

authorization for the pilots for an additional 2 years in 2002 and for 

another 5 years in 2003.16 Congress also mandated DHS to expand the 

Basic Pilot Program to employers in all 50 states by December 2004, which 

DHS did.17 DHS terminated the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot 

Program and the Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program in 2003 

because of technical difficulties and unintended consequences, such as 

 16Basic Pilot Extension Act of 2001, P.L. 107-128 and Basic Pilot Program Extension and 

Expansion Act of 2003, P.L.108-156. 

17P.L. 108-156. IIRIRA required the INS to initially operate the Basic Pilot Program in at 

least five of the seven states with the highest estimated population of undocumented aliens 

in the United States. In 1997, INS began offering participation in the Basic Pilot Program to 

employers in California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas. In 1999, INS began offering 

participation in the Basic Pilot Program to employers in Nebraska because, at the time, INS 

was conducting an initiative in the state, called Operation Vanguard, to help the 

meatpacking and processing industry gain and maintain a legal workforce. 

Basic Pilot Program 

Employment Verification 

Process 
Page 10 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

increased fraud and discrimination, identified in evaluations of the 

programs.18

The Basic Pilot Program is a part of USCIS’s Systematic Alien Verification 

for Entitlements Program, which provides a variety of verification services 

for federal, state, and local government agencies. USCIS estimates that 

there are more than 150,000 federal, state, and local agency users that 

verify immigration status through the Systematic Alien Verification for 

Entitlements Program. In fiscal year 2004, about 2,300 employers actively 

used the Basic Pilot Program within the Systematic Alien Verification for 

Entitlements Program. 

The Basic Pilot Program provides participating employers with an 

electronic method to verify their employees’ work eligibility. Employers 

may participate voluntarily in the Basic Pilot Program but are still required 

to complete Forms I-9 for all newly hired employees in accordance with 

IRCA. After completing the forms, these employers query the pilot 

program’s automated system by entering employee information provided 

on the forms, such as name and Social Security number, into the pilot Web 

site within 3 days of the employees’ hire date. The pilot program then 

electronically matches that information against information in SSA and, if 

necessary, DHS databases to determine whether the employee is eligible 

to work, as shown in figure 1. The Basic Pilot Program electronically 

notifies employers whether their employees’ work authorization was 

 18Under the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot Program, only the status of newly hired 

employees attesting to being work-authorized noncitizens was electronically checked 

against information in INS databases. The evaluation of this pilot program identified 

several problems, including inherent discrimination against work-authorized noncitizens 

and the lack of strong safeguards against fraudulent citizenship attestions. The evaluation 

stated that individuals who attested to being citizens did not need to show documents 

proving their citizen status, and the individuals’ information was not queried through the 

pilot program. The Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program was initiated only in Iowa 

because Iowa was the sole state at the start of the pilot program issuing driver’s licenses 

and identification cards that included machine-readable information needed for completing 

the Form I-9 (e.g., name, date of birth, Social Security number). In evaluating this pilot 

program, the Institute for Survey Research and Westat found that the program had a 

number of technical and procedural problems, such as card reader difficulties in reading 

the driver’s licenses and Iowa’s no longer requiring the Social Security number as the 

driver’s license number. This change in Iowa’s requirements resulted in the inability of 

employers to use the readers on driver’s licenses without Social Security numbers. See 

Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Citizen Attestation Verification 

Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: April 2003) and Institute for Survey 

Research and Westat, Findings of the Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program 

Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: May 2003). 
Page 11 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

confirmed. Those queries that the DHS automated check cannot confirm 

the pilot refers to USCIS staff, called immigration status verifiers, who 

check employee information against information in other DHS databases. 
Page 12 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Figure 1: Basic Pilot Program Verification Process 

In cases when the pilot system cannot confirm an employee’s work 

authorization status either through the automatic check or the check by an 

immigration status verifier, the system issues the employer a tentative 

Work authorization 

not confirmed (by 

SSA’s database)

Immigration

Status Verifier reviews

Form I-9 information 

and checks other 

DHS databases

Information

 is compared 

with DHS 

database

SSA tentative nonconfirmation issued

Employee 

contests 

finding; Must visit 

SSA local 

office

Employee 

contests 

finding; Must 

call or visit 

DHS

Employee does not 

contest finding or does 

not resolve issue with 

SSA local office within 

8 days

Employee does not 

contest finding or does 

not resolve issue with 

DHS within 

8 days

Employer informs employee of the finding

DHS Tentative non-confirmation issued

Authorized

Authorized

Authorized

Authorized

Authorized

Final 

nonconfirmation

Final 

nonconfirmation 

DHS tentative nonconfirmation issued

Employer informs employee of the finding

Noncitizens

Citizens

Social Security Administration

Department of Homeland Security

Source: GAO analysis based on USCIS information.

Employer enters 

new employee

Form I-9 data

Information

 is compared with SSA

database through

DHS system
Page 13 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

nonconfirmation of the employee’s work authorization status. In this case, 

the employers must notify the affected employees of the finding, and the 

employees have the right to contest their tentative nonconfirmations 

within 8 working days by contacting SSA or USCIS to resolve any 

inaccuracies in their records.19 During this time, employers may not take 

any adverse actions against those employees, such as limiting their work 

assignments or pay. When employees do not contest their tentative 

nonconfirmations within the allotted time, the Basic Pilot Program issues 

a final nonconfirmation for the employees. Employers are required to 

either immediately terminate or notify DHS of the continued employment 

of workers who do not successfully contest the tentative nonconfirmation 

and those who the pilot program finds are not work-authorized. 

There is ongoing congressional consideration about employment 

verification and worksite enforcement efforts, and various initiatives have 

been proposed related to these issues, including possible new temporary 

worker programs. Since January 2004, the current administration has 

discussed the possibility of initiating a guest worker program in which 

foreign workers would be granted status for employment in the United 

States for a specified period of time. Similarly, some recent legislative 

proposals would provide a means for foreign workers to obtain temporary 

employment and possible permanent residency or citizenship at a later 

date. Other initiatives propose revising visa programs to increase the 

number of foreign workers legally admitted to the United States. In 

addition, legislative proposals have addressed methods for enhancing 

employment verification and worksite enforcement efforts. For example, 

one proposal would make use of the Basic Pilot Program mandatory for all 

employers, and another would increase the fine amounts for employers 

who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. These initiatives reflect 

 19In February 2005 we reported that verification services, like the Basic Pilot Program, 

provide a valuable opportunity to prevent many unintended or careless mistakes when 

hiring new workers and reporting worker earnings. In particular, we concluded that the 

Basic Pilot Program provides an option for addressing the problem of unauthorized 

workers’ earnings posted to the Earnings Suspense File, which occurs when individuals’ 

names or Social Security numbers in wage reports do not match SSA records. According to 

SSA officials, when individuals contest SSA tentative nonconfirmations, SSA can update 

the individuals’ information in the SSA database when, for example, individuals provide 

information on name changes or correct inaccurate birthdates. SSA officials said that such 

updates may help prevent wage reporting problems and the posting of individuals’ wage 

information to the Earnings Suspense File. GAO, Social Security: Better Coordination 

among Federal Agencies Could Reduce Unidentified Earnings Reports, GAO-05-154 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4, 2005). 

Recent Proposals Related 

to Employment 

Verification and Worksite 

Enforcement 
Page 14 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

differing perspectives on employment verification and worksite 

enforcement and touch on a variety of related issues, such as the number 

of foreign workers, if any, needed in the United States, the economic 

impact of illegal aliens residing in the country, and policy decisions on 

ways to address the millions of illegal aliens in the United States. 

The current employment verification process relies on employers’ review 

of work eligibility documents to determine whether employees are 

authorized to work, but the process has several weaknesses. Document 

and identity fraud have hindered employers’ efforts to reliably verify 

employees’ work eligibility under the Form I-9 process. In addition, the 

large number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work 

eligibility have undermined the process. We have previously reported on 

the need to reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents 

and to improve the integrity of the documents.20 The Basic Pilot Program, 

as a voluntary, automated verification program, offers a mechanism with 

potential to enhance the employment verification process by reducing 

document fraud. ICE officials said that access to Basic Pilot Program 

information could help the agency better target its worksite enforcement 

efforts by identifying employers who do not follow program requirements. 

However, existing weaknesses in the program, such as the inability of the 

program to detect identity fraud, delays in entering data into DHS 

databases, and some employer noncompliance with pilot program 

requirements, could become more significant and additional resources 

could be needed if employer participation in the program greatly increased 

or was made mandatory. 

In 1986, IRCA established the employment verification process based on 

employers’ review of documents presented by employees to prove identity 

and work eligibility. Under the process, employers must request that newly 

hired employees present a document or documents that confirm 

employees’ identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employees must 

attest that they are U.S. citizens, lawfully admitted permanent residents, or 

aliens authorized to work in the United States. Employers must then 

certify that they have reviewed the documents presented by their 

employees to establish identity and work eligibility and that the 

 20GAO, Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination, 

GAO/GGD-90-62, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 1990) and GAO/GGD-99-33. 

Various Weaknesses 

Have Undermined the 

Employment 

Verification Process, 

but the Basic Pilot 

Program Shows 

Potential to Enhance 

the Process 

Current Employment 

Verification Process Based 

on Employers’ Review of 

Documents 
Page 15 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. In 

making their certifications, employers are expected to judge whether the 

documents presented are obviously counterfeit. Employers are deemed in 

compliance with IRCA if they have followed the verification procedures, 

including instances when an unauthorized alien may have presented 

fraudulent documents that appeared genuine. In addition, on the Form I-9, 

employers are required to reverify the employment eligibility of individuals 

whose work authorization has expired, such as aliens with temporary 

work authorization, to determine whether the individuals are authorized to 

continue to work. 

Since the passage of IRCA in 1986, document fraud (use of counterfeit 

documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or 

information belonging to others) have made it difficult for employers who 

want to comply with IRCA to ensure that they employ only authorized 

workers through the current verification and reverification processes. In 

its 1997 report to Congress, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform 

noted that the widespread availability of false documents made it easy for 

unauthorized aliens to obtain jobs in the United States. In 1999, we 

reported that large numbers of unauthorized aliens have either 

fraudulently used valid documents that belong to others or presented 

counterfeit documents as evidence of employment eligibility.21

Furthermore, in 2004 we reported that unauthorized workers were able to 

use false documents to illegally gain entry to secure areas of critical 

infrastructure sites, such as airports, nuclear power plants, and military 

bases.22 Representatives from some of the employers and employer 

associations we interviewed for this review indicated that, in cases where 

employees present documents that employers suspect of being 

counterfeit, employers may not request that these employees present other 

documents proving their work eligibility because the employees could 

claim that employers are discriminating against them. To help protect 

against discriminatory hiring practices, such as employers requesting 

specific documents from foreign-looking or sounding employees, 

employers are prohibited under IRCA from requesting that new employees 

present specific documents from among the list of acceptable documents 

to prove their identity and work eligibility. 

 21GAO/GGD-99-33. 

22GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a Layered 

Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004). 

Document and Identity 

Fraud Have Undermined 

the Form I-9 Process 
Page 16 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Although studies suggest that the majority of employers comply with IRCA 

and try to hire only authorized workers, the studies have also noted that 

some employers knowingly hire unauthorized workers, often to exploit the 

workers’ low cost labor.23 In 1997, the U.S. Commission on Immigration 

Reform reported that the minority of employers who knowingly hired 

illegal aliens avoided sanctions by going through the motions of 

compliance while accepting false documents. Likewise, in 1999 we 

concluded that those employers who do not want to comply with IRCA 

can intentionally hire unauthorized aliens under the guise of having 

complied with the employment verification requirements by claiming that 

unauthorized workers presented false documents to obtain employment.24

The large number and variety of documents that are acceptable for 

proving work eligibility have also complicated employer verification 

efforts under IRCA. Following passage of IRCA in 1986, employees could 

present any of 29 different documents to establish their identity and/or 

work eligibility. In a 1997 interim rule, INS reduced the number of 

acceptable work eligibility documents from 29 to 27. Eight of these 

documents establish both identity and employment eligibility (e.g., U.S. 

passport or permanent resident card); 12 documents establish identity 

only (e.g., driver’s license); and 7 documents establish employment 

eligibility only (e.g., Social Security card without the legend “Not Valid for 

Employment”).25 The interim rule implemented changes to the list of 

acceptable work eligibility documents mandated by IIRIRA and was 

intended to serve as a temporary measure until INS issued final rules on 

modifications to the Form I-9. In 1998, INS proposed a further reduction in 

the number of acceptable work eligibility documents to 14 but did not 

finalize the proposed rule. 

Since the passage of IRCA, various studies have addressed the need to 

reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents to make the 

employment verification process simpler and more secure. In 1990, we 

reported that the multiplicity of work eligibility documents contributed to 

(1) employer uncertainty about how to comply with the employment 

 23There are no current reliable data available on the number or percentage of employers 

who seek to comply with IRCA and those who attempt to circumvent it. 

24GAO/GGD-99-33. 

25See appendix I for the complete list of acceptable work eligibility documents. 

Large Number and Variety 

of Acceptable Documents 

Have Hindered Employer 

Verification Efforts 
Page 17 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

verification requirements and (2) discrimination against authorized 

workers.26 A 1992 report prepared by the Senate Committee on the 

Judiciary noted that the first step to simplifying the employment 

verification process was to reduce the current list of acceptable work 

eligibility documents and make them more counterfeit-proof.27 In 1998, INS 

noted that, when IRCA was first passed, a long, inclusive list of acceptable 

work eligibility documents was allowed for the Form I-9 to help ensure 

that all persons who were eligible to work could easily meet the 

requirements, but as early as 1990, there had been evidence that some 

employers found the list confusing. In 1999 we reported that various 

studies of IRCA’s employment verification process advocated that the 

number of documents that employees can use to demonstrate employment 

eligibility should be reduced to make the employment verification process 

more secure and easier to understand.28

Additionally, some of the employers, employer associations, and 

immigration experts we interviewed for this review told us that the large 

number of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility and the fact 

that the Form I-9 has not been updated have impeded employer efforts to 

verify employment eligibility. Representatives from three employer 

associations said that member employers have expressed concerns that 

the Form I-9 has not been updated to reflect changes in the list of 

acceptable work eligibility documents, causing confusion among some 

employers regarding which documents are acceptable. In addition, among 

the 23 employers we interviewed, 5 discussed the need to update the Form 

I-9 to reflect revisions to the list of acceptable work eligibility documents. 

Two of these employers told us that they manually edit the Form I-9 to 

reflect the changes in the list of acceptable work eligibility documents. 

DHS officials told us that the department is assessing possible revisions to 

the Form I-9 process, including revisions to the number of acceptable 

work eligibility documents, but has not established a target time frame for 

 26GAO/GGD-90-62. 

27U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee 

Affairs, Options for an Improved Employment Verification System (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 23, 1992). 

28GAO/GGD-99-33. 
Page 18 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

completing this assessment.29 They said that the Handbook for Employers, 

which provides guidance for completing the Form I-9, would also need to 

be updated. In May 2005, DHS released an updated version of the Form I-9 

that changed references from INS to DHS but did not modify the list of 

acceptable work eligibility documents on the Form I-9 to reflect changes 

made to the list by the 1997 interim rule. In the absence of final regulations 

and an updated Form I-9 and handbook, employers, employees, and other 

stakeholders may not clearly understand the Form I-9 process, particularly 

which documents are acceptable for proving work eligibility. 

We have previously reported on efforts to enhance the integrity of 

acceptable work eligibility documents, which could help reduce document 

fraud and make the employment verification process more secure, 

especially if the number of acceptable documents was reduced. For 

example, in 1999 we reported that INS had taken steps to increase the 

integrity of immigration documents, such as by issuing new employment 

authorization documents with visible security features like holograms and 

by issuing permanent resident cards with digital photographs and 

fingerprint images.30 We noted that, although INS enhanced the integrity of 

its documents, unauthorized aliens could present non-INS documents, 

such as Social Security cards, to employers to prove work eligibility. In 

1998, we reported on estimates of costs associated with alternative 

proposals for SSA issuance of enhanced Social Security cards.31 We are 

currently reviewing SSA efforts to enhance the integrity of Social Security 

cards and how enhanced cards might strengthen the employment 

verification process and plan to report on these issues next year. 

In addition, we have previously reported on the possible use of biometrics 

in verification and identification processes—such as those used at U.S. 

ports of entry.32 Biometrics covers a wide range of technologies that can be 

 29In addition to developing a rule on the reduction of the number of acceptable work 

eligibility documents, DHS is also developing regulations on the electronic Form I-9, which 

employers were authorized to use beginning at the end of April 2005. See appendix III for 

more information on the electronic Form I-9. 

30GAO/GGD-99-33. 

31GAO, Social Security: Mass Issuance of Counterfeit-Resistant Cards Expensive, but 

Alternatives Exist, GAO/HEHS-98-170 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 1998). 

32GAO, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002). 

Proposals Have Been Made 

to Improve Document 

Integrity 
Page 19 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

used to verify identity by measuring and analyzing human characteristics.33

Biometrics can theoretically be very effective personal identifiers because 

the characteristics they measure are thought to be distinct to each person. 

Because they are tightly bound to an individual, biometrics are more 

reliable, cannot be forgotten, and are less easily lost, stolen, or guessed. 

While biometrics may show promise in enhancing verification and 

identification processes, we have also reported on the trade-offs for using 

biometric indicators, such as concerns regarding the protections under 

current law for biometric data, the absence of clear criteria governing data 

sharing, and infrastructure processes such as the binding of an identity to 

the biometric data. We reported that while a biometric placed on a token, 

such as a passport or visa, cannot necessarily link a person to his or her 

identity, it can reduce the potential for an individual to assume multiple 

identities. We also reported that although federal agencies are required by 

statute to provide security protections for information collected and 

maintained by or for the agency commensurate with the risk and 

magnitude of harm that would result from unauthorized disclosure, 

disruption, modification, or destruction of the information, poor 

information security is a widespread federal problem with potentially 

severe consequences. In reporting on the possible use of biometrics in 

verification and identification processes, we identified several examples of 

such risks associated with using biometric data.34

Recent laws and legislative proposals have addressed possible ways to 

enhance the integrity of documents and strengthen the employment 

verification process. The Real ID Act of 2005 mandated that states must 

meet minimum standards in developing and issuing driver’s licenses 

before federal government authorities can accept state driver’s licenses as 

identification for official purposes.35 These standards include (1) adding 

physical security features to prevent counterfeiting and tampering, 

(2) including common machine-readable technology on driver’s licenses, 

and (3) requiring driver’s license applicants to provide evidence of their 

dates of birth and Social Security numbers. The Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required SSA to form a task force to, 

among other things, establish standards for safeguarding Social Security 

 33GAO, Information Security: Challenges in Using Biometrics, GAO-03-1137T 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003). 

34GAO-03-174. 

35P.L. 109-13, 49 U.S.C. 30301 note. 
Page 20 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

cards from counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft.36 In addition to 

these laws, various legislative proposals address possible ways to make 

identity and work eligibility documents more secure and to enhance the 

employment verification process. For example, one recent proposal would 

mandate that individuals can present only machine-readable, counterfeit 

and tamper-resistant Social Security cards to obtain employment. 

According to the proposal, these machine-readable cards would allow 

employers to check employees’ work authorization status against 

information maintained in an employment eligibility database.37 These laws 

and proposals differ in the extent to which they address issues related to 

enhancing employment verification through electronic means, such as the 

availability and accessibility of machine-readable technology and the 

security and privacy of information maintained on documents and in 

databases. 

Various immigration experts have noted that the most important step that 

could be taken to reduce unlawful migration is the development of a more 

effective system for verifying work authorization. In particular, the U.S. 

Commission on Immigration Reform concluded that the most promising 

option for verifying work authorization was a computerized registry based 

on employers’ electronic verification of an employee’s Social Security 

number with records on work authorization for aliens. The Basic Pilot 

Program, which is currently available on a voluntary basis to all employers 

in the United States, operates in a similar way to the computerized registry 

recommended by the commission. Yet only a small portion—about 2,300 

 36P.L. 108-458. 

37Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 98, 109th

Cong. 

Basic Pilot Program Shows 

Promise in Enhancing 

Employment Verification, 

but Current Weaknesses 

Could Undermine 

Increased Use 

Basic Pilot Program May Help 

Employers Reliably Verify 

Work Eligibility and Decrease 

Document Fraud 
Page 21 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

in fiscal year 2004—of the approximately 5.6 million employer firms 

nationwide actively used the pilot program.38

The Basic Pilot Program assists employers in detecting document fraud by 

helping to eliminate employer guesswork as to whether information 

contained on work eligibility documents presented by employees is 

authentic or counterfeit. If newly hired employees present counterfeit 

documents containing false information, the pilot program would not 

confirm the employees’ work eligibility because the employees’ Form I-9 

information, such as a false name or Social Security number, would not 

match SSA and DHS database information when queried through the Basic 

Pilot Program. In the evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, the Institute 

for Survey Research at Temple University and Westat found that the 

program appeared to reduce unauthorized employment arising from 

employee presentation of counterfeit or altered documents containing 

false information. Twenty of the 22 employers we interviewed who 

participated in the Basic Pilot Program indicated that the program helps 

them to reliably verify newly hired employees’ work authorization status. 

ICE has no direct role in monitoring employer use of the Basic Pilot 

Program and does not have direct access to program information, which is 

maintained by USCIS. ICE officials noted that, in a few cases, they have 

requested and received pilot program data from USCIS on specific 

employers who participate in the program and are under ICE investigation. 

ICE officials told us that program data could indicate cases in which 

employers do not follow program requirements and therefore would help 

ICE better target its worksite enforcement efforts toward those employers. 

For example, the Basic Pilot Program’s confirmation of numerous queries 

of the same Social Security number could indicate that the Social Security 

 38The number of employers who actively used the program in fiscal year 2004 includes a 

small number of employers who switched between two versions of the program and, as a 

result, were counted twice as active users. USCIS is not able to easily determine which 

employers were counted twice. In addition, the approximately 2,300 employers who 

actively used the pilot program in fiscal year 2004 do not reflect the number of worksites or 

individual business establishments using the program. In 2002, the most recent year for 

which data are available, there were approximately 5.6 million firms in the United States. 

Under the Basic Pilot Program, one employer may have multiple worksites that use the 

pilot program. For example, a hotel chain could have multiple individual hotels using the 

Basic Pilot Program. This hotel chain would represent one employer using the pilot 

program. A firm is a business organization consisting of one or more domestic 

establishments in the same state and industry that were specified under common 

ownership or control. See appendix IV for data on employer participation and use of the 

Basic Pilot Program. 

ICE Sees Additional Benefit in 

Access to Basic Pilot Program 

Data 
Page 22 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

number is being used fraudulently or that an unscrupulous employer is 

knowingly hiring unauthorized workers by accepting the same Social 

Security number for multiple employees. However, USCIS officials stated 

that they have concerns about providing ICE with broader access to Basic 

Pilot Program information for the worksite enforcement program. USCIS 

officials said that, if ICE has access to pilot program information for 

worksite enforcement purposes, that access might create a disincentive 

for employers to participate in this voluntary program and could be used 

for purposes other than identifying potentially unscrupulous employers. 

These officials stated that employers may be less likely to join or 

participate in the program because the employers may believe that they 

are more likely to be targeted for a worksite enforcement investigation as 

a result of program participation. 

ICE suggested that there could be possible benefits to their worksite 

enforcement efforts if employers were required to participate in a 

mandatory automated verification program like the Basic Pilot Program. 

ICE officials said that a mandatory automated verification system could 

help ICE focus worksite enforcement efforts on employers who try to 

evade using the program. They also stated that a mandatory system like 

the pilot program could limit the ability of employers who knowingly hired 

unauthorized workers to claim that the workers presented false 

documents to obtain employment, assisting ICE agents in proving 

employer violations of IRCA. Officials from 7 of the 12 Special Agent in 

Charge field offices we interviewed suggested that a mandatory Basic Pilot 

Program could help them better target their worksite enforcement efforts. 

Although an automated verification program like the Basic Pilot Program 

has potential to enhance the employment verification process and help 

employers detect use of counterfeit documents, the program cannot 

currently help employers detect identity fraud. In 2002 we reported that, 

although not specifically or comprehensively quantifiable, the prevalence 

of identity fraud seemed to be increasing, a development that may affect 

employers’ ability to reliably verify employment eligibility.39 If an 

unauthorized worker presents valid documentation that belongs to 

another person authorized to work, the Basic Pilot Program may find the 

worker to be work-authorized. Similarly, if an employee presents 

counterfeit documentation that contains valid information and appears 

 39GAO, Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to Be Growing, GAO-02-363 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2002). 

Basic Pilot Program Does Not 

Help Employers Detect Identity 

Fraud in Verifying Employees’ 

Work Eligibility 
Page 23 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

authentic, the Basic Pilot Program may verify the employee as workauthorized. DHS officials told us that the department is currently 

considering possible ways to enhance the Basic Pilot Program to help it 

detect cases of identity fraud, for example, by modifying the program to 

provide a digitized photograph associated with employment authorization 

information presented by an employee. Yet, DHS cannot fully assess 

possible ways to modify the Basic Pilot Program to address identity fraud 

in the absence of data on the costs and feasibility of implementing such 

modifications. 

In addition, the Basic Pilot Program does not assist employers in verifying 

the work authorization status of employees whose status requires 

reverification and therefore does not help employers detect document or 

identity fraud in the reverification process. Employers currently may not 

use the Basic Pilot Program to re-verify the employment eligibility of 

individuals whose work authorization has expired, and employers agree 

not to use the pilot program for reverification when registering to 

participate in the program. Therefore, participating employers cannot fully 

use the Basic Pilot Program to verify the work authorization status of all 

employees for whom verification, including reverification, is required 

under the Form I-9 process. According to one USCIS official, the pilot 

program does not face any technological or other limitations that would 

prevent the program from being used for reverification purposes, if such 

use was required or allowed as part of the pilot program. 

Another current weakness in the Basic Pilot Program that could affect the 

program’s success if use increased or was made mandatory is delays in the 

entry of information on immigrants’ and nonimmigrants’ arrivals and 

employment authorization into DHS databases. Although the majority of 

pilot program queries entered by participating employers are confirmed 

via the automated SSA and DHS verification checks, about 15 percent of 

queries authorized by DHS required manual verification by immigration 

status verifiers in fiscal year 2004.40 According to USCIS, immigration 

status verifiers typically resolve cases referred to them for verification 

within 24 hours, but a small number of cases take longer. For example, 

nine employers we interviewed reported that a small number of 

 40In fiscal year 2004, about 10 percent of total Basic Pilot Program queries were referred to 

DHS for verification. Of these queries referred to DHS for verification, about 85 percent 

were confirmed via the DHS automated check. 

Delays in Data Entry May 

Lengthen the Pilot Program 

Verification Process 
Page 24 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

immigration status verifier verifications took longer than 24 hours to 

resolve, with a few verifications taking as long as 2 weeks to resolve. 

Immigration status verifiers reported that the primary reason for queries to 

require verification by them is because of delays in entry of employment 

authorization information into DHS databases. USCIS officials told us that 

those verifications that take longer than a few days to resolve are generally 

caused by delays in the entry of data on employees who received 

employment authorization documents generated by a computer and 

camera that are not directly linked to DHS databases, such as those used 

at ports of entry for refugees and at USCIS field offices. They said that 

information on the employment authorization documents generated 

through this process is electronically sent to USCIS headquarters for entry 

but is sometimes lost or not entered into databases in a timely manner. By 

contrast, employment authorization documents issued at USCIS service 

centers are produced via computers that are used to update data in USCIS 

databases, which USCIS officials told us represent the majority of 

employment authorization documents currently issued by USCIS. The 

Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat found that 

verifications that require immigration status verifiers’ review lengthen the 

time needed to complete the employment verification process. In addition, 

among the 22 employers we interviewed, 7 reported that they may 

experience some losses in work time, training, or money for background 

checks and physicals when employees contest tentative nonconfirmations. 

USCIS has taken steps to increase the timeliness and accuracy of 

information entered into databases used as part of the Basic Pilot 

Program. In June 2004, USCIS reported that, among other improvements, it 

had started work to expedite data entry for new lawful permanent 

residents and arriving nonimmigrants and to improve data entry for 

changes in work authorization status.41 For example, USCIS said that it has 

worked to reduce the time in which data are available for Basic Pilot 

Program verifications by expediting submission of data on newly arrived 

immigrants and nonimmigrants from ports of entry and field offices to 

USCIS service centers for data entry. The agency reported that, as a result 

of its efforts, data on new immigrants are now typically available for 

verification within 10 to 12 days of an immigrant’s arrival in the United 

States while previously, the information was not available for up to 6 to 

9 months after arrival. Moreover, USCIS reported it has worked to 

 41DHS, Report to Congress on the Basic Pilot Program (Washington, D.C.: June 2004). 
Page 25 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

increase the timeliness and availability of temporary work authorization 

information in its databases by increasing the number of employment 

authorization documents issued by service centers as compared with the 

number of documents issued through computers not directly linked to 

DHS databases. The department reported that, while in 1999 less than half 

of all employment authorization documents were issued by service 

centers, over three-quarters of the cards are now issued through service 

centers. USCIS officials told us that the agency has continued these efforts 

to improve the timeliness and accuracy of information entered into DHS 

databases and noted that the agency is currently planning to fund another 

evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program that will include a review of the 

accuracy of DHS database information. 

Furthermore, analysis of the Basic Pilot Program database indicates that 

the timeliness and accuracy of the DHS automated checks against the 

Basic Pilot Program database have improved. In fiscal year 2004, about 

10 percent of all queries were referred to DHS for verification. Among 

those queries authorized by DHS, the percentage of queries verified by the 

DHS automated check increased from about 67 percent in fiscal year 2000 

to about 85 percent in fiscal year 2004, as shown in figure 2. 
Page 26 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Figure 2: Number of Queries Authorized by DHS through the Automated Check and 

the Immigration Status Verifier Check 

Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest hundred. 

Although USCIS has taken some steps to improve the timeliness and 

accuracy of information entered into databases used as part of the Basic 

Pilot Program and plans to review the accuracy of database information as 

part of its planned evaluation of the pilot program, USCIS cannot 

effectively assess future use of the pilot program, including possible 

increased program usage, without information on the costs and feasibility 

of ways to further reduce delays in the entry of information into DHS 

databases. 

Another factor that may reduce the effectiveness of the pilot program if 

usage is increased or made mandatory is employer noncompliance with 

Basic Pilot Program requirements. These requirements are intended to 

safeguard employees queried through the program from such harm as 

discrimination or reduced training and pay. The Temple University 

Employer Noncompliance with 

Pilot Program Procedures May 

Adversely Affect Employees 

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

33,300

2000

Fiscal year

2001 2002 2003 2004

33,100

30,500

40,600

47,900

16,200 16,400

13,600

9,200

8,700

Employment authorizations issued by DHS immigration status verifier review

Number of queries

Employment authorizations issued by DHS automated check

Source: GAO analysis of USCIS data. 
Page 27 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Institute for Survey Research and Westat evaluation of the Basic Pilot 

Program concluded that the majority of employers surveyed appeared to 

be in compliance with Basic Pilot Program procedures. However, the 

evaluation found evidence of some noncompliance with these procedures 

that specifically prohibit screening job applicants and taking actions that 

adversely affect employees while they are contesting tentative 

nonconfirmations, such as limiting employees’ work assignments or pay. 

For example, 30 percent of the employers surveyed for the evaluation 

reported restricting work assignments while employees contested 

tentative nonconfirmations, a practice that is prohibited under the Basic 

Pilot Program. Of the 22 employers we interviewed who participate in the 

pilot, 7 reported using the Basic Pilot Program in a way that did not 

conform with pilot program procedures, including using the pilot program 

to screen job applicants before offering jobs to the applicants. 

The Basic Pilot Program provides a variety of reports that may help USCIS 

determine whether employers follow program requirements. For example, 

these reports could help USCIS identify employers who do not appear to 

refer employees contesting tentative nonconfirmations to SSA or DHS, 

which is required under pilot program procedures. USCIS could then 

follow up to determine if such employers are following pilot procedures 

that require employers to refer all employees with tentative 

nonconfirmations to SSA or DHS. USCIS officials told us that efforts to 

review employers’ use of the pilot program have been limited by lack of 

staff available to oversee and examine employer use of the program, and 

they noted that there are currently 15 USCIS headquarters staff members 

responsible for administering USCIS verification programs, including the 

Basic Pilot Program. The officials said that, as part of the next evaluation 

of the pilot program, USCIS plans to assess the extent to which employers 

follow pilot program requirements and procedures, such as employer 

adherence to requirements to notify employees of tentative 

nonconfirmations. However, without information on the costs and 

feasibility of routinely reviewing employers’ use of the pilot program, 

USCIS cannot fully determine possible ways to regularly examine 

employer use of the program and therefore the extent to which employers 

comply with pilot program requirements. 

According to USCIS officials, due to the growth in other USCIS 

verification programs, current USCIS staff may not be able to complete 

timely verifications if the number of employers using the Basic Pilot 

Program were to significantly increase. In particular, these officials said 

that if a significant number of new employers registered for the program 

or if the program were mandatory for all employers or a segment of 

Current Program May Not 

Complete Timely Verifications 

if Use Greatly Increased 
Page 28 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

employers, additional resources would be needed to maintain timely 

verifications, given the growth in other verification programs. For 

example, the REAL ID Act of 200542 mandated that states must meet 

minimum standards in issuing driver’s licenses and nondriver 

identification cards, including verifying the immigration status of all 

noncitizen applicants, before federal government authorities can accept 

the licenses and cards for official purposes beginning in 2008. Currently, 

USCIS has approximately 38 immigration status verifiers available for 

completing Basic Pilot Program verifications, and these verifiers reported 

that they are able to complete the majority of current required checks 

within their target time frame of 24 hours.43 However, USCIS officials said 

that because of the growth in other verification programs that would 

increase the number of verifications that require checks by immigration 

status verifiers, the agency has serious concerns about its ability to 

complete timely verifications if the number of Basic Pilot Program users 

greatly increased. 

USCIS officials also stated that the agency lacks funding to further expand 

the Basic Pilot Program. The Basic Pilot Program and other verification 

programs have been funded by fees USCIS receives from applicants for 

adjudication of immigration and citizenship benefits. USCIS allocated 

about $3.5 million from its fee accounts for all of its verification programs, 

including the Basic Pilot Program, in fiscal year 2005.44 USCIS officials said 

that this allocation included a $500,000 increase for additional employee 

verifications by employers using the Basic Pilot Program. However, these 

officials told us that current funding levels allocated for USCIS verification 

programs would not be sufficient to cover costs associated with 

mandatory use of the Basic Pilot Program for all employers, should this be 

adopted. In 2004, we reported that USCIS fees were not sufficient to fully 

 42P.L. 109-13, codified at 49 U.S.C. 30301. 

43Other immigration status verifiers are dedicated to completing manual verifications for 

other USCIS verification programs. 

44According to USCIS, in fiscal year 2005, the agency allocated about $475,000 to reimburse 

SSA for Basic Pilot Program query costs and about $337,500 for employer query costs. In 

addition, USCIS estimated about $7 million in annual costs for verifications by immigration 

status verifiers. 
Page 29 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

fund the agency’s operations but noted that cost data were insufficient to 

determine the full extent of the funding shortfall.45

The Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat estimated 

a range of costs associated with expanding the dial-up version of the pilot 

program,46 including costs for making the program mandatory for a 

selected group of employers, like employers with more than 10 employees, 

and making the program mandatory for all employers, regardless of the 

number of employees. The report estimated that a mandatory dial-up 

version of the pilot program for all employers would cost the federal 

government, employers, and employees about $11.7 billion total per year, 

with employers bearing most of the costs.47 USCIS has worked with 

participating employers to switch them to the Web-based version of the 

program and discontinued the dial-up version in June 2005. The Temple 

University Institute for Survey Research and Westat did not estimate costs 

for a mandatory Web-based version, although they noted that operating 

costs associated with such a program would be less than for the dial-up 

version because employer computer maintenance and telephone costs 

would be lower. As part of the next evaluation of the pilot program, USCIS 

plans to assess the costs and potential time frames associated with making 

the Web-based version mandatory for all employers or specific segments 

of employers. Given the growth in other USCIS verification programs, 

USCIS cannot effectively assess potential costs for making the Web-based 

version of the Basic Pilot Program mandatory without information on 

other possible resources needed for the program, such as staff needed for 

conducting manual verifications. 

 45GAO, Immigration Application Fees: Current Fees Are Not Sufficient to Fund U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Operations, GAO-04-309R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 

5, 2004). In April 2004, USCIS raised its fees for immigration benefit applications. 

46Under the dial-up version of the Basic Pilot Program, employers installed pilot program 

software directly onto a computer and used a dedicated telephone line to access the pilot 

system. 

47The Institute for Survey Research and Westat estimated that the contractor who runs the 

Basic Pilot Program charged $0.28 per query. They estimated that it cost about $6 to 

resolve each query that required review by immigration status verifiers. 
Page 30 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

The worksite enforcement program is one of various ICE immigration 

enforcement programs, and has been a relatively low priority. Since fiscal 

year 1999, the number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers for 

violations of IRCA and the number of administrative worksite arrests have 

declined, which, according to ICE, are due to various factors, such as the 

widespread use of counterfeit documents that make it difficult for ICE 

agents to prove employer violations. INS and ICE have also faced 

difficulties in setting and collecting meaningful fine amounts and in 

detaining unauthorized workers arrested at worksites. In addition, ICE has 

not yet developed outcome goals and measures for the worksite 

enforcement program, making it difficult for ICE and Congress to assess 

program performance and determine resource levels for the program. 

Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement 

programs formerly managed by INS and now managed by ICE, and 

competes for resources with these other program areas, such as alien 

smuggling and fraud. Among INS and ICE responsibilities, worksite 

enforcement has been a relatively low priority. For example, in the 1999 

INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, the strategy to block and remove 

employers’ access to undocumented workers was the fifth of five interior 

enforcement priorities.48 In this same year, we reported that, relative to 

other enforcement programs in INS, worksite enforcement received a 

small portion of INS’s staffing and enforcement budget. We noted that the 

number of employer investigations INS was able to conduct each year 

covered only a fraction of the estimated number of employers who may 

have hired unauthorized aliens.49

In keeping with the primary mission of DHS to combat terrorism, after 

September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused investigative resources 

primarily on national security cases, such as investigations of aliens in the 

United States who may have overstayed their authorized time periods for 

being in the country and the National Security Entry and Exit Registration 

System; on participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces;50 and on critical 

 48INS, Interior Enforcement Strategy (Washington, D.C.: January 1999). 

49GAO/GGD-99-33. 

50The National Security Entry and Exit Registration System domestic registration required 

selected groups of aliens from a number of countries to register with immigration 

authorities between November 2002 and April 2003. Joint Terrorism Task Forces are multiagency investigative teams composed of federal, state, and local agencies that work jointly 

with other nonmember agencies to investigate terrorism matters. 

Competing Priorities 

and Lack of Outcome 

Goals and Measures 

May Hinder Worksite 

Enforcement Efforts 

Worksite Enforcement Has 

Been a Relatively Low 

Priority for ICE, but ICE 

Has Proposed Additional 

Resources for the Program 
Page 31 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

infrastructure protection. In particular, INS and then ICE focused available 

resources for worksite enforcement mainly on identifying and removing 

unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites, such as airports 

and nuclear power plants, to help reduce vulnerabilities at those sites. In 

2004, we reported that, if critical infrastructure-related businesses were to 

be compromised by terrorists, this would pose a serious threat to domestic 

security.51 In 2003, we testified that, given ICE’s limited resources, it needs 

to ensure that it targets those industries where employment of illegal 

aliens poses the greatest potential risk to national security.52 According to 

ICE officials, the agency adopted this focus on critical infrastructure 

protection because the fact that unauthorized workers can obtain 

employment at critical infrastructure sites indicates that there are 

vulnerabilities in those sites’ hiring and screening practices, and 

unauthorized workers employed at those sites are vulnerable to 

exploitation by terrorists, smugglers, traffickers, or other criminals. 

Consistent with these priorities, in 2003 ICE headquarters issued a memo 

requiring field offices to request approval from ICE headquarters prior to 

opening any worksite enforcement investigation not related to the 

protection of critical infrastructure sites, such as investigations of farms 

and restaurants. ICE officials told us that the purpose of this memo was to 

help ensure that field offices focused worksite enforcement efforts on 

critical infrastructure protection operations. Field office representatives 

told us that noncritical infrastructure worksite enforcement was one of the 

few investigative areas for which offices had to request approval from ICE 

headquarters to open an investigation. According to ICE, the agency 

recently issued a memo delegating authority to approve noncritical 

infrastructure worksite enforcement cases to field offices’ Special Agents 

in Charge. Eight of the 12 offices we interviewed told us that worksite 

enforcement was not an office priority unless the worksite enforcement 

case related to critical infrastructure protection. ICE has inspected Forms 

I-9 and employer records at hundreds of critical infrastructure sites as of 

March 2005. For example, as part of Operation Tarmac, ICE conducted 

investigations at nearly 200 airports nationwide and, as part of Operation 

Glow Worm, conducted investigations at more than 50 nuclear power 

 51GAO-05-66. 

52GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges to Implementing the Immigration Interior 

Enforcement Strategy, GAO-03-660T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2003). 
Page 32 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

plants as of March 2005.53 Between October 2004 and the beginning of May 

2005, about 77 percent of the worksite enforcement cases opened by ICE 

were related to critical infrastructure protection.54

Since fiscal year 1999, INS and ICE have dedicated a relatively small 

portion of overall agent resources to the worksite enforcement program. 

As shown in figure 3, in fiscal year 1999, INS allocated about 240 full-time 

equivalents to worksite enforcement efforts, while in fiscal year 2003, ICE 

allocated about 90 full-time equivalents.55 Between fiscal years 1999 and 

2003, the percentage of agent work-years spent on worksite enforcement 

efforts generally decreased from about 9 percent to about 4 percent. 

 53Operations Tarmac and Glow Worm were ICE initiatives to detect and remove 

unauthorized workers from airports and nuclear power plants, respectively. 

54Data are not available on the number of critical infrastructure and noncritical 

infrastructure worksite enforcement cases ICE opened prior to fiscal year 2005 because 

before fiscal year 2005, ICE’s case management system did not distinguish between the two 

case types. 

55One full-time equivalent is equal to one work-year or 2,080 nonovertime hours. 
Page 33 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Figure 3: Investigative Agent Work-years Spent on Worksite Enforcement Efforts 

and Agent Work-years Spent on Other Investigative Areas for Each Fiscal Year from 

1999 through 2003 

Although worksite enforcement may remain a low priority relative to other 

programs, ICE has proposed increasing agent resources for the worksite 

enforcement program by adding staff to its headquarters’ worksite 

enforcement unit,56 which was comprised of three staff members as of July 

2005, and hiring additional worksite enforcement staff for field offices. In 

particular, ICE plans to use the $5 million provided for fiscal year 2005 by 

a congressional conference report for the worksite enforcement program 

to fund additional headquarters positions for the worksite enforcement 

unit.57 In its fiscal year 2006 budget submission, ICE requested funding for 

117 compliance officers, 20 additional investigative agents, and 

 56ICE headquarters’ worksite enforcement unit is responsible for managing the agency’s 

worksite enforcement program. 

57H.R. Conf. Rep. 108-774 (2004) accompanying the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-334. 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

240

2,499

176

2,472

117

2,341

132

2,290

90

2,430

Work-years

Work-years for worksite enforcement

Work-years for all other investigative areas

Source: GAO analysis of INS case management data.

Fiscal year
Page 34 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

6 additional program managers for worksite enforcement. ICE has 

proposed hiring these compliance officers to conduct the administrative 

elements of worksite enforcement cases, such as the inspection of Forms 

I-9 and other employment records. ICE officials said that these officers 

would pass cases involving potential criminal violations to investigative 

agents for review. ICE officials told us that the agency would use the 

compliance officers only for worksite enforcement efforts. According to 

ICE, compliance enforcement officers are less costly than investigative 

agents. ICE estimates that each investigative agent would cost the agency 

approximately $167,000 to $176,000 in fiscal year 2006, while one 

compliance enforcement officer would cost about $76,000. At this point, it 

is unclear what impact, if any, these additional resources would have on 

worksite enforcement efforts. 

The number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers as well as the 

number of unauthorized workers arrested at worksites have generally 

declined. Between fiscal years 1999 and 2004, the number of notices of 

intent to fine issued to employers for improperly completing Forms I-9 or 

knowingly hiring unauthorized workers generally decreased from 

417 to 3.58 (See figure 4.) 

 58ICE worksite enforcement investigations can span several fiscal years. For example, ICE 

can open an investigation in one fiscal year, but may not complete the case, including 

issuing a notice of intent to fine, if warranted, for several fiscal years. In addition, after ICE 

issues a notice of intent to fine, employers may negotiate with ICE attorneys to set a final 

amount for the fine. Therefore, ICE could issue a notice of intent to fine in one fiscal year, 

but not issue the final order for the fine until the following fiscal year. 

ICE Attributes Decline in 

Numbers of Employer Fine 

Notices and Worksite 

Arrests to Document 

Fraud and Resource 

Allocation Decisions 
Page 35 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Figure 4: Number of Notices of Intent to Fine Issued to Employers for Each Fiscal 

Year from 1999 through 2004 

The number of unauthorized workers arrested during worksite 

enforcement operations has also declined since fiscal year 1999. As shown 

in figure 5, the number of administrative worksite arrests declined by 

about 84 percent from 2,849 in fiscal year 1999 to 445 in fiscal year 2003. 
Page 36 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Figure 5: Number of Worksite Enforcement Arrests for Each Fiscal Year from 1999 

through 2003 

According to ICE records, worksite enforcement criminal arrests totaled 

159 in fiscal year 2004 and 81 in the period from October 2004 through 

April 2005.59

ICE attributes the decline in the number of notices of intent to fine issued 

to employers and number of administrative worksite arrests to various 

factors including the widespread availability and use of counterfeit 

 59These data on worksite enforcement criminal arrests for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 do not 

include data on the number of worksite enforcement administrative arrests for those fiscal 

years. Fiscal year 2004 and 2005 data cannot be compared with data for previous fiscal 

years because the way INS agents entered data on investigative work-years into the INS 

case management system differs from the way ICE agents enter such data into the ICE 

system. Following the creation of ICE in March 2003, the case management system used to 

enter and maintain information on immigration investigations changed. With the 

establishment of ICE, agents began using the legacy U.S. Customs Service’s case 

management system, called the Treasury Enforcement Communications System, for 

entering and maintaining information on investigations, including worksite enforcement 

operations. Prior to the creation of ICE, the former INS entered and maintained 

information on investigative activities in the Performance Analysis System, which captured 

information on immigration investigations differently than the Treasury Enforcement 

Communications System. 
Page 37 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

documents and the allocation of resources to other priorities. Various 

studies have shown that the availability and use of fraudulent documents 

have made it difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers knowingly 

hire unauthorized workers. For example, in previous work we reported 

that the prevalence of document fraud made it difficult for INS to prove 

that an employer knowingly hired an unauthorized alien.60 In 1996, the 

Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General reported that the 

proliferation of cheap fraudulent documents made it possible for the 

unscrupulous employer to avoid being held accountable for hiring illegal 

aliens.61 ICE officials told us that employers who agents suspect of 

knowingly hiring unauthorized workers can claim that they were unaware 

that their workers presented false documents at the time of hire, making it 

difficult for agents to prove that the employer willfully violated IRCA. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, ICE also noted that the IIRIRA 

provision that limited employer liability for certain Form I-9 paperwork 

violations affects ICE’s ability to substantiate employer charges for 

knowingly hiring unauthorized workers and, therefore, the number of 

notices of intent to fine that ICE issues. This provision came into effect in 

1996, so it is unclear what effect, if any, the provision had on the decline in 

the number of notices of intent to fine issued between fiscal years 1999 

and 2004. 

In addition, according to ICE, the allocation of INS and ICE resources to 

other priorities has contributed to the decline in the numbers of notices of 

intent to fine and worksite arrests. For example, INS focused its worksite 

enforcement resources on egregious employer violators who were linked 

to other criminal violations like smuggling, fraud, or worker exploitation, 

and de-emphasized administrative employer cases and fines. Furthermore, 

INS investigative resources were redirected from worksite enforcement 

activities to criminal alien cases, which consumed more investigative 

hours by the late 1990s than any other enforcement activity. After 

September 11, 2001, INS and ICE focused investigative resources on 

national security cases and, in particular, focused worksite enforcement 

efforts on critical infrastructure protection, which is consistent with DHS’s 

primary mission to combat terrorism. According to ICE, the redirection of 

 60GAO/GGD-99-33 and GAO, Identity Fraud: Prevalence and Links to Alien Illegal 

Activities, GAO-02-830T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002). 

61Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Immigration and Naturalization 

Service Efforts to Combat Harboring and Employing Illegal Aliens in Sweatshops, I-96-08 

(Washington, D.C.: May 1996). 
Page 38 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

resources from other enforcement programs to perform national securityrelated investigations resulted in fewer resources for traditional program 

areas like fraud and noncritical infrastructure worksite enforcement. 

Additionally, some ICE field representatives, as well as immigration 

experts we interviewed, noted that the focus on critical infrastructure 

protection does not address the majority of worksites in industries that 

have traditionally provided the magnet of jobs attracting illegal aliens to 

the United States. 

INS and ICE have faced difficulties in setting and collecting final fine 

amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring 

unauthorized workers and in detaining unauthorized workers arrested at 

worksites. ICE officials told us that because fine amounts are so low, the 

fines do not provide a meaningful deterrent. These officials also said that 

when agents could prove that an employer knowingly hired an 

unauthorized worker and issued a notice of intent to fine, the fine amounts 

agents recommended were often negotiated down in value during 

discussions between agency attorneys and employers. The amount of 

mitigated fines may be, in the opinion of some ICE officials, so low that 

they believe that employers view the fines as a cost of doing business, 

making the fines an ineffective deterrent for employers who attempt to 

circumvent IRCA. ICE officials at 11 of the 12 field offices at which we 

interviewed staff said that they experienced instances in which fine 

amounts were mitigated down in value. According to ICE, the agency 

mitigates employer fine amounts because doing so may be a more efficient 

use of government resources than pursuing employers who contest or 

ignore fines, which could be more costly to the government than the fine 

amount sought. Recently, ICE settled a worksite enforcement case with a 

large company without going through the administrative fine process. As 

part of the settlement, the company agreed to pay $11 million and 

company contractors agreed to pay $4 million in forfeitures—more than 

any administrative fine amount ever issued against an employer for IRCA 

violations, according to ICE. 

One ICE official said that use of such civil settlements instead of pursuit of 

administrative fines, specifically in regard to investigations of noncritical 

infrastructure employers, could be a more efficient use of investigative 

resources. ICE officials also said that use of civil settlements could help 

ensure employers’ future compliance by including in the settlements a 

requirement to enter into compliance agreements, such as the Basic Pilot 

Program. ICE recently employed this strategy in its $15 million settlement 

with the large company. As part of the settlement, the company agreed to 

INS and ICE Have Faced 

Difficulties in Setting Fine 

Amounts and in Detaining 

Unauthorized Workers, but 

Have Taken Steps to 

Address Difficulties 
Page 39 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

enter into a compliance program with ICE. Other compliance agreements 

with employers could involve mandatory participation in the Basic Pilot 

Program. Additionally, ICE officials said that the agency has proposed 

working with employers who are not the subjects of worksite enforcement 

investigations to help them ensure compliance with IRCA through 

enhanced education and partnerships. In April 2005, ICE issued its interim 

strategic plan, which, as part of its objective on identifying critical 

industries for worksite enforcement operations, included an approach for 

partnering with businesses to help them comply with IRCA.62 This 

partnership program, called the ICE Mutual Agreement between 

Government and Employers, is intended to provide employers with 

training and best practices for complying with IRCA. In addition to 

implementing this partnership program, ICE plans to promote expanded 

use of the Basic Pilot Program to help encourage employers in critical 

industries to strengthen their ability to verify employees’ work eligibility. 

The practice of civil settlements with employers and joint compliance 

programs are in the early stages of implementation; therefore the extent to 

which they may address the difficulties faced in setting fine amounts that 

provide a meaningful deterrent is not yet known. 

The former INS also faced difficulties in collecting total fine amounts from 

employers, but collection efforts have improved. We previously reported 

that the former INS faced difficulties in collecting total fine amounts from 

employers for a number of reasons including that employers went out of 

business, moved, or declared bankruptcy.63 In 1996, the Department of 

Justice Office of the Inspector General reported that the deterrent effect of 

civil fines on sweatshop operators was adversely affected by collection 

difficulties and noted that INS had no national system for billing, tracking, 

and collecting employer fines. In 1998, INS created the Debt Management 

Center to centralize the collections process, and the center is now 

responsible for collecting fines ICE issued against employers for violations 

of IRCA and providing other collection services for ICE and USCIS. The 

 62ICE’s objective for identifying critical industries for worksite enforcement operations 

included the following five elements: (1) identify and remove unauthorized workers from 

critical industries; (2) implement and expand an ICE-employer partnership program to 

enhance employer compliance, training, and information sharing; (3) investigate criminal 

employers linked to smuggling, trafficking, worker exploitation, and other criminal 

violations; (4) revitalize employer sanctions to provide financial deterrence; and 

(5) promote use of employment eligibility verification technology, like the Basic Pilot 

Program. See ICE, Interim Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: April 2005). 

63GAO/GGD-99-33. 
Page 40 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

ICE Debt Management Center has collected total amounts on most of the 

invoices issued to employers for final fine amounts between fiscal years 

1999 and 2004—about 94 percent as of the end of June 2005.64

In addition, ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal has limited detention 

space, and unauthorized workers detained during worksite enforcement 

investigations are a low priority for that space.65 In 2004, the Under 

Secretary for Border and Transportation Security sent a memo to the 

Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Assistant 

Secretary for ICE outlining the priorities for the detention of aliens. 

According to this memo, aliens who are subjects of national security 

investigations were among those groups of aliens given the highest priority 

for detention, while aliens arrested as a result of worksite enforcement 

investigations were among those groups of aliens given the lowest priority. 

Officials in 8 of the 12 field offices we interviewed told us that lack of 

sufficient detention space has limited the effectiveness of worksite 

enforcement efforts. For example, ICE officials stated that if investigative 

agents arrest unauthorized aliens at worksites, the aliens would likely be 

released because the Office of Detention and Removal detention centers 

do not have sufficient space to house the aliens. Field office 

representatives said that offices can expend a large amount of resources 

to arrest unauthorized aliens at worksites and that these aliens would 

likely be released and may re-enter the workforce, in some cases returning 

to the worksites from where they were originally arrested. As a result, the 

use of resources to arrest unauthorized aliens at worksites may be 

unproductive. A congressional conference report for fiscal year 2005 

provided funds to the Office of Detention and Removal for an additional 

1,950 bed spaces.66 Given competing priorities for detention space, the 

effect, if any, these additional bed spaces will have on ICE’s priority given 

to workers detained as a result of worksite enforcement operations cannot 

currently be determined. 

 64The Debt Management Center issues invoices to employers for collecting fine amounts. 

According to ICE, multiple invoices can be issued for each final order for an employer fine, 

as a payment plan is typically established for employers as part of the final order for the 

fine amount. 

65The Office of Detention and Removal is primarily responsible for identifying and 

removing criminal aliens from the United States. The office is also responsible for 

managing ICE’s space for detaining aliens. 

66H.R. Con. Rep. 109-72 (2005) accompanying the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 

Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13. 
Page 41 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Given ICE’s limited resources and competing priorities for those 

resources, ICE’s lack of performance goals and measures for the worksite 

enforcement program may hinder the agency’s ability to effectively 

determine and allocate resources for the program. Performance goals and 

measures are intended to provide Congress and agency management with 

the information to systematically assess a program’s strengths, 

weaknesses, and performance. A performance goal is the target level of 

performance—either output or outcome—expressed as a tangible, 

measurable objective against which actual achievement will be compared. 

A performance measure can be defined as an indicator, statistic, or metric 

used to gauge program performance and may typically include outputs and 

outcomes. Outputs provide status information about an initiative or 

program in terms of completing an action in a specified time frame. 

Outcomes show results or outcomes related to an initiative or program in 

terms of its effectiveness, efficiency, or impact. Outputs should support or 

lead to outcomes and, for each outcome goal, there are typically several 

output goals. Outputs and outcomes together help agencies determine and 

report on products or services provided through a program and the results 

of those products or services. 

ICE lacks output goals and measures necessary to inform its resource 

allocation decisions. Output goals and measures are an essential 

management tool in managing programs for results. They help provide the 

information that agencies need to aid in determining resources for a 

program and whether they are using program resources efficiently and 

effectively. ICE officials told us that the agency does not plan to focus on 

developing and using output goals and measures for worksite 

enforcement, such as the number of cases initiated or number of worksite 

arrests made, because they believe that such goals and measures do not 

adequately indicate ICE’s level of effort for worksite enforcement. 

Therefore, the ICE officials said that ICE plans to focus on developing 

outcome goals and measures for the program that better reflect the 

program’s effect. Yet in its fiscal year 2006 budget request, ICE identified 

two output measures for its worksite enforcement program: a 20 percent 

increase in the number of administrative worksite case completions and 

criminal employer case presentations made to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 

fiscal year 2007 and a 30 percent increase in these two indicators in fiscal 

year 2008. Although these two measures would provide a general 

indication of ICE’s level of worksite enforcement activity, these measures 

alone would not allow ICE or Congress to effectively determine resources 

needed for the worksite enforcement program because these indicators 

address only two elements of the worksite enforcement program and do 

not address other program elements, such as critical infrastructure 

ICE Has Not Yet 

Developed Outcome Goals 

and Measures for Worksite 

Enforcement 
Page 42 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

protection. Furthermore, in July 2005 the Secretary of Homeland Security 

discussed the need for DHS, of which ICE is a part, to be an effective 

steward of its resources. Without additional output goals and measures for 

worksite enforcement, ICE’s ability to effectively determine and allocate 

worksite enforcement resources needed to meet program goals, especially 

given other agency priorities for resources, and to fully assess whether the 

agency is using those resources effectively and efficiently in implementing 

the program may be hindered. 

In addition, ICE lacks outcome goals and measures that may hinder its 

ability to effectively assess the results of its worksite enforcement 

program efforts, including critical infrastructure protection efforts. 

Outcome measures provide agencies with an assessment of the results of a 

program activity or policy compared to its intended purposes. ICE officials 

told us that the agency plans to develop outcome goals and measures for 

its worksite enforcement program, but it has not yet developed these goals 

and measures. As a first step, ICE officials told us that field offices 

conducted baseline threat-level assessments in August and September 

2004 to help identify regional risks, such as risks to critical infrastructure 

sites. These officials stated that an action plan will be developed to 

address these risks. Field office agents will then measure how well a 

particular threat has been addressed by measuring the impact of ICE’s 

investigative activities on deterring threats or decreasing vulnerabilities to 

national security. ICE has not yet established target time frames for 

developing worksite enforcement program outcome goals and measures 

and, without these goals and measures, ICE may not be able to effectively 

assess the results of program efforts. For example, until ICE fully develops 

outcome goals and measures, it may not be able to completely determine 

the extent to which its critical infrastructure protection efforts have 

resulted in the elimination of unauthorized workers’ access to secure areas 

of critical infrastructure sites, one possible goal that ICE may use for its 

worksite enforcement program. 

Efforts to reduce the employment of unauthorized workers in the United 

States necessitate a strong employment eligibility verification process and 

a credible worksite enforcement program to help ensure that employers 

are meeting verification requirements. The current Form I-9 employment 

verification process has not fundamentally changed since its establishment 

in 1986, and ongoing weaknesses in the process have undermined its 

effectiveness. Although DHS and the former INS have been assessing 

changes in the process since 1997, DHS has not yet issued final regulations 

on these changes, and it has not established a definitive time frame for 

Conclusions 
Page 43 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

completing the assessment. Completion of this assessment and issuance of 

final regulations should strengthen the current employment verification 

process and make it simpler and more secure. Furthermore, the Basic 

Pilot Program, or a similar automated verification system, if implemented 

on a much larger scale, shows promise for enhancing the employment 

verification process and reducing document fraud. However, current 

weaknesses in pilot program implementation would have to be fully 

addressed to help ensure the efficient and effective operation of an 

expanded or mandatory pilot program, or a similar automated 

employment verification program, and the cost of additional resources 

would be a consideration. Although USCIS plans to review current pilot 

program weaknesses, additional information on the costs and feasibility of 

addressing these weaknesses is needed to assist USCIS and Congress in 

assessing possible future use of the Basic Pilot Program, including 

increased program usage. 

Even with a strengthened employment verification process, a credible 

worksite enforcement program is needed because no verification process 

is foolproof and not all employers may want to comply with the law. ICE’s 

focus on critical infrastructure protection since September 11, 2001 is 

consistent with the DHS mission to combat terrorism by detecting and 

mitigating vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks at critical infrastructure sites 

which, if exploited, could pose serious threats to domestic security. This 

focus on critical infrastructure protection, though, generally does not 

address noncritical infrastructure employers’ noncompliance with IRCA. 

As a result, employers, particularly those not located at or near critical 

infrastructure sites, who attempt to circumvent IRCA face less of a 

likelihood that ICE will investigate them for failing to comply with the 

current employment verification process or knowingly hiring unauthorized 

workers. ICE is taking some steps to address difficulties it has faced in its 

worksite enforcement efforts, but it is too early to tell whether these steps 

will improve the effectiveness of the worksite enforcement program. In 

addition, given ICE’s limited resources and competing priorities for those 

resources, additional output goals and measures are needed to help ICE 

track the progress of its worksite enforcement efforts, effectively 

determine the resources needed to meet worksite enforcement program 

goals, and ensure that program resources are used efficiently and 

effectively. Moreover, a target time frame for developing outcome goals 

and measures is needed to assist Congress and ICE in determining 

whether the worksite enforcement program, including critical 

infrastructure protection, is achieving its desired outcomes. 
Page 44 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

To strengthen the current employment verification process, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following 

action: 

• set a specific time frame for completing the department’s review of the 

Form I-9 process, including an assessment of the possibility of reducing 

the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, and issuing final 

regulations on changes to the Form I-9 process and an updated Form I-9. 

To assist Congress and USCIS in assessing the possibility of increased or 

mandatory use of the Basic Pilot Program, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to take the 

following action: 

• include, in the planned evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an 

assessment of the feasibility and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot 

Program’s current weaknesses, including its inability to detect identity 

fraud in the verification and reverification processes, delays in entry of 

new arrival and employment authorization information into DHS 

databases, and employer noncompliance with program procedures, and 

resources needed to support any increased or mandatory use of the 

program. 

To assist Congress and ICE in determining the resources needed for the 

worksite enforcement program and to help ensure the efficient and 

effective use of program resources, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for ICE to take the 

following two actions: 

• establish additional output goals and measures for the worksite 

enforcement program to clearly indicate the target level of ICE worksite 

enforcement activity and the resources needed to implement the program, 

and 

• set a specific time frame for completing the assessment and development 

of outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement program to 

provide a target level of performance for worksite enforcement efforts and 

measures to assess the extent to which program results have met program 

goals. 

We requested comments on this report from the Secretary of Homeland 

Security. In its response, DHS agreed with our recommendations. DHS’s 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 
Page 45 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

comments are reprinted in Appendix V. DHS also provided technical 

comments, which we considered and incorporated where appropriate. We 

also received technical comments from SSA, which we considered and 

incorporated where appropriate. 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the 

date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Labor, the Attorney 

General, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the 

Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and appropriate 

congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix VI. 

Richard M. Stana 

Director, Homeland Security 

 and Justice Issues 
Appendix I: Employment Eligibility 

Verification Form (Form I-9) 

Page 46 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Appendix I: Employment Eligibility 

Verification Form (Form I-9) 
Appendix I: Employment Eligibility 

Verification Form (Form I-9) 

Page 47 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 
Appendix I: Employment Eligibility 

Verification Form (Form I-9) 

Page 48 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Page 49 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

To determine how the employment eligibility verification (Form I-9) 

process functions, we examined laws related to the employment 

verification process, including the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 

1986 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 

of 1996; federal regulations on the Form I-9 process; and former U.S. 

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) guidance on the Form I-9, 

such as the Handbook for Employers, which provides instructions for 

completing the form. We evaluated this information to identify the Form 

I-9 requirements, including employer and employee responsibilities for 

completing the form, and challenges to meeting those requirements. We 

examined our past reports and other studies, such as the 1997 U.S. 

Commission on Immigration Reform Report to Congress, to obtain further 

information on the employment verification process. We analyzed former 

INS plans for addressing Form I-9 challenges, including its plans to modify 

the list of acceptable work eligibility documents. We also examined U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) interim guidelines on the 

electronic Forms I-9 to determine what guidance, if any, they provide to 

employers using the electronic form. 

To determine challenges to the Form I-9 process and obtain information 

on the Basic Pilot Program, we also interviewed and obtained information 

from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), ICE, and Social 

Security Administration (SSA) officials. In addition, we interviewed 

representatives of 23 employers; 12 employer, employee, and advocacy 

groups; and 6 immigration experts to obtain their views on employment 

verification and worksite enforcement.1

 We selected the employers to 

interview based on a mix of the following criteria: the total number of 

Basic Pilot Program queries; the total number or percentage of pilot 

program queries that resulted in authorized employment, tentative 

nonconfirmations, and final nonconfirmations; geographic proximity to 

the ICE field offices we visited; previous records of being sanctioned for 

Form I-9 violations; and industry categorization. The 23 employers we 

interviewed were located in the following states: California, Illinois, 

Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. The 

23 employers were also part of the following industries: meat processing, 

transportation, health care, landscaping, manufacturing, accommodation, 

food services, agriculture, janitorial and maintenance, temporary 

employment, critical infrastructure, local government, and newspaper. 

 1

According to Department of Labor data, there were about 5.6 million employer firms in the 

United States in 2002, the year for which the most current data are available. 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Page 50 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

One of the employers we interviewed did not participate in the Basic Pilot 

Program. As a result, when we discuss employers’ views on the Basic Pilot 

Program, we refer to the views of the 22 employers we interviewed who 

participated in the Basic Pilot Program. 

We selected the 9 employer and employee associations with which to meet 

based on a mix of criteria, including industry categorization, gross output 

by industry in 2002, number of paid employees by industry in 2002, and 

estimates of the number of illegal immigrants employed by industry.2

 We 

interviewed officials from employer and employee associations in the 

following industries: construction, agriculture, accommodation, food 

services, retail, health care, and meat. We selected the 3 advocacy groups 

to interview based on the groups’ interest in issues related to employment 

verification and worksite enforcement efforts and interviewed officials 

from advocacy groups that represent a range of views on these issues. We 

selected the 6 immigration experts to interview based on the experts’ 

range of views on immigration issues. We analyzed information from these 

agencies, employers, groups, and experts to determine their views on the 

Form I-9 process and difficulties in verifying work eligibility through the 

process. We used information obtained from employers, employer and 

employee associations, and advocacy groups only as anecdotal examples, 

as information from these entities cannot be generalized to all employers 

and groups in the United States. 

Furthermore, we evaluated information from USCIS and SSA on the Basic 

Pilot Program, including the Basic Pilot Program user’s manual and 

memorandum of understanding for employers, to determine how the pilot 

program functions and how it might assist participating employers in 

reliably verifying employees’ work eligibility and in detecting counterfeit 

documents. We analyzed this information to determine ongoing challenges 

in implementing the Basic Pilot Program and ways these challenges could 

affect increased or mandatory use of the pilot program. We did not 

evaluate security measures in place for the Basic Pilot Program or the 

program’s vulnerability to security risks. To identify pilot program 

challenges, we examined the findings and methodology of the evaluation 

of the Basic Pilot Program completed by the Institute for Survey Research 

at Temple University and Westat in June 2002. In addition, we analyzed 

 2

At the time of selection, 2002 data on gross output by industry from the Bureau of 

Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce were the most current data available. Also, 

the most recent data available on the total number of paid employees by industry from the 

U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce were from 2002. 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Page 51 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

data on employer participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program, 

including data on Basic Pilot Program employment authorizations, to 

determine how participation and use have changed since fiscal year 2000. 

We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing them for accuracy 

and completeness, interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the 

data, and examining documentation on how the data are entered, 

categorized, and verified in the databases. We determined that the 

independent evaluation and these data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of our review. 

To obtain information on the implementation of the worksite enforcement 

program, we interviewed officials from ICE, the SSA Office of the 

Inspector General, the Department of Labor, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, and the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related 

Unfair Unemployment Practices. We also interviewed officials from 12 of 

the 26 ICE Special Agent in Charge field offices. We met with officials from 

the following 8 field offices: Los Angeles and San Diego, California; 

Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; Newark, New Jersey; New York City, 

New York; and Houston and San Antonio, Texas. We spoke with officials 

from the following 4 field offices over the telephone: Denver, Colorado; 

Miami, Florida; Buffalo, New York; and Seattle, Washington. We selected 

the 12 field offices based on a mix of the following criteria: the number of 

investigators in each field office in fiscal year 2003, the number of 

investigations conducted by each field office in fiscal year 2003,3

 the 

estimated number of undocumented immigrants in the state in which each 

field office was located, the number of sanctions issued to employers as a 

result of closed cases located in the same city as the field office between 

calendar years 1986 and 2000,4

 the number of critical infrastructure 

operations in which the field office participated from October 2001 

through April 2004, the number of employers located in the same city as 

the field office that participated in the Basic Pilot Program, and 

geographic area. We also interviewed officials from 4 U.S. Attorney’s 

Offices that were located in the same areas as 4 of the field offices we 

visited. We met with officials from the following 3 U.S. Attorney’s Offices: 

 3

At the time of selection, the most current data available on the number of investigators in 

each field office and the number of investigations conducted by each field office were from 

fiscal year 2003. 

4

At the time of selection, the most current data available on the number of sanctions issued 

to employers located in the same city as the field offices were from calendar years 1986 

through 2000. 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Page 52 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

the Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney’s Office; the Southern 

District of Texas U.S. Attorney’s Office; and the Western District of Texas 

U.S. Attorney’s Office. We spoke with the Southern District of California 

U.S. Attorney’s Office over the telephone. We used information obtained 

from the field offices only as anecdotal examples, as information from 

these entities cannot be generalized to all field offices in the United States. 

We analyzed ICE headquarters and field office guidance, memos, and 

other documents on worksite enforcement to evaluate ICE’s priorities for 

and management of worksite enforcement efforts and to identify any 

challenges in program implementation. We analyzed ICE’s April 2005 

Interim Strategic Plan to determine ICE’s strategy for its worksite 

enforcement program. We also examined former INS guidance and 

strategies and other studies, such as reports from the Department of 

Justice Office of the Inspector General, to determine how worksite 

enforcement priorities, implementation, and challenges have evolved. 

In addition, we separately analyzed ICE and INS data on the worksite 

enforcement program and assessed their validity and reliability by 

reviewing them for accuracy and completeness, interviewing agency 

officials knowledgeable about the data, and examining documentation on 

how the data are entered, categorized, and verified in the databases. We 

determined that the data from each agency were sufficiently reliable for 

the purposes of our review. However, we could not compare the INS and 

ICE data because, following the creation of ICE in March 2003, the case 

management system used to enter and maintain information on 

immigration investigations changed. With the establishment of ICE, agents 

began using the legacy U.S. Customs Service’s case management system, 

called the Treasury Enforcement Communications System, for entering 

and maintaining information on investigations, including worksite 

enforcement operations. Prior to the creation of ICE, the former INS 

entered and maintained information on investigative activities in the 

Performance Analysis System, which captured information on immigration 

investigations differently than the Treasury Enforcement Communications 

System. 

Additionally, ICE officials indicated that, in a few cases, the INS and ICE 

data did not completely account for all worksite enforcement operations 

results. ICE officials told us that agents use judgment in categorizing cases 

entered into both systems and there are a limited number of instances in 

which agents did not appropriately categorize cases. For example, ICE 

officials told us that, in reviewing worksite enforcement cases in the ICE 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Page 53 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

system for fiscal year 2004, they found a few cases that agents 

inappropriately categorized as worksite enforcement. 

To determine the investigative agent work-years, or full-time equivalents, 

that INS spent on the worksite enforcement program for each fiscal year 

from 1999 through 2003, we divided the total hours INS reported spending 

on employer investigations by the total hours spent on all investigations, 

including agent hours spent on leave, training, and other administrative 

and noninvestigative work. We then multiplied this result by 2,080 hours, 

which constitute one work-year, to determine the number of work-years 

spent on worksite enforcement. 

We conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix III: Information on the Electronic 

Form I-9 

Page 54 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

In October 2004, Congress authorized the electronic Form I-9 to be 

implemented by the end of April 2005.1

 ICE has provided interim 

guidelines for using electronic Forms I-9, until the agency issues final 

regulations on their use. The interim guidelines specify that employers will 

have options for completing, signing, storing, and presenting for 

inspection electronic Forms I-9. For example, the guidelines note that 

employers may choose to complete Forms I-9 on paper and store the 

forms electronically or they may choose to both electronically complete 

and store Forms I-9. The guidelines also state that electronic signatures 

could be generated through various technologies such as electronic 

signature pads, personal identification numbers, biometrics, and dialog 

boxes. The guidelines also state that employers could use electronic 

storage systems to retain Forms I-9 that include quality assurance steps to 

prevent and detect the unauthorized creation, addition, alteration, 

deletion, or deterioration of electronically stored data. In addition, 

employers may consider an electronic storage system that includes an 

indexing system and ability to reproduce legible and readable hard copies 

of electronically stored forms. 

 1

P.L. 108-390. 

Appendix III: Information on the Electronic 

Form I-9 
Appendix IV: Data on Employer Participation 

in and Use of the Basic Pilot Program 

Page 55 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Employer participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program has generally 

increased. Between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, the number of employers 

actively using the Basic Pilot Program increased from 1,205 to 2,305. In 

addition, as shown in figure 6, the number of total queries processed 

through the Basic Pilot Program has generally increased since fiscal year 

2000. 

Figure 6: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries Run by Participating Employers 

for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004 

Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest thousand. 

As shown in figure 7, the majority of Basic Pilot Program queries that 

resulted in employment authorizations for each fiscal year from 2000 

through 2004 were issued by SSA. 

Appendix IV: Data on Employer Participation 

in and Use of the Basic Pilot Program 

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

2000

Fiscal year

2001 2002 2003 2004

394,000

421,000

385,000

492,000

657,000

Number of queries

Source: GAO analysis of data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.
Appendix IV: Data on Employer Participation 

in and Use of the Basic Pilot Program 

Page 56 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Figure 7: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries that Resulted in Employment 

Authorizations for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004 

Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest hundred. 

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

294,300

325,600 306,400

394,300

539,700

2000

Fiscal year

2001 2002 2003 2004

33,300

33,100

13,600

16,400

16,200

30,500

40,600

9,200

8,700

47,900

Total DHS employment authorizations resulting 

from immigration status verifier reviews

Employment authorizations

Total DHS automated employment authorizations

Total SSA employment authorizations

Source: GAO analysis of data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 57 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 58 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 59 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement 

Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777 

In addition to the contact named above, Orlando Copeland, Michele Fejfar, 

Ann H. Finley, Rebecca Gambler, Kathryn Godfrey, 

Charles Michael Johnson, Eden C. Savino, and Robert E. White made key 

contributions to this report. 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(440347) 
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER