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22–847 PDF 2005

S. HRG. 109–151

THE NOMINATION OF DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE

TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINETH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 18 AND 19, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

DAY ONE—JANUARY 18, 2005

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana

Opening statement ........................................................................................... 1

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 22

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 99

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., U.S. Senator from Delaware

Opening statement ........................................................................................... 4

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 26

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 102

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, U.S. Senator from California, introduction of the

nominee ................................................................................................................. 9

Rice, Dr. Condoleezza, nominee to be Secretary of State, opening statement .... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 31

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 106

Sarbanes, Hon. Paul S., U.S. Senator from Maryland

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 35

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 109

Chafee, Hon. Lincoln , U.S. Senator from Rhode Island

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 38

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 114

Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 41

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 116

Round Three Questions .................................................................................... 145

Allen, George, U.S. Senator from Virginia

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 47

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 121

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachussetts

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 50

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 125

Round Three Questions .................................................................................... 149

Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 55

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 128

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 59

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 131

Voinovich, Hon. George E., U.S. Senator from Ohio

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 63

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 134

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 67

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 136

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Page

IV

Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 74

Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 77

Alexander, Hon. Lamar, U.S. Senator from Tennessee

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 84

Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 86

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 141

Sununu, Hon. John E., U.S. Senator from New Hampshire

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 90

Martinez, Hon. Mel, U.S. Senator from Florida

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 93

DAY TWO—JANUARY 19, 2005

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana

Opening statement ........................................................................................... 165

Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 166

Chafee, Hon. Lincoln , U.S. Senator from Rhode Island

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 168

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 192

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., U.S. Senator from Delaware

Opening statement ........................................................................................... 170

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 173

Round Two Questions ...................................................................................... 192

Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 175

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 176

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 179

Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 187

Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois

Round One Questions ....................................................................................... 189

BUSINESS MEETING—JANUARY 19, 2005

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, closing statement ............. 197

Allen, George, U.S. Senator from Virginia, closing statement ............................. 199

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachussetts, closing statement ..... 200

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, closing statement ............ 201

Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut, closing statement . 203

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., U.S. Senator from Delaware, closing statement Biden . 204

The Roll Call Vote ................................................................................................... 208

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I—RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MEMBERS

OF THE COMMITTEE TO DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Richard Lugar .. 211

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden,

Jr. .......................................................................................................................... 246

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Russell Feingold ........................................................................................................................ 262

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson ........ 265

Page

V

APPENDIX II—ADDITIONAL MATERIAL INCLUDED IN THE RECORD AT THE REQUEST OF

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Prepared Statement Submitted by Senator Russell Feingold (Submitted as

part of the 1/19/2005 Business Meeting Prior to the Vote) .............................. 273

Letter to the Chairman from the Department of State in reference to DOS

support for S. 2127 ............................................................................................... 274

Charts Detailing U.S. Trade Deficits Submitted by Senator Sarbanes .............. 275

‘‘The Right Call,’’ by L. Paul Bremer III, The Wall Street Journal, January

12, 2005 ................................................................................................................. 278

Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,

30 September 2004 ............................................................................................... 280

Excerpts from The White House Regular Briefing, April 10, 2003, Thursday ... 281

Correspondence from the White House Regarding H.R. 10/S. 2845 (Intelligence Reform Legislation) ................................................................................. 283

(1)

THE NOMINATION OF DR. CONDOLEEZZA

RICE TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

Day One

Tuesday, January 18, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m. in Room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar,

chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd,

Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is called to order.

Let me begin by welcoming distinguished new Members to the

committee who have joined us. I want to introduce Senator Lisa

Murkowski of Alaska, Senator Mel Martinez of Florida, Senator

Barack Obama of Illinois. We’re delighted that you have chosen to

be on this committee, and we assure you that we will have activity

and, we hope, progress. We appreciate your coming with us, and

appreciate all Members’ attendance this morning.

We will proceed with an opening statement, that I will give. In

the event that the distinguished Ranking Member, Senator Biden,

arrives during that time, he will then deliver his statement. If he

does not, he’ll deliver the statement following Dr. Rice’s statement

and before our questioning. And I will ask, after the two opening

statements, our distinguished colleague from California, Senator

Feinstein, to introduce Dr. Rice.

The Committee on Foreign Relations meets today to consider the

nomination of Dr. Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State. We

are especially pleased to welcome Dr. Rice to the committee. As a

result of her distinguished service as National Security Advisor to

President Bush in her earlier assignments on the NSC, she is well

known to many Members of this committee, and we admire her accomplishments. We’re particularly thankful for the cooperation that

she has provided to this committee in its work.

The enormously complex job before Dr. Rice will require all of

her talents and experience. American credibility in the world,

progress in the war on terrorism, and our relationships with our

2

allies will be greatly affected by the Secretary of State’s actions and

the effectiveness of the State Department in the coming years. Dr.

Rice is highly qualified to meet those challenges. We recognize the

deep personal commitment necessary to undertake this difficult assignment, and we are grateful that a leader of her stature is willing to step forward.

The Secretary of State serves as the President’s top foreign-policy

advisor, as our nation’s most visible emissary to the rest of the

world, as a manager of one of the most important departments of

our government. Any one of those jobs would be a challenge for

even the most talented of public servants, but the Secretary of

State, at this critical time in our history, must excel in all three

roles.

Since 2001, we have witnessed terrorists killing thousands of

people in this country and destroying the World Trade Center and

a part of the Pentagon. We have seen United States military personnel engaged in two difficult and costly wars. We have seen the

expansion of a nihilistic form of terrorism that is only loosely attached to political objectives and is, therefore, very difficult to

deter. We have seen frequent expressions of virulent anti-Americanism in many parts of the Islamic world. We have seen our alliances, our international standing, and our budget strained by the

hard choices that we have had to make in response to terrorism.

In this context, many diplomatic tasks must be approached with

urgency. In particular, our success in Iraq is critical. The elections

scheduled for January 30 must go forward, and the United States

must work closely with Iraqi authorities to achieve the fairest and

most complete outcome possible. At the same time, we must understand that those forces that want to keep Iraq in chaos will commit

violence and intimidation. Both Iraqis and the coalition will have

to be resilient and flexible in the elections’ aftermath.

The Bush administration and the State Department also must

devote themselves to achieving a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; to coming to grips with the nuclear proliferation problems in

Iran and North Korea; to continuing urgent humanitarian efforts

in Sudan, the Indian Ocean region and elsewhere; to maintaining

our commitment to the global fight against HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases; to advancing democracy in Afghanistan, Ukraine,

and elsewhere; to repairing alliances with longstanding friends in

Europe; to reinvigorating our economic and security relationships

in our own hemisphere; and to engaging with rapidly changing national powers, especially China, India, and Russia.

Even though this list of diplomatic priorities is daunting, it is not

exhaustive and does not anticipate unforeseeable events. Just

weeks ago, none of us could have predicted that an earthquake and

a tsunami would change the face of the Indian Ocean region. Our

efforts must include the expansion of our foreign-policy capabilities

so that we will be better prepared for crises that cannot be averted,

and better able to prevent those that can be.

I would like to outline a handful of initiatives brought forward

by this committee on which I would ask for your assistance.

First, the committee intends to report out a Foreign Affairs Authorization Bill no later than March. With the support of the Senate leadership, I am confident that the obstacles to Senate passage

3

that we have encountered in the past will be overcome. It is crucial

that the executive branch, especially the State Department, works

together with our committee on this legislation. Not only does the

authorization fund the Department and foreign affairs programs, it

also contains personnel and other authorities important for the Department to carry on its work effectively and efficiently. We will be

calling upon you for you advice and to exercise your considerable

persuasive power at key moments as the legislation works its way

through Congress.

Second, the Bush administration must continue its efforts to

safeguard and destroy vulnerable stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. To this end, I plan to reintroduce legislation designed to

eliminate impediments to the Nunn-Lugar program. My bill would

drop conditions on weapons dismantlement work that in the past

have slowed or threatened to slow the urgent task of eliminating

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Furthermore, the legislation removes the $50 million cap on the President’s ability to utilize Nunn-Lugar funds outside the former Soviet Union.

I will also reintroduce the Conventional Arms Threat Reduction

Act, designed to improve the State Department’s efforts to combat

the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons, including

MANPADS. The bill would unify program planning, coordination,

and implementation of a global strategy into one office at the State

Department.

Third, we must ensure the State Department has adequate resources to do the difficult job it faces. Under the leadership of

President Bush, the administration has requested major funding

increases for the State Department and U.S. foreign policy objectives. You have argued successfully for the creation of new foreign

policy tools, including the Millennium Challenge account, the Global AIDS Initiative, and the new Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization.

The State Department’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative,

launched by Secretary Powell, has made great progress in addressing personnel shortfalls in the Foreign Service. In addition, the

State Department has continued an efficient program to upgrade

security at U.S. missions around the world. Even though Congress

has failed to provide all the funds requested by the President to

strengthen the State Department and U.S. foreign policy capabilities, this committee is enthusiastic about the progress that you

have made so far. We want to work with you to achieve the President’s vision of reinvigorated diplomatic capabilities.

Finally, I would like to highlight a crucial need that has been

identified by Members of this committee. Our country must improve its capacity to stabilize failing or war-torn nations, and to assist in their reconstruction. If we are to deny sanctuaries to terrorists, a goal identified by the 9/11 Commission as a top priority, we

must improve planning and organization for post-conflict reconstruction operations.

Last year, the Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passed

the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of

2004. I appreciate the State Department’s letter endorsing the purposes of S. 2127, and I ask that the letter be submitted in the

record.

4

[The letter referred to by Chairman Lugar appears in Appendix

II of this hearing transcript.]

The CHAIRMAN. In addition, a study done by the Defense Science

Board endorses the legislation. The State Department has now established an Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization, as called

for in the legislation.

The new office, headed by Carlos Pasqual, is doing a governmentwide inventory of the civilian assets that might be available for stabilization and reconstruction tasks. It is also pursuing the idea proposed in S. 2127 of a Readiness Reserve to enable rapid mobilization of post-conflict stabilization personnel.

In addition, I hope that the office will develop the concept of a

250-person active-duty Response Readiness Corps. In Army terms,

this is less than a small battalion of well-trained people—a modest

but vigorous force-multiplier that would greatly improve our nation’s stabilization capacity. This Corps would be composed of State

Department and USAID employees who have the experience and

the technical skills to manage stabilization and reconstruction

tasks in a hostile environment. I consider this new office to be one

of the most important long-term defenses that the State Department can mount against future acts of terrorism. I would urge the

State Department to embrace the concept of a well-funded civilian

stabilization and reconstruction capability.

Dr. Rice, we welcome you to the committee on this historic occasion. We look forward to a dialogue that will illuminate the direction of United States foreign policy for Members of this committee

and for the American people, who are observing this hearing.

Now, at this point, I would normally call upon Senator Biden,

but I would say, on his behalf, his train was canceled. He took the

next one possible, and he will be here momentarily. We appreciate

that very special effort.

I’m going to call now upon Senator Feinstein, our distinguished

colleague from California, for her introduction of Secretary——

Ah, in the nick of time. Indeed, the distinguished Ranking Member has arrived. And I’ll talk for a few minutes to give you a chance

to catch your breath. And then if you will proceed with your opening statement.

Senator BIDEN. I’m ready, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator BIDEN. My purpose in being here today is to get more

money for Amtrak. I want to know your position on that, Madam

Secretary.

Dr. Rice, welcome. If I’m somewhat out of breath, it’s because I

am. There’s very few people I’d run from the station for. And I welcome you, as you already have been welcomed.

And I’d also like to welcome the new Members of the committee—Senator Obama, Murkowski, and also a man who sat in

your chair in a different committee, the distinguished Senator from

Florida. And I want to welcome back, although I don’t see him here

right now, our good friend, John Kerry, a long-time member.

5

Dr. Rice, I congratulate you and President Bush on your nomination. We’ve enjoyed frequent discussions, maybe more than you

would have liked, over the past four years in your office and in the

Oval Office. And I’ve enjoyed our meetings. And I hope this will be

the first of many visits before this committee.

As you know as well as anyone, America faces two overriding national security challenges in this century. We must first win the

struggle between freedom and radical Islamic fundamentalism,

and, in my view, with the leadership of the Chairman of this committee, Senator Lugar, keep the world’s most dangerous weapons

away from its most dangerous people. To prevail, we obviously

have to be strong, but we also have to be smart, wielding the force

of our ideas and our ideals, as well as the force of our arms.

Today, after a necessary war in Afghanistan and a optional war

in Iraq, we’re rightly confident in the example of our power. But

we have sometimes forgotten the power of our example. Foreign

policy is not a popularity contest, as you well know. We have to

confront hard issues, and sometimes it simply requires us to make

hard choices that other countries don’t like. But, above all, these

hard decisions require American leadership—the kind that persuades others to follow. We’ve been having a tough time doing that

the past few years; that is, persuading others to follow.

Clearly, we pay a price, in my view, for being the world’s sole superpower—we inspire as much envy and resentment as we do admiration and gratitude, even if we do everything correctly, in my

view. But the fact is, relations with many of our oldest friends are,

quite frankly, scraping the bottom right now, and we need to heed

the advice of the President of the United States, just before his

first inaugural, when he talked about acting with humility as well

as force.

In the Muslim world—despite the hundreds of thousands of Muslims that we have helped save in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and, yes, in my view, in Iraq, as well, our motives are still

suspect, our actions are resented, and, as bizarre as it sounds to

most Americans, the polls show that Osama bin Laden has a higher approval rating than, not only President Bush, but than America, as a whole, in most of those areas. And the result is that, despite our great military might, we are, in my view, more alone in

the world than we’ve been in any time in recent memory. And the

time for diplomacy, in my view, is long overdue.

As a result, we’re in—in my view, a less secure position than we

should be in the world. That’s because virtually all the threats we

face—from terrorism to the spread of weapons of mass destruction

to rogue states flouting the rules to the pandemic diseases that we

face now, and will face—can be solved solely by American soldiers,

by themselves. America is much more secure working with, and

reaching out to, others than it is walking alone.

And I believe the heart of your mission must be to help rebuild

America’s power to persuade and to restore our nation to the respect it once enjoyed; quite frankly, for our own safety’s sake. And

it’s going to be very difficult to achieve any of this until we find

a way forward in Iraq.

This committee has worked hard across party lines to support

the President’s decision to hold Saddam Hussein to account. In reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
6

turn, prior to going in, we asked the administration to do two

things: one was to build a broad and deep international coalition,

and, two, develop a detailed plan to win the peace. We held extensive hearings, as you know, and we had many discussions in this

committee—back in the bad old days, when I was chairman, and

then immediately after that, when the Chairman took over, not

about the day after—we held detailed hearings about the decade

after. And the administration, in my view, neither generated a

deep international coalition nor had a plan to win the peace. And

I think we’re paying a very heavy price for it now.

We also asked the administration, most importantly, to level

with the American people about how hard and dangerous Iraq was

going to be, and how long it was going to take, and, to our best

judgment, how much it was going to cost.

You may remember, just prior to going in, we had a meeting with

congressional leaders—you were present, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense—in the Cabinet room. And the President, as he

often does—he’s engaging—leaned over to me and publicly said, in

front of all our colleagues, ‘‘Joe, why aren’t you with me?’’ He called

me ‘‘Mr. Chairman,’’ which I’m not. I’m flattered he did that, but

he really understands who the chairman is. He said, ‘‘Mr. Chairman, why aren’t you with me?’’ You may remember, I said then,

and publicly many times, ‘‘Mr. President, I’ll be with you when two

things occur. One, when you, in fact, indicate what you’re going to

do after we win, because winning’s not going to be the hard part;

and, two, level with the American people about the cost, the price

they’re going to have to pay.’’

I think one thing we all learned—whether we were for or against

the war in Vietnam, whether we went or didn’t go—of the Vietnam

generation is that no foreign policy can be sustained without the

informed consent of the American people. The informed consent.

And I think the only people who leveled with us before the war—

like General Shinseki, who said it would take several hundredthousand troops to secure Iraq, and the Economic Advisor, Larry

Lindsay, who said it would cost upward of $200 billion—were

shown the door. And, since the war, Ambassador Bremer has indicated that he said he needed more force, and didn’t get it. Field

generals, with whom I have spoken on my three trips since 2003

to Iraq, have indicated that they need more force. And we keep

hearing from the Defense Department and the President, ‘‘No,

we’re winning, and we don’t need any additional force, and we

haven’t needed any additional force for the past two years.’’

Just last week, very quietly, the administration ended its search

for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Not much fanfare. The administration concluded that the reason for going to war—weapons

of mass destruction—did not exist, they found nothing, and said so.

Quietly.

And the National Intelligence Council, the CIA’s think tank, concluded that Iraq has replaced Afghanistan as the training ground

for the next generation of terrorists, something it was not before

the war.

Despite all that, we now learn from the President that there’s no

reason to hold any administration officials accountable for mistakes

7

or misjudgments in Iraq. According to the President, ‘‘We had an

accountability moment, and that’s called the 2004 elections.’’

Dr. Rice, I hope that you, as Secretary of State—and I’m confident you will be confirmed Secretary of State, and I plan on voting for you as Secretary of State—I hope you will demand accountability from the people who serve you if, heaven forbid, they misserve you to the extent that our country has been, in my view, misserved in Iraq. This is not about punishing people or embarrassing

the President; it’s about learning from our mistakes so we don’t repeat them. And a second term is also a second chance, and I hope

the President will seize it. I hope he will seize it, quite frankly, by

rejecting the neo-conservative notion about how we are going to, in

fact, secure Iraq and the Middle East.

So I hope we can start leveling today. We’d like to hear how you

see the road ahead in Iraq. What should the American people expect about what we can achieve, and when we can hope to achieve

it, and how we are going to succeed? I, for one, want to work with

you toward success, but I hope you’ll not give Wolfowitz answers

by saying, ‘‘It is unknowable.’’ There’s a whole heck of a lot that

is knowable.

Iraq is an overwhelming issue. And this administration, like its

predecessors and the seven Presidents with whom I’ve served, is

only human. Every major problem winds up on the desk of the

same senior people. The same senior people. Every problem. This

is not a criticism; it’s an observation. It’s not possible—in my experience of observing seven Presidents up close and personal—to give

every challenge the attention it deserves.

Consequently, it’s understandable that, while we’re focused on

Iraq, other problems remained, if not on the back burner, not getting full attention. But now, some of those pots are boiling over,

starting with the nuclear program in North Korea and Iran, the

dangerous backsliding of democracy in Russia, the genocide in

Sudan, and the lack of focus on public diplomacy, which I hope,

and I expect, you’ll talk about.

Over the past few years, North Korea has increased its nuclear

capacity by as much as 400 percent, and now may have as many

as eight nuclear weapons which it could test, hide, or sell to the

highest bidder. You have said, ‘‘It is unacceptable,’’ for North Korea

to have nuclear weapons. What does that mean? And what do you

propose to do to stop this growing threat?

Over the past few years, the reform movement in Iran has been

literally crushed in front of the whole world. Surrounded by about

200,000 forces, it very openly just reached out and crushed the democracy movement. So much for the notion of leveraging power.

Over the past four years, things have gotten considerably worse

in Iran, and it’s accelerated its own nuclear program. There may

be nothing we can do to persuade Iran not to develop weapons,

mass destruction. But our European allies are trying, through a

combination of carrots and sticks. They believe they cannot succeed

unless the United States engages in this effort. And, in my view—

and it may not be true; I’m anxious to hear what you have to say—

we seem to be sitting on the sidelines. What do you propose we do

to diffuse—or, if necessary, defeat—this emerging danger?

8

Over the past few years, President Putin has reversed the course

of democratic development, human rights and the rule of law in

Russia. The administration has been largely silent. How can we be

so concerned about the advancement of democracy in the Middle

East and so unconcerned about the regression in Russia? At the

same time, we’ve gotten little return for turning the blind eye to

Russia’s regression. Just the last week, the press reported—hopefully it’s not true, but I worry it may be that Russia is about to

sell new missiles to Syria, which would threaten stability and

progress toward peace in the Middle East.

One of the most important programs to protect America’s security—the effort to help Russia account for, secure, and destroy

weapons of mass destruction and related materials—has become

mired in red tape that the two presidents need to cut through. How

are we going to approach this problem? How are you going to approach it as Secretary of State?

And, finally, the administration has done, in my view, an admirable job of promoting peace between North and South in Sudan.

But in Darfur, we have watched a terrible tragedy unfold, as militia supported by the Sudanese government have killed as many as

100,000 civilians and chased as many as two million from their

homes.

I literally, as I was getting off the train, spoke to Jack Danforth,

who called me. He said he hoped I would keep an open mind about

the notion of carrots and sticks to deal with this problem. I’d like

to know how—it seemed as though that process worked in Libya.

I can’t believe, had we not made the concessions or agreements we

made relative to oil and their ability to produce more in cooperation from the West, and us in particular, I doubt very much, in my

meeting, that—I will be precise—when I went to meet with

Qaddafi, I believe, at the President’s request; I know it was at

yours—I am confident that—and I think you did an incredible job—

I’m confident that it wouldn’t have happened unless there were

carrots, as well. The last four years, we’ve not seen many carrots

except there, and that process started earlier.

Four months ago, before this committee, Secretary Powell rightly

called what was going on in Sudan ‘‘genocide.’’ Since then, the situation has gotten worse. What do you believe the administration

and Congress can do, now, to stop this slaughter and to help African allies develop their own peacekeeping capacity?

There’s much, much more to talk about that we’ll not be able to

talk about here at this hearing. Relations with emerging powers

like China, fault-line friends like India and Pakistan, long-time allies in Europe and Asia, and, closer to home, the troubled—but ignored in many respects—Latin America.

I’ve spent a little bit of time in Europe recently, and I have one

simple message: ‘‘Get over it. Get over it. President Bush is our

President for the next four years, so get over it and start to act in

your interest, Europe.’’ But that requires us to engage the hopedfor diplomacy from the gentlelady from Stanford.

We want to hear your thoughts about bolstering our capacity to

handle post-conflict reconstruction. I listened on the radio, and I

know you spoke about that. Chairman Lugar has drafted important

9

legislation to do just that, which I was pleased to cosponsor. And

I hope you’ll support it.

And I intend to ask you about a source of urgent opportunity: the

Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Abu Mazen’s election may provide a rare second chance to forge a lasting, secure peace in Israel

and to give the Palestinians a state of their own. I’d like to know

what you believe we should do to seize this opportunity, and how

urgent you think it is.

But let me end with something you’ve talked about and that I

hope you will elaborate on today: putting diplomacy back at the

center of America’s foreign policy. I strongly agree that this is a

time for a new diplomatic offensive with old friends, rising powers

and even hostile regimes, but it has to be sustained, it has to be

persistent, and it has to do as much listening as it does talking.

And it has to use all the tools at our disposal—our military might,

but also our intelligence, our public diplomacy, our alliances, international organizations, treaties and agreements, development assistance, trade and investment—even if it is frustrating, even if the

payoff takes years, even if it takes a generation.

You often point out to me privately, and to others, with some degree of accuracy, in my view, that the corresponding difficulty after

World War II and the corresponding difficulty—corresponding to

the situation in Iraq—I’m not sure how applicable it is, but one

way it clearly was a major, major, major, major piece of our postreconstruction effort in Germany and after World War II was diplomacy, public diplomacy. We convinced many parts of the world that

our ideas were ascendant, that we provided what was needed, and

would provide what was needed, to bring security to the region,

and freedom.

I remember when Lech Walesa first walked into my office, like

he did to many of us here, he walked up, and I said, ‘‘Congratulations’’—I said, ‘‘Solidarity.’’ He said, ‘‘No, no, no, Radio Free Europe. Radio Free Europe.’’

Now we’re faced with a new but no less dangerous set of challenges, and it seems to me we have to recapture the totality of

America’s strength. Above all, we must understand that those who

spread radical Islamic fundamentalism and weapons of mass destruction although they may be beyond our reach—we have to defeat them, but there are hundreds of millions of hearts and minds

around the world that are open to American ideas and ideals.

There are 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, and we have to reach

out to them.

So I’m looking forward to working with you to do just that; I’m

anxious to hear what you have to say, and I’ll have some questions.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make my statement. And, again, welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden. I call

now on Senator Feinstein for her introduction.

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

Senator Feinstein: Thank you very much.

Chairman Lugar, Ranking Member Biden, distinguished Members of the Foreign Relations Committee, it gives me great pleasure

10

to introduce a friend and fellow Californian, Dr. Condoleezza Rice,

as the President’s nominee to be the next Secretary of State.

Dr. Rice’s story began 50 years ago with her birth in Birmingham, Alabama. A precocious child, she began piano lessons at

age three, could read by five, and skipped the first and seventh

grades. She attended public schools before enrolling at Birmingham

Southern Conservatory of Music in 1964. Her mother and father

are here in spirit today. Her father, an educator and pastor, aptly

nicknamed his only child Little Star. Today, she is, indeed, a big

star.

Dr. Rice’s family moved to Denver, Colorado, in 1969, where she

entered an integrated school for the first time as a tenth grader.

Staying close to home, she opted for the University of Denver, and

was awarded her B.A. degree, with honors, at the age of 19.

By this time, Dr. Rice was engrossed with Soviet military issues

and the related problems of arms control. She began her graduate

studies on the topic at Notre Dame, and was awarded an M.A. degree in 1975. Thereafter, she returned to the University of Denver

to finish her dissertation on the Czech military’s effect on society.

Dr. Rice’s career as an academician then brought her to my alma

mater, Stanford University, in 1981, where she became an assistant professor of political science. During this time, she authored

‘‘Uncertain Allegiance, The Soviet Union and Czechoslovak Army,

1948 to 1963,’’ and continued to follow her great interests in football and piano.

From 1989 to 1991, in the first Bush administration, she proved

her mettle in government for the first time as a senior director for

Soviet Affairs and East European Affairs at the National Security

Council. President George Bush had this to say about her abilities,

quote, ‘‘Condi was brilliant. She disarms the biggest of big-shots.

Why? Because they know she knows what she is talking about,’’

end quote.

It was then back to Stanford in the early 1990s, where she was

named provost of the university. She was the first woman, first African American, and the youngest person, at age 38, to hold the position, in the school’s history. For six years, she managed a oneand-a-half-billion-dollar school budget, 1400 faculty members, and

14,000 students.

She returned to the White House, as the first African American

woman to serve as National Security Advisor, in January 2001.

As a young girl, Condi stood at the gates of 1600 Pennsylvania

Avenue with her father, telling him that, quote, ‘‘Daddy, I’m barred

out of there now because of the color of my skin, but one day I’ll

be in that house,’’ end quote. She’s delivered on that promise. Now

she is the President’s choice to be our country’s next Secretary of

State.

As both the Chairman and the Ranking Member have so well

stated, American foreign policy today is at a crossroads—in Iraq,

across the Middle East, in North Korea, in our relations with

China, and in so many other places we face major challenges. I

would submit that Dr. Rice has the skill, the judgment, and the

poise and the leadership to lead in these difficult times. If confirmed, she will have the deep, personal trust and confidence of the

President, a real asset. She has been by his side for every crucial

11

national security decision in the last four years. My sense is that

the President trusts her implicitly. When Dr. Rice meets with Hu

Jintao or Arial Sharon or Vladimir Putin, there will be no doubt

that she speaks for, and on behalf of, the President of the United

States.

The problems we face abroad are complex and sizeable. If Dr.

Rice’s past performance is any indication, though, we can rest easy.

It’s difficult to know ahead of time how anyone will perform as Secretary of State. Time and events test vision, facile thinking, and

resolute problem-solving. But, indeed, this is a remarkable woman

that I introduce to you today, and it is with great pride that I do

so.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Senator Feinstein, we thank you for a truly

remarkable introduction of our candidate.

And, Dr. Rice, before I call upon you for the opening statement,

I’m going to ask you to rise and to raise your right hand so that

I might administer the oath.

Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but

the truth, so help you God?

Dr. RICE. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you. Please proceed with your statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, NOMINEE

TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

Dr. RICE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, and Members of the

committee. I’d also like to thank Senator Dianne Feinstein, who, as

a fellow Californian, I have admired as a leader on behalf of our

state and our nation, and on whose wise counsel I have relied, and

will continue to rely.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, it is an honor to be

nominated to lead the State Department at this critical time, a

time of challenge and hope and opportunity for America.

September 11th, 2001, was a defining moment for our nation and

for the world. Under the vision and leadership of President Bush,

our nation has risen to meet the challenges of our time, fighting

tyranny and terror, and securing the blessings of freedom and prosperity for a new generation. The work that America and our allies

have undertaken, and the sacrifices we have made, have been difficult and necessary and right.

Now is the time to build on these achievements to make the

world safer and to make the world more free. We must use American diplomacy to help create a balance of power in the world that

favors freedom. The time for diplomacy is now.

I am humbled by President Bush’s confidence in me to undertake

the great work of leading American diplomacy at such a moment

in history. If confirmed, I will work with the Members of this Congress, from both sides of the aisle, to build a strong bipartisan consensus behind American foreign policy. I will seek to strengthen

our alliances, to support our friends, and to make the world safer

and better. It is a time to reflect on this challenge, and I do so

humbly.

I will enlist the great talents of the men and women of the State

Department, the Foreign and Civil Services, and our Foreign ServVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
12

ice nationals. And if I am confirmed, I will be especially honored

to succeed a man—a man that I so admire, my friend and my mentor, Colin Powell.

Four years ago, Secretary Powell addressed this committee for

the same purpose that I do now. Then, as now, it was the same

week that America celebrates the life and legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King. It is a time to reflect on the legacy of that great man,

on the sacrifices he made, on the courage of the people he led, and

on the progress our nation has made in the decades since. I, personally, am indebted to those who fought and sacrificed in the civilrights movement so that I could be here today.

For me, this is a time to remember other heroes, as well. I grew

up in Birmingham, Alabama—the old Birmingham, of ‘‘Bull’’ Connor and church bombings and voter intimidation, the Birmingham

where Dr. King was thrown in jail for demonstrating without a permit. Yet there was another Birmingham, the city where my parents, John and Angelina Rice, and their friends built a thriving

community in the midst of terrible segregation. It would have been

so easy for them to give in to despair and to send that message of

hopelessness to their children, but they refused to allow the limits

and injustices of their time to limit our horizons. My friends and

I were raised to believe that we could do or become anything, that

the only limits to our aspirations came from within. We were

taught not to listen to those who said, ‘‘No, you can’t.’’

The story of Birmingham’s parents and teachers and children is

a story of the triumph of universal values over adversity, and those

values, a belief in democracy and liberty, and the dignity of every

life and the rights of every individual, unite Americans of all backgrounds, all faiths, and all colors. They provide us a common cause

and a rallying point in difficult times, and they are a source of

hope to men and women across the globe who cherish freedom and

work to advance freedom’s cause. And in these extraordinary times,

it is the duty of all of us—legislators and diplomats and civil servants and citizens—to uphold and advance the values that are core

to our identity and that have lifted millions around the world.

One of history’s clearest lessons is that America is safer, and the

world more secure, whenever and wherever freedom prevails. It is

neither an accident, nor a coincidence, that the greatest threats of

the last century emerged from totalitarian movements. Fascism

and communism differed in many ways, but they shared an implacable hatred of freedom, a fanatical assurance that their way was

the only way, and a supreme confidence that history was on their

side.

At certain moments, it seemed that history might have been on

their side. During the first half of the 20th century, much of the

democratic and economic progress of earlier decades looked to be

swept away by the march of ruthless ideologies armed with terrible

military and technological power. Even after the allied victory in

World War II, many feared that Europe, and perhaps the world,

would be forced to permanently endure half-enslaved and half-free.

The cause of freedom suffered a series of major setbacks—communism imposed in Eastern Europe, Soviet power dominant in

East Germany, the coup in Czechoslovakia, the victory of Chinese

communists, the Soviet nuclear test five years ahead of schedule,

13

to name just a few. In those early years, the prospect of a united

democratic Germany and a democratic Japan seemed farfetched.

Yet America and our allies were blessed with visionary leaders

who did not lose their way. They created the great NATO Alliance

to contain, and eventually erode, Soviet power, they helped to establish the United Nations, and created an international legal

framework for this and other institutions that have served the

world well for more than 50 years. They provided billions in aid to

rebuild Europe and much of Asia. They built on an international—

they built an international economic system, based on free trade

and free markets, to spread prosperity to every corner of the globe.

And they confronted the ideology and propaganda of our enemies

with a message of hope and with truth. And, in the end, though

the end was long in coming, their vision prevailed.

The challenges we face today are no less daunting. America and

the free world are, once again, engaged in a long-term struggle

against an ideology of hatred and tyranny and terror and hopelessness, and we must confront these challenges with the same vision

and the same courage and the same boldness that dominated our

post-world-war period.

In these momentous times, America has great tasks, and American diplomacy has great tasks. First, we will unite the community

of democracies in building an international system that is based on

shared values and the rule of law. Second, we will strengthen the

community of democracies to fight the threats to our common security, and alleviate the hopelessness that feeds terror. And, third,

we will spread freedom and democracy throughout the globe. That

is the mission that President Bush has set for America in the

world, and it is the great mission of American diplomacy today.

Let me address each of these three tasks.

Every nation that benefits from living on the right side of freedom has an obligation to share freedom’s blessings. Our first challenge is to inspire the American people, and the people of all free

nations, to unite in common to commonly solve problems that confront us. NATO and the European Union and our democratic allies

in East Asia and around the world will be our strongest partners

in this vital work.

The United States will also continue to work to support and uphold the system of international rules and treaties that allow us to

take advantage of our freedom, to build our economies, and to keep

us safe and secure. We must remain united in insisting that Iran

and North Korea abandon their nuclear-weapons ambitions and

choose, instead, the path of peace. New forums that emerge from

the broader Middle East and North Atlantic Initiative offer the

ideal venues to encourage economic, social, and democratic reform

in the world. Implementing the Doha development agenda and reducing trade barriers will create jobs and reduce poverty in dozens

of nations. And by standing with the freed peoples of Iraq and Afghanistan, we will continue to bring hope to millions, and democracy to a part of the world where it is sorely lacking.

As President Bush said in our national security strategy, America is guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. If I am confirmed, that

14

core conviction will guide my actions. Yet when judging a course

of action, I will never forget that the true measure of its worth is

its effectiveness.

Our second great task is to strengthen the community of democracy so that all free nations are equal to the work before us. Free

peoples everywhere are heartened by the success of democracy

around the globe. Together, we must build on that success.

We face many challenges. In some parts of the world, an extremist view threaten the very existence of political liberty. Disease and

poverty have the potential to destabilize whole nations and whole

regions. Corruption can sap the foundations of democracy. And

some elected leaders have taken illiberal steps that, if not corrected, could undermine hard-won progress for democracy.

We must do all that we can to ensure that nations which make

the hard choices and do the hard work to join the free world deliver

on the high hopes of those citizens for better lives. From the Philippines to Colombia to the nations of Africa, we are strengthening

counterterrorism cooperation with nations that have a will to fight

terror, but need help with the means. We’re spending billions to

fight AIDS and tuberculosis and malaria and other diseases, to alleviate suffering for millions, and help end public-health crises.

America has always been generous in helping countries recover

from natural disasters, and today we are providing money and personnel to ease the suffering of the millions afflicted by the tsunami

and to help rebuild those nations’ infrastructure.

We are joining with developing nations to fight corruption, instill

the rule of law, and create a culture of transparency. In much of

Africa and Latin America, we face the twin challenges of helping

to bolster democratic change while alleviating poverty and hopelessness. We will work with reformers in those regions who are

committed to increasing opportunity for their peoples, and we will

insist that leaders who are elected democratically have an obligation to govern democratically.

Our third great task is to spread democracy and freedom

throughout the world. I spoke earlier of the grave setbacks to democracy in the first half of the 20th century. The second half of the

century saw an advance of democracy that was far more dramatic.

In the last quarter of that century, the number of democracies in

the world tripled. And in the last six months of this new century

alone, we have witnessed the peaceful democratic transfer of power

in Malaysia, a majority Muslim nation, and Indonesia, the country

with the world’s largest Muslim population. We’ve seen men and

women wait in line for hours to vote in Afghanistan’s first-ever free

and fair presidential election. We—and, I know, you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you for your role in this—were heartened by the refusal of the people of Ukraine to accept a flawed election, and heartened by their insistence that their democratic demands would be met. We have watched as the people of the Palestinian territories turned out to vote in an orderly and free election.

And soon the people of Iraq will exercise their right to choose their

leaders and set the course of their nation.

No less than were the last decades of the 20th century, the first

decades of this new century can be an era of liberty. And we, in

America, must do everything we can to make it so.

15

To be sure, in our world there remain outposts of tyranny. And

America stands with oppressed people on every continent—in Cuba

and Burma and North Korea and Iran and Belarus and Zimbabwe.

The world should really apply what Nathan Sharanski called the

‘‘town-square test.’’ If a person cannot walk into the middle of the

town square and express his or her views without fear of arrest,

imprisonment, and physical harm, then that person is living in a

fear society. And we cannot rest until every person living in a fear

society has finally won their freedom.

In the Middle East, President Bush has broken with six decades

of excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom, in hoping to

purchase stability at the price of liberty. The stakes could not be

higher. As long as the broader Middle East remains a region of tyranny and despair and anger, it will produce extremists and movements that threaten the safety of America and our friends.

But there are hopeful signs that freedom is on the march. Afghanistan and Iraq are struggling to put dark and terrible pasts

behind them, and to choose a path of progress. Afghanistan held

a free and fair election, and chose a president who is committed to

the success of democracy and the fight against terror. In Iraq, the

people will soon take the next step in their journey toward full,

genuine democracy. All Iraqis, whatever their faith or ethnicity,

from Shias to Sunnis to Kurds to others, must build a common future together. The election later this month will be an important

first step as the people of Iraq prepare to draft a constitution and

hold the next round of elections, elections that will then create a

permanent government.

The success of freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq will give

strength and hope to reformists throughout the region, and accelerate the reforms already underway. From Morocco to Jordan to

Bahrain, we are seeing elections and new protections for women

and minorities, and the beginnings of political pluralism. Political,

civil, and business leaders have—during calls for political, economic, and social change. Increasingly, the people are speaking,

and their message is clear: the future of this region is to live in

liberty.

And the establishment of a Palestinian democracy will help to

bring an end to the conflict in the Holy Land.

Much has changed since June 24th, 2002, when President Bush

outlined a new approach for America in the quest for peace in the

Middle East and spoke the truth about what would be required to

end this conflict. Now we have reached a moment of opportunity,

and we must seize it. We take great encouragement from the elections just held in the Palestinian territories. And, Senators Biden

and Sununu, I want to thank you for representing the United

States at those historic elections. America seeks justice and dignity

and a viable, independent, and democratic state for the Palestinian

people. We seek security and peace for the state of Israel. Israel

must do its part to improve the conditions under which Palestinians live, and to build a better future. Arab states must join to

help, and deny any help or solace to those who take the path of

violence.

I look forward to personally working with Palestinian and Israeli

leaders and bringing American diplomacy to bear on this difficult,

16

but crucial, issue. Peace can only come if all parties choose to do

the difficult work. And the time to choose peace is now. But there

can be no permanent peace without an end to terror. Building a

world of hope and prosperity and peace is difficult. As we move forward, America’s relations with world global powers will be critical.

In Russia, we see that the path to democracy is uneven and that

it’s success is not yet assured, yet recent history shows that we can

work closely with Russia on common problems. And, as we do so,

you can be assured that we will continue to press the case for democracy, and we will continue to make clear that protection of democracy in Russia is vital to the future of U.S./Russian relations.

In Asia, we have moved beyond the false assumption that it is

impossible to have good relations with all of Asia’s powers. Our

Asian alliances have never been stronger, and we will use that

strength to help secure peace and prosperity.

Japan, South Korea, and Australia are key partners in our efforts to deter common threats and spur economic growth. We are

building a candid, cooperative, and constructive relationship with

China that embraces our common interests, but recognizes our considerable differences about values.

The United States is cooperating with India, the world’s largest

democracy, across a range of economic and security issues. This,

even as we embrace Pakistan as a vital war on—vital ally in the

war on terror and a state in transition toward a more moderate future.

In our own neighborhood, we are cooperating closely with Canada and Mexico and with our close neighbors in Latin America. We

are working to realize the vision of a fully democratic hemisphere

bound by common values and free trade.

But, perhaps most importantly, we must realize that America

and all free nations are facing a generational struggle against a

new and deadly ideology of hatred that we cannot ignore. We need

to do much more to confront hateful propaganda, dispel dangerous

myths, and get out the truth. We will increase our exchanges with

the rest of the world. America should make a serious effort to understand other cultures and learn foreign languages. Our interaction with the rest of the world must be a conversation, not a

monologue. And America must remain open to visitors and workers

and students from around the world. We do not, and will not, compromise our security standards; yet if our public-diplomacy efforts

are to succeed, we cannot close ourselves off from the rest of the

world.

If I am confirmed, public diplomacy will be a top priority for me

and for the professionals I lead. In all that lies ahead, the primary

instrument of American diplomacy will be the Department of State

and the men and women of its Foreign and Civil Services and Foreign Service Nationals. The time for diplomacy is now, and the

President and I will expect great things from America’s diplomatic

corps. We know from experience how hard they work, the risks

that they and their families take, the hardships they endure. We

will be asking even more of them in their service of the country

and of a great cause. They will need to develop new skills and rise

to new challenges. This is a time that calls for transformational diplomacy.

17

More than ever, America’s diplomats will need to be active in

spreading democracy and fighting terror and reducing poverty and

doing our part to protect America’s homeland. I will personally

work to ensure that America’s diplomats have all the tools they

need to do their jobs, from training to budgets to mentoring to embassy security. I also intend to strengthen the recruitment of new

personnel, because American diplomacy needs to constantly hire

and develop top talent. And I will seek to further diversify the

State Department’s work force. This is not just a good cause, it’s

a necessity. A great strength of our country is its diversity, and the

signal sent to the rest of the world when America is represented

abroad by people of all cultures and races and religions is an unsurpassed statement about who we are and what our values mean

in practice.

Let me close with a personal reflection. I was in government in

Washington from 1989 to 1991. I was lucky enough to be the Soviet

specialist in the White House at the end of the Cold War. I got to

participate in the liberation of Eastern Europe and the unification

of Germany, the beginnings of the peaceful collapse of the Soviet

Union. It was a heady time for all of us. But when I look back, I

know that we were just merely harvesting the good decisions that

had been made in 1947 and 1948 and in 1949, when Truman and

Acheson and Vandenberg and Kennan and so many wise and farsighted statesmen in the executive and legislative branches recognized that we were not in a limited engagement with communism,

we were in the defining struggle of our time. Democrats and Republicans united around a vision and policies that won the Cold

War. The road was not always smooth, but the basic unity of purpose and values was there. And that unity was essential to our

eventual success.

No President and no Secretary of State could have effectively

protected American interests in such momentous times without the

strong support of the Congress and from this committee. And the

same is true today. Our task and our duty is to unite around a vision and policies that will spread freedom and prosperity around

the globe.

I have worked directly with many of you. And in this time of

great challenge and opportunity, America’s coequal branches of

government must work together to advance freedom and prosperity.

In the preface to his memoirs published in 1969, Dean Acheson

wrote of the postwar period that, ‘‘Those who had acted in this

drama did not know, nor do any of us yet know, the end,’’ close

quote.

Senators, now we know. And many of us here were witness to

that end. The end was a victory for freedom, the liberation of half

a continent, the passing of a despotic empire, and vindication for

the wise and brave decisions made at the creation.

It is my greatest hope and my deepest conviction that the struggle we face today will someday end in a similar triumph of the

human spirit. Working together, we can make it so.

Thank you very much.

[Dr. Rice’s prepared statement follows:]

18

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE

Thank you Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, and Members of the Committee. And

let me also thank Senator Dianne Feinstein who, as a fellow Californian, I have

long admired as a leader on behalf of our state and our nation.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, it is an honor to be nominated to lead

the State Department at this critical time—a time of challenge and hope and opportunity for America, and for the entire world.

September 11th, 2001 was a defining moment for our nation and the world. Under

the vision and leadership of President Bush, our nation has risen to meet the challenges of our time: fighting tyranny and terror, and securing the blessings of freedom and prosperity for a new generation. The work that America and our allies

have undertaken, and the sacrifices we have made, have been difficult—and necessary—and right. Now is the time to build on these achievements—to make the

world safer, and to make the world more free. We must use American diplomacy

to help create a balance of power in the world that favors freedom. And the time

for diplomacy is now.

I am humbled by President Bush’s confidence in me to undertake the great work

of leading American diplomacy at such a moment in history. If confirmed, I will

work with members of Congress, from both sides of the aisle, to build a strong bipartisan consensus behind America’s foreign policy. I will seek to strengthen our alliances, to support our friends, and to make the world safer, and better. I will enlist

the great talents of the men and women of the State Department, the Foreign and

Civil Services and our Foreign Service Nationals. And if I am confirmed, I will be

especially honored to succeed a man I so admire—my friend and mentor, Cohn Powell.

Four years ago, Secretary Powell addressed this committee for the same purpose

I do now. Then as now, it was the same week that America celebrates the life and

legacy of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. It is a time to reflect on the legacy of that

great man, on the sacrifices he made, on the courage of the people he led, and on

the progress our nation has made in the decades since. I am especially indebted to

those who fought and sacrificed in the Civil Rights movement so that I could be here

today.

For me, this is a time to remember other heroes as well. I grew up in Birmingham, Alabama—the old Birmingham of Bull Connor, church bombings, and

voter intimidation—the Birmingham where Dr. King was thrown in jail for demonstrating without a permit. Yet there was another Birmingham, the city where my

parents—John and Angelena Rice—and their friends built a thriving community in

the midst of the most terrible segregation in the country. It would have been so easy

for them to give in to despair, and to send that message of hopelessness to their

children. But they refused to allow the limits and injustices of their time to limit

our horizons. My friends and I were raised to believe that we could do or become

anything—that the only limits to our aspirations came from within. We were taught

not to listen to those who said to us, ‘‘No, you can’t.’’

The story of Birmingham’s parents and teachers and children is a story of the triumph of universal values over adversity. And those values—a belief in democracy,

and liberty, and the dignity of every life, and the rights of every individual—unite

Americans of all backgrounds, all faiths, and all colors. They provide us a common

cause in all times, a rallying point in difficult times, and a source of hope to men

and women across the globe who cherish freedom and work to advance freedom’s

cause. And in these extraordinary times, it is the duty of all of us—legislators, diplomats, civil servants, and citizens—to uphold and advance the values that are the

core of the American identity, and that have lifted the lives of millions around the

world.

One of history’s clearest lessons is that America is safer, and the world is more

secure, whenever and wherever freedom prevails. It is neither an accident nor a coincidence that the greatest threats of the last century emerged from totalitarian

movements. Fascism and Communism differed in many ways, but they shared an

implacable hatred of freedom, a fanatical assurance that their way was the only

way, and a supreme confidence that history was on their side.

At certain moments, it almost seemed to be so. During the first half of the 20th

century much of the democratic and economic progress of earlier decades hooked to

be swept away by the march of ruthless ideologies armed with terrible military and

technological power. Even after the allied victory in World War Two, many feared

that Europe, and perhaps the world, would be forced to permanently endure half

enslaved and half free. The cause of freedom suffered a series of major strategic setbacks: Communism imposed in Eastern Europe—Soviet power dominant in East

Germany—the coup in Czechoslovakia—the victory of the Chinese Communists—the

19

Soviet nuclear test five years before we predicted—to name just a few. In those

early years, the prospect of a united democratic Germany and a democratic Japan

seemed far-fetched.

Yet America and our allies were blessed with visionary leaders who did not lose

their way. They created the great NATO alliance to contain and eventually erode

Soviet power. They helped to establish the United Nations and created the international legal framework for this and other institutions that have served the world

well for more than 50 years. They provided billions in aid to rebuild Europe and

much of Asia. They built an international economic system based on free trade and

free markets to spread prosperity to every corner of the globe. And they confronted

the ideology and propaganda of our enemies with a message of hope, and with the

truth. And in the end—though the end was long in coming—their vision prevailed.

The challenges we face today are no less daunting. America and the free world

are once again engaged in a long-term struggle against an ideology of tyranny and

terror, and against hatred and hopelessness. And we must confront these challenges

with the same vision, courage and boldness of thought demonstrated by our postWorld War Two leaders.

In these momentous times, American diplomacy has three great tasks. First, we

will unite the community of democracies in building an international system that

is based on our shared values and the rule of law. Second, we will strengthen the

community of democracies to fight the threats to our common security and alleviate

the hopelessness that feeds terror. And third, we will spread freedom and democracy

throughout the globe. That is the mission that President Bush has set for America

in the world—and the great mission of American diplomacy today.

Let me address each of the three tasks I just mentioned. Every nation that benefits from living on the right side of the freedom divide has an obligation to share

freedom’s blessings. Our first challenge, then, is to inspire the American people, and

the people of all free nations, to unite in common cause to solve common problems.

NATO—and the European Union—and our democratic allies in East Asia and

around the world will be our strongest partners in this vital work. The United

States will also continue to work to support and uphold the system of international

rules and treaties that allow us to take advantage of our freedom, to build our

economies, and to keep us safe and secure.

We must remain united in insisting that Iran and North Korea abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions, and choose instead the path of peace. New forums that

emerge from the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative offer the ideal

venues to encourage economic, social and democratic reform in the Islamic world.

Implementing the Doha Development Agenda and reducing trade barriers will create jobs and reduce poverty in dozens of nations. And by standing with the free peoples of Iraq and Afghanistan, we will continue to bring hope to millions, and democracy to a part of the world where it is sorely lacking.

As President Bush said in our National Security Strategy, America ‘‘is guided by

the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and

multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations.’’ If I

am confirmed, that core conviction will guide my actions. Yet when judging a course

of action, I will never forget that the true measure of its worth is whether it is effective.

Our second great task is to strengthen the community of democracies, so that all

free nations are equal to the work before us. Free peoples everywhere are heartened

by the success of democracy around the globe. Together, we must build on that success.

We face many challenges. In some parts of the world, an extremist few threaten

the very existence of political liberty. Disease and poverty have the potential to destabilize whole nations and regions. Corruption can sap the foundations of democracy. And some elected leaders have taken illiberal steps that, if not corrected, could

undermine hard-won democratic progress.

We must do all we can to ensure that nations which make the hard choices and

do the hard work to join the free world deliver on the high hopes of their citizens

for a better life. From the Philippines to Colombia to the nations of Africa, we are

strengthening counterterrorism cooperation with nations that have the will to fight

terror, but need help with the means. We are spending billions to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other diseases, to alleviate suffering for millions and help end

public health crises. America has always been generous in helping countries recover

from natural disasters—and today we are providing money and personnel to ease

the suffering of millions afflicted by the tsunami, and to help nations rebuild their

infrastructure. We are joining with developing nations to fight corruption, instill the

rule of law, and create a culture of transparency. In much of Africa and Latin America, we face the twin challenges of helping to bolster democratic ideals and instituVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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tions, and alleviating poverty. We will work with reformers in those regions who are

committed to increasing opportunity for their peoples. And we will insist that leaders who are elected democratically have an obligation to govern democratically.

Our third great task is to spread democracy and freedom throughout the world.

I spoke earlier of the grave setbacks to democracy in the first half of the 20th century. The second half of the century saw an advance of democracy that was far more

dramatic. In the last quarter of that century, the number of democracies in the

world tripled. And in the last six months of this new century alone, we have witnessed the peaceful, democratic transfer of power in Malaysia—a majority Muslim

nation—and in Indonesia—the country with the world’s largest Muslim population.

We have seen men and women wait in line for hours to vote in Afghanistan’s first

ever free and fair presidential election. We—and I know you Mr. Chairman—were

heartened by the refusal of the people of Ukraine to accept a flawed election, and

their insistence that their democratic will be honored. We have watched as the people of the Palestinian Territories turned out to vote in an orderly and fair election.

And soon the people of Iraq will exercise their right to choose their leaders, and set

the course of their nation’s future. No less than were the last decades of the 20th

century, the first decades of this new century can be an era of liberty. And we in

America must do everything we can to make it so.

To be sure, in our world there remain outposts of tyranny—and America stands

with oppressed people on every continent—in Cuba, and Burma, and North Korea,

and Iran, and Belarus, and Zimbabwe. The world should apply what Natan

Sharansky calls the ‘‘town square test’’: if a person cannot walk into the middle of

the town square and express his or her views without fear of arrest, imprisonment,

or physical harm, then that person is living in a fear society, not a free society. We

cannot rest until every person living in a ‘‘fear society’’ has finally won their freedom.

In the Middle East, President Bush has broken with six decades of excusing and

accommodating the lack of freedom in the hope of purchasing stability at the price

of liberty. The stakes could not be higher. As long as the broader Middle East remains a region of tyranny and despair and anger, it will produce extremists and

movements that threaten the safety of Americans and our friends.

But there are hopeful signs that freedom is on the march. Afghanistan and Iraq

are struggling to put dark and terrible pasts behind them and are choosing the path

of progress. Just months ago, Afghanistan held a free and fair election, and chose

a president who is committed to the success of democracy and to the fight against

terror. In Iraq, the people will soon take the next step in their journey toward full,

genuine democracy. All Iraqis, whatever their faith or ethnicity—from Shias to

Sunnis to Kurds—must build a common future together. The election later this

month will be an important first step as the people of Iraq prepare to draft a constitution and hold the next round of elections—elections that will create a permanent government.

The success of freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq will give strength and hope to

reformers throughout the region, and accelerate the pace of reforms already underway. From Morocco to Jordan to Bahrain, we are seeing elections and new protections for women and minorities, and the beginnings of political pluralism. Political,

civil, and business leaders have issued stirring calls for political, economic and social change: Increasingly, the people are speaking, and their message is clear: the

future of the region is to live in liberty.

And the establishment of a Palestinian democracy will help to bring an end to

the conflict in the Holy Land. Much has changed since June 24th, 2002, when President Bush outlined a new approach for America in the quest for peace in the Middle

East, and spoke the truth about what will be required to end this conflict. Now we

have reached a moment of opportunity—and we must seize it. We take great encouragement from the elections just held for a new Palestinian leader. And Senators

Biden and Sununu, I want to thank you for representing the United States at these

historic elections. America seeks justice and dignity and a viable, independent, and

democratic state for the Palestinian people. We seek security and peace for the State

of Israel. Israel must do its part to improve the conditions under which Palestinians

live and seek to build a better future. Arab states must join to help—and deny any

help or solace to those who take the path of violence. I look forward to personally

working with the Palestinian and Israeli leaders, and bringing American diplomacy

to bear on this difficult but crucial issue. Peace can only come if all parties choose

to do the difficult work, and choose to meet their responsibilities. And the time to

choose peace is now.

Building a world of hope, prosperity and peace is difficult. As we move forward,

America’s relations with the world’s global powers will be critical. In Russia, we see

that the path to democracy is uneven and that its success is not yet assured. Yet

21

recent history shows that we can work closely with Russia on common problems.

And as we do so, we will continue to press the case for democracy, and we will continue to make clear that the protection of democracy in Russia is vital to the future

of US-Russia relations. In Asia, we have moved beyond the false assumption that

it is impossible to have good relations with all of Asia’s powers. Our Asian alliances

have never been stronger—and we will use that strength to help secure the peace

and prosperity of the region. Japan, South Korea, and Australia are key partners

in our efforts to deter common threats and spur economic growth. We are building

a candid, cooperative and constructive relationship with China that embraces our

common interests but still recognizes our considerable differences about values. The

United States is cooperating with India, the world’s largest democracy, across a

range of economic and security issues. This, even as we embrace Pakistan as a vital

ally in the war on terror, and a state in transition towards a more moderate and

democratic future. In our own neighborhood, we are cooperating closely with Canada

and Mexico, and working to realize the vision of a fully democratic hemisphere,

bound by common values and free trade.

We also must realize that America and all free nations are facing a generational

struggle against a new and deadly ideology of hatred that we cannot ignore. We

need to do much more to confront hateful propaganda, dispel dangerous myths, and

get out the truth. We will increase our exchanges with the rest of the world. And

Americans should make a serious effort to understand other cultures and learn foreign languages. Our interaction with the rest of the world must be a conversation,

not a monologue. And America must remain open to visitors and workers and students from around the world, without compromising our security standards. If our

public diplomacy efforts are to succeed, we cannot close ourselves off from the world.

And if I am confirmed, public diplomacy will be a top priority for me and for the

professionals I lead.

In all that lies ahead, the primary instrument of American diplomacy will be the

Department of State, and the men and women of its Foreign and Civil Services and

Foreign Service Nationals. The time for diplomacy is now—and the President and

I will expect great things from America’s diplomatic corps. We know from experience

how hard they work, the risks they and their families take, and the hardships they

endure. We will be asking even more of them, in the service of their country, and

of a great cause. They will need to develop new skills, and rise to new challenges.

This time of global transformation calls for transformational diplomacy. More than

ever, America’s diplomats will need to be active in spreading democracy, fighting

terror, reducing poverty, and doing our part to protect the American homeland. I

will personally work to ensure that America’s diplomats have all the tools they need

to do their jobs—from training to budgets to mentoring to embassy security. I also

intend to strengthen the recruitment of new personnel, because American diplomacy

needs to constantly hire and develop top talent. And I will seek to further diversify

the State Department’s workforce. This is not just a good cause; it is a necessity.

A great strength of our country is our diversity. And the signal sent to the rest of

the world when America is represented abroad by people of all cultures, races, and

religions is an unsurpassed statement about who we are and what our values mean

in practice.

Let me close with a personal recollection. I was in government in Washington in

1989 to 1991. I was the Soviet specialist in the White House at the end of the Cold

War. I was lucky to be there, and I knew it. I got to participate in the liberation

of Eastern Europe. I got to participate in the unification of Germany and to see the

Soviet Union collapse. It was a heady time for us all. But, when I look back, I know

that we were merely harvesting the good decisions that had been made in 1947, in

1948, and in 1949, when Truman and Acheson and Vandenberg and Kennan and

so many wise and farsighted statesmen—in the Executive and Legislative

branches—recognized that we were not in a limited engagement with communism,

we were in the defining struggle of our times.

Democrats and Republicans united around a vision and policies that won the Cold

War. The road was not always smooth, but the basic unity of purpose and values

was there—and that unity was essential to our eventual success. No President, and

no Secretary of State, could have effectively protected American interests in such

momentous times without strong support from the Congress, and from this Committee. And the same is true today. Our task, and our duty is to unite around a

vision and policies that will spread freedom and prosperity around the globe. I have

worked directly with many of you. And in this time of great challenge and opportunity, America’s co-equal branches of government must work together to advance

freedom and prosperity.

In the preface to his memoirs, published in 1969, Dean Acheson wrote of the postwar period that ‘‘those who acted in this drama did not know, nor do any of us yet

22

know, the end.’’ Senators, now we know—and many of us here bore witness to that

end. The end was a victory for freedom, the liberation of half a continent, the passing of a despotic empire—and vindication for the wise and brave decisions made at

the beginning. It is my greatest hope—and my deepest conviction—that the struggle

we face today will some day end in a similar triumph of the human spirit. And

working together, we can make it so.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Rice, thank you. The committee asked you to

make a comprehensive and thoughtful statement, and you certainly

have fulfilled our request. We appreciate the time and effort that

you have given to that statement, and, likewise, to the responses

that you’ve given to all of our questions. Just for the benefit of Senators and those following the hearing, I would add that during the

past few weeks, Senators have submitted to Dr. Rice folios of questions. The questions have been answered, and they will all be made

a part of the record. For the record, some Senators may wish to reiterate some of those questions today, but we know you will be well

prepared, because you have already written some remarkable answers that give us a great deal of assurance.

I’ve consulted with the distinguished Ranking Member, Senator

Biden, about the format, and we will now have a round of questions. Each Member will have ten minutes, and I’ll ask Members

to be respectful of that time so that they will not infringe upon the

opportunities of others. And then, following that, if Members wish

to ask additional questions, we will have a second round of ten

minutes per Member; and, if required, a third and even a fourth

round. I have consulted with Dr. Rice. She is prepared for a number of hours of questions, and I appreciate that.

We’ll proceed at least until noon, and maybe a little beyond that,

commence again at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon. If it appears that

the hearing might be concluded at some time in the early evening,

it would be my privilege to continue on and to preside and to be

with any Member who wishes to keep asking questions throughout

that period of time.

My hope is that Members on both sides of the aisle will be prepared, at the conclusion of all of the questioning, whether it should

occur today or tomorrow, to have a business meeting of the committee so that we might take a vote upon this nomination, and that

it might be available, therefore, for action on the floor of the Senate

on Thursday, January the 20th. Dr. Frist has indicated that, after

3:00 o’clock, roll-call votes will be in order. My prayer is that one

of the roll-call votes will be on this nomination.

This is a potential roadmap for us to proceed through the hearing in an orderly way that is fair to all Members, and I want to

make that point clear. We have offered two full days so that, in the

event Members have a lot of questions, they will have an opportunity to raise them for a complete record of the hearing.

Now, Dr. Rice, I’ll begin, and I’ll ask the timekeeper to be as rigorous on my questions as on anyone else’s for the next ten minutes.

Let me say that, last year, I introduced legislation intended to

relieve the burdens placed on the Nunn-Lugar program by the Congress in the form of conditions, certifications, reporting requirements. These have occurred over many years, and many were

points well taken at the time, as there was gross distrust of the

Russians, and, likewise, a hope for progress through these restricVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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tions. Nevertheless, they have inhibited, substantially in some

years, the amount of work that could be done to actually work with

the Russians in cooperative threat reductions, to take warheads off

of missiles, to destroy the missiles, to destroy the aircraft that

might fly over our country, and even in the Shchuch’ye Project, to

move toward a neutralization of the chemical weapons.

The goal of my legislation is to provide President Bush with more

flexibility in the utilization of this program in achieving nonproliferation and dismantlement goals. Does the administration

support this legislation?

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Yes, we do. And I want to start by saying thank you very much

for the tremendous leadership that you have given and that, earlier, Senator Sam Nunn gave to this. And I know that a number

of Senators on this committee and on other committees have been

stalwarts in this extremely important initiative. I’m an old student

of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet military, and I really can

think of nothing more important than being able to proceed with

the dismantlement, the safe dismantlement, of the Soviet arsenal,

with nuclear safeguards to make certain that nuclear weapons facilities and the like are well secured, and then the blending down,

as we are doing, of the number of hazardous, potentially lethal materials that could be used to make nuclear weapons, as well as, of

course, you mentioned, Shchuch’ye and the chemical weapons.

So this is an extremely important program. I want to be clear

that we do pay attention, in our relationship, to the progress, or

lack thereof, of democracy. We pay attention and push the Russians on questions of accounting fully for their chemical-weapons

stockpiles, for permitting an understanding of their biologicalweapons programs. But flexibility in being able to administer the

program would be most welcome, and it is just an extremely important program that—I think you know—that we continue to push.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that statement very much. We will

be working with you and the Department. Likewise, we will continue our efforts with the Department of Defense and DTRA and

the Cooperative Threat Reduction Group, which has been so helpful.

Now, the future of U.S./Russian cooperation on nonproliferation

and the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction is contingent also upon the continuation of the Nunn-Lugar Umbrella

Agreement that undergirds all of our efforts in this area. To date,

the Kremlin has not submitted the agreement reached in 1999 to

the Duma for approval. What are your views on the prospects of

the United States and Russia reaching agreement on such things

as liability, tax-free status, and the other issues that are covered

by the umbrella agreement?

Dr. RICE. Senator Lugar, the President has raised with President

Putin the issue of ratification in the Duma of the CTR over—umbrella over a number—on a number of occasions, including, most

recently, when they were at Sea Island. I’m sure that he will raise

it when he sees President Putin in the next several weeks. And we

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ward. And to the degree that there are bureaucratic logjams that

need to be broken, we’ve simply got to break them.

The other possibility, which is that you leave materials unsecured and you don’t take as full initiative as you can under these

very important programs, is simply not acceptable. And so, we are

working to see how we can move this forward with the Russians.

We had discussions, just recently, with the Russian Defense Minister, when he was here, about moving forward, so you can be assured that we’re looking to break whatever bureaucratic logjams

have emerged over this period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that response, and I’m hopeful that

you will work with the President so that that will be on the agenda

of his meeting with President Putin. Clearly, President Putin is

cognizant of all of these programs, but bureaucracy in Russia sometimes moves slowly——

Dr. RICE. Right.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. ——as it does in our country. To the

extent that we can expedite this, that would be helpful. As the

President pointed out, weapons of mass destruction or materials of

mass destruction, improperly secured, are the basis for many of the

terrorist threats, whether it be al Qaeda or the Russians’ fear of

the Chechnyans, or whoever. The materials are there to be picked

up and to be utilized without research and difficulty. These are

critical items, and I know that you agree.

Let me also mention that the G8 meeting, the so-called ‘‘10 plus

10 over 10’’ program, attempted to enlist our allies in matching the

effort, of about a billion dollars a year, that we are putting into

these programs—Defense, State, and Energy Departments. It’s

been difficult for them to do that, because they do not have satisfactory umbrella agreements, in most cases, either.

So, while the President is visiting with President Putin bilaterally, perhaps he could also mention our seven allies within the

G8 that we urgently need to enlist in this type of work.

Dr. RICE. I agree completely, Senator. In fact, the President has

talked to President Putin about the difficulties that others are having extending money.

I think one of the really great breakthroughs was when we came

up with this global partnership initiative, because it permitted us

to multiply the resources that the United States was putting in by

resources from Japan and Italy and Great Britain and other places.

And it’s important that those resources get spent.

This is one part, an extremely important part, of a broad nuclear

nonproliferation initiative agenda that we are pursuing to—with

our allies—to try and deal with this very nettlesome, difficult problem.

The CHAIRMAN. And, of course, also, as the President visits with

the German leadership, and perhaps the French leadership and

what have you, they are parties to this and are——

Dr. RICE. They are.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. ——hopefully, eager to be a part of

it.

Dr. RICE. In fact, I think that the nonproliferation story is a

quite remarkable story of cooperation among the major allies. We

have outstanding cooperation with France and Germany and our

25

other allies. We have been working, for instance, in something

called the Proliferation Security Initiative, which 60 countries are

now party to—and a number of others have expressed interest—to

try to interdict with—consistent with international law—to try and

interdict suspicious shipments. This has given us new means of intelligence cooperation, law-enforcement cooperation, naval cooperation. And it—these are very important.

We work best when we’re putting the alliance to use and to

work——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——on difficult problems together.

The CHAIRMAN. And this is a great way to do so. I would add an

agreement that’s also important, the AMEC agreement. We have

enlisted the support of Norway and friends who want to work in

that area, particularly on the submarine issues and the pollution

of nuclear material that may have been dumped, or could be

dumped, without activity on our part.

Let me turn to another issue. In your answers to questions for

the record—and I cite that, because I’ve asked this question for the

record and you have responded—I particularly appreciated your response on the Law of the Sea Convention. You urged the committee

to favorably report it out, and you said that you will work with the

Senate leadership to bring the convention and implementing agreement to the floor for a vote during the 109th Congress. You also

said the following, ‘‘Joining the convention will advance the interests of the United States military. The United States, as the country with the largest coastline and the largest exclusive economic

zone, will gain economic and resource benefits from the convention.

The convention will not inhibit the United States, nor its partners,

from successfully pursuing the Proliferation Security Initiative.

And the United Nations has no decision-making role under the convention in regulating uses of the oceans by any state party to the

convention.’’ That language clears up an issue sometimes raised by

opponents to the convention. And, finally, you said, ‘‘The convention does not provide for, or authorize, taxation of individuals or

corporations.’’

I cannot think of a stronger administration statement in support

of the Law of the Sea Convention. Should I assume that the President would like to see this convention passed as soon as possible?

Dr. RICE. Would certainly like to see it passed as soon as possible. And, Senator, I think—you know the history of this better

than I, as well as Senators like Senator Warner and others, who

worked very hard to make sure that some of the early concerns

about the convention were addressed and that the convention, as

it now stands, serves our national security interest, serves our economic interest, and we very much want to see it go into force.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you for that response.

In your responses to questions for the record, you embraced the

Department’s role as the lead on an interagency team working for

a more coordinated approach to stabilization and reconstruction efforts, a role that I’ve been pushing, as have Senator Biden and

many others on our committee, as a new core mission for the Department of State. Your support for the Department’s Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department will be crucial as

26

it seeks the personnel, resources, and budget to succeed. Can you

outline your own vision for the Department of State in this area?

And how would you integrate USAID with this effort?

Dr. RICE. We have learned a lot of lessons over the last several

years, and one of them, I think, is that we need to be better able

to marry civilian expertise in reconstruction and stabilization with

whatever we need to do militarily to stabilize the situation. These

post-conflict situations require a wide range of skills and talents

that we’ve had to assemble, in a rather ad-hoc fashion, from within

the United States Government when we faced Afghanistan or faced

Iraq. And, frankly, we will face these again. We face it in Liberia,

we face it in Sudan—we will face it in Sudan if those situations

can be stabilized. And so, we have been—and I’ve been—very

heartened by the work that has been done on this new Office of—

for Reconstruction and Stabilization. I know, Senator, that you and

your staff have had a lot of conversations, first with people who

were on my staff in the NSC who were interested in this. And now

that the office has been created in the State Department, I’ve had

briefings on what Carlos Pasqual and his people are already doing.

We are going to try to make sure that they have the resources for

this first-phase effort that they are in.

I think we need to look at what further functions and what further requirements there are for this especially important task. But

the State Department does need to lead this effort. There is great

enthusiasm in the State Department for being able to do this, as

I’ve talked to people in briefings and the like. And so, the office will

not only have my support, but I’m counting on it to be able to help

us make better efforts as we face these stabilization problems

around the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Great. And we will count upon you for leadership

of our legislative efforts. We will work together on this.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Rice, you’re, I’m told, a great football fan. I notice, when I

go in your office, you are. I’m not going to ask you this under oath,

but are you aware of who the national champions that won doubleA football were last year?

Dr. RICE. Did they come from Delaware, sir?

Senator BIDEN. Yes, they did.

Dr. RICE. Yes, sir.

Senator BIDEN. University of Delaware. Thank you very much. I

knew you’d know that. I knew you’d know that.

Dr. RICE. Right.

Senator BIDEN. Very important point.

Dr. Rice, I’d like to talk to you about Iraq, if I may start there.

You quote eloquently, and you write eloquently, in your opening

statement, ‘‘But when I look back, I know that we were merely harvesting the good decisions that had been made in ’47, ’48, and ’49,

when Truman, Acheson, and Vandenberg and Kennan, and so

many other wise and foresighted statesmen in the executive and

legislative branch, recognized that we are not in a limited engagement with communism, we are in the defining struggle of our

times.’’

27

Based on our discussions over the years, I think we agree that

the defining struggle of our times right now is this struggle between freedom and radical Islamic fundamentalism. That’s not the

only problem in the world, but it’s the one that, I think, takes a

long time. And Truman and Acheson and others came up with—

and leveled with the American people about how long and hard and

expensive it was going to be—the Truman Doctrine, the establishment of NATO, the Bretton Woods agreement, the Marshall Plan,

well over 300,000 troops in Europe. We still have a considerable

number of troops in Europe. And we flat-out told the American people. And yet I’m a little concerned that the American people don’t

have a clear sense of what is expected of them in this defining

struggle that we always talk about. And the focus right now is primarily in Iraq. And we have an exit strategy, which I happen to

agree with. The ultimate exit strategy is a stable, secure Iraqi government brought about as a consequence of a series of elections,

this one just being the first of a series, and providing Iraq the capacity to maintain order and peace, not only in the streets, but

along their borders.

And, toward that end, we had significant discussions in this committee prior to going in, and a number of experts, from RAND to

others, indicated that we were going to need somewhere in the

order of 5,000 European paramilitary police troops, in addition to

the military. I think the number was 5,600. And my first question

is, Did your outfit write a report suggesting how many military

forces your team thought would be needed in Iraq?

Dr. RICE. No, Senator, we did not write a report of that kind. We,

obviously, were aware of all the literature out there about how one

stabilizes, and we looked at that literature, we considered it. But

as a part of a team that is the National Security Council, and that

is where the President’s primary national security advisors sit, I

sat through briefing after briefing that assessed the plan for both

the war and for the immediate postwar period and, as a part of

that plan, the troop levels that were recommended by General

Franks and by his commanders. The President had good military

advice from General Franks, good military advice from Chairman

Myers, who represents, of course, not just himself, but the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And they were very clear

that they believed that the plan that they were going to execute,

including phase four—that is, the stabilization phase—was adequately resourced, in terms of troop strength.

Senator BIDEN. In retrospect, do you think it was adequately

resourced? What do you think now? Everybody gets a chance to determine whether or not what they signed on to or thought, recommended by professionals, was workable or not. Do you think it

was adequate, now, looking back?

Dr. RICE. Senator Biden, I would not presume to try to give the

President military advice, but I do believe that he got good military

advice, and I do believe that the plan and the forces that we went

in with were appropriate to the task. We did meet with some unforeseen circumstances; most importantly, as we swept through the

country really rather rapidly, this—the core of this insurgency—

that is, the Ba’athists and many of Saddam’s loyal forces melted

into the population. They didn’t stand and fight. When they reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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emerged, they reemerged as an insurgency, I think, that, frankly,

cannot be dealt with by military power alone, and certainly not by

overwhelming military power, but must now be dealt with through

the political mobilization of the Iraqi people, which is why these

elections are so important, through economic reconstruction—and I

would be the first to say that we want very much to accelerate that

reconstruction—and then, most importantly——

Senator BIDEN. So bottom line——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——through the Iraqi forces.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——getting the chance to look back,

you think there were an adequate number of forces—beginning,

middle, and now. You wouldn’t, if you got to go back, change the

force structure.

Dr. RICE. I don’t think I would, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Okay. You’re aware that Mr. Bremer suggests

that we needed more force—he is the former, as we all know, ambassador who was in charge up until we handed over sovereignty.

And I’ve made three trips since 2003, and every trip I make I meet

with the flag officers, and they’re all telling me they need more

force, and they needed more force. The reason I asked the question

is not to assess blame, because who the heck knows—as I said to

Bremer—and I think the three of us were together the first time—

I said, ‘‘Mr. Ambassador’’—in the first meeting after Saddam was

dethroned and we were in Baghdad—I said, ‘‘If the Lord Almighty

came down and sat on this table and gave you the right answer to

60 percent of all the difficult questions you’ll have to answer, you

still only have an even chance of succeeding. No one’s ever done

what we’re trying to do.’’ And I supported the effort. But it concerns me that, in retrospect, you still think the force structure was

appropriate.

Which leads me to this issue of one element of our exit strategy,

and that is the training of Iraqi security forces. On October 21st

of last year, you said, ‘‘The Iraqi security force will number 125,000

by the end of the year, there will be 145,000 security forces by February, and 200,000 by the time of the permanent election.’’ And

then March of last year, Secretary Rumsfeld, ‘‘We now’’—he said,

‘‘We now have 200,000 Iraqi security forces that are out there providing security in the country.’’ And a month later, he said,

‘‘210,000 in uniform,’’ and called it, quote, ‘‘an amazing accomplishment.’’

And now, what I’d like to know is what you all mean by ‘‘trained

Iraqi security force.’’ Do you mean someone who we give a uniform

to, someone who had been in the Iraqi military before, or the police? Or does ‘‘trained’’ mean someone capable absent a physical

presence of the United States or a coalition force with them to, in

fact, do their job, whatever it’s assigned, in whatever region they’re

in? What do you mean by ‘‘trained?’’

Dr. RICE. By ‘‘trained,’’ Senator, what we’ve been trying to do is

to take Iraqis—some of whom have served before, some of whom

have not—and to give them, depending on whether it’s police training or army training or commando training, the skills that they

need to be able to secure the country. Now, we have had to, in

many cases, understand that this is—that the initial training is—

just that, it’s initial training, and that you face a number of other

29

issues. You face the issues of leadership. One of the problems that

we’ve had with the desertion rates that we faced in the Iraqi security forces and with some of the problems of—I’ll call it, ‘‘discipline,’’ broadly—is that we think there has been leadership gap.

We learned, early on, that Iraqis were not going to train and then

serve coalition leaders. And so——

Senator BIDEN. What have we done about that leadership gap?

Dr. RICE [continuing].——we have a very active program now

that Prime Minister Allawi is very involved in, himself, of vetting

proven leaders in the former Iraqi security forces to bring top-down

leadership to those people. NATO, of course, has put in a training

mission that is devoted to training leadership, and a——

Senator BIDEN. That’s not even set up yet, is it?

Dr. RICE. Well, it’s—we have, on the ground——

Senator BIDEN. I’m not criticizing. Look, here’s the reason I

asked this question. I talked about, earlier—and my time is about

up—I talked, earlier, about the need to level with the American

people. When you say we have 200,000 trained security forces, and

the Secretary of Defense says you have 210,000, the impression of

the average American is that, we’ve actually trained up people who

can do the job.

Now, I’ve made four trips there, three since Saddam came down.

I’ve gone to the training facility for police in Jordan. With the

American head trainer, I said, without anybody there, and I believe

my friend—and a person who has an ideological bent considerably

different than mine—my friend from South Carolina was there. I

said, ‘‘There’s no one in the room. Please cut all the malarkey. Is

this training program worth a darn?’’ And the answer was, ‘‘No,’’

from our own trainer. I asked the head of the Jordanian police

force who was there, and the Canadian Royal Mounted Policeman

who was there as the triumvirate running the operation. I’ve been

back and spoke with General Petraeus on two occasions. He is a

first-rate soldier. He has indicated that he is just basically beginning.

How many—and this is my last question, Mr. Chairman—how

many security forces do you think are trained that can shoot

straight, kill, and stand their ground? I don’t mean in a uniform.

I spent four hours in Fallujah. Our marines are not real anxious

to stand next to, and count on, a lot of Iraqi forces, except the few

that were trained as special forces. Now, how many do you really

think are trained that Allawi can look to and say, ‘‘I can rely on

those forces?’’ What do you think that number is?

Dr. RICE. Senator, I have to rely on the what I get from the field.

And, by the way, I think that the trips that you’ve made, and the

trips that the others have made, have given us information that we

can go back with, and I appreciate your doing that

We think the number right now is somewhere over 120,000. We

think that, among those people, there are clearly—continue to be

questions about on-duty time; that is, people who don’t report for

duty. And so, this is being looked at. We are trying to provide, for

some of these units, mentors who can help, trying to provide leadership from the Iraqis, themselves, that can help these people.

But this is the reason that Gary Luck has gone out, at Secretary

Rumsfeld’s direction, to take a hard look at the training program

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to see what General Petraeus—who, as you say, is a terrific soldier

and has a lot of experience in Iraq—what he’s been able to achieve,

to work with the Iraqis to address some of these problems of leadership and morale and desertion in the armed forces and in the police forces, and to look at some of the equipping of the police forces.

But I do want to note, Senator, that the Iraqis are making a lot

of sacrifices here——

Senator BIDEN. No question.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——their soldiers, their police. In places

like Fallujah and places like Samara, and places like Najaf, they

have played an active role in their security. But it is a process that

takes some time. We believe that we’ve made some progress. We

have more progress to make.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I thank you for your answer. I think you’ll

find, if you speak to the folks on the ground, that they don’t think

there’s more than 4,000 actually trained Iraqi forces. I strongly

urge you to pick up the phone or go see these folks. And the reason

I press it is not that the Iraqis aren’t sacrificing; they are—but

that’s almost irrelevant in one regard: the exit strategy for America

is a trained force of several hundred-thousand people. We’re talking about a year or more to get anywhere close to that. We should

level with the American people about it. But after you take a hard

look, as Secretary of State, I’d like to talk more with you about

that.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Hagel?

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Welcome, Dr. Rice.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement that I would

ask to be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be included in full.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

[Senator Hagel’s prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate Dr. Rice on her nomination and look forward to

working with her in her new position as Secretary of State. She has served with

distinction as Assistant to the President for National Security, as well as in other

National Security Council positions. Dr. Rice comes to this job well-qualified and

prepared to take on her new responsibilities.

The challenges for U.S. foreign policy over the next four years will be formidable.

U.S. foreign policy cannot be separated from our energy, economic, defense and domestic policies. It all falls within the arch of national interest. There will be windows of opportunity, but they will open and close quickly. Foreign policy will require

a strategic agility that, whenever possible, gets ahead of problems, strengthens U.S.

security and alliances, and promotes American interests and credibility.

Our public diplomacy requires convincing the next generation of the world that

America’s purpose is not defined solely by our power. It is to work with our friends

and allies to help build a better world for all people. A safer, more stable and prosperous world is in America’s interest. That message has been lost. I am not sure

how it happened, nor do I believe that it was solely our fault. I do know that public

diplomacy is not about packaging, marketing, or spin. It is about our policies and,

most importantly, our actions. It is a long-term process of engagement, dialogue and

enhancing present relationships and building new ones.

31

American policies in the war on terrorism must address the political and economic

conditions that breed radicalism and violence, especially in the Muslim world. Poverty and underdevelopment do not necessarily lead to terrorism. But a lack of political freedom and economic opportunity undermine the prospects for stability and democracy in developing regions, and present easy targets for extremists.

We must think creatively about how best to reorganize our foreign policy structure for stabilization and reconstruction missions, whether in post-conflict situations

like Iraq and Afghanistan, or following natural disasters like the tsunami in Asia.

America’s inter-agency process and our military have done a tremendous job helping those people affected by the tsunami. We learn from experiences that test and

exercise relationships within our own government.

The U.S.-Europe-Japan alliance has been the foundation of our post-World War

II global strategy and should remain so. America is both an Atlantic and Pacific

power. Our alliance with Europe and Japan functions as a bridge between East and

West, Atlantic and Pacific, and is based on a shared commitment to democracy, free

trade, and global leadership. In addition to strengthening our Trans-Atlantic bonds

as Europe undergoes its own historic changes, America’s Asian alliances will also

require attention and focus. The Asia-Pacific region will greatly define America’s interests in the 21st century.

America’s relationships with Russia, China and India will shape international politics, commerce, and security in the coming decades. These are powerful states undergoing dramatic and historic changes. Our bilateral relations with Russia, China

and India will require a delicate diplomatic balance of security and commercial interests, as well as support for reform and human rights.

The Western Hemisphere must be a high priority for U.S. foreign policy. The U.S.

relationship with Mexico is as important as any relationship we have. The United

States’ cultural integration with the Western hemisphere is a fact of life—more than

50% of U.S. immigrants are from Latin America. The United States and Mexico

must work together on immigration polices that further our shared interests in a

more stable and prosperous Western hemisphere.

There are few more urgent challenges facing this country today than immigration

reform. A new 21st century U.S. immigration policy must be developed and implemented. I look forward to working with the Bush Administration on immigration

policy and plan to re-introduce my immigration reform bill in the next few weeks.

America must recognize the opportunities, however imperfect, presented by the

election of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) earlier this month,

and the election of the Iraqi National Assembly, which will take place on January

30.

The Israeli-Palestinian issue lies at the core of our strategic engagement with the

Middle East and the Muslim world. The United States, its Quartet partners—the

European Union, the United Nations, and Russia—and the Arab world must now

actively engage in helping Israelis and Palestinians re-start the Peace Process. It

will not be easy. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon faces a political challenge from

Israeli settler groups and from those within his own Likud Party opposed to Israeli

withdrawal from Gaza. Terrorists and extremists will continue to be a security

threat to Israel and will seek to undermine Abu Mazen’s government. That is happening now. We must not allow terrorists to hold hostage Middle East peace and

the future of a two-state solution.

The National Assembly elections on January 30th represent a critical benchmark

for Iraqi sovereignty and self-governance, as well as for an American exit strategy

from Iraq. Developments in Iraq will influence and constrain America’s foreign policy initiatives as long as U.S. combat troops remain there. We need a military exit

strategy for Iraq. The questions are when and how. An exit strategy requires a sovereign Iraqi government and a strategy for diplomatic partnerships and regional security with Iraq and its neighbors.

This hearing is an opportunity to discuss with Dr. Rice the war in Iraq, other foreign policy challenges facing the United States, and the Bush administration’s plans

and initiatives to deal with them.

Thank you.

Senator HAGEL. As has been noted here and, I think, eloquently

stated by Senator Feinstein, you come before this committee impressively qualified, well prepared, and it is a nomination all of

America can be proud of. And I mean that sincerely. So thank you

for offering yourself for another four years of very engaging, responsible leadership. We appreciate that.

32

I also want to note, Mr. Chairman, for the record, the good work

of Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary Armitage—I noted, Dr. Rice,

that you mention him in your statement—the work that the Powell-Armitage team has done for this country over the last four years

has been significant. All those who were part of that team need to

be acknowledged, as well. So thank you, Dr. Rice, for noting Secretary Powell’s leadership.

I want to pursue, to some extent, some of the same line of questioning on the same subject, as well as other subjects in my ten

minutes, that Senator Biden was talking about: Iraq. He left off

with exit strategy. Would you explain to this committee what you

and the President see as an exit strategy for America from Iraq,

which would be, I suspect, connected to a post-January 30th election, which will provide an Iraqi—an elected Iraqi national assembly? What are our plans after that?

Dr. RICE. Well, we do have some things that we have to accomplish after the elections. Senator Biden has talked a lot about the

training of Iraqi security forces. I think that’s probably, in many

ways, our most important task. Iraq’s most important—the task of

the Iraqis is to find a way forward from their elections for political

reconciliation. And we can, of course, try to help in that, and do

what we can to support that effort, but that’s largely an Iraqi task.

I think for us to try and improve Iraq’s capability to defend itself.

And I will just say, I have talked with people from the field, and

I recently talked with General Casey, who was back here, and others. I think they think that they are doing relatively well on starting to get the numbers up for Iraqi security forces, but that they

do need to address these questions of leadership, which then lead

to problems with desertion and the like, and that they need to do

something that is actually quite promising, which is to work with

the Iraqis who have some ideas, themselves, about how some of

these security forces might be restructured. So we will focus very

heavily, I think, on trying to give the Iraqis, or help them get, more

capacity on the security side.

It is also the case that, of course, we will continue to seek the

terrorists, and to help them fight the war on terrorism that they

are now fully engaged in, and to try and continue to help in building capacity in the Iraqi ministries. Because, ultimately, the coalition is there because the Iraqis lack certain capacities. And if we

focus, in this next period after the election, on helping them to

build those capacities beyond where they are now, I think we will

have done a major part toward the day when less coalition help is

needed, across the board. The——

Senator HAGEL. May I——

Dr. RICE. Of course.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. ——may I just ask——

Dr. RICE. Certainly.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. ——a followup to that? How will

that change from what we have been doing? Can you give this committee some specifics of what you’ve stated? You’ve framed clearly—I think we understand what you said. I support what you—

what you’re talking about, your objective. But how will that change

from what we have been doing? Fewer troops? Less troops? More

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NATO troops? Or what will envision the change in what you’re anticipating our role to be? And connect that to an exit strategy.

Dr. RICE. Well, our role is directly proportional, I think, Senator,

to how capable the Iraqis are. And so, as the Iraqis become more

capable, then I would assume, certainly, our help will be needed

less. I am really reluctant to try to put a timetable on that, because

I think the goal is to get the mission accomplished, and that means

that the Iraqis have to be capable of some things before we lessen

our own responsibility. But we will be working with a newly elected government, and I’m quite sure that they’re going to have their

own ideas about how this—how we move forward to improve security. The Iraqis will take more and more responsibility for fighting

the terrorists, for rooting out the Ba’athists. And we have to help

them get there.

If I could just add, Senator, on—we also, of course, have a major

task of continuing, on the reconstruction front, to employ the resources that were given to the executive branch by the Congress

so that we can help the Iraqis with their reconstruction tasks. But

I see it as a diminution of our responsibility, over time, as the

Iraqis become more capable. So we need to focus on building their

capability.

Senator HAGEL. Will that require a change of policy?

Dr. RICE. I don’t think it requires a change of policy. We have

all had, over time, an evolution of attitude, which just comes from

the fact that, as you work with increasingly more representative

and legitimate Iraqi government, they have more say in how this

is all done. And I think that that’s only appropriate and right. We

are no longer in occupation of the country, as we were under the

Coalition Provisional Authority. And so, this has become a very intensive partnership with the Iraqis to get these tasks done, and I

think that will probably continue to——

Senator HAGEL. Well, let me——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——to accelerate.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. ——let me ask you, on the basis of

troops, if I have read accurately—and you’ve noted this, General

Casey’s statements regularly; when some of us were over there last

month, we met with General Casey, as well as other general officers—will that mean that the 150,000 or so American troops we

have there today will now be refocused on acceleration of training

or—what does this mean in the way of actually accomplishing what

you are talking about?

Dr. RICE. Well, we’re certainly, right now, very focused on security for the election. And while that will pass on September—on

January 30th, there will continue to be important security tasks to

make sure that the initial stages for this new government are secure. But one of the things that the Luck mission is to try and determine is what the path forward is with the Iraqis, in terms of security. Are we training the right—continuing to train the right security forces? What ought to be the roles and responsibilities of coalition forces in training, versus active security? How much can the

Iraqis take on some of these active security roles themselves? So

we thought that the time just before the election and leading to

after the election was an ideal time to have this mission. And I

think we will get some answers from that mission.

34

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Let me move to the Israel-Palestinian issue. What do you and

the President envision as a new role, or a different role, for the

United States now as a result of the Palestinian elections? For example, are you contemplating a special envoy? How are we going

to engage more deeply and widely than we have in the past? Or

are we going to? Give this committee some sense of where we’re

going in the next year.

Dr. RICE. We all believe—and most especially, the President—

that we have a really good opportunity here, given the election of

a new Palestinian leader, and given the Israeli Gaza withdrawal

plan, which is linked to the West Bank through the forced settlements that would be dismantled in the West Bank, as well. We

think this is a moment of opportunity. That means that there is

going to have to be engagement at all levels. I expect, myself, to

spend an enormous amount of effort on this activity.

I can’t substitute for the parties and their willingness to take on

their responsibilities, and that’s the message that we have to keep

sending. We’ve had to note that—how hard this road is going to be

was in evidence during this last few days, and we’ve pressed very

hard for the Palestinians to take on terrorism, because we’re not

going to get very far if there is terrorism from the Palestinian militants. But you can be sure that we will have very active engagement, because we think this is a time of responsibility.

I think I need to, for the time being, demur on the question of

a special envoy. No one has objections, in principle, to the idea of

an envoy, but it is a question of whether that is appropriate to a

particular point in time in the process that we’re involved in.

Senator HAGEL. But, as Secretary of State, you intend to be very

involved, engaged, with considerable activity as we go forward.

Dr. RICE. Absolutely. Because, Senator, I don’t think we can afford to miss this opportunity if the parties, themselves, are willing

to really take advantage of the opportunity.

Senator HAGEL. I probably have time for one question that’s

going to be on more—one more question—immigration. You noted,

in your prepared delivery—and I thought it was excellent; you covered a number of the areas that we all have interest in, and we’ll

want to go deeper into them—but you talked about exchange programs. You hit on that, I thought, very—a very important point.

Immigration reform. Is the President going to push for immigration

reform?

Dr. RICE. As you know, the President has been concerned about,

and a proponent of, immigration reform going back to the time that

he was Governor of Texas, when he faced these issues as Governor.

He has a proposal on the table for a temporary-worker program

that would serve the purpose of—purposes, in a humanitarian

sense, in that it would help to alleviate what is really a humanitarian crisis for us. It would help us economically, because matching willing workers and willing employers is an extremely important thing for our economy, when Americans—when there are jobs

that Americans will not take. It’s not an amnesty, and the President’s been very clear about that, but it also has, for our security,

real implications, because if we are not asking our border guards

and our border personnel to deal simultaneously with immigration

35

that comes out of economic circumstances, and dangerous border

infringement that comes out of terrorism, and they have a more

regularized way to deal with the former, we think that that will

make it easier to deal with some of the terrorism and concerns

about bad people coming to do bad things.

Senator HAGEL. I’m going to reintroduce my comprehensive—I

think the only bipartisan immigration reform legislation of last

year—I’m going to reintroduce it. I look forward to working with

you on this. I don’t think there is a more urgent problem America

has to deal with today—far more urgent than Social Security, in

my opinion—than this immigration reform issue. So thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Senator Sarbanes?

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

First of all, I want to welcome our new colleagues to this committee—Senator Murkowski and Senator Martinez, on your side of

the aisle; and Senator Obama, on our side of the aisle. We’re very

pleased to have them join the committee.

And, Dr. Rice, I want to join all of my colleagues in welcoming

you——

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. ——here before the committee

today.

The post for which you’ve been nominated is obviously an extremely important one, perhaps the premier post in the Cabinet.

And in an independent and interconnected world, where events

that happen thousands of miles away can affect our own economy,

our health, or our national security, literally within minutes, the

Secretary of State can make a critical difference in our everyday

lives.

In my view, a Secretary who forges meaningful partnerships to

foster peace or reduce global poverty and hunger, promote democratic values, and address emerging threats can set our country on

a course to greater security and prosperity. By the same token, I

think a Secretary who adopts a unilateralist approach in the international environment may miss important opportunities to prevent

conflicts and to build alliances. And, in that regard, I’d just note

that it’s not enough to have the ear of the President; I think the

Secretary of State must also win the ear of the world.

Before I turn to my first question, I want to note that I have

watched Senator Lugar work assiduously on this cooperative threat

reduction issue. I think he and Senator Nunn provided exemplary

leadership. And Senator Lugar, assisted by Senator Biden and others on this committee, has continued to pursue that issue. And the

only counsel I would give you is, listen to Senator Lugar on the cooperative threat reduction question. He knows the issue, he’s lived

with it, he’s invested an incredible amount of his own time and effort to try to make it work. So I would hope the administration

would, in effect, follow his counsel and guidance on this issue. I

know of no one who knows the issue better, or whose advice is

more measured and more reasoned than that of the Chairman.

I’d extend the same advice, if I may be so bold as to do so, in

terms of hoping you would listen to Senator Biden and Senator

36

Hagel in their interchange with you about Iraq. They’ve both been

there now a number of times, at some risk to themselves, obviously, as anyone who goes out there well knows. And it seems to

me, the counsel and advice they have given is perceptive, it’s measured, it’s tough-minded, and I would very much hope the administration would listen to that.

Now, my first question is based on a new book by T. R. Reid, a

very distinguished journalist. His book, which has just only recently come out, is entitled, ‘‘The United States of Europe: The

New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy.’’ And I

want to talk some economics with you here this morning. I looked

through your statement quickly, and, other than a couple of references to ‘‘prosperity’’ and to ‘‘free trade,’’ there’s not much in it

on economics. And I think that’s a very important dimension of

what we need to discuss here.

A review of this book, which recently appeared in the New York

Times, said that small things happen, of which we may not be

aware, but over time they gather, and then they become instrumental. They really end up having a very significant impact. Let

me just quote here, ‘‘Sometimes major events take place quietly,

their import obscured by the hubbub of more arresting happenings.

Only with time is the shift perceptible.’’

And in that regard, I’d like to show you just three charts that

set the context. First is a chart that shows the U.S. Trade deficit.

[The charts to which Senator Sarbanes referred appear in Appendix II to this hearing transcript.]

Since Senator Dodd is an important part of our efforts to get a

trade surplus, I don’t want to close him out of this discussion.

Senator DODD. I’ve been in your shadow for years.

Senator SARBANES. As this chart shows, it’s pretty apparent

what’s happened here. There has been an incredible deterioration

in recent years in the U.S. trade deficit. And it’s estimated that

we’re now running a trade deficit of well over $600 billion a year,

by far the largest trade deficit in our history. Now, of course, when

you look at the current accounts—which is a somewhat broader

measure—we have the same situation. Again, we see an incredible

deterioration in the current-account situation, and much of it highly accelerated in the last four or five years. And the end consequence of running these large trade deficits and these large current-account deficits—astronomical for us, in historical terms—is to

give us this marked deterioration of our net investment position.

Our net investment position is now going well over the three-trillion mark.

Now, it seems to me, this ought to be a matter of very, very real

concern. Chairman Greenspan, testifying before the Congress, said

that ‘‘the rate at which the U.S. is running current-account deficits

and accumulating external debt is unsustainable.’’ He said, ‘‘countries that have gone down this path invariably have run into trouble, and so would we.’’ And just a few days ago, the president of

the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Timothy Geithner, said in a

speech, ‘‘The size and concentration of external imbalances in the

system are at an unprecedented scale, between 5 to 6 percent of

GDP, in the case of the U.S. current account deficit.’’ He concluded,

37

‘‘what’s new is that we are significantly more dependent today on

the confidence of the rest of the world in U.S. economic policy and

the safety and stability of our financial markets.’’

Now, the Economist recently said, talking about the dollar as the

reserve currency and the challenge now to the dollar that’s coming

from the euro, ‘‘Never before has the guardian of the world’s main

reserve currency been its biggest net debtor.’’ ‘‘Never before has the

guardian of the world’s main reserve currency been its biggest net

debtor.’’ And the Financial Times, earlier this year, in an editorial

entitled ‘‘Borrowing From the Rest of the World,’’ warned, ‘‘Like

Tennessee Williams’ ill-fated character Blanche Dubois, the U.S.

has long been dependent on the kindness of strangers. Foreigners’

hitherto insatiable appetite for dollar assets is what has enabled

the U.S. to keep running on credit for so long. Like Miss Dubois’

dysfunctional relationships, this one is symbiotic but potentially

hazardous.’’

How serious do you regard this situation as being?

Dr. RICE. Well, I know, Senator, that the President and his economic team regard it as a serious set of issues that they will be

dealing with. The President has talked about the importance of the

fundamentals of the American economy, strengthening the American economy, the importance of a strong dollar, which continues

to be our policy. He’s talked about the need for budget discipline.

And I think he is working toward a budget that will express that.

Senator SARBANES. Do you consider this a matter for your agenda? After all, it affects American power and the ability to project

power, and there’s a lot of suggestion now that the economic basis

on which we can project power is being substantially eroded.

Dr. RICE. Yes, Senator, of course it is an important—the strength

of the American economy is an important issue for American

power, and, therefore, an important issue for the Secretary of

State. I do think that the help that our diplomacy and our foreign

policy can give to a strong American economy comes, for instance,

through trade and through the efforts that we make to promote

free trade, and to promote it on a basis in which the playing field

is level. The United States is engaged in, through the person who

will become my deputy, I hope, if you confirm him, Bob Zoellick,

a very active trade agenda through the Doha development agenda,

which will improve growth worldwide, but also will improve the

American economy, because we’re believers in free trade. I

think——

Senator SARBANES. But the trade balance——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——I think that is one way that we can

help.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. ——has worsened markedly. I

mean, something’s wrong with the set of policies we’re pursuing, it

seems to me, if we’re going to have the kind of erosion in the trade

balance that we have seen, particularly in recent years. It’s a very

negative figure. And, of course, every year the figure is negative,

the amount of debt that we owe overseas and our dependence upon

others increases.

Dr. RICE. Senator, there are a number of factors that have contributed to that, and the—I do think that the economic team is

aware and trying to deal with those factors in the American econVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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omy. Where the State Department and our diplomacy can be supportive is really in two ways—first, to promote a trade agenda that

is—that levels the playing field, that makes certain that the rules

of the trading system are followed. For instance, many of the

changes, economically, are coming as the result of a strong and

growing China, and China’s role in the world economy. The need

to make certain that China is, in its growing strength in the economy, playing by the rules of the international economy, is enhanced

by the work that we did to have China accede to the WTO. We

now, of course, have to make certain that China is living up to its

obligations on the WTO. So we spend a good deal of time, for instance, trying to get the Chinese to react to intellectual-propertyrights issues.

Another way that the State Department can help with this very

important agenda is to make certain that the markets of others are

as open to us as our markets are to them. And that’s an activity

that I would expect to be involved in as a part of my diplomacy,

I’ve been involved in as National Security Advisor. If we’re not to

have deformations in the way that the international economy

works, then people cannot be protectionist.

Those are some of the ways in which I think the diplomacy can

support a strong economic policy. And I agree with you completely

that a strong economy is very important to our national—to our

international standing.

I would note that we are still the fastest-growing of the major

developed countries of the world, so we have considerable economic

strength.

Senator SARBANES. Well, we’re growing in a way, though, that

causes us to become increasingly mortgaged to others. China and

Japan now are holding tremendous dollar reserves, which then, of

course, play into the trade relationship much to their advantage,

so that we become more dependent. They’re able to skew the trade

arrangement to their advantage, which makes us more dependent,

and the vicious circle continues in a downward spiral.

But I see my time is expired. I may revisit this in another round.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Chafee?

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And congratulations and welcome, Dr. Rice.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

Senator CHAFEE. Senator Feinstein mentioned how proud your

parents John and Angelina must be, and, here in spirit, would be,

rather. And out of curiosity, did your father know Martin Luther

King at all?

Dr. RICE. He did. And—he was a minister in Birmingham, and

they all did, and everyone admired him. We also had a number of

friends who worked with him, like Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth

and—who was a giant in our community.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, Dr. King’s one of my heroes.

Dr. RICE. Yes. Mine, too.

Senator CHAFEE. Senator Hagel mentioned the distinguished career of your predecessor, Secretary Powell, and I’m curious as to

how you might look at the improvements as we go forward, or how

39

you—what would you see, as you come in now, as the new Secretary of State—what improvements might be occurring——

Dr. RICE. Okay.

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. ——in the State Department?

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator.

The goal here is to build on the considerable achievements of

Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage. I think that it is

well recognized that they did a great deal to improve the fundamentals in the State Department, and I would hope to follow on

that. For instance, the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, which

brought whole classes of new people into the diplomatic corps. We

can’t afford, again, to get to the place where we skipped several

years in hiring of Foreign Service officers. That—you pay the price

for that later down the road. You pay for the price for it early, too,

because you don’t bring in that new, young energy. And so, I would

hope to continue to press the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.

I know that the Secretary was, kind of, appalled when he saw

the state of technology in the State Department. And Senator Allen

has had a particular interest in this. I gather—I don’t know if it’s

apocryphal or not—that people were still using WANGs in certain

parts of the State Department—not that there was anything wrong

with WANGs; it’s just a few generations back. And they have done

a lot on the IT side. And I would expect to continue to try to help

people have those tools.

I will say, I’ve had briefings about this, and they’ve made wonderful investments in the infrastructure, the hardware. I, myself,

chaired Stanford’s executive committee on the changing out of

Stanford’s information technology systems. And Stanford, even

though it was in the heart of the Silicon Valley, had a terrible set

of legacy systems. The hard part now is to give people the training

and the software and the ability to use that technology in their

jobs, and I would hope we could do that.

They’ve made tremendous progress, I think, on the training of

people. Colin’s emphasis on leadership training and skills, management skills, for the State Department personnel is extremely important. We have to make sure that people are well paid and that

they are valued.

But the most important thing—and here they’ve made tremendous progress—is on the security of our personnel abroad. We operate in a very dangerous environment in which everybody—many,

many bad people would like nothing better than to wreak havoc

against American interests abroad. And so, the efforts that have

been made to build new security into the facilities and to revamp

our most vulnerable posts will be a very high priority for me. The

first meetings that I had were with the Under Secretary for Management, and I would expect to make that a large part of the agenda.

Senator CHAFEE. Do you see any significant changes ahead?

Dr. RICE. Well, there are—there’s always need for change, because, of course, conditions are different. And I think we have to

continually review and update the skills of our diplomatic corps.

We’re asking our diplomatic corps to do more, actively, in, for instance, helping transform whole societies, getting in and helping

the Iraqis with their currency exchange, or getting in and helping

40

the Nigerians root out corruption. These are skills that are of a

more active transformational diplomacy, and one that probably

wasn’t really foreseen in the earlier stages of building Foreign

Service skills. So I look forward to working with those people, but

also with Members of this committee, who I know have some interest in skills development, to see if we can push that envelope.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, thank you.

As Chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee of the Foreign

Relations Committee, I’m interested in your comments on the

Israeli-Palestinian issue. And in your opening statement, you

talked about, ‘‘America seeks justice and dignity and a viable independent, democratic state for the Palestinian people.’’ Can you expound—expand at all on ‘‘viable?’’ What do you see as a viable Palestinian state?

Dr. RICE. Well, there are several ways to think about viability.

One is that it has to have territory that makes it viable. It cannot

be territory that is so broken up that it can’t function as a state.

And I think that’s now well understood. It has to have economic

viability. And, there, it probably needs to have economic viability

in relationship to other states around it—to Jordan, to Israel, and

to others. And viability also comes from democratic institutions.

One of the things that I think we didn’t pay enough attention to

in the past is the development of democratic institutions in the Palestinian territories. In a time when we are promoting the progress

of democracy in the Middle East, the Palestinians are a people who

should be able to adopt those habits and take them up. They are

a talented, in many ways educated population, a population that

has tried, even under very limited circumstances, to have some, at

least, pluralism in their politics. And so, viability, I think, also has

a political or a democracy dimension that we need to pay attention

to.

Senator CHAFEE. I’m sure that many Palestinian moderates

would like to hear more specifics on what might constitute a viable

Palestinian state. Are we looking at something perhaps along the

Geneva Accord lines?

Dr. RICE. Well, I—as the President said when he met with Prime

Minister Sharon back in—I think it was May—we have to recognize that the parties are going to determine their borders, that it

is not for us to prejudge what those borders might be. There has

been a lot of negotiation. I think we will—they will need to look

at what has been looked at before. But the June 24th, 2002, speech

really focused on some fundamentals to get us to the place that discussions of final status would be successful. And those fundamentals now seem to be starting to come into place. The new Palestinian leadership—I think, a Palestinian leadership, at least in

word—is devoted to fighting terror. It needs to be, indeed, as devoted to fighting terror. An international community that, whenever I talk to people, is quite devoted to, and taken with, the idea

of helping the Palestinians to build those democratic institutions,

to reconstruct, economically, in areas which Israel leaves. We have,

in Israel, a new coalition that was built around the idea that Israel

will disengage from the Gaza and from the four settlements in the

West Bank.

41

And we now really—I’d just like to mention the neighbors. The

Arab states have responsibilities here, too. And they can’t incite violence against Israel, on the one hand, and call for peace and a

two-state solution, on the other. And so, we’ve got work to do with

them.

But, as the fundamentals are beginning to come into place, everyone can be certain that it is a very high priority to seize this

moment to try and push toward the day when we have interlocutors who can work on the final status issues.

Senator CHAFEE. In the news today, some were calling upon the

new Palestinian leadership to be more proactive against some of

the violence which is occurring within their own ranks. The previous Palestinian leadership did not intend to go—to do that, under

Yasser Arafat, the danger being that once Palestinians take up

arms amongst themselves, you could have Palestinian civil war.

How do you—how do we go forward with that dilemma?

Dr. RICE. Yes. Well, I do believe that Abu Mazen made a good

start in what he said, which is that there really is no route to a

Palestinian state through violence. And that means that he is appealing, in my—to my mind, correctly—to those Palestinians who

realize that the use of terror techniques, the use of violence is not

going to result in the fulfillment of their national aspirations.

Having said that, the people who insist on violence, and insist on

terrorism, have got to be isolated and, ultimately, disarmed. The

Palestinians are fond of saying, ‘‘There has to be one authority, one

gun.’’ We can help with that, because the restructuring of the Palestinian security forces is something that we have helped with in

the past, and should now, with other neighbors like Egypt or Jordan, be helping with in the future. The construction of unified Palestinian security forces that are accountable to the Palestinian

leadership and are not, in effect, armed gangs is probably one of

our most important tasks.

So I don’t see it as a matter of civil war; but, rather, as a matter

of the isolation of those who are unwilling to pursue the aspirations

of the Palestinian people through peaceful means.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Rice. I see my

time is up. I just returned from a trip with Senator Dodd and Senator Nelson——

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. ——to Latin America, and I have

to say, Senator Dodd was a good leader of this trip—he has perfect

Spanish—and a good ambassador for the United States as we travel in the region.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Chafee. And what a

wonderful introduction of our questioner.

Senator Dodd?

Senator DODD. Bienvenido a nuestra commite.

Dr. RICE. You’ll stimulate me to answer in Russian. I’m sorry,

Senator.

Senator DODD. I’m not going to try and ask you questions in

Spanish. Welcome to the committee. And, Mr. Chairman, thank

you very much.

Let me also join my colleagues in welcoming our new Members

to the committee—Mel Martinez, who I got to know when he was

42

Secretary of HUD and appeared before my other committee, the

Banking Committee, on numerous occasions; and Senator Murkowski, of course, a colleague from Alaska; and Barack Obama,

new Member from Illinois. We’re delighted to have all three Members here.

Senator SARBANES. Senator Martinez has gone on the Banking

Committee. He wants to work over his successors.

Senator DODD. I know. I’ll expect you to ask tough questions in

those hearings and through the confirmation process.

Let me also, Mr. Chairman, commend you for your opening statement, and some very wonderful ideas that you’ve raised here. I

particularly want to commend you for working hard, I think all of

us will join you on this side, to get an authorization bill out of this

committee as early as we can, by March. And that’s a—we’ve done

it once before in my tenure on this committee, when you chaired

the committee a number of years ago. It was a very exciting time

for the committee, and I look forward to working with you to

achieve that reality.

Let me also join with Senator Sarbanes and Senator Biden in

commending you and our former colleague, Senator Nunn, for the

efforts in the Nunn-Lugar approach. You and I have talked about

this on several occasions over the last year or so, and I’m heartened to hear you raise it again as such a priority. I think it’s critically important. There’s still time for us to make a difference in

this area. And, Dr. Rice, I appreciate your response to Senator

Lugar’s question in expressing a strong interest to see the ideas

that Senator Lugar has offered are ones that you could endorse and

support and urge the President to do, as well.

Let me also join Senator Hagel in—this is a transformational

time, as you talked about, for American foreign policy. We’d be remiss in this committee if we did not express our deep sense of gratitude to Colin Powell and Richard Armitage and the staff they put

together. He’s been a tremendous public servant, and whatever else

life holds for him, he deserves our commendation for the job he’s

done for our nation. So we thank him for that, as well.

And I want to thank my colleagues for raising some of the issues

they have. Obviously, Iraq is a major current foreign policy question and, rightfully, would dominate a lot of our conversation here

today.

As Senator Chafee mentioned, Senator Chafee and Senator Nelson and I just completed an eight-day trip to Latin America—Venezuela, Paraguay, Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador, coming back. And

I want to focus some attention on that in this first round. There

are other questions I have.

There are roughly 600 million people in this hemisphere, excluding ourselves, who look to the United States for leadership. Two of

our most important trading partners—Mexico and Canada—are, of

course, in this hemisphere. The issues that Senator Sarbanes has

raised about economic policy are absolutely on target and one that

we should be paying much more attention to, in my view. Because,

as we have found over the last eight days traveling in South America, these issues are the ones they care the most about, in many

ways, and they’re the ones the absence of our attention to these

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stand—certainly, 9/11 diverted our attention elsewhere, the events

in the Middle East have certainly dominated our attention. But I

want you to know, at least my observations over the last week or

so, is, we’re in trouble in this hemisphere, Dr. Rice. We’re in deep

trouble in this hemisphere. And I—others may know other parts of

the world well, and certainly there have been great changes in

China and India, Russia, the Middle East, certainly in Africa, but

we need to get back on track in this hemisphere. And I’m going to

ask you a broader question about what direction we’re going to

take here.

Let me tell you, just briefly, some of the things that we found

over the last seven or eight days. And my colleagues, Senator Nelson, Senator Chafee, can add or detract from these conclusions.

We found facing—these governments facing major demands from

their citizens, with inadequate resources to meet those demands. In

fact, the budget indications coming out of the administration are

significantly—going to provide significantly less resources, in terms

of aid to this part of the world, than has been the case in previous

years. You mentioned the important years of 1947, ’48, ’49, and

thereafter, in terms of our efforts to grapple with the great challenge of the second half of the 20th century. Certainly, one of the

great speeches given, that set the tone for that, was Harry Truman’s only inaugural address, in which point 4 would set up the

U.S. aid missions. It made a huge difference in the 1950s and ’60s,

the Alliance for Progress that Senator Kennedy initiated. These

ideas had strong economic components to them as we grappled

with the great challenges facing choices in those days between

what the Soviet Union offered and what we offered. So we found

great demands on the part of the citizens of these countries.

We found government institutions that have been weakened and

co-opted by unsolved internal political disputes. We found government officials interested in concluding bilateral free-trade agreements, not only because it would improve access to our markets,

but because they know it can be a means of institutionalizing reforms, that it will mean more jobs and incomes for their citizens.

We found government leaders concerned about the declinein U.S.

resources available to assist them fight against narco-terrorists,

terrorists ready to take advantage of the lawlessness created by the

systemic corruption that exists generally throughout the region,

and especially in the tri-border area of Paraguay and Brazil and

Argentina, where Muslim organizations are reportedly raising and

laundering money to support their international ambitions.

We found government leaders frustrated by the suspension of

U.S. military assistance and training to their military services because of our fixation with the international criminal court, as codified by the American Servicemen’s Protection Act, which links continued assistance to these areas to the signing of the so-called Article 98 Agreements of the United States. And I heard this from

American military personnel, Dr. Rice—not from foreigners, but

our own personnel worried about placing so much emphasis on that

point we’re stopping the training so necessary to build those relationships in this century with people in that part of the world.

We found government leaders desirous of positive relationships

with the United States, and disappointed that our government

44

hasn’t made relations with them a higher national priority. Even

President Chavez expressed an interest in improved relations with

the United States. Putting aside the obvious issue that’s going on

in the last several days, it’s going to be critically important that

we try and do something new with Venezuela than the continued

policies of isolation, in my view.

So I’d like to get from you, if I could, after these opening comments, Are we going to have a new direction here in this critical

part of the world? Senator Hagel mentioned immigration. No other

issue. Vicente Fox, the one issue that he was hoping he’d get some

resolution from over the last four years was on immigration, and

nothing was done. One speech that I’m aware of, no legislation introduced, no effort up here to make a difference. It’s a crippling

economic problem here at home and a sword of continuing contention between one of our very, very important allies around the

globe and the closest neighbor to us with some of the important

issues. What are we going to do about that? And are we going to

change some direction here? Or are we going to stick with the policies of the past that are creating some serious, serious problems in

this part of the world for us?

Dr. RICE. Well, thank you, Senator Dodd. And thank you, also,

for the time that you did spend. And I look forward to talking to

you more about the future of Latin America, Western Hemisphere.

It’s obviously extremely critical to our agenda.

Let me start with Mexico and Canada, because the relationship

with our closest neighbors—a good policy begins with the relationship with your closest neighbors. I do think we’ve made a lot of

progress with Mexico and Canada on a number of issues. For instance, on the Smart Border Initiative, which has helped us to solidify and codify our homeland-security concerns, it was something

that we needed to do in the face of 9/11 and the terrorist threats

and the relationships that our Homeland Security Secretaries have

been able to forge so that we get to a position where the borders

are allowing in commerce, but not allowing in those who might

harm us. And that was very important, because I remember, in the

very first days after September 11th, that some of our efforts to secure the border were actually very quickly going to prevent commerce. And so, we needed to find the right balance. And we’ve

made a lot of progress, in terms of the use of technology. And those

Smart Border initiatives will continue.

We also, with our Mexican and Canadian counterparts, are talking a lot about what the next steps are in our NAFTA relationships, because, as—Senator Sarbanes talked about some of the economic difficulties the United States may face, or some of the difficulties we may face if we’re—if we should have problems in our

economy—we also face a lot of competition around the world. And

as we have watched Europe and the European Union integrate its

economic policies, I think it has raised questions about what the

future can look like for NAFTA and for the NAFTA states to extend those relationships. And we’ve had discussions about what the

next phases are. And I think that is a way forward, and I would

look forward to having extensive discussions about how we improve

the competitiveness of Northern America as we face competition

from the rest of the world.

45

We also have been very active in Central America. And I would

agree with you, there are very grave challenges now to some of

these regimes. And we don’t want to repeat what has tended to be

a cycle in Latin America of democratic developments followed by

authoritarian ones. And I don’t think that we have to.

In Central America, and in Latin America, we have to recognize

that, while there are, in many of these places, growth rates that

are very, very high for these regions, that the ability for these

countries to actually deal with the problems and demands of their

people are—that’s really the next step. And we had, at Monterey,

a number of discussions about developing the human potential of

these countries, worrying about education and worrying about literacy and worrying about economic opportunity for people. These

are, in many ways, very highly stratified societies, and we need, in

the United States, to associate ourselves, I think, with the struggle

of those who are trying to overcome that stratification. We can’t

just associate ourselves with an old order. We have to be concerned

about the indigenous peoples that are trying to find their rightful

place in a political and economic system. Our own history should

tell us that that’s an extremely important task ahead.

So it is a very big agenda to do what the President has been trying to do, which is to promote democratic development and democratic institutions, to begin to marry those democratic institutions

with economic progress for the peoples of the region.

Certainly, one of the ways that we can contribute to the twin

progress of democracy and economic development is through trade,

and we have had a number of successful free-trade agreements. We

had the free-trade agreement with Chile. We are—you, in the Senate, will be contemplating, at some point, a free-trade agreement,

the CAFTA agreement. We continue to work, with Brazil as our cochair, to try and push forward on the Free Trade of the Americas

Agreement. So trade is a big part of this agenda.

If I might just take one other moment to say that we also are

trying to work relationships, key relationships in this region, in a

very aggressive way. And I would focus for just a moment on the

relationship with Brazil, which I think is extremely critical to the

region.

There are others, as well, but the President and President Lula

have met on a couple of occasions. We had, in the earliest stage,

a meeting of both cabinets to try and have an agenda going forward. Because if we think about the real challenges, those are economic, social mobility, education and literacy for people, and how

that can be done within democratic institutions so that the challenges don’t have to come from outside of democratic institutions,

we need partners in that. Brazil is such a partner, but so are others. And I would hope to really spend some time with the Organization of American States making certain that the agenda of promoting democratic development, holding accountable leaders who

do not govern democratically, even if they are democratically elected, that that would be an agenda that we could mobilize around.

Senator DODD. Well, I thank you for your broad answer. My time

is up here. Let me—just a couple of points.

One, this underscores the point Senator Sarbanes was making,

in my view, that—I, too, was a bit disappointed, reading your openVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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ing statements, about the parsity of—paucity, rather, of comments

about economics and the importance of the issue. You’ve highlighted this exactly, and you’re correct, this is part of the issue. But

I think it’s critically important that we pursue these issues without

expressing yet, until we see them, these final agreements on these

trade agreements.

But I would hope—and if you want to quickly answer—Are we

going to have these trade agreements up here in short order? You

and I both know that if you wait—even good trade agreements, if

coming up at the wrong time up here, the circumstances, can fail.

And if they fail, I think the implications could be serious for the

region.

So, quickly, are we going to see CAFTA and the DR Trade Agreement coming up, the Andean Agreement, which they’re working on

right now? Are we going to see those sooner rather than later, an

administration priority?

Dr. RICE. Well, we will certainly work with the Congress on this.

But we, obviously, would like to see these agreements sooner rather than later.

Senator DODD. And let me just comment, please, I think Senators Chafee and Nelson and I would tell you, as well, we were

very impressed, Mr. Chairman, with the competency and quality of

the State Department personnel we ran into in these countries.

I would hope, as you’re making choices about the senior positions, there’s some wonderfully talented, knowledgeable people

about this part of the world, and my hope would be that you’d put

a team together that would reflect the very things you’re suggesting in response to my questions. Because I think you will agree

with me: for reasons we may understand, we’ve really got to pay

more attention to this part of the world.

Dr. RICE. Thank you. Senator, may I just have one moment? You

asked—you mentioned Venezuela, and I’d like to just address that

quickly, if I may.

We have a long and good history with Venezuela, and long ties.

I think it’s extremely unfortunate that the Chavez government has

not been constructive. And we do have to be vigilant, and to demonstrate that we know the difficulties that that government is

causing for its neighbors, its close association with Fidel Castro, in

Cuba—still the only empty chair at the OAS is that of Cuba, because it’s not a democratically-elected government. And those relationships are deeply concerning to us, and to me. And we are very

concerned about a democratically-elected leader who governs in an

illiberal way. And some of the steps that have been taken against

the media, against opposition, I think, are really very deeply troubling. And we’re going to have to, as a hemisphere that signed a

democracy charter, be devoted to making sure that those who

signed that charter live up to it.

Senator DODD. Well, I appreciate your saying that. But it’s a

two-way street, Dr. Rice. It requires we work on it, as well. It’s not

the 1960s or ’70s, and there are people down there—you mentioned

President Lula. I can go back and show you statements that President Lula made that would compete with anything President Chavez has said, yet we’ve found a way to work with this new president. My strong suggestion is, find ways to do this. Going back and

47

repeating these statements over and over again only digs the hole

deeper and deeper. And that’s an important relationship, it’s important in the hemisphere. We need to work at it. My hope is, you

will.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd. I congratulate you and Senator Chafee and Senator Nelson on the trip. I

know Senator Coleman has been very active in the area, too. And

I would underline the request that we really have people in the Department who are on top of the situation. I think that Senator

Dodd makes a good point, a group of people really interested in the

area, forwarding these difficult situations.

Let me call now on Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess

this is on. And I’d thank all the Members preceding me for their

questions.

And, Dr. Rice, I’ve thoroughly enjoyed listening to your statement and your very positive life story. Four years ago, as a rookie

Senator, I was introducing Secretary Powell, or General Powell, to

this committee, a genuine American hero. Your personal life story,

and his, although in different backgrounds, certainly are an inspiration and, I think, very helpful for us as we, as a country, try to

advance freedom for people all over the world.

And I do think that when you talk about your life story, and

bringing up Birmingham, I would encourage some of my colleagues,

there’s a civil-rights pilgrimage every year. Last year, I went on it.

Senator Coleman was there—Senator DeWine, a few others. This

year, Senator Corzine, on the Democrat side, me on the Republican

side, will be heading a delegation there for the 40th anniversary

of the Voting Rights Act. And it goes—you go to Birmingham, that

church that was bombed that I know that you are a member of, as

well as Montgomery and Selma. And I found it a very moving, profoundly impacting, and very meaningful event for me. And a lot of

those who—now, Dr. King, obviously, is gone, but many of those

who were involved in the civil-rights movement are actually still

alive, and you can talk and question them on what they were trying to do.

Now, Dr. Rice, you mentioned the future, which is important.

And some people call the 20th century ‘‘America’s Century.’’ I believe, as you do, that the 21st century needs to be ‘‘Freedom’s Century.’’ Individual freedom, regardless of race or gender or ethnicity

or religion, are key. I look at those as some of—the four pillars of

freedom or individual liberty are: freedom of religion, freedom of

speech—you used the town-hall test—three is private ownership of

property, and, fourth, the rule of law to protect those rights, and

constitutional rule. And we do learn from history. That’s why I like

reading and listening to your statement.

You referenced Truman—President Truman and Acheson and so

forth, and—1947 to 1949, and that is fine, that was the beginning

of the Cold War. I will say, though, that President Ronald Reagan,

George Schultz, Cap Weinberger and that administration were the

ones who changed that dynamic of the Cold War from one of containment and coexistence to the advancement of freedom. Some

criticized President Reagan for calling the Soviet Union—in my

48

view, rightfully—‘‘The Evil Empire.’’ They criticized him for going

to the Brandenburg Gate and telling Mr. Gorbachev to ‘‘Tear down

that wall,’’ but that’s actually what did happen. Because of that,

there are now hundreds of millions of people tasting that sweet

nectar of liberty in Central Europe, Friends and allies, not just in

the war on terror, but also economically, thanks to that leadership.

One of the things that was key in those years was Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. Presently, there’s still Radio and TV

Marti, insofar as Cuba is concerned.

One of the concerns that I have presently, insofar as the Arab

world and, more particularly, Iraq, is—we may grouse about what

TV stations people may watch or what radio they may listen to.

There are so many satellite dishes that you see in Iraq. I would

like to get your views—and Senator Biden brought this up in his

opening statement, just a glancing blow of it. What is your view of

what we can do with the Board of Broadcasting Governors to find

a way of—not propaganda, not music, but just facts——

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator ALLEN [continuing]. ——about the United States, our

motivation, or just the concepts of freedom, so that the people of

Iraq and others in the Arab world have a fair and balanced view

of the United States and our purposes and the concepts of individual liberty?

Dr. RICE. Yes. Well, we really do have to enhance our efforts, I

think, in getting our word out, and getting ‘‘the word’’ out. And I

used ‘‘the word’’ advisedly, because Radio Free Europe and Voice

of America and Radio Marti are about telling the truth, not about

propagandizing, and we have to make certain that people that otherwise don’t have access to the truth receive it. We also have to

make certain that people who are hearing what are sometimes just

incredibly amazing propaganda and lies about our policy have alternative sources of information.

And so, I would expect that, as the part of a broad public-diplomacy effort, which I really want to emphasize, I think this is something that we really have to pay attention to. We’ve done some

good things, we’ve done some good things with al Hurra, which is

the Arab-language television satellite station. We have done some

good things with Radio Farda and Radio Sawa. Obviously, we’ve

done some good things with Radio Marti. But—and TV Marti—but

there is, perhaps, in this war of ideas, nothing more important

than getting out the truth.

And so, I look forward to working with the Broadcasting Board

of Governors, respecting the line that is there, that has been observed between the State Department and the Board, but recognizing that if we’re going to win the war of ideas, then we’re going

to have to really compete on the playing field a lot better than

we’re competing right now.

I think it’s broadcasting, but I also look forward to broadening

our exchanges and our efforts to get people here so that they know

what America is about. Some of our student exchanges have been

probably our most valuable policies. I remember sitting in many

places where the prime minister or the economics minister or the

foreign minister were people who studied in the United States, and

they obviously have a different view of us.

49

So I can’t think of a more important task.

Senator ALLEN. Well, count me as one who’s going to want to

work with you to make sure that we’re getting news and information out to people in those areas. We actually don’t have the same

problems we have with jamming, say, to——

Dr. RICE. Right.

Senator ALLEN [continuing]. ——Cuba or with the former Soviet

Union in that regard.

Now, when you talk about students, let me go to the second

issue, and that has to do with visas. You mentioned in your remarks, ‘‘America must remain open to visitors, workers, and students from around the world.’’ I hear from business leaders, from

those in research and also in the scholarly or the collegial—in the

literal sense—community how difficult it is for people to get visas.

Clearly, after 9/11, we do need to have better information. The consulates all have to have the information that Defense Intelligence

has, and the CIA, so that visas are not granted to people who

should never be allowed into this country. However, in between

there, of completely shutting it down, and with these long delays,

versus no scrutiny whatsoever, in my view, are ways that we can

be utilizing technology. Your predecessor, Secretary Powell, has

done a great job in upgrading the technology, so at least they can

e-mail back here in—within some of the embassies.

The technologies on visas, whether it’s a variety of biometrics,

need to be implemented. We need to show the lead, here in this

country, clearly harmonizing, particularly with Europe and certain

Asian countries where we do have a lot of visitors, whether they

are for tourism, whether it’s for business, whether it’s research, or

for our universities. Can you share with me and our committee

what you envision of utilizing better biometrics and ensuring security while also stopping this—or reducing the lengthy, inhibiting

time involved in acquiring a visa for somebody who is a safe traveler to come to this country?

Dr. RICE. Well, obviously, after September 11th we had to worry

about who was inside the borders, and I think we took a number

of steps that were very important and long overdue. But it is also

important to remain open.

Now, I—the State Department, should I be confirmed, under my

leadership would be resolute and attentive to the security issues

and the kind of policies about biometric passports and biometric

identification. I want to look at where we are on that issue and—

to make sure that we can get the standard in place so that when

we require others to have it in place, that we have been in the

lead. It’s obviously the case that you can’t ask others to do what

you won’t do. And so, I will pay a lot of attention to that, and spend

some time understanding whatever impediments there are to getting that done.

As to the visa policies, themselves, and the slowness, I would

very much like to have the time—and also the counsel of this committee, because I think it’s the one issue that came up when I

talked to almost every Member of this committee—to see what we

can do to improve this situation. It’s partly—a lot has been done.

Secretary Powell and Secretary Ridge worked very hard on it. They

made available some information-sharing between various agencies

50

that has made it quicker. We put a lot of stress and pressure on

our consular people in this process, and I appreciate their good

works.

But there is clearly and certainly more that we can do. And I

look forward to working with Judge Chernoff, if he is confirmed, to

see what we can do to give a sense of greater openness to people

who want to come here, not to harm us, but to be a part of this

great experience that is America.

I am a big proponent of, particularly, student exchanges, having

been, myself, in a place that had a lot of foreign students. It’s the

best policy that we can have. Universities will have to play their

part in helping us to make sure that the policies that they are carrying out help with the security.

But this is something that I’m going to pay a lot of attention to,

Senator.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Dr. Rice. I look forward to working

with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.

Senator Kerry, as you—before you came in this morning, Senator

Biden paid tribute to your service on the committee, and let me

join him. We’re proud that a Member of our committee was a candidate for President of the United States, and we’re delighted that

you are here today.

We recognize you for your questions.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, I indicated to

Senator Kerry. I am very disappointed that he’s back. But I am

happy to see him.

Senator KERRY. Well, Mr. Chairman, I wish we could have translated your pride into some votes, but thank you, anyway. But I respect the pride, and I love your friendship, and I thank you for it

very, very much. And to my friend Joe, the Ranking Member, I

want to thank him also for his comments. I actually heard them

back in the office, and I wanted to thank you personally, both of

you.

I guess it’s, sort of, good to be back.

Dr. Rice, welcome. Welcome to the world of oaths and testimony

and congressional accountability, which I tried so hard to distance

myself from for awhile.

I admire, enormously, your personal story. I admire the road

you’ve traveled. I admire your relationship with the President,

which is obviously special. And he certainly has the right and prerogative, as we all know, as President, to make choices. You are

going to be confirmed, and everybody knows that. But without anything personal at all, whether or not it is with my vote is yet to

be determined.

I have reservations. And they are not personal in any way whatsoever. But they do go to the story and trail of the last four years.

And I even listened closely to your answer to Senator Biden a few

moments ago about troops, and the numbers. And, frankly, your

answer disturbed me.

Despite Paul Bremer saying he thought they needed more troops,

despite General Shinseki talking about more troops, despite the acknowledged mistake by so many people, certainly all the leaders I

51

met with in the region in recent days, about the disbanding of the

military, the de-Ba’athification that went as deep as it did, despite

the failure to guard ammo dumps, the weapons of which are now

being turned on our troops, despite the failure to guard nuclear facilities, when, after all, the purpose of the invasion was to deal

with weapons of mass destruction, despite the inability to deliver

services immediately, despite the security level that we have today,

you sat there this morning and suggested it was the right number

of troops, contrary to the advice of most thoughtful people who

have been analyzing this.

The Chairman of this committee, at one point, said that he

thought the administration’s efforts with respect to the delivery of

aid, et cetera, was embarrassing. The Ranking Member on their

side, Senator Hagel, thought it was both pitiful and even reached

a zone of dangerous. So there’s, sort of, this hanging-in-there to the

status quo, which is worrisome. And then, afterwards, you said,

‘‘Well, there were unforeseen consequences, unforeseen events, because the army melted into the countryside.’’ Well, that wasn’t unforeseen. That’s exactly what they did in ’91. And we, in fact, encouraged them to do it, because we leafletted and broadcast and

told them that if they disbanded, we would pay them, and they

would not suffer any consequences for putting down their arms and

going home and getting out of uniform. So we told them to do that.

But we didn’t pay them. We went back on that promise. And they

got angry and organized.

Now, having just come back from there—I haven’t been as many

times as Joe, but—in Fallujah and Kirkuk and Mosul, I talked with

Iraqis, who are trying to make this work, who are desperate about

the lack of support from Baghdad, the lack of resources coming.

And they almost feel forgotten by Baghdad.

And it seems to me that if the administration is going to—you

know, we went in to rescue Iraq from Saddam Hussein. Now I

think we have to rescue our policy from ourselves. And what I

learned from every single leader over there—and, you know, I don’t

come back with any joy in this, but it’s, sort of, the reality we’ve

got to deal with. We’ve got kids who are dying over there. They’re

going on missions that, in my judgment, are questionable in what

they’re going to achieve, in terms of the population and the overall

goal. I hope General Luck comes back with some judgments about

that.

Our troops are stunning. Superb. You know that, I know that,

the President knows that, every American knows that. But they deserve and want a policy. They ask questions, you know, ‘‘How are

we going to do this? How are we going to get out of here? How are

we going to take care of this business?’’ And what I came away

from was an unbelievable sense of willingness of the communityat-large—European leaders, Arab leaders—to do more, to be able

to be more a part of this.

My question to you is several-fold, and there are a lot of questions I want to ask, in a number of areas, obviously—North Korea

proliferation, the Middle East, a whole host of things. But all we’ve

have time for in these rounds is probably this first initial effort.

Every Arab leader I asked, ‘‘Do you want Iraq to fail?’’ says no.

‘‘Do you think you will be served if there’s a civil war?’’ They say

52

no. ‘‘Do you believe that failure is a threat to the region and to the

stability of the world?’’ Yes. Same of European leaders. But each

of them feel that they have offered more assistance, more effort to

be involved, want to be part of a playing field that’s more cooperative, and yet they feel rebuffed.

I’ll give you an example. President Mubarak said to me, ‘‘We’re

only training 146 officers.’’ He doesn’t understand why; offered to

do more, hasn’t been taken up on it, by Iraqis or by us. Similarly,

European leaders are prepared to do more, in terms of training. I

know they don’t want to put boots on the ground; well, I understand that. But we’re not training people with the sense of urgency

that recognizes that there’s only one way out of this successfully,

and that is to provide the capacity ofIraq to have stability and

then, with the stability, to affect a political reconciliation that they

all talk about, critical to making up for what will be the deficiencies of this election.

So the event we have to look at is not the election, itself, but

what you do—you and the President and this administration—in

the immediate minutes and hours after that election, to change

this dynamic.

Now, can you share with us what you believe the reality is on

the ground and what steps you intend to take to change this dynamic that is spiraling downwards and not resolving, you know,

centuries-old conflicts in the way that we ought to be?

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator. I know that you’ve been there recently, and I look forward to hearing from you on what you found.

I do think that we have to look at the overall difficulty and complexity of trying to help a society recover from the kind of tyranny

that Saddam Hussein imposed upon it.

This was never going to be easy. It was always going to have ups

and downs. I’m sure that we have made multiple—many decisions,

some of which were good, some of which might not have been good.

But the strategic decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein was the

right one, and we’re all going to be very glad that we no longer

have to deal with a bloody dictator, in the middle of the world’s

most dangerous region, who was an avowed enemy of the United

States. I would rather trade the considerable difficulty of helping

the Iraqi people get to a democratic future, and a future in which

they will be allies in the war on terror, for what was, yet again,

a chance or a policy that thought that we could buy stability even

if there was a regime of the tremendous brutality of Saddam Hussein’s in place in the Middle East. And so, I think we made the

right decision to overthrow him.

Having made that strategic decisions, you’re right, we do have

some big tactical challenges to get the strategic—to the get to the

strategic goal that we have.

After the election—and I do think the election is an important

event, it’s a next step on the Iraqi people’s road to a better future.

It is not the final step. It’s a step that will allow them to elect leaders who will then begin the political process of trying to deal with

the many divisions and historic and other divisions that the Iraqi

people, themselves, have. And they’re going to have to make political compromises to do it. They’re going go have to find their own

way politically, and we will be there to support them. That is perVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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haps the most important set of steps that have to take place after

this election.

Our role, as you rightly say, is to focus on what we can do to help

them build capacity in their security forces and in their economy.

And in their security forces, again, I—we can talk about what was

foreseeable or what was not—the people who are fighting now, yes,

some of them are frustrated young people, and we need to do—and

Allawi is doing—Prime Minister Allawi is doing what he can to siphon those people off and to give them a stake in the future of

Iraq, and he’s doing it—we will help him with jobs programs. I

think we do, as one adjustment, need to pay more attention to

what jobs we are creating for Iraqis out of the reconstruction dollars that we are spending. And that’s one issue that I’ve asked to

have looked at a little bit more closely. If the metric is, ‘‘How many

jobs are we creating,’’ how are we really creating jobs for the

Iraqis?

But many of the people who are blowing up their fellow citizens,

are blowing up Iraqis, are not actually people who were angry because they weren’t paid. They are people who were part of Saddam

Hussein’s regime. They were Ba’athists, at the high level of

Ba’athism—not people who joined the party because they had to,

to get a job, but people who enjoyed the benefits and the fruits of

Saddam Hussein’s regime, and people who spent their lives oppressing their fellow citizens. They’ve lost power, and they want it

back. And so, we have to be clear who the enemy is here.

Others are foreign terrorists, like Zarqawi, the face of terrorism,

who, frankly, do see Iraq as the central front in the war on terror.

And they were committing terrorist acts someplace. They weren’t

sitting and drinking tea someplace. They were fighters, hardcore

fighters, in the war on terrorism; now they’ve decided to fight in

Iraq.

Senator KERRY. Can I just interrupt you for a minute?

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator KERRY. I understand that. I mean, you’re describing for

me the different groups of terrorists. I know who they are. Some

of them are criminals, some of them are jihadists, some of them are

the former Ba’athists, some of them are Zarqawi. We understand

that.

The question I asked you is, what are you going to do? Why have

we rebuffed the efforts of others to be involved—Russians, Indians

offered peacekeepers, others involved, the U.N. offered at a point

in time. There have been a series of offers here, and we keep, sort

of, making this decision to go it alone. And there’s a frustration out

there in the global leadership that’s wondering, you know, whether

we’re going to change that dynamic and bring them to the table in

a legitimate way.

Dr. RICE. Well, Senator, the only reason that I rehearsed who

we’re fighting is that there was the notion somehow that these

were people who were made angry by——

Senator KERRY. Well, somewhere——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——our policies. I think most of them were

made angry by the fact that Saddam Hussein was overthrown. But,

you’re right, there are people who we need to respond to who need

jobs and the like.

54

As to international help, I would note we do have an international coalition. We have 27 countries on the ground with us,

soon to be 28. Yes, some of the contributions are small, but, for

small countries, they are significant contributions. We have contributions from places like Japan and South Korea that one would

not expect, Asian allies who are serving in Iraq, and we need to

honor those contributions.

Senator, I’ll check, but, frankly, I’m not aware of Russian effort—

or Russian offers of peacekeepers——

Senator KERRY. Indian——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——or Indian peacekeepers——

Senator KERRY [continuing]. ——peacekeepers?

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——in Iraq. As a matter of fact, quite the

opposite, that there don’t seem to be people who are willing to put

forces on the ground. There are people——

Senator KERRY. They offered training, and——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——there are people who, in differing

ways, are offering training. For instance, we’ve taken up, and have

been using for some time, the German efforts at training in the

UAE, for police forces. The Egyptians have trained some people.

We’ll look at what more they can do.

Senator KERRY. Germans say they could do more.

Dr. RICE. And we will—if they want to do more, they only have

to say they can do more. And I can guarantee you we will want

them to do more.

One of the things that I will do, going forward, is, after this election is over, we have a chance now to, as an international community, support a new elected Iraqi government. And it may be a time

that we can enhance the contributions of some members of the

international community. But it is not for lack of trying that we

have not been able to get forces on the ground from some of these

countries.

Senator KERRY. Well, are—my time is up, and I want to—we’re

not really finished with it, in a sense, but let me just say to you,

very quickly, that, as you make a judgment about this, I think all

of my colleagues would report to you—and I think you’ll hear it

from generals and others—that current policy is growing the insurgency, not diminishing it. And you need to think, as—I mean, I’m

still, sort of—you know, try to see if we can be more precise about

what you intend to do to change this dynamic and affect the political reconciliation necessary. There are many people who believe

that Kirkuk, for instance, may explode because of the Kurd issue,

after the election, because of what happened in their efforts to

move people in, and they were denied the effort. And so, the dynamics of the election could actually, without the proper actions,

provide a greater capacity for civil war than there is today, absent

the right steps.

Dr. RICE. Senator, I think that the elections—the Iraqis understand the opportunity that the elections will give them to address

some of the divisions that you are talking about. There is no doubt

that Iraq is a country that has deep divisions, and it is a country

where Saddam Hussein exploited those divisions—for instance,

with the policy of Arabization in Kirkuk. And so, they have a long

and hard road ahead to effect national reconciliation.

55

But I’ve been, frankly, quite heartened by the fact that the Shia,

whenever there is an attack against them by Zarqawi and his people or by the insurgents, don’t take to the barricades. What they

say is, ‘‘This is going to be a unified Iraq, and we’re not going to

fall to sectarian violence.’’

So I think we need to give them a chance here. You know, the

political process, as you well know, and you all know better than

I, is one of coming to terms with divisions—coming to terms with

institutions that mitigate against people’s sense of alienation. It

takes time, it takes effort. Sometimes the compromises are a bit

imperfect, at first. But, over time, it gets better.

You know, we’ve had our own history with this. I often say, and

I don’t mean it jokingly, that, so far, I have not seen the Iraqis,

or, for that matter, the Afghans, make a compromise as bad as the

one in 1789 that declared my ancestors to be three-fifths of a man.

So we need to be patient with people as they make these moves

to democracy, understand that it will be in small steps, that they

will have ups and downs, that the whole process will have ups and

downs. But as long as they’re on a strategic road that is getting

them to a government that can actually represent the aspirations

of the Iraqi people, as a whole, I think they’ve got a chance.

The insurgency wants, very much, to halt that process and throw

Iraq back. We have to provide the Iraqis with the tools—through

training, through capacity-building—to defeat that insurgency,

with our help. And that’s what we’re trying to do.

Senator KERRY. I couldn’t agree with you more. The only question is why it’s not happening at a pace that maximizes the capacity for success and minimizes the potential of disaster. The Sunnis

are viewing this election, as you know, with the highest level of

anxiety and suspicion. They view it as, sort of, a quasi-American

joining with the Shia to provide Ayatollah Sistani and the Shia

with a power-hold that they never could achieve in several hundred

years otherwise. And unless there’s some kind of reconciliation

process, that every European leader and every Arab leader talked

to me about, which currently isn’t on the table, we’re going to have

an exceedingly hard time, sort of, patching that together.

I want to have happen what you just described. My fear is, there

is nothing that shows me a sufficient level of sophistication and

openness to bringing people to the table to make it happen. I think

you have a unique opportunity now. But I’d like to hear the administration articulate a little more how it intends to proceed to grab

that opportunity.

And I’ve abused my time. I apologize, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Kerry. The

Chair has allowed the exchange to proceed because it was an important one, and perhaps there will be a further opportunity to continue that dialogue.

I’m going to suggest, respectfully, to Members that there will be

four more Senators recognized before we have our break today, and

that will get us farther and farther down the batting order, so that

we can commence this afternoon with recognition of everybody else,

and then maybe a second round.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

56

I want to join those in applauding Secretary Powell and Deputy

Secretary Armitage for the work they did.

And I also do want to note that some of us are overjoyed to have

Senator Kerry back here with us today.

Senator KERRY. There’s going to be a certain unanimity over

there.

Just pass a quick resolution and move on.

Senator COLEMAN. I also want to make note of the incredible

work that the Foreign Service staff does. I just came back from a

bipartisan trip, with Majority Leader Frist and Whip McConnell,

Senator Landrieu, from Louisiana, and Senator DeWine, from

Ohio. And we had a chance to be in Iraq with Ambassador

Negroponte and his staff, many of whom are former ambassadors

who have come back into service, and not the ambassadorial level.

That level of commitment is just extraordinary. I saw that in Afghanistan and Pakistan and India and other places that we were—

in Brussels—as part of our journey. So I just—I don’t think we give

enough credit to folks who are doing such great work for this country.

Just an observation from my trip, and perhaps a little different

perspective from Senator Kerry’s. One, what I saw was an incredible moment of opportunity, right now. I met with Prime Minister

Singh of India, and he said that relations between America and

India have never been better. Have never been better.

And I didn’t sense, by the way, that sense of being rebuffed in

Iraq. In fact, the sense I got—and we raised the issue of Iraq with

all the leaders in Pakistan and in India and with the European

Union—I think there’s a tentativeness, certainly about the security

situation in four of the 18 provinces. There is a concern—not a concern, but there is a hope—that the election, the election that’s

going to take place, that has to take place—has to take place—on

January 30th, provides a moment of opportunity, with two more

elections to come. But one of the great success stories, which we

don’t talk about enough, is Afghanistan. The election there was a

paradigm-shifting event. Paradigm-shifting event. President Karzai

ran on a platform of developing a stronger strategic relationship

with the United States—and was elected. Eighty-two percent, by

the way, of the voters were women. And in Minnesota, where we

pride ourselves in having the highest turnout in the nation, I don’t

think we get 82 percent. Pretty stunning.

And so, the sense I got is, Afghanistan is this great miracle. Iraq,

in four of the 18 provinces, deep concerns. But we met with Carlos

Valenzuela, the U.N. Advisor to the Election; he said the election

would pass, today, international tests of credibility and independence. It would be a solid election.

In Pakistan, we met with Musharraf, who was not democratically

elected, but talked about a commitment to democracy within two

years, talked about a vision of enlightened moderation within the

Islamic world. And that was heartening. He’s got to follow through

now. We have to hold him to those commitments. But we saw that.

And then, in Brussels, with the EU, with Secretary General de

Hoop Scheffer and European Union President Barraso, they talked

a new wind blowing, a new moment of opportunity.

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So I hope that, Dr. Rice—and I’m sure you recognize—there is

this moment of opportunity, for whatever reason. The President’s

going to be there four more years. What happened in Afghanistan

with the election, I think, is very important. I don’t think we reflect

on it enough. And the sense I got from our allies is not that they’re

being rebuffed, but a little hesitancy. But now they’re ready to

come forward, and we have to then seize the moment.

The challenge, in two areas that I think are critical. One—and

Senator Dodd raised—in Latin America. I’m deeply concerned

that—we’ve had 20 years of democracy that, I think, threatens to

be undermined by economic promises that aren’t fulfilled. And I

think we need to be focused on that region. And then, in the second

round of questions, I think I’ll specifically ask about Colombia and

talk about that. So I think there is a great challenge. And the other

is Russia. I think in your comments you talked about an uneven

path ‘‘the path to democracy is uneven.’’ I would agree with Senator Biden that what we’re seeing is a slippage, we’re seeing a reversal of course, we’re seeing a regression on the part of the Russians. And as the President prepares to meet with Putin, I just

hope we continue to press this issue.

In fact, I’ll raise a micro-issue, and the micro-issue has to do

with some religious documents important to the Jewish community, the Schneerson documents important to the ChabadLubavitch community. I marched for Soviet Jewry—for the issue of

freedom for Soviet Jewry—in the 1980s here in Washington. And

we still face those issues.

So my concern is, as we look to develop our relationship with the

Russians, that we continue to press them on the religious freedom

issues, these documents in particular. I continue to have deep concerns—deep concerns—as to what I see as a regression.

So I just want to make that statement, and I hope that you

would, kind of, push on those. The little things sometimes become

big things.

Dr. RICE. Thank you. And we will very much push on those

issues and the issues of the Schneerson documents, but also religious freedom. I think you’re very right, we need pay attention, in

Russia, to what is happening to individual rights and—as well as

religious freedom.

Senator COLEMAN. Let me raise, then, in this round, just one

other issue. Obviously, my Subcommittee is involved in the investigation of Oil for Food. We just had a release of documents. By the

way, I want to thank the State Department. I know, within the

budget committees of the U.N., they pushed to have member states

have access to these reports. And, as a result, we got them a lot

quicker, because of that kind of support, that kind of focus.

These most recent documents highlight a lot of mismanagement,

serious mismanagement. We fund 22 percent of the U.N.’s operating budget. We’ve had, as you know, a terrible environmental crisis, which, by the way, we responded to very, very well. The Indians also responded well. I worry about the ability of the U.N. to

be able to respond credibly when we’ve got this stain of mismanagement. Again, I think we’re just seeing the tip of it right

now. Our investigation will go on, but these audits demonstrate seVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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vere mismanagement of resources. That is simply not tolerable

with concerns and the needs that we have.

Can you reflect a little bit on the Oil for Food impact on U.N.

credibility and how do we move forward?

Dr. RICE. Yes, absolutely. I would agree with you that it is a—

I’ll use the world ‘‘scandal.’’ I think it is a scandal that—what happened with Oil for Food. And it is extremely unfortunate, because

it—not only did it allow Saddam Hussein to continue to get resources, it really did—it was very hard on the Iraqi people. So we

had the worst of both circumstances. It was also the process that

we were relying on, of course, to keep Saddam Hussein contained

and checked. And clearly we weren’t doing that. The sanctions

were breaking down. He was playing the international community

like a violin. And we can’t let that happen again, should we ever

get into a position where we have to do something in terms of sanctions. It’s just outrageous.

Now, I hope that the Voelcker commission will get all of the cooperation that they need from the U.N. to continue their process.

And we have worked—and I appreciate hearing that things have

gotten better for the congressional committees here, because we

really do expect openness and transparency and information flow

from the United Nations. I know we’ve made State Department

people, who would have knowledge, available to talk with people

here. We’ve opened up the Iraq—the Iraq Survey Group’s files, in

effect, to people. We’ve got to get to the bottom of what happened

here, and those who were responsible, I think, should be held accountable.

I will note that some changes are being made at the U.N., in

terms of the structure of the staffing there, that more changes have

been recommended as a part of the high-level panel, and the

United States has to stay active in the U.N. reform process, because we want the U.N. to be effective. We don’t want it to be an

ineffective organization. We have too much work to do together,

and it has to be in—it has to be effective, and it has to be admired

and—for its integrity and its programs. And so, this will be an important agenda for us.

And if I could just go back to the point that you made earlier,

Senator Coleman, which is about the moment of opportunity. It’s

very easy, in the day-to-day, to lose sight of some of the things that

you mentioned. I do think that if you had sat here two-and-a-half

years ago trying to talk about the situation in Afghanistan, you

might have wondered at the sanity of someone who said that there

was going to be an election, with a president elected who was running on a platform that he is pro-American, who would have dealt

pretty effectively now with the warlords around him, who is moving toward women’s rights and the likes. I think we would have

thought that farfetched.

Similarly, if you had sat here three-and-a-half years ago and said

that Pakistan was going to turn its guns on extremism, rather than

supporting the extremists in places like al Qaeda and the Taliban,

you would have, again, said that this is farfetched.

So we have to remember that these are historical processes.

And I want to just go back to Iraq for a moment. This is a huge

historical change that is going on in the center of the Arab world,

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and it has great promise, and it has great peril. And we are aware

of both. But we shouldn’t lose sight of the promise of Prime Minister Allawi and the leaders, including the Shia leaders, reaching

out to Sunnis and saying, ‘‘You are going to have a place in this

government. Yes, you are only 20 percent of the population, and,

yes, the Shia, who are now 60 percent of the population, have been

repressed, as have the Kurds, but that doesn’t matter. We’re going

to have a common Iraqi future.’’ And my read is that the reason

that Sunnis are nervous about this election is not that they want

to boycott the elections because they think they’re somehow just a

shield for Sunni—for Shia dominance, but, rather, because there is

widespread intimidation by these thugs against the Sunni people.

We have to recognize what the motivation is here. The Sunnis

want to participate in these elections, but there are people who are

engaging in the most brutal intimidation.

And so, the Iraqis, I think, will find a way to, after the elections,

unify their country again, and we have to be there to help them.

But from the historical perspective of 30,000 feet, it’s sometimes

important to see the long sweep, not the short—short term.

Senator COLEMAN. And we heard that from our bipartisan visit

just last week.

If I can, Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record a

commentary by Paul Bremer that was in the Wall Street Journal

of January 12th.

Dr. Rice has answered the concern raised by Senator Kerry, but

Bremer did note in this article, he said, ‘‘Moreover, in July 2003,

we began paying a monthly stipend to all but the most senior

former officers. These payments continue to this day. So if any

former army officers is involved in the insurgency, it is not for

money; their objective is simply to retake power and to return Iraq

to its horrible past.’’ So I would like that to be part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of the record.

[The article to which Senator Coleman referred appears in Appendix II of this hearing transcript.]

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Coleman.

Senator Feingold?

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me join the other Members of this committee in congratulating you, Dr. Rice, on your nomination. I’ve always enjoyed our

conversations and work together. It’s long been apparent that the

President has tremendous confidence in you, and his choice to

nominate you to be the Secretary of State at a time when the

United States faces so many profound challenges and so much global distrust, is still more evidence of his deep and abiding trust in

you.

Dr. Rice, obviously you and I disagree on many issues. I actually

think that the Bush administration’s foreign policy over the last

four years has been, on many fronts, misguided and self-defeating,

and I will continue to oppose these policies.

Nothing is more important to this country than prevailing in the

fight against terrorism. In that effort, and the related effort to repair our country’s image and create a more stable and just and

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prosperous world for our children to inherit, we have to make sure

our policies are effective and well thought out.

I just returned, two days ago, from a trip to Algeria, Chad, and

Mali. And, after that, I’m even more convinced than before that we

need to make a much more substantial commitment to ensuring

that the vast youthful populations of the Middle East and Asia and

Africa do not mistakenly believe that our goal is to humiliate them,

and, therefore, believe that their best hope might be a movement,

that may seem to promise pride and belonging, but actually delivers hatred and repression and brutality and terror.

So, Dr. Rice, where we do agree, I hope to be a strong and active

ally of yours. We have to make the right policies work.

Just as an aside, I note that, in response to Senator Coleman’s

questions, you talked about the need for accountability of the U.N.

for the Oil for Food Program. And I agree with that. But I just

have to note, shouldn’t the demand for accountability also apply to

this administration for the long litany of mistakes and

misstatements about Iraq? There hasn’t been serious accountability

for that. So I’m not going to hesitate to point out mistakes or raise

questions. The stakes are to too high.

And I’d like to begin by continuing an exchange you had with

Senator Kerry. You indicated that if there are countries willing to

do more to help us stabilize Iraq, quote, ‘‘All they have to do is say

they want to do more.’’ I think this comment troubles me.

Americans are dying, and our approach to burden-sharing is to

wait for others to come to us?

I would like to hear a little bit about what your strategy will be

to proactively reach out, to squeeze every drop of assistance from

others that is available. That will be your job. We just can’t sit and

wait for others to raise their hands and volunteer.

I wonder if you could comment on that?

Dr. RICE. Of course. And, Senator, let me be very, very clear

about this. We have been reaching out to others and asking them

what they can do to stabilize Iraq. It is a constant preoccupation

of Senator—or of Secretary Powell, who has talked to every counterpart that he has about what might be possible. It is something

that the President has raised in his many meetings with people.

It’s something that we took to NATO, and that’s how we got the

NATO training mission, talking to people about what NATO can

do. We mobilized the world to—the G7 to give debt forgiveness to

Iraq, which will save that country a lot of resources and make it

possible for it to recover.

I know, in my personal conversations around the world, I always

ask the question. I start with the premise that we all want to see

a stable and democratizing Iraq. I then go on to say that I understand that we’ve had differences in the past, but that now we all

have a common future in looking to a stable and democratizing

Iraq. And then the very next question is, ‘‘So what can you do to

help?’’ And this has been a preoccupation of reaching out.

My only point was that we will have another opportunity when

the elections are held, elections that will come out of a process that

the U.N. blessed in a U.N. Security Council Resolution, and that

countries that may have had hesitancy, for whatever reason, I hope

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ference, for instance, in which countries made very large financial

pledges to this effort.

So we are getting help. I think we can get more. Perhaps more

countries will be active after the elections.

I would just note, on the matter of the region, there have been

a couple of very important meetings of regional leaders—one that

took place with the G8 and—with the EU the G8 and regional leaders there—to pledge support to Iraqi democracy. There was a recent meeting that King Abdullah of Jordan held, which was a

meeting that was to actively ask people to participate in the elections.

I think the world is coming together behind the idea that we

have to succeed in Iraq, and we have to succeed by building a more

democratic Iraq. And we’ll welcome all the help. But I didn’t mean

to leave the impression that we’re not reaching out. We’re consistently and constantly reaching out.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I thank you for that. My sense is that

we’ve not reached out as often and as well as we could, but I wish

you well in an aggressive approach to this. I don’t think anything

would mean more to the American people, and particularly the

families of our soldiers, to know that we’re doing everything that

we can possibly do to get the help from other countries that we can.

Dr. Rice, I’ve reflected, a lot of times, on the memo that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld issued in October 2003, which indicated

that despite over two years having passed since September 11th,

quote, ‘‘relatively little effort had gone into developing a long-range

plan to win the fight against terrorism.’’ He pointed out that there

is no consensus within the national security community of the

United States about how to even measure success in the fight.

Now, I think the Secretary of Defense was quite right, and I

don’t see any particular evidence that this problem has been remedied. In fact, we just listened to discussion here at this three-hoursome hearing today—there’s been, actually, not a whole lot of discussion about the fight against terror, unless you believe that the

Iraq War is the heart and soul of that, which I don’t. And that

troubles me. I think we risk losing focus, something I believe happened when we turned the lion’s share of our attention to Iraq, devoting many years and billions of dollars, and possibly many American lives, to ineffective or self-defeating strategies.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, how have you

and the Department been assessing the success and efficacy of policies designed to actually fight terrorist networks, to strengthen the

multilateral coalition cooperating to combat these networks, and to

prevent these networks from gaining new support and new recruits? And how do you, sort of, measure that success? Do you

think the metrics and assessments that we’re now using in the

fight against terror are sufficient?

I want to reiterate, I’m talking here about, not the broader strategy that the President has articulated, but the specific issue of terrorist networks and where they actually exist.

Dr. RICE. Well, Senator, there are a number of important elements in the fight on terror, and I’ll come back to—because I do

think there is a broader context here that has to be understood.

But, first of all, when you look at the organization that did 9/11,

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al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden’s organization, I think that you

would see that we have had considerable success in bringing down

the ‘‘field generals’’ of that organization, people like Khalid Sheik

Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah and others. It is true, I’m certain,

that they worked to replace those people, but they lose a lot of skill

and experience in these field generals in—who had trained in Afghanistan together and had worked to produce September 11th.

There’s a lot of evidence that we’ve really hurt the organization in

that way.

Secondly, in terms of their financing, I think we’ve made a great

deal of progress, not just in the United States in tracking and dealing with terrorist financing, but around the world. You know, we

didn’t understand, really, the structure of terrorist financing very

well. We didn’t understand the role of non-governmental organizations that sounded like they were for good purposes but were, in

fact, carrying out or funding terrorist activities. Others didn’t understand that, in the Muslim world, like the Saudis. And we have

made, I think, great strides in doing that.

We’ve made strides in denying them territory. You know, one of

the ways that you fight a war is, you deny the other side territory.

And when you look at what has happened to them, their world has

gotten smaller. Afghanistan is not a hospitable environment now

for terrorists. It used to be the home base for al Qaeda, with its

training camps and its access to Afghanistan’s benefits of being a

state. They can no longer count on Pakistan, which had such

strong ties to the Taliban that it was not really an aggressive actor

against al Qaeda. They can no longer count on not being pursued

up in the northwest frontier. The federally administered tribal

areas that hadn’t been governed by Pakistan for—hadn’t been ever

governed by Pakistan—they can’t count on that territory. So we are

denying them territory.

Senator FEINGOLD. Dr. Rice, I don’t share the view that they’ve

lost territory, actually. I happen to have supported the invasion of

Afghanistan, and understand absolutely why we had to do that.

But I’ve done a fair amount of work in East Africa and Northern

Africa. We aren’t denying terrorist elements those territories. When

it comes to Somalia or Algeria or the activities that have occurred

in Kenya—our focus on Iraq has been so single-minded—and, in

fact, I was told by some of our own officials in that region, this past

week, that a lot of things have gone waiting because of the demands of the Iraq invasion, in terms of dealing with this issue in

North Africa and in East Africa. I know there are efforts going on,

and I encourage those efforts, and I support them. But in terms of

the balance? I think the balance has not been correct.

Dr. RICE. Well, Senator, in East Africa, we have a very effective

set of partnership in counterterrorism strategy with, for instance,

Kenya. Somalia is a particular problem, a unique problem, given

that it’s ungoverned, in effect, and the problem there is to try and

bring about some kind of stable government, in the long run. But,

in the meantime, we have worked with Somalia’s neighbors to try

and increase their capacity to deal with counterterrorism——

Senator FEINGOLD. Dr. Rice, I see my time’s up, but we have no

policy in Somalia. Our government has no policy in Somalia, and

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we simply must reverse that if we’re going to get serious about terrorism.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——But, Senator, our intention in Somalia

is to try to work with the EGAD process there to bring about a government. It has been extremely difficult. In the meantime, we’ve

tried to contain the terrorist threat in Somalia by working with

Kenya and with others in East Africa.

But I will tell you, Senator—I’d just like to make one final

point—I do sit every day and look at the terrorist-threat reporting

that’s coming in. I look, every day, at the efforts that disrupt terrorism around the world. And I can tell you that the reports come

from every—practically every service in the world, because our liaison relationships are so much more developed now, that when you

have a situation like we faced back in December of last year, where

we thought there might be an imminent threat to the United

States, that we are able to mobilize law enforcement around the

world, that you do get major take-downs of terrorists in places like

Pakistan, which had been a central place for them to operate. We

are making a lot of progress in this, but I—I know that there are

differences on the question of what the ultimate antidote to terror

is, and it is our view, and the President’s view, that the ultimate

antidote is to deal with the source of that terror, and that really

is, ultimately, the freedom deficit, and that in order to do that,

you’ve got to have a different kind of Middle East. And that’s why

we do see Iraq as being a part of that war on terrorism.

Senator FEINGOLD. Just one last comment. I certainly—the freedom deficit is a legitimate way to look at this, but I think the reality of failed states and lawless areas is just as important, in

terms of the terrorist threat, and needs to be considered in that regard.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Senator Voinovich?

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I’d like to publicly thank Secretary Powell and Secretary Armitage—and their team—for the outstanding job that

they’ve done for this country during the last four years.

I’d like to thank you, also, for being willing to come before us and

to seek confirmation as Secretary of State of the United States of

America.

I couldn’t help but think, as I have heard my colleagues ask

questions here today, about the enormous responsibilities that

you’re taking on, in terms of the world. There’s no country in the

world where a foreign minister is being asked questions about the

whole world. And, today, you’re being asked questions about the

whole world and, what you are going to do.

And I’d like to share with my colleagues that one of the things

that we all ought to be concerned about is whether or not the new

Secretary of State is going to have the budget and the human capital that she is going to need to get the job done. Are we going to

prioritize, in terms of this nation, the money necessary, so that

many of the questions that have been asked here at this table

about what you are going to do in parts of the world can actually

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be done? And, at the same time, maybe we need to look at our own

tax policy and give consideration to what Senator Sarbanes has

been talking about, the trade deficit that’s looming, and the account deficit.

And I am very happy to hear that Bob Zoellick is interested in

coming over to the State Department because Bob’s got tremendous

background in the area of trade, which I think is essential to almost everything that you’ll be doing.

I was glad, also, in your testimony you said that, ‘‘More than

ever, America’s diplomats will need to be active in spreading democracy, fighting terror, reducing poverty, and doing our part to

protect the American homeland. I will personally work to ensure

that America’s diplomats have the tools they need to do their jobs,

from training to budgets to monitoring embassy security.

We expect you to come here before this committee and tell us

what you think you need to get the job done. And I think it’s your

job to advocate to the administration about what it is that you need

to get the job done. We’ve got to be real.

I have dealt with a lot of the major issues that are on everyone’s

mind, but I think you know I have a particular interest in Southeast Europe, where I’ve spent probably more time than any Member of the Foreign Relations Committee. And we’ve made some

progress there. We’ve gotten rid of Milosevic, we’ve gotten rid of

Tudjman. Stipe Mesic just got reelected to serve as President of

Croatia. Slovenia has joined NATO and the EU. There’s some real

progress being made.

But I am very concerned about what’s going on in Serbia and

Montenegro today. I’m also very concerned about what’s happening

in Kosovo, because I really believe that unless things are stabilized

in Serbia and Montenegro, and unless we stabilize things in

Kosovo, we could very well have another crisis on our hands this

year, particularly because we’re discussing the final status of

Kosovo and what’s going to be happening there.

I’d like to say that Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman has

done a good job, but I’d like to know, where is this on your priority

list? Are you familiar with problems in Southeast Europe? We’ve

got our NATO forces in Kosovo, and they haven’t got the job done.

You’ll recall, on the 17th of March last year, ethnic violence resulted in 4,000 refugees, 900 homes burned, and 30 churches destroyed. There are some real problems in that part of the world.

We’ve invested a lot of money. I’d like to know, what do you think

you’re going to do about that?

Dr. RICE. Yes. I think it is a high priority, Senator, because it

would help complete the European construction, if you think of it

that way, that, in effect, until the Balkans have settled, it’s going

to be hard to think of Europe as truly whole and free. And so, we

need to resolve the remaining Balkans issues.

And on Bosnia and Herzegovina, we’ve made a lot of progress.

We’ve been able to end the S4 mission there and to have the EU

take that mission over. But, you’re right, in Kosovo, in Serbia Montenegro, we have a thorny set of problems.

One of the issues in Kosovo has been to try to get some energy

into UNMIK. And I think we’ve got now, in the leadership there,

strong people who are looking to try to improve the coordination on

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economic and political affairs there. We definitely need the Serbs

to continue their democratic process. I think we were all somewhat

heartened about the election there, of Mr. Tadic. And I hope that

they will take the opportunity that that provides to make progress

on the further democratization of Serbia. And, of course, we do

need their cooperation in the international tribunal for Yugoslavia,

and we continue to press that case.

Ultimately, on Kosovo, as we’ve had this standards-before-status

approach, we recognize that the standards are going to be important to the future of that region. Meeting those standards is going

to be important to the future of that region. And I notice that Mr.

Jessen Peterson has put a lot of emphasis on those standards that

are about minority rights and the need to deal with the Serbian

minority there so that we can move on, then, to discussions in the

review conference that’s coming up——

Senator VOINOVICH. I’d just like to say that I hope that we really

give it the priority it needs.

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator VOINOVICH. Because last year, when Secretary Powell

was here, I said to him, ‘‘I don’t think we’re doing the job we’re

supposed to be doing.’’ He said, ‘‘No, I think things are fine.’’ And

then we had the blowup there.

Dr. RICE. Oh.

Senator VOINOVICH. But I’m just telling you, we have a situation,

and now you’ve got the new prime minister of Kosovo, who may go

to The Hague. Solana and our people have encouraged the

Kosovars not to put that person in, and he’s still there. So you’ve

got a real problem there that needs to be taken care of, in addition

to getting the other countries to give up their national caveats, in

terms of what they can do. Because we had the burnings of homes

there, and some NATO forces just watched the homes and monasteries burn down and said, ‘‘We can’t do anything about it, because our orders are—we only protect people, not property.’’

Dr. RICE. I take the point, Senator.

Senator VOINOVICH. The other issue that I’m very interested in,

and where we’ve made some great progress, is the issue of global

anti-Semitism. And, as you know, we passed legislation, which the

President signed into law. I think the report on global anti-Semitism that came out of the State Department did an outstanding job

of portraying the situation, which is a crisis all over the world, particularly in the OSCE area.

And I would encourage you to give the same kind of commitment

to this issue that Secretary Powell has made. He was in Berlin.

And one of the concerns I have—and I’d be interested if you’re familiar with it—is the budget of the OSCE, and whether or not the

OSCE is going to provide the money necessary to ODIHR, which

is the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, to really monitor this anti-Semitism issue. They’ve agreed to do it. But,

as you know, so often people agree to do things, and then the

money is not there to get the job done.

And I am not sure whether anybody has talked to you about the

fact that they’re going to have another conference in Cordoba,

Spain, in June. I would recommend that you be there, because I

think that, without the presence of the Secretary of State of the

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United States, it doesn’t get the kind of clout that we need for that

issue to be dealt with.

Dr. RICE. I appreciate it, Senator. I am aware of the conference.

It’ll be a very important conference.

I will look into the budget issue. I was not aware of the budget

issue, but I will look into that——

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, it’s my understanding that the Soviet

Union—or Russia——

Dr. RICE. Russia.

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. ——is dragging its feet and

slowing things down right now.

Dr. RICE. Right. And I think, at some point, have said they might

not contribute. I understand that.

But this is an issue that I think gets everybody’s attention when

you have something pending, like the conference. We’ll put a focus

on it, we’ll put an emphasis on it the way that we did in the past.

I think it was a great thing. Actually, everyone who was there, including the countries of the OSCE, thought it was a great thing,

and I’m glad we’re having a second one.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, as I say, it’s a high priority, the

money.

As you know, I also, feel that our best offense against terrorism

is intelligence, diplomacy, and something that Robert Burns once

spoke to, and that is, ‘‘Oh, that some great power would give me

the wisdom to see myself as other people see me.’’

I was recently in England and parts of Southeast Europe prior

to attending the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Venice.

And I was just shocked at what I got back from our friends about

how badly we’re thought of today in that part of the world. And I

just wonder, what are you going to do to try and change that? I

think what we’re doing to help following the tsunami right now is

wonderful. But we have got to show people that we love them, that

we are for democracy, that we want them to enjoy the same thing,

that we haven’t any hidden motives. What are you planning on

doing in that area?

Dr. RICE. Senator, first of all, I do agree that the tsunami was

a wonderful opportunity to show, not just the U.S. Government,

but the heart of the American people. And I think it has paid great

dividends for us.

Sometimes what happens is that we’ve had to ask people to do

very difficult things, and we’ve had policies that people don’t like.

I think, in some corners, there are people who have been unhappy

with the way that we’ve dealt with the Middle East, with the

strong support for Israel, with our strong belief that terrorism has

got to stop there. But we somehow have to get the message out

that this is also the first President to call, as a matter of policy,

for a Palestinian state. And somehow we’re not getting that message out, as well.

What I plan to do is that, I’m going to put a major emphasis on

public diplomacy, in all of its forms. That means, in getting our

message out. And public diplomacy really is the State Department’s

core—a State Department responsibility. The State Department

has to take on this challenge. Because public diplomacy isn’t done

here in Washington; public diplomacy is done in London, or done

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in Oman, or done in Riyadh. And so, the arms and legs of the public-diplomacy effort are our embassies out there and our ambassadors and what they do on a daily basis. And so, I think we have

to have a new renewed effort on that piece of it, getting our message out.

We also have to have a new renewed effort on getting our people

back and forth, because people, when they come to the United

States and see who we are and can get past some of the filter of,

perhaps, some of the sides of America that are not well liked or respected, I think, do come away with a different view of us. And so,

I will have a strong emphasis on getting our message out, on getting the truth to people, on diminishing the—on doing something

to mitigate against the propaganda that’s out there against us, but

also on going to our long-time partners and friends and saying, ‘‘We

have a common purpose here, a great cause ahead of us.’’ And the

Transatlantic Alliances—you know, sometimes it’s a little bit like

whatever it was that Mark Twain said about Wagner’s music; I

think he said, ‘‘It’s better than it sounds.’’ Well, in fact, our Transatlantic Alliances are really getter than people give us credit for.

We’re cooperating in a lot of places, we’re working hard together

in a lot of places, we’ve had a lot of successes. But we can do more,

in this period of tremendous opportunity, to unify the great democracies, the great alliances for a push to spread freedom and liberty.

I think it’s an agenda thatis inspiring, and I think we’ve done a

lot already, but there is much more that we can do.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

Senator Boxer?

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank

you, Dr. Rice, for agreeing to stay as long as it takes, because some

of us do have a lot of questions.

And, Senator Lugar, you are a very fair Chairman. And I wanted

to say to the new Members, also, welcome, and you’ll enjoy this

committee because we have such a great Chairman and such a terrific Ranking Member, and we really do a lot of things in a bipartisan way, unlike other committees. And I think you’re going to

enjoy your time here.

Dr. Rice, before I get to my formal remarks, you, no doubt, will

be confirmed. That’s, at least, what we think. And if you’re going

to become the voice of diplomacy, this is just a helpful point. When

Senator Voinovich mentioned the issue of tsunami relief, you said—

your first words were, ‘‘The tsunami was a wonderful opportunity

for us.’’ Now, the tsunami was one of the worst tragedies of our

lifetime. One of the worst. And it’s going to have a ten-year impact

on rebuilding that area. I was very disappointed in your statement.

I think you blew the opportunity. You mention it. It’s part of one

sentence. And I would hope to work with you on this, because children are suffering, we’re worried they’re going to get in the sex

trade. This thing is a disaster, a true natural disaster and a human

disaster of great proportions, and I hope that the State Department

will take a huge lead, under your leadership, in helping those folks

in the long range.

Mr. Chairman, again I thank you.

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Dr. Rice, I was glad you mentioned Martin Luther King. It was

very appropriate, given everything. And he also said, Martin Luther King, quote, ‘‘Our lives begin to end the day we become silent

about the things that matter.’’

And one of the things that matters most to my people in California and the people of America is this war in Iraq. Now, it took

you to page three of your testimony to mention the word ‘‘Iraq.’’

You said very little, really, about it, and, only in this questioning,

have we been able to get into some areas.

Perhaps you agree with President Bush, who said, ‘‘All that’s

been resolved.’’ I’m quoting today’s Post, ‘‘Bush said, in an interview last week with the Washington Post, that the ’04 election was

a moment of accountability for the decisions he made in Iraq. But

today’s Washington Post/ABC poll found that 58 percent disapprove of his handling of the situation, to 40 percent who approve,

and only 44 percent said the war was worth fighting.’’

So, in your statement, it takes you to page three to mention the

word ‘‘Iraq.’’ Then you mention it in the context of elections, which

is fine, but you never even mention, indirectly, the 1366 American

troops that have died or the 10,372 who have been wounded, many

mentally. There’s a report that I read over the weekend that maybe

a third will come home and need help because of what they saw,

it’s been so traumatic to them. And 25 percent of those dead are

from my home state. And this from a war that was based on what

everyone now says, including your own administration, were falsehoods about WMDs, weapons of mass destruction. And I’ve had

tens of thousands of people from all over the country say that they

disagree—although they respect the President, they disagree that

this administration and the people in it shouldn’t be held accountable.

I don’t know if you saw the movie ‘‘The Fog of War.’’ War is a

nightmare. You know that. Colin Powell, I think, was the most eloquent I’ve heard on it, because he’s seen it, himself. He’s been

there and done it. And I don’t want to have you in a circumstance

where you’re writing something, years later, about the fog of war.

And I’m fearful, if we don’t see some changes here, we’re going to

have trouble. And I think the way we should start is by trying to

set the record straight on some of the things you said going into

this war.

Now, since 9/11, we’ve been engaged in a just fight against terror. And I, like Senator Feingold and everyone here who was in the

Senate at the time, voted to go after Osama bin Laden, and to go

after the Taliban, and to defeat al Qaeda. And you say they have

less territory? That’s not true. Your own documents show that al

Qaeda has expanded from 45 countries in ’01 to more than 60 countries today.

Well, with you in the lead role, Dr. Rice, we went into Iraq. I

want to read you a paragraph that best expresses my views—and

ask my staff if they would hold this up—and, I believe, the views

of millions of Californians and Americans. It was written by one of

the world’s experts on terrorism, Peter Bergen, five months ago. He

wrote, ‘‘What we’ve done in Iraq is what bin Laden could not have

hoped for in his wildest dreams. We invaded an oil-rich Muslim nation in the heart of the Middle East, the very type of imperial adVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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venture bin Laden has long predicted was the U.S.’s long-term goal

in the region, we deposed the secular socialist, Saddam, whom bin

Laden has long despised, ignited Sunni and Shia fundamentalist

fervor in Iraq, and have now provoked a defensive jihad that has

galvanized jihad-minded Muslims around the world. It’s hard to

imagine a set of policies better designed to sabotage the war on terror.’’

This conclusion was reiterated last Thursday by the National Intelligence Council, the CIA Director’s think-tank, which released a

report saying that, ‘‘Iraq has replaced Afghanistan as the training

ground for the next generation of professionalized terrorists.’’

That’s your own administration’s CIA.

NIC Chairman Robert Hutchings said Iraq is, quote, ‘‘a magnet

for international terrorist activity.’’ And this was not the case in

’01. And I have great proof of it, including a State Department document that lists every country—could you hold that up?—in which

al Qaeda operated prior to 9/11. And you can see the countries. No

mention of Iraq. And this booklet was signed off on by the President of the United States, George W. Bush—was put out by George

Bush’s State Department, and he signed it. There was no al Qaeda

activity there. No cells.

Now, the war was sold to the American people, as Chief of Staff

to President Bush, Andy Card, said, ‘‘like a new product.’’ Those

are his words. ‘‘Remember,’’ he said, ‘‘you don’t roll out a new product in the summer.’’ Now, you rolled out the idea, and then you had

to convince the people as you made your case with the President.

And I, personally, believe—this is my personal view—that your loyalty to the mission you were given, to sell this war, overwhelmed

your respect for the truth. And I don’t say it lightly. And I’m going

to go into the documents that show your statements and the facts

at the time.

Now, I don’t want the families of those 1366 troops that were

killed, or the 10,372 that were wounded, to believe for a minute

that their lives and their bodies were given in vain, because when

your Commander in Chief asks you to sacrifice yourself for your

country, it is the most noble thing you can do to answer that call.

I am giving their families, as we all are here, all the support they

want and need, but I also will not shrink from questioning a war

that was not built on the truth.

Now, perhaps the most well-known statement you’ve made was

the one about Saddam Hussein launching a nuclear weapon on

America, with the image of, quote—quoting you—‘‘a mushroom

cloud.’’ That image had to frighten every American into believing

that Saddam Hussein was on the verge of annihilating them if he

was not stopped. And I will be placing into the record a number

of such statements you made which have not been consistent with

the facts.

As the nominee for Secretary of State, you must answer to the

American people, and you are doing that now through this confirmation process. And I continue to stand in awe of our Founders,

who understood that, ultimately, those of us in the highest positions of our government must be held accountable to the people we

serve.

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So I want to show you some statements that you made regarding

the nuclear threat and the ability of Saddam to attack us. Now, on

July 30th, 2003, you were asked by PBS News Hour’s Gwen Ifill

if you continued to stand by the claims you made about Saddam’s

nuclear program in the days and months leading up the war. In

what appears to be an effort to downplay the nuclear-weapons

scare tactics you used before the war, your answer was, and I

quote, ‘‘It was a case that said he was trying to reconstitute. He’s

trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Nobody ever said that it was

going to be the next year.’’ So that’s what you said to the American

people on television. ‘‘Nobody ever said it was going to be the next

year.’’

Well, that wasn’t true, because nine months before you said this

to the American people, what had George Bush said? President

Bush, at his speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center, ‘‘If the Iraqi

regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have

a nuclear weapon in less than a year.’’

So the President tells the people there could be a weapon. Nine

months later, you said, no one ever said he could have a weapon

in a year, when, in fact, the President said it.

And here’s the real kicker. On October 10th, ’04, on FOX News

Sunday with Chris Wallace, three months ago, you were asked

about CIA Director Tenet’s remark that, prior to the war, he had,

quote, ‘‘made it clear to the White House that he thought the nuclear-weapons program was much weaker than the program to develop other WMDs.’’

Your response was this, ‘‘The intelligence assessment was that

he was reconstituting his nuclear program, that, left unchecked, he

would have a nuclear weapon by the end of the year.’’

So here you are contradicting—first contradicting the President,

and then contradicting yourself. So it’s hard to even ask you a

question about this, because you are on the record, basically, saying—taking two sides of an issue. And this does not serve the

American people. If it served your purpose to downplay the threat

of nuclear weapons, you said, ‘‘No one said he’s going to have it in

a year.’’ But then later, when you thought perhaps you were on

more solid ground with the American people, because, at the time,

the war was probably popular, or more popular, you say, ‘‘We

thought he was going to have a weapon within a year.’’ And this

is—the question is—this is a pattern here of what I see from you—

on this issue, on the issue of the aluminum tubes, on the issue of

whether al Qaeda was actually involved in Iraq, which you have

said many times. And in my rounds—I don’t have any questions on

this round, because I’m just laying this out—I do have questions

on further rounds about similar contradictions. It’s very troubling.

You know, if you were rolling out a new product, like a can opener, who would care about what we said? But this product is a war,

and people are dead and dying, and people are now saying they’re

not going to go back because of what they experienced there. And

it’s very serious. And as much as I want to look ahead—and we

will work together on a myriad of issues—it’s hard for me to let go

of this war, because people are still dying. And you have not laid

out an exit strategy, you have not set up a timetable, and you don’t

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seem to be willing to, (a) admit a mistake, or give any indication

of what you’re going to do to forcefully involve others. As a matter

of fact, you’ve said more misstatements, that the territory of the

terrorists has been shrinking, when your own administration says

it’s now expanded to 60 countries.

So I am deeply troubled.

Thank you.

Dr. RICE. Senator, may I respond?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Let me just say that I appreciate the importance of Senator Boxer’s statement. That’s why we allowed the

statement to continue for several more minutes——

Senator BOXER. I’m sorry.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. ——beyond time.

Senator BOXER. I’m sorry. I lost track of the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Clearly, you ought to have the right to respond.

And then, at that point, we’re going to have a recess. But will you

please give your response?

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator, I am more than aware of the stakes that we face in

Iraq. And I was more than aware of the stakes of going to war in

Iraq. I mourn and honor—I mourn the dead and honor their service, because we have asked American men and women in uniform

to do the hardest thing, which is to go and defend freedom and to

give others an opportunity to build a free society which will make

us safer.

Senator, I have to say that I have never, ever lost respect for the

truth in the service of anything. It is not my nature. It is not my

character. And I would hope that we can have this conversation

and discuss what happened before, and what went on before, and

what I said, without impugning my credibility or my integrity.

The fact is that we did face a very difficult intelligence challenge

in trying to understand what Saddam Hussein had, in terms of

weapons of mass destruction. We knew something about him. We

knew that he had—we had gone to war with him twice in the past,

in 1991 and in 1998. We knew that he continued to shoot at American aircraft in the no-fly zone as we tried to enforce the resolutions of U.N. Security Council—that the U.N. Security Council had

passed. We knew that he continued to threaten his neighbors. We

knew that he was an implacable enemy of the United States who

did cavort with terrorists. We knew that he was the world’s most

dangerous man in the world’s most dangerous region. And we knew

that, in terms of weapons of mass destruction, he had sought them

before, tried to build them before, that he had an undetected biological weapons program that we didn’t learn of until 1995, that he

was closer to a nuclear weapon in 1991 than anybody thought. And

we knew, most importantly, that he had used weapons of mass destruction.

That was the context that, frankly, made us awfully suspicious

when he refused to account for his weapons-of-mass-destruction

programs, despite repeated Security Council resolutions and despite the fact that he was given one last chance to comply with

Resolution 1441.

Now, there were lots of data points about his weapons-of-massdestruction programs. Some were right, and some were not. But

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what was right was that there was an unbreakable link between

Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction. That is something that Charlie Duelfer, in his report of the Iraq Survey Group,

has made very clear, that Saddam Hussein intended to continue

his weapons-of-mass-destruction activities, that he had laboratories

that were run by his security services—I could go on and on.

But, Senator Boxer, we went to war, not because of aluminum

tubes, we went to war because this was the threat of weapons of

mass destruction in the hands of a man against whom we had gone

to war before, who threatened his neighbors, who threatened our

interests, who was the world’s—one of the world’s most brutal dictators, and it was high time to get rid of him. And I’m glad that

we’re rid of him.

Now, as to the statement about territory and the terrorist

groups, I was referring to the fact that the al Qaeda organization

of Osama bin Laden, which once trained openly in Afghanistan,

which once ran with impunity in places like Pakistan, can no

longer count on hospitable territory from which to carry out their

activities. In the places where they are, they are being sought and

run down and arrested and pursued in ways that they never were

before. So we can have a semantic discussion about what it means

to take or lose territory, but I don’t think it’s a matter of

misstatement to say that the loss of Afghanistan, the loss of the

northwest frontier of Pakistan, the loss of running with impunity

in places like Saudi Arabia, the fact that now intelligence networks

and law enforcement networks pursue them worldwide, means that

they have lost territory where they can operate with impunity.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I’m going to take 30 seconds,

with your permission.

First of all, Charles Duelfer said, and I quote—here it is—I ask

unanimous consent to place in the record Charlie Duelfer’s

report——

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record.

[The information to which Senator Boxer referred appears in Appendix II to this hearing transcript.]

Senator BOXER [continuing]. ——in which he says, ‘‘Although

Saddam clearly assigned a high value to the nuclear progress and

talent that had been developed up to ’91, the program ended, and

the intellectual capital decayed in the succeeding years.’’

Here’s the point. You and I could sit here and go back and forth

and be—present our arguments. And maybe somebody watching a

debate would pick one or the other, depending on their own views.

But I’m not interested in that. I’m interested in the facts. So when

I ask you these questions, I’m going to show you your words, not

my words. And, if I might say, again you said, you’re aware of the

stakes in Iraq. We sent our beautiful people—and thank you, thank

you so much for your comments about them—to defend freedom.

You sent them in there because of weapons of mass destruction.

Later, the mission changed, when there were none. I have your

quotes on it. I have the President’s quotes on it. And everybody admits it but you, that that was the reason for the war. And then,

once we’re in there, now it moves to a different mission—which is

great. We all want to give democracy and freedom everywhere we

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can possibly do it. But let’s not rewrite history. It’s too soon to do

that.

Dr. RICE. Senator Boxer, I would refer you to the President’s

speech before the American Enterprise Institute, in February, prior

to the war, in which he talked about the fact that, yes, there was

the threat of weapons of mass destruction, but he also talked to the

strategic threat that Saddam Hussein was to the region.

Saddam Hussein was a threat, yes, because he was trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. And, yes, we thought that he

was—that he had stockpiles, which he did not have. We had problems with the intelligence. We were all, as a collective polity of the

United States, trying to deal with ways to get better intelligence.

But it wasn’t just weapons of mass destruction. He was also a

place—his territory was a place where terrorists were welcomed,

where he paid suicide bombers to bomb Israel, where he had used

SCUDs against Israel in the past, and so we knew what his intentions were in the region, where he had attacked his neighbors before, and, in fact, tried to annex Kuwait, where we had gone to war

against him twice in the past. It was the total picture, Senator, not

just weapons of mass destruction, that caused us to decide that,

post-September 11th, it was finally time to deal with——

Senator BOXER. Well, you should——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——Saddam Hussein.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. ——read what we voted on when we

voted to support the war, which I did not, but most of my colleagues did. It was WMD, period. That was the reason and the causation for that, you know, particular vote.

But, again, I just feel you quote President Bush when it suits

you, but you contradicted him when he said, yes, Saddam could

have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. You go on television

nine months later and said, ‘‘Nobody ever said it was going to

be’’——

Dr. RICE. Senator, that was just a question of pointing out to

people that there was an uncertainty, that no one was saying that

he would have to have a weapon within a year for it to be worth

it to go to war.

Senator BOXER. Well, if you can’t admit to this mistake, I

hope——

Dr. RICE. Senator, we can——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. ——that you’ll——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——we can have this discussion in any

way that you would like, but I really hope that you will refrain

from impugning my integrity.

Thank you very much.

Senator BOXER. I’m not. I’m just quoting what you said. You contradicted the President, and you contradicted yourself.

Dr. RICE. Senator, I’m happy to continue the discussion, but I

really hope that you will not imply that I take the truth lightly.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me intervene at this point now. We’ve had

four hours of good hearing. And we thank all Members for their

constancy.

We’re going to recess, and I’m going to suggest we come back at

2:30. Is that convenient for——

Dr. RICE. Perfect.

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The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. ——you, Dr. Rice?

Very well. We recess until 2:30.

[recess]

[The committee remained in recess until 2:35 p.m.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is called to order again.

The Chair recognizes Senator Murkowski for a ten-minute round

of questioning.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It’s a privilege and honor to be part of the committee, and I appreciate the warm welcome from you and the other committee

Members.

Welcome to you, Dr. Rice. The opportunity to sit down and speak

with you a couple of weeks ago was greatly welcomed, and it was

a chance for me to speak to some of the issues that, as a new Member to this committee, were important to just, kind of, have that

discussion and get on the table.

One of the issues that is really quite paramount in Alaskans’

mind is the situation over in North Korea. Our proximity in that

region is one that causes us to look very carefully at what is happening in North Korea, and what is happening particularly with

the nuclear-weapons program over there.

I’m heartened to hear, from the media reports, that North Korea

appears willing to restart the six-party talks. And, again, I think

Alaskans are anxious to know that there will be success there.

Looking beyond the talks and further down the road, I’m curious

to know your views on a future North Korea. We recognize that,

for these past many years—about 60 years or so—under the reign

of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Il, an entire generation of North Koreans, including their military leaders, have basically been brainwashed into believing that their military can defeat the armed

forces of any country in this world. And this raises considerable

concern, in the event of a regime change, about who has control

over the North Korean military, and what actions that military, or

an individual commander, might take.

So as the administration moves forward in these six-party talks,

what steps will you take to develop the relationship with North Korea’s future leadership?

Dr. RICE. Well, thank you very much, Senator Murkowski. I—we

did have an opportunity to talk about a number of issues, and I

recognize the importance of this issue to everyone, because, obviously, North Korea is a very dangerous power, and one that has

been intent on seeking weapons of mass destruction, particularly

nuclear weapons.

Let me start by just saying that it is important to repeat that

North Korea should understand fully that we have a deterrent

against any North Korean action, or attempts at action, because we

have a very strong alliance with South Korea, a very technologically sophisticated alliance, that is getting more so with the

changes that we are discussing with the South Koreans about how

to realign military forces on the peninsula. And we do have, as you

mentioned, a very active diplomacy now through the six-party

talks, which brings all of the neighborhood together to say to the

North Koreans, ‘‘You do not have a choice. If you intend to be a

75

part of the international system, you have got to give up your nuclear-weapons programs.’’ And that’s an important innovation, because it speaks, in a part, to the broader question of how we manage a problem like North Korea in the neighborhood. It is not

something that the United States wants to have to do unilaterally.

It’s something that we’re much better off doing with South Korea,

with Japan, with Russia, and, most especially, with China, which

is playing an important role in the six-party talks, and needs to

play—it needs to continue to play an active role.

This is a very closed and opaque society that we’re dealing with

when we’re dealing with North Korea. It is a sad thing that there

probably is no more desperate population than the population of

North Korea, in terms of starvation, in terms of repression. The

United States has no problem with the people of North Korea. And,

in fact, we have consistently been a large food-aid donor to North

Korea because we do not want the people of North Korea to suffer.

It doesn’t have to be this way. There is another path. And we’ve

made clear to the North Korean regime that the President of the

United States has said, and that the United States has no intention to attack North Korea, to invade North Korea, that multilateral security assurances would be available to North Korea, to

which the United States would be party, if North Korea is prepared

to give up its nuclear-weapons program verifiably and irreversibly.

So we will continue to work on that issue.

It is very hard, actually, to make contact with the Korean—

North Korean people at all, but, to the degree that we can, through

South Korean contacts, try to encourage the North Korean people

that there might be a better future for them, I think that’s an important thing to do. But our goal now has to be to make the sixparty mechanism work for dealing with the North Korean nuclear

program, and then hopefully for dealing with the broader problem

of managing this dangerous regime.

I hope that they will follow through, and that, indeed, they do

intend to restart the six-party talks. We have an offer on the table

that we put there at the last round of the six-party talks. It was

an offer that I think all other parties thought moved the ball forward. We’ve heard nothing, really, from North Korea, and I hope

that they will actually act, because we’ve found that their words

are not always completely reliable.

Senator MURKOWSKI. We also had a chance to talk a little bit

about the Arctic Council. This is probably not a question that

you’re going to get from anybody else on this panel, so I will take

the time to ask it. I know that my colleague here from Florida is

not going to ask it, so I will.

But one of the things that I hoped to achieve, or to work on, during my time here on the Foreign Relations Committee is to raise

my colleagues’, and the rest of the United States’, awareness of—

and just really the knowledge of the Arctic regions. And there’s a

lot of focus right now on what’s going on up north because of the

climate change. We’re wondering whether or not this is a permanent event or whether it’s just part of a natural cycle. But we do

know that it’s a reality. We do know that it’s—it will have an impact on our lands, particularly up north. And what we’re seeing is,

there’s a potential for increased circumpolar maritime commercial

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activity, which is going to impact our northernmost boundaries, as

well as substantial new scientific exploration in the Arctic region.

Now, along with the Arctic nations, the U.S. is a member of the

Arctic Council, which was formed to address the common problems

of the many Arctic nations. And so far as I can tell, our role, the

U.S. role, within this Council, has been underutilized in furthering

our relationship with our Arctic neighbors.

So my question to you at this time is, what role do you see for

international institutions, like the Arctic Council, in U.S. foreign

policy? And how can we use our Arctic location to further this country’s interests?

Dr. RICE. There’s a very important point that I’d like to make

about the broader question that you ask. And I do think that, on

issues of this kind, we can work both internationally and regionally—in a sense, the most interested and affected countries.

I would like to spend some time talking with you about what

more we might do in the Arctic Council. I know we’ve been supportive of the Arctic Council and members, but perhaps there is

more that we can do.

It speaks—for instance, you mentioned the environmental—global environmental issues, like climate change. We have a lot to offer,

in terms of the science and the technology, and we ought to be, and

are trying to, develop relations with others who are interested in

harnessing that science and that technology to deal with some of

the environmental challenges that we have.

And so, I very much look forward to talking with you about what

role we can play. There are some important countries that would

probably share interests. For instance, the Russians would probably share interests, and this is another area for potential cooperation. And so, I look forward to having a chance to look at what

more we can do.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I think it is an opportunity for us, and it’s

something that needs to be cultivated in order to work to our advantage. So I do look forward to that opportunity, with you.

Very general. This might be a softball to you, but how is the administration working to improve the role of women in the Middle

East and elsewhere in the world?

Dr. RICE. Well, in fact, it may be one of the most important

things that we do over the next few years. We’ve already tried to

do a lot. I think there’s no doubt that the Afghanistan situation,

which was really one of the true horror houses for women—and I

know that Senator Boxer and others were very involved in trying

to promote the cause of women in Afghanistan. Well, we promoted

the cause by the overthrow of the Taliban. It’s a remarkable thing

that the first person to vote in Afghanistan was a young woman.

It’s a remarkable thing that women can now see a doctor without

a male relative’s permission, that they can no longer be punished

for letting one little hair show out from under the veil, that women

are taking their rightful place in Afghan society. And I think it is

in their documents, like their new constitution, that women are

considered equal citizens.

That may seem like a small thing, but in a region of the world

where women have been anything but equal citizens, to have that

enshrined in the Afghan constitution—and it will be—it’s in the

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TAL, or the Transitional Administrative Law, for Iraq. These are

important steps forward.

We’ve also been very outspoken about the need of every society

to make sure that women’s rights are protected. It is a part of the

agenda in the broader Middle East initiative, where clearly countries are going to move at different speeds on this issue, but where

you have to put on the agenda that you cannot function as a modern society if half your population is essentially kept out of the political process. And we are particularly interested in women’s education, the education of girls, which, in some of these societies,

stops when girls are 10 or 11 years old. Pressing the case for the

education of girls is an important part of what we’re doing. Helping

to empower women politically through political activity and civil-society activity.

And we’ve done more than just in the Middle East, which is to

be very active on, for instance, the Trafficking in Persons Initiative,

which benefits women, because, very often, the people who are trafficked, particularly for sex crimes, are women. And the President

went to the United Nations, put this on the agenda. We’ve gotten

a resolution about it, and we are prosecuting people here and

pressing countries to prosecute people on this very terrible crime.

Finally, I would just mention the HIV/AIDS initiative, with has

a mother-to-child transmission element, as well as helping caregivers, who, many times, are women, to deal with the travails of

caring for relatives with AIDS, preventing further infections, many

of whom would be women. This is a broad agenda of helping

women, and it is in our moral interest, of course, to do so, but it’s

also in the interest of these societies, economically and in terms of

modernity, that women take a rightful place and are fully contributing to the prosperity of these societies.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. Appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski.

Senator Nelson?

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Rice.

Senators Dodd and Chafee and I just returned from visiting with

four Latin American presidents in their respective countries, and

we are certainly of one mind that we need to be more engaged in

the region. When a leader, such as Chavez in Venezuela, starts

lurching to the left, and yet we have a dependency there of some

13 to 15 percent of our daily consumption of oil coming from Venezuela, clearly one part of our foreign policy ought to be that we

ought to start planning on weaning ourselves from that dependence, not even to speak of the global dependence that we now have

on foreign oil. But here’s one right in our neighborhood.

And Chavez has threatened, from time to time, that he was going

to cut it off. Now, that’s a hollow threat, because there are no refineries that—outside of the Gulf Coast, that can do it, although it

would take them a year, maybe two, to build those kind of refineries, if, for example, they struck a deal in China, to take his oil.

We, clearly, urge you that we need a Latin American policy that

will get us engaged a lot more.

And then in the places where we see the presidents of those

countries really trying to do something—and, in fact, having an effect—such as Toledo in Peru, such as Paraguay, such as ArgenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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tina’s beginning to have some economic uplift that—if America is

more engaged, it’s just going to—it’s going to be some wind under

their wings, and it’s going to help stem that. If Chavez continues

to go leftward, we should enable those other countries, who are

more centrist, to corral him, or at least have a chance of doing that.

So that’s a little message that I bring you from the activities of the

last week.

Now, elsewhere in the hemisphere—and you can appreciate this

since I represent the state of Florida. Haiti is a disaster. And it’s

going to continue to be a disaster until we get engaged and do

something seriously, along with particularly the other nations of

the Western Hemisphere, financially and politically, to help them.

I’ve had a difference of opinion with the administration, and I

think you did have a policy of regime change. And although

Aristide was a bad guy, you know, it’s kind of hard to say we support democracy in elections and then we go and push him out. But

that’s done.

Looking forward, we’re getting close to the authorized support,

now, under the U.N. peacekeeping force, of 6700 military and 1600

civilian police. Do you think that’s an adequate number?

Dr. RICE. Well, I believe the number that has been determined,

6700 or so led by Brazil as a stabilization force now, after the initial stabilization was done by the United States and the French

and the others, is judged to be adequate to the task. The question

has really been about—more of, what can that force do? And I

think the expansion of it, of a more aggressive stance by that force

in going into areas that are particularly violent, and dealing with

the violence and the militias in those areas, is probably really the

question that we have to deal with.

I’m glad, Senator, you mentioned the police forces, because, in

the long run, what really will help Haiti is that it needs a professional civilian police force that can be counted on to enforce law,

not to break law. And we have, as you well know, dispatched civilian police trainers from the United States, and from other places,

to try and engage in that activity. But I agree completely.

Unfortunately, Haiti seems to be a place where natural and manmade disasters have come together in a really terrible way for the

Haitian people. They do have a new chance now. They have a transitional government that is trying to arrange elections in the fall.

We need to support that process. And we have had a successful

donor conference recently, with a billion-dollar commitment. The

United States is about 230 million of that. And so——

Senator NELSON. The problem is, they never follow through.

Dr. RICE. Senator, I agree, we have to press very hard on people

to follow through on the pledges that they make. That’s a problem

worldwide.

Senator NELSON. And this has been going on for 200 years of

Haiti’s history. Now, when the U.N. peacekeeping force comes up

for reauthorizing, in the Security Council, what’s going to be your

posture about considering an expansion of that peacekeeping force?

This is a country of seven-and-a-half million, and a lot of them are

outside, in those areas that are now defoliated; thus, the mud, the

slides after the storms, and so forth.

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Dr. RICE. Senator, we’ve been focused, to now, on trying to stabilize the situation with the stabilization force that is there. The

Brazilians have done a fine job of leading that. And I just might

mention that this is the first time that a lot of those countries,

most of whom are from the hemisphere—many of whom are from

the hemisphere—have actually done peacekeeping in the Western

Hemisphere. And so, this is a step forward, for the neighbors to

embrace Haiti in the way that they have.

What more will be needed, I have to demur. I think we need to

look at the situation. But, for now, I think we are in the right

place, in terms of the peacekeeping forces. We have been concerned

about what missions they were prepared to take on, and that is

being resolved, and there is a more aggressive posture. And we

really have to put a major effort into the civilian police development.

We also, as you—you are absolutely right, people pledge; they

don’t follow through. And we have money to put Haitians to work.

We have money to help restart the Haitian economy. But we’ve got

to——

Senator NELSON. Well, then I want to——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——follow through.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. ——I want to suggest something to

you. And it’s a bill that is sponsored by one of our Republican colleagues, Mike DeWine of Ohio, and it’s called the HERO Act, which

is an acronym, but what it does is, it allows textiles to come in, like

we already have in the Caribbean Basin Initiative in other areas

in the Caribbean, but it allows it for Haiti. And then they can

come, duty free, into the U.S. It would foster an economic uplift by

creating jobs. But we can’t get the administration to support it. It’s

a Republican Senator’s bill.

Dr. RICE. Senator, I think we believe, at this point, that the best

course with Haiti is to work with them to take full advantage of

the Caribbean Basin Initiative, to work with them on job creation

through some of the programs that we have out of our economic

support fund for Haiti. They will benefit, in a secondary way, from

what happens in Central America with trade if CAFTA can be

taken—can be passed. And so, at this point we think we have the

right tools, we just have to make it work.

I understand fully the concerns about Haiti, both from a humanitarian point of view and also from a stability point of view. And

we probably dodged a bullet, in the earlier days, with the ability

to get Aristide out peacefully, because he had lost the ability to

control that country, to govern authoritatively in that country.

But we have a lot of work ahead of us in Haiti. I’d be the first

to admit it.

Senator NELSON. Madam Secretary-designate, you can make a

difference. If you’ll jump on that horse and ride it, and keep on it

over the next four years of your tenure, it’ll start to pay huge dividends. And nobody’s done that. We go in, and we fix a problem,

and then we turn around and we leave it, and so do the other nations. And then Haiti just goes back into chaos.

Let me shift to the other side of the globe, to Iran. What specific

steps will you advocate to stop Iran’s nuclear program? And I’m

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talking about beyond the noise that we hear from Europe. This

Senator doesn’t think that’s gonna cut it.

Dr. RICE. Well, Senator, we—this is a problem that we’re trying

to approach both multilaterally and through some bilateral pressure. And we were the first to really put the Iranian nuclear program on the table when the President did his speech, his State of

the Union speech, and identified the Iranian nuclear program. I

can remember, back in the early days, Senator, people didn’t take

nearly as seriously that Iran was actually trying to, under cover of

its nonproliferation treaty access to civilian nuclear energy, to build

a nuclear weapons program. I think people now, because of Iranian

behavior, are very skeptical and suspicious of what the Iranians

are doing.

Senator NELSON. Are you ready for sanctions?

Dr. RICE. Well, we already have an awful lot of sanctions on Iran

unilaterally. There is really not terribly much more we can do. But

I do——

Senator NELSON. How about getting Europe to go along?

Dr. RICE. Well, Senator, I would take it the first step, that if the

Iranians do not show that they’re going to live up to their international obligations, that we refer them to the Security Council.

That has been our policy. That—when you’re in violation of your

obligations under the NPT, that you get referred to the Security

Council. And the IAEA has been, I think, documenting that the

Iranians have not been serious about their obligations. So, at some

point, that may be exactly where we need to go.

We are making some progress in unifying people’s view of what

the Iranians are doing, and putting pressure on the Iranians. We

do work with the EU 3 to try and help them formulate a strategy

that would really hold Iran accountable, not just take Iran’s word

for it. And we’ve made some progress in getting people who engage

in bilateral assistance with Iran to be more cognizant of some of

the proliferation risk. For instance, the Russians, who have a civilian nuclear power program with Iran in their reactor at Bushehr,

now say to the Iranians that, ‘‘You will have to return the fuel.’’

In other words, ‘‘Close the fuel cycle and sign the additional protocol.’’ Those are all positive steps. We need to continue to take

those.

But, Senator, the spirit of your question is that, at some point,

Iran has to be held accountable for it’s unwillingness to live up to

its international obligations, and I could not agree more.

Senator NELSON. Hopefully, sooner, than later.

Dr. RICE. I could not agree more.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Senator Alexander?

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rice, welcome, congratulations, and thank you for being here

today.

I apologize to you, I missed part of the hearing because I was at

another hearing for Mike Leavitt, who’s been nominated to Department of HHS. But it wasn’t a total loss, because we were talking

about early-childhood education, and I was able to remind your

new colleague in the Cabinet that you began piano lessons at age

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three, and that that is a good sign for early-childhood education,

to have that kind of example here.

I have three questions to ask. They’re all subjects that have come

up before in one way or the other. And I thought I’d ask ’em all

at once and then give you a chance to comment on them, because

they’re interrelated. One is about Iraq, one is looking beyond Iraq,

and one is to return to the subject that you said almost every Senator had mentioned to you, Senator Coleman has done some work

on, especially on this committee, and that has to do with visas of

foreign students and the effect on our higher-education system. I

want to think about that in a little different way.

Question number one, about Iraq. Some colleagues have suggested and asked you about an exit strategy. I don’t think we need

an exit strategy. I think we need a success strategy. But I would

suggest—and my question is this—that is—after the election, that

we might take a more realistic, and perhaps a different, view of

how we define success. And so, my question is, how many American lives? How long are we willing to take? How much money are

we going to spend? What is the definition of ‘‘success’’ in Iraq? It’s

one thing to give people their freedom, it’s quite another to help

build a stable pluralistic democratic society. What are the limits of

that? That’s the first question.

The second question. This is beyond Iraq. I know your conversations with the President are between the two of you, but perhaps

you can talk about this in a general way. You’re the Secretary of

State, President Bush is President, you’re sitting around in a National Security Council meeting in a year or so, and someone suggests that we have a circumstance in a Middle-Eastern country or

some other country where we need change a regime, we need to engage in nation-building again. What are—what kind of advice

would you give the President about what lessons we’ve learned

from Iraq and the other examples of nation-building that he ought

to consider before he commits us again to one more nation-building?

I’ve heard strong words today about Iraq. I wasn’t here, but I

would have voted to give the President authority to go to Iraq. I

think he made a reasonable decision to go. The war was a stunning

success. And, in my view, they’ve done a series of miscalculations

since then. You, yourself, have used words like ‘‘adjustments.’’ I

think it’s no—it’s a sign of strength for us when we—when we look

back, we see something that we could do better, that we recognize

that, learn from that, and go ahead.

So I’m asking, if we were to consider nation-building again—and

we’ve done it many times since World War II—what are the lessons

for the President? And my own view of that is that there is more

than one way to implement the City on the Hill moral mission that

we have in this country to spread freedom around the world. One

way is to change a regime and try to make a country more like

ours. Another way might be to celebrate our own values and

strengthen ourselves, and be a good example, and, by doing that,

to spread freedom.

You, yourself, mentioned—and this leads me to my third point—

the example of foreign students here. All of us, when we travel, we

see ministers, we see citizens, business people, who have been in

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this country, and who have carried our message, our values, our

principles back more effectively than almost anything we can think

of. In fact, I think perhaps our most effective method of foreign policy has been our programs that have admitted so many students

from around the world to the United States.

But there is another aspect of that, as well. The number of foreign students attending our major universities, especially the graduate programs in our major research universities, such as the one

where you were provost, Stanford, has dropped dramatically. Applications to American graduate schools declined 28 percent last year.

Those from China fell 45 percent. From India, 28 percent.

There are several reasons for that. One is that India, China, Germany, Great Britain all are seeing a brain-drain to the United

States. We talk a lot about outsourcing of jobs; we have an

insourcing of brains that that drop of foreign students, of brain

power, hurts our ability to keep our technological edge. And it is

of great concern to me over the next ten years.

So I’m not just looking at spreading our values around the world;

I’m looking very much at our own self interest in another way,

which is, what can we do to make certain that we pay more attention, for example, to making sure that students who are here, or

researchers, who already cleared the visa process don’t have to go

home for a month to reapply for the same kind of visa.

So my questions, related, are, one, what is our success strategy

for Iraq? Number two, based on the lessons for Iraq, what advice

would you give our President about some things he might want to

consider, in terms of the amount of money, the amount of time, the

amount of troops we might have to expend or sacrifice in any future nation-building exercise? What have we learned in Iraq? And,

number three, what can we do to help you, in your new role, to

make it easier for foreign students to come here, both so we can

spread our values around the world and so we can take advantage

of their brain power to create jobs for us in the United States?

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator.

Let me take the first of this, and I’ll try to segue, as you did so

well, into the second.

I do think that, in Iraq, you were right, what we need is a success strategy, not an exit strategy. And I—that’s a very good way

to talk about it. The success here is going to be that Iraqis are in

charge of their own future, and recognize that it is really up to

them to make that future one that is inclusive of all of the divisions that have bedeviled Iraq, that we have given them the capability to defend themselves—principally from internal insurgency,

but also to give them the ability that their neighbors will understand that Iraq is a stable place that is a unified Iraq—one of the

obligations, by the way, that we undertook when we decided to

change the regime in Iraq was that we would be concerned about

the territorial integrity of Iraq, and we have to keep that obligation—and, finally, that they are beginning the process toward the

stabilization of their economy so that the economy can support

those first two, a political process and a military—a security process.

I can’t give you a timeline, but I think we will know when the

Iraqis are able to have in place institutions, no matter how fragile

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and no matter how young, where they’re actually beginning to try

and solve their own problems within those institutions. Now,

they’re not going to solve them perfectly, they’re not, probably,

going to solve them the way that we might, necessarily, but you

see, step by step, over the last year or so, the Iraqis taking more

and more responsibility for solving their own political problems.

And I would take, for example, what has been going on with the

Kurds about provincial elections in Kirkuk. They have been resolving that among themselves. That’s an important political process.

On the security side, I think it’s going to be somewhat clearer.

They may need the help of multinational forces for a while, but, ultimately, Iraqis have to be willing to defend, and fight for, their

own freedom. And they are showing a desire to fight and defend

their own freedom. We have to get them the capacity to do it. And

I took note of what Senator Biden and Senator Hagel and others

said this morning—Senator Kerry—about the need to make sure

we’re training forces in the right way, that we accelerate that

training. I do look forward to General Luck’s coming back and letting us know what the next phase ought to be. We’ve faced changing circumstances here, but I’ve put a lot of emphasis and a lot of—

a lot of emphasis on getting those security forces trained, and then,

finally, helping them economically.

So it isn’t that we have to see an Iraq that is a fully democratized, mature economy, fully able to deal with all of its divisions.

That’s going to take a very, very, very long time. What we have to

see is that they’ve been launched on a path to be able to achieve

that, that that path is one that is clear ahead for everybody, and

where they are taking advantage of that path. And I think we will

start to see that after these elections. And I think they are thinking in those ways.

Senator, I’ve thought, a thousand times, about how one thinks

about nation-building, something that I famously said we probably

wouldn’t be involved in. We have been. And it’s turned out that

we’ve had to be, because our security depends on states that can

function, on not having failed states in the midst. We learned the

dangers of an Afghanistan that people left alone after the Soviets

left, and we left it as a place that became a terrorist haven. We

can’t make that mistake again.

One of the important lessons that we’ve learned is that the skills

needed to help reconstruct and stabilize the country and put it on

a path to stable nationhood are skills that we haven’t really had

to use in a very long time, maybe since World War II. And one of

the reasons that I’m so supportive of this new Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization is, I think it starts to give the State Department a focus for those skills. We find ourselves trying to help people create police forces. We find ourselves trying to help people create independent judiciaries that are not going to be wracked by corruption. We find ourselves giving technical assistance on currency.

We find ourselves giving people advice about how to start up a

ministry, in many of these places. We can learn, from the experiences that we’ve had in Afghanistan and in Iraq, how to put those

skills together in a more permanent way, and how to be more predictive of what might be needed in places that we know we’re going

to have to engage in this kind of activity.

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The office that is there now, I think, needs to look at what is

going to be needed in Liberia, what is going to be needed in Sudan,

and start to put together those skills now, so that you have a civilian counterpart to what our military often does in providing immediate stabilization. Otherwise, we have to depend on the military

to do it, and that’s not always the best answer.

I can tell you how incredibly supportive the uniformed military

and the Defense Department are of this idea of an Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, because they want and understand that

the State Department needs to have the kind of expertise that we

need to do this.

Finally, just on the visa issue, I will be coming back to you on

exactly this. I’m, of course, an academic. I was provost of Stanford

University. We had a large foreign student population. It was one

of the best things for the foreign students, and it was one of the

best things for our students, too, because they engaged people from

other places as students—not as Chinese or not as Russians, but

as students. They were all in a common enterprise. It changes the

way we think about people, it changes the way they think about

us. I’ve gone abroad so many times and sat and heard the prime

minister describe how many universities his—American universities his people have come from. And you know what’s really remarkable about it? It’s not just from Stanford or Harvard or Yale,

but it’s also from universities like I went to, the University of Denver or Texas A&M or Nebraska or, I’m sure, Tennessee. And that’s

invaluable.

And so, I will be coming back to you, because these numbers are

disturbing, and we need to do something to reverse the trend.

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to ask to

put my entire statement in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be.

[The prepared statement of Senator Alexander follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAMAR ALEXANDER

President Bush has made an excellent choice in nominating Dr. Condoleezza Rice

to be America’s next Secretary of State. her experience as national Security Adviser

will make her uniquely effective. When foreign leaders talk with Dr. Rice, they will

know she is speaking with the President’s voice.

I will have a question for Dr. Rice about Iraq and one beyond Iraq.

The major issue confronting Dr. Rice and our Nation is the war in Iraq. Some of

my colleagues have said we need an exit strategy in Iraq. I disagree. We don’t need

an exit strategy in Iraq, we need a success strategy—but such a strategy may mean

taking a more realistic view of what we mean by ‘‘success.’’ It is one thing to help

people to win their freedom. It is another to help a country become a stable, pluralistic, democratic, flourishing society. How many American lives are we willing to

sacrifice to do this? How long are we willing for it to take? What is our standard

for ‘‘success?’’

That leads me to the question beyond Iraq, and it is this: the next time the opportunity occurs for the United States to undertake regime change or nation building,

what advice will Dr. Rice give President Bush about the lessons we have learned

in Iraq? During his campaign for the Presidency in 2000, President Bush was critical of nation building. That was before September 11, 2001.

Our initial war in Iraq was a stunning success. What came afterwards has been

a series of miscalculations. But the United States has engaged in nation building

more than a dozen times since World War II. Based upon those experiences, should

we not have anticipated that nation building in Iraq should have required more

troops, more money and taken longer than we expected? And what do these lessons

say about our future policy toward nation building?

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American history is the story of setting noble goals and struggling to reach them

and often falling short. We sincerely say that ‘‘ anything is possible’’ and that ‘‘all

men are created equal’’ and ‘‘no child will be left behind’’ even though we know

down deep we will fall short and we will have to keep trying. We also have said

we want to make the world safe for democracy and we remember and inaugural

speech 44 years ago in which a new President said we would ‘‘pay any price, bear

any burden’’ for freedom. Yet there obviously is a limit to what we can do, and what

we are willing to do and the number of lives we will sacrifice to secure the blessing

of freedom and democracy for others.

At President Reagan’s funeral last June, former Senator Jack Danforth said the

text for his homily was ‘‘the obvious,’’ Matthew 5:14–16. ‘‘You are the light of the

world. A city built on a hill cannot be hid. No one after lighting a lamp puts it in

a bushel basket, but on a lamp stand, and it gives light to all in the house. In the

same way, let your light shine before others, so that they may see your good works,

and give glory to your Father in heaven.’’

From our beginning, that vision of the city on a hill has helped to define what

it means to be an American and provided America with a moral mission. It helps

explain why we invaded Iraq, why we fought wars ‘‘to make the world safe for democracy,’’ and why we are forever involving ourselves in other nations’ business. It

is why when I was in Mozambique last summer I found 800 Americans, 400 of them

missionaries and most of the rest diplomats or aid workers.

But is it possible that too much nation building runs the risk of extending too

far the vision of the city on a hill? Letting a light shine so that others may see our

good works does not necessarily mean that we must invade a country and change

its regime and remain there until it begins to look like us. It may mean instead

that we strive harder to understand and celebrate our own values of democracy,

equal opportunity, individualism, tolerance, the rule of law, and the other principles

that we hope will be exported to other parts of the world. How we ourselves live

would then become our most persuasive claim to real leadership in a world filled

with people hungry to know how to live their lives. For example, in my own experience, and I am sure in Dr. Rice’s, we have found that sometimes the most effective

way to export our values is to train foreign students at our universities who then

return home to become leaders in their own countries.

Of course we will never say that only some men are created equal, that only some

children will not be left behind or that we will pay only some price to defend freedom. But perhaps we should think more about strategies for extending freedom and

democracy in the world other than nation building and determine what those strategies are and when they most appropriately might be used.

Senator ALEXANDER. And if I may just underscore, I just want

to emphasize the point that, with all the discussion about visas,

that we’re not just talking about some goodwill gesture to the

world; we’re basically talking about recruiting the most talented

people in the world, who have helped us create our very high

standard of living so that 5 or 6 percent of the people in the world

have 25 to 30 percent of all the money. That’s what we’re—that’s

one of the things we’re talking about here. We’re going to lose our

capacity to do that, to some degree, if we don’t solve this problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Alexander.

As you can tell, Dr. Rice, the committee is fortunate to have people who have served as governors of states, members of the Cabinet. But the visa issue was a part of our hearings last year. Senator Alexander played a leading role in the followup with a roundtable group. It’s a very serious issue because of homeland security

and other purposes. We are losing ground, and the committee takes

it very seriously. I’m sure you do too from your background in

Stanford and elsewhere. I appreciate his bringing this up, and,

likewise, your reiterating the reconstruction idea, which could also

be called nation-building, which is so important. And the progress

you’re making there, I think is critical.

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Well, let me now call upon Senator Obama for his initial ten

minutes of questioning.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Members

of the committee, Dr. Rice.

First of all, let me say how grateful I am to have the opportunity

to serve on this committee. I know that it has a wonderful reputation for bipartisanship, and that, I think, is partly due to the excellence of the Chairman and the Ranking Member, and the degree

to which you both work together extremely closely. So I’m looking

forward to my service here.

Dr. Rice, it’s wonderful to see you here, and I’ve been very impressed, obviously, with your mastery of the issues. Since it’s the

day after King’s birthday, obviously 20 to 30 years ago it’s unlikely

that I’d be sitting here asking you questions. And so, I think that’s

a testimony to how far we’ve come, despite how far we still have

to go. And I think everybody, rightly, is extraordinarily impressed

with your credentials and your experience in this field.

I’ve got three areas that I’d like to explore that have already

been touched on to some degree. I want to try to see if I can knock

out all three of them with the time that I have remaining.

The first has to do with the issue of nuclear proliferation, which

has already been discussed. But, you know, I think it’s important

to note that, in the midst of what was sometimes a very divisive

campaign, there was strong agreement between President Bush

and Senator Kerry that our number-one priority, that our single

greatest challenge, is keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of

terrorists. And there has been enormous leadership on the part of

this committee—and Senator Lugar, in particular, working with

former Senator Nunn—to move the process forward of securing nuclear material in the former Soviet Union.

I am still concerned that less nuclear material, as I understand

it, has been secured from the former Soviet Union in the two years

after September 11th than the two years prior to September 11th.

Now, it may just be that there was low-hanging fruit initially, and

it starts getting harder as time goes by. But I’m also concerned by

the fact that we’ve never fully funded, it appears to me, the NunnLugar program. And so, I know that Senator Lugar is going to be

presenting an amendment that gives your office more flexibility in

this area. I’m hopeful that I’m going to have the opportunity to

work with him and my colleagues on this piece of legislation.

I guess my question is, how are you going to use this flexibility?

Number one, are you going to be seeking full funding? Number

two, beyond the existing mechanisms to lock down existing nuclear

material, what else are we doing, for example, to make sure that

Pakistan has a mechanism in place to assure that those nuclear

weapons, or that technology, is no longer drifting off into the hands

of hostile forces?

Dr. RICE. Thank you. First of all, on nuclear proliferation, let me

just say that, broadly, our strategy has been really threefold. First

of all, to be very concerned about the loopholes in the Nonproliferation treaty. The Nonproliferation Treaty is in trouble, because

there are countries that have signed on to it, and then are using

the access to civilian nuclear power to really pursue nuclear-weapons programs. Iran is a prime example of that. The President has

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made a number of proposals—Senator Lugar has—we’ve talked

about this—to close the fuel cycle, to make it not possible for countries to enrich uranium or other fuels to the point that they are left

with the fuel, but, rather, to get a fuel supply from the fuel suppliers that are out there. And it’s a proposal that has met with

some resistance, but it’s something that we’re continuing to work

on.

Clearly, we have to make the proliferation problem somewhat

easier by not having countries, that are suspect, with access to the

fuel supply.

Senator OBAMA. Can I interrupt, just real quickly?

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator OBAMA. Is the resistance on those reforms coming simply

from countries that are in the midst of development, or are we also

seeing resistance from allies, like France and Germany and others,

that already have——

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. ——existing nuclear capacity?

Dr. RICE. Well, the resistance really is coming from countries

that we think have no intention of trying to build a nuclear weapon, but who want to maintain the access to their entire civilian nuclear cycle. So we’ve had to talk with some countries about the fact

that, yes, under the Nonproliferation Treaty, countries have a—

have access to this, but, when you get a country that is cheating

under that access, that maybe for those countries you shouldn’t

have the access. So this is a discussion—we got a one-year moratorium on enriching and reprocessing, and we’ll try to keep pressing

forward.

Secondly, we’ve been very aggressive on what is a really bad

problem, which is nuclear entrepreneurship, the kind of AQ Khan

factor, these black-market entrepreneurs who are selling nuclear

secrets, selling, in fact, the whole little ‘‘kit,’’ if you will. And the

takedown of the AQ Khan network is really one of the most important things that we’ve done. It will give us information on how this

works. We have to put this one out of business, and we have to

work to see if there are others.

This has all been helped by what happened Libya, where a country voluntarily gave up its weapons of mass destruction, in hopes

of a better relationship with the international community. And we

have to try and incent that kind of behavior on countries that have

pursued weapons of mass destruction.

And then, finally, you mentioned—oh, I should also mention the

Proliferation Security Initiative, which, of course, helps us to interdict dangerous cargo. So it’s a broad program. But the Nunn-Lugar

piece of this is very important. As I’ve said, as an old Soviet specialist, I know a good bit about the dangers there.

We have tended—we have tried to fund it at levels that are adequate to do the work at hand. And you mentioned the securing before 2001, and the securing afterwards. Some of that is exactly as

you mentioned, low-hanging fruit. Some of it is that there’s a, kind

of, schedule for which sites get secured when. What we have done

is to go to the Energy Department and ask them to prioritize, to

try to get the most important sites secured in the earliest time.

And the timetable has been collapsed to one where, if we keep to

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schedule, we should be able to secure all materials within the next

four years. So we’re making some progress.

We need to work harder on the bureaucratic impediments to this.

There are impediments on both sides.

Senator OBAMA. Okay, but my understanding, though, is also

that, at the current schedule, we’d be stretching this process out

for potentially 13 years, as opposed to four. Collapsing it will require a little more aggressive movement on the part of the State

Department. And I recognize this is difficult. Russia may not always be entirely——

Dr. RICE. Right.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. ——interested in moving this along

as quickly as possible. But it strikes me that, with the expertise

we have on this committee, this is something we’d like to work

on——

Dr. RICE. And we should certainly work on it.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. ——aggressively.

Dr. RICE. We do, by the way, have a collapsed schedule, for four

years. We will see what it takes to get that done. But I appreciate

the interest in this. This is something we should work very carefully on.

Senator OBAMA. The second question I have—and this is something that I think repeatedly comes up as I travel through Illinois;

I suspect this is true everywhere—and that is the enormous strain

that is being felt by our national guardsmen and reservists in Iraq.

And, you know, I did a calculation, or my staff did, that I think

if Illinois was a country, we’d be fourth or fifth in size of—as a coalition partner. I think that may be true, in fact, for just the National Guard, alone.

Now, I recognize that you’re not up for confirmation as Secretary

of Defense. Presumably, at some point I’ll have the opportunity to

ask Secretary Rumsfeld about some of these questions. But I am

concerned about this notion, that was pursued by Senator Biden

and others, that we’ve made significant progress in training troops.

Because it seems to me that—in your response to Senator Alexander—that we will not be able to get our troops out, absent the

Iraqi forces being able to secure their own country, or at least this

administration would not be willing to define success in the absence of such occurring.

I never got quite a clear answer to Senator Biden’s question as

to how many troops, Iraqi troops—don’t just have a uniform and

aren’t just drawing a paycheck, but are effective enough and committee enough that we would willingly have our own troops fighting side by side with them. The number, of 120,000 that you gave,

I suspect does not meet those fairly stringent criteria that Senator

Biden was alluding to. And I just want to make sure, on the record,

that you can give me some sense of where we’re at now. You may

not have all the answers, but I’d like to at least get a better sense

of that.

Dr. RICE. The number that we consider trained is 120,000. It’s

a little hard to give a number in—for exactly the criteria that you

are talking about, because a lot of this is a matter of what you experience when these forces actually go into difficulty.

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We have had—and everybody understands that we have had

problems with people leaving, people deserting. We’ve had problems with people—well, not coming back. And we’ve had problems

with, particularly, some of the police forces, who are, frankly,

undermanned. And one of the things—or under-supplied—we are

dealing with the structure of the police forces by trying to go to

more commando units that are more heavily armed for what is now

contact with insurgencies, not just what your average beat-cop can

do.

The Iraqi forces have fought pretty well in a number of places.

The forces that have fought best are the ones that have clear leadership by Iraqis. And this has caused us to focus more on the need

for leadership, for coherent leadership for these forces. And I mean

leadership of units, not leadership in the broad sense. And so, the

Iraqis, themselves, are spending more time vetting people who—experienced leaders—who can be brought back these—to give structure and moral to these people. They’re considering the policy of

putting some of our people in as, really, almost mentors with these

forces, really paying more attention to their capability to fight as

integral units, not just the numbers of people that we’re training.

And I think that’s going to be responsive to some of the concerns.

And one of the points that General Luck will look at is how well

that process is going and what more we need to do.

But the numbers are 120,000. When they are tested, some perform well, and some don’t. We have to recognize that this is a very

tough environment, even for the best-trained forces.

Senator OBAMA. Ours.

Dr. RICE. Even for our—even for our forces. And while we want

to accelerate the training of the forces, we don’t want to do what

we did in an earlier cycle, I think, which was to accelerate it to the

point that we put unprepared forces on the field. So it’s a complicated issue, but I think we’re trying to work our way through it.

We’ve tried to adapt to what are really changing circumstances and

changing demands for the Iraqi security force personnel.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. I would

just make this note, that if our measure is to bring our troops

home, and success is measured by whether Iraqis can secure their

own circumstances, and if our best troops in the world are having

trouble controlling the situation with 150,000 or so, it sounds like

we’ve got a long way to go. And I think part of what the American

people are going to need is some certainty—not an absolute timetable, but a little more certainty than is being provided. Because,

right now, it appears to be an entirely open-ended commitment.

Dr. RICE. Senator, if I may just—to that point, I want to be understood that we are always looking to complete the job, but, of

course, to get our forces home as soon as possible. And it will be

a function of our—their capability and our ability to help them. But

there is at least some hope that Iraqis may, themselves, fight this

fight somewhat differently and somewhat better, because it is their

fight.

I was asked once, why are Iraqis better in certain situations than

even the best-trained coalition forces? And, of course, an Iraqi

knows whether that is a Syrian or a Saudi or an Iraqi. They are

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‘‘of’’ the country, ‘‘of’’ the culture, and they’re fighting for their own

freedom.

And so, one of the standards of success is really that the Iraqis

are fighting for their freedom; even if they’re not fully able yet to

secure themselves, that they are fighting for their freedom. And I

think we are seeing very strong signs of that in the country.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.

I just want to underline the Senator’s point. And you have addressed that, in your own way, Dr. Rice. But I know that when

Prime Minister Allawi was here, he told some of us who are around

this table that, by the time of the election—about a year from now,

there would be at least 200,000 people, who are both police force

and National Guard, who would be capable, who could, in fact, patrol the streets, control the country. And then, he assured us, there

will be a good election, unlike what we are likely to see on January

the 30th.

I’m wondering if it’s not possible for us to devise, between you

and us, some metrics that are more satisfying than the large

spread that we have between Senator Biden’s questions and Senator Obama’s followup, 4,000 and 120,000. As you point out, of the

120,000, it is very difficult to determine how well-trained they are,

how many weeks they will need, what kind of staying power they

might have, whether they’re overwhelmed. We appreciate that. As

Allawi said, the negotiation with us as to how rapidly we withdraw

in a seemly and secure way must occur. This is going to be up front

with the American people for quite some time. And I think we can

probably do better with the question. It’s very difficult to do so in

this dialogue because all the criteria of training and capability are

not really clear. But I’d just ask you to think through this a little

bit, and we will, too, creatively, maybe through hearings or through

studies of some sort. I think some measurement is essential, perhaps like the way we were gauging the electrical power output for

a while, or determining how much oil was in the planning to be

produced. There have to be some indicators that give some sense

of progress and hope and what have you.

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sununu? And I congratulate you on your

co-chairmanship with Senator Biden of a very successful observation effort.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I suppose it’s

largely due to the fact that you chose me, so I’m very grateful for

that.

Dr. Rice, in your remarks, you mentioned that the United States

has a role to play in providing assistance to the new Palestinian

leadership. And in our meetings last week with both Abu Mazen

and Abu Ala, it was emphasized that, in structuring the Palestinian security forces, one of the biggest needs was money to deal

with the pension issues and payment issues.

Do you intend to recommend a financial-assistance package for

the new Palestinian leadership to restructure their security forces?

And is it likely that that request would be part of a supplemental

budget early in the year?

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Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator. I will look with others, when I get

to State, at precisely how we might fund the obligations that I’m

sure we’re going to have to undertake to help the Palestinians in

this important period of time. Clearly, the training of the security

forces is going to be critical. They’ve got to fight terrorism. They’ve

got to have trained security forces to do it. It will be a good investment, to train those forces.

I would just note that we have, through indirect assistance,

through the United Nations, through non-governmental organizations, provided a good deal of funding to Palestinian reconstruction,

Palestinian humanitarian needs. We also have—the President approved the funding of $20 million in direct support to the Palestinians just recently to help with their elections. So there is a fund

flow, and we will look at what more we need.

I would hope that some of this would be funded by their Arab

neighbors. I have to say that, you know, if people really want a

peace—if the countries in the neighborhood, as they come and they

tell me, and they come and they tell the President, they come and

they tell the Secretary Powell all the time, ‘‘We have got to have

peace, you’ve got to work on behalf of the Palestinians’’—then there

are a number of their neighbors who could really afford to help

fund some of these efforts. And I’m sure that I will be actively

seeking their support, because that is one thing that the neighbors

could do for the Palestinian people.

Senator SUNUNU. Well, that was my second question: What can

the Arab states do to help? Obviously, with 45- or 50-dollar-a-barrel

oil, the economy is there, and the revenue base there is much

stronger than it has been in past years. Is there any specific role

that you see for the Arab states, in addition to financial resources?

One of the issues that was raised in some our meetings were, perhaps, the opportunity to assist in the training of the security forces.

And, let me be clear, there are two different steps to this. One is

restructuring the security forces, which will take resources and

funding, in and of itself, and a lot of political will. And then the

second step would be the training of security forces. Is there a particular partner in the region that you think might be best suited

to that training role?

Dr. RICE. Yes, I—it appears to me that both the Egyptians and

the Jordanians will probably have a role to play. They’ve played

that role before, in various ways, and we have had extensive conversations with them at other times about playing that role—at the

time, for instance, of Akaba. And we would want to get them involved. The Egyptians, of course, also have a role to play in helping

stabilize the Gaza as the Israeli forces withdraw, and we have

talked with them about that.

There are other roles that we need the Arab states to play, and

I think the most important is—I mentioned earlier, you can’t incite

hatred against Israel and then say you want a two-state solution.

It’s just got to stop. They’ve got to stop it in their media, they’ve

got to stop it in their mosques, because it is a message that is inciting the people who want to destroy the chances for peace between

Israel and Palestine—the Palestinian territories. So we have—

we’ve sent that message.

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And it was probably little noticed, but when we went to Sharm

El Sheik, the Arabs actually issued a very good statement, and it

was on behalf of Arab states, the Arab League, and it was a very

good statement. We will be going back to them to remind them of

that statement and to ask them to live up to it.

Senator SUNUNU. In addition to the value of that statement, I

would mention that one of the things that came up time and again

was the impact that your visit had on the area, and the importance

of that kind of high-level engagement. I know you answered some

questions with regard to a special envoy. It’s something that you

have supported, in concept. But I would just underscore the value

of that, a high-level engagement, whether it’s through our special

envoy or your personal commitment.

You mentioned Egypt and Jordan. So a third question has to do

with public diplomacy. You mentioned it in your remarks. It’s obviously a goal that’s shared by most everyone on this committee, to

focus on public diplomacy and even to reform some of our efforts

in that area. I believe one of the areas of public diplomacy that has

been a success story is that of the American university in Beirut,

the American University in Cairo, what they have done for both

students in the region and American students seeking to broaden

their educational base.

I have had suggested to me the initiative of developing an American university in Amman, and I was curious what you thought of

that objective, and what kind of support you might lend to such an

effort.

Dr. RICE. Well, thank you. I will certainly look at it. I haven’t

taken a look at that, and I’d like to have a chance to do that. But

I have to say that the two universities that you mentioned have

been, really, extremely important in helping to create a link between the United States and these important countries and in providing a place for moderation in these societies. And so, it’s certainly the kind of thing that we should look at.

We have to look, overall, at what I like to call a conversation, not

a monologue. It’s one thing to get your message out, which is how

we often think about it, but it’s also important to engage other cultures. And I would hope that that includes, on the part of the

United States, a commitment—a renewed commitment to the training of people—Americans in critical languages, like Arabic and

Farsi and other languages, and in the study of those cultures.

I was a Soviet specialist and learned Russian at a time when a

lot of us were told that was a good thing to do for the well-being

of the country. And we linked our cultural awareness and linguistic

awareness to the broader question of how we secured ourselves and

how we won the war of ideas. And we have to do that again. There

are too few of us who are able to engage those societies on their

own terms.

Senator SUNUNU. Finally, I’d like you to talk a little bit about the

Middle East Partnership. This is a new way of looking at financial

assistance. It’s obviously consistent with the goals that you spoke

about in your remarks today—economic liberalization, political reform. Do you believe that MEPI, as implemented to date, has been

successful? Is it a model that we ought to seek to reproduce elsewhere? And how do we ensure that an approach like MEPI and the

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funding commitment made through the Middle East Partnership

isn’t duplicative of efforts within USAID or other State Department

programs?

Dr. RICE. On the broader question, there needs to be very close

coordination between USAID and the State Department. And I

think that that has gotten better. Just watching it from the outside—I will obviously know more as I get to the inside, but I really

do think that Andrew Natsios and Rich Armitage and Colin Powell

have worked very closely together to make sure that all our resources are going in a way that is not duplicative to further our

goals.

I am a supporter of MEPI. I think that it is a part of the concrete

things that we can do to change the environment in the Middle

East. And its focus on good governance, as well as liberalization of

economies at the same time that assistance is flowing, is a very important innovation. It is also behind the Millennium Challenge account approach, where I think we now have a consensus about foreign assistance, that foreign assistance has to be a two-way

street—that it’s not just money going into a country, but it is—a

country has to be devoted to fighting corruption, to liberalizing the

economy, to good governance, to spending money on healthcare and

education for the people—or it’s not going to succeed. And that

kind of compact between donor and donee is the wave of—the future wave, I believe, for foreign assistance.

And so, we do have other initiatives that push in the same direction. I might just mention, also, Senator, that we hope, in the Middle East, to be able to take advantage of free trade as a tool, both

to encourage peaceful liberalization between the countries of the region, but also with us. And so, Bob Zoellick has been putting freetrade agreements in place in a lot of places in the Middle East, and

looking to the day that we might have a Middle East free-trade

area.

Senator SUNUNU. I want to note, for the record, that was question number five, Jordanian free trade and, obviously, the initiatives in Morocco that have been undertaken. And I certainly encourage you to continue along that line. I think, in the long term,

the issues that have been stressed within part of the Middle East

Partnership—that is, economic liberalization and the trade liberalization that comes along with that—will do far more for economic

growth and development as any short-term assistance that we

might provide. That short-term assistance is important, and especially in areas like restructuring the Palestinian security forces. I

don’t think that can happen in the short term without some outside

assistance, but, in the long term, economic growth, development opportunity—it’s really going to be determined by the macroeconomic

policy and trade policy that are chosen by our partners.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sununu.

Senator Martinez?

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It’s a

great honor to be a part of your committee. I want to thank you

and Ranking Member Biden for the warm welcome, and I look forward to working with you and the other Members.

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I’m particularly honored today to have the opportunity to participate in the confirmation of Dr. Rice, someone I came to know as

a colleague and friend in our work together in the administration.

And I can certainly recall many moments in which her steady leadership and her steady hand were felt, from those early days of our

administration, when an American airplane was down in the—off

the coast of China, to tumultuous days after 9/11. When good,

steady leadership was needed, Dr. Rice was there, providing it to

the President each and every day. And I know that, in all my interactions with her, I’ve always found her to be, not only extremely

competent, but a person of great personal integrity, and I’m extremely proud to be in support of her confirmation.

We’ve talked a little bit about Latin America, Dr. Rice, an area

that’s of great interest. I share, with Senator Dodd and Senator

Nelson, the anxiety that we have about the need for us to be more

engaged in the region. You hear it from all their leaders when you

travel there. You also just know that it is an area that begs for our

participation and engagement in a more direct way than we’ve had

in the last several years.

There are some signs that are troubling to me. And I know we’ve

talked about Venezuela. I want to go back into Venezuela for a moment, because it seems to me that over the last—well, first of all,

Venezuela is a government that, purportedly, was elected through

a democratic process. However, anything but a democratic governance is what takes place there today. I’m troubled by the recent

events, where property has been expropriated, inflammatory statements, as Mr. Chavez travels the world, that he continues to make

against the United States, which has been a pattern of his throughout the time of his governance, his close relationship with another

negative force in the region, with the Government of Cuba and

Fidel Castro, himself. It really does raise, in my mind, some serious

skepticism of our ability to work with him, or his commitment to

true democracy and pluralism within his own country.

In addition to that, we now know, recently, that Mr. Chavez has

initiated conversations with Russia about the major purchase of

arms. It sounds to be something in the order of $5 billion. It would

be a terribly destabilizing effect on the region. He’s talking about

purchasing MiG-29s, advanced jet fighters, as well as a large, large

number of AK rifles and other military equipment. He’s already

purchased helicopters. This would create, I think, a tremendous imbalance in the region, in terms of the potential to trigger an arms

race in a region that, frankly, does not need one.

And, also, I greatly concern myself with the continuing friction

that appears to exist—or, actually, doesn’t appear; it, in fact, exists—between Venezuela and its neighboring country, Colombia. I

know, in Colombia, we have tried to support President Uribe in his

fight against the narco-trafficker terrorists, or narco-terrorists.

And so, my question to you would be, how do you view the government of President Chavez, the kind of threat that it represents

to stability in the region, as well as to his neighboring Colombia,

and his continuing pattern of association and relationship with

some of the worst characters in the world, including Fidel Castro?

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator. I think that we have to view, at

this point, the Government of Venezuela as a negative force in the

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region, negative in terms of its effect on its neighbors, as you have

outlined, and negative in embracing the only undemocratic government in the region—as I said, the only place there’s an empty chair

in the OAS is for Cuba—negative in the sense of what he is doing

inside of his own country to suppress opposition. And it’s a very,

very serious matter. And the—we can, I think, work with others to

expose that and to say to President Chavez that this kind of behavior is really not acceptable in this hemisphere that is trying to

make its way toward a stable, democratic future.

Democracy has a lot of challenges in Latin America. It has challenges of new, fragile institutions that have come into being over

the last less-than-two decades. It has the challenges of trying to

bring economic prosperity to very poor populations. It has the challenge of trying to integrate into the political system people who

have long been shut out of that political system, like indigenous

peoples. It has a lot of challenges. In some places, it has the challenge of terrorism and narco-trafficking, like Colombia.

But I do want to say that President Uribe has been very tough

on narco-trafficking and terrorism, and we’ve supported him, and

I think he’s making some progress. It has places like the Andean

region, which we’ve supported through extension of Andean trade

preferences and through working on the Andean Initiative.

We are engaging, and need to engage more, this very vital region. It has a lot of challenges. It has a lot of promise. But I would

have to say that, at this point, one would have to judge the influence of Venezuela—Venezuela’s government as negative. And it’s

too bad, because it has been a longstanding good relationship with

the United States, and we have great affection for the Venezuelan

people. I just think that right now it’s a pretty negative influence.

Senator MARTINEZ. As it relates to Cuba, I know that the President put forth a very broad policy towards Cuba in May of this

year, which included, among other things, a really strong outreach

to the dissident community with Cuba, and providing encouragement and assistance so that this budding group of people could continue to thrive. Understanding that they operate under tremendous

difficult circumstances, as we know, from the continuing humanrights suppression in Cuba and political prisoners, like Dr. Oscar

Elias Biscet and others, who continue to unjustly be imprisoned.

I wondered if you could speak to the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on a Free Cuba, which, obviously, some of them have been already taken place, but I’m particularly concerned about whether there will be, within the State Department, someone that you will task to be a point-person in the

continuity of this and in the ensuring of the implementation of all

of its different points, including, in this, the obvious need for there

to be a continuing flow of information to the Cuban people.

I was delighted when Ranking Member Biden mentioned that,

when he saw Lech Walesa, the first thing he said was not ‘‘solidarity,’’ but was ‘‘Radio Free Europe.’’ I think that Radio and TV

Marti can have that same freeing potential for the people of Cuba

if we can break through the jamming that continues to be there because of Castro’s fear of his own people hearing just free news and

information.

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So can you help me giving me some assurance that there will be

someone to ensure the carrying out of this by having a point-person

so assigned, and a continued commitment to Radio and TV Marti,

and the platform that we’re talking about, having a dedicated opportunity to pierce the jamming, by ways in which—we’ve done it

recently, in ways that I think would help the people of Cuba to get

free information.

Dr. RICE. Well, the information flow to Cuba is a very important

tool for us, because Castro would like nothing better than to have

his people shut off from information. And Radio Marti and TV

Marti, of course, we’ve been very supportive. We’ve been flying

commando solo. We’re looking at how best to extend that and make

certain that we can continue to do that.

I don’t know about the structure just yet, but I can assure you

that there will be very close attention to the implementation of the

Commission’s recommendations. We’ve already made a lot of

progress with our—with immigration, with homeland security. Castro, I think, is feeling some of that, where we are beginning to

make it not possible for him to skim money off of monies that people send for humanitarian or family reasons or travel to fuel his

dictatorial regime.

The day that the people of Cuba are finally free is going to be

a great one for the Western Hemisphere, and the Commission recommendations were intended to try and hasten that day and also

to try and prepare the ground for a peaceful transition. And it’s a

very important goal, and you can be certain that we’ll pay extremely close attention to it.

Senator MARTINEZ. You have in the past, and I know you will in

the future.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

Senator MARTINEZ. Shifting to the Middle East, I had the opportunity to travel there recently and also saw the Palestinian election

take place. One of the great concerns that seems to be there as we

look to a peace process is the continued stability in Southern Lebanon—the fact that the United Nations resolutions have never

been implemented, Syria has never really left the region, the Lebanese Government has never really taken over the southern part of

Lebanon—and it just continues to exacerbate the inability of Israel

to not suffer the terrorist attacks, which then creates more instability in the region.

Do you think that there will be an opportunity for us to more

forcefully assert the need for that resolution to be observed by

Syria and Lebanon?

Dr. RICE. Absolutely, Senator. The Resolution 1546, which we

and the French cosponsored to put the Syrians on notice that the

world expected them to observe the legitimate sovereignty of Lebanon, to begin to remove their forces, to stop terrorism from there,

I think, was a very important achievement. Secretary General

Annan has appointed someone to keep on top of the implementation of that resolution. And that’s also very important.

Lebanon can be one of the democratic strongholds in the Middle

East. And so, we need to pay attention to what is going on in Lebanon.

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And if I just may say one line about Syria, as well, I think that

it’s fair to say that the Syrian Government is behaving in a way

that could, unfortunately, lead to long-term bad relations with the

United States. It is incumbent on Syria to respond, finally, to the

entreaties of the United States and others about their ties to terrorism, about the harmful activities that are taking place from Syrian territory into Iraq, and to act on a number of the steps that

were first outlined to them by Secretary Powell almost three years

ago, and then by Deputy Secretary Armitage just very recently.

And so, this is an important issue with Syria, and I just want to

thank the Congress. We do have, thanks to the Syrian Accountability Act, some tools, but we will have to mobilize them, because

Syria should not be, but is, thus far, not a constructive force.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.

At this point, I want to have a little discussion. I will not let this

become a full-scale debate. But I want to survey what is possible

with the committee this afternoon in the hearing. And so, I’m going

to ask each Member who is assembled for some estimate of how

many minutes the Member would require in raising additional

questions. And we’ll try to total that up and come to some idea,

then, of whether we might complete our work this afternoon and,

in fact, have a vote on confirmation. Or, if that is not in the cards,

we will proceed in regular order so that Members will have the opportunity to ask the questions that we promised everyone they

could ask.

Dr. RICE. And, Senator, I’m willing to stay here longer than the

afternoon, if you need me to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you may be more prepared than all of our

Members. But, nevertheless, we’ll not debate that, either, in terms

of eagerness.

But let me just ask. Senator Hagel, do you need more time?

Senator HAGEL. Ten minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. About ten minutes.

Senator Chafee?

Senator CHAFEE. Probably five.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator Coleman?

Senator COLEMAN. Maybe five, but I’d forego my five if we came

to some consensus that we could vote this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Flexible, okay.

Senator Voinovich?

Senator VOINOVICH. Ten.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator Martinez?

Senator MARTINEZ. Sir, I’m awfully new, I need to be very flexible.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Well, I read that somewhere between

30 and 40 minutes—plus or minus a few.

Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. I have at least ten minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes?

Senator SARBANES. Another round.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

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Senator Dodd?

Senator DODD. The same, 10 or 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. Feingold?

Senator FEINGOLD. Ten minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer?

Senator BOXER. About two rounds.

The CHAIRMAN. About two hours?

Senator BOXER. Two rounds.

The CHAIRMAN. Two rounds, all right.

Senator BOXER. I don’t want two hours.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Very good.

Senator Obama?

Senator OBAMA. That sounds better than 20 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Well, that would be at least 70 minutes

or so, it looks like.

And, Senator Murkowski, how many more minutes would you

like to question the witness?

Senator MURKOWSKI. I think it can be done in ten.

The CHAIRMAN. Another ten, all right.

Well, it appears probably we have at least two hours of work

ahead of us, maybe more. And let me just mention, the distinguished Ranking Member, because of an important commitment,

will need to leave at about 6:00 o’clock or thereabouts.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I do have a longstanding commitment at 6:00. I assumed we’d go two days. But I want to make it

clear, if, in fact, the committee has exhausted its questions in the

time frame of 6:00 or 7:00 o’clock, I would leave my proxy with my

colleague, if you would be still here, or with you, to vote my proxy.

I have no objection to proceeding, assuming every Member is satisfied they’ve had their questions answered. And I’m sure the witness would be delighted to not have to be back tomorrow, although

we enjoy her company greatly and expect her back many times.

Dr. RICE. Many times.

Senator BIDEN. So I have no objection, as long as the Chairman

understands, my constraint is at about ten minutes of 6:00. I’m

going to have to leave for a longstanding commitment.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, if I might just—I think what

you’re doing to do is a wise thing, to proceed in this way, but let’s—

I would hope, because, in terms of the nominee’s responses and so

forth, you may find Members needing more time than they’ve indicated to you here——

The CHAIRMAN. Could be.

Senator DODD [continuing]. ——in good faith. It would be improper for us to assume that you might be able to say there are

two hours left, and we’d be, sort of, failing in our commitments to

you if we discovered that we needed more time to pursue some

issues maybe a little more aggressively.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. And the Chair will not be unreasonable in keeping the hearing going forever. We’ll try to gauge

what is doable. Now, if, at some point it appears that we’re still

raising good questions, but we’re not going to conclude, then I

would ask for Members’ cooperation to come back tomorrow morning at 9:00 o’clock again. And, hopefully, under those cirVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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cumstances, perhaps to have a vote on the nomination before noon

so that we would then compact our efforts, perhaps, and thus leave

afternoons available for the nominee and for ourselves.

But if that doesn’t work, why, we’ve reserved the afternoon, also.

One option or another probably will work out, and that’s why I just

took the time to gauge your preferences at this juncture. We’ve had

wonderful attendance. As you’ve noticed, Dr. Rice, all 18 Members

have been present and have all taken at least ten minutes, some

a few more—as the case may be.

There is deep interest in this, as is evidenced by the attendees

at the hearing who have come to hear you. And we’ve had standing-room only throughout the hearings. You cannot see this from

where you are sitting, but I can testify to this.

Well, we’ll proceed now. We’ll set a ten-minute round. Members

need not use all ten minutes if they are disposed to stop short of

that.

Let me begin by saying, Dr. Rice, that I submitted a question to

you, and I appreciated your response, endorsing my initiative for

an institute on the free press at the National Endowment for Democracy. Given both public and private sectors working together,

the National Endowment seemed to me to be a good framework for

this. We can make some headway on the public diplomacy initiatives that you have expressed today, and enlist both parties, Republicans and Democrats, through the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute, and others who are

affiliated. I’ll not take time to question you, but I just wanted to

note that I appreciated, very much, that endorsement. I mention it

because of your strong advocacy, today, of public diplomacy, the

need for us to get our message out.

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask about Ukraine. We have had a dramatic chain of events, and they are, by no means, at conclusion.

The story evolves there. But it is clear that President Yushchenko

will have numerous hurdles in front of him. It would be helpful, in

my judgment, if we could have the administration’s support of legislation repealing Jackson-Vanik restrictions for Ukraine. Do you

have an opinion on——

Dr. RICE. We would——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. ——that initiative?

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——we support the repeal of those——

The CHAIRMAN. For Ukraine.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——For Ukraine, at the time that it’s appropriate, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate that. And you may be able to

help us determine, in the timetable, when it is appropriate, and to

work with us on that legislation so that there will not be hitches

or misunderstandings with the government that we are trying to

assist there.

Senator Biden has indicated an appropriate and timely call from

our former colleague Senator Danforth, our ambassador to the

United Nations, with regard to Sudan. And I had the privilege of

visiting with him in the last few days, over the telephone, on specific issues that are now before us. Despite peace between the north

and the south, there is, in fact, the need, still, for peacekeepers—

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African troops, essentially. About $250 million, he estimated, would

be required to pay for that peacekeeping effort by these troops, in

addition to a commitment he feels that we have made as part of

the carrots of the carrots-and-stick business, of about $500 million

in development aid to the Government of Sudan. Now, Senator

Danforth was concerned about both sums, the 250 million and the

500 million, and the incorporation by the Department of this in our

foreign assistance budget—or wherever it may be appropriate, perhaps in the Defense budget. Have you given thought to how we are

going to meet the Sudan commitments?

Dr. RICE. Senator, I need to look at precisely how we will meet

the commitments. We have been aware of the commitments that

we have, and we will do it through some combination of funding

accounts.

As to the peacekeepers, I think our goal, right now, is to convince

the Sudan Government that the AU needs to have the full 3,300

complement, not just 1,100. And we’re working very hard on that.

But we recognize the commitments that we’ve made on——

The CHAIRMAN. So they still need to be convinced that they need

3300 peacekeepers.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——Right. That’s right.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, well, that’s a very——

Dr. RICE. That’s a problem.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. ——important factor. But it’s still

important that we succeed, I think, in having an appropriate

amount, not only to gel together the success thus far, but, obviously, because Darfur is still in some jeopardy, as Senator Danforth

has told this committee, with a lot of guilt on all sides, in that situation.

Of course, sadly enough, he also, I’m sure, informed Senator

Biden, as he did me, that he will be leaving his post today.

Dr. RICE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And so, once again we have a very important

diplomatic assignment that requires a nominee. I would just request that you work closely with colleagues in the White House

and with the President to forward a nominee quickly, because, as

we went through this progression with Ambassador Negroponte’s

nomination, the committee moved very rapidly to hold a hearing almost before the Ambassador might have been prepared for it, as

well as the Department, considering all of the paperwork that

needs to be done. At this particular crucial time, an ambassador to

the U.N. from the United States is so important. So I know that

that’s on your mind, but I——

Dr. RICE. Yes, it is.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. ——just wanted to take the occasion

of the hearing to underline it.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to mention, in Venezuela, as others

have already, that we do have a very, very heavy oil traffic with

Venezuela that’s mutually beneficial. However, given all the difficulties and vagaries of the situation, I just simply want to ask,

Is there a contingency plan, in the event of another suspension of

oil exports from Venezuela? Because even the hint of this, or of

labor difficulties in Venezuela, causes spikes in the oil futures marVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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kets. These bring speculation and higher gas prices for Americans,

all over. They see us, as constituents, and ask, ‘‘What are you going

to do about it?’’

Nigeria sometimes is responsible, quite apart from the Middle

East and the normal suspects. But, with Venezuela, do we have,

really, some contingency plan of what to do with this 13 percent

of the oil that we require?

Dr. RICE. Well, we’re certainly hoping that the Government of

Venezuela realizes, as you said, the mutual beneficial nature of

this. I think that it was Senator Nelson who mentioned the fact

that some 80 percent of Venezuelan exports are actually—in oil—

are actually to us. So it is mutually beneficial. Obviously, we have

to prepare for disruption. That’s why we have a strategic petroleum

reserve. And the long-term goal, of course, is to have an energy policy that lessens our——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——dependence on foreign supplies. But it

would be—I would hope that the Venezuelan government, whatever our differences and difficulties with, understand that this is,

economically, a mutually beneficial relationship.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as you take hold, would you just take

under advisement the need for a more explicit plan, and perhaps,

through the appropriate departments in the Department of State,

work with the subordinates that you will have? Because it just

seems to me that something here is going to be required, beyond

the hope, eventually, for an energy plan or the various contingencies that we have thus far.

I just wanted to touch on Iran briefly to indicate that there has

been enormous commentary, not only from the press, but among

academics, about the extent of our participation with the Europeans in negotiations with Iran or with the IAEA. And from time

to time, it appears that the Europeans, or Ambassador Baradei, negotiate various things, and then we make an editorial comment

about it, but are not exactly around the table are not lifting in the

same way.

Are you examining what our role ought to be in these ongoing

negotiations so that, in fact, they will be more successful, so that

they will have greater staying power, and the Europeans, as well

as the U.N., will have greater confidence that our heft is behind

this situation?

Dr. RICE. Well, we’re certainly working very closely with the Europeans. And, with the IAEA, we’re full participants, as members

of the board, in the processes that the IAEA is going through.

Obviously, we need to keep reviewing this situation, but I think

that we believe, at this point, that there is a path ahead. If the Europeans are unable to get satisfactory understanding with the Iranians about their international obligations, I think we have to go

back and look at the process that was prescribed, which is that this

would go to the Security Council, and we would go from there.

Nobody is saying that there have to be sanctions right away, or

anything of the sort, but we are saying that Iran has to be held

to account for its international obligations.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, indeed, that has been our policy. I, once

again, am hopeful—and I see an opportunity with the Europeans

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here, as we begin to meld together strategies for the future in the

Middle East—some possibilities for more cooperation, for more mutual assistance in this process, in addition to, as you say, our

thought that responsibility means that they’ve got to do this or

that, or face the U.N. Ultimately, they might face the Security

Council, and not much might come of it. I think you understand

better than any of us the importance of the negotiations. I’ve just

seized, once again, on some possibilities of working with Great

Britain, with France, with others who have been doing more heavylifting here.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, finally, in May, the Nonproliferation Treaty

Review Conference is going to take place in New York. May is at

least four months away, but what sort of preparations is the administration making for that conference? What sort of objectives

will we have at that point?

Dr. RICE. Well, we will try, at that conference, to work with others to try and address some of the loopholes that are there in the

NPT. And I think the big one, of course, is this issue of civilian nuclear-use being used to cover——

The CHAIRMAN. The loop that——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——nuclear programs——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. ——you mentioned earlier.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——this fuel cycle——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——loop. And we have some proposals.

We’re working—there’s a proposal for a special committee on compliance, which I think is a good proposal, and we probably can

work that out. But the NPT needs some repair. And we will try

and press this agenda at the conference.

I have to say that the leadership of the IAEA has also been interested, when I’ve talked to Mr. El Baradei about this, in trying to

pursue some of these problems, too, because they know that, without a sound NPT, there’s—we really are—we have one hand tied

behind our backs.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Rice, I’m going to ask several questions, and we can both get

right to it. It’ll keep me from a second round, maybe an incentive.

First of all, I’d like to ask you briefly about Iraq. In my last trip

to Iraq, I was surprised at how frequently—and I’m not exaggerating, my colleagues may have found the same thing, I think

they did—how many people asked us, including our own military,

‘‘Are we staying’’—how many times I heard the question, from

Iraqis as well as our own military, ‘‘Are we staying, or is the administration’s exit strategy an election? At the end of January,

Allawi, whomever is elected, turns and says, ‘We want you out,’

and we leave; we declare that Saddam has been defeated, we have

eliminated weapons of mass destruction, or there are none there to

begin with, and we’ve done our job, and we leave.’’

Can you tell this committee whether or not it’s the administration’s position to see through the process until the election that’s

due at the end of 2005?

103

Dr. RICE. Well, it is certainly this administration’s intention to

see that process through. I think what that means for our force levels, we will have to see, as we’ve been talking about, Iraqi forces.

There’s no doubt that we believe strongly that they’re on a path

here, and we have to help them through that path.

Senator BIDEN. Do you see any possibility—now, everything is

possible—do you see any reasonable possibility that the United

States would withdraw the bulk of its forces before the end of

2005?

Dr. RICE. I can’t judge that, Senator Biden, but I will say that

we’re going to try to help the Iraqis get this done. And what force

levels we need to get it done, we’ll just have to keep to get it done.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I think it would be a useful thing, upon

consideration, once you’re sworn in, for somebody to tell the American people what to expect, so they have some sense of an honest

assessment of what is likely. Every single military person I have

spoken with in my trips to Iraq says we need a minimum of

150,000 troops, at least for the next year and possibly beyond that,

that there’s no reasonable possibility, no matter how well we train

Iraqis, that we would be able to draw down in any significant way.

Some are talking about drawing down the 12,000 we put in for the

election.

And so, I hope that there will be an attempt on the part of the

President to try to just give his best judgment to the American people of what is expected of them, because I think they’re prepared

to do anything that’s asked of them, but I don’t think they’re prepared to continue not to know, not to have some honest sense of

what may be expected of them. Because I expect you’re going to

have to come back for tens of billions of dollars this year, and I

know we’ll go through the game of not—I know Iraq’s not part of

our budget; it’s that magic thing that we never know—having any

idea what we’re going to spend, even though we know exactly how

much it costs to maintain X number of troops in Iraq. It’s just fascinating. It’s like Democrats talking about revenue enhancements.

Republicans talking about Iraq is up there in the sky somewhere

and we don’t have to include it in the budget, like the Lord Almighty may come down and pluck it from the Earth and drop it

on Mars. But I just think we need a little more candor. I hope

you’ll focus on that a little bit.

Iran. Seymour Hersch wrote, in The New Yorker, that the, quote,

‘‘Hawks in the Pentagon, in private discussions, have been urging

a limited attack on Iran because they believe it could lead to a toppling of the religious leadership,’’ end of quote.

I’m not asking you about whether there’s any discussion about

an attack, but do you believe that it is possible to ‘‘topple,’’ quote,

the religious leadership in Iran? And—by any short-term military

action—is that a goal—not militarily—is it a goal of the United

States to change the regime in Iran?

Dr. RICE. The goal of the administration is to have a regime in

Iran that is responsive to concerns that we have about Iran’s policies, which are 180 degrees antithetical to our own interests at this

point. That means that the—a regime, ‘‘the’’ regime, would have to

deal with its nuclear-weapons obligations, deal with the fact that

there are al Qaeda leaders who have been there, deal with the fact

104

that they’re supporting Hezbollah and terrorism against—and Palestinian rejectionists against the Middle East peace process. That’s

what we’re seeking.

I do want to say that the Iranian people, who are among some

of the most worldly, in a good sense, that we know, do suffer under

a regime that has been completely unwilling to deal with their aspirations, and that has an appalling human-rights record——

Senator BIDEN. One of the things that—if I can stick on the nuclear side of this equation for a minute, one of the things that I’ve

found—I may be mistaken, but I think Senator Hagel also might

have found, there were a lot of feelers coming out, we talked to you

about it in detail, from the Modulists and members who were

viewed as at least modern and not clerical, not necessarily proWestern—was, I didn’t find a lot of distinction between quote, ‘‘Iranian democrats,’’ with a small ‘‘d,’’ and the Ayatollas on the issue

of whether Iran, quote, ‘‘was entitled to be a nuclear power.’’

The arguments I would get would be—even from people we

would not consider hardliners—was that, ‘‘We’re in a dangerous

neighborhood. We believe Israel has nuclear weapons, Russia has

nuclear weapons, Pakistan has nuclear weapons, India has nuclear

weapons, others are seeking nuclear weapons. Why are we not entitled to nuclear weapons? And there’s no umbrella or guarantee

coming from any nuclear power for us.’’

Do you think, if there was a regime change—that is, assume that

the reform movement had been successful, assume that instead of

toppling those elected officials in genuinely held democratic elections, assume that instead of them being thrown out, assume that

they had prevailed and the religious leadership had been defeated,

politically, in Iran. Do you think Iran would forego its nuclear aspirations?

Dr. RICE. Well, it’s hard to—I really don’t want to speculate. I

think it’s the kind of thing that we’ve—we don’t know. I do think

that we’re sending a message—the world is sending a message to

Iran that Iran cannot be a legitimate participant in international—

the international system, international politics, and pursue a nuclear weapon. And I would hope that that would have an effect

on——

Senator BIDEN. Well, we did——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——whatever regime there is in——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——that, and——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——Iran.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——and you did it very successfully,

along with our European friends, who had initiated it, with regard

to Qaddafi. But, as I said earlier, there were significant carrots in

the Qaddafi, quote, ‘‘deal.’’ And I fully supported what you did, and

I think it was a great success.

Now, the EU 3, the European community, has approached this

in a slightly different way than we have, with a slightly different

emphasis. And I asked you about that in my questions to you, written ahead of time, and you said, in answer to the question about

our participation with the EU 3, you said, among other things,

‘‘The United States Government is not a party to the EU 3’s ongoing dialogue with Iran. We believe that additional bilateral and

multilateral pressure, including reporting Iran’s noncompliance to

105

the U.N. Security Council, will be required to persuade Iran’s leadership to end its sensitive nuclear fuel cycle pursuits. We will continue to consult with our friends and allies toward this end.’’

Now, my question is, why do you think it is not—or is it that we

are not welcome, or is it not profitable to be actually engaged with

the EU 3 as they proceed now? Because the likelihood of the U.N.

Security Council—maybe you have more faith in the U.N. Security

Council than I do—but the likelihood of them concluding that Iran

is in noncompliance and imposing broad sanctions—we’re already

sanctioning the heck out of them—I wouldn’t want to bet anything

on that.

So I’m confused. Why are we not prepared to engage in the process and talk about what carrots we may be willing to offer in return for a cessation of their nuclear program and their missile program? Is there some philosophic reason for that, or is it a practical

reason or what’s the reason?

Dr. RICE. Well, we do have a number of other problems with

Iran, not just the nuclear problem. And I think that the future of

Iranian relations—U.S./Iranian relations—rests, not only on the

nuclear issue, but at other—a number of other issues, too—terrorism, our past—their human-rights record.

The way that we’ve chosen to do this is that Europeans work

very closely with us, and they—we are trying to see if, indeed, the

process that they’re engaged in is going to bear any fruit.

Senator BIDEN. I understand that. And I think you’ve given me

a straightforward answer, and I want to make sure I don’t misunderstand you. When I talk to our European friends, who are the

three, their foreign ministers and/or their parliamentarians who

are engaged in this, what they say to me is essentially what you

just said. I think the Europeans would be willing to cut a deal with

the Iranians now, relating to economic help, if there was a

verifiable foreswearing of production of nuclear weapons and a missile program. But the truth is—and I’m not being critical, I just

want to make sure I understand it—even if they did that, as long

as they were continuing to support Hezbollah, as long as they were

exporting the efforts to destabilize Israel, and as long as they were

engaged in human-rights abuses, then the administration’s position

would be—even if the Lord Almighty came down and said, ‘‘We

guarantee you we can verify this, guarantee we can verify a compliance with no nuclear weapons and no missile technology,’’—we still

wouldn’t go for that deal, would we?

Dr. RICE. Well, I think we would have to say that the relationship with Iran has more components than the nuclear side, but

let’s see how far the Europeans get, and——

Senator BIDEN. Well——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——take a look at——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——I appreciate——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——where we are.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——that. I would just suggest that

we have a real relationship with China, and their human-rights

abuses are terrible. The watch group looking at Russia has now put

Russia in the category—I can’t find the exact quote, my staff has

it—of being non-democratic. We continue to have a relationship

with them. And my worry is—I’ll be very blunt with you, with reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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gard to both Iran and Korea—is that I’m not sure we’re ready to

take yes for an answer. I don’t know whether they would go forward. But I do believe one thing firmly, that there is no possibility

of any fundamental change in the nuclear program in Korea or

Iran, absent the United States actively, deeply engaged in the negotiation. We’re the 800-pound gorilla. We’re the outfit, they want

to know where they are, where we are. And it concerns me that we

say the single most dangerous thing—as my friend from Illinois

said—and that both candidates agree, the most single-most dangerous thing in the world is the spread of nuclear weapons and

their possible access by the bad guys beyond the nation-states.

We seem to be able to delineate when we deal with Russia. We

seem to be able to delineate when we deal with China. I would

argue the human-rights abuses in China are not fundamentally different than human-rights abuses in Iran. By the way, it was Freedom House who categorized—I know you guys know this, I couldn’t

remember the outfit—that now labels Russia as, quote, ‘‘not free.’’

As my grandpop used to say, the horse may not be able to carry

the sleigh that you all are insisting on, but at any rate, thank you

very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Hagel?

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Dr. Rice, can you share with us what diplomatic initiatives President Bush will be carrying to Europe next month?

Dr. RICE. Well, we are working, currently—and, indeed, discussing—with our European allies how we might structure this

very important trip. I think what we want to do, and what the

President wants to do, is to unite this important alliance behind

the kind of great goals that we all have. And there is a calendar

that permits some potential movement on the Middle East. We can

hope for that. For instance, there’s a conference in London on

March 1st that Prime Minister Blair is hosting. And that should,

therefore, provide an area where, in the runup to that, which the

President’s trip will be, we can have a discussion about how we

move forward on Middle East peace. I think we will want to have

a discussion about how we move forward on Iraq in the wake of

elections. Elections will have just been held. What are the tasks?

Who’s going to play what role? What, with a new government in

place, we can do to support that government. I would hope we

would also look for concrete movement on the broader Middle East

agenda.

The Forum for the Future was a great success, but we need to

keep moving that forum forward so that it doesn’t just become a

place where we get together, kind of, every six months and talk.

I would characterize it this way, Senator Hagel, that what we’ll

try to do is to focus—and when I talk to my friends in the Transatlantic Alliance, they agree with this—focus the Transatlantic Alliance on what we’re going to do together. We’ve spent a lot of time

talking about ‘‘the’’ Transatlantic Alliance. We’ve actually spent a

good deal of time transforming some of its elements, like the

changes that we’ve made to an expanded NATO, over time, giving

it a rapid-reaction force, and so forth. But it’s now time to put this

great alliance to work in the service of the great causes that we

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have ahead of us. And I think that’s really the agenda, is to enlist,

unite, discuss how we move ahead together on what is really, kind

of, the agenda of our time.

Senator HAGEL. Might that agenda include climate change?

Dr. RICE. We will certainly be in discussions with the—with our

allies on this issue, because Prime Minister Blair has made it a

discussion issue for Gleneagles in the G8. And so, we will want to

work with them. I don’t know how much will be done on this trip,

but this is in—a set of discussions we’ve already begun to have. I

know of your interest in this, Senator, and perhaps we can talk

more about it.

There are technological initiatives that we have with a number

of countries in the world. There is a Methane Emissions Initiative

that we have with a number of countries in the world. What we,

in the developing—developed world need to realize is that we need

to have an approach to this that is growth, energy, and environment, because we’re going to have to bring onboard the large developing states, like China and India, if we’re going to be able to approach the issues of climate change.

So it will certainly be an—a subject for discussion, and eventually an initiative. Whether, on this trip or later, as we prepare for

Gleneagles, I think we’ll have to see.

Senator HAGEL. Well, I—as you know, and you mentioned when

you and I had an opportunity to visit a little bit, I told you that

I was going to introduce comprehensive climate-change legislation.

I’ve been working with Chairman Lugar and others over the last

few months on this. And I also, as you know, met with Prime Minister Blair last month, in London, on this. So I would hope, especially in light of what Senator Murkowski noted, and others, this

morning, that this would get some attention, because I do think climate change is one of those areas where it’s value-added for relationships, especially diplomacy. And so diplomacy, and some efforts—and I hear that, incidentally, from many from of our friends

around the world. So thank you.

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator. And I will work you. I know we’re spending $5 billion on this issue. And so, I think——

Senator HAGEL. I know it.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——we have something to bring to the

table.

Senator HAGEL. No—well, the record is actually very, very positive. It’s just that we have not explained it very well.

Dr. RICE. I agree with you there.

Senator HAGEL. And I think we have an opportunity to do that.

Speaking of explaining records, we spent some time this morning

on public diplomacy. You thoroughly noted how important it is to

you and your efforts, in your statement this morning, as well as in

our private conversations. Can you share with this committee any

new initiatives that you are thinking about in the area of public

diplomacy at the State Department?

Dr. RICE. Well, I would like to do a couple of things. First of all,

I have to get there and look at the structure. There have been a

number of studies of what to do about the structure. I’ve had the

chance to talk to Ed Djerejian, I’ve had a chance to talk to Davie

Abshire, I’m going to talk to others who have been a part of these

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studies, because we need to look at how the—Washington works

with the field. As I said, public diplomacy’s done in Amman, not

in Washington. And so, we’re going to look at that set of issues.

I think we will need to—we have some very effective cultural and

educational exchange programs. I think we need to look at how we

leverage those, move those forward. Are we doing enough, particularly in the Muslim world and in places like Indonesia and countries that we have, unfortunately, been not very active in recent

years? What more can we do? And so, I would hope to have some

initiatives on that score, too.

So both structure and through initiatives, I would hope to make

a very early push to demonstrate that—we have fine professionals

in this field. I’m quite certain of it. But this is something that we

once really knew how to do, during the Cold War. We somehow lost

our ability to do it as effectively as we once did. And we broke up

a lot of the apparatus when we thought we—the end of history had

come. And now we are going to have to look at what we need to

reestablish in order to be able to do the job. And, again, I think

this is an area where I would hope to have considerable input from

Members of the committee.

Senator HAGEL. Well, I think you will not have to ask twice on

that. You’ve received some indication of this committee’s interest.

And I think, under Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden’s leadership, it has been a high priority over the last few years, and it

needs to be revisited. And I think the entire committee is very

pleased that you have put this on your list, on your agenda, as a

high priority.

United Nations. It was mentioned here earlier during our hearing, but, in particular, what types of reform, at the United Nations,

would you be looking for and will you help lead?

Dr. RICE. Well, we are digesting the High-level Panel Report, at

this point. And we’re going to put a lot of attention on consultations with countries around the world about that report. It’s something that I’ve discussed with Kofi Annan, and that he’s asked of

us to make an effort.

Obviously, there are two kinds of reforms, simply those that will

make the U.N. work better, in terms of management—and we’ve

long had an interest in those. I think we need to pursue them. We

also, obviously, want the U.N. to have the kinds of structure and

tools that it needs to face the threats and the opportunities of the

21st century.

And I know there’s a lot of discussion of Security Council reform.

I don’t think we have any particular perceived wisdom right now

on how to do that, except to say that there needs to be a look at

where we are, in terms of the representation in the U.N. bodies of

countries that are contributing a lot.

Even outside of the United Nations, there are a number of rising

influential democracies, like India and Brazil and South Africa,

that we just need to be working more with on all kinds of issues.

And I hope that we can pursue that at the same time that we look

at what the structure of the U.N. may look like.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

There has been considerable discussion today about proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction; in particular, nuclear proliferation.

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Little conversation, so far, about bioterrorism. Do you think it

would be in our interest to initiate an effort to develop some kind

of an international model—using CDC, Centers for Disease Control,

as an example—where all nations could, in some way, work together through that international body, which—not unlike some of

the nonproliferation treaty efforts, although we’re seeing, I think,

necessary refinements, and probably reforms, in that, if that can

happen. But if you would speak to that kind of an idea, about

maybe a CDC international model for bioterrorism.

Dr. RICE. It’s a very interesting idea, Senator. We should definitely explore it. Homeland Security people have had some discussions with their counterparts around the world about the bioterrorism threats, because it’s obviously one of those threats that

could be quite borderless and quite stateless. And so, we have had

some discussions of that. But a more concentrated international effort that deals with all of the elements of bioterrorism detection,

prophylactic efforts that might be undertaken, and then, heaven

forbid, consequence management, I think this is something that

should be put on the international agenda, and we’ll look at various

ways to do that.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

Senator Sarbanes?

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rice, I’m going to run through a series of questions, and

maybe we can move very quickly, and then I want to come back

to the economic questions, as well.

First of all, if you were Secretary of State, how much discretion

or authority would you have in filling positions within the State

Department?

Dr. RICE. I work very closely with presidential personnel, but I

have to say that the folks have been very understanding of the fact

that I have to have a team that is a team that I can work with

and that’s my team.

Senator SARBANES. But your selections have to clear Presidential

Personnel?

Dr. RICE. Well, these are presidential appointments, at least the

ones that are presidential appointments.

Senator SARBANES. I know it’s been written so often about how

close you are to the President, but you don’t have, as it were, the

kind of a vote of confidence or commitment to you from the President that you can go ahead and fill these positions yourself.

Dr. RICE. Senator, it’s been just very easy to work through Presidential Personnel. It’s just not been an issue.

Senator SARBANES. Well, if there were an issue, though, you

don’t have that kind of commitment, is that correct?

Dr. RICE. These are appointments by the President. And so, I

think it’s a perfectly appropriate role.

Senator SARBANES. I understand the answer.

My next question is, I’ve always been curious to know the rationale why a National Security Advisor will not appear before the

Congress to testify and answer questions, but goes on the news

programs or appears at the Press Club and, at the end of it, says,

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‘‘Now I’m open to take your questions,’’ and then proceeds to answer questions on the public record in front of the public. Now,

what is the rationale for that? Why doesn’t the National Security

Advisor respond to the Congress?

Dr. RICE. Well, the rationale, Senator, has been a couple of

things—first of all, that there is a separation of powers, and the

President’s staff is, to him, in the executive branch, private counsel. When you go on——

Senator SARBANES. Well, it’s not very private counsel when you

go on the national media shows, appear publicly, and answer questions in that forum. I’d have a little more understanding of the rationale if you didn’t do that, if you limited yourself to giving private

advice to the President, and turned down the interviews. But you

depart from that, and you go outside in very public fora and make

these appearances and answer questions, and won’t come to the

Congress.

Dr. RICE. Senator, it’s a longstanding practice of every National

Security Advisor. I have actually been here to answer questions of

the whole committee at one point, but also Senators and groupings

of Senators, but not in testimony. It’s a line that National Security

Advisors have kept as private advice to the President, as presidential staff. And I—National Security Advisors have also, of

course, gone on television and made public appearances.

But in terms of the line between the executive and the legislature, the President’s staff has simply not been subject to congressional testimony.

Senator SARBANES. Well, what’s your position on appearing before the Congress if you were the Secretary of State? How can we

be confident that you would engage in frequent, thorough, and

meaningful consultations with this committee?

Dr. RICE. Well, Senator, I would no longer be staff to the President if I’m confirmed. I’ll be the Secretary of State if I’m confirmed,

and that is a Cabinet officer with—who’s been confirmed by this

body. And, it seems to me, at that point, it is not only perfectly appropriate, but only right, that the Secretary of State and other

members of the Cabinet, as well as other members of the State Department, respond positively to requests to testify whenever possible.

Senator SARBANES. Is it your view, then, that Secretary of State

would not invoke executive privilege in testimony before the Congress?

Dr. RICE. Well, I believe that the Secretary of State would come

and testify before the Congress, and testify fully. Whether a Secretary of State might choose to keep private some conversation that

that person has had with the President or not, I think that’s another matter. But certainly the Secretary of State would appear before this body and others on a regular basis, and it has been——

Senator SARBANES. What’s your sense of your responsibility, if

you were the Secretary of State, to deal with the Congress in a

nonpartisan or bipartisan manner, however one wants to describe

it? I’m prompted to ask that question by the fact that you did, at

one point, make a rare trip to Capitol Hill for separate closed-door

briefings with Republicans and Democratic lawmakers, if you recall

that. You met with Republican representatives for well over an

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hour, did not meet with the House Democrats—met only with the

Republican members of the House. You came to the Senate side,

had a lengthy meeting with Senate Republicans, and then a very

brief meeting with Senate Democrats, caught short by a vote that

was scheduled by the leadership, I guess. But, in any event, there

was a marked difference in the extent of the meeting and the consultation between Republicans and Democrats.

Presumably, as Secretary of State, you wouldn’t intend for anything of that sort to happen, I would take it.

Dr. RICE. Senator, I will conduct this in a completely bipartisan

way. Let me just say that—I will check, but I believe that we’ve

generally offered to both sides in both—both sides of the aisle and

both houses, and I was prepared to stay in that Senate meeting as

long as desired. But, as you said, it was cut short by a vote.

Senator SARBANES. Well, what about the House side?

Dr. RICE. I believe we offered, but I will check to see. Because

it was my view that the National Security Advisor also needed to

deal in a bipartisan way, and I believe I’ve dealt with Members of

the committee, Democrat and Republican.

Senator SARBANES. Ordinarily, at the start of each new Congress,

the administration conducts a review of signed treaties to determine which ones to send as priorities for Senate advice and consent

to ratification. The administration did not submit a treaty priority

list to this committee in the 108th Congress. Are there plans or intentions to send up a list of treaty priorities to this new Congress?

Dr. RICE. There are plans to do so, Senator. We will.

Senator SARBANES. You plan to do that.

Dr. RICE. We plan to do that, yes.

Senator SARBANES. Now, let me ask you to come back to the economic questions. Do you think it’s to America’s advantage for the

dollar to be the world’s main reserve currency?

Dr. RICE. Senator, I’m going to demur here. I will think these

questions better asked of the Treasury. I have a strong interest in

our economic well-being. I have a strong interest in what I can do,

as Secretary of State, to promote our economic well-being, particularly through free trade and through the establishment of good

partners in trade and a level playing field in trade, but I really

don’t feel that I should comment on currency matters.

Senator SARBANES. Well, it goes back to our discussion this

morning. I, frankly, concluded that round with some concern, because you kept talking about the President’s economic team, as

though that’s something separate and apart from the concerns or

the responsibilities of the Secretary of State, even though at one

point you stipulated that the strength of America’s economy is fundamental to its ability to assert strength in the world. And these

all play together.

And I mentioned a book, this morning, ‘‘The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy,’’

and one of the points made in that book is that the euro was specifically designed to challenge the global hegemony of the dollar.

And, of course, we’ve seen the value of the euro rise very substantially in recent times. In fact, we now know, in 2001, Middle

Eastern oil-producing countries kept 75 percent of their currency

reserves in dollars. Now, that figure is now 60 percent—it’s

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dropped substantially—with much of the rest of it in euros. And

Chinese and Russian central bankers are also shifting their reserves.

Does this cause you some concern?

Dr. RICE. Senator, there are many reasons for what has happened to the relationship between the euro and the dollar, but,

again, I really think it best that I not comment on currency matters. I will do what I can, as Secretary of State, to try and enhance

the prospects for a strong American economy. I think I can do that

principally through the promotion of free trade, through the promotion of a level playing field, in using the diplomacy to carry economic messages, when we need to do, as we’ve done, for instance,

with the Chinese on intellectual property rights. I’ll be an active

and interested participant, but there are some matters that I really

feel are best left to the Treasury, and that’s the commentary

on——

Senator SARBANES. Last month, China’s president, Hu Jintao,

embarked on a 12-day tour of Latin America. He wound up making

commitments to invest $30 billion in the region. China is now Brazil’s second largest trading partner, and Chile’s largest export market. In trade, technology, investment, education, and culture, China

has been displacing the United States all across Asia, and it’s now

starting to do the same in America’s backyard. Are you concerned

about this expansive China?

Dr. RICE. Well, this is an area that I think bears some watching

and some activity, and I would work very carefully and very closely

with those in trade and economics to try and deal with this. We

do face a rising China. There is no doubt about that. And the way

that we’ve tried to deal with the fact that China’s economic

strength is growing, and that China’s influence is growing along

with its economic strength, and its penetration of markets and its

own market are growing exponentially, is to embed China in the

World Trade Organization, and to make certain that it lives up to

the rules of a rule-based international economic system. And we

have a lot of work to do, because China is not always completely

attentive to some of its obligations under the World Trade Organization.

The other thing that we can do, Senator, is that we can assert

our still-considerable global reach and our still-considerable regional influence through organizations like APEC, which we attend, and which we are nurturing, and which we are pushing forward with a very active agenda. We have had problems with

ASEAN because of the presence of Burma, but we have had meetings and discussions with the countries of ASEAN.

I was in China, Japan, and South Korea in June of this past

year, and I will say that I think most of the countries of Asia look

to us to continue to be a major influence and an active player in

Asia, because they don’t want to see China ‘‘supplant,’’ quote/unquote, the United States. We also have to remember that the Chinese economy, for all of its vigor and all of its robustness, is still

a developing economy whose size is not going to approach the size

of the American economy for quite a long time. It is a China that

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omy. And while it is a huge market, and is doing very well in our

own markets, I think it’s important to recognize that it is a—at a

different stage of its economic development than the United States.

Senator SARBANES. Well, it’s interesting, because they seem to be

doing pretty well, if that’s the case. I mean, our accumulated debt

to foreign investors is now 28 percent of our gross domestic product. That’s nearly double the share of four years ago. And most of

it is being funded by borrowing from foreign central banks, primarily those of Japan and China. In fact, it’s staggering, the increase of foreign official assets in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would just note that, in the 1990s,

the U.S. admonished Mexico and Argentina to get their economic

houses in order. This month, the Chinese premier gave Washington

a similar lecture. And by not taking the important corrective measures we need to take with respect to our economy, we’re running

up these large trade imbalances and becoming increasing dependent on the kindness of strangers. We’re in their hands. And I can’t

help but believe that this will be brought to bear in other areas of

the U.S.-China relationship, if and when it becomes relevant.

Dr. RICE. Well, Senator, I agree with you, and I think the President would agree, that the issue is for the U.S. economy to be as

strong as it possibly can, and as competitive as it possibly can. And

there are a lot of measures being undertaken to do that. My role,

I think, will be to try and enhance our economic growth and our

economic strengths through our openness in trade, but also by

making certain that those with whom we trade are dealing with us

on a level playing field. And I’ll be completely dedicated to that.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Let me just indicate, Dr. Rice, that I appreciate the point you’re

making as to what the scope of the State Department may be, and

your role. But I would have to agree with Senator Sarbanes. The

issue that he’s touching upon—and this would be the subject for a

couple of days of good hearings—is profoundly important. It finally

comes down to how we’re going to pay for our foreign policy. We

have reached a critical juncture, given the circumstances of the foreign exchange situation, our own exchange rates, and so forth.

I suppose that we are taking advantage of the fact that you are

perceived as a super-competent person and are perhaps prepared

to take all of this on, on behalf of the President. But I would encourage you to visit with the President about this—you probably

have—because I’m sure we’ll all be getting back to it again and

again. We’ll not be able to solve it today, but I would just underline

that there are some dynamics here that all of us find difficult to

comprehend—the growth of China, the growth of India as economies, a third of the population of the world going out now to try

to find energy resources everywhere, maybe sucking up the resources of the world. This is good for the soybean farmers of Indiana, and we’re grateful for everything that comes along that way.

But it’s nevertheless going to be tough, with regard to energy and

other things.

I don’t want to take more time, but I was moved by what Senator

Sarbanes is saying, because he works over in the Banking Committee. Other Members of this committee are active in that area.

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And we have interchanged disciplines in our own way, as you do.

But please, if you can, take under advisement our conversation

today.

Dr. RICE. Absolutely. Thank you, Senator. I will.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Chafee?

Senator CHAFEE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I agree

with your comments and Senator Sarbanes’ comments also, concerning on the financial issues, particularly the rise of the euro and

the potential for OPEC to move in that direction. It could be alarming.

Thank you for your time. Your stamina and your breadth of

knowledge are both remarkable. In fact, at the lunch we were joking that we’re going to find an obscure country to ask you about.

But we agreed it would be futile, you’d know all about it.

And I’d like to follow up on some of Senator Biden’s comments

about what seems to be a hypocritical approach to our foreign policy, in some ways; in particular, how we deal with some of those

democracies, such as Russia, Senator Biden said, uneven or undemocratic or some of the Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,

even Musharraf—President Musharraf, and then, on the other

hand, have a completely different view of, say, Iran, as Senator

Biden was saying. It seems as though we magnify our differences,

on the one hand, and then, on the other hand, we magnify our similarities.

In particular, after having just come back from South American

and meeting with President Chavez—here he has been—gone before his people—high, high turnout, just had a referendum. And, as

one of the people from our embassy said, ‘‘He cleaned their clocks

and kicked their butts.’’ And it seems to me to say derogatory

things about him may be disrespectful to him, but also to the Venezuelan people. How do you react to that?

Dr. RICE. Well, I have nothing but good things to say about the

Venezuelan people. They are a remarkable people. And if you notice, Senator Chafee, I was not making derogatory comments, I was

simply recognizing that there are unhelpful and unconstructive

trends going on in Venezuelan policies. This is not personal.

Senator CHAFEE. And there aren’t in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan——

Dr. RICE. And we——

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. ——and Russia and——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——and we speak out about those——

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. ——Pakistan?

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——we speak out about those, as well. But

some of this is a matter of trend lines and where countries have

been and where they are now going.

Senator CHAFEE. Are their government’s unconstructive?

Dr. RICE. Well, the Russian government is not unconstructive in

a lot of areas. It’s quite constructive in many areas. It’s been more

constructive on Iran in recent years. It is constructive on—to a certain extent, in trying to deal with the kind of Nunn-Lugar issues

that we’ve talked about. It’s been constructive in Afghanistan. It’s

constructive on a number of areas. But that doesn’t excuse what is

happening inside Russia, where the concentration of power in the

Kremlin, to the detriment of other institutions, is a real problem.

And we will continue to speak to the Russians.

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I think we do have to remember, that is also not the Soviet

Union. The Russians have come quite a long way from where the

Soviet Union was, and we need to always keep that in mind when

we judge current policies. But where they’re going is simply not

very good. It is something to be deeply concerned about, and we

will speak out.

And countries are going to need—going to move at different

speeds on this democracy test. I don’t think there is any doubt

about that. But what we have to do is, we have to keep the agenda—keep this item on the agenda. We have to continue to press

countries about it. We have to support democratic forces and civilsociety forces wherever we can.

I would just note that Ukraine, I visited in 2001, not long after

I had become National Security Advisor. And I, frankly, when this

happened, in Ukraine, was pretty stunned by how effective civil society was and how effective the Ukrainian people were in making

their voices known. Some of that is because we and the EU and

others have spent time developing civil society, developing political

opposition, working with people, not to have a specific candidate in

any of these countries, but to have a political process that’s open.

And we have to do more of that.

We’re going to spend some $43 million this year—I believe that’s

the number—on Russian institutions, trying to help, for the development of civil society there. We need to do more of that kind of

thing, because, while we put it on an agenda, while we confront the

governments that are engaged in nondemocratic activities, we also

have to help the development of civil society and opposition.

Senator CHAFEE. You and Senator Boxer were having a little bit

of a debate over credibility. And, to me, it seems as though trust

is built with consistency. Is it possible for you to say something

positive about the Chavez administration?

Dr. RICE. It’s pretty hard, Senator, to find something positive.

Senator CHAFEE. I don’t understand——

Dr. RICE. Let me say——

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. ——that.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——this.

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. ——After——

Dr. RICE. Let me say this——

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. ——after——

Dr. RICE. Let me say this——

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. ——Tajikistan, Pakistan,

Russia——

Dr. RICE. No, what——

Senator CHAFEE. It seems as though, as I say, magnifying our

differences to some countries, and magnifying our similarities with

others. And, as I said, I think trust is built with consistency. I don’t

see consistency——

Dr. RICE. Well, the——

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. ——in some of your comments.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——the state of behavior in the Western

Hemisphere, or the state of affairs in the Western Hemisphere, is

such that we’ve had democratic revolutions in all of these places,

and we don’t want to see them go back. We have some places

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where the democratic revolution is still to place. And we just have

to understand that there are differences in that regard.

But I have said, we hope that the Government of Venezuela will

continue to recognize what has been a mutually beneficial relationship on energy, and that we can continue to pursue that. We certainly hope that we can continue to pursue counter-drug activities

in the Andean region, and Venezuela participates in that.

But I have to say that, for the most part, the activities of the

Venezuelan government, in the last couple of years, have been

pretty unconstructive.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, thank you very much. I’ll go back to what

I said earlier. It seems disrespectful to the Venezuelan people.

They have spoken.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Chafee.

Senator Dodd?

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’ll try and

move along in this, as well.

Let me just pick up on the—one of the points that Senator Sarbanes was raising earlier with you, and that is, of course, the apparent contradiction, obviously, of having an NSC advisor not be

able to appear with any regularity before the committee, and then

appearing with rather significant regularity on national television.

I’ll also note—and I’m sure you’re not the first NSC advisor to do

this—but, just in the fall of this year, according to some staff work

here, that you made some ten speeches in the fall of this year in

battleground states, I guess, except one, involved in the politics.

And I always—I know that the Secretary of State, historically, is

not Secretary of Defense, and I commend Senator Powell and Senator Rumsfeld for not having been involved in the campaign. Would

you make a similar commitment? Obviously, there—the President

doesn’t run again, but, obviously, there are midterm elections. And

would you share with us your opinion on whether or not it’s wise,

given the historic efforts to try and create bipartisanship when it

comes to foreign policy, to have an NSC advisor out on the campaign trail, and certainly as Secretary of State. Can you quickly

give us some sense of where you think that ought to——

Dr. RICE. Certainly. As National Security Advisor, I spoke a lot,

actually, and I tried to get outside of Washington to speak. I

went——

Senator DODD. Were these campaign stops?

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——I went to places that were nonpartisan. I went to places like world-affairs councils and universities. Anybody could come. I was thoroughly questioned about

American foreign policy, and I thought it only appropriate, at a

time in which we were at war. They were not a part of the campaign, and I think the fora that we chose would demonstrate that.

But you can be certain that I will respect the tradition of this

office, of Secretary of State, should I be confirmed. I think it has

to be bipartisan. I think it cannot be political in any way. And I,

in my comments, mentioned how important I thought bipartisan

foreign policy is, and I’ll do everything that I can to make——

Senator DODD. I don’t want to dwell on it, but it’s an important

point. And, again, I’m not sure what the precedents are of those

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who have preceded you in the office as NSC advisor. But I think

it is bad business, in those periods, to get involved in this stuff. It

does create problems, and I think it’s a wiser course to follow.

Let me quickly jump to the issue of the Justice Department’s

opinion memos regarding torture in interrogation. In a response to

a question for the record, you indicated that the Justice Department opinion memos on torture in interrogation were provided to

the National Security Council for review by staff, in draft form.

And you indicated that the response—that you were not involved

in reviewing the draft opinion. Just a series of three or four questions, if I may.

Did you ever read the opinion?

Dr. RICE. I did not read the opinion.

Senator DODD. And did you have a view at the time about them

at all?

Dr. RICE. Senator, I did not think it my role to try and give legal

advice to the President, but that legal advice was then discussed

in a policy context. And, at that point, the policy of how we would

treat detainees in this new kind of war—and we did face a very difficult and different circumstance. I mean, you were dealing with al

Qaeda on the battlefield, people——

Senator DODD. Yes.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——who were not living up to the laws of

war. This is a different kind of combatant. People like Khalid

Sheikh Mohammed and people who were—who plotted 9/11 and

clearly were not part of any organized army. We did have a series

of difficult choices to make, but——

Senator DODD. You were aware, I presume, of the State Department concerns at that time about these memos?

Dr. RICE. I was aware. And, in fact, we made certain that, before

the President made a final decision on this matter of how Geneva

would be applied, that he had the advantage of hearing from all

of his advisors.

Senator DODD. Do you want to share with us what your opinions

were?

Dr. RICE. Senator, I gave my advice to this—to the President on

this matter, and I really would prefer not to talk about what advice

I gave him. He came out in a place that I think was consistent with

both living up to our international obligations and allowed us to

recognize that the Geneva Conventions should not apply to a particular category of people. Now, when we got to Iraq, there was no

question that the conflict itself was covered under Geneva. Iraq

was a signatory to the Geneva Conventions, and we believed that

the conflict was, therefore, covered.

Senator DODD. Let me just ask you very briefly about—what are

your views? Let’s get to the bottom of this—we can fool around

with the language here, but what are your views on things like

waterboarding and nudity? What are your views on that? Is that

torture, in your view, or not? And should it be—should the United

States stay away from that activity, or is that—do you have a—sort

of, a mixed view on that? I’d just like to get some sense——

Dr. RICE. Senator, under no circumstances should we, or have

we, condoned torture. And the President has been very clear that

he expects everyone to live up to our international obligations and

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to American law. And the Justice Department makes a determination on any interrogation techniques that are used, that they have

to be consistent with our international obligations and with American law. I——

Senator DODD. You’re familiar now, aren’t you, with——

Dr. RICE. No.

Senator DODD [continuing]. ——the draft opinion that was submitted? Just tell me what—now that you know what the draft

opinion was, not according to what you thought at the time, would

have raised objections to it, had you been aware of what was included in that?

Dr. RICE. I didn’t say I wasn’t aware of what was in the opinion;

I didn’t read the full opinion, Senator. But I believe that the President, as a policy matter, decided that, in order to protect American

interests, but also in order to live up to our obligations, internationally, even though this was a very different kind of war, a different kind of set of circumstances, that the right policy call was

to treat the detainees, even al Qaeda detainees, consistent with our

obligations—or consistent with the principles of Geneva, consistent

with military and security necessity. And I think that was the right

call. And it—I just can’t emphasize enough how difficult it is when

you’re dealing with a totally new set of circumstances.

Now, we have talked about what we might to do engage the——

Senator DODD. Let me just come back to the—just want to

make—this is a simple question.

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator DODD. Is it your view, as a human matter, is

waterboarding and the—uses we saw in the prisons in Iraq, of nudity, is that torture, in your personal view, as a nominee here for

the——

Dr. RICE. Senator, I’m not going to speak to any specific interrogation techniques, but let me talk about Abu Ghraib, because that

was not acceptable——

Senator DODD. I’d like to just get your views on this simple matter. It’s a simple question I’m asking.

Dr. RICE. Well, you asked me about the incidents in Iraq,

and——

Senator DODD. I asked you about some very specific techniques

that we used, whether or not you consider them to be torture, or

not.

Dr. RICE. Senator, the determination of whether interrogation

techniques are consistent with our international obligations and

American law are made by the Justice Department. I don’t want

to comment on any specific interrogation techniques. I don’t think

that would be appropriate, and I think it would not be very good

for American security.

Senator DODD. Well, let’s leave it. That’s your answer, there. It’s

a disappointing answer, I must say. And this is a very—the face

of U.S. foreign policy is in the person of the Secretary of State, and

it’s important, in moments like this, to be able to express yourself,

aside from the legalities of things, how you, as a human being,

react to these kinds of activities. And with the world watching

when a simple question is raised about techniques that I think

most people would conclude, in this country, are torture. It’s imporVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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tant, in a moment like that, that you can speak clearly and directly, without getting involved in the legalisms questions. I understand these involve some legal determinations. But, as a human

being, how you feel about this, about to assume the position to be

responsible for pursuing the human-rights issues that this nation

has been deeply committed to for decades, it is a very important

moment.

Dr. RICE. Senator, I maintain the commitment, and will maintain the commitment, of the United States to norms of international behavior and to the legal norms that we have helped

to——

Senator DODD. Let me ask you this, then. What would happen

if someone did this to an American? What would happen if we saw

it on television, that a captured American was being subjected to

these kind of activities? How would you react to it?

Dr. RICE. Senator, the United States of America—American personnel are not engaged in terrorism against innocents——

Senator DODD. I wasn’t asking what they have been charged

with; I’m asking whether or not, if you saw an American being

treated like this, how would you react?

Dr. RICE. We expect Americans to be—because we are parties to

the Geneva Conventions, we expect Americans to be treated in accordance with the Geneva——

Senator DODD. Of course we do.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——Conventions.

Senator DODD. And so you consider these kinds of activities to

violate the Geneva Conventions?

Dr. RICE. We believe that there are certain categories of people—

the al Qaeda, for instance—who were not covered by Geneva, that,

in fact, it would have been a stretch to cover them under Geneva,

would have weakened Geneva to cover them. But the President

said that they had to be treated, as military necessity allowed, consistent with the application of Geneva——

Senator DODD. Do me a favor, at the end of all these hearings,

I’d like you to spend about 15 minutes with John McCain and talk

to him about this stuff. I think you’ll get some good advice, when

it comes to this subject matter, someone who’s been through this,

about what the dangers are when we have, sort of, waffling answers about these questions, and then Americans can be apprehended, and what happens to them?

Let me move on, because I don’t want to take up the committee’s

time on this particular point, but I’m troubled by your answer.

Now, let me ask you about, if I can, the HIV/AIDS issue. Let me

move to the Caribbean again, come back to the—this region of the

world. During the consideration of the legislation on 2003, I attempted to add countries to the HIV/AIDS legislation—Caribbean

countries. And let me tell you why I did. We have a staggering percentage, high percentage, of people in the Caribbean who are HIVpositive. I know we do a lot already as part of this program in Guyana and Haiti, but—and I won’t list all of the island nations in the

Caribbean—involving some 600,000 people who have almost as

high a rate of AIDS contamination as some of the most seriously

affected countries in Africa. And yet we’ve left these countries out

because we never passed the legislation. It’s an important issue. I

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won’t go through all the details with you here, but there are ten

million Americans who visit these island nations, not to mention

the tremendous number of people who come to our own country, far

more so than have contact with some of the nations that are very

adversely affected in Africa. And I would hope that you might, as

we look at these programs here, expand the coverage to these countries.

The average—today, the average Haitian man can expect to live

only 47 years; the average woman, 51 years. It’s the single highest

cause of death in the Caribbean nations for men under the age of

45. It really deserves far more attention than it’s getting. Do you

want to—have a quick answer, a quick response?

Dr. RICE. Yes, just that the President’s emergency plan was intended to deal with the 14 and then 15 most affected countries. I

think it’s an excellent plan. And if we meet our goals, we will be

providing treatment to two million people, and preventing seven

million infections, and getting ten million people into contact with

educational and other programs. And it’s a very fine program. It’s

not all that we do. We do a lot of other assistance, bilateral assistance. Some 85 or so countries are affected by the assistance that

we give. And, of course, the global fund, to which we are, by far,

the largest single contributor, is also very active in that.

I think we’ve made a very big step forward. I know Senator

Kerry and others have been long proponents of an international effort on AIDS. We have made a major breakthrough in the President’s emergency plan. We wanted to have a number of countries

where we could worry, not just about the disbursement of money,

but about helping to build delivery systems that would actually get

the job done. But I would just emphasize that it’s not the only assistance that we give.

Senator DODD. Take a good look at this, please. The Dominican

Republic is on the same island—shares the island of Hispaniola

with Haiti. Haiti is covered; the Dominican Republic is not. That’s

ridiculous, on its face, given that cross-contamination that occurs,

with just populations that move from Haiti to the Dominican Republic, as we speak, here, because of the cane-cutting seasons and

the—and, obviously, the potential there.

I see my time is expired. Let me just—just quickly, and I’ll come

back—I said one round, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, I may have to

come back for a few more questions.

But I want to emphasize, again—I know you’ll come back to this

Venezuela issue, and Latin America. We’ve got to be thinking a bit

differently. No one’s going to argue about some of the decisions

that have been made in many of these countries, things that they

do that we find very different from how we would approach issues.

But what Senator Chafee has said, I think is an accurate description, we’ve got to be more balanced about this view. It strikes many

of us as being, sort of, domestic politics rather than foreign policy,

when it comes to these issues.

I mentioned earlier, statements that have been made—it’s good

politics in Latin America, too often, to attack the United States.

Here was our good friend, Chile, for instance, when the issue came

up in the vote in the United Nations on Iraq, where we threatened

them not to complete the Chilean-U.S. Trade Agreement. It was

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only as a result of the intervention of Spain which put it back on

track again. That word is widely known—that conclusion widely

known in the region. That’s not helpful as we’re trying to build

these relationships. And I’d urge you not to get caught in this

mindset, sort of, to use your own experience, the Pavlovian sort of

reaction to some of these people, and to try and engage in a positive and constructive way.

I’ll guarantee you that, certainly in Venezuela today, they’re

watching very carefully what’s been said. That’s not to say we

agree or applaud decisions being made that we would disagree

with, but we need to try something differently here if we’re going

to succeed in building different relationships. And I’ll want to come

back to that.

But I’ve been disappointed in the way that—I don’t expect you,

sort of, agree with Democrats up here, but we’ve got to be thinking

in a way that shows we’re going to move where the world is headed, in many ways, looking for different ways to establish better relationships. And I want to come back to that when we finish our

round.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator Allen?

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have some questions I want to get to on competition and corruption, but let me follow up on some of the cross-examination of

Senator Dodd.

On the question of what—I understand you don’t want to use the

word ‘‘torture,’’ but maybe the word ‘‘abuse’’ is appropriate, insofar

as the conduct of our military, some of our military people in Abu

Ghraib prison. Now, we all can agree that this conduct, whatever

you want to call it—whether it’s ‘‘abuse,’’ whether it’s ‘‘torture’’—

the bottom line is, as far as Americans are concerned, this is a violation of our standards, standards of conduct and the expectations

that we have of our government, and, therefore, the Bush administration. And not just the administration, the United States, indeed,

is going after those who are culpable and are, in fact, being prosecuted and punished. Charles Grainer just received a ten-year sentence for his actions and activity, and responsibilities for it.

So I would say, Dr. Rice, that this administration and the United

States Government is on record finding that deplorable, regardless

of what phraseology one wants to use to describe this conduct.

Dr. RICE. Yes. Senator, let me just be very clear. I didn’t have

a chance to say, Abu Ghraib was unacceptable, it was abuse, and

people are being punished for that. The question came about broader detainee policies, but what happened at Abu Ghraib made everyone sick to their stomachs. And the good thing about the United

States is that we actually prosecuted the people who did it, and

will continue to as the investigations unfold.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you. I wanted to adduce that response,

which I figured was actually was your sentiments on it. You’re getting kind of tied in all the legalistics there.

On the issue of competition that Senator Sarbanes brought up,

you mentioned a fair or level playing field, I very much agree with

some—many of the things Senator Sarbanes is saying, as well as

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what you brushed on, generally. And the Chairman mentioned

India and China being concerns, long term.

I look at India differently. India is the largest democracy in the

world. We have great and strong bilateral ties with India and also,

more recently, with Pakistan. Somehow we ought to be able to help

continue the rapprochement with India and Pakistan.

Insofar as China, though, China is not a democracy, and China—

there are concerns that you’re going to be facing, as far as China,

with the Europeans potentially selling arms to China. But on the

area of what you mentioned, corruption—this is on page 3 of your

statement—‘‘corruption can sap the foundation of democracy.’’ And,

indeed, if you look at the trade practices of China, they cheat on

a variety of fronts—textiles, furniture—they have in semiconductor

chips, as well. Mr. Zoellick, who’s going to be with you, has helped

prosecute some of those, to various degrees, but finally got ’em on

their cheating-on-the-semiconductor-chip matter, as well as South

Korea doing that, as well.

But the one area that they wholly fail, as well, in is intellectual

property, and they—there’s no adequate protection of intellectual

property, which is stealing from Americans, their creativity, our ingenuity. I’d like your view on what we can do—and you said ‘‘corruption can sap the foundations of democracy’’—and part of that

corruption, in my view, would be China’s unfair trade practices.

I have worked with this committee to increase funding, to train

law enforcement and judicial-system systems around the world on

the protection of intellectual property. We’ve funded—it’s $5 million to help enforce IP laws, intellectual property laws, and make

these countries, many of whom are unaware, apparently, of violations, and they needed to be educated on it. I do think, though,

China is educated on it. This is not a question of unknowing violations.

I would like to hear from you what steps that you can foresee

the United States taking to help combat corruption in other nations; in particular, the violations and the theft of our intellectual

property, which is so key to the competitiveness of our country in

the future.

Dr. RICE. It absolutely is. And we have been very active—in fact,

aggressive—with China about the IPR problem, trying to get them

to have more stringent laws and, more importantly, enforcement

when they finding pirating. We make the point to them that, as

they begin to invent, themselves, they are not going to want a

world in which intellectual property rights are stolen, but, rather,

in which intellectual property rights are protected.

I think we’ve gotten a little movement forward, but not enough,

and we keep pressing this agenda. We are pressing the agenda, by

the way, also with Russia, where pirating is a very big problem and

where, actually, there have been fewer prosecutions than in China.

So I think we need to press those issues.

As to the broader concerns about corruption, there is no doubt

that corruption, which leads to legal systems that allow the—allow

pirating of technology, allow terrorists to flourish, allow drug-runners and arms dealers to flourish, it’s all a part of the same problem. And so, having police forces that are properly paid, trained,

and loyal, having judges that are properly paid, trained, and loyal,

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is a very important part of a wide—worldwide effort that we have

to help with corruption, especially in some countries, like Nigeria—

we’ve offered assistance in these ways.

We also, Senator, have tried to get the international development

banks to be more concerned about corruption in the granting of aid,

that when aid goes in, that it’s clear that the tax isn’t going to be

a corruption tax on top of the aid that goes in. And we’ve made

some progress.

Finally, in something like the Millennium Challenge account, the

President’s made very clear that corruption, which is one of the indices that leads to a country being eligible or not, that corruption

is an index that we ought to look at very, very carefully, because

if you have a corrupt government, that aid is just going to be wasted.

Senator ALLEN. Well, thank you very much. I look forward to

working with you, and I know this whole committee will, on this

issue of protecting intellectual property rights and the issue of corruption, as well, because it does undermine freedom and democracy

and the respect for the rule of law.

Finally, let me just bring up this area of question, and this is

South Caucasus, or the Black Sea, area. I’ve been one who believes

that we ought to be looking at maybe basing more of our NATO

forces in the Black Sea area, closer to the Middle East, the areas

that are of greatest concern because of the proximity, obviously. It

seems clear that—I think—the United States ought to be working

to shore up—it’s not even ‘‘shore up,’’ it’s actually ‘‘enhance’’ our alliances with the new countries in Central Europe that have joined

the European Union, joined NATO.

How do you envision the administration working with countries

in the Caucasus, Southeast Europe, as they—to promote their

democratic reforms, but also your views on integrating them into

the European Union, and into our NATO operations?

Dr. RICE. Well, certainly some of the countries of that region

have already begun to integrate in very fruitful ways. A number

of them have already acceded to the EU, as well as to NATO.

One of the ways that we can encourage that integration is what

used to be Partnership for Peace is now, in many ways—in many

cases, NATO membership, and, as NATO refines its capabilities to

be responsive to the threats of the 21st century, rather than sitting

and waiting for the Soviet Union to come across the German

plains, as much of the forces looked like—the ability of those countries to place specialized missions within NATO’s overall portfolio

is very important, and it gives opportunities for training, for civilmilitary interaction, for the kinds of things that strengthen democracy. And I happen to think that what we did with Partnership for

Peace, and what we continue to do in some countries that are not

yet capable of accession to NATO, like, for instance, Georgia, that

those programs which ensure contact between democratically-governed militaries and militaries in those societies, the kinds of seminars that we are able to conduct under Partnership for Peace,

those all have very positive effects, and I would hope that those

would continue. But the future for most of these countries is a further integration into Europe’s great pillars, and we need to work

toward that.

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Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Dr. Rice.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to say, in conclusion here, Dr. Rice,

thank you for your wonderful leadership that you have provided.

I look forward to working with you in the years to come. I know

we’re going to have some debate here, and some votes, but I feel

very comfortable that with you as our Secretary of State in this administration, and I think, reflecting all the highest and best aspirations of America, you will help us advance freedom, our security,

but also for freedom for people all over the world. Thank you, and

good luck to you, and thank you for putting up with a lot of crossexamination today. But it’ll be nothing compared to the achievements that you will see in the next four years.

Dr. RICE. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.

Let me just broach, with the committee, two scenarios, one of

which is that we would have a business meeting at some time this

evening, and a vote on the nominee; or alternatively that we will

continue, in either case, to have questioning so that Members will

have an opportunity to ask their questions, but also to continue

again tomorrow. Might I suggest, perhaps, a vote so that Members

can be alerted in midmorning tomorrow morning. I have asked this

in terms of the preferences of the committee, in terms of other

schedules. Senator Boxer, you have——

Senator BOXER. Yes, I just would like to say, myself, that what’s

happening here is, the questioning is so good from both sides of the

aisle that it raises other issues. And I don’t agree it’s ‘‘cross-examination.’’ I think it’s our job. And so, I think we ought to do this

tomorrow. I think we ought to maybe hear from Senator Kerry, as

the closer—it’s a thought—and come back in the morning and continue.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we’ll come back in the morning, in that

event, anyway. But we’ll also continue this evening so that every

Senator who is here has an opportunity to ask questions.

Senator BOXER. Okay.

The CHAIRMAN. I’m not prepared to end the hearing. My thought

was simply that we might have a vote at the end of the questioning

this evening, thus obviating the need for a meeting tomorrow. In

the event that Senators are not prepared to vote this evening, then

we’ll continue the hearing tonight and reconvene tomorrow and

proceed.

Senator BOXER. Are you saying we would continue questioning

tomorrow, as well, and then have the vote?

The CHAIRMAN. In the event that we are still meeting tomorrow,

then it would be open for questions tomorrow morning.

Senator ALLEN. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator Allen?

Senator ALLEN. Just for the Senator from California, the term—

I used the term ‘‘cross-examination,’’ not in a derogatory sense. It’s

normal. Just questioning people and adducing answers from people. So don’t take any offense from that.

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator Kerry?

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Senator KERRY. I don’t know if I want to get in the middle of

this.

I wonder, Mr. Chairman—I know I heard Dr. Rice say, earlier,

she’s willing to stay and stay and stay, but I wonder if, you know,

there’s sort of a limit of decency of how long we want to——

Dr. RICE. No, I’m perfectly happy to stay, Senator. I look forward

to further exchange.

Senator KERRY. Fair enough.

I’m reading from an article, on December 15th, which says, by

David Ruppe, ‘‘Invoking comments by then-presidential candidate

Senator John Kerry, a senior Energy Department official said yesterday that the Bush administration would defy critics and finish

securing 600 tons of Russian nuclear weapons materials by 2008.’’

It goes on to explain the distinction between sites and tons and

how they’re going to try to do it.

So I’m glad that some people heard what we were talking about.

But in a debate with the President, we were both asked—I think

it might have been by Bob Schaffer—what we thought the most important issue was, and I answered, nuclear proliferation, globally,

and the President agreed.

Now, this is in 2004 that the President agreed that this is the

most pressing issue, globally and nationally, to our security. And

yet the fact is that, by the end of this year, we will have secured

maybe 46 percent of the material that’s out there, and 70 percent

of the sites. The fact is, also, that this administration has requested less money than the Clinton administration did in its last

year. And each year, this administration has either cut or flat-lined

the money for this enterprise.

In 2002, the administration unveiled its G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, pledging to spend $10 billion. But if you look at what was then being spent, it was about

a billion dollars a year; in effect, that was ten billion over the next

ten years—same amount of money, no additional commitment of

funds to the most significant threat the country faces.

Now, a number of years ago, I remember a suitcase was captured—I think it was in Amman, at the airport—with something

like 250 grams of radioactive material, and the sale was several

hundreds of millions of dollars on the black market. That’s the suitcase we caught. As a former prosecutor, you always wonder about

the suitcases you don’t catch and the people you don’t catch.

No threat has been greater to us, according to, I think, everybody, than the potential of a ‘‘dirty bomb’’ and the threat of terrorists securing these materials. And you explained earlier about the

sort of marketing of this process.

You know, I don’t say this as a matter of politics at all, but just

as a matter of common sense. I don’t understand how the administration can choose to spend—now we’re going to be close to $300

billion in Iraq to disarm weapons that weren’t there, and yet $1 billion a year to secure weapons that we know are there, potentially,

because every fissionable site is a potential weapon. Real. Ascertainable. Tangible.

So my question to you is, there are a series of steps that could

be taken, very simply, as a matter of common sense, for the United

States of America to lead the world, as we ought to, with respect

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to proliferation. One is accelerating, even further, this securing of

sites. That material is subject to theft, some of it poorly guarded

by people who are poorly paid. It is insecure. Senator Lugar and

Senator Nunn and others put enormous energy into this effort. And

the administration even allowed money to be cut at one point with

respect to this effort. That hardly defines a serious commitment.

So, one, will the administration—will you press for a global effort

that meets the seriousness of the threat and that puts the United

States back into the position of leadership with respect to securing

fissionable material that we know is there?

Dr. RICE. Senator, I think that we are working to do exactly that.

There are a lot of reasons that the schedule is what it is. We’ve

talked about some of the bureaucratics of this; not just here, but

principally in Russia. We’re on a schedule to do this in four years.

I think we will get it done in four years. We’re also on a very active

program of securing nuclear sites with the Russians, through

Nunn-Lugar.

I’m completely and totally dedicated to this program. I think

Senator Lugar would tell you that I’ve been one of its biggest advocates inside the administration, and I will continue to be one of

its——

Senator KERRY. Well——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——biggest advocates.

Senator KERRY. But, you see, that—what you just said doesn’t

ring with what has happened. I mean, we secured more nuclear fissionable material in the two years prior to 9/11 than we did in the

two years after 9/11, when we supposedly had an even better relationship with Mr. Putin. Now, the fact is that you’ve allowed summit after summit with Russian President Putin to go by without

any action that has been taken to overcome—in fact, at the last—

the most recent summit, in September of 2003, the United States

and Russia laid out an agenda for that effort, and it didn’t even

include the subject of securing nuclear stocks. It wasn’t even on the

agenda.

Dr. RICE. It is part, Senator, of what we call the ‘‘checklist,’’

which is a vehicle that we have for working with the Russians on

very concrete projects that we have going forward. And we just had

discussions, in the strategic dialogue with the Russians, about

what more we can do to push this agenda forward. And I think it

will be a major issue when President Putin and President Bush

meet——

Senator KERRY. Yes——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——in a couple of weeks.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. ——I know, but global diplomacy, as

you know well, is defined by the issues that a President of the

United States chooses to publicly put on the table and to publicly

announce accomplishments on. And, you know, whether it’s a

checklist that’s private versus a major——

Dr. RICE. The checklist——

Senator KERRY [continuing]. ——agenda issue——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——the checklist is public, Senator.

Senator KERRY. But the—it wasn’t on the agenda.

Dr. RICE. Senator, the President has, not only put this nonproliferation on the agenda, but he’s made proposals for how we

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might deal with the multiple aspects of nonproliferation that we

have to deal with at this point. I mentioned the proposals that he

made at National Defense University, which we’ve taken up in the

G8 and we’ve tried to press, the Global Partnership, to which you

referred, which multiplies American assistance to this area——

Senator KERRY. With the same amount of money. It didn’t add

a cent.

Dr. RICE. Senator, there—this is a program that we’ve worked

out jointly with the Russians on what can be done when. The

amount of money that is dedicated to that particular part of the

program is the amount of money that we believe we can spend on

the programs that are in the queue. We are going to accelerate the

securing of these materials to the point that it can be done in a

period of four years, not 13 years. This is a very high priority, and

we have funded the program, we have put emphasis on it. We have

run into some bureaucratic obstacles, and I’ve just represented to

Senator Lugar that I intend to try and break through those bureaucratic obstacles.

Senator KERRY. Well, I appreciate that, and I certainly, obviously, hope you will.

A second initiative that could be taken with respect to this is to

actually push for a global clean-out of potential bomb-making materials, and that could be done in four years. We’ve got highly enriched uranium that can be used to create a bomb. I gather it’s

being used to fuel over 130 research reactors in more than 40 countries right now. I’ve set out a plan that would allow us to be able

to secure that completely. I think your current plan, the Bush administration took three years to even get to the point of saying that

it would take another ten years to achieve. I believe that could be

done in three or four years. Is there any reason that the administration couldn’t similarly accelerate that?

Dr. RICE. Well, Senator, I’d love to sit down and talk with you

about your plan and what it entails, and to see what could be done.

I do think that we spend an awful lot of time trying to work with

the Russians to make full use of Nunn-Lugar and other aspects.

Now, in terms of a global way to deal with this material that is

around, we have a G8 partnership that might allow us to do that,

but I’d be very pleased to talk with you about your plan.

Senator KERRY. What do you think about pursuing an effort

which many nations support—there’s a lot of international support

for this—to embrace a ban on all production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, and that would,

in effect, permanently freeze current stockpiles?

Dr. RICE. In the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, that is being—

we have said that we favor the negotiation of a Fissile Material

Cutoff Treaty. We’ve been prepared, for some time, to live up to its

terms. The problem has been that we did an extensive review, and

we do not believe that we can get adequate verification of such a

treaty. But we are still prepared to pursue a fissile-material cutoff,

and we’ve made very clear to our partners that we’re prepared to

do that.

Senator KERRY. And what about any initiatives or discussions

with President Musharraf and the Indians with respect to failsafe

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procedures in the event—I mean, there have been two attempts on

President Musharraf’s life——

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator KERRY. If you were to have a successful coup in Pakistan, you could have, conceivably, nuclear weapons in the hand of

a radical Islamic state automatically, overnight. And, to the best of

my knowledge, in all of the inquiries that I’ve made in the course

of the last years, there is now no failsafe procedure in place to

guarantee against that weaponry falling into the wrong hands.

Senator KERRY. Senator, we have noted this problem, and we are

prepared to try to deal with it. I would prefer not, in open session,

to talk about this particular issue.

Senator KERRY. Okay. Well, I raise it, again. I must say that, in

my private briefings, as a nominee, I found the answers highly unsatisfactory. And so, I press on you the notion that—without saying

more, that we need to pay attention to that.

Dr. RICE. We are very aware of the problem, Senator, and we

have had some discussions, but I really would prefer not to——

Senator KERRY. Okay.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——discuss that.

Senator KERRY. Let me get to the question of North Korea. North

Korea has quadrupled its weaponry capacity——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, your——

Senator KERRY. I’m sorry. I apologize.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s all right. Proceed, but then make that the

final——

Senator KERRY. No, that’s fine.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair is going to declare a recess of ten

minutes. We’ve been at it for over three hours, and you have been

responsive for that period of time. Then we will come back. We

have five Senators who remain to be heard; and so, we will hear

those five and then conclude for the evening at that point, and then

we will start at 9:00 tomorrow, with the thought that the Senators,

hopefully, will be prepared for a midmorning business meeting and

a vote.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, you said 9:00 o’clock? Is that what

you said?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

We’ll have a recess for ten minutes, in the event that you would

like to recess at this point.

[Recess at 5:30 p.m.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is called to order again.

The chair now calls on Senator Coleman for his questions.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Dr. Rice, I do want to thank you for your strong remarks

about the international student exchanges. I think you said that we

need to do something to reverse the trend, and we do. My colleague

from Tennessee talked about it as an economic competitive issue in

the United States. I also think it is a national security issue, that

we are losing the ability to have relationships with folks who are

going to be the prime ministers and the generals and others.

So I have actually introduced legislation which contains a number of provisions to reverse the decline in international students

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studying in America. One, the computer system, the SEVIS system

that tracks students, needs to be improved. It tends to get bogged

down.

And another little piece of it is we have got a 50-year-old requirement under law that requires students who are applying for student visas to demonstrate strong ties with the country they come

from. But it is hard if you are a 19-year-old kid. You do not have

a mortgage. You may not have a spouse. So we put some requirements on folks that, I think, if we took a more common sense approach, we would be able to increase the flow, and in the end I

think there are both economic competitive issues and national security issues.

I also want to echo the comments of some of my colleagues about

Latin America. And we have talked about that and we had a

chance to visit. We need to increase American involvement.

I do want to make one comment about Venezuela. It is clear that

Chavez won an election. There are a number of us who want to engage. We want to engage more. But I also think it is fair to say

that in our business, actions matter and words matter. And the

rhetoric from Chavez has to change. You cannot be proclaiming

sympathy with folks who are killing Americans in Iraq. My colleague and friend from Connecticut noted that President Lula had

said some things, but he said them 20 years ago. Chavez said them

last week, in the last month.

Senator DODD. It was not 20 years ago. I hear you but——

Senator COLEMAN. But in any case—I think it is fair. There are

a number of us who believe we need to figure out a way to engage,

but there has got to be a two-way street here. And words matter;

actions matter.

My question for you is about Colombia. After decades of terror,

we are seeing killings down. President Uribe is, I think, providing

outstanding leadership. Folks are actually able to travel on the

roads, which they were not able to do before. The economy is responding positively to some of the increased security. Clearly Plan

Colombia is working, but Plan Colombia expires at the end of this

fiscal year. Our President—I am pleased that one of his first trips

right after reelection was to Latin America—visited Colombia.

I have two questions for you. One, if you can reflect on the situation in Colombia and discuss the future of Plan Colombia. Where

are we going?

And then the second issue is that one of the things Uribe is doing

is that they are having one of the largest demilitarizations of a

paramilitary group probably in history. Because of limitations put

on us in the Foreign Operations Bill, this is going on without the

participation of the U.S. Government. I would appreciate your reflections on what you believe to be the proper role of the United

States in this effort to demilitarize a paramilitary group.

Dr. RICE. Well, thank you very much, Senator.

First of all, on Colombia, I think that Colombia has outstanding

leadership in President Uribe. What he has done is to mobilize Colombian society, the Colombian people to take on the terrorism, the

narcoterrorism in a new and renewed fashion. He went to the people in a democratic way, and he said here is what we have to do

and here are the resources that we have to put behind it. He is

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starting to have a lot of success. It is a very tough environment,

but he is also taking very tough policies toward the FARC. We

have very good cooperation on that piece of it.

I think that many of the aspects of Plan Colombia that dealt

with alternative livelihoods, that dealt with dealing with the crop,

all of those have worked to improve the circumstances in Colombia

to the point that now it is possible for President Uribe to have this

very tough policy. It is always a struggle, but it is beginning to

work and we just need to support this democratically elected president who went to his people and said we have got to defeat the

narcoterrorists, and he is doing it.

The dismantlement or the disarming of militias, including the

AUC, is an important part of this revitalization of Colombia and

dealing with its past problems. Obviously, there are some things

that we cannot do. We have gotten a little bit of flexibility to help

some in some of the efforts that he needed toward the FARC, and

that was much appreciated.

We would like to be in a position to do whatever we need to do

to help him and to have him tell us what that is. I am sure that

in the demilitarization, we could do more. But the one thing that

we have made clear is that while the AUC needs to be demobilized,

demilitarized and while he has talked about reconciliation with certain aspects, not with blood on their hands, and that has been a

very important admonition to this government. But Colombia is becoming—I will not declare yet—a success story because you have

had very determined leadership, and I think we have been a good

partner for President Uribe.

Senator COLEMAN. I think the challenge is you cannot give a free

pass to folks with blood on their hands, but we need to somehow

have an ability to continue forward with getting guns out of the

hands of narcoterrorists.

Dr. RICE. The most important thing that they must do next.

Senator COLEMAN. I would hope that we would be able to have

a more assertive role in that and perhaps some guidance from

State down the road.

Just to follow up in terms of what we can do to support President

Uribe, what do you see as the next phase with the expiration then

of Plan Colombia but with, obviously, still great needs, still security concerns? What is our role in the next 2, 3, 5 years for Colombia?

Dr. RICE. I think there is no doubt that we are going to have to

explore with Colombia its economic development. It is a country

that has potential but a lot of that potential has been held back

by the terrible security situation produced by narcotrafficking. As

the narcotrafficking situation is brought under control, we obviously will want to be a partner with Colombia in how they build

a vibrant democracy.

Part of that is that they have asked us to discuss with them

what we might be doing in the area of free trade. I think that is

something that we will want to explore with them. Obviously, it

has to be seen in the context of what we are trying to do with the

free trade area of the Americas, but we have not been shy to go

ahead and look at what we might be able to do bilaterally in trade.

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I know that trade is an area that Colombia is extremely interested

in.

Senator COLEMAN. One of the areas where we have been successful is cutting down on the hectares of cocaine, coca that is being

grown there. Spraying has worked in Colombia.

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator COLEMAN. When we met with Karzai in Afghanistan, I

know that in Afghanistan there are concerns about the spraying.

The good news there is that we are hearing that their folks were

actually voluntarily stopping poppy growing. We are still waiting

to get confirmation of that, but we have got a number of those reports. I think the climate may be more fertile for other things to

grow there.

But I would hope that we would at least give evidence to the Afghans about spraying, that it can be done with environmental concerns being met, and that it can be effective if some of the other

things that they are doing do not work to the degree that we think

they should.

Dr. RICE. I agree, Senator. In fact, we asked the Colombians, and

they agreed, to talk to the Afghans about their experience.

But we are exploring or pursuing with Afghanistan a kind of

five-pillar approach to the counternarcotics problem, which really is

now, I think, in many ways the most urgent in Afghanistan, first

of all, to look at eradication, to look at eradication both aerial and

manual. At this point, manual is all that we can do, but we will

see whether aerial is needed and what we can do in that regard.

We are working on alternative livelihoods. We are working on

legal reform and police training so that we can help with that.

Prosecutions of people need to take place.

And then there is a very big public affairs campaign. Karzai

made the point to us that he needed, after many years of no democratic contact with the society, to delegitimize in the eyes of the

people the growing of poppy. He has been very aggressive on that.

He has appointed a minister for counternarcotics. He went to the

people and said this is a stain on Afghanistan that we have this.

So there is a lot of work to do, but I think we have a government

that is dedicated to the counternarcotics fight. And we will see

what role aerial spraying has to play.

Senator COLEMAN. We saw last week great success in Afghanistan. Some people talk about the hustle factor. The people there

are proud of what they have accomplished, proud of what they

have done with their election, proud of where their country is

going. The opium trade threatens to undercut all of that. We spoke

to our European allies, NATO, about that. But that is the one issue

that could derail the incredible success we are having.

So I appreciate your perspectives and I look forward to supporting your nomination. I know that you will serve this country

with great distinction and great skill as you have done already, and

I know you will continue to do so.

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Coleman.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rice, thanks for all your time today.

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I do want to commend you for your strong statements on the

need to focus in a much more serious way on public diplomacy and

particularly to ensure that our efforts involve a real dialogue and

exchange, not just broadcasting our opinions or handing out cassettes or pamphlets. We have to show people the basic respect of

listening to them, even when we disagree. It is so important particularly in political cultures in which ideas about humiliation are

so prominent. I hope to work closely with you on these issues.

Every time I travel, I become more and more convinced of the

importance and the value of involving more and more Americans,

our farmers, our artists, our teachers, in this kind of an issue. I

think Americans want to contribute in this way, and I very much

hope that you will consider me a true ally in your efforts in this

regard.

On the other hand, I am deeply troubled by your response or,

rather, your failure to respond clearly and directly to Senator Dodd

about torture and interrogation techniques. We went through the

same kind of process with the nominee for Attorney General in our

Judiciary Committee, but frankly this was even more troubling. It

is simply not okay to equivocate on torture. It is not okay from the

point of view of the safety of our own troops. It is no okay in terms

of global perceptions of this country, and it is not okay because it

is not who we are as a country. America is better than that. We

stand for something and we do have standards. I just felt I wanted

to say that before I proceed to one other area.

Less than 10 days ago, a comprehensive peace agreement was

signed that we all hope will mean a lasting end to the tremendously costly north/south civil war in Sudan, which the Chairman

mentioned. I congratulate the administration, which worked tirelessly on this issue, on this accomplishment, but as we all know,

the crisis in Darfur continues to fester. And despite the fact that

Secretary Powell acknowledged that we were dealing with genocide, the United States and the international community have basically taken no effective action to stop the violence.

Last week I met with refugees who had fled to desolate camps

in eastern Chad, and I heard the fear in their voices as they told

me that they cannot return home until there is some kind of meaningful security on the ground. To date the administration simply

has proven unable or perhaps unwilling to exert enough pressure

on the Government of Sudan to convince it to change its behavior.

Of course, one of the many difficult issues in addressing Sudan,

something that has come up in other contexts today, is the tension

between the desire to have a solid counterterrorism relationship

with Sudan and, on the other hand, our reaction to the kind of unacceptable atrocities we see in Darfur right now. We see this tension in other places as well, such as Uzbekistan.

How can this kind of tension be managed?

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator.

First, let me try to be clear. The United States does not and cannot condone torture. I want to make very clear that that is the

view and the policy of the administration, the policy of the President, and that he has made very clear to American personnel that

we will not condone torture.

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As to Sudan, it is a very difficult problem. And I thank you very

much for the recognition for what we have been able to do on the

north/south issue, and I want to just say that Senator Danforth did

a fantastic job on that. The President, when he first came into office, said that he wanted to try to do something about Sudan. He

enlisted Jack Danforth and we did get something done on the comprehensive peace between north and south.

We have hoped that that would give us some leverage to deal

with the Darfur issue because Khartoum now has more at stake.

If, in fact, we are going to move forward on a relationship, having

resolved the north/south issue, Darfur has to be resolved too. So

there is more at stake for Khartoum in resolving the Darfur issue.

We were early and we have been consistent in trying to deal with

the humanitarian crisis, getting access for the nongovernmental organizations, having opened up an additional access route with

Libya, spending money. I met with NGO’s that were operating

there. I think they believe that the American effort on the humanitarian side was really quite active.

The problem, as you note, is that Khartoum has been difficult to

deal with, particularly on the security issue, where we have been

saying to them you have got to disarm the Janjaweeds. You have

got to stop the atrocities against people. We do believe it rises to

the level of genocide and we are pressing Khartoum very, very

hard on those matters.

There also has to be a political process ultimately, and we have

tried to help sponsor one.

Frankly, this is a place where I am really disappointed in the response of some others in the international community. The reason

that we could not get a tougher Security Council resolution is not

because the United States did not want one. It was because certain

members of the Security Council refused to have one. One of the

problems in working in a multilateral environment is that sometimes you are blocked by others.

Now, we are impressing and I think we need to. One reason that

we thought it important to call genocide genocide was to put pressure on members of the Security Council who have been reluctant

to even talk about the future, a future that might include sanctions, that it was important to put pressure on those other Security

Council members. So we will continue to press this case.

We also need—I think I mentioned earlier, and this is actually

a broader issue within Africa. Our policy has been to try to improve

the capability of African institutions to involve themselves in civil

conflict of this kind. We did it with ECOWAS in Liberia. We are

working with the AU in Sudan. But again, right now, we believe

3,300 peacekeepers ought to be there. Khartoum has allowed 1,100.

So we are really going to have to have an international effort in

order to bring greater pressure on the Sudanese Government, but

we are trying to raise the spotlight on it. We are trying to pressure

others to raise the spotlight on it, and we are doing what we can,

in the meantime, to deal with the humanitarian circumstances.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I think your comments are fair with regard to the lack of cooperation from other countries in past months

with regard to Sudan. But based on the extensive conversations I

had last week in that region, my guess is that the combination of

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our counterterrorism interests and the commitment to the north/

south agreement in Sudan will provide too much momentum in the

other direction and that the Darfur situation will not be resolved

unless we do something fairly dramatic.

Let me reiterate my call and the call of others that a special

envoy be appointed to deal with this issue. You mentioned Senator

Danforth. He did a tremendous job as a special envoy on the north/

south problem. This situation, this genocide, as your predecessor

called it, will not be resolved unless we do something dramatic, and

it makes perfect sense to take that step. So let me urge that on

you.

Finally, just to go back to the torture issue for a minute, I appreciate your general statement that you abhor and reject torture.

Senator Dodd got it down to specific types of activities that are reprehensible. You were unable to say that those particular kinds of

conduct were unacceptable forms of torture. And I am afraid that

that is absolutely the wrong message we want to send today, with

all respect.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to talk to you a little bit about budget and management. The 150 account, function 150, is what funds your agency.

It is about 1 percent of the total Federal budget outlays, that is as

compared to the defense budget which represents about 17 percent

of budget outlays.

The President—and I pat him on the back for this—requested a

7 percent increase for the Department in his 2005 budget. We

unanimously agreed to that and, unfortunately, my colleagues in

Budget and Appropriations came up $1.8 billion short.

There is some talk today around town that the President is going

to be asking all agencies, other than Defense and Homeland Security, to prepare options for cutting current spending by 5 percent

with the intention of holding non-defense resources to 1 percent of

growth in the 2006 budget.

What impact would this have on your 150 account, number one?

And do you believe the State Department should be included in

such national security exemptions in a way similar to the Defense

Department, Intelligence, and Homeland Security?

Dr. RICE. First of all, I do understand the budget concerns that

the country is operating under at this point and the need to have

budget discipline. I fully understand that. And obviously, the budget numbers are not yet available, not yet final.

I do believe that we will be able to execute the American foreign

policy. We will be able to keep momentum in the very considerable

improvements that have been made in management in people, in

the diplomatic readiness initiative in technology——

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you believe that the State Department

should be part of the national security exemptions just as the Department of Defense, Intelligence, and Homeland Security? I would

like to know whether you think it should be an exemption or not.

135

Dr. RICE. I think the important thing, Senator, is that we are

able to perform the functions that we need to perform. That is

what I am going to be watching. If at any time I do not think we

will be able to perform those functions, I will make that known not

only to OMB but to the President.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, it is pretty important because we have

heard a lot today. There are a lot of areas where people want

money, but there is just only so much that is there. I do believe

that your Department is as important to our national security as

the Defense Department, and we are going to have to start to reevaluate the way we spend our money around here if we are going

to deal with this new challenge that we have of global terrorism.

The next question I have is the issue of management. Do you

know when the last time was when the Department of State had

a management audit to find out whether or not it was organized

the way it ought to be organized?

And second of all, when was the last time that somebody looked

at how the Department sets its priorities?

Dr. RICE. Senator, I do not know when the last management

audit was, and I have to assume that they looked at priorities on

a yearly basis. I know that this has been a very fine management

team that Secretary Powell has set in place and they have made

a lot of progress.

But I want to assure you that I feel very strongly about the need

to manage a Department very well. Without the management of

your resources—and that means budget, people, technology, buildings, all of those things—it is very hard to actually conduct policy.

You have my word that the management agenda will be a very important part of my agenda, and if there has not been a management audit or a review for some time, then there will be because

it is an important thing to do.

Senator VOINOVICH. I am going to be paying a lot of attention to

that part of it not only as a member of this committee, but also because of my chairmanship of the Oversight of Government Management in Governmental Affairs. I am really interested in that information because if you do not have the people to get the job done,

then we have got some real problems.

Dr. RICE. I agree, Senator. Let me just say, on the budget matter

again, we can meet our obligations. If there is a supplemental, we

will look forward to, obviously, being a part of it for a number of

our requirements for a number of things that have to get done. But

I just want to emphasize we will look at the resources that we have

and can we do the job, and I will not hesitate, if I think that we

have problems in that regard, to make certain that the President

knows.

Senator VOINOVICH. I would really like to know who is going to

be looking management issues? Bob Zoellick? You are going to be

so busy with all kinds of things. We are talking about special envoys to other places, among other things, and you are saying, well,

maybe we will not do it. If you get involved in the Middle East and

start shuttle negotiations or something, somebody has got to pay

attention to who is running the shop, and I am real concerned

about it.

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One other thing I would like to bring up is the Global Anti-Semitism Review Act. Part of that act requires the State Department

to create a new office to monitor and combat anti-Semitism. I

would like to know when is that office going to be created.

Dr. RICE. Senator, I will have to look into that. I know that we

need to create the office. I know that they have looked at creating

it. There is some question about where it will be located. I will look

into that as soon as I am, hopefully, confirmed and get back to you

with an answer.

As to who will manage, clearly the deputy has an important role

to play in the management. So does the Under Secretary for Management.

But I just want to emphasize I know that I will be doing a lot

of things, but I was chief operating officer of Stanford University’s

Provost. I cared a lot about the management issues. I understand

management of big organizations, and I know that if you are not

watching, all kinds of things can happen that are to the detriment

of your objectives. So you can be certain that it is something I will

be paying attention to.

Senator VOINOVICH. That is great because your people will want

to know you care.

Dr. RICE. The first briefing that I actually had was with the

Under Secretary for Management because I wanted to understand

what the management challenges were, what the future looked

like. Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage have done a

fine job of managing. We have to continue that tradition and push

further.

Senator VOINOVICH. One other issue again deals with management. Our European Subcommittee conducted a hearing on crime

and corruption in Southeast Europe and that area. You have got

the FBI, you have got the State Department and other agencies involved in it. I would suggest that someone look at the way that effort is organized because the conclusion I drew was that everybody

is involved, but there does not seem to be an orchestra leader or

somebody who is coordinating it. I do not know whether it is the

State Department or the Justice Department. I think you understand it. You mentioned in your remarks that crime and corruption

in some of those parts of the world are a much greater threat than

terrorism, and if we do not really have our act together in that regard, many of these new democracies are going to be undermined.

Dr. RICE. Understood. Thank you, Senator. I will look into that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to make a couple of comments and then I am going

to continue the questioning on the torture issue.

I hope that you will consider what colleagues have said on both

sides of the aisle about a lack of consistency in our foreign policy.

For example, Senator Dodd at one point said we are in trouble in

Latin America, and I would say, having come back from a 6-day

conference with Senator Lugar, bipartisan on Central and South

America, it is true because they do not sense a consistency. As Senator Chafee points out, you praise Uribe for democracy even though

we were told at this conference that he is trying to pass a law

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which would forbid sitting governors and sitting senators from running against him. And you condemn the head of Venezuela, Chavez, after having the administration, not you personally, briefly

praise a coup. And it was not until the OAS spoke up and said,

well, wait a minute, that is wrong, that we backed off. So we really

do need more consistency here.

For example, in Mexico where the PRI is coming back. We have

got to pay attention to Mexico. I hope that will be a priority because I know they are very distressed and disappointed that they

do not feel they were a priority. We have got immigration issues

in my State that I know you are very aware of being a resident

there, and we have got to deal with these issues. We have a situation where the PRI now is trying to disqualify someone who wants

to run. So we have got a lot of democracy issues there, and I think

we need to be even-handed.

Also, I think Senator Biden’s point—and I think Senator Lugar

might have picked up on it. I am not sure—that for the Axis of Evil

countries, we have a certain set of criteria, but yet it does not extend to other countries like China and Russia and other places that

I think Senator Chafee mentioned.

I put this out there because I know it is all tough and we play

the game and we need all of our friends to be with us and we overlook certain things. But we will lose credibility. So I hope you can

think about that as you, I believe, will try to restore credibility for

this country.

Now, we sparred over the weapons of mass destruction, and I

just want to place something in the record because I do not want

to go on and on because we just will not agree. We might as well

say you see it one way, I see it another. But I thought what I put

in the record is a statement by the President’s spokesman, Ari

Fleischer, right after the war started. I ask unanimous consent to

place this statement in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record.

Senator BOXER. At a press conference he said: ‘‘The fact of the

matter is we’re still in a war and not everything about the war is

known, but make no mistake, as I said earlier, we have high confidence that they have weapons of mass destruction. That is what

this war was about and it is about.’’ That’s Ari Fleischer.

I would like to place that in the record because we are not going

to agree at the end of the day. That is why I am trying to put in

statements that say that my view is not coming from me. It is coming from people who are all around you.

[The material to which Senator Boxer referred appears in Appendix II of this hearing transcript.]

Senator BOXER. Now, Senator Dodd gave you a great moment in

history to show your humanity on the issue of torture. He said, I

am not talking to you as a nominee. I am talking to you as one

human being to another. And you answered in legalisms. Then

Senator Feingold gave you another chance and you did not take the

opportunity. Now, I respect that, but I am distressed about it. And

I agree with Senator Dodd. It is very, very disappointing. So I am

going to press you a little further not only on what you have said

on it, but what you have actually done on the issue.

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What you said today what happened in Abu Ghraib was unacceptable, was abuse. It made us all sick to our stomachs, and I

think we could all agree. Did you see all of the photos that were

available from that prison?

Dr. RICE. I do not know if I saw all of them, but I saw enough

of them to know that it was a stain on our country.

Senator BOXER. Well, I appreciate that. I went up to see the

photos. And at my age we take stress tests. Also because of the

work we are in, we take stress tests. And they tell you, when you

get up on that machine, just keep on going until you cannot take

it anymore. That is how I felt when I was watching those photographs. I saw things there that will be burned in my memory forever.

And that is why I am so supportive of making sure that America

stands tall, tall, the leader in the world against torture. I am very

upset at certain things that occurred, and I want to tell you what

they are.

You said, on July 1, 2004, when you commented on the abuses

that took place in Abu Ghraib—we are going to put this up here.

You said: ‘‘What took place at the Abu Ghraib prison does not represent America. Our Nation is a compassionate country that believes in freedom. The U.S. Government is deeply sorry for what

happened,’’ and so on. You said that about Abu Ghraib. I thought

your remarks were very appropriate.

Now, last Thursday we find out that after the Senate unanimously approved an amendment to restrict the use of extreme interrogation measures by American intelligence officers, you wrote

a letter, along with Mr. Bolton, to the members of the conference

committee asking them to strike that language from the final bill.

Unfortunately, that is what they did at your request.

Now, I want to read you the operative language that you asked

to be struck from the bill and was struck from the bill. And by the

way, this is written by Joe Lieberman and John McCain—John

McCain, a man who knows what torture is. So he wrote this with

Joe Lieberman. ‘‘In general, no prisoner shall be subject to torture

or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment that is

prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.’’ Pretty straightforward, pretty elegant, bipartisan. That

amendment passed the Senate unanimously, every single member.

A letter comes and the newspaper writes that at your request,

at the urging of the White House, congressional leaders scrapped

a legislative measure last month that would have imposed new restrictions on the use of extreme interrogation measures by American intelligence officers. In a letter to Members of Congress sent

in October and made available by the White House on Wednesday—this is last week—Condoleezza Rice, the National Security

Advisor, expressed opposition to the measure on the ground that it

‘‘provides legal protections to foreign prisoners to which they are

not now entitled under applicable law and policy.’’

Now, my understanding of this is that is a restatement of what

the law is.

So again, I am so distressed that we hear from you, even though

you had a chance today to put your personal touch on it—we hear

good words about how it was terrible, what happened at Abu

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Ghraib. Again, I know you are aware that the overwhelming number of those people were set free from Abu Ghraib. So those people

in that pyramid who were being sexually abused were set free, the

vast majority of them. Yet, when we had a chance, the bipartisan

Senators voted to say this has to end, this has to stop, who writes

a letter—you do—telling them to drop this?

Why on earth did you do that after we passed this unanimously?

And you say that what happened in Abu Ghraib was unacceptable

and it was abuse. It is to me rather stunning. So can you explain

to me why you wrote that letter?

Dr. RICE. Senator, it was our view in the administration that,

first of all, this was covered in the defense authorization bill, which

the President did sign.

Senator BOXER. But this has to do with the intelligence community, not the military.

Dr. RICE. And secondly——

Senator BOXER. So it is not covered.

Dr. RICE. But all Government agencies were covered in the defense authorization.

Senator BOXER. This was just the intelligence officers.

Go ahead.

Dr. RICE. All Government agencies were covered in the defense

authorization. So intelligence was covered.

Senator BOXER. No, it was not.

Dr. RICE. It was our view.

Secondly, we did not want to afford to people who should not

enjoy certain protections those protections. The Geneva Conventions should not apply to terrorists like al Qaeda. They cannot or

you will stretch the meaning of the Geneva Convention.

But, Senator, I have to go back to the broader point here.

Senator BOXER. One second. Excuse me. I just want a clarification.

Dr. RICE. Yes.

[Pause.]

Senator BOXER. Got it. Thanks. Go ahead.

Dr. RICE. Nobody condones torture. Nobody condones what was

done at Abu Ghraib. In fact, you had everyone from the President

of the United States on down, in effect, offer an apology to those

who had endured that treatment. The people who perpetrated it

have been punished and are being punished. It is being investigated. It is looked into as to whether there was a broader problem. The United States reacted the way that democracies react

when something goes wrong. And something definitely went wrong

at Abu Ghraib and nobody condones or excuses what happened at

Abu Ghraib.

The problem of how to deal with unlawful combatants, though,

in a different kind of war is, frankly, a very difficult problem. You

have people who kill innocents with impunity. You have people

who burrow into our country and try to harm us. You have people

who have engaged in large-scale acts against children in Russia

and against commuters in Madrid. This is a different kind of war

and these are combatants with which we are not accustomed.

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Senator BOXER. So do you then oppose that language in the defense bill? You seem to oppose it in the intelligence bill.

Dr. RICE. Did we oppose the language in the defense bill?

Senator BOXER. I am asking you now. You said that you

should——

Dr. RICE. The President signed it.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. ——No, no, no. I am asking about

you. You said——

Dr. RICE. The President signed it.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. ——No, no. You are not listening to

the question.

You said you do not want to extend these international laws to

all prisoners. However, it is extended in the defense bill, and this

was just extending it to the intelligence officers. So that is why I

am asking you. Since you said you cannot extend it, do you support

it in the defense bill? Whether the President signed it, I am asking

your opinion.

Dr. RICE. Of course, I support it in the defense bill, Senator.

Senator BOXER. But you do not in the intelligence bill. Is that

correct?

Dr. RICE. No. Senator, we think the intelligence agencies are covered in the defense bill. It was unnecessary to have it in——

Senator BOXER. But then you go on to say that these agreements

should not cover it.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——I was making a broader point, Senator, which is that the Geneva Conventions should not be extended

to those who do not live up to the obligations of the Geneva Conventions.

Senator BOXER. Well, let me just say this, Mr. Chairman. The

person who wrote this, Dick Durbin, Senator Durbin, the senior

Senator from Illinois, offered the language to the Defense Department bill. He then said the Senate intelligence reform bill would

have simply extended these requirements to the intelligence community.

Now, I am getting two messages from you. One is we did not

need this because the intelligence community is already covered. If

that was the case, why not leave it in so the world can see that

we are not only willing to put it in the defense bill, but in the intelligence bill? Because, obviously, colleagues here—John McCain

kind of knows what he is doing in legislation and so does Senator

Lieberman. They are the ones who did this. 100 to nothing it was

passed through the United States Senate. I think people felt it was

important, in light of Abu Ghraib, to stand up and be elegant on

the point.

And I am going to read it one more time, because what they said

was quite elegant. And it does not have any extra words at all. ‘‘In

general, no prisoner shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhumane,

or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.’’

And for everyone in the Senate, Republican and Democratic, it

was a shining moment. And then in a letter—and it just comes to

light last week that you write—you asked that this be stricken. I

have to say that is the problem I have. There are beautiful words

and then there is the action or there are contradictions.

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Dr. RICE. Senator, it is the law of the land.

Senator BOXER. I do not think that you have explained it because

by saying we did not need it, it was in the defense bill, A, people

do not agree with that in the Senate; and B, so what if it was duplicative, that we said it twice that torture is wrong and we will

obey international laws?

I think it just shows that this is not an issue that you feel very

comfortable with. You had an opportunity when Senator Dodd

asked you. You had an opportunity to say how you felt personally

about it. You had a chance to embrace this language, which was

embraced by Senator McCain and Lieberman and every Member of

the Senate, and yet you write a letter and as a result, it is dropped.

I just think it is a sad day for us. That is how I feel.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.

I call now on Senator Obama.

Let me just announce, while there are still Senators here, that

after consultation with many parties and if not quite unanimous

consent, certainly majority consent, it is the chair’s view that we

will commence our hearing tomorrow morning at 9 o’clock. We will

have a round of questions for cleanup purposes, limited to 5 minutes a Senator. At 10 o’clock, we will have a business meeting of

the committee at that point, and at that point we will have debate

and hopefully a vote on the nominee.

I appreciate that this inconveniences some Senators and the witness. On the other hand, Senator Biden had obligations this

evening and so have two Senators, who will remain nameless, who

had television appearances and other things that needed to happen. So we are attempting to do the best we can to try to be fair

to everybody involved.

We will continue this evening and Senator Obama will ask questions and take a regular round. We will then go back to other Senators who wish to continue the questioning at that point. Senator

Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rice, I appreciate your stamina.

I have got one very specific question that I would like maybe a

brief answer to even though it is a large question, and then maybe

I want to engage with you a little bit on this public diplomacy

issue.

I think that you have done a commendable job in helping the

United States rethink its international aid and development programs. So I know the Millennium Challenge Account you were very

active in. I understand the President pledged $10 billion by fiscal

year ’06. To date, $2.5 billion has been appropriated. My understanding is very little has been spent.

The President also pledged in 2003 $15 billion for HIV/AIDS,

something that all of us care deeply about, but to date only around

$2 billion has been appropriated for HIV/AIDS, leaving $13 billion

to be appropriated and spent over the next 3 years.

So my very specific question is, are you planning and would you

pledge here to make full funding of these commitments a central

priority of the administration in its budget requests for Congress?

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Dr. RICE. The MCA is a very important initiative for us, and we

have been trying to get it right. So it takes some time to negotiate

compacts with these countries and to make sure that they are prepared to take on the obligations of receiving MCA funding. We

were also about a year late—not a year late, a year in getting in

the Millennium Challenge Corporation up and running. So what we

will do is we will make sure that the funding is there for the program that is before us, and we will, over time, certainly fulfill the

President’s obligation to, by 50 percent, increase American spending on development assistance.

Senator OBAMA. Okay. The reason I make this point I think is

not that I want us to spend money willy-nilly. And in the same way

on social programs, if programs are not well thought through and

you throw money at them, it may be a waste of money—and we

do not have money to waste—the same is certainly true on the

international stage.

On the other hand, when we publicly announce that we are making these commitments and if it appears that we are not following

through, then that undermines our credibility and makes your job

more difficult. So I would urge that there is a clear signal by the

administration in its budgeting process this time out that we are

moving forward on this. And if in fact it turns out that the spending on this money was overly ambitious because we do not quite

know how to spend all of it wisely, then that should be stated publicly and clearly and the time line should be extended, but there

should be a clear signal sent by the administration on that. So that

is the relatively narrow point.

The broader point I think draws on a number of themes that

have been discussed earlier. The issue of public diplomacy—some

of it is technique. It is technical. Do we have the equivalent of a

Radio Free Europe in the Middle East that is effective? What are

we doing with respect to exchange students and visas? I think

there are a whole host of technical questions that we can deal with.

But effective public diplomacy, at least from my perspective, is

not just spin. It is substantive. Part of the problem we have overseas is not just a matter of presentation. It is profound disagreements with our approach to certain policies. And I think that one

area that this comes up—and I think Iraq highlighted, and I see

in your statement I think it may highlight it as well. When I read

in the third paragraph of your testimony or opening statement

today, it says, ‘‘under the vision and leadership of President Bush

our nation has risen to meet the challenges of our times, fighting

tyranny and terror and securing the blessings of freedom and prosperity for a new generation. Part of, I think, the concern of that

I have here—and this has been a concern for critics of the administration for some time—is the conflation of tyranny and terror. That

may be where the mixed signals or the lack of consistency that

Senator Chafee and Senator Boxer and others were alluding to

arises.

We are unanimous in wanting to root out terror. It appears that

even within the administration, there is ambiguity with respect to

our views on tyranny. Tyranny is problematic but if engaged in by

an ally of ours or a country that is sufficiently powerful that we

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do not think we can do anything about it does not prompt military

action. In other cases it does.

Part of the, I think, debate and divisiveness of Iraq had to do

with the fact that it appeared that the administration sold military

action in Iraq on the basis of concern about terror, and then the

rationale shifted, or at least got muddied, into an acknowledged desire to get rid of a tyrant.

And I guess what I am trying to figure out here—and this is particular to military action and military incursions—do we have a

well-thought-through doctrine that we can present to the world

that explains when we feel that military action is justified and

when it is not?

Apparently it is not justified in Sudan where there is a genocide

taking place. It was not justified in Rwanda, despite I think unanimity that that was one of the greatest tragedies that occurred in

my lifetime. There are a number of circumstances in which we

have felt that such incursions or nation-building are not appropriate despite the evidence of great tyranny, and yet in Iraq and

perhaps in Iran and perhaps in other circumstances, we think it is.

So what I am looking for is some clearly articulated statement

as to when you think, as Secretary of State, military action is appropriate. Or do you think alternatively that the administration

should be able to engage in sort of ad hoc judgments as it goes

along as to whether, well, let us take these folks out and let us not

take these folks out?

Dr. RICE. Well, it is a very interesting question, Senator. It is one

that actually is debated in the academy around the world. How can

you think about a standard for the use of military force?

Senator OBAMA. Not to interrupt, but of course this is not academic because——

Dr. RICE. No, of course.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. ——we have 150,000 troops over

there right now.

Dr. RICE. Of course. That is exactly my point, that when you are

not debating it in the academy, it is a bit more difficult to have a

hard and true definition of when one would use military force and

when one would not because circumstances differ and one has to,

when choosing a policy course, look at the mix of tools available to

you. Military force should really be a last resort, certainly not a resort that is early on in the process because so much is at stake and

lives are at stake and war is an unpredictable, blunt instrument.

So it is, indeed, outside the confines of the academy, very difficult

to have a specific definition of when you use force and when you

do not.

I think that when one looks at Iraq, you look at a circumstance

in which an awful lot of factors came together to make the case of

Saddam Hussein approachable really ultimately only through the

use of military force, that it was in that sense a last resort because

you had had 12 years of failed diplomacy after a war, in which he

had fought a war of aggression, and which he had then signed on

to certain obligations, not kept those obligations. He signed on to

the obligations, by the way, in order to end the 1991 conflict. He

then did not live up to those obligations, flaunted them before the

international community, continued to threaten his neighbors, conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00149 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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tinued to threaten our pilots trying to enforce the no-fly zones. We

did have someone with a history and a present and a shadow of

the future concerning the world’s most dangerous weapons, and we

had someone who was an ally of terror and was in the world’s most

dangerous region. I think he had the whole package.

Senator OBAMA. Dr. Rice, I do not mean to interrupt you, but I

know that I am going to be running out of time. I see that yellow

light going off.

I guess my point is not to relitigate the Iraq issue. I think it is

to move forward. The concern that many of my constituents in Illinois express is that we went into Iraq, at least in their minds, because of a very specific threat of terror, not tyranny but terror. Had

the administration sold the plan to go into Iraq based on this complex mix, then it is not clear it would have generated public support. That is past.

As we move forward and we look at Iran or we look at North

Korea or these other circumstances, I think it is important for us

to be clear that the American people have to have an honest accounting of why we are going in because once we are in, we are

stuck.

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator OBAMA. And we are now going to be spending at least $200 billion in Iraq, and we have lost over 1,300 lives and it is

counting.

So part of the public diplomacy, both internationally as well as

domestically, requires this administration to at least be able to articulate these reasons in a way that are coherent and somewhat

consistent. I understand that the world is complicated and it is not

always going to be fitting into the neat boxes of the academy, but

right now at least, it seems like it is a moving target, both for the

American people and for the international community.

Dr. RICE. Well, Senator, I appreciate that, but if I could just

speak to the moving target notion because I do not think it has

been a moving target.

The fact is tyranny and terror are linked. They are linked. We

know that if we deal with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda and the

organization that did 9/11, we are still going to be dealing with its

spawn and we are still going to be dealing with the ideology of hatred that it has been perpetrating. And we know that the ground

in which that ideology of hatred has grown and matured and prospered is the ground of places in the world where there is a freedom

deficit and where the anger and hopelessness has been channeled

into these very malignant forces.

Senator OBAMA. Absolutely, but again—I know I am out of time

here, but that is true in Sudan. There is a lot of anger in Sudan.

There is a lot of anger all through sub-Saharan Africa, and yet we

do not make these decisions. So I am not disputing that if you have

a vibrant democracy and a healthy, functioning free-market system

there is less likelihood of terrorism. I think all of us recognize that

connection, but we are making very specific calculations on the

basis of flawed information or flawed intelligence and finite resources. And so we have got to make the best judgments we can

in these circumstances. So the fact that there is a link somewhere

between terror and tyranny is not sufficient for us to be making deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00150 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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cisions about spending $200 billion to $300 billion or sacrificing the

lives of American servicemen and women.

Dr. RICE. Senator, I appreciate that, but I have to say I do not

think it is a vague link. When you talk about the Middle East, it

is a pretty clear link. You are talking about the rise of Islamic extremism. You are talking about jihadism. You are talking about the

ground in which it grew up, and you are talking about a very narrow definition of terrorism if you only talk about trying to take

down the al Qaeda organization.

Senator OBAMA. I think that is fair, and if that is the case—

again, I do not belabor this, but I am just trying to give you a sense

of where I think our public diplomacy fails. There is certainly a

link between tyranny in Saudi Arabia and terrorism, and yet we

make a whole series of strategic decisions about accommodating

the Saudi regime. I am not saying that is a bad decision.

But what I am saying is the degree to which you as the spokesperson for U.S. foreign policy are able to articulate greater consistency in our foreign policy and where those links exist between tyranny and terror, you are able to apply those not just in one or two

areas but more broadly, then I think your public diplomacy is going

to be more successful.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.

I will pass on this round and recognize Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a number

of areas to cover.

Let me mention, first, on a positive note because Senator

Voinovich and others, I think maybe the chairman raised earlier—

in fact, I want to thank you. You came by and we had a pleasant

conversation I think in December or early January. I have forgotten which now.

Dr. RICE. December I think.

Senator DODD. I appreciate the time and the willingness to do

that.

One of the things you and I talked about in that meeting was

this issue of the—at least statistically we are told in the press

about a declining number of graduate students coming to the

United States. I think you were talking about this earlier, the visa

issue and this problem we are having with, I think, a 45 percent

decline in graduate schools, about 8 percent in undergraduate degrees. We ran into it in this trip that Senator Nelson and Senator

Chafee and I took in our embassies and talking to other people.

There is a declining number of applicants coming through our office

because of the bureaucracy, just waiting for a decision whether or

not they can come. Given the opportunities to choose other universities around the world who are competitive with our own, they are

making choices to go elsewhere.

I think one of the great strengths in this post-World War II era

was the opening of America’s doors, our universities and the tremendous benefit to us, to them as well going back. How many of

us have run into students, leaders today that went to American

universities, came here as students and had a wonderful effect on

their decision-making process as young adults? I am hopeful that

we can get back to that issue again.

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I realize there are modern considerations in the wake of 9/11

that we have to weigh in all of this, but I think we do so at our

own peril if we do not get this right soon in my view.

I will not go back because time is limited here, but in your opening statement, you made a couple of wonderful statements here

that I certainly agree with. You speak eloquently about the visionary leaders we had at the end of World War II. I think too often

we forget about how visionary they really were in many ways and

things they did.

I say that because in talking about the subject matter earlier

when I raised the issue of torture and these questions, and I say

this because I remember growing up and getting a constant diet of

this. My father was about a 35- or 36-year-old lawyer when he

went to Nuremberg. And Winston Churchill and others at that

time talked about the defendants in the first round of prosecutions

were some of the most vicious people that mankind had ever seen.

Whether they wore uniforms or not, they brutally murdered 6 million Jews and 5 million others, civilians not to mention the millions

who lost their lives as combatants.

Winston Churchill and others argued at the time that we just

ought to summarily execute these people, but the American team

argued, without any basis—there was no Geneva Convention that

I am aware of in those days that sat—that they believed very deeply that the place at Nuremberg was so appropriate because that

was the site of the Nuremberg laws that gave the Nazis the legal

justification for the final solutions. And the Nuremberg trials occurred in that city. We insisted that every defendant there get a

lawyer. They could present evidence before that court, that tribunal

made of the allies.

They did so not because there was some body of law someplace

that said they had to, but because we wanted to tell the world who

we were. We were very, very different not just in terms of our economic plans and political plans, but how we viewed mankind.

What I think we are getting at here in these questions to you is

not about the legalisms of this, but in these troubled times—and

we are dealing with great threats of fundamentalism that threatens our way of life—that we are different out there. We stand for

things that are different based not so much on laws or statutes

that get passed, but go right back to our Constitution in this country. When our Founders wrote, they did not talk about people who

were blessed enough to either be born here or live here when they

talked about mankind. And that is what we are getting at with

these questions.

I know you have got a job to follow the law and read the statutes

and so forth, but I wanted to give you as an opportunity to talk

as that very visionary generation did in the wake of World War II

with all of the anger, all of the feelings they had. They insisted

that we send a different message to the world, that even these brutal, cruel human beings who did what they did to innocent civilians, we treated them differently than they ever would have treated their own victims. That is the issue really, not what the law

says, not dotting the I’s and crossing the T’s, but speaking more

fundamentally as to who we are as a people. That is really what

is at the core of this issue. I want to give you a chance to talk

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about that because that is important to people around the globe.

So that is the reason I raised it.

It goes to a third issue which I want to get to in a minute, but

if you want to respond to this again, I would like to give you another chance to do so because your answer was very troubling to

me.

Dr. RICE. Well, we are and have been different. We have now

friends who have similar views of international law. The United

States has been a leader. Senator, I understand what something

like Abu Ghraib does to our image and not just our image but to

people’s desire to really hold onto America as something different.

I understand that. I understand it fully. It is one reason that it was

so hard to watch and so hard to respond to and so hard to know

exactly what to say. It is a rare thing that the President of the

United States apologizes for something like that, but he did, and

I thought it was the right thing to do.

I know too that we are struggling with the fact that we are in

a different kind of war even than World War II when there were

certainly terrible atrocities, but now a war in which we are trying

to prevent the next attack through information by the people who

are captured on these battlefields and the like and people who blow

up innocent civilians and who drive airplanes into buildings and

who behead people and who slit the throat of Daniel Pearl. It is

a different kind of war. I think you would agree with me that these

are enemy noncombatants that we——

Senator DODD. Do not become like them.

Dr. RICE. No.

Senator DODD. Do not become like them.

Dr. RICE. I agree. And Senator, if we were like them, we would

not have punished the people for Abu Ghraib. If we were like them,

the President of the United States would not have apologized. If we

were like them, we would not have so much concern about how not

to have that happen again.

Senator DODD. All right.

Dr. RICE. But may I just say one final thing about this? Because

probably the answer to the tensions between trying to live with the

laws and the norms that we have become accustomed to and the

new kind of war that we are in is to really have a kind of international conversation about this problem. I have been talking to

other national security advisors when they face terrorism. I have

talked to attorneys general and interior ministers around the

world. They feel the tension too, and we would like to look—I know

Judge Gonzales mentioned this. We would like to look at what

other kinds of international standards might be needed to deal

with this very special war because we are a country of laws. We

are going to maintain them.

Senator DODD. Well, make sure you come up here and talk with

us on these treaties because they are important. I am sure the

chairman would underscore that point as well——

Dr. RICE. Absolutely.

Senator DODD [continuing]. ——that we would like to be involved.

Let me jump quickly because the time is going to move here.

Senator Martinez and others have raised the issue of Cuba. Again,

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no one is here apologizing or defending Fidel Castro at all. But one

of the things that struck me—again, your opening statement talked

to this, and I think you rightly point out in 1989–1991, I remember

being in the Senate and watching those miraculous events occurring. You are so right to point out this just was not a victory of

that year. This was a victory that took years to achieve.

And one of the things that I think contributed to it—and I presume you would agree with this—in addition to our military prowess, which was very important, was the amount of access we had,

the amount of information we punched into those eastern bloc

countries that gave hope to people like Lech Walesa and Vaclav

Havel and others who, because there was that communication and

contact back and forth and I think contributed to the collapse of

the Soviet Union—you might argue it was not an overwhelming

reason, but it certainly was a major factor.

What troubles me here is that we are going the opposite direction

in a sense in dealing with Cuba in many ways. I hear no idea to

change anything at all. Tonight, if I walked out here, I could go to

any country in the world if they would accept me. I can fly to Iran.

I can go to Iraq. I can go to North Korea. They may not let me in.

But my own Government will let me go there. The only place in

the world that I cannot go to, nor can a Cuban American to see

their family, is the island nation of Cuba.

Why do we make such a difference or distinction on that country

if we are trying to break down those barriers and to demonstrate

to the Cuban people that we are different? Why is it we deny

Cuban Americans, second and third generations, the opportunity to

go and visit their families, put limitations on the remittances that

go back? Is there not a greater possibility, given our earlier experience in the latter part of the 20th century, that we might have a

greater chance of effectuating change there than keeping it isolated

and closed off?

Dr. RICE. Well, Senator, there are those who believe that that is

the case.

Senator DODD. Well, did it not work in part in eastern Europe?

Dr. RICE. Well, it worked in part in eastern Europe but it worked

in part in eastern Europe after a long time in which those countries were actually quite isolated. It did not happen overnight in

eastern Europe.

Senator DODD. We had Radio Free Europe. We had all those activities.

Dr. RICE. These were countries that it was possible to actually

access a civil society. It was possible to actually access university

students and the like. Castro keeps such a tight lid and such a

tight handle on that regime——

Senator DODD. That is another point. Let him turn me down if

show up to go in. Why are you telling me I cannot go? I can go to

North Korea. Right? I can fly to North Korea. You would let me

go there, would you not?

Dr. RICE. Yes, if you would like to go.

Senator DODD. Yes, but there is nothing that prohibits me from

going. I can go to Iran. I can go to Iraq tonight if I wanted to. The

only country you will not let me go to is the island nation of Cuba.

Why does the——

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Dr. RICE. Because the Cuban regime would use your travel and

the skimming off the top of that travel——

Senator DODD. And North Korea would not do that?

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——to continue to strengthen the hold of

that brutal regime. And that is what Castro does. He uses humanitarian efforts by people with their families. He uses travel. He uses

every possible way to skim the money to——

Senator DODD. But, Doctor, you are not going to tell me you are

going to make that distinction there and tell me that all these

other places I mentioned are not equally as brutal and can be more

brutal. In fact, some of them are directly involved in exporting terrorism, shipping weapons around the world. You cannot say that

about the Cuban Government at this point. They may have earlier

but not today.

Dr. RICE. Senator, not that many people are going to go to North

Korea.

Castro has made a living of siphoning money off of travel, off of

mules that he sends, off of humanitarian packages. The Cuban regime needs to be isolated in this hemisphere.

Senator DODD. All right. The point is—enough said.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. I pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Chafee passes.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank

you, Dr. Rice, for your patience and hanging in here.

I have got a few areas of inquiry that I would like to pursue if

I can.

Number one, have you read this article in the New Yorker by Sy

Hersh? Are you familiar with it?

Dr. RICE. I am familiar with it, but I have not read it, Senator.

Senator KERRY. Coming wars. Just to quote from it for a minute,

he talks about the administration conducting secret reconnaissance

missions inside Iran at least since last summer. He talks about the

administration looking at the region as a huge war zone, and next

we are going to have the Iranian campaign. This is a quote from

the Bush administration former high level intelligence official.

‘‘Next we’re going to have the Iranian campaign. We’ve declared

war on the bad guys wherever they are, the enemy. This is the last

hurrah. We’ve got four years and want to come out of this saying

we won war on terrorism.’’

I am not going to ask you to comment on anything classified, but

I am going to ask you to comment on this. A former high level intelligence official told me: ‘‘They don’t want to make any WMD intelligence mistakes as in Iraq. The Republicans can’t have two of

those. There’s no education in the second kick of a mule. The official added that the government of Pervaiz Musharraf, the Pakistani President, has won a high price for its cooperation: American

assurance that Pakistan will not have to hand over A.Q. Khan,

known as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bombs, to the IAEA or

to any other international authorities for questioning.’’ Do you

know whether or not that is accurate?

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Dr. RICE. I will just reiterate what was said about that article

by the Defense Department. It is filled with inaccuracies and its

credibility is sorely lacking. The——

Senator KERRY. Well, on that specific point——

Dr. RICE. Let me just speak to the handling of A.Q. Khan. What

we have been concerned about is that we are able to get the information that we need to break up the network. We have not made

any deals about what happens with him.

Senator KERRY. I am sorry.

Dr. RICE. We have not made any deals about what happens with

him, but we have been concerned with the Pakistani Government

to get access to as much information as we possibly can. This is a

matter that is being handled by the Pakistanis. It is not our place

to talk about what should or should not happen with the IAEA,

and we have not.

Senator KERRY. So what about our own interests and our own efforts with respect to A.Q. Khan?

Dr. RICE. Our own interests are being very well served by the

fact that A.Q. Khan is now off the market, that we are working

with the Pakistanis to get information about what he knows, very

well served by cooperation with several other governments about

members of his network. Several of them are in custody. Some will

be prosecuted. So our interests are very well being served in this

regard.

Senator KERRY. Are they being served if we do not have direct

access to him?

Dr. RICE. We believe that we have a working relationship with

Pakistan on dealing with the A.Q. Khan matter. At this point we

are getting cooperation from Pakistan on what we need with A.Q.

Khan.

Senator KERRY. But are they being served if we do not have direct access to him?

Dr. RICE. They are being served at this point.

Senator KERRY. Adequately?

Dr. RICE. We are getting the information that we need to deal

with the A.Q. Khan network. Senator, I do not know what we will

need to ask in the future, but at this point we have a good working

relationship with Pakistan on this matter.

Senator KERRY. And with respect to Iran, are you also denying

or discounting any of the allegations in this article?

Dr. RICE. The article is inaccurate.

Senator KERRY. With respect to Iran.

Dr. RICE. The article is, as Defense said, inaccurate.

Senator KERRY. With respect to Iran.

Dr. RICE. Senator, the article does not represent our policies toward Iran or our expectations of policies toward Iran.

Senator KERRY. Coming back, if I may, for a minute to Iraq,

what steps are you going to take in the immediacy of your confirmation in the next days, if you have thought about this, or if

any, prior to the election, to put in place the kind of political reconciliation that I talked about at the very beginning in the morning? Have you thought that through?

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Dr. RICE. Well, the Iraqis are trying to put in place a means for

political reconciliation to the degree of what is needed for political

reconciliation after the elections.

Senator KERRY. You do not think we have a specific role to play

with the Europeans and Arab community?

Dr. RICE. We certainly have a role to play and we have played

that role in doing what we can to encourage contacts between the

Sunnis and certainly the members of the Iraqi interim government.

We have tried to help with that. We have tried to facilitate it.

You know, they have their own contacts that are, frankly, much

better even than our own. They are reaching out to the tribal leaders. Sheikh Gazi al-Yawar, the President of Iraq, is himself an influential leader in Mosul, an influential Sunni, and as he says,

many members of his tribe are also Shia. He is actively engaged.

We help them, we talk to them, but really but this has to be an

Iraqi process. I do not think we want this to be an American process.

Senator KERRY. Oh, I agree with that completely, which is really

what I am getting at, because it has been, it is, and is still perceived as such. This was what was raised with me with almost all

of the leaders that I met in the region. It is the urgency of the

sense of reconciliation of coming together. I do not think they believe it is going on, and I am just reporting to you what I gleaned

in the last few days, real serious concerns that it is not going on.

And within the country itself, deep concerns.

I cannot remember if it was in Mosul or Kirkuk the governor—

incidentally, just a tribute to a lot of the Iraqis—and I agree with

you. So many of them want to vote. So many of them want the freedom. We understand all that and I am very sympathetic towards

it.

But this fellow was the governor. His brother had been killed.

His son had been killed. His cousin had been killed and he still assumed the role of governor, which says something. But he and others were all complaining about just sort of the lack of communication, lack of contact, sense of divorce and alienation from Baghdad

and so forth.

So the urgency seemed to leap out everywhere, whether it was

Sunni, Shia, secular, religious, whoever I met with. And especially

leaders in the surrounding countries who feel that a major effort

is going to be necessary, almost a convening—I am sure you are

familiar with it, but whether it is right in the focus right now—

but in the 8 June resolution in the United Nations, section 5 specifically invites the Government of Iraq to consider how the convening of an international meeting could support the above process,

the above process being the forming of the transitional government

and this kind of reconciliation I am talking about.

So you really have this already solidly laid out within the resolution itself, but there does not seem to be the kind of organizational

effort or initiative or leadership on the table to say this is what we

are going to do and there is a post-election process so you avoid any

kind of post-election chaos.

Dr. RICE. Well, I think that they are very focused. I really do

think that they are very active in reaching out. All that we hear

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from the embassy and from others about the contacts is that they

are almost constant at this point.

It is an Iraqi process. Some of it is transparent to us. Some of

it is not, but that they are actively engaged in trying to reach out

to all aspects, I have no doubt about that.

As to the international piece, we have had one international conference and the King of Jordan just recently on January 6th

brought people together. The Sunni leaders from around the world

or around the region, like the King of Jordan and like the Saudis

and others, are speaking out. When the meeting took place, the

Egyptians spoke out. When we recently had a meeting in Egypt,

the grand religious leader of Egypt spoke out to encourage Sunnis

to participate in the vote. I think there is a lot of activity.

Now, as to the post-election period, how to bring about a process

of reconciliation after what will be a difficult and probably imperfect election, but nonetheless a tremendous step forward for the

Iraqi people that they will hold this election, that is a process that

I think the Iraqis themselves are discussing and trying to come to

terms with how they are going to use the process of putting together the transitional assembly and then the process of writing

the constitution to begin to overcome their divisions.

But I have to say, Senator, I have been impressed with the degree to which they recognize the importance to use this next step

as a step in the process of national reconciliation. They are not saying we are going to have elections and that is it.

Senator KERRY. Well, I know they are not saying that, but with

all due respect, I was in Jordan the night before that meeting. I

met with several of the foreign ministers who were at that meeting,

including the Syrian, may I add. You have been pretty tough on

Syria here today, but Syria tried to cooperate and send its foreign

minister and specifically stood up and said, yes, the elections ought

to take place. Each of the foreign ministers that I met with there,

as well as King Abdullah, as well as President Assad and others,

talked about this Sunni alienation, as well as intimidation, but

alienation beyond the intimidation.

There is a lot of curiosity because there is such a history here.

I do not know if you have had a chance to ever read a book I happen to read going over there. It was Desert Queen by Gertrude

Bell. You read about her meetings in Cairo in 1919 and she is sitting there talking about Mesopotamia—Iraq did not exist—and

how they were going to divide up completely separate interests between Shia, Sunni, Kurds, Jews, Christians, et cetera, none of

whose interests mixed. We are doing the same thing.

Dr. RICE. Well, Senator, I think it is better than that. This would

not be the first time in history that countries through a process of

democratization, through a process of building institutions start to

overcome differences that seemed irreconcilable in the past. This

would not be the first time that that has happened. We are watching a process in Afghanistan where precisely that is happening,

and I do not think you would have bet on Afghanistan to be able

to carry that forward either.

Senator KERRY. Actually I did.

Dr. RICE. Good.

Senator KERRY. And I supported that, if you will recall.

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Dr. RICE. I know you supported it, but there were many people

who did not think that they would ever reconcile Pashtun and the

various ethnic groups of Afghanistan.

Senator KERRY. But they are very different in a lot of ways, and

that is what concerns a lot of people who are struggling with this

now.

Look, I do not pretend to be an expert, but I know how to listen

to people who have lived there all their lives and who talk through

the history. I think they all have an interest in seeing things stabilized and work. I come at this from the position of I want it to

work. We all want it to work.

But I am just relaying to you that there is a deep-rooted skepticism in the region among people who are potential players and

existing players, some more visible than others in some countries

and some very much on the line like Jordan or Egypt who are

deeply concerned about the lack of a sense of how this reconciliation itself is going to take place.

Dr. RICE. Well, what we have been saying to them is that they

can translate that concern into action because this is an Iraqi process, but it is also a process that can include the neighbors. In recent weeks, I do think that the King of Jordan and others have

made more efforts to reach out to Sunnis themselves and to be part

of the reconciliation effort.

It is one thing for them to express concern. It is another thing

for them to realize that they actually have a role to play in the reconciliation and stabilization of Iraq. And I think we are beginning

to see that.

Senator KERRY. But it is another thing also for them to put their

political necks on the line when they have seen a series of, frankly,

unilateral and, to them, insensitive steps taken that have worsened

the situation and not made it better. For a population in Jordan

that is majority Sunni and for a population in Egypt, majority

Sunni, likewise in Saudi Arabia, this is complicated. So it does not

come easily to step in if they do not see how it is going to play out,

which is why I am saying this international effort. And I heard it

in Europe from the European leaders likewise. I think there is a

readiness for it, and if I were you, I would embrace it and want

to get in there. And I think you will be surprised pleasantly at the

possibilities. But if we stand back and we are not willing to share

both decision-making and listening, I think we are going to invite

more problems.

Dr. RICE. I appreciate that, Senator. I just want to assure you

that we are reaching out and we are encouraging international

partners to be as active in Iraq as they possibly can be. There has

been some hesitancy. I think the security situation has made some

people uncomfortable about certain kinds of activity. But we are all

hands on deck. We believe very strongly that a free and democratic

Iraq, a stable Iraq is going to be in everybody’s interest, and the

opposite is true. If Iraq does not find stability, then that is going

to be to everybody’s detriment. And that is the message that we

have been carrying, and I think that after these elections, we will

try to carry it even more strongly.

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Senator KERRY. I do have some more questions, but I see my colleague is waiting also. So I will pass to him and then I will come

back.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. I am just staying here to keep the Chairman

company.

I pass on my questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator Voinovich passes, and we revert back to Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you.

North Korea. There are a lot of observers, and I heard this

throughout the campaign and we obviously went back and forth on

the subject of Six Party versus alternatives. Your predecessor, Secretary Powell, at one point announced that the administration was

going to proceed forward with bilateral talks following up on the

Clinton administration, and even while Kim Dae-jung was here,

the President announced otherwise from the Oval Office. Since

then, we went through a period where there was no discussion at

all, no dialogue at all, and then finally under pressure, the Six

Party Talks came together. But generally speaking, observers have

indicated to me that those Six Party Talks are really waiting for

U.S. leadership and for a change in U.S. position that moves it forward.

Do you have any feeling at this point that you might be prepared

to recommend to the President or that the President will and you

will engage in bilateral discussions that might try to resolve this

question of nonaggression versus progress on the nuclear program?

Dr. RICE. I think, Senator, that the North Koreans should be

well aware that the United States has no intention to invade them

or attack them—we have said that—and that there are multilateral

security assurances that are available to them if they choose to

take them. Now, obviously, if there are multilateral security assurances, the United States would be one of the parties to those security assurances.

We did put a new proposal on the table at the last round of the

Six Party Talks. The North Koreans were unresponsive. Some say

that they wanted to bide their time a bit and that they will get

back to us now that they are trying to position themselves for the

President’s second term.

But I really do think that we have to step back and recognize

that what happened in the ’94 agreement—and by the way, at the

time it was probably the right thing to do, but we know now that

the North Koreans, within just a couple of years perhaps, were violating that agreement by pursuing a separate route to a nuclear

weapon, a highly enriched uranium route.

Jim Kelly, the Assistant Secretary for Asia, was all set to go to

North Korea and say here is a bold approach on how we can

change the nature of North Korean/U.S. relations. And it had all

the things that you might imagine in it about what role we might

play in economic assistance, what we could do in humanitarian assistance, so forth and so on.

On the way to that, we learned in a definitive way that was not

available to the Clinton administration about this HEU program.

So when Jim got there, he told them we also know you have an

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HEU program. First they admitted it. Then they shut down. And

the bilateral route at that point was really closed to us, and it had

not been effective.

Our strong view is that the Six Party Talks has the advantage

of not letting the North Koreans play us off against the others. It

has the advantage of having China at the table, and China has

much greater leverage with North Korea than we will ever have.

And it has the advantage of having the parties in the region work

together on a serious security problem.

Now, I am hopeful that the North Koreans, seeing no other option but to recognize that they are going to have to give up their

nuclear weapons program in a verifiable way, that they are going

to be persuaded to come back to the talks.

But as to the question of what they have to fear from the United

States, the President has been very clear that we do not have any

intention to invade them, any intention to attack them, and that

there is another path that could be there for them, but the roadblock on that path is the North Korean program. So sometimes

there is a tendency to think that the problem is U.S. policy. The

problem is North Korean regime that has not yet made a fundamental choice, and we just have to press them to make a fundamental choice.

Senator KERRY. That is different from what one hears from some

of the other parties to the talks themselves who believe that we

have not put something sufficient on the table. Now, we are not

going to iron this out here and now, but I would love to pursue that

with you at some point in time.

I mean, if that is true and they are now, let us say, up to the

published publicly number of eight weapons and it is again, as we

have said about Iran, unacceptable that they do this, what do you

view as the options that are on the table?

Dr. RICE. Well, we still believe that this is something that we can

resolve diplomatically. We are committed to that course. Of course,

the President never takes any option off the table, but I think we

all know that this is something that needs to be resolved diplomatically.

Senator KERRY. Given the intransigence and the cheating, why

does this lend itself more to being resolved diplomatically than

Iraq?

Dr. RICE. Because, Senator, despite the problems with North

Korea, it is actually not sitting in the middle of the Middle East.

We have not gone to war with them twice in recent years.

Senator KERRY. Well, I am taking about before we went twice

and we were working on once.

Dr. RICE. Well, they invaded Kuwait. That was the reason——

Senator KERRY. No, no, no. I am working after that. During the

WMD inspection process.

Dr. RICE. Well, the WMD inspection process was simply not getting anywhere. I think the inspectors will tell you that while they

were in the country, they were able to make some headway, but

of course, Saddam Hussein——

Senator KERRY. I think the inspectors said—I do not want to go

back and redebate it, but they said they were partially in compliance and partially out. That was the last report of Hans Blix.

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Dr. RICE. Well, partially was not good enough——

Senator KERRY. Well, I understand that.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——when you are talking about somebody

who had used weapons of mass destruction. And so we could not

accept partial compliance.

But you asked me, Senator, what is the difference, and my——

Senator KERRY. Well, the difference is why could you not have

gotten full compliance. You do not know the answer to that because

you made a different decision.

Dr. RICE. Well, I do not think you were going to get full compliance from Saddam Hussein.

Senator KERRY. We know you do not think that.

Dr. RICE. Well, with American and coalition forces building up on

his shores, he still decided not to comply with his international obligations. So that is pretty good evidence that he was not going to

be convinced to comply.

Senator KERRY. But again, this goes into process, which I do not

want to really go to for a number of different reasons. I am just

trying to find the root of your confidence about this resolution with

North Korea.

Dr. RICE. Oh, I did not say that I was confident that it would

be resolved. I said that I thought we still had room for a diplomatic

solution. We also, of course, have a vibrant deterrent on the Korean

peninsula in the person of our alliance with South Korea.

But if anyone is going to do anything about the North Korean

nuclear program, it is going to be the combined pressure of its

neighbors, not the United States alone. When we put the proposal

on the table, one that, by the way, was discussed and vetted and

talked about with our closest allies, Japan and South Korea, before

we put it on the table, people did think that it was a step forward.

The North Koreans have not responded. We will see if we can get

them to respond.

What I had really hoped that they would see is that there is another path. They do not have to be on this path, but they are going

to have to recognize that there is no good path in the international

system as long as they try to hold onto their nuclear weapons program.

Senator KERRY. And how do you distinguish that from Iran?

Dr. RICE. From Iran?

Senator KERRY. Yes, and the possibilities there.

Dr. RICE. Well, for one thing, I think with Iran we are dealing

with a country that is not nearly as isolated as North Korea. The

Iranian people are not going to eat bark as the North Koreans do,

and so I think that we have some other instruments of pressure,

if we are willing and able to mobilize them, on Iran.

We are also in a somewhat earlier stage with Iran, and the

IAEA, I think, is starting to try to function there in an effective

way.

We have some bilateral ways to try and deal with the Iranian

nuclear program. I mentioned earlier that the Russians and their

requirement with the Iranians that they sign the additional protocol and bring back the spent fuel.

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We simply have different tools with Iran than we had with North

Korea and different tools with North Korea than we had with Iraq.

That is the nature of dealing with these very different regimes.

Senator KERRY. Do you believe that we would be better advantaged with respect to Iran if we were to be either leading or at

least joined into more directly and openly with the British, French,

and Germans in their initiative?

Dr. RICE. I think the British, French, and Germans know that

we are coordinating with them, that we are skeptical that this is

going to work, but we certainly hope that it is going to work. We

will see how far the Europeans get. Someone needs to test the Iranian willingness to live up to their international obligations, and

that is what the EU-3 are doing.

Senator KERRY. Why not be part of it?

Dr. RICE. I think it is always very important, Senator, that the

Iranians know that the United States is not prepared at this point

to take away the possibility that the real course ought to be here

to declare them not in compliance and take them to the Security

Council.

Senator KERRY. Do you not always have that option anyway? Is

the option of sanctions and greater action not always on the table?

Dr. RICE. I think we think the best course right now, Senator,

is to EU-3 see if they can get this agreement. We are skeptical

about it.

Senator KERRY. Is this a good cop/bad cop routine, or is it something more thoughtful than that?

Dr. RICE. I think it is probably not a good thing for us to be involved in negotiations about which we are skeptical. Let us let

them explore with the Iranians, and we will see what steps are

needed by the United States.

Senator KERRY. Is it possible that your own skepticism breeds a

failure?

Dr. RICE. I do not think so. I think if the Iranians are going to

live up to their international obligations, the EU-3 have given them

plenty of reason to do it.

Senator KERRY. The Iraqi Stabilization Group that you were put

in charge of October 2003 by almost everybody’s judgments has disintegrated. People have left it. It has not been successful. I wonder

if you would speak to that. There were a half dozen agencies or so

that were supposed to identify and resolve problems. How would

you characterize the work and effect of that group?

Dr. RICE. The Iraq Stabilization Group, Senator, was actually an

internal NSC group. It was not an interagency group.

Senator KERRY. Well, you had a half dozen agencies that were

part of it that were reporting to you as part of it, were they not?

Dr. RICE. No. The role of the Iraq Stabilization Group was to improve the information flow during the period of time when we had

the CPA in place. It was to try and de-bottleneck back here when

there were problems for the CPA. We were very active and I think

played a very important and useful role in the governance issues

so that Bob Blackwell, who at the time was heading the Iraq Stabilization Group on governance and had an under secretary’s group

on governance, was very active in working with Lakhdar Brahimi

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in bringing about the Iraq interim government. So that was a very

successful outcome of having the Iraq Stabilization Group.

But it was a group that was really there for the period in which

the Coalition Provisional Authority was moving from one that had

been almost exclusively in the chain of command for the Defense

Department to one that needed more interagency back-stopping

back here. Many of those functions have really now been taken

over by the United States embassy and by the State Department.

Senator KERRY. Well, in the Washington Post—maybe they got

it wrong, but they characterized it as the new group to be led by

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and drawn from more

than a half dozen cabinet agencies——

Dr. RICE. Let me just make the distinction that the Iraq Stabilization Group was an intra-NSC group.

Senator KERRY. No, I understand that.

Dr. RICE. It reached out to and tried to help the CPA by bringing

together interagency teams when it was necessary to try and get

something done. We tried to improve the information flow. We tried

to improve the coordination back here. We tried to de-bottleneck for

the CPA. When the CPA needed some help, for instance, on the

currency reforms, we worked with the Treasury to get the right

people out there from Treasury to do the currency reform, which

was actually very successful.

Senator KERRY. Was this an effort to try to straighten out what

the military itself was not able to do or not doing?

Dr. RICE. It was an effort to move from a stage at which it had

been almost exclusively Defense Department and military to a period in which you needed better interagency support for what the

CPA was doing.

Senator KERRY. How successful would you say it was?

Dr. RICE. I think it was successful in a number of ways. If you

look at several projects, the currency reform I think was very successful. I think that we were very successful on the governance

issues. Again, Bob Blackwell, who was the chair of the governance

Iraq Stabilization Group, was very active with Lakhdar Brahimi in

bringing about the Iraqi interim government. I do not think it

would have happened without the activities of that group. So it had

its successes. Bottlenecks also remained and we continued to work

on them.

I think it is a much smoother system, frankly, with an embassy

and an ambassador who can oversee those things with the backstopping of the State Department and the interagency process of

which the State Department is in the lead.

Senator KERRY. Has been?

Dr. RICE. I think it has been smoother——

Senator KERRY. Smoother.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——with an embassy in place that can be

the coordination in the field. We have always had the view that

most of the interagency coordination ought to actually be done in

the field.

Senator KERRY. How does that reconcile with the pretty strong

opinion you had that you wrote in Foreign Affairs when you said

the President must remember that the military is a special instrument? It is lethal and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police

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force. It is not a political referee. It is most certainly not designed

to build a civilian society. What happened?

Dr. RICE. Well, we found ourselves building a civilian society,

and we frankly as a country do not really have the tools outside

of the military to do it, which is why the work that Senator Lugar

has done in sponsoring this office of reconstruction and stabilization is such important work. We need a civilian corps that can do

the kinds of things that we had to put together in a really rather

ad hoc fashion in Afghanistan, in Iraq, even frankly in BosniaHerzegovina going all the way back. This has been a need, a set

of skills that I think we will want to have in a more coherent and

directed way. That is why I think we have to give very great support to this office of stabilization and reconstruction. It would have

been very helpful to have it in the past couple of years.

Senator KERRY. Do you think that that misjudgment about what

it can or cannot do—and I say misjudgment in broad terms—has

complicated choices that you may face and the President may face

today as a result of the stretching pretty thin of our military forces,

numbers of divisions, active duty, equipment? The commanders

over there tell me that in a matter of months, you put on several

years of wear and tear on equipment. There is going to be a huge

equipment deficit at the back end of this that America has yet to

really see the bill for. I gather 1 year there is worth 7 years on an

aircraft.

Dr. RICE. Well, we have been at war and we have had to use our

forces and use them hard. I think that Secretary Rumsfeld is giving a lot of attention to how to deal with the obligations that we

have and the structure of our forces. We believe we can continue

to meet obligations that we have globally with the forces that we

have, but there is no doubt as to the matter of how one transitions

from war to peace and that intermediate stage that we need new

skills and new organizations in order to be able to do that. The

military fights and wins the war. There is a period of time, I think

appropriately, where the military is really the dominant force on

the ground. But as you move to civilian reconstruction, you need

people who understand legal reform and understand how to build

a civil justice system and a police system, how to change a currency, and that is what we are going to try to build.

Senator KERRY. I know that Senator Lugar has long been concerned about this. A lot of us on the committee have. But I must

say to you that I am deeply concerned. I recommended that we add

another 40,000 troops. I gather there is going to be an addition of

some 30,000 without formally creating new divisions. But I think

we are way behind the curve in terms of this civilian side combined

public diplomacy component, and I do not think the budget begins

to match what it needs to. And when you look at the other side of

the costs I just described, the back-end military equipment, et

cetera, the American taxpayer, to pursue this properly, has a—it

goesback to what Senator Biden was saying earlier about kind of

telling the American people what is expected of them. I do not personally think it is all on the table sufficiently when you combine

the needs of the counterproliferation efforts with various challenges

of the human condition with various challenges of the narcotics and

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other environmental and other kinds of efforts that are all sort of

growing rather than receding.

And then you add it to what Senator Sarbanes has been saying

about our overall fiscal challenge here. We have some very, very

tough choices ahead of us and I hope the administration and you

will really put them to the Congress and to the American people

because the outcome is obviously gigantic, but we have got to be

on the right track.

With that in mind, I would just like to ask you a couple more

quick things, and I appreciate your patience.

You wrote or said—I cannot remember whether it was in a

speech—that the terrorist ideology is the direct heir to communism

and naziism and fascism. That struggle against terror is fundamentally a struggle of vision and values. Do you really see terrorism

as an ideology? Is it not really anarchy?

Dr. RICE. Senator, I think it is really—terrorism is the tool of Islamic extremism. That is really what I was referring to in that article.

Senator KERRY. You would not really think of it as an ideology.

Dr. RICE. I think of Islamic extremism as an ideology.

Senator KERRY. So do I. Terror is the——

Dr. RICE. Right. We have talked a lot about this. The fact is that

early on what we have had to do is to talk about terrorism in order

to delegitimize it, and I think we are doing a good job internationally of delegitimizing it. Saying that no cause can be served by the

use of terrorism is an extremely important message. But there is

no doubt that when you talk about al Qaeda or you talk about the

threats to the Middle East or the threats to the Pakistan or what

operated out of Afghanistan, you are talking about a virulent form

of extremism coming, in large part, out of the Middle East, which

is a perversion of Islam.

Senator KERRY. Do you believe that we can do a better job than

we have been of bridging that gap, of reaching out to moderate

Islam, bringing mullahs, clerics, imams, et cetera together, along

with leaders of other religions and having a much more concerted

global dialogue on this?

Dr. RICE. I do think that interface efforts are very important and

should be done. I think a lot of it is going on in the private sector,

and I actually am not sure that this is something that the U.S.

Government would do better than letting the private sector——

Senator KERRY. Well, is it not really a part of public diplomacy?

There is no way to——

Dr. RICE. It is certainly a part of public diplomacy, Senator, but

I often think that we are too narrow in our definition public diplomacy if we only think it is something the U.S. Government is going

to do.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. ——Well, this will be the first time

this administration left a faith-based analysis lying by the wayside.

Dr. RICE. Well, the faith-based analysis here I would agree with,

and I think the need for interfaith dialogue is important. I would

hope it would happen in the society more broadly.

But on the debate that is going on within Islam itself, that is

also an extremely important debate. We cannot be the ones who

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carry that debate. Moderate imams, moderate mosques, moderate

universities have got to do that.

Senator KERRY. Of course, but they’re anxious. I met with one of

the principal leaders of Islam in Cairo, and they are fighting their

own struggle. I think they are interested in seeing us and others

reach out in a way that tries to help bridge the gap because it has

serious implications in their countries.

Dr. RICE. I could not agree more, and we should be doing that.

We are trying in some ways. The broader Middle East Forum, the

forum for the future, allows for moderate voices, civil society, business groups, other groups, to come together in kind of space that

they can engage each other, and I think that is very important.

You take a country like Pakistan, it has come a long way. It was,

3 and a half years ago, on the brink of really going completely to

extremism, with its ties to the Taliban, with thorough penetration

of al Qaeda. If you look now at the way that they fight instead al

Qaeda and if you look at one of my top 10 speeches that any leader

has given in recent years, it was a speech that Musharraf gave on

December 12th after the attack on the Indian parliament in which

he said that extremism and modernism cannot exist side by side

in Pakistan. That has given rise to very promising developments,

if you think about it, in South Asia. As India and Pakistan start

feeling a better future, I think in part that has been fueled by

Pakistan’s unwillingness to be associated with extremism and India’s democracy and a very healthy set of developments there. They

are small steps still and it is still fragile.

Senator KERRY. Yes, they are and I agree with you. I hope you

will really take a look at this. I think it is an important mark of

the current leadership because there are such political and obviously security overtones attached to this so that it cannot be left

exclusively to the realm of whatever religious initiatives are going

to take place.

And secondly, it is paramount because we have an urgent need

to isolate the terrorists rather than having them isolate us or having extremists isolate us. In many parts of the world, we have been

the ones. I think you know that.

A couple of last questions. You also wrote at one point that you

moved our Nation beyond antiquated theories like mutual assured

destruction and moved forward with the deployment of ballistic

missile defense. To the best of my knowledge, obviously, not to be

cute, but we do not have a ballistic missile defense yet. And the

outlook as to when we might have the kind of defense that really

obviates mutual assured destruction is anybody’s guess.

Do you really believe it is ‘‘antiquated’’ after your experience as

a student of the Soviet Union and what we succeeded in doing and

what Ronald Reagan succeeded in doing in all of this?

Dr. RICE. Senator, it was meant really to reflect a change in the

relationship between the United States and Russia. I do think mutually assured destruction was antiquated in regards to the United

States and Russia. With the United States and the Soviet Union,

there was nothing——

Senator KERRY. But you are not referring generically——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——coming between us but mutually assured destruction. The change here was to say to the Russians that

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when we are no longer enemies, mutually assured destruction does

not make any sense. We need to have a different kind of relationship.

And by the way, on ballistic missile defense, we will, I think,

have initial operating capability fairly soon, but the important

thing is that we are exploring the technologies now, working toward the development of the systems. We are getting a lot of interest in these systems from some corners that one might not expect.

We have even had discussions with the Russians about what we

might do to deal with the threat of ballistic missiles.

Senator KERRY. Well, I support the research and the development. I am skeptical of a rapid deployment prior to its being adequately tested and proven, particularly given the financial concerns

that we face as a country. But obviously, we ought to pursue it,

and if it is feasible, I think there are ways to make it safer.

Dr. RICE. Well, we will deploy. We actually have begun deployment and will continue deployment because we believe that sometimes it is important to start getting the initial capability in place.

Senator KERRY. If I can just say, summarizing, a couple of

things. Number one, you said earlier that you support the State

Department’s new office of reconstruction and stabilization so that

our skills in nation-building can be honed and we can do the job.

And we need to do that, and all of us agree. But regrettably, the

State Department itself issued a report saying that its own plan for

that kind of stabilization and effort in Iraq was ignored.

So we have had a process here, and I am not going to go through

it all. But I think a lot of us are hoping—let me just take this instance to say something about your predecessor.

I think Colin Powell pushed as hard as he could. I think he

wanted to do those things. I think he is obviously an exceptional

public servant. We owe him a great deal, a great debt of gratitude

for that service. And I have great respect for him. I know that he

fought for things and was skeptical about things that others were

more certain of and went forward notwithstanding his advice and

counsel. And I know that the State Department had very significant plans and concerns that, had they been adequately embraced

and adequately implemented, might have really saved us not just

lives, but money and prestige and relationships in the world.

You do not have to comment on this, but you pick up the newspapers almost anywhere and you read about how the President is

going to be going to Europe shortly in order to repair relationships.

Now, you might not use that language, but the language is used

universally around the world.

So my hope is—and I say this with the deepest commitment to

working in a bipartisan way when we can. When we cannot, when

criticism is appropriate, I intend to level it. But after 20-plus years

on this committee and working with people like Senator Lugar and

others and watching the balance shift here so many times, we all

know that we are strongest when we are together. We are strongest when we are bipartisan. Historically in the old days with Senator Vandenberg and others, foreign policy picked up in a bipartisan fashion almost always and politics ended at the water’s edge.

I think that is how it ought to be if it is properly done, but that

requires a level of consultation, a level of respect, a level of listenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00168 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 CRICE.001 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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ing and of dialogue that just has been absent, unlike any period of

time since I have served here in the Senate. I think there was

greater dialogue and greater discussion and greater trust and less

ideology with President Reagan, with George Herbert Walker

Bush, and going back in history.

So my hope is that you are going to herald a new period. Everybody knows the trust that the President has in you. Everybody

knows the closeness of your relationship. You have the President’s

ear. You would not be here. So we are all really asking for an opportunity to try to bind the wounds up, bring the country together,

find the common ground.

I think the world is waiting for a different approach, and I am

confident that if the President offers the genuine opportunities for

this kind of mutuality, not just here but abroad, you will be able

to advance the interests of our country and of the planet. I think

that history can be written in a different way than it has been in

the last 4 years.

So I hope you will seize that opportunity and I hope that we have

the opportunity to work together. I pledge to you that if you reach

out and if there are ways to find that common ground in the interests of our country, I am prepared to meet you halfway, which I

think we need to do.

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator, and I fully accept and look forward to working with you.

Senator KERRY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Kerry, and

that is a good note on which to conclude today, that there is a

reaching out to work together. I thank you, Dr. Rice, and members

of the committee for over 9 and a half hours of testimony today.

We look forward to seeing you again tomorrow morning at 9

o’clock. Providence willing, we will have a business meeting at

10:00.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 7:45 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 9:00 a.m., Wednesday, January 19, 2005.]

(165)

THE NOMINATION OF DR. CONDOLEEZZA

RICE TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

Day Two

Wednesday, January 19, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m. in Room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar,

chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman,

Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, Martinez, Biden, Dodd,

Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee is called to order.

We appreciate the attendance of Senators. We appreciate, especially, the attendance of our witness, the nominee for Secretary of

State, Dr. Condoleezza Rice. I want to thank Dr. Rice, her staff,

and all Members for their diligence throughout yesterday. As has

been mentioned, we had over nine hours of testimony, including, I

think, very good questions and very good answers. I was just visiting with my colleague Senator Boxer. Almost every point of view

of the American public was heard.

We want to continue this morning with another round of questioning from committee Members who have remaining questions to

ask. Some do have questions, some do not; and, therefore, a number of Members will pass. We will have a five-minute round. This

will conclude at 10:00 o’clock. We’ve announced to Members that

they should anticipate a business meeting and a roll-call vote on

nomination, with that activity commencing at 10:00. But, prior to

that time, we look forward to questioning.

Now, let me say, from the beginning, at least on my part, I will

pass on this round, and I will call now upon Senator Dodd for any

remaining questions that he might have.

Senator DODD. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and

let me join you in commending our colleagues in the committee yesterday, and our nominee, as well. It was a long day. If nothing else,

I was very impressed with your tenaciousness to sit at that table

and have 18 of us up here raising questions that covered the entire

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globe, and matters of deep concern to all of us. And we appreciate

your willingness to go through that. It was a long day, but, I think,

a worthwhile one, Mr. Chairman, as you point out. And I’m sure

our colleague, Senator Biden—I don’t know if he’s going to be along

or not this morning.

I just have a couple of matters I’d like to raise——

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator DODD [continuing]. ——if I may, with you, as this time

moves on, of—a little more than ten days ago, Dr. Rice, a disturbing report surfaced that the United States—specifically, the

CIA—was making a practice of handing over detainees from U.S.

control to a third country for the purposes of interrogation. This

process is referred to as ‘‘rendition,’’ I think, is what it’s called. And

the Intelligence Agency admits to practicing it since the early

1990s. In this report, there are several accounts of prisoners being

transferred by the U.S. to certain countries, and then allegedly

being tortured during those interrogations.

Last year, I introduced an amendment to the defense authorization bill, part of which would have prevented the Department of

Defense from transferring prisoners to third countries without

keeping a record of the transfer, and the reasons for it. I wonder

if you might comment on this, if you’re familiar enough with the

practice, and whether or not we might be willing at least to—one,

at least, either preventing these renditions from occurring, or, if

not, at least keeping some record so we have some way of determining how these people are being treated. Are you familiar——

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator DODD [continuing]. ——with the subject matter?

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Senator. May I just take one moment, before answering the question, just to also thank the Members of the

committee for yesterday? I think it was an extensive, some would

say even exhaustive, look at the questions that we face in American foreign policy, but I think it was an important day. I appreciate, very much, the spirit in which the questions were asked. And

I look forward—and I really meant what I said, and I want to underscore—I look forward to working with each and every Member

of the committee in a bipartisan fashion so that we can fashion an

American foreign policy for the 21st century that takes advantage

of the substantial opportunities before us, recognizing that these

are also difficult times for the country.

And I want to thank you, especially, Mr. Chairman, for your

leadership of yesterday, and to tell you that I look forward to many

other sessions of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Great.

Dr. RICE. Senator—now let me turn to Senator Dodd’s question—

the United States is not permitted to transfer anyone if we think

that they are going to be tortured. And, in fact, we make efforts

to ascertain, from any party, that this will not happen. And you

can be certain that we will continue to do so.

I want to be careful on commenting on intelligence matters, particularly in open session, but to say that we do—anything that is

done, is done within the limits of the law. It is done with a recognition that the United States is special, and has special responsibilities, and that we will continue to do that.

167

As to keeping a record, I would have to demur for now. I don’t

have enough information——

Senator DODD. If you’d look at that for me, and get back——

Dr. RICE. I will, and I’d be happy to talk with you about it at

some point, when we’re not in open session.

Senator DODD. Appreciate it. Another one—and I’ll—this may be

the last, Mr. Chairman, to make sure we have enough time for others as well—mentioned earlier, Senator Nelson, Senator Chafee,

and I made this trip in—to South America. And one of the issues,

obviously—it came up everywhere—is the contraband issues and

the narco-trafficking issues. It’s very, very common thing. The economic issue is important, as well. I’m not asking you to comment

on this. I’d ask you to pay particular attention to that tri-border

area——

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator DODD [continuing]. ——that Senator Chafee, Senator

Nelson, and I spent some time in, that Brazilian, Argentinian, Paraguayan corner where there—it is the—the term ‘‘The Wild West,’’

in terms of contraband issues, and money flowing back and forth,

and some very, very important questions. And there needs to be

some specific attention, I think, paid to that, more attention than

we are right now.

The narco-trafficking issue, there’s a great concern about the ballooning effect we’ve seen over the years, and that is where we’ve

put a lot of attention, as we have, over $3 billion dollars in Columbia over the last few years. And there’s concerns now of this problem reemerging again in Peru and Bolivia, where it was in the

past, even parts of Brazil. The issues of Venezuela obviously get effected by these decisions, as well. And there is—really is a need,

I think, for a more comprehensive approach to this.

When we had the certification process here, which the Chairman

and others will remember, it was a rather difficult process we went

through, year end and year out, declaring which countries were

complying, or not complying, with our anti-narcotic efforts. It

caused a lot of acrimony between countries that would be labeled

not being supportive and the like. So we changed that, we dropped

that. But we promised, when we did it, that we were going to replace it with something. Just doing nothing about it was not the

answer.

And part of what we talked about was developing a more comprehensive approach; whereas, the consuming country, we’d work

more closely with the producing, transferring, money-laundering

nations, as well.

I would urge you to see if we can’t revitalize that. There is a

growing concern with the great disparity of resources we’re applying to these countries as they battle with these issues, and it’s

something that really deserves more attention or we’re going to

find this problem just moving from nation to nation in these countries without really addressing it more thoroughly.

I don’t know if you want to comment on that at all, or not, but

I’d ask you to really pay attention to that, if you could.

Dr. RICE. Thank you Senator. I will take a hard look at it. We

had, in concept, when we had the Andean Initiative, exactly this

in mind, of course, which was that if you stop the spread narcoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00173 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 CRICE.002 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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trafficking in one place, it would find a home in another. And it

was intended to be comprehensive, in terms of alternative livelihoods and in terms of economic development to forestall that. But

it’s a very good point and I’ll take a hard look at it.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

Many Senators have come in since the beginning of the hearing.

Let me repeat, we’re going to have a five-minute round. Senators

are not obligated to use their five minutes. Some will want to pass.

In any event, at 10:00 o’clock, Senators, we’ll gather for a business

meeting on the nomination.

Senator Chafee?

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning,

Dr. Rice.

I see you’re fourth in line for succession to the presidency. And

so, this is an important hearing we’re having. And also, in that line

of succession, the only one that hasn’t appeared before the public

in any kind of capacity in electoral process, so this is an important

process.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

Senator CHAFEE. Going back to our questions of finding—my

questions from yesterday—finding common ground. And as I look

back in history—and you’re a historian—and the success we had

with the thaw with the People’s Republic of China, had a lot to do

with the exchange of pingpong teams of all things. And I always

admired the architects of that doctrine, in that we knew the Chinese pingpong players were probably going to beat us 21 to 2, or

something, but that wasn’t what was important; it was the start

of finding common ground. And I was wondering—in some of my

questions you seem to reject that doctrine of finding common

ground.

Dr. RICE. Thank you Senator, for giving me an opportunity to answer that. Because, obviously, we need to look for common ground.

There is no reason that the United States has to have permanent

enemies. We have had circumstances in which there have been

major changes in the world. And the Libyan experience shows

that—if there are countries that are prepared to foreswear behavior that is dangerous to the international system, that we can start

down a different path. And I’m glad that you mentioned the

pingpong diplomacy, because, obviously, in almost every circumstance, the exchange of people of civil society, of non-governmental actors is often an important tool in thawing difficult relations. And so, I don’t want to leave the impression that I would be,

by any means, opposed to looking for those opportunities, and I will

look for them.

Senator CHAFEE. Can we specifically go back to Venezuela,

again? Where can we find common ground?

Dr. RICE. Well, we have, obviously—we talked about the economic relationship yesterday, and there’s common ground there.

We sit together in the OAS, we sit together in the Summit of the

Americas. The point is that the—we don’t have a problem with

finding common ground. We have, right now, a government in Venezuela that has been unconstructive, in important ways. And I

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would just urge that the entire neighborhood, as well as the Venezuelan Government, look at what’s happening, in terms of democracy in Venezuela, in terms of Venezuela’s relations with its neighbors. But this is a matter of sadness, not of anger.

Senator CHAFEE. And with Iran, can you—is there any potential

for finding common ground with Iran?

Dr. RICE. Well, I think the problems with Iran are well known.

And we’ve tried to make them known to the Iranian government—

often through third parties, sometimes when we’ve been in four together.

This is just a regime that has a really very different view of the

Middle East and where the world is going than we do. It’s really

hard to find common ground with a government that thinks Israel

should be extinguished. It’s difficult to find common ground with

a government that is supporting Hezbollah and terrorist organizations that are determined to undermine the Middle East peace that

we seek.

So I would hope that the nuclear issues will be resolved. It’s extremely important to the world that Iran not acquire a nuclear

weapon. And we are working closely with the European Union on

that. I would hope that Iranian Government does something to

make clear to the world that they’re not going to support terrorists

who are determined to undermine the two-state solution in the Palestinian—in the Holy Land. And those are barriers to relations,

and we just have to be honest about it. It’s a very different view.

Not to mention, by the way, that a theocratic government that has

a view that the mullahs ought to rule, that has no rights—or it has

a human-rights record that is really appalling, and that treats its

citizens, its women, in that way is not a regime with which I think

we have very much common ground, particularly given the way

that we would like to see the Middle East develop.

Senator CHAFEE. It seems to me, going back into history, the

same occurrences were—with the People’s Republic of China, at the

time—they were arming the—in the middle of the Vietnam War,

arming our opponents in that war. I mean, there was every opportunity to accentuate our differences and everything wrong with

them, but, nonetheless, through this thawing, this process of exchange and ping-pong diplomacy, now the two countries are not

killing each other.

And, interestingly, on Iran, I went to a conference in Bahrain,

earlier in December, and the Iranians were there, and I looked up,

out of curiosity, ‘‘Who are these delegates from Iran?’’ And each of

the three delegates from Iran had been educated in the United

States—one at the University of Houston, one at the University of

Cincinnati, and one at Michigan State. And I wasn’t surprised.

There is common ground. But, given every opportunity to express

even the slightest finding of that common ground, I find that you,

instead, fall into accentuating and magnifying our differences.

Dr. RICE. Well, Senator, let me just make the following point.

You know, when the Forum for the Future was held, the very important meeting that was held to talk about reform in the Middle

East, the Iranians were actually invited. The Moroccans wanted to

invite them. We said we had no objection. And they didn’t come.

And I think there’s a reason they didn’t come, which was that that

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was a gathering of civil society and business leaders and people—

people in the country who wanted to talk about reform. That’s an

opportunity for Iran to interact with the world.

We showed, I think, our respect for, and our humanitarian impulse to, the Iranian people with our response to the Bam earthquake, and it was a very great moment in American—in the history of American compassion and generosity. And I hope we’ll have

other opportunities, that are not linked to disaster, to let the Iranian people know that we have no desire to isolate them from the

international system, or from others.

And so, I understand your question. It’s a complex problem,

when you’re dealing with a regime that really has views that we

consider illegitimate. But from the point of view of the Iranian people, this is a people who should be in contact with the rest of the

world.

Senator CHAFEE. Well thank you very much. I know my time is

up. I’ll just say thank you for your time. And yesterday we talked

about Martin Luther King day and I recommend you read his great

treatise, ‘‘Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community.’’

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Chafee.

Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Madame Secretary, you had a long day yesterday, and you’ve got many long days ahead of you as Secretary of

State. But I’d like to cut right to it.

I want to make it clear, I intend to vote for you, because I believe, strongly, the President is entitled to his Cabinet, unless the

person he taps is far out of the mainstream, and you’re clearly not,

or is not intellectually capable to handle the job. You’re clearly capable. And he obviously values you very, very much as his counsel.

So I’m going to vote for you. But I must tell you it’s with a little

bit of frustration and some reservation.

The questions we asked you in writing, and then yesterday at

the hearing, I thought gave you an opportunity to acknowledge

some of the mistakes and misjudgements of the past four years.

And I want to make it clear—and I’ve made it clear time and

again—no matter who is President—it could have been the Lord

Almighty, it could have been Al Gore, it could have been John

Kerry, it could have been anyone, it could have been John Kennedy, Franklin Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan—after 9/11, they would

have made mistakes. There’s no way in which we could have undertaken this effort without some mistakes being made. So the

point we are—at least I, and I don’t think anyone else here is different—trying to get to you yesterday, is not to play ‘‘I got you,’’

or embarrass the President, but about what we’ve learned, what

we’d do differently, how we would proceed differently, given the opportunity again or given a similar circumstance, which we may

face. We may face a God-awful choice in North Korea. We may face

a God-awful choice in Iran. We may face an awful choice with regard to Syria.

And so, we’re trying to get some insight into how a second term,

a second chance, a second round might be different, not because—

not even because anyone else would have done it better—that Al

Gore, had he been President, would have done it better.

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But instead of seizing the opportunity, it seems to me, Dr. Rice,

you danced around it. You sort of stuck to the party line, which

seems pretty consistent. You’re always right, you all never made

any mistakes, you’re never wrong. And it’s almost like, ‘‘If I acknowledge any weakness, if I acknowledge any misjudgments on

the part of me, or the President, or anybody on the team, it’s a sign

of weakness.’’ But I, personally, don’t think it is. I think it’s a sign

of some degree of maturation, a strength.

Yesterday, you claimed my colleague Barbara Boxer was impugning your integrity when she asked you about the changing rationale for the war in Iraq. I wish, instead, you had acknowledged the

facts, that the administration secured the support of the American

people, and of the Congress, for going to war based overwhelmingly

on the notion that they believed—and it was portrayed, in my view,

by the administration, understandably, from your perspective—that

Iraq was an imminent threat because it possessed, or was about to

possess, weapons of mass destruction. Now, when it turns out there

were no such weapons, you claim the war was based on removing

a dictator.

Now, my recollection—I’ve asked my staff to go back and check

this, and, before the hearing’s over this morning, they’ll have statements—my recollection is that it was explicitly stated it was not

about regime change. That’s not why we were going to war. That

would be effect, but that wasn’t the rationale for going to war when

we went to war.

Now, I’m glad Saddam’s gone. He deserves a special place in hell.

A special place in hell. Chuck Hagel and I, we went up into Irbil,

got smuggled in before the war in Northern Iraq, we rode in a

seven-hour ride through the mountains—I understand why the

Kurds now say, ‘‘The mountains are our only friends’’—and three

hours, four hours before that in Turkey, and we met with the widows of those people who were gassed. We saw the pictures of little

kids’ eyes bulging out. And, you know, we saw what Chemical Ali

actually did to those people. So he deserves a special place in hell.

But if you read the resolution Congress passed giving the President authority to use force if necessary, it was about disarming

Saddam. It was about disarming him. And reread the words of the

President and other senior officials. In speech after speech, TV appearance after TV appearance you left the American people the impression that Iraq was on the verge of reconstituting nuclear weapons. I don’t doubt you believed that. But to pretend we didn’t leave

them that impression, and leave the Congress the impression. In

fact, I’m not positive of this, but I think I was on Face the Nation

the day that the Vice President was on Meet the Press, and he got

asked about nuclear weapons. The Vice President said, ‘‘They have

reconstituted their nuclear weapons.’’ And I got on, and I was

asked, on either Late Edition or one of the other Sunday shows—

they said, ‘‘Is that true?’’ And I looked at the camera and said, ‘‘Absolutely not. One of two things, either the Vice President is deliberately misleading the American people and the Congress, or you

all are not telling the Congress the truth’’—and at that time I was

the Ranking Member and, just prior to that, the Chairman—‘‘telling us the truth about what we had, in terms of intelligence, because,’’ I said, ‘‘I’ve seen nothing—nothing, nothing, nothing, up to

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that date, to indicate they had reconstituted their nuclear capability.’’ Back then, as I said, we were all left with the impression,

as Senator Boxer suggested, that this was about weapons of mass

destruction and an imminent threat.

Now, when I said, about, I don’t know, six, eight months—maybe

longer—ago, I said the administration claimed that there was an

imminent threat. It was pointed out to me that the phrase ‘‘imminent threat’’ was not used by the President. But here’s what other

senior officials said: ‘‘immediate threat,’’ quote, ‘‘moral threat,’’

quote, ‘‘urgent threat,’’ quote, ‘‘grave threat,’’ quote, ‘‘serious and

mounting threat,’’ quote, ‘‘unique threat’’.

Now, it would almost be funny, if wasn’t so, so serious, that we

are sort of dancing on the head of a pin here, whether ‘‘imminent’’

was stated. Now, you didn’t say that—I was corrected by other administration officials for saying the President said ‘‘imminent.’’

But here’s my point. Especially on matters of war and peace,

we’ve got to level with the American people. And if we want, not

only their support, if we want to sustain that support—my greatest

worry, and it genuinely is a worry, is that if we’re going to get the

job done in Iraq, you’re going to have to come back here for another

at least $100 billion dollars before it’s over, probably close to $200

billion before it’s all over. And I’m worried your friends on that side

of the aisle are going to say, ‘‘Whoa, whoa, whoa, wait a minute,

Jack. You all didn’t tell me that.’’ Now, maybe I’m wrong. Maybe

they’ll all pledge today, publically, that if you ask for $200 billion

dollars, they’ll belly up to the bar and do it. I can tell you, I will.

I can tell you, I will. But you’re going to have a little problem

here—‘‘you, the administration’’—with this outfit, Democrats and

Republicans, because I don’t think they know what’s in store here.

We’ve all got to be honest, also, with the world. Otherwise, we’ll

do terrible damage, beyond what we’ve already done, to our credibility, which is, in my travels around the world, at least in question, in many places.

You’ve heard, a thousand times, the analogy about, you know,

when Acheson went to de Gaulle and said, ‘‘You know, Mr. President, here, I want to show you the pictures of the Cubans, the fact

that the Cubans have put in Russian missile sites,’’ et cetera, et

cetera, and de Gaulle raised his hand and said, ‘‘No, no, I don’t

need to see that.’’ I’m paraphrasing. He said, ‘‘I know President

Kennedy would never mislead me in a matter of war and peace.’’

Well, we both know, because the world has changed, that even if

Kerry had been elected, nobody out there is likely to believe a

President of the United States on matters of intelligence just by

saying, ‘‘I know he’d never mislead me, you don’t have to show me

anything.’’ Those days are gone, unfortunately, for a while.

After Iraq, it’s much harder for the world to rally to our side if

we have to face a truly imminent threat in Korea or Iran. The

same goes for the way you answered my questions, in my view,

about training Iraqi security forces. It is true, there’s probably

about 120,000 people in a uniform. But the question really is—and

I’ll end Mr. Chairman, I know I’m going over my time—the question really is, how many of those forces could supplant an American force, how many of them we could trade off for an American

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soldier? Because that’s ultimately, again, the exit strategy—get

enough Iraqis there so we don’t need American troops there.

Time and again, this administration has tried to leave the American people with the impression that Iraq has well over 100,000

fully trained, fully competent military police and personnel. And

that is simply not true. You and I know that. We’re months, probably years, away from reaching our target goal.

When the Chairman and I were in Iraq with Senator Hagel,

right after Saddam’s statue went down, we asked the military, as

well as the police trainers, ‘‘How long would it take you to train

the military forces necessary?’’ They talked about 40,000. And they

said, ‘‘At least two, maybe three years.’’ ‘‘How long would it take

you to train a police force capable of policing the country, to replace

the 79,000 thugs that were called police before?’’ They said, ‘‘Three

to five years.’’ That was our people. Our people told us that.

And, all of a sudden, Rumsfeld announces, ‘‘Hey, we got this

done.’’ ‘‘Don’t worry, be happy,’’ that calypso song, should be the

theme song of the civilian leadership of the Defense Department.

So yesterday I think you had a chance to help wipe the slate

clean for the American people and our allies, tell them, flat out,

how hard it was going to be, how much more time it was going to

take, and why we needed to do it. It’s not about revisiting the past,

Dr. Rice, it’s about how you’re going to meet the challenge in the

future. And I must tell you, for the first time in the last four years,

I have doubts about it. Either because you’re not telling us, the

President doesn’t know, or you all don’t have a plan, because I’m

telling you honestly, that’s what I walk away from this hearing

worried about.

I’m going to vote for you because of the standard I have about

the President having intelligent, bright people, if they’re honorable—and you’re all of those things—he gets to choose who he

wants. But I left the hearing yesterday, and got on the train somewhat perplexed. I mean—and I’ll end with this—it was like the

issue I asked you about Iran—if, in fact, the Lord Almighty came

down and said, ‘‘Look, we guarantee we can monitor whether

they’re keeping the commitment—no nukes, no missiles’’—would

we make a deal with them? Doesn’t mean we don’t still fight about

their support of Hezbollah, terror, human rights.

And my impression from you—and maybe you can clarify it

now—is that you said, ‘‘no, we wouldn’t make a deal if it was just

those two things. No nukes, no missiles. Period.’’ Would we make

a deal with them? That’s my question. Would we? Or do we have

to have it all settled, all at once, with them?

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Dr. RICE. Senator, I’ll be—I’ll be brief. The question about Iran,

I think, is a question of looking at the totality of the relationship.

Obviously, the pressing issue, right now, is to deal with Iran’s nuclear program. And I think that we will see what becomes of the

EU-3 efforts. We’ll work with them. We will see what we can do

in the IAEA. If the Iranians——

Senator BIDEN. If they got that deal, would we sign it?

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——if the Iranians are prepared to

verifiably and irreversibly get rid of their nuclear program, then

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that will be a very good day, and I think it would certainly change

the circumstances that we are looking at.

Senator BIDEN. I wish we had a court reporter——

Dr. RICE. But I——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——to play back——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——I really——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——what you just said. What’s the

answer? Would you——

Dr. RICE. The answer——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——make the deal——

Dr. RICE. The answer——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——or not?

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——Senator, is, I’m not going to get into

hypotheticals til I know what I’m looking at. That’s the answer.

Senator BIDEN. Well, you’re in a hypothetical with China. You

make a lot of deals with China. Their human-rights record is horrible.

Dr. RICE. I understand those——

Senator BIDEN. Their problems with us are serious. I don’t get

it. Why can’t you just say, ‘‘If that worked’’—wouldn’t that be a

nice message to send to the Iranians? Hey, guarantee us no missiles, guarantee us no nukes, we can make a deal.

Dr. RICE. Senator, what we have——

Senator BIDEN. Is that a good idea?

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——what we have said to the Iranians is,

’’Look at the Libyan example.’’ The United States doesn’t have permanent enemies.

Senator BIDEN. And look at the Libyan example, and look at

Qaddafi’s role in human rights now, in his country.

Dr. RICE. But what we’ve done with the Libyan example, is that

the Libyans made an irreversible, we believe, decision about their

weapons of mass destruction. They made it, by the way, without a

promise of specific deals. They—we told them that there could be

a path to better relations, and they’re now on a path to better relations. That’s——

Senator BIDEN. That’s not what Qaddafi told me. I asked him

why he made the deal. Straight up. The State Department was in

there. He said, ‘‘It was simple.’’ He said, ‘‘I knew if I had used

nuclear‘‘—first of all, he said, ‘‘Nuclear weapons didn’t help you

much‘‘—through a translator—‘‘Nuclear weapons didn’t help you

much in Vietnam and in Iraq.’’ That was his comment. Secondly,

he said, ‘‘I know, if I use them‘‘—and I forget exactly the phrase—

‘‘you’d blow me away.’’ And thirdly, he said, ‘‘They weren’t much

value to me.’’ And then he went on to say, ‘‘And now I can have

American oil companies in here pumping the oil out of the ground.’’

I asked why he wanted American oil companies, and he made an

analogy of the French. He said, ‘‘You make a deal with the French,

they say 90-10 and they take 95.’’ He said, ‘‘The Americans, you

say 50-50, they only take 50.’’ He was the most candid guy I ever

spoke with.

Dr. RICE. Well, the Libyan example is a good example.

Let me turn to the—very briefly, to the question of lessons

learned. I said, yesterday, Senator, we’ve made a lot of decisions

in this period of time. Some of them have been good, some of them

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have not been good. Some of them have been bad decisions, I’m

sure. I know enough about history to stand back and to recognize

that you judge decisions, not at the moment, but in how it all adds

up. And I’ve—that’s just strongly the way that I feel about big, historical changes. I’m being as straightforward with you as I possibly

can.

Senator BIDEN. I appreciate——

Dr. RICE. And that’s——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——that.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——that’s how I see it.

Senator BIDEN. It’s a little——

Dr. RICE. Now——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——bit like I told my daughter,

when I have no doubt—16—I have no doubt, by the time she was

30 years old, she would be a beautiful, intelligent, well-educated,

happy lady. I just wondered how much pain there was going to be

between then and——

Dr. RICE. I understand that. And I’m——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——I’m talking about pain, here.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——Well I’m afraid, in difficult hysterical

circumstances, there’s going to be a lot of it, and a lot of sacrifice.

I don’t have a 16-year-old daughter to refer to, but I will tell you

that I think the analogy is apt, because it’s how Iraq turns out that

really ultimately matters.

If I could just say one thing, though, about lessons learned—and

that is—I spoke, yesterday, about the important work that we’ve

been doing on the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. I

think that’s a lesson learned. We didn’t have the right skills, the

right capacity to deal with a reconstruction effort of this kind. And

we are going to face these again, even if it’s not after war. And I

certainly hope that it will not be. We’re going to face it in places

like Liberia, places like Sudan. And so——

Senator BIDEN. All we want to know is, how are you going to face it with the $15 billion bucks that’s sitting out there now, that you

haven’t spent, and, you know, you don’t know what to do with?

Dr. RICE. We do know what to do with it, Senator. And——

Senator BIDEN. If you want to tell us——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——That——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. ——it would be good. Tell us.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——that spending is accelerating, and I’ll

be glad to give you a full accounting of it next time I see you.

Senator BIDEN. God bless you. And, by the way, my daughter is

23. She thinks I’m handsome and smart again, and all is well.

Dr. RICE. All is well.

The CHAIRMAN. And she’s right.

Senator BOXER. We’d better straighten her out.

Senator BIDEN. Thanks, pal.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coleman?

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. I just——

Senator NELSON. I’ve got one that’s 27, and I’m still going

through a lot of pain.

Senator COLEMAN. Two comments, Dr. Rice. One, with all the

talk about foreign-policy goals, there are things that impact my

constituents most directly. I was surprised, my first year as a SenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00181 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 CRICE.002 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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ator, I probably spent more time on immigration issues and child

adoption than any other issue in my state office. So I just want to

raise that. And probably, by the way, the most satisfying portion

of what I do, to unite families.

You have a program called Adjudicate Orphan Status First. It’s

a pilot project. I would just urge you to take a look at expanding

it. We do wonderful things to bring families together, and it’s really

important stuff that we don’t talk about much.

And I am just going to have to join in the conversation here. I

am sympathetic to some of my colleagues’ concerns about finding

common ground. I join with some of my colleagues, believing that

we need to find more common ground with Venezuela. I think we

have to figure out a way to do that.

But I have to agree with you, and appreciate your response, in

separating Venezuela from Iran, a country that’s calling for the destruction of Israel, that’s supporting terrorism, that has no freedom

of religion, an abysmal human-rights record. Pursuit of nuclear

weapons—just in Iraq, talking to Allawi with concerns about Iran

interfering with what’s going on in Iraq. And I will say, Dr. Rice,

for this Senator, the idea of finding common ground with Iran, and

the mullahs makes me sick. So I guess there is a separation there,

and I believe it’s important for some of us to keep our eye on that

difference between Iran and Venezuela.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much Senator Coleman.

Senator Feingold?

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rice, thanks for this further opportunity to speak with you.

I’m struck by the conversation you just had with Senator Biden

with regard to Iraq; in part, because I think if people are watching

this hearing, they would think that we’ve been in great disagreement about foreign policy ever since 9/11. That’s not what really

happened. We were all quite unified with regard to the fight

against terrorism, trying to figure out this challenge, up until the

time that serious disagreements occurred with regard to whether

Iraq really was part of that effort, or to what extent it was.

So I want to return, in that spirit, to the item that I started with

yesterday, Secretary Rumsfeld’s interesting comments, in his

memo, that there was no consensus within the national-security

community of the United States about how to even measure success in the fight against terrorism. And you and I had an exchange

about this yesterday, where you talked about some of the places,

geographically, where it’s much harder for the terrorists’ network

to operate. I talked about my concern that I think they actually are

able to operate in other places—North Africa—and we went back

and forth on that. But, fundamentally, I’d like to have you say a

little bit about, how do we measure success—not a list of things

we’ve done, but how do we measure how well the terrorists are

doing? How do we know whether they’re picking up steam, in

terms of picking up recruits and gathering more help around the

world, or not? How do we measure this thing? I think that’s one

of the most important things that perhaps we could come together

on, and start discussing again, once we get through this serious

disagreement on Iraq.

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Dr. RICE. It’s a very interesting question Senator. And it’s a hard

question. As you know, when you’re measuring any social phenomenon, you are usually without hard tools to do it. That’s one

of the lessons of social science. If you’re measuring scientific phenomena, you have hard tools to do it. If you’re measuring human

phenomena, how do you measure how well a young person is developing? These are human phenomena. They are hard to measure.

One of the hardest things about this is, it’s a very shadowy network whose numbers are hard to count. It’s important and difficult

to know what is a hardcore terrorist who is committed to the jihad

and would never be reformable in any way versus somebody who

might just be attracted to the philosophy because they’re jobless or

hopeless, or whatever, and might be brought back into the fold.

That’s the kind of important question for which we, frankly, don’t

have a measurement. And I don’t think we’re going to. I think

we’re going to see this in broader strokes.

We can measure, with good intelligence, issues like how well we

think they’re doing on funding. We can measure something like

that. Imperfectly, because we’re dependant on what intelligence we

can learn about that. We can measure, imperfectly, when we take

down some of their leadership, whether they seem to be able to replace that leadership. We can measure, imperfectly, whether we

think they are able to carry through on threats that we believe

they have issued. But, again, imperfectly.

What we’re not going to be able to measure, and I would resist

trying to measure, is how we’re doing in empowering moderate

Islam against radical Islam, because that is an historical process

that is going to have its ups and downs, but, in time, when you

have a Pakistan coming back from the brink of extremism, or you

have an Indonesia carrying out a democratic election in which the

role of terrorism in Islam was actually a fairly minor issue, you

have to say, we are making some progress. How much? I can’t tell

you, but we’re making some progress.

What I keep my eye on is, how is moderate Islam doing? When

I’m asked what future am I looking for, I’m looking for a future in

which the regions of the world that we’re concerned about, whether

it is North Africa, or East Africa, or the Middle East, or Southeast

Asia, that moderate Islam is winning. It’s winning in government,

it’s winning in rhetoric, it’s winning in educational programs, but

the impact of that is going to be a while before we see it.

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that answer. Let me—I recognize

how imperfect it is. And I do think a lot of it has to do with how

moderate Islam is doing. But let me just give you an example from

Algeria, where, of course, they’ve gone through this horrendous period of terrorism, and they’re coming out of it. And we had a dinner

with civil society people last week, in Algiers, and I said, ‘‘Now,

what about the young people here? Are they likely to return, to be

attracted to a radical, violent Islam, or not?’’ And the sense was

that they probably wouldn’t, because it was horrible; but perhaps

if economic opportunity didn’t improve, that it could happen. I’m

not so sure that can’t be measured more than we’re doing. I’m not

so sure that we can’t identify these trends in a more serious way

than we are, and I think it would be very valuable information.

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Let me turn to another question. I’d like you to explain how the

President’s emergency plan for AIDS relief will help build

infrastructural capacity in Africa, particularly in the area of training healthcare practitioners, especially community health workers

and discouraging the medical brain-drain. In the course of the work

I’ve done on this committee, I’ve had a lot of wonderful conversations with people in countries seriously affected by the pandemic,

especially in Africa. And I found one of the most heartbreaking to

be my conversation in Botswana with the president of that country,

President Mogae, who was acknowledging that they had a 40 percent AIDS rate, and that they were trying to deal with it, but,

whenever they’d get some local healthcare workers trained, they

were poached by American healthcare entities or European

healthcare entities, and they couldn’t keep the very people that

were trying to deal with this situation.

So will implementing partners all adhere to a set of principles regarding hiring local staff to ensure that we don’t siphon resources

away from the domestic healthcare infrastructure, making our efforts, in the end, unsustainable?

Dr. RICE. That’s, again, a very important point. And the whole

concept, especially of the part of the emergency plan that is for the

15 most affected—once 14, now 15 most affected—is to focus, not

just on the delivery of services, which is important in itself—the

cure—the treatments to millions; preventing seven million, giving

access to information and care for ten million—those are all very

important goals. But the design of the program has also been to

worry about the delivery mechanism for that care, to use a tiered

approach so that you have clinics in the cities that can do that, or

hospitals in the cities, but that you also build capacity in the village—in some of these places, even using motorcycle-riders to get

the care out that people who’ve been trained to administer, or help

administer, the drugs—so that you’re improving the delivery, the

healthcare delivery system, as well. And that really was the innovation that came about through studying and working with, for instance, the Ugandans, who have a very effective system of delivery.

It is also the case, of course, that if you improve the delivery system for AIDS you improve the healthcare delivery system for other

things, as well—malaria, tuberculosis are part of the program, but

other—others as well. If you improve mother-to-child transmission

delivery, you improve OB/GYN care, you improve neonatal care,

and so forth.

And so, I think it’s a really—probably one of the most important

aspects of the emergency plan would be not to just focus on the

treatment itself, although that’s extremely important, but what are

we doing for the healthcare delivery system.

I hadn’t thought much of the—about the problem of well-trained

healthcare workers being siphoned off, but we’ll go back and give

that some thought.

Senator FEINGOLD. I would appreciate that.

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much Senator Feingold.

Senator Hagel?

Senator HAGEL. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hagel passes.

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Senator Boxer?

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for being

so fair.

Thank you, Dr. Rice, for answering our questions.

Mr. Chairman and my Ranking Member, I’m going to use my

time this morning to lay out the rest of my concerns, and then,

when we get a chance to vote, I’m going to put all my concerns

back into context again.

Dr. Rice, clearing the air and, as Senator Biden said, starting

from a fresh page here would have been wonderful. We haven’t had

that. And the reason I think it is so important to place into the

record some of your past statements is because your administration

has named several countries in the ‘‘axis of evil.’’ We don’t know

what your plans are. We haven’t been able to flush them out. I

think Senator Biden has been trying to push you on the Iran situation. We don’t have an exit strategy for Iraq, that we can tell, because you insist there’s 120,000 in the Iraqi forces, but yet, being

pressed by several Senators here yesterday, you still won’t say how

many of them really are trained. So we’ve got problems here; at

least, I have problems here. So forgive me if I continue along the

lines of yesterday.

Now, Dr. Rice and colleagues, our country is united in waging

war on those responsible for 9-11, and eliminating the al Qaeda

network. That is why I find it so troubling that the Bush administration used the fear of terror to make the war against Iraq appear

to be part of the response to 9/11. And, Dr. Rice, as I said, you were

involved in that effort. You were the face on television, as was

pointed out yesterday. You tell us that you were giving the President confidential advice, but you didn’t shrink from talking

straight to the American people.

Now, I don’t know one American who wants Saddam Hussein to

see the light of day. I don’t. So that’s not the point. I don’t know

of one American who wanted Slobodan Milosevic to see the light of

day. And guess what? And you know this—1,300 plus American

soldiers didn’t have to die to get rid of Slobodan Milosevic, and

10,000 didn’t have to get wounded. So there are issues surrounding

this.

Now, on September 25th, ’02, you said, in an interview with Margaret Warner, on PBS, ‘‘We clearly know that there were in the

past, and have been, contacts between senior Iraqi officials and

members of al Qaeda going back for actually quite a long time.’’

And you went onto say, ‘‘And there are some al Qaeda personnel

who found refuge in Baghdad.’’

Now, that statement and others by administration officials assert

there was a longstanding operational alliance between Iraq and al

Qaeda.

We know the truth is otherwise. We know it. And I’ll show you,

again, the State Department document, signed off by President

Bush in October 2001, one month after 9/11, showing absolutely no

operational cells in Saddam-Hussein-controlled Iraq.

And, second, most experts agree that Saddam Hussein and

Osama bin Laden were far from being allies. In an interview on

CNBC with Maria Bartiromo, on March 24th, ’03, Peter Bergen

was asked if he saw any direct connection between Saddam and

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Osama. Mr. Bergen said, ‘‘Well, you know, I met bin Laden in ’97,

and I asked him, at the end of the interview, his opinion of Saddam. And he said, ‘Well, Saddam is a bad Muslim, and he took Kuwait for his own self aggrandizement.’ ’’

In November ’01, the former head of the Saudi intelligence said,

quote, ‘‘Iraq doesn’t come very high, in the estimation of Osama bin

Laden. He thinks of Hussein as an apostate, an infidel, or someone

who is not worthy of being a fellow Muslim.’’

Third, you were contradicted by the bipartisan 9/11 Commission,

which stated in its report, last summer, that there was, quote, ‘‘no

collaborative relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.’’ In fact, the

9/11 Commission report states that you received a memo on September 18th, ’01, detailing what was known about the links between al Qaeda and Iraq. Let me read the 9/11 Commission’s description of the memo you received. They write, ‘‘The memo pointed

out that bin Laden resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein’s

regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting

on Saddam cooperating with bin Laden.’’

So you received a memo, on September ’01, clearly stating there

was no link. The President, himself, was part of a State Department publication which said there were no al Qaeda in Iraq prior

to 9/11, there’s documented history of bin Laden’s loathing of Saddam, and, in spite of this, you went on TV and told the American

people there was a clear connection between Saddam and al Qaeda.

Even the State Department was very clear that there was no such

contacts.

So it is very disturbing to think that, in spite of everything and

all the information that you had, you continued to go out there and

claim this contact and make the people feel that, somehow, going

to war against Iraq was our response to 9/11.

Now, on the aluminum tubes, I’m not going to get into the back

and forth with you on the aluminum tubes, but I’m going to lay

this into the record, because I think it’s essential. On September

8th—first, I believe you tried to convince the American people that

Iraq’s purchase of aluminum tubes proved positively that they were

going to build a nuclear weapon. Thus, your statement about the

mushroom cloud, which scared the heck out of every American. On

September 8th, ’02, you were on CNN’s Late Edition with Wolf

Blitzer, and you made this statement, ‘‘We do know there have

been shipments going into Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes

that are really only suited to high-quality aluminum tubes that are

only‘‘—I’m reiterating what you said—‘‘really suited for nuclear

weapons programs, centrifuge programs.’’

That unequivocal statement was wrong. You never mentioned to

the American people that there was a major dispute about the

tubes, even though our nation’s leading nuclear experts in Department of Energy, in 2001, said, ‘‘The tubes were for small artillery

rockets, not for nuclear weapons.’’

It is reported that one Energy—a Department analyst summed

up this issue for the Senate Intelligence committee saying, quote,

‘‘The tubes were so poorly suited for centrifuges that if Iraq truly

wanted to use them this way, we should just give them the tubes,’’

unquote.

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This dispute among the CIA, the DIA, the Department of Energy,

Department of State over the likely use of tubes was played out in

front of this committee. And, Mr. Chairman, I remember it. I was

there in that meeting. It was very contentious, and we saw all

sides of the issue.

This dispute was so well known that the Australian Intelligence

Service reportedly wrote, in a July 2002 assessment, that the tubes

evidence was, quote ‘‘patchy and inconclusive.’’

Third, the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, reported, on January 8th, ’03, that the tubes were, quote, ‘‘not directly suitable for uranium enrichment, and were consistent with

making ordinary artillery rockets.’’

So, given the concerns raised by Department of Energy, Department of State, the Australians, the IAEA, you still failed to level

with the American people on the subject of the aluminum tubes.

Even as recently as a few months ago, October 3rd, 2004, you had

the opportunity to finally set the record straight. And, as Senator

Biden says, it’s good to set the record straight, we’ve got to move

on. But when you were asked by This Week’s George Stephanopoulos about the tube controversy, you said, ‘‘There was dispute

only by one agency. That’s the State Department.’’

Now, that is not the truth. It’s not the facts. And it is very, very

troubling to me. As Senator Biden said, we all make mistakes. God

knows, I’ve made mine, and I will make more. I apologize in advance to my constituents for the mistakes I’ll make. But once all

the facts are out there, can’t we just make sure that the truth is

finally embedded into history, without being—without turning our

backs on what the truth is. So that’s another area.

Now, I know my time is up. I can either wait til one more round,

or just finish up my last area of concern. Can I just finish it up?

Mr. Chairman: Proceed.

Senator BOXER. Okay.

When you were making the case for the war in Iraq, one of the

things you said that, frankly, stunned me was that a reason to go

was, the Iranians were gassed by the Iraqis. Now, this is truly a

horrific fact, that is right. But, Dr. Rice, we all know the Iran-Iraq

war took place between 1980 and 1988. And the United States

knew—they knew—that Saddam Hussein was using chemical

weapons against the Iranians. And it was appalling. Despite this

fact—despite this fact—I’m sure you’re aware who traveled to Iraq

to meet with Saddam Hussein one month after we became aware

of this. It was Donald Rumsfeld. And Donald Rumsfeld tried to increase diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein. Iraq was a charter member of the terrorism list in 1979, put on there by Jimmy

Carter. Do you know—and I’m sure you knew at the time you said

this—that it was the United States who removed Iraq from our list

of state sponsors of terrorism? And they didn’t get put back on til

1990.

So, let’s review. While Saddam was gassing the Iranians—a despicable act—Donald Rumsfeld and the Reagan administration reestablished U.S. relations with the Iraq and refused to put Iran back

on the terrorism list.

So, in ’03, when you told the American people that Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against Iran was a justification for

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war—one of them that you gave—why didn’t you tell them the full

story? Why didn’t you mention that it was Rumsfeld who favored

the normalization of relations with Iraq during a time when Saddam was using chemical weapons against Iran?

So a reason you gave the American people for the war in Iraq,

and a reason you believe it was worth American lives, was the heinous gassing of the Iranians by Saddam in the ’80s. This gassing

was known to the American Government at the time. The gassing

did nothing to dissuade the American Government from launching

full diplomatic relations with Saddam. America gave its seal of approval to Saddam Hussein by sending special envoy Donald Rumsfeld to Iraq when we had zero relations with Iran at that time.

So, to me, it’s telling a half truth to the American people. It’s

‘‘gaming’’ the American people. And, as someone who believes that

we, again, owe the full story, it was very upsetting to me that you

didn’t put it into context.

Now, had you said, ‘‘You know, we were wrong, we were fooled,’’

maybe it would have been better. But there’s no mention, anywhere.

So I guess what I’m saying, Mr. Chairman, these are my areas

of deep concern. I’ve gone back through the record, exhaustively,

because I knew Dr. Rice—and you saw it yesterday—you know, we

can get into a give-and-take, and she’s a very good debater, and I’m

a pretty good debater, and that’s interesting, but I think we need

to see what the facts are and why I’m disturbed about this particular nomination. It isn’t based on qualifications or intelligence or

all the rest, because that’s obvious—wonderful break in the glass

ceiling and all those beautiful things, which I’m proud of. It’s not

about that. It’s about candor. It’s about telling the full story. It’s

about, seemingly, not being willing to go with us, in both sides of

the aisle, because it was the same answer to Senator Chafee when

he pressed you. It seems to me a rigidness here, a lack of flexibility, which is so troubling to me; and, most of all, going back into

recent history, an unwillingness to give the American people the

full story. Because the mission, the zeal of selling the war, was so

important to Dr. Rice, that was her job. And yet I feel—and, again,

I know not everyone agrees with me at all in the country, but

many do—that this war, and all of these horrific deaths and the

wounded and all of that, is a direct result of not leveling with the

American people.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.

Dr. RICE. Thank you. I’ll just—I’ll be brief.

Senator Boxer, let me respond to a couple of specific points, very

briefly, and then to an overall point. But I, first, need to go back

to yesterday.

Senator Boxer, you mentioned the letter that we wrote

concerning——

Senator BOXER. Yes.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——I just want to note—and I will want

to note for the record, that you put up one provision, not——

Senator BOXER. Yes.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——all of the provisions.

Senator BOXER. That’s right.

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Dr. RICE. And it was a provision, of course, with which we would

have no difficulty, which was one that is enshrined in law, which

is that we should not torture, and so forth and so on. But there

were other provisions that you did not put up that was not fully

in context, what you presented yesterday. And——

Senator BOXER. Dr. Rice, I agree with you completely.

Dr. RICE. Yes, and——

Senator BOXER. But your letter didn’t say——

Dr. RICE. No, I understand that.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. ——that one——

Dr. RICE. But——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. ——provision.

Dr. RICE. But——

Senator BOXER. Because the conferees could have kept that one

provision.

Dr. RICE. Yes, we decided—you’re right—not to try and parse.

But I just want to make clear that you did not put up the entire

set of provisions.

Senator BOXER. Of course I didn’t.

Dr. RICE. Yes.

Senator BOXER. Because the conferees could have kept that. You

didn’t tell them to keep it.

Dr. RICE. Yes, but the impression was left that what we objected

to was that one provision, when it——

Senator BOXER. Well, you did.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——when, in fact, there were several.

Senator BOXER. Well, you did, yesterday, object to it. You said it

was duplicative, didn’t you?

Dr. RICE. No, I said it was in the Defense authorization bill. But

I just want, for the record, it to be noted that the Bush administration was objecting, not to something to do with the law of the land,

but to other provisions, and I’ll provide that to you.

[The information to which Dr. Rice referred appears in Appendix

II of this hearing transcript.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. RICE. So the context here was extremely important.

Secondly, let me just respond, very briefly, Senator Boxer, to a

few points.

First of all, I really just can’t agree that Milosevic and Saddam

Hussein were the same problem. And we do have to recognize that

different tools have to be taken against different dictators. It was

a remarkable set of events with Milosevic, but he was in the center

of Europe. We had all kinds of pressure on Milosevic that we had

failed to be able to bring about with Saddam Hussein. And so, I

just reject the analogy between the two.

Secondly, as to the question of al Qaeda and its presence in Iraq,

I think we did say that there was never an issue of operational control, that al Qaeda—that Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with

9/11, as far as we know or could tell. It wasn’t a question of operational alliance, it was the question of an attitude about terrorism

that allowed Zarqawi to be in Baghdad and to operate out of Baghdad. There were contacts going back to the early 90s, and those

are, indeed, detailed in the 9/11 report.

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Third, on the question of aluminum tubes, we didn’t go to war

because of aluminum tubes. This was a debate about whether this

issue, this particular piece of evidence, was evidence was reconstitution of the nuclear program. And the—there was one agency

that disagreed that he was reconstituting his nuclear program, and

that was the State Department. The INR. Other——

Senator BIDEN. Didn’t the Department of Energy also——

Dr. RICE. No, the Department of Energy said that they did not

believe that the tubes were evidence of reconstitution, but that he

was, indeed, they believed, reconstituting his program. And

that’s—that’s an important distinction, though. But I said ‘‘reconstituting his program.’’ I was not talking about the tubes.

The Department of Energy, in fact, I learned, when the process

unfolded, did have reservations, or did believe that the tubes were

not for nuclear weapons. The majority of agencies in the intelligence community did.

I was representing, Senator—and I’ve made this available for the

record—the views of that majority, and the view on reconstitution

was one that all but the State Department held.

Now, I just have to put this into context. When you’re dealing

with intelligence matters, you are not dealing with perfect information, and you do have to put that information into a context of

someone’s history—this was someone who was very close to a nuclear weapon in 1991, much closer than we thought; of his

present—the intelligence community’s belief was that he was reconstituting his program, that there was evidence of this in his procurement activities and keeping the nuclear scientists together;

and he—and that the shadow of the future, according to that National Intelligence Estimate was that, left unchecked, he would

have a nuclear device by the end of the decade. I just don’t think

that the President of the United States and I were going to give

him the benefit of the doubt.

And as to the ‘‘mushroom cloud’’ statement, one that I’ve heard

repeated many, many times, it was simply a statement about uncertainty, that you didn’t want the first evidence that he had nuclear weapons to be the kind of evidence that we learned when we

found out that the Soviet Union had a nuclear weapon five years

ahead of schedule.

On the Iranians and Iraq, I’ll say it right now, the United States

Government has often, as the President’s said, supported regimes

in the hope that they would bring stability. And we’ve been, in the

Middle East, sometimes blind to the freedom deficit. We’re not

going to do that anymore. And what happened with Saddam Hussein was probably evidence that that policy was not a very wise

policy.

In general, Senator, let me just say, again, we did go to the

American people with a case for war. It was a case that, yes, said

that the threat that this horrible dictator—sitting in the Middle

East in the worlds most dangerous region, with whom we had gone

to war twice before, who had used weapons of mass destruction,

who was shooting at our aircraft—that it was not acceptable to

have him with weapons of mass destruction.

And we believed, like most of the intelligence agencies in the

world, like the United Nations—and much of the information was

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from the United Nations—that he had weapons of mass destruction. He refused to account for them. Even with coalition forces sitting on his doorstep, he refused to account for them. We weren’t

prepared to give Saddam Hussein the benefit of the doubt, given

his history and given the shadow of the future.

We also had a situation, now rectified, of a Middle East out of

which the terror threat, the jihad’s threat, comes, with a factor, in

Saddam Hussein, who was going to make it impossible to change

the nature of the Middle East. I don’t think anybody can see a different kind of Middle East with Saddam Hussein in the middle of

it.

So we can disagree about the course that we took. We can certainly have, I think, a healthy debate about the course that we

should take, going forward. I would be the first, again, to say,

we’ve had to make a lot of decisions, some of them good, some of

them bad. But I would hope that what we will do now is to focus

on where we go from here.

I can assure you, I will be candid. My assessments may not always be ones that you want to hear, they may not always be ones

with which you agree, but I will tell you what I think. And that’s

a promise that I make to you today.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator BOXER. Thank you. If I could—and I know I’m taking a

lot of time—I just don’t want to have to speak again, but I would

like to finish my comments here.

The fact is that the reconstituting were based on the yellow cake

and the aluminum tubes, both of which proved to be false. And

when I asked you about aluminum tubes——

Dr. RICE. And balancing equipment and the accounts out of

which these came and his keeping nuclear scientists together. Let’s

have the entire picture.

Senator BOXER. Okay. Yes, exactly my point. Let’s have the entire picture. And when I asked you about aluminum tubes, you

talked about the larger picture. The fact is, when you go on television, and you say the aluminum tubes can only be used for nuclear weapons—you want to turn it to a different subject, that’s

okay, but that’s what you said, and the facts proved otherwise, and

we knew that at the time—four or five agencies were having a

giant battle over that. No one could have possibly said that they

could only be used—because the Intelligence Community was split.

My last point has to do with Milosevic. You said you can’t compare the two dictators. You know, you’re right, no two tyrants are

alike. But the fact is, Milosevic started wars that killed 200,000 in

Bosnia, 10,000 in Kosovo, and thousands in Croatia. And he was

nabbed, and he’s out, without an American dying for it. That’s the

fact.

Now, I suppose we could have gone in there, and people could

have killed to get him. The fact is, not one person wants either of

those two to see the light of day again. And in one case we did it

without Americans dying, and in the other case we did it with

Americans dying. And I think if you ask the average American, you

know, ‘‘Was Saddam worth one life, one American life,’’ they’d say

no. He’s the bottom of the barrel. And the fact is, we’ve lost so

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many lives over it. So if we do get a little testy on the point, and

I admit to be so, it’s because it can continues, day in and day out,

and 25 percent of the dead are from California. We cannot forget—

we cannot forget that.

Dr. RICE. May I just close by saying, Senator Boxer, I, probably

more than most, because I did have a role in the President’s decision to go to war, mourn every day the people that are lost. I look

at their pictures, I think about their families, I’ve been to Walter

Reed, I see the pain and suffering. I believe that their service and

their sacrifice was needed for our security.

I don’t think there is anyone who believes that you could have

gone into Iraq and nabbed Saddam Hussein. It wasn’t that kind of

regime.

The CHAIRMAN. Members of the committee, let me just say, we

tried, in fairness, to leave the debate open last evening. Dr. Rice,

Senator Kerry, Senator Voinovich and I were here for 50 minutes

of questioning. The table was available for any Senator who wanted to stay and ask questions at that point.

Now, Senator Boxer obviously has strong points of view. And, in

a spirit of fairness, the Chair has let the hearing verge out of control.

But we’re going to come back into control at this stage.

Senator BOXER. I’m finished, you’ll be happy.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I understand, and I appreciate that.

We have called for a business meeting at 10:00 o’clock. Now, I

don’t want to be arbitrary, because I appreciate that there may be

impelling questions for the completion of the record, questions that

people hadn’t thought of last night, but rather this morning.

We rapidly want to come to conclusion here. I just simply want

to ask, Are there Senators who have impelling questions, or can we

proceed to have a business meeting of the committee?

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Chairman: Yes.

Senator BIDEN. In response, Senator Levin importuned me in the

hall on the way up here, and he had said that he had sent a letter,

which I asked for a copy of—that there are questions, some of

which have been touched on here, that he’d like Dr. Rice to answer

in writing before we vote in the Senate. And I’ll read the letter.

‘‘Dear Dick and Joe, Enclosed are some questions for the record

which I request that you ask Dr. Rice on my behalf. I’d appreciate

a response in writing before the time set for the Senate vote on her

nomination. Thank you for your assistance.’’

They’re pretty straightforward. I’d be guided by your judgement.

I could ask them, on behalf of the Senator, right now, or we could

do them in writing, and I think there’s plenty of time.

I think you could answer all of these, Dr. Rice. They relate to,

for the record, uranium from Africa, and the second—and there are

a total of six questions relating to that—aluminum tubes, one question; and no distinction between Iraq and al Qaeda, one question.

So I guess, for the record——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me suggest that, first of all, as Senators

know, Dr. Rice has been answering questions for a month. We’ve

all had ample opportunity to ask everything we wanted.

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Secondly, however, I’ll ask Dr. Rice to respond to the questions

of Senator Levin, our colleague, as a courtesy. Our hearing, here,

is with the Foreign Relations Committee. Yet we are prepared to

help any Senator find answers. I’m sure Dr. Rice will be cooperative; at least I presume so. And so, within the next few hours, presumably those questions will be answered.

Senator BIDEN. They’re very straightforward.

The CHAIRMAN. My guess is, they probably have been answered

in the folios of questions that are a part of the record, so it will

not be difficult, I suspect, to reiterate.

Dr. RICE. I’m happy to do it, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that.

Dr. RICE. We’ll get them back to you shortly.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Now, impelling questions. I see Senator Nelson raising his hand.

Are there any, on this side, that feel they need to ask questions?

All right, one short question by Senator Chafee, and Senator

Obama has——

Senator BIDEN. And there may be closing statements, not questions, before the actual vote, which would be appropriate. Senator

Dodd has a closing statement, and maybe someone else does.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that could perhaps be a part of our business meeting.

Senator BIDEN. Yes. That’s exactly right.

The CHAIRMAN. We’ll have discussion at that point.

All right. Senator Nelson?

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just picking up on a theme that was hit here, there was a discrepancy, Dr. Rice, between the intelligence in the State Department and other intelligence. In this particular case that was discussed, about the aluminum tubes, there was also a difference of

opinion within the intelligence community with regard to unmanned aerial vehicles possessed by Saddam Hussein. Indeed, I

and other Senators were told, that not only did he have those

UAVs for offensive reasons, but there was a plot. He was going to

put them on ships off the eastern seaboard of the United States

and launch them over eastern cities of the United States, dropping

chemical or biological weapons. We were told that. But what we

were not told is that there was a vigorous disagreement within the

intelligence community—specifically, that Air Force intelligence,

which knows the most about UAVs—but we were not told that they

had disagreed. Now, it was written in the report, but I’m talking

about those verbal briefings that we received in the secure room in

the Capitol.

Tell us what you know about that kind of dispute of intelligence.

Because we don’t ever want to get into a situation where we are

operating on information that is incomplete, as we were in this particular case.

Dr. RICE. Senator, I’m sorry, I don’t remember the briefing—

what was said at the briefing. I don’t even know if I was there at

the briefing to which you’re referring. There was a dispute about

the UAVs, and I think it was fully outlined in the National Intelligence Estimate, which should have been the basis for the briefings.

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Let me just—if you don’t mind, I’ll just make a broader point,

which is, obviously we need the very best intelligence, and obviously there were problems with the intelligence concerning Iraq

weapons of mass destruction. I don’t think members of the intelligence community were trying to deceive or to do a bad job or any

of those things. It’s an incredibly difficult intelligence challenge

when you’re dealing with a closed society that is deliberately deceiving, and where they’re using dual-use equipment. And the

question very often is, Do you give Saddam Hussein the benefit of

the doubt that these are really for weather monitoring, or not? And

so, I think it’s just a very difficult—I’m sorry, I just don’t

remember——

Senator NELSON. Well, I guess——

Dr. RICE [continuing]. ——the circumstance.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. ——the question would be—since

we’re looking forward, which has been the theme of my statements.

If your intelligence in the Department of State has a difference of

opinion from the rest of the intelligence community, what is the

way that you will receive and handle that intelligence?

Dr. RICE. Well, I will certainly encourage INR, which is headed

by an assistant secretary who I’ve known for 20-plus years, somebody that I have known at Stanford—I will certainly make certain

that they are making their views known in the intelligence community. I don’t think I have to do that. I think they have been making

them known. And I think INR has demonstrated that it has a different take on things and that that is worth looking at. Why have

they had a different take? They have very often been right about

some of the dissents that they’ve taken. And so, I look forward to

working with them to understand that somewhat better. But as

we’re restructuring the intelligence community, understanding how

different intelligence agencies do their work is going to be important to the National Intelligence Director—the Director of National

Intelligence—in making sure that he’s getting competitive views on

the intelligence front.

Senator BIDEN. Would the Senator yield for ten seconds?

Senator NELSON. Of course.

Senator BIDEN. Will you tell us if there’s a difference, if we ask

you?

Dr. RICE. Well, of course. And you’ll know, because the intelligence community always fights any dissents.

Senator BIDEN. No, but you, as Secretary of State, will you tell

us, if we don’t ask you, if we don’t know to ask you? Will you level

with us? Will you tell us, ‘‘By the way, there’s a different take on

. . .’’——

Dr. RICE. From the INR——

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Dr. RICE. Of course, yes.

Senator NELSON. See, that’s the point. We felt like we didn’t

know what to ask, because we were told about these UAVs. Yes,

it was buried in the National Intelligence Estimate, but we were

getting these verbal communications in a very secure room. And

that’s the whole point, so that we can make judgements based on

the full information.

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Mr. Chairman, let me just wrap up with a couple of other subjects here. It’s already been discussed, we’ve got a problem in Latin

America in the tri-border region, and that needs your attention. It

is, as Senator Dodd said, ‘‘The Wild West.’’ And there’s a lot of financing of some bad actors that comes out of that area. We’ve got

to keep our eyes on President Chavez. He told us one thing, a week

ago Monday, and then, lo and behold, a whole different thing suddenly emerges after we left Caracas. And thanks to the Chairman,

he noted this, way back in November, which I fully support. What

are the implications to the United States if Chavez cuts off the oil?

And the Chairman has called for a GAO investigation. I hope the

Chairman will call for hearings on this, and I fully support him.

And then, you know, there seems to be some flap over this very

courageous Cuban resident name Oswaldo Paya, who went out and

got 11,000 signatures on a petition and then the government of

Cuba stiffed him, when, in fact, that was a part of what their constitution said. Will you support the Varela Project, and other grassroots movements inside Cuba?

Dr. RICE. Absolutely. And we’ll look for even better ways to support them.

Senator NELSON. Okay. And my final statement, it’s just a little

thing that nobody ever recognizes, but, because in my former life

I had been, handling issues for people that were victims of the Holocaust, and their families. There’s a little office in the United

States State Department that is a pittance on what its budget is.

I asked this four years ago of Secretary Powell, when he was here

for his confirmation. He said he would continue it. It still is there.

And what it’s trying to do is to see that people in the particular

life, that I had lived before, were seeing how all of these people had

been run over by insurance companies. They had collected the policies for years and years, and then, after the war, they said, ‘‘We

don’t know you.’’ And that’s just one of the things that the Holocaust victims and their families, now, and the Holocaust survivors,

have suffered. And so, I would ask you to maintain the Office of

the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues.

Dr. RICE. Thank you Senator. I will.

Senator NELSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

I will call upon Senator Obama, because Senator Chafee has already had one opportunity, and then I will call upon Senator

Chafee.

Senator Obama?

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. And I’ll

try to be brief.

The first question I guess I have is more of a request, Dr. Rice,

and that is, assuming your successful confirmation here today that

we schedule some mechanism for your Department to follow up on

the question that had been raised yesterday, both by Senator Biden

as well as myself and others, about figuring out a concrete measurement of our progress in training, because—training of Iraqi

troops—because one of the questions that will continue to come up,

every time I have a town hall meeting in Illinois, is, what’s the status of our troops, and what’s our exit strategy?

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And I recognize that you are hesitant, in your current position,

to provide a timetable. I thought Senator Alexander said something, yesterday, about wanting a success strategy, as opposed to

merely an exit strategy, and I recognize that approach. On the

other hand, constituents and families in small towns all across Illinois need some more satisfactory answer to them. And it strikes

me that this whole issue of training troops, turning over security

functions to the Iraqi Government is critical to that.

So my first question, I guess, is, Are you committed to setting up

some mechanism whereby we can get some specific answers on

that?

Dr. RICE. I am. I will note that the police training is actually

under the Defense Department, and not under the military.

Senator OBAMA. I understand. This may require——

Dr. RICE. But I will make certain that——

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. ——an additional commitment

from——

Dr. RICE. I’ll——

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. ——Secretary Rumsfeld. But——

Dr. RICE. I will talk to Secretary Rumsfeld about it. And I’m certain that we can be responsive to the concern.

Senator OBAMA. Okay. The second—I guess this is more of a

point, rather than a question, but I’m happy to solicit a response.

You know, all of us, I think, are rooting for your success. And I recognize—not just yours, personally, but this administration’s success. I think the notion that we have a very real and present danger in the nihilistic ideologies of radical Islam, I think most Americans share.

I think to the extent that we can encourage a more moderate

brand of Islam, it already exists, it has to be nurtured. Although

I have to dispute, a little bit, your notion that, sort of, we’re always

making progress. Indonesia, for example—I actually lived in Indonesia for five years—perceptions of America and the West were

much better then than they are currently, subsequent to 9/11. So

I’m not always certain we’re going in a straight line in that route,

but I recognize that it’s a complicated issue, and we wish you well.

And I’m—I don’t think there’s anybody on this committee who

would not prefer to see this administration succeed, even though

there have been strong disagreements about the decisions that

have been made in the past.

I guess the comment that I’d like to make is that—in the activist,

proactive strategies that you’ve pursued. It seems to me that this

administration often asks that we simply go along and have faith

that you’re making the right decisions. And that’s true—I think

part of the reason you were hesitant to talk about the torture issue

yesterday had to do with the fact that you don’t want to define

‘‘torture’’ too much, because you want a little bit of wiggle room.

You want us to assume that you will make sound decisions based

on immediate circumstances. And I think that the reason it’s hard

to pin you down on an exit strategy, or Iran, or these other circumstances, is, you don’t want to bind this administration. ‘‘Trust

us,’’ I think is the message, ‘‘and we’ll make the best decisions.’’

But I think that, from the perspective of my constituents in Illinois, at least, a number of people did vote for George Bush, and

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do trust him. But my job, as a Senator, is to make sure that we’re

basing these decisions on facts and that I probe and not simply

take it on faith that good decisions are being made.

And so, my final comment, I guess, is simply this. Your predecessor had a reputation of being willing to maybe tell the President

some things that he didn’t always want to hear. I think he displayed a certain independence that was encouraging, and I think

the people felt that he was speaking on behalf of the American people and not simply being a mouthpiece for the administration. If

there’s criticism of this administration, I think, on foreign policy

it’s—I think the most profound one is—is that maybe dissenting

views have a difficult time getting a hearing.

And so, I just would urge you, in your role as Secretary of State,

to display some independence and make certain that, as you’re

making these difficult calculations, that you are not engaging in

simply agreement with the conventional wisdom inside the White

House, but that the hard questions are being asked in all these decisions, because, ultimately, you’ve got young men and women who

are making sacrifices as a consequence to these decisions, and the

entire country is spending huge sums of money that could be spent

on other things on the basis of these decisions.

So I think my comment is just, I hope that you show the kind

of independence that will make the country proud, and not just

please the administration.

Dr. RICE. Thank you. Let me just, perhaps—Senator Chafee will

have comment—but let me just—I have no difficulty telling the

President exactly what I think. I’ve done that for four years. Sometimes he agrees, and sometimes he doesn’t. The fact is, that I felt,

very strongly, that no one else should ever know the times that

when he disagreed and the times that when he didn’t.

Senator OBAMA. Which I respect.

Dr. RICE. When we agree——

Senator OBAMA. I have no problem with that, in your role as National Security——

Dr. RICE. Yes. Well, but in my role as Secretary, I want it to be

clearly understood that I still believe that we are one administration, with the President in the lead.

The President is the only elected official in the war council. Of

course, the—was the only elected official in the war council, other

than the Vice President, of course.

The President will, as we move from war to peace, still be the

elected official as we decide how to try to use this time of diplomacy to build new structures and to bring old relationships to use

to pursue this new agenda.

But I know what he expects from me. And he expects my most

candid advice. He expects me to argue vociferously for that which

I believe. He expects the State Department to play a strong and active role, not just in the execution of American foreign policy, but

in its generation, in its formulation. And that, he’ll get.

I know the men and women of the State Department—not every

single one of them, but I’ve worked with them—many of them over

the last four years and in years past. And what I’ll ask from them

is their best in pursuing a course, and in recommending a course,

and then moving forward on a course. So you don’t have to worry,

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Senator, that I will be a strong voice for what I believe and for

what the State Department believes is the best course, going forward.

Senator OBAMA. I wish you the best of luck.

Dr. RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Chafee?

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, once again, Mr. Chairman.

I’d just like to respond to some of the comments from Senator

Coleman. And I deplore any rhetoric of hate, and particularly

against the state of Israel. I do believe the challenge with the Iranians is to empower those many, many Iranians who believe that

we’ve got to find a way to resolve our differences without bloodshed, and that’s our challenge.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you Senator Chafee.

Now, I’ve been requested by the distinguished Ranking Member

to welcome one final comment or statement that he will make. Following that, we will proceed to the business meeting, and we will

excuse you from further activity, Dr. Rice.

Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Dr. Rice, I suspect your press office has been

asked by the press as often as I have in the last 24 hours how

there could be such a discrepancy in our individual assessment of

the trained troops in Iraq. And I want to just set the record

straight. It implies that I know I’m right. So I’m not setting the

record straight—I’ll give you how I arrived at my numbers and why

I think it’s important.

It’s not about criticizing the administration. It’s about, I believe,

a recognition on the part of our trainers, our folks in the field, that

we made, understandably, the wrong judgement, early on, as to

how to train. I will not mention the general’s name—but last trip,

I think my friend said this; I don’t want him in trouble, because

maybe he didn’t—he said, ‘‘We went for quantity, not quality, at

the front end, and it hasn’t worked,’’ end of quote.

Now, here’s what I know to be the facts, as told to me by your

administration personnel in charge of training, not by anybody

from the outside. First of all, the claim there is 53,520 trained police. That’s what the administration says in the last report. These

consist of police who receive a three-week refresher course and new

recruits who get an eight-week course.

Parenthetically, I’ll point out that we talked about lack of automobiles and lack of equipment for the police. At the training center, when I asked whether they received the automobiles, the person in charge of training said, ‘‘We have them, but they’re not

much use. I found out they don’t know how to drive.’’ Literally. My

word. They don’t know how to drive. ‘‘So we’re teaching them how

to start automobiles, mainly’’—paraphrasing; I don’t know the

exact quote—‘‘to get out of the way of an explosion.’’

So that’s the quality of the people we’re sending.

There’s a 24-week field-training course by U.S. trainers in the

manual. It has never begun. Not a single one of these claimed

53,000 cops have gone through that. They don’t even know, when

they send the police back to—you should know this, if you don’t—

back to Iraq, they have no notion where they go, they have no noVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00198 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 CRICE.002 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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tion who they’ve been assigned to, they don’t have any idea where

they are, and no one way to follow up.

Instead of the 5,700 international trainers recommended by your

administration, your assessment team, in June of ’03, it took until

this fall, ’04, to get 500. U.S. only. Nobody else. U.S.-only trainers.

You stated, yesterday, Doctor, this is not an environment for,

quote, ‘‘beat cops.’’ It’s an insurgency—witness Mosul in November,

where the police force nearly deserted after insurgent attacks.

On September 15th, 2004, the administration claimed it had

32,000 trained police. You all are now claiming—you’ve gone from

32,000 to 53,000—up 20,000 just since September 15th.

In that hearing, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Joe

Bowab, who I think will still be there when you get there, who was

in charge of overseeing the training program from State’s end, I

asked him the following question, quote, ‘‘Do we have 32,000

trained Iraqi cops on the street?’’ Trained. Not cops on the street,

but trained Iraqi cops. Bowab said, ‘‘No, sir.’’ Quote, ‘‘No sir.’’

I won’t bother you with the rest of it. I went onto say, ‘‘My impression is, you don’t have one trained Iraqi cop—having gone

through all the training.’’ His answer to that was, ‘‘Yes, we don’t.’’

National Guard, 40,063 in the latest report. Training consists of

three weeks by the individual and three to four weeks collective

training. Training is not standardized. There have not been good

results. They report high absenteeism. Large casualties from insurgents has led to a climate of intimidation. Reports of infiltration by

insurgents—they think infiltration of the U.S. base in the Mosul

attack.

Allawi himself dismissed the national guard before the interim

assembly, saying it was a concept not understood by Arab societies.

So, who’s equipped, trained, led and experienced to fight the insurgency? As General Petraeus said—and he’s a first-rate guy,

please listen to him—we have to change the—quote, ‘‘the operational concept. This is an insurgency, not regular police work.’’

That’s Petraeus. Police commandos, led by General Adnam—I

think, A-d-n-a-m, a former Iraqi general with whom I met last time

around—Petraeus introduced us to him in December. He will eventually have about 1,000—he probably has about 600 now; that’s an

educated guess—able to operate independently in collecting their

own intelligence. But Petraeus has figured out: don’t send the cops

back to their home town. Send the cops you finally do train to another town. Focus on—what we’ve been arguing you should do for

two years—focus on training, essentially, SWAT teams, people to

rely on, heavy training, heavily armed, to send them in. So we’re

finally doing that, Petraeus is doing that. But, just to put it in perspective, there’s about 600 of those folks now. And this General

Adnam is a pretty tough guy. I’m convinced he knows what he’s

doing, and Petraeus does, too.

Intervention force—latest reports, 9,159—all of them don’t have

the experience to stand up to the insurgency.

Special operation forces—latest report, 674—some element to the

army—the latest report puts the number at 4,159—are trained.

That’s where I got the number, roughly 4,000. That’s what we’re

saying.

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The latest report puts the number at 4,159, though the mission

is supposed to be national defense, not fighting internal battles

against fellow Iraqis. These same outfits refused to fight in

Fallujah in April.

This is my staff’s assessment, and I agree with it.

At the high end, assuming every one of these forces is battleready, that would give you about 14,000 forces. But, in reality, it’s

probably no more than a third who are actually battle-ready. Most

are rookies and will not have time to gain the experience, the skills

that are needed, unless they’re embedded, like our reporters are,

in U.S. forces.

And the delays in the NATO staff colleagues helping? That

hasn’t helped at all, either.

Now, Peter Khalil, the former Director of National Security in

the CPA—this is the guy who was in charge of training—in the

New York Times, December 20, said, ‘‘The answer lies with specially trained Iraqi internal security forces, separate from the

standard military, including mobile counterterrorism units, light

infantry police battalions and SWAT teams. There are now only a

handful of battalions with such training.’’ Continue to quote, ‘‘Unfortunately, the coalition was late off the mark in building up these

units, and the training is long—a minimum of 16 weeks for each

man, as compared to the two weeks of boot camp given to a typical

guardsman.’’ Quote—continued quote, ‘‘Training these specialized

troops will take time; the United States should be prepared to

shoulder the main burden of Iraq security for the next six to 12

months.’’

Now, Khalil also did a piece in the New York Times. He’s now

a visiting fellow of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy. And

he says, and I’ll end this, ‘‘150,000 Iraqis who have so far joined

the state security services can do little to stand in their way; in

fact, even if their ranks increased to 500,000 through rushed training, they would still be largely ineffective. However a force of

25,000 or so highly trained Iraqi internal security troops, operating

at the sharp end of the spear, with the remaining bulk Iraqi forces

in a supporting role, might be able to do the job. That’s because

counterinsurgency is not about numbers; the quality of the security

forces, not their quality is the key.’’

Every single person I have spoken to—on the ground in Iraq, in

my four trips, three since Saddam is down, every tough marine,

every single military guy I’ve spoken to, says that. Been saying it

for two years. And yet you guys—I’m not asking people to say,

‘‘Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa, we made a mistake.’’

Forget that. You all don’t do anything except parrot, ‘‘We’ve trained

120,000 forces.’’

So I go home, and people ask me the same thing they ask the

Senator from Illinois, ‘‘Why are we still there—120,000 trained

Iraqis—why are we still there?’’

So do me a favor—as my mother would say, ‘‘God love you,

please do me favor‘‘—start to tell the whole deal. Let me cite a new

definition of ‘‘trained.’’ If you’re able to take the place of U.S.

Forces. Let’s call it that.

And I’d like you to think about and, in private, tell us later—

after you’re Secretary, and I’m about to vote for you in about five

195

minutes—tell us how many of those folks you think—and, for God’s

sake, don’t listen to Rumsfeld; he doesn’t know what in the hell

he’s talking about with this.

Thank you very much. You want to comment? I welcome it.

Dr. RICE. I only want to say, Senator, that we talked, yesterday,

about the fact that the 120 is ‘‘those trained.’’ I said, there are

problems with leadership, there are problems with desertion, there

are problems with some absenteeism, as well. And I also said, in

response to Senator Obama, that the real test is, do they fight

when they’re put in the field? In some places they’ve fought well,

in other places they’ve not fought well.

Senator BIDEN. What’s your overall assessment?

Dr. RICE. I think that we have had problems with the training.

I’d be the first to say that. That’s why General Petraeus says what

he says. And we’re working to address those problems. And that’s

one reason that General Luck is out there, is to get an assessment

of what we need to do.

Part of it is that the circumstances do keep changing. We

thought we were training ‘‘beat cops.’’ We were training cops who

were going to have to face insurgents.

Senator BIDEN. In truth, they haven’t changed, in 19 months.

Dr. RICE. Well, that piece of it has changed. Because the cops

were taking a real beating. But, at any case, we are absolutely

clear that that key for the administration, the key for America, is

to get Iraqi forces trained. We understand that. We are working on

it.

Senator BIDEN. That translates, then, that we have to keep

American forces in large numbers there for at least six months to

a year, right?

Dr. RICE. Well Senator, we can—let’s have this discussion later.

I will say that I don’t know if the standard is——

Senator BIDEN. Believe me, I’d rather have it after I was confirmed.

Dr. RICE. I don’t—no, no. I don’t know if the standard is that

they have to be able to, one for one, replace American soldiers.

There are some things that they will do better than American soldiers because they know the neighborhood. There are many things

that they will not do as well. And so I think I would not accept as

a standard a one-for-one exchange of an Iraqi for an American soldier. That’s my only point.

Senator BIDEN. What is your standard? You tell me your standard.

Dr. RICE. My standard is that they are able and capable of carrying out the tasks that are required to deal with the insurgency,

and to begin to root out the insurgency, and to work in a

counterinsurgency way. Frankly, they may not do it the way an

American soldier would do it.

Senator BIDEN. As long as they do it, so we can come home.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Dr. Rice, as you can tell, we are, as a committee, concerned about

the training; likewise, we are concerned about the economic issues

that were raised yesterday as a part of foreign policy; we are concerned about the budget; we are concerned about support for your

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Department. We want to ensure that you have the resources that

are required.

We appreciate, very much, the quality of your answers. We appreciate the quality of the questions that were raised. This has

been a comprehensive view of American foreign policy at times of

stress. We congratulate you on the hearing.

I look forward to supporting you. For the moment, I will recess

the hearing, and then, in a few moments, we will commence a business meeting of the committee.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Dr. Rice.

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Thank you, Members of the committee.

[Whereupon, at 10:44 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

(197)

THE NOMINATION OF DR. CONDOLEEZZA

RICE TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

Business Meeting

Wednesday, January 19, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:46 a.m. in Room

423 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar [chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Coleman, Biden, Sarbanes, Feingold, Kerry, Boxer, Nelson, Obama, Dodd, Alexander,

Sununu, Murkowski, and Allen.

The CHAIRMAN. Members of the committee, I call the business

meeting to order. The question before the committee is on the nomination of Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State of the United

States of America. Is there a debate, or discussion, at this point?

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, first let me thank you from the

bottom of my heart for your fairness in these hearings. I know it’s

difficult, and these are difficult times, difficult matters. I think you

show patience and you show a spirit of bipartisanship that I think

is a model for the rest of us tonight.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator BOXER. I just want you to know I feel that way. In my

mind there is no doubt that Dr. Rice has the resume and the intelligence, and the experience to be Secretary of State. And after nine

hours of grueling questions and answers she certainly proves she

has endurance for the job.

But I’m very troubled because, although this committee on both

sides gave Dr. Rice the opportunity to speak candidly and set the

record straight, there were a number of areas where she just didn’t

do that. She was given a chance to set the record straight on the

nuclear threat which was hyped to the American people and got

this country into a war. She failed to admit that she had made any

mistake in over stating Saddam’s nuclear capabilities even though

as I put into the record at least four agencies had told her otherwise.

She was given the chance to set the record straight on terrorism

and the effect of the Iraqi war on terror. She actually stated that

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Qaeda has expanded from operating in 45 countries in 2001 to 60

countries today. And I think Senator Feingold pressed her on that

in terms of al-Qaeda’s president—presence in Africa.

I pointed out to her a State Department document showing no

al-Qaeda in Iraq before 9-11. She didn’t even address that. And

that was a report that was signed by the President of the United

States. She was on another subject given a chance to set the record

straight on our inconsistent policy towards Central America. Senator Chafee pressed her on that, I pressed her on that, Senator

Dodd pressed her on that. And she showed a rigidity in her answer

which I found troubling. She was given the chance to set the record

straight on what Iran can do—this was an answer to Senator

Biden—to avoid a dangerous clash with the United States of America. And she demurred when given this amazing opportunity she

had to speak directly to the Iranian leadership.

She was given the opportunity to set the record straight on the

number of really trained Iraqi security forces and our exit strategy

in Iraq. Every American wants us, yes, Senator Alexander, to succeed and leave. And yet she would not really even say that this

was a troubling issue, when pressed by Senator’s Biden, Kerry, and

Obama. She was given the chance to address the issue of America’s

past relationship in supporting Saddam Hussein when he was gassing the Iranians. She didn’t even pick up that challenge, or discuss that in anyway to set the record straight.

And I have to say most troubling to me, she was given the opportunity to set the record straight on her feelings about torture and

the United State’s policy on torture. And here I have to say I have

grave concerns. Because she said to us today that she never objected to the language in the intelligence bill written by Senators

Lieberman and McCain when I have right here her very words that

the administration opposes that section which provides legal protections of foreign prisoners. And I ask unanimous consent to place

this into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record.

Senator BOXER. So a lack of candor in the past is bad enough.

And here we have a continuing assault on reality. This is not right.

The fact is she said, well, we objected to other sections, not the section that guaranteed that no prisoner shall be subject to torture or

cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment that’s prohibited by the Constitution, and yet that’s the very section she cites

in her letter, Mr. Chairman. So her lack of candor on that issue

alone is very troubling to me.

Now I know there are areas of common ground. I think that Senator Murkowski raised some of those because—I’m so happy she’s

on this committee because we can really work together on issues

affecting women and children and families, and I’m thrilled that

she’s here. And Dr. Rice is very accepting of the fact that this will

be important to her. I’m very glad about that. And I’m glad she

mentioned the Syria Accountability Act which I authored along

with Rick Santorum, which is now the law of the land. But that

aside, these other areas are terribly troubling.

And I’ll conclude in this way. This is a terrific committee. I’m so

proud to be on it. I think members on both sides are very candid

and forthcoming. And I didn’t see that replicated by Dr. Rice and

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we gave her every opportunity on both sides to do that. I look at

her opening statement, as I said yesterday, and wait to page three,

the bottom of page three, a thousand words into it to mention Iraq

and a passing reference to the Tsunami.

I just if—I think if someone was kind of beamed down and knew

about what was troubling Americans and they read that, I agree

with Senator Biden, it was sort of ‘‘don’t worry, be happy’’ until

this committee got into the hard issues of the day. So I continue

to stand in awe of our founding fathers. I wish there were founding

mothers at that time. Give credit where credit is due. That anyone

at a high level like this is in fact responsible to the American people.

And I hope if nothing else Dr. Rice now gets the difference between her role as the National Security Advisor where she wasn’t

in any way responsible to come before Congress, but went to the

American people and sold a war, and continued to repeat things

that were not so. And her role now where she is responsible to the

American people as well as to the President, and to the American

people through us. And so I just hope we have better times ahead

and I will not be able to support this nomination even though I

know I’m in a—a quite a minority. Thank you.

Senator ALLEN. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. If I may Mr. Chairman. Thank you and Senator

Biden for your outstanding leadership of this committee. I’ve listened to the Senator from California’s comments and questions. In

fact when talking about Dr. Rice’s opening statement, I thought it

was a very powerful opening statement. And while we can quibble

as to which page and when into the speech one gets into talking

about Iraq, I think this is how we need to look at Dr. Rice and the

totality of her character, her experience, her knowledge, and capabilities to be our next Secretary of State. One, in reading her statement, she first talked about her own background. All of us are a

composition of our life experiences. The fact that she grew up in

the segregated south, persevered, is part of what I think will help

her be an effective Secretary of State as we’re trying to advance

freedom around the world.

She then got into the details, but the key point in her testimony

and all the questions was, we want to advance freedom. And I

think that should be a bipartisan goal and aspiration. And

throughout it all, Dr. Rice showed a basic, fundamental belief in

trusting free people, trying to advance freedom, put in the institutions of freedom so that there is not corruption in government, how

there’s religious freedom, how there’s freedom of expression, many

times talking about the rule of law. She faced some tough questions

on some tough challenges facing our country presently and in the

future. And there was some bump and run defenses and tactics

used against her but she never really got off stride. She kept her

poise through these many, many hours of questioning and I think

when you look at the totality of her—of her record, her experience,

her principles I respectfully ask my colleagues to confirm President

Bush’s choice to be his Secretary of State.

I think she will do our country proud. She has shown a great

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mittee has asked, and every Senator’s had more than adequate

chance to ask questions.

But through it all Dr. Rice has never gone off stride. She’s the

embodiment of the modern day American dream for all people who

have an equal opportunity to compete and succeed regardless of

their gender, their race, or their religion. That is the meritocracy

we have in this country. And she understands that as does this

President. As other countries, the people in other countries of the

world have such opportunities not only will they have greater opportunity and hope, but we also will be more secure. And I think

Dr. Rice will be an outstanding Secretary of State for advancing

those principles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Allen.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you very much

for your stewardship of these hearings. They have been what my

colleagues have—have called them. I think you’ve been fair and patient and generous and I appreciate it and I think everybody on the

committee appreciates it. And I want to thank you for staying extra

time last night and I thank Dr. Rice for hanging in there. The Senator from Virginia talks about sort of the standard here by which

we should make this judgment.

There isn’t anybody in the United States of America who doesn’t

admire Dr. Rice for the journey she’s made, for what she represents. And is she qualified for the job? Absolutely. Of course she

is, absolutely qualified. The President has a right to make a choice.

But our votes also have to count for something, and it seems to me

if you think about this hearing and what we’ve heard over the

course of the last hours, a majority of this committee, bipartisanly,

has expressed unbelievably serious reservations about policies in

one part of the world or another. Serious reservations about North

Korea, about Iraq, about Iran, about proliferation, about Haiti,

about Latin America. And particularly the absence even of policy

in some of those places.

So in my judgment it’s not a question of ratifying a life story as

much as it is a judgment that we make about the direction of our

nation, the security of our country, and the choices that have been

made. The judgments that have been made over the last years. I

choose to vote my concerns, not to overlook them. I choose to vote

my gut, not custom. I know what custom says. But the fact is that

Dr. Rice is one of the principle architects, implementors, and defenders of a series of administration policies and choices that in my

judgment have not made our country as secure as we ought to be

in the aftermath of 9-11. And that have alienated much of the

world and certainly much needed allies in our effort to reduce the

cost in lives and dollars to the American people.

I also believe there’s been a collateral cost of other initiatives

that we might have been able to undertake that would also have

advanced the cause of freedom as well as the security of our nation.

I came to this hearing genuinely open minded to see what I would

hear. And I regret to say that while we heard words sort of offering—so the convention of this city and of current politics. I didn’t

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mental bipartisan change. For a policy that shows a direction that

can build the kind of consensus that our nation needs and that the

world needs.

Nor even a new vision for America’s foreign policy that can make

us stronger and help us win the war on terror. On Iraq, on North

Korea, and on Iran to name just a few what I heard was really a

policy that predicts more of the same. Senator Biden is right about

those numbers and the refusal to even acknowledge that to the

American people is quite stunning at this point in time. You can’t

deal with that kind of reality, you can’t really tell the American

people what the choices and options really are.

I hope I’m proven wrong. And I hope the course will change. And

I hope the administration will recognize the strength of a foreign

policy that has bipartisan support. And I’m prepared as I said last

night to work with Dr. Rice and all the colleagues on this committee to find the kind of bipartisanship that has always made

America stronger. Historically politics stopped at the water’s edge,

it ought to. We haven’t seen that kind of strength in these last

years.

So I will work, I’ll work with the administration, I’ll reach out

and I’m confident that colleagues on both sides of the aisle will do

the same. But while I recognized at the beginning of this hearing

that Condoleeza Rice will be confirmed overwhelmingly by the

United States Senate it will have to be without my vote for the reasons that I’ve stated. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry. Let me just make a

personal comment. Part of Dr. Rice’s responsibilities, as we all recognize, is to be a strong administrator of the Department of State.

She has spent quality time to try to make certain that confidence

could be built in the Department. Secretary Powell was certainly

remarkable in the leadership that he gave in that respect. I mention that part of the issue because it’s one that we all have to be

cognizant of on this committee.

We talked about the support that she will need, the budgetary

support, the things that need to happen in our embassies abroad,

in our consulates, the security of our people. We touched upon

these issues which are not really differences of policy but really

ones of emphasis. This committee should be an advocate for a

strong budget. We have talked about the need for a strong authorization, the refashioning of various institutions that sometimes

don’t get looked at.

I see in Dr. Rice someone who is fully capable of making changes

as required, of working and listening carefully to those who are

part of that Department and in our embassies. I admire that. I appreciate the points made by members on both sides of the aisle

with regard to the debate that we have had for many years on

American foreign policy. Certainly that has been found in this committee in abundance. We have a responsibility to try to bring forward a bipartisan support so there is one face for America. I think

that the committee has discharged that very well through the

chairmanship of my friend Joe Biden and hopefully during the past

two years.

I think that this hearing was designed for not only a ventilation

of all of our views but also a public opportunity for Dr. Rice and

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for the American people to understand the gravity of our concerns.

We have underlined many concerns.

There were, in fact, instances during our hearing in which Dr.

Rice recognized that we have work to do. There will be more conversations, more hearings. There will need to be. At the end of the

day, she does have very strong confidence in the President of the

United States, and it’s a unique relationship. I’m not certain that

I saw the very beginning of it, but I think I saw a part of that in

visits to Stanford University to see my friend and our former Secretary of State George Schultz at a time when Dr. Rice was serving

as provost of the university. For a variety of reasons, George

Schultz came to the conclusion that, at least on the Republican

party side, that George Bush was the best bet. As a result he gave

very strong support to the candidacy of the Governor of Texas.

Perhaps through his intercession, Dr. Rice became an advisor,

and was even sometimes suggested as a tutor, as a mentor to Governor Bush during the primary campaigns and the election. That

trust has been built over many years. She does have the ear of the

President.

Many of you have raised questions as to how candid she will be

with the President. She affirmed today that she tells the President

what’s on her mind. Sometimes he agrees and sometimes he disagrees. Each one of us, less frequently, has had that opportunity.

Most of us have availed ourselves of that opportunity in very candid ways, advising to the best of our ability our President about

what we believe is the thing to do.

I see in Dr. Rice, in the conversations that I’ve enjoyed with her,

sometimes with Senator Biden, sometimes with other members of

the committee, a degree of openness to listen. She possess a loyalty

to the President, so there is not immediate acquiescence or commitment. But at least there is an opportunity to move the policy along.

I saw in her discussion today of the nation building issue, now

called reconstruction or whatever, a very large change. President

Bush in his first few speeches on foreign policy five years ago indicated that we were not involved in nation building, and that was

the generally held view of many people, on both sides of the aisle.

When Chairman Biden held hearings before the war on Iraq, we

heard from many witnesses. We asked how long will we be there.

The witnesses said, some in the Bush administration, some in previous administrations, that the mission would not be very long because it would be embraced by the Iraqi people. They’ll proceed on

to democracy and we’ll be out of there.

Our role is not one of building, and hand holding and so forth.

We’ve had a 180 change in this world. We all understand, having

seen Afghanistan and elsewhere, how profound that change has

been. Dr. Rice did acknowledge that we are enthusiastically trying

to build something. We’re going to have to make sure it has the

right personnel cadre for whatever the contingency may be.

I look forward to supporting her nomination both today and

when we will have a vote of the full Senate. Even more importantly

I look forward to working with her, and to expressing to her as candidly as we did today things that we think are important, and try

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ently as possible. Let us just conclude by saying that I’m hopeful

that members will give her strong support with their votes today,

but, even if not, then at least with their support and their good advice in months to come.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me—because I presume others may want to if not make public statements

here today want to have some remarks included in the record. So

I’d ask unanimous consent that any and all members be allowed

to express their views. I’d ask unanimous consent that some comments I have be included in the record. I’ll leave it there.

Let me—first of all let me begin by saying if I had my druthers

this morning the chair to my right would be vacant and that I

would have listened to someone appear before this committee at

some date seeking the job of Secretary of State. Is that mic—is that

mic on? And possibly even the chair to my left might have been vacant as well under some circumstances. I began my membership on

this committee 24 years ago. I’m watching this new freshman from

Illinois, and by the way you handled yourself brilliantly, I thought,

during the last day and a half, and I’m very proud to have you as

a member of the committee along with Senator Martinez and Senator Murkowski. When I sat in that chair, Al Haig was the nominee under the Reagan administration. Senator Sarbanes, Senator

Biden, Senator—the chairman of the committee were present at

that time. And so I’ve been through a number of these hearings

over the last 24 years. I think I’ve counted I think seven Secretaries of State over that period of 24 years that have been before

this committee.

I always begin with the presumption that elected Presidents

ought to have their official families, their cabinets. To begin with

that presumption—I don’t do the same with judicial nominations,

but I certainly do when it comes to having the people around you

who are going to express and carry out the policies as you’ve described them and as they’ve articulated them. And I do that here

in this case as well.

And I intend, on that basis, to vote for this nominee. Having said

that, I want to thank Senator Boxer and Senator Kerry. Others

may take the same view they have of this nomination, but I think

the Chairman has said it well and the ranking member has said

it well. This is a very important service we provide to the American

public through a confirmation hearing. However the votes are cast

those who have watched the hearings and as they’ve been reported

it’s one of the unique opportunities we get to really examine as we

thoroughly would like a broad array of issues that affect the interests of this nation. And whatever you may feel about the votes we

cast here I think the Senators who have raised the criticisms and

the expressions made by my colleagues from California and Massachusetts have provided an invaluable service. Because they’ve

raised serious questions about past policies of this administration

and where they will take this nation over the next four years.

I was deeply troubled by the unwillingness of Dr. Rice, just very

candidly and simply to answer the question about torture. It’s troubling to me because as others have said, it’s not just the President

of the United States, it’s the face of American foreign policy, but

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the Secretary of State as well. In simple statements that they

make they can say so much about who we are as a people. What

direction we want to go in as a nation as we begin this 21st century.

Troubled as well about a lack of interest that I suspect that exists when it comes to Latin America. And again I thank my colleague from Florida, my Senate colleague from Rhode Island, for

spending the last week, more than a week traveling in the region

to try and understand better the needs of this part of the world and

how we can, in a cooperative way, look for new ways to establish

new relationships that will advance the interests of our own Nation.

So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your patience as Senator

Kerry and Senator Boxer have pointed out. You’ve conducted a

wonderful hearing. It’s been a pleasure to serve with you over

these last 24 years in this committee. And I hope that Dr. Rice,

that she listened carefully to what Senator Boxer was saying and

Senator Kerry and Senator Biden, Senator Obama, members on

this side. We need to get back to building this bipartisanship in foreign policy. It is critical. The problems we face are international in

scope; they require cooperation. We’ve done it in the 20th century,

we need to do it in the 21st century. And so I’m going to take the

side of supporting this nominee with all the reservations that have

been expressed. Because I want to begin with a sense of optimism

that maybe we can go in a bit of a different direction on these

pressing issues before us. And I look forward to working with her.

I hope she does reach out to the minority, work with the majority

and this committee to try to help forge a more constructive and

thoughtful foreign policy for the 21st century.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. All right, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, thank you,

and I thank Dr. Rice in abstenia for being willing to be here as

long as it would take. I don’t second guess the motives of any Senator and how they vote. I respect the Senators from California and

Massachusetts and I could easily see how I could go that way.

But I want to make one clerical point. We did have extensive

hearings prior to going to war in that brief period when I was

chairman, then you followed through with even better hearings on

whether or not to go to war. And it is true that former administration witnesses came forward, from Weinberger on, saying that this

would be a slam dunk—didn’t use the words slam dunk but that

we’d be greeted with open arms, that if would be fairly quick. We

didn’t have to worry about nation building. Then you raised, extensively, questions about duration. But the vast majority of the witnesses we had said this was going to take years upon years. That’s

why the title of the article that was issued after our series of hearings when I was Chairman was not ‘‘The Day After’’ but ‘‘The Decade After.’’

‘‘The Decade After.’’ You and I and Senator Hagel and others on

this side talked about how this was going to be a gigantic commitment, and that we should get ready for it. Which leads me to this

point. I think we’re going to rue the day when the administration

acknowledges that they failed to level with the American people

about what was required of the American people in order to make

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this policy work. I know I’ve said it a thousand times, and I’m

going to say it a thousand more times, no foreign policy can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. And

that means the whole deal.

I thought Senator Boxer was really articulate in making the

point about half truths. I am a practicing Catholic which I guess

as a Democrat is getting harder to be. But I’m a practicing Catholic. I went through Catholic grade school and I remember when we

were learning to receive the sacrament of penance where we Catholics go in confession, as some of my non-Catholic friends know, and

confess our sins. Which I still do because I still have many to confess.

And I’ll never forget the pastor in Saint Helen’s where I was a

student taught by the Sisters of Saint Joseph. He tried to explain

to a grade school kid that when you go to confession you have got

to tell the whole truth. And he gave the following example: Johnny

went to confession and said, ‘‘Bless me, Father, for I have sinned,

this is my first confession. And I want to tell you the sins I’ve committed’’. Johnny proceeded to say, ‘‘I did something very bad, I stole

something.’’ And Father said, ‘‘what did you steal, Johnny?’’ Johnny

said, ‘‘I stole a gold chain.’’ Father said, ‘‘Well, Johnny, are you

sorry for that?’’ And Johnny said, ‘‘I am heartily sorry Father. I’m

heartily sorry for it, but I lost the chain and I can’t give it back.’’

So the priest admonished him and then said, ‘‘Say three Our Father’s and three Hail Mary’s and be a good boy.’’ And Johnny left.

And then father learned that there was a gold watch attached to

that chain. Johnny told the truth, he stole a chain. But there was

a gold watch on the end of the chain. Johnny didn’t tell Father that

part. And he still had the watch. So Father went on to say, ‘‘When

you go to confession tell the whole deal. I not only stole a chain.

There was a gold watch hooked to the chain.’’

This administration, first of all, doesn’t go to confession, nor

should it have to. But it hasn’t told the whole story about what we

face. And I hope I’m wrong. I’ve been here 32 years. I go back a

long way with Secretaries of State. Kissinger was National Security

Advisor when I got here. Wasn’t even Secretary of State yet.

And I am very concerned that the American people—when the

going gets even rougher, which it well—may say, ‘‘Hey guys you

don’t know what you’re talking about. We want to get out of there.’’

And I’ll make you all a bet, I doubt whether anybody would disagree with me.

We leave before the job is done and we will have a generational

problem. A generational problem in the Middle East. It will be

chaos. The likelihood of the Saudi Kingdom remaining is, I think,

is problematic. The Jordanians would be under incredible stress,

the Turks and the Kurds may very well go to war over time. It will

be a disaster. I hope I’m wrong. Hope everybody gets to say, Biden,

you said if we lose this for the American people, leave prematurely,

that these awful things are going to happen and they didn’t happen. I hope I’m wrong.

You’re all politicians, you all know what your folks are saying at

home. How many of your folks are saying at home what you know

is the truth? We’ve got to send more forces. How many folks at

home say, ‘‘Let’s really stay the course here?’’

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Some are, but they are doing it, I think, because they believe the

President’s told them the whole deal: ‘‘We got 120,000 trained

troops, we don’t really need to have any more significant expenditure there. We, in fact, don’t even have to include Iraq in the budget—it’s going to take care of itself. And by the way, things are getting better from June through December. Everything is fine in

Iraq, it’s getting better.’’ The American people, because they like

him, as I like him, believe the President levels with us. ‘‘Man,

what’s the matter with you, Joe? You go over there to Iraq and you

come back and say, ‘Geez it’s not that good.’ President says it’s

fine.’’

And with regard to advancing freedom, if my colleagues can forgive me, although the future Secretary of State likes football so she

won’t mind the analogy. Senator Allen’s father is one of the greatest pro football coaches in my lifetime, so I suspect he knows a lot

more about it than I do. If I can continue the football analogy, he

said, ‘‘We want to advance freedom.’’ Well, we want to score when

we’re on the team.

But if the offense you’re running isn’t working, you’ve only

gained a total of 74 yards in the first three quarters, and there’s

been four interceptions. And the defense is riddled with holes because you’re running nickel defense, and it’s not working against

this quarterback. What you want to ask at halftime is, ‘‘Hey, it

ain’t working, we’re losing. What’s the plan Stan, what’s the game

plan? Are you going out of that nickel defense, are you going to

stop trying to run the ball up the middle? Are you going to move

on the outside and run counter plays? What’s the deal, what are

you going to do? How are you going to score?’’

So everybody here wants to advance freedom. But a lot of us

think of advancing freedom by wishing that if we just make it

available to you and you see it you will rise up and embrace it. I

don’t think it works that way.

So what we need is a coach George Allen. We need a game plan.

And all we’re looking for here, to continue this silly analogy, is for

a game plan on training. Just tell me the plan, what is the game

plan? What you have now, everybody acknowledges, is not working.

What’s the game plan on Iraq?

You want us to support you, Mr. President, and I want to support you. We want to have a bipartisan foreign policy. As my

friends can tell you, I often get beat up on in our caucus because

I’m not more critical of the President. I want to help. But we also

need a game plan for Iran and Russia. And how are we going to

do it? Everyone, including Dr. Rice, says it needs to be done.

What Dr. Rice is saying, by implication and directly, is that we

have to repair our relations around the world. Diplomacy will be

the watch word. Did any of you hear a plan on diplomacy? I’ve submitted to the President and other have, I think, about a 15–16

page game plan on public diplomacy that he seemed to like a lot.

Other people submitted other plans. The President says, ‘‘No,

what’s the plan? What are we going to do?’’ I didn’t hear a thing

other than the ortatory assertions that we want to do this. But I

don’t want to dwell on my disappointments as a result of Dr. Rice’s

testimony.

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I must tell you, though, that the thing that stunned me most is

either her lack of willingness to talk about it or her lack of understanding of the impact of the economy on foreign policy. I was literally stunned, when asked the question, ‘‘Do you want the dollar

to be the reserve currency for the rest of the world or the Euro?’’

And then she said she didn’t have an opinion on that. I’m paraphrasing. Whoa, that’s the Secretary of Treasury’s job.

I’ll conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying optimism is an occupational requirement in this business. And my job is the same as

every other Senator here, no more, but its slightly different. My job

as the Democratic Ranking Member on this committee is to, hopefully, continue to have a relationship with whoever the Secretary

of State is. And it gets harder when you vote no. I like her, I’ve

been disappointed, but I think of the obligation I have. And every

other Senator can judge it for themselves. For me, my particular

role is to be able to work with her where we can. Because I do

think she has the President’s ear.

And I hope she’s willing to take on some of the neoconservative

notions in this administration. And maybe this is the wish is the

father of the thought, maybe she is a neoconservative and I don’t

know. But if she’s not, I hope she confronts some of the premises

upon which this is based. And that’s the reason I asked her yesterday, Mr. Chairman about the stories in the New Yorker by Seymour Hersh, who is a pretty solid guy. Saying that we already

have teams in there trying to figure out how to take down the nuclear act. Coincidentally, I had George Tenet in Delaware for four

hours, rode up in the train with him. He made the obvious point

without declaring anything that I didn’t already know or you don’t

already know. The Iranians have gotten smart. It’s diverse, it’s all

over the country. There ain’t no one rocket shot that we can take

out like the Israelis did before. That does not exist as a possibility.

The reason I asked her the question was not about her confirming

whether they’re in there or not. I wanted to ask her the underlying

point.

The premise the neocons have, if this is being done, some of our

neoconservative friends, is not that you’ll destroy all the nuclear

capacity but that that will cause the freedom loving people of Iran

to rise up and throw out the clerical oppression. That’s the basic

fundamental premise. And I hope to God she doesn’t believe that.

And I hope to God that if she doesn’t believe it, that she’ll be the

one, if anyone presents such a plan to the President, who says,

‘‘Whoa, whoa, wait a minute. Let’s get real here.’’ That’s the reason

I asked the question.

You know, Mr. Chairman, we who do foreign policy everyday, we

have a whole different vocabulary, we talk in terms and phrases

that make what we do sound really important. We talked about the

first tranche agreement and the second tranche and we talk about

having bilat with so and so. We better start to speak simple

English. All foreign policy is a logical extension of human relationships with a whole hell of a lot less information to go on. So we’ve

got to start talking to the American people that way. And the

President is extremely good at that if he chooses to do it.

Now I’ll end, Mr. Chairman, with this point. I thought that Senator Kerry was eloquent when he said how he chooses to view this

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question. And it reminded me—I hope I’m quoting it correctly because I try to quote everybody correctly—of a quote from Samuel

Johnson, who was talking about second marriages. And Samuel

Johnson said, ‘‘Anyone who marries a second time is choosing the

triumph of hope over experience.’’ That’s Samuel Johnson’s comment. Well this is a second administration and I acknowledge I am

choosing the triumph of hope over experience.

Because my experience with the first four years of this administration has not been real good in terms of what I think their policies are. And my experience with Dr. Rice in this hearing has been

a disappointment. But I choose hope over experience. Because at

the end of the day the constitution says, as my friend from Connecticut says, the President gets to propose and we dispose. We all

are required, as responsible Senators on both sides of the aisle, to

choose the standard by which we’ll make that judgment. And my

standard has always been, with regard to a cabinet, the President

is entitled to his family even if they’re substantially wrong.

The only time we’ll vote against cabinet appointees is when

they’re appointed to dismantle that cabinet that they’re being appointed to. That’s why I voted against Reagan nominees for the Department of Education because Reagan said, as the former Secretary would say, he chose to eliminate the Department of Education. So I wasn’t going to be complicitous in voting for someone

who’s job it was to dismantle the Department of Education. And I

also voted against people who I thought were incompetent in their

mastery of the subject or people who’s reputation and character

was not worthy of a vote. On all that score, in no sense does Dr.

Rice fit any of those probations in my view.

So I’m going to vote for Dr. Rice. But I pray to the Lord that

she’s at least telling the President, ‘‘Hey boss, it’s not going that

well. Hey boss, we don’t have that many people trained. Hey boss,

the Iranians aren’t going to rise up if some of our special forces

guys take out a nuclear facility. Hey boss, we ought to read a little

bit of history.’’ It’s really that basic. I’m not trying to be a wise guy.

It’s that basic. So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your patience as

you would acknowledge this is, other than voting for the Supreme

Court or the third branch of the government, I think this and the

Secretary of Defense jobs are the two most important jobs we vote

on. And I look forward to working with you and Dr. Rice. She’s always been available when I’ve asked her for her view. But I was

disappointed in this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you Senator Biden. This is an important

vote, and I hope we’re prepared for the vote. And if so, I’ll ask the

clerk to call the roll.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Hagel?

Senator HAGEL. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Chafee?

Senator CHAFEE. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Allen?

Senator ALLEN. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Voinovich?

The CHAIRMAN. Votes aye by proxy.

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Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Alexander?

Senator ALEXANDER. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Sununu?

Senator SUNUNU. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Ms. Murkowski?

Senator MURKOWSKI. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Martinez?

Senator MARTINEZ. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Sarbanes?

The CHAIRMAN. Aye by proxy.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Dodd?

Senator DODD. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Kerry?

Senator KERRY. No.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Feingold?

Senator FEINGOLD. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Mrs. Boxer?

Senator BOXER. No.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Nelson?

Senator NELSON. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Obama?

Senator OBAMA. Aye.

Ms. OURSLER. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

Will the clerk please tally the count?

Ms. OURSLER. Sixteen yeas two nays.

The CHAIRMAN. Sixteen yeas; two nays. The committee votes to

report the nomination to the Senate floor. I thank all Senators.

[Whereupon at 11:31 a.m. the committee was adjourned]

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I—RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE TO DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

AIDS Vaccine

Question. A group of independent organizations under the urging of the Gates

Foundation has formed an alliance called the Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise. The

Enterprise is preparing a blueprint for action by researchers and others to improve

international collaboration. Do you believe that development of an AIDS vaccine is

a national security issue for the United States? What plans does the administration

have to support an international development program for an HIV vaccine?

Answer. This administration is dedicated to providing unprecedented global leadership and commitment in funding the global AIDS emergency. The President’s

Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief is the largest international public health initiative

ever launched by a single nation against a single disease. Beyond being a vital matter of public health, the global HIV/AIDS pandemic carries strategic implications,

posing a direct challenge to our country’s political, economic, and even security interests.

Prevention of HIV infection remains a primary strategy in the fight against the

worldwide HIV pandemic, and a safe and effective HIV vaccine would provide an

extremely important tool for this purpose. At the Sea Island Summit, the G–8 countries, under the President’s leadership, endorsed the establishment of a Global HIV

Vaccine Enterprise. The President announced that he would establish an additional

Vaccine Research and Development Center here in the United States and urged

other nations to do the same.

The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator works with several agencies in

implementation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. Research for the

development of an AIDS vaccine is primarily conducted under the auspices of the

National Institutes for Health (NIH). The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), who oversee this initiative, recently released a Request for

Applications (RFA) to establish a Center for HIV/AIDS Vaccine Immunology

(CHAVI). The Center will support intensive, coordinated, and multi-pronged approaches to address key immunological roadblocks to the discovery and development

of a safe and effective HIV vaccine as identified by the Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise at the G8 Summit. The award is expected to be awarded in late in FY06.

ITAR Waivers for the United Kingdom and Australia

Former Secretary of State Powell wrote to me shortly after I introduced legislation in 2003 regarding agreements the administration negotiated with Australia and

the United Kingdom to gain exemptions from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR, 22 CFR 120–130). Former Secretary Powell called my language ‘‘a

prudent measure of legislative relief that will allow these agreements to come into

force.’’

On October 28, 2004, President Bush signed H.R. 4200, the Ronald W. Reagan

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375). I

am very concerned with language appearing in section 1225, ‘‘Bilateral Exchanges

and Trade in Defense Articles and Defense Services Between the United States and

the United Kingdom of Australia.’’ The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 did not provide the exceptions I sought, and, in fact, enactment of

its provisions made many question the need for future efforts to obtain statutory

exceptions for the exemption agreements with the United Kingdom and Australia.

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The language of section 1225(b) of Public Law 108–375 states: ‘‘the Secretary of

State shall ensure that any license application submitted for the export of defense

articles or defense services to Australia or the United Kingdom is expeditiously

processed by the Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Defense, without referral to any other Federal department or agency, except where the

item is classified or exceptional circumstances apply.’’

Question. Does the administration, and do you, support the agreements with the

governments of Australia and the United Kingdom, as negotiated?

Answer. I welcome the Senate’s support for these agreements, which would allow

most categories of unclassified defense items to be exported to two of our closest allies without a license, advancing interoperability and defense cooperation with the

UK and Australia.

Only the British and Australian governments, and a limited number of companies

that the United States selects, would be authorized to receive U.S.-origin defense

items under the waivers.

I am aware our efforts to work with Congress on this issue are unresolved. If confirmed, I will review the situation promptly, and I look forward to working with the

committee on this important issue.

Question. Do you envision any effort on the part of the administration or yourself

to renegotiate either of these agreements, in whole or in part?

Answer. I know that our efforts to implement these agreements have been stalled,

and, if confirmed, will review the situation promptly.

These agreements are the product of years of serious negotiation with the British

and Australian governments and require them to enact new export control laws,

regulations, and practices to better protect U.S. defense technology. Those improved

measures are very much in our interest.

The British and Australian companies that would be authorized to receive certain

categories of U.S. defense items without a license would also have to make new commitments, including to their own governments, to protect U.S. defense items.

Question. With regard to section 1225, do you agree with me that this language

could harm our government’s ability to provide necessary and complete interagency

review of munitions license applications because of the inclusion of the phrase

‘‘without referral to any other Federal department or agency?’’

Answer. The State Department agrees with the general point that defense export

licenses for our British and Australian allies should be processed as quickly as possible. However, it is not clear how the goal of responsible defense export controls

was advanced by a law restricting the ability of licensing officers to seek input from

agencies other than DOD. For example, most licenses related to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) have been referred to an interagency committee

(Missile Technology Export Control committee, MTEC), which includes Commerce,

and NASA as well as DoD. In other cases we have seen fit to consult law enforcement or intelligence agencies.

We think a better approach would be to approve the ITAR waiver agreements

with these governments, which would allow certain unclassified exports to proceed

without any license under controlled conditions, and to permit licensing officers to

determine when and to which agencies cases need to be referred for input. Now,

with more sensitive defense exports meriting case-by-case approval, our licensing officers will only refer an application to an agency other than DoD if they believe it

has an interest or expertise that should be taken into as an ‘‘exception’’ to normal

practice.

Nunn-Lugar Liability Issues

From 1992 until 1999, the Nunn-Lugar program operated under the terms of the

Umbrella Agreement negotiated in 1991–92. In 1999, the 1992 agreement expired.

A re-negotiated Extension Protocol was signed by the United States and Russia in

1999, and has never been sent by Presidents Yeltsin or Putin to the Duma. President Putin and other Russian officials have at various times promised to send the

Umbrella Agreement Extension Protocol to the Duma, but this has not happened.

Question. Will you make ratification by the Duma of the Nunn-Lugar Umbrella

Agreement with the Russian Federation a priority matter, and ensure that the

United States engages at the highest levels necessary to break this logjam?

Absent Duma approval, and should the Extension Protocol expire under provisional application, do you see any other means with which to remedy the liability

problem with our Russian non-proliferation assistance programs?

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Are the problems of liability peculiar only to nuclear non-proliferation assistance

programs in Russia, or are they emerging in other nonproliferation programs such

as chemical weapons destruction or biological weapons redirection efforts?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to make Duma approval and Russian ratification of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement (as extended

in 1999) a key priority and will seek to ensure the United States engages with Russia at the highest levels necessary to achieve this. Ratification would put ongoing

CTR programs on a solid footing. It is our understanding, however, that CTR ratification will not resolve liability for any expanded or new nonproliferation assistance

programs with Russia. We will want to resolve both ratification and these other

matters in 2005, well before CTR comes up for extension again in 2006. The administration is actively reviewing ways of breaking the liability logjam with Russia—

while protecting CTR programs—to remove this impediment to plutonium disposition and other cooperation. If confirmed, I will make every effort to resolve these

issues as soon as possible. On the other hand, ongoing CTR programs can continue

absent Russian ratification of the CTR agreement, as they have since 1992 with no

Duma approval or ratification. Those programs could also continue without Duma

approval or ratification after the 2006 expiration date of the CTR agreement, if both

sides agree again to extend that agreement provisionally in 2006.

Ongoing efforts under the CTR umbrella agreement or the International Science

and Technology Centers Agreement (such as chemical weapons destruction and biological weapons redirection) have not been blocked by differences over the liability

issue. But the liability issue has hindered progress on important projects outside

CTR, most notably U.S. and G-8 efforts to convert excess Russian weapon-grade plutonium into forms not useable for weapons under the plutonium disposition program.

Congressional Conditions on Nunn-Lugar Assistance

Question. What is the national security benefit of maintaining the CTR certification and waiver process in light of the fact that for every time Russia (or in some

cases other states) have not met the conditions, the administration has waived the

conditions in the interests of US national security?

Answer. I share concerns about the certification requirements for assistance to

Russia (or other states) under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs of the USG.

The fact that each year since 2002, Russia has benefited from waiver authority

when certification could not be made demonstrates the over-riding importance to

U.S. national security interests worldwide of the aid provided under CTR.

Since there is every reason to believe that CTR assistance will continue to be of

vital importance to the U.S. national interest as long as it is needed, if confirmed,

I look forward to working with Congress on this issue.

Congressional Conditions on Nunn-Lugar Assistance: Chemical Weapons Destruction

Facility at Shchuchye, Russia

Question. Section 1308 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2002 (Public Law 107–107) created six requirements for certification before construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) at Shchuchye, Russia, could continue. Four of the six requirements have now been met, but Russia

still has not provided information ‘‘regarding the size of the chemical weapons stockpile of Russia.’’ More than three years after their enactment, do you believe the requirements of section 1308 of Public Law 107–107 have furthered US objectives

with respect to securing and destroying chemical weapons at Shchuchye or with regard to Russian transparency under the Chemical Weapons Convention?

Answer. The destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons at Shchuchye, in accordance with the verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),

furthers the key U.S. national security objective of keeping weapons of mass destruction and related technologies out of the hands of terrorists or rogue states.

However, the United States maintains longstanding concerns regarding the completeness and accuracy of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile declaration. Despite

Russia’s insistence that they do not possess any undeclared chemical weapons

stocks, the United States continues to pressure Russia for clarification of our concerns, and an acceptable approach that will increase our confidence in this area as

part of our regular expert level consultations. Experts and Senior administration officials have pressed Russian officials for documentation into past activities, as well

as short-notice visits to undeclared suspect Russian chemical weapons sites. Russian

officials have told us that past documentation in this area no longer exists and that

visits to undeclared suspect CW sites are not acceptable. However, the United

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States remains ready to review Russian proposals in attempt to resolve our concerns.

The existence of the conditions in Section 1308 provides some additional leverage

on our continuing efforts to address our compliance concerns with Russia. The construction and use of a CWDF at Shchuchye is essential for the timely and irreversible destruction of Russia’s nerve agent

Despite slow progress and longstanding concerns regarding the completeness and

accuracy of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile declaration, the United States will

continue to pursue resolution of these concerns with Russia.

Senior administration officials meet regularly with Russian counterparts and

stress the importance of resolving these concerns in a timely manner, as well as remind counterparts that funding hinges on tangible progress.

The United States intends to continue to address this matter through a combination of gathering corroborating information, identifying an acceptable approach, encouraging Russian cooperation and transparency, and continuing bilateral expert

consultations.

Budget: Strengthen Capacity

Question. One of your most important tasks as Secretary of State will be to design

and fight for a budget that reflects the challenges and difficulties that our foreign

policy faces as we fight the war against terror. What are your plans to strengthen

our civilian capacity in the same way we are strengthening our military capacity?

Answer. Winning the war on terror remains our top foreign policy priority. With

support from Congress, the Department has established a new Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction to provide a civilian capacity to respond to post-conflict situations and thwart the growth of terrorism and spread freedom and prosperity. State

Department budgets have also included resources to:

• increase diplomatic staffing on the front lines of the global fight, including additional security professionals;

• extend an on-going program of security upgrades to protect diplomatic facilities

and personnel in the face of terrorism; and

• accelerate a capital construction program to replace facilities at high risk with

secure new embassy compounds.

Budget: Cut Current Spending

Question. There are reports that the White House is asking all agencies, other

than Defense and Homeland Security, to prepare options for cutting current spending by 5%, with the intention of holding non-defense resources to 1% growth in FY

2006. Do you believe that the State Department should be included in such national

security exemptions in a way similar to the Defense Department, Intelligence, and

Homeland Security?

Answer. The President, OMB, and Congress recognize the vital role that the State

Department and International Affairs funding play in national security.

Discretionary belt-tightening has constrained State operations and Foreign Operations funding levels.

With supplemental funding, the Department has been able to meet U.S. foreign

policy priorities.

Budget: Budget Pressures

Question. The combination of previously announced spending commitments for

international HIV/AIDS, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Middle

East Peace Initiative is going to put tremendous pressure on the foreign affairs

budget for ’06. Are you working now to make certain that these program increases

can be accommodated without cutting into other important areas of a very tight

budget? To what extent is the administration going to request funding for 150 account activities in the supplemental?

Answer. The President’s Fiscal Year ’06 budget is still under review. If confirmed,

I look forward to briefing the committee and ensuring our important needs in the

150 account activities are met.

We do have significant foreign and State operations funding shortfalls in FY 2005

that can only be met through supplemental appropriations. Once the administration

has finalized the supplemental requirements, and if confirmed, I would be pleased

to brief the committee on those needs.

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Defense Science Board Study on Transition to and From Hostilities

Question. In August 2004 the DSB concluded a study on ‘‘Transition to and from

Hostilities.’’ The study included an analysis of the very substantial costs and manpower requirements for both the Department of State and Defense that are needed

to achieve our objectives in stabilization and reconstruction operations, like our current activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The intent was to provide guidelines for

matching our national foreign policy objectives with the resources that need to be

devoted to accomplishing those objectives. What is your assessment of the gap between the Department of State’s current and near-term projected manpower and resources and the requirements revealed by the DSB study, and if you are confirmed

what will you do to bridge that gap?

Answer. The DSB study has provided a valuable analysis of the costs we already

spend on reconstruction and stabilization and the level of resources required not

only to provide assistance, but to manage that response, to prepare for it, to staff

it, and to maintain it. It highlighted the need for additional resources for civilian

agencies in both people and money.

We agree with the basic thrust of the resource recommendations in the DSB

study: resources are needed both to lead, manage and implement stabilization and

reconstruction operations, and to support programmatic activities that promote security and rule of law and create the conditions for democracy and market economics to take root. Some important resource requirements are not highlighted in the

DSB study, particularly the cost of deploying civilian teams, when needed together

with the military, to multiple locations in a country. We will review all these resource needs in State and other agencies in order to institutionalize a strong stabilization and reconstruction capability within the U.S. Government.

Question. That same DSB study proposed a management regime aimed at even

better planning, including preparation far in advance, for stabilization and reconstruction operations. The approach would orchestrate, not just coordinate, activities

in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and other organs of government, taking into account not only legislated authorities but also realistic organizational capabilities. Do you agree with the proposed regime; if not, can you describe the specifics of a better alternative to accomplish comparable goals; and if you are confirmed what particular steps will you take to ensure

even better planning for stabilization and reconstruction?

Answer. We appreciate the DSB report’s analysis and agree with the need for a

more coordinated approach between all agencies. The administration has taken the

decision to vest the responsibility for this coordination in the Department of State,

which has the lead in foreign policy and which must manage our long-term interests

overseas. Within the State Department, we have built an interagency team with

USAID, CIA, and the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice and others to coordinate stabilization and reconstruction activities for countries in transition from

conflict and civil strife, to plan for potential conflicts, and to avert or mitigate conflict when we can. This interagency team for planning and for response management led by the Department of State will achieve the objectives of the study, provided that sufficient resources are made available to State and other agencies implementing programs overseas.

Office of the Coordinator For Reconstruction and Stabilization

Question. How do you expect the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization to develop in the future? Can you describe a hypothetical situation where you and the

President might turn to it and what you would expect from it, both in terms of planning and operations?

Answer. Creating a strong USG stabilization and reconstruction capacity is an administration national security priority. We appreciate the leadership Senators

Lugar, Biden and Hagel and others in the Congress have shown on this issue.

S/CRS will not take over activities of partner organizations within the government, but will be value-added by: preparing contingency plans; building USG capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction; developing systems to pre-position people and money; conducting outreach to international partners and NGO’s aimed at

strengthening global capacity; applying lessons learned and managing and integrating the USG response.

If it is determined that the technical capacities of S/CRS would be a value added

in a certain situation, S/CRS will be asked to organize and manage, in conjunction

with the relevant regional bureau at the State Department, a multi-agency response

to a failing, failed or post-conflict state.

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S/CRS would manage a response effort by—establishing an interagency task force

proposing strategies to senior leadership working with international community to

coordinate efforts mobilizing required personnel deploying personnel, equipment and

other resources designing programs to respond to identified needs managing response efforts to meet identified goals.

Our efforts will be focused on early response when assistance can have the most

impact on the long-term prospects. Longer term management of these responses will

be devolved to normal structures when long-term plans and budgets are in place.

Office of the Coordinator For Reconstruction and Stabilization: Budget

Question. The Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization is small and has a very

modest budget. Will the administration be requesting substantial funding for the

Office in the upcoming supplemental or in the ’06 budget?

Answer. The office currently has 35 staff from: State, USAID, Defense, Treasury

and CIA. The administration will recommend the resources necessary for the office

to start meeting its mission.

We will need resources for management—from CJS appropriations—and for foreign assistance programs from Foreign Operations appropriations.

Experience has shown that we must have the capacity to manage 2–3 stabilization

and reconstruction operations concurrently. That means staff in Washington and the

field to manage and deliver quality programs.

In advance of a specific crisis, the Department will need to have certain programs

and funds already in place and have money available to deploy teams quickly and

pay for security and logistics, while additional longer term funds are identified and

sought.

Obviously we are in a difficult budget climate, but the administration is committed to working with Congress to support this stabilization and reconstruction initiative as a national security priority.

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction And Stabilization: Legislation

Question. The committee’s bill, S.2127, called for a new 250-person nation-building corps of civilians who can move quickly into a still hostile environment to provide public information, deliver emergency medical care, train police, rebuild

schools, roads and airports, and reconstitute political processes. Do you share our

view of the necessity for such an active duty civilian corps?

Answer. We need the ability to send the right people into the field as well as to

manage programs in Washington. To deploy people quickly and lead the coordination process in Washington, we need to have in place core staff who can plan, exercise, and train together. This will require additional staff and resources because the

gaps we must fill cannot be met by rearranging existing personnel.

The model we have developed incorporates the core concepts you laid out in your

bill for a civilian response corps. And, if confirmed, I want to examine the concept

further. And, if confirmed, I look forward to discussing it with you. We need additional diplomatic personnel to underpin operations overseas and we need a corps of

technical experts to design, deliver, and manage programs.

The complete solution requires a mixture of on-call rosters, permanent staff and

pre-positioned contracts in order to assemble the teams needed in varying situations.

As we analyze the capacity we have and the gaps, we will work with the Congress

to put in place the necessary authorities, mechanisms, and resources.

Law of the Sea: Ratification Efforts

Question. The most recent Treaty Priority List submitted by the administration

to the committee listed the Law of the Sea Convention as a treaty ‘‘for which there

is an urgent need for Senate approval.’’ How can we work together to make certain

that the treaty is ratified on an urgent basis?

Answer. The administration supports early Senate action on the Convention.

The administration urges the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to again favorably report out the Convention and Implementing Agreement, with the Resolution

of Advice and Consent to Ratification as reported by the committee last March.

The administration will work with the Senate leadership to bring the Convention

and Implementing Agreement to a floor vote in the 109th Congress.

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Law of the Sea: Benefits for National Security

Question. I was pleased to see in the U.S. Ocean Action Plan that he submitted

to the Congress on December 17, the President states that ‘‘as a matter of national

security, economic self-interest, and international leadership, the administration is

strongly committed to U.S. accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.’’

Can you cite specific benefits that accession will have for U.S. national security?

Answer. Joining the Convention will advance the interests of the U.S. military.

As the world’s leading maritime power, the United States benefits more than any

other nation from the navigation provisions of the Convention.

Those provisions, which establish international consensus on the extent of jurisdiction that States may exercise off their coasts, preserve and elaborate the rights

of the U.S. military to use the world’s oceans to meet national security requirements.

They achieve this, among other things:

• by stabilizing the outer limit of the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles;

• by setting forth the navigation regime of innocent passage for all ships in the

territorial sea, through an exhaustive and objective list of activities that are inconsistent with innocent passage—an improvement over the subjective language

in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone;

• by protecting the right of passage for all ships and aircraft, through, under, and

over straits used for international navigation, as well as archipelagoes;

• by reaffirming the traditional freedoms of navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic zone and the high seas beyond; and

• by providing for the laying and maintenance of submarine cables and pipelines.

U.S. Armed Forces rely on these navigation and overflight rights daily, and their

protection is of paramount importance to U.S. national security.

Becoming a party to the Convention would strengthen our ability to deflect potential proposals that would be inconsistent with U.S. national security interests, including those affecting freedom of navigation.

Law of the Sea: Economic Benefits

Question. Support for U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention has been

expressed by U.S. companies and industry groups whose businesses depend on the

oceans. These include the American Petroleum Institute, the U.S. Oil and Gas Association, the Chamber of Shipping of America, the U.S. Tuna Foundation, the American Chemistry Council, the National Oceans Industries Association, and the U.S.

Council for International Business. Do you agree with these U.S. companies that acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention will advance U.S. economic interests and

benefit American businesses?

Answer. Yes. The United States, as the country with the longest coastline and the

largest exclusive economic zone, will gain economic and resource benefits from the

Convention:

• The Convention accords the coastal State sovereign rights over non-living resources, including oil and gas, found in the seabed and subsoil of its continental

shelf.

The Convention improves on the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, to which the

United States is a party, in several ways:

• by replacing the ‘‘exploitability’’ standard with an automatic continental shelf

out to 200 nautical miles, regardless of geology;

• by allowing for extension of the shelf beyond 200 miles if it meets certain geological criteria; and

• by establishing an institution that can promote the legal certainty sought by

U.S. companies concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf.

Concerning mineral resources beyond national jurisdiction, i.e., not subject to the

sovereignty of the United States or any other country, the 1994 Agreement meets

our goal of guaranteed access by U.S. industry on the basis of reasonable terms and

conditions.

Joining the Convention would facilitate deep seabed mining activities of U.S. companies, which require legal certainty to carry out such activities in areas beyond

U.S. jurisdiction.

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The Convention also accords the coastal State sovereign rights over living marine

resources, including fisheries, in its exclusive economic zone, i.e., out to 200 nautical

miles from shore.

The Convention protects the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines,

whether military, commercial, or research.

In addition, the Convention establishes a legal framework for the protection and

preservation of the marine environment from a variety of sources, including pollution from vessels, seabed activities, and ocean dumping.

The provisions effectively balance the interests of States in protecting the environment and natural resources with their interests in freedom of navigation and communication.

With the majority of American living in coastal areas, and U.S. coastal areas and

EEZ generating vital economic activities, the United States has a strong interest in

these aspects of the Convention.

Law of the Sea: Military Operations

Question. It is my understanding that it has been U.S. policy since President Reagan’s 1983 Statement of Ocean Policy that the United States, including the U.S.

military, will act in accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention’s provisions relating to the traditional uses of the oceans. Would acceding to the Law of the Sea

Convention require the United States military to make any changes in its existing

policies or procedures with respect to the use of the oceans to conduct military operations?

Answer. No.

As the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, testified before the Senate

Armed Services Committee on April 8, 2004, ‘‘I am convinced that joining the Law

of the Sea Convention will have no adverse effect on our operations . . . but rather,

will support and enhance ongoing U.S. military operations, including continued

prosecution of the global war on terrorism.’’

The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, testified before the

House International Relations Committee on May 12, 2004, that the Navy ‘‘currently operate[s]—willingly because it is our national security interests—within the

provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention in every area related to navigation. We

would never recommend an international commitment that would require us to get

a permission slip—from anyone—to conduct our operations.’’

Admiral Mullen concluded his oral statement by emphasizing, ‘‘Simply, the Convention does not require a permission slip or prohibit these activities; we would continue operating our military forces as we do today.’’

Law of the Sea: Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Question. Some commentators have asserted that acceding to the Law of the Sea

Convention would prevent the United States from taking action necessary to stop

the transportation of weapons of mass destruction across the oceans. I note, however, that State Department Legal Adviser William Taft testified before the House

International Relations Committee that ‘‘the Convention will not affect applicable

maritime law or policy regarding interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, their

means of delivery and related materials.’’ Do you believe that acceding to the Law

of the Sea Convention will in any way diminish the ability of the United States to

take necessary action to prevent the transport of weapons of mass destruction?

Answer. No.

The Convention’s navigation provisions derive from the 1958 law of the sea conventions, to which the United States is a party, and also reflect customary international law accepted by the United States.

As such, the Convention will not affect applicable maritime law or policy regarding interdiction of weapons of mass destruction.

Like the 1958 conventions, the LOS Convention recognizes numerous legal bases

for taking enforcement action against vessels and aircraft suspected of engaging in

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction:

• exclusive port and coastal State jurisdiction in internal waters and national airspace;

• coastal State jurisdiction in the territorial sea and contiguous zone;

• exclusive flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas (which the flag

State may, either by general agreement in advance or approval in response to

a specific request, waive in favor of other States); and

• universal jurisdiction over stateless vessels.

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Nothing in the Convention impairs the inherent right of individual or collective

self-defense (a point which is reaffirmed in the Resolution of Advice and Consent

proposed in the last Congress).

Law of the Sea: Proliferation Security Initiative

Question. Some commentators have asserted that acceding to the Law of the Sea

Convention would prevent or inhibit the United States from implementing the Proliferation Security Initiative. I note, however, that State Department Legal Adviser

William Taft testified before our committee that the PSI is consistent with the Law

of the Sea Convention, and that the obligations under the Convention do not present

any difficulties for successfully carrying out this important initiative. Chief of Naval

Operations Admiral Vern Clark gave similar testimony before the Senate Armed

Services Committee. I also note that all of the other countries that are partners

with the United States in PSI are themselves parties to the Law of the Sea Convention. In your view, will acceding to the Convention inhibit the United States and

its partners from successfully pursuing the PSI?

Answer. No.

PSI requires participating countries to act consistent with national legal authorities and ‘‘relevant international law and frameworks,’’ which includes the law reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

The Convention’s navigation provisions derive from the 1958 law of the sea conventions, to which the United States is a party, and also reflect customary international law accepted by the United States.

As such, the Convention will not affect applicable maritime law or policy regarding interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related

materials.

Like the 1958 conventions, the LOS Convention recognizes numerous legal bases

for taking enforcement action against vessels and aircraft suspected of engaging in

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction:

• exclusive port and coastal State jurisdiction in internal waters and national airspace;

• coastal State jurisdiction in the territorial sea and contiguous zone;

• exclusive flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas (which the flag

State may, either by general agreement in advance or approval in response to

a specific request, waive in favor of other States); and

• universal jurisdiction over stateless vessels.

Nothing in the Convention impairs the inherent right of individual or collective

self-defense (a point which is reaffirmed in the Resolution of Advice and Consent

proposed in the last Congress).

Law of the Sea: Role of the UN

Question. Some commentators have asserted that the Law of the Sea Convention

gives the United Nations the power to regulate the use of the oceans and that U.S.

accession to the Convention would allow the United Nations to veto uses of the

ocean by the United States, including by the U.S. military. It is my understanding

that, under the Convention, the United Nations has no decision-making role with

respect to any uses of the oceans. Please explain what role, if any, the United Nations would have in regulating uses of the oceans by the United States if the United

States were to accede to the Law of the Sea Convention.

Answer. The United Nations has no decision-making role under the Convention

in regulating uses of the oceans by any State Party to the Convention.

Commentators who have made this assertion have argued that the International

Seabed Authority (ISA) somehow has regulatory power over all activities in the

oceans.

The authority of the ISA is limited to administering the exploration and exploitation of minerals in areas of deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, generally

more than 200 miles from shore. The ISA has no other role and has no general regulatory authority over the uses of the oceans, including freedom of navigation and

oversight.

Law of the Sea: Taxation by International Seabed Authority

Question. Some commentators have asserted that acceding to the Law of the Sea

Convention would involve giving the International Seabed Authority the power to

impose taxes on U.S. citizens. State Department Legal Adviser William Taft has tesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00225 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 CRICE.004 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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tified before Congress that the International Seabed Authority has no ability or authority to levy taxes. In your view, is there any basis for concern that U.S. accession

to the Law of the Sea Convention will result in U.S. citizens being subject to taxation by the International Seabed Authority?

Answer. No. The Convention does not provide for or authorize taxation of individuals or corporations.

Law of the Sea: Technology Transfer

Question. Some commentators have asserted that the United States would be required to transfer sensitive technology, including technology with military applications, to developing countries if it acceded to the Law of the Sea Convention. It is

my understanding, however, that provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention containing mandatory technology transfer requirements were eliminated by the 1994

Agreement addressing the Convention’s deep seabed mining regime. Do you believe

there is any reason for concern that acceding to the Convention would require the

United States to transfer any technology to developing countries?

Answer. No, technology transfers are not required by the Convention.

Law of the Sea: U.S. Sovereignty over Ocean Resources

Question. Some commentators have asserted that acceding to the Law of the Sea

Convention will involve ceding to the International Seabed Authority sovereignty

currently enjoyed by the United States over ocean resources. It is my understanding, however, that the jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority addresses only mining of minerals in areas of the deep seabed beyond the jurisdiction

of any country, and that the United States has never asserted sovereignty over such

areas. Do you believe that acceding to the Convention would involve any surrender

of existing United States claims to sovereignty over ocean resources?

Answer. No, the United States has never claimed sovereignty over areas or resources of the deep seabed.

The Convention’s provisions on the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf

preserve and expand U.S. sovereign rights over the living and non-living ocean resources located within, and with regard to the continental shelf beyond, 200 miles

of our coastline.

Law of the Sea: Effect of 1994 Implementing Agreement

Question. Some commentators have asserted that there is uncertainty as to the

legal status of the 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of

the Law of the Sea Convention, which addresses the Convention’s deep seabed mining regime. I have received a letter from eight former Legal Advisers to the Department of State from both Republican and Democratic administrations stating that

the 1994 Agreement ‘‘has binding legal effect in its modification of the LOS Convention.’’ Do you believe there is any basis for questioning the legal effect of the 1994

Agreement?

Answer. No. My understanding is that the notion that the 1994 Agreement has

no legal effect is incorrect.

Defense Science Board Recommendations

Question. The Pentagon’s Defense Science Board (DSB) recently proposed establishing at the NSC a new deputy post to coordinate strategic communications and

public diplomacy throughout the government. Is this a good idea?

Answer. The DSB and other studies of public diplomacy and strategic communications over the past several years offer many good ideas for strengthening public diplomacy and strategic communication. If confirmed, strengthening public diplomacy

will be one of my priorities as Secretary of State. I do not want to comment at this

time on what structures would best serve that objective but will consider a full

range of options, and will be delighted to do so in cooperation with members of this

committee. The State Department must lead the Public Diplomacy effort, particularly in the field through our embassies and missions abroad.

Public Diplomacy: Budget Increases

Question. ECA has finally seen its budget increase after suffering significant cuts

in the 1990s. There has been a major shift in funding to programs aimed at the

Middle East and Muslim world, at the expense of programs in Europe, the former

Soviet Union, and other parts of the world. Do you believe that enough is being done

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to focus attention on the growing degree and shrillness of anti-Americanism in Europe, Latin America, and Asia?

Answer. Combating terrorism and the apparent deterioration of the U.S. image

abroad are global challenges that require a strategic approach to the use of exchange programs in every region of the world.

Our political and economic adversaries use misperceptions about our goals, disagreements about our policies and a general sense of anti-Americanism to move

their specific agendas forward around the world. The Department is committed to

balancing the needs of all our regions to address U.S. foreign policy goals.

We know that exchanges present the best face of America, they work to convey

to publics that we care about the future of their young people and education, they

convey that we have common cause in basic shared vales, and they are ‘‘moving the

needle’’ with individuals. Results consolidated from a number of program evaluations in 2003 show that 88% of exchange participants gained new knowledge/skills

on key issues, and 89% of exchange participants gained a better understanding or

more positive view of the United States.

Twenty-five percent of ECA’s budget currently goes to exchanges in the countries

covered by the Bureaus of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; new programs and

increases in traditional exchanges are effectively addressing these critical areas. We

have moved some resources from Eurasia to do so, but have maintained robust programs in Eurasia aimed at youth, from high school through undergraduate and

graduate level students. In all other regions, we have been able to keep exchange

programs at roughly the FY 03 level. In all regions, we are focusing on our most

important audiences.

Resources for exchanges, coupled with the effective programming provided by

ECA, offer a strong antidote to anti-Americanism. The Department looks forward

to working further with Congress to identify the appropriate level of resources for

exchanges to meet the challenges we face in every part of the world.

Public Diplomacy: Guidance to U.S. Broadcasting

Question. How do you view the State Department’s role in providing strategic

guidance and greater coherence to U.S. broadcasting efforts? Should the Department

play a stronger role? Does the current bureaucratic structure serve us well or could

it be improved? For example, should the VOA be integrated into State?

Answer. The State Department and BBG must effectively coordinate U.S. international broadcasting efforts. As you know, the Secretary of State is a member of

the Board of Governors, and his/her designee actively participates in Board meetings and deliberations.

The BBG also coordinates regularly with the regional bureaus and with the Under

Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. As part of its annual language

service review process, the BBG regularly receives briefings from the Department

of State on matters of strategic guidance as a way to ensure that high priority languages are identified. The Department provides guidance and clears on VOA editorials on a daily basis, and when issues of difference arise, the BBG and Department work together to resolve them.

I believe that these arrangements serve the State Department and the BBG very

effectively.

NED

Question. In the 9/11 Commission legislation that Congress recently passed, my

initiative to establish a free press institute at the NED was included. NED officials

and other stakeholders in the media field have moved quickly to begin to make it

a reality. They will be making a proposal to the State Department for $1 million

for institute staff, the development of a strategic plan, and organizational meetings.

Would you support this grant and expedite its approval?

Answer. The State Department supports the work of the NED and will support

the initiative to develop a free press institute. We would also support including the

$1 million for free press staff as part of the grant for NED core funding that passes

through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. We look forward to

consultations on the development of a strategic plan and discussion of organizational efforts.

Embassy Security

Question. Some agencies who will be required to contribute under the Capital Security-Cost Sharing Program have maintained that their financial participation is

unwarranted or excessive. The Department of Defense has been particularly relucVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00227 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 CRICE.004 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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tant to participate. Are all the agencies now on board with this plan, including Defense?

Answer. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108–447) makes clear

that all Departments and agencies are to contribute their shares under the Capital

Security Cost-Sharing Program ‘‘notwithstanding any other provision of law,’’ ‘‘without offsets,’’ and ‘‘in advance.’’ The Department is directed not to build space for employees of any agency that fails to pay its full amount of funding required by costsharing.

OMB had already directed each agency to include its FY05 cost-sharing contribution in its FY05 budget. All agencies have been cooperating with the Department

in determining their respective overseas staffing levels, and we anticipate that they

will transfer the funds upon request. So far we have no indication that any agency

will refuse to comply.

Danger Pay

Question. The committee has voted twice in favor of increasing danger pay for

State Department employees who serve in hostile environments. Why has the administration not requested this benefit as part of its overall submission to the Congress?

Answer. I appreciate your support for creating further incentives for employees

to serve in hostile environments. The administration did not request the danger pay

increase as part of its overall submission for FY 2004 or FY 2005 for budgetary reasons. Any future administration initiative to increase danger pay would need to consider the additional funding required to finance the increase within overall budget

constraints.

Submission of Treaties

Question. The administration did not submit to the committee a Treaty Priority

List during the 108th Congress. Does the administration intend to submit a Treaty

Priority List during the 109th Congress? If so, when does the administration expect

to submit the list?

Answer. The administration intends to submit to the committee a Treaty Priority

List during the 109th Congress. The administration recognizes that having such a

list can assist the committee in organizing its work. We will endeavor to submit a

list as soon as possible after receiving the customary request from the committee.

NED and Free Press

Question. The President last year called for a doubling of the NED budget. We

were successful in increasing the budget significantly in the omnibus legislation. I

was able to have included in the intelligence reform bill language that embraced the

concept of S. 2096. Do you agree that a free press institute funded through NED

would be one good way of consolidating U.S. expertise, allowing for private contributions, and building a coordinated capacity to support free press in countries building

democratic institutions?

Answer. The Department of State recognizes and supports the importance of and

the role of independent media in the development of open democracies. The establishment of a free press institute funded through NED would be one way to promote

this objective and would add a fifth ‘‘core’’ partner institute to complement NED’s

work in other areas to promote democracy. We support the initiative to coordinate

USG and private efforts to develop and encourage free press and believe that a free

press institute could help mobilize private sector resources to build free press activities and support democratic institution building. We believe that USG efforts to promote free and independent media should also be coordinated with the important

similar work being done by Internews, IREX and other nongovernmental organizations that support and share these universal human rights values. We would urge

the funding of the free press institute to be treated as separate from existing media

training and independent media support activities, and kept clearly distinct from

public diplomacy initiatives.

Iraq Issues

Question. Reports indicate General Casey and Ambassador Negroponte have established a close working relationship. There is a gap, however, between the military and civilian efforts in Iraq. The Department of State, which is responsible for

executing U.S. assistance to Iraq, is dependent on the Department of Defense, which

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owns and controls transportation assets, controls the airspace and roads and is helping the Iraqis establish security. The U.S. military, for its part, does not have the

statutory responsibility, mechanisms or resources to operate jointly with the State

Department to provide reconstruction assistance. How can you ensure that there is

an integrated, joint civilian-military operational capability for stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq?

Answer. All agencies of the United States government recognize the importance

and urgency of reconstructing and stabilizing Iraq. It is a prime mission for both

our DoD and Department of State components in Iraq, and they are working together closely. We have developed a strong interagency process—at all levels—both

in Washington and Iraq to ensure civilian-military coordination and cooperation.

The overall policy and operating relationship between the State and Defense Departments is set out in a series of documents, including NSPD 36, ‘‘Operation Plan

(OPLAN) Sovereign Iraq,’’ and three Memoranda of Understanding on support and

security. These documents are the product of the joint State-DOD Interagency Transition Planning Team that closed down CPA and stood up Mission Baghdad. In

practice, they are working well.

Embassy Baghdad (and DOD) participates through video teleconference in regular

and frequent interagency meetings on Iraq—meetings of the National Security

Council, Principals and Deputies Committees, and the Iraq Policy Operations

Group. General Casey participates in meetings of the National Security Council.

On the ground in Iraq our reconstruction efforts are coordinated by a civilian-military interagency organization, the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO),

headed by Ambassador William Taylor. IRMO coordinates closely with the Project

and Contracting Office (PCO), a Pentagon-based organization responsible for implementing projects from the $18.4 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund that

Congress approved in 2003.

The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), led by LTG

David Petraeus, is responsible for the development of the Iraqi Armed Forces and

Iraqi Security Forces. MNSTC-I works closely with MNF-I, and Embassy, and

IRMO.

Rather than seeing a ‘‘gap’’ between civilian and military efforts, I see that at

every level they are intertwined and integrated:

• State Department, USAID and PCO representatives at the Regional Embassy

Offices in Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla and Basra work closely with the military commands in those regions. Our State Embedded Teams are located within military

commands in Tikrit, Ba’quba, Ramadi/Falluja, Najaf and Karbala, providing

close State-military coordination.

• MNF-I officers are embedded in the offices of IRMO’s senior ministry consultants. MNF-I officers participate in the Mission’s Elections Security Cell.

• The military has changed its security mission in Iraq to ensure the protection

of infrastructure under insurgent attack, and to provide security for the assistance materials IRMO imports for the reconstruction of the country.

• Military commanders have used their Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to fund reconstruction projects.

• 800 Civil Affairs personnel work on the ground, in every major American maneuver command, in coordination with civilian reconstruction officials. MNF-I’s

Civil Affairs troops are supporting IRMO in Falluja resettlement and reconstruction.

• USAID and 1st Cavalry Division have partnered to provide services and employ

youth in Baghdad; expanded to include PCO, this has been a model for reconstruction assistance in strategic cities such as Najaf, Samarra, Tal Afar and

Falluja.

Carrying out reconstruction and securing the country are two parts of a single effort, and that is the way our people on the ground in Iraq see it—civilian and military alike. They understand that cooperating in such a difficult and dangerous environment is essential. They are doing a superb job.

Question. When USAID advertised openings for 20 personnel in their Baghdad office, there were no applicants. They have managed through aggressive recruitment

by Mr. Natsios to fill these openings, but mid-level experienced FSO’s are still needed. How will you address the personnel shortfalls created by the demands of Iraq

and Afghanistan? Do we need to offer tax-free war zone incentives for State Department personnel like we have done for the military? The committee has supported

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increasing danger pay and would like to see an administration request to that effect.

What other incentives are needed?

Answer. USAID has done a tremendous job recruiting for Baghdad and Kabul, already filling all positions through October 2005. State, of course, has many more

positions than USAID to fill at both posts. Despite the difficulties and dangers of

service, Department of State employees have also been responsive for service at

these sites, as well as in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and

the remotely located positions throughout Iraq. This includes Civil Service as well

as Foreign Service volunteers.

USAID has noted that issues like security and family concerns are more important determinative factors for recruitment than financial compensation, and the Department of State will continue to address these issues for all agencies under Chief

of Mission authority.

We are exploring whether any additional financial incentives are needed, and

would expect to return to Congress if we determine such incentives are necessary.

Question. This committee has given great attention to the pace of reconstruction

assistance, which has accelerated somewhat, but still remains slow. Effective reconstruction projects can make a great deal of difference in Iraq, yet U.S. assistance

continues to be plagued by lack of coordination and duplication of efforts between

the military and civilian organizations, bureaucratic processes, and above all, by a

lack of security in Iraq. You have seen this from the NSC vantage point. Do you

consider the pace of reconstruction too slow? Are we making progress? Do you plan

another review and overhaul? What will you do differently?

Answer. The pace of reconstruction is not moving as smoothly as we may have

hoped; however, we are making progress, even in the face of an ongoing insurgency.

Clearly, security remains the most serious issue affecting the pace of our reconstruction efforts. Despite the challenging environment, the U.S. continues to increase our

reconstruction spending, and we have obligated nearly $13 billion of the over $20.9

billion that Congress has appropriated for Iraq reconstruction. Of this total, we have

disbursed over $4.3 billion–$1.9 billion from the FY03 Supplemental (IRRF I) and

$2.4 billion from the FY04 Supplemental (IRRF II) as of January 5th.

All agencies of the United States government recognize the importance and urgency of reconstruction and stabilizing Iraq. It is a primary goal of each civilian and

military organization working in Iraq, and they are working together closely.

We continue to develop a strong interagency process—at all levels—both in Washington and Iraq to ensure civilian-military coordination and cooperation and to review and fine-tune our effort. The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO)

located within our Embassy in Baghdad is working hard to coordinate reconstruction efforts among the implementing agencies ‘‘on the ground’’ in Iraq.

Rather than seeing a ‘‘gap’’ between civilian and military efforts, I see that at

every level they are becoming more intertwined and integrated. For example: since

early 2004, USAID and the 1st Cavalry Division have engaged in a partnership to

provide essential services in Baghdad while generating employment for Iraqi youth.

This partnership was expanded to include the PCO, and ultimately became the

model for rapid reconstruction assistance in strategic cities such as Najaf, Samara,

Tel Afar and Falluja.

Our reconstruction efforts have made significant progress in supporting our objectives in Iraq and in improving the lives of the Iraqi people.

Currently, over 133,000 Iraqis are employed in USG administered programs.

Despite recent and serious insurgent attacks on the oil infrastructure, the weekly

average output during Dec. 27–Jan. 2 stood at 2.1 million barrels per day with exports earning Iraq more than $1.4 billion in hard currency each month.

We have added over 1800 MW generating capacity to the Iraqi power grid since

the transition to Iraqi sovereignty and we will add more. Power is also more equitably distributed throughout the country than under Saddam, when electric power

was diverted to Baghdad.

Iraq is experiencing power shortages now due to sabotage, fuel distribution problems, unscheduled outages and seasonal spike in demand. We are working with the

Ministry of Electricity to increase available hours of power in the shortest possible

time.

We continue to seek the most effective means of delivering assistance to Iraq. Last

fall, Ambassador Negroponte, in close coordination with the Iraqi Interim Government, General Casey of MNF-I and LTG Petraeus of MNSTC-I, undertook a strategic review of the spending plan and suggested the reallocation of $3.46 billion in

reconstruction assistance.

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In an effort to disburse funds more quickly, PCO is proceeding with a pilot program to contract directly with the IIG Ministries, allowing them to implement and

manage infrastructure projects which meet their most pressing priorities.

We are also using Iraqi firms to the greatest extent possible to put an ‘‘Iraqi face’’

on our reconstruction efforts.

As part of the ongoing assessment of spending priorities, our Embassy has recently identified an additional $457 million to reallocate to high-impact, rapid-action

projects designed to stabilize and address the near-term needs of the electrical sector as well as to deliver quick-delivery essential services programs to the populations of 4 cities (Fallujah, Najaf, Samarra and Sadr City) living in post-battle environments.

Question. The elections scheduled for January 30, 2005 are the first in a multiyear process. Will the Iraqi Election Commission (MCI) [presumably referring to the

Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI)] have the credibility to monitor

elections? Will the elections be judged fair if the Sunnis boycott or if we have to

bypass three governorates? How are plans for the next two elections coming? Should

we expect the security situation to improve after Iraqis vote?

Answer. The elections that will take place on January 30 are an important next

step for Iraqis seeking to put their dark past behind them. Over the past several

months, the IECI has repeatedly demonstrated its independence and its dedication

to ensuring that Iraq’s elections are substantially free and fair. The IECI is enlisting thousands of Iraqi election workers. Thousands more will serve as domestic election monitors and are being trained by the National Democratic Institute (NDI). A

conference in Ottawa in December organized the International Mission for Iraq

Elections (IMIE), an international effort that we support.

PM Allawi, President al Yawar, the IECI, and the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG)

have all called for full participation—by all Iraqi political, ethnic, and religious

groups—in the January 30 elections. We support the Iraqi call for full participation

and believe all Iraqis have a role to play in the future of Iraq, including Iraqi

Sunnis.

The IECI, Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, and the Multinational Force-Iraq are

working closely together to ensure security for the elections in all 18 governates.

The IECI is also considering ways to ensure that voters in areas still plagued by

security issues are able to participate in the election, even if they have not yet registered to vote.

The IECI is responsible for carrying out not only the January elections, but also

the constitutional referendum scheduled for October and the elections for a constitutionally based government in December. We welcome Secretary General Annan’s

statement that the UN stands ready, if asked, to help Iraqis as they draw up a new

constitution and conduct a national referendum and further elections. The U.S. Government will provide support as requested by the Transitional Government of Iraq.

The January elections will mark a watershed moment in Iraq’s history, which

should help the Iraqi Transitional Government battle those who seek to derail Iraq’s

progress to full democracy. But we should not underestimate the commitment of

these forces to deny Iraqis a stable, democratic, and prosperous future. As election

day approaches, these elements will probably step up their attacks out of desperation that Iraq’s political transition is succeeding.

Afghanistan

Question. A Congressional Notification arrived in December outlining a new Afghanistan counter-narcotics program costing $776.5 million in 2005. Given the exponential growth of poppy cultivation and drug production in Afghanistan in the past

two years this amount may be justified, however, the entire Afghan appropriation

for 2005 is only $980 million. Does this put other reconstruction in Afghanistan in

jeopardy? How much funding for Afghanistan will be requested in the upcoming

supplemental? What is the expected budget request for FY 2006?

Answer. The new Afghanistan counter-narcotics program does not put in jeopardy

other reconstruction in Afghanistan, provided that supplemental funding is received

to replenish the reprogrammed accounts in full prior to beginning of the third quarter. In preparing the reprogramming request every effort was made to minimize any

delay or disruption in existing programs.

The President has not yet decided on the timing or content for a Supplemental.

Funds will be requested to continue the Afghanistan counter-narcotics program in

FY 2006. However, the levels have not yet been finalized.

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Question. The Congressional Notification indicates that $312.5 million is to be immediately reprogrammed from other critical accounts identified for Afghanistan.

What programs will be affected by the reprogramming? Will these be replenished

in the supplemental?

Answer. In preparing the reprogramming request every effort was made to avoid

any delay or disruption to existing programs.

All reprogrammed funds would to be replenished with the exception of the INCLE ‘‘Prior year De-obligated Funds’’ of $3,000,000.

Question. Why is 40 percent of the counter-narcotics budget being slated for eradication of only 10 percent of the crop, while only 15 percent is being budgeted for

alternative livelihoods? Should more resources be spent to put courts, prisons, laws

and greater opportunities for alternative livelihoods in place to prepare for a sustainable Afghan-driven eradication program?

Answer. Eradication is one of the most crucial elements of a counter-narcotics program, and the objectives of the other elements will be undermined without an effective eradication program. Considerable up-front capital investment in equipment

and infrastructure to support eradication is needed. This constitutes a large share

of the initial counter-narcotics spending. Farmers must also be given alternative

livelihoods opportunities if they are to stop planting poppies. We are already at

work providing farmers with real options and have reprogrammed $11 million from

FY2004 funds to provide economic incentives for farmers to plant licit crops.

Most countries—the United Kingdom and the U.S. being the exceptions—decline

to contribute to eradication programs for a variety of reasons. The eradication program is therefore a key U.S. value-added contribution to the overall effort.

The proposed Afghanistan counter-narcotics initiative takes into account the willingness of other donors to contribute to law enforcement and criminal justice system

development, alternative development, public information, and demand reduction

programs. The counter-narcotics initiative will be coordinated with existing USG

programs that provide support for the justice sector in Afghanistan, with the objective of a stable, peaceful Afghanistan with a legitimate central government respecting the rule of law.

Question. There are consistent concerns that the funds identified for Afghanistan

are not reaching the ground. What proportion of each dollar is going toward overhead? How can we improve the impact of every dollar and the timeliness of assistance? Is the head of the Afghan Inter-Agency Operations Group sufficiently authorized to ensure coordinated and efficient obligation of funds?

Answer. From FY 2001–2004, the U.S. provided over $4.5 billion for Afghanistan’s

reconstruction. The size and diversity of our ambitious program precludes a simple

answer to the proportional amount allocated towards overhead. Overhead costs vary

by sector and project, and would have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

We believe the current inter-agency organizational model is sufficient to adequately monitor and track the impact of our spending and the timeliness of our assistance program to Afghanistan. Through the near-daily meetings of the Afghanistan Inter-agency Operation Group (AIOG), there continues to be close inter-agency

collaboration on all funding issues and the Coordinator and other policy makers are

periodically provided charts that track all U.S. obligations and available resources.

These charts are designed to highlight efficiencies and expose bureaucratic bottlenecks. Progress toward specific sectoral objectives is also carefully tracked on a

month-to-month basis through our Afghanistan ‘‘metrics’’ document.

We believe the Coordinator for Afghanistan possesses sufficient authority to carry

out the administration’s priorities in Afghanistan.

Iran Issues

Question. What should the U.S. do to encourage Iran to close its shared borders

with Iraq? Who is coming across the border now? Are fighters sanctioned or supported by the Iranian government?

Answer. We have made clear to Iran that we will oppose actions that undermine

Iraq’s stability. Senior officials of the Iraqi Interim Government have publicly voiced

their concerns about Iranian interference in Iraq.

We urge the Iranian government to live up to its publicly stated policy of supporting the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity of

Iraq, and its commitment to combat the flow of terrorists across the Iraqi-Iranian

border as stated in the November 23, 2004 regional conference on Iraq held at

Sharm el-Sheikh.

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Iran should also heed the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1373

to deny safe haven to those who plan, support, or commit terrorist acts and to affirmatively take steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts by providing early

warning to other states by exchange of information.

Saudi Arabia Issues

Question. How can U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia counter the growing antiAmericanism in some segments of the Saudi population and facilitate the Kingdom’s

progress toward political, economic, and educational reforms, without undermining

our close security and economic cooperation with the government?

Answer. Our support for reform in Saudi Arabia is not incompatible with our close

security and economic agenda with the Kingdom. In fact, we believe strongly that

the Saudis must pursue reform as the best way to ensure that the shared security

and economic interests of the US and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia grow stronger.

We are addressing anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia through two principal

means. The first is our traditional public diplomacy effort, which includes Fulbright

and carefully targeted International Visitors programs, other educational exchanges,

and dissemination of U.S. views via placements in the local media and through

USG-sponsored Arabic language media.

The Saudis themselves have a reform agenda that includes holding first-ever municipal elections in the spring of 2005; developing a new school curriculum aimed

at promoting greater tolerance; and continuing Crown Prince Abdullah’s groundbreaking series of national dialogues with religious leaders, intellectuals, young people and women on Saudi’s most sensitive issues. The Saudis are also taking significant steps to advance economic reform, and are currently in the process of negotiating their accession to WTO.

We support these initial efforts and are encouraging the Saudis to take additional

steps, via our bilateral Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the G-8 sponsored Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), to provide a better

future for their citizens, and to give all those citizens a greater voice in the decisions

affecting their lives.

We share the view that meaningful reform must reflect the desires of the people

of the region—it will only succeed if it is internally driven, not externally imposed,

but we and others can and must help.

Greater Middle East 21st Century Trust Issues

Question. What is your view of the Greater Middle East Trust idea contained in

S. Res. 375?

Answer. President Bush has established the promotion of freedom, democracy,

and political, economic, and educational reform in the countries of the broader Middle East as a major long-term priority for the United States. Increasing freedom and

opportunity will generate new hope, and diminish the appeal of extremism for people throughout this region.

We are moving forward with implementing the Broader Middle East and North

Africa Initiative, agreed by G-8 leaders at the Sea Island Summit, and continue to

make progress through the dozens of impact-oriented reform programs launched

under the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative.

We welcome the leadership shown by Members of Congress in proposing increased

assistance and new programs and coordination mechanisms to support reform. I

share the goal of structuring U.S. efforts effectively to coordinate and implement democracy and reform assistance programs to support the President’s vision.

A ‘‘Greater ME 21st Century Trust’’ is a worthy idea which we should explore further. Creating such a trust fund, however, could require an increase in available appropriations for promoting reform and democracy in the region. The steady reduction in funding for MEPI over the past three fiscal years has strained our ability

to advance U.S. reform efforts. It would be difficult to persuade other governments

to contribute into a ‘‘Trust’’ unless we demonstrate U.S. resolve in this area.

Cuba

Question. I have received reports that officials of the U.S. Department of State,

Treasury, and possibly the National Security Council are recommending administrative or regulatory clarification related to implementation of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, which would likely impact U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. The reported revision of requirements applied to U.S. agricultural

sales will be injurious to American farmers, and emphasize that the U.S. is not a

reliable exporter. If accurate as reported, the proposed change would overturn ConVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00233 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 CRICE.004 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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gressional intent to allow normal cash sales to Cuba as they are currently transacted. Dr. Rice, please provide background information on the genesis and status

of this proposed change and how you expect it to affect agriculture sales to Cuba.

Answer. U.S. agencies, including the Department of State, have met with concerned parties, including U.S. exporters and shipping companies, to hear directly

their views about any potential change and its impact on their business.

There is an inter-agency process considering whether the regulations implementing the law should be clarified. However, no decision has been made, and thus

no change has been made in U.S. policy concerning agricultural shipments to Cuba.

Russia

Question. How would you describe U.S.-Russia relations today? What are the

main challenges to the relationship that you will need to address in the near future?

Answer. In many areas, the relationship is more or less on the right track, but

we have a ways to go to realize the full potential that both countries had hoped for.

We have worked well together in some areas, notably on counter-terrorism and nonproliferation. However, we have growing concerns about Russia’s reversal of many

democratic reforms implemented in the 1990’s. We continue to raise our concerns

as a partner that wants Russia to succeed as a strong, vibrant, democratic country.

The cold-war rhetoric and threat of global nuclear annihilation has been replaced

by unprecedented U.S.-Russia counter-terrorism and nonproliferation cooperation.

We now share actionable counterterrorism intelligence and are close to concluding

a bilateral agreement on MANPADS.

Presidents Bush and Putin have a good, strong relationship that sets the right

tone for moving forward on a broad range of initiatives. Recent joint successes include Iraqi debt forgiveness, space cooperation, and Afghanistan elections. The relationship’s resilience was shown on ABM withdrawal and NATO expansion to the

Baltics, which many said would provoke a crisis in our relations and did not.

At the same time, significant challenges remain. We have some work to do to convince the Russians that geo-political and economic success is not a zero-sum game.

Free, peaceful and prosperous Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and other neighbors are

in Russia’s interest.

Ten years on, Chechen war needs a political solution and an end to human rights

abuses. We must also make clear that there is no excuse or justification for terrorism.

Russia needs to integrate more firmly into global institutions as appropriate. Russia can play a constructive role in Six-Party talks, on Iran, BMENA initiatives and

as part of the Middle East Quartet. Recent backsliding on democracy and other

human rights may begin to raise questions about the suitability of Russian participation in other international institutions.

To further this integration, Russia must show that it shares Western and international values, including a free judiciary and press, strong civil and governmental

institutions, the rule of law, freedom of speech, assembly and religion.

Russia will likely continue to project ‘‘soft’’ power using its oil and gas resources

and nuclear know-how. Unfortunately, the handling of the Yukos case poses serious

questions about Russia’s respect for the rule of law, property rights, and openness

to investment.

Question. How is Russia cooperating with the United States in the Global War

on Terror? What assistance is Russia providing to Afghanistan? Does the United

States envisage a role for Russia in reconstruction activities in Iraq?

Answer. President Putin was the first world leader to call the President to offer

assistance in the wake of September 11.

Our two governments have a Counterterrorism Working Group, chaired by the

Deputy Secretary of State and his Russian counterpart, that facilitates operational

cooperation and exchanges of information on a wide range of terrorism concerns.

Among the priority issues addressed by this Working Group are intelligence and law

enforcement, aviation security, WMD, MANPADS, and terrorist financing.

Russia is assisting the Afghan National Army with equipment. We expect Russian

aid to Afghanistan may increase if continued progress is made on resolving the issue

of Russian debt contracted by previous Afghan governments.

To contain the outflow of Afghan narcotics, we are encouraging Russia to work

with us, the EU, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the Tajiks to

strengthen border security and interdiction, as well as to train and equip the Tajik

Border Guard as Russian-led forces leave the Tajik-Afghan border by 2006.

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Russia has considerable potential to assist in Iraq’s reconstruction, particularly in

infrastructure development and the energy sector.

President Putin recently committed to reducing Iraq’s debt to Russia by about 93

percent, in accordance with its Paris Club obligations and additional commitments

made by Paris Club members in November.

Question. How could possible setbacks in democratization and respect for human

rights in Russia affect U.S.-Russian relations? How might the United States respond

to such developments?

Answer. A stable, healthy, democratic Russia serves both U.S. and Russian interests, and will make Russia a more effective international partner.

Today’s Russia bears little resemblance to the country that emerged from the

ashes of the USSR. Despite fits and starts, Russia has overall made progress toward

a more open society and economy. Recent backsliding—particularly the dilution of

judicial independence, state control over nationwide television and end of the direct

regional elections—raises concerns for us. Actions surrounding the Yukos case undermine Russia’s commitment to the rule of law, transparency, respect for property

rights and willingness to uphold the norms and values of a democratic market economy.

Based on these trends, during the certification process for the Cooperative Threat

Reduction Initiative, we decided this fall for the first time to not certify Russia on

human rights grounds. We informed our Russian colleagues about this decision as

well as Members of Congress (the President signed the waiver to ensure continued

flow of CTR funds).

We must maintain good channels of communication at all levels of the Russian

Government in order to effectively share our concerns about how negative trends in

these areas could hurt our relationship. We speak to our Russian interlocutors as

frank partners who want to see Russia become a strong, vibrant, democratic country.

We also need to maintain good ties with those individuals and groups in Russia

that are advocating for democratic values and institutions. Therefore, the U.S. must

continue to provide robust support for programs that strengthen the rule of law,

help fight corruption, and defend democratic values, including respect for human

rights, in Russia. Building a larger constituency base between our two countries and

our two societies will redound to the benefit of our overall relationship.

In FY 2005, we plan to spend over $43 million for democracy programs in Russia—about a third more than we did in FY 2004. If confirmed, I look forward to

working with Congress to ensure continued strong support for democratization and

human rights in Russia.

Ukraine

Question. What is your sense of the impact the Ukrainian elections will have on

the future of democracy in the region?

Answer. The fact that a democratic process prevailed and delivered a result that

reflects the will of the people represents a stunning success for Ukraine.

It could have a major impact on the development of democracy in the region. It

will signal to millions of people that democratic freedom is within reach and on the

ascendance, and that citizens standing up peacefully for their political rights can

make a difference. This will help bolster supporters of democracy, even as authoritarian governments in Belarus, Central Asia, and elsewhere in Eurasia crack down

on pro-democracy civil society groups.

We will intensify our efforts to ensure that respect for democracy and human

rights remains an integral component of our relationships. We will continue to emphasize that long-term stability, security, and prosperity arise when people enjoy

freedom to participate in the civic life of their countries and fundamental human

rights. We should bear in mind, however, that the conditions that made people’s revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia a success—especially a well-developed civil society—do not exist everywhere in the former Soviet Union. Moreover, rulers in some

of these countries are already drawing the wrong conclusion from the Orange Revolution and are bringing strong pressure to bear on pro-democracy NGOs.

Question. The U.S. imposed sanctions on several top Ukrainian leaders. What is

the current status of those actions?

Answer. For months, we repeatedly and consistently warned Ukrainian officials

of the high importance we place on the conduct of their presidential election process

and voting day itself.

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Most recently, in his November 18 letter to President Kuchma, President Bush

wrote that a tarnished election would lead us to review our relations with Ukraine,

and consider further steps against individuals engaging in fraud.

As we said during the campaign, any individual who has engaged in or benefited

from corruption or interference in judicial or electoral processes should expect his

visa application to be reviewed in light of Presidential Proclamation 7750 and all

U.S. laws relating to visa eligibility. Pursuant to the Proclamation, we have denied

the U.S. visa application of one prominent Ukrainian under Section 212(f) of the

U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act for engaging in serious corrupt activity, including in the Ukrainian electoral campaign.

We continue to review the behavior of senior officials of the Kuchma/Yanukovych

government and to consider whether further action may be in order in some cases.

Question. What is the new president’s position on Ukraine’s troops in Iraq? What

impact, if any, will Ukraine’s troop presence in Iraq have on your deliberations?

Answer. The U.S. and our Multinational Force (MNF) partners are very grateful

for Ukraine’s substantial troop contribution in Iraq. Ukraine has a 1,580-man troop

contingent in Iraq—one of the largest in the MNF. Ukraine also has contributed

peacekeepers in the Balkans, Africa, and Lebanon, and has provided support for Coalition operations in Afghanistan. These troops are making valuable contributions,

and we have encouraged Ukraine to continue to support these operations.

During the presidential election campaign in Ukraine, both leading candidates

said they would consider the possible withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Iraq.

Since the circumstances of any withdrawal are hypothetical at this point, I cannot

comment further on their implications.

Europe

Question. How can we improve U.S.-European relations? In your view, can gaps

between U.S. and European views regarding the role of multilateral institutions and

the use of force be bridged?

Answer. The continued strength of U.S.-European relations is shown in the common values we share, and our common efforts to address the challenges to the

transatlantic community. Although we have had sometimes very public disagreements with some European countries over Iraq and other issues, we are working

together effectively in counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, Afghanistan, promoting

democracy and reform in the Broader Middle East, Haiti, Darfur, the Balkans, and

many other areas.

In Iraq, even leaving aside our largest coalition partner, the United Kingdom, we

are working closely with many European nations to strengthen security and democratic institutions and to rebuild the economy. NATO is training senior military officers, and the European Union is playing an increasing role in providing technical

assistance and police training.

The President’s upcoming trip to Europe will take us still further in working together with our Europeans allies and friends, including through NATO and the European Union, to address the common challenges we face.

The U.S. consults with Europeans constantly through a variety of fora, bilaterally

with virtually all European countries and multilaterally through such institutions

as the UN, NATO and the EU. We often consult with our European friends and allies before taking positions in international meetings. We regularly discuss with European governments the need to ensure that multilateral institutions are effective

in carrying out their work. These consultations cover the widest spectrum imaginable, ranging from democracy promotion in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle

East to combating HIV/AIDS, fighting terrorism, and promoting economic growth

through free markets and competition.

We also engage a broad spectrum of European audiences in public fora in order

to ensure that our policies are understood. There is no substitute for personal contact as we advocate our policies. It is important also to consider how to increase

educational exchange with Europe.

Despite popular perceptions, the U.S. and Europe are working together more often

than not in both multilateral institutions and in the use of force. Although Europe

is proud of its ‘‘soft power,’’ its hard power is also essential: German soldiers are

playing a major role in promoting security in Afghanistan. France has taken a leading military role in peacekeeping in Africa, a French general is commanding the

ISAF mission, and France has special forces deployed with us in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Troops from the United Kingdom, Poland, Italy, and

many other European nations are playing a vital role in strengthening security and

building democracy in Iraq. And while popular attention focuses on U.S. military

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deployments, the United States regularly uses civilian experts, technical assistance,

public diplomacy, economic contacts, and a range of other diplomatic means to advance our objectives. America and Europe work together best when we both deploy

all the variety of resources at our disposal in addressing common challenges as we

are doing in so many areas today.

Question. What will be the administration’s priorities in NATO and for U.S.-EU

relations over the next four years? How can Washington best encourage its NATO

allies to strengthen enhanced military capabilities and develop mobile forces able to

project power beyond Europe?

Answer. The U.S. seeks in the EU a healthy, reliable partner that can help us

address the challenges of the 21st Century: building stable and secure democracies

in Iraq and Afghanistan; preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons; fighting

terrorism and WMD proliferation; promoting freedom, markets, social integration in

the Broader Middle East; finding a lasting solution to the Israel/Palestine situation;

and addressing lingering challenges in Eurasia and in Europe’s immediate neighborhood: Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Caucasus, the Balkans (especially

Kosovo).

On the economic side, we will seek to boost growth on both sides of the Atlantic,

by promoting economic reform and innovation, enhancing our trade and investment

relationship, and working jointly to speed global trade liberalization through the

WTO. We will also seek to resolve all outstanding trade disputes.

We welcome EU efforts to enhance its military capabilities and to create rapid response forces, as long as these efforts are consistent with Berlin Plus arrangements.

NATO remains the essential forum for transatlantic security, and we will continue to implement the historic decisions made by NATO leaders at Istanbul last

year: promote peace and stability in Afghanistan; train and equip Iraqi security

forces; maintain security in Kosovo; and reach out to partners in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

But NATO is only as strong as its capabilities. At Prague in 2002, NATO agreed

on the need to improve Alliance capabilities to meet current and future threats and

committed to acquiring the most needed capabilities, such as airlift, sealift, air refueling, and precision munitions. Progress has been made, but more work is needed.

We will continue to urge Allies to meet these capability commitments.

NATO is strengthening its ability to respond to contingencies quickly through the

creation of the NATO Response Force, which is expected to reach full operational

capability by 2006. We have been pleased to see Allies making substantial NRF

troop contributions.

The Balkans

Question. How does the administration plan to carry out its ‘‘Standards Before

Status’’ Review policy on Kosovo by mid-2005? What process can be established to

begin to address Kosovo’s status? Should status be considered if Kosovo has not

achieved progress on certain standards, such as security for the Serbian minority

in Kosovo? What will be the U.S. role in this process?

Answer. We remain committed to a secure, stable and multiethnic Kosovo that is

fully integrated into Europe. Resolving the issue of Kosovo’s status will be a major

step in achieving the President’s vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

The eight international standards for Kosovo cover everything from security to

rule of law to the economy. Their achievement will benefit the people of Kosovo no

matter what its future status. Kosovo has made some progress on the standards,

but much work remains.

The head of the UN Mission in Kosovo, Soren Jessen-Petersen, recently identified

a number of key indicators that Kosovo should focus on in the lead up to the mid2005 review. These are standards primarily designed to ensure the protection and

rights of Kosovo’s minority communities, notably the Serbs. Achievement of these

key standards, while ensuring there is no major outbreak of violence, would help

pave the way for a positive review.

At the same time, we are encouraging work to decentralize the administration of

Kosovo, which would give Serb communities a greater voice in education, health

care and possibly even justice issues, in municipalities where they have a large

presence.

We are actively engaged with the Contact Group—where we join the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the EU—as well as with the UN, in assessing Kosovo’s progress on the standards and in considering the possibility of

launching status discussions. We are also actively engaging Belgrade to ensure that

Serbia has a voice, but not a veto, in this process.

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The United States will be an active player in the mid-2005 review and in any status discussions that may be launched. However, Kosovo’s future, and that of its

neighbors, is as a part of Europe. We will expect our Allies and friends in the European Union to take a leading role in this process.

Question. Following examples in Macedonia and Bosnia, should peacekeeping duties in Kosovo be turned over from NATO to the European Union? Should the U.N.

Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) be reformed or restructured?

Answer. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 has governed the administration of

Kosovo since the end of NATO air campaign against the Milosevic regime in 1999.

Under 1244, UNMIK was established as the civil administration for Kosovo and a

NATO-led KFOR provides security. We are committed to both institutions.

The administration remains committed to the President’s ‘‘in together, out together’’ pledge but we seek to ‘‘hasten the day’’ when Kosovo will be stable enough

to stand without a NATO mission. While it is possible that either or both missions

could change as part of discussions on Kosovo’s status, it is premature to speculate

on what direction those discussions might take.

At their December meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to maintain a ‘‘robust KFOR’’ and to consider changes to its composition only as a result of an improved security situation on the ground. Soren Jessen-Petersen, appointed by Kofi

Annan to lead UNMIK last August, and his American deputy, Larry Rossin, have

brought a new dynamism to the mission that has greatly improved its effectiveness.

We will continue to work with UNMIK, the UN Secretariat in New York, and

other partners, such as the EU, to ensure that the mission is structured effectively

and operating smoothly, particularly in the run-up to the mid-2005 review and possible launch of discussions on Kosovo’s future status.

Question. Despite episodes of cooperation, Belgrade’s lack of compliance with its

commitments regarding the ICTY has held up Serbia and Montenegro’s efforts to

become more closely integrated into the EU and NATO. U.S. bilateral assistance

has also been curtailed. What is the way forward on this issue?

Answer. The United States remains strongly committed to supporting the work

of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and its efforts

to bring to justice those most responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. The United States and our allies have made clear that upholding

international obligations to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia remains the most serious obstacle to Serbia and Montenegro’s further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace.

We have called on all authorities in Serbia, especially Prime Minister Kostunica

as head of the government, to issue clear and unambiguous orders for cooperation

with the Tribunal, including the immediate apprehension and transfer to The

Hague of Ratko Mladic, the three indicted generals living openly in Belgrade and

all other fugitives hiding in the country.

We want to see Serbia succeed. We want to help Serbia and Montenegro integrate

into Euro-Atlantic structures to create a Europe whole, free and at peace. We look

forward to working with leaders in the state union and the Serbian Republic on a

variety of issues in the coming months. The U.S. is ready and eager to broaden and

deepen our relationship with Serbia and Montenegro and the Republic of Serbia.

But the way forward will depend on Belgrade’s actions to meet its international obligations. Serbia and Montenegro already faces consequences from its record of noncooperation, including the suspension of some U.S. assistance.

President Bush’s NDU Speech: IAEA Proposals

Last February, President Bush made several important proposals concerning the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),

and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

IAEA Proposals. The President made three proposals with regard to strengthening

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). First, he proposed that all states

should sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, and that signing of the Additional Protocol should be a condition for countries seeking equipment for their civilian nuclear

programs by next year. Second, he proposed that the IAEA Board of Governors create a special committee on safeguards and verification. And, third, he proposed that

no state under investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed to serve

or continue serving on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new special committee.

Question. What is the status of each of these proposals?

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Answer. Additional Protocol (AP)

We are actively engaged in a number of efforts to promote universal acceptance

of the safeguards agreements mandated under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT) as well as the related Additional Protocols. For the past several months we

have been engaged with other G-8 partners in diplomatic approaches to a variety

of states that have not yet concluded one or both of these agreements.

We are also actively engaged in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in advocating

signature of the AP as a condition of supply for transfers of nuclear trigger list

items and technology. A subsequent British/Austrian proposal would require AP implementation rather than only signature as a condition of nuclear supply by the end

of 2005. This is attracting broad support in the NSG, although a few states are reluctant to move ahead. We will continue to press for approval of the British/Austrian version of the President’s proposal.

There is substantial support for the President’s proposal to establish a special

committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to focus intensively on safeguards. At

last year’s summits, G-8 and EU leaders agreed to work together to establish such

a special committee, which would be responsible for preparing a comprehensive plan

for strengthened safeguards and verification. These leaders also agreed that the special committee should be made up of member states that are in compliance with

their NPT and IAEA commitments.

We have circulated a proposal for the mandate of this special committee to members of the IAEA Board of Governors, and expect the Board of Governors to take

this up in the coming year.

The President’s proposal that states under investigation for proliferation violations should not be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors or the proposed special committee was based on the principle that those actively breaking the

rules should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules. We have achieved broad support for this principle.

G-8 and EU leaders agreed that countries under investigation for non-technical

violations of their nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards obligations should elect

not to participate in decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors or the special committee regarding their own cases.

We are working to have this principle accepted by the Board of Governors. We

will also work to persuade each of the regional groups not to put forward as candidates for Board of Governors membership states that are under investigation.

Question. What is the current status of all U.S. diplomatic efforts to achieve universal adoption of the Additional Protocol?

Answer. We have long pressed for universal adherence to the Additional Protocol,

and are working actively with G-8 and EU leaders to achieve that goal. We are also

urging those states that have not yet done so to conclude promptly the safeguards

agreement required under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In particular, G-8 Foreign Ministers, led by Secretary Powell, agreed to write to their

counterparts worldwide and urge them to take the necessary steps.

We have also supported the IAEA’s global outreach efforts. We will continue this

work and use our actions on the U.S. Additional Protocol to demonstrate our commitment to strong IAEA safeguards.

I would like to thank the Senate and the members of this committee for your

prompt action in consenting to ratification of the U.S. Protocol. If confirmed, I look

forward to working with Congress on the passage of implementing legislation.

IAEA Referral of Cases of Noncompliance

Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA states that the Board of Governors, in

cases of non-compliance, ‘‘shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy

forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred’’ and ‘‘[t]he Board

shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and

General Assembly of the United Nations.’’

This language, however, appears to have been ignored given that no action was

taken by the United Nations on the IAEA’s report North Korean noncompliance in

2002 and we remained stalled in Vienna on Iran. Some experts believe that reporting to the UNSC is a formula for inaction and, therefore, risks undermining the

NPT.

Question. What do you think we should do to correct the impression that referral

to the UNSC might result in inaction at the UN thereby undermining the NPT,

starting with the case of North Korea?

Answer. Reporting of noncompliance with International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) safeguards to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is an important

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tool in enforcement of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(NPT). We should not shrink from its use. In the case of North Korea, reporting to

the Security Council has placed pressure on the North Korean regime to address

the international community’s concerns regarding its violations of the NPT.

While a report of noncompliance does not mandate any particular UNSC response,

the action alone makes an important statement. Reporting noncompliance to the

UNSC places the issue on the agenda of the international body with the legal authority to address threats to international peace and security. A demonstrated willingness by the IAEA Board of Governors to report noncompliance to the UNSC can

itself lead to positive movement on remedying noncompliance even before the IAEA

Board of Governors votes on a decision to report noncompliance. Moreover, the

Board of Governors has a responsibility to all NPT parties to safeguard their security and to place these matters before the UNSC. The Board of Governors cannot

shy from its duty under the IAEA Statute simply because it fears ‘‘inaction’’ by the

UNSC.

While the UNSC may not always pursue the action we would want in response

to a report of safeguards noncompliance from the IAEA Board of Governors, having

the weight of the UNSC behind the IAEA Board of Governors could be useful. This

is the case even when immediate action by the UNSC is not feasible (or perhaps

even desirable) under the circumstances of a particular case.

Question. Do you believe that any nation should be allowed to withdraw from the

NPT after violating it and not be held responsible for its violations?

Answer. No. Article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(NPT) should not be treated as an escape clause for Parties that violate the NPT.

Arms control and nonproliferation treaties typically have withdrawal clauses stating that a Party, in exercising ‘‘its national sovereignty,’’ shall have the right to

withdraw from the treaty if it believes that circumstances ‘‘jeopardizing its supreme

interests’’ justifying that action. Article X of the NPT contains such a provision.

However, if an NPT party exercises its right to withdraw when it is in violation of

the NPT, withdrawal does not excuse those violations. In some cases, a party may

be held responsible for violations that preceded its withdrawal from the NPT. Moreover, the United Nations Security Council and/or Parties to the NPT, may find it

necessary to take action against the withdrawing party based on legal authorities

separate from the NPT, even though the state is no longer Party to the NPT.

Question. As Secretary of State, how will you work to make sure that IAEA referral of noncompliance to the UNSC will no longer result in inaction at the United

Nations?

Answer. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I will work to ensure that any future

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors’ report of noncompliance with IAEA safeguards agreements to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is handled in the most effective way possible.

Every case of noncompliance is unique, and there is no one remedy. In some

cases, such as the one involving Romania in 1992, it may not be necessary for the

UNSC to take action other than noting that the noncompliance occurred and has

been remedied. Even in cases not already resolved, there also may be no immediate

need for punitive action. For example, it may be enough initially for the UNSC to

provide support to actions being taken by the IAEA to resolve the noncompliance.

In the toughest cases, those in which the violating state refuses to meet its obligations, sanctions may indeed be required to help compel the necessary compliance.

The gravity of noncompliance with the NPT must be addressed and in a manner

that ensures that noncompliance does not weaken the NPT or cause Parties to reassess their security calculations.

NPT 2005 Review Conference

Many experts have called for re-examination of the ‘‘atoms for peace’’ philosophy

that appears to sit at the heart of the NPT. Sometimes called ‘‘the nuclear bargain,’’

this thinking states that guarantees to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy ought

to be provided to any state forswearing nuclear weapons under the NPT. Thus,

states such as Iran argue that they have a ‘‘right’’ to fuel-cycle activity under the

NPT that could lead to a nuclear weapon. The plain terms of the NPT, though, seem

to suggest that a NNWS can only obtain the benefits of the nuclear bargain under

Article IV so long as they are in conformity with their obligations under Article II.

Question. Do you believe that the NPT contains a right to fuel-cycle activities, notably reprocessing of spent fuel and enrichment of fresh fuel?

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Answer. No, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) does

not create a right to engage in fuel-cycle activities. States have a right to develop

nuclear energy as a matter of national sovereignty. However, non-nuclear-weapon

state (NNWS) parties to the NPT—such as Iran—have undertaken a legal obligation

to pursue only a peaceful nuclear program, in conformity with the nonproliferation

obligations in NPT Article II and, by extension, the safeguards obligations in NPT

Article III.

Iran’s claims that its extensive, covert fuel-cycle activities, including enrichment

and reprocessing, are for peaceful, non-weapons purposes are belied by the fact that

they were not pursued in conformity with Iran’s Article III commitment, nor, we believe, were they in conformity with Article II. The only credible explanation for

Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing programs is that Iran is vigorously pursuing a

nuclear weapons capability. For nearly two decades, Iran procured technology for

and developed these programs in secret and in violation of the NPT. It deceived the

IAEA. Iran’s small and nascent nuclear research and power programs cannot justify

its expensive and troublesome nuclear program. In short, Iran cannot credibly argue

that the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes extends to its program of developing enrichment and reprocessing for clear weapons purposes.

There is no need to reconsider the atoms for peace ‘‘bargain’’ of the NPT. There

is an adequate nuclear fuel supply and compliant NPT parties are receiving ample

external assistance for their peaceful programs. Currently there is no need for new

states to establish reprocessing or enrichment capacity.

Parties do need to address the challenge posed by noncompliance with NPT nonproliferation obligations and ensure that parties pursue peaceful programs in ways

fully consistent with the NPT’s core nonproliferation obligations. Given the nature

of the technology, the recent record of parties pursuing this technology, and the adequacy of the nuclear fuel supply, NPT parties that currently do not have fully functioning reprocessing and enrichment plants should not pursue these technologies. In

keeping with the President’s February 2004 initiative, we are seeking to persuade

other supplier states not to supply such technologies to those parties that do not

possess fully functioning plants, but rather to ensure fuel supply at a reasonable

price. In the meantime, we should deal promptly with NPT violators that seek these

technologies, particularly in the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Question. Are the challenges posed by the fuel cycle the only challenges for the

NPT, or are there other areas in which the United States might focus attention during the 2005 Review Conference?

Answer. The fuel cycle is only one part of a broader challenge faced by the Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its parties: non-nuclearweapon state (NNWS) noncompliance with NPT nonproliferation obligations. Our

principal focus at the Review Conference (RevCon) will be on this challenge, and we

will cite Iran and the DPRK as the most pressing examples. We will urge others

to recognize the gravity of noncompliance, press all parties to insist on full compliance by all parties, and more to strengthen collective tools against proliferation.

In the last two decades four states—the DPRK, Iran, Iraq, and Libya—have violated their NPT nonproliferation obligations in an effort to produce nuclear weapons. These violations threaten the security of all NPT parties. Two of these cases

remain unresolved: the DPRK and Iran. The RevCon can provide vital political support to efforts such as the Six-Party Talks to resolve these cases. The RevCon can

reaffirm the NPT’s contribution to international security, the need for strict compliance with all of its provisions, the need for parties to address promptly and firmly

cases of noncompliance, and the need to strengthen the NPT to avert future cases

of noncompliance.

In addition to noncompliance, the RevCon should also consider the threat to international security posed by non-state actor interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and

non-state actor involvement in trafficking in nuclear materials, technology, and

equipment. We will pursue support for the President’s February 11, 2004 NDU proposals to address these challenges from noncompliance and non-state actors. In addition to restraint on enrichment and reprocessing, other key tools are the NPT Additional Protocol, the Proliferation Security Initiative, implementation of UNSCR

1540, and expansion of the G-8 Global Partnership. We will of course be prepared

to address the full range of issues we anticipate will be discussed at the RevCon.

Question. Do you believe that the NPT continues to serve the interests of the

international community, or has it been permanently weakened given the events in

Iran, North Korea or even South Korea to the point of making it irrelevant?

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Answer. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues

to be of fundamental importance to the interests of the international community.

The NPT is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and is vital to

the national security of its parties. It sets the standards by which we define nuclear

proliferation as a common security threat and provides essential mechanisms to respond to that threat.

The challenge posed by non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) noncompliance with

nonproliferation obligations is unquestionably serious, particularly those posed by

the unresolved cases of the DPRK and Iran. However, the proper response to these

challenges is to strengthen international resolve to compel compliance, not to devalue the Treaty itself.

The vast majority of NPT parties comply with their obligations. Four states relinquished nuclear weapons and adhered to the Treaty as NNWS; others relinquished

serious nuclear weapons ambitions to do the same. As many as 35 to 40 NPT NNWS

have the technological capability to pursue nuclear weapons but do not because they

perceive their security interests better protected by a strong NPT. The key challenge

for the United States and all responsible NPT parties is to ensure that this equation

does not change. Parties must address current cases of noncompliance and work to

prevent future cases. Parties must ensure that noncompliance does not weaken the

NPT or cause parties to reassess their security calculations. As part of this effort,

the United States will urge others to recognize the gravity of noncompliance, press

all parties to insist on full compliance by all other parties, and move to strengthen

collective tools against nonproliferation.

Nuclear Suppliers Group Proposals

The President also proposed that members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

should refuse to sell uranium enrichment or reprocessing equipment or technology

to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants.

Question. Neither the thirteenth nor fourteenth NSG Plenary meetings (at Pusan,

South Korea and Goteborg, Sweden) adopted the President’s proposals. Does the administration intend to continue advocating for these ideas in the NSG?

Answer. We introduced the President’s February 2004 proposal for blocking the

further spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology (ENR) into the

NSG’s Consultative Group (CG) meeting in March and pursued it in the May

Goteborg Plenary and in the October 2004 Consultative Group Meeting. (FYI—The

13th NSG Plenary in Pusan referred to in the question took place in May 2003, nine

months before the President’s speech.) The proposal has also been discussed in G8 meetings. The G-8 Leaders at Sea Island in June 2004 agreed to put in place longterm controls on ENR equipment and technology by their July 2005 Summit, and

in the interim to refrain for the next year from transfers involving such equipment

and technology to additional states. We are continuing to press for the President’s

original proposal at the NSG and in the G-8. Other members have suggested instead

establishing criteria by which to judge potential ENR transfers. We are discussing

with partners the possibility of an alternative, criteria-based approach which would

deny ENR technology or equipment to actual or potential proliferators. Thus far,

however, we have not identified criteria—other than those which the President proposed in February 2004—which would provide sufficiently strong protections against

ENR proliferation.

NSG Proposals

Question. As I noted in correspondence with the administration last April, China’s

entry into the NSG was preceded by its sale to Pakistan of two reactors. How do

you assess China’s record with regard to nuclear non-proliferation? Are you in any

way concerned with China’s ability to both control nuclear technology exported to

it from the United States or other countries as well as enforce necessary export controls over dual-use nuclear commerce?

Answer. President Clinton’s 1997 certification to the Congress that China ‘‘is not

assisting and will not assist any non-nuclear weapon state, either directly or indirectly, in acquiring nuclear explosive devices or the material and components for

such devices’’ remains valid. China has shown that it is serious in wanting to improve and strengthen implementation of its nuclear export control laws and regulations, including strengthening its ability to enforce nuclear export controls.

For example, in September 2003, China intercepted a shipment of chemicals that

could have been used in North Korea’s nuclear program. Chinese officials repeatedly

have emphasized China’s opposition to nuclear weapons proliferation and support

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for international nuclear nonproliferation efforts, including enhancing the effectiveness of the NPT, strengthening IAEA safeguards, and encouraging wider acceptance

of the Additional Protocol. In fact, China was the first nuclear weapon state to bring

an Additional Protocol into force. China has supported efforts to enhance physical

protection of nuclear material and strengthen international and national export controls. China has cited its establishment of a comprehensive legal system for nuclear,

chemical, biological and missile export controls in accordance with international

treaties and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Australia Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines. At the May 2004 NSG Plenary, China announced

it was adopting dual-use catchall provisions and full-scope safeguards as a condition

of nuclear supply.

However, vigilance is clearly required in the area of dual-use nuclear commerce

where Chinese enforcement against illicit transfers to countries of concern remains

inadequate. To that end, we have repeatedly raised with China the need for rigorous

enforcement of its export controls to prevent such transfers, and interdict

transhipments. Problems persist in Chinese export control implementation, enforcement and transparency. Exports by Chinese entities to sensitive countries continue

to be of concern and U.S. statutory sanctions continue to be applied against Chinese

companies, including sanctions for exports to Iran, pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. To encourage China’s movement in the right direction on

export controls, we held two export control talks with China in 2004, with specific

emphasis on implementation of nuclear export controls. These talks open possibilities for additional U.S.-China technical cooperation on enhancing nuclear export

controls.

NSPD–19 and Regulatory Issues

On November 21, 2002, the White House announced details of a National Security

Presidential Directive (NSPD-19) examining many aspects of U.S. defense trade controls law and policy.

Question. What is your understanding of the status of the administration’s promulgation of policies I understood to be contained in NSPD-19 or when President

Bush might sign it?

Answer. State, Defense, and Commerce concluded their review of defense trade

issues and held consultations with Congressional staff several months ago.

I believe the measures developed by the agencies are prudent and useful, but

whether the President will choose to have the measures implemented is a matter

for his decision.

Question. What do you understand to be the specific regulatory changes associated

with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (the ITAR, 22 CFR 120–130) on

which some of NSPD-19 bears, and what specific changes to the ITAR would you

envision being necessary as a result of President Bush’s potential signature of

NSPD-19? Would any part of NSPD-19 require amendments to the Arms Export

Control Act?

Answer. Some of the measures recommended by the interagency review would require changes to the ITAR, and one would require a change to the AECA , but as

noted previously, all the agency recommendations are a matter for Presidential decision.

Question. What are the specific problems created by the current regulatory environment under the ITAR for allied interoperability, controls on U.S. defense articles,

services and technical data once they are exported, and the 21st century defense industrial global marketplace?

Answer. The ITAR has served its primary objective, which is to ensure that exports of U.S defense articles and services support U.S. national security and foreign

policy interests, and to keep such articles and services out of the hands of potential

adversaries. The licensing process can be cumbersome; many improvements have

now been made. But we need to pay attention to how we manage 60,000 license applications valued at nearly $100 billion in proposed exports each year. Overregulation can harm our ability to control sensitive goods and support legitimate coalition

and alliance efforts.

Coalition operations in the Global War on Terrorism have reinforced the importance of ensuring that our friends and allies have timely access to U.S. defense technology in order to fight effectively alongside our forces against our common enemies.

In addition, rapid advances in defense technologies and changes in the U.S. and forVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00243 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 CRICE.004 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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eign defense industries require us to look for ways to make our laws, regulations,

and procedures as timely and effective as possible in advancing our objectives.

Question. Will you continue to respect the long-standing practice of pre-notification of commercial arms sales to Congress under section 36 (c) of the Arms Export

Control Act (22 USC 2276(c))?

Answer. The Executive Branch has a strong interest in ensuring U.S. arms transfers enjoy the benefit of congressional oversight. We will continue to comply with

the Congressional notification requirements of Sec. 36 of the AECA.

If confirmed, I intend to work with the Congress to ensure that the oversight process promotes effective consultation so that we may better understand the Members’

perspectives in our management of this important defense export function.

Question. There were multiple changes to the United States Munitions List (the

USML, 22 CFR Part 121) in both 2003 and 2004. Do you envision any additional

changes in 2005, either as a part of the NSPD-19 process or other administration

reviews of the USML? If so, which USML categories might be amended?

Answer. Considerable effort has gone into reviewing the USML since 2001. Of the

21 categories in the Munitions List, 10 have been revised and published in the Federal Register. Eight additional categories are completed, near completion or being

reviewed by State, Commerce, and DOD, so I expect there will be additional changes

in the near future. I expect this process to continue, as the USML continues to be

out of date.

As required by law, removals from the USML will be notified to the Congress.

Pakistan: Arms Sales and Policy Linkages

In November 2004, the State Department notified Congress of three Foreign Military Sales (FMS) sales to Pakistan under 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, ‘‘the

Act’’, (22 USC 2776(b)). The three sales had not received, by long-standing and wellestablished practice, the pre-clearance of the majority and minority sides of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These sales to Pakistan were notified without resolution of many issues and questions surrounding arms sales to Pakistan during

pre-consultations on these cases.

Question. If you are confirmed to the position of Secretary, your Department will

coordinate FMS with the Defense Department. Will you respect the long-standing

practice of pre-notification of FMS to this committee?

Answer. We will continue to comply with the Congressional notification requirements contained in the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance

Act.The Executive Branch has a strong interest in ensuring that U.S. arms transfers enjoy Congressional support. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I intend to

work with Congress to ensure that these objectives are met.

Question. What is the administration’s overall policy with respect to arms sales,

government or commercial, to South Asia?

Answer. The U.S. Government’s overall policy for the conduct of arms sales, government or commercial, is governed by the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. These legislative parameters are codified by the Conventional

Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy with the Department of State having been given statutory oversight for arms transfers and military export programs. Conventional arms

sales are a legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy, designed and implemented

to serve U.S. foreign policy and national security requirements. To this end, defense

trade with the countries of South Asia is consistent with existing conventional arms

transfer policy.

With the lifting of sanctions against India and Pakistan in 2002, the Department

has applied the CAT policy with rigor and deliberation to all countries of South

Asia. Arms sales, particularly commercial licenses, have increased significantly over

the past three years. The Department applies the rigor required of the CAT policy

to all arms sales in order to ensure U.S. national security interests are being served

and that regional stability factors are duly weighed. Utilization of Foreign Military

Sales (government-to-government arms sales) has not yet reached its potential. Increased Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Pakistan, and continuity of message

to the Government of India will help achieve greater reliance on government-to-government arms sales in the coming years.

We are mindful of the importance of not fueling a potentially destabilizing arms

race between India and Pakistan. That said, both countries have legitimate defense

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needs. U.S. defense sales are a means of helping them address those needs in a way

that is consistent with our foreign policy objectives.

Question. I have read many reports with respect to the potential sale to Pakistan

of FMS under F-16’s. Should the sale, particularly if it is financed by the U.S. taxpayer, be conditioned on greater access by U.S. officials to A.Q. Khan and increased

efforts by the Pakistan Government to counter all forms of terrorism emanating

from its territory, especially given the potential regional repercussions of such a

sale?

Answer. Pakistan sent the U.S. government a Letter of Request for 18 Block 50

F-16 aircraft in July 2004. The administration has not made a final decision on

Pakistan’s request. We will continue to consult closely with Congress on this matter.

Since July, Pakistan has made substantial progress in the war on terror, has

acted decisively to shut down A.Q. Khan’s proliferation activities, and has pursued

peace with India. The GoP has raised the issue of F-16s with us on a number of

occasions. It is a conversation we will continue to have. If confirmed, I will of course

be available to address questions of this kind with the committee, perhaps in a

closed session.

Question. Public press reports indicate that Pakistan and Iran have completed a

formal defense cooperation agreement. Does such cooperation increase any concerns

you may have with respect to Pakistan’s ability to keep sensitive U.S. arms and

technology out of the hands of state sponsors of terror, namely Iran?

Answer. Pakistan and Iran share a common border and maintain correct relations. The administration is aware of discussions and agreements between Pakistan

and Iran on defense-related matters.

In August 2004, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported that Iran’s DefMin Ali

Shamkhani and GoP acting DefMin Haid Nawaz Khan signed an MOU expanding

defense ties and setting up a joint commission for defense cooperation. It remains

unclear whether the August visit and subsequent MOU will lead to a significant increase in Pakistani-Iranian defense trade.

We have expressed our concerns about this issue to the Government of Pakistan

on multiple occasions. On August 19, 2004, the South Asia Bureau stressed to officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense the comprehensiveness of USG law and policy on diversions of U.S.-licensed equipment and technology to third parties and access by third parties to the equipment and technology.

The Assistant Secretary of the Political-Military Bureau reinforced these points with

MFA officials in Islamabad at the end of August.

In our discussions, we have made clear the potential implications for U.S.-Pakistan relations of defense-related cooperation between Pakistan and Iran. Subsequently, those discussions were relayed to your staffs. It is also worth noting that

Iran has also pursued closer defense ties with India simultaneously, even engaging

in joint naval maneuvers. Iran is looking for allies to break out of its strategic isolation and Pakistan is one of several countries with which Iran is engaged. We will

continue to monitor this issue. If confirmed, I will of course be available to address

questions of this kind with the committee, perhaps in a closed session.

Question. Do you know of any past cases of transfers from Pakistan to other countries of U.S. defense items which could result in sanctions for illegal transfers of

lethal military equipment (LME)?

Answer. Any discussion on this topic will have to be classified. If confirmed, I will

of course be available to address questions of this kind with the committee, perhaps

in a closed session.

RD–180: Goals and Policy

Commercial space launch vehicle cooperation with Russian entities has been seen

as a means of preventing the diversion of ballistic missile technical knowledge and

equipment to rogue states such as Iran or North Korea and achieving a domestic

production capability for advanced and unique Russian systems.

Until 2004, the State Department had continued licensed cooperation with NPOEnergomash for co-production of the RD-180 engine under a contract with United

Technologies Corporation. Pratt and Whitney and Lockheed Martin on a limited

basis. In 2004, the Department submitted four licenses to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, three of which, (DTC 018–04, 019–04 and 020–04) were authorizations that extended the validity of these licenses beyond the annual duration under

which they had been previously notified. A subsequent authorization DTC 086–04,

was received by the committee in the later part of 2004. All of these licenses were

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approved on the understanding that the goal of these arrangements was to achieve

a U.S. production capability for the RD–180 and prevent proliferation of this technology. Yet, Russian ballistic missile proliferation appears to have continued, as the

Central Intelligence Agency’s most recent Unclassified Report to Congress on the

Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced

Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, notes.

Question. What is your understanding of U.S. goals and policy with respect to licenses for the RD-180, both with regard to a timeframe for domestic U.S. production

and whether this licensing arrangement has, in fact, served U.S. non-proliferation

concerns in Russia?

Answer. Industry-to-industry contact can be an effective nonproliferation tool. We

have repeatedly made the point to Russia that it is important that the Russian aerospace industry not assist missile programs in problem countries if it wants to enjoy

the benefits of space cooperation with the United States. Export arrangements for

the RD-180 program have been scrutinized at the highest levels of the Department

to ensure that the progress of the program has been in line with our nonproliferation objectives.

According to United Technologies, the current contract phase will allow for the

building of critical engine components and establishment of a capability to produce

such systems in the United States. It is currently estimated that a co-production

facility in the United States will be completed in 2007.

Question. How do you assess Russia’s ballistic missile proliferation, both with regard to steps the Russian Government has undertaken to prevent such proliferation

and its failures to prevent it (as can be inferred from the latest CIA report to Congress)?

Answer. We continue to have concerns about the Iranian missile program and its

efforts to acquire missile technology from Russian sources.

We use every opportunity to make our concerns known to the Russian Government, to urge Russia to cut-off the flow of sensitive items to Iran, and continue to

use the leverage afforded by U.S. space launch cooperation to seek better Russian

controls.

As a result, Russia has taken some steps to address the problem of Russian supply to Iran’s missile program, including implementation of strengthened export control laws and enforcement.

But we remain concerned that Russia has not done enough to thwart Iranian missile-related procurement. Russia’s enforcement efforts remain inadequate, and the

Iranian missile program continues to have access to missile-related technologies

from Russian entities.

Museum Project

Question. The Department has set aside a space and promised to provide staff and

security if private funds are raised for exhibits for the planned national museum

of American diplomacy. What is the status of this project? Will it be completed during your tenure?

Answer. The Department shares with the Congress, the White House and other

Federal institutions a commitment to make the work of our government more accessible to the American people. As with the Capitol Visitor Center, the Department’s

Visitor Center and Museum of American Diplomacy will provide an engaging place

where citizens can come to learn how diplomacy was crucial in shaping our nation

and how the work of the Department affects the lives of all Americans every day.

Only an informed public will lend us their full support.

Working closely with our non-profit partner, the Foreign Affairs Museum Council,

the Department has laid the groundwork for this project by creating a design concept that will draw visitors to the Department; finalizing a fundraising strategy that

will ensure adequate private sector support; and creating an office, the United

States Diplomacy Center, to oversee and manage the project. The Foreign Affairs

Museum Council will assist in raising $25 million in private funds for design and

fabrication of the exhibitions and has already raised over $1.2 million to support the

design effort

This project began as a Department exhibit, expanding to its future 18,000-

square-foot location within the Harry S Truman Building as its potential as a public

resource was realized. The three immediate preceding Secretaries of State have supported the project and all living former Secretaries of State are Honorary Directors

of the Foreign Affairs Museum Council. The Chairman of the Board of Directors is

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Senator Charles McC. Mathias and Ambassador Stephen Low serves as President.

Senator Sarbanes is also on the Board of Directors.

The Visitor Center and Museum of American Diplomacy will operate in conjunction with an adjacent, publicly accessible conference center and auditorium at the

Department’s 21st Street entrance. Together, the two will provide programs and

events that enhance the Department’s public outreach efforts.

The United States Diplomacy Center is working closely with the Bureaus of administration and Diplomatic Security to address safety and security concerns. Visitors to the centers will pass through an exterior security pavilion with x-ray and

magnetometer screening devices. Both centers will be outside the security hard line.

Global Environment Facility

Question. Since 1994, the United States has been part of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The GEF has committed $4.2 billion in grants, and leveraged

$11 billion in additional financing for more than 1,000 sustainable development

projects in 160 countries. The U.S. is behind in its dues by $139.8 million. Our dues

for FY05 are $177 million.

Is the administration committed to supporting the GEF, correcting our arrears,

and paying our dues this year on time?

Answer. The United States remains committed to supporting the GEF. The U.S.

is the largest contributor to this important fund, whose projects have resulted in significant environmental and development benefits in over 160 countries.

The United States pledged $107.5 million per year for each of the four years of

the 2003–2006 GEF replenishment period, in exchange for the GEF adopting specific reforms, including the adoption of a performance allocation system, by the end

of the replenishment period. We volunteered to seek an additional $70 million if the

reforms were in place by November 2004, which unfortunately did not occur. In addition, we committed to seek additional contributions to pay off earlier U.S. arrears

during this same period.

We will continue to work with the Congress to ensure that the GEF successfully

meets its objectives under the 3rd replenishment agreement, particularly those concerning performance and transparency. Although the administration sought a total

of $153 million in arrears in fiscal years 2003 to 2005, Congress only provided $65

million over these three years. So it is clear that it will take longer to pay off arrears than originally anticipated.

Over the past three years, the United States has actively pressed for significant

improvements in the GEF’s operations. As part of the 2003–2006 replenishment

deal, the GEF agreed to establish a transparent performance-based allocation system to ensure effective use of assistance funds.

While some very real improvements have been made in the GEF as a result of

U.S. initiatives, we are concerned that this performance-based allocation program

has not yet been put in place. The progress made in implementing this program

could be a factor in decisions on future U.S. contributions.

India-Pakistan Dialogue

Question. The U.S. has played an important role over the last two years in getting

India and Pakistan back to the negotiating table. How can the U.S. most effectively

use the strong ties we have developed with both sides to encourage further progress

on the India-Pakistan dialogue?

Answer. We welcome the positive developments in relations between India and

Pakistan. The agreement last January to resume a wide ranging dialogue, with the

objective of reaching a peaceful settlement on all bilateral issues including Kashmir,

was a real breakthrough. The efforts that have been made by both governments

since then to move the Composite Dialogue forward are encouraging.

The conflict between India and Pakistan has deep roots. Ultimately, it will be up

to both countries to resolve their differences. They must make the determination to

accept the dictates of geography and recognize that there is no alternative to getting

along with their neighbor. The decision to enter into a dialogue and their success

in sustaining it throughout 2004 is testament to the fact that a desire for peace is

growing in both nations. Our aim is to develop strong, separate relationships with

India and Pakistan. I think we are succeeding, and we were able to put those good

relationships to use during our efforts to reduce tensions in the region when they

have flared during the last few years.

U.S. efforts to encourage the Indo-Pak peace process—some public, some private—

are centered on nudging both countries to sustain dialogue and positive engagement. While we strongly support the dialogue process, we do not see ourselves as

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mediators or taking a direct role. We stand ready to provide any assistance requested by both sides.

Pakistan: Cutting Off Support for Kashmiri Militancy

Question. U.S. officials in the past have said that we cannot push the Musharraf

government too hard on the issue of cutting support to Kashmiri militants because

of the myriad other issues on our agenda with Pakistan and out of concern that we

might contribute to destabilizing his regime by asking him take on too many vested

interest at once. However, many of the Pakistan-based militants training to fight

in Kashmir have links to international terrorists, including those that target U.S.

personnel in Afghanistan. How do we plan to work with the Musharraf government

to ensure all official support (financing, training, and other) to Pakistan-based militancy is halted?

Answer. The U.S. Government is concerned about the activities of Kashmiri militant groups. We have repeatedly made clear to the Pakistani Government that it

must continue its efforts to close all Kashmiri militant training camps and halt all

militant infiltration across Kashmir’s Line of Control (LOC). The Pakistani Government has formally banned several major extremist organizations, including Kashmiri militant groups, and has prohibited donations to these groups. We look forward

to working with Pakistan and the international community at large to intensify the

effort to cut off money flows to these groups.

Pakistan: Support for President Musharraf

Question. The U.S. has taken a fairly neutral position on the issue of Musharraf

maintaining his dual role as President and Chief of Army Staff, leading many U.S.

observers, as well as Pakistanis, to criticize U.S. policy as being too ‘‘Musharraf-centric.’’ How do you react to this criticism? How can we continue to encourage real

progress on democracy in Pakistan over the next few years?

Answer. The U.S. Government is committed to a long-term relationship with Pakistan that goes beyond individuals. Pakistan’s transition to a sustainable democracy

with strong democratic institutions is among our top policy goals in Pakistan. We

regularly impress upon our interlocutors in the Pakistani Government the need to

continue to make progress on democratization, including holding free and fair multiparty elections in 2007, as scheduled.

The U.S. Government is assisting Pakistan’s own democratization efforts through

USG-funded programs aimed at making Pakistani democracy more participatory,

representative, and accountable. This includes strengthening national and provincial

legislatures, political parties, NGO’s, and independent media.

North Korea

Question. North Korea continues to insist on a ‘‘security guarantee’’ from the

United States. Under what conditions is such a guarantee possible, and how would

it be structured?

Answer. The proposal that we tabled at the last round of Six-Party Talks, in June

2004, included the provision of a multilateral security assurance if the North were

to commit to dismantle its nuclear programs in a permanent, transparent and thorough manner, subject to effective verification, and begin taking the steps we outlined in our proposal to commence the dismantlement process.

As we told the North in our proposal, upon acceptance of the DPRK’s initial declaration of its nuclear programs, and while it verifiably undertakes the initial dismantlement steps outlined in our proposal, the parties would provide provisional

multilateral security assurances, which would become more enduring as the process

proceeded. These would include assurances that no party had any intention to invade or attack another, as well as a commitment on the part of all parties to respect

the territorial integrity of others.

We have made clear to North Korea and all of the members of the Six-Party process that the U.S. will not provide a bilateral security assurance to the North. As

North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is a multilateral concern, the U.S. will

participate in only a multilateral security assurance. President Bush has, however,

made clear that the United States has no intention of invading or attacking North

Korea.

U.S.-China Relations

Question. Several East Asian leaders have expressed frustration to committee

Members over what they view as mixed messages from the Executive branch on the

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cross-Strait issue involving China and Taiwan. Could you explain our nation’s ‘‘OneChina’’ policy? Is it your understanding President Bush intends to continue this approach? Under what circumstances would the U.S. come to the assistance of Taiwan

in case of attack?

Answer. President Bush remains committed to our One-China Policy based on the

three Joint Communique ́s and on the Taiwan Relations Act.

Our establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China

rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful

means. We oppose unilateral moves by either side to change the status quo.

To this end, we make available to Taiwan arms of a defensive character, and we

maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other

forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

We consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful

means, including by boycotts or embargoes, to be a threat to the peace and of grave

concern to the United States.

The President will promptly inform the Congress of any threat to the security or

the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan. The President and the Congress would then decide on appropriate action by the United States in response to

any such danger.

Question. During your visit to Beijing in July 2004, what areas of agreement and

disagreement did you find concerning U.S. and PRC information on North Korean

nuclear weapon programs? Has China shared any information on Pakistani scientist

A. Q. Khan’s nuclear sales? How might China be more helpful in using its ‘‘considerable influence with North Korea?’’

Answer. We have briefed our Six-Party partners on our assessment of North Korea’s nuclear programs, including its uranium enrichment program. The evidence we

have supports that assessment.

We continue to have close consultations with all of our Six-Party partners, including China, on the nuclear issue. Our allies and other partners in the Six-Party talks

share our concerns about North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons.

As coordinator and host of the Six-Party talks, China has been active in all aspects of the Talks, including working groups and formal plenary discussions, as well

as during the intervals between plenary sessions. We have encouraged China to be

an active participant, and not just a mediator in the Six-Party talks.

We also told China that they must work harder at convincing North Korea’s Kim

Chong-il that North Korea must return to the Six-Party talks and must commit to

the dismantlement of their entire nuclear program, to include their uranium enrichment program—which North Korea continues to deny having

There is a concerted, worldwide investigation into the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. China supports the international community’s efforts to shut down the network.

Question. China is rapidly accelerating its diplomatic and business ties to Southeast Asia. Whether to locate necessary resources to meet growing energy demands

or to increase cooperation in agricultural trade and economic development, China

is aggressively reaching out to ASEAN. Recently agreement was reached to pursue

the China-ASEAN Free Trade Zone. How will such economic ties impact U.S. security and trade interests in the region?

Answer. China’s outreach to ASEAN has indeed accelerated in recent years. The

outreach takes the primary form of economic engagement, a fact that has political

and strategic implications for the United States. Nevertheless, the United States

continues to be a major player in the economy of the Asia-Pacific region, and U.S.

ties with ASEAN are strong and growing stronger.

China’s recent outreach has included the November 2004 ‘‘early tariff reduction

agreement’’ between China and ASEAN countries, which will begin reducing duties

in mid-2005, prior to the projected 2010 conclusion of the China-ASEAN Free Trade

Area.

Countries in Asia increasingly view Beijing as a positive economic force in the region. For example, Beijing pledged more than $20 million to support work in agriculture, information technology, education and Mekong River Basin Development

under the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. Because final processing of goods

has generally migrated to China in recent years, ASEAN enjoys a significant trade

surplus with China.

Nonetheless, the strength of the U.S. economy means we will remain a top trading partner for most Asian nations. China’s free trade agreements with other Asian

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economies are unlikely to dramatically reduce that dominance. The United States

has over $120 billion in trade annually with ASEAN countries. Over time, development in China and other Asian countries might enable them to compete more aggressively with us in high-tech and service sectors. We will work hard to ensure

that competition with China and other rising economies takes place within the context of a rules-based system. We are working to strengthen U.S.-ASEAN relations

through the President’s Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, which focuses on improving trade ties, and the ASEAN Cooperation Plan, which supports cooperative programs, including in the economic area.

More broadly, we will continue strong economic engagement in Asia, working with

our long-term partners, South Korea and Japan, and strengthening regional fora

such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

Broader Latin America

Question. How would you define success with Latin America at the end of your

tenure?

Answer. Thirty-three of our thirty-four neighbors in the Western Hemisphere

enjoy the benefits of democratic government. Most share a commitment to free market principles.

One of the key goals of the Bush administration is consolidation of democratic

rule in our hemisphere. Hopefully, that will include a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba in the near future.

The administration’s strategy for the Western Hemisphere is built on secure borders and commitments to democracy, free markets and economic integration. True

success will be the extension of economic opportunity to all citizens of the Western

Hemisphere, working to liberate millions more from the tyranny of poverty, inadequate education and crime.

Question. How can we best reverse negative public opinion in the region toward

the United States? Do we need a change in our policies toward the region or is it

a problem of communication?

Answer. Press reports to the contrary, mid-2004 polls show the U.S. is well respected in most countries in the region. Majorities in 12 of 17 countries polled hold

a good image of the United States. Majorities of two-thirds or more in 13 countries

see good ties between their country and the United States. Citizens of Central

America, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru hold the most positive opinions of

the U.S. Six in ten Mexicans have a positive image of the U.S., and two-thirds assess bilateral relations as good.

We will build on these good relations by expanding our outreach efforts, including

educational, press, and economic exchanges, throughout the hemisphere. We will

continue to counter negative claims by the Cuban and Venezuelan governments and

highlight the USG’s sustained efforts to improve the lives of millions in the hemisphere.

Question. Could you list in order of importance challenges facing U.S. interests

in the region?

Answer. Our challenges in the Western Hemisphere include:

• Securing our borders by developing capacity for governments to exercise effective sovereignty and provide basic security over their territories.

• Strengthening democratic institutions by promoting representative, constitutional government as the only legitimate form of political organization in our

hemisphere.

• Ensuring economic opportunity by bringing economic benefits to all, not just the

rich or powerful.

• Investing in people by fomenting policies and programs to allow all citizens a

‘‘share’’ of prosperity and quality of life.

President Bush’s strategy and vision for the hemisphere provides the roadmap for

responding to these challenges and achieving full implementation of the economic

and social reforms needed to deliver the benefits of democracy to all citizens of this

hemisphere.

North American Border Security

Question. What progress has been made in implementing ‘‘Smart Border Declaration’’ agreements with Canada and with Mexico? What other policies are being imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00250 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 CRICE.004 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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plemented to improve hemispheric border security? What will you do during your

tenure to gain improved cooperation with Mexico and Canada on border security?

Answer. The Smart Border Partnership Action Plans continue to be the framework for United States border security cooperation with Canada and Mexico.

The United States is pleased with Mexican and Canadian cooperation under these

Plans. Through Congressional authorization, we have provided assistance to Mexico

to strengthen border controls, such as:

• 13 state-of-the-art inspection (VACIS) systems in Mexican customs facilities,

and mobile X-Ray inspection units in some Mexican cities.

• Expansion of a secure electronic network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection lanes.

• Training for over 350 Mexican officials on border safety issues.

If I am confirmed, I will continue our collaborative efforts under existing plans

while seeking opportunities for new initiatives to further border security in hemisphere.

Unilateral United States programs, such as US-VISIT and passport requirements

for American citizens, further improve hemispheric security.

Beyond our collaboration with Mexico and Canada on contiguous border security,

we work in multilateral fora, including the Organization of American States InterAmerican Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), and with regional partners. Examples of such cooperation include:

• President Bush’s Third Border Initiative to focus attention, including security

upgrades, on our border with the nations of the Caribbean Basin.

• In Central America, the United States supports a variety of anti-smuggling initiatives, including the Container Freight Tracking System.

• Our on-going ‘‘3+1’’ Counterterrorism Dialogue with Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina has made significant steps to enhance border security and build

counterterrorism finance capacity in that region.

Question. Though the ‘‘Smart Border’’ declarations with Mexico and Canada further enhance the security of the borders and the flow of commerce, these agreements are largely dependent on current government-to-government relations. There

is no legal framework within which to implement these agreements. Under your

leadership, what will the Department do to create an institutional framework to

deal with hemispheric border security? Given that Guatemala is the southern border to the NAFTA space, should Guatemala be included?

Answer. Agreements, letters of intent, statements of mutual understanding, and

other arrangements that have been developed in the past several years shape our

security cooperation with Mexico and Canada.

With Canada, the Smart Border Accord is the framework. The Canadian

Preclearance Act provides authority for U.S. border inspectors working in Canada.

In Mexico, the 22-Point Border Partnership Action Plan, signed in 2002, provides

a framework. Letters of agreement with Mexico have been negotiated for the use

of Congressionally-authorized funds to improve border security.

The U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission, which has met annually for 23 years, includes cabinet-level bi-national discussion of border security and cooperation.

The U.S.-Canada Cross-Border Crime Forum provides similar opportunity for senior officials of our countries to review security efforts.

The United States has a multifaceted law enforcement program with Guatemala,

including enhancement of border ports of entry. The work is part of a larger Central

American regional program to improve border controls. The Government of Mexico

actively cooperates with the Government of Guatemala to combat smuggling and

other threats along the Mexico/Guatemala border.

Venezuela

Question. Has the administration drawn up contingency plans in the event of another suspension of oil exports from Venezuela? Should arrangements be made with

other regional oil producers to replace a Venezuelan shortfall? What other contingency plans should be made?

Answer. The United States and Venezuela have traditionally enjoyed a strong,

mutually beneficial energy relationship. Venezuela is among the largest suppliers of

petroleum to the United States. The United States is the single largest destination

for Venezuelan oil.

We strongly believe this energy relationship remains in the national interests of

both countries.

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As outlined in our National Energy Policy, we are constantly working to enhance

our energy security through promoting increasing diversity of global energy suppliers.

Question. How can the United States press for Venezuelan adherence to democratic standards without appearing to interfere in Venezuelan affairs?

Answer. Pressing for adherence to democratic standards is not interference in the

internal affairs of another country. It is the right thing to do. As a signatory to the

Inter-American Democratic Charter and other instruments, Venezuela must honor

its commitments to uphold democracy, human rights and the rule of law. We are

increasingly concerned about the continued deterioration of democratic institutions—unchecked concentration of power in the executive, politicization of the judiciary and increased threats to basic democratic and civil rights.

We are working with our hemispheric and international partners and the Organization of American States to help strengthen democracy in Venezuela. We continue

to press the Venezuelan government to honor its constitutional and international

commitments to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Additionally, we continue to engage civil society and democratic nations that share our values and concerns.

In August 2002, the United States Agency for International Development established the ‘‘Venezuela Confidence Building Initiative’’ to strengthen the country’s

fragile democratic institutions by working with independent organizations to facilitate and enhance dialogue and support constitutional processes. We will continue

to look for ways to enhance our support to democratic institutions in Venezuela and

elsewhere. Support for democracy is a cornerstone of President Bush’s foreign policy.

Question. Currently the level of our direct engagement with the Venezuelan government is through our ambassador in Caracas. Do you intend to elevate this level

of contact?

Answer. Our two countries traditionally have enjoyed close, friendly relations

based on shared democratic values. We lament this historic relationship has deteriorated due to the actions and rhetoric of the Government of Venezuela (GOV).

Our relations are conducted in Caracas through our Ambassador and in Washington between the Department of State and the Venezuelan ambassador to the

United States. In June, we accepted a GOV proposal for a bilateral working group.

Although the GOV informed us of the intention to send two special representatives

to Washington to explore the idea, the Venezuelan government never followed

through.

Our Ambassador has been in Caracas for nearly five months and has only been

granted a handful of meetings with Venezuelan officials in Caracas. Regrettably, the

actions of the Government of Venezuela do not appear to indicate a desire to improve bilateral relations.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Tenure as National Security Adviser

Question. Section 108 of the National Security Act requires submission to Congress of a ‘‘national security strategy report’’ on an annual basis. Such a strategy

report is also required within 150 days after a new President takes office. During

this administration, this report has been submitted to the Congress only once, in

September 2002. As Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, is it

not your responsibility to assure the preparation and submission of this report? Why

has the administration failed to comply with this legal requirement?

Answer. Unlike previous national security strategies, President Bush’s National

Security Strategy of September 2002 was meant to be an enduring document, one

that would last for more than a year. Significant time and resources were dedicated

to producing a comprehensive strategic document that would reflect the President’s

vision and his specific priorities and initiatives to protect our national security over

the next several years and beyond. It was a top down document that required Principals’ time and that of the President. We have reviewed the September 2002 strategy during each of the last two years and believe that it remains valid today. I regret, however, that we did not communicate this conclusion to Congress. The administration plans to update the strategy to take account of significant developments

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since its publication, including the war in Iraq, and to submit an update to Congress

this year.

In the last six months of 2004, you gave 11 public speeches, nine of which were

delivered in states that were considered important ‘‘battlegrounds’’ in the 2004 presidential election, including Oregon, Washington, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Florida.

Question. (a). Please comment on why you believe it was appropriate to deliver

these speeches in such ‘‘battleground’’ states during the presidential campaign period. Why did you not have a concern that these appearances—inasmuch as all of

them (but one) occurred after the Democratic and Republican national conventions

and prior to Election Day—might be construed as partisan political activity?

(b). Do you agree that, as Secretary of State, you should abstain from activities

that might be construed as partisan political activity?

Answer. By tradition and custom, the National Security Advisor does not actively

participate in public campaign or political events, and I have continued that tradition. However, I do not believe that this means being non-accessible. At a period

in U.S. history when national security has been very much on the minds of the

American people, I have found it important, throughout my tenure as National Security Advisor, to discuss the President’s national security policies in public speeches . It is also important to me to make myself accessible not just in Washington

but to citizens in their communities and to local reporters. Because of concerns expressed by some members of Congress, I understand that all of my speeches in 2004

were reviewed by the Office of Special Counsel, which concluded that they were

standard policy speeches that did not involve partisan political activity or campaigning. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I intend to continue the tradition in

that position of not actively participating in public campaign or political events.

9/11 Attacks

Question. Looking back at the period between January 20, 2001 and September

11, 2001, do you believe there is anything you should or could have done differently

to assist the President to try to prevent the 9/11 attacks?

Answer. I believe that we did everything that was appropriate and possible at the

time to protect the American people and our interests from terrorist attacks. I do

not believe there was a single ‘‘silver bullet’’ that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks. As I said during my testimony before the 9/11 Commission, ‘‘In hindsight, if

anything might have helped stop 9/11, it would have been better information about

threats inside the United States, something made difficult by structural and legal

impediments that prevented the collection and sharing of information by our law enforcement and intelligence agencies.’’ This view is shared by the 9/11 Commission,

which found that government institutions failed to adapt to the threat of terrorism,

enabling the terrorists to exploit ‘‘deep institutional failings within our government’’

caused by a variety of factors spanning many years, many departments, and multiple administrations.

On July 13, 2001, you gave a speech at the National Press Club. You indicated

that mid-July was ‘‘as good a time as any to start making some observations on how

[the administration was] doing.’’ The speech started by listing the President’s priorities, and then reviewed some of these priorities, such as relations with Europe and

Africa, and missile defense. A noticeable omission was the subject of terrorism,

which was mentioned only as a challenge that faced Africa. The report of the 9/11

Commission indicates there was a significant level of threat reporting in the immediate period before your speech (see, e.g., p. 257—‘‘Threat reports surged in June

and July, reaching an even higher peak of urgency’’).

Question. Given the ongoing level of threat reporting, why was the threat of terrorism against the United States and U.S. interests not considered a priority meriting substantive discussion in this address?

Answer. Counterterrorism was—and continues to be—a high priority for President

Bush. After he took office, President Bush retained George Tenet as Director of Central Intelligence and Louis Freeh as Director of the FBI; I retained Dick Clarke and

the entire Clinton administration’s counterterrorism staff at the NSC. We quickly

moved to develop a new and comprehensive strategy to eliminate the al-Qaeda terrorist network, which was approved on September 4, 2001, and was the first major

national security policy directive of the Bush administration. While we were developing this new strategy to deal with al-Qaeda, we also took action on a number of

specific anti-al-Qaeda initiatives that had been proposed by Dick Clarke, and

worked hard on multiple fronts to detect, prevent, and protect against terrorist acVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00253 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 CRICE.004 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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tivities. I did not address the subject in this speech because we had not yet concluded the policy review.

Question. The 9/11 Commission reported that ‘‘no Principals committee meetings

on al Qaeda was held until September 4, 2001,’’ although there were 32 such meetings on other subjects prior September 11, 2001. At the September 4 meeting, the

Principals Committee approved a draft presidential directive on al Qaeda. Why did

it take over 7 months to convene a Principals Committee meeting on this subject,

and to approve a strategy on al Qaeda?

Answer. The Deputies and department/agency staffs worked intensely on developing this new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) beginning in March

2001. The development of a new, comprehensive, and aggressive al-Qaeda strategy

was exceptionally fast, especially given the time required for the Senate to confirm

key principals and deputies, the complexities involved in orchestrating all aspects

of our national power, other pressing issues, and the activities attendant to the start

of a new administration. While the NSPD was approved by the Principals Committee on September 4, it is important to note the strategy development process was

completely different from the on-going process of identifying and responding to specific threats, which occurred throughout 2001 and was not contingent upon the Principals’ approval of the NSPD.

Iraq and Pre-War Intelligence

On January 28, 2004, David Kay stated to the Senate Committee on Armed Services that ‘‘we were almost all wrong’’ about the judgment that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction before March 2002.

Question. (a). Do you agree with Dr. Kay’s statement? Please elaborate.

(b). Do you believe the President was well-served by the Intelligence Community

and by the NSC staff in the preparation and presentation of pre-war intelligence

on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs? Please elaborate.

Answer. I believe that the matter is more complicated than Dr. Kay’s five word

characterization. I agree with Charles Duelfer’s conclusion that:

Saddam continued to see the utility of WMD. He explained that he purposely gave an ambiguous impression about possession as a deterrent to

Iran. He gave explicit direction to maintain the intellectual capabilities. As

UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that

could support full WMD reactivation. He directed that ballistic missile work

continue that would support long-range missile development. Virtually no

senior Iraqi believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever. Evidence

suggests that, as resources became available and the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of activity that would have had

the effect of supporting future WMD reconstitution. Comprehensive Report

of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, September 30, 2004, Vol.

I, p. 9.

In ordering the creation of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the

United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, the President has shown his

determination to ensure that we have the very best intelligence possible on this critical issue.

Aluminum Tubes

In an interview with CNN on September 8, 2002, you stated that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes that ‘‘are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs.’’ The report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (‘‘Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on

Iraq,’’ July 7, 2004) indicates that there was considerable debate in the intelligence

community for nearly a year and a half before September 2002 about the utility of

the aluminum tubes. On September 12, 2002, in his address to the United Nations

General Assembly, the President stated that ‘‘Iraq has made several attempts to buy

high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.’’

Question. Were you aware of this debate when you made this assertion about the

aluminum tubes? Were you aware of it during the preparation of the President’s

speech to the UN? If so, do you regret your categorical statement about the purpose

of the tubes? If not, why do you think you were not informed that there was such

a debate?

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Answer. My statement in September 2002 was consistent with the majority view

of the Intelligence Community at the time. Subsequently, in October 2002, the National Intelligence Council produced the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq,

which stated that: ‘‘Most agencies believe that Saddam’s personal interest in and

Iraq’s aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors—as well as Iraq’s attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines,

and machine tools—provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a

uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees

that reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes

probably are not part of the program.).’’

Iraq

On July 21, 2003, USA Today reported that, prior to the war, the NSC staff prepared a memorandum that examined previous peace and stability operations and

came up with specific estimates for a force size to stabilize a post-Saddam Iraq. According to the article, the memo suggested that using Bosnia as a guide, 500,000

forces would have been required.

Question (a). What were your views on the requirements of the size of the stabilization force?

(b). Prior to the war, there was an open disagreement between General Eric

Shinseki (then Army Chief of Staff), and the civilian leadership of the Pentagon over

the size of the force required in post-conflict Iraq. Did you take steps to ensure that

the views of General Shinseki and others in the uniformed military reached the

President? Why were those views dismissed? What is your understanding of the assumptions that led the Pentagon to ultimately deploy the level of troops it did for

stability operations? In retrospect, do you believe that we deployed sufficient forces

for stability operations?

Answer. The NSC staff did perform a ‘‘quick look’’ prior to the war, which examined the ratio of stabilization forces to the overall population of countries where

such forces had been stationed. A number of examples were examined, and the ratios varied widely. None was seen as a yardstick for Iraq. The NSC staff does not

determine military requirements. The President was briefed on a continuing basis

prior to, during, and after the Operation Iraqi Freedom by the Secretary of Defense,

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (who is the principal military adviser to

the President and also represents the Joint Chiefs), and the Commander, U.S. Central Command.

On October 25, 2004, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Department of Defense prepared detailed plans in June 2002 for options to strike a military camp in

northeastern Iraq where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi allegedly was based, but the White

House never approved such a strike. NBC News reported on March 2, 2004 that

such a strike was rejected three times by the White House between June 2002 and

January 2003. Press reports also indicate that the vast majority of terrorists—many

of whom were al-Qaeda from Afghanistan—fled the camp before we and the PUK

finally attacked it during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Zarqawi is now one of the most

lethal terrorists in Iraq, having recently been named head of al-Qaeda in Iraq by

Osama bin Laden. Ansar al-Sunna, which has taken responsibility for the recent

bombing of a U.S. military base in Mosul and a series of other vicious attacks in

Iraq, is thought to be an off-shoot of Ansar al-Islam, which was operating in the

same camp.

Question (a). On how many occasions did the administration refuse to approve

strike plans? Please explain why.

(b). Do you regret that such a strike was not undertaken?

Answer. If we had been able to determine Zarqawi’s location prior to the war, we

would have taken action to capture or kill him. While we knew that he and his associates were transiting the border between Iraq and Iran prior to the war, we did

not have actionable intelligence that would have given his location at a given point

in time.

Iraq Stabilization Group

In October 2003, the President directed that you head the Iraq Stabilization

Group. As of this month, only $2.4 billion of the funds appropriated the following

month have been expended, (just 13%), despite the fact that the administration requested them on an urgent basis that autumn.

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Question (a). What specific steps have you taken to accelerate the disbursement

of the $18.4 billion package for Iraqi reconstruction signed into law by the President

in November 2003?

(b). Are you satisfied with the current rate of expenditure? Do you believe that

enough Iraqis are involved in the process? Are local and provincial governments in

Iraq being used enough to help get funds expended so that Iraqis realize tangible

benefits?

Answer. My staff has been interacting with relevant agencies and Embassy Baghdad (and the CPA prior to the transfer of sovereignty) on an almost daily basis with

respect to how the United States might best use the $18.4 billion IRRF monies. We

have worked to improve the flow of information and to coordinate the U.S. response

in an effort to create innovative ways to spend taxpayer money most effectively

while at the same time maximizing benefits to Iraqi citizens.

Iraq needs the resources to overcome the formidable obstacles its faces. Our goal

is to give the people of Iraq the resources they need to cultivate a new Iraq.

Through our strategy, we have sought to identify and target key high-impact areas

for immediate focus—and funding—to create the momentum and legacy of visible

success, which can, in turn, support longer-term reconstruction efforts.

Offices in the government that became involved in post-conflict Iraq have told the

committee that they were not involved in planning before the war.

Question (a). Why was the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

established only on January 20, 2003, less than two months prior to the conflict?

(b). What steps did you take to ensure that State Department’s Future of Iraq

project were incorporated into the overall administration efforts to plan for postSaddam Iraq?

(c). What role did the NSC play to promote interagency coordination in pre-war

planning, and what notable successes and failures resulted?

Answer. Contingency planning in case of war in Iraq began in the early Fall of

2002. It was done by an interagency team coordinated by NSC staff, and included

every relevant agency. The team met multiple times per week for months, and covered both pre-war planning to support the war-fighter and to avert humanitarian

disasters if war occurred as well as every aspect of post-war civilian matters—water,

sewage, medical care, food, ports, electricity, courts, and governance.

Later, in January 2003, it was decided that a special office should be established

to take all the work that had been done and put it to use if we went into Iraq.

ORHA was created with that purpose. The interagency team was indeed familiar

with the work the Future of Iraq project had done, and of course the State Department was represented on the team. That work did become part of the overall preparations the team was undertaking. Some aspects were immediately useful; other

parts, such as the redesign of the judicial system, are still very valuable and will,

we hope, help Iraq’s new government with that important task. The team worked

well and put together a good plan for the civil and humanitarian work in case of

war.

Our planning efforts have paid off in many vital areas, although the environment

in Iraq has proved to be very challenging and we have had to adapt to some unforeseen circumstances. At the same time, I strongly support the creation of the Office

of Reconstruction and Stabilization inside the State Department to create the permanent capacity to work with the Department of Defense to do reconstruction and

stabilization planning in post-conflict and other crisis situations. I very much appreciate the committee’s leadership on this effort.

Before the war, a specific recommendation was made to this committee that,

based on past experience in post-conflict situations, it was necessary to recruit an

international police force of roughly 5,000 before hostilities to move in quickly to

train Iraqi police afterwards. A similar recommendation on the size of an international police training force was made by our own experts in the Iraq Police Assessment Team in June 2003.

Question (a). What steps were taken to act on their recommendations? Please describe any attempts that the administration made to recruit international police

forces before the war. If none were made, please explain why.

(b). In June 2004, more than 14 months after the fall of Baghdad, General

Petraeus was appointed to revamp and consolidate the training program for Iraqi

security forces. Why did the administration not move more quickly to overhaul this

program?

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Answer. Recommendations made early on to field an international police force of

approximately 5,000 men in Iraq failed to recognize the significant differences between the situation in Iraq and past experience with UN peacekeeping missions.

Importantly, in contrast to Kosovo and other UN peacekeeping missions, the security situation in Iraq, where heavily-armed soldiers are being killed every day, has

never been stable enough to allow for widespread deployments of lightly-armed civilian policemen. There has never been a UN Civilian Police force deployed in a nonpermissive security environment, and governments have shown their reluctance to

send national contingents into the volatile environment of Iraq.

Because there is a limited pool of trained civilian policemen in the United States

available for international missions, the United States alone could not have supplied

a 5,000 man force. Few local or state police departments will release officers badly

needed at home, and American civilian policemen going to missions are retirees or

leave poorly paying jobs. To field 500+ U.S. civilian policemen in Kosovo posed significant difficulties, and INL had similar difficulties to get to 500 by November

2004, the target number set for March 2004.

As such, assembling a force of 5,000 men would require large contributions both

in funding and personnel from a number of countries, since national contingents are

often less than 200 and are often dependent on the UN to pay for the bulk of their

expenses. However, no UN peacekeeping account was available for Iraq and many

European countries have exhausted their supplies of police available for other peacekeeping missions.

The military has been very involved in Iraqi police programs since the outset and

has had considerable influence over the way it has progressed. State/INL initially

led the interagency management effort because of its control of funding and its traditional role in running civilian police programs in UN missions. The deteriorating

security situation together with the recognition that a different approach was required made it prudent to shift lead responsibility for the entire program to the

military. MNSTC-I was then set up and General Petraeus was put in charge.

China

In your Foreign Affairs article you wrote: ‘‘The longstanding U.S. commitment to

a ‘one-China’ policy that leaves to a future date the resolution of the relationship

between Taipei and Beijing is wise.’’ And you strongly criticized the Clinton administration for articulating a policy of ‘‘three no’s’’ during the President’s trip to China.

Specifically, President Clinton said, ‘‘I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy

which is that we don’t support independence for Taiwan, or ‘two China’s,’ or ‘one

Taiwan, one China,’ and we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member in any

organization for which statehood is a requirement.’’

The Bush administration has not only adopted the ‘‘three no’s’’ position you criticized, but gone a major step further, arguing that Taiwan does not currently enjoy

sovereignty and rejecting a final outcome that might lead to Taiwan independence,

both steps that no U.S. administration had ever taken before. On October 25, 2004,

Secretary Powell said in Hong Kong: ‘‘Both sides should show restraint, not taken

any unilateral actions, look for ways of improving dialogue across the Straits and

move forward toward that day when we will see a peaceful unification,’’ adding,

‘‘There is only one China. Taiwan is not independent . . . It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation, and that remains our policy, our firm policy.’’

Question (a). Does the United States have a position on whether Taiwan enjoys

sovereignty? If so, what is that position? Is Taiwan part of China?

(b). Was Secretary Powell wrong to rule out Taiwan independence as a possible

future for Taiwan?

(c). Will you continue to argue that Taiwan and China should be reunified and

that Taiwan does not enjoy sovereignty?

Answer. Our policy of long standing has not changed. We do not support Taiwan

independence, and we oppose attempts by either side to unilaterally alter the status

quo. American policy toward Taiwan is governed by our One-China Policy, the three

Joint Communique ́s, and the Taiwan Relations Act.

Additionally, we have reaffirmed our commitment to uphold the Six Assurances

to Taiwan originally conveyed by President Reagan, including the assurance that

the United States will not alter its position on the sovereignty of Taiwan, which is

that it is a matter to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves.

We have long maintained that differences between the People’s Republic of China

and Taiwan are matters to be resolved peacefully by the people on both sides of the

Taiwan Strait, absent the threat or use of force, and in a manner acceptable to the

people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

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Indonesia: Timika Murders

Question.No suspect has yet been brought to justice for murder of two U.S. citizens in Timika in August 2002. Initial reports, by both Indonesian police and the

State Department, implicated the Indonesian military in the attack. In June, however, Attorney General Ashcroft shifted the blame to an alternate suspect, and

downplayed a possible connection to the Indonesian military (TNI). In the meantime, the suspect remains at large, well documented ties between him and the TNI

remain unexplored in official accounts of the case, and there appears to be no effort

under way to advance the investigation.

Do you believe the FBI’s investigation exonerates the TNI, or do you believe more

investigation needs to be done? If more needs to be done, what do you intend to do

to persuade the Indonesians to cooperate?

Answer. The arrest and prosecution of Anthonius Wamang, who was indicted by

the FBI for the murder of two American citizens, is one of our top priorities. Although the investigation is not complete, the FBI has uncovered no evidence indicating TNI involvement in the Timika murders.

We know President Yudhoyono understands the importance of this matter to the

United States and trust that the Government of Indonesia will take the appropriate

actions to achieve justice in this case.

Question. If the case remains stalled—with no suspect in jail, no investigation actively probing alleged ties to TNI, no plans for any movement in the future—would

you support a resumption of IMET training to the Indonesian military?

Answer. IMET for Indonesia is in the US interest. In FY 05, we have allocated

$600,000 in IMET funds (includes E-IMET) for Indonesia. The aim of IMET is to

strengthen the professionalism of military officers, especially with respect to the

norms of democratic civil-military relations such as transparency, civilian supremacy, public accountability, and respect for human rights. The GOI has demonstrated

cooperation as required. We are currently evaluating whether to issue the required

determination.

Nonproliferation

Question. The United States has several very useful programs to help former Soviet weapons of mass destruction scientists find new careers in more socially useful

areas. These programs include the International Science and Technology Centers,

Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, Chem/Bio Redirect, Nuclear Cities Initiative,

and the Cooperative Research and Development Foundation (which is independent

of the U.S. Government, but receives State Department funds). These programs

have been so successful that some of them are being used as models for similar efforts to redirect Iraqi and Libyan scientists. But the programs have rarely received

budget increases from this administration, although Congress has sometimes increased their funding. Will you seek greater funds for these programs?

Answer. We have developed a strategic framework for Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Expertise (NWMDE) that is relevant to both mature programs in Russia and Eurasia and nascent programs in Iraq and Libya. The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) will allow us to exploit unanticipated

opportunities in Iraq and Libya in FY 2005. In FY 2006, we plan to sustain our engagement of former Soviet, Iraqi and Libyan WMD scientists within the Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise budget line.

IAEA Director General

The United States took a ‘‘principled stand’’ last year that nobody should be elected to a third term as IAEA Director General. No other country seems to have agreed

with that stand, however, perhaps because previous IAEA Directors General have

routinely served more than two terms. Nobody has filed to even challenge Dr.

ElBaradei for that post, so it would appear that he will be re-elected.

Question.What does the United States gain by persisting in its opposition to Dr.

ElBaradei’s re-election, which is probably seen by other countries as based more on

personal pique than on principle? Will you continue that approach in our non-proliferation policy, or will you inject more practicality into our policy?

Answer. For many years the United States and other major donors to the UN system have expressed the view that the heads of UN organizations serve only two

terms. This is not a new approach and we reminded Dr. ElBaradei of this view at

the beginning of his second term as IAEA Director General. From the U.S. perspective, Dr. ElBaradei has served with distinction. However we do see merit in predictVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00258 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 CRICE.004 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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able turnover at senior levels in international organizations that a two-term policy

provides. If I am confirmed, I will look carefully at the views of other governments

and take them into consideration as well as discuss this with other members of the

IAEA Board as we move ahead.

Non-Proliferation Assistance Programs

Although the administration has voiced support for threat reduction and non-proliferation assistance programs in the States of the Former Soviet Union, these programs have suffered from recurrent crises and have too often failed to achieve the

speed or universality of coverage that was envisioned for them.

Question (a). The issues of access to Russian sites and contractor liability protections have stalled new efforts in the MPC&A and plutonium disposition programs.

Why have the U.S. and Russian bureaucracies been unable to make progress on

these issues?

(b). Will you urge President Bush to engage directly, intensively, and in a sustained manner with President Putin to agree on solutions and give clear direction

to the bureaucrats? Alternatively, would you recommend a new mechanism to develop U.S. Russian inter-agency decisions on these programs?

Answer. The administration strongly supports cooperative threat reduction efforts

with Russia and will continue to work hard to resolve the challenges of liability and

access to sensitive nuclear facilities.

On liability, if confirmed, I will continue to make Russian approval and ratification of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement (as extended

in 1999) a key priority and will seek to ensure the United States engages with Russia at the highest levels necessary to achieve this. Ratification would put ongoing

CTR programs on a more solid footing.

It is our understanding, however, that CTR ratification will not resolve liability

for any expanded or new nonproliferation assistance programs with Russia. This includes U.S. and G–8 efforts to convert excess Russian weapon-grade plutonium into

forms not useable for weapons under the plutonium disposition program. The liability issue has hindered progress on this important project. The administration is actively reviewing ways of breaking the liability logjam with Russia—while protecting

CTR programs—to remove this impediment to plutonium disposition and other cooperation. If confirmed, I will make every effort to resolve these issues as soon as

possible.

On the issue of access to sensitive Russian nuclear facilities, we are continuing

our efforts to address this effort with Moscow. We and the Russians have developed

special procedures to provide access to these sensitive facilities and protect their nuclear secrets but have not been able to agree to implement them at some key remaining facilities. We have also recently provided unprecedented access to Russian

officials to U.S. nuclear facilities to demonstrate openness and show them how we

too are grappling with how to improve nuclear security. We will continue to press

senior Russian officials on these issues to ensure that the security at all such nuclear facilities is increased to prevent terrorist access to these weapons.

We will want to resolve both CTR umbrella agreement ratification and these other

matters in 2005, well before CTR comes up for extension again in 2006.

Nonproliferation (Global Pathogen Surveillance Act)

Since 2001, I have introduced legislation to authorize the State Department to

lead an interagency effort to help other countries improve their pathogen surveillance capabilities—with particular emphasis on giving them the ability to spot an

outbreak that might be man-made and to call in international resources to promptly

investigate and respond to such an outbreak. The Senate passed that bill in 2002,

and it was a title in the State Department authorization bills reported out by this

committee in 2003 and 2004. In a world where natural diseases like SARS and

avian flu threaten to cause world-wide epidemics, and where biotechnology gives our

enemies increased ability to create ‘‘designer’’ diseases for use against us, don’t we

need a major program to build up the world’s defenses against biological terrorism?

Question (a). Will you work with us to see that the Global Pathogen Surveillance

Act is enacted?

(b). Do you agree that the State Department should take the lead in this area,

or do you favor leaving that to the Departments of HHS or Defense?

Answer. We believe that the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act will indeed help

strengthen developing countries’ abilities to identify and track pathogens that could

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erately-released. Improved disease surveillance and communication among nations

are critical defenses against both bioterrorism and natural outbreaks. We look forward to working with you in support of the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act.

We believe that improving monitoring and reporting on infectious disease outbreaks globally sits at the very intersection of foreign policy, health, and national

security concerns. As such, we agree that the Department of State should lead the

activities articulated in the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act. The Department is

already working to better coordinate and integrate the multiple U.S. initiatives on

disease surveillance internationally, collaborating with the Departments of Health

and Human Services, Defense, Homeland Security, Agriculture, and other federal

agencies.

One of the true ‘‘nightmare’’ scenarios—of a bioterrorist attack or a naturally-occurring disease—involves a contagious biological agent moving swiftly through a

crowded urban area of a densely populated developing nation. Thus, we believe that

it is critical to increase efforts to strengthen the public health and scientific infrastructure necessary to identify and quickly respond to infectious disease outbreaks—

and that the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act will provide valuable support in

these efforts.

Proliferation Security Initiative

Several countries have joined the Proliferation Security Initiative, there have been

many meetings and exercises, and the United States has signed boarding agreements with some major seafaring nations. But thus far there has been no interdiction that we know of that was clearly a PSI operation.

Question (a). What real-world interdiction capability does PSI give us, what are

its operational objectives, and how will we know if it has been successful and worth

the effort?

(b). What do you plan to do, if confirmed, to further the PSI?

Answer (a). An important measure of PSI’s success is the foundation it provides

for states to work together. Over sixty countries support the PSI and dozens have

participated in or observed PSI exercises. PSI is succeeding because of the international consensus that WMD proliferation is a threat to global peace and security.

PSI is also succeeding because it is based on practical actions that make maximum

use of each country’s strength in countering proliferation. The real-world capability

consists of partnerships being forged, contacts being made, and operational readiness established, all of which helps create a lasting basis for cooperative action

against proliferation.

The PSI Operational Experts have overseen fourteen interdiction training exercises and currently have 15 sea, air, and land exercises scheduled for 2005/6 with

additional regional exercises in the planning stages. These have significantly improved the interoperability of PSI participants and contribute directly to our ability

to work cooperatively to interdict shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials at sea. PSI exercises also send a strong deterrent signal to those

who would engage in proliferation trafficking because they could be stopped, caught

and held responsible for their activities. These operational gains and deterrent benefits are already worth the effort.

(b). In 2005, we will work to build on our successes. We will seek to put smooth,

effective communication and operational procedures in place to interdict shipments

and we will seek to use them; we will learn more about how proliferators behave;

we will devise new strategies to shut down this deadly trade; and we will reach out

to industry to intensify cooperation. In all, we will make it far more difficult and

costly for those who engage in WMD trafficking to continue their dangerous work.

Public Diplomacy: Decline in Support for U.S. Foreign Policy

Public opinion polls abroad reflect a significant decline in support for the United

States and U.S. foreign policy. For example, the ‘‘Global Attitudes Survey’’ in March

2004 by the Pew organization found that the percentage of people that had favorable views of the United States were just 37% in France and 38% in Germany, and

much lower percentages in key countries with Islamic majorities, such as Jordan

(5%), Pakistan (21%) and Turkey (30%). In the same survey, Osama bin Laden had

higher favorability ratings in Pakistan (65%) and Jordan (55%).

Question. To what do you attribute this decline in support for the United States

in foreign countries and the significant support for bin Laden in some key Muslim

countries?

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Answer. Although polling can be useful in providing insights into some aspects

of public opinion, it is easy to put too much stock in polls. Even polls which gain

the most attention as apparently revealing a very negative picture of America’s

standing abroad show a much more complex picture with many positive aspects

when we dig more deeply into the details.

America’s standing in the eyes of the world is, of course, important. We must do

all we can through active public diplomacy to ensure that our policies and actions

are understood and that we build sustainable relationships of mutual understanding

with people and institutions in other countries.

Our goal is not popularity per se but increased understanding of American values,

policies and initiatives to help create an international environment receptive to U.S.

interests.

Public diplomacy is not the answer to all negative views others may hold of America. Our military, cultural and economic power, our pre-eminent position in the

world can create negative reactions. In some cases, policies which we pursue as necessary for our national interest, are unpopular. We cannot forego necessary policies

for the sake of international public opinion, but we can extend every effort to create

understanding and acceptance if not active support.

Any support for Osama bin Ladin is disturbing in that it indicates a great lack

of understanding of the threat he poses to international stability and security. One

of the primary challenges for public diplomacy is to break the myth of Osama bin

Ladin where it exists and support the voices of tolerance opposed to the regressive

fanaticism Osama bin Ladin represents.

Public Diplomacy: Measuring Public Diplomacy Efforts

Question. What measures do you think are necessary to improve U.S. public diplomacy efforts?

Answer. The improvement of our Public Diplomacy efforts will be a very high priority for me. We must improve coordination of public diplomacy strategy and activities within the Department and interagency. Within State, the Under Secretary

must serve as a full advisor to the Secretary on all aspects of foreign policy, ensuring that all policy initiatives have a strategic communications component and that

public diplomacy resources are deployed in support of those policy objectives. This

is done now; we can do better.

We must strengthen the position of the Under Secretary. In particular, we must

strengthen the effective relationship between the Under Secretary and our embassies and consulates, which shape and carry out public diplomacy for maximum impact in the field.

We have interagency mechanisms which can be used to strengthen public diplomacy. In particular the Policy Coordinating Committee process can be developed

more fully in the public diplomacy context.

We must transform the conduct of diplomacy by demonstrating through action

and awareness that every major strategy, policy or diplomatic initiative must have

public support in order to succeed. This requires better institutional understanding

of the promise of public diplomacy within the Department and foreign affairs community, promoted through vigorous outreach on the part of public diplomacy practitioners, from the Under Secretary on down.

To communicate with a skeptical world, the United States must exploit its technological edge and vastly expand its international media presence. It must build on

successful exchange programs and expand face-to-face contact. Certainly greater cooperation and coordination with private sector outreach efforts will extend the reach

of the American people, but we cannot rely on the private sector to carry the government’s policy messages.

Additionally, public diplomacy must continue to develop meaningful methods of

evaluating its performance. This will require the development of honest performance

indicators, the proliferation of a culture of measurement among public diplomacy

practitioners, and the professional staff to analyze results.

Public Diplomacy: Role of DoD

There have been press reports that the Department of Defense is seeking to take

a leading role within the government on public diplomacy, and undertaking

disinformation campaigns abroad (e.g., ‘‘Pentagon Weighs Use of Deception in Broad

Arena,’’ The New York Times, Dec. 13, 2004).

Question (a). Do you believe that the State Department should have the lead role

in this area? Should the Defense Department have a significant role in this area?

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(b). Should the Department of Defense—outside the context of the battlefield—engage in disinformation campaigns?

Answer (a). The State Department is charged with conducting the foreign relations of the United States, and public diplomacy falls squarely within this responsibility. With a continued, consistent presence worldwide and an already established

infrastructure through our missions abroad, the Department of State is best

equipped to advise on how to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics most effectively. We have a broad range of tested programs to do so, as well as a corps

of creative public diplomacy professionals who are not afraid to innovate. State has

strengthened its capacity to lead by establishing an office of policy, planning, and

resources under the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Other departments and agencies, including DOD, also make valuable contributions to public diplomacy. An example is the high-visibility role played by the U.S.

military in delivering relief to the victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami. State and

the NSC co-chair a policy coordinating committee on Muslim World Outreach that

includes Defense and several other agencies in an effective process of collaboration,

an interagency model that can be applied to other tasks. Since shortly after 9/11,

State has maintained a working-level fusion team, with DOD participation that

manages State-DOD collaboration on strategic communication on a daily basis.

If confirmed, I will be open to good ideas and the improvement of our Public Diplomacy efforts will be a very high priority for me.

(b). Truth is our greatest public affairs weapon and the Department of State will

not ever seek to influence the media or others with lies or half-truths. I would argue

strenuously against others in the U.S. Government using disinformation tactics. Deliberate deceptions and falsehoods can seriously undermine the credibility of the

U.S. Government and irreparably harm our foreign policy and our national security.

The credibility of the United States is too valuable an asset to risk for a momentary

advantage.

Memos on Geneva Conventions and Torture Convention: Torture Convention/Interrogation Memo

A Justice Department opinion memorandum on the Torture Convention and interrogation, issued August 1, 2002 (and then superseded last month) was reportedly

vetted by lawyers from the National Security Council before being finalized [Washington Post, June 27, 2004].

Question (a). Were NSC lawyers involved in reviewing the document? Did you

have a role in reviewing the document, or in supervising the NSC legal staff? Please

elaborate.

(b). The Department of State was not involved in the preparation of this memorandum, and in fact were unaware of it until it was reported in the press. As Secretary, will you work to ensure that State Department lawyers are involved in any

legal review of issues relating to treaty obligations?

Answer. The President has repeatedly made clear that the United States stands

against and will not tolerate torture. The President has also made clear that American personnel are required to comply with all U.S. laws, including the United

States Constitution, Federal statutes, including statutes prohibiting torture, and our

treaty obligations with respect to the treatment of all detainees. Interrogation policies of U.S. government departments and agencies have been carefully vetted by the

Department of Justice to ensure that they comply with this mandate.

I have been advised that a copy of the draft opinion on the Torture Convention

and torture statute was made available to the Legal Adviser to the National Security Council before it was finalized. I was not involved in reviewing the draft opinion, although our Legal Adviser advised me that the Office of Legal Counsel was

preparing analyses of laws applicable to interrogation of detainees to ensure that

we comply with those laws.

Yes, if confirmed, intend to work to ensure that State Department lawyers are

involved in any legal review of issues relating to treaty obligations.

Memos on Geneva Conventions and Torture Convention: Geneva Conventions

According to President Bush’s directive of February 7, 2002, Taliban prisoners

taken in Afghanistan are denied the protections of the Geneva Conventions.

Question. Were you involved in the consideration of this directive? Please elaborate.

Answer. I was involved in the process by which the President made the decisions

reflected in his February 7, 2002 directive concerning humane treatment of al

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Qaeda and Taliban detainees. Although the Attorney General and other senior lawyers within the administration took the lead on the legal question concerning application of the Geneva Conventions, I was involved in meetings where both the legal

and policy issues were discussed.

In his directive, the President decided that, as a policy matter, the Department

of Defense will treat all Taliban and Al-Qaida detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with

the principles of the Geneva Convention.

Role as Secretary of State

Question. What are your top five foreign policy priorities?

Answer. The United States is a global power which does not have the luxury of

maintaining a single focus on just a few foreign policy issues. We have several opportunities and imperatives which we must address simultaneously.

A guiding principle of our foreign policy is the promotion of democracy. The

spread of freedom is the single greatest factor behind the spread of peace and prosperity in the world, and thus also the greatest long-term guarantee of the safety

and well-being of the United States.

We must remain focused on winning the war on terrorism. This means continuing

and winning the fight against al-Qaida and other jihadist groups.

But it also means supporting the development of a different kind of Broader Middle East—one that is built on the foundations of freedom and democracy, and opportunity for all people in the region. A democratic and secure Iraq, as well as a democratic and secure Afghanistan, will contribute to the transformation of this wider

region. We are committed to continuing to work with the Afghan and Iraqi governments to this end. And we are committed to supporting freedom and reform

throughout the Broader Middle East, a process launched by President Bush and G8

leaders at the Sea Island Summit, strengthening through the Forum for the Future

meeting held in December 2004 in Morocco, and continuing, with the next meeting

set for 2005 in Bahrain. And we are determined to working as hard as we can to

achieve the President’s vision of Israel and a democratic Palestinian state living

side-by-side in peace and security.

We are also focused on the need to prevent and, where necessary, counter the

spread of weapons of mass destruction, in Iran, in the Broader Middle East, in

North Korea and elsewhere.

Our efforts to promote freedom and democracy are not limited to the Broader Middle East. We are pleased to see the will of the Ukrainian people reflected democratically in the election of a new President; the strengthening of democracy in Russia

will be critical to the pace and extent of our ability to develop a strategic partnership with that country.

We continue our efforts to promote and strengthen democracy, opportunity, prosperity, trade and hope in Latin America. And, of course, the relationships with our

neighbors, Canada, Mexico and the states of the Caribbean, are critical for freedom,

prosperity, and security for ourselves and our hemisphere.

In Asia, we will strengthen our sound alliances with Japan, South Korea, and

Australia, as well as those in Southeast Asia, while working to promote a positive

and constructive role for a transforming and increasingly powerful China.

We have strengthened our ties with India and that will continue because the

world’s two largest democracies should have strong relations. Similarly, other increasingly influential democracies, such as South Africa and Brazil, must be a part

of our vision for the future.

Under President Bush’s leadership, we have strengthened our support for democracy, development, good governance, and peace on the African continent. We will

continue to lead the fight against poverty and disease, and to strengthen institutions that will guarantee freedom, opportunity, human rights, and justice for a new

generation of Africans.

In all of these areas, we will work together with our allies and friends in Europe,

especially through NATO and the European Union. The United States and Europe

share common values, common history, and common goals. We must therefore meet

together the common challenges we face at the dawn of the 21st century. As President Bush has said, ‘‘the world is better off, America is better off, Europe is better

off when we work together.’’

In Europe, in Asia, in Africa, the Americas, and the Broader Middle East, we seek

to mobilize and lead the efforts of all free nations, while maintaining strategic relationships with other global powers, all in the interest of strengthening a balance of

power that favors freedom.

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Middle East Peace Process

Question. I understand that when the Jordanian government first proposed the

idea of the Road Map, you stated that the administration could not support it. The

President later agreed with the concept. Please explain the rationale behind your

initial position.

Answer. When the concept of the roadmap was first raised, we reacted positively,

not negatively. But we could not support a plan that lacked phasing, had a strict

calendar, or was not performance based, and it was clear that stopping terrorism

had to be an immediate goal in any such document. That is what we sought, and

we engaged in, intensive negotiations in the Quarter to produce a document that

met these goals.

The President’s Personal Representative

In June 2003, the President designated you as his personal representative to the

peace process.

Question (a). What specific actions did you take in your capacity as the President’s

personal representative?

(b). During Abu Mazen’s tenure as Prime Minister, did the United States, the

international community, and the Israelis do enough to support him? What steps

did you take to bolster him? After Abu Mazen’s departure, what steps did you take

to try to revive peace efforts?

Answer. The President designated Secretary Powell and me to work together. And

we did. Both of us made trips to the region, both of us met—often together, in my

office—with literally dozens of European, Arab, Israeli, and Palestinian officials. We

continued the hard work of diplomacy as we moved first into a hopeful period after

Aqaba, then quickly into a longer period where Arafat blocked progress. Many of

the meetings I held were efforts to get things moving again despite the roadblocks.

We also helped to mobilize international assistance to support Palestinian reform.

As part of this effort, we provided $20 million in direct budget assistance to the Palestinian Authority, whose Finance Ministry under Salam Fayyad managed, despite

Arafat, to attain a level of fiscal transparency and accountability that was heralded

and recognized internationally. As part of this effort, we appointed Ambassador

John Wolf to serve as the head of a United States monitoring mission to monitor

the parties’ compliance with the Roadmap. Our efforts helped produce an agreement

between the two sides by which Israel withdrew its military forces from roads and

population centers in Gaza and Bethlehem. Indeed, the Israelis were about to withdraw from more population in the West Bank when significant Palestinian terrorists

actions were perpetrated, undermining their efforts.

It was the pressure from the United States, and our Quartet partners, that led

to the creation of the position of Prime Minister to begin with. When Abu Mazen

was appointed, we put together the Sharm el Sheik and Aqaba summits in June

2003 to bolster him and add to the forward momentum. We then hosted him at the

White House in August. As you know, he was soon thereafter in essence fired by

Arafat After his departure, Secretary Powell and I pressed very hard to work

around Arafat, but it became evident to everyone in the Quartet that unless and

until the PA firmly broke with terrorism, and had new leadership, forward movement was unlikely.

Iran

The United Kingdom, France and Germany—known as the EU-3—have been engaged in negotiations with Iran to explore the chances of getting Iran to extend indefinitely its suspension of uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and to

drop its program to construct a heavy water-moderated research reactor that could

be used for plutonium production. Many believe that such an agreement cannot be

achieved unless the United States becomes part of the solution, so that Iran could

receive security and other benefits that only the United States can provide in return

for giving up its nuclear weapons ambitions.

Question (a). Do you believe the EU-3 effort can succeed, and if so, what role

should the United States play? What specific benefits might the United States put

on the table? If you believe the EU-3 effort is likely to fail, what alternatives do

you suggest for U.S. policy?

(b). The administration has called on the IAEA Board of Governors to refer Iran

to the UN Security Council for its nuclear activities. What specific action do you believe the Security Council should take? Have you developed any plans for a phased

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initiation of sanctions? Can anything short of sanctions on Iran’s sale of oil get

Tehran’s attention?

(c). Russia plays a critical role as chief supplier of nuclear technology and fuel to

Iran and has also been one of Iran’s advocates at the IAEA. How will you convince

Russia to join the U.S. and EU effort to terminate Iran’s fuel cycle program?

Answer (a). Whether or not the EU-3 initiative can succeed depends on whether

or not Iran is willing to step away from its nuclear weapons ambitions. So far, we

have seen no indication that Tehran is willing to do so. The United States shares

with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (the EU-3), with the rest of the

EU, and with many others on the IAEA Board of Governors and in the international

community, strong concerns about Iran’s long record of clandestine nuclear activities

and Iran’s systematic violation for almost two decades of its NPT-required IAEA

Safeguards Agreement. We share with the EU3 and others the view that Iran must

permanently and verifiably end all of its efforts to develop fissile material production if it hopes to build international confidence that it has abandoned the pursuit

of a nuclear weapons capability. It is our understanding that the EU3’s goal in its

ongoing dialogue with Iran is to secure Iranian agreement to such full cessation of

its sensitive nuclear fuel cycle pursuits.

However, we have seen no evidence suggesting Iran’s leadership has made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program, and we remain skeptical of

Iran’s intentions to implement fully the terms of its November 14, 2004 suspension

agreement with the EU3. Indeed, Iran’s leaders have publicly admitted that they

have no intention of ending their enrichment program, and Iran most recently followed-through on its stated intention by rushing to convert 37 tons of natural uranium yellowcake at the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. The United States

government is not a party to the EU3’s ongoing dialogue with Iran. We believe that

additional bilateral and multilateral pressure, including reporting Iran’s noncompliance to the UN Security Council, will be required to persuade Iran’s leadership to

end its sensitive nuclear fuel cycle pursuits. We will continue to consult with our

friends and allies toward this end.

(b). Once the IAEA Board of Governors reports Iran’s safeguards noncompliance

to the UN Security Council (UNSC), as is required under the IAEA Statute, we believe there will be a range of options available to the Council. The UNSC has the

legal authority to require Iran, for example, to stop its dangerous, unnecessary pursuit of the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. We continue

to consult other Council members regarding how the UNSC might address Iran’s

nuclear activities, which we consider to be a growing threat to international peace

and security. We believe that UNSC involvement on this issue would help change

the Iranian leadership’s calculations regarding the costs to Iran of continuing to

pursue its nuclear weapons program.

(c). The United States has for several years raised the Iran nuclear issue actively

and at high levels with Russia, and we will continue to do so. We have engaged Russia both bilaterally and multilaterally, including at the IAEA Board and within the

G–8. Russia has already joined us in calling on Iran to accept and implement a full

moratorium on all sensitive nuclear fuel cycle efforts. We believe Russia shares our

profound concerns at the prospect of a nuclear weapons-capable Iran, and Russia

agrees with us that the international community must do all it can to prevent Iran

from acquiring that capability.

Arms Control Reorganization

We understand that Secretary Powell intends to propose the merger of the Bureau

for Arms Control (AC) with the Bureau for Nonproliferation (NP), and to notify Congress of this action just before your nomination hearing. Such a reorganization

would clearly constitute a reprogramming request under current law, and you would

be responsible, if confirmed promptly after the hearings, both for obtaining the assent of congressional committees and for implementing the reorganization.

Question (a). Do you support the merger of the AC and NP bureaus? If so, why?

(b). How would the AC and NP bureaus be merged without sending the world a

message (whether intentionally or not) that the administration is renouncing Arms

Control as a tool of U.S. foreign policy?

(c). How would the AC and NP bureaus be merged without diverting the attention

of the Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation from the difficult, day-to-day worldwide diplomacy involved in stemming sales of suspect materials and technology

around the world to the more glamorous world of international treaty negotiations?

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(d). Will you commit to close consultation with this committee as you move forward with any reorganization?

Answer (a). I support the merger of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Bureaus as part of the Bush administration’s strategy to fine tune the State Department’s international security units to better address the challenges of the post-9/11

world. This merger recommendation by the Department of State Inspector General

was endorsed by Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton.

If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the AC/NP merger best utilizes these

bureaus’ talented officers while improving efficiency. A State Department task force

headed by Human Resources experts has been working on the reorganization since

last September. I have been briefed on their work and I believe that new bureau

will be an asset to U.S. foreign policy.

(b). Per the recommendations of the State IG Inspection Reports of the AC and

NP bureaus, this is a merger of equals. The Bush administration will remain committed to pressing all states to honor their arms control treaty obligations through

the new bureau, especially the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological

Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

(c).The State Department panel overseeing the AC-NP merger has worked to devise a structure for the new bureau that provides adequate coverage for all of its

responsibilities. Like the current AC and NP bureaus, the merged bureau will retain

special representatives and ambassadors who are responsible for treaty negotiations.

(d). If confirmed, I will stay in close contact with Congress about this reorganization and welcome this committee’s questions and comments on it.

China and Nonproliferation

You wrote in the Wall Street Journal in October 2003 that China has shown a

‘‘pattern of cooperation’’ in combating proliferation, yet the Bush administration

sanctioned Chinese firms 37 times from June 21, 2001 through September 2003.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance said on July 24,

2003 that Chinese ‘‘entities are involved in too many sensitive transfers for the

problem merely to be one of imperfect enforcement.’’ The State Department has repeatedly sanctioned Chinese firms since the Fall of 2003, most recently imposing

sanctions on four more Chinese firms in November 2004.

Question (a). Why did you praise China for a ‘‘pattern of cooperation’’ weeks after

the State Department announced new sanctions on Chinese firms and complained

about a pattern of violations? Has China’s proliferation conduct improved since October 2003?

(b). What will you do as Secretary of State to end China’s continuing pattern of

proliferation of WMD technologies to countries such as Iran and North Korea?

Answer. Cooperating with the Chinese government on non-proliferation issues

while sanctioning Chinese companies for actions taken which are in violation of our

nonproliferation laws, including the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, are not mutually exclusive actions. They are part of our overall effort to get China to play a

more responsible role on non-proliferation. In the past 15 years, China has taken

substantial steps to strengthen its nonproliferation policies, joining the IAEA and

the Nuclear Suppliers Group, adhering to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, joining the Biological Weapons Convention, signing and ratifying the Chemical Weapons

Convention, signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and agreeing to work with

the international community to ban production of fissile nuclear weapons material.

In 2002 the PRC promulgated a series of regulations restricting the export of missiles and missile-related technology; subsequently, the PRC promulgated regulations

on dual-use chemical and biological items and technologies and joined with us in

the Container Security Initiative. In December 2003, China incorporated these existing measures into a new comprehensive system of export control regulations that

include counterterrorism and regional stability considerations in licensing decisions.

I might note that these measures were implemented as we have been increasing the

use of sanctions against Chinese entities. The point is that one shouldn’t assume

that sanctions and cooperative measures are inconsistent. In fact, they are two sides

of the same coin, and Chinese nonproliferation cooperation improved after we imposed sanctions on Chinese entities that had apparently not gotten the message.

More recently, China has been working closely with the U.S. and other nations in

the Six-Party Talks to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program.

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We will continue our extensive efforts to persuade China to effectively control exports, including the imposition of sanctions when warranted or when required by

U.S. law. Through continuing dialogue and steps to impose costs upon proliferant

entities where problems arise, we look forward to seeing China’s pattern of cooperation improve even more in the future. In particular, we hope that China will improve implementation of export controls to the point that Chinese companies no

longer engage in transfers that lead to the imposition of U.S. sanctions.

FMCT

In March 1995, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to negotiate, in the words

of the Shannon mandate, ‘‘a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally

and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.’’ In September 2004, after a

lengthy review, the United States declared in Geneva its view that effective

verification of an FMCT is not achievable.

Question (a). If confirmed, will you push for negotiation of an FMCT without any

verification provisions whatsoever, or might it be possible to agree on some measures that would be imperfect, but would not harm our national security?

(b). Will you call for revising the Shannon mandate (which could well be difficult

to achieve because the Conference on Disarmament operates on the basis of consensus), or will the administration be willing to begin negotiations under the Shannon mandate, while adhering to its stand that verification measures might do more

harm than good?

Answer. The United States announced the results of its review of FMCT in July,

reaffirming our commitment to negotiation in the CD of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. Noting that

the United States has not produced fissile material for such purposes for over 15

years, our announcement also reaffirmed the U.S. moratorium on such production.

At the same time, we noted our serious concerns that effective verification of an

FMCT is not realistically achievable.

Because of these concerns, which we described in more detail at the end of August, we have told other interested states that including in the negotiators’ mandate

an a priori requirement that an FMCT be effectively verifiable would only set an

unrealistic standard, making success impossible and blocking prospects for an

agreement. Constructing an ineffective set of ‘‘verification’’ provisions could give

false confidence about states’ compliance with their obligations, while the difficulty

of negotiating them would slow agreement on the basic FMCT prohibition. That

legal prohibition on producing fissile material for weapons, the central element of

any FMCT, would add an important further barrier to nuclear proliferation, one applying to both current and potential nuclear powers. To delay this achievement

while arguing at length over provisions that would at best still not provide effective

verification and at worst possibly damage other U.S. interests (e.g., risking disclosure of proliferation sensitive or national security information) is, in our view, counterproductive.

We have not made agreement on this view a condition for moving forward, but

do not wish to reaffirm a position on verification we believe incorrect. We hope to

achieve consensus in Geneva that negotiations on an FMCT should begin without

any imposed prejudgment.

NPT Review Conference

In May 2005, the States Party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear

Weapons will gather in New York for a five-year review of the Treaty. The 2000

Review Conference seemed poised for failure, with many countries focused on proliferation on the subcontinent, the seemingly slow progress on reductions by the five

nuclear weapon states, and the typical effort by Middle East nations to draw attention to Israel’s nuclear program. After lengthy negotiations, however, a consensus

resolution was agreed. If the results of the 2004 Preparatory Committee meeting are

any indication, this year’s Review Conference promises to be equally, if not more,

contentious and will require high-level, careful and focused U.S. leadership to prevent further erosion to the nonproliferation regime. Secretaries Christopher and

Albright led the U.S. delegations to the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, respectively.

Question (a). Will you lead the U.S. delegation at the May review conference?

(b). What are we doing now to ensure that the NPT Review Conference is successful?

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Answer (a). The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the foundation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and is vital to U.S. and

international security interests. Review conferences are important benchmarks in

the life of the NPT. The 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) promises to be particularly important, given the many challenges the Treaty faces. Our principal focus at

the RevCon will be on nonproliferation noncompliance, citing Iran and North Korea

as current challenges. We will urge others to recognize the gravity of noncompliance

with the Treaty’s nonproliferation obligations, press all states to insist on full compliance by all Parties, and move to strengthen collective tools against proliferation.

If I am confirmed, I plan to remain closely involved as the administration completes its preparations for the RevCon. While the administration has not yet determined who will head the United States Delegation in New York, you may be certain

that the President’s eventual designee will enjoy his full confidence and provide the

necessary leadership to promote effectively the nonproliferation objectives of the

United States at the RevCon.

(b). The U.S. aim for the 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) is an outcome that

strengthens the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Our

priority is the challenge to the NPT posed by non-nuclear-weapon state noncompliance with their NPT nonproliferation obligations. The RevCon can reaffirm the

NPT’s contribution to international security, the need for strict compliance with all

its provisions, the need for parties promptly and firmly to address cases of noncompliance, and the need to strengthen the Treaty to avert future cases of noncompliance. The proposals to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime

that the President outlined in his address to the National Defense University (NDU)

last February will be at the core of the initiatives that the United States will pursue

at the RevCon.

In addition to noncompliance, the RevCon should also consider the threat to international security posed by non-state actor interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and

non-state actor involvement in trafficking in nuclear materials, technology, and

equipment. We will pursue support for the President’s NDU proposals to address

these challenges from noncompliance and proliferation involving non-state actors.

Among the key tools in addition to restraint on enrichment and reprocessing are the

universality of the Additional Protocol, aggressive pursuit of the Proliferation Security Initiative, implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540,

and expansion of the Global Partnership.

In the spirit of promoting full compliance with all of the provisions of the Treaty,

the United States also intends to demonstrate its strong record of achievement in

nuclear disarmament efforts in conjunction with NPT Article VI.

The State Department leads a strong interagency team, which meets regularly to

discuss, refine, and determine ways to advance these NPT policy positions at the

upcoming RevCon. The United States routinely consults before, during, and after

each review process meeting with key NPT Parties, particularly U.S. allies, with the

leadership of the various Preparatory Committee meetings and RevCons, with officials in the UN Secretariat, and with the relevant non-governmental organizations.

United States officials also conduct frequent travel abroad to consult with foreign

governments, and to represent the United States at international workshops, conferences, and seminars to advance U.S. policy positions and learn the policy priorities of other NPT Parties.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Non-Proliferation

Question. Developments in Iran have exposed problems in the Non-Proliferation

Treaty regime that need to be addressed. Some have suggested that the U.S. work

with others to reform the NPT, so that countries cannot legally go right to the brink

of producing a nuclear weapon, making it a bit late for enforcement action once they

finally do cross the line. Some have also proposed changing the regime so that countries that reject inspections or withdraw from the NPT without addressing previous

infractions must dismantle their nuclear capabilities to come back into the fold, and

one could achieve agreement that nations which the IAEA cannot find to be in full

compliance should no longer receive any nuclear assistance from others. What is

your view of such proposed reforms? Are you satisfied that the U.S. can effectively

work with other members of the international community to address Iran’s nuclear

ambitions under the current nonproliferation regime?

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1 Note that all figures regarding positions and posts in Africa do not include those for Egypt,

Tunisa, Libya, Algeria and Morocco, which are part of the Department’s Bureau of Near East

Affairs, not the Bureau of African Affairs.

Answer. President Bush and other world leaders have recognized the problems

you mentioned and work is under way in several fora to address them. The Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is being tested as never before. Without stronger

measures, confidence in the security benefits of the NPT could erode.

Certainly, the Additional Protocol is essential in verifying compliance, as it allows

the International Atomic Energy Agency greater access to sites and to information

and can give the international community more warning time. But of course much

more is needed. Efforts to limit enrichment and reprocessing technology are critical

or we could see more countries like Iran that exploit and violate the NPT to advance

their nuclear weapons potential. Stronger export controls and the Proliferation Security Initiative can help to halt or interdict clandestine nuclear commerce.

Violations of the NPT and withdrawal from the Treaty to acquire nuclear weapons

and avoid its consequences are serious threats to the NPT and should, at the very

least, result in a cutoff of nuclear assistance to the state in question. The elimination of nuclear weapons programs in these states should be pursued relentlessly.

These states must see that they face a dim future, and isolation from the international system, unless they abandon their nuclear weapon ambitions.

We will continue to work with our friends and allies—and the entire international

community—to persuade Iran, in particular, to make the right choice, and to vigorously pursue the reforms necessary to improve enforcement of the NPT.

Human Resources Requirements in Africa

Question. After 12 years on the Subcommittee on African Affairs, I have traveled

widely enough to know that understaffed embassies in Africa are more the norm

than the exception. We have wonderful, capable, deeply committed Foreign Service

officers working in Africa. I admire them and I am deeply grateful for their service.

But they are too few in number—particularly when it comes to seasoned, expert

people. Tiny embassy staffs are trying to cover huge, complex countries—too often

without adequate effort or capacity to get out of the capital city. We have no permanent presence in northern Nigeria or eastern Congo, despite the fact that the stability of whole swathes of the continent can hinge on events in those areas. We have

no permanent presence in Zanzibar or in Mombassa. We need more people on the

ground. The 9/11 Commission points to parts of Africa, including the Horn and to

West Africa as areas deserving of special focus. What steps are you prepared to take

to match our personnel resources to our needs?

Answer. Engagement with Africa is very high among President Bush’s foreign policy objectives, from resolving conflict in Sudan and the Great Lakes to fighting terrorism in the Horn and limiting spread of HIV/AIDS under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). We are promoting democracy, expanding

trade and investment opportunities, and strengthening health care, environmental

protection, and efforts against trafficking in arms, drugs, and people. We also face

substantial new staffing requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a number of

other high priorities.

With the significant difficulties faced by our employees who serve in Africa, we

continue to face challenges in meeting staffing needs, and the Department is making progress.

Through the Department’s recent hiring efforts, we created 135 additional positions in our 48 posts in the Bureau of African Affairs 1 in FY 2002 to 2004, including

those for consular and diplomatic security personnel, bringing the total number of

State Dept. Foreign Service positions at the 48 African posts to 893 (an 18% increase). Even with the new positions, small to medium sized African posts often

have little staffing depth and must be augmented by temporary personnel to cover

gaps when staff members transfer or take annual leave. Additional positions are

necessary to add depth and address future challenges.

Difficult living conditions at many posts make them a challenge to staff. Given

the security situation, three posts in Africa currently do not allow any family members at post and another three allow only adult dependents, making the one or two

year tours there particularly difficult for employees who are also being asked to staff

other ‘‘unaccompanied’’ posts such as Baghdad and Kabul. Many of the African posts

are among the hardest to fill because of concerns about security, health, education,

and other hardship conditions. Thirty of forty-eight posts in the Bureau of African

Affairs receive the highest hardship rating of 25 percent. Many of these places long

ago hit the 25 percent ceiling for hardship differential (the compensation employees

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receive for the extraordinary hardship conditions at post). Due to the pay cut that

non-senior Foreign Service employees take when serving overseas from the loss of

locality pay, employees in many places like Abuja, East Timor, Guinea, and the

Congo receive only 9% more pay than their colleagues in Washington (since their

25% hardship differential is off set by 16% locality pay in Washington), hardly a

significant monetary incentive to serve there.

We are in the process of formulating career development plans, which will include

both incentives and requirements for hardship service to ensure staffing at our most

difficult posts.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Over 3.5 million people are thought to have died from war related causes in recent years in DRC. Countless others have been victims of brutal assaults and continue to live in fear. Yet despite the horrifying human costs of the conflict, despite

the questionable efficacy and astronomically expensive nature of the peacekeeping

mission on the ground, and despite the fact that the future of Congo has serious

implications for the future of many African countries, the administration has not

made stabilizing central Africa a priority.

Question. What steps will you take as Secretary of State to help create a context

in which MONUC can succeed and the Congolese people can realistically hope for

a better future?

Answer. MONUC remains one of the primary tools to achieve peace and stability

in DRC. The United States will continue to work with the UN, specifically Special

Representative Swing, to ensure maximum effectiveness of MONUC’s activities

within its current mandate and within the current authorized troop ceiling of

16,700. We are supportive of the recent increase to MONUC’s authorized strength

of 5,900 troops. As these new troops arrive in the region over the next two months

they will be positioned in eastern Congo to directly address the issue of armed militias.

Since May of 2004, the United States has facilitated Tripartite talks between the

governments of DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. During these talks all three nations

agreed that the greatest threats to Great Lakes stability are the armed militias that

roam uninhibited throughout eastern Congo. The United States, in coordination

with the UN Security Council, is discussing how to assist MONUC to meet fully and

completely the various parts of its mandate, specifically the issue of support for

DRC government efforts to disarm, demobilize and repatriate or resettle ‘‘negative

forces’’ in eastern Congo.

Our direct diplomatic effort with the Tripartite Commission has been instrumental to keep communication open on all sides, so that differences can be aired

between all nations of the Great Lakes region.

North Korea

Question. The last four years of U.S. policy toward North Korea have failed to address the threat posed by a nuclear-armed and potentially a proliferating North

Korea. Is this administration prepared to tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea? If

not, what changes in policy will you pursue?

Answer. The United States is not prepared to tolerate a nuclear-armed North

Korea. But the problem is not the United States or our policies. The problem is in

North Korea. That said, we have succeeded in establishing a regional consensus

that the Korean Peninsula must be nuclear free. We have continued to coordinate

closely through the trilateral process with our allies, South Korea and Japan. We

have established the first multilateral security forum in Northeast Asia, the SixParty talks. All of the parties to the Six-Party Talks have agreed on the objective—

a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula. And the five parties at the first Plenary,

in August 2003, all told North Korea very clearly that they will not accept North

Korea’s possessing nuclear arms.

We believe the Six-Party process offers the best opportunity to resolve this issue

through peaceful, multilateral diplomacy.

The U.S. is working within that process to achieve the dismantlement of all North

Korean nuclear programs in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner, subject to effective verification.

We have repeatedly made clear to the DPRK that the Six-Party forum is the way

to end its international isolation, and that we and other parties are prepared to take

corresponding measures as the DPRK dismantles its nuclear programs in an effectively verifiable manner.

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We met in New York in November and December with the North Korean Permanent Representative to the United Nations to make clear that we are ready to resume talks at an early date and without preconditions.

Our partners in the Six-Party Talks—Japan, the Republic of Korea, China and

Russia—are also urging the DPRK to rejoin and participate seriously in the talks.

We remain in close contact with them on this issue.

As the President has stated, the Six-Party process is the way forward. We and

our Six-Party partners are keeping the focus on getting the talks going again, so

that we can make real progress on the agreed objective. At the next round of talks,

we will be prepared to give a detailed presentation on the proposal we tabled at the

talks in June, and to respond to questions the DPRK may have as well as to raise

concerns we have about their proposal.

Africa: Charles Taylor

Former Liberian President Charles Taylor continues to reside in Nigeria, despite

the fact that he is wanted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone to stand trial for

war crimes and crimes against humanity. As I understand it, it is the policy of the

United States to support the Special Court.

Question. How will you work with the Nigerians, the Liberians, the Sierra

Leonians and the Court itself to resolve this issue and ensure that Charles Taylor

is held accountable for his crimes?

Answer. We strongly support the work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and

its efforts to bring to justice those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious

violations of international humanitarian law. Ensuring accountability for these

crimes will also contribute to reconciliation and to the restoration of peace in Sierra

Leone and all of West Africa.

The administration and the Congress share a common goal of seeing Charles Taylor held accountable to face the charges pending against him. We must remember

that by accepting Taylor, Nigeria saved hundreds, if not thousands of Liberian citizens who were determined to fight a civil war in Liberia while Taylor remained in

power.

The United States is in frequent contact with the Governments of Nigeria and Liberia on the issue of Charles Taylor. We have made clear to Nigerian President

Olusegun Obasanjo, Liberian Chairman Gyude Bryant and othersthat our mutual

goal must be for Charles Taylor to appear before the Special Court for Sierra Leone

and face the charges pending against him. We also continue to urge Nigeria at the

highest levels to take steps to further contain and confine Taylor and eliminate his

ability to endanger the peace both of our nations have worked so hard to establish.

We have made clear to President Obasanjo, Liberian Chairman Bryant and others

that our mutual goal must be for Charles Taylor to appear before the Special Court

in Sierra Leone and face the charges pending against him. We will continue to work

with them to ensure that this happens.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR BILL NELSON

Iraq

Question. From time to time there are whispers that the Iranian presence in Iraq

is pervasive. What are your views on the role of the Iranians in Iraq? How widespread is their presence and how effective can they be in securing an Iraqi government they can influence? Without diplomatic relations with Iran, how effective can

we be at competing with their wider influence?

Answer. We have made clear to Iran that we will oppose actions that undermine

Iraq’s stability. Senior officials of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) have publicly

voiced their concerns about Iranian interference in Iraq. We have also made clear

to Iran that we will oppose actions that undermine Iraq’s stability. Our policy remains that we are willing to engage with Iran on specific issues of mutual concern,

in an appropriate manner, if and when the President determines it is in our interest

to do so. Iraq is clearly one of those issues.

Afghanistan

Question. The growing and pervasive threat of drug trafficking to the security and

stability of Afghanistan is frightening and dangerous. We have ignored this problem

for far too long and allowed the illicit opium economy to re-develop across the counVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00271 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 CRICE.004 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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try. I am concerned that any reaction at this point will be a case of too little too

late, particularly with such a small presence of American troops who are already

focused on the task of capturing OBL and other Al Qaeda leaders. I noticed that

the majority of the money being used for anti-narcotics programs in Afghanistan is

from accounts controlled by the State Department. How will you effectively coordinate with DOD to ensure that these funds are spent properly and effectively? How

will we effectively fight the cultivation of opium poppies without alienating the Afghan people, threatening support for their nascent government?

Answer. We have an important opportunity to leverage USG resources to support

President Karzai’s determination to rid Afghanistan of the scourge of illicit narcotics

and we have developed a comprehensive USG counternacotics plan.

We are also closely coordinating our efforts with the U.K. who are the lead international nation in the counternarcotic fight. The Afghans themselves will be the deciding factor in this war on drugs. They are determined to win this battle and we

are ready to lend them a hand.Working closely together in Kabul, all USG agencies

are focused on ensuring a coordinated, cost-effective and successful counter-narcotics

effort. An Embassy Interagency Planning Group (EIPG), reporting to the Ambassador, facilitates coordination. General Barno, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, maintains an office with dedicated staff at Embassy Kabul that is literally steps from the Ambassador’s office.

The Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)

is responsible for implementing the eradication component of the USG’s five-part

counternarcotics plan in Afghanistan, and plays a substantial role in coordinating

and/or implementing the other four parts: public information, alternative livelihoods, law enforcement, and interdiction.

INL officers in Washington and Kabul work closely with the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies that are involved in Afghan counternarcotics, including USAID, Department of Agriculture, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Department of Justice, through regular discussions and communications. In Washington,

substantial interagency coordination occurs through the Afghanistan Interagency

Operations Group (AIOG), which meets several times a week. It is co-chaired by the

State Department’s Afghanistan Coordinator and an NSC senior staff member, and

includes Defense and other interagency representatives. There are also periodic

interagency meetings at more senior levels in Washington.

The Afghan Government understands that a nation based on the cultivation of

opium poppy is not sustainable. As one of his first acts following his election, President Karzai made a dramatic call for the elimination of the illicit narcotics trade

in Afghanistan, calling it a direct threat to the development of a stable, democratic

society that respects human rights and the rule of law. We believe that the Afghan

people and their government understand the need to address this problem quickly.

One of the key parts of our counternarcotics plan is an aggressive alternative livelihoods program, which will provide Afghans with short- and long-term sources of

income to encourage their movement out of the poppy economy. Through employment, business and infrastructure creation, Afghans in affected areas will receive

short-term cash for work as well as longer-term opportunities to produce, process,

and sell marketable crops other than poppy. Alternative livelihoods programs will

also assist the central government in working through its provincial ministry representatives and governors to bring legitimate government services to the major

poppy-producing provinces.

Another component of our plan is a robust public information campaign in Afghanistan. Posters and radio messages in local languages are already informing the

Afghan public of the danger and immorality of narcotics cultivation and trafficking,

and President Karzai has been speaking out forcefully against the drug trade.

The Department looks forward to continued close consultation and cooperation

with Congress as we support the Afghan Government’s fight against poppies. We

appreciate your continued support for the resources necessary to implement programs for all parts of our counternarcotics plan.

North Korea

Question. What have we accomplished with our North Korea Policy over the past

four years? Kim Jong Il remains in power and his people continue to suffer an arduous daily existence. We believe that he increased the number of nuclear weapons

in his arsenal and the six-party talks occur in fits and starts. Keeping in mind the

events of the past four years, how are we going to alter this policy moving forward?

Answer. North Korea has for decades pursued a nuclear weapons program, which

threatens the entire East Asia region and the integrity of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The President has repeatedly made it clear he seeks a peaceful

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diplomatic resolution to the North Korea nuclear issue. The United States has adhered to three basic principles to achieve that outcome. First, we seek the dismantlement of all DPRK nuclear programs in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner, subject to international verification. We cannot accept another partial solution that does not deal with the entirety of the problem, allowing North

Korea to threaten others continually with a revival of its nuclear program. Second,

because North Korea’s nuclear weapons threaten the international community, multilateral diplomacy is the best approach to resolving the issue. Third, we will not

reward North Korea for coming back into compliance with their international obligations. To do so would only incentivize their bad behavior, and would send exactly

the wrong signal to other rogue regimes.

In April 2003, we held a round of trilateral discussions in Beijing, with China and

the DPRK. We made clear future talks would need to include the ROK and Japan,

and we welcomed the participation of Russia as well.

The Six-Party Talks were launched in August 2003, with China as host. The five

parties all told North Korea very clearly in plenary session that they will not accept

North Korea’s possessing nuclear arms.

At the Second Round of talks, in February 2004, the parties agreed to regularize

the talks, and to establish a working group to set issues up for resolution at the

plenary meetings. The ROK offered fuel aid to the DPRK, if there were a comprehensive and verifiable halt of its nuclear programs as a first step toward complete nuclear dismantlement, and other non-U.S. parties subsequently expressed a

willingness to do so as well. Also subsequent to the Second Round of talks, two sessions of the Working Group were held, running two to three days each.

The United States tabled a comprehensive proposal to North Korea at the Third

Round of Talks, in June 2004. The ROK and DPRK also tabled proposals. The U.S.

met directly with all of the parties over the course of the talks, and held a two-anda-half-hour discussion with the DPRK delegation. We signaled our willingness to respond to any questions about our proposal the DPRK might have, and have indicated that we have a number of questions for the DPRK about its proposal.

Despite the agreement of all six parties in June to resume talks by end-September, and the willingness of five parties to hold to that commitment, the DPRK

has not yet agreed to return to the table.

North Korea’s rhetoric notwithstanding, the U.S. leadership has said repeatedly

that we have no intention of attacking or invading the DPRK. If the DPRK is prepared to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions, the U.S. remains ready, as we

sought to convey in the third round of the Six-Party Talks in June, to work in the

context of the Talks to resolve the issues between us.

Diplomatic contacts among the Six Parties are continuing. We met with the North

Koreans in New York twice late last year, and made clear we remain ready to resume the talks at an early date, without preconditions, and asked that they return

to the table. We have also met with our partners in the talks, in Seoul, Tokyo and

Beijing. All of us agree that the Six-Party process is the way forward and that the

only acceptable outcome is the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement

of all nuclear programs in North Korea.

The door is open for the DPRK, by addressing the concerns of the international

community, to vastly improve the lives of its people, enhance its own security, normalize its relations with the U.S. and others, and raise its stature in the world. The

United States, working with our allies and others, remains committed to resolving

the nuclear issue through peaceful diplomatic means. We have laid out the path to

a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. The only thing that is missing is a strategic decision by Pyongyang to recognize that its WMD programs make it less, not

more secure and to negotiate in earnest.

Haiti

Question. Haiti remains a country teetering on the edge of disaster. A small contingent of peacekeeping troops is all that prevents Haiti from once again descending

into chaos. Bearing this in mind, why is the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti still

undermanned seven months after its initial authorization by the UN Security Council? Haiti is short 1,910 military personnel out of a total authorization of 6,700 and

352 short of a total authorization of 1,622 for civilian police. In other words, the

military personnel are only at 70% strength and civilian police only stand at 78%.

Do you find this acceptable? What are the specific steps that will be taken to rectify

this situation, recruiting the necessary forces and ensuring that they are effectively

supported on the ground?

Answer. The UN Stabilization Force in Haiti (MINUSTAH) now has 6,334 of the

6,700 troops and 1,398 of the 1,622 civilian police authorized by the Security CounVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00273 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 CRICE.004 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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cil. We continue to work with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to

ensure that additional and appropriate police and troop personnel are assigned to

Haiti.

The Brazilian-led UN Mission has begun to establish a presence in the hardesthit areas of Port au Prince. Security remains a major challenge and we fully support

the UN in its job of providing security and training and vetting new and existing

HNP so the Haitians can take responsibility for their own security. To that end, we

have provided 25 US CIVPOL to the MINUSTAH mission, and are providing over

$6 million in bilateral support to build the capacity of the HNP.

Question. What specific countries were contacted by our government to encourage

their participation in this mission? Are you satisfied that the U.S. has contacted an

appropriate number of countries to encourage and support their participation in the

UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti?

Answer. The United Nations has the primary responsibility to request that Member States contribute forces and personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Working

closely with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the U.S. separately

contacted Jordan, Brazil, Argentina, Nepal, Uruguay, Canada, France, Italy, Chile,

Peru, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ecuador, the Philippines, and Paraguay

to encourage their participation in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

(MINUSTAH).

We are satisfied that we contacted the appropriate number of countries that we

believed would participate. MINUSTAH’s force level is now close to the maximum

authorized strength of 6,700.

Question. The tragic storms and subsequent flooding in Gonaives resulted in a terrible loss of life and subsequent dislocation for many Haitians. What was the U.S.

commitment to supporting the rehabilitation of these communities? What is our current commitment? Are you satisfied with results that have been achieved in

recuperating these communities?

Answer. We have made $46 million in assistance, including $38 million from the

supplemental appropriation, available for the rehabilitation of areas affected by

flooding during Tropical Storm Jeanne. We greatly appreciate the bipartisan support we received from Congress to assist the Haitian people recover from this disaster.

We have signed contracts for rehabilitation of irrigation systems, hillside stabilization, road repair, and other infrastructure projects. Over 5,000 Haitians are

employed by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in a clean-up program

that has removed 15,300 cubic meters of mud from the city of Gonaives. Food is

being provided to approximately 80,000 people and we have repaired ten pumps

that are being used for irrigation and drinking water. Silt is being removed from

the primary canals to further increase water availability and ten tons of bean seeds

have been distributed to farmers.

We have made a long-term commitment to the affected area and are focused not

only on repairing the damage, but the environmental causes for the flooding.

Question. What is the goal of U.S. policy towards Haiti? I suggest that it is longterm support to establish a stable democratic government that guarantees the security and economic well-being of its people. But U.S. policy over the last several years

was a series of fits and starts, which has not fostered the profound changes that

can be achieved through a deep and steadfast commitment. What are the specific

steps as Secretary of State that you will take to ensure that we create a stable and

safe Haiti?

Answer. Our goals in Haiti are to give the Haitian people the tools they need to

create a democratic government, stable institutions and a viable economy. To

achieve this, the international community and we are first working to stabilize the

security situation. This is accomplished through the UN Stabilization Mission,

which along with the Haitian National Police has primary responsibility for security, and through the promotion of economic growth and the development of sound

political institutions. Elections this fall will be vital to the establishment of a democratic government that, with broad popular support, can build on the momentum

of the Interim Government to address the vast social and economic challenges Haiti

faces. One of the lessons learned from prior interventions in Haiti is the need to

proceed steadily and for the long haul, which the UN and we are prepared to do.

Haitians face serious and daunting challenges to establishing a viable democracy

and the rule of law. Haitians are the first to concede their history has been too often

characterized by violence, authoritarianism and criminality. Former President

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Aristide’s administration sadly followed that model. The Interim Government of

Haiti has begun the process of establishing the rule of law to give the Haitian people the quality government they deserve. Aristide’s lawful resignation and departure

opens the door for this in the first time in a decade.

The job of building Haitian democracy is up to Haitians themselves, but the U.S.

and the international community can and will help them build viable institutions

and institute good governance.

Question. Why has the administration not come out in support of the HERO act

introduced by my colleague Senator DeWine? This legislation provides Haiti with

economic advantages that would attract industry and create jobs for the Haitian

people. We must restore a sense of hope to the Haitian people. This legislation offers

only the first small step in that direction. But it appears that the administration

is not even committed to this step, casting our overall commitment into question.

Answer. We strongly support the people of Haiti. We continue our efforts to help

the Interim Government to build a more prosperous economy. Clearly, Haiti’s economic development is in the U.S. interest. Creating economic opportunity in Haiti

will make Haitians less dependent on foreign assistance for survival. It will help

deter illegal migration and provide alternatives to drug smuggling as a source of income. It will increase the government’s revenue base and the country’s overall stability.

The United States has taken broad steps to assist Haiti, including a pledge of $230 million at the World Bank Donors’ Conference, which included $22 million to

support economic growth and job creation. While the Senate passed the HERO legislation in the last Congress, the House took no action and the administration has

not taken a position on the HERO legislation. If confirmed, I want to work with the

Congress to fashion legislation that will find the right balance between job growth

in Haiti and maintaining jobs here at home.

Colombia

Question. Please provide an update on the status of the three American hostages,

Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell, held by the FARC in Colombia.

How regularly are their families contacted and updated on the situation? I want to

ensure that you will personally raise this issue at every opportunity with the Colombian government to make certain that these men are brought home safely and as

soon as possible.

Answer. In Colombia, there is no higher priority for the United States Government than the safe return of Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell,

whose captivity will reach two years on February 13, 2005.

Our continued efforts to locate the hostages include employing all assets of national power: diplomatic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement, military, and public diplomacy. In Washington, Miami, and Bogota ́, dedicated U.S. Government officials are working daily to bring them home.

We are working closely with the Colombian government and other governments.

We have and will continue to raise this issue at the highest levels. President Bush

and President Uribe most recently discussed the situation during their Cartagena

meeting in November 2004. Ambassador Wood is in frequent contact with President

Uribe and his cabinet about the three Americans. The Government of Colombia is

providing the fullest cooperation possible.

The Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs (State/CA) has been the principal

point of contact with the hostages’ families on behalf of the U.S. Government since

February 2003. An officer in the Consular Bureau’s Directorate of Overseas Citizen

Services calls family members every week to keep them updated. The State Department hosted each family for a day of briefings from interagency representatives in

February, March and April 2004, as part of our continuing efforts to keep them informed, respond to their questions and concerns personally, and remain in close

touch with them. The Department is preparing to hold another round of meetings

soon. The Department of Justice and FBI have also had direct contact with the families.

If confirmed, you have my commitment that the State Department and I personally will continue to utilize every opportunity to raise the issue of the safe return

of Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howes and to work for their safe

return.

Latin America

Question. In Latin America there are troubling trends in both security and democracy. We see frightening movements of Al Qaida and other international terrorist

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organizations that indicate an expansion of their operations in Latin America. We

also see democratically-elected leaders govern in undemocratic ways, while others

are too weak to govern properly and in some cases are forced to resign because they

are ineffective. How do we balance these critical but sometimes competing interests?

We must tread carefully to ensure that we do not jeopardize our interests in

strengthening democracy as we work to secure these countries from the threats of

international terrorism.

Answer. Enhancing security and promoting democracy must go hand-in-hand. For

example, our efforts to strengthen the rule of law help Latin Americans to tangibly

feel the benefits of the rule of law. In turn, this renewed faith in their governments

provides a critical buffer against support for illegal groups active in the region.

We will continue to support justice and law enforcement programs that create the

environment necessary for democracy to thrive. At the same time, we will help our

partners develop the necessary capacities to combat terrorists within their national

territories We will also assist them in protecting critical infrastructure such as the

Panama Canal, as well as strengthen regional mechanisms that address terrorism.

Multilaterally, we will support OAS efforts to both strengthen democracy and

build effective counter-terrorism capacities, focused on increased border and financial controls, transportation security (aviation and ports), and cyber-security. In pursuing our goals, we will diligently promote adherence to the principles of democracy,

including respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and

shine a light on activities of leaders who govern undemocratically.

Question. President Bush made the Western Hemisphere one of his top priorities

at the beginning of his first administration. After September 11, his attention naturally refocused to other areas of the world. After three years, we have seen the troubling results of turning our backs too strongly on this region. Latin America continues to face difficult issues of security drug trafficking, poverty, disease, and instability. As Secretary of State, how will you make Latin America again a priority?

Answer. While events elsewhere in the world have demanded increased attention

and resources, President Bush has continued to recognize the strong economic, political, security, and cultural ties that inexorably link together the countries of the

Western Hemisphere. Our policy toward the Western Hemisphere focuses on bolstering security, strengthening democracy, promoting prosperity and investing in

people—all within a multilateral framework.

We will have two unique opportunities in 2005 to reinforce and demonstrate the

high priority that we place on the Hemisphere: the General Assembly of the Organization of American States scheduled for June and hosted by the Secretary of State

in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida and the November Summit of the Americas in Argentina.

Building on the recent successes in the Hemisphere and the strong bipartisan

support in Congress for our policies in the region, we will continue to focus our efforts on reducing drug production and trafficking, combating poverty, and confronting instability in the region. Our successes in Colombia, from counterterrorism

operations and coca eradication to alternative development, strongly demonstrate

how U.S. support can make a critical difference.

In a similar vein, the U.S. has committed to improve health and reduce infectious

diseases through the Global AIDS Initiative and the Summit of the Americas process. Our free trade initiatives, including trade capacity building, are eliminating

trade barriers, opening new markets, and committing countries to modern trading

rules. These efforts demonstrate the importance the U.S. places on such an important region.

Russia

Question. The situation in Russia becomes more troubling every day. President

Putin appears determined to dismantle the democratic institutions that were created in Russia over the past decade. I am troubled that the administration has not

taken a more vocal stand in criticizing President Putin’s actions. As a student of

Russia, you must be troubled by this situation. As Secretary of State how will you

approach this problem?

Answer. The consolidation of democracy in Russia is in our strategic interest, as

we believe it is in Russia’s. A stable, healthy, democratic Russia will make a stronger partner internationally. We must first recognize that the Russia of today bears

little resemblance to the Russia that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Progress has been made on the path towards a free market-based democracy.

However, progress has not been even, and recent trends show considerable backsliding. We need to remain engaged with Russia. Efforts to isolate it would only furVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00276 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 CRICE.004 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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ther encourage the domestic trends we find most troublesome. As part of that engagement, we need to share with our counterparts at all levels of the Government

of Russia our questions and concerns regarding the detrimental impact backsliding

on democracy will have on our relationship. We must also continue to maintain close

relations with those individuals and groups in Russia that are advocating for democratic values and institutions. We must continue to provide robust support for programs that strengthen the rule of law, help fight corruption, and defend democratic

values in Russia. We must continue to support linkages between American and Russian institutions and individuals that focus on these issues. In FY 2005, we plan

to spend over $43 million for democracy programs in Russia—about a third more

than we did in FY 2004. And we need a robust program of public outreach to show

Russians how democratic institutions and practices have helped the United States

meet the challenges we both face in the 21st Century. If confirmed, I look forward

to working with the Congress to ensure continued strong support for democratization in Russia.

APPENDIX II—ADDITIONAL MATERIAL INCLUDED IN THE RECORD AT THE

REQUEST OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

(Submitted as part of the 1/19/2005 Business Meeting Prior to the Vote)

I cast my vote in favor of the confirmation of Dr. Rice to be Secretary of State

because I believe that the president has the right to appoint cabinet officers who

share his ideology and his perspective. Barring serious concerns about a nominee’s

qualifications or ethical record, and in keeping with Senate practices and precedents, my inclination is to give the President—any President—substantial deference

in his cabinet choices.

However, I want to be clear that I was troubled by some of Dr. Rice’s statements

in the hearing. Our most senior diplomat, our emissary to the entire world, should

be able to represent our core values. Dr. Rice’s failure, and the failure of the administration, to categorically reject tactics that the average American would acknowledge to be torture is more than disappointing. It is dangerous, and it is unacceptable.

I also want to state, as I have before, that the President’s foreign policy over the

last four years has been, on many fronts, misguided and self-defeating. I am troubled by the damage done to our image around the world; I am concerned by our

loss of focus in fighting terrorism; I am angry about the use of shifting justifications

and faulty information to sell the war in Iraq; I am angry about the failure to plan

for the fact that overthrowing a regime leads to disorder and disorder leads to

looting; I am angry about the official insistence on grossly underestimating the bill

that would be handed to the American taxpayer and then declining to budget for

this massive expense once its parameters became more clear; I am angry about the

mismanagement of efforts to put a competent Iraqi security force in place; I am

angry about the woefully slow pace of reconstruction, and I am angry about this administration’s failure to ensure that our troops were adequately equipped for the circumstances in which they found themselves. Many people in this country and in this

Congress are troubled not only by the mistakes, but by the fact that there appears

to be no real accountability for these failures.

At one point in the course of the hearing, Dr. Rice expressed some indignation

regarding questions or remarks that she felt impugned her credibility. Her credibility is a legitimate question. Dr. Rice made sweeping, public characterizations

about aluminum tubes sought by Iraq before the war began that were, quite plainly,

misleading. She permitted a reference to Iraq seeking uranium from Africa, a reference that she knew the intelligence did not support, to be included in a major

Presidential address. She has a credibility problem, not just among skeptics in this

country, but around the world. And to explore that issue in this forum was entirely

appropriate.

The American people elected President Bush, and, like any President, he is entitled to a cabinet that reflects his views. But I will continue to oppose every bad policy, to question every baseless assertion, and to advocate for a wiser course that will

make our country more secure. The stakes are far too high for me to do anything

else.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, D.C. 20520,

August 11, 2004.

The HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department supports the purposes of S. 2127 and the Administration has

been leading a similar effort as recently notified to your committee. The Secretary

has established an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/

CRS) within the Office of the Secretary. S/CRS will oversee and coordinate intraDepartmental and interagency civilian post-conflict and crisis response efforts. This

Office’s vision is largely in line with the vision in your bill.

The Department is currently working to secure necessary interagency involvement

including details from key agencies to provide requisite expertise in specialized

areas of reconstruction, stabilization, and humanitarian assistance. The Department

is also developing an Operational Readiness Reserve concept to enable and test

methods for agile and responsive mobilization of staff to meet these needs. Experience gained in the formation and initial operation of S/CRS will inform Administration decisions that could lead to creation of a more robust Office of Stabilization and

Reconstruction Operations. As currently envisaged, this office would have many of

the attributes called for in S. 2127.

During this formative stage, sufficient authority exists to establish S/CRS and develop the concept to mobilize agency resources. As we move forward, we will work

with you and provide more detailed comments on the entire bill. However, of greatest immediate benefit would be the provisions set forth in Section 5 of S. 2127 that

authorize the President’s request for a $100 million account to meet immediate

needs in a complex crisis and provide other special assistance authorities including

waiver of certain transfer and drawdown limitations. The ability to reallocate resources from a broad range of accounts in a time of crisis is essential if there is

to be an effective and timely response to the situation in the affected country or region. We would appreciate your support in securing appropriations and authorities

in Section 5.

The Department greatly appreciates the willingness of your Committee to address

how best to respond to failing, failed, or post-conflict states. The Department looks

forward to working with you on creating the resource framework for the new Office

in the near term and on future efforts that could lead to building a robust operational capability in sequence.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that there is no objection to the

submission of this report from the standpoint of the President’s program.

Sincerely,

PETER N. PETRIHOS,

Acting Assistant Secretary,

Legislative Affairs.

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CHARTS DETAILING U.S. TRADE DEFICITS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SARBANES

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THE RIGHT CALL

By L. Paul Bremer III,

The Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2005; Page A10

Recently some Monday morning quarterbacks have questioned the Coalition’s decision to ‘‘disband’’ Saddam’s army and bar senior Baathists from government jobs

after we liberated Iraq. These were the right decisions. They served an important

strategic purpose and recognized realities on the ground after the war.

The Coalition’s objectives in Iraq went beyond ‘‘regime change.’’ President Bush

made clear that we were going to help Iraqis create ‘‘a New Iraq,’’ an Iraq freed

from Saddam’s unparalleled cruelty toward his own citizens. For more than three

decades, the dictator had used the army and intelligence services to inflict misery,

torture and death on Iraqis and their neighbors. The Baath Party was another important instrument of Saddam’s tyranny. Saddam explicitly modeled his efforts to

control Iraqi society on the Nazis. ‘‘Mein Kampf’’ was required reading for members

of his intelligence services.

In the north, Saddam repeatedly used his army to repress the Kurds, once employing chemical weapons to kill more than 5,000 in a single day. In the South, after

the 1991 uprising, Saddam ordered his army to sweep up Shia men, women and

children indiscriminately. They were transported to nearby fields on flatbed trucks,

machine-gunned en masse and thrown into open pit graves. So far, almost a hundred of these mass graves have been found, monuments to Saddam’s army’s brutality toward Iraq’s citizens. Conservative estimates are that Saddam’s security and

intelligence forces killed at least 300,000 of their fellow countrymen. The true number of victims will never be known because over a million and a half Iraqis are still

missing.

After Liberation, the Coalition felt it was vital to reassure the Iraqi people that

in the New Iraq these organizations would no longer be used as instruments of repression. And so the Coalition prohibited the top 1% of the Baath Party from continuing in government service and ‘‘disbanded’’ what was left of Saddam’s military

and security forces. The political importance of these decisions cannot be exaggerated. During my time in Iraq, Iraqi citizens from all over the country, from every

sect, religion and ethnic group, repeatedly praised the de-Baathification and disbanding of Saddam’s security forces as the Coalition’s most praiseworthy decisions.

An opinion poll in early July 2003 revealed that over 94% of Iraqis agreed that top

Baathists should not be allowed in government.

Kurdish leaders told me that the decree on the security services convinced the

Kurds that the Coalition was serious about creating a united Iraq. That reassurance, they explained, was the decisive factor in the Kurdish decision to remain inside a united Iraq. If instead the Kurds had seceded, civil war would have followed.

And a civil war in Iraq would have quickly become a regional war. The Shia, victims

of wholesale slaughter by Saddam’s army, delighted in the prospect of a New Army

no longer dominated by Saddam’s henchmen. They welcomed our promise that Shia

men would be able to play an important role in that New Army.

There was a practical side to our decision, too. By the time Baghdad and Tikrit

fell, the Iraqi army had already disbanded itself. There was not a single organized

Iraqi military unit intact after mid-April 2003.

The majority of Saddam’s soldiers had been young Shia conscripts. These enlisted

men were subjected to brutality and abuse by their mostly-Sunni officers. Conscripts

who were not killed or captured during the war not surprisingly took advantage of

the war’s end to desert. Grateful to be alive, hundreds of thousands of enlisted men

simply went back to their farms and families. Trying to get them to return voluntarily would have been a brutal undertaking. Do critics seriously propose that the

Coalition should have gone into Iraqi homes and farms and forced these conscripts

back into the hated army?

Critics also ignore the political turmoil which would have resulted from reviving

Saddam’s armed forces. Last April, there was widespread outrage when a few hundred former army officers were brought back by the U.S. Marines in an effort to

create a ‘‘Fallujah Brigade.’’ Imagine the reaction if at Liberation we had tried to

recall tens of thousands of officers. The former army men did not go home emptyhanded. Many of them, and looters, stripped their bases and barracks clean. They

took not only anything which would move, but a lot that was nailed down—the

sinks, faucets and toilets and even the tile and piping in the bathrooms. In many

military bases at Liberation not a single brick was left standing on another. No base

was usable without major repairs.

So not only was there no Iraqi army left. There would have been no place to put

an army if we had wanted to recall it. It has taken a year and billions of dollars

279

just to reconstitute the facilities and equipment necessary for the New Iraqi Army.

Nonetheless the Coalition understood the need to provide a future for the former

army members. We immediately began recruiting the New Army and announced

that members of the old army, with the exception of its top officers, would be welcomed into it.

Today, more than three-quarters of the enlisted men in the New Army and virtually all of the officers and NCOs served in the old army. Moreover, in July 2003

we began paying a monthly stipend to all but the most senior former officers. These

payments continue to this day. So if any former army officers are involved in the

insurgency, it is not for money. Their objective is simply to retake power and to return Iraq to its horrible past. The fact that Iraq’s new security forces are still not

performing well enough to take full responsibility for Iraq’s security underscores

that creating a well-equipped, professional army cannot be done over night. The

problems those forces face today would be even worse if, instead of a fresh start,

we had tried to restore Saddam’s old system.

The decision to ‘‘disband’’ the Iraqi security forces was approved by the military

commander on the ground and by America’s senior civilian leadership. It was the

right call. This decision, coupled with the prohibition of the top 1% of the Baath

Party from government employment, signaled to the Iraqi people the birth of a New

Iraq, one in which the security forces would no longer threaten their freedoms.

Mr. Bremer was administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority from May

2003 to June 2004, when sovereignty was returned to Iraq.

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COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE DCI ON IRAQ’S WMD,

30 September 2004

[The information below is from the complete report which can be accessed at:

http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_WMD_2004

NUCLEAR

Key Findings

Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and significance of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after that date.

• Saddam Husayn ended the nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf war.

ISG found no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the program.

• Although Saddam clearly assigned a high value to the nuclear progress and talent that had been developed up to the 1991 war, the program ended and the

intellectual capital decayed in the succeeding years.

Nevertheless, after 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain the intellectual

capital developed up during the Iraqi Nuclear Program. Senior Iraqis—several of

them from the Regime’s inner circle—told ISG they assumed Saddam would restart

a nuclear program once UN sanctions ended.

• Saddam indicated that he would develop the weapons necessary to counter any

Iranian threat.

Initially, Saddam chose to conceal his nuclear program in its entirety, as he did

with Iraq’s BW program. Aggressive UN inspections after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the existence of the program and destroy or surrender components

of the program.

In the wake of Desert Storm, Iraq took steps to conceal key elements of its program and to preserve what it could of the professional capabilities of its nuclear scientific community.

• Baghdad undertook a variety of measures to conceal key elements of its nuclear

program from successive UN inspectors, including specific direction by Saddam

Husayn to hide and preserve documentation associated with Iraq’s nuclear program.

• ISG, for example, uncovered two specific instances in which scientists involved

in uranium enrichment kept documents and technology. Although apparently

acting on their own, they did so with the belief and anticipation of resuming

uranium enrichment efforts in the future.

• Starting around 1992, in a bid to retain the intellectual core of the former

weapons program, Baghdad transferred many nuclear scientists to related jobs

in the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). The work undertaken by these

scientists at the MIC helped them maintain their weapons knowledge base.

As with other WMD areas, Saddam’s ambitions in the nuclear area were secondary to his prime objective of ending UN sanctions.

• Iraq, especially after the defection of Husayn Kamil in 1995, sought to persuade

the IAEA that Iraq had met the UN’s disarmament requirements so sanctions

would be lifted.

ISG found a limited number of post-1995 activities that would have aided the reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program once sanctions were lifted.

• The activities of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission sustained some talent

and limited research with potential relevance to a reconstituted nuclear program.

• Specific projects, with significant development, such as the efforts to build a rail

gun and a copper vapor laser could have been useful in a future effort to restart

a nuclear weapons program, but ISG found no indications of such purpose. As

funding for the MIC and the IAEC increased after the introduction of the Oilfor-Food program, there was some growth in programs that involved former nuclear weapons scientists and engineers.

• The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear weapons program

from leaving either their jobs of Iraq. Moreover, in the late 1990s, personnel

from both MIC and the IAEC received significant pay raises in a bid to retain

them, and the Regime undertook new investments in university research in a

bid to ensure that Iraq retained technical knowledge.

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1 A transcript of the complete White House Briefing will be maintained in the committee’s permanent files.

THE WHITE HOUSE REGULAR BRIEFING, April 10, 2003, Thursday 1

Briefer: Ari Fleischer, White House Spokesman

Location: White House Briefing Room, Washington, D.C.

* * * * * * *

QUESTIONER. Ari, on weapons of mass destruction, British Prime Minister Blair

said a couple days ago in Belfast that after the regime fell, that we, the coalition,

would be led to them. That was his words. Yesterday Defense Secretary Rumsfeld

was offering rewards for Iraqis to prevent the regime from either destroying documents or destroying materials or shipping them out to the country. So, I mean,

what’s the bigger picture here‘ Are we in a position—is the United States in a position where we have to rely on people on the ground to ultimately get to the very

weapons that we say Iraq has and that we’ve been after?

Mr. FLEISCHER. Well, I think there are two principal things that involve the Iraqi

people in the efforts to determine where their weapons of mass destruction are. One

is the people who are involved in it and want to do everything they possible can

to destroy all the evidence of their involvement in it. Obviously, those people are

the problem. And then there are other people who may have knowledge about it who

want to provide that knowledge to the United States or to coalition allies so that

evidence of mass destruction can indeed be unearthed or found. And I think we’ll

see both on the ground in Iraq. I think it is something that will be found We’ve

always that we have information that they have weapons of mass destruction. The

precise location of where it is is information that the Iraqi people can be helpful

with.

QUESTIONER. Well, but—okay. But you’re saying now that—I mean, it appears

that we really are relying on people to lead us to them rather than knowing where

these materials are. And if we don’t have that sort of cooperation, I mean, are we

going to come up empty here?

Mr. FLEISCHER. I think you’ve always heard and you continue to hear from officials a measure of high confidence that indeed the weapons of mass destruction will

be found. What we have is a regime that was a master at hiding it, that have set

up a very large and elaborate infrastructure for the sole purpose of hiding it. And

the military conflict goes through its various phases and we turn the corner from

actual military conduct, military operation, to more of a pursuit of where the weapons of mass destruction are, then I think additional information will come in. And

we don’t rule out that it can come in thanks to the help of the Iraqi people.

And I think additional information will come in, and we don’t rule out that it can

come in thanks to the help of the Iraqi people.

QUESTIONER. But I’m trying to nail this down. You’re—either the bad actors are

going to slip and tell you about it, lead you to it or present it to you, or people who

are as the good actors are going to tip you off, you know, once you’re there and lead

you to the materials, that right now the government forces on the ground are not

in a position independently to get to where the major caches——

Mr. FLEISCHER. No, you can’t rule out that the coalition forces might find something along their travels on the ground.

QUESTIONER [continuing]. ——because you know who it is.

Mr. FLEISCHER. Well, they’re involved in military operations. And Iraq has been

hiding it. But what we have is intelligence about their having it. Whether it was

specific location or not is often not the case. But keep in mind the rescue of Jessica

Lynch, for example. That was developed as a result of information provided to us

by an Iraqi citizen. And so we of course were on the lookout for our POWs. We had

our antenna up doing everything we could to find them. We have means to be able

to do certain things. But there’s a limit to these means. The more that there is help

from the Iraqi people, the easier the effort.

Ron?

QUESTIONER. I’m not asking for specifics, but I want to know specifically if the

United States knows where a cache of WMD is?

Mr. FLEISCHER. Well, we have——

QUESTIONER [continuing]. ——(inaudible)—if the site was (cleaned?), they could go

to it again.

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Mr. FLEISCHER. What we have always said is that we know that they had it, and

they are expert at hiding it.

QUESTIONER. Do you know where any of it is?

Mr. FLEISCHER. Ron, we have always said we know they have it; they are expert

at hiding it. I can’t discuss all intelligence information,and this is something Secretary Powell talked about when he went to the United Nations and talked about

their abilities to hide. But make no mistake, we maintain high confidence that they

have it and it will be found.

David?

QUESTIONER. Do we know where any of it is?

Mr. FLEISCHER. David?

* * * * * * *

QUESTIONER. Ari, part of the reason for the war was WMD. Now, well into the

war, WMD has not been found. The American public is going to the television every

morning, listening to the radio every morning, trying to find out if indeed WMD was

found. Does the administration feel there’s some awkwardness right now with these

statements of ‘‘they’re professional at hiding’’ and ‘‘we know it’s there?’’ I mean, is

there some sort of awkwardness about the fact that this has not been found as of

yet?

Mr. FLEISCHER. No. We know Saddam Hussein is there, but we haven’t found him

yet either. I mean, the fact of the matter is, we are still in a war, and not everything

about the war is yet known. But make no mistake; as I said earlier, we have high

confidence that they have weapons of mass destruction. That is what this war was

about and is about. And we have high confidence it will be found.

* * * * * * *

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CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE WHITE HOUSE REGARDING H.R. 10/S. 2845

(INTELLIGENCE REFORM LEGISLATION)

THE WHITE HOUSE,

WASHINGTON, DC.

October 18, 2004.

The HON. PETER HOEKSTRA,

United States House of Representatives,

Washington, D.C. 20515.

The HON. SUSAN COLLINS,

United States Senate,

Washington, D.C. 20510.

Dear Representative Hoekstra and Senator Collins:

As the House-Senate conference on intelligence reform legislation (H.R. 10/S.

2845) meets, the Administration urges the Conferees to reach agreement on an effective bill to strengthen the nation’s intelligence capabilities that both Houses can

pass and the President can sign into law as soon as possible to meet the nation’s

security needs. There are many good provisions in both bills and the President endorses the best of each as outlined in this letter to strike a reasonable compromise

that will best reorganize our intelligence capabilities and will make the country

safer and stronger. The Administration appreciates the significant efforts of the

House and Senate to date in passing H.R. 10 and S. 2845, and looks forward to continuing to work closely with the Conferees on this historic legislation.

The Administration is pleased that a majority of the provisions of the President’s

legislative proposal, dated September 16, 2004, are included in either the House or

Senate versions of the legislation. America is a nation at war, and the Conferees

have an opportunity to contribute to the passage of a bill that takes another important step forward as we do everything in our power to defeat terrorism and protect

the American people. These provisions include creating a National Intelligence Director (NID) with full budget authority, providing important statutory authorities

for the newly created National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), preventing the disclosure of highly sensitive budget information to our nation’s enemies, especially

during wartime, and preserving the chain of command.

This letter addresses a number of important provisions in H.R. 10 and S. 2845

that the Administration supports, as well as a number of provisions that the Administration opposes, for the reasons generally described below. This letter does not

purport to address the Administration’s comprehensive position on all of the provisions contained in H.R. 10 or S. 2845.

National Intelligence Director

Budget Authority. The Administration supports the strong budget authority provided to the NID in S. 2845. To be effective, the NID must have clear authority to

determine the national intelligence budget, strong transfer and reprogramming authorities, explicit authority to allocate appropriations, and the ability to ensure execution of funds by national intelligence agencies consistent with the direction of the

NID. S. 2845 would provide such budget authority.

The Administration is pleased that H.R. 10 would prevent disclosure of sensitive

information relating to the intelligence budget. Disclosing to the nation’s enemies,

especially during wartime, the amounts requested by the President, and provided

by the Congress, for the conduct of the nation’s intelligence activities would harm

the national security.

Chain of Command. The Administration again stresses the importance of section

6 (‘‘Preservation of Authority and Accountability’’) of the President’s proposal; the

Administration strongly supports the inclusion of this provision by the Conferees.

Inclusion of this section is essential to preserve in the heads of the executive departments the unity of authority over, and accountability for the performance of, those

departments (including accountability for implementing the NID’s statutory-based

guidance). The section also recognizes that the authority of the Director of the Office

of Management and Budget is unaffected. In addition, the Administration notes that

many of the specific concerns with the NID provisions noted below relate to ensuring that the legislation does not interfere with clear lines of authority within the

Executive Branch and does not, by excessive specification of management structures, confuse lines of authority or interfere with areas in which the Executive

should retain discretion.

Management Structure. The Administration is gravely concerned about the excessive and unnecessary detail in the structure of the Office of the NID included in

both the House and Senate bills. The voluminous and bureaucratic requirements

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create confused chains of command, diminish accountability, and foster a risk-adverse culture. Such a structure will undermine rather than promote the ability of

the national security community to carry out its responsibilities. The provisions of

S. 2845 would, in the aggregate, construct a cumbersome new bureaucracy in the

Office of the NID with overlapping authorities and responsibilities. This legislatively

mandated bureaucracy is inconsistent with the final report of The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (‘‘9/11 Commission’’) and will

hinder, not help, in the effort to protect the national security and preserve our constitutional rights. Many of the details contained in these provisions overlap with

standard authorities of an Inspector General and a privacy officer. The bill should

not create additional layers of investigative offices and staffs that will harm national security and prevent these officers from carrying out their duties. The Administration opposes creation of the Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority

and the Analytic Review Unit, and also opposes provisions that allow a subordinate

officer to oversee or otherwise supervise the work of his superior. The Administration opposes the requirements in S. 2845 that the General Counsel for the NID be

appointed from civilian life; this requirement interferes with the President’s ability

to pick the best qualified candidate. We urge the conferees to adopt the President’s

proposal relative to the structure of the Office of the NID.

The Administration also notes that in August the President established a civil liberties board ‘‘within the executive branch’’ (as called for by the 9/11 Commission)

to further safeguard the rights of Americans (Executive Order 13353 of August 27,

2004). The Administration therefore opposes as unnecessary efforts to duplicate our

ongoing efforts to protect civil liberties and privacy by the creation of another executive branch board. One of the most significant findings of the Commission Report

is that agencies need to act more flexibly, rapidly, and together to protect national

security. America needs an Intelligence Community that is focused on protecting

America, while ensuring necessary protections for the rights of Americans as reflected in the President’s Executive Order.

The Administration is also concerned with the conforming amendment in H.R. 10

(section 1079) that designates the existing Community Management Staff as the Office of the NID in all statutes and legislation. The duties, responsibilities, and authorities of the CMS and those granted the NID in proposed legislation are not entirely consistent. This inconsistency further complicates the NID management structure and introduces more confusion into the chain of command. Instead, the NID

should be given statutory authority to provide for a transition in an orderly fashion

of CMS personnel and assets into the office of the NID, as appropriate.

Responsibilities and Authorities. The Administration believes that the responsibilities and authorities of the NID should be described in a single provision that is

both internally consistent and consistent with the goal of establishing a strong, effective NID. In addition, the Administration recommends that new sections

102(b)(3) and 102A(a)(1)(D) of the National Security Act as proposed in H.R. 10 be

deleted. The Administration also believes that the NID should have the authorities

set forth on pages 12–14 of the President’s proposal in order to ensure that the NID

is effectively empowered to operate the Office of the NID.

Appointments. The Administration supports giving the NID a role in the appointment of key individuals in the Intelligence Community. The Administration supports the provisions in S. 2845, which are based on the President’s proposal. The

Administration also notes that certain of the provisions regarding the appointment

of the NID are constitutionally problematic and looks forward to working with Congress to correct these provisions.

Personnel Management. The Administration supports strong personnel management authorities for the NID similar to those set forth in sections 112(a)(8), 113(g),

and 114 of S. 2845.

Collection, Analysis, and Tasking. The Administration supports intelligence collection, analysis, and tasking authorities for the NID similar to those set forth in section 102(f) of H.R. 10.

Acquisition Authority. The Administration supports the Senate’s approach to

granting the NID milestone decision authority, which will help ensure that the NID

has full and effective budget authority. The Administration supports modifications

to the language of section 162 of S. 2845 to limit the likelihood of duplicative bureaucracy.

Coordination with Foreign Governments. The Administration would support the

provisions in section 113(i) and the proposed new National Security Act section

103(f) in S. 2845 that assign to the NID and CIA Director complementary responsibilities with respect to relationships with foreign intelligence and security services,

subject to the addition of the phrase ‘‘or involving intelligence acquired through

clandestine means’’ before the period in section 113(i) and section 103(f). Section

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1011(a) of HR. 10 fails to grant the NID sufficient authority to coordinate these relationships and also fails to specify a role for the CIA Director in implementing this

authority by coordinating contacts with foreign services.

HUMINT Collection. The Administration supports granting responsibility for the

overall direction and coordination of human intelligence operations overseas to the

CIA Director. Section 301(a) of S. 2845 would ensure that overseas operations involving human sources will be coordinated and executed according to consistent

standards. Section 1011(a) of H.R. 10 does not clearly establish the CIA Director as

the coordinator of overseas HUMINT activity, and risks disrupting ongoing collection operations in the War on Terror.

Alternative/Competitive Analysis. The Administration opposes section 146 of S.

2845. A new bureaucracy that duplicates the work of the National Intelligence

Council is both burdensome and unnecessary. The need for independent, competitive, or alternative analysis is appropriately acknowledged in section 102(c)(l2) of

the President’s proposal of September 16, 2004, and section 1011(a) of H.R. 10.

Protect Sources and Methods. The Administration supports provisions of S. 2845

that make explicit the NID’s authority to protect intelligence sources and methods.

At the same time, the Administration believes that the head of each element of the

Intelligence Community should be explicitly charged with carrying out this critical

authority according to the NID’s guidance.

Joint Intelligence Community Council. The Administration supports the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Community Council to ensure that heads of Departments containing elements of the Intelligence Community are held accountable for

carrying out their statutory responsibilities to the NID and conversely, that the NID

is held accountable for meeting the intelligence needs of the Council members. The

Administration prefers section 1031 of HR. 10 over section 203 of S. 2845, but believes that the Administration-proposed provisions for the Council should be adopted.

Reserve for Contingencies. The Administration believes that the NID and CIA each

should have a Reserve for Contingencies. Section 118 of S. 2845 would create a Reserve for Contingencies for the NID and the CIA, but would transfer the unobligated

balance in the CIA Reserve for Contingencies to the new Reserve. The House bill

does not establish a Reserve for Contingencies for the NID and would preserve the

CIA Reserve for Contingencies (see, e.g., section 1071(a)(5)). Creating a NID Reserve

and at the same time maintaining the CIA Reserve would enhance the NID’s ability

to deal with exigencies, while also preserving a key source of the flexibility CIA

needs to meet its unique mission requirements.

Location of Office of the NID. The Administration opposes section 121(e) of S. 2845

which would bar the Office of the NID from being co-located with any other Intelligence Community element, as of 1 October 2006. It is imperative that the NID

have the ability and flexibility to begin carrying out the reorganization and any new

functions and duties that would be directed by intelligence reform legislation, while

ensuring that all current intelligence activities within the purview of the Director

of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community are continued in an effective

and productive manner. The NID therefore should have the opportunity and the discretion, subject to direction from the President, to determine the optimal location

for the Office of the NID in light of resources, security, efficiency, and other operating and management factors.

National Counterterrorism Center

The Administration supports legislation to provide statutory authorities for the

National Counterterrorism Center established by the President in Executive Order

13354 of August 27, 2004. The Administration strongly prefers Section 1021 of H.R.

10 over section 143 of the S. 2845, except that the Administration believes that the

Director of the NCTC should be appointed by the President.

National Counternroliferation Center/Other Centers

The Administration favors waiting until the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction completes its

study before creating additional intelligence centers. The Administration looks forward to receiving the Commission’s recommendations. Mandating creation of a National Counterproliferation Center (section 144 of S. 2845) or other similar organization with insufficient study is premature and risks disrupting ongoing efforts to

counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Administration opposes section 145 of S. 2845, which legislates the structure

and authorities of other centers. Such a provision poses an unnecessary risk of

interfering with the rapid organization of flexible centers to respond to new and

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emerging threats, limiting the flexibility to rapidly organize centers designed to respond to new and emerging threats.

Security Clearances

The Administration opposes provisions in S. 2845 and H.R. 10 that would restrict

the President’s ability to manage the security clearance process. The President and

the NID should retain the authority to tailor standards and procedures to agencies

if necessary to protect the national security. The Administration is committed to improving the security clearance process, but is concerned with unrealistic time limits

that could compromise national security. The Administration supports language contained in the President’s proposal requiring the NID to prescribe standards for common personnel clearance policies.

Information Sharing

The Administration commends and supports the provisions in H.R. 10 that promote the development of a secure information sharing environment under the direction of the NID, while also providing flexibility concerning its design and implementation. The Administration also supports the language in H.R. 10 that preserves the

information sharing responsibilities assigned to the Department of Homeland Security under sections 892 and 893 of the Homeland Security Act and Executive Order

13311, and urges the Conferees to ensure that those responsibilities are preserved

in the final legislation. In contrast, S. 2845 is overly prescriptive and contains excessive detail that will restrict the ability to adapt rapidly evolving technologies to

changing circumstances. Similar flexibilities should also be provided with respect to

the House provisions regarding an interoperable law enforcement and intelligence

data system.

Definition of ‘‘National Intelligence’’

The Administration supports the definition of ‘‘national intelligence’’ contained in

H.R. 10. This definition will further strengthen the NID and help to promote greater

information sharing inside and outside of the Intelligence Community. The Administration is very concerned, however, about sections 221–225 of S. 2845 that raise significant constitutional issues.

Foreign Language Skills

It is important in the War on Terror that intelligence agencies recruit and retain

as many people as possible who are fully qualified in the foreign languages these

agencies need. The Administration supports the provisions of the House bill that

would advance foreign language education and training, and requests that those

provisions be clarified to ensure that service payback obligations are enforceable.

Declassification Board

The Administration supports the extension of the Public Interest Declassification

Board but opposes section 226 of S. 2845, which would rename the Board as the

Independent National Security Classification Board and create a Congressional

right to appeal classification decisions made by an executive agency with respect to

national security information. The authority to make such decisions is clearly vested

in the President and his designated subordinates under the Constitution. Moreover,

this provision is not germane to the 9/11 Commission’s findings or recommendations.

Congressional Oversight

The Administration is concerned that neither bill addresses the critical need to

reorganize congressional oversight, including intelligence oversight and oversight of

the Department of Homeland Security. The 9/11 Commission concluded that the creation of a NID and NCTC ‘‘will not work if congressional oversight does not change

too.’’ Similarly, the 9/11 Commission recommended that ‘‘Congress should create a

single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security.’’ Accordingly,

the 9/11 Commission specifically noted that, of all their recommendations, reorganizing congressional oversight may by ‘‘among the most important.’’ The Administration strongly urges the Conferees to address this critical omission.

The Administration is concerned not only with the omission of congressional oversight reform, but the vast expansion of oversight by additional legislative agents

contained in S. 2845. This is a significant step in the wrong direction and will

hinder the ability of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees to perform their

oversight function. The Administration opposes these provisions, including sections

207(1) and 335 of S. 2845.

* * * * * * *

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In addition to provisions concerning the NID, the NCTC, and other core issues

responsive to the Administration’s proposal, both bills contain a number of additional provisions that will help ensure that the Intelligence Community and others

in the War on Terror have all the necessary tools which are needed to prevent terrorist attacks. Some of the most important of these provisions are discussed below.

Terrorism Prevention, Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community

Additional Tools for the Intelligence Community. The Administration strongly supports and looks forward to working with the Conferees to enact those provisions of

Title II of H.R. 10 that seek to ensure that the Intelligence Community and others

in the War on Terror have all of the necessary tools that are needed to prevent terrorist attacks, and which help address 9/11 Commission recommendations such as

those concerning weapons of mass destruction terrorism financing, and facilitators

of terrorist travel and other material support for terrorists. The most critical of

these include enhanced provisions to deny material support to terrorists (section

2043), including addressing military-type training by terrorists (section 2042, as

well as section 3035); to ensure that communities are protected from suspected terrorists prior to trial and arrested terrorists are unable to launch attacks afterwards

(section 2602, and the related post-release supervision provision in section 2603); to

prevent attacks by ‘‘lone wolf’’ terrorists (section 2001); to prevent attacks using

weapons of mass destruction (subtitle K); to further eliminate sources of terrorist

financing (sections 2111–2115, and 2121–2124); and to ensure that the death penalty is available for all terrorist murders (e.g., section 2502, and the air piracy

amendments in section 2503). These and other anti-terrorism tools in Title II would

help keep America safer and help to address the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations.

Terrorist Travel and Border Security. The Administration also supports those provisions of Titles II and III of H.R. 10 that will better protect our borders from terrorists, while maintaining our tradition as a welcoming nation, and further address the

9/11 Commission’s recommendations concerning such efforts as border security, terrorist travel, and related vulnerabilities. In particular, the Administration strongly

supports efforts to enhance our ability to utilize efficient, flexible tools to keep out

or remove convicted criminals and suspected terrorists who cannot be charged with

Criminal violations and those who have had their visas revoked (including the enhanced tools in sections 3009, 3010, and 3033), and our ability to share information

about terrorist threats and crimes with foreign governments (section 2191).

The Administration supports the provisions in section 3001 of H.R. 10 designed

to close a security gap by eliminating the Western Hemisphere exception for U.S.

citizens. But the Administration intends to work with Congress to ensure that these

new requirements are written and implemented in a way that does not create unintended, adverse consequences.

The Administration strongly opposes the overbroad expansion of expedited removal authorities in H.R. 10 (section 3007), and has concerns about the provision

addressing asylum (section 3008); these sections should be modified or dropped altogether. The Administration also believes that any changes in the asylum program

must include removal of the annual asylee adjustment cap. The Administration also

has concerns with the overbroad alien identification standards proposed by the bill

(section 3006). The Administration welcomes efforts in Congress to address the 9/

11 Commission’s recommendations concerning uniform standards for preventing

counterfeiting of and tampering with drivers licenses and birth certificates, but believes that additional consultation with the States is necessary to address important

concerns about flexibility, privacy, and unfunded mandates. The Administration

generally supports sections 1026–1029 of S. 2845, but recommends that the responsibility for establishment of the standards be assigned to the Secretary of Homeland

Security, in consultation with other officials as appropriate, and that the development and issuance process be by means other than negotiated rulemaking.

With respect to Section 3032 of H.R. 10, the Administration looks forward to

working with the Congress on the detention-related paragraphs to ensure that the

provision applies to the appropriate categories of dangerous aliens; that all of such

aliens are provided with the appropriate procedural safeguards; and that it does not

inadvertently interfere with Executive Branch efforts to find other countries to accept such people. The Administration is also opposed to the ‘‘seek assurances’’ provision of section 3032 as it is inconsistent with the President’s constitutional authority.

Counterterrorism Assistance. The Administration opposes section 3087 of H.R. 10

because it unduly constrains the provision of counterterrorism assistance under the

Foreign Assistance Act. Strengthening foreign countries’ counterterrorism capabilities is an important line of defense in protecting the United States from terrorist

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attack. Like a number of other provisions, section 3088 raises constitutional concerns and should be made precatory.

International Cooperation and Coordination

The Administration does not support adding Title IV of H.R. 10 or Title X, Subtitle A, of S. 2845 to the final legislation as a number of its provisions are inconsistent with the President’s constitutional authority with respect to foreign relations, diplomacy, and international negotiations. Furthermore, many of the provisions may adversely impact the ongoing War on Terror.

The Administration also opposes section 1014 of S. 2845, which provides legal protections to foreign prisoners to which they are not now entitled under applicable law

and policy. Section 1095 of the proposed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (H.R. 4200) already addresses this issue.

Other Government Restructuring

The Administration opposes provisions in H.R. 10 that would encumber the Federal rulemaking process with duplicative and burdensome new requirements and

significant potential litigation risks (section 5091).

Burdensome Reporting Requirements. The Administration is very concerned about

the dozens of new reporting requirements contained in the bills. The Administration

will continue to work with the Congress to eliminate or reduce the burden created

by unnecessary or duplicative statutory reporting requirements and divert resources

from critical national security tasks.

Responding to Attacks. The Administration commends the provisions of H.R. 10

that add to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s flexibility in providing first responder grant funds to certain high-risk areas, but has concerns about border state

funding mandates that reduce that flexibility. The Administration opposes any provision that would unduly limit the Secretary’s ability to allocate funds to high-risk

areas. In addition, the provision authorizing letters of intent for multi-year interoperability grants may complicate homeland-security planning efforts by creating

unrealistic expectations of long-term funding.

Personnel. The Administration is concerned about a number of other provisions

in Title V of H.R. 10, including, as referenced above, Subtitle F on security clearances. For instance, the Administration opposes provisions in Title V that would create inequities in personnel policy between the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, and looks forward to working with the Congress on a separate and comprehensive reform of law enforcement pay and benefits. While appreciating the intent behind it, the Administration also opposes section 5041 because of its harmful ramifications. The section would prevent officials from exercising delegated Presidential

functions and from serving in agency lines of succession.

Ethics Laws. The Administration opposes section 5043 of H.R. 10, which would

eliminate the level playing field established for all three branches of government by

the Government-Wide Ethics Reform Act of 1989, creating a new regime of non-uniform ethics laws. The financial disclosure process should be modernized to reflect

changed circumstances. The Administration strongly urges Congress to adopt the

bill to modernize government-wide financial disclosure submitted by the Office of

Government Ethics to the Speaker on July 16, 2003.

Market Preparedness. As currently drafted, subsection 2(E) of the proposed

amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in section 5085 of H.R. 10

weakens the Treasury’s longstanding responsibility for the orderly functioning of the

market for government securities, by providing the SEC with unilateral authority

to suspend or restrict the operations of clearing agencies for government securities

in the event of a national emergency. Control by the Treasury over this market is

critical because of both the special characteristics of the market and the independent need of the Treasury to be able to provide for effective funding of the government of the United States at all times. The problem created by the current draft

can be solved by deleting paragraph (E), which would have no effect on the remaining provisions.

Public Safety Spectrum. The administration is dedicated to ensuring that adequate spectrum exists for public safety. The Department of Commerce has released

a series of specific recommendations as part of the President’s Spectrum initiative

to accomplish this goal. The Administration opposes the inclusion of the ‘‘Digital

Transition Consumer Assistance Fund’’ under Title X, Subtitle F of S. 2845. Creating a billion dollar fund to subsidize consumer electronics such as digital converter

boxes, high-definition televisions, and the installation of cable and satellite services

is not necessary to achieve the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. The Administration has proposed an analog spectrum fee on broadcasters to encourage faster reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:53 Oct 17, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00294 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 CRICE.004 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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turn of analog TV spectrum. This proposal would facilitate public safety access to

spectrum in a timely fashion without generating budgetary costs.

Conclusion

The Administration also has concerns with a number of other provisions in the

House and Senate versions of the legislation and notes that a number of provisions

in the legislation could be applied only to the extent consistent with the President’s

constitutional authorities. We look forward to working closely with the Conferees as

you craft a final bill to strengthen the nation’s security that the President can sign

as promptly as possible.

Sincerely,

JOSHUA B. BOLTEN,

Director, Office of Management and Budget.

CONDOLEEZZA RICE,

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

cc: All House and Senate Members of the Conference

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