NONPROLIFERATION – 

CHALLENGES OLD AND NEW 

by 

Brad Roberts 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 24 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New 

Brad Roberts 

August 2004 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 24 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 24 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm 

Contents 

Page 

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii 

The Author................................................................................................. iii 

I. Introduction .............................................................................................1 

II. The “Strengthening” Agenda .................................................................2 

III. The George W. Bush Administration ...................................................8 

IV. Taking Stock 1990 – 2004..................................................................12 

V. Looking to the Future ..........................................................................15 

VI. The Next “Strengthening” Agenda.....................................................22 

VII. Conclusions.......................................................................................25 

Notes..........................................................................................................27 
Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 

ii
The Author 

Dr. Brad Roberts is a member of the research staff of the Institute for

Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia, where he contributes to studies 

for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DoD support agencies, and the 

joint military staff. His areas of expertise are NBC weapons 

counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism. He is also an 

adjunct professor at George Washington University, a member of DoD’s 

Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, chairman of the research council 

of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, chairman of the 

Threat Reduction Program Review Committee for Los Alamos National 

Laboratory, and a member of the executive committee of the U.S. 

committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific. He 

joined IDA in 1995, having served previously at the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies as a research fellow and as editor of The 

Washington Quarterly. Dr. Roberts has a Bachelor’s degree from 

Stanford University, a Master’s degree from the London School of 

Economics and Political Science, and a doctorate from Erasmus 

University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. 

iii
iv
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 1

Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New 

Brad Roberts 

I. Introduction 

Since the advent of the nuclear era in 1945, Americans and others 

have been debating whether or how it might be possible to prevent the 

proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 

As each new proliferation challenge has emerged, debate about the 

shortcomings of the various policy tools for coping with proliferation has 

intensified. These debates have grown only more intense in the last ten to

fifteen years. Despite such debates, American presidents have steered a 

fairly consistent course—promoting nonproliferation, innovating along the 

way, while also coping with its periodic failures. 

The end of the Cold War seemed to make new things possible for 

nonproliferation, with the promise of even more cooperation between East 

and West on specific proliferation challenges. And the Persian Gulf War 

of 1990-91 seemed to make new things necessary, as the United States 

faced the first regional war under the shadow of weapons of mass

destruction. First President George H.W. Bush and then President 

William Clinton committed the federal government to significant political 

efforts to strengthen the tools of nonproliferation policy. 

At this juncture, a decade or so hence, it is useful to take stock. What

was the “strengthening agenda” that they launched? How has thinking 

changed over three administrations—and in the wake of 9/11—about the 

means and ends of policy? More specifically, how has thinking about the 

balance between nonproliferation and counterproliferation evolved? How 

much progress has been made? Is there a future for nonproliferation?

Where might national efforts most effectively be focused?1
2 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

II. The “Strengthening” Agenda 

The first Bush administration committed itself in the early 1990s to 

seek a strengthening of nonproliferation in various ways.2

 Early priority

was given to conclusion and rapid entry into force of a global ban on 

chemical weapons. This was a Bush priority since his time as Vice 

President when he proposed a draft treaty in 1984 which resulted in 

conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the very last 

days of the Reagan administration. 

Anticipating the 1995 review conference of states parties to the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the first Bush administration began to 

work for a decision to extend the treaty indefinitely. It also sought a 

strengthening of the safeguards system policed by the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).3

 The Bush administration sought to lead 

an effort to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 

(BWC), with special focus on dealing with compliance challenges. 

Strengthening cooperation on export controls was also an administration 

priority, with focus on improved coordination in the ad hoc supplier 

groups such as the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control 

Regime (MTCR). 

The first Bush administration also focused on a string of specific 

problem cases. It took steps to promote North Korea’s compliance with 

its International Atomic Energy Agency and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty obligations. To deal with rising concerns about Russian Biological

and Toxin Weapons Convention compliance it promoted a trilateral 

inspection effort involving the U.S., U.K., and Russia. In regions of 

proliferation concern, it promoted various steps. In Latin America it 

promoted the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime, including the 

Mendoza Declaration outlawing chemical weapons there. In the Middle 

East it promoted the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) 

process. It continued pressures on India and especially Pakistan. The 

administration also exploited the end of the Cold War to recast the military 

environment in Europe by using the agreement on Conventional Forces in 

Europe (CFE), the Vienna Confidence and Security Building Measures, 

and the Open Skies Treaty as tools for providing predictability and 

transparency. 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 3

At a more strategic level, the administration took the lead in 

mobilizing consensus among the permanent members of the United 

Nations Security Council to issue an unprecedented statement at the headof-state level on weapons of mass destruction proliferation. In their 

January 1992 summit statement, they declared the proliferation of 

unconventional weapons to be a threat to international peace and security 

(code words for justifying the use of force under the UN Charter) and 

committed themselves to concerted follow-up actions to strengthen 

nonproliferation—with special though not sole focus on Iraq.4

The Clinton administration inherited this agenda and proposed no 

significant departures from it. An early priority was to secure ratification 

of the Chemical Weapons Convention and its rapid entry into force, 

though on this effort it stumbled badly, not least in the failure to anticipate 

deep-seated opposition to the treaty from within the Republican Party. 

Finally the treaty did enter into force with U.S. participation, but only after 

the administration acceded to a plan of the Senate Republican Committee 

for an overhaul and contraction of the federal arms control process (i.e., 

elimination of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). 

The Clinton administration successfully brokered the 1995 decision 

of states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to extend the

treaty indefinitely. This was a significant achievement in the face of the 

desire of many states to extend the treaty only for a fixed period of time

and with certain explicit conditions. It was won in part on the promise to 

conclude and bring into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 

(CTBT). But this ultimately foundered in the U.S. Senate, in part because

of limited senior level engagement and poor bureaucratic follow-up of the 

kind that bedeviled Chemical Weapons Convention ratification. The 

Senate CTBT debate also revealed a wide chasm of thinking among 

American experts on the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War

environment. The efforts to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons 

Convention continued under the Clinton administration. The technical 

exploration of means to strengthen verification launched by the Bush 

administration was redirected with formation of an ad hoc international 

group of experts to consider broader questions associated with 

strengthening compliance.5

The special processes on problem cases were carried forward and

adapted by the Clinton administration. Achieving the denuclearization of 
4 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

the non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union was an especially 

important early nonproliferation success for the Clinton administration—

especially in the case of Ukraine, where denuclearization was hard won. 

Working with Congressional leaders Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, the 

administration also launched the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)

effort to address concerns about the so-called “loose nukes” and “brain 

drain” problems in the former Soviet Union (the threat that weapons, 

sensitive technologies or materials, and expertise might migrate from the 

former Soviet weapons complex to proliferators in the Middle East and 

elsewhere). Along the way, concern about the Russian biological warfare 

(BW) problem seemed to slip from the list of top priorities, in part because 

the trilateral inspection process had been stymied by the Russians. 

The regional agenda also continued to receive high-level attention in

the Clinton administration. Mounting crisis over North Korea led to near 

war and then adoption of the 1994 Agreed Framework, brokered by 

former President Jimmy Carter, which seemed to promise an avoidance of

war on the bet that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 

would not survive long enough in the post-Cold War environment to 

realize its nuclear weapons ambitions. Efforts to promote regional 

approaches to nuclear nonproliferation were frustrated by developments in 

both South Asia and the Middle East and by international division about 

how to deal with threats that had not taken clear shape. 

On export control, the Clinton administration continued the effort to 

adapt Cold War mechanisms to post-Cold War realities. It promoted an 

expansion of membership in some of the ad hoc mechanisms (e.g., 

Australia Group). It led the effort to replace the Cold War vintage

Coordinating Committee on Export Controls with the Wassenaar 

Agreement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use

Goods and Technologies, a much looser mechanism, though also one 

seemingly better attuned to the requirements of an era of globalization. 

This, too, was much criticized by Senate Republicans, as an abandonment 

of the types of coercive measures that had served American interests well 

in the past. 

With regard to the other major powers, the Clinton administration 

made some progress with Moscow in addressing the “loose nukes” 

problem, though less progress in preventing Russian nuclear and missile 

aid to others, especially Iran. The administration made more progress 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 5

with Beijing in drawing China into the global nonproliferation effort—

including Chinese membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

and Chemical Weapons Convention and support for the objectives of the

Australia Group and Missile Technology Control Regime—though China

did not bring its export behaviors fully into alignment with Washington’s 

preferences. And vis-à-vis the European allies, the Clinton administration 

suffered continued frustration in building common approaches to Iran, 

North Korea, and others. And on the Clinton watch, the United Nations 

Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) enjoyed both its greatest 

successes and suffered its ultimate collapse as consensus on the Security 

Council about how to deal with Iraq finally dissolved. 

The Clinton administration also addressed as an urgent priority the

need to come to terms with the military planning requirements of 

proliferation. In doing so, they were directly following a line of thinking 

advanced earlier in the Pentagon under Secretary Richard Cheney. 

Throughout the Cold War, the challenges posed by the chemical, biological, 

and nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union were so daunting that any other 

challenge was simply a lesser-included problem. But with the collapse of 

the Soviet Union and following a decade (the 1980s) of rapid proliferation 

of chemical and, possibly also, biological weapons, U.S. military planners 

had to begin to think more seriously about the operational requirements of 

projecting power and prevailing against regional powers armed with 

weapons of mass destruction. The near-brush with Iraqi weapons of mass 

destruction in 1990-91 only confirmed this view. 

Thus in the Cheney Pentagon the term “counterproliferation” was 

coined to encompass such efforts and a plan was developed to reorganize 

the Pentagon in a second Bush administration. Cheney’s successor, Les 

Aspin, arrived from his former post as chairman of the House Armed 

Services Committee with a keen interest in this particular problem.

Embracing the term counterproliferation and the intended reorganization, 

Aspin launched his Defense Counterproliferation Initiative on December 

7, 1993, and with it a top-level effort to motivate the Services, Joint Staff, 

and regional commands to take seriously the challenges, especially of

chemical and biological weapons. The term “counterproliferation” was 

used and misused in many different ways—to suggest an emphasis on 

counterforce attack operations or a rejection of nonproliferation or new 

nuclear missions—with the result that the Clinton National Security
6 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

Council brokered an agreement across the U.S. government about the 

means and ends of nonproliferation and counterproliferation. A key theme

was that the two objectives are mutually supportive.6

 Nonproliferation 

requires that the weapons proliferators might acquire not be useful, 

whether militarily or politically, for blackmailing the United States and 

others who are confronted with WMD-armed aggression. 

Counterproliferation is easier to achieve if the number of WMD-armed 

states is few and their capabilities are restrained by the lack of access to 

global markets, foreign expertise, and extensive testing. 

Against this backdrop there were three further important

developments in the decade after the Persian Gulf War. One was the

rising concern about the proliferation of ballistic missiles. In the late 

1980s, the Missile Technology Control Regime enjoyed its original 

success in stifling development of the Condor missile (a joint development

program pursued by Egypt, Argentina, and others). As a result of 

cooperation by technology suppliers facilitated by the Missile Technology 

Control Regime, cooperation among Third World missile developers was 

sharply curtailed, and this fueled optimistic predictions about the future of

missile nonproliferation. By the late 1990s, an entirely different view of 

missile proliferation had taken hold in Washington, in part through the 

prodding of the Commission on Ballistic Missile Proliferation chaired by 

Donald Rumsfeld, and in part through the emerging threat from North 

Korea and the unfolding nuclear and missile competition in South Asia. 

Washington policymakers became increasingly concerned about the 

convergence of nuclear and missile proliferation trends and the possibility

that the United States might, sooner rather than later, come within range of 

emerging rogue ballistic missiles. 

The second important development was the emergence of intensified 

domestic political debate about the tools of nonproliferation. In a certain 

sense, this reflected a return to normalcy in American politics. The notion 

that ‘politics stops at the water’s edge’ held true through much of the Cold 

War but not in the decades since. In the 1990s, as the risks of nuclear 

Armageddon receded, it thus seemed natural to some national leaders to 

try to exploit divisions on foreign and defense policy issues for partisan 

gain. But to cast the history of this era as one marked by a return to 

partisanship in the debate about nonproliferation would be misleading, as 

the most intense debates about how to deal with proliferation challenges 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 7

seemed to unfold within the Republican Party rather than between the two 

major parties. This debate touched on many issues central to 

nonproliferation. On the utility of arms control, for example, former

Congressman Newt Gingrich took aim at part of his own party in 

describing a “difference between those who rely on lawyers to defend 

America and those who rely on engineers and scientists” as he made his 

case for missile defense.7

 On the virtues of multilateralism as opposed to

unilateralism there was an equally intense debate among Republicans. 

The Clinton administration seemed increasingly unable to set its own 

agenda on nonproliferation and national policy and its strategy in the face 

of Republican opposition in the Congress. At the same time, the deeply 

divided Republicans were unable to agree on an alternative agenda. 

The third important development was rising concern about the linkage 

between proliferation and terrorism. The 1993 truck bomb attack on the 

World Trade Center, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 1995 attack 

on the Tokyo subway with sarin nerve gas, and a dramatic spike in the 

number of anthrax hoaxes all contributed to new-found concern about 

whether and when terrorists might resort to weapons of mass destruction. 

This concern affected nonproliferation in a number of ways. It fueled the 

broader political attack on arms control and nonproliferation from the right 

wing of the Republican Party, on the argument that nonproliferation 

regimes have little relevance to the emerging terrorism threat.

The increasing focus of the United States on domestic preparedness

also magnified concerns among friends, allies, and others that the United 

States was beginning to turn inward and thus away from the leadership

role it had played in dealing with international problems. The rising

concern about weapons of mass destruction terrorism also affected the 

counterproliferation effort in the sense that it became a serious distraction, 

by diverting fiscal, operational, and intellectual resources. Military

counter-WMD assets, already stretched to the limit to deal with the 

planning and operational implications of regional adversaries armed with 

weapons of mass destruction, were shifted increasingly to deal with the

domestic counter-terrorism mission. 

Thus, through the 1990s there was both continued progress in the 

effort to strengthen nonproliferation and a mounting crisis of confidence in 

the overall regime. The continuity from Bush I to Clinton was striking. 

The architecture of the regime was developing further. Specific 
8 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

challenges were being addressed. But at the same time, the efficacy of 

nonproliferation in delivering security came increasingly into question. 

The failures of nonproliferation in South Asia and the Middle East were 

sharp and compelling and of far more political and military interest than

the successes in many other parts of the world.8

 That crisis of confidence 

was felt acutely by small and medium powers around the world that had 

forsworn WMD in the global treaties, and they wondered increasingly 

about whether the bet they had made was a sound one. But it was also felt 

acutely by those Republicans that for a decade and more had fought the 

Bush/Clinton “strengthening” agendas. 

III. The George W. Bush Administration 

Given the diversity of opinion that emerged in preceding years, it is

hardly surprising that the new Bush administration seemed in its first year 

or so to pursue an inconsistent nonproliferation policy. 

At first there was a certain reactive quality to the Bush 

administration’s policy—an effort to correct the many perceived 

deficiencies of the Clinton administration. In the words of William 

Schneider, a senior advisor to Secretary Rumsfeld in his capacity as 

chairman of the Defense Science Board, “the Clinton administration is 

fighting the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction with 

the tools of a bygone strategic era.”9

 He argued further that “the political 

constituency for...multilateral agreements is losing strength. Americans 

are less and less interested in arms control measures that have not in fact 

stopped the proliferation of these weapons and actually impede our own 

ability to provide security for ourselves and our allies in the face of that 

proliferation...the Clinton administration has enacted policies which have 

actually accelerated proliferation rather than retarding it.”10

This view led to early efforts to move away from the Agreed 

Framework with North Korea, to resurrect something like CoCom in the 

export control domain, to talk tougher to Russia and China about their 

continued trade with proliferators—and to deploy ballistic missile

defenses as rapidly as possible.11

Also, during this period, the administration gave serious consideration 

to the possibility of significantly curtailing the Cooperative Threat 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 9

Reduction program with Moscow, on the arguments that its time had 

passed and that the Clinton administration had not figured out that the 

Cooperative Threat Reduction program was being exploited by the 

Russians to divert resources to purposes not intended by the United States. 

The reaction to eight years of Clinton policy also contributed to the 

decision to reject the package of measures designed to strengthen the 

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention that had been the focus of 

international effort since the first Bush administration had helped set the

process in motion a decade earlier.12

At the same time, others in the administration seemed to be making 

contrary claims. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 

International Security, John Bolton, asserted that “our commitment to 

multilateral regimes to promote nonproliferation and international security 

never has been as strong as it is today.”13 He voiced strong administration 

commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pushed for 

increased funding for the IAEA.14 He also expressed support for the 

Chemical Weapons Convention and spearheaded an effort to eject the 

director of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on 

the charge that he was ineffectual. But Bolton also resisted use of the

challenge inspections provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention to 

pursue allegations of noncompliance by Iran and others. 

This ambiguity was partially caused by the institutional perspectives

of persons from different departments. But it also reflected uncertainty in 

the administration about the value of both arms control and multilateralism 

more generally. Its opposition to bilateral arms control with Russia was 

evident from the start, with the desire to move away from the restraints 

embodied in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty but also the 

reluctance to negotiate any kind of successor to the Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (START I). The opposition to bilateral arms control 

was often couched in language dismissive of arms control more generally, 

though some in the administration were careful to argue that the desire to 

move away from the Cold War strategic framework with Moscow did not 

also connote a desire to move away from multilateral arms control 

mechanisms for dealing with weapons of mass destruction proliferation. 

Others seemed perfectly content to dismiss all arms control, both 

bilateral and multilateral, as a dangerous placebo that should be struck 

down and dismantled so that Americans are no longer fooled by the 
10 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

illusion of security these critics associate with negotiated measures. 

Moreover, for many in the administration, multilateralism was seen as 

something being promoted by those resentful of American power and 

wishing to compel American restraint. 

Behind closed doors in the policy studies community in this period, it 

was not uncommon to hear some heretical ideas about nonproliferation 

offered by appointees or affiliates of the new administration. Some were 

willing to argue that the nonproliferation battle had been lost completely—

that the nuclear jungle is here or just right around the corner, given the 

emergence of second-tier suppliers like North Korea as well as the 

continued proliferation behaviors of Moscow and Beijing, and that it’s 

time to get over nonproliferation and to see it as a lost dream of the Cold 

War. Others were willing to argue that more proliferation may be 

perfectly acceptable to the United States—as it promises new friends and

allies in the next major international competition.15 It was not uncommon 

to hear talk about the possibility of collapsing the global treaty regime, on 

the argument that we would then be free of the delusion that it protects us. 

And then came 9/11, and with it the need to sort out the various

opinions, impulses, and perspectives represented in the administration. For 

the President at least, the lessons of 9/11 as they bear on the proliferation 

question were clear enough. More proliferation is not tolerable. The threat

posed by the crossroads of weapons of mass destruction technology and

tyranny is clear and present and cannot be allowed to go further. Rather

than acquiesce, the United States must pursue rollback. The Axis of Evil—

his term of reference for “rogue states”—must be confronted and pacified

now, with preventive wars of preemption if necessary, before they can 

pose imminent threats to America. Wars for regime removal are necessary 

because arms control has proven itself incapable of compelling their 

compliance with international norms. The national strategy to combat 

weapons of mass destruction was to be revitalized, and along with it the 

commitment to nonproliferation renewed and updated. 

Such thinking was evident first and foremost in the National Security 

Strategy of 2002, and then in more detail in the National Strategy to 

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction of late 2002.

16 In spring 2003, the 

Bush administration supplemented these strategies and the associated 

initiatives with an effort to promote enforcement of existing agreements

with stronger international cooperation for interdiction of illegal 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 11

shipments—the so-called Proliferation Security Initiative.17 In February 

of 2004, the President also gave a wide-ranging address at National 

Defense University in which he gave strong endorsement to the principles 

and mechanisms of nonproliferation and proposed seven new steps to 

strengthen them.

18 Readers of these documents who are also conversant 

with the proliferation-related developments over the last decade in the

global landscape and in American politics cannot help but be struck by the

essential continuity in national policy envisioned by the White House. 

The embrace of a broad strategy encompassing political and military and 

unilateral and multilateral measures echoes the thinking of the preceding 

Clinton and Bush administrations. 

Indeed, the aspects of the strategy deemed most unprecedented by 

some opinion-makers, i.e., the emphasis on preemption and interdiction, 

can readily be found in the strategic logic of the 1993 Defense 

Counterproliferation Initiative. There is at least one striking disconnect

between the two Bush administration documents: the logic of preemption 

elaborated so forcefully in the National Security Strategy can barely be 

found in the National Strategy to Combat WMD, even though the latter 

appeared months after the former. Moreover, there is also a striking 

silence about the risks of proliferation to friends and allies of the United

States in contrast to the constant refrain about the risks of proliferation to 

enemies. 

In addition, as part of his commitment to eliminate “gathering

threats,” the President took the nation to war in Iraq to expel Saddam 

Hussein from power. A year after the end of major combat operations, the 

legacy of this effort for nonproliferation remains uncertain and deeply 

debated. The Bush administration argued that regime removal was

necessary to remove the imminent threat of Iraqi weapons of mass 

destruction, though as U.S. weapons of mass destruction inspector David 

Kay subsequently famously argued, “[W]e were almost all wrong,” 

regarding the existence of such arms.

19 The administration also

apparently believed that only by beginning with an effort to democratize 

Iraq could the larger political transformation of the Middle East occur, 

with the apparent hope that this would contribute both to an easing of the 

terrorist threat and of weapons of mass destruction proliferation pressures. 

On the other hand, the exercise of unilateralism has proven deeply 

injurious to the will of others to cooperate with the U.S. in post-war Iraq. 
12 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

For some observers, it has raised questions also about whether a more

interventionist United States might generate additional proliferation 

pressures of its own. 

Thus, in its fourth year, the Bush administration has undertaken some

bold initiatives of its own while also drawing closely to key continuities in 

U.S. strategy vis-à-vis proliferation as it has been pursued for the last 15 

years, and longer. The flirtation with heresies during its first year has 

given way to a concerted national strategy built around clearly defined 

presidential priorities and encompassing both nonproliferation and 

military measures. 

IV. Taking Stock 1990-2004 

What has this strategy accomplished over 15 years? How much 

progress has been made in strengthening nonproliferation in the period 

since the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War? 

The effort to strengthen the global treaty regimes has fallen far short 

of the expectations of a decade ago. Membership of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty has grown (especially with the addition of China,

France, and Ukraine, among others) and the treaty has been extended 

indefinitely; but the effort to strengthen the safeguards system has moved 

only a few steps and the challenges of noncompliance by a handful of 

states remain acute. Both India and Pakistan have demonstrated their 

weapons and apparently continue to acquire additional capabilities. 

The Chemical Weapons Convention was concluded and entered into 

force and is moving through the phase of its work focused on the 

destruction of declared stockpiles of chemical weapons and their 

production facilities; but it has yet to tackle the problems posed by 

suspicions of undeclared capabilities and to initiate the use of challenge

inspections.

The effort to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons 

Convention produced a package of verification and other measures; but 

these were rejected by the United States and were not warmly received by 

others concerned with their impact on the interests of biodefense and 

biotechnology. 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 13

The efforts to strengthen the supporting export control ad hoc 

coordinating mechanisms have produced some incremental measures; but 

with the growing importance of dual-use technologies in all of these areas 

(i.e., those with both civilian and military applications), such mechanisms 

seem to offer decreasing utility in the years ahead. 

The effort to address specific proliferation problems has generated

various processes but few actual results. The long and tortuous process to 

address the North Korean nuclear problem has yet to result in restoration

of North Korea’s compliance with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

obligations (withdrawal from the treaty has not legitimized or legalized the

activities that it pursued in violation of the treaty).

North Korea’s program has been helped by the transfer of uranium 

enrichment technology and advice from the A.Q. Khan black market

operation out of Pakistan. North Korean representatives have admitted to

a significant uranium enrichment effort and claim to already possess 

atomic weapons. The DPRK has now withdrawn from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and may now possess as many as seven nuclear

weapons according to claims. 

The process to turn back the Iranian nuclear weapons program has 

garnered some grudging support from Moscow and Beijing and elsewhere 

but has not so far resulted in cessation of the effort to build reprocessing 

capabilities. Indeed, Iran and North Korea are continuing to press toward 

nuclear weapons capabilities. They loom as the two most significant 

nuclear proliferation challenges and both promise to pose serious 

challenges in the immediate years ahead. Iranian and North Korean 

nuclear programs might well provoke similar programs in countries like 

Japan, the Republic of Korea, and interest in nuclear weapons in Saudi 

Arabia. 

The process to pressure India and Pakistan to rollback their nuclear 

capabilities or, at least, to agree to some form of mutual, formal restraint 

has yet to result in such agreement. The Cooperative Threat Reduction 

program continues its work in the former Soviet Union; but the Russian 

biological warfare problem remains unaddressed, as do concerns about 

China’s noncompliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons

Convention. As argued above, the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 

problem has been resolved with the war to expel Saddam and the Ba’ath 

Party, though at the same time the failure (at this writing) to find evidence 
14 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

of any such weapons seems likely to poison future U.S. efforts to build 

international coalitions against states and regimes with weapons of mass

destruction ambitions. Fortunately, as of this writing, no state-developed 

weapons of mass destruction appear to have been acquired by terrorist 

groups by purchase or theft, or at least such acquisition has not yet 

resulted in weapons of mass destruction use.20

The effort to strengthen the commitment of the major powers in their

role as international security guarantors to deal with weapons of mass 

destruction proliferation has reached a crucial crossroads. On the one 

hand, the second Bush administration is clearly loath to pursue the agenda 

of the first Bush administration to utilize the UN Security Council as a 

venue for fashioning and demonstrating such commitment (on the general 

argument that deference to the Council is an infringement of U.S. 

sovereignty). Its willingness to proceed to war against Saddam without a 

clear Security Council mandate is testament to its antipathy to this 

mechanism and its unwillingness to defer to the concerns of the other 

major powers in the effort to reach agreement. 

On the other hand, the Bush administration has worked diligently in 

bilateral as opposed to multilateral modes to elicit the support of Moscow 

and Beijing in dealing with the specific proliferation challenges of Iran

and North Korea. The administration’s rejection of the UN Security

Council for these roles reinforces a general lack of U.S. leadership of the 

multilateral treaty regimes. The United States remains engaged but is not 

leading. Absent U.S. leadership, the effort to strengthen nonproliferation 

has faltered, not least because no other nation or group of nations can play 

that leadership role. This raises basic and profound questions about the 

future of efforts both in the United States and internationally to strengthen 

nonproliferation. 

This stocktaking summary should look beyond the effort to strengthen 

nonproliferation to the broader question of the status of nonproliferation. 

Over the last decade, and despite all of the rising concern about 

proliferation, the number of nuclear-armed states or states deeply 

committed to achieving a nuclear capability has not grown. Indeed, over 

the last decade, the states that have abandoned nuclear weapons (Ukraine, 

Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa) or nuclear weapons capabilities

(Argentina, Brazil, and Libya) outnumber the states that have moved

forward (North Korea and Iran). Over the last decade India and Pakistan
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 15

became overt nuclear weapon states (though the tests they conducted in

1997 were clearly demonstration shots rather than developmental ones, 

aimed at revealing capabilities developed in preceding decades). The 

number of chemically-armed states has not increased and may well have 

decreased as the Chemical Weapons Convention has been implemented. 

The number of states understood to be seeking or possessing biological 

weapons jumped dramatically in the early 1990s but seems to have held 

steady since then. These rough statistics suggest that whatever the various 

shortcomings of the tools of nonproliferation—and the rising debate about 

the efficacy of those tools—nonproliferation has enjoyed some important 

successes. 

V. Looking to the Future 

Over the early decades of the nuclear era, a certain way of thinking

about the weapons proliferation problem emerged and, despite various and 

sometimes intense debates, a significant measure of consensus emerged 

internationally and in the United States about the nature of the problem 

and what to do about it. In the period since the end of the Cold War, this 

consensus has given way to greater uncertainty and increasing division 

over the premises and principles of policy. Continuity of presidential 

commitment promises a measure of continuity in U.S. nonproliferation

strategy. But it seems reasonable to anticipate an increasingly broad and 

deep debate about the fundamentals of proliferation and nonproliferation 

in the period ahead. In this author’s view, that debate will revolve around 

the following core questions: 

What is the problem? Writing more than four decades ago, Albert 

Wohlstetter provided a classic definition: “n plus one.”21 By this

definition, the proliferation problem equates with the next state in line 

desiring to acquire nuclear weapons. In the wake of 9/11 another view of 

the problem has taken hold in some quarters, to the effect that “the

problem” is no longer proliferation to states but has become proliferation 

to non-state actors, even individual terrorists and criminal extortionists. 

But these are both oversimplifications. Even in an era of rising

concern about terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, concern 

remains strong about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional 
16 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

states—hence President Bush’s commitment to rollback of the so-called

Axis of Evil. And “n plus one” touches on only one facet of the state 

proliferation problem. It is useful to think of different types of state 

problems. The vast majority of states would greatly prefer not to have

nuclear weapons and not to live in a world in which they are a customary 

tool of security and war. A tiny number of states appear deeply committed 

to acquiring nuclear weapons—and even among these high-risk 

proliferators it would seem that some are more committed to being seen to 

be moving toward having a future capability than to actually possessing 

such weapons. Some larger number of states has forsworn nuclear 

weapons on a contingent basis—they have the technical sophistication to 

acquire such weapons but abstain because of feared negative 

consequences of nuclearization (and because some viable alternatives 

exist, such as alliance with the United States).22 These states tend to

develop latent capabilities as a hedge against a future breakdown in their 

security environment and the need to pursue an autonomous nuclear 

stance. In fact, many of them are “repentant nuclear powers” that have

previously had nuclear ambitions but stopped short.23

In this world, many types of proliferation are possible: by the “n plus 

one” country, by the hedging latent states, in subregions such as East Asia 

where these factors coalesce, and more globally if proliferation patterns in 

different subregions interact with one another. Between “n plus one” and 

a complete breakdown of the prevailing nuclear order are many 

conceivable interim states. For example, a wave of nuclearization by 

states in East Asia is conceivable as is a separate wave in the Middle East; 

if both were to occur, the results would likely be felt elsewhere—e.g., 

Central Asia and Europe. The larger forms of breakdown spanning 

multiple regions and involving large, developed countries would seem to 

require a catalytic event of some kind. For the hedging latent states, the 

single most important factor would seem to be the United States. If the 

United States somehow discredits itself as a security guarantor, then such 

states are likely to question whether the United States can be an effective 

steward of their interests. Ironically, it might be years after such a 

breakdown before it was recognized as having happened—as the latent 

states covertly turn their weapons potential into break-out capabilities. 

What is winning (and is it possible)? One version of “winning” the 

nonproliferation battle is defined as preventing “n plus one,” i.e., stopping 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 17

the next states desirous of nuclear weapons from achieving that ambition.

This is an important, indeed central, definition of winning and it has

sometimes proven possible to achieve. But as suggested above, there are

other definitions of winning. One is ensuring that the latent hedgers do 

not choose to turn latent capabilities into overt ones, even in time of crisis. 

A variant of this is ensuring that the repentant powers do not turn 

recidivist.

24 Winning by this definition has obviously been possible, 

though the conditions of future success are unclear. Another definition of 

winning is ensuring that the large ranks of leaders of states opposed to 

nuclear weapons and hopeful of the future possibility of eliminating them 

from the affairs of states do not lose that hope and do not begin to think 

that they should invest in their own hedges against a future breakdown of 

the prevailing nuclear order. Winning here also looks promising but 

cannot be assumed. President Bush has reminded us of an important 

additional definition of “winning”: rollback, i.e., restoration of the status

quo ante (i.e., the pre-nuclear status). 

Secretary Rumsfeld has argued that the number of nuclear-armed

states could double over the next decade (without any indication of what 

categories and calculations led him to this number).25 One version of 

“winning” is limiting the damage to just a doubling. Another version is 

ending up in a decade from now with even fewer nuclear-armed states—

clearly the President’s objective. 

Consider for a moment the reverse question: What is losing? Losing 

means more than an incremental addition to the number of nuclear-armed 

states. It means rising fears of nuclear competition and war, as for 

example seen in South Asia since 1998. It means fears of the spillover 

effects from one subregion to another. More parochially, from a U.S.

perspective, losing could mean also the partial eclipse of U.S. power. 

After all, if some of the “repentant” powers such as Japan or South Korea 

or Taiwan opt for nuclear weapons in reaction to some event(s) that has 

discredited the U.S. as a security guarantor, their decision to acquire 

nuclear weapons will reflect a loss of confidence in the United States and 

will signal an increased autonomy in their international relations. The 

United States may find them occasional willing partners in some U.S. 

initiative, but it seems less likely to be able to count on them as full allies 

in some new American project. 
18 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

Moreover, the fact that they might have moved to nuclear status while 

under the cover of the U.S. nuclear umbrella would be interpreted by 

many international observers as a U.S. violation of the commitment under 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not to assist others to acquire nuclear 

weapons. If “winning” is possible, so too is “losing” as defined here, at a 

cost to U.S. political and security interests that is difficult to calculate. 

Winning remains possible and should not be abandoned even in the 

face of setbacks on the “n plus one” challenge.26 In concluding its 

National Strategy to Combat WMD, the Bush White House has argued as 

follows: “The requirements to prevent, deter, defend against, and respond 

to today’s WMD threats are complex and challenging. But they are not 

daunting. We can and will succeed in the tasks laid out in this strategy; 

we have no other choices.”27

What policy tools work best for nonproliferation? Especially in

recent years there has been a strong debate about whether political or 

military tools are better suited to deal with the proliferation problem. This 

question is a red herring. Different tools are suited to different challenges. 

Dissuading and deterring potential proliferators is best done with military 

capabilities that promise them defeat in war and successful rollback of one 

or two of the high-risk proliferators; such military prowess ought to have

some positive impact on the thinking of other potential proliferators. 

Dissuasion and deterrence can be reinforced by political measures that 

promise exposure and punishment of illicit activities especially in the case 

of those states that pursue weapons not for purposes of national survival 

but for purposes of aggression and coercion. 

On the other hand, assuring the repentant powers and other allies and 

friends of the United States that they remain secure without nuclear 

weapons is best done with political instruments—alliances, security

guarantees, legal regimes, and other mechanisms for international security 

cooperation. “Best for what?” is the right answer to the question posed 

above. The glaring present shortcomings of treaty regimes in ensuring 

compliance by especially willful malefactors do not make them irrelevant

to the other facets of the proliferation challenge—to reassuring the latent 

states and to facilitating international cooperation to deal with those other 

than the aggressive cheaters. 

Are multilateral approaches a help or a hindrance? The traditional 

nonproliferation community has seen such approaches as the sine qua non 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 19

of nonproliferation.28 Some in the Bush administration have given a 

strong endorsement to multilateralism, while others have attacked it as a 

form of restraint on the exercise of American power.29

Multilateral approaches to proliferation encompass the specific treaty

regimes, the ad hoc supporting mechanisms, and the international 

institutions such as the United Nations. The drawbacks to such 

approaches are numerous and well known. Multilateral approaches are 

often reduced to the lowest common denominator, and what is possible 

often substitutes for what is necessary. Over the last decade multilateral 

approaches have been conspicuously ineffective at securing compliance by 

states such as Iraq and North Korea with self-accepted treaty obligations. 

And as the case of the UN Security Council debate on military action 

against Iraq suggests, multilateral approaches sometimes constrain 

American power. For all of the debate about the proper balance between 

unilateral and multilateral approaches, few in America would argue that 

unilateral action is never justifiable. The question for Americans then 

must be: what can multilateralism add beyond unilateralism?

Excessive unilateralism comes with its own costs: it suggests to many 

foreign observers that the global problem today is posed not by rogue

regional challengers but by an unpredictable America that has put itself 

above the law in its pursuit of hegemony.30 This may induce a new wave 

of proliferation, as others react to the increasing unpredictability of 

American power or arm themselves in fear of U.S. intervention.31 

Especially as the United States pursues an ambitious war against terror of 

global reach and as it confronts Iraq, North Korea, and potentially other 

WMD-armed regional powers, it has a strong interest in dampening fears 

that it will widen the war beyond the scope necessary to these ends and in 

refuting the argument that a rogue America is the new international 

security problem. Anchoring its actions in the legitimizing frameworks of 

multilateralism can help secure this interest. 

Secretary Rumsfeld has argued that proliferation “is not a problem 

that individual nations can handle by themselves...We face three 

intersecting dangers today: the growing arsenal of rogue, failed or failing 

states; the exponential growth in trade among these states in WMD-related 

materials, technologies, and delivery capabilities; and the relationship 

between these state and terrorist networks that are seeking to obtain 

chemical and biological and nuclear material. If we are to deal with these 
20 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

new dangers, we need new tools of international cooperation, including 

new authorities to prevent—and, if necessary, interdict—the import, the 

export, and the transshipment of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic 

missiles, and WMD-related materials from and between and to terrorist

states.”32 He goes on to identify strengthening and reforming the 

institutions of multilateral action as a top priority. 

Do norms matter? Underlying the debate about political measures 

and multilateral institutions is a debate about nonproliferation norms. Are 

they relevant to success in meeting the proliferation challenge?

Nonproliferation norms lack the coercive power of other tools of 

policy. The fact that they are not universally adhered to is what causes 

them to exist —behaviors exist that people find intolerable. But the 

importance of such norms is growing, not declining, in an era in which 

high-leverage technology is diffusing from states to non-state 

organizations and even individuals. Views of right and wrong help to 

shape the behavior of individuals and organizations whose behaviors 

cannot be policed effectively all or any of the time. 

U.S. policymakers tend to talk about the virtues of creating 

nonproliferation norms. But with rare exception, norms are not

promulgated. They exist, as derived from human experience of things 

people consider wrong. The word itself derives from the Latin for a 

carpenter’s set-square. “The set-square tells the carpenter what a rightangle is ‘expected and required’ to be...An international norm defines

‘expected and required’ behavior in the society of states. The existence of 

a norm, at any level, does not imply permanence, still less divine edict.”33 

Norms are an unreliable basis for persuading the malefactor to improve his 

behavior, because he sees his behavior as required and warranted by his 

circumstance. But without norms, no behavior is right or wrong, and thus

no behavior can be punished. Norms are more reliable for promoting 

cooperation to deal with the malefactor than in affecting its behavior 

directly. In the current international climate of unipolarity, whenever the 

United States fails to explain its uses of powers in terms of accepted

norms of international behavior, it undercuts these norms and fuels the

perception that nothing more than a competition of power and interest is at 

stake. 

What role can and should the United States play? In combating 

proliferation, the United States has no choice but to lead. If it abandons its 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 21

leadership position, others can be expected to fill the gap with projects of

their own, projects that cannot always be expected to show the same

respect for U.S. interests as those conceived in Washington. But the 

ability of any other state or coalition of states to fill the gap is very 

doubtful. Sustained retreat from its historic leadership of the 

nonproliferation project could well help precipitate a breakdown of the

prevailing nuclear order Even if that breakdown would have many 

explanations, it seems highly likely that the blame for its breakdown 

would fall on Washington. After all, nuclear nonproliferation has been a 

special American Project from the advent of the nuclear era and American 

defection from this effort would lead others to predict the imminent 

collapse of existing approaches.34 Moreover, as the most powerful actor 

in the international system, blame naturally attaches to the United States

for any and all developments that others would have wished avoided. 

What mode of leadership best suits U.S. interests in nonproliferation? 

The two White House strategy documents, the National Security Strategy 

of the United States (2002) and the National Strategy for Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003), provide many useful answers. But 

leadership also requires an effort to build a shared vision of how to 

achieve desired objectives and a willingness to work at keeping people 

focused when distractions arise. Coming to a unified position on an 

approach to solving the weapons of mass destruction threat is difficult for 

we are not all of one mind on how best to pursue our nonproliferation 

goals. Indeed, there are entrenched and powerful opponents who provide 

a direct challenge to a president who seeks to lead a national strategy that 

is integrated, synergistic and has the backing of the public. 

The questions and answers provided in this chapter are constructed

with a focus on nuclear weapons. Do they fit the other problems we face, 

especially the proliferation of biological weapons? The biological 

weapons proliferation problem is analogous to the nuclear problem in the 

sense that the number of proliferators remains few. There are perhaps a 

dozen or so states with biological weapons or actively seeking to acquire

them. But the number could increase in different ways and over different 

thresholds in response to some catalytic event. Winning here means some

rollback of the BW capabilities of specific actors (especially Russia but 

also North Korea, Iran, and perhaps China). It also means accepting a 

high degree of latent capability among all states, given the diffusion of 
22 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

dual-use biotechnologies. In the biological weapons domain, both military 

and political tools are applicable, as in the nuclear domain. But the 

military tools remain badly undeveloped, especially relative to the focus 

on nuclear security, and the political tools seem largely abandoned by an 

administration that sees the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention as

unverifiable. Unilateral approaches cannot “solve” the biological weapons 

problem just as they cannot solve the nuclear one—but they have a role to 

play. Norms matter, even more in the biological weapons realm than the 

nuclear, given the relative ease with which states and sub-state groups can 

produce and employ these weapons. Here as in the nuclear area, there is 

no substitute for U.S. leadership, as no other actor has a global view of the 

problem or a comprehensive view of the tool kit to work it. 

The biological weapons problem seems, however, to hold out the 

possibility of future engagement with two new constituencies not relevant 

to the effort to prevent nuclear proliferation. One is the international 

scientific community seeking to develop biotechnologies for peaceful 

purposes. The other is the U.S. industrial community in the 

pharmaceutical, agricultural, and other domains that has a stake in 

promoting society’s acceptance of its new products. Both of these 

constituencies resist engaging in the effort to police compliance with

international norms against the misuse of their expertise but both are 

increasingly essential as partners in that effort. The biotechnology 

revolution is making bio-weapons more accessible to small states as well 

as terrorist groups. Thus, it is all the more important to bring scientists 

and bio-tech firms into new regimes. To do so will require new thinking 

and new cooperation between the U.S. government in partnership with key 

firms working together within a framework of guidelines and regulations 

designed to keep the BW genie in the bottle. 

VI. The Next “Strengthening” Agenda 

A decade or so ago the United States committed itself to leadership of

an international effort to strengthen nonproliferation. Despite a widening 

and deepening of debate about the fundamentals of strategy and policy, 

national leadership appears committed to sustained pursuit of

nonproliferation objectives. Looking ahead another decade or so, how 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 23

might the United States best focus its efforts to strengthen 

nonproliferation?

Part of the answer is found in the context of the treaty regimes. 

Despite some Bush administration misgivings about the shortcomings of

multilateral arms control, the United States remains a party to the three 

core treaties and remains central to the effort to strengthen them. In 2005, 

states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will again convene 

in a review conference to evaluate progress in implementing the terms of 

the treaty, and a successful review conference will oblige Washington to 

have a strategy that takes account of the various developments since the 

1995 review and extension conference, including U.S. rejection of the 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the emergence of India and Pakistan as 

de facto nuclear weapon states, the Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture 

Review and New Strategic Framework, and the challenges of rollback, as 

so far pursued against Iraq, Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Over the 

coming decade, most of the stockpiles of chemical weapons declared by

states parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention will have been 

destroyed and the emphasis of states parties will shift increasingly to 

dealing with noncompliance and thus with challenge inspections. The

effort to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention will 

also continue, though it is unlikely that the Bush administration or its 

successors will easily be persuaded that the treaty can be made verifiable 

at a cost that the United States (and others) are willing to pay—a fact that 

could help keep states parties focused on myriad other projects of utility to

the regime. 

But, of course, treaty regimes are only part of the “answer.” Expect 

continued efforts to tighten export controls and the associated ad hoc

coordinating mechanisms—as well as continued frustration with the utility 

of such measures in an era of globalization and a broadening array of dualuse (civil-military) technologies. 

Expect also continued efforts to promote international partnerships to 

deal with particular problems—partnership for example with Russia and 

China and with other conduits of weapons of mass destruction technology 

and expertise to proliferators. Expect continued efforts to interdict 

shipments of sensitive materials, technologies, and weapons when other 

measures have failed. 
24 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

An important new question has emerged about how to reap the 

benefits for nonproliferation of the Bush administration’s efforts to 

confront “gathering threats at the crossroads of technology and tyranny.” 

Some in the administration have spoken privately about their hope that 

these efforts will “re-set” international norms by demonstrating that the

United States in partnerships with coalitions of the willing will see to it 

that flagrant violations will not go unpunished. In other words, having 

eliminated the Taliban, suppressed al Qaeda, driven Saddam from power

in Iraq, and tightened political and economic pressures on North Korea 

and Iran, are there opportunities now to rollback others without recourse to 

war and to reinforce nonproliferation more broadly?

Richard Perle, among others, has offered up one logical implication: 

that other proliferators, watching military action against these actors, 

ought to conclude that the possible costs of weapons of mass destruction 

far outweigh the benefits and, thus, the next round of proliferators ought to 

be dissuaded by the action of the Bush administration.35 Libya’s decision 

to give up its nuclear program would seem to buttress this claim. Of 

course, some (such as North Korea) may conclude that they had better 

rush to complete nuclearization before they face serious prospect of a U.S. 

effort to remove their regime. 

Another possibility is that other states will come to appreciate the 

seriousness of the United States in its desire to confront weapons of mass 

destruction proliferators and will no longer object to U.S.-led efforts to

pressure those suspected of noncompliance. This message may be

especially powerful for Moscow and Beijing, who also desire greater

partnership with Washington on various other concerns. Of course, 

success in this regard would seem to require some vindication of the 

intelligence that led to Bush administration claims that Iraq possessed 

weapons of mass destruction. Failing to uncover such vindication, the

United States may find it considerably more difficult to build such 

coalitions in the future. 

These possibilities suggest that the future focus of U.S. policymakers

will remain on the challenges of compliance and not on the challenges of 

constructing new pieces of the nonproliferation architecture. But to a 

significant extent, this would seem to depend on the political winds. 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 25

VII. Conclusions 

After a decade or so of intensifying debate about the means and ends 

of nonproliferation, remarkable continuity prevails in the main scope and 

thrust of policy. Despite debate about whether “winning” is possible, 

judging by its actions the United States remains strongly committed to

winning. Despite debate about whether nonproliferation is an 

anachronistic concept with roots in an era now past, the United States 

remains committed to the effort to strengthen nonproliferation 

mechanisms. Despite debate about the proper balance between military

and political tools of policy, there is broad consensus that both sets of 

tools are necessary to deal with the various facets of the nonproliferation

problem. 

Events may trigger new nonproliferation possibilities in the future. 

For example, if there were a major use of nuclear, biological, or chemical 

weapons, whether by a state or terrorist group, this could create new 

dynamics, including perhaps new demands and opportunities for increased 

international cooperation and perhaps also increased regulation of 

sensitive industries (e.g., biotechnology, pharmaceutical plants, chemical 

factories, and the nuclear power industry). It could also create a new 

potential for armed conflict, especially if a state made the attack or is

believed to have assisted. 

A consistent long-term U.S. goal of this importance deserves 

consistent, strong policy support, especially in the face of what seems to

be a growing proliferation challenge. But looking to the future, continued 

debate about both the means and ends of policy seems likely—with a 

harmful effect on the ability of the United States to achieve its objectives

and to lead others toward that end. Indeed, fundamental questions deserve 

broader and deeper exploration as the Cold War recedes further into the 

past and the new challenges of technology diffusion, mass casualty 

terrorism, and weak and collapsing states come into sharper focus. But for 

the coming decade at least it seems that no American president will want 

to be tarnished with a rapid and broad proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

As the National Strategy to Combat WMD concludes, there is too much at 

stake for the United States to allow this to come to pass. 
26 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 27

Notes 

1. Earlier drafts of this paper have benefited from thoughtful and constructive

critiques by Lewis Dunn, Michael Moodie, and Victor Utgoff. The author alone remains 

responsible for the final arguments presented here. 

2. Michael Moodie, “Multilateral Arms Control: Challenges and Opportunities,” in 

James Brown, ed., Challenges in Arms Control for the 1990s (Amsterdam: VU 

University Press, 1992), 71-82. Moodie was, at the time, assistant director for 

multilateral affairs in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 

3. Richard Hooper, “Strengthening IAEA Safeguards In an Era of Nuclear

Cooperation,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 9 (November 1995), 14-18. 

4. UN Security Council Resolution on proliferation: Note by the President of the

Security Council, UN Document S/235000 (January 31, 1992). 

5. For a review of the effort to strengthen the BWC, see Jonathan B. Tucker, “In the 

Shadow of Anthrax: Strengthening the Biological Disarmament Regime,” Nonproliferation

Review, Vol. 9, No.1 (Spring 2002), 112-121.

6. For a review of this effort, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation:

Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: GPO, April 1996). 

7. Cited in John Ikenberry, “American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror,”

Survival, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Winter 2001-2002), 27. 

8. For some analyses of the progress made during the 1990s in working these

various problems, see Brad Roberts, “Proliferation and Nonproliferation in the 1990s: 

Looking for the Right Lessons,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 1999), 70-

82; Jayantha Dhanapala, “Multilateralism and the Future of the Global Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Regime,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001),

99-106; Jonathan B. Tucker, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Has it Enhanced U.S.

Security?” Arms Control Today (April 2001), 8-12; and Siegfried S. Hecker, “Thoughts 

about an Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia,” Nonproliferation 

Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2001), 1-24. 

9. William Schneider, “Weapons Proliferation and Missile Defense: the Strategic 

Case,” in Robert Kagan and William Kristol, eds., Present Dangers: Crisis and 

Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco, Calif.: Encounter

Books, 2000), 269.

10. Ibid., 269, 271. 
28 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

11. Phillip C. Saunders, “New Approaches to Nonproliferation: Supplementing or

Supplanting the Regime?” Nonproliferation Review (Fall-Winter 2001), 123-136. 

12. Tucker, “In the Shadow of Anthrax.”

13. Statement to the Conference on Disarmament, January 2002. 

14. “Expounding Bush’s Approach to U.S. Nuclear Security, an Interview with

John R. Bolton,” Arms Control Today (March 2002), 3-8. 

15. In each significant debate over the nuclear era about how to respond to the next

nuclear proliferation challenge, there has been a body of opinion reflecting the view that 

some additional proliferation might serve U.S. interests, whether by strengthening an ally

or by providing security to a friendly state for which a security guarantee would not be

viable. Such arguments have tended to draw on the thinking of Kenneth Waltz about 

nuclear proliferation that “more may be better” because it stabilizes competitive 

relationships. See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear 

Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton and Co., 2003). But as a matter of

policy, the U.S. government has opposed each and every new nuclear state, including 

even Britain. 

16. Both are available at the website of the White House, White House website. Online, Internet, 10 January 2004, available from www.whitehouse.gov. 

17. “Countries Draft Guidelines for Intercepting Proliferation,” Arms Control

Today, Vol. 33, No. 7 (September 2003), 27, 48. 

18. Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, 

National Defense University, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004. On-line, Internet, 10

January 2004, available from www.whitehouse.gov. 

19. “Transcript: David Kay at Senate Hearing,” CNN.com, 28 January, 2004. Online, Internet, 22 Nov 04, available from www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/28/kay.transcript/. 

David Kay’s report also indicated that Iraq still had traces of a BW program but no

serious on-going effort. Also, his team found Iraq was not in full compliance with UN

resolution and Desert Storm ceasefire terms with regard to the deployment of ballistic 

missiles. 

20. The Chechen acquisition of a small amount of Cesium-136 and threatened use,

with no result, is a possible exception, except that they appeared to have no more than 

they buried in a Moscow park for police to find. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan

manufactured its own biological and chemical weapons. There is also the possibility that 

the South African chemical and biological weapons programs were exported to

Zimbabwe and elsewhere in Africa. See Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 29

Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Program (Maxwell AFB,

AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, April 2001), 17-38. See also, W. Seth Carus,

Bioterrorism and Biocrimes (Washington, D.C.; Center for Counterproliferation 

Research, NDU, March 1999 edition), 47-86.

21. Albert Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country,” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3 (April 1961), 355-387. 

22. These arguments are elaborated in more detail in Brad Roberts, Weapons

Proliferation and World Order After the Cold War (Boston, Mass.: Kluwer Press, 1995).

23. Leonard S. Spector, “Repentant Nuclear Proliferants,” Foreign Policy, No. 88

(Fall 1992), 3-20 and Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their 

Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995). 

24. For more on nuclear recidivism, see Kurt M. Campbell, “Nuclear Proliferation

beyond Rogues,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 2002-03), 7-15 and Ariel

E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security,

Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002-03), 59-88.

25. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, remarks delivered on the 10th 

anniversary of the George Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany, June 11, 2003. 

26. For the argument that winning is possible by two conservative commentators,

see Henry Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign Against Strategic Weapons

Proliferation (Westport, Ct.: Praeger, 2001) and Baker Spring, Ten Principles for 

Combating Nuclear Proliferation, Heritage Lecture No. 783, Heritage Foundation,

Washington, D.C., March 27, 2003. 

27. National Strategy to Combat WMD, 6. 

28. Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfstahl and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly

Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, 2002). 

29. See remarks by Richard N. Haass on “hard-headed multilateralism” to the 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Center on International 

Cooperation, November 14, 2001. On-line, Internet, 10 January 2004, available from

www.ceip.org. See also Richard N. Haass, “What to Do with American Primacy,”

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5 (September-October 1999). 

30. For more on the argument that American primacy is the major foreign policy

theme for most of the other actors in the international system, see Brad Roberts, 
30 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New

American Primacy and Major Power Concert: A Critique of the 2002 National Security 

Strategy (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2002). 

31. Saunders, “New Approaches to Nonproliferation,” 133-135. 

32. Rumsfeld remarks, June 13, 2003. 

33. Coral Bell, “Normative Shift,” National Interest (Winter 2002/03), 44. 

34. William Walker, “Nuclear Order and Disorder,” International Affairs, Vol. 76,

No. 4 (2000), 703-724.

35. This was an argument made in the context of his case for going to war to expel

Saddam in such close succession to the war against the Taliban. See Richard N. Perle, 

“Next Stop, Iraq,” remarks to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 14, 2001. 

On-line, Internet, 10 January 2004, available from www.aei.org. More precisely, Perle 

has argued that a wider war ought not be necessary to achieve desired changes among 

many countries so long as a good example is made of one or two countries. 
Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New . . . 31

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1999 to provide 

education and research to the present and future leaders of the USAF, to assist them in 

their activities to counter the threats posed by adversaries equipped with weapons of mass 

destruction 

Barry R. Schneider, Director 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle

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Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell.af.mil

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Email: JoAnn.Eddy@maxwell.af.mil

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32 . . . Nonproliferation – Challenges Old and New