ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2005 FED App. 0001P (6th Cir.)

File Name: 05b0001p.06

BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

In re: WILLIAM VAN AKEN, )

)

Debtor. )

_____________________________________ )

)

SHIRLEY VAN AKEN, )

)

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

)

 v. ) No. 04-8037

)

WILLIAM VAN AKEN, )

)

Defendant-Appellant. )

_____________________________________ )

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division at Cleveland.

No. 03-20434.

Argued: November 4, 2004

Decided and Filed: February 11, 2005

Before: AUG, GREGG, and LATTA,

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judges.

____________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Richard A. Baumgart, DETTELBACH, SICHERMAN & BAUMGART, Cleveland,

Ohio, for Appellant. Madelon Sprague, ZAMORE, LURIA & GISSER, Shaker Heights,

Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Richard A. Baumgart, DETTELBACH, SICHERMAN &

BAUMGART, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Keith E. Belkin, Shaker Heights, Ohio, for

Appellee.
2

____________________

OPINION

____________________

JENNIE D. LATTA, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. This case is before us on

the appeal of William Van Aken (“Debtor”) from an order of the bankruptcy court declaring

nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) an obligation to pay spousal support

and an obligation to pay attorney fees awarded as additional spousal support. The Debtor

argues that the disputed awards were not actually in the nature of support and that the

bankruptcy court erred in not admitting extrinsic evidence regarding the intent of the

parties. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the order of the bankruptcy court.

I. ISSUES ON APPEAL

The issues presented on appeal are (i) whether the disputed obligations bear the

required indicia of support under state law to render them nondischargeable under federal

bankruptcy law; and (ii) whether extrinsic evidence may be admitted to explain or vary the

terms of a Separation and Property Settlement Agreement incorporated into a Judgment

Entry of Divorce. 

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) of the Sixth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear

and decide this appeal. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio

has authorized appeals to the BAP. A “final order” of a bankruptcy court may be appealed

by right under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). For purposes of an appeal, an order is final if it “ends

the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”

Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S. Ct. 1494, 1497 (1989)

(citations omitted). A bankruptcy court’s judgment determining dischargeability is a final

and appealable order. Cundiff v. Cundiff (In re Cundiff), 227 B.R. 476, 477 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.

1998)(citations omitted).
3

“The bankruptcy court’s order regarding nondischargeability is a mixed question of

law and fact. The appellate court reviews the conclusions of law de novo but the findings

of fact under a clearly erroneous standard.” Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Vitanovich (In re

Vitanovich), 259 B.R. 873, 875 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2001) (citing Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800

Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 1996)). “‘De novo review requires the Panel

to review questions of law independent of the bankruptcy court’s determination.’” Bailey

v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 254 B.R. 901, 903 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2000) (quoting First Union

Mortgage Corp. v. Eubanks (In re Eubanks), 219 B.R. 468, 469 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.

1998)(omitting citations)). “Determinations of dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523 are

conclusions of law reviewed de novo.” Bailey, 254 B.R. at 903 (citing Hart v. Molino (In re

Molino), 225 B.R. 904, 906 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998)), Sorah v. Sorah (In re Sorah), 163 F.3d

397, 400 (6th Cir. 1998)(holding that “the interpretation of § 523 is a legal issue that we

review de novo”). But the BAP must “‘affirm the underlying factual determinations unless

they are clearly erroneous.’” Bailey, 254 B.R. at 903 (quoting In re Molino, 225 B.R. at 906)

(additional citation omitted); Sorah, 163 F.3d at 400 (“We review the factual determination

of whether an obligation constitutes nondischargeable support under the ‘clearly erroneous’

standard”) (citations omitted). A factual determination is clearly erroneous “when although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Bailey, 254 B.R. at 903

(citations omitted). 

The bankruptcy court’s ruling regarding the application of the parol evidence rule is

a matter of Ohio state law, and as such is to be reviewed de novo by the BAP. Salve

Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1221 (1991). 

III. FACTS

The Debtor and Appellee Shirley Van Aken were divorced on December 16, 1997,

after nineteen years of marriage. The parties’ Judgment Entry of Divorce (the “Judgment”)

incorporated the terms of a Separation and Property Settlement Agreement (the

“Separation Agreement”) which was signed by the Appellee on June 7, 1997, and by the

Debtor on August 5, 1997. The Judgment provides in relevant part as follows:
4

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

the Defendant [Debtor] shall pay to the Plaintiff [Appellee] as

spousal support/alimony the following sums under the following

terms and conditions:

A. For a period of two years commencing September 1, 1997,

and terminating no later than August 31, 1999, the Defendant

shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of One Thousand Dollars

($1,000.00) plus poundage, for a total of twenty-four (24)

consecutive payments; provided, however, that in the event the

Plaintiff does not vacate the marital Residence prior to

September 1, 1997, then for any month or partial month

thereafter through and including March, 1998 that the Plaintiff

remains in the marital Residence, the Defendant’s monthly

payment under this Item A shall be completely abated and the

Defendant shall not be required to make the payment due for

any such month. Notwithstanding the foregoing, such

payments shall not be abated on or after April 1, 1998, the date

by which the Plaintiff must vacate the Residence. Upon such

payments becoming due and payable, the payments shall be

administered by the Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency

(“C.S.E.A.”) and therefore may be prorated on a semi-monthly

or weekly basis according to the Defendant’s pay schedule.

The Defendant and Plaintiff shall notify CSEA of and enter into

an Agreed Judgment Entry reflecting the date that such

payments shall commence to be due and payable and

administered by CSEA, and of the amount for which the

Defendant shall receive credit for any abated payments as

provided above.

B. As of August 5, 1997 until the Plaintiff vacates the marital

Residence, or until March 30, 1998, whichever is earlier, the

Defendant shall further furnish and pay as spousal support for

the benefit of the Plaintiff the following expenses in connection

with the marital Residence: mortgage payment, real property

taxes, reasonable utilities (gas, water, electric and sewer only),

landscaping and ordinary maintenance, provided that only the

Defendant may authorize any maintenance expense, repair or

capital improvement to the marital Residence; provided,

however, that in the event that the Plaintiff opens the pool at

the marital Residence during all or any portion of the Spring,

Summer or Fall, 1997, then she will pay and be responsible for

any pool maintenance costs occurred during that period and

fifty percent (50%) of any utility charges (gas, water, electric
5

and sewer) in connection with the marital Residence for such

charges incurred for any month or partial month during which

the pool is in operation. Said payments by the Defendant

under this Item B shall be made directly to third party creditors

and shall not be administered by CSEA.

C. For a period of five (5) years commencing in 1999, the

Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff as additional spousal

support the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000) per

year, for a total obligation of One Hundred Thousand Dollars

($100,000). The first payment shall be due and payable on

December 31, 1999 and each annual payment thereafter shall

be due and payable on December 31 of each consecutive

proceeding year, until the balance is paid in full. The

Defendant’s obligation under this item C shall be without

interest. Said payments are of an infrequent nature and

therefore shall not be administered by CSEA and shall not be

construed as a gift.

D. For a period of four (4) years, commencing September 1,

1999 and terminating August 31, 2003, the Defendant shall

pay, as spousal support, the sum of One Thousand Five

Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) per month, plus poundage, for a

total of forty-eight (48) consecutive payments. Said payments

shall be administered by CSEA and therefore may be prorated

on a semi-monthly or weekly basis according to the

Defendant’s pay schedule.

E. Defendant’s obligations to pay or furnish support under

subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) above shall immediately and

absolutely cease and terminate upon the death of either party

or the wife’s remarriage or cohabitation. The Defendant’s

obligations under subparagraph (D) above shall terminate

earlier than provided therein only upon the death of the Wife.

The Debtor failed to pay the obligations owed to the Appellee. The Appellee filed

at least three motions in the state court to compel the Debtor to make the required

payments. One resulted in an award of $2,700.00 as additional spousal support for

attorney fees. A second resulted in a judgment of $90,794.16 for unpaid spousal support

plus interest through September 1, 2002, and an award of $1,100.00 as additional spousal
6

support for attorney fees. A third motion was pending and a final hearing on the motion

was imminent when the Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition.

The Debtor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on

August 6, 2003. On October 10, 2003, the Appellee filed a complaint to have the

obligations owed to her by the Debtor declared nondischargeable pursuant to §§ 523(a)(2),

523(a)(4), and 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. She subsequently filed an amended

complaint that did not correct the erroneous reference to §§ 523(a)(2), 523(a)(4), and

523(a)(6). 

On March 25, 2004, the Appellee filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint

again pursuant to Rule 7015 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The motion

was granted over the objection of the Debtor, and a Second Amended Complaint was filed

by the Appellee which contained two counts, the first alleging that the Judgment awarded

her by the state court and the ongoing obligations created by the Judgment were

nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the second alleging

that the same obligations were nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(15). Upon the

motion of the Debtor, the second count of the amended complaint was later dismissed as

untimely. 

The bankruptcy court conducted a trial on the issues raised in Count I of the

complaint on April 14, 2004. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated April 28, 2004,

the court held that the obligations to pay spousal support set out in the Separation

Agreement and incorporated into the Judgment were designated as support, bore all the

traditional indicia of support under state law, and thus were conclusively presumed to be

nondischargeable support obligations pursuant to § 523(a)(5). The bankruptcy court

refused to consider evidence submitted by the Debtor to show that the parties actually

intended the five annual installments of $20,000 each (the “Installment Payments”) as a

division of property. The court further held that all attorney fees awarded by the state court

as additional spousal support were likewise nondischargeable. Finally, the court held that

the Debtor’s obligation to assume certain third-party debts, which was not designated

spousal support, was dischargeable because the Appellee failed to offer any proof
7

concerning the nature of those debts. The Appellee did not seek review of this portion of

the bankruptcy court’s order. 

The Debtor timely filed a notice of appeal seeking review of the bankruptcy court’s

decision concerning the nondischargeability of the spousal support and the attorney fees.

Although the bankruptcy court’s order encompasses each of the provisions for spousal

support established in the Judgment, the primary focus of the Debtor’s argument is the

Installment Payments, which he insists were intended as a division of property

notwithstanding their designation as spousal support.

IV. DISCUSSION

A.

The nondischargeability of spousal and child support obligations is specified at 11

U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), which provides: 

(a) A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not

discharge an individual debtor from any debt –

(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor,

for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such

spouse or child, in connection with a separation

agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of

record, determination made in accordance with State or

territorial law by a governmental unit, or property

settlement agreement, but not to the extent that – 

(A) such debt is assigned to another entity,

voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise

(other than debts assigned pursuant to section

408(a)(3) of the Social Security Act, or any such

debt which has been assigned to the Federal

Government or to a State or any political

subdivision of such State); or

(B) such debt includes a liability designated as

alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such

liability is actually in the nature of alimony,

maintenance, or support.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
8

The Debtor argues that the Installment Payments are not in the nature of support,

alleging that both parties to the Separation Agreement intended that the five annual

payments of $20,000 be a property settlement; specifically, he asserts that the payments

were intended to be in exchange for the Appellee’s interest in certain stock. The

bankruptcy court disregarded this testimony because it found that the Installment Payments

were conclusively presumed to be in the nature of support.

In Sorah, the Sixth Circuit gave instructions for determining whether spousal

obligations designated “support” are actually in the nature of support for purposes of

§ 523(a)(5). The court directed that the trial court look to traditional state law indicia of

support, which include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) a label such as alimony, support, or maintenance in the

decree or agreement, (2) a direct payment to the former

spouse, as opposed to the assumption of a third-party debt,

and (3) payments that are contingent upon such events as

death, remarriage, or eligibility for Social Security benefits.

Sorah v. Sorah (In re Sorah), 163 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir. 1998). The analysis for

determining whether an award is support is “not limited to the traditional indicia and can

include others . . . [such as] . . . the disparity of earning power between the parties . . . the

need for economic support and stability . . . the presence of minor children, and . . . marital

fault.” Bailey v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 254 B.R. 901, 906 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2000). The nondebtor spouse carries the burden of demonstrating that the indicia of support are present.

See Sorah, 163 F.3d at 401.

In this case, the Appellee relied upon the Judgment which (1) designates the

Installment Payments as “spousal support/alimony”; (2) provides for direct payment of the

Installment Payments by the Debtor to the Appellee; and (3) provides that the payments

are contingent upon “the death of either party or the wife’s remarriage or cohabitation.” In

addition to these indicia, the Appellee testified at trial before the bankruptcy court that at

the time of the divorce she was unemployed, had no income, and was not in good health.

The Appellee clearly demonstrated her need for support at the time of the divorce and

showed that the Installment Payments provided for in the Judgment carried all of the
9

traditional indicia of support. Sorah provides that once this burden is met, the stated

obligation,

should be conclusively presumed to be a support obligation by

the bankruptcy court. A non-debtor spouse who demonstrates

that these indicia are present has satisfied his or her burden of

proving that the obligation constitutes support within the

meaning of § 523, and is thus nondischargeable. The burden

then shifts to the debtor spouse to demonstrate that although

the obligation is of the type that may not be discharged in

bankruptcy, its amount is unreasonable in light of the debtor

spouse’s financial circumstances.

Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

The Debtor argues that not all of the required indicia of support are present with

respect to the Installment Payments and that an exception to the conclusive presumption

established by Sorah should be made when the disputed obligation was created by

agreement of the parties rather than by decree of a court. The Panel will consider each of

these arguments in turn.

B.

The Debtor argues that rather than looking to the Judgment, the underlying

Separation Agreement is “obviously the key document.” He further argues that there was

a typographical error in Subsection E of Section 3 of that agreement dealing with the tax

treatment of the various obligations, an error which gives rise to an ambiguity in the

Separation Agreement.

The Panel rejects the Debtor’s argument that the Separation Agreement takes

precedence over the Judgment. The Judgment does not merely incorporate the Separation

Agreement. Although it obviously is based upon the Separation Agreement and apparently

did not result from a contested hearing, the Judgment restates each of the relevant terms,

including the provision for the Installment Payments. The Judgment was approved for

entry by both of the parties and their attorneys before being signed by the state court judge

and entered on the docket. There is no indication that the Debtor sought relief from this

Judgment in an appropriate state court. Upon entry, the underlying agreement was merged

into the judgment. Davis v. Davis, 258 N.E.2d 277, 281 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1970) (“[I]t is

settled that a separation agreement is superseded by a divorce decree when the
10

agreement is incorporated into, and made a part of the decree . . . .”). The Panel need not

look behind the Judgment to determine the intent of the parties unless the Judgment itself

is ambiguous.

The Judgment is not ambiguous. It provides for the Debtor either to pay expenses

related to the marital residence until it could be sold or to make monthly support payments

of $1,000.00 in lieu of payment of these expenses for a period of two years. It provides for

the payment of the Installment Payments beginning December 31 of the year in which the

monthly payments cease. It provides that both the monthly payments and the Installment

Payments will cease upon the death of either party or the remarriage or cohabitation of the

wife. It further provides for an additional 48 months of payments to commence after the

initial 24 months have been paid and provides that these payments are to terminate only

upon the death of the Appellee. All of these obligations taken together are clearly labeled

“spousal support/alimony.”

If, as the Debtor argues, there was a typographical error in the Separation

Agreement, it should have been corrected in the Judgment. Paragraph E of the Separation

Agreement (providing for the tax treatment of the various obligations) was omitted from the

typewritten Judgment and a handwritten paragraph G was added which incorporates by

reference Paragraph E of the Separation Agreement. No change was made between the

Separation Agreement and the Judgment concerning the tax treatment of the various

obligations. In both documents, obligations A, B, and C are not to be deducted by the

Debtor or treated as income by the Appellee. Obligation D is to be deducted by the Debtor

and included in income by the wife provided that the Debtor has sufficient income to benefit

from the tax deduction. Generally, alimony is deductible by the payor and must be included

in a former spouse’s income. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 71 and 215. From the record it

does not appear that the Debtor made any attempt to correct the “error” in the Separation

Agreement. 

The Panel notes that there is a difference between paragraph F of the Separation

Agreement and paragraph E of the Judgment, both of which deal with the termination of

the Debtor’s obligations to the Appellee. In the Separation Agreement, it is obligations A,

B, and D that terminate upon death, remarriage or cohabitation, while obligation C (the
11

obligation to make Installment Payments) terminates only upon death of the wife. In the

Judgment, obligations A, B, and C terminate upon death, remarriage or cohabitation, while

obligation D (the subsequent monthly payments) terminates only upon the death of the

wife. The change in the termination condition for the Installment Payments is puzzling, but

it does not render the Judgment ambiguous. The Debtor has not pointed to one indicia of

support that is not present with respect to the Installment Payments. Despite the Debtor’s

protestations to the contrary, nothing on the face of the Judgment indicates that property

settlement obligations were being disguised as spousal support. Indeed, the Sorah court

directs that once the non-debtor spouse has met her burden of proving that obligations

bear the required indicia of support, the Debtor “may not ask the bankruptcy court to

assume the role of a psychological examiner probing the state court’s decision for linguistic

evidence of ulterior motives.” Sorah, 163 F.3d at 401. The bankruptcy court’s finding that

the Installment Payments are actually in the nature of support is not clearly erroneous.

Once the bankruptcy court made this determination, it was up to the Debtor to demonstrate

that the spousal support was unreasonable under the circumstances. Sorah, 163 F.3d at

401-02. The Debtor did not attempt to show that the Installment Payments were

unreasonable.

C.

The Debtor argues instead that the Panel should disregard the clear teaching of

Sorah because this case may be factually distinguished from Sorah. The Debtor urges that

this case be treated differently because the obligations in question were created by

agreement rather than by court order. He points to bankruptcy court decisions from other

federal circuits which indicate that labels used by the parties to a settlement agreement

should not be controlling on the issue of dischargeability. See Garrard v. Garrard (In re

Garrard), 151 B.R. 598 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); Cassata v. Cassata (In re Cassata),119

B.R. 280 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). The Debtor asserts that there was no independent court

inquiry and no determination by the trial court as to what constituted spousal support and

what constituted property settlement. The Debtor then argues that, under this set of

circumstances, extrinsic evidence should be considered in determining whether an

obligation labeled “support” in a separation agreement is actually in the nature of support.
1

 The bankruptcy judges in each judicial district constitute a unit of the district court

known as the bankruptcy court for that district. 28 U.S.C. § 151.

12

As stated previously, the state court did not merely incorporate the terms of the

Separation Agreement. All of the relevant terms were restated in the Judgment and in one

important respect vary from the Separation Agreement. The Debtor has pointed to no

portion of the record to support his assertion that the trial court failed to make an

independent inquiry into the appropriateness of the parties’ agreement. The Judgment is

the controlling document, and the Panel will not entertain the Debtor’s attempted collateral

attack on the Judgment. District courts, and thus bankruptcy courts,1

 “do not have subject

matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions in judicial proceedings.”

Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S. Ct. 149, 150 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 1311 (1983)). The only federal

court with jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts is the United States Supreme

Court. Charchenko, 47 F.3d at 983. (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S. Ct. at 1316);

see generally In re Johnson, 210 B.R. 1004, 1006 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1997) (discussing

the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and its application to the bankruptcy courts).

Further, while not necessary to its decision in this case, the Panel finds no basis in

Sorah to limit its holding to state support orders as opposed to agreements. Sorah directs

that no extrinsic evidence be considered when an obligation is labeled “support” and bears

all of the traditional indicia of support. This direction is analagous to the parol evidence

rule, which precludes the introduction of extrinsic evidence to vary, contradict or

supplement the terms of a final written agreement. Galmish v. Cicchini, 734 N.E.2d 782,

788-89 (Ohio 2000) (quoting 11 Williston on Contracts § 33.4 at 569-70 (4th ed. 1999)).

The parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence, but a rule of substantive law. Id. As

such, it may not be waived at trial by failure to timely object. Charles A. Burton, Inc. v.

Durkee, 109 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ohio 1952).

Similarly, the direction in Sorah that obligations that are clearly labeled spousal

support and have all of the traditional indicia of support are conclusively presumed to be
13

in the nature of support is a rule of substantive law. For policy reasons a debtor will not be

permitted to introduce evidence tending to contradict the conclusive presumption of

support. To hold otherwise would unnecessarily and inappropriately entangle the federal

bankruptcy courts in domestic relations proceedings. The state courts are expected to fully

express their intent with respect to spousal support awards in their written judgments and

decrees, including rulings which incorporate agreements between the parties to a divorce

or separation. The Panel thus disagrees with the suggestion of the bankruptcy court in

Woolard that a distinction should be drawn “between contested and uncontested divorce

proceedings in terms of the deference to be given a state court decree.” Woolard v. Axline

(In re Woolard), 269 B.R. 754, 758 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001). The same result could

possibly have been reached in Woolard under the Sorah analysis because the obligation

in question in that case did not bear all the traditional indicia of support. The obligation was

terminable upon the death of the wife, but not upon her remarriage.

D.

The Debtor argues that the bankruptcy court erred in its determination that the

attorney fees awarded to Appellee were spousal support because some portion of the fees

related to enforcement of the obligation to make the Installment Payments and some

portion of the fees related to property settlement.

The bankruptcy court devoted little discussion to its determination that the attorney

fees award was nondischargeable, but what it did make plain was that it found the award

to be related to the findings of the state court that the Debtor was in contempt of court for

failure to make alimony or spousal support payments. The bankruptcy court referenced

Ohio Revised Code § 3205.18(G), which directs that the cost and reasonable attorney fees

that arise in relation to an act of contempt be paid to the prevailing party. The judgment

entries that were provided by the Debtor in his appendix indicate that the Appellee’s

motions to show cause were granted and that the Debtor was found in contempt of court.

One of the judgment entries specifically awards attorney fees as “additional support to

Plaintiff”; the other clearly awards attorney fees in connection with a finding of contempt.

Generally, the contempt power of a court is available to enforce obligations of support, not

division of property. The state entries of judgment make no distinction between the
14

Installment Payments and the other provisions of spousal support; that is, the court orders

the Debtor to continue making the Installment Payments as well as the monthly payment

as if both were intended as support. The finding of the bankruptcy court that the attorney

fees awards constitute additional spousal support is not clearly erroneous.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the bankruptcy court is AFFIRMED.