SEEKING A PORT IN THE WMD STORM: 

COUNTERPROLIFERATION PROGRESS, 

SHORTFALLS AND THE WAY AHEAD 

by 

Barry R. Schneider 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 29 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm: 

Counterproliferation Progress, Shortfalls 

and the Way Ahead 

Barry R. Schneider 

May 2005 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 29 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 29 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm 

i 

Contents 

Page 

Disclaimer ................................................................................................... ii 

The Author .................................................................................................iii

I. Introduction........................................................................................ 1 

II. Deterrence .......................................................................................... 3 

III. Counterforce....................................................................................... 7 

IV. Active Defenses ............................................................................... 13 

V. Passive Defense................................................................................ 19 

VI. Consequence Management .............................................................. 37 

VII. Counter-CBRN Operations: Suggestions for Combatant 

Commander Plans ............................................................................ 41 

VIII. Counter-CBRN Planning, Education, Training, and Exercises ....... 45 

IX. International CP Cooperation........................................................... 47 

X. Summary of the CP Program Progress and Shortfalls ..................... 53 

Notes ......................................................................................................... 59 
ii 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 
iii 

The Author 

Dr. Barry R. Schneider is the director of the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center at Maxwell AFB, AL and a Professor of 

International Relations at the Air War College. Dr. Schneider specializes 

in NBC counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues. He is the author 

of Future War and Counterproliferation: U.S. Military Responses to NBC 

Proliferation Threats (Praeger, 1999) and contributor to and co-editor of 

The War Next Time: Countering Rogue States and Terrorists Armed with 

Chemical and Biological Weapons, (USAF Counterproliferation Center, 

2003), The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm. (Westport, Connecticut: 

Praeger Publishers, 2004), Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary 

Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures (USAF Counterproliferation Center, 

2002), Middle East Security Issues: In the Shadow of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Proliferation (USAF Counterproliferation Center, 1999), 

Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear 

Threats (Frank Cass Ltd., 1998), Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century 

Warfare Issues (Air University Press, 1998), Missiles for the Nineties: 

ICBMs and Strategic Policy (Westview, 1984), and Current Issues in U.S. 

Defense Policy (Praeger, 1976). He has served as a Foreign Affairs 

Officer and Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency, as a Congressional staffer on arms control and 

defense issues, and was a Senior Defense Analyst at The Harris Group and 

the National Institute for Public Policy. He has taught at the Air War 

College since 1993. As a faculty member, he teaches elective courses, 

which include International Rivals, International Flashpoints, 

Counterproliferation Issues, and CBW Issues for the USAF. He has 

taught at six other colleges and universities, and has a Ph.D. in Political 

Science from Columbia University. 

Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 1 

Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm: 

Counterproliferation Progress, Shortfalls 

and the Way Ahead 

Barry R. Schneider 

I. Introduction 

Like a ship running from a hurricane at sea, the United States 

Government is struggling to reach a safe port and shelter from a 

threatening WMD storm. In an era where some adversaries are perhaps on 

the cusp of achieving the capabilities to destroy forward deployed 

American military forces with nuclear weapons (e.g., in a future conflict 

with North Korea) or to kill thousands of Americans in our cities with 

aerosolized biological weapons (e.g., if Al Qaeda were to achieve the 

capability), the United States and its allies are racing to create effective 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) countermeasures. 

Serious gaps remain, however, and extreme vulnerabilities persist even a 

decade after Secretary Les Aspin announced the beginning of the 

Department of Defense (DoD) Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI). 

Much has been done since the CPI was launched in 1993, but much 

still must be accomplished before the United States can confidently either 

deter all adversaries from CBRN attacks or, at least, effectively neutralize 

any such attacks by a combination of effective counterforce targeting, 

active defenses, passive defenses, or the ability to recover through superb 

consequence management actions. 

The Ideal Counterproliferation Posture 

Much progress has been made in the decade since Secretary Aspin 

and his deputy, Dr. Ashton Carter, launched the DoD Counterproliferation 

Initiative. However, progress to date does not equate to success. Many 

additional steps must be taken before the United States and its allies can 

claim reasonable levels of preparedness in the effort to halt, thin out, 
2 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

manage, rollback, or counter the weapons of mass destruction threats 

posed by adversary states and groups. 

To evaluate the ideal and compare it to the present counterproliferation 

program, and identify the progress and shortfalls of the counterproliferation 

program, it is useful to look at the various elements where the Department 

of Defense is the lead agency before offering an overall assessment. 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 3 

II. Deterrence 

Maximum Deterrence Stance 

The ideal deterrence posture can only be arrived at if the United 

States and its partners possess a known retaliatory military and economic 

capability that can impose costs on an aggressor state that are 

unacceptably high to its leadership should they elect to attack us. Further, 

that adversary leadership must believe the United States and its allies will 

have the will to use such full retaliatory strikes if provoked. Third, this 

U.S./allied retaliatory force must be able to survive an enemy surprise 

attack before delivering its response. Fourth, deterrence is most likely to 

work when the adversary leadership is rational and fully understands the 

self-defeating nature of starting a conflict and does not believe it can 

secure a compromise place down the road that would allow them to keep 

any initial gain made by striking first. Fifth, U.S. allied counterforce, 

active defense, passive defense, and consequence management capabilities 

would be so robust in an ideal counterproliferation posture that an 

adversary chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attack 

would be neutralized and U.S./allied forces would be better equipped to 

fight in such a toxic environment than the aggressor forces. Knowing that 

his CBRN weapons could be neutralized, a rational adversary is likely to 

be deterred from use of unconventional arms. 

Last, but not by any means least, an ideal robust U.S. and allied 

deterrent would be based on a thorough knowledge of the enemy, both his 

leadership and order of battle. The full intelligence preparation of the 

battlespace would include political-psychological profiles of enemy leader 

tendencies and values as well as a full understanding of adversary force 

characteristics and numbers as well as where their key assets are located. 

For full deterrent effects, the adversary should be made to understand that 

U.S. forces can effectively put bombs on key targets of greatest value to 

the adversary leaders. 

Deterrence can be improved if you know the capabilities and mind of 

your adversary. U.S. intelligence services should seek to learn the CBRN 

capabilities, locations, and intent of possible adversaries. The recent 

experience in Iraq indicates a shortfall in U.S. and allied intelligence about 

Saddam Hussein’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons potential. 
4 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

The United States Government appears to have drastically overestimated 

the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction threat as a result of depending upon 

unreliable defector information, relying on inconclusive findings from 

national technical means, and lacking adequate human intelligence inside 

Saddam Hussein’s regime. 

Plausibly, U.S. intelligence concluded from Iraq’s inability to 

document disarmament of its weapons of mass destruction programs, its 

unwillingness to cooperate with United Nations inspection teams, and the 

heavy economic costs of non-compliance, that Iraq was hiding a 

significant weapons of mass destruction arsenal and infrastructure. 

Saddam Hussein’s regime is estimated to have lost $100 billion or more 

due to sanctions that limited Iraqi oil sales until the United Nations 

inspectors could verify that Iraq had truly scrapped its weapons of mass 

destruction assets. Further, Saddam Hussein, before his defeat in 

Operation Desert Storm, had invested heavily in his nuclear, chemical, and 

biological warfare programs and the tyrant was still in place in early 2003 

when Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched into Iraq to disarm his 

regime. 

Many questions remain as to the disposition of Iraqi CBRN weapons: 

1. Were these weapons programs discontinued to avoid further 

United Nations sanctions? 

2. Were they hidden somewhere inside or outside Iraq to be claimed 

at a later date? 

3. Were the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction hardware programs 

discontinued while “software” analytic efforts to perfect such 

weapons continued? 

4. Was Saddam Hussein too proud to cooperate with the United 

Nations inspectors and/or afraid to look so weak as to admit 

disarming? 

5. Did Saddam Hussein disarm privately but pretend to retain 

weapons of mass destruction in order to deter enemies like Iran 

and the United States from intervention into Iraq? 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 5 

6. Did Iraqi scientists lie to Saddam Hussein about the extent of their 

WMD research and production, thereby making it impossible to 

find weapons never actually produced in quantity after 1991? 

We may never know the full story about the Iraqi weapons of mass 

destruction program. What is clear to the U.S. Select Committee on 

Intelligence, however, is that U.S. intelligence about the program was far 

off the mark1

 and largely in the dark, leading analysts to draw speculative 

conclusions that were wrong because they were grounded in too many 

uncertainties and because their plausible theory, nevertheless, appears to 

have turned out to be incorrect. 

This has led critics of U.S. intelligence to suggest that analysis of 

adversary weapons of mass destruction be more careful and rigorous, be 

increasingly reliant on human intelligence, be dependent on known hard 

facts, and that interpretations be challenged more by intelligence superiors 

as well as by decision-makers. Furthermore, such analyses should be 

mated with a more intense scrutiny of the intent of adversary leaders and 

the factors that shape their decisions. 

With regard to the last point, U.S. deterrence capability versus 

enemies’ war initiation or use of weapons of mass destruction should rest 

on a clear understanding of the thinking of adversary leaders to enable 

U.S. leaders to pose retaliatory threats that such adversaries will most fear 

and best understand. 

Profiling of potential adversary leaders, done by intelligence experts 

dedicated to understanding their goals, decision-making processes, 

tendencies, personalities, and vulnerabilities can yield useful deterrence 

results if combined with a very potent U.S. retaliatory capability, an 

obvious will to respond to attacks, and a clearly crafted communication of 

both U.S. military muscle and U.S. determination to exact retribution for 

any losses suffered by U.S. citizens. In the end, adversaries must be 

taught to fear the American retribution and to conclude that aggression 

against the United States is a fool’s gamble, a path that could only lead 

them to a terrible end. 

Unfortunately, U.S. intelligence services have placed less importance 

on profiling of enemy leaders in the post-Cold War era than they did when 

we were threatened by the Soviet Union in the period from 1946 to 1991. 

These profiling capabilities, if resurrected and heeded, may give us better 
6 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

insights into how to deter, compel, counter, and anticipate the actions 

ordered by leaders of rogue states and terrorist adversaries. 

It is suggested that both the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and 

the CIA resurrect such dedicated interdisciplinary profiling groups that 

can study and help U.S. leaders understand the political/psychological 

dimensions of adversary leaders, their strategic cultures, military 

doctrines, and organizational decision-processes to determine likely 

adversary courses of action and tendencies in projected scenarios. A good 

model to follow would be the Center for the Analysis of Personality and 

Political Behavior directed by Dr. Jerrold Post at the CIA for a number of 

years that did profiles of foreign leaders to inform and assist U.S. policymakers who dealt with them.2

 Unfortunately, this center was dissolved 

and never adequately replaced after the late 1980s. 

Such profiling could help U.S. leaders better understand who they 

are contending with, the things enemies most value and would least like 

to lose, and the actions that would most likely elicit either more 

cooperation or more violent responses. Such analysis of adversary 

leaders might help U.S. leaders better sort out enemy bluffs from real 

threats and might guide U.S. actions that could help persuade an 

adversary not to initiate a conflict nor escalate it to weapons of mass 

destruction use once embroiled. 

In addition, it will be important for the U.S. intelligence services to 

greatly expand their expertise in the Middle East and northeast Asia 

particularly. More analysts need to be trained in the Korean, Chinese, 

Arabic, and Farsi languages, and much more emphasis needs to be given 

to creating human intelligence on the ground in countries in the conflict 

zones. HUMINT is in scare supply and it is difficult to “know thy enemy” 

without it. 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 7

III. Counterforce 

Maximum Counterforce Capability 

The ideal counterforce posture will combine a comprehensive 

precision-guided munition arsenal of weapons, acquired in such numbers 

that most known key fixed surface targets in the adversary state can be 

eliminated. In addition, all airborne attack assets should be on stealthy 

launch platforms that cannot be readily detected by the radars of enemy 

surface-to-air missiles and other anti-aircraft batteries. 

This counterforce capability against fixed surface targets must also be 

coupled with additional capabilities to locate and destroy both mobile 

CBRN missile launchers and CBRN assets located in deeply buried 

facilities, hidden in tunnels bored into hillsides or concealed in cut-andcover hardened shelters. The ideal counterforce capability will have the 

use of robust earth penetrators and have the information and capabilities 

needed to inflict functional defeats on the hardened underground target 

sets when absolute destruction is not possible. 

The ideal counterforce capability also will be augmented by a 

comprehensive and accurate intelligence preparation of the battlespace. 

Ideally, all CBRN targets of consequence must be identified, 

characterized, and located. Then, optimally, after such locations and 

assets are struck, accurate damage assessments must be capable of being 

made in order to restrike undamaged CBRN assets, and this process 

should, within a short time, be able to silence such adversary CBRN 

weapons. 

Ideal counterforce capabilities would be robust enough to tackle the 

entire range of enemy CBRN assets before a significant number could be 

employed against U.S. and allied targets. This suggests the need for a 

persistent overhead shooter and sensor capability, augmented by heavy 

Special Operations Forces incursions on the ground, to slam the door shut 

on enemy CBRN usage before it could inflict heavy damage. Such an 

ideal force also will require a 24/7/365 overhead persistent intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) presence to provide targeting 

information to shooters until the threat is eliminated. 

Finally, the maximum or ideal counterforce capability will require 

adequate stocks of effective agent defeat weapons to destroy, neutralize, or 
8 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

entomb adversary chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons 

assets without significant spillover danger to adjacent civilians or friendly 

forces. 

Progress and Shortfalls in Counterforce 

The advent of precision-guided munitions has greatly improved the 

accuracy, and therefore, the lethality of U.S. weapons against fixed targets 

identified on the earth’s surface from the time of Operation Desert Storm 

on. This precision-guided munition revolution has resulted in a dramatic 

change in the ratio of weapons employed to targets destroyed. Whereas, 

in pre-1991 wars, air campaign outcomes were described in terms of 

hundreds or thousands of sorties per target destroyed, in the present era we 

can now talk of numbers of targets destroyed per sortie. 

The introduction of stealthy aircraft also has made the counterforce 

mission easier and less costly in terms of aviators and aircraft lost on these 

missions since air defenses have been almost helpless against such hardto-locate attackers. Stealthy aircraft can not only penetrate to target but 

can also attack targets at closer range at less risk than if conventional 

aircraft were used, increasing the chances of successful engagements. 

So long as U.S. intelligence can provide exact coordinates for surface 

targets, U.S. strike aircraft can destroy them with great effectiveness. 

There, of course, is the rub. Certain high value, time-sensitive targets, 

such as ballistic missiles with CBRN warheads about to be launched from 

hidden or camouflaged mobile launchers or those at fixed sites, may be 

invisible to United States intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

assets. It is difficult to destroy targets whose precise whereabouts are 

uncertain, so counterforce effectiveness against surface targets is 

dependent on accurate target location information. 

Because of the increasing vulnerability of fixed-location assets on the 

ground, U.S. adversaries have begun placing their command and control 

centers, missile launchers, and weapons of mass destruction assets either 

in underground hardened sites, inside tunnels bored into the sides of hills 

or mountains, or have made them mobile by deploying them on wheeled 

vehicles or trains. Thus, counterforce attacks may be complicated by an 

enemy’s mole or mobility tactics. North Korea, for example, has hidden 

most of its missile launchers and artillery in tunnels bored into the sides of 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 9 

mountains north of the Demilitarized Zone. Iraq, during the 1990-1991 

Gulf War, launched 88 ballistic missiles toward Coalition forces and Israel 

and the U.S. “Scud Hunt” for these mobile assets was deemed almost 

totally unsuccessful. Despite allocating approximately 1,500 sorties 

against such targets in the war, there was not a single confirmed kill 

against Scud transporter-erector-launchers. 

Defeating some of the deeply buried hardened targets through 

outright physical destruction of the facilities may be outside the 

capabilities of today’s forces. Short of nuclear weapons use, many 

underground hardened sites cannot be eliminated, and some are so deeply 

buried that even a nuclear detonation may not suffice. Added to these 

problems is the fact that nuclear use likely would have so much of a 

political downside that U.S. decision-makers probably would be unwilling 

to open Pandora’s Box by employing such precedent-setting weapons and 

by risking incurring worldwide disfavor, condemnation, and the sanctions 

that probably would follow. 

Perhaps the best and most likely strategy to defeat underground 

targets is to first locate them and then inflict a functional defeat by 

denying that facility electrical power, air, heat, connectivity, food, water, 

ingress or egress, and other essentials. This places an extraordinary 

burden upon the U.S. intelligence preparation of the battlespace in order to 

locate the wiring, vents, entrances, exits, antennas, and emissions of each 

such underground facility. 

It is difficult to evaluate how much the United States has progressed 

in its ability to achieve functional defeats on underground targets since it 

has had little wartime experience since 1991 against such targets. 

However, clearly there has been a degree of progress in fielding ISR assets 

needed to do the thorough intelligence assessments necessary to this 

difficult mission. The addition of Predator and Global Hawk Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) gives the military a somewhat more continuous 

overhead view of such installations, combined with Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) improvements and the still imperfect development of 

unattended ground sensors. 

Still missing is a suite of weapons capable of destroying deeply 

buried hardened targets, the lack of enough persistent overhead 

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, and the limited 

numbers of “shooters” that can be kept close to the targets 24/7. Further, 
10 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

only a limited agent defeat weapon capability exists. Therefore, the 

balance of advantage over the past decade has to be given to adversary 

defenses over U.S. counterforce offenses. Should the United States field a 

nuclear earth-penetrating weapon it would bring a number of additional 

high value targets within reach that are currently not threatened, although 

a certain number of such deeply buried facilities would still remain 

relatively safe from being destroyed. Employing such a nuclear device, 

however, would likely create diplomatic and political problems that could 

be seen to outweigh its counterforce advantages. 

The U.S. capability to track, target, destroy, and assess damage 

against mobile missile launches is probably improved a good deal from 

Operation Desert Storm in 1991 to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 

2003. Exercises prior to OIF at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, led to 

greater coordination between Special Forces, strike aircraft, and ISR assets 

and probably would have narrowed the advantages still enjoyed by 

adversaries in “the Scud Hunt.” There have been considerable Scud 

Hunting improvements in ISR due to deployment of Global Hawk and 

Predator UAVs, as well as command and control improvement due to the 

professionalization, reorganization, and information processing changes in 

the Combined Air Operations Center. 

However, having said all this, U.S. persistent overhead ISR is still 

lacking over the battlespace and many of the information processing, 

battle management, and automatic target recognition technologies are still 

in research and development rather than deployed, as many should have 

been thirteen years after the Scud Hunt failures of 1991. The continued 

inability to solve the critical mobile missile problem is an unfortunate 

failure. Unfortunately, no single organization or agency has been 

appointed or chosen to step forward to solve this pressing military 

problem. Hopefully, it will not require a military catastrophe to get proper 

attention to this problem. It would be very unfortunate if the gravity of 

this error was only realized after an adversary kills tens of thousands of 

U.S. or allied personnel when launching a missile carrying a weapon of 

mass destruction warhead from a transporter-erector-launcher that 

otherwise could have been neutralized. 

The “Scud Hunt” program needs leadership attention, more persistent 

overhead intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, more 

shooters and sensors constantly in the target area, and new technology that 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 11

assists in more rapidly processing battle management information and 

target tracking, to reduce the sensor-to-shooter time to just a few minutes. 

First, and foremost, someone in the Department of Defense has to own the 

problem, be responsible for progress, and wield enough influence to bring 

the multiple research and development solutions now available to the 

field, where U.S. combatant commanders can wield them in the next war. 

Not only should someone be put in charge of coordinating all the 

cross-functional elements of “Scud Hunting,” but someone else at the 

highest levels of the Department of Defense must oversee the progress of 

the program, ensure proper funding, and hold the commanders and 

managers accountable for outcomes. Combatant commanders must 

demand that their forces be properly organized, trained, and equipped to 

carry out this mission in the future. Additional Congressional oversight 

and Presidential level attention might be needed to direct proper attention 

to this program. 

The issue of preemption has become a controversial topic for policy 

debate. One component of this debate is the question of when such action 

is appropriate, legal, and necessary for security. Given the extreme level 

of damage that could be done by, say, a nuclear or strategic biological 

weapons attack, it is prudent to destroy those types of threats before they 

are inflicted upon one’s own forces or population, if the attack appears to 

be imminent and intelligence is such that reasonable certainty of use can 

be confirmed. 

As one recent study by the Center for Counterproliferation Research 

at the National Defense University states with regard to the need for a 

capability for rapid precision strikes: 

“Because the time window for engaging many WMD 

counterforce targets may be narrow, there will be a 

premium in these missions on what has come to be called 

“network-centric operations” – the effective integration of 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), rapid 

adaptive planning, collaborative decision-making, strike 

coordination, and real-time battle damage assessment. The 

need in some cases for prompt strikes highlights a potential 

shortfall in current capability. Prompt conventional global 

strike is a potentially high-value deterrent and combat 

capability against a range of target types. That is, the 
12 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

ability to deliver decisive effects rapidly may be key to 

denying adversaries the time to exercise asymmetric 

strategies, holding strategic assets at risk before effective 

sanctuary is achieved, and restoring deterrence through 

rapid, shock-maximizing strikes. In particular, there is 

advantage for U.S. forces if time-sensitive targets can be 

held at risk at all times – including when theater-based 

assets are not available.”3
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 13

IV. Active Defenses 

Maximum Active Defenses 

The ideal active defense force will be robust enough so that it can 

reduce enemy missile and aircraft attacks to a minimum by intercepting, 

destroying, or deflecting them before their CBRN warheads and bombs 

can reach their targets. Such an ideal system will have very high 

performance SATKA capabilities for surveillance of incoming attackers, 

acquisition of the targets, tracking of the targets, killing of the attacking 

missiles or aircraft, and assessing the results to determine whether to go 

into a re-attack mode. 

The likely ideal missile defense will probably feature a layered 

defense with accurate and effective missile interceptors operating in the 

boost phase, post-boost phase, mid-course range, and terminal phases of 

an adversary missile’s flight. A three-layer or four-layer defense, with 

each phase providing a 90 percent kill probability in its engagements, if 

deployed in adequate interceptor numbers, should be able to sweep the 

skies of adversary aircraft or missiles. 

This ideal active defense system could also be provided by a multi-shot 

speed-of-light system such as the boost-phase airborne laser (ABL) now in 

development, if it is proven feasible, is procured in adequate numbers, is 

continuously deployed, and has a high probability of kill (PK) per shot. 

The ideal active defense capability will also defend comprehensively 

against the 360 degree azimuth threat of low flying, relatively inexpensive 

cruise missiles, possibly launched in swarms. The ideal defense against 

cruise missiles will probably deploy airborne look-down radars to discern 

low-flying cruise missiles from the surrounding ground clutter and will be 

augmented by airborne and ground-based interceptors that can be directed 

to a full 360 degree layered or multi-shot defense. An ideal active defense 

would be robust enough to intercept, simultaneously, even a saturation 

attack by dozens of cruise missiles. 
14 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

The Progress and Shortfalls in Active Defenses 

One means of delivering CBRN weapons is by ballistic or cruise 

missiles and, as of this writing, both present very difficult challenges to 

U.S. active defenses. The difficulty of the theater ballistic missile (TBM) 

defensive task is akin to developing a bullet to hit an incoming bullet. 

Nuclear and biological munitions mounted on missiles will increasingly 

pose a strategic threat to U.S. and allied forces and citizens in the next two 

decades. The list of states with such missiles is growing. For example, it 

has been estimated that 75 states have some form of cruise missiles and 

that there are roughly 75,000 cruise missiles held by these countries. 

Compared to nuclear and biological weapons, chemical arms pose no 

strategic threat unless, for example, many tons of chemical agents are 

delivered, an unlikely threat. Radiological weapons are strictly tactical, 

but could be useful to the user in rendering certain limited areas unusable 

or, at least dangerous, to operate within. 

U.S. ballistic missile defense programs have made important 

improvements since 1993. The Patriot-2 (PAC-2) theater ballistic missile 

terminal defense system was introduced in the 1991 Gulf War where it 

enjoyed some limited success against Iraqi ballistic missile attacks. The 

PAC-2 has now been superseded by the more accurate Patriot-3, which 

introduces new hit-to-kill technology and has a wider range of coverage. 

Basically, however, United States forces will not be very well defended 

against theater ballistic missiles until the next generation of defense 

upgrades which will provide a layered defense. 

Now in development are no fewer than five other U.S. theater missile 

defense systems: the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), the 

Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), the mid-course 

interceptor Navy Theater-Wide Ballistic Missile Defense system, lowertier Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System, and the 

Airborne Laser (ABL). When all or most are fielded, if they work as 

advertised, and are deployed in sufficient numbers, the United States and 

its allies will possess for the first time a viable ballistic missile defense 

against enemies who possess several hundred of such missiles. This will 

be a breakthrough since no nation state has had a viable missile defense 

since WWII when these types of weapons were introduced into combat by 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 15

the Germans when they barraged Great Britain with their V-1 and V-2 

missiles. 

The goal in ballistic missile defense is to achieve a multi-layered or 

multi-shot defense where each layer or shot has, let us say, a 90 percent or 

higher kill probability against the incoming missiles. Indeed, it may be 

possible to intercept such enemy systems multiple times when using the 

Airborne Laser, which is expected to be capable of up to 30 speed-of-light 

shots or intercepts. One can imagine a three layer defense made up of the 

Airborne Laser to intercept missiles in their boost and post-boost phases of 

flight, augmented by the Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 

and Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses for kinetic kills at midcourse ranges, and PAC-3, Medium Extended Air Defense System, and 

Navy lower-tier interceptors to rise to meet whatever enemy missiles got 

through the first two layers of defense. 

Therefore, if a country such as North Korea were to become engaged in 

combat with U.S. and Republic of Korea forces in the South and fired off a 

hundred ballistic missiles at Republic of Korea targets, a two-layer (midcourse and terminal interceptor) defense with a 90 percent probability of kill 

per layer would permit just one leaker to reach its targets. In this case, 90 of 

the 100 missiles could be eliminated by mid-course interceptors like 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Aegis Wide Area interceptors. 

Then, 9 of the remaining 10 missiles might be eliminated by terminal 

defenses like the Patriot-3 or the Aegis Navy terminal interceptors. 

Unfortunately, at present only limited numbers of Patriot-3s are defending 

these areas where adversary states might possibly one day take action. 

Several international partners are also working on theater ballistic 

missile defensive systems. Lockheed-Martin has collaborated with Israel 

in its development of the Arrow interceptors now being deployed. In 

addition, the United States is in the early stages of collaborating with 

Japan to develop a ballistic missile defense system. And, finally, the 

NATO allies are collaborating to finance the Medium Extended Air 

Defense System, a mobile terminal “bubbletop” defense for shielding land 

forces as they move into or across theater. The Medium Extended Range 

Air Defense System, for example, could be an excellent terminal defense 

for an invasion force being landed at ports or being sent across a beach 

under hostile fire. It is designed to provide the protective bubble over a 

power projection force being sent into a foreign theater to “kick the doors 
16 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

down” for follow-on reinforcements. Until theater active defenses are 

augmented with such robust multi-layered, multi-shot interceptors, U.S. 

forces will be largely at the mercy of enemy ballistic missile attacks. 

Adding to this emerging U.S. theater ballistic missile defensive 

capability will be a new U.S. strategic terminal defensive system to defend 

the continental United States. Twenty interceptors based in Alaska and 

California will provide the possibility of a defense against a light enemy 

missile strike. The beginnings of such a system, no longer restricted by 

the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, designed initially to be capable of 

defending against a light ballistic missile attack, was scheduled to be in 

place and operating by late 2004. Thus, United States territory will be 

defended against a handful of missiles launched against targets on the 

West Coast of the United States from potential adversary states such as 

North Korea or China. It might also be used to intercept stray accidental 

launches of long-range ballistic missiles that headed toward U.S. territory. 

Missile defense programs, both theater and strategic, cost $10 billion in 

FY 2004, and consume the large majority of Department of Defense 

funding for counterproliferation capabilities. 

Perhaps most disturbing in the area of active defenses is the lack of 

progress in U.S. cruise missile defenses at a time when foreign cruise 

missile capabilities have spread to over seventy-five countries.4

 The 

leadership of the Missile Defense Agency has focused its work almost 

exclusively upon defeating the ballistic missile threat, to the neglect of 

cruise missile defense. 

This neglect of cruise missile defense is compounded by the fact that, 

from an adversary perspective, these are perhaps the ideal adversary 

weapons to carry biological munitions. Adversary leaders of a relatively 

poor state might pursue an asymmetrical strategy of coupling the poor 

nation’s best strategic delivery system, cruise missiles, with the poor 

nation’s best weapon of mass destruction, biological weapons, in order to 

level the playing field against the world’s military superpower. Cruise 

missiles are much cheaper to build or buy than ballistic missiles. They 

have tiny radar cross-sections and fly close to the nap of the earth where 

they can be lost in the earth’s ground clutter, making them difficult to 

detect, track, and target. Because they are relatively cheap they can be 

produced and fired in numbers sufficient to saturate even very good air 

defenses. Further, they can pose a 360 degree threat since they can be 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 17

programmed to fly pre-designated routes and change directions as 

programmed. Finally, their speed is relatively slow so that they can more 

easily distribute aerosolized biological warfare agents on targets below 

them, as opposed to supersonic ballistic missiles that can be less easily 

programmed for optimal height of bursts and have problems of heat 

shielding which, if not perfect, could burn up the biological munitions 

being delivered. 

Thus, a possibly fatal flaw in U.S. active defenses is the neglect of 

cruise missiles defense during the past decade, and the failure of the U.S. 

Missile Defense Agency or the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense 

Organization (JTAMDO) to focus on this problem satisfactorily. 

Of course, active defenses also need to be conducted on the ground 

along places like the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas, 

along the U.S. and allied borders and around U.S. military facilities in the 

continental United States or worldwide. Enemy Special Forces and 

terrorists could utilize CBRN weapons in various ways without utilizing 

missile systems, witness the possibilities of using crop duster aircraft to 

distribute biological agents over targeted areas or saboteurs to detonate 

explosives where toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and toxic industrial 

materials (TIMs) are manufactured and stored. Every American and allied 

city and port has such targets and guarding against all other types of 

CBRN attacks is an unenviable active defense job where the odds favor 

the attackers who can pick the time and place. 

Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 19

V. Passive Defense 

Maximum Passive Defenses 

The ideal passive defensive system will provide redundant and highly 

effective biological, chemical, and radiological weapons detectors, lightweight biological warfare masks, and full counter-chemical warfare and 

counter-biological warfare individual protective equipment (IPE) complete 

with masks, boots, gloves, and overgarments to each U.S. and allied 

military person, and associated civilian support workers.5 Indeed, each 

individual should possess multiple backup protective suits, masks, gloves, 

and boots so that they can change out of contaminated gear to gain 

continuous protection over the period of the conflict. The ideal passive 

defenses will also have administered the full range of biological warfare 

vaccines and chemical warfare antidotes to the U.S. and allied force and 

support workers and will have ready access to prepositioned counterbiological warfare and counter-chemical warfare medicines, protective 

equipment, and decontaminants such as are stockpiled in the continental 

United States in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). 

Also, the ideal passive defense program will provide effective 

collective protection shelters for all base personnel and will stockpile 

adequate medical supplies and equipment to cope with CBRN 

emergencies. Further, this program will provide plans, training, and 

adequate resources for dealing with the medical side of a CBRN conflict, 

including well-thought-out plans for handling evacuations, mass casualties 

(triage, evacuations, quarantines), and identification of the physically 

injured and separation from the “worried well” to prevent the 

overwhelming of medical staffs and supplies. 

The ideal passive defense program will provide both a point detector 

and a stand-off sensor system that detects biological and chemical agents in 

incoming weapons or in aerosolized clouds approaching U.S. and allied 

positions. This ideal detect-to-warn sensor alarm will provide enough 

warning time for friendly forces to don masks and take shelter before the 

attack arrives, thus substituting for the “detect to treat” system now in place. 

In addition to the need for excellent point and stand-off detectors to 

sense when a CBRN attack is taking place, and decontamination and 

medical diagnostic capabilities to sustain the force when it is subject to 
20 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

such enemy weapons, the ideal passive defense system also needs 

technologies to shield the force, including individual and collective 

protective equipment and chemical, biological, or radiological 

prophylaxes. Finally, the ideal passive defense must be designed and run 

by those who understand the threat environment by providing to the 

warfighter the optimal battle analysis, battle management tools based on 

modeling and simulation training. The ideal passive defense will take 

advantage of an integrated early warning system, an advanced medical 

surveillance system, and concepts of operation designed to both protect 

the force and its ability to execute the mission (e.g., the USAF CounterCW CONOPS). 

Progress and Shortfalls in Passive Defense 

Significant progress has been made in passive defenses over the first 

decade since the start of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in 

1993. Indeed, in no element of U.S. counterproliferation policy has more 

progress been made than in passive defense, and that is true despite the 

fact that the active defense investment is ten times that of passive defense, 

with far less satisfactory results. This leads some to question the priorities 

of the overall CP program. 

When Secretary Aspin launched the CPI, only a small percentage of 

the armed forces personnel had been administered anthrax vaccine. 

Today, most personnel going into harm’s way have been inoculated 

against this primary BW threat, although in late 2004 the anthrax 

vaccinations were halted by court order, subject to further safety testing of 

the vaccine. As of this writing in 2005, the DoD is appealing this ruling in 

order to restart the program. 

In 1993, those military units that had protective masks, overgarments, 

gloves, and boots to guard against chemical attacks had only the very 

bulky, very hot, very restrictive protective gear. Today, much of the 

active duty U.S. military assigned to forward bases in danger zones like 

Iraq, South Korea, and Afghanistan have at the ready much lighter, less 

restrictive, and less oppressive new Joint Service Lightweight Integrated 

Suit Technology (JSLIST) overgarments. 

In addition, the force has been given improved protective masks like 

the M20 and M42. These replace the M17, M25, and M9 and feature a 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 21

better face seal, increased useful life, weather and ozone resistance, 

improved comfort and ease of cleaning and maintenance. Also, the new 

M25 mask supports the Army and special operations forces personnel and 

gives them close-fitting eye lenses, a voice-emitter for face-to-face and 

telephone communication, a drinking tube, and an interphone for aircraft 

communications. Three other new improved masks are now in R&D for 

deployment in the next several years for helicopter pilots, and selected 

ground forces and commercial applications. 

Further, inspections of U.S. bases abroad in the early to mid-1990s 

showed that collective protection (COLPRO) shelters had long been 

neglected and were inadequate to meet the chemical and biological warfare 

threats anticipated in the future. Some progress, although not nearly 

enough, has been made to improve the collective protection capabilities at 

key bases like Osan Air Base in the Republic of Korea and others within 

close reach of adversaries. Other U.S. bases generally are far less prepared 

to offer up-to-date, fully equipped and supplied, toxic-free shelters. 

In FY 2001, the United States military began deploying a 300 square 

foot Chemical Biological Protective Shelter (CBPS) to replace the older 

M51 shelters. These CBPS units will help provide relief to personnel who 

can use such contamination-free zones to rest, get treatment, gain relief 

from protective overgarments, take care of bodily functions, and get into 

fresh protective gear. 

Other new collective protection shelters used to improve medical 

service to combatants are the U.S. Army Chemical Protected Deployable 

Medical System (CP DEPMEDS) and the U.S. Air Force Chemically 

Hardened Air Transportable Hospital (CHATH) which were both 

introduced to the field in FY 2001 to provide a toxic free treatment area. 

U.S. Navy ships are also being backfitted to accept a Collective 

Protection System (CPS) to provide a contamination-free environment in 

designated locations aboard each vessel. These were designed to protect 

mission-essential and life-sustaining functions on board while the naval 

vessel and its crew are subject to chemical and/or biological attacks. This 

backfitting program began in FY 2001 and will proceed for many years as 

the United States moves to protect its fleet and personnel. 

In addition, the Department of Defense also is working on the Joint 

Collective Protection Equipment (JCPE) program to provide improved 
22 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

filters to prevent the flow of chemical and biological particulates into 

collective protection shelters. 

Finally, still in research and development is the Joint Transportable 

Collective Protection System (JTCOPS), a modular shelter system that can, 

when deployed, be used as a stand-alone structure or as a toxic-free shelter 

within existing structures to protect against chemical and biological agents, 

toxic industrial materials, and radiological particulate matter.6

Medical preparations for CBRN warfare have led to some very useful 

new passive defense programs in the decade since the Counterproliferation 

Initiative was begun. One such advance is the introduction of the Global 

Expeditionary Medical System (GEMS), previously known as Desert Cove.7

The Global Expeditionary Medical System allows for integration of 

patient evaluation, epidemiological analysis, and command and control 

linkages of medics at the scene of casualties to commanders in the rear. The 

Global Expeditionary Medical System uses the Rugged Advanced Pathogen 

Identification Device (RAPID) to tell medical personnel and commanders in 

real time what kind of biological warfare agent is being used by the enemy 

force. This RAPID assessment facilitates command decisions such as what 

kinds of treatment to administer, whether to isolate casualties, and whether 

or not to quarantine personnel or sectors. Another GEMS tool is the Patient 

Encounter Module, a paperless data linked tool for the front line medic to 

record and trade individual patient assessments. The Global Expeditionary 

Medical System also utilizes the Theater Epidemiological Module, an 

analysis tool designed for far forward use as well as a capable reporting 

system to aid command and control surveillance of the battle area. Finally, 

the Global Expeditionary Medical System personnel also use the Theater 

Occupational Module which assists the user in estimating the level of 

biological warfare contamination risk in a given area by comparing and 

contrasting readings with a baseline normal operating environment. 

In the past decade, the military medical community has given more 

attention to the medical risks of different types of biological agents and 

the intelligence assessments of what different adversary states and 

groups are thought to possess. For example, they have concluded that 

for a group of rogue states the medical risks and intelligence assessment 

of possible possession is greatest for agents like anthrax, botulinum 

toxin, plague, and ricin. The possibility of biological warfare agents like 

smallpox, encephalitis, and Ebola being in the hands of adversaries is not 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 23

as likely, but should they use such weapons the results could be as or more 

severe than the first four cited.8

 (See Figure 1.) 

Figure 1. Biodefense: Certain Weapons Pose Critical Risk9

Medical countermeasures have now been developed to decrease the 

risk to personnel associated with enemy biological warfare attacks and to 

continue to carry out U.S. military missions. One such product, new to the 

inventory in the 1990s, is Pentavalent Botulinium Toxoid (PBT) to treat 

Botulinium Toxin (BOT). Unfortunately, there is no present manufacturer 

to produce PBT in the quantities needed. The U.S. military medical 

community works to keep food and water safe, provides a number of 

relevant vaccines like the Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA), uses 

systems like the Global Expeditionary Medical System to detect and 

identify biological agents rapidly, and utilizes protective equipment to 

protect personnel and field hospitals. If these pre-exposure measures do 

not prevent infections, the medical community still utilizes vaccines, 

antibodies, antivirals, protective equipment, decontamination, disease 

surveillance techniques, and other treatments to aid casualties and prevent 

the spreading of contagious diseases. 

Intelligence Threat (HAZARD PROBABILITY)

GREATEST LEAST

Brucellosis

Typhus

Q-Fever

Cholera

Enceph. virus 

(VEE)

None

Negligible

Mycotoxins

(Tricothecene)

Tularemia Glanders

SEB (Staph. 

Enterotoxin)

None

Marginal

Smallpox None None

Encephalitis

Anthrax

Bot.Toxin

Plague

Ricin

Critical

Catastrophic None None Ebola None

Medical Risk

LEAST GREATEST

High Risk and Threat Agents have the potential to severely 

degrade Air Operations – Vaccines can manage some risk
24 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

Still under study is how to treat massive numbers of casualties, what 

roles the civilian sector can play in such treatment, how to triage a mass 

casualty event, when to quarantine casualties and exposed personnel, where 

and when to execute an evacuation of personnel, and how to dovetail the 

medical response with ongoing combat operations. Also, unresolved is how 

much forward-deployed stockpiles of medical equipment, vaccines, and 

medical supplies are required in different Combatant Command areas of 

responsibility to cope with possible biological warfare attacks. 

Recent analysis of what many consider the number one biological 

warfare threat, anthrax, shows some interesting data on survivability of 

personnel given the timing and medical countermeasures taken. (See 

Figure 2.) 

Figure 2. Medical Countermeasures and 

Survivability Example: Anthrax10

Note the importance of administering Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed 

either during the pre-exposure or pre-symptomatic phases of an anthrax 

attack on personnel. A combination of both Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed 

Exposure to 

Lethal Dose

Onset* of 

Symptoms

*Range: 2-43 days, 

(usually by 7 days)

Pre-exposure

Note: Antibiotic = 30-60 days of Ciprofloxacin or Doxycycline at recommended dose, ideally 

begun in first 48 hours after exposure. Vaccine = Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA)

(Case survival rate 

untreated ~3%)

Estimated

Survivability

93-95% 93-95%

~90% ~90%

~100% ~100%

~100% ~100%

Vaccine only

Vaccine Antibiotic

Antibiotic only

Antibiotic + Vaccine

Vaccine

Antibiotic + Vaccine

Time

Not Protective

11-14%

Pre-Symptomatic Symptomatic

Ref: MMWR, 

49:RR-15, 

2000
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 25

and the relevant antibiotics (Ciprofloxacin or Doxycycline) should lead to 

close to 100 percent survival. Failure to treat until after symptoms begin 

changes the estimated survival rate to only 11 to 14 percent. This shows 

the need for early warning and good biological warfare early warning 

sensors. Unfortunately, the United States and its allies are still in the 

“detect to treat” rather than the far more favorable “detect to warn” mode 

of operations, and changes in our alerting capabilities could save tens of 

thousands of lives in a biological warfare scenario. 

The military science and technology (S&T) community has been 

working very hard to give the warfighter and homeland defender a variety 

of new tools to help them survive, fight, and win either on the chemical and 

biological battlefield, or on the home front. Note the array of chemical and 

biological defense technologies that have been deployed in the field since 

Secretary Aspin’s Counterproliferation Initiative was begun in the areas of 

individual protection, collective protection, decontamination, medical 

assistance, contamination avoidance, information systems, modeling and 

simulation, and CBRN protection and response. (See Figure 3.) 

Figure 3. Chemical and Biological Defense Technologies: 

Reducing the Threat with Enhanced Capabilities11

PROTECTION

DETECTION

RESTORATION

Chemical Biological Medical Systems

Collective Protection

AVA

SMALLPOX

PLAGUE VAC

BOTULINUM VAC

VEE VAC

JBAIDS

CRP

ADV ANTICONVULSANT

ATNAA

SNAPP

SERPACWA

RSDL

Contamination Avoidance

CAM / ICAM JCAD RADIACs ACADA

WATER MONITOR

PBAS

M93 / M93A1 FOX

STRYKER NBCRV

JSLNBCRS

CB MASS SPEC

JSLSCAD

DRY FILTER UNIT

PORTAL SHIELD

JBPDS BIDS

JBSDS ARTEMIS

CP D

CBPS EPMEDS

C

JC

PS

P

BKFT

J E TCOPS

TCP S /M28CPS

SCPE

Individual Protection

AABO

A/P-22P MASK,MC

FOOTWEAR COVERS

GLOVES

JCESM

JPACE

JSAM

JSGPM

JSLIST JSMLT

MCU2P SECOND SKIN Decontamination

JSFDS

JSSED

SORBDECON

RESTOPS

nI of mr ation Systems

JEM

JOEFVPS TSC

JWARN

BMIS

ASSESSMENTS

DATA MANAGEMENT

CSIS

Guardian

CBRN PROTECTION

CBRN OPERATIONS

WMD-CST

ALS Model ni g & Simulation

C41
26 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

However, in some other areas of passive defense, major deficiencies 

still exist. Out of the fourteen biological agents deemed most useful for 

weaponization, the United States has still fielded only four vaccines that 

have been given the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) stamp of 

approval. In some cases, even where a FDA-approved vaccine exists, no 

adequate supply of the vaccine has yet been purchased. In several cases 

there is no usable vaccine yet in sight despite the passage of a decade 

when, with proper funding and dedication to finding workable solutions, 

vaccines might have been available now to protect U.S. armed forces. 

Indeed, had there not have been the Al Qaeda attacks of September 

11, 2001, followed by the October-November 2001 anthrax-through-themail attacks, there would likely have been even less progress in vaccines, 

antibiotics, anti-viral drugs, and the stockpiling of emergency medical 

supplies. 

Because our intelligence is limited about the kinds of chemical and 

biological agents that rivals like North Korea or Iran might possess, and 

because such programs are easy to conceal and are inherently difficult to 

detect using U.S. national technical means, it is wise to adopt a 

capabilities-based passive defense approach rather than a threat-based one. 

Thus, even if an adversary CB threat has not definitively been detected, it 

is wise to prepare for the contingency of adversary CB use if it is within 

their capability to produce and use such arms. 

DHS Support for Passive Defense 

As of FY 2004, nine out of ten federal dollars spent on passive 

defense against BW are spent by the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS). The U.S. Congress has recently passed, and the DHS has pushed, 

the Bioshield and Biosensor programs that should upgrade the U.S. 

vaccine development and biological sensor R&D programs. Department 

of Homeland Security programs already have sparked the acquisition of 

enough smallpox vaccine to inoculate every American citizen and created 

a Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) program whereby 50-ton “Push 

Packages” of all types of vaccines, medicines, decontamination agents, and 

emergency medical equipment are stored in a dozen locations across the 

United States in preparation for emergencies in all regions of the country. 

The Strategic National Stockpile has increased 50 percent from FY 2001 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 27

to FY 2004. The Strategic National Stockpile program should be 

duplicated and/or made available for overseas application as well and 

likely will be extended and adopted in hot spots abroad in the future where 

the CBRN threat is greatest. 

The Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 

September 11, 2001, have galvanized U.S. biodefense preparedness, even 

though it still has a long way to go to reach a satisfactory condition. 

Federal investment in biodefense is up 17 times from $294 million in the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in FY 2001 to $5.2 

billion in FY 2004.12 Each of the 50 states of the United States now has 

bio-terrorism response plans in place, including mass vaccination plans, 

and all have created disease reporting systems that should rapidly detect a 

bioterrorist event.13 The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has 

drafted model legislation on emergency health powers for states to adopt 

in order to deal with such crises. 

The Laboratory Response Network, connecting labs that can help in a 

bio-attack emergency, has been expanded from 80 labs in FY 2001 to 145 

labs by FY 2004.14 The number of state and local public health labs that 

are approved for work at the biosecurity level three (BSL-3) has expanded 

to 47, four times the number in 1999.15 In FY 2003, the U.S. Centers for 

Disease Control provided specialized bioterrorism training to 8,800 key 

lab technicians. Eleven new high-level biocontainment research 

laboratories are currently being funded by the National Institutes of Health 

(NIH). These could be made available also for assistance in a public 

health response to a bioterrorist event.16

Moreover, the Department of Health and Human Services has 

expanded the U.S. Centers for Disease Control Public Health Information 

Network to reach one million public health professionals, including those 

in 90 percent of all county public health agencies. Further, almost 

174,000 health professionals have been trained in FY 2003 and FY 2004 

through Health Resources and Services Administration’s Bioterrorism 

Training and Curriculum Development program.17

The Department of Health and Human Services has quadrupled the 

Readiness Force in the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps 

from 600 in FY 2001 to about 2,300 in FY 2004. The Food and Drug 

Administration has increased its imported food inspections at ports of 

entry from 40 ports in 2001 to 90 ports in FY 2004 and has conducted 
28 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

eight times more such inspections.18 Also since the September 11, 2001, 

Al Qaeda attacks, the Food and Drug Administration created a Food 

Emergency Network, with 63 laboratories serving 34 states to deal with 

possible food poisoning events.19

The National Institutes of Health has invested in new and improved 

vaccines against smallpox and anthrax. The smallpox vaccine supply has 

increased from 15.4 million to over 300 million doses, enough to 

vaccinate all U.S. citizens, if required. The National Institutes of Health 

has also developed an Ebola virus vaccine that has worked in monkeys 

and is now being tested on human volunteers.20

The National Institutes of Health also established eight Regional 

Centers of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases 

Research.21 Further, in 2002 the U.S. Centers for Disease Control in 

collaboration with the Department of Justice created a Forensic 

Epidemiology course to train public safety and law enforcement 

professionals to aid in investigations. By 2004, 42 of the 50 states had 

participated and 5,000 professionals were trained.22

This progress in bio-defense made by HHS and the Department of 

Homeland Security also arms the United States with greater protection, 

expertise and bio-defense assets that can be copied or borrowed by the 

warfighter community in foreign wars. 

Other Medical Defenses 

Clearly, in the realm of vaccine research and distribution to counter 

infections from biological weapons, there has been some impressive 

improvement. Most U.S. active duty military personnel assigned to 

forward areas in conflict zones have been vaccinated against anthrax. 

Moreover, the United States now has enough smallpox vaccine to 

inoculate the entire U.S. population, including all U.S. military personnel 

should the need arise. Unfortunately, as of this writing, the anthrax 

vaccination program has been at least temporarily halted by court order 

until more safety tests can be conducted. The DoD is appealing this 

ruling, arguing that the vaccine is safe. 

While it is reassuring that U.S. defenses against these twin scourges, 

anthrax and smallpox, have been improved, that does not protect U.S. 

forces and citizens against the consequences of several other biological 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 29

agents that could be used as weapons of war or terror. The United States 

currently has only a few FDA-approved vaccines such as those for 

cholera, plague, smallpox, and anthrax. Even in these, the cholera vaccine 

is not recommended for routine protection in endemic areas and the plague 

vaccine, while FDA-approved, is no longer available in quantity.23

Some counter-BW vaccines are in what is called the “Investigational 

New Drug (IND)” status, awaiting Food and Drug Administration 

approval pending further trials. The vaccines for Q-fever, tularemia, 

Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE), viral hemorrhagic fevers, and 

botulism are in this Investigational New Drug category and are in very 

short supply.24

No vaccine at all currently exists that is effective against such 

biological agents as glanders, brucellosis, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, 

ricin, or T-2 mycotoxins and a myriad of other diseases that could also be 

weaponized in the future.25

It is especially recommended that the Departments of Defense and 

Homeland Security give top priority to several medical chemical and 

biological defense Science and Technology programs, namely:26

• multi-agent biological warfare agent vaccines and medicines, 

• programs to provide earlier indications of biological warfare 

attacks and infections, 

• drugs to provide short-term biological warfare agent protection, 

• antivirals for pox and hemorrhagic fever virus, 

• medicines and vaccines to combat adversary fourth generation 

chemical warfare agents, and 

• plasma technology to neutralize BW agents. 

With regard to the non-thermal plasma technology cited above, the 

Air Force Research Laboratory is presently testing two portable devices to 

neutralize biological agents, one that uses high powered pulsed 

microwaves, the other atmospheric pressure plasma to kill the bacteria and 

viruses. High energy electrons are discharged to preferentially interact 

with and destroy or neutralize otherwise harmful biological agents. The 

Non-Thermal Plasma Technology, still in the research and development 

stage, is designed to suck in air particles, neutralize them, and thereby 
30 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

clean rooms, aircraft, vehicles, and containers without using the foams, 

solvents, or bleach that could otherwise harm both ordinary and sensitive 

materials. 

Sensor Upgrades Needed 

In addition, new types of bio-detectors are needed that can identify 

the contents of aerosolized clouds being borne by wind currents in the 

direction of U.S. and allied forces. Bio-sensors are also needed that can 

provide rapid and accurate information on bio-contamination over a wide 

area, as opposed to the current point detectors like the Biological 

Integrated Defense System (BIDS), a road mobile laboratory developed in 

the mid-1990s after Desert Storm. 

Science and Technology research also needs to provide improved 

reconnaissance capabilities to detect biological and chemical agents 

already on the surface and to identify the areas contaminated from those 

that are clean. Such improved sensors need to be integrated into a 

centralized battle management command and control system at military 

bases and ports. 

Of course, during the period from 1991 to 2004, the U.S. armed 

services have shown some improvement in both biological and chemical 

sensors despite funding problems and a failure to put anyone in charge of 

the entire effort until the late 1990s. The M-22 Automatic Agent 

Detector/Alarm was introduced together with the M21 Remote Sensing 

Chemical Agent Alarm, and the Improved Chemical Monitor. Also, the 

Combatant Commands began to introduce Dry Filter Units to sample bioagents in the air at their installations. Both the U.S. Army and Marines 

fielded improved radiacs to help detect radiation and give warning. 

A new array of chemical and biological agent detectors were in U.S. 

hands by 200427 including the: 

Chemical Sensors: 

• Automatic Chemical Agent Detection Alarm (ACADA), a manportable vapor alarm that serves as a point detector and identifier 

of nerve and blister agents; 

• Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD); 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 31

• Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM); 

• Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM); 

• Improved (Chemical Agent) Point Detection System (IPDS) 

installed on naval vessels to detect nerve and blister agents; 

• Joint Services Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector 

(JSLSCAD); 

• Shipboard Automatic Liquid Agent Detector (SALAD); 

• Joint Services Lightweight NBC Reconnaissance Systems (JS 

NBCRS) (also detects biological, radiological and nuclear 

contamination); 

• Joint Warning and Reporting System (JWARN) (for CBRN 

agents); and the 

• Artemis, a standoff chemical agent detector still in research and 

development, that scans threat clouds in all directions out to 20 

kilometers or more. It will be used on a variety of land, sea, and 

air platforms. 

Biological Agent Sensors 

• Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS); 

• Interim Biological Agent Detector (IBAD); 

• Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) provides a 

common sensor that can identify a biological agent in 15 minutes 

that began to replace IBAD in 2003; 

• Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System (JBREWS); 

• Joint Biological Universal Detector (JBUD); and the 

• Joint Biological Standoff Detection System (JBSDS) is a research 

and development project that when perfected is expected to use a 

LIDAR beam to detect aerosol clouds out to a range of 15 

kilometers for particulate matter and identify the existence of 

biological particles out to 3 kilometers. 
32 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

Radiation Agent Sensors 

• The AN/UDR-13 Radiac Set, a compact handheld, pocket-size 

tactical radiation meter which measures gamma/neutron doses in 

the vicinity; 

• The AN/VDR-2 Radiac Set, a handheld or vehicle-mounted sensor 

to detect and measure nuclear radiation from fallout; 

• The AN/PDR-75 Radiac Set that measures dose exposure of 

individuals to gamma and neutron radiation; and 

• The AN/PDR-77 Radiac Set that measures doses of alpha, beta, 

gamma and x-ray radiation. 

The standoff chemical, biological, and radiation sensor systems, in 

particular, once perfected, will be the beginning of the U.S. military’s 

capability to provide adequate warning to its forces to get into protective 

gear and shelters prior to the arrival of a chemical or biological attack. 

Once the U.S. and allied military forces have turned the corner in 

transitioning from a detect-to-treat situation to a detect-to-warn capability, 

all personnel will be significantly safer from chemical and biological 

attacks. Much research and development work on standoff sensors 

remains before this becomes a reality. 

In addition to these detectors, Portal Shield is also an interim 

capability for bio-detection at high value fixed overseas sites. It was 

initially deployed in 1998 and has been introduced to numerous sites as of 

2004. Portal Shield uses a network of sensors ringing a base or facility, 

linked to the command and control of a centralized computer accessible to 

the site commander. Portal Shield is to be replaced by the more advanced 

Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPD) which works faster and is 

more accurate. 

Also, highly desirable will be the invention and deployment of methods 

and equipment for identifying fourth generation chemical warfare agents 

and other new technology agents (NTAs). Moreover, improved 

decontamination materials are required. 

While substantial progress has been made in biodefense, in the area of 

decontamination of equipment and personnel that have been exposed to 

chemical agents, only marginal progress has been made. The U.S. 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 33

military still relies on chemical agent decontaminants like bleach that are 

too caustic for cleaning up both contaminated personnel and equipment. 

One useful new decontaminant for personnel that has been introduced 

in the last ten years is the Skin Exposure Reduction Paste Against 

Chemical Warfare (SERPACWA) product. Another recent innovation is 

the XM-100 Sorbent Decontamination System (SDS), an aluminum oxide 

powder to remove chemical contaminants from the surface of facilities and 

equipment, and reduces the need for water. Also, it is being examined by 

the FDA for possible application as a skin or open wound decontaminant. 

There has been limited success in developing new decontaminants 

that will not ruin the surfaces of equipment or glaze over windshields of 

aircraft or land vehicles that have been coated with toxic chemicals. Nor 

has an effective way been found to decontaminate rubber or plastic that 

has been exposed to chemical warfare agents. Instead, such materials 

absorb the chemicals and remain toxic for long periods, thwarting all 

present remedies. 

As noted there have been a number of new chemical agent detectors 

introduced to the field in the past few years. However, laying down M-8 

detection paper or M-9 detection tape is still considered the best way to 

detect the areas contaminated by chemical warfare agents, to help indicate 

what places are safe and which are still dangerous. It would be valuable to 

operations and personnel if chemical “markers” were produced to be 

sprayed over areas and when in contact with toxic materials, to turn color 

or otherwise show areas of contamination so that operational workarounds 

of hot spots could be more safely and rapidly done. 

Considerable progress has been made in designing new chemical and 

biological sensors. The Portal Shield sensor suites are a first step toward 

ringing military bases and facilities with a detection and warning system 

vis-à-vis biological warfare attacks, but the system, like most of the other 

detectors in the field, is far from perfect, causing far too many false 

alarms. 

The Fox Vehicle and the Biological Integrated Detection System 

(BIDS) are mobile, protected laboratories for detecting and identifying 

chemical and biological agents, respectively, an analysis that can provide 

point detection and identification within 30 minutes. 

Although considerable research and development work on standoff 

detectors is proceeding, there is nothing yet in the field that can detect 
34 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

aerosolized agents drifting in clouds toward a targeted area. Something 

like this is needed to provide detection to warn friendly troops to don 

protective chemical and biological gear before the hazard arrives. At 

present, our sensors only confirm the presence of chemical and biological 

agents after they have contaminated an area, and all such detection is point 

detection, not wide area detection. What is most needed is a “detect to 

warn” system, rather than the present “detect to treat” system where the 

first sign of an attack may be the physical symptoms of victims reacting to 

chemical or biological attacks. 

Passive Defense: Is a Quick Fix Possible? 

The slow pace of research and development in biodefense sensors and 

the serious biological warfare threat that exists has led some analysts to 

search for immediate and commercially available off-the-shelf remedies 

for protecting personnel living and working at fixed military bases that 

face potential biological attacks.28 Much of the danger of biological 

warfare or biological terrorist attacks could be alleviated if the targeted 

personnel were to don inexpensive N-95 masks to filter out the biological 

microbes, since aerosolized BW agents are the main threat. 

How would personnel know when to don their masks? This might be 

required when the threat indicators were highest. For example, it would 

be wise to wear masks when the intelligence agencies signaled that the 

threat was higher than usual, for example Threat Level “Charlie” or 

“Delta,” especially when this warning level coincided with optimal 

meteorological conditions for a biological warfare attack from the 

standpoint of those behind it. Thus, masks should be worn when the 

intelligence warning levels are “Charlie or higher” and, when 

simultaneously, there were cool cloudy overcast days or cool nights, when 

a temperature inversion was likely. The N-95 masks are much less 

cumbersome, restrictive and uncomfortable than the rubberized gas masks 

now issued. 

The masks normally worn by military personnel are restrictive and 

expensive, costing anywhere from $170 to $210 or more each. However, 

a normal $20 painter’s filter mask (N-95) can filter out one-to-five micron 

diameter biological particles, the kind that is most dangerous and likely to 

stick when breathed into the lungs. 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 35

It would also greatly aid the ability of our Combatant Commands to 

provide passive defense against CBRN attacks if the science were better 

understood in several areas where currently some uncertainty exists. One 

such area for further research is in understanding the evaporation and 

neutralization rates of toxic chemical and biological agents in different 

environments. Another area where better understanding could improve 

passive defense is research in the effects on personnel of lower levels of 

chemical toxicity than we have previously investigated. A third area 

where the payoff for passive defense might be very high is research that 

throws light on the validity for humans of animal testing of chemical and 

biological agents antidotes and vaccines. A fourth area recommended for 

closer research investigation is further analysis of the mechanisms by 

which disease spreads or chemical agents work in the body in order to 

design appropriate doses of antidotes and other medications.29 These four 

science and technology research projects, if successful, can help the 

Departments of Defense and Homeland Security provide more effective 

passive defense protection to the warfighter, emergency responder 

communities, and to victims of CBRN attacks. 

Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 37

VI. Consequence Management 

Maximum Consequence Management 

The ideal consequence management capability to cope with CBRN 

warfare will provide the means of avoiding, decontaminating, and 

reconstituting operations after such an attack. This ideal reconstitution of 

a fighting force can be facilitated first by understanding the likely 

persistence of a toxic CBRN environment. Once the “science” is 

understood, effective counter-CBRN concepts of operation can be 

implemented by applying the best and most appropriate tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to avoid, eliminate, and work around 

the toxic hazards. 

Clean-up of contaminated areas in an ideal system will be conducted 

by spraying areas with “markers” that turn color or provide other physical 

indicators of agent activity when brought in contact with CBRN agent 

contamination. Then, in the ideal consequence management system, all 

contaminated personnel, equipment, and areas could be de-toxified by 

applying available, effective but benign decontamination agents that can 

completely neutralize the CBRN agents without harming the personnel or 

equipment being treated. 

Further, the ideal consequence management program will have 

worked out a system for dealing with contaminated aircraft, ships, and 

other equipment both for decontamination, and for isolation and 

reconstitution. Landing and basing of such assets and procedures for 

cleaning and recertifying them for renewed use would be worked out in 

agreements previously articulated to the satisfaction of U.S. and allied 

governments to facilitate operations in a CBRN theater. Standards would 

also have to be agreed upon that define minimal standards of how clean 

the equipment or personnel have to be before they could be admitted on 

the soil of receiving states or before they could be returned to action. The 

answer to the “how clean is clean?” question must both protect those 

dealing with the contaminated persons and equipment and must also not 

be set so impossibly high that it paralyzes the nation’s warfighting 

capability. Moreover, it needs to be addressed well in advance of the 

conflict so as to facilitate timely and appropriate contingency planning and 

actions and to avoid nasty show stopping surprises in the middle of a war. 
38 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

Progress and Shortfalls in Consequence Management 

If, despite our best efforts, an enemy succeeds in inflicting damage 

through CBRN attacks, it then falls to U.S. (and allied) forces to clean up 

the target area, resurrect the damaged capability, bind up the wounds of 

casualties, and bury the dead. Consequences must be managed to limit the 

damage, reconstitute the force, and keep U.S. and allied operations up and 

running so as to continue to carry the fight to the enemy. 

How much better prepared are we now to manage consequences of 

CBRN strikes than we were in 1993? What shortfalls remain? Progress in 

consequence management has been made on several fronts. First, the 

United States and its allies are somewhat improved in the areas of passive 

defense, active defense, and counterforce so that against the same level of 

CBRN attack as could have been launched a decade ago, there should be 

fewer consequences to cope with than was the case then. On the other 

hand, the CBRN threat likely has grown along with U.S. consequence 

management countermeasures, so that despite U.S. improvements in 

organization, training, and equipment, we are still falling short of an 

adequate response capability to CBRN weapons attacks. 

Nevertheless, there have been major improvements in our 

appreciation of the danger of CBRN attacks in the wake of (1) repeated Al 

Qaeda attacks over the last decade, (2) the October 4 to November 21, 

2001, anthrax letter deliveries,30 and (3) the October 2001 major 

cyberattack that cost the United States $3 billion in repairs. 

This heightened appreciation of CBRN dangers has led both the 

administrations of President William Clinton and President George W. 

Bush to issue strong new policy and guidance to the U.S. Armed Services 

and to Domestic Emergency responders to prepare better for consequence 

management of CBRN attack contingencies both abroad and within the 

continental United States. Consequence management of CBRN attack 

effects will be the joint responsibility of the Department of Defense and 

Department of Homeland Security, with the origin and location of the 

attack determining who has primary responsibility for response. 

The United States has made progress over the decade in expanding 

the number of laboratories capable of rapidly identifying chemical and 

biological agents. Efforts have succeeded in improving the U.S. 

surveillance and detection of biological outbreaks and in differentiating 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 39

natural from man-initiated events, and a good deal of thought has gone 

into how to achieve further early warning and in identifying the sources of 

outbreaks.31

Another area of improvement is in understanding and preparing to 

combat panic, and to provide U.S. forces and private citizens effective 

public affairs guidance during and after a weapon of mass destruction 

event to reduce the number of “worried well” flooding hospitals, and to 

improve constructive responses to a serious crisis either at home or in the 

battlespace.32

All this is positive. Nevertheless, much still needs to be done before 

consequence management preparations can be considered adequate. Since 

1993, despite an increased concern about weapons of mass destruction 

effects, only a small amount of study has gone into what kinds of public 

information procedures will be needed to limit panic and reduce adverse 

psychological reactions to a CBRN attack. Medical facilities could easily 

be overwhelmed both in the military’s battlespace and at home in terrorist 

scenarios if the “worried well” were not rapidly sorted out from the 

“physically impaired” after a weapon of mass destruction strike. 

Only in a preliminary way, through several Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency conferences and workshops, has this problem of controlling 

adverse behavior of U.S. and allied personnel during a CBRN crisis or 

attack been addressed. The USAF Biodefense Task Force and the 

Strategic Integrated Process Team of the Contamination Avoidance at Sea 

Ports of Debarkation (CASPODS) Advanced Concepts and Technology 

Demonstration (ACTD) have analyzed, brainstormed, and discussed the 

means of using public announcements, training, and public affairs 

bulletins to mitigate panic, provide effective information, and squash 

rumors before they take on a life of their own.33

Modest gains have been made in some areas of consequence 

management since 1993. The Restoration of Operations (RestOps) ACTD 

made some progress in policies for handling human remains after a CBRN 

event at an airbase, but considerable further mortuary affairs work 

remains. Organizing U.S. forces and on-scene responders for weapon of 

mass destruction events has resulted in the creation of the USMC ChemBio Incident Response Force, the U.S. Army Tech Escort Units, and U.S. 

Army Reserve weapons of mass destruction Civil Support Teams in 32 

states by 2004, with all 50 states to have them by 2005. These second-
40 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

responder units could help restore services and public confidence and 

restore order in areas affected at home. 

Decontamination agents exist to clean up toxic areas, but much 

additional work needs to be done to create non-caustic decontamination 

agents that can be immediately applied. No work appears to have been 

done to develop CBRN “markers” to identify the contaminated from 

uncontaminated areas where chemical and biological attacks had occurred 

in the proximity. Only M-8 paper and M-9 tape are currently available to be 

applied by ground-based personnel. It is to be hoped that markers will be 

developed that would turn color or otherwise give indication when in 

contact with toxic chemical or biological agents, and that could be delivered 

over wide areas in a timely manner, perhaps by air, to give commanders and 

their units a rapid appreciation of where chemical or biological toxicity 

exists and where safe areas are located. 

Within the United States, domestic weapons of mass destruction events 

will be handled first by the Department of Homeland Security, with Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) taking the lead in consequence 

management and the FBI in crisis management. The Department of 

Defense will be a supporting rather than the lead department in domestic 

consequence management activities. 

With regard to overseas weapons of mass destruction events, the U.S. 

Department of State has the formal lead role in U.S. consequence 

management activities in aiding a foreign government which takes the 

overall responsibility for directing such efforts. The Department of Defense 

will be a key supporter of the State Department in such consequence 

management abroad, especially in airlifting needed equipment and supplies 

to the areas affected. Given the paucity of resources directly available to the 

Department of State, it is certain that the Defense Department will play a 

key role in support since its resources abroad are far more extensive. 

There are spectrums of new threats that neither U.S. forces abroad nor 

U.S. responders at home have adequate capabilities to cope with. These 

include the ability to neutralize so-called fourth generation nerve agents and 

genetically altered biological agents. Further, in a target-rich environment, it 

is likely that defensive and consequence management programs will continue 

to lag far behind the offensive CBRN possibilities available to rogue states 

and terrorists. 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 41

VII. Counter-CBRN Operations: 

Suggestions for Combatant Commander Plans 

Counter-CBRN Operations will focus on eliminating enemy weapons 

of mass destruction as early as possible in a conflict, if possible. We must 

get them before they can get us. Failing that, effective active defenses 

become paramount. If you can’t eliminate such massive threats before 

they are launched, it is imperative to intercept them enroute. If there are 

failures in both counterforce and active defense, then survival of one’s 

forces is reliant on effective passive defenses or dependent upon placing 

units in positions where they are difficult to eliminate. This means staying 

out of enemy range or dispersing forces, and removing civilians, if 

possible, from the combat zones.34

Preemption versus enemy weapons of mass destruction assets or 

preventive war launched with the element of surprise is, in most cases, an 

unrealistic option against such heavily armed opponents. First, as 

Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrated all too well, the United States and its 

allies may have unreliable intelligence about the number, type, and 

location of adversary CBRN weapons. It is difficult to target assets that 

you lack such intelligence about. 

Furthermore, unless preemption works completely, it is likely that 

enemy weapons of mass destruction retaliation will take place against the 

United States forces by an enemy leader who figures he had better use, 

rather than lose, such forces to further U.S. attacks. A wounded enemy 

with weapons of mass destruction could exact a terrible price for a botched 

U.S. counterforce strike. 

A preemption strategy might work in a very few scenarios such as the 

Israeli strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor at a time when there was a 

single unprotected very high value target and the Iraqis, embroiled in a 

fierce war with Iran, were not equipped to retaliate. However, facing an 

opponent with a weapons of mass destruction retaliatory capability is an 

altogether more dangerous proposition. A better strategy is to rely on the 

overwhelming U.S. nuclear and conventional deterrents to such action 

unless one’s intelligence is absolutely complete, the counterforce strike is 

very likely to be successful, and the WMD threat is deemed imminent.35

Should a conflict escalate to the use of chemical, biological, or 

nuclear weapons, despite the best U.S. effort to deter their use, U.S. 
42 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

counter-CBRN military doctrine and concepts of operations (CONOPs) 

will be needed to protect U.S. personnel. 

Shortfalls in operational plans still exist in such areas as how to 

conduct resupply and reinforcement using strategic lift assets in 

contaminated areas where air and sea transports may become toxically 

coated. Still to be determined is how to recover such aircraft and ships 

after VX, sarin, or anthrax contamination. Still to be decided is where to 

take such aircraft and ships for decontamination, what cleanliness 

standards to set for re-employment of such aircraft, and what criteria to 

choose for introducing such valuable assets into a CBRN scenario where 

contamination might lay waste to a very expensive and hard-to-replace 

aircraft or ship. 

The U.S. Combatant Commands are still evaluating how to fight an 

opponent who may use an array of biological weapons, a type of war the 

U.S. military has yet to fight in the modern era. Given the potential 

strategic nature of biological weapons, this uncertainty is an ominous sign. 

Indeed, the uncertainties about how to fight a biological war is perhaps the 

single most serious flaw in U.S. military operational plans at present and 

needs to be addressed as soon as possible. 

In the past decade, the U.S. Air Force has led the way in developing a 

new Counter-CW concept of operations at air bases to keep aircraft sortie 

rates high even in the midst of ballistic missile attacks using chemical 

weapons. The Counter-CW concept of operations, features initial 

protection of aircraft, crews, and equipment using shelters and coverings, 

followed by base reconnaissance and split-MOPP operations, where the 

amount of protection adopted depends on the amount and locations of 

chemicals. One favorable factor was the discovery that blister and nerve 

agents are rapidly absorbed by the asphalt and concrete of runways. 

Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for handling potential hazards, 

and risk evaluation decision tools for commanders promise to keep most 

U.S. attack aircraft in the air despite the base being “slimed.” 

As previously discussed in great detail, the Air Force is now working 

on a counter-biological concept of operations element to augment its CCW concept of operations. Eventually, this will be augmented by a 

counter-radiological concept of operations element, counter-nuclear 

concept of operations element and perhaps a counter-high yield explosive 

CONOPs element so that an overall Counter-CBRNE concept of 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 43

operations will provide guidance to commanders if faced with such 

threats. This goal will be difficult to achieve should an enemy use a 

combination of, say, both chemical and biological weapons in the same 

campaign, since the concept of operations for each may differ or even be 

opposed to each other in some scenarios. 

Finally, in the event of another campaign along the lines of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, where U.S. Forces clash with an adversary armed with 

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, U.S. forces have to 

be organized, trained, and equipped for the WMD elimination mission. 

WMD elimination should not be an ad hoc “pick up game,” but must be 

institutionalized in our deliberate planning. 

U.S. forces must be able to systematically and comprehensively 

remove an adversary state’s CBRN programs by eliminating their capacity 

to do CBRN-related research, production, testing, storage, deployment, or 

use of such weapons in the foreseeable future. As one recent study 

summarized: 

“Conceptually, WMD elimination may be divided into 

three main tasks. Exploitation refers to locating, 

characterizing, and securing and functionally defeating an 

adversary’s WMD sites, documentation, personnel, and 

materials. Forensic evidence is developed as necessary. 

Destruction refers to rendering safe, dismantling, 

destroying, removing, or otherwise safely and verifiably 

disposing of weapons, materials, equipment, and 

infrastructure. Monitoring and redirection are intended to 

prevent the WMD threat from reconstituting, including the 

“conversion” of WMD activities and personnel. These 

tasks may be sequential for specific WMD sites but are 

likely to be simultaneous for larger WMD programs. 

Planning should reflect this, especially because each of the 

tasks requires some unique capabilities in terms of skill sets 

and expertise, equipment, and so forth.”36

Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 45

VIII. Counter-CBRN Planning, Education, 

Training, and Exercises 

In the years since Secretary Aspin launched the DoD 

Counterproliferation Initiative there has been some substantial progress in 

the way that the Department of Defense and the military services have 

organized themselves to make decisions on Counter-CBRN issues and 

programs. Note the reformation in the DoD Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program that took place from 1996 to 2001 and that serves DoD 

today. 

In addition, the Air Force, in 1997, issued a service-wide 

Counterproliferation Master Plan that set out objectives and called for 

initiatives to improve USAF counterproliferation capabilities. Among 

these, “in the area of passive defense, the Master Plan called for a 

continuing process of scientific research, operational analysis and 

capability improvements with the following objectives: 

• Improve technical and scientific knowledge of chemical/ biological 

agent behavior. 

• Identify and assess the operational implications of CBRNE attacks 

with enough precision to understand and quantify their effects on 

operations. 

• Develop and implement USAF policy, doctrine and guidance 

governing actions to counter the effects of CBRNE attacks.”37

Other services would be wise to develop their own C-CBRNE Master 

Plans and Roadmaps based on this USAF model. In both the USAF 

Masterplan and the USAF Counter-CBRNE Roadmap, the Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force has required that USAF education, training, and exercises 

(ETE) be designed to prepare every Airman with the kind of 

understanding of CBRNE threats and countermeasures that will allow 

them to survive, operate, and win in conflicts where such weapons are 

available to the adversary. Such Counter-CBRNE education, training, and 

exercises must be realistic and appropriate to the kinds of career paths 

each Airman takes, at each step during their time in the service from when 

they join to the time they separate. 
46 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

In the professional military education (PME) of U.S. military officers 

on these Counter-CBRN topics, several PME institutions have taken the 

lead. The Army Chemical School produces first-rate technical experts in 

dealing with countering CBRN threats. The Air University, particularly 

the Air War College in combination with the USAF Counterproliferation 

Center staff, have provided the most extensive number of elective courses 

on the subject. Other leading institutions that have specialized courses in 

this field are National Defense University in combination with their WMD 

Studies Center and the Naval Post-Graduate School. Several other PME 

schools have a course or two each on Counter-CBRNE issues but much 

work needs to be done to educate, train, and exercise military officers of 

all ranks on the threats these potent weapons pose and best practices for 

countering them in future conflicts. 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 47

IX. International CP Cooperation 

Ideal International Counterproliferation Program 

In the optimal coalition situation, each unit in the coalition will be 

equipped fully with the same quality and quantity of individual protective 

equipment, the same collective protective shelters, the same quantity and 

quality of medicines and vaccines, and have the same high quality sensors 

to alert them of contamination and incoming attacks sufficient to warn 

them in time to don protective equipment and take adequate protective 

shelter. Each element of the coalition will fall within the protective 

umbrella of effective and multi-layered or multi-shot missile and aircraft 

defenses. Further, each element of the coalition will have sufficient 

counterforce capability and dedicated persistent overhead intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to rapidly degrade the launchers 

and missiles that could threaten CBRN attacks upon them. Finally, each 

unit in the coalition should possess skilled first and second responders, and 

other well equipped and practiced consequence management capabilities 

against the most likely CBRN threats. The entire coalition should be 

thoroughly trained in specific counter-CBRN concepts of operations for 

continuing military operations on land, sea, and air during a conflict, 

including frequent training in such concept of operations and tactics, 

techniques and procedures to sustain operations and accomplish the 

mission. The entire coalition should also have an integrated command and 

control structure, should be organized, trained and equipped for CBRN 

warfare to a common standard, and employ a common military doctrine 

and operational war plan for conducting military operations in a CBRN 

environment. 

Progress and Shortfalls in International Cooperation 

Unfortunately, only some grudging progress has been made to get 

allied states involved and taking steps to counter CBRN threats to their 

forces and societies but, to date, there has been far more talk than action 

by most. The NATO states’ leaders with one exception (the United 

Kingdom) either do not appear to believe the weapons of mass destruction 
48 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

threat is imminent or do not want to confront the economic costs of 

serious preparations against such a threat. They are slowly investing in 

one missile defense system, the Medium Extended Range Air Defense 

System, but overall progress in counterproliferation organization, training 

and equipping is slow or virtually non-existent. 

The same is true of Japan and Arab states in the Persian Gulf. For 

example, there have been numerous annual meetings of the Cooperative 

Defense Initiative group, including the United States and the Arab states 

of the Gulf, but the physical progress toward either a counterforce, active 

defense, passive defense, or good consequence management capability is 

very much more theory than accomplished fact. At least it is a topic for 

consideration of the military leaders of those allied countries and regularly 

scheduled meetings on the topic are held, but the political will and 

budgeting does not currently exist to translate these talks into much 

concrete action. It is as if each such ally is deciding to let the United 

States provide the defense or they are waiting for a weapons of mass 

destruction disaster before they will be willing to act seriously. 

Unfortunately, if Counter-CBRN preparations by the United States 

over the last decade are still inadequate, they still far exceed the C-CBRN 

efforts of U.S. allies, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Israel. 

Among U.S. allies, only Israel has erected its own independent active 

defenses against ballistic missiles. Israel, the exception to the rule, 

depends on their terminal-phase Arrow theater ballistic missile defense 

program, as well as, in some crises, the U.S. Patriot-3 batteries for 

protection, but even this tandem of missile defenses offers only a partial 

answer to such threats. Israel also has a serious vaccination program in 

place and has created programs to give them a practiced passive defense 

and consequence management capability should enemies attack them with 

either chemical or biological weapons. Israel also has a serious aircraftbased counterforce capability and has in the past been willing to preempt 

adversary positions and assets in their ongoing conflict with Palestinian 

Arabs and adjacent Arab states. For example, Menachem Begin ordered 

the destruction of the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981 to prevent 

Saddam Hussein from developing Iraqi nuclear arms that might have 

otherwise been used later against Israel. 

Japan has just agreed to participate in a bilateral effort to develop 

theater missile defense systems to offset the North Korean No-Dong threat 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 49

and possible future Chinese missile threats as well. The U.S. allies in 

Europe have been working with the United States in a joint program to 

develop the Missile Extended Air Defense System to provide a mobile 

defensive bubble over allied ground troops moving in wartime within 

enemy missile range. The Missile Extended Air Defense System is a 

terminal phase interceptor, as is the Israeli Arrow interceptor. Only the 

United States is funding R&D work on more extended range (mid-course, 

post-boost, or boost phase) interceptors such as the Terminal High 

Altitude Air Defense, the Navy Wide Area Missile Defense, or the 

Airborne Laser programs. 

States like the Republic of Korea, our Persian Gulf Arab allies, our 

NATO allies, Japan, and others have very weak passive defense programs 

lacking in adequate quantities or quality of protective masks, suits, 

collective protective shelters, decontamination capabilities, vaccines, 

inoculated personnel, and pre-positioned medical supplies and equipment. 

Only the Israelis and the British forces have adequate vaccine inoculation 

preparations against possible future biological attacks by adversaries 

armed with anthrax and smallpox. 

U.S. Central Command has worked with U.S. Arab state allies in the 

Persian Gulf to better prepare them against chemical and biological 

warfare and chemical and biological terrorist threats. That is the mission 

of the Cooperative Defense Initiative program, whereby top military 

leaders from these states have met with top U.S. experts over the past four 

years on cooperative chemical and biological defense preparations and 

training. 

Similarly, the U.S. Central Command has held a series of Desert 

Breeze tabletop exercises on how to fight a chemical and biological war in 

the Gulf, involving the U.S. Central Command Combatant Commander 

and his planning staff. A similar series of exercises is run by the U.S. 

Pacific Command Combatant Commander and his staff, titled Coral 

Breeze, to analyze how to best cope with an adversary like North Korea 

that is armed with chemical and biological weapons. These Combatant 

Commander exercises take into account the state of counter-CBRN 

readiness of allies in each region, and lessons learned are reviewed and 

shared with our coalition partners. 

One of the serious deficiencies in U.S. and allied defenses against 

CBRN attacks is the fact that allied military forces are so much more 
50 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

vulnerable to chemical or biological attacks that U.S. forces may find 

themselves fighting with partners whose military prowess is greatly 

diminished after such an attack. Allied forces may be very impaired by 

such chemical and biological warfare scenarios and this, in turn, creates 

greater danger for U.S. forces. 

Further, U.S. forces may become hamstrung if host nation or third 

party nationals who work the airbases and ports feel unprotected and 

refuse to stay and perform their jobs if CBRN weapons are threatened or 

used by an adversary. This is especially true if such base or port workers 

have to worry about protecting and/or evacuating families from the danger 

zones. This problem will be exacerbated if enemy military or terrorist 

organizations were to target Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) and Toxic 

Industrial Materials (TIMs) in the area of U.S. and allied ports or airbases. 

The end result might be the same as or worse than if the enemy fired a 

ballistic missile armed with chemical weapons at the port or airbase. 

Panic control measures need to be provided to keep host nation and 

third party national workers from bolting and abandoning their support 

roles at these bases and ports in wartime. Pre-crisis or pre-war training 

and education can solve some of these problems and alleviate unrealistic 

fears. Excellent command and control procedures coupled with first-rate 

communications from trusted authorities can cut panic, as can the rapid 

treatment and removal from sight of dead and wounded. Assignments of 

specific crisis jobs and protective responses can cut both real and 

psychological casualties. Also, each key worker needs some basic 

protection equipment, both individual protective equipment and collective 

protection shelters. Workers also need to be assured of emergency 

medical help, and should be acquainted with emergency response 

procedures learned in pre-war/pre-crisis drills. At key foreign ports of 

entry (seaports of debarkation or SPODs), the U.S. military and civilian 

authorities need to have negotiated agreements with host nations for how 

to administer the port in wartime. They need to agree on the conditions 

for replacing indigenous or third party national workers if necessary. 

Also, sectors of the port should be designated beforehand for use by the 

combatant forces in unloading equipment, supplies, and personnel. Berths 

should be assigned for docking military supply ships. Key port and 

airbase personnel should have dispersed housing, not collocated at the port 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 51

or airbase, and be provided toxic-free shelters near the work area as well 

as dependable transportation in the event of a CBRN attack or alarm. 

Collective coalition plans for protecting all coalition units from 

CBRN strikes, both by properly equipping and training allied forces that 

are to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with U.S. personnel, and by protecting 

the civilian work forces at key bases and ports, will be essential when 

facing CBRN-armed opponents. Otherwise, U.S. forces may lack the 

allied support required for victory against a rogue state military using 

weapons capable of inflicting mass destruction, disruption, and casualties. 

Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 53

X. Summary of the CP Program Progress and 

Shortfalls 

Areas for Capability Enhancement (ACEs) 

Each year for most of the past decade, the U.S. Counterproliferation 

Program Review Committee produces an Annual Report to Congress and 

the Executive Branch where it lays out, in priority order, the areas identified 

by the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. 

Intelligence Community that most need improvement in the coming years. 

These items are called “Areas for Capability Enhancement” or ACEs. 

Unfortunately, progress has been slow in important 

counterproliferation areas and few ACEs have been solved and dropped 

from the list in the past decade. It is instructive to look at what the 

Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DOE), and the 

Intelligence Community (IC) all believe are the most important areas for 

capability enhancement. Note the priorities in Figure 4 each of the three 

have assigned to the following U.S. counterproliferation needs.38

Figure 4. Areas for Capability Enhancement (ACEs) 

DoD DOE IC ACEs

1 1 Timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of strategic, 

operational, and tactical level actionable intelligence to support 

CP and CT.

2 2 Detection, identification, characterization, location, prediction, 

and warning of traditional and nontraditional CW and BW agents 

(including medical surveillance). 

3 3 Defense against, and detection, characterization and defeat of 

paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist WMD capabilities 

(including protection of critical CONUS and OCONUS 

installations). 

4 2 5 Detection, location, and tracking of WMD/M and related 

materials, components, and key personnel. 

5 7 Support for maritime, air, ground WMD/M interdiction, including 

special operations. 

6 Enable sustained operations in a WMD environment through 

decontamination, and individual and collective protection. 

 Continued on page 54. 
54 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

Figure 4. Areas for Capability Enhancement (ACEs) (Continued)

DoD DOE IC ACEs

7 Medical protection, training, diagnosis, treatment, and 

countermeasures against NBC agents, to include surge 

manufacturing capability and stockpile availability of vaccines, 

pretreatments, therapeutics and other medical products. 

8 9 Ballistic and cruise missile active defense. 

9 Consequence management in response to use of WMD (including 

civil support in response to domestic WMD contingencies). 

10 6 Target planning for WMD/M targets. 

11 3 4 Detection, location, characterization, defeat, and elimination of 

WMD/M weapons and related facilities while minimizing 

collateral effects. 

12 8 Detection, location, characterization, and defeat of HDBTs while 

minimizing collateral effects. 

13 10 Prompt mobile detection and defeat. 

14 1 Protection of WMD/M and WMD/M-related materials and 

components. 

15 5 11 Support to export control activities of the U.S. Government. 

16 4 12 Support to inspection and monitoring activities of arms control 

agreements and regimes and other nonproliferation initiatives. 

Obviously each department, agency or command has a different set of 

priorities for enhancing U.S. counterproliferation capabilities depending 

on their own unique missions. Note, for example, the combined ACE 

priorities of the U.S. Combatant Commanders39 as shown in Figure 5.40
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 55

Figure 5. Combatant Commander Prioritized 

Counterproliferation Requirements

Rank Counterproliferation Requirement 

1 

Timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of Strategic, Operational and 

Tactical level actionable intelligence to support counterproliferation and 

counterterrorism. 

2 Detection, identification, characterization, location, prediction and warning of 

CW and BW agents. 

3 Enable sustained operation in a WMD environment through decontamination, 

and individual and collective protection. 

4 

Medical protection, training, diagnosis, treatment, surveillance and 

countermeasures against NBC agents, to include surge manufacturing 

capability and stockpile availability of vaccines, pretreatments, therapeutics 

and other medical products. 

5 Support for Special Operations including WMD/M interdiction. 

6 

Defense against, and detection, characterization and defeat or paramilitary, 

covert delivery, and terrorist WMD capabilities (including protection of 

critical CONUS and OCONUS installations). 

7 Ballistic and cruise missile active defense. 

8 Consequence management in response to use of WMD (including civil 

support in response to domestic WMD contingencies). 

9 Detection, location, and tracking of WMD/M and related materials, 

components and key personnel. 

10 Target planning for WMD/M targets. 

11 Detection, location, characterization, defeat and elimination of WMD/M, 

NBC/M and related facilities while minimizing collateral effects. 

12 Detection, location, characterization, and defeat of HDBT while minimizing 

collateral effects. 

13 Prompt mobile target detection and defeat. 

14 Protection of WMD/M and WMD/M-related materials and components. 

15 Support to export control activities of the U.S. Government. 

16 Support to inspection and monitoring activities of arms control agreements 

and regimes and other nonproliferation initiatives. 
56 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

Despite many progressive steps, much more obviously still needs to 

be done to provide an adequate U.S. defense against CBRN weapons at 

home and abroad. Funds are still limited within the U.S. defense budget 

for passive defenses against CBRN attacks, roughly $1 billion per year as 

opposed to roughly $10 billion spent in FY 2004 for ballistic missile 

defenses. Clearly, the U.S. military needs to prioritize better in how it 

allocates defense funding to U.S. counterproliferation programs. 

Some suggest that the relatively slow pace of solving major CBRN 

threat problems could be partially cured by putting a “czar” over all 

counterproliferation programs, with an integrated budget and authority, 

enabling him or her to establish better priorities between the different 

program elements or pillars. This would create greater coherence among 

the various units needed to execute, for example, the Scud Hunt problem. 

A single counterproliferation czar would also provide leadership needed to 

address neglected programs such as cruise missile defense and could be 

held responsible for successes or failures for a program that, today, either 

finds no one in charge or too many trying to lead at once with the result 

that there is not sufficient unity of effort. 

Despite key shortfalls in the U.S. counterproliferation effort there is 

still some consolation in the fact that the sum is greater than its various 

less-than impressive parts. For the most part, U.S. nonproliferation and 

counterproliferation policies have, up to now, been sufficient to prevent 

almost all chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks on its 

forces, allies, and population with the exception of the anthrax-mail 

attacks of October and November 2001 that killed five individuals, caused 

22 total casualties and caused major disruptions on Capitol Hill and 

elsewhere. 

Some consolation can be drawn from the fact that the very great 

majority of the over 190 countries in the world have neither used nor 

acquired CBRN weapons. It is only a handful of states that persist in 

pursuing such mass effects weapons, as well as several terrorist 

organizations like Al Qaeda. On the whole, U.S. and international efforts 

to erect arms control and nonproliferation treaty regimes such as the Nonproliferation Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, and Biological 

Weapons Convention, augmented by a series of export control regimes 

like the Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and two 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 57

nuclear suppliers control groups, have kept the weapons of mass 

destruction genie in the bottle with just a few important exceptions. 

Treaties and export control regimes have been augmented recently by 

more than 60 states that have joined together in the Proliferation Security 

Initiative (PSI) to intercept dangerous shipments of missiles, CBRN 

weapons, CBRN agents, dual-use technologies, equipment, and 

components to prevent their transfer to other hostile hands. These 

programs have also been augmented by strong “carrot and stick” 

diplomacy to facilitate rollbacks in CBRN programs in places like Libya, 

South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. 

Further, the U.S.-Former Soviet Union Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Program has achieved considerable success in destroying surplus nuclear, 

biological, chemical, and associated missile capabilities and in helping to 

secure fissile material in storage in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. 

Efforts have begun to give alternative employment to scientist weaponeers 

and to secure existing nuclear, biological, and chemical assets. 

This mix of nonproliferation policies, agreements, and programs is 

one solution to the weapons of mass destruction problem by helping to 

prevent the spread of these assets to adversaries. However, what treaties, 

export controls, diplomacy, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the 

Cooperative Threat Reduction programs cannot do to dissuade states and 

groups from CBRN programs and use, U.S. and allied military 

countermeasures must contain. 

Most rogue state leaders, even if they choose to pursue such CBRN 

capabilities, will likely be deterred from using such mass effects weapons 

by the U.S. and allied capability and threats to inflict a massive retaliatory 

attack on any aggressor state. Further, U.S., and allied preparations in 

counterforce targeting, active and passive defenses, and in consequence 

management all are likely to persuade any knowledgeable and rational 

enemy leader that our forces should be able to fight better in a CBRN 

environment than can their own personnel. This fact, if properly 

communicated and understood, should make a rational and informed 

enemy leader hesitate in launching the dogs of a CBRN war. 

In conclusion, there are many shortfalls and deficiencies in U.S. and 

allied counterproliferation readiness and warfighting capability. 

Nevertheless, even mediocre capabilities in each area of the 

counterproliferation program, when combined, can serve as an important 
58 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

safety net against unconventional and asymmetrical attacks. If the cords 

of such a safety net were made up of a single strand of thread, it is likely 

to break under pressure. But when many such strands are woven together, 

the net can provide strength and security. Such, too, is the U.S. and allied 

counterproliferation safety net. When all elements, “all 8 Ds” of 

counterproliferation work in tandem (disarmament, diplomacy, defusing, 

dissuasion, denial, deterrence, defense, and destruction) the whole effort is 

synergistic and can be greater than the sum of its parts. 

This is not to say that the U.S. Government and its key allies can 

afford to rest and neglect the strands that make up this safety net. It would 

take only one CBRN war to wreak havoc on us. The United States and its 

allies can ill afford to be the unready confronting the unthinkable. In this 

era when even poor countries, small groups, or a few individuals now 

could possess and use weapons of mass destruction, inflict mass 

casualties, and cause mass disruption, all efforts must be made to mobilize 

the best minds and capabilities to meet and defeat the challenge of 

adversaries with CBRN weapons. To do less is to court a disaster unlike 

in its dimensions and scope anything we have ever previously suffered. 

Time and the momentum of events are not on our side. A maximum 

counterproliferation effort is needed in this second decade of the 

integrated counterproliferation program and even that might not be enough 

to protect us from the coming WMD storm. 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 59

Notes 

1. William Branigin, “Senate Report Blasts Intelligence Agencies’ Flaws,” 

Washington Post, July 9, 2004, 1-2. 

2. Jerrold M. Post, Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World, (Ithaca, 

NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), xv-xvi. The CIA group was composed of an 

interdisciplinary team made up of area specialists, psychiatrists, social anthropologists, 

and other specialists. 

3. “At the Crossroads: Counterproliferation and National Security Strategy,” A 

Report of the Center for Counterproliferation Research, (Washington, D.C.: NDU, April 

2004), 34-35. 

4. Rex Kiziah, “Assessment of the Emerging Biocruise Threat,” 

Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series, No. 6, August 2000; Michael E. 

Dickey, “Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat,” Counterproliferation Papers, Future 

Warfare Series, No. 7, September 2000. Both were published by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 

5. Of course, the ultimate would be to design effective individual protection 

equipment that is so user-friendly that there is little or no degradation in combat 

effectiveness when military personnel wear it. In the past and at present, that is far from 

the case. See Barry R. Schneider, “Combat Effectiveness in MOPP4: Lessons from the 

U.S. Army CANE Exercises,” The War Next Time: Countering Rogue States and 

Terrorists Armed with Chemical and Biological Weapons (Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF 

Counterproliferation Center, November 2003), 173-182. 

6. Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program FY02-03 Overview

(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2003), 28. 

7. Major General (Dr.) Joseph Kelley, USAF Assistant Surgeon General for 

Healthcare Operations, Briefing on “Biodefense: The Air Force Medical System 

Approach,” Washington, D.C., 8 December 2003. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Ibid. 
60 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

12. See the “HHS Fact Sheet: Biodefense Preparedness,” The White House website,

28 April 2004. On-line, Internet, 11 July 2004, available from http://www.white 

house.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040428-4.html. 

13. Ibid. 

14. Ibid. 

15. Ibid. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Ibid. CDC’s Centers for Public Health Preparedness (CPHP) helps prepare 

frontline health workers at the local level. There are now 34 such centers in 46 states. 

18. Ibid. From 2001 to 2004. 

19. Ibid. 

20. Ibid. 

21. Ibid. 

22. Ibid. 

23. USAMRIID’s Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, Fourth 

Edition, February 2001, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 

Fort Detrick, Maryland. 

24. Ibid. See also, Barry R. Schneider, “U.S. Bio-defense Readiness: Thoughts 

after September 11th,” in Jim A. Davis and Barry R. Schneider, eds., The Gathering 

Biological Warfare Storm, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF Counterproliferation 

Center, 2002), 1-8. 

25. Ibid. 

26. These suggestions were made originally by Dr. Charles Gallaway, Director, 

Chemical-Biological Division, DTRA/TD at a 2004 conference. 

27. Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program FY02-03 Overview, 

Op. Cit., 8-27. See note 6. 

28. Jim A. Davis and Bruce W. Bennett, “Needed Now: The 85% Solution to the 

CBW Threat,” The War Next Time, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF Counterproliferation 

Center, 2003), 219-246. 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 61

29. These are suggestions of Dr. Charles Gallaway, Director of the ChemicalBiological Division, DTRA. 

30. Leonard A. Cole, The Anthrax Letters, A Medical Detective Story, (Washington 

D.C.: Joseph Henry Press, 2003), ix. 

31. See Barbara F. Bullock, “Surveillance and Detection: A Public Health 

Response to Bioterrorism,” in Jim A. Davis and Barry R. Schneider, eds., The Gathering 

Biological Warfare Storm (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 

April 2002), 41-66. 

32. See Tanja Korpi and Christopher Hemmer, “Avoiding Panic and Keeping the 

Ports Open in a Chemical and Biological Threat Environment: A Literature Review,” 

USAF Counterproliferation Center Study, September 15, 2003. 

33. Ibid. 

34. Barry R. Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation: Military Responses 

to NBC Proliferation Threats, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999). 

35. See Barry R. Schneider, “Twenty Questions to Ask When Dealing with a 

NASTI,” Future War and Counterproliferation, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 157-162 

for a discussion of the many questions top U.S. leaders ought to ask before preemptively 

attacking an opponent’s WMD assets. 

36. “At the Crossroads: Counterproliferation and National Security Strategy,” A 

Report of the Center for Counterproliferation Research, (Washington, D.C.: NDU, April 

2004), 38. 

37. Major General Roger W. Berg, “U.S. Air Force Goals: Survive, Operate, 

Sustain,” NBC Report [Journal of the U.S. Army Chemical and Nuclear Agency], March 

2005. 

38. “CPRC Areas for Capability Enhancement,” Counterproliferation Program 

Review Committee, Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and 

NBC Terrorism, Executive Summary Vol 1, May 2004, 3-4, on-line, Internet, 2 February 

2005, available from http://cms.isn.ch/public/docs/doc_10259_290_en.pdf. 

39. U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. 

Southern Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Special 

Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. 

40. “Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

Defense Program,” Annual Report to Congress, May 2004. On-line, Internet, 6 
62 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm 

December 2004, available from http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp under the reports section as an 

Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) file. 
Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm . . . 63

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

 The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1999 to provide 

education and research to the present and future leaders of the USAF, to assist them in 

their activities to counter the threats posed by adversaries equipped with weapons of mass 

destruction 

Barry R. Schneider, Director 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427 

Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell.af.mil 

Jo Ann Eddy, Associate Editor 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Email: JoAnn.Eddy@maxwell.af.mil 

(334) 953-7538 (DSN 493-7538) 
64 . . . Seeking a Port in the WMD Storm