United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Committee on Environment 

and Public Works, U.S. Senate 

ARMY CORPS OF 

ENGINEERS 

History of the Lake 

Pontchartrain and Vincinity 

Hurricane Protection 

Project 

Statement of Anu Mittal, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST 

Wednesday, November 9, 2005

 

GAO-06-244T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2005

ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

History of the Lake Ponchartrain and 

Highlights of GAO-06-244T, a testimony Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project 

before the Committee on Environment and 

Public Works, U.S. Senate 

 

The greatest natural threat posed 

to the New Orleans area is from 

hurricane-induced storm surges, 

waves, and rainfalls. A hurricane 

surge that can inundate coastal 

lowlands is the most destructive 

characteristic of hurricanes and 

accounts for most of the lives lost

from hurricanes. Hurricane surge 

heights along the Gulf and Atlantic

coasts can exceed 20 feet. The 

effects of hurricane Katrina flooded

a large part of New Orleans and

breeched the levees that are part of

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(Corps) Lake Pontchartrain, and 

Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane 

Protection Project. This project,

first authorized in 1965, was

designed to protect the lowlands in

the Lake Pontchartrain tidal basin

from flooding by hurricane-induced

sea surges and rainfall. 

GAO is providing information on 

(1) the purpose and history of the 

Lake Pontchartrain, and Vicinity, 

Louisiana Hurricane Protection 

Project and (2) funding of the

project. 

 

GAO is not making any 

recommendations in this 

testimony. 

Congress first authorized the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana 

Hurricane Protection Project in the Flood Control Act of 1965. The project 

was to construct a series of control structures, concrete floodwalls, and 

levees to provide hurricane protection to areas around Lake Pontchartrain. 

The project, when designed, was expected to take about 13 years to 

complete and cost about $85 million. Although federally authorized, it was a 

joint federal, state, and local effort. 

The original project designs were developed based on the equivalent of what 

is now called a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane that might strike the 

coastal Louisiana region once in 200-300 years. As GAO reported in 1976 and 

1982, since the beginning of the project, the Corps has encountered project 

delays and cost increases due to design changes caused by technical issues,

environmental concerns, legal challenges, and local opposition to portions of 

the project. As a result, in 1982, project costs had grown to $757 million and 

the expected completion date had slipped to 2008. In the mid-1980s, the 

Corps shifted to an alternative project design; however, this change did not 

affect the level of protection provided to New Orleans because the 

alternative design selected was expected to provide the same level of 

protection as the original design. When Hurricane Katrina struck, the 

project, including about 125 miles of levees, was estimated to be from 60-90 

percent complete in different areas with an estimated completion date for 

the whole project of 2015. The floodwalls along the drainage canals that 

were breached were complete when the hurricane hit. 

The pre-Katrina estimated cost of construction for the completed project 

was $738 million with the federal share being $528 million and the local 

share $210 million. Federal allocations for the project were $458 million as 

of the enactment of the fiscal year 2005 federal appropriation. This 

represents 87 percent of the federal government’s responsibility of $528 

million with about $70 million remaining to complete the project. Over the 

last 10 fiscal years (1996-2005), federal appropriations have totaled about 

$128.6 million and Corps reprogramming actions resulted in another $13 

million being made available to the project. During that time, appropriations 

have generally declined from about $15-20 million annually in the earlier 

years to about $5-7 million in the last three fiscal years. While this may not 

be unusual given the state of completion of the project, the Corps’ project 

fact sheet from May 2005 noted that the President’s budget request for fiscal

years 2005 and 2006, and the appropriated amount for fiscal year 2005 were 

insufficient to fund new construction contracts. The Corps had also stated 

that it could spend $20 million in fiscal year 2006 on the project if the funds 

were available. The Corps noted that several levees had settled and needed 

to be raised to provide the level of protection intended by the design. www.gao.gov/cgibin/getrpt?GAO-06-244T

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Anu Mittal at 

(202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers (Corps) Lake Pontchartrain, and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane 

Protection Project. This project, first authorized in 1965, was designed to 

protect the lowlands in the Lake Pontchartrain tidal basin within the 

greater New Orleans metropolitan area from flooding by hurricaneinduced sea surges and rainfall. As you know, the effects of Hurricane 

Katrina breeched the levees that are part of this project and flooded a 

large part of New Orleans. In my testimony, I will discuss (1) the purpose 

and history of the project and (2) funding of the project. This statement is 

based on GAO’s past reports on the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, 

Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project and on the Corps’ flood control 

efforts in general, which we updated as necessary.

1

In summary, the Lake Pontchartrain hurricane project was designed to 

protect areas around the lake from flooding caused by a storm surge or 

rainfall associated with a standard project hurricane, which is roughly the 

same as what is now classified as a fast moving Category 3 hurricane. The 

project, when designed in the mid-1960s, was expected to take about 13 

years to complete and cost about $85 million. Over the years, the project 

has undergone some significant design changes as a result of a successful

court challenge, local opposition to certain aspects of the proposed 

design, and changed Corps thinking about the most cost-effective 

approach. None of these changes, however, affected the level of protection 

provided to New Orleans because the alternative design selected was 

expected to provide the same level of protection. As of early 2005, the 

project was not expected to be completed until 2015—nearly 50 years after 

it was first authorized—and cost about $738 million, much of the cost 

increase is due to inflation over the years and changes to the scope and

design of the project. In recent years, questions have been raised about the 

ability of the project to protect the New Orleans area from hurricanes 

greater than Category 3. This issue was only beginning to be studied by the 

Corps when Hurricane Katrina hit the area in August 2005. 

 1

GAO, Cost, Schedule, And Performance Problems Of The Lake Pontchartrain And

Vicinity, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project, GAO/PSAD-76-161 (Washington, D.C.: 

Aug. 31, 1976); GAO, Improved Planning Needed By The Corps Of Engineers To Resolve 

Environmental, Technical, And Financial Issues On The Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane

Protection Project, GAO/MASAD-82-39 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 1982); and GAO, Army

Corps of Engineers: Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, 

GAO-05-1050T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2005). 

Page 1 GAO-06-244T 
Since its founding in 1718, the city of New Orleans and its surrounding 

areas have been subject to numerous floods from the Mississippi River and 

hurricanes. The greater New Orleans metropolitan area, composed of 

Orleans, Jefferson, St. Charles, St. Bernard, and St. Tammany parishes, sits 

in the tidal lowlands of Lake Pontchartrain and is bordered generally on its 

southern side by the Mississippi River. Lake Pontchartrain is a tidal basin 

about 640 square miles in area that connects with the Gulf of Mexico 

through Lake Borgne and the Mississippi Sound.

While the area has historically experienced many river floods, a series of 

levees and other flood control structures built over the years were 

expected to greatly reduce that threat. The greatest natural threat posed to

the New Orleans area continues to be from hurricane-induced storm 

surges, waves, and rainfalls. Several hurricanes have struck the area over

the years including Hurricane Betsy in 1965, Hurricane Camille in 1969, 

and Hurricane Lili in 2002. The hurricane surge that can inundate coastal 

lowlands is the most destructive characteristic of hurricanes and accounts 

for most of the lives lost from hurricanes. Hurricane surge heights along 

the Gulf and Atlantic coasts can range up to 20 feet or more and there is 

growing concern that continuing losses of coastal wetlands and settlement 

of land in New Orleans has made the area more vulnerable to such storms. 

Because of such threats, a series of control structures, concrete 

floodwalls, and levees, was proposed for the area along Lake 

Pontchartrain in the 1960s. 

Congress first authorized construction of the Lake Pontchartrain and 

Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project in the Flood Control Act 

of 19652

 to provide hurricane protection to areas around the lake in the 

parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, and St. Charles. Although 

federally authorized, it was a joint federal, state, and local effort with the 

federal government paying 70 percent of the costs and the state and local 

interests paying 30 percent. The Corps was responsible for project design 

and construction and local interests were responsible for maintenance of 

levees and flood controls. The original project design, known as the 

barrier plan, included a series of levees along the lakefront, concrete 

floodwalls along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, and control 

structures, including barriers and flood control gates located at the 

Rigolets and Chef Menteur Pass areas. These structures were intended to 

Background 

Purpose and History 

of the Lake 

Pontchartrain and 

Vicinity Flood Control 

Project 

 2

Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077. 

Page 2 GAO-06-244T 
prevent storm surges from entering Lake Pontchartrain and overflowing 

the levees along the lakefront. The original lakefront levees were planned 

to be from 9.3 feet to 13.5 feet high depending on the topography of the 

area directly in front of the levees. 

This project plan was selected over another alternative, known as the 

high-level plan, which excluded the barriers and flood control gates at the 

Rigolets and Chef Menteur Pass complexes and instead employed higher 

levees ranging from 16 feet to 18.5 feet high along the lakefront to prevent 

storm surges from inundating the protected areas. In the 1960s, the barrier 

plan was favored because it was believed to be less expensive and quicker

to construct. As explained later in my statement, this decision was 

reversed in the mid-1980s. The cost estimate for the original project was 

$85 million (in 1961 dollars) and the estimated completion date was 1978. 

Page 3 GAO-06-244T 
Figure 1: Flood Protection Control Levees In and Around New Orleans, LA. 

Barriers of Earth and Concrete

Levees and floodwalls that protect against flooding from both the Mississippi River 

and hurricanes are built by the Army Corps of Engineers and are maintained by 

local levee districts. The corps and the local districts share the construction cost of 

hurricane levees, while the Mississippi River levees are a federal project. Local levee 

districts also build and maintain nonfederal, lower-elevation levees with construction 

money from each district's shareof property taxes and state financing.

HEIGHT ISN’T

EVERYTHING

Different factors

permit Lake

Pontchartrain

levees of varying

elevations to

withstand an 11.5

foot storm surge

plus several feet of

waves:

Lake

Pontchartrain

Breakwaters

Levees without any breakers

need to be about 17 feet

tall or taller

Levees on higher ground and separated from the water

by 5 miles of marshland need be only 12.5 feet tall

Marsh

Levees fronted by boulders and concrete

rubble breakers can be about 14 feet high

Seawalls on

the water

must be 22

feet high

Note: The height and shape of a levee is based on the

 roughness of the area over which waves pass

 to reach the structure, and the

 slope of the structure.

Levees and Floodwalls

Mississippi River

Interior parish

Hurricane protection

Source: Staff graphic by Emmett Mayer III/emayer@timespicayune.com.

The original project designs were developed to combat a hurricane that 

might strike the coastal Louisiana region once in 200-300 years. The basis 

for this was the standard project hurricane developed by the Corps with 

the assistance of the United States Weather Bureau (now the National 

Weather Service). The model was intended to represent the most severe 

meteorological conditions considered reasonably characteristic for that 

region. The model projected a storm roughly equivalent to a fast-moving 

Page 4 GAO-06-244T 
Category 3 hurricane. A Category 3 hurricane has winds of 111-130 miles 

per hour and can be expected to cause some structural damage from 

winds and flooding near the coast from the storm surge and inland from 

rains. 

Even before construction began on the project, it became evident that 

some changes to the project plan were needed. Based on updated Weather 

Bureau data on the severity of hurricanes, the Corps determined that the

levees along the three main drainage canals, that drain water from New 

Orleans into Lake Pontchartrain, would need to be raised to protect 

against storm surges from the lake. The need for this additional work 

became apparent when Hurricane Betsy flooded portions of the city in

September 1965. 

During the first 17 years of construction on the barrier plan, the Corps 

continued to face project delays and cost increases due to design changes

caused by technical issues, environmental concerns, legal challenges, and 

local opposition to various aspects of the project. For example, foundation

problems were encountered during construction of levees and floodwalls 

which increased construction time; delays were also encountered in 

obtaining rights-of-ways from local interests who did not agree with all 

portions of the plan. By 1981, cost estimates had grown to $757 million for 

the barrier plan, not including the cost of any needed work along the 

drainage canals, and project completion had slipped to 2008. At that time, 

about $171 million had been made available to the project and the project 

was considered about 50 percent complete, mostly for the lakefront levees 

which were at least partially constructed in all areas and capable of 

providing some flood protection although from a smaller hurricane than 

that envisioned in the plan. 

More importantly during the 1970s, some features of the barrier plan were 

facing significant opposition from environmentalists and local groups who 

were concerned about environmental damages to the lake as well as 

inadequate protection from some aspects of the project. The threat of 

litigation by environmentalists delayed the project and local opposition to 

building the control complexes at Rigolets and Chef Menteur had the 

potential to seriously reduce the overall protection provided by the 

project. This opposition culminated in a December 1977 court decision3

that enjoined the Corps from constructing the barrier complexes, and 

 3

Save Our Wetlands v. Rush, Civ. A. No. 75-3710 (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 1977). 

Page 5 GAO-06-244T 
certain other parts of the project until a revised environmental impact 

statement was prepared and accepted. After the court order, the Corps 

decided to change course and completed a project reevaluation report and 

prepared a draft revised Environmental Impact Statement in the mid-1980s 

that recommended abandoning the barrier plan and shifting to the highlevel plan originally considered in the early 1960s. Local sponsors 

executed new agreements to assure their share of the non-federal 

contribution to the revised project. The level of protection provided to 

New Orleans was not expected to change because the high-level design

was expected to provide the same level of protection as the original 

barrier design. 

As of 2005, the project as constructed or being constructed included about 

125 miles of levees and the following major features: 

• New levee north of Highway U.S. 61 from the Bonnet Carré Spillway East 

Guide Levee to the Jefferson-St. Charles Parish boundary 

• Floodwall along the Jefferson-St. Charles Parish boundary 

• Enlarged levee along the Jefferson Parish lakefront 

• Enlarged levee along the Orleans Parish lakefront 

• Levees, floodwalls, and flood proofed bridges along the 17th Street, 

Orleans Avenue and London Avenue drainage canals 

• Levees from the New Orleans lakefront to the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway

• Enlarged levees along the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Mississippi 

River-Gulf Outlet 

• New levee around the Chalmette area. 

The project also includes a mitigation dike on the west shore of Lake 

Pontchartrain. 

The pre-Katrina estimated cost of construction for the completed project

was $738 million with the federal share being $528 million and the local 

share $210 million. The estimated completion date as of May 2005 for the 

whole project was 2015. Prior to Katrina, the project was estimated to be 

from 60-90 percent complete in different areas. The work in Orleans Parish 

was estimated to be 90 percent complete with some work remaining for 

Page 6 GAO-06-244T 
bridge replacement along the Orleans Avenue and London Avenue 

drainage canals. The floodwalls along the canals, where the recent 

breaches occurred, were complete. Jefferson Parish work was estimated 

to be 70 percent complete with work continuing on flood proofing the 

Hammond Highway bridge over 17th Street and two lakefront levee 

enlargements. Estimated completion for that work was 2010. In the 

Chalmette area work was estimated to be 90 percent complete with some 

levee enlargement work and floodwall work remaining. In St. Charles 

Parish work was 60 percent complete with some gaps still remaining in the 

levees. Closure of these gaps had been scheduled to be completed by

September 2005. 

Post Katrina, four investigation teams sponsored by the American Society 

of Civil Engineers, the Corps, the state of Louisiana, and the National 

Science Foundation, began gathering forensic data to determine what 

caused the levee breaches in New Orleans. Preliminary reports from these 

teams indicate that they found a number of different mechanisms that 

caused failures in the levee system, including scour erosion caused by 

overtopping, seepage, soil failure, and internal erosion (also known as 

piping). On November 4, 2005, the Corps told us that it was too soon to 

determine whether the change in project design had any impact on the 

levee breaches that occurred in New Orleans, and the agency is still in the 

process of assessing whether the change in the project design had any 

impact on the breaches. However, the investigations necessary to address 

this question are not planned to be conducted by the Corps as part of its 

ongoing examination of the performance of the existing project. Instead 

these investigations would be included in future analyses of any 

modifications to the existing hurricane protection system. 

Federal allocations for the project totaled $458 million as of the enactment 

of the fiscal year 2005 federal appropriation. This represents 87 percent of

the Federal government’s responsibility of $528 million with about $70 

million remaining to complete the project in 2015. Over the last 10 fiscal 

years (1996-2005), federal appropriations have totaled about $128.6 million 

and Corps reprogramming actions resulted in another $13 million being 

made available to the project. During that time, appropriations have 

generally declined from about $15-20 million annually in the earlier years 

to about $5-7 million in the last three fiscal years. While this may not be 

unusual given the state of completion of the project, the Corps’ project 

fact sheet from May 2005 noted that the President’s Budget request for 

fiscal years 2005 and 2006 and the appropriated amount for fiscal year 

2005 were insufficient to fund new construction contracts. Among the 

Recent Funding 

History for the Project 

Page 7 GAO-06-244T 
construction efforts that could not be funded according to the Corps were 

the following: 

• Levee enlargements in all four parishes 

• Pumping station flood protection in Orleans Parish 

• Floodgates and a floodwall in St. Charles Parish 

• Bridge replacement in Orleans Parish. 

The Corps had also stated that it could spend $20 million in fiscal year 

2006 on the project if the funds were available. The Corps noted that 

several levees had settled and needed to be raised to provide the designlevel of protection. For the last few years, the project generally received 

the amount of funds appropriated to it and was not adversely affected by 

any Corps reprogramming actions. 

In recent years, questions have been raised about the ability of the project

to withstand larger hurricanes than it was designed for such as a Category

4 or 5, or even a slow-moving Category 3 hurricane that lingered over the 

area and produced higher levels of rainfall. Along this line, the Corps 

completed in 2002 a reconnaissance or pre-feasibility study on whether to 

strengthen hurricane protection along the Louisiana coast. A full feasibility 

study was estimated to take at least five years to complete and cost about 

$8 million. In March 2005, the Corps reported that it was allocating $79,000 

to complete a management plan for the feasibility study and a cost-share 

agreement with local sponsors. The President’s fiscal year 2006 budget 

request did not include any funds for the feasibility project. 

In closing, the Lake Pontchartrain hurricane project has been under 

construction for nearly 40 years, much longer than originally envisioned 

and at much greater cost, although much of that can be attributed to 

inflation over these years, and the project is still not complete. Whether 

the state of completion of the project or the change in design played a role

in the flooding of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in August

2005 is still to be determined as are issues related to whether a project 

designed to protect against Category 4 or 5 hurricanes would or could 

have prevented this catastrophe. 

Page 8 GAO-06-244T 
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared testimony. We would be happy 

to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee 

may have. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Anu Mittal at 

(202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Individuals making contributions to 

this testimony included Ed Zadjura, Ken Lightner, Omari Norman. 

Page 9 GAO-06-244T 

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