### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 213 -CV

Sus an Com bs, Com ptroller of P ubl ic Acc ounts of the State of T exas, and Gre g Abbott, Attor ney Ge neral of the State of Texas , Appellan ts
v. Texas Entertainm ent Association, Inc. and Karpod, Inc. , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-07- 0041 79 , HO NORAB LE SCO TT H. JENK INS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

C O N C U R

R I N G O P I N I O N Al tho ug h I

a g re e that stri c t sc rutiny

is the a pp ro pr iate sta

nd ard to a pp ly in t his c a se and conc ur in the dec ision to affirm the trial court’s j udg ment, I write sepa rate ly to addre ss the issue raised by the parties conce rning the use and rele vance of post-enac tment e vidence i n d et er m i ning the statute’s pre dominant purpose.

Our F irst Amendment ana ly sis procee ds in three pa rts. See City of Los Angeles

v. Alameda Books, Inc

. , 5 3 5 U. S
. 4 2 5 , 4 3 4 (2 0 0 2 ) ( p l u ra l i t y o p . ) ( ci t i n g City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. , 475 U.S. 41, 46, 47-49, 51-54 (1986) ). The f irst question, whether the challeng ed law im p o s e s a c o mp le te b an

o r is in s te a d

a “ ti me , p la c e , an d

ma n n e r ” r e g u lati on, see id. , is no t in
c on te nti on

he re , a s th e pa

rt ie s a g re e that th e fe e or

ta x at i ssu e is the latte r. Th e se c on d q ue sti on in the analy sis is whether the re striction is content-neutra l or content-ba sed, see id. ; th e ans we r t o th is question determines w hat level of scrutiny should be applied, s ee City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. ,2

52 9 U .S. 27 7, 27 8 (20 00 ) (p lur a lity op .) . A c on te nt- ba se d r e g ulatio n is c on sid e re d p re sumpt ive ly invalid and is s u b

j ec t t o s t ri ct scrutiny
. Simon & Schuster, Inc . v. Me mbers of N. Y . State Crime V ic tims Bd. , 5 02 U. S. 1 05 , 1 15 , 1 18 (1 99 1) ; Arkansas W riters’ Project, Inc . v. Ragland , 48 1 U .S. 22 1, 230- 31 (1 98 7) . G ov e rnme nt r e g ulatio n o f s pe e c h o r o the r e xpre ssi ve a c tiv ity is content-ne utral and subjec t only to intermediate sc rutiny if it is adopted not “bec ause of disag ree ment with the m essag e it convey s,” but for reasons unrelated to the content of t he spee ch. Hill v. Colorado , 5 3 0 U. S
. 7 0 3 , 7 2 0 (2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g W ar d v . R oc k Ag ain st R ac ism , 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) . Even in c ases when a regulation ha s an incidental eff ect on some spe aker s or messag es but
no t ot he rs , h ow e ve r, it wil l be de e me d c on te nt- ne utr a l and re vie we d und e r i nte rm e diate sc rutiny if its predominant purpose wa s aimed at pe rce ived har mful seconda

ry eff ects of the speec h, rathe r than at its content. A la m e d

a Books , 5 3 5 U. S
. at 434; City of Renton , 475 U.S. at 48-49. Afte r de te rm ini ngthe le ve l of

sc rutiny , th e thi rd

pa rt of the ana ly sis inv olv e s a

pp lyin g the a

pp ro pr iate constitutional standard to dec ide whethe r the re g ulation is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling g overnme ntal interest (stric t scrutiny ), see Arkansas W

riters’ Project , 4 81 U. S. at 23 1, or na rr ow ly draw n to further

a substantial g overnme ntal i n t er es t unrelated to the suppression of f ree speec h (i ntermediate scrutiny

), see Turner Broad. Sy

s. v. Fede ral Commc’ns Comm’n , 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). I a g r e e w i t h J u s t i c e H e n s o nt h a t , i nt h e p r e s e n tc a s e , t h e l e v e l

- o f

- s c r u t i n y i n qu i r

y ( i .e. ,

“ qu e sti on tw o” ) c an p ro pe rl y

be de c ide d by c on sid e ri ng the pla in te xt of the statut e a t is su e and its statutory context. See, e .g. , Illusions - Dallas Private Club, Inc. v . Steen , 482 F.3d 299, 310 ( 5th Cir. 2007) (holding that statute ’s p re dominant purpose could be deter mined by consideringtext and3

statutory context). I n addition to those factor s, Ibelieve it is also appr opriate at this s tag e of the inquiry to look bey ond whether the statute is content-ba sed or c ontent-neutra l on i t s face a nd consider e vidence reg ardingwhether the statute’s pre dominant purpose wa s to regulate spee ch or to addre ss seconda

ry ef fects. See City of Renton , 475 U.S. at 48-49. To the e x tent that J ustice Henson’s opinion sug g ests that seconda ry -ef fec ts analy sis is or shoul d be conf ined strictly

to case s involving zoning r egulations, Ido not adopt that view. Give n t h at, i n deter mining the c ontent neutra lity of any

statute under the First Amendme nt, “[t] he g overnme nt’s purpose is the c ontrolling consideration,” W

ar d , 491 U.S. at 791, it would be unwise to ignor e evide nce r eg ardingwhether the g overnme nt’s actua l purpose wa s to combat neg ative sec ondary eff ec ts
. A ccor dingly , Isee no r eason to a naly ze a nd decide case s in which protec ted speec h is regulated throug h imposit ion of a tax any dif fe re ntl y fr om c a se s in

wh ic h it is r e g ulate d b y

a zon ingre str ic tio n o r o the r m e ans . As the Eleve nth Circuit has observe d, while t he S upreme Court has stated that zoning
or din a nc e s an d p ub li c-nu di ty

ord in ances sh ou ldbe re vi ewedun der d is ti nct st a nd a rd s, “ the Cou

rt a lso has so m et imes collapsed the two c ateg ories into a sing le, over arc hing c ateg ory of re g ulatory action tar g eting the neg ative ‘se condar y eff ects’ o f n o n -obscene adult ente rtainment and dr awn conclusions about this single c ateg ory .” Pe e k -a -B oo Lou nge of B ra de nto wn, In c . v . M an ate e City , 33 7 F .3 d 1 25 1, 12 55 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 3) . “ Ad dit ion a lly , th e Court ha s o c c a sio na lly

bo rr ow e d s pe c if

ic doctrines de veloped in one c ateg ory of ca se to apply

to the other.” Id. at 1 2 5 5 -5 6 (c i t i n g Alameda Books , 535 U.S. at 434 (plurality op.) (r elying on Court’ s holding in Pap’s A.M. , a ca se involving public-nudity

ordinanc e, to explicate evidentiary showing nece ssary to sustain adult-enterta inment
zon ingor din anc e ); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. , 501 U.S. 560, 583-84 (1991) ( Souter, J .,See also City of Erie v. Pap’ s A.M. , 529 U.S. 277, 281-82 (2000) (plurality op.) (applying 1 Renton ’s se c ondary -e ff

e c ts d oc tr ine to j us tif

y no n- zon ingre str ic tio ns ); W ar d v . R oc k

Ag ain st Ra c ism , 4 9 1 U. S
. 7 8 1 , 7 9 1 (1 9 8 9 ) ( ci t i n g Renton for pr oposition t hat “ [ a] regulation that serves purposes unre lated to the conte nt of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidenta l effe ct on so me sp e a ke rs or me ssa g e s b ut n ot o the rs ” in n on -zo nin g c on te xt). Th e fe de ra l c ourt s o f a pp e a ls have f ollowed suit. See, e .g. , Fantasy Ranch I nc. v. City of Arlington , 459 F.3d 546, 556 ( 5th Cir. 20 06 ) (h old ing that c ity or din anc e re qu ir ing se xua lly or ie nte d bu sin e sse s to e nf orce proximity provisions betwee n nude danc ers a nd patrons wa s content-ne utral bec ause “ the ordinanc e’s predominate conce rn is for se condar y eff ects” ); Dream Palac e v. County of Maric opa , 384 F.3d 990, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004) (equating second question of Renton te st t o d e te rm inatio n o f whe the r s tatut e wa s d e sig ne d to c omb a t se c on da ry e ff e c ts o f a du lt e ntert ain men t indu str y ); G.M. Enters., I

nc. v. T own of St. Joseph , 35 0 F .3 d 63 1, 63 7 (7 th Cir
. 20 03 ) (f oc us ing le ve l- of

-s c rutiny inq

uir y so le ly on wh e the r or din anc e s targ e te d se c on da ry e ff e c ts of se xua lly or ie nte d b us ine sse s and

op tin g no t to decide whether

ordinanc es we re c ontent-base d or conte nt-neutra l). 4 concur ring ) (r elying on e videntiary standard de scri b ed in Renton , a zon ingc a se , to e xplic a te evidentiar y showing nece ssary

to sustain public-nudity

ordinanc e))
. There fore , Iwould hold that

1 the Renton test may be applied here and that question t wo of that test may be dec ided by

considering evidenc e re levant to the issue of w hether the leg islature’s pr ed o m i n an t p u rpose in ena cting the statut e wa s to a dd

re ss s e c on da

ry e ff e c ts. I n the pre sent ca se, the trial c ourt made se vera l written fac t findings r elating to the absenc e of e vidence that the statute’s pre dominant purpose wa s to combat s econda ry eff ects of
c omb ini ngnu de da

nc ingand a lc oh ol:
Th e a uth or of HB 17 51 , St a te Re pr e se ntativ e El le n Coh e n, te sti fi e d b e fo re the Ho us e Way s & Means C ommitt ee that she claimed no link between se x ual assault and the businesses re sponsible for the f ees to be paid. The House R es ea rch O rg anization’s Bill Analy sis claimed no link betwee n sexual assault and the busine ss responsible for the fe es to be pa id.5

There is no evidence that the L eg islature ac tually considere d or s aw an y

studies claiming a link betwee n sexual assault and the sexually oriented businesse s that are r e s p o n s ib le f

o r th e SO B T a x. Victoria Camp’ s testimony indicated that mate rials s upporting the exist ence of such links were ma de ava ilable to cer tain leg islators, but no evidence s h owed that a ny le g isl a tor ha d a c tua lly

c on sid e re d o r e ve n s e e n th os e mate ri a ls. There is no evidence that studies about sexually oriented business es wer e cr eate d, consulted, or r eviewe d by the L eg islature prior to e nactingHB 1751.
The State doe s not challeng e those finding s in this appea l. The trial court a lso made the following
c on c lus ion

of law:
I f re li an ce by

the L eg islature on some pre -ena ctment evidenc e of links betwe en se c on da ry e ff e c ts and pro te c te d s pe e c h is a c on sti tut ion a l r e qu ir e me nt ( a s is sug g ested, n o t expressly

held, by Supreme Court ca se law) , the SOB Tax must be he ld un consti tut ion a l be c a us e no e vid e nc e ind ic a tin g that th e L e g isl a tur e a c tua lly c on sid e re d a

ny e vid e nc e of

su c h li nk s w a s p re se nte d at tr ia l.
The State a

rg ues that, in making the fore g oing f indings a nd conclusion, the trial court
cre ated a “fa lse distinction” betwee n pre- and post -e n ac t m ent evidenc e, which le d it to determine that the State’s “e vidence of a link betwe en the c ombinat i o n o f alcohol and nude da ncing and sexual assault” was insuff icient. Relying on Justice Souter’s conc urringopinion in Barnes and two Fifth Circuit dec isions, see Fantasy Ranch , 4 59 F .3 d at 56 0; N.W

. Enters. Inc. v . City of Houston , 352 F.3d 162, 175 (5th Cir. 2003) , the State argues that the Supreme Court ha s never require d the g overnme nt to produce “ pre- enac tment evidence ” of le g islative purpose in orde r to meet its burden of showing that a statute is content- neutra l. The State’s re liance on the se ca ses is inapposite.S e e F a n ta s yRanch , 459 F .3 d at 56 0- 61 (d isc us sin g po st- e na c tme nt e vid e nc e in 2 de te rm ini ngwh e the r o rd ina nc e fu rt he re d im po rt a nt o r s u b s t a nt i a l g o v e r

nm e nt in te re st) ; N.W

. E nte rs. I n c . v . Ci ty

o f H o u s ton , 3 5 2 F.3d 162, 175 ( 5th Cir. 2003) (holding sa me and noting that question-two stag e is not appropr iate point to require leg islature “to show ev i d en ce of neg ative se c on da ry e ff e c ts an d of the ne w re g ulatio ns ’ ef fi c a c y ” be c a

us e “ [d]isp ute s o ve r t

he e ff e c tiv e ne ss of the propose d regulations are pr operly rese rved f

or the fina l prong of the Renton analy sis”). 6 Whil e Just ice Souter did ur g e that “the appropr iate focus is not an empiric al enquiry into the actual intent of the enac ting leg islatur e, b u t ra t h er the exis tence or not of a c urre nt g overnme ntal interest in the ser vice o f whi ch the c halleng ed application of the statute may be constitutional,” see id. at 582, his c omments w ere made in the c ontext of a discussion of que stion three of the Renton analy sis—whether the g overnme nt satisfied the intermediate-scr utiny standard by pr od uc ing su ff ic ie nt ev ide nc e of a lin k b e tw e e n th e c ha lle ng e d r e g ulatio n a nd the a sse rt e d in te re st in combating seconda

ry eff ects. L ikewise, the state ments in the cited F ifth Circuit cases r eg arding the us e of po st- e na c tme nt e vid e nc e we re ma de in t he c on te xt of qu e sti on -t

hr e e dis c us sio ns . But 2 inq uir ingint o w he the r a

statut e ’s purpose was to addre ss seconda ry eff ects is wholly

distinct from inquiring into whe ther the statute c an be justif ied on the basis that it a ctually further s an important or substantial g overnme ntal interest in combatingneg ative sec ondary eff ects; the former

deter mines the level of

scrutiny to be applied, w h ile the latter de termines whe ther the statute pa sses constitutional must er unde r the a pplicable standard. Although I ag ree that post-enac tment evidence may be conside red in a

nsweringquestion three, a nd is often essential to that inquiry , it is far fr om clea r that post-ena ctment evidence—e ven evidence directly rele vant t o purpose—may proper ly be considere d in answer ing que stion two. See, e .g. , Illusions , 4 82 F .3 d at 31 0 n .7 (d e c lin ingto a dd re ss qu e s t i o no f

w h e t h e r d i s t r i c tc o u rt e r

r e d i n r e l yi n g o ns t a t e ’ s p o s t
- e n a c t m e n ta s s e rt i o no f s e c o n d ar y-7

e ff e c ts p ur po se a s ba sis fo r a

pp lyingint e rm e diate sc rutiny , h a vin g de c ide d th a t st a tut e wa s c on te ntneutra l based on its plain text and statutory context); W

hite River Amuseme nt P ub, Inc. v . Town of Ha rtf or d , 4 81 F .3 d 163 , 171 -7 2 (2d Cir . 2 00 7) (c on c lud ingthat Renton pe rm its c on sid e ra tio n o nly of pr e -e na c tme nt e vid e nc e a t qu e sti on -t wo sta g e ); Dream Palace , 384 F.3d at 1013-14 (same ); Pee k-A-Boo Lounge , 3 37 F .3 d at 12 68 & n. 16 (s a me ); SOB, Inc . v. County of Benton , 317 F.3d 856, 86 2 (8 th C ir . 2 00 3) (s a me ); D.H.L. Assocs., Inc . v. O’ Gorman , 199 F.3d 50, 57- 58 (1st Cir. 1999) (s a me ); Z.J

. G ift s D -2 , L. L.C. v . Ci ty

of A ur ora , 136 F.3d 683, 690 ( 10th Cir. 1998) (same)
. I rre spective of wh et h er courts may proper ly consider post-e nactment e vidence of purp os e in a

ns we ri ngqu e sti on

tw o, ho we ve r, a ll o f t

he State ’s po st- e na c tme nt e vid e nc e in t his c a se
wa s relev ant to the i ssu e of wh e the r t

he statut e c an b e jus tif

ie d ( qu e sti on

thr e e ), no t it s p ur

po se (q ue sti on tw o)
. As the tr ia l c ourt e xpla ine d in its de ta ile d fi nd ing s of fa c t, the re c or d in this ca se does not contain e vidence —either pr e- or post-enac tment—that the leg islature’s predominant pu rp o s e i n enac ting the statute was to combat perc eived ne g ative sec ondary eff ects of c ombining alcohol and nude dancing
. Thus, the State’s argument that the trial court cre ated a false distinction betwee n pre- and post-ena ctment evidenc e is u n a v a il in g , b e c a

u s e n o e v id e n ce w as produc ed showing that th e le g isl a tur e ’s purp os e wa s a ime d at se c on da ry e ff e c ts. I n sum, Iag ree with J ustice He nson that the text and conte x t of the statute show that it is a content-base d restric tion. Theref ore, in the a

bsence of any

evidenc e that the leg islature’s pr e do min ant p ur

po se wa s to a dd

re ss s e c on da

ry e ff e c ts, the statut e may

no t be de e med c on te ntneutra l a nd must be review ed under strict scrutiny , see City of Renton , 475 U.S. at 48-49, which the State ha s c on c e de d it

c ann ot m e e t.8 Ijoin the “Sovere ign I mmunity ” and “Attorne y s’ Fe es” se ctions of J ustice He nson’s opinion.

____________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ________ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Filed: June 5, 2009