RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1742-18T2

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.H.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

V.J.,

Defendant.

_____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF K.V.J., 

a Minor.

_____________________________

Submitted October 10, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Nugent and DeAlmeida.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 8, 2019
2

A-1742-18T2

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket 

No. FG-07-0068-18.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for

appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, 

of counsel; Sigrid Sletteland Franzblau, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Amy L. Bernstein, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief). 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor (Todd S. Wilson, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant A.H. appeals from the December 3, 2018 order of the Chancery 

Division terminating her parental rights to her daughter K.V.J.1 We affirm.

I.

A.H. gave birth to K.V.J. in 2016. Defendant V.J. is the child's father. He 

surrendered his parental rights and has not participated in this appeal.

A little more than four months after K.V.J.'s birth, the Division of Child 

Protection and Permanency (DCPP or Division) received a referral A.H. had 

dropped the child off at her cousin's house a month earlier. The cousin reported 

 

1

 We use initials to protect the anonymity of the child. R. 1:38-3(d).
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she had no contact information for A.H., apart from her Facebook page, and did 

not know where she was. A.H. had not left proof of the child's medical insurance 

or written authorization to make medical decisions for the child. In addition, 

apart from twenty-four dollars A.H. left on a windowsill, the cousin received no 

financial support from A.H. to care for the child. The cousin reported A.H. had 

been using drugs, was hearing voices, and told her she did not want K.V.J.

A few days later, Division representatives found A.H. waiting on the 

porch of her cousin's home. A.H. was intent on taking K.V.J. to Pennsylvania. 

The cousin had called police and refused to permit A.H. into her home because 

of her history of violent behavior. A.H. was uncooperative but admitted she left 

K.V.J. with her cousin with no provisions for her care. A.H. acknowledged she 

was unstable, had been "running the streets," and was not taking medication

prescribed for her psychiatric illnesses. A.H. appeared to be under the influence 

of controlled substances, as she nodded off several times while speaking with 

the DCPP staff members. By the time police arrived, A.H. was unresponsive. 

DCPP effectuated a "Dodd removal" of K.V.J.

2

 The notice of removal was left 

on A.H.'s lap because she was not conscious.

 

2

 A "Dodd removal" refers to the emergency removal of a child from the home 

without a court order pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82, known as the Dodd 

Act. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 26 n.11 (2011).
4

A-1742-18T2

DCPP filed a complaint in the Chancery Division seeking custody, care, 

and control of K.V.J. The court granted temporary custody to DCPP. The 

Division's plan was to provide services to A.H. to facilitate reunification.

DCPP placed K.V.J. with A.H.'s cousin and offered A.H. supervised 

visitation at DCPP's office. The Division also scheduled A.H. for services, 

which she did not attend. She yelled profanities at a DCPP caseworker who 

attempted to reschedule the services.

A.H. did not visit K.V.J. for almost a month after the child's removal from 

her custody. During part of that time, A.H. was hospitalized after being found 

wandering the streets in a state of paranoia. Shortly after her first visit with 

K.V.J., A.H. was arrested on three outstanding warrants. While in jail, A.H. 

admitted to hearing voices. DCPP arranged for A.H. to attend an intensive 

outpatient drug treatment program and anger management classes. A.H. failed 

to participate in those services.

During the following months, A.H. was hospitalized several times for 

psychiatric issues. During one hospitalization, A.H. was placed in restraints due 

to her aggressive behavior. She admitted to having taken herself off medications

prescribed for bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. She was arrested and 

convicted of assaulting a police officer, involuntarily committed several times, 
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admitted to hearing the voices of God and her children calling out to her, and 

reported having visions of her children when they were not with her.

After being found wandering outside a police station, A.H. admitted being 

depressed and suicidal. She acknowledged using "molly," the commonly used 

name for MDMA, a synthetic drug that alters mood and perception, and Xanax, 

a drug used to treat anxiety and panic disorders. She said "molly" gave her 

special powers to read people's minds and made her feel closer to God. At a 

court hearing A.H. tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, 

benzodiazepines, and antidepressants. Although claiming some of these drugs 

had been prescribed for her, A.H. did not produce proof of any prescriptions, 

despite court orders to do so. DCPP referred A.H. for several psychological 

evaluations. She did not attend any of her scheduled appointments.

Although A.H. claimed to have been receiving services in Pennsylvania, 

where she then lived, she did not produce evidence of her claim. DCPP's 

attempts to get records of A.H.'s treatment in Pennsylvania were not successful.

DCPP referred A.H. to a certified drug and alcohol counselor on several 

occasions. She repeatedly failed to appear. When she did attend an evaluation,

she was "very hostile and very aggressive" and refused to give a urine sample.
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A.H.'s visits with K.V.J. were sporadic. DCPP was unable to contact A.H. 

for long periods of time. On occasion, months would pass between visits. When 

the child was fifteen-months old, A.H. visited after a five-month absence. 

K.V.J. was visibly upset during the visit and cried when A.H. would reach for 

her. A month later, A.H. visited K.V.J. She had to resort to candy to tempt the 

child to come to her because K.V.J. was unfamiliar with her mother. A.H. did 

not visit the child again until three months later. During that visit, K.V.J. was 

again unfamiliar with A.H. During her final visit, A.H. told K.V.J. that she had 

to come home with her to stop A.H. from "going crazy." A.H. admitted that she 

was triggered by the visit and felt a "psychiatric episode" coming on.

In December 2017, K.V.J. was moved from the cousin's house and placed 

in a DCPP-approved resource home. The change in physical custody was 

brought about by the cousin's inability or refusal to provide required medical 

and personal records to DCPP and to make repairs to the cousin's home deemed 

necessary for the child's safety.

DCPP contacted and assessed several maternal and paternal relatives as 

possible placements for K.V.J. The evaluation of the father's adult daughter was 

unsuccessful because she and her roommate refused to be fingerprinted. A.H.'s 

mother, who had custody of some of A.H.'s other children, was evaluated by 
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DCPP. She informed the agency she did not want to care for any additional 

children. DCPP ruled out A.H.'s grandmother because she was living in senior 

housing, which precluded placement of the child. The father's sister refused to 

participate in the DCPP evaluation process. Two additional out-of-state 

placements, including A.H.'s aunt, were considered.

The father recommended C.S., a family friend in Georgia he considered 

to be his stepsister. C.S. was a licensed foster parent with a history of providing 

foster care in New Jersey and Georgia. The child was placed with C.S. after she 

was approved as a resource parent. C.S. expressed her desire to adopt K.V.J. A 

DCPP evaluation determined K.V.J. was receiving excellent care and support 

from C.S. The court subsequently held a permanency hearing and approved 

DCPP's plan for termination of A.H.'s parental rights.

A trial was held in November 2018. A.H. did not attend the trial and her 

attorney reported that she did not wish to appear by telephone. DCPP did not 

offer an expert witness to opine on the bond between A.H. and the child because 

A.H. refused to submit to a bonding evaluation. A.H. did not call any witnesses. 

The law guardian representing K.V.J.'s interests supported DCPP's application.

The trial court issued an oral opinion concluding DCPP satisfied the fourprong statutory criteria for termination of A.H.'s parental rights. The court 
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found A.H.'s failure to provide for the care of K.V.J., her effective abandonment 

of the child, history of incarceration, drug abuse, hospitalizations, and refusal to 

take psychiatric medications harmed and endangered K.V.J. In addition, the 

court found A.H. unable or unwilling to address the causes of the harms.

The court found "[t]here's absolutely no question" DCPP made reasonable 

efforts to reunify A.H. and K.V.J. by offering A.H. numerous services, but A.H. 

refused to participate in those services. Finally, the court found termination of 

A.H.'s parental rights would not do more harm than good to K.V.J. The court 

concluded A.H. had, in effect, already terminated her relationship with the child

and K.V.J. would not be harmed by separation from A.H. Based on these 

findings, the court entered a December 3, 2018 order terminating A.H.'s parental 

rights to K.V.J.

This appeal followed. A.H. raises the following arguments for our 

consideration:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

THE DIVISION CARRIED ITS CLEAR AND 

CONVINCING BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 

PRONG THREE WAS SATISFIED BECAUSE DCPP 

DID NOT MAKE ANY MEANINGFUL EFFORT TO 

PROVIDE SERVICES TO A.H.
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B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 

PRONG THREE WAS SATISFIED BECAUSE THE 

DIVISION DID NOT INVESTIGATE OR ASSESS 

THE RELATIVES OF A.H. AS POTENTIAL 

PLACEMENTS FOR K.V.J.

II.

Our scope of review on appeal from an order terminating parental rights 

is limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007). 

We will uphold a trial judge's factfindings if they are "supported by adequate , 

substantial, and credible evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 

217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014). "We accord deference to factfindings of the family 

court because it has the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses 

who testify before it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related 

to the family." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 

(2012); see Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). "Only when the trial 

court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should an 

appellate court intervene and make its own findings to ensure that there is not a 

denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 

(2008) (quoting G.L., 191 N.J. at 605). We also accord deference to the judge's 

credibility determinations "based upon his or her opportunity to see and hear the 

witnesses." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 88 
10 A-1742-18T2

(App. Div. 2006). No deference is given to the court's "interpretation of the 

law" which is reviewed de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46 (2012).

When terminating parental rights, the court focuses on the "best interests 

of the child standard" and may grant a petition when the four prongs set forth in 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) are established by clear and convincing evidence. In re 

Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347-48 (1999). "The four criteria 

enumerated in the best interests standard are not discrete and separate; they 

relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that 

identifies a child's best interests." Id. at 348.

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires the Division to prove:

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has 

been or will continue to be endangered by the 

parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and 

the delay of permanent placement will add to the 

harm. Such harm may include evidence that 

separating the child from his resource family 

parents would cause serious and enduring 

emotional or psychological harm to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
11 A-1742-18T2

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good.

A.H. challenges only the court's determination DCPP satisfied the third 

prong of the statutory test. Specifically, she argues the Division did not make 

reasonable efforts to provide appropriate services to assist her in achieving the 

stability necessary to care for K.V.J. In addition, A.H. argues DCPP did not 

satisfy its obligation to assess placement of the child with a relative before 

placing her with a non-related family friend.

Under prong three, DCPP's efforts must be analyzed "with reference to 

the circumstances of the individual case[,]" including the parent's degree of 

participation. In re Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 390 (1999). N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(c) defines reasonable efforts as those reasonable "attempts by an 

agency authorized by [DCPP] to assist the parents in remedying the 

circumstances and conditions that led to the placement of the child and in 

reinforcing the family structure . . . ." The statute sets forth examples of 

"reasonable efforts," including but not limited to:

(1) consultation and cooperation with the parent in 

developing a plan for appropriate services;

(2) providing services that have been agreed upon, to 

the family, in order to further the goal of family 

reunification;
12 A-1742-18T2

(3) informing the parent at appropriate intervals of 

the child's progress, development, and health; 

and

(4) facilitating appropriate visitation.

[Ibid.]

After carefully reviewing A.H.'s arguments in light of the record and 

applicable legal principles, we are convinced there is adequate, substantial, and

credible evidence supporting the trial judge's findings of fact and agree with its 

legal conclusion DCPP satisfied all of the statutory requirements for termination 

of A.H.'s parental rights to K.V.J.

The record demonstrates DCPP offered A.H. numerous opportunities to 

address her mental health and substance abuse issues and her apparent inability 

to provide a safe and secure existence for K.V.J. The Division offered A.H. 

counseling, psychological and psychiatric evaluations, parenting skills classes, 

anger management classes, substance abuse evaluations, supervised visitation, 

and family team meetings. She failed to take advantage of those opportunities.

It is apparent that A.H. suffers from serious mental health and substance 

abuse issues that likely explain her unwillingness or inability to participate in 

the services needed to become a reliable parent to K.V.J. Her failure to 
13 A-1742-18T2

participate in services, even if arising from her illnesses, does not negate the 

reasonable efforts the Division made to reunify A.H. with her daughter.

We see no merit in A.H.'s argument DCPP should have done more to 

confirm the services A.H. claimed to have been receiving in Pennsylvania or 

yielded to that State's supervision of the relationship between A.H. and K.V.J. 

A.H. did not produce evidence of successful treatment in Pennsylvania of her 

substance abuse issues or compliance with her psychiatric medication regimen. 

DCPP cannot be faulted for continuing its efforts to provide services to A.H. in 

New Jersey and pursuing a permanency plan for K.V.J., who was in this State.

Nor are we convinced DCPP failed to consider A.H.'s family members as 

placements for K.V.J. before placing her with C.S. It is "well established that it 

is the Division's policy to place children with relatives whenever possible." N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.F., 357 N.J. Super. 515, 527 (App. Div. 

2003). There is, however, no presumption in favor of placement with a relative

over a suitable third party. Id. at 528-29. There is adequate, substantial, and 

credible evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion DCPP actively pursued 

relatives of A.H. for placement of K.V.J. The cousin at whose home A.H. 

initially left K.V.J. failed to complete the process necessary for DCPP approval. 

A.H.'s mother informed the agency she did not want to care for any additional 
14 A-1742-18T2

children. A.H.'s grandmother lived in senior housing, where placement of an 

infant is not permitted. When the Division placed K.V.J. with C.S., review of 

A.H.'s aunt in Pennsylvania was still pending. The outcome of that review was 

uncertain. The record supports the trial court's finding there was no reason to 

delay K.V.J.'s placement in a home where she had a likelihood of permanency

to await the outcome of the review of A.H.'s aunt. A.H. had failed to provide a 

stable and secure home for her daughter, who had been in foster care for nearly 

two years at the time of her placement with C.S. See N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 69, 87 (App. Div. 2013) ("The Division 

must perform a reasonable investigation of such relatives that is fair, but also 

sensitive to the passage of time and the child's critical need for finality and 

permanency.").

Affirmed.