U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

49–010 

" ! SENATE 109TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REPORT

2005

109–209 

Calendar No. 224 

HOMELAND SECURITY FOOD AND 

AGRICULTURE ACT OF 2005 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

TO ACCOMPANY

S. 572 

TO AMEND THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 TO GIVE ADDITIONAL BIOSECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

DECEMBER 15, 2005.—Ordered to be printed 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JAMES R. MCKAY, Counsel 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA D. TYRER, Chief Clerk 


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Calendar No. 224 

109TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 1st Session 109–209 

HOMELAND SECURITY FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ACT OF 

2005 

DECEMBER 15, 2005.—Ordered to be printed 

Ms. COLLINS, from the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 572] 

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

to which was referred the bill (S. 572) to amend the homeland security act of 2002 to give additional biosecurity responsibilities to 

the Department of Homeland Security, having considered the same 

reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends 

that the bill do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Purpose & Summary ..................................................................................... 1 

II. Background .................................................................................................... 2 

III. Legislative History ......................................................................................... 4 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis .......................................................................... 4 

V. Estimated Cost of Legislation ....................................................................... 6 

VI. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact .................................................................. 7 

VII. Changes in Existing Law .............................................................................. 7 

I. PURPOSE & SUMMARY

The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee (the ‘‘Committee’’) 

approved S. 572, the Homeland Security Food and Agriculture Act, 

on September 22, 2005. This legislation would establish a program 

at the Department of Homeland Security (the ‘‘Department’’ or 

‘‘DHS’’) to protect agriculture and the food supply by increasing the 

coordination and communication between federal, state, and local 

governments on agricultural security. 


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1Much is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain,’’ Government Accountability Office, GAO–05–214, March 8, 2005. 2 Bio-security and Agro-Terrorism: Hearing before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, 

and Forestry, 109th Congress (2005) (statement of the Honorable Charles F. Conner, Deputy 

Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture). 3 Agroterrorism: The Threat to America’s Breadbasket: Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Hrg. 108–491, (2003) (statement of Dr. Peter Chalk, RAND Corporation) 

at 14. 4 Id. at 80. 

5 Hearing supra note 2, (statement of Mr. John E. Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, 

Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation). 6 Id. (statement of Dr. Robert Brackett, Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration). 7 ‘‘First Annual Report to the President and Congress: Assessing the Threat,’’ Advisory Panel 

to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(the Gilmore Commission), December 15, 1999, at 12–15. 

II. BACKGROUND

United States agriculture generates over $1 trillion annually, including $50 billion in exports.1 ‘‘The agriculture industry represents about 13 percent of Gross Domestic Product and nearly 17 

percent of domestic employment.2 One in eight Americans work in 

an area directly supported by food production.3

An event that causes a loss of confidence in any portion of the 

U.S. agriculture sector could result in severe economic losses for 

the U.S. economy. As a result of the detection of only one case of 

bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow disease) in the 

United States in December 2003, most countries banned U.S. beef 

exports which caused the U.S. beef industry to lose between $3.2 

and $4.7 billion in 2004. Two years later, Japan and South Korea, 

which together account for over 50 percent of U.S. beef exports, 

have not lifted the ban. According to a study conducted by the California Department of Food and Agriculture, each day that an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease is not contained could cost the 

United States $1 billion in trade sanctions alone.4

Experts warn that the American food supply system could be a 

target of terrorist attack. While testifying before the Committee on 

Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on July 20, 2005, Mr. John 

Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), stated, ‘‘Most people do not 

equate terrorist attacks with agroterrorism. But the threat is real, 

and the impact could be devastating.’’ 5 Another witness, Dr. Robert 

Brackett, Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, 

Food and Drug Administration (FDA), added, ‘‘A terrorist attack on 

the food supply could have both severe public health and economic 

consequences, while damaging the public’s confidence in the food 

we eat.’’ 6

A 1999 report to Congress by the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (also known as the Gilmore Commission) stated: 

. . . a biological attack against an agricultural target offers terrorists a virtually risk-free form of assault, which 

has a high probability of success and which also has the 

prospect of obtaining political objectives, such as undermining confidence in the ability of government or giving 

the terrorists an improved bargaining position.7

In 2003, while testifying before the Senate Governmental Affairs 

Committee, Dr. Peter Chalk, RAND Corporation, further noted 


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8 Hearing supra note 3 at 79. 

9 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, ‘‘Critical Infrastructure Identification, 

Prioritization, and Protection,’’ December 17, 2003. 

that unlike other types of terrorist attack, an agroterrorist attack 

could be executed with little technical expertise or financial cost 

and would not put the attacker in harm’s way because most foreign 

animal and plant diseases are not transmittable to humans.8

Since September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration has taken 

steps to improve U.S. agriculture security, but holes in prevention, 

preparedness, and response remain. 

On December 17, 2003, the Administration issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD–7) which established a national policy for federal departments and agencies to identify and 

prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources 

and to protect them from terrorist attacks. HSPD–7 tasks the Secretary of Homeland Security with coordinating the overall national 

effort to enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure and 

designates the Department of Agriculture with the sector-specific 

responsibility for food and agriculture protection.9

On January 30, 2004, the Administration issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD–9) to establish a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD–9 generally 

instructs the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Agriculture 

(USDA), and Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the 

Environmental Protection Agency, the Attorney General, and the 

Director of Central Intelligence to coordinate their efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from an 

agroterrorist attack. HSPD–9 specifically tasks DHS with developing a coordinated agriculture and food-specific standardized response plan, ensuring that adequate response capabilities exist at 

the federal, state, and local levels for an attack on the agriculture 

sector, establishing information sharing and analysis mechanisms 

for agriculture and food, and coordinating the federal research efforts into countermeasures against catastrophic animal, plant, and 

zoonotic diseases. 

According to a March 2005 Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) report entitled, ‘‘Much is Being Done to Protect Agriculture 

from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain,’’ DHS’s 

communication with state and local officials and coordination of 

federal activities is lacking. GAO reported a lack of communication 

between DHS and states regarding the development of emergency 

response plans, grant guidance, and best practices. State and industry officials reported that there is no mechanism to share lessons learned from exercises or real-life animal disease outbreaks. 

The GAO report also stated that shortcomings exist in DHS’s federal coordination of national efforts to protect against 

agroterrorism. Federal officials claim that there is confusion in 

interagency working groups as to which responsibility falls with 

whom. According to GAO, DHS has been unable to coordinate agriculture security research efforts throughout the government as it 

was tasked to do in HSPD–9. While some program staff from DHS, 

USDA, and Health and Human Services have engaged in prelimiVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:25 Dec 21, 2005 Jkt 049010 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR209.XXX SR209

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10 Report supra note 2. 

nary discussions, there is no overall departmental coordination of 

policy and budget issues between the various federal agencies.10

The lack of DHS leadership on agriculture security can be seen 

in the June 2004 incident in Washington State where 18 cattle developed chromium contamination. Agroterrorism was suspected, yet 

neither USDA nor DHS were notified for over a week. In May 

2004, representatives from the FBI, FDA, and USDA gave a presentation at an agroterrorism conference in Kansas City, Missouri 

on lessons learned from the Washington outbreak which included 

a slide stating that the following agencies should be contacted if 

agroterrorism is suspected: a state’s Department of Agriculture, 

FDA, USDA, FBI, local law enforcement, and state and county public health officials. However, despite presidential directives, the Department of Homeland Security was not on the list. It is apparent 

that federal coordination remains inadequate if notification of DHS 

is considered unnecessary by other responding agencies. 

Since September 11, 2001, the Senate has held three hearings on 

agriculture security. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats of 

the Senate Committee on Armed Services held a hearing titled, 

‘‘Agricultural Biological Weapons Threat to the United States,’’ on 

October 27, 1999. Four years later the Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing focusing on the federal government’s preparedness and response capabilities titled, ‘‘Agroterrorism: The 

Threat to America’s Breadbasket,’’ on November 18, 2003. The 

Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry held a hearing 

on the subject, ‘‘Biosecurity and Agroterrorism,’’ on July 20, 2005. 

However, no comprehensive agriculture security legislation exists 

and the Department of Homeland Security’s role in agriculture security remains largely undefined in statute. S. 572 would define 

and codify the important role DHS should play in agriculture security preparedness and response. 

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

S. 572 was introduced on March 9, 2005, by Senators Akaka and 

Durbin and was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs. On September 22, 2005, the Committee 

considered S. 572 and ordered the bill, as amended by an Akaka 

substitute amendment, favorably reported by voice vote. Members 

present were Senators Collins, Lieberman, Voinovich, Coleman, 

Chafee, Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Lautenberg, and Pryor. 

Senator Akaka introduced similar bills in the 107th and 108th 

Congresses. S. 2767, the Agriculture Security Preparedness Act, 

was introduced on July 22, 2002, and referred to the Committee on 

Agriulture, Nutrition, Forestry, and S. 427, the Agriculture Security Assistance Act, and S. 430, the Agriculture Security Preparedness Act, were introduced on February 24, 2003, and referred to 

the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, Forestry. 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Short title 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Homeland Security Food and Agriculture Act of 2005.’’


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Section 2. Agricultural biosecurity 

(a) This subsection amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

(P.L. 107–296) to create Subtitle J, Agricultural Biosecurity, after 

Subtitle I under Title VII. 

Section 899(a)—Definitions 

Section 899(a) of the new Subtitle J defines the terms agriculture 

disease, agriculture, agroterrorist act, and biosecurity for the purposes of this Subtitle. 

Section 899(b)—Agriculture security responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security 

Subsection (a) authorizes an agriculture security program within 

the Department to include advising and coordinating with federal, 

state, local, regional, and tribal homeland security officials regarding preparedness, detection, prevention, and mitigation of an 

agroterrorist act and executing the agriculture security responsibilities of the Secretary described in Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 7 (December 17, 2003) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (February 3, 2004). 

Subsection (b) tasks the Secretary of Homeland Security with the 

following responsibilities under the agriculture security program: 

organizing communication among federal, state and local emergency response providers for agricultural emergencies; ensuring 

that emergency response providers execute their roles in the event 

of an agroterrorist attack; ensuring that emergency response providers have the necessary information and resources regarding an 

agroterrorism; developing information sharing procedures among 

emergency response providers; working with the Department of 

Transportation to developing guidelines for the transportation of 

agricultural products in response to an agricultural disease; coordinating with the Environmental Protection Agency about the potential environmental impact of an agricultural disease; coordinating 

with the Department of Agriculture regarding recognizing agricultural products from suspected locations; coordinating with Department of State to establish mutual assistance agreements with other 

countries; ensuring state, local, and regional response plans include 

an agriculture security component; and establishing a taskforce of 

state and local homeland security officials to identify best agriculture security practices and disseminate the best practices to all 

states. 

Subsection (c) creates a grant program in the Office of State and 

Local Government Coordination and Preparedness to facilitate the 

participation of agriculture specialists in agricultural security 

emergency preparedness. This grant program is intended to be 

used for events such as conferences and exercises that will bring 

emergency management and animal and plant healthcare officials 

together for planning and preparedness purposes. 

(b) This subsection makes technical and conforming amendments. 


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V. ESTIMATED COST OF LEGISLATION

S. 572—Homeland Security Food and Agriculture Act of 2005 

S. 527 would amend the Homeland Security Act to require the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a program to 

protect the agriculture industry and the nation’s food supply from 

terrorist acts. In addition, the legislation would authorize the appropriation of $5 million in fiscal year 2006 for grants to state and 

local animal health care officials. 

CBO estimates that implementing S. 572 would cost $8 million in 2006 and $53 million over the 2006–2010 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. Enacting the legislation 

would not affect direct spending or revenues. 

S. 572 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates 

as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and 

would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. Any 

costs incurred by these governments to participate in the activities 

authorized by this bill would be incurred voluntarily. 

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary impact of S. 572 is shown in the following table. The cost of 

this legislation falls within budget function 800 (general government). 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 

CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION 

Establish Food Supply Protection Program: 

Estimated Authorization Level ....................................................................... 6 9 12 12 12 

Estimated Outlays .......................................................................................... 5 8 11 12 12 

Local Community Emergency Planning: 

Authorization Level ......................................................................................... 5 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays .......................................................................................... 3 2 0 0 0 

Total Changes: 

Estimated Authorization Level .............................................................. 11 9 12 12 12 

Estimated Outlays ................................................................................. 8 10 11 12 12 

Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill 

will be enacted early in fiscal year 2006 and that spending will follow historical patterns for similar programs. 

DHS currently has a Directorate for Preparedness that identifies 

and assesses current and future threats to the United States. According to that office, it is working to coordinate the protection of 

the agriculture industry and food supply throughout the United 

States. 

S. 572 would codify and expand the current duties of the Directorate for Preparedness. The directorate would be responsible for 

communicating and coordinating among federal, state, and local 

emergency response providers regarding threats to the agriculture 

industry and food supply, for ensuring that state and local officials 

have access to information on agricultural terrorism, and for planning to prevent and respond to food and agriculture emergencies. 

Based on information from DHS, CBO estimates that the office 

would need about $12 million a year for additional staff to carry 

out its additional responsibilities under S. 572. CBO expects that 

the office would steadily expand its budget and staff over the next 

three years before it reached that level of effort. We estimate that 


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the added duties for the directorate would cost $48 million over the 

2006–2010 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary funds. The legislation also would authorize the appropriation of $5 million for grants to state and local animal care officials to participate 

in community emergency planning efforts. CBO estimates that implementing the grant program would cost $5 million over the 2006– 2007 period. 

Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 572 contains no 

intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA 

and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

Any costs incurred by these governments to participate in the activities authorized by this bill would be incurred voluntarily. 

Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Matthew Pickford; Impact 

on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Marjorie Miller; Impact 

on the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach. 

Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

VI. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of 

the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has considered 

the regulatory impact of this bill. CBO states that there are no 

intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and no costs on state, local, or tribal 

governments. The legislation contains no other regulatory impact. 

VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, S. 572 adds entirely new language and, therefore does not change existing law. 

Æ 


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