OSAMA’S WAKE: 

THE SECOND GENERATION 

OF AL QAEDA 

by 

Blake D. Ward 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 32 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

Osama’s Wake: 

The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

Blake D. Ward 

August 2005 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 32 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 32 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

Contents 

Page 

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii

The Author................................................................................................. iii

I. Introduction.........................................................................................1 

II. The Wellspring ...................................................................................5 

III. Replenishment ....................................................................................9 

IV. Allies and Affiliates..........................................................................23 

V. Conclusion ........................................................................................35 

Notes..........................................................................................................37 
ii 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 
iii 

The Author 

CDR Blake D. Ward is currently serving on the HQ USEUCOM J3 

staff. His previous duty assignments include OPNAV N6/7 staff; 

Cruiser Destroyer Group 12; Forward Operating Base, Det-Stuttgart; 

Fleet Ocean Surveillance Facility, Spain; and VAW-116. He has 

participated in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, DESERT FOX, 

JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE. He is a 

graduate of Gustavus Adolphus College and the Air War College. 

To my family, thank you for your patience during the research and 

writing of this essay. I would also like to extend thanks to Dr. Barry 

Schneider for his support. 

Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 1 

Osama’s Wake: 

The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

Blake D. Ward 

I. Introduction 

The enemy is not a single political regime or person or 

religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism— 

premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 

against innocents....Our priority will be first to disrupt and 

destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack 

their leadership; command, control, communications; 

material support; and finances. 

–The National Security Strategy of the 

United States of America, 2002 

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States 

inadequately defines the threat which on September 11, 2001, propelled 

the United States towards a Global War on Terrorism and redirected the 

nation’s security efforts. Most critics of the NSS point out the futility of 

waging war on “terrorism,” since it is a time-worn means to an end. If the 

nation is to have a strategy to combat an enemy, it has to define who, or 

what, the enemy is. 

The War on Terrorism should not be an infinite struggle against any 

entity willing to use terrorist means; and attempting to scope the threat to 

groups with “global reach” is not a discriminating factor in today’s 

globalized and interconnected world. The enemy must be defined not just 

by their methodology but also by their ideology and politics. 

Al Qaeda is a revolutionary salafist mujahedin terrorist organization. 

It cannot be appropriately defined in three words or less if it is to be 

distinguished from categories of terrorist and Islamic fundamentalist 
2 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

groups. It is internationalist in nature, but it is not by any means the only 

one in existence. Whereas Al Qaeda may have been the only organization 

with the patience and means to execute the attacks of 9/11, the U.S.S. Cole, 

and the U.S. embassies, it is not unique in its intent. To focus U.S. 

instruments of national power to engage the threat, we must identify what 

Al Qaeda is, what is required to sustain it, what are its critical 

vulnerabilities, and who else shares its intent and capabilities. 

Much commentary has been made on Al Qaeda’s ability to replace its 

leadership, describing the losses of key figures as mere temporary 

setbacks because other personnel are able to fill the vacant committee 

positions. But with an organization heavily dependent on social contacts, 

key people become operative nodes necessary to sustain the organization – 

their loss has an impact on Al Qaeda’s ability to maintain funding streams, 

operative cells, and alliances. 

Some aspects of Al Qaeda are insurmountable in the near term: its 

ideology and agenda will not disappear with the demise of Osama bin 

Laden and his core Arab colleagues. Numerous groups exist with similar 

agendas supported by a portion of the Muslim population ever willing to 

finance jihad. What then, is the staying power of Al Qaeda following the 

loss of its core leadership? What linkages would remain between a 

succeeding leadership and Al Qaeda’s support base? Would a surviving 

or allied group be willing to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

against the United States to the extent the current leadership intends? 

To measure the threat in the proceeding stage of the post-bin Laden 

era, this paper will attempt to examine the pervasiveness of Al Qaeda’s 

ideology and its enduring capabilities in terms of organization, finance, 

and personnel. The most critical vulnerability to Al Qaeda is its social 

networks and, by extension, its alliances. Funding and recruiting will 

remain accessible until the attrition of key personalities is sufficient to tear 

the organizational fabric, allowing Al Qaeda to function internally and 

externally. Unfortunately, fragments of the Al Qaeda leadership and 

network can easily find refuge and purpose in other like-minded groups, 

perhaps initially remaining locally or regionally-focused until re-engaging 

the “far enemy.” Ample Al Qaeda allies and sympathizers exist beyond 

the first generation to sustain a threat to U.S. interests. 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 3 

This paper does not attempt to encompass the entire breadth of 

salafist mujahedin groups; instead a representation has been selected for 

discussion to illustrate the commonality and enduring scope of the threat. 

Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 5 

II. The Wellspring 

A Vision Shared 

Not all Islamic fundamentalists are enemies of the United States and 

not all anti-Americans are Islamic fundamentalists. It is imperative to 

distinguish Al Qaeda in political and religious contexts. Al Qaeda wants 

to revive the Caliphate to its historic apex of Islamic power. To revive the 

Caliphate is to remerge political and religious power under one authority 

following the overthrow of secular or religiously impure governments and 

the withdrawal of foreign, corrupting influences from the region. 

Al Qaeda is not unique in its worldview of the problems ailing the 

greater Muslim community; its blame and hatred of the West is shared by 

many Muslims and the objective of returning to a purer Islamic society is 

embodied in the philosophy of the transnational Muslim Brotherhood 

movement. But whereas the mainstream of the Muslim Brotherhood has 

forgone violence as a means to obtain Islamic utopia, in most Arab 

countries offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda and other 

Islamic groups, have decided on militancy to change the destiny of the 

Muslim world. 

The ideology of the mujahedin filling Al Qaeda’s ranks envisions 

repulsion of Western influences and a return to early Muslim values in 

order to revive the glory days of Islam. To best describe the militant 

campaign of Al Qaeda and similar groups, the term, “salafist jihad,” is 

preferred.1

 Hereafter, the term, “salafist mujahedin,” will be used to 

describe militant, revivalist, Islamic fighters waging offensive war against 

“forces of evil” in religious terms of Dar al-Harab, the “House of War.” 

The salafist jihad ideology attempts to regain the height of Islamic 

culture and power of the Middle Ages by returning to early, “pure” 

practice of Islam as it was during the time of the first generation of 

Muslims (salaf). This variant of fundamentalist religion has appeal across 

the Muslim world; its promise of a better future through adherence to early 

Islamic practices offers an alternative to the feelings of humiliation and 

degradation felt as a by-product of Western military and economic 

dominance over the Islamic world. Since Islam’s inception and 

propagation by the Prophet Mohammed, there is an important correlation 
6 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

between Islam’s stature and its political-military power;2 therefore, in the 

believer’s world view, the decline in relative influence/strength of Islamic 

civilization to the West reflects a reversal of Islam’s power and 

displacement of its rightful role as the dominant religion of the world. 

Osama bin Laden spoke of this perspective when he mentioned the 

“humiliation and disgrace” felt since the fall of the Ottoman sultanate in 

his video message of October 2001.3

The current struggle against Western civilization is categorized by 

salafist mujahedin as a struggle against good and evil; a revival of the 

early and militant spread of Islam against “the forces of evil” in the first 

offensive jihad.4

 Since the United States is the epitome of non-Islamic 

power in the post-Cold War era, it is characterized as the clichéd “Great 

Satan” and target of Islamic militancy. 

Salafist mujahedin interpret jihad beyond the moderate sense of 

personal spiritual improvement and defense of the Muslim community; it 

includes the moral duty of overthrowing Muslim governments and 

societies considered apostate (Jahiliyya). In their view, the obstacle to 

achieving the perfect Islamic state is the apostate governments and the 

U.S. policies supporting them. As Bernard Lewis writes, “some of them 

still see the West in general and its present leader the United States in 

particular as the ancient and irreconcilable enemy of Islam, the one serious 

obstacle to the restoration of God’s faith and law at home and their 

ultimate universal triumph” [the spread of Islam globally].5

Besides Al Qaeda, groups embracing salafist jihad ideology, include: 

Jemaah Islamiya (JI); Jamma’at al-Tawid wa’al Jihad; Al-Jihad (EIJ); Al 

Tawid; Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); 

Armed Islamic Group (GIA); Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC); 

Salafia Jihadia (SJ); Asbat al-Ansar; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 

(IMU); Islamic Army of Aden (IAA); Moroccan Islamic Combatant 

Group (GICM); and the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG).6

 Western 

realization of salafist jihad advocacy, and its irreconcilable political 

revolutionary implications to the security environment of Western and 

allied societies, can serve to identify future and current threats in the form 

of Al Qaeda allies or successors. Recognizing salafi jihadists could also 

forestall mistakes such as harboring religious extremists like Aba Hamza 

al-Masri (belatedly jailed in the UK) and Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman 

(the 1993 WTC bombing conspirator). 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 7

Al Qaeda was initially distinguished from other salafist mujahedin 

groups by its global jihad operational view; other groups have or had 

jihadi objectives limited to their native land. As it has been observed, 

however, groups and individuals are willing to expand the domain of their 

jihad because they either lacked success in their locale, embraced the 

global jihad perspective, or acted as temporary surrogates for Al Qaeda. 

The transition from expanding the target set from the incumbent regime to 

the West has been exercised often. 

The most obvious example is the EIJ. Though not all members of the 

EIJ agreed with the ideological shift detracting from overthrowing the 

Egyptian government, the majority decided to merge with bin Laden and 

join the jihad against America and Israel. Proximity of U.S. forces to 

current national salafi jihadist groups could also easily compel mujahedin 

to target U.S. interests. In Iraq, the salafist mujahedin are already active; 

in Afghanistan, salafi jihadists await the United States to leave. Salafi 

jihadists the world over have been encouraged by Al Qaeda’s success and 

feel as unified participants in a global running war with the United States 

and its allies. Due to the geographical spread of salafist believers 

throughout the world, the insurgency waged by the salafist mujahedin is 

ensured to be of worldwide proportions. Though not seemingly 

coordinated on a global magnitude unless Al Qaeda is involved, due to the 

number of autonomous groups participating in this global insugency, the 

leadership of Al Qaeda could become irrelevant in the jihad’s direction 

and sustenance. 

A Common Means 

It is important to note certain Islamic extremists do not consider the 

killing of innocents during the fight against evil as a moral dilemma since 

it is reasoned Allah will provide divine justice by rewarding or punishing 

the victims in the after life according to their virtue.7

 The lack of 

measures to avoid killing even fellow Muslim bystanders (who may be 

considered apostate since they are not mujahedin supporters) is a common 

trait of the salafist jihad movement. Their lack of distinction between 

combatants and non-combatants warrants applying the term “terrorist” to 

most salafist mujahedin, though there may be exceptional groups who 

only target government forces. Any salafist mujahedin terrorist group 
8 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

should be considered the preeminent security threat and most likely to 

utilize WMD against U.S. interests. The salafist brand of jihad values 

public demonstration, or witness, of personal sacrifice as a necessary 

affirmation of faith. The suicidal and murderous 9/11 highjackings would 

be understood by salafist mujahedin as “spectacular martyrdom...the 

ultimate demonstration of jihad as a testament.”8

Suicidal mass killings are meant as demonstrations of faith to fellow 

Muslims and meant to convey to non-believers that Islam’s superiority is 

made evident by virtue of its followers who are more willing to sacrifice 

in the “cosmic struggle between good and evil” than its enemies.9

 With an 

ideological propensity for dramatic death and destruction, it is hard to 

imagine a salafist mujahedin group that would not use WMD if it had the 

capability. Indeed, clerics, such as the Saudi Naser bin Hamad al-Fahd, 

continue to fuel the extremist fire with the issuing of fatwas urging the use 

of WMD against non-Muslims.10 The salafist mujahedin active in Iraq, 

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the group Ansar al-Islam, have chemical 

weapon knowledge with the propensity to use it. A Jordanian al-Zarqawi 

cell is claimed to have been prevented from committing a chemical attack 

in Amman, Jordan, in 2004.11

A successor or allied group to today’s Al Qaeda will have the same 

commonalities: a goal of renewing the Caliphate by first establishing a 

fundamentalist Islamic state through violent overthrow; a willingness to 

attack the United States or western nations as a means to compel the West 

to withdraw from the Islamic community and, thus, undermining the 

targeted “apostate” local government; and a willingness to use WMD or 

equal conventional means to provide a catastrophic number of casualties. 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 9 

III. Replenishment 

Recruitment 

On an individual basis, Muslim men throughout the globe may 

engage in militant jihad out of a sense of defending a Muslim community. 

In most cases it has been to defend a Muslim population from direct 

aggression (Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iraq); for 

some, however, jihad also entails defending the global Muslim community 

from Western influences by attacking the United States and its allies. 

Perceiving the United States as a threat to Islam is made easier by the 

increasingly prevalent anti-American attitude in the Muslim world shared 

by non-salafist Muslims and salafist mujahedin alike.12

The realization of the disparity of power and prosperity between the 

Western and Muslim communities has fueled hatred against ineffective 

Muslim rulers and the Western powers perceived supporting them. The 

scholar Bernard Lewis writes, “By now there is an almost standardized 

litany of American offenses recited in the lands of Islam, in the media, in 

pamphlets, in sermons, and in public speeches.”13

But hatred for a regime and its framework does not directly translate 

to suicidal mass-murder. Combined hatred, a sense of religious duty, and 

reward by sacrifice transforms grievance into murderous acts. Due to the 

number of disparate salafist mujahedin groups in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan in the 1990’s, it is clear that although Al Qaeda presently serves 

as an inspiration, it is not the sole means or rally point for salafist 

mujahedin. In fact, Mohammed Atta and the rest of his Hamburg cell 

decided to join the mujahedin in Chechnya before being recruited by Al 

Qaeda.14 It can be assumed aspiring mujahedin will continue to find a 

venue for their cause, with or without Al Qaeda. 

What is the mechanism for attracting people to the salafist jihad 

ideology and providing recruits to Al Qaeda and other jihad groups? The 

means by which Al Qaeda obtains recruits is less overt than a recruiting 

office. Social bonds, more than propaganda, contribute to mujahedin 

recruitment. In a biographic study of 400 Islamic terrorists, University of 

Pennsylvania professor Marc Sageman discovered 70 percent of terrorists 

were recruited outside their native country, having traveled abroad in 
10 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

search of improving their livelihood through jobs or education.15 Family 

separation and a feeling of alienation from their host society prompted 

many to seek companionship with other Muslims at the mosques. 

Friendship accounted for 68 percent of the recruitment, kinship (directly 

or through marriage) 20 percent, and “discipleship” a mere 10 percent.16 

Social networking continues to be an indoctrination scheme utilized by the 

fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood, a precursor movement of many of 

the salafist terrorist groups.17 Mohammed Atta and his fellow cell 

members in Hamburg were bound to each other through a social network 

formed at the mosque.18

Although detecting active recruitment is unlikely, the social 

characteristic of these terrorist networks is a vulnerability of salafist 

mujahedin terrorist groups. Individuals serve as critical links between 

prospective recruits and mujahedin groups, as well as between autonomous 

groups. These human hubs connect communication, money, equipment, 

and expertise.19 The elimination of these personalities would have the 

effect of isolating cells and reducing the efficiency of the organization 

severely. Isolated salafist jihad groups would be unable to launch an 

orchestrated operation of the scale similar to 9/11.20 Additionally, if Osama 

bin Laden is eliminated, those that have sworn bayat, or fealty and 

abeyance, may not be bound to remain under Al Qaeda direction. Though 

personal agendas may remain the same, individuals may seek to join other 

local, less ambitious or efficient groups. 

The numerous training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan provided a 

collecting point for aspiring mujahedin from all over the world and a pool 

of candidates for Al Qaeda to selectively recruit from. The loss of the 

camps hinders recruitment, but probably has not prevented it. The 

recruitment needs of Al Qaeda seem to be qualitative in nature, not 

quantitative, and recruitment through social contacts may suffice until a 

large number of trusted individuals, who serve as the group’s bridge to the 

disenchanted masses, are killed or captured. Although Al Qaeda has lost 

many of its frontline fighters in the Afghanistan battlefield, Al Qaeda does 

not rely on, nor have a need to reconstitute a standing army of Arab 

warriors. Al Qaeda is most lethal via its selective, carefully planned 

operations which could, out of necessity, utilize training sites of other 

groups (e.g., Hezbollah at least once provided explosive training in 

Lebanon).21 What the camps certainly did provide was a place to vet 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 11 

pools of new mujahedin to be prospective clandestine operatives. 

Mohamed Atta and his Hamburg friends were partially chosen because 

they spoke English and were accustomed to living in a Western country. 

Additional sources of personnel may come from other jihad groups 

that heretofore only had local objectives. Where Al Qaeda and local jihad 

aims merge, Al Qaeda has a chance to hire services or recruit experts and 

operatives for missions under their direction. Recent Al Qaeda operatives 

have reportedly risen from Pakistani militant jihad groups and, for the near 

term, Al Qaeda can probably still have global reach through its contacts 

fostered in Afghanistan.22 As it was before Operation Enduring Freedom, 

Al Qaeda will be the premier group to seek entry into as long as it has the 

funding to sponsor operations, partner with, and support other groups. 

A question arises, however, if the Al Qaeda leadership were to be 

decimated to the point the organizational structure is defunct, would a 

leadership vacuum exist for the masses of mujahedin who desire to be part 

of a global jihad? A review of other Islamic terrorist groups reveals a 

dearth of leaders with resources and ambition equal to that of bin Laden. 

Leadership 

Al Qaeda at the time consisted of three elements...The first 

element is the ‘Al-Qaeda hardcore’. In addition to the 

dozen associates who had stayed with him since the late 

1980s, bin Laden was able to attract many of the preeminent militants active at the time. Most came for purely 

pragmatic reasons. Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001 

was an excellent place to be. For militants who had spent 

years trying to mobilise and act, struggling all the while 

with domestic security services, Afghanistan was like a 

department store designed for Islamic terrorists. Recruits, 

knowledge, ideas and even cash could be had off the shelf. 

Bin Laden and his associates were running a whole floor, 

the biggest, the best stocked and the most glitzy. By the 

time of the September 11th attacks, bin Laden and his 

dozen or so close associates had been able to attract and 

retain the loyalty of around a hundred highly motivated 

individuals from throughout the Islamic world who all had 
12 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

key skills and expertise and were committed to a similar 

agenda...these hundred or so men, with the dozen or so 

long-term associates at their centre, can be considered the 

‘Al-Qaeda hardcore.’ 

–Jason Burke 

Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror 

Although Al Qaeda is often referred to as a network, there existed an 

organizational framework at the top consisting of Osama bin Laden, 

Ayman al-Zawahiri, the shura majlis advisory council, and heads of the 

military, financial, information, political, foreign purchase, and security 

committees. The members of these committees constitute the functional 

core of the organization at its strongest when it still had the “long-term 

associates” described above. 

Membership of the committees has since changed as personalities 

have been eliminated. Al Qaeda thrives on a network of senior personal 

contacts grown through the Afghan-Soviet war and Muslim Brotherhood 

involvement. A key consideration is whether Al Qaeda operates like an 

institution, or is still dependent on leadership personality to remain 

effective? 

Osama bin Laden’s leadership was initially dependent on his ability 

to provide funds. His access to money and equipment was the factor that 

elevated his profile among the many mujahedin in the Afghan-Soviet war. 

His familial contacts with the royal Saudi family and other wealthy elite in 

Saudi Arabia allowed him access to wealthy contributors and 

correspondingly allowed him to provide services and funds at an 

individual level that made him noticeable. His charity and his ability to 

deliver formed his reputation and stature. Now that bin Laden’s 

organization successfully attacked the United States multiple times on a 

spectacular scale, his name inspires and draws mujahedin and contributors 

alike. His popularity alone amongst destitute Muslims must be worth 

capital. 

A pivotal moment in Al Qaeda’s history was the merger of the 

members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) to bin Laden’s group in 

1998. The Egyptians from the EIJ are thought to have been the 

operational brains of Al Qaeda, matching their covert terrorist skills and 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 13 

experience with the financial resources of bin Laden. The EIJ members 

dominated many of the top leadership positions within Al Qaeda, shaping 

Al Qaeda’s organization along EIJ’s committee structure.23 Surviving 

members of this group would seem to be the natural successors should the 

leadership of bin Laden or Zawahiri be eliminated; however, a former EIJ 

member might not have adequate access to financing and be totally reliant 

on bin Laden’s financial sources. It is postulated Al Zawahiri joined bin 

Laden because the EIJ was financially destitute.24 Further, notable EIJ 

members known to have been part of Al Qaeda have been killed, arrested 

or detained, potentially reducing the number of experienced veterans, or 

those with financial links, to a critical few.25 Saiid Al-Masri, a member of 

the finance committee, is still at large and can be assumed to have 

sufficient contacts to obtain funds; so too, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah. 

A search for successors to the current leadership of Al Qaeda requires 

two considerations: who can lead and who can inspire? Leadership will 

entail ability to conceive, plan, and fund operations. Ability to inspire 

others will be measured through their capability to attract funding and 

recruits. Legitimacy will be important in either case, either by association 

to bin Laden or continued clerical support for the ideology. Osama bin 

Laden’s son, Saad bin Laden, may be the logical successor to Osama since 

he is part of the upper tier network and has a renown name to attract 

funding and converts. His implication in the May 2003 Riyadh bombings 

(despite his possible detention in Iran with Egyptians Saif al-Adel and 

Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah since 2002) suggests he may have planning 

experience as well.26 If true, Saad bin Laden is able to direct operations in 

lieu of his father and may be able to garner the respect of the Al Qaeda 

peerage. It may be also safe to assume he shares the same vision of a 

revived Islamic Caliphate. 

Should the Al Qaeda top leadership be eliminated, the remaining 

cadre may have to merge with another salafist mujahedin group. Outside 

the Saudi and Egyptian Al Qaeda clique, successive leadership of the 

salafist mujahedin movement is difficult to ascertain. If leaders share bin 

Laden’s vision, but do not have access to their own income, it is doubtful 

they could be effective unless the Al Qaeda financiers were willing to 

make resources available. Experienced and known salafist mujahedin 

leaders that have cooperated with bin Laden in the past include: 
14 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

• Imad Fayez Mugniyah, the Lebanese Hezbollah leader who 

masterminded the Beirut Marine barracks bombing; he facilitated 

explosives training for Al Qaeda and the escape of Al Qaeda 

members from Afghanistan to Iran.27

• Ahmad Abdel Karim al-Saadi (aka Abu Mohjen), the Palestinian 

leader of the Asbat al-Ansar terrorist group which received 

financing and training from Al Qaeda in the late 1990’s. Al-Saadi 

is unlocated but his group is based in the uncontrolled Ain alHilweh refugee camp in Lebanon.28

• Abu Bakar Bashir, the Indonesian cleric and co-leader of the 

Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Bashir has close contacts with bin Laden 

and has demonstrated the willingness and capability to conduct 

transnational operations in order to achieve an Islamic state 

encompassing numerous Southeast Asia nations. Bashir was put 

on trial in Indonesia for the Bali bombings, but only received a 

two-and-a-half year sentence in the spring of 2005. He enjoys 

some popular support within Indonesia. 

• Tohir Yuldashev, unlocated leader of the Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan (IMU) who has expanded his goals beyond 

overthrowing the Uzbekistan government to include establishing a 

regional Islamic Caliphate. IMU conducts activities throughout 

central Asia and has supposedly joined with other regional groups 

to form the Islamic Movement of Central Asia (IMCA).29

• Burhanuddin Rabbani a Tajik mujahedin warlord and former 

Afghan President.30 He is currently a member of the Loya Jirga 

and head of one of the largest political parties, Jami’at-e Islami. 

• Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an anti-American Pashtun Afghan 

mujahedin leader who ran terrorist training camps in the 1990’s 

with Gulf nation and Pakistani ISI backing. He was designated a 

terrorist by the United States in February 2003 for his past support 

to Al Qaeda. Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) has 

vowed to fight the Karzai regime and called for jihad against 

international troops in Afghanistan; his whereabouts are currently 

unknown.31
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 15 

• Abdul Rasul Sayyaf,32 the Afghan hardliner, who due to his Saudi 

financial ties, ran numerous and prominent mujahedin training 

camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan.33 His forces are accused of 

numerous war crimes.34 He is cited as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s 

mentor when he arrived in Afghanistan.35 He currently is a 

member of the Loya Jirga. 

Although the sampling of the above leaders possess the qualifications, 

it is difficult to discern whether they: 1) would give up on their local 

struggle to attempt to orchestrate a global campaign and 2) could keep the 

Arab core, with all its financial and social contacts, together as a cohesive 

functioning organization. Certainly a number of groups would volunteer 

to absorb a financially well-endowed organization like Al Qaeda, but other 

salafist mujahedin leaders have exhibited little inclination to wage war on 

the “far enemy” in order to establish a Caliphate. Most leaders are 

singularly focused on establishing local Islamic states and have not 

engaged in activities outside their locale.36 Even considering the 

overthrow of the local apostate government as a first and essential step 

towards larger Al Qaeda schemes, based on declared aims, only the JI, the 

Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), and the IMU/IMCA have 

regional goals approaching the bin Laden/Zawahiri vision; and each have 

yet to support operations on another continent.37 Even the Asian cosignatories to the 1998 “World Islamic Front” never left the gravity of 

their local Kashmiri or Bangladeshi issues, giving slight indication they 

were part of a global movement save their signatures on a piece of paper. 

Many groups have supporters abroad in Western nations, but the lack of 

converting support cells into attacking operatives may reflect a calculation 

where the negative consequences of attacking host countries outweighs the 

indirect locally gained benefits. Mahgreb groups such as the Armed 

Islamic Group (GIA), Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), and 

the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), have conducted attacks against 

Western targets outside of their objective domain and reflect the most 

transnational modus operandi akin to Al Qaeda. 

It is understood some of the salafist mujahedin groups are a loose 

regional alliance, providing mutual support and occasionally bound by the 

ties of Al Qaeda. But none presently compare to the unique, central, and 

capable role the Al Qaeda leadership has served the salafist mujahedin 
16 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

movement to date. It is not clear how long the residual Afghanistan 

veteran network can serve as a conduit for cooperation. Abu Musab AlZarqawi is perhaps the only leader in a position to rally mujahedin for a 

cataclysmic contest in Iraq against the iconic Western superpower. If 

Zarqawi can survive bin Laden, Zawahiri, and his U.S. pursuers, he may 

have the reputation and the network to guide the global jihad. 

Having sustainable resources, however, is also key to a global role in 

the salafist jihad. It is hard to imagine a JI leader or an Afghan warlord 

having an orchestrating role without the ability to financially attract and 

support allegiance. The numerous small mujahedin movements such as 

the Bangladeshi Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI-B), Iraqi Ansar al-Islam 

(AI) or the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) will most 

likely remain isolated efforts unless their leaders establish diverse 

financial sources able to nurture outside mujahedin interest. 

Financing 

Terrorist operations require funding for recruitment and propaganda, 

housing and feeding of operatives, training camps, equipment and weapons, 

forged identity documents, communications, bribery and intelligence 

gathering.38 Although the 9/11 operation is estimated to have cost Al Qaeda 

between $400,000 to $500,000,39 the attack on the U.S.S. Cole between 

$5,000 to $10,000, and the Bali bombing $74,000,40 the upkeep of the 

organization at its height is estimated to be approximately $30 million a 

year. It should be noted, however, $10 million to $20 million of this 

figure was necessary to give annually to the Taliban for safe sanctuary.41

According to a UN study, 90 percent of Al Qaeda’s expenses would 

stem from infrastructure costs such as communications, protection, 

networks, and training facilities, while less than 10 percent of their 

expenses were operational costs.42 Al Qaeda may still pay for sanctuary 

today, but since it does not support the extensive training infrastructure it 

enjoyed in Afghanistan, it may have experienced a tradeoff of quantity of 

Al Qaeda cadre for lesser expenses. The lack of training facilities has 

made the use of affiliated groups and their locally trained ranks more 

important in executing operations on Al Qaeda’s behalf. Al Qaeda gave 

Jemaah Islamiah $130,000 between 1996 and 2001, with another account 

citing $200,000 paid for operations beginning 2000.43
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 17

Major sources of revenue are available to terrorist organizations 

through charitable donations, businesses, and just about any illegal activity 

such as drug, weapon and immigrant trafficking, counterfeiting, forgery, 

kidnapping, etc. If access to a drug trade is not possible, the most 

lucrative monetary source available to Al Qaeda remains charitable 

donations. According to a 2003 United Nations Security Council report, 

Saudi charities alone send $800 million in funds overseas annually.44 The 

same source of charitable funding for Al Qaeda is available to other 

Islamic groups, and sharing the same agenda as Al Qaeda, is likely to 

garner the same support base, though Osama bin Laden enjoyed excellent 

social access to wealthy contacts. Despite the claim by Muntassir AlZayat, in his book Ayman Al-Zawahiri As I Knew Him, that the 9/11 

attacks dried up U.S. and European sources of income for jihadist causes, 

untraceable funds from Arab countries continue to suffice for jihadist 

movements.45

The 2002 UN report on Terrorism Financing states the past venues 

for Al Qaeda to receive money are still in place; in other words, the 

collaborative relationship of wealthy zakat sponsors, money laundering 

banks, businesses, and charity fronts that provided Al Qaeda $300 million 

to $500 million between 1991-2001 is still functioning today (with an 

approximate annual income of $50 million).46 Within the zakat system, 

the current individual or institutional brokers distributing religious-based 

contributions to charities or persons are probably the same who funneled 

money directly to Al Qaeda charities. These individuals or institutions are 

traditionally trusted and are unlikely to change unless implicated of 

willingly supporting terrorism. Even if not directly supported by 

sympathetic brokers within legitimate charities which have typical poor 

financial oversight, Al Qaeda can still be expected to have loyalists 

implanted within the organization to siphon off funds on Al Qaeda’s 

behalf.47 Front charities established by Al Qaeda and like-minded groups 

are assumed to be still functioning but under different guise. Charities, 

like the International Relations and Information Center (IRIC) established 

by Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law and responsible for funding Khalid 

Sheik Mohammed and Ramzi Yousef’s Bojinka operation, may have 

changed names but not intent. The IRIC operations and staff were 

assumed by another Islamic charity headed by an associate of the IRIC 
18 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

founder.48 The transfer of funds is still untraceable due to couriers and the 

broadly-used and unregulated hawla money transfer system. 

Small or local terrorist groups using simplistic attacks do not need 

large sums of money to execute operations, but sustaining a larger 

confederation of groups around the globe requires large sums to provide 

sanctuary, security, transport, and leverage with allied groups.49 Although 

charitable contacts are believed to deliver the bulk of Al Qaeda funds, 

business revenue has been part of Al Qaeda’s financial planning and has 

included joint ventures with other salafist mujahedin groups. When the 

hunt for Al Qaeda’s money sources began, Osama bin Laden dispersed Al 

Qaeda’s assets among different holding companies with investments in 

financial, commercial, and real estate institutions.50 Though some 

business holdings may be discovered, bin Laden has exhibited flexibility 

in creating new investments and keeping them distributed. 

Despite the government of Sudan confiscating his business holdings 

when he was evicted, bin Laden was able to reestablish new businesses 

elsewhere, replicating the same pattern he orchestrated in Southeast Asia. 

Businesses managed under JI members were started with initial capital 

from Al Qaeda with the intent to become profitable so as to provide 

income for the overall JI organization and local cells. Other businesses 

were established to be fronts in order to acquire equipment or launder 

money. The fronts were established at the rate of one a year between 1993 

and 1996 and included a bio medical lab, two trading companies, and a 

computer firm.51

For further security, Al Qaeda diversified some of their financial 

assets into commodities. Al Qaeda is assessed to have transferred as much 

as $20 million into diamonds and gemstones between 2000-2001.52 Al 

Qaeda also has assets in gold which have been reportedly shipped to 

Sudan in 2002, indicating the organization still has sufficient contacts in 

its former sanctuary.53

The fate of the Al Qaeda freighter fleet is also undetermined. Fifteen 

to fifty ships may have been under the control of Osama bin Laden at one 

time, generating income or supporting operations.54 Marmoun Darkanzali, 

a Syrian businessman in Germany is sought by Spain on charges he helped 

buy a freighter for Osama bin Laden in 1993.55 That Darkanzali was only 

being found out in 2004 attests to the organization’s ability to conceal its 

financial network. 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 19 

Any organization with the means to illicitly move personnel and 

equipment has the means to earn high profits from smuggling, apparently 

without moral reservation. Though the 9/11 commission report refutes Al 

Qaeda having access to Afghan drugs, the Taliban exhibited no hesitation 

in exclusively reserving this income to support their regime.56 Likewise, 

other Islamist groups have used drug trafficking for an easy, profitable, 

and sustainable revenue stream.57 Engaging in risky crimes such as 

robbery and kidnapping may be deemed as a last resort to groups or cells 

without support from significant outside funding. In the case of Al Qaeda, 

if it cannot tap into its significant holdings, various means to generate 

money, such as forgery and alien smuggling, is always possible to its cells 

although it may mean curtailing the scope of operations. 

More intriguing than how money is obtained, transferred, or 

laundered, is how someone retains control of the organization’s wealth 

and can direct its use. The diversity of Al Qaeda’s income origins and 

assets indicates a number of personnel are necessarily part of the financial 

management network. Al Qaeda’s financial committee is reportedly the 

largest of the leadership tier, consisting of approximately 20 financiers, 

bankers, and accountants to manage funds across the continents.58 Though 

a few individuals identified as financiers and members of the financial 

committee have been apprehended, there appears to remain a sufficient 

number of dedicated caretakers to keep things running. The remaining 

assets and managers of Al Qaeda’s financial base will be the most critical 

elements remaining of the top tier should attrition of key personalities be 

sufficient to cause organizational fragmentation. When Al Qaeda 

financiers find themselves unable to function at the service of a 

commander, they have the possibility of joining or supporting other 

salafist mujahedin groups and bringing powerful resources to local or 

regional actors in the Mahgreb, Southeast, South or Central Asia. 

Endowed with money and expertise, the inheritors can try to re-construct 

the inter-group relationships abandoned by Al Qaeda. 

Training and Convergence Points 

Even though the mujahedin prevailed over the Soviet-backed 

government in Afghanistan, throughout the 1990’s training camps run by 

Hekmatyar, Sayyaf, the Pakistani government, and other Islamic groups 
20 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

continued to provide jihadist training to Muslims arriving from around the 

world. In Al-Qaeda, Jason Burke writes, “...running camps was essential 

to sustained political and military success. Recruits, whatever their 

original background, naturally felt some allegiance to the group that 

trained them. An element of credit from the trainees’ subsequent activities 

was reflected on their patrons.”59 Hosting mujahedin around the globe in 

camps, schools, and safe houses helped establish the bonds needed for 

cooperative efforts. Social networks were enlarged and allies were found 

for future ventures. Just as nations do in war, groups or individuals 

incorporated the war interests of their allies. Though some trainees may 

have arrived with only a limited objective in mind, they often left with a 

greater sense of global jihad or found themselves part of a mujahedin 

network Al Qaeda would utilize in later years. In the role of benefactor 

and trainer, individuals such as Osama bin Laden became global leaders. 

If people such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG), Tohir Yuldashev (IMU), 

and Abu Bakar Bashir (JI) can generate the finances, find the sanctuary, 

and attract willing volunteers, they have the equal potential to become 

global figures of the jihadist movement. 

There is still evidence Al Qaeda has been able retain some of its 

training infrastructure in Pakistan. Though military training camps are 

harder to conceal, safe houses are still run to host new mujahedin. Al 

Qaeda was still operating safe houses for extremists in Pakistan as late as 

2003.60 Military hideouts and training for extremists were still available 

throughout tribal lands in regions of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in 

late 2004. Pakistan reported the presence of hundreds of foreign fighters 

in South Waziristan and the elimination of two foreign training camps in 

September 2004.61 In late November 2004, Pakistani forces destroyed 

training camps belonging to a militant South Waziristan tribesman, 

Abdullah Mahsud,62 who was once jailed at Guantanomo Bay and is 

blamed for the kidnapping and killing of Chinese engineers. The Pakistani 

Interior Minister accused Mahsud of harboring “foreign miscreants.”63 It 

remains to be seen if Pakistani military actions will have a lasting effect in 

deterring tribal leaders from hosting mujahedin. 

Meanwhile, a Philippine secret report indicated Jemmah Islamiah (JI) 

and Al Qaeda have been able to train in southern Philippine island 

enclaves for the past seven years. Al Qaeda operatives trained 

Indonesian/Malaysian JI recruits and Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 21 

members (MILF) which would serve to sustain selective Al Qaeda 

recruitment and ties to the JI affiliate organization.64

At least one Pakistani group has used their resources to support 

external interests of other groups, though public evidence is not 

overwhelming. As recently as 2004, the former Harakat ul-Mujahidin 

(HuM), now Jamiat ul-Ansar (JUA), has diverted fighters from its 

traditional Kashmir battleground to Afghanistan in order to fight 

American forces.65 JUA had until lately been led by Fazlur Rehman 

Khalil, a co-signatory with Osama bin Laden of the 1998 fatwa against the 

United States 

Besides providing sanctuary for jihadi training, the importance of 

Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s was its role in allowing a community 

of ideologues to come together, mutually support each other, and 

propagate their ideology. Free-lance terrorists came seeking sponsors for 

their plans. Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed were examples 

of those who utilized associations with various groups to obtain contacts, 

funding, and training to mount their own conceived operations. Jason 

Burke writes: 

Ramzi, in his short career, was involved with Arab veterans 

of the Afghan war of a dozen different nationalities, bankers 

from half the countries in the Gulf, a series of different 

Islamic militants, several former Afghan mujahideen leaders, 

Pakistani sectarian terrorists and a whole range of recruits he 

found in Bangkok, Manila, New York, Peshawar, Quetta and 

Karachi. Bin Laden’s involvement in any of this was 

tangential at best.

66

Afghanistan provided a convergence point and gave birth to a 

worldwide phenomenon and network to sustain it. Returning Afghan 

veterans perpetuated the vision and shared their deadly skills in their own 

lands. In remote regions of Yemen, the Sahara, Sub-Sahara, South Asia, 

or other places where the central government is weak, such as in South 

Lebanon, aspiring mujahedin could find sufficient haven to conduct 

training, but not in the open atmosphere the Taliban once provided. 

International vigilance and pressure has compelled lax governments to 

control militant groups in their midst. In the case of Indonesia and 
22 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

Lebanon, the government may be limited by geography or military 

capability in how much control it can exert in its own territory. In the case 

of Yemen, which had an emerging mujahedin group by the name of 

Islamic Army of Aden, the government was successful in disbanding or 

co-opting the group. Yemen’s actions denied Al Qaeda one less group it 

could lean on. 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 23 

IV. Allies and Affiliates 

Osama bin Laden’s February 1998 fatwa against the United States 

from the “World Islamic Front” symbolized the united passion of the 

salafist mujahedin but also its diversification. Co-signed not just by his 

Egyptian co-conspirators, but also by representatives of jihad movements 

in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the fatwa clearly revealed disparate groups 

can ally themselves for common cause. The Al Qaeda core represents 

only the most ambitious portion of a grander salafist insurgency seeking to 

establish Islamic states via terrorist means. In describing the 

indeterminate number of jihad groups in Afghanistan before the Taliban’s 

fall, the journalist Jason Burke describes autonomous nature of the groups 

despite their shared passions: 

But though they may see bin Laden as a heroic figure, 

symbolic of their collective struggle, individuals and 

groups have their own leaders and their own agenda, often 

ones that are deeply parochial and which they will not 

subordinate to those of bin Laden or his close associates. 

Until recently, many were deeply antipathetic to bin Laden. 

As many remain rivals of bin Laden as have become 

allies.67

Salafist mujahedin groups have been established specific to their own 

local conditions without the direction of Osama bin Laden and the Al 

Qaeda organization. These groups received material assistance from 

Osama bin Laden at times or became allied, but the underlying 

philosophical underpinnings of a segment of the Muslim community will 

continue to feed the formation of independent, like-minded Al Qaeda 

groups.68 To illustrate the depth of the salafist mujahedin movement, the 

next two segments discuss three groups linked to Al Qaeda, each starting 

with an independent history but eventually combining their operations 

under the umbrella organization. 
24 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

The Maturation of the Moroccan Affiliate 

A large portion of the Moroccan populace is alienated from its 

constitutional monarchy due to a desire for greater democracy and 

political reform. Political disenfranchisement coupled with conditions of 

high unemployment, high illiteracy rates, and low per capita income 

widened the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism.69 Morocco experienced 

Islamic radicalism in 1969 with the birth of the Shabiba Islamiya (Islamic 

Youth) movement. The group was banned and split into two factions, one 

evolving into the government-accepted PJD party, the other into the 

unrecognized Al Islah wa al-Tawhid. The lineage of Moroccan terrorist 

groups from Shabiba Islamiya is not clear; but members probably 

volunteered for the Afghan-Soviet war and returned with new ideas for 

commencing “jihad” at home. The indigenous extremist group, Salafia 

Jihadia (SJ), was founded in the early 1990s by veterans of the Afghan 

war.70 Salafia Jihadia and another terrorist group, Takfir wal-Hijra 

(Judgement on the Infidels), were responsible for approximately 300 

murders across Morocco metting out Islamic justice for non-Islamic 

behavior. By 2002, it had 400 known members and was alleged to be 

providing logistical support to the Saudi Al Qaeda cell plotting attacks on 

the Straits of Gibraltar.71

An audiotape released in February 2003 and attributed to bin Laden, 

described Morocco as “ripe for liberation,” giving indications of 

impending attacks.72 The following month on May 16, 2003, twelve 

suicide bombers in Casablanca conducted five coordinated attacks on 

Western and Jewish targets, killing 45 people.73 More targets were 

intended, but some of the would-be attackers failed to execute their 

missions, suggesting the home-spun attackers were not under the tutelage 

of Al Qaeda, but may have been merely inspired by the bin Laden’s call to 

jihad.74 The government blamed the attacks on SJ, which advocated 

violence and war against infidels. Eighteen Moroccans eventually 

received heavy sentences for their participation; ten were accused of 

belonging to SJ, the remaining eight men were accused of belonging to a 

second group, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) whose 

members were accused of being trained in Afghanistan and receiving 

support from Al Qaeda.75
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 25 

The GICM emerged after SJ in the late 1990s with the aim to 

establish an Islamic state in Morocco and support Al Qaeda’s jihad against 

the West.76 Its initial membership also originated with Afghanistan war 

veterans. GICM reportedly has émigré groups throughout Europe and 

sustains itself through trafficking of arms and falsified documents.77

The relationship between the two Moroccan groups is not clear; SJ 

appears to operate within Morocco, while GICM has a focus abroad, either 

through deliberation or by default of its immigrant operatives. Moroccan 

individuals, whose membership in either organization is not discernable, 

tie the groups together through personal association while also providing 

links to the Al Qaeda umbrella organization. 

On March 11, 2004, explosions ripped through the Madrid train 

station killing 191 people, and injuring 2,000. A group calling itself the 

“Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigades” and claiming to act on the behalf of Al 

Qaeda took credit for the attack while demanding Spain’s withdrawal from 

Iraq.78 Twenty of the 24 people charged to date with the Madrid attacks 

are Moroccan. The bombings have been subsequently attributed to the 

GICM. Its leader for this attack was initially believed to be Jamal 

Zougam, a 30 year-old Moroccan from Tangiers. Serhane ben Abdelmajid 

Fakhet, a Tunisian who had worked in Morocco before moving to Spain, 

was later identified as the ringleader.79 Fakhet and six other terrorists, all 

Moroccan, died in a self-detonated explosion during the police siege of 

their Madrid apartment in April 2004. 

The Ties that Bind 

The GICM coordinator of the Madrid bombings was the Tunisian, 

Serhane Fakhet. Though first believed to be the architect of the plan, 

Italian telephone wiretaps revealed an Egyptian, Rabei Osman Ahmed, as 

the self-confessed mastermind of the bombings. In the years prior to the 

bombing, Ahmed was financed for unspecific purposes by a Saudi cleric, 

purportedly a friend of Osama bin Laden.80 If Ahmed is a paid operative 

of Al Qaeda, then a direct tie to the GICM operation can be linked. 

One of the prime suspects in the Madrid bombings is Jamal Zougam, 

a Moroccan cell phone shop owner who has ties with SJ and numerous 

personalities in the terrorist web. He is a follower of Imad Eddin Barakat 

Yarkas, aka Abu Dahdah, a leader of a Spanish Al Qaeda cell. In a 2001 
26 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

telephone conversation, Zougam tells Abu Dahdah he is ready and willing 

to provide finances to Mohamed Fizazi, the spiritual leader of SJ.81 

Zougam’s role is perplexing in that it is not discernable whether he is part 

of the Spanish Al Qaeda cell or one of the two Moroccan groups, but he 

apparently knows key figures of both. Zougam represents a human node 

connecting linkages of Islamic terrorist groups bound via shared ideology 

and personal relationships (see Figure 1). Zougam also personally knew 

two Moroccan suspects in the Casablanca bombings, the brothers, 

Abdelaziz Benyaich and Salaheddin Benyaich. The Benyaich brothers 

temporarily stayed with an Al Qaeda member in 1998, David Courtailler, 

who had connections to Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reed.82

Al-Zarqawi 

Network Al

Qaeda

Al Qaeda 

Spanish Cell

Moroccan 

Islamic 

Combatant 

Group (MO)

Salafiya 

Jihadia (MO)

Amer El-Azizi (MO)

Casablanca

Osman Ahmed

911

Serhane Fakhet

Imad Yarkas

Jamal Zougam (MO)

Mohammed 

Fizazi (MO)

Benyaich 

brothers (MO)

Karim el-Mejjati (MO)

Madrid

“Abu-Hafs al-Masri 

Brigades”

Known Ties

Tentative Ties

Figure 1. The Moroccan Networks

An additional key Moroccan player is Amer el-Azizi, an Afghanistan 

veteran who served as an Al Qaeda emissary to extremist cells in Europe. 

He was in contact with Yarkas and is believed to have been a close 

associate of Zougam.83 Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the head of another 

terrorist network, was Azizi’s benefactor between the 9/11 attacks and the 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 27

Madrid bombing.84 Another Moroccan believed to be a high level 

member within the loose affiliation of Al Qaeda groups, Karim el-Mejjati, 

is suspected to be an accomplice to both Casablanca and Madrid bombings 

and is still at large.85

Investigations to date have not established a hierarchal linkage 

between the mujahedin; instead a picture is forming of a family of separate 

groups with members who can interoperate between them. While SJ may 

remain committed to waging jihad in Morocco and allowing itself to host 

Al Qaeda in preparation for its Strait of Gibraltar attack, the GICM may 

consist of SJ members spun off specifically to conduct operations in 

Europe at the behest of Al Qaeda. They may have been recruited while at 

training camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan and were subsequently 

supplemented by non-Moroccans. Citing intelligence and police reports 

following two months of investigation, Baltasar Garzon, the Spanish 

investigating judge for the Madrid train bombing, assessed Morocco was 

home to roughly 100 “Al Qaeda cells,” each cell consisting of 5-10 

members.86 Based on documents found in Al Qaeda premises, Moroccan 

authorities estimate 600 Moroccans have trained in Al Qaeda camps in 

Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. The Moroccan government cannot 

account for the whereabouts of 400 of the attendees,87 signifying the 

mujahedin could be in Europe, Morocco, or elsewhere. 

More than one reason could explain why the GICM targeted Spain. 

First, there are a large number of legal and illegal Moroccan immigrants in 

the country, making it a convenient staging ground for Al Qaeda-inspired 

attacks in Europe. Secondly, Morocco has historical colonial grievances 

with the Spanish, making it a sentimental “imperialist target” for 

Moroccan jihadists.88 Even as recently as December 2004, four GICM 

members were arrested in the Spanish Canary Islands suspected of 

establishing a new base. Lastly, as an Al Qaeda Internet posting warned 

before the attack, and as the “Abu Hafs Al-Mari Brigades” claimed 

afterward, the attack was a concentrated effort to remove Spanish troops 

from Iraq.89 The combination of having a pre-positioned proxy cell of 

Moroccan ex-patriots in Spain (GICM) timed with Spanish involvement in 

Iraq, gave Al Qaeda an opportunity to strike another blow at the West. 
28 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

Al Qaeda Lite 

If there was one organization coming close to resembling Al Qaeda 

on a smaller scale, it is Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Since its inception, it has 

had a collaborative alliance with Al Qaeda. The number of followers 

within the JI is unknown; the U.S. State Department’s 2003 Patterns of 

Global Terrorism states the number can range between the hundreds to 

thousands. Suffice to say, the JI has sufficient members to conduct 

operations within Indonesia and throughout Southeast Asia, having proven 

the capability to create cells and stage operations in Thailand, Singapore, 

and the Philippines. It also has a mature, intact income-producing 

apparatus composed of charities, front companies, hawala banking 

proceeds, gold/gem smuggling, and petty crime90 and historically has 

established training grounds throughout remote parts of Indonesia and 

southern Philippine Islands. Given income, remote locations, and a 

following, JI would seem poised to assume a commanding lead of the 

jihad scene following a setback for Al Qaeda. Already, signs indicate Al 

Qaeda is increasingly relying on the region to hide its money, though JI 

and Al Qaeda maintain separate control of their funds.91

The JI has suffered numerous setbacks of its own with the arrest of 

two of its founding leaders and arrest of approximately 250 members in 

December 2003.92 Commentators cannot agree on the amount JI has been 

diminished, however, factors such as social ties through marriage, 

extremist Muslim boarding schools, and a membership suspected to be in 

the thousands across a vast archipelago will contribute to the group’s 

resiliency.93 Evidence of the type of progeny that an intact or fractured 

larger group can produce is noted by Mujahidin KOMPAK, a Muslim 

extremist group on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi (differing in its 

rashness and impatience), Laskar Mujahidin, and Laskar Jundullah. Many 

of the leaders are derived from the JI, and the groups share the same goals 

and desire for self-sufficiency.94

Like Al Qaeda, JI fostered relationships with foreign mujahedin 

groups to enlist support for training and operations. Aside from its 

extensive collaboration with Al Qaeda, mutual support was given and 

received from the Malaysian KMM and Philippine MILF, respectively. 

How much remains of the personal ties that typically cement these inter-
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 29 

group relationships is unknown, but Hambli and Bashir’s detention has 

possibly weakened some bonds. 

Due to the Indonesian government’s increased seriousness about not 

allowing jihadist groups to thrive under their noses, no outstanding leader 

has risen to level of prominence as Bashir (who is still highly visible 

during his trial). Abu Rusdan, the supposed spiritual replacement for 

Bashir, is still fulfilling his short prison sentence, but the 2004 bombing of 

the Australian Embassy proves JI is functioning regardless. JI has a 

networked organization which can continue to function as long as 

operative cells can produce revenue, or receive a hand-out from Al Qaeda. 

The Indonesian group has a common history, the infrastructure, and colocation to Al Qaeda’s assets to be an attractive refuge for a decimated Al 

Qaeda organization. 

The Iraqi Jihad 

With the resounding loss of Afghanistan as a fundamentalist state, the 

salafist jihad objective of establishing a Caliphate has been severely 

disrupted. Iraq now serves as their new jihadi front and a fresh 

opportunity to establish an Islamic state under sharia law. The Jordanian 

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi currently is the most prominent figurehead of an 

insurgent movement in Iraq fighting against coalition forces. Although it 

is speculated he was linked to Al Qaeda before Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

his affiliation with the organization before 2004 is debatable and reports 

indicate he was previously at odds with the organization.95 Zarqawi 

headed his own mujahedin group during the 1980s, formed his own Jund 

al-Shams Jordanian network, initially sending them to an Al Qaeda 

training camp in 1999.96 He eventually ran his own training camps near 

Heart, Afghanistan, in 2000, utilizing his own funding and recruiting 

streams, illustrating that many activists in Afghanistan and Pakistan were 

capable of operating independently from Osama bin Laden.97 By 2001, 

Zarqawi established the Al Tawid group in Germany, demonstrating the 

generic terrorist pattern of importing recruits to training camps and then 

deploying them abroad to form franchise groups or cells under direct 

control. Like most foreign mujahedin, Zarqawi had to flee Afghanistan 

after the fall of the Taliban and ended up in Iraq where he re-established 
30 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

contacts with Arab donors.98 He may have been welcomed by Baathists 

who were willing to support a guerilla veteran with an anti-U.S. passion. 

Although he has been active in Iraq since mid-2003, recent evidence 

indicates Zarqawi was not an Al Qaeda associate until late 2004. A copy 

of a letter attributed to him was captured in January 2004 and is believed 

to be addressed to Osama bin Laden.99 In it, Zarqawi reports on the 

situation within Iraq and his strategy for engagement, but the language in 

the letter does not leave one with the impression it is a report from a 

subordinate to his commander. Zarqawi acknowledges the addressee as 

the figurehead of the global jihad, but the letter insinuates his jihad in Iraq 

is an independent effort with the possibility of competing with Osama’s 

limelight when he states, “We do not see ourselves as fit to challenge you, 

and we have never striven to achieve glory for ourselves....” Zarqawi 

describes his campaign as “the spearhead, the enabling vanguard,” with 

which he hopes to achieve a victory to establish an Islamic state. The 

letter concludes with a solicitation to the recipient to support Zarqawi’s 

campaign; it does not resemble a request for additional funds to something 

already supported. In fact, Zarqawi indicates he has yet to swear fealty, or 

bayat, to the recipient—something that Al Qaeda operatives swear to bin 

Laden before being assigned an important mission. Though Zarqawi 

concludes with a statement that he and the addressee share a common 

vision, he acknowledges there is room for disagreement. It does not have 

the tone of supplication but of coalition building. 

It is not evident what Zarqawi was in need of, whether it was funding, 

fighters, weapons, or the Al Qaeda name for recruitment purposes. The 

letter was captured before his suspected Fallujah base was overrun in 

November 2004. The writing on the wall of his hideout, “Al Qaeda 

Organization,”100 indicates he swore bayat to Al Qaeda sometime in 

October 2004 and changed the name of his organization from “Jam’at alTawid wa’al Jihad” to “Al Qaeda in Iraq.”101 Zarqawi must have had his 

own source of recruiting, supply, and funding to run insurgent operations 

prior to his subordination to bin Laden. The Iraqi hawala system was and 

remains intact to funnel funds from outside donors.102 U.S. officials 

confirm there are ample finances available to the insurgency originating 

from loyal Baathists, Hussein relatives, charities, and Saudi donors who 

still transfer money through Syria.103
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 31 

But why would Zarqawi need the assistance of bin Laden, if the usual 

terrorist business practices were available to him? Perhaps for the simple 

reason he could not elicit the necessary amount of support to expand 

operations as the reputable bin Laden name could, or he lacked sufficient 

personal contacts for sustained avenues of funding. After all, if Zarqawi 

envisions Iraq to be the jihad frontier and a replacement for Afghanistan, 

he requires more fighters, and notably those with the same Islamic fervor 

as the Afghanistan mujahedin. He complains in the letter attributed to 

him, “we are striving urgently...to create companies of mujahedin” in 

order to have a sufficiently overt fielded fighting force. Zarqawi’s 

disappointment in current recruits is plain, however, when he refers to the 

secular Iraqis as those who “still prefer safety and returning to the arms of 

their wives;” they obviously were still uncommitted to the idea of 

martyrdom. 

As much as Iraq symbolizes the opportunity to plant democracy in the 

Middle East, Iraq symbolizes as grand an opportunity to the salafists. The 

conditions must seem favorable from their viewpoint: the fall of a secular 

regime in the Arab heartland; an unshackled, disgruntled populace fresh to 

the ideas of salafist Islam; and an American enemy (“easy quarry”) to rally 

behind the jihad banner.104 Osama bin Laden is the most recognizable 

jihadist in the world; if Zarqawi can benefit from the association and 

realize his dream in Iraq, he could potentially usurp bin Laden as the 

leader of the global Jihad. Unfortunately for the United States, Iraq has 

the potential to be another breeding ground for additional terrorist 

networks that individuals like Osama bin Laden or his successor can 

exploit. Just as Osama used the social contacts between mujahedin groups 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan to form an umbrella global network of 

cooperative jihad organizations and foot soldiers, Iraq’s battleground 

could provide Al-Zarqawi a similar environment should he survive and 

achieve some foothold. Without geography to aid him and unity of effort 

of the Iraqi populace, however, he will likely fail. 

Zarqawi’s group represents one upstart organization in Iraq with the 

potential to take a leading role in the global jihad. Perhaps nothing 

illustrates the regenerative capability of the salafist mujahedin and the 

incorporation of residual extremist networks into succeeding groups better 

than Ansar al-Islam (AI). Following the disruption of Al Qaeda 

operations with the loss of Afghanistan, AI began in December 2001 as a 
32 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

Kurdish/Arab group to create an independent Islamic state in Iraq. The 

U.S. State Department describes AI as a distinct but allied group with Al 

Qaeda that trained its members in Al Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan. It is 

attributed to providing refuge to Al Qaeda fighters after their Afghan 

rout.105

The origin of AI began with the founding Kurd, Mullah Krekar, who 

was exiled to Europe over ten years ago and singularly focused on Kurdish 

northern Iraq. Notably, a Lebanese, Abu Mohammed Lubnani (aka 

Mustapha Darwich Ramadan), is now the leader of the group, bearing 

evidence the group has an expanded membership beyond Kurdish origins. 

AI has begun to attract numerous recruits from Europe and the Middle 

East to join the jihad against U.S. presence by utilizing recruitment and 

smuggling networks that may have, or continues to be used, by Al Qaeda. 

Lubnani (who lived in Denmark for 14 years) probably added his own 

personal network to the nascent AI, but attesting to the role personal 

contacts play in maintaining networks and bridging distinct groups, 

Abderrazak Mahdjoub (an Algerian immigrant) has been identified as 

being associated both with Al Qaeda’s 9/11 Hamburg cell and smuggling 

fighters into Iraq for AI.106 Again, as in the Moroccan example, 

sympathetic individuals possess dual roles or membership in separate 

organizations – willing and able to serve emerging and established 

organizations. What is also clear in examining AI, is the recruitment base 

for salafist jihad is growing; although depleted by U.S. attacks in 2003, AI 

membership has resurged to its pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom levels.107 AI 

attacks are currently confined to Iraq, but it is not beyond expectation for 

the group to expand its scope to other areas. If the battle of Iraq is 

perceived as the beginning of a greater Islamic caliphate, the mujahedin 

may decide to broaden the front. 

The generation of terrorists bound together by their Afghanistan 

experience is being rolled back through the combined counter-terrorism 

measures of allied nations. A new class of mujahedin is being inducted in 

Iraq, but with dimmer prospects for victory than their predecessors. After 

the war culminates in victory for the current Iraqi government, the 

surviving mujahedin are likely to disperse to their native lands, but not 

without the use of a new socially-based operational network to potentially 

continue the jihad. 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 33 

Hopefully, the most stunning blow to the global salafist mujahedin 

movement, more than the physical elimination of the Al Qaeda core 

leadership, would be the moral loss of Iraq to Coalition forces and the 

establishment of a secular, liberal government. The myth and momentum 

of the mujahedin, which started with victory over the Soviet superpower 

and slowed with the fall of the Taliban, might be diffused by the 

democratization of Iraq. Even in a war of ideologies, tangible success or 

failure, eventually matters. 

Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 35 

V. Conclusion 

Due to the current resiliency of the salafist jihad ideology and lack of 

political freedom and economic opportunity in the Muslim world, there is 

no lack of recruits to wish harm to the United States and its allies. 

Matching intent with means, however, remains dependent on linkage to an 

organization with an ability to execute successful operations via 

leadership, resources, and means. 

The decapitation strategy of eradicating the top leadership of Al 

Qaeda may be assumed to have the effect of fragmenting the organization 

to a point of ineffectiveness. To date, attrition of key figures has probably 

slowed operations, but the core leadership, its cells, and allies are still 

threaded together by relationships involving bin Laden, Zawahiri, and 

their lieutenants. The number of key social “hubs” in the organization are 

unknown, as are the number of corresponding alliances and franchises; to 

this end, it is hardly known when all the targets have been hit. 

Post mortem bin Laden, the remnants of top tier personnel will most 

likely have financial means available to them due to the diverse 

distribution of monetary assets currently in place. Survivors could merge 

with another salafist mujahedin group, reforming its leadership from 

within the old Al Qaeda or adopting a leader from the new partner. 

Potential candidates for merger could stem from the independent groups 

that have executed the majority of the post 9/11 attacks (Al-Zarqawi, Abu 

Sayyaf, AI, SJ, GICM, GSPC, JI, etc.)108

In his essay, Killing In the Name of God, Jerrold Post proposes four 

scenarios following the elimination of Osama bin Laden from the Al 

Qaeda movement. Given the following: Al Qaeda’s reliance on 

individuals to sustain social networks for coordination and access; a steady 

stream of revenue to sustain remote cells and procure allegiance; and the 

need for ambitious and competent leadership, the most likely outcome 

proposed by Post is one predicting the dispersal of Al Qaeda 

members/cells into other local salafist mujahedin groups. While he 

expects regional or local jihads to persist and transnational operations to 

abate in this scenario, I propose regional and local groups will eventually 

expand their operations as financial and social ties are re-sown. Even if 

short of success in his local arena, a leader with burgeoning resources can 
36 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

establish his own franchise abroad, forge new alliances, and widen the 

jihad to again engage the “far enemy” – as long as the idea of resurrecting 

Islamic power through militant jihad continues to appeal. 

A successful U.S.-Iraqi conclusion to the insurgency in Iraq could 

deliver a severe setback to the aspirations of salafi jihadists, while the 

pursuit of entities affiliated with Al Qaeda can dissuade collaboration and 

alliances. The United States should not be mistaken, however, into 

thinking the dismemberment of Al Qaeda will mean an end to the war on 

terrorism. Constant identification and prosecution of salafist mujahedin 

will be necessary to curb a growing and adaptive threat. 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 37

Notes 

1. Testimony of Marc Sageman during the hearing of the National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim World, 9 

July 2003, On-line, Internet, 10 Dec 2004, available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 

security/library/congress/9-11commission/030709-sageman.htm. 

2. Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York, 

N.Y.: The Modern Library, 2003), 20. 

3. Ibid., xv. 

4. Ibid., 26. 

5. Ibid., 28. 

6. If listed, spelling is derived from the U.S. State Department’s list of Foreign 

Terrorist Organizations available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2004/35167.htm. 

7. Lewis, 151. 

8. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London, U.K.: I.B. Tauris 

& Co, 2003), 33-36. 

9. Ibid, 34. 

10. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s 

War Against America (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 2003), 468. 

11. Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “Who is Abu Zarqawi?” The Weekly 

Standard, 18 May 2004, Vol. 09, Issue 35, On-line, Internet, 11 December 2004, 

available from http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/ 

094npvzg.asp?pg=1. The article also reports Zarqawi denies having chemical weapons, 

although he states he would use them against Israel if he did. 2003 Patterns of Global 

Terrorism, U.S. Government Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, April 

2004), 116, also refers to a chemical/toxin weapon expertise within Ansar al-Islam. 

12. The loss of favorable global Muslim public opinion towards the U.S. is 

documented in The 9/11 Commission Report (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & 

Company, 2004). 

13. Lewis, 80. 

14. The 9/11 Commission Report, 166. 
38 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

15. Marc Sageman, “Understanding Al Qaeda Networks,” slide brief, National 

Institute for Standards and Technology, date unknown, 18, On-line, Internet, 10 

December 2004, available from www.bfrl.nist.gov/PSSIWG/presentations/Understanding 

_al_Qaeda_Networks.pdf. 

16. Ibid, 18-22. 

17. Gary Servold, “The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Radicalism,” in Know Thy 

Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures, ed. Barry R. 

Schneider et al. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2003), 55. 

18. The 9/11 Commission Report, 165. 

19. A display of social and operational Al Qaeda linkages created by Marc Sageman 

reveal parallel relationships and social nodes presented by key personalities. Sageman, 

“Understanding Al Qaeda Networks,” 7-27. 

20. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Terrorism, 

Al Qaeda, and the Muslim World, July 9, 2003, 10. 

21. The 9/11 Commission Report, 68. 

22. Owais Tohid, “Next wave of Al Qaeda Leadership,” Christian Science Monitor, 

5 October 2004, On-line, Internet, 10 December 2004, available from 

http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1005/p01s04-wosc.html. 

23. Youssef Aboul-Enein, Ayman Al-Zawahiri: The Ideologue of Modern Islamic 

Militancy (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2004), 14. 

24. Ibid, 12. 

25. Besides Bin Laden’s son and the aforementioned Egyptians, the Egyptian 

Tharwat Salah Shihatah is also believed to have been detained in Iran since 2002. It is 

suspected Shihatah formed a separate group when the EIJ merged with Al Qaeda. 

26. Douglas Farah and Dana Priest, “Key Al Qaeda role for bin Laden son,” 

Washington Post, 14 October 2003, On-line, Internet, 13 December 2004, available from 

http://www.msnbc.com/news/979918.asp?cp1=1. 

27. Ibid. 

28. Yael Shahar, “Al Qaeda’s links to Iranian Security Services,” International 

Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 20 January 2004, On-line, Internet, 14 December 

2004, available from http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=460. 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 39 

29. Ibragim Alibekov, “IMU Reportedly Expands, Prepares to Strike Western 

Targets,” EurasiaNet.org, 29 October 2002, On-line, Internet, 20 February 2005, 

available from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav102902.shtml. 

30. Burke, 55. Rabbani and Sayyaf were the most prominent of Osama Bin Laden’s 

contacts when he first arrived in Pakistan in 1980. 

31. “Profile: Gulbiddin Hekmatyar,” BBC News, 28 January 2003, On-line, Internet, 

14 December 2004, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/ 

2701547.stm. 

32. Rabbani, Sayyaf and Hekmatyar comprised the leadership of an early Afghan 

Islamist group, the Muslim Youth Organization. Like the Arab salafist leaders, they also 

came from relatively wealthy families and were university educated. Burke, 63-64. 

33. Ibid., 21-22. 

34. Patricia Gossman, “A Setback for Afghan Justice; Karzai’s Error,” The 

International Herald Tribune, 6 May 2004, On-line, Lexis Nexis, 14 December 2004. 

35. The 9/11 Commission Report, 146. 

36. Followers, who see themselves as part of the global jihad, are more willing to 

attack targets outside of the local area, as has been seen when members cross 

organizational lines. 

37. Based on review of U.S. State Department’s 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism. 

38. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed-and How to Stop 

It, (Chicago, Il.: Bonus Books, 2003), 1. 

39. The 9/11 Commission Report, 172. 

40. Jean-Charles Brisard, Terrorism Financing: The Roots and Trends of Saudi 

Terrorist Financing, report for the President of Security Council United Nations (New 

York, 19 December 2003), 6, On-line, Internet, 13 December 2004, available from 

http://www.sos-attentats.org/juridique/documents/Terrorismfinancing.pdf. 

41. The 9/11 Commission Report, 170-171. 

42. Brisard, 7. 

43. Zachary Abusa, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network 

of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah,” National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis, 
40 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

December 2003,Vol 14, Number 5, On-line, Internet, 16 December 2004, available from 

http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/vol14no5/145.pdf. 

44. Ehrenfeld, 2-3. 

45. Aboul-Enein, 13. 

46. Brisard, 3. 

47. Zachary Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network 

of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah,” 25. 

48. Ibid, 28. 

49. Brisard, 7. 

50. Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden; the Man Who Declared War on America 

(Roseville, Ca.: Prima Publishing, 2001), 314. 

51. Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al 

Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah,” 34-35. 

52. Douglas Farah, “Report says Africans Harbored Al Qaeda; Terror Assets 

Hidden in Gem-buying Spree,” Washington Post, 29 December 2002, On-line, Lexis 

Nexis, 14 December 2004. 

53. Douglas Farah, “Al Qaeda Gold Moved to Sudan,” Washington Post, 3 

September 2002, On-line, Internet, 14 December 2004, available from 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A27535-2002Sep2?language=printer. 

54. John Mintz, “15 Freighters Believed to be Linked to Al Qaeda,” Washington 

Post, 31 December 2002, On-line, Lexis Nexis, 14 Dec 2004. 

55. Peter Conradi and Justin Sparks, “Bin Laden Bought Ship ‘for Terror,’” Sunday 

Times, 17 October 2004, On-line, Lexis Nexis, 14 December 2004. 

56. The 9/11 Commission Report, 171. 

57. Ehrenfeld, 12. 

58. Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al 

Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah,” 8. 

59. Burke, 96. 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 41 

60. “Australian terror suspect trained at Al-Qaeda camp, court told,” Agence France 

Presse, 24 November 2004, On-line, Lexis Nexis, 15 December 2004. 

61. Reports Attribute Foreign Presence in Waziristan to either Al Qaeda or the 

Uzbek IMU. Refer to “Pakistan Tightening Noose around Al-Qaeda militants,” Pakistan 

Press International, 18 September 2004, On-line, Lexis Nexis, 15 December 2004, or 

Michael Redman, “Central Asian Militant Group Remains Active in Pakistan,” 

EurasiaNet.org, 24 March 2004, On-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032404.shtml. 

62. “Pakistan destroys militant training camps near Afghanistan,” AFX News 

Limited, 21 November 2004, On-line, Nexis Lexis, 15 December 2004. 

63. Makhdoom Babar, “Chinese Engineers Rescued through Commando Action,” 

Daily Mail, October 2004, On-line, Internet, 15 December 2004, available from 

http://dailymailnews.com/200410/15/news/102.html. 

64. Jim Gomez, “Secret Government Report Shows Al-Qaida-Linked Militants 

Conducted Terror Training In Philippines For At Least Seven Years,” Associated Press, 

22 September 2004, On-line, Lexis Nexis, 16 December 2004. 

65. Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Lets Taliban Train, Prisoner Says,” New York Times, 4 

August 2004, Section A; column 1, On-line, Lexis Nexis, 15 December 2004. 

66. Burke, 94. 

67. Ibid., 14. 

68. The 9/11 Commission Report, 58. 

69. “Country Profile: Morocco,” BBC News, 13 July 2004, On-line, Internet, 3 

October 2004, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_ 

profiles/791867.stm 

70. Andrew Hussy, “A Country on the Edge,” New Statesman, 17 March 2003, Online, Internet, available from Find Articles.com, 30 September 2004. 

71. Ibid. 

72. “New FBI Terror Warnings,” CBSNews.com, 19 May 2003, On-line, Internet, 

27 September 2004, available from http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/20/attack/ 

main554765.shtm. 
42 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

73. “Death Sentences for Morocco Bombings,” BBC News, 19 August 2003, Online, Internet, 26 September 2004, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/ 

3162285.stm. 

74. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, 471. 

75. “Jail Terms in Morocco Terror Trials,” BBC News, 28 September 2003, On-line, 

Internet, 26 September 2004, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/ 

3145834.stm. 

76. “French Hold Morocco Bomb Suspects,” BBC News, 5 April 2004, On-line, 

Internet, 3 October 2004, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/ 

3599745.stm 

77. Benjamin Keating, “In the Spotlight: Moroccan Combatant Group,” Center for 

Defense Information, 21 May 2004, On-line, Internet, 4 October 2004, available from 

http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=2227&from_page=/index.cfm. 

78. “Extract: Al Qaeda Warns of More Attacks,” BBC News, 18 March 2004, Online, Internet, 28 September 2004, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 

3859587.stm. 

79. “Piecing Together Madrid Bombers Past,” BBC News, 5 April 2004, On-line, 

Internet, 27 September 2004, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/ 

3600421.stm. 

80. Daniel Woolls, “Suspect in Madrid Train Bombing was Bankrolled by Saudi 

Cleric,” Associated Press, 30 September 2004, On-line, Lexis Nexis, 4 Oct 2004. 

81. “Algerian Suspect Brought before Madrid Court,” Associated Press, USA 

Today, 17 March 2004, On-line, Internet, 4 October 2004, available from 

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-03-17-spain-court_x.htm. 

82. Transcript of “Fallout from Terror in Spain,” CNN NewsNight with Aaron 

Brown, 16 March 2004, On-line, Internet, 4 October 2004, available from 

http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0403/16/asb.00.html. 

83. “Morocco: Overview,” Ackerman Group LCC, 19 April 2004, On-line, Internet, 

4 Oct 2004, available from http://www.ackermangroup.com/docs/sampleforecast.htm. 

84. Leiken and Brooke. 

85. “Spain Charges Two More in Bombings,” Associated Press, 30 Mar 2004, Online, Internet, 4 October 2004, available from http://www.morningsentinel.com/News/ 

2004/0330/Front_Page/009.html. 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 43 

86. Daniel Woolls, “Spain Judge Calls Morocco Terror Threat,” Associated Press, 

15 July 2004, On-line, Internet, 4 October 2004, available from 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51535-2004Jul15.html. 

87. “Morocco ‘Loses Track’ of Fighters,” BBC News, 25 July 2004, On-line, 

Internet, 3 October 2004, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/ 

3145913.stm. 

88. Elinor Shields, “Analysis: Madrid Terror Probe,” BBC News, 12 September 

2004, On-line, Internet, 28 September 2004, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 

world/europe/3647508.stm. 

89. Stephen Ulph, “Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigades: Fraud or Dissimulation?” The 

Jamestown Foundation; Terrorism Focus, 20 Aug 2004, Vol 1, Issue 2, On-line, Internet, 

4 October 2004, available from http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php? 

volume_id=403&issue_id=3049&article_id=2368408. The Abu Hafs Al-Mari Brigades 

group which claimed responsibility for the Madrid bombings is named after Mohammed 

Atef, one of the top Al Qaeda leaders who died in a U.S. air strike in Afghanistan. The 

group is reportedly active in Iraq, but Ulph proposes it isn’t a real group – only a cover 

organization that falsely claims a number of attacks, possibly as part of a disinformation 

campaign to confuse the western governments. The group has consistently issued threats 

to European governments. 

90. Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al 

Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah,” 5. 

91. Ibid., 8. 

92. Abusa, “The State of Jemaah Islamiya and the Future of Terrorism in Southeast 

Asia,” Terrorism Monitor, 30 January 2004, Vol 2, Issue 2, On-line, Internet, 20 

February 2005, available from http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php? 

volume_id=400&issue_id=2904&article_id=23506. 

93. “Jemaah Islamiya in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” Asia 

Report, No 63, 26 August 2003, On-line, Internet, 20 February 2005, available from 

http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=1452&1=1. 

94. “Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi,” Asia Report, No 74, 3 

February 2004, On-line, Internet, 20 February 2005, available from http://www.icg.org/ 

home/index.cfm?id=2500&1=1. 

95. Leiken and Brooke. 

96. Burke, 234. 
44 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda 

97. U.S. Department of the Treasury Press release, “JS-757; Treasury Designates Six 

Al-Qaida Terrorists,” 23 September 2003, On-line, Internet, 14 December 2004, available 

from http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js757.htm?SEARCH.X=23\&SEARCH.Y=5. 

98. “Jordanian Court Sentences Man for Collecting Funds for Al-Zarqawi Group,” 

Jordan Times, 1 November 2004, On-line, Nexis Lexis, 14 December 2004. 

99. Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, intercepted letter to unknown addressee, assessed by 

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to be Osama bin Laden, released by CPA 

February 2004, On-line, Internet, 10 December 2004, available from 

http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm. 

100. Liz Sly & James Janega, “Fallujah Safehouse Thought to be Former Zarqawi 

Hideout,” Chicago Tribune, 18 November 2004, On-line, Internet, 10 December 2004, 

available from http://www.charlotte.com/mld/charlotte/news/world/10217589.htm?1c. 

101. “Al Qaeda Site Urges Iraqi to Join Bin Laden,” Associated Press, 27 October 

2004, On-line, Internet, 10 December 2004, available from http://www.foxnews.com/ 

story/0,2933,136832,00.html. 

102. Vivienne Walt, “Iraq is a Hard Sell,” Time Online Edition, 22 March 2004, 

On-line, Internet, 11 December 2004, available from http://www.time.com/time/ 

globalbusiness/article/0,9171,1101040322-600897-2,00.html. 

103. Tom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Falluja Documents Help in Hunt for 

Insurgents,” The International Herald Tribune, 3 December 2004, On-line, Lexis Nexis, 

14 December 2004. 

104. Zarqawi. 

105. 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 115. 

106. Craig Whitlock, “In Europe, New Force for Recruiting Radicals,” Washington 

Post, 18 February 2005, On-line, Internet, 20 February 2005, available from 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33346-20005Feb17.html. 

107. Ibid. 

108. Rohan, Gunaratna, “The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda,” The Washington 

Quarterly, 27:3, Summer 2004, 93. 
Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda . . . 45 

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46 . . . Osama’s Wake: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda