IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2023 ND 68

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

 v.

Michael D. Neugebauer, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20220174

Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial 

District, the Honorable Bobbi Brown Weiler, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice, in which Chief Justice Jensen and

Justices Crothers and Tufte joined. District Judge El-Dweek filed a concurring 

opinion.

David L. Rappenecker, Assistant State’s Attorney, Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff 

and appellee.

Steven Balaban, Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellant.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

APRIL 13, 2023 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

State v. Neugebauer

No. 20220174

McEvers, Justice.

[¶1] Michael Neugebauer appeals from a district court order denying his 

motion for a sentence reduction. On appeal, Neugebauer argues the district 

court erred in determining N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1 does not apply retroactively.

We affirm.

I

[¶2] In 1992, Michael Neugebauer was charged with four counts of murder. 

Neugebauer pled guilty to all counts and was sentenced to life imprisonment 

on each count, running concurrently. On October 5, 2020, Neugebauer moved 

for a reduction of his sentence under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1 and requested 

oral argument under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2. On October 9, 2020, the district court 

denied the motion without a hearing, citing this Court’s holding in Garcia v. 

State, 2019 ND 103, 925 N.W.2d 442 (holding N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1 does not 

apply retroactively). Neugebauer appealed, and this Court reversed and 

remanded for a hearing on the motion, concluding the district court abused its 

discretion by ruling on the motion without giving Neugebauer an opportunity 

to be heard under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a)(3). State v. Neugebauer, 2021 ND 54, ¶ 5, 

956 N.W.2d 406.

[¶3] On March 22, 2022, the district court held a hearing on Neugebauer’s 

motion. After the hearing, the court again denied his motion, concluding

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1 does not apply retroactively. Neugebauer appeals.

II

[¶4] Neugebauer argues N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1 should apply retroactively. 

He acknowledges our holding in Garcia v. State, 2019 ND 103, 925 N.W.2d 442, 

but argues its analysis “negates the very essence of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1” 

and “presumes an idle act by the Legislature.” He also argues the application 

of the ameliorative penal legislation exception to the general rule against 

retroactivity applies because this case is not lessening punishment; it is simply 
2

giving an avenue to specific individuals to move the court for a reduction in 

sentence.

[¶5] Section 12.1-32-13.1(1), N.D.C.C., provides: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a court may reduce a 

term of imprisonment imposed upon a defendant convicted as an 

adult for an offense committed and completed before the defendant 

was eighteen years of age if:

a. The defendant has served at least twenty years in custody

for the offense;

b. The defendant filed a motion for reduction in sentence;

and

c. The court has considered the factors provided in this

section and determined the defendant is not a danger to the

safety of any other individual, and the interests of justice

warrant a sentence modification.

[¶6] Our standard for interpreting a statute is well established:

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is fully 

reviewable on appeal. The primary objective in interpreting a 

statute is to determine the legislature’s intent, and we look at the 

language of the statute first to determine intent. Words in a 

statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood 

meaning, unless they are defined by statute or unless a contrary 

intention plainly appears. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. The letter of a 

statute cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its 

spirit when the language of the statute is clear and 

unambiguous. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05. A statute is ambiguous if it is 

susceptible to different, rational meanings. Statutes are construed 

as a whole and are harmonized to give meaning to related 

provisions.

Peterka v. State, 2015 ND 156, ¶ 10, 864 N.W.2d 745.

[¶7] We addressed this issue in Garcia, 2019 ND 103. We ultimately held 

that N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1 does not apply retroactively because retroactive 

application would constitute an infringement on the executive pardoning 
3

power. Garcia, at ¶ 12. We reasoned because Garcia’s sentence was final prior 

to enactment of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1, retroactive application is barred. Id.

[¶8] Section 1-02-10, N.D.C.C., states no part of the code is retroactive unless 

it is expressly declared to be so. However, “[s]ection 1-02-10, N.D.C.C., is a rule 

of statutory construction which is ‘subservient to the main rule that the intent 

and purpose of the legislature must be given effect.’” Smith v. Baumgartner, 

2003 ND 120, ¶ 14, 665 N.W.2d 12 (quoting State v. Davenport, 536 N.W.2d 

686, 688 (N.D. 1995)). “[T]here is no need to resort to N.D.C.C. § 1-02-10 to 

discern legislative intent if we are able to rationally infer from other sources 

that the legislature intended retroactive application of the statute.”

Davenport, 536 N.W.2d at 689. We can discern no such inference here. In this 

instance, a review of the legislative history demonstrates the Legislative 

Assembly specifically considered retroactivity with testimony supporting both 

sides. After passing the House, Representative Lawrence Klemin presented 

the bill to the Senate, explaining, “[t]he bill is not expressly stated to be 

retroactive and therefore should not be retroactive. See Section 1-02-10 of the 

North Dakota Century Code.” Hearing on H.B. 1195 Before the Senate 

Judiciary Comm., 65th N.D. Legis. Sess (March 13, 2017) (testimony of 

Lawrence Klemin, Representative).

[¶9] Neugebauer was convicted of murder as a juvenile and sentenced to life 

imprisonment. Like Garcia, Neugebauer brings his motion for sentence 

reduction under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1. Notably, Neugebauer’s conviction 

includes the possibility of parole. Neugebauer’s convictions were final long 

before enactment of this statute. Judgment was entered for the first count of 

murder on October 7, 1993, and on January 24, 1994, for counts two through 

five. The statute was enacted on August 1, 2017. Therefore, as the Court 

explained in Garcia, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1 does not apply retroactively. 2019 

ND 103, at ¶ 12. Moreover, our interpretation of the statute does not render it 

meaningless or allow an idle act. “We construe statutes in a way which does 

not render them meaningless because we presume the Legislature acts with 

purpose and does not perform idle acts.” Motisi v. Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist., 2021 

ND 229, ¶ 13, 968 N.W.2d 191 (citation omitted). In Garcia, this Court 
4

explained the recent holdings of the United States Supreme Court as to 

sentencing a juvenile offender:

The Court held the Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory 

sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 

juvenile offenders . . . . The Court further explained its decision 

did not categorically bar the penalty of life in prison without the 

possibility of parole, but it mandates that a sentencer consider a 

juvenile offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before 

imposing the sentence.

. . . 

The holding of Miller is limited to mandatory sentences of 

life in prison without the possibility of parole, and its central 

rationale rests on the mandatory nature of the sentence 

prohibiting the sentencing court from considering the mitigating 

attributes of youth.

Garcia v. State, 2017 ND 263, ¶¶ 19-22, 903 N.W.2d 503 (relying on Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016)). 

In Miller and Montgomery, the United States Supreme Court held that 

mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles are often 

unconstitutional and should only be given in rare circumstances, and 

announced factors to be considered when sentencing juveniles. Miller, 567 U.S. 

460; Montgomery, 577 U.S. 190. The Court’s Montgomery announcement of 

retroactivity “means that because the source of the Miller rule ‘is the 

Constitution itself,’ it ‘necessarily pre-exists our articulation of the new rule.”

Garcia, at ¶ 21. Stated plainly, the “rule” is retroactive because it is a 

constitutional violation. The constitutional violation only applies to 

mandatory life imprisonment without parole for juvenile offenders. 

[¶10] These holdings allow for a discretionary sentence of life without parole 

“for the rare juvenile offender.” Our Legislative Assembly removed the 

unconstitutional mandatory life sentence without parole for juvenile offenders 

in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-03(4). In enacting N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1, the 

Legislative Assembly also “allows juvenile offenders who have been in state

custody for more than twenty years to seek relief from their sentence” based 
5

upon factors set forth in Miller and Montgomery. Garcia, 2019 ND 103, ¶ 4. 

The statute provides greater relief than Miller and Montgomery, and was not 

an idle act by the Legislative Assembly.

III

[¶11] Neugebauer also argues his sentence must be reviewed for compliance 

with Miller and Montgomery due to the analysis regarding juvenile offenders

and their diminished culpability.

[¶12] Section 12.1-32-13.1, N.D.C.C., was enacted in response to the United 

States Supreme Court cases relating to the constitutionality of punishments 

for juveniles sentenced to life terms in prison, such as Miller and Montgomery. 

However, the district court reviewed this Court’s holding in Garcia and the 

significance of Miller and Montgomery and correctly concluded those cases 

dealt with juveniles sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

Neugebauer was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole and will be 

eligible for parole in October of 2027. Given this distinction, a separate 

analysis of the cases in question is not necessary. The district court addressed 

the constitutionality of Neugebauer’s sentence and correctly concluded

Neugebauer does not qualify for relief under Garcia, Miller or Montgomery.

IV

[¶13] Neugebauer also argues the district court abused its discretion by 

denying his motion to reduce his sentence by erroneously weighing the factors 

under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1. Because the statute does not apply

retroactively, we need not address this argument. 

V

[¶14] We have considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by 

Neugebauer and conclude them to be either without merit or unnecessary to 

our decision. We affirm the district court’s denial of Neugebauer’s motion for 

reduction of sentence.
6

[¶15] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte

El-Dweek, District Judge, concurring.

[¶16] I concur with the majority’s result because the district court thoroughly 

reviewed and considered the factors in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1(3) and rightly 

found that a reduction was unwarranted at the present time. However, I write 

separately because N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1 should not be subject to the general 

rule against retroactivity. 

[¶17] The majority correctly points out that N.D.C.C. § 1-02-10 “states no part 

of the code is retroactive unless it is expressly declared to be so.” Supra, ¶ 8. 

However, the Supreme Court recently renewed its long-standing position to 

“construe statutes in a way which does not render them meaningless because 

we presume the Legislature acts with purpose and does not perform idle acts.” 

Larson v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2022 ND 118, ¶ 21, 975 N.W.2d 552 

(citing Christiansen v. Panos, 2022 ND 27, ¶ 9, 969 N.W.2d 709 and Dubois v. 

State, 2021 ND 153, ¶ 22, 963 N.W.2d 543 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

[¶18] The majority has concluded because Neugebauer was sentenced before 

the enactment of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1, he is ineligible to even petition a 

court to review his sentence under the statute because of the bar against 

retroactivity. This implies that the statute cannot have any effect until at least 

the year 2037, or 20 years from the enactment of the statute. It is my opinion 

this application of the statute is the very essence of an idle act by the 

Legislature. At oral argument, the State rightly conceded the point: the State 

argued the Legislature did not have to act for the United States Supreme Court 

decisions in Miller and Montgomery to apply in North Dakota. In the face of 

this reality, the Legislature still chose to act by enacting N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-

13.1. 

[¶19] I recognize that the Supreme Court has characterized N.D.C.C. § 12.1-

32-13.1 as legislation that lessened punishment in Garcia v. State, 2019 ND
7

103, ¶¶ 10-13, 925 N.W.2d 442, and is therefore not retroactive. The Garcia

Court cited State v. Cummings in support of the proposition that “[a] statute 

that lessens the punishment for a criminal act cannot be applied to a sentence 

if the statute become effective after a conviction is final.” Id. at ¶ 10. However, 

Cummings was a case of what sentence should be applied to a Driving Under 

Suspension conviction—either 15 days under an old law or 4 days under the 

current version. State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468, 470 (N.D. 1986). That is 

distinguishable from a statute at issue here which allows a mechanism by

which a Defendant may apply for a sentence reduction under some very limited 

circumstances. The statute does not even provide for any additional mitigating 

sentencing factors—all it provides is a mechanism to consider a reduction.

[¶20] Despite the district court finding that the statute did not have 

retroactive effect, I concur with the result of the majority because the district 

court correctly analyzed the facts of the case in light of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-13.1. 

[¶21] Daniel S. El-Dweek, D.J. 

[¶22] The Honorable Daniel S. El-Dweek, D.J., sitting in place of Bahr, J., 

disqualified.