alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### McGarvey v. Hall.

Judicial Powee — Special Judge.

Neither the court nor the parties to an action can empower a private citizen to preside as judge at the trial or exercise judicial authority-in the case.

*Appeal from the District Court of San Miguel County.*

Mr. S. D. Crump, for appellant.

' Mr. John Gray, Mr. Lou R. Smith and Mr. George T. Sumner, for appellee.

Thomson, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The record in this case discloses the following facts: The trial was commenced before Hon. T. A. Rucker, judge of the ninth judicial district, who presided at the request of Hon. W. H. Gabbert, judge of the court in which the cause was pending; the latter being disqualified by reason of his having'been the defendant’s counsel in the case. After a jury had' been impaneled, and a portion of the testimony heard, sickness in Judge Rucker’s family compelled him to leave, and it was agreed by the parties that H. M. Hogg, Esq., an' attorney at law, should act as judge, and that the remainder of the testimony should be heard, and the trial concluded, before him. Mr. Hogg accordingly took charge of the trial at the point where Judge Rucker left it, heard the evidence, instructed the jury, received their verdict, overruled a motion for a new trial, and rendered final judgment. We are asked to review this judgment on error.

The judgment is an absolute nullity. It is not a judgment. Mr. Hogg could not act as judge. He could not be empowered either by the court itself, or by the parties, to preside as judge at the trial, or exercise judicial authority *427in the case. *Haverly I. M. Co. v.*Howcutt, 6 Colo. 574. There was no trial and no judgment, and there is nothing for us to review. The appeal will be dismissed, and the cause remanded for trial.

*Dismissed.*
From: Stephen E. Berube [mailto:echocreekcapital@gmail.com] 

Sent: Tuesday, September 08, 2015 11:14 AM

To: EBSA, E-ORI - EBSA

Subject: RIN 1210-AB32 

Please do not restrict the use of options in retirement accounts. Options can be used to hedge 

positions, create income and limit downside. Giving the investment public less flexibility is not positive!

Thanks!

Stephen E. Berube

President

Echo Creek Capital, LLC

4808 Moorland Lane

Suite 109

Bethesda, MD 20814

301-652-0724 (o)

301-509-4076 (c)

301-652-0734 (fax)

echocreekcapital@gmail.com
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         304,390
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  4,325,737
<ALLOWANCES>                                   30,000
<INVENTORY>                                    5,973,076
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               11,952,875
<PP&E>                                         16,421,447
<DEPRECIATION>                                 6,817,857
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 31,822,699
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          4,304,382
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    400
<COMMON>                                       53,706
<OTHER-SE>                                     15,227,384
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   31,822,699
<SALES>                                        27,027,002
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               27,027,002
<CGS>                                          21,716,761
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  21,716,761
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               3,325,927
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             946,755
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                1,161,282
<INCOME-TAX>                                   67,113
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            1,094,169
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   1,094,169
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .15
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .14
        


</TABLE>
§ 382.123 Driver identification. ( a ) *Identification information on the Alcohol Testing Form (ATF).* For each alcohol test performed under this part, the employer shall provide the driver's commercial driver's license number and State of issuance in Step 1, Section B of the ATF.
( b ) *Identification information on the Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control Form (CCF).* For each controlled substance test performed under this part, the employer shall provide the following information, which must be recorded as follows: ( 1 ) The driver's commercial driver's license number and State of issuance in Step 1, section C of the CCF.
( 2 ) The employer's name and other identifying information required in Step 1, section A of the CCF.
[81 FR 87724, Dec. 5, 2016, as amended at 86 FR 35639, July 7, 2021]
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-548

In Re: W. A. MACGUIRE, Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CA-96-1235-A) Submitted: April 17, 1997 Decided: June 17, 1997 Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. W. A. MacGuire, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).1 In re Beard , 811 F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987). 2 Mallard v. United States Dist. Court , 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989). 3 In re United Steelworkers , 595 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1979). 2 PER CURIAM: William A. MacGuire filed a mandamus petition in this court after the district court denied his application for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunctionagainst the Secretary-Treasurer of the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners. Finding that the facts and claims of this action have been repeatedly addressed by state and federal courts, the district court dismi ssed the action on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Essentially, MacGuire appeals the district court's decision. The granting of the writ is a drastic remedy and should only be granted in extraordinary situations. 1 MacGuire must show that he has no other avenue for relief and that his right to relief is clear and undisputable. 2 MacGuire fails to meet his burden, and mandamus relief cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. 3 Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the motion to view the entire case file, and deny the petition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.3 PETITION DENIED
EBSA-2010-0050-DRAFT-1297.html[7/22/2015 10:02:49 PM]

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: July 16, 2015

Received: July 08, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8jve-8blh

Comments Due: July 21, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: EBSA-2010-0050

Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice; Notice of

 proposed rulemaking and withdrawal of previous proposed rule.

Comment On: EBSA-2010-0050-0205

Definition of Fiduciary; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment Advice and Related Proposed

 Prohibited Transaction Exemptions; Hearing and Comment Period Extension

Document: EBSA-2010-0050-DRAFT-1297

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-14921

Submitter Information

Name: Leslie Pickett

General Comment

This administration cannot manage the billions of dollars it already steals from law abiding tax payers and

 borrows from foreign countries - DON'T LET IT STEAL THE LITTLE AMOUNT OF SAVINGS I

 MANAGED TO PUT AWAY OVER MY YEARS AND YEARS OF WORKING FOR IT!
Hillsborough,

Dec., 1894.

#### Jewell *v.*McQuesten & *a.*

In a petition for partition, brought by the husband of a person deceased against her devisees, a plea in bar alleging an agreement by the husband not to claim any right, title, or interest in his wife’s property is demurrable.

Petition, for partition. To the defendants’ plea in bar — alleging that August 9, 1884, the plaintiff’s wife Mary was seized in fee simple of the land described in the petition and of other land, that on that day she and her husband entered into a contract for a division of property, that pursuant to the terms of «aid contract Mary deeded to the plaintiff one half of the property then standing in her name, that by said contract they mutually agreed with each other in writing that neither one would claim any right, title, or interest in the other’s property, that Mary died in October, 1892, and that the defendants are devisees of the lands not conveyed by her to her husband — the plaintiff ■demurred.

*Burnham, Brown Warren,*for the plaintiff.

*David A. Taggart,*for the defendants.

Carpenter, J.

The plea is bad. Assuming all the allegations to be true, the plaintiff may nevertheless be entitled to judgment for partition. His agreement not to claim any right, title, or interest in Mary’s property is not in terms an agreement not to claim his statutory rights in the property after her decease. P. S., *c.*195, *ss.*12, 13.

Consistently with the plea, her acquisition of the property may have been “ occasioned by payment or pledge of the property of” the plaintiff, and the only purpose and effect of the contract, assuming it to be valid in law, may hkve been to enable her to hold the property during the continuance of their married life free from her husband’s interference or control. P. S., *•c.*176, *s.*1. The question whether by any form of contract he could convey or release to his wife, or estop himself from claiming, his statutory rights in her estate after her decease is not considered.

*Demurrer sustained.*

.All concurred.
NORWEST FINANCIAL, INC.
                                       
              COMPUTATION OF RATIOS OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                                       
                                 Exhibit (12)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                     Three
                     Months
                     Ended
                    March 31,
                      1999                     Years Ended December 31,

                                                (Thousands of Dollars)

                                 1998      1997      1996      1995      1994
<S>                  <C>        <C>       <C>       <C>       <C>       <C>
Net income           $59,763    $238,604  $269,450  $276,331  $267,941  $223,340

Add:

  Fixed charges:

  Interest including
  amortization of
  debt expense       124,863     485,784   401,736   372,859   359,079   259,605

  One-third of
  rentals*             3,395      13,406    12,107    10,748    10,317     9,747

  Total fixed
  charges            128,258     499,190   413,843   383,607   369,396   269,352

  Provision for
  income taxes        32,335     121,668   144,082   148,096   147,873   116,900

Total net earnings,
  fixed charges and
  income taxes -
  "Earnings"        $220,356    $859,462  $827,375  $808,034  $785,210  $609,592

Ratio of earnings
  to fixed charges      1.72        1.72      2.00      2.11      2.13      2.26

</TABLE>

*One-third of rentals is deemed representative of the interest factor.
**Exhibit 32-a**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Annual Report ofCinergy Corp., The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company, PSI Energy, Inc.and The Union Light, Heat and Power Company (the “Companies”) on Form 10-Kfor the period ending December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, James E. Rogers,Chief Executive Officer of the Companies, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to thebest of my knowledge and belief, that:

 

 (1) The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

 (2) The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresult of operations of the Companies.

 

Date:  February 28,2006

 
| /s/ James E. Rogers |                    |
|---------------------|-------------------------|
|                | James E. Rogers         |
|                | Chief Executive Officer |
|                     |                         |  |

 

----
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 6357** 

NOEL GRAY , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v.
WARDEN ROBERT M. STEVENSON, III , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Florence

. Cameron McGowan Currie , District Judge. ( 4:11

- cv
- 00227

- CMC )

Submitted : May 31, 2012 Decided: June 6, 2012

Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Noel Gray , Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General , William Edgar Salter, III, Assistant Attorney General , Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee

.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Noel Gray seeks to appeal the district court ’ s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The
district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. A. § 636(b)(1)(B) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) . The magist rate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised
Gray that failure to file timely objections to this
recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court
order based upon the recommendation.
The timely filing of specific objections to a
magistrate judge ’ s recommendation is necessary to preserve
appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when
the parties have been warned of the consequences of
noncompliance. Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 845

- 46 (4th
Cir. 1985); see also T homas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Gray has waived appellate review by failing to timely file objections
after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we deny Gray’s pending motion to appoint counsel, deny a certificate of
appealability , and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials3 before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
#### William S. Douglas Appellant, v. James A. Stockwell. Respondent.

The appeal from, the part of the order refusing judgment on. answer dismissed, with ten dollars costs. The rest of the order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and printing disbursements. Mem. by

Learned, P. J.
Amendment No. 1, dated as of December 13, 2005



 Exhibit 10.2 
 Amendment No. 1 
 to 
 Solo Cup Investment Corporation 
 2004 Management Investment and Incentive
Compensation Plan 
 This Amendment No. 1 to the Solo Cup Investment Corporation (“SCIC”) 2004 Management Investment and
Incentive Compensation Plan (the “Plan”) is made as of the date the Board of Directors of SCIC adopt such amendment. 
 1.
Paragraph 6 “Shares Reserved Under the Plan” is hereby amended by deleting the first sentence in its entirety and replacing it with the following: 
 “The total number of Common Shares authorized for issuance under the Plan is 1,350,000 shares and, together with the Common Shares underlying the CPUs, 1,450,000, subject to adjustment as set forth in
Section 9 below.” 
 2. Except as expressly amended above, all other terms and conditions of the Plan are in full force and effect.
District Clerk’s LetterOnReceipt NOAatt.wpd

CHRIS DANIEL

HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT CLERK

CIVIL/FAMILY POST TRIAL

DATE: April 30, 2015

FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS INFORMATION SHEET BY TRIAL COURT 

CLERK

Note to trial court clerk: You are expected to file the clerk’s record by the original due date. If 

you cannot, you should advise the Clerk of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals immediately in 

writing, stating the reason and the date by which the record will be filed. Generally speaking, 

for good cause shown, the Court will grant no more than two extensions from the original due 

date, each extension not to exceed 30 days.

Appellate Case Number 14-14-00767-CV

Trial Court Case Number: 2010-07076____________________________

Trial Court Number 269TH District Court

______________________________________________________________________________

Information from Trial Court Clerk

The clerk’s record will be completed and filed with the appellate court clerk by the 

original due date, subject to payment arrangements being made.

 X The clerk’s record will not be filed by the original due date. (Please state reasons below) 

Reason(s): This clerks record consist of about 12 full index pages; it is very close

 to being fully prepared due to some technical difficulties has caused a few days

 delay; 

I believe I can file the clerk’s record by 5-8-15, and I request 5 days extension.

 

 Appellant has not made payment arrangements.

 Appellant has been notified that the clerk’s record is ready.

 Appellant has made payment arrangements.

 CHRIS DANIEL,

 CLERK DISTRICT COURT,

 HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

 BY: /s/ PHYLLIS WASHINGTON

 PHYLLIS WASHINGTON, DEPUTY

 FILED IN 14th COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 4/30/2015 6:17:12 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
1

FILED

October 3, 1995

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

CHARLES WILLIAM COULTER and ) C/A NO. 03A01-9505-CH-00150

wife DONNA LEE COULTER, ) HAMILTON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

 )

Plaintiffs-Appellants,)

 )

 )

 )

v. ) HONORABLE HOWELL N. PEOPLES,

 ) CHANCELLOR

 )

 )

RICHARD ANTHONY HENDRICKS, )

 )

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

CONCURRING OPINION

I concur wholeheartedly in the majority opinion. I

write separately to address the plaintiffs' contention that their

sister married Richard Anthony Hendricks "in jest." Even

assuming, for the purpose of argument, that the common law

requirement of mutual intent to be bound is still a requirement

for a valid marriage in Tennessee, an allegation that the parties

married in jest is conclusory in nature. Furthermore, it is not

supported in the complaint by factual allegations and hence not

conceded to be true by the defendant's motion to dismiss. Such a

pleading admits well-pled facts, not conclusions of the pleader. 

See Swallows v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 543 S.W.2d 581, 583

(Tenn. 1976); Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tenn. App.

1992). Therefore, the conclusory allegation of a marriage in

jest does not render the trial court's action of dismissal

inappropriate. The well-pled facts, liberally construed in favor

of the plaintiffs, do not make out a cause of action.
2

______________________________

Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
From: Saxton, Greg [mailto:Greg.Saxton@gbrx.com] 

Sent: Monday, September 07, 2015 11:59 AM

To: EBSA, E-ORI - EBSA

Subject: RIN 1210-AB32 Fiduciary Responsibility

I support the idea that anyone providing advice to retiree’s investment accounts like 401K, IRA and 

even HSA accounts should be held to fiduciary standards. 

For example:

I work for a company where an HSA is the only reasonable health care option. We are able to HSA 

money to a captive set of mutual funds. All of these funds have high fees and poor returns. These 

special mutual funds exist to fleece people like me. I would never agree to buy them if I had a choice of 

open market funds.

The financial community is by nature extremely aggressive. If individuals working for a company can 

make a short term bonus and move on to another company leaving that first company with a big fine, 

that seems to be within the bounds of what happens all the time. The very best that we should expect is 

that they do anything they can do to make money for themselves; short of risking jail. So let’s set the 

bar where it needs to be. That bar is the bar of a fiduciary.

People working and saving for their retirement deserve protection from unscrupulous predators. 

Gregory J. Saxton

503 329 6087

This message contains confidential information intended only for use by the intended recipient(s). If you are not an 

intended recipient any distribution, duplication or use of this message or any attachments is not permitted. If you 

received this message in error please immediately advise the sender by reply e-mail and delete the original message. 

Thank you.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-10873

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DERON LEWIS EDWARDS,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:19-CR-2-1

Before WIENER, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Deron Lewis Edwards pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a 

firearm. Because he possessed the firearm in connection with his commission 

of a felony drug offense analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 841, the district court applied 

the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) cross-reference to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1 and then used 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 to calculate his offense level. Now on appeal, Edwards 

challenges the district court’s application of a two-level § 2D1.1(b)(1) 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 2, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-10873 Document: 00515370282 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/02/2020
No. 19-10873

2

dangerous weapon enhancement based on his possession of the firearm 

underlying his offense of conviction.

We review the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines 

de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. ReynaEsparza, 777 F.3d 291, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2015). First, Edwards cites no 

language in the relevant guidelines suggesting that applying the § 2D1.1(b)(1) 

enhancement was expressly prohibited double counting, see United States v. 

Jimenez-Elvirez, 862 F.3d 527, 541 (5th Cir. 2017), and we have previously 

rejected an indistinguishable argument, see United States v. Andrus, No. 92-

2708, 1993 WL 529720, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 1993) (unpublished but 

precedential pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3). 

Second, the record supports the application of the dangerous weapon 

enhancement. See United States v. Rodriguez-Guerrero, 805 F.3d 192, 195 (5th 

Cir. 2015). Edwards’s argument that § 2X1.1(a) requires an additional

evidentiary showing for specific offense characteristics based on conduct that 

actually occurred is inconsistent with that guideline, the commentary, and our 

precedent. See § 2X1.1(a) comment. (n.2); United States v. Cabrera, 288 F.3d 

163, 169-70 (5th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 19-10873 Document: 00515370282 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/02/2020
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and for 

attorney fees. Because we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we grant 

respondent's motion, and we 

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED. 2 

ACP..1.‘„,11 The J. 

Parraguirre 

cc: Hon. Susan Scann, District Judge 

Lansford W. Levitt, Settlement Judge 

McDonald Carano Wilson LLP/Las Vegas 

Perelman & Fink 

Michael B. Lee 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2Respondent's request for sanctions pursuant to NRAP 38 is denied. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A me 2