IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 

AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

JAMES ERIC GRANT, §

Appellant §

§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00473-CR

V. § TRIAL COURT NO. 69,168

§

THE STATE OF TEXAS, §

Appellee §

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appealed from the 264th Judicial District Court, Bell County, Texas 

Hon. Martha J. Trudo, presiding

COPELAND LAW FIRM

P.O. Box 399

Cedar Park, TX 78613 

Tel/Fax: 512.215.8114

Email: tcopeland14@yahoo.com

Tim Copeland

State Bar No. 04801500 

Attorney for Appellant

APPELLANT HEREBY WAIVES ORAL ARGUMENT

ACCEPTED

03-15-00473-CR

6612918

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

8/24/2015 8:17:52 AM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 8/24/2015 8:17:52 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Contents i

Index of Authorities ii-iv

Identity of Parties and Counsel 1

Statement of the Case 3

Background 4

Summary of the Argument 6

Professional Evaluation of the Record 7

Conclusion 16

Notice to Client 17

Prayer 18

Certificate of Service and Compliance with Rule 9 19

and Kelly v. State
ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Authorities Page

United States Supreme Court cases

Anders v. California 7,16

386 U.S. 738 (1967)

McCoy v. Court of Appeals 16

486 U.S. 429, 108 S.C. 1895, 100 L.Ed.2d 4440 (1988)

Padilla v. Kennedy 8

130 S. Ct. 1477 (U.S. 2010)

Strickland v. Washington 12,13

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases

Bradley v. State 10

608 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)

Dansby v. State 8

398 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)

Daniels v. State 18

30 S.W.3d 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)

Ganious v. State 7

436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969)

Hernandez v. State 11

613S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (op. on reh’g)
3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES, continued

Authorities Page

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases, continued

Hernandez v. State 13

988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)

Jackson v. State 15

680 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)

Jackson v. State 13

877 S.W.2d 768 (Texas Crim. App. 1994)

Jackson v. State 13

973 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)

Kelly v. State 18

436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)

Mitchell v. State 10

608 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)

Nunez v. State 15

565 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)

Rickles v. State 14,15

202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)

Speth v. State 11

6 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)

Stafford v. State 16

813 S.W.2d 503, 509-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)
4

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES, continued

Authorities Page

Texas Court of Appeal cases

Antwine v. State 14,15

268 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. App. – Eastland 2008, pet.ref’d)

Bradfield v. State 15

42 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2001, pet.ref’d)

Burruss v. State 13

20 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2000, pet.ref’d)

Coronado v. State 16

996 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex. App. – Waco 2000, pet.ref’d)

Gutierrez v. State 11

354 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2011,

pet. granted on other grounds)

Kanouse v. State 15

958 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 1996, no pet.)

Statutes

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 21.02 and 26.13 (West 2014) 8,9

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 42.12 §11(a) 11

TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §481.115 (West 2010) 3,4

TEX. RULES APP. PROC. 17
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 1

IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 

AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

JAMES ERIC GRANT, §

Appellant §

§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00473-CR

V. § TRIAL COURT NO. 69,168

§

THE STATE OF TEXAS, §

Appellee §

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

COMES NOW,James Eric Grant, Appellant, who would show the Court that 

interested parties herein are as follows:

JAMES ERIC GRANT, appellant, TDCJ No. 0193588, Darrington Unit, 59 

Darrington Rd., Rosharon, Texas 77583.

GREGORY SIMMONS, Trial Attorney for Appellant, 714 4th Street, 

Killeen, Texas 76541.

TIM COPELAND, Appellate Attorney for Appellant, P.O. Box 399, Cedar Park, Texas 78613.
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 2

MICHAEL WALDMAN and BOB ODOM, Bell County Assistant District 

Attorneys, Trial and Appellate Attorneys, respectively, for Appellee, the State of 

Texas, P.O. Box 540, Belton, Texas 76513.
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 3

IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 

AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

JAMES ERIC GRANT, §

Appellant §

§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00473-CR

V. § TRIAL COURT NO. 69,168

§

THE STATE OF TEXAS, §

Appellee §

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 5, 2011, pursuant to plea agreement, James Eric Grant entered a 

guilty plea to the offense of possession of a controlled substance, to-wit: cocaine, 

one gram or more but less than four grams, a third degree felony. See TEX. 

HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §481.115 (West 2010). His indictment also 

alleged two prior felony convictions for enhancement purposes, but the state 

abandoned one paragraph as part of the plea agreement, and Grant pled “true” to 

only one enhancement paragraph. (C.R. 1, pp. 5, 33 and 88). On June 3, 2011, after 

hearing punishment evidence, in keeping with the agreement, the trial court deferred 

a finding on Grant’s guilt, and he was placed instead on community supervision for 

ten years. (C.R. 1, p. 39). On November 1, 2013, the State filed a motion to 

adjudicate his guilt. The motion to adjudicate alleged various violations of the terms 

and conditions of Grant’s community supervision. (C.R. 1, p. 54). On May 19,
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 4

2014, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s first amended motion to adjudicate. 

(See, C.R. 1, p. 66). At that hearing, Grant entered an open plea of “true” to all of 

the State’s allegations in its amended motion. (R.R. 5, p. 7). The trial court 

adjudicated Grant’s guilt and, after hearing punishment evidence, assessed a 

sentence of 18 years on June 6, 2014. (C.R. 1, p. 88). Grant filed a notice of appeal 

from that judgment and sentence on July 17, 2014, forty-one days after sentencing. 

His appeal was dismissed by this Court on October 31, 2014, for want of jurisdiction. 

(See CCA No. 03-14-00447-CR). Grant filed an application for writ of habeas 

corpus with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. He alleged ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel in giving timely notice of appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals 

granted the application by order dated June 24, 2015, and Grant subsequently gave 

due notice of appeal from the original judgment and conviction. (C.R. 1, p. 114).

BACKGROUND

Original Plea

On May 5, 2011, Grand entered a plea of “guilty” to the third degree felony 

offense of possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, and “true” to one 

enhancement paragraph. (R.R. 3, p. 26). After properly admonishing Grant and 

securing waivers of jury trial, both in writing and in open court, the trial court 

accepted his plea and written plea admonitions. The latter included a stipulation of
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 5

evidence. (C.R. 1, pp. 30-35). The plea documents were signed by Grant and/or his 

trial attorney and appear proper in all regards.

Adjudication Motion

As a result of his pleas, Grant’s guilt was deferred, and he was placed on 10 

years’ community supervision. (C.R. 1, p. 39). On November 1, 2013, the State 

filed its first motion to adjudicate Grant’s guilt. (C.R. 1, p. 54). The motion alleged 

that Grant had used cocaine on one occasion in violation of the terms of his 

community supervision and that he had failed in a number of ways to satisfy his 

financial obligations imposed by various terms of his community supervision. (C.R. 

1, pp. 54-55). In an amended motion, the State alleged the commission of two 

additional offenses. (C.R. 1, pp. 66-67). At a hearing on May 19, 2014, Grant 

entered an open plea of “true” to all the allegations in the State’s amended motion 

to adjudicate. (C.R. 1, p. 78 and see R.R. 5, p. 6). The trial court admonished Grant 

concerning his plea and the enhanced punishment range, and both Grant and his trial 

counsel indicated their understanding of the proceedings. (R.R. 5, pp. 6-9).

Punishment Evidence

At his subsequent sentencing hearing, Grant’s probation officer, Stephanie 

Frincke, testified concerning Grant’s failure to abide by the terms and conditions of 

his community supervision. Grant testified in his own defense that he had medical
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 6

conditions, as well as other problems, that initially made it difficult to meet the terms 

and conditions of his community supervision, but with a new support system in 

place, he said that he felt he could complete his community supervision if given 

another chance. After hearing argument of counsel, the trial court found the 

allegations in the State’s first amended motion to adjudicate guilt “true” based upon 

Grant’s plea of “true”, adjudicated his guilt, and sentenced him to 18 years’ 

incarceration. (R.R. 7, p. 40).

Judgment

The written judgment entered by the trial court on June 6, 2014 is entitled 

“Judgment Adjudicating Guilt.” (C.R. 1, pp. 88-89). The judgment states thatGrant 

was previously granted deferred adjudication community supervision on June 3, 

2011, that he entered a plea of “true” to the allegations in the State’s amended motion 

to adjudicate, that the trial court found that Grant had violated terms and conditions 

of his community supervision as alleged, and that, finally, in the best interests of 

justice, he should be punished by confinement in the Institutional Division of the T

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Appellate counsel concludes that the record examined contains no reversible 

error or arguable grounds for appeal.
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 7

PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION OF THE RECORD

Counsel has reviewed the records in this case, which consist of the various 

documents in the Clerk’s Record and the transcript of Grant’s plea to the State’s 

amended motion to adjudicate as well as his sentencing hearing. As a matter of his 

professional judgment, Counsel reluctantly concludes that the records contain no 

reversible error. Neither are there any jurisdictional defects apparent in the records 

examined. In such a case, where Counsel concludes that there are no arguable 

grounds for reversal, he is required to present a professional evaluation of the record 

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced for appeal. See, 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Ganious v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1969). That evaluation follows.

Arguable Points of Error

Various appellate courts, including the Third Court of Appeals at Austin and 

the Thirteenth Court of Appeals at San Antonio have provided instructive lists for 

consideration when complying with Anders. Accordingly, Counsel in this case has 

reviewed Mr. Grant’s records for error centering on the following areas:

1. Whether his original indictment was a sufficient charging 

instrument.

2. Whether there were any adverse pretrial rulings, including but 

not limited to rulings on motions to suppress, motions to quash
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 8

or the like (in this case limited to Mr. Grant’s adjudication 

hearing).

3. Whether there was compliance with Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure 26.13 and, if appropriate, Padilla v. Kennedy, 130 S. 

Ct. 1477 (U.S. 2010).

4. Whether the issue of competency was raised prior to sentencing, 

so as to warrant an inquiry by the court, and whether appellant 

was mentally competent when the court accepted his pleas (in 

both the original case and in his adjudication hearing).

5. Whether appellant’s pleas were freely and voluntarily made.

6. Whether there were any adverse rulings during the punishment 

hearing on objections or motions.

7. Whether there was any failure on the part of appellant’s trial 

counsel to object to fundamental error.

8. Whether the sentence imposed was within the applicable range 

of punishment.

9. Whether the written judgment accurately reflects the sentence 

that was imposed and whether any credits were properly applied.

10. Whether there is evidence to support a guilty plea in a felony case 

(or, in this case, a plea of true to the adjudication motion) 

including an examination of the records with regard to the 

recently enunciated exception to the general rule that the State 

must only prove one violation of a community supervision 

condition to sustain a revocation order, as carved out by the 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Dansby v. State, 398 S.W.3d 

233, 241-243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

11. Whether an examination of the records reflectsthat appellant was 

denied effective assistance of counsel.
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 9

Additionally, because this case involves deferred adjudication proceedings, 

Counsel has examined that area of jurisprudence for potential violations of due 

process with regard to imposition of terms and conditions of community supervision 

including whether those terms and conditions were reasonably imposed as well as 

the adequacy of the State’s notice of violations of the terms and conditions of his 

community supervision which resulted in the instant adjudication of his guilt.

Prior Proceedings – Guilty Plea and Conviction

Grant’s original indictment for possession of a controlled substance tracked 

the then applicable statutory provisions of §481.115 of the Texas Health and Safety 

Code and appears regular in all respects. The indictment meets the “requisites of an 

Indictment” provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure’s article 21.02, and thus 

constitutes a proper charging instrument. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

21.02 (West 2014).

Original Compliance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 26.13

On May 5, 2011, Grant appeared before the trial court with his attorney and 

entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged – possession of one to four grams of 

cocaine. Grant’s plea included the execution by him and his trial attorney of “Guilty 

Plea Admonishments” which included a waiver of jury trial and stipulation of
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 10

evidence wherein Grant judicially confessed to the alleged offense. (C.R. 1, p. 30-

35). The documents were signed by Grant and his attorney and appear proper in all 

regards.

Adjudication Motion

As a result of his plea, Grant was placed on 10 years’ deferred adjudication. 

In the adjudication motion the subject of his subsequent hearing and of this appeal, 

the State alleged that Grant had violated the terms and conditions of that community 

supervision in a number of particulars. See, Motion to Adjudicate, 1st Amended 

Motion to Adjudicate and Judgment Adjudicating Guilt. (C.R. 1, pp. 54, 66 and 88, 

respectively).

A motion to revoke probation and, by extension, a motion to adjudicate guilt, 

need not meet the particulars of an indictment, information or complaint. Mitchell

v. State, 608 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The allegations in such motions 

need only be sufficient to apprise probationer of the violations alleged to have 

occurred. In the instant case, it appears that the allegations in Grant’s motion to 

adjudicate were sufficiently specific to apprise him of the violations alleged such 

that he may not, for the first time on appeal, claim that they were vague or did not 

otherwise provide fair notice. See C.R. 1, pp. 54 and 66, and Bradley v. State, 608

S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Moreover, Grant made no such complaint at
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 11

his adjudication hearing, but, in fact through his attorney, he acknowledged receipt 

of adequate notice of the motions and their contents. (R.R. 5, pp.9-10).

Reasonableness of Terms and Conditions of Community Supervision

A trial court has broad discretion in imposing conditions of community 

supervision. The conditions must be reasonable and must be designed to “protect or 

restore the community, protect or restore the victim, or punish, rehabilitate or reform 

the defendant.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 42.12 §11(a); and,see Speth

v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A review of the terms and 

conditions of community supervision imposed upon Grant (including all 

amendments to his community supervision) do not show that any term or condition 

relied upon to adjudicate Grant’s guilt based on a violation of his community 

supervision appears unreasonable on its face. Moreover, even if a term or condition 

was unreasonable, complaint may not be made for the first time on appeal. Gutierrez

v. State, 354 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2011, pet. granted on other grounds).

That Grant never complained of a particular term or condition thus operated as a 

waiver of the right to complain after a subsequent adjudication of his guilt based 

upon a violation of any term of his community supervision. Hernandez v. State, 

613 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (op. on reh’g).
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 12

Adverse Pre-Hearing Rulings

There were no adverse pre-adjudication hearing rulings.

Evidentiary Rulings/Fundamental Error

There were no adverse rulings during the adjudication hearing, and no failure 

on the part of Grant’s trial counsel to object to fundamental error.

Trial Error/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Appellate counsel found no evidence in the records examined which would 

support a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel.

Strickland v. Washington decided by the United States Supreme Court in 

1984 established the standard by which to gauge the adequacy of representation of 

counsel and articulated a two-step analysis:

1. Did the attorney’s performance fail to constitute “reasonably 

effective assistance,” i.e., did the defense attorney’s 

representation fall below an objective standard of reasonableness 

under prevailing professional norms?

2. If so, was there a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings could have 

been different?

– see Strickland, 466 U.S. 668,

694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80

L.Ed.2d 674, 690.
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 13

(The test in Strickland is properly applied to the punishment phase of a noncapital case as well. See, Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1999).

In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a reviewing court 

begins with a strong presumption that counsel was effective. Jackson v. State, 877 

S.W.2d 768, 771 (Texas Crim. App. 1994). A reviewing court presumes counsel’s 

actions were motivated by sound trial strategy. Id. A complainant has the burden 

of rebutting that presumption by evidence from the record affirmatively supporting 

the claim. See, Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 

However, even if a complainant can prove such error occurred, he must then prove 

that but for the error, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding 

would have been different. See, Burruss v. State, 20 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex. App. –

Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d).

In the instant case, evidence adduced at Grant’s adjudication and sentencing 

hearings included Grants plea of “true” as well as testimony from Grant’s probation 

officer, Stephanie Frincke. She testified about certain aspects of Grant’s community 

supervision file which detailed Grant’s various contacts, meetings, and 

correspondence with the community supervision officer and office and including his 

failure to pay all fees assessed against him. (R.R. 5, pp. 18-26). In his testimony,
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 14

Grant denied that he had failed to provide documentation of a medical condition to 

Frincke’s office. However, he admitted that he had failed to report because he had 

thought that he had a terminal illness, and he wanted to be with his family in his last 

days. (R.R. 7, p. 36). He also admitted to other violations of his community 

supervision including the use of cocaine while on community supervision. (R.R. 6, 

p. 18).

In light of his own testimony, even if examination of his adjudicationhearing 

revealed instances where his trial counsel possibly committed an error of some kind 

in his representation (which the record does not support), it is highly unlikely that 

but for such error, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of Grant’s 

adjudication hearing would have been different.

Sufficiency of Evidence of Violations

A trial court’s order revoking community supervision and, by extension 

adjudicating guilt, is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Rickles v. 

State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Antwine v. State, 268 S.W.3d 

634, 636 (Tex. App. – Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). On violation of a condition of 

community supervision, the defendant is entitled to a hearing limited to the 

determination by the court of whether a violation has occurred. In an adjudication 

hearing, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 15

violated the terms of his community supervision. Rickles v. State, 202 S.W.3d at 

763-4; Antwine v. State, 268 S.W.3d at 636. Proof of any one of the alleged 

violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support an 

adjudication order. Antwine v. State, 268 S.W.3d at 636.

Here, Grant admitted that he had used cocaine during his term of community 

supervision. (R.R. 6, p. 18). That violation alone constitutes sufficient evidence to 

justify the adjudication of his guilt based upon a violation of his community 

supervision and the imposition of resulting punishment. Thus, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in moving to adjudicate Grant’s guilt.

Sufficiency – Punishment

The trial court assessed an 18-year prison sentence upon adjudication of 

Grant’s guilt after hearing sentencing evidence. A review of the evidence for 

sufficiency in the case is inappropriate with respect to that assessment of 

punishment. See, Bradfield v. State, 42 S.W.3d 350, 351 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 

2001, pet. ref’d); Kanouse v. State, 958 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 

1996, no pet.)(citing Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1984)). The sentence ultimately assessed by the trial court of 18 years following 

adjudication of Grant’s guilt was within the applicable punishment range for the 

enhanced subject offense, and the sentence, on its face, was not “unreasonable” or
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 16

“irrational.” See Nunez v. State, 565 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Thus, 

Grant cannot establish any error arising from the punishment assessed by the trial 

court.

Standard of Review – “Frivolous Appeals”

In an Anders case, a reviewing court must, “after a full examination of all 

proceedings, [...] decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S.at 

744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; accord Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 509-11 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991); Coronado v. State, 996 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex. App. – Waco 2000, pet. 

ref’d). An appeal is “wholly frivolous” or “without merit” when it “lacks any basis 

in law or fact.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 439 n. 10, 108 S.C. 1895,

1902, 100 L.Ed.2d 4440 (1988). Arguments are frivolous if they “cannot 

conceivably persuade the court.” Id. at 426, 108 S. Ct. at 1901. An appeal is not 

frivolous if based on “arguable grounds.” Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

CONCLUSION

Here, appellate counsel cannot in good faith argue that there is a basis “in law 

or in fact” that an error occurred in the adjudication of Grant’s guilt or in his 

subsequent assessment of punishment. For that reason, appellate counsel is required 

to move for leave to withdraw to allow appellant the opportunity to submit his own
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 17

appellate brief should he choose to do so. See, Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Accompanying this brief then, attached as Appendix 1, is 

a copy of appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw on those grounds. An original of 

the motion has been separately filed with this Court.

NOTICE TO CLIENT

Counsel hereby affirms that he has notified James Eric Grant, appellant, 

of the filing of this brief in the referenced case, of his right to file a pro se 

response to the brief should he choose to do so and of his right to examine his 

appellate records per the applicable Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to 

accomplish that goal. (See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2014) and Appendix 2)). Notice of those rights and of Counsel’s motion to 

withdraw was provided to Mr. Grant by both certified mail, return receipt 

requested, and by first-class mail at his last known mailing address at the date of 

this filing,to-wit:

James Eric Grant

TDCJ No. 01936588

Darrington Unit 

59 Darrington Rd.

Rosharon, TX 77583
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 18

COMPLIANCE WITH KELLY v. STATE

Finally, Counsel also hereby affirms that he has provided to Mr. Grant a 

motion for access to his appellate record as required by the dictates of Kelly v. State, 

436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) for the referenced case. (See copy of same 

in Appendix 2).

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Counsel respectfully prays that this Court permit him 

to withdraw from this case after this Court’s own examination of the record and 

to afford Mr. Grant his right to file a pro se response brief if he wishes to do so.

COPELAND LAW FIRM

P.O. Box 399

Cedar Park, TX 78613 

Phone: 512.897.8196

Fax: 512.215.8114

Email: tcopeland14@yahoo.com

By: /s/Tim Copeland

Tim Copeland

State Bar No. 04801500 

Attorney for Appellant
Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR

James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Brief of Appellant 19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF 

COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9 and KELLY v.STATE

This is to certify that on August 2, 2015, a true and correct copy of the 

above and foregoing document was served on Bob Odom, Assistant District 

Attorney of Bell County, P.O. Box 540, Belton, Texas 76513 and on James Eric 

Grant,TDCJ No. 01936588,DarringtonUnit, 59 DarringtonRd.,Rosharon,TX 77583 in 

accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and that Appellant’s 

brief is in compliance with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 

and that portion which must be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 3612 

words. Further, Counsel certifies that he has complied with the dictates of Kelly

v. State insofar as providing a motion for Mr. Grant to gain access to his 

appellate records if he so chooses.

/s/ Tim Copeland 

Tim Copeland
APPENDIX I
IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 

AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

JAMES ERIC GRANT, §

Appellant §

§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00473-CR

V. § TRIAL COURT NO. 69,168

§

THE STATE OF TEXAS, §

Appellee §

MOTION TO WITHDRAW 

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF SAIDCOURT:

NOW COMES Tim Copeland, PO Box 399, Cedar Park, Texas 78613, 

appellate attorney for James Eric Grant, and respectfully moves this Honorable 

Court to allow said attorney to withdraw as attorney of record in this matter, 

terminating his representation of the above referenced appellant and for good cause 

would respectfully show this Honorable Court asfollows:

I.

Contemporaneous with the filing of this Motion to Withdraw, counsel has 

filed an Anders brief. Withdrawal of counsel is necessary to permit Mr. Grant to file 

a pro se response brief, if he so desires.
II.

Pending Deadlines

Appellant’s brief is due September 11, 2015.

III.

Documents Filed and Prepared forDefendant

Counsel has prepared a docketing statement and Appellant’s Brief in this 

cause, and has filed same with this Court. Counsel previously prepared Appellant’s 

Notice of Appeal, Request for Reporter’s Record and Designations of Clerk’s 

Record.

IV.

Notice of Last Known Address ofDefendant

Counsel has notified Appellant of the filing of this Motion to Withdraw and 

of the filing of this brief by mailing a copy of this Motion to Appellant’s last 

known mailing address by regular, first class mail and by certified mail, return 

receipt requested, and addressed asfollows:

James Eric Grant 

TDCJ No. 01936588

Darrington Unit

59 Darrington Road

Rosharon, TX 77583

V.

WHEREFORE, Movant prays this Honorable Court to allow Movant to 

withdraw from the representation of appellant and would, in all things, relieve
Movant herein, discharging Movant from her obligations and responsibilities to 

this Defendant in thismatter.

Respectfully submitted,

COPELAND LAWFIRM

P.O. Box 399

Cedar Park, TX 78613 

Pho: 512.897.8126

Fax: 512.215.8114

Email: tcopeland14@yahoo.com

/s/ Tim Copeland 

Tim Copeland

State Bar No. 04801500

Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ANDOF 

COMPLIANCE WITH RULE9

This is to certify that on August 2, 2015, a true and correct copy of the 

above and foregoing document was served on Bob Odom, Assistant District 

Attorney of Bell County, P.O. Box 540, Belton, Texas 76513 and on JamesEricGrant, 

TDCJ No. 01936588, Darrington Unit, 59 Darrington Rd., Rosharon, TX 77583 in 

accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and that Appellant’s brief 

is in compliance with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that 

portion which must be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 462 words. Further, 

Counsel certifies that he has complied with the dictates of Kelly v. State insofar 

as providing a motion for Mr. Grant to gain access to his appellate records if he so 

chooses.

/s/ Tim Copeland 

Tim Copeland
APPENDIX II
COPELAND LAW FIRM

P.O. Box 399 

Cedar Park, Texas 78613

512.215.8114 (phone/fax)

TIM COPELAND* ERIKA COPELAND**

*Board Certified - Oil, Gas & Mineral Law **Of Counsel

Texas Board of Legal Specialization

Certified Mail No. 7015 0640 0000 3705 1092

August 24, 2015

James Eric Grant 

TDCJ No. 01936588

Darrington Unit 

59 Darrington Rd.

Rosharon, TX 77583

Re: Cause No. 67,168 (Bell County);

Appeal No. 03-15-00473-CR

Dear Mr. Grant:

Enclosed please find a copy of my motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California that I have prepared and filed in your case. After a 

diligent search of both the clerk's record and reporter's record in your case and a 

review of the applicable law, it is my opinion that no reversible error occurred at 

your pleaorsentencingproceedings.

Whenever appellate counsel files a motion such as this, the law provides the 

appellant the right to review the record and file a response identifying to the 

appellate court any grounds he thinks are non-frivolous issues to be raised on his 

behalf that the appellate court should consider in deciding whether the case 

presents any meritorious grounds for appeal. Because I have filed this motion and 

brief, you now have the right to review the records and file a response or brief if you

so choose in any or all of your cases. To assist you in obtaining the records if you

wish to review them, I have enclosed a Motion for Pro Se Access to the Appellate

Record for you to
file for each case. In order to obtain the appellate records, you must sign and 

date the motions and mail them to the Third Court of Appeals within ten days of 

the date of this letter to the following address:

Jeffrey D. Kyle

Clerk, Third Court of Appeals

209 W. 14th St., Rm. 101

Austin, TX 78701

The Court of Appeals will then direct the clerk of the trial court to provide you 

with copies of the appellate records. Your response will be due to be filed in the 3rd 

Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date the clerk provides the record to you.

Whether or not you file a response, the law requires the Court of Appeals to 

review the record to determine if the Court agrees with my assessment that no 

meritorious grounds for appeal exist, i.e., that no reversible error exists. If the Court 

does not agree, but instead believesthere are non-frivolousissuesto be raised on your 

behalf, the Court must abate the appeal to have another attorney appointed to review 

the record on your behalf.

Should the Court of Appeals ultimately determine that there are no meritorious 

grounds to be raised and that your appeal is frivolous, the Court will affirm your 

conviction. You may then file a pro se petition for discretionary review with the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals. Such petition must be filed within 30 days of the date 

the Court of Appeals renders its judgment.

Feel free to write me if you have any questions about the procedure utilized in 

your appeal. I will do my best to answer any questions you may have.

Again, I amsorry I came to the conclusionsI did, but many times with pleas, that 

is all we are left with.

Sincerely,

TC:aw 

encl.

Tim Copeland
CAUSE NO. 03-15-00473-CR

JAMES ERIC GRANT § IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

V. § THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

THE STATE OF TEXAS § SITTING AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

MOTION FOR ACCESS TO APPELLATERECORD

NOW COMES James Eric Grant, appellant, TDCJ No. 01936588, 

Darrington Unit, 59 Darrington Rd., Rosharon, Texas 77583 and respectfully moves

this Honorable Court to grant him access to the appellate record in the abovereferenced cause in order to effectuate his right to file a response to the Anders brief 

filed herein by Appellant’s appellatecounsel.

Respectfully submitted,

James Eric Grant 

TDCJ No. 01935688

Darrington Unit 

59 Darrington Rd.

Rosharon, TX 77583

Date:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ANDOF 

COMPLIANCE WITH RULE9

This is to certify that on _______________, 2015, a true and correct copy 

of the above and foregoing document was served on Bob Odom Assistant District 

Attorney of Bell County, P.O. Box 540, Belton, Texas 76513 in accordance with 

the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and that this motion is in compliance 

with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion which 

must be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 207 words.

James Eric Grant 

TDCJ No. 01935688

Darrington Unit 59 

Darrington Rd.

Rosharon, TX 77583

Date:
COPELAND LAW FIRM 

P.O. Box 399 

Cedar Park, Texas 78613 

512.215.8114 (phone/fax) 

TIM COPELAND* ERIKA COPELAND**

(512) 897-8196 mobile/text (512) 897-8126 mobile/text 

tcopeland14@yahoo.com ecopeland63@yahoo.com 

*Board Certified - Oil, Gas & Mineral Law **Of Counsel 

Texas Board of Legal Specialization

August 24, 2015 

Clerk of the Court 

Third Court of Appeals 

Austin, TX 

Via e-file 

 Re: Cause No. 03-15-00473-CR (Trial Court No. 69,168) 

 James Eric Grant v. The State of Texas

Dear Mr. Kyle: 

Please be advised that I have complied with the dictates of Kelly v. State, 436 

S.W. 3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) with regard to notification of the abovereferenced client of 1) the filing of an Anders brief in his case and of my filing of a 

motion to withdraw, 2) his right to file a pro se response to the brief and of his right 

to review the appellate records preparatory to filing that response, and 3) informed 

him of his pro se right to seek discretionary review should the Court of Appeals 

declare his appeal frivolous. I have also prepared and mailed to him a motion for 

his use in obtaining access to his appellate records should he choose to do so.

 Very truly yours, 

 /s/Tim Copeland 

 Tim Copeland 

ACCEPTED

03-15-00473-CR

6616383

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

8/24/2015 10:31:06 AM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK
TC:aw

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF

COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9

This is to certify that on August 24, 2015, a true and correct copy of the

above and foregoing document was served on Bob Odom, Assistant District Attorney

of Bell County, P.O. Box 540, Belton, Texas 76513 and on James Eric Grant, TDCJ 

No. 01936588, Darrington Unit, 59 Darrington Rd., Rosharon, TX 77583 in accordance 

with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and that this letter is in compliance

with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion which must 

be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 344 words.

/s/ Tim Copeland 

Tim Copeland