## NO. 12-07-00427-CV IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTR ICT

TYLER, TEXA S

NOLAN VANCE HOLLOWAY, § APPEAL F ROM THE 145TH APPELLANT V. § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF TEXAS ELECTR IC UTILITY CONSTRUCTION, LTD. AND DE EP E AST TEX AS § NA CO GD OC HES CO UN

TY, T EXAS ELE CTR ICAL CO OP

ERAT IV E, APP ELL EES OPINION No lan V anc e Ho llo wa

y a pp e a ls t he tr ia l court ’s e ntr

y of no e vid e nc e summa

ry jud g me nts in favor of Appe llees Texas Electric Utility Construction, Ltd. ( “Te x as Electric ”) a nd Dee p East Texas Electric Cooperative ( “DETE C”) re spectively . In two issues, each o f wh i ch contain numerous subissues, H olloway argues that the trial cour t errone ously

g rante d Texas Electric’ s and DETEC’s

no e vid e nc e mot ion s f

or summa ry jud g me nt. We a ff

ir m in pa rt and re ve rs e and

re mand in p art

.
B ACKG ROUND Holloway was injured while working on high voltag e ele ctric tra nsmissi on lines owned by DETEC. At the time of his injury , Holloway was using an all terra in aer ial lift bucket ve hicle known as a “ rollag on” to re move a nonener g ized guy wire that was no longer neede d. Holloway

sustained

sever e ele ctrica l injury when the rollag on’s ae rial bucke t arm unexpectedly moved upwar d, pushing his neck a nd chin into an ene rg ized line. Holloway filed the instant lawsuit alleg ing that Texas Electric ne g ligen t l y supplied the defe ctive rollag on to his employ er, InfraS ource Under g round Construction Service s, L L C, or,

a lte rn ativ e ly , n e g lig e ntl y

le ft the ro lla g on

on the wo rk sit e wi th t he ke y s in it whe n it wa s f or e se e a ble2

that In f r a So ur c e e mp lo y e e s w o u ld u s e th e r o ll a g o n . H o ll o w ay f urth e r a ll e g e d

that DETEC neg lige ntly

exercised its c ontrac tual rig ht to deter mine whether

the lines would be e nerg ized or deener g ized while he per formed the work in question. Subsequently , Texas Electric a nd DETEC ea ch filed no evidence motions for summary judgme nt, to which Holloway responde d. Ultimately , the trial court g rante d both Texas Electric’ s and DETE C’s no evidenc e motions for summary judgme nt. This appeal f ollowed.

S TA N D A R D O F RE VI E W AND G OVE RNI NG L AW After adequa

te time f or discovery , a party without pr esenting summary judgme nt evidence may move for summary judgme nt on the g round that there is no evidence of one or more e ssential

e le m e n t s o f

a c l a i mo r d e f e n s e o nw h i c hana dv e r s e p arty w o u l d h av e th e b ur d e no f

p r o o f attr i a l. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 166a(i). T he motion must st ate the e lements as to which ther e is no evidenc e. Id. Once a no evidenc e mot ion has been filed i n acc ordanc e with rule 166a(i), the bur den shifts to the nonmovant to br ing forth evidenc e that raises a fac t issue on the cha lleng ed evide nce. See Macias v. F iesta Mart, In c. , 988 S.W .2d 316, 316–17 (Tex. A pp.–Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, no pet.). A

no evidenc e mot ion is proper ly g rante d if the nonm ovant fails to bring forth more than a sc intill a of probative e vidence to raise a gen u ine issue of mate rial fa ct as to an e ssential element of the nonmovant’s claim on which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at trial. See Me rrell Dow Pharm s., Inc. v. Havner , 9 5 3 S

. W

. 2 d 7 0 6 , 7 1 1 (T ex . 1 9 9 7 )

. If th e e v i d en ce s u p p o rt i n g a fi nd ingri se s to a

le ve l th at w ou ld e na

ble reas on able , f

a ir min de d p e rs on s to dif

fe r i n th e ir conclusions, then more t h an a scinti lla of evide nce e x ists. See Havner , 9 53 S.W. 2d at 71 1. L e ss than a sc intill a of e vidence exis ts when the evidence is so weak as to do no more than c reate a mer e surmise or suspicion of a fac t, and t h e l ega l eff

ect is that there is no evidence

. See Kin dred v. Con/ Chem , Inc. , 650 S.W .2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983). On appe al, we w ill uphold a no evidence summary judgme nt only if the summary

judgme nt
rec ord re veals no e vidence of t he challeng ed element, i.e., (a) t here is a complete absenc e of e vidence as to the cha llenged ele ment; (b) the e vidence offe red to prove the cha lleng ed ele ment is no more than a mer e scintilla; (c) the evidenc e esta blishes conclusively

the opposite of the c halleng ed

e le me nt; or

(d ) t he c ourt is b arr e d b y

ru le s o f l aw o r o f e vid e nc e fr om g ivi ngweight to the on ly“W ritten m o tio n , an sw e r, o r o the r re sp o n se ,” a s a p p lied to tra d iti o n a l m o tio n s fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t, 1
a p p lies e q u a lly to no e v id e n c e m o tio n s fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t. See LaRu e v . Ch i e f Oi l & Gas , L. L. C. , 167 S. W

. 3d 8 6 6 , 87 6 (T ex. A p p . – Fo rt W o rt h 20 0 5 , no p et

. ). 3 evidenc e off

ere d to prove the c halleng ed ele ment. See Taylor-Made Hose , I n c. v. Wilkerson , 21 S.W .3d 484, 488 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (citingRobert W. Calvert, “No Evidenc e” and “Insufficient Evidence ” Points of Error , 38 T EX
. L. R EV . 361, 362–63 (1960))

.
T EX A S E L E C T R IC ’ S N O E V I D ENC E M OT I ON F OR S UM M ARY J UDGMENT In his first issue, Holloway argues that the trial c o u rt err ed in g rantingTexas Electric’ s no evidenc e motion for summary judgme nt. Texas Electric c ontends that Holloway failed to respond to one of the no e vidence g rounds it raised in its motion. S pecif ically , T ex as Electric argues that Holloway failed to re spond to its alleg ation that there was “no evidenc e that any act or omission of [Tex as Elec tric] was a proximate cause of the a ccide nt and/or [Holloway ’s] alleg ed injuries.” Whe n a pa rt y fi le s a no e vid e nc e mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt i n c om pl ian ce w ithru le 166a(i), the nonmovant h as t h e b u rd en to bringforth evide nce that raises a fac t issue on the ch al l en ged evide nce. See Macias , 9 8 8 S. W. 2 d at 3 1 6

– 1 7

. T o d e f e at a n o e v id e n c e mo tion for summary judgme nt, the response need only point out evidence that raises a fac t issue on the challeng ed ele ments. SeeT EX
. R. C IV
. P. 1 66 a (i ) c mt. ; P-K Chart er, Inc. v. Tum che Corp. , No. 02- 06-00350-CV, 2007 WL3037743, at *1 (Tex. A pp.–For t Worth Oct. 18, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). I ssues not expressly prese nted to the trial court by written motion, answer , or other r esponse c annot be considere d on appea l a s g rounds for r ever sal. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 1 66 a (c ); Tum che Corp. , 2 0 0 7 WL 30 37 743, at *1; see also Mc Conn e ll v . So uths ide

Ind e p. Sc h. D ist

. , 8 5 8 S. W. 2 d

3 3 7 , 3 4 1 ( T e x. 1993). 1 P r ox im at e Ca use To prove a

neg lige nce c ause of

action, the plaintiff must establish that the de fenda nt’s brea ch proxi mately cause d the plaintiff’s injury

. See D. H ouston , Inc. v. Love , 9 2 S. W. 3 d 4 5 0 , 4 5 4 ( T e x. 2002). The components of proxi mate cause are (1) c ause in fa ct and ( 2) for esee ability

. See Trav is

v . Ci ty of Me sq uite , 830 S.W .2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992). Cause in Fact Th e te st f or c a us e in f a c t is wh e the r the ne g lig e nt a c t or omi ssi on wa s a su bs tanti a l fa c tor

in4

bring ing about the injury and without which the injury would not have oc curr ed. Id. Cause in fa ct must be proved by

evidenc e of pro b at i v e fo rce and not by mere conjec ture, guess, or spec ulation. See Leitch v. Hornsby , 935 S.W .2d 114, 119 (Tex. 1996). The evidence must be sufficient for the jury to determine w ithin a rea sonable probability that the plaintiff’s injury would not have oc curr ed

w it h o u t th e d e f

e n d an t’ s n e g lig ence . See Lenger v. P hysician’s Gen., Inc. , 455 S.W .2d 703, 706 (Tex. 1970)

. Ca

u s e in f a c t i s n o t s h o w nw h e nth e d e f e n d an t’ s c o n d

u c t i s to o r e mo te ly

c o nnecte d with the plaintiff’s injury t o co n s t i tute leg al ca

usation. See Union Pu m p Co. v. Allbritton , 898 S.W .2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995). Fo re se e ab ili ty To prove f

orese eability , the plainti ff m ust establish that a person of ordinary intelligenc e should have anticipated the dang er c reated by the neg lige nt act or omission. See Nixon v . Mr. Prop. Mgm t. Co. , 6 90 S.W. 2d

54 6, 54 9– 50 (T e x. 19 85 ). F or e se e a bi li ty do es not r e qu ir e a

pe rs on to foresee the particula

r ac cident or injury

that, in fac t, occur s. See Trav is , 8 3 0 S. W. 2 d at 9 8. F or e se e a bil ity re qu ir e s o nly

that (1) the i nju

ry be of su c h a g e ne ra l c ha

ra c te r a s mi g ht r e a so na

bly have be en anticipated, and ( 2) the injured pa rty be so similarly

situated in relation to the wrong ful act that the injury

to him or to someone similarly situated might re asonably have be en for esee n. See Nixon , 690 S.W .2d at 551. The que stion of forese eability involves a pra ctical inquiry based on “common experienc e applied to human c onduct.” City of Gladewater v. Pike , 727 S.W .2d 514, 518 (Tex. 1987). It asks whether the injury

might re asonably have been contemplated a s a re sult of the defe ndant’s conduc t. See id. Ade quac y o f Re spo nse To qualify

as an a dequate re s p o n s e under r ule 166a( i), the nonmovant must, at the ver y minimum , provide som e fo rm o f d iscussion that raises issues of mate rial fa ct on the cha lleng ed elements. See Jo hnso n v . Bre we r & P

rit c hard, P. C. , 7 3 S

. W

. 3 d 1 9 3 , 2 0 7

– 0 8 ( T e x . 2 0 0 2 )

. In Johns on , the s upreme court held that the nonmovant’s response was a dequate beca use it provided both argument and evide nce to support its claims. See id

. The court noted that in the fac ts section, the nonmovant had at least one sente nce that alleg ed a con s p i ra cy cl ai m . Id. at 207. Fur ther, the nonmovant provided some argument in a section entitled “The re are Genuine I ssues of Mate rial F act that Preclude the Gra

nting of Summary

J udg ment.” Id. In that section, the nonmovant stated that5

its claims of conspirac y , conver si o n , ac tual and construc tive fra ud, and neg lige nce w ere based on a bre ach of

fiduciar y duty

. Id . T he no nmo va nt w e nt o n to pr ov id e arg ume nt a nd a uth or iti e s to support its position that the movant owed a fiduciar y duty

. Id . Additionally , the nonmovant pointed the cour t to facts that esta

blished a fiduc iary

duty and a br eac h of that duty

. Id . The supre me cour t he ld t hat whe the r t

he no nmo va

nt a de qu ate ly po int e d out e vid e nc e re latin g to c ha lle ng e d e le me nts of the c onspiracy

cause of ac tion was a c lose question, but that the nonmovant nonetheless satisfied the minimum requirements. Id . at 207–08. In the ca se at ha

nd, afte r re peate d rea din gs o f Holl oway ’s re sponse, we c annot locate any discussion of the eleme nt of proxim ate c ause that points out evidence that raises a fac t issue on that element. As suc h, we c onclude that Hollowa y ’s response is ina dequate for its failure to addre ss the challeng ed ele ment of prox imate cause, either g ener ally or as to its subcomponents of ca use in fac t
and fo re se e a bil ity . T he re sp on se de dic ates at lea st s ix pa g e s to the e le me nt o f d uty and br ie fl y
a dd re sse s th e e le me nt o f b re a c h. Ye t it a br up tly c on c lud e s fol low ing the se c tio n on “ br e a c h” wi th a pra y er f or re lief. Summ ation The re quirements imposed upon the pa rties by rule 166a (i) ar e plain. Rule 166a(i ) was

enac ted over eleve n y ear s ag o and has not been amended since i ts adoption. The interpr etations of its langua g e and the comment t o the rule, particula rly with reg ard to the nonm ovant’s burde n when fac ed with a no e vidence motion for summary j udg ment, have be en lar g ely consistent; the

non movant must file a written re sponse that points out evidence that raises a fac t issue on the challeng ed ele ments. Be cause Holloway failed to me et his bur den under rule 166a(i), we hold that the tr ia l c ourt

pr op e rl y g ra nte d T e xas E le c tr ic ’s no e vid e nc e mo ti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. Holloway ’s first issue is overr uled.

DETEC’ S N O E V I D ENC E M OT I ON F OR S UM M ARY J UDGMENT In his second issue, Holloway argues that the trial c ourt err ed in g ranting DETEC’s no evidenc e motio n fo r s u m mary judgme nt. Holloway

initially contends that DET EC’s no evidenc e motion was leg ally insufficient beca use DETEC failed to a lleg e that there was no evidenc e of any

e le me nts of

Ho llo wa y ’s c a us e of a c tio n, but rathe r so ught to dis pr ov e e le me nts of Ho llo wa y ’s c a us e of ac tion by

submitt ing a lleg edly

undisputed evidenc e.W e have p revi o usl y ad d res sed whether a p art y was r eq ui red t o preserve by s p eci al excep t i o n a co m p l ai nt 2 tha t a n o e v id e n c e m o tio n fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t f a iled to sa tisf

y the re q u ire m e n ts o f rule 1 6 6 a (i). See F l ory v. D ai m l er Chr

ys l er Cor

p. , N o . 1 2 -0 2 -0 0 2 7 0 -C V , 2 0 0 3 W L 2 2 8 7 2 4 0 7 , at *1 n.2 (T e x . A p p .– T yle r D e c . 3 , 2 0 0 3 , p e t. d eni ed ) ( m em . op . on reh’ g). I n F l o ry , w e d e te rm ine d tha t suc h a n issu e c o u ld b e w a ive d

. I d. H owe v er , w e di d n ot b ase our holdi ng i n t hat case on waiver and s p eci f i cal l y noted t hat t he ap p el l ee’ s no evi d ence m o t i o n f o r s um m ary ju d g m e n t co m p lied w ith ru le 1 6 6 a (i). I d. U p o n furth e r c o n sid e ra tio n , an d in ligh t o f t h e ho ld ing s o f o u r siste r c o u rts o f ap p ea l s i n c ase s such as Ki ll am , C r ocker , a n d M i nns , w e h ol d t h at t h e l eg al s u f f i ci en cy of

a n o e v i den ce mot i on fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t ca n b e c h a llen g e d fo r th e fi rs t t im e o n a p p e a l.

It has b een o f

t en no t ed t hat al t ho ugh T exas R ul e o f C i vi l P roce d ure 16 6 a d o es not pro hi b i t t he 3 p re se n ta tio n o f a c o m b ina tio n tra d iti o n a l an d no e v id e n c e m o tio n , t h e b e tter p ra c tice is t o fi le two se p a ra te m o tio n s. S e e , e.g ., Bi nur v . Jac obo , 1 3 5 S .W .3 d 6 4 6 , 6 5 0

– 5 1 (T e x . 2 0 0 4 ); C o o k -P izzi v. Va n Wat er s & Ro ger s , I nc. , 94 S .W .3 d 6 3 6 , 6 3 9 n.1 (T e x . A p p .– A m a rillo 2 0 0 2 , p e t. d e n ie d ); Ke ll y v . LI N Te l e v i s i o n o

f Tex a s , L. P. , 27 S. W

. 3d 5 6 4 , 56 9 (T ex. A p p . – E ast l and 20 0 0 , pe t

. de ni ed ). 6 Le ga l Suffic ie nc y o f No Evi de nc e M ot ion s forSum m ar y J udgm e nt Summary judgme nts must stand on their own mer its. Cuyle r v . M inns , 60 S.W .3d 209, 212 (Tex. App.–Houston [14t h Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). As set forth previously , a no evidence motion for summary

judgme nt must st ate the e lements as to which the mova nt contends there is no evidence

. See Callagh an Ranch, LTD. v. Killam , 53 S.W .3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2001, pet. denied)

. The motion mu s t b e s p e c if ic in c h a ll e n g in g th e e v id e n ti ar y s u p p o rt f o r an e le me n t o f a c la im or defe nse; conc lusory

motions or ge nera l no evidence challeng es to an oppone nt’s case ar e not authorized. Id

. I f an o ev i d en ce m o t i o nfo r s um m ary j u d gm en ti s n o t s p e c i f

i c i nch al l en gi n g a particula r ele ment or i s conclusory , the m otion is leg ally insufficient a s a matter of law and ma

y be challeng ed for the f

irst time on appeal. Id .; see also Crocker v. Paulyne’s Nursin g Hom e, Inc. , 95 S.W. 3d 41 6, 41 9 ( Te x. Ap p. –D a lla s 2 00 2, no pe t.) ; Minn s , 60 S.W .3d at 213. 2 In th e c a se at ha

nd , D ET EC f

ile d a sin g le ins tr

ume nt t hat r e qu e ste d s umm ary

jud g me nt b oth under r ule 166a( a) a s well as rule 166a(i). DETEC’s filing contained three sections entitled “Point 3 I ,” “Point I I ,” and “ Point I I I ” re spectively

. Po int I In Point I , DETEC ar gued that it neither ow ed nor br eac hed a duty to H olloway beca

use of the i ndepende nt contra ctor status of Holl oway ’s employ er, Infra Source. D ETEC next s et forth what it c la ime d w e re un dis pute d f a c ts s up po rt ingits c onte nti on . Th e re a ft e r, DE TE C di sc us se d a uth or ity

conce rninga g ener al contra ctor’s limited duty over a subcontrac t o r whe re the g ener al contra ctor reta ins control over the subcon t ra ctor’s methods of work or ope rative de tails so that the subcontrac tor is not entirely fre e to do t he work in his own way

. See Koch Refinin g Co. v. Chapa ,B ecause co m p arat i ve res p o nsi b i l i t y i nvo l ves measuri ng t he p art y ' s co m p arat i ve f aul t i n causi ng t he 4 p la intiff ' s inj u rie s, it ne c e ssita te s a p re lim ina ry find ing tha t t h e p la intiff w a s in fa c t co n trib u to rily ne g lige n t. M o o re v. Ki t s m i ll er , 20 1 S.W

. 3 d 14 7 , 15 1 (T ex. A p p . – T y l er 20 0 6 , pe t

. de ni ed ). C o nt ri b ut o ry negl i gence i s an af f i rma t i ve d e fen se o n w h ic h the d e fen d a n t ha s the b u rd e n o f p ro o f. See id ; s ee al s o T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 94. 7 11 S.W

. 3 d 1 5 3 , 154 (Tex. 1999). DETEC fur ther discussed a

uthority supporting that a g ener al contra ctor that reta ins c ontrol over safe ty matters owes a duty to a subcontra ctor’s e mploy ees if the g ener al contra ctor is awa re that its contractor r outinely ignor es applica

ble fe dera l guide lines and standard c ompany

policies related to safe ty

. See Hoechst-Celanese Corp. v. Mendez , 967 S.W .2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1998). Ther eaf ter, DET EC argued that ther e wa s no evidenc e that ithad “a ny actua l knowledg e of the dang erous a ctivity perf ormed by [Holl oway] t hat ca

u s ed his injury .” It further argued that ther e wa s no evidenc e that any “DETE C people” w ere prese nt when Holloway ’s injury

oc c ur re d or that the y “ ha d any kn ow le dg e or re a so n to be lie ve that H oll ow ay wo uld do wh at he did on this isol ated oc casion.” The only duty that DETEC raised that relates to a g ener al contra ctor’s know ledg e is the socalled “ Mendez duty .” See Mendez , 967 S.W .2d at 357. However, a Mendez duty require s proof of an a war eness that the subcontrac tor routinely ignor es applica

ble fe dera l guide lines and standar d company policies related to safe ty . Thus, DETEC’s alleg ations that there was no e vidence that it had knowledg e that Holloway was pe rfor

ming a dang erous a ctivity

at the time he wa s injured do not

s u f f i c i e n t l y r a i s e a

n o e v i d e n c e i s s u e o nth e e l e m e n to f d u ty. Point II In Po int I I , DET EC ma de an a rgume nt c on c e rn ingc omp ara tiv e re sp on sib ili ty . We fi rs t no te that DETEC fa iled to make any no evidenc e alleg ations in this s ection. More over, a no evidenc e motion for summary

jud gm en t m u s t m ake a lleg ations of “no e vidence ” on a c laim or defe nse on which the nonmovant ha s the burden of proof. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 166a(i). H ere , Holloway does not have the bur den of pr oof on compa rative r esponsibility

. As such, Point I Idoes not contain a ny 4 alleg ations that could proper ly be considere d the subject of a no evidenc e motion fo r sum mary jud g me nt. Point III In Point I I I , DETEC ar gued that Holloway ’s claim conce rning its alleg ed duty to assure thatA cco rding t o D E T E C ’ s m o t i o n, “ 1

- shot ” i s a co nd i t i o n de si gned t o prevent t he aut o m at i c recl o si ng and 5
re e n e rg iz ing o f t h e li n e w h e re a “tem p o ra ry fa u lt” h a s o c c u rr e d

.

W e do not r eac h t he r emai ni ng s ubi s s ues cont ai ned wi t hi n H ol l oway ’ s s econd i s s ue. 6 8 the elec trical line wa s place d in “1-shot,” “mu s t fa il for lack of proxi mate ca

use” be cause the 5 evidenc e is undisputed that Holloway only rec eived one “shot” o f el ec tricity . Whether DETEC’s argument under Point I I I

amounts to a motion under either 166a(a ) or (i) is unc lear at best. DETEC made no express claim that there was no evidenc e of proxi mate ca use and makes re fer ence to other evidenc e, which it claimed was undisputed. Reading Point I I Ias a whole, we c annot conc lude that DETEC satisfied the r equire ments of rule 166a (i) by its contentions made there under. Summ ation DETEC’s motion asserts that it is beingfiled both under the tradition al an d n o evidenc e summary judgme nt standards. Ye t, apar t from that claim, there is lit tle relation between D ETEC’s mot ion and the pla in r e qu ir e me nts of ru le 16 6a (i ). B y

its mot ion , D ET EC m a de no e ff or t to desig nate those c laims it soug ht to submit under the traditional summary judgme nt standard ve rsus the no evidenc e standard. Fur thermore , though D ETEC made a t least one re fer ence to “no evidenc e” under Point I , the evidenc e it claimed wa s lackingdid not have a direct relationship to the dut y it had previously

discussed. Mu c h li k e th e r e qu ir e me n ts c o n c e r n in g a p arty ’ s r e s p o n s e to a n o e v id e n c e mo tion for summary judgme nt, the require ments a movant must satisfy under r ule 166a( i) are straig htforwa rd. To shift the burden of

proof to its opponent, when the re ha s been adequate t ime for discove ry , the

mov ant n e e d o nly

(1 ) s tate the e le me nts a s to wh ic h the re is n o e vid e nc e and (2 ) s tate tha

t th e re is

no e vid e nc e a s to on e or

mor e of tho se e le me nts

. We de c lin e to exte nd a “ fa ir no tic e ” e xce pti on

to the re quirements of r

ule 166a( i). See Fieldt

e c h Av ion ics & I

nstr umen ts, In c. v. C

ompon e nt Cont rol.com , Inc. , 2 62 S.W. 3d 81 3, 82 4 n. 4 (T e x. Ap p. –F or t Wor th 2 00 8, no pe t.) ; Mott v. Red’s Safe and Lock Servs., Inc. , 249 S.W .3d 90, 98 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). As such, we cannot c onclude with any level of c onfidenc e that DETE C satisfied ru l e 1 6 6 a( i )’s low threshold in its mot ion. Thus, w e hold that D ETEC’s no evidenc e motion is leg ally insufficient a

nd that the trial cour

t’s ord er grantingDETEC’s no evide nce motion for summar y judgme nt was
err oneous. Holloway ’s sec ond issue is sustained. 69 D I S P OS I T I ON Havingoverr

uled Holloway ’s first issue, we a f firm t h e t rial cour

t’s judgme nt as to Texas El ec t ri c. Havingsustained Holloway ’s sec ond issue, we reverse the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt a s to DETEC and remand

the c a us e fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.

JA M ES T. WOR THEN Chief J ustice
Opinion delivere d Marc h 25, 2009. P an elconsi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. , G r i

f f i t h, J. , and H oyl e, J.

(PUBL I SH)