138 Nev., Advance Opinion W 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

NEVADA GAMING COMMISSION, A 

POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE 

STATE OF NEVADA; AND NEVADA 

GAMING CONTROL BOARD, A 

POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE 

STATE OF NEVADA, 

Appellants, 

VS. 

STEPHEN A. WYNN, AN INDIVIDUAL, 

Respondent. 

No. 82263 

FilLED 

Appeal from a district court order granting a petition for 

judicial review of, or a writ of prohibition concerning, a gaming commission 

proceeding. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Adriana Escobar, 

Judge. 

Reversed and remanded. 

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Darlene S. Caruso, Chief Deputy 

Attorney General, Kiel B. Ireland, Deputy Attorney General, and Steven G. 

Shevorski, Chief Litigation Counsel, Carson City, 

for Appellants. 

Campbell & Williams and Donald J. Campbell and J. Colby Williams, Las 

Vegas, 

for Respondent. 

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(01 1947A 4(e14. 
OPINION 

By the Court, SILVER, J.: 

NRS 463.315(1) entitles a person subject to disciplinary 

proceedings by the Nevada Gaming Commission to judicial review of the 

Commission's final order in district court. NRS 463.318(2) states that this 

judicial review "is the exclusive method of review of the Commission's 

actions, decisions and orders in disciplinary hearings." NRS 463.318(2) also 

precludes extraordinary common-law writs or equitable proceedings "where 

statutory judicial review is made exclusive." In this appeal, we consider for 

the first time whether NRS 463.318(2) precludes a petition for a writ of 

prohibition challenging the jurisdiction of the Commission and the Nevada 

Gaming Control Board (collectively, when possible, the Agencies) over a 

party in disciplinary proceedings before the Commission enters a final 

decision. We also consider whether an order by the Commission denying a 

motion to dismiss is "final" under NRS 463.315(1). 

In the underlying disciplinary action before the Commission, 

respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that the Agencies lacked 

jurisdiction over him. The Commission denied the motion, and respondent 

filed a petition for judicial review or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition 

in the district court. The court found that judicial review was unavailable 

because the Commission had not entered a final decision. The court 

consequently found, however, that respondent lacked an adequate legal 

remedy to challenge the Commission's jurisdiction and that it could 

therefore entertain respondent's petition to the extent that he alternatively 

sought a writ of prohibition. Ultimately, the court granted writ relief, 

determining that the Agencies exceeded their jurisdiction in the 

disciplinary action against respondent. 

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Summon COURT 

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NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 4140114 

We conclude that, pursuant to NRS 463.318(2), the district 

court lacked jurisdiction to entertain respondent's petition for a writ of 

prohibition to arrest the disciplinary proceedings against him. The district 

court also lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition for judicial review 

pursuant to NRS 463.315(1) because an order denying a motion to dismiss 

for lack of jurisdiction is not a final order. Therefore, we conclude that the 

district court erred by entertaining and granting respondent's petition, 

whether viewed as a petition for judicial review or as a petition for a writ of 

prohibition. Accordingly, we reverse. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

From 2005 to 2018, respondent Stephen A. Wynn was the Chief 

Executive Officer, Chairman of the Board of Directors, and controlling 

shareholder of nonparty Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, dba Wynn Las Vegas and 

Wynn Resorts, Ltd. (Wynn Resorts). In accord with his involvement with 

Wynn Resorts, Wynn obtained a finding of suitability from the Commission, 

which allowed him to serve in his various capacities with the gaming 

establishment. In January 2018, The Wall Street Journal published an 

article in which several Wynn Resorts employees alleged that Wynn had 

engaged in sexual misconduct since 2005. Following this publication, the 

Board began to investigate these allegations. A few weeks after the Board 

started its investigation, Wynn resigned as CEO and Chairman of Wynn 

Resorts and signed a separation agreement. In that agreement, Wynn 

agreed to forgo any severance payment from Wynn Resorts for his services 

as CEO and Chairman and agreed to sell his stock shares of Wynn Resorts. 

Wynn sold his shares in Wynn Resorts shortly thereafter. 

Months later, as a part of its investigation, the Board sent 

Wynn notice of its intent to require Wynn to testify at an investigative 

hearing. Wynn did not appear at that hearing. Instead, Wynn's attorneys 

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met with the Agencies and requested that Wynn's cooperation with the 

investigation be limited to answering written inquiries due to pending 

lawsuits by the Wynn Resorts employees regarding Wynn's alleged sexual 

misconduct. The Agencies rejected the request. Wynn's attorneys 

responded with a letter reiterating the request and arguing that Wynn 

should not have to testify because he was no longer involved with Wynn 

Resorts. The Agencies did not respond to this letter. 

In January 2019, the Board filed a complaint seeking monetary 

fines against Wynn Resorts, but not Wynn individually, for violations of the 

Nevada Gaming Control Act and gaming regulations stemming from 

Wynn's alleged sexual misconduct. The Board and Wynn Resorts settled 

that action a month later, with Wynn Resorts agreeing to pay a fine of $20 

million. The Board then filed a complaint before the Commission to revoke 

the finding of suitability regarding Wynn. The Board asserted that Wynn's 

alleged sexual misconduct constituted four violations of Nevada gaming 

statutes and regulations and that his failure to appear and testify at the 

investigative hearing constituted a fifth violation. Wynn moved to dismiss, 

arguing that the Agencies lacked jurisdiction over him because he had 

resigned as CEO of Wynn Resorts, had moved from his residence in the 

property, had sold his stock in Wynn Resorts, and was no longer involved 

with gaming licenses at the time the Board filed its complaint against him. 

The Commission denied the motion, and Wynn filed a petition for judicial 

review or, in the alternative, for a writ of prohibition in the district court. 

The district court denied Wynes request for judicial review, 

finding that such review was not available because the Commission had not 

entered a final decision. However, the district court concluded that it could 

entertain Wynn's request for a writ of prohibition. The court reasoned that 

because it lacked jurisdiction to consider Wynn's petition for judicial review, 

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Wynn lacked an adequate legal remedy. As a result, the court found, a writ 

of prohibition was available if the Agencies had exceeded their jurisdiction 

in the disciplinary action against Wynn. Ultimately, the district court 

agreed with Wynn that, because he was no longer involved with Wynn 

Resorts, the Agencies lacked jurisdiction over Wynn. Accordingly, the court 

granted Wynn's petition to the extent that he sought a writ of prohibition.' 

The Agencies now appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

The Agencies argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

review the Commission's order denying Wynn's motion to dismiss. The 

Agencies contend that Wynn is not entitled to writ relief because judicial 

review under NRS 463.318 is the exclusive method of court intervention 

regarding the Commission's disciplinary decisions and that writ relief is 

explicitly excluded. They further assert that judicial review is precluded 

because only final orders may be reviewed, and the district court properly 

found that the Commission's order is not final. We agree. 

The district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Wynn's petition for writ 

relief 

Generally, we review a district court's decision to grant or deny 

a writ petition for an abuse of discretion. DR Partners v. Bd. of Cty. 

Comm'rs, 116 Nev. 616, 621, 6 P.3d 465, 468 (2000). However, we review 

questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Pawlik v. Deng, 134 Nev. 83, 

85, 412 P.3d 68, 70-71 (2018). Because this case requires us to interpret 

whether the relevant statutory scheme allowed the district court to 

'The district coures order stated that it granted Wynn's petition for 

judicial review. However, a careful reading of the reasoning in that order 

evinces that the district court intended to grant Wynn's petition for a writ 

of prohibition, not his petition for judicial review. Accordingly, we treat the 

appealed order as one granting a petition for a writ of prohibition. 

SOMME COURT 

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entertain or grant Wynn's writ petition, we review the district court's 

decision de novo. 

A person subject to disciplinary proceedings before the 

Commission is entitled to judicial review of the Commission's final order in 

district court. NRS 463.315(1). "Mudicial review by the district court and 

the appellate court of competent jurisdiction afforded in this chapter is the 

exclusive method of review of the Commission's actions, decisions and orders 

in disciplinary hearings held pursuant to NRS 463.310 to 463.3145, 

inclusive." NRS 463.318(2) (emphasis added). Under NRS 463.318(2), writ 

relief is not available "where statutory judicial review is made exclusive or 

is precluded, or the use of those writs or proceedings is precluded by specific 

statute." 

We will give effect to a statutes plain language and will not go 

beyond it to determine legislative intent. See Sonia F. v. Eighth Judicial 

Dist. Court, 125 Nev. 495, 499, 215 P.3d 705, 707 (2009). A fundamental 

axiom of statutory interpretation is that related statutes must be read 

together. See Barney v. Mt. Rose Heating & Air Conditioning, 124 Nev. 821, 

826-27, 192 P.3d 730, 734 (2008) ("Statutes are to be read in the context of 

the act and the subject matter as a whole . . . ."). Crucially, a specific statute 

controls over a general statute. Piroozi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 131 

Nev. 1004, 1009, 363 P.3d 1168, 1172 (2015). 

We are not persuaded by Wynn's contention that the district 

court had jurisdiction to grant writ relief because NRS 34.320, which 

defines the general function of a writ of prohibition, permits district courts 

to issue such relief when a tribunal or board acts without or in excess of its 

jurisdiction. Even if we were to credit Wynn's argument that the Agencies 

lacked jurisdiction over Wynn—which we need not resolve in this appeal—

we conclude that NRS 463.318(2) bars the district court from granting writ 

6 
relief in this specific case.2By its plain language, NRS 463.315(2) provides 

that a district court may review the Commission's disciplinary decisions 

only after the Commission issues a final order and the petitioner files a 

petition for judicial review under NRS 463.315(1). During its review, the 

court may consider whether the Commission exceeded its statutory 

authority and jurisdiction. NRS 463.317(3)(b). NRS 463.318(2), in turn, 

expressly precludes writ relief by providing that judicial review under NRS 

463.315(1) is the exclusive method of obtaining review of the Commission's 

disciplinary actions. See generally Crane v. Cona Tel. Co. of Cal., 105 Nev. 

399, 401, 775 P.2d 705, 706 (1989) (When the legislature creates a specific 

procedure for review of administrative agency decisions, such procedure is 

controlling."). Our interpretation of NRS 463.318(2) is consistent with the 

principle that a specific statute controls over a general statute, see Piroozi, 

131 Nev. at 1009, 363 P.3d at 1172, and our precedent limiting judicial 

intervention into the Commission's disciplinary proceedings. See State v. 

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 111 Nev. 1023, 1025, 899 P.2d 1121, 1122 

(1995) (explaining that the jurisdiction afforded to Nevada's district courts 

under the Nevada Constitution "does not authorize court intrusion into the 

administration, licensing, control, supervision and discipline of gamine). 

Accordingly, we hold that NRS 463.318(2) precludes writ relief in this case 

arising from Commission proceedings. 

The district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Wynn's petition for judicial 

review under NRS 463.315(1) 

Because we conclude that Wynn was not entitled to writ relief, 

the district court could only properly entertain Wynn's petition as one for 

2We do not address whether the Agencies lacked jurisdiction over 

Wynn because we determine that the district court did not have jurisdiction 

to entertain either Wynn's petition for judicial review or his petition for writ 

relief. 

7 
judicial review, and even then, only if the Commission's order denying 

Wynn's motion to dismiss was a final order under NRS 463.315(1). We 

determine that the district court properly found that the Commission's 

order denying Wynn's motion to dismiss was not final. For an order to be 

final, it must dispose of all the issues presented in a case. Cf Lee v. GNLV 

Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) (explaining that a 

judgment is final for purposes of appealability under the Nevada Rules of 

Appellate Procedure when it disposes of all issues and leaves only postjudgment issues, such as attorney fees and costs, for future consideration). 

Here, the Commission denied Wynn's motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction and, therefore, did not dispose of all of the issues presented. As 

a result, the Commission's order was clearly not final, see Resnick v. Nev. 

Gaming Comm'n, 104 Nev. 60, 63, 752 P.2d 229, 231 (1988) ("The legislature 

did not intend, by using the words 'final decision or order, that an 

interlocutory Commission determination . . . would be immediately subject 

to judicial scrutiny." (quoting NRS 463.315(1))), and the district court 

therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain Wynn's petition for judicial review. 

CONCLUSION 

NRS 463.318(2) precludes writ relief in this circumstance and 

limits judicial review to petitions filed under NRS 463.315(1) challenging 

the Commission's final order on disciplinary matters. Based on our 

interpretation of NRS 463.318(2), we conclude that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to entertain Wynn's petition for writ of prohibition. We further 

conclude that the district court properly determined that the Commission's 

order denying Wynn's motion to dismiss is not a final order. As the order 

was not final, the district court also lacked jurisdiction to consider Wynn's 

8 
ACL.A J. 

Hardesty 

A7NAL•11416.Stylglftessom 

Parraguirre 

petition as one for judicial review under NRS 463.315(1). Therefore, we 

determine that the district court erred by granting Wynn's petition. 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order granting Wynn's petition 

and remand this matter to the district court with instructions to dismiss the 

petition for lack of jurisdiction. 

J. 

We concur: 

Silver 

Ale4Cw0 J. 

Stiglich 

J. 

Cadish 

Poem J. 

Pickering 

Herndon 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(th 1947A 410#0 

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