* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** Honorable G. Thomas Van Bebber, Chief Judge, UnitedStates District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by design ation.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 11/5/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

GENE A. FREEMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-5008 (D.C. No. 94-C-1107-W) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRISCOE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER, ** District Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral1 Although this case was filed after the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna E. Shalala, were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security, Shirley S. Chater, we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the un derlying administrative decision.

2 By consent of the parties, this matter was decided by the magistrate judge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a). -2- argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Gene A. Freeman appeals from the district court’s order affirming the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ denial of his application for Social Security disability insurance benefits. 1 Claimant, a fifty-seven year-old man with a high school education, has worked in the past as a security guard. He alleges disability from April 1989, due to fatigue, pain fr om heart problems, pain in his back and legs, shortness of breath, and lightheaded ness. Claimant’s application for disability benefits, fil ed on February 9, 1993, was denied both initially and on reconsideration. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a decision de nying benefits. The magistrate judge affirmed the decision of the Secre tary. 2On appeal, claimant contends that (1) the ALJ failed to consider proper ly claimant’s subjective complaints of pain; (2) the ALJ erred in finding cl aimant’s complaints of fatigue, shortness of breath, and lightheadedness incredible based solely on a lack of-3-

objective medical evidence; and (3) the ALJ failed to develop the record as to the specific demands of claimant’s past relevant work i n light of his limitations. At step four, claimant bears the burden to establis h that he cannot return to his past relevant work. Nielson v. Sullivan , 992 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 1993). Our review of the Secretary’s decision is l imited to determining whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether th e Secretary applied correct legal standards. Castellano v. Secretary of Health& Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). “To find that the Secretary ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, there must be sufficient rele vant evidence in the record that a reasonable person might deem adequate to support the ultimate conclusion.” Bernal v. Bowen , 851 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir. 1988). However, we may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment fo r that of the Secretary. Id. Applying these standards, and after careful review of the record, we affirm. An individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act only if his impairments are so severe that he “is n ot only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, an d work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which ex ists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). Here, the ALJ denied ben efits at step four of the fivestep evaluation process applied for determining dis ability. See Williams v.
Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)(discussing the five steps in detail).-4-

In denying benefits at step four, the ALJ found that claimant was capable of performing a full range of light and sedentary work , and that his past relevant work as a security guard was light work. First, claimant asserts that the ALJ failed to cons ider properly his subjective complaints of pain. In evaluating pain we consider (1) whether the claimant established a pain producing impairment byobjective medical evidence; (2) whether there is a nexus between an establishedobjective impairment and the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain; and (3) w hether upon consideration of all of the evidence, the claimant’s pain is disabli ng. Musgrave v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1371, 1375-76 (10th Cir. 1992). Here, because claimant presented medical evidence that he suffers from stable angina, a cond ition reasonably likely to produce some pain, the ALJ was required to determin e whether that pain was disabling. See Luna v. Bowen , 834 F.2d 161, 164 (10th Cir. 1987). Contrary to claimant’s assertions, the ALJ properlyconsidered claimant’s allegations of pain by reviewing his medical treatm ent, the effectiveness of his medications, his testimony regarding his daily acti vities, and the consistency of his complaints of pain with the objective medical e vidence. Id. at 165-66. As the ALJ determined, claimant’s medical evidence does no t support a determination of disabling pain, and “[c]laimant’s testimony alone c annot establish the existence of disabling pain.” Musgrave , 966 F.2d at 1376.-5-

None of claimant’s treating physicians reported that claimant’s pain was constant, severe, or disabling. See Talley v. Sullivan , 908 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1990)(“The medical records must be consistent with the nonmedical testimony as to the severity of the pain.”). In ad dition, the ALJ found, and the record supports, that any pain which may result fro m the stable angina was controlled by nitroglycerine. Accordingly, the ALJ correctly applied the criteria for evaluating subjective complaints of pain, and w e conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that clai mant’s pain does not impair his ability to engage in a full range of light and sedentary work activities. Next, claimant asserts that the ALJ failed to make specific credibility findings regarding his subjective complaints of fat igue, lightheadedness, and shortness of breath. Specific findings as to credi bility are required only after a claimant has produced objective medical evidence sh owing that claimant’s impairment reasonably could be expected to produce the symptom. See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995)(if objective me dical evidence shows a pain-producing problem, ALJ is required to considerclaimant’s allegations of pain and decide whether they are credible); see als o SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996)(a finding as to credibility is made after a physical or mental impairment reasonably expected to produce the subje ctive symptom is shown by “medically acceptable clinical laboratory diagnosti c techniques”). The ALJ-6-

concluded, and we agree, that there was no medical evidence in the record to indicate that claimant’s stable angina could reason ably produce his fatigue, lightheadedness, and shortness of breath. Therefor e, the ALJ correctly found that these nonexertional impairments did not have an imp act on his ability to do light and sedentary work. See id. Next, claimant asserts that the ALJ did not adequat ely develop the record as to the demands of claimant’s past relevant work, an d did not make the required specific findings as to how claimant’s impairments would mesh with those demands. See Henrie v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Se rvs. , 13 F.3d 359, 361 (10th Cir. 1993)(ALJ required to make find ings regarding a claimant’s residual functional capacity, the physical and ment al demands of a claimant’s past relevant work, and the ability of the claimant to p erform those demands given claimant’s residual functional capacity). Here, the ALJ found that claimant could perform a f ull range of light and sedentary work unlimited by his stable angina or any other impairment. The vocational expert testified that claimant’s past re levant work as a security guard was light work. Therefore, because claimant’s resi dual functional capacity did not include any limitations on his ability to perfo rm a full range of light and sedentary work, the ALJ was not required to conductany further comparison of limitations with work demands. See SSR 82-62, Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv., Rulings-7-

1975-1982, at 812 (in making findings at step four, ALJ must obtain “factual information about those work demands which have a b earing on [a claimant’s] medically established limitations ”)(emphasis added). Here, the ALJ made the requisite findings regarding claimant’s residual functional capacity, ascertained that his past relevant work was light in exertional level, and found that claimant could perform light work given his residual functio nal capacity. See Henrie , 13 F.3d at 361. The ALJ’s decision that claimant could perform his past relevant work was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahom a is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge