## NO S

. 12

- 20

- 00215

- CR 12

- 20

- 00216

- CR

IN THE COUR T OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS

JAMES ALTON SUMRALL, SR. , APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF T EXAS , APPELLEE §

§

§ APPEAL S FROM THE

COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO

. 2

ANGELINA COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINI ON James Alton Sumrall, Sr . appeals his convictions for driving while his driver ’ s license
was invalid and without having established financia l responsibility for the vehicle and possession of a handgun in a motor vehicle while driving with a suspended dr iver ’ s license. Appellant raises four issues on appeal. We affirm.

B A CKGR OUND Appellant was charged by separate informations with driving w hile his driver ’ s license
was invalid and without having established financial responsibility for that vehicle th rough a motor vehicle liability policy and possession of a handgun in a moto r vehicle while driving with a suspended driver ’ s license. Appella nt pleaded “guilty ” and elected to proceed pro se, although the trial court appointed counsel to attend proceedin gs on “standby.” Appellant waived his right to a jury trial, and the ma tter proceeded to a bench trial. Ultimately, the trial court found App ellant “guilty” as charged on both counts and sentenced him to confinement for ninety days
for each offense. Thi s appeal followed.2 F AILURE TO O RDER C OMPETENCY H EARING In his first is sue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by fa iling sua sponte to hold a competency hearing. Standard of Review and Governing Law
We review a trial court ’ s f ailure to conduct a competency inquiry for an abuse of
discretion. Kost ura v. State , 292 S.W.3d 744, 746 (Tex. App.

– Houston [14th Dist.] 2009 , no pet.); Lahood v. State , 171 S.W.3d 613, 617

– 18 (Tex. App.

– Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet.
ref ’ d); see also Mo ore v. State , 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999 ). A defendant i s not competent to stand trial if he lacks (1) a sufficient present ab ility to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. art. 46B.003(a) ( West 2018 )

. If evidence which raises a bo na fide doubt as to the defendant ’ s competence to stand trial comes to the trial court ’ s attention, the trial cour t sua sponte shall “suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to sta nd trial” and , then , “determine by informal inquiry whether
there is s ome evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.” Id. art. 46B. 004 ( West 2018 ); s ee Fuller v. State , 253 S.W.3d 220, 228 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A bona fide doubt is “a real doubt in the judg e ’ s mind as to the
defendant ’ s competency.” Alcott v. State , 51 S.W.3d 596, 599 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
Evi dence raising a bona fide doubt “need not be sufficient to support a fin ding of incompetence and is qualitatively different from such evidence .” Id. Evidence is usually sufficient to create a bona fide doubt if it shows “recent severe mental illness, a t least moder ate retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant.” McDaniel v. State , 98 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ; Kostura , 292 S.W.3d at 7 47

. Discussion In the instant case, there is no evidence that Appellant suffered from mental illn ess or that
he is an individual with any sort of moderate mental or inte llectual disability. Appellant first
contends that several communicat ions he made to the trial court during trial sufficed to raise a
bona fide doub t as to hi s competence to stand tri al to the trial court ’ s attention

. The nature of
these communications is summarized as follows:

• Appellant filed a pro se motion , in whic h he claim ed that he was the beneficiary of an express trust and asked for an order to dissolve the trust immediat ely.3 • At the beginning of the trial, when the court asked if the parties were ready to proceed, Appellant asked the trial court to which “Ja mes Sumrall” he was referring and told the judge that he was not James Sumrall and the trial judge was , in fact Ja mes Sum rall.

• Appellant stated at the beginning of trial that he objected to the court entering a plea on his behalf, that “the court assum ed liability[,]” that he did not “ agree to jurisdiction [.] ”

• Appellant asked about a January 2019 Presidential Executi ve Order on the trafficking of persons and any law that i s c onsidered unconstitutional is null and void from inception.

• Appellant s tated that “An individual is a corporation. I do not declare myself as a corporation. ” The witness replied, “ You ’ re a pe rson. Like I said, you ’ re a living, breathing, human b eing [ ,] to which Appellant responded, “No, I ’ m not a person. A person is a corp oration.”

• During the punishment proceedings , Appellant interjected “I don ’ t want to accept the benefit [ of the trust, ] but there is a name floating out

-- floating around that n eeds

-- ”

However, Appellant ’ s unusual behavior did not mandate a compete ncy inquiry absent the
existence of evidence raising a bona fide doubt as to his present ability to communicate or understand the proceeding s. See Kostura , 292 S.W.3d at 7 47

. As the State notes in its brief, despite these unusual statements, Appellant pa rticipated in trial, made arguments that are subject
to a reasonabl e legal interpretation, and e ngaged to an effec tive degree with the witness during

cross examination

. The fact that Appellant does not have traditional legal training cannot be
overlooked. Nonetheless, Appellant had a right to act as his own counsel. See, e.g. , Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 8 32

– 35, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2540

– 41, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975)

. Based on
our review of the record, Appellant ’ s arguments reasonably can be interpret ed to have raised
issues related to (1) the trial court ’ s subject m a tter jurisdiction , (2) the constitutionality o f
Texas ’ s firearms regulations and licensing scheme, and (3) the State ’ s burden of proof on his identity inasmuch as he declin ed to co ncede t h at issue to the trial court

. Lastly, it is undeniable that some of Appellant ’ s statements at trial ha d a tenuous bearing , at best , on the issues in the case. Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that such state ments, when made by a defendant acting

pr o se , w ithout more, trigger the trial court ’ s duty to investigate that pro se defendant ’ s competency.
In Farett a , the United States Supreme Court discussed the matter of pro se

re presentation

. See id. In so doi ng, the Court noted that it is “ undeniabl e that in most criminal prosecutions , defendants could better defend with counsel ’ s guidance than by their own uns killed
efforts ” and that a pro se defendant may hope to realize , if at all, the “ potential advantage of a4 lawyer ’ s training and experience

. . . onl y imperfectly .” See id. , 422 U.S. at 832, 95 S. Ct. at
2540

. Here, Appellant made several statements th at fairly can be described as “off

- topic” legal arguments. And while such statements may appe ar, at first glance, to those with legal educati on and years of practical experience to be, as Appellant describe s them in his brief, “bizarre,” the y are less tha n bizarre when considered in the context of a layperson ’s attempting to defend himself against crim inal charges. The trial court reasonably could ha ve construed th ese statements in this context as Appellant ’ s lod ging every potential “legal” argument he could
devise , in the hope that one of the argument s w ould prove fruitful. Some of Appellant ’ s
argume nts arguably were relevant but not successful. Ot hers simply we re neither artfully put nor
relevant. Yet , we are mindful that, unlike this court, the trial court was in the best position to judge Appe llant ’ s demeanor and behavior. And we cannot rule out the possibility that the trial court reasonably c ould have interpreted Appellant ’ s communications before it to be a matter of Appellant ’ s behaving in an obdurate, difficult , or disruptive manner in an attempt to der ail the ordinary course of the proceedin gs. In any event , based on our review of the reco rd , we decline to categ orize such statements as “truly bizarre ” or indicative that Appellant did not understand the proceedings against him, so as to trigger the tria l court ’ s duty to conduct a competency
h earing. See id. ; see also T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. art. 46B.003(a) ; Kostura , 292 S.W.3d at
7 47

. B ased on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the evidence supports that the trial court should have had any rea l doubt as to the Appella nt ’ s competency

. See Alcott , 51 S.W.3d at 599
n.10 . Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its di scretion by declining sua sponte to investigate Appellant ’ s competence. Appellant ’ s first issue is overruled.

K N OWING AND I NTELLIGENT D ECISI ON TO D ECLINE A PPOINTED C OUNSEL In his second issue, Appellant a rgues that his decision to waive his right to cou nsel and proceed pro se was not made knowingly and intelligently due to his incompetency and, therefore,
the tr ial c ourt abused its discretion in permitting him to proceed pro se

. Standard of Revi ew and Gove rning Law The standard by which an appellate cou rt reviews whether the defendant “clearly and unequivocally” has invoked his right to represent himself is an abus e of discretion standard,5 vi ewing the evidence in “the light most favorable to the trial cour t ’ s ruling.” Rodriguez v. State , 491 S.W.3d 18, 28 (Tex. App.

– Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref ’ d). An appella te court may imply “any findings of fact supported by the evidence” when , as h ere, the trial judge “failed to make explicit findings.” Chadwic k v. State , 309 S.W.3d 558 , 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the
Texas Constitution provide that a defendant in a criminal trial has the right to assistance of
counsel. This ri ght may be waived, and a defendant may choose to represent himself at trial.
Faretta , 422 U.S. at 819

– 20, 95 S. C t. at 2533 ; Fulbright v. State , 41 S.W.3d 228, 23 4 (Tex. App.

– Fort Worth 2001 , pet. ref ’ d)

. However, a waiver of the right to counsel will no t be inferred lightly , and courts will indulge ev ery reasonable presumption against the validity of such

a waiver

. Geeslin v. State , 600 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex. Cri m. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
A waiver of counsel must be made competently, knowingly and intel ligently, and voluntarily.
Collier v. State , 959 S.W.2d 621, 625

– 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Godinez v. Moran , 509 U.S. 389, 400

– 01, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2687, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993)). Th e decision to waive counsel and proceed pro se is made knowingly and intelligently if it is made with a full
under standing of the right to counsel , which is being abandoned, as well as the dangers and disadvantages of self

- repre sentation. Collier , 959 S.W .2d at 626; Blankenship v. State , 673 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The decision is made voluntarily if it is uncoerced.
Collier , 959 S.W.2d at 6 26. No formulaic questioning is required to establish a knowing and i ntelligent waiver

. See Blan kenship , 673 S.W.2d at 583. A defendant “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self

- representa tion, so that the record will establish that ‘ he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. ’ ” Faretta , 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S

. Ct. at 2541; see also Goffney v. State , 843 S.W.2d 583, 585 ( Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The
record must be suffic ient for a reviewing court to make an assessment that the defendant was made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of the self

- representation

. Goffney , 843 S.W.2d at 585; Johnson v. State , 760 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
Courts look at the t otality of the particular facts and circumstances of a case in deciding
whether the defendant ’ s decision was kn owing, intelligent, and volunta ry. See Grant v. State , 255 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.

– Beaumont 2007, no pet.)

. The totality of the circumstance s may include the defendant ’ s education or sophistication, the complex or simple nature of the6 charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See i d. at 648. Other considerations include whether the
defendant wa s represented by counsel before trial, whether st andby counsel was appointed, and whether the defendant had prior experience with the criminal justice system. Id.
Discussion
In the instant case, no reporter ’ s record was made of the hearing at which Appel lant initially waived his right to counsel. But Appellant does not now c onte nd that no such admonishment took place. Rather, Appellant argues that he could not have knowingly and
voluntaril y waived his rights because of his incompetency. However, as set forth above, Appellant was not found to be incom petent, nor did the tria l court abuse its discretion in declining sua sponte to investigate whether App ellant was incompetent at the time of t rial.
A t the outset of tri al, the tria l court made the following statements to Appellant regarding
his decision t o represent himself:

But Mr. Sumrall,

. . . I recognize you from previous hearings, so you ’ re here, and you have chosen to represent you rsel f and you have that constitutional righ t. But out of concern for the fact that this is a legal proceeding, I want ed Mr. Al Charanza to be present in the courtroom. I assume he ’ s been provided with all the appropriate materials by the State, to assist you in representation should you choose to avail yourself of [his] s ervices. Mr. Charanza is board certified in crim inal law and is a knowledgeable and experienced attorney, former prosecutor, and is very capable counsel. He is available to assist you. You do not have to consult him if you don ’ t want to. You

can procee d on your own.

Furthermore, during the punishme nt phase of the proceedings, the trial court again
addressed the matter as follows:

Okay. And for the record, I think it ’ s already been e stab lished, but Mr. Sumrall has dec lined to attempt to hire counsel and has elected to represent himself as he is enti tled to do. But because this charge or his charges carry a possible penalty of jail time, I felt obligated that competent counsel should b e av ailable for Mr. Sumrall to cons ult at all times if he were willi ng to do so, so I appointed Mr. Albert Charanza, w ho is a former military prosecutor in the United States Marine Corps., former Assistant District Attorney in Angelina County, and is board

cer tified in criminal law in the s tate of Texas, has tried a number of cases and has many years [of] experience, to b e available

. . . .
Based on our review of the particular facts and circumstances of this case, it is apparent
that App ella nt was sophisticated enough to understand the nature of the proceedings , which
i nvolved straightforward matters of minimal complexity, i. e., charges of driving with a suspended license and unlawful possession of a firearm. Appellant’s driving record w as7 a dmitted at trial, which demonstrated that this was not the first time Appellant had been accused of committing a t raffic offense. As set forth previously, Appellant participated in trial proceedings , made arguments that , al though not successful, are s ubje ct to a reasonably legal interpretation, and engaged to an effective degree with the witness during cross examinat ion. Furthermore, the trial court appointed standby counsel at both the guilt

- innocence and punishment phases of the proceedings . In so doin g, the trial court relayed standby counsel ’ s qualifications to Appellant , by whi ch it implicitly conveyed to Appel lant that he lacked the experience possessed the qualified attorney made available to him, and further, that this attorney was standing by to assist Appellant because the proceedings would not be tailored to Appellant ’ s la y man ’ s experience level. 1 See Bla nkenship , 673 S.W.2d at 583 (n o formulaic questioning required to establish knowing and intelligent waiver )

. Throughout the course of the pro ceedings, Appellant never flagged in his intent to act pro se , and there is no e vidence that suggests that his
dec ision to represent himself or continue in that course of action resulted from coercion.
We remain mindful that t he s tate cannot force a de fendant to have a lawyer. See Faretta , 422 U.S. at 820

– 21, 834, 95 S. Ct. at 25 33

– 34

. A defendant has a constitu tional right to represent himself. Id. , 422 U.S. at 819

– 20, 95 S. Ct. at 2533

– 34

. Here, t he record reflects that Appellant elected to re pres ent himself , and, under the par ticular facts and circumstances of this

case, we hold he made his decision voluntar ily, knowingly, and intelligently. See Grant , 255
S.W.3d at 647

– 48. Appellant ’ s second issue is overruled.

E VIDENTIARY S UFFICIENCY
- U NL AWFU LLY C ARRYING A W EAPON In his third issue, Appellant argues that the evidence i s legally insufficient to support h is conviction for unlawfully carrying a weapon. Standard of Review and Governing Law
The Jackson v. Virginia 2 legal sufficiency standar d is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether t he evidence is sufficient to suppor t each element of a criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v.
State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional

1 During the punishment phase of the proceedings, stand by counsel addressed the cour t at length in an attempt to elucidate the trial court about Appellant’s statements regarding his unw illingness to “accept the benefits of the trust.”

2 443 U.S. 307, 315

– 16 , 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786

– 87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).8 minimum requir ed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a
criminal conviction. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 315

– 16, 99 S. Ct. at 2786

– 87; see also Escobedo
v. State , 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.

– San Antonio 1999, pet. ref ’ d). The standard for reviewi ng a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson , 443 U. S. a t 320, 99 S. Ct. a t 2789; see also Johnson v. State , 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Johnson , 871 S.W.2d at 186. A jury is free to believe al l or any part of a witness ’ s testimony or disbelieve all or a ny part of that testimony. See Lee v. State , 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.

– Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff ’ d , 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A successful legal suf fici ency challenge wil l result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing

court. See Tibbs v. Florida , 457 U.S. 31 , 41

– 42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217

– 18, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing gu ilt, and
circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Rodri guez v. State , 521 S.W.3d 822, 827 (Tex. App.

– Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Sorrells v. State , 343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Each fact need not poin t directly and inde pendently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumu lative force of all the incriminati ng circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. See Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Juries are permi tted to draw multiple r easonable inferences as long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 15. Juries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions

. I d. An inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducin g a logical consequence from them, while speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence presented. Id. at 16. The sufficiency o f th e evidence is measur ed against the offense as defined by a hypothetically corre ct jury charge. See Malik v. State , 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge would include one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
ind ictm ent, does not unnece ssarily increase the State ’ s burden of proof or unnecessari ly restrict
the State ’ s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant is tried.” Id.9 Discussion
In order to prove that App ella nt was “guilty” of unlawfully carrying a handgun , the State was required to dem onstrate that Appellant intentional ly, knowingly, or recklessly carried, on or about his person, a handgun while engaged in criminal activity, othe r than a Class C misdemeanor, that is a violation of law or ordinance regulating t raffic

. See T EX

. P ENAL C OD E A

NN

. § 46.02(a

- 1) (West Supp 2020 ). However, S ection 46.02 does not apply to a person who is “traveling.” Id

. § 46.15(b)(2) (West Supp. 2020 ). At trial, An gelina County C onstable of Precinct 1 Tom Selm an testified that he stopped Appellant , who was driving a white Dodge pickup truck in Angelina County, Texas on December 20, 2019 , because the license plates on the truck were expired and he suspected an
issue with the vehicl e ’ s registration. Selman testified that he discovered App e llant ’ s driver ’ s lic ense had been suspended and, furthe r, Appellant had a prior conviction for the same offense

. He also stated that Appellant told him h e did not have insurance for the vehicle. A s a result,
Selman placed Appellant under arrest. Selman stated that because he also smelled the odor of
burned marijuana emanating from the vehicle, he conducted a search of the vehicle. As he did so, Selman a sked Appellant if he had any weapons, to wh ich Appellant answered affirmatively and, further, informed Selman that a pisto l was located in a first aid kit be hind the driver ’ s seat

. Thereafter, Selman discovered a .22 caliber pistol located in a first aid kit in the location Appellant described.
“On or About His Person” Appellant first arg ues that the handgun was not disc overed “on or about his person.” T he phrase “on or about [his] person” has been construed to mean “[nearby], close at hand,
convenien t of access, and within such distance of th e party so having it as that such party could, without materially changing his position, get his hand on it. ” See Courtney v. State , 424 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (also noting that proof that accused carried a pistol in car ’ s glove compartmen t warrants conviction for carrying a pistol “o n or about his person”); see also
O ’ Leary v. State , 494 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (pistol located on shelf behind
driver ’ s seat); Freeman v. State , 864 S. W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. App.

– Houston [1st Dist. ] 1993, pet.
ref ’ d (handgun was “on or about” appellant ’ s person where it was d iscovered in briefcase behind
drive r ’ s seat). Here, the evidence demonstrates that Selman discovered the handgun in a first aid
kit b ehind the driver ’ s seat of the vehicle , the same location where Appellant told him it was10 located. Therefore, we conclude that the handgun was discovered “o n [Appellant’s] person.”
See Courtney , 424 S.W.2d at 441; see also O ’ Leary  ̧494 S.W.2d at 842; Free man 864 S.W.2d at
759. “Traveling” Exceptio n Appellant ne xt argues that Section 46.02 is inapplicable because the eviden ce conclusively establishes that he was “traveling” at the time he was stopped

. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 46.15(b)(2). Appellant bas es this contention on the fact that his dri ving record, which was admitted into evidence, listed his address in Appl e Spr ings, Trinity County, Texas
and the traffic stop occurred in Angelina County, Texas. Even though the traveling excepti on has been in existence in Texas since enactment of
the first proscription on carrying handguns, what constitutes traveling remains a source of
discussion

. Soderman v. S tate , 915 S.W.2d 605, 609 (Tex. App.

– Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet.
ref ’ d, untimely filed)

. Texas courts never have strictly defined “ travel ing, ” but, in applying the
rule , generally have considered the distance, time , and mode of travel. See id. ; see a lso Sanchez
v. State , 122 S.W.3d 347, 355

– 56 (Tex. App.

– Texarkana 2003, pet. ref ’ d)

. Moreover, if a traveler loiters along the way or unneces sarily deviates from the course of travel, the travel exemption does not apply

. Soderman , 915 S.W.2d at 609 (citi ng Payne v. State , 494 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (holding that defendant was not entit led to requested jury
instruction where evi dence showed that he had deviated from course of travel and loitered) )

. Ultim ately, if the journey is “ so short t here is no real journey, then one is not a traveler. ” Sanchez , 122 S.W.3d a t 356. Here, the onl y evidence upon which Appellant relies is t he difference between the county listed as his residence on his driving record and the county in which h is vehicle was stopped.
There is no evidence of record indicating where his journey originated, how far he t raveled before he was stopped , how much far ther he planned to travel, or the location of his destination.
Without such e vidence, the trial court neither cou ld determine whe ther appellant was “traveling , ”
as he now alleges for the first time on appeal nor, assuming he was traveling, whether, at the
time he was stopped, Appellant was loitering or otherwise deviating from the course of his purported travel s

. Even if we were t o assume that the address on Appellant ’ s driving record alone conclusively establishes the origin of his travel on the date i n question, the outcome would not11 change. The record reflects that Appellant was stopped on State Highway 94 near Hudson, Texas. Hudson, Texas is approximately fourteen miles from Apple Springs, Texas. Although the parties did not present evidence of th e distance between these two cities, we not e that this geographical fact is no t subject to dispute, and we therefo re take judicial notice of it. See generally Barton v. State , 948 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. App.

– Fort Worth 1997, no p et.) (recognizing that appe llate court “may take judicial notice of th e location of counties because

geog raphical facts are easily ascertaina ble and capable of verifiable certainty”)

. Therefore, we hold that the mere fact that Appellant is stopped in a ca r in a neighboring county a pproximately
fourteen miles from where h e a rguably began his drive , without mo re, is insufficient to conclusively establish th at Appellant is “travel ing ” pursuant to Section 46. 15(b)(2)

. See, e.g. , Sanchez , 122 S.W.3d at 356 ( ev idence that defendant was t raveling by automobile for distance
of approximately fifteen miles was, a s a m atter of law, “ no real journey ”). A ppellant ’ s third
issue is overruled.

M OTION TO S UPPRESS In his fourth issue, Appellant argues that the trial cour t abused its discretion by failing to rule on his oral motion to suppress. Specifically, Appellant argue s that he made this motion to

suppre ss while he cross examined Selman , in pertinent part, as follows:

Q

. Tom, did you see anything dangerous going do wn the road behind me? A

. I don ’ t recall seeing anything dangerous on the road.
Q

. So it was just that license plate that got your attentio n? A

. Yes, sir. It sure was.
Q

. This

-- this is what we ’ re dealing with is the Texas Code of Transportation, isn ’ t it? A

. Yes, sir. Texas Transportation Code.
Q

. And what do codes apply to? A

. Codes apply to any an d all operators of motor vehicles an d conveyances. In the Transportation Code, it

-- i t regulates the entire movement of traffic on our public highway and transportation syste m in the State of Texas, as well as it imposes licensing and regulation on th e users of the highway system as a c ondition that they use it.
Q

. Just in general language, what does a code

-- what is a code? A

. A code is

-- is a la w, basically. It ’ s a la w.
Q

. Or is it the color of law? A

. No. The color of law is actions that co uld be perceived that one takes whil e operating under the law. Color of law is different than just law.12 Q

. How about perception of law? A

. Perception of law. Well, that ’ s a wide open subject. Perception is up to the perceiver.
Q

. With my experiences , I know that policies and codes are usually to employees. A

. Well, there are codes in the State of Texas that deal with employees and the Texas Occupa tions Code deals with a lot of that. But there are codes for the Water Code and there ’ s a myriad of codes. But the Transportation Code is what regulates the movement of traffic on the highways.
Q

. I wasn ’ t involved in traffic. A

. Well, you were operati ng a motor vehicle on a public highway in the State of Texas. Therefore, the Transportation Code and its provisions apply to you and all the other users of the highway.
Q

. Does the Transportation Code have a provision for a road machine? A

. Yes, sir. I t does. Yeah, while they ’ re working on the road and involved in construction. But if it ’ s not i nvolved in construction, then road m achines, you know, there are exemptions for them whe n they ’ re doing construction.
Q

. Well, a road machine can be about any thing, couldn ’ t i t? A

. No, sir. They ’ re not motor vehicles. There ’ s a specific definition of motor vehicle and motorcycles and a ll that. And there ’ s a definition for that, which I can ’ t cite to you by heart because I don ’ t deal with road machinery much.
Q

. Motor vehi cles deals with transportation. Transportation is commercial commerce. A

. No t necessarily.

. . . . Q

. Does

- - excuse me. Does commercial commerce require a licen se? A

. It depends on the trade, but all operators and users of the highwa ys have to conf orm to the regulations that are in place that govern the movement of vehicles and govern the operation of driver s. So therefore

-- Q

. Doesn ’ t an operator or driver, isn ’ t that a hired hand? A

. No, sir. It ’ s not. It ’ s an individual, it ’ s a person. It i s a living, breathing, human being. Right now we don ’ t have any regulations for autonomously operated vehicles o n the roadway in this state that I know of, but your vehicle was not autonomously operated, you were in control of that vehicle. Y ou were ma king the decisions of it to go up and down the road. You were driving it, wh ether you want to call it something else or not, you were the operator, so therefore, y ou were responsible for making sure you had a license, insurance, registration

--
Thus, Appellant contends , the trial court abused its discretion by failing to inter pret his
cross examination of Selman as a n oral motion to suppress because “ merely seeing an out of state license plate should not be reasonable suspicion to conduct a tra ffic st op or investigate the validity of the vehicle registration. ”
Where a motion t o suppress makes broad arguments and otherwise fails to bring the specific matter to the trial court ’ s attention that an appellant later seeks to raise on appeal, error is not pr eserved. See Gomez v. State , 459 S.W.3d 651, 668 (Tex. App.

– Tyler 2015, pet. ref ’ d )13 (citing Resendez v. State , 30 6 S.W.3d 30 8, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ) ; see also T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 33.1. Even construing Appellant ’ s cross examination of Selman liberal ly in t he interest of justice, we cannot conclude that it properly could be constr ued by the trial court as Appellant ’ s

m aking a motion to suppress. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to rule on this purporte d motio n. Appellant ’ s fourth issue is overruled.

D ISPOSITION Having overruled A ppellant ’ s first, second, third, and fo urth iss ues, we affirm the trial courts judgments.

J AMES T. W ORTHEN Chief Justice

Opinion delivered August 2 5 , 2021. Panel consisted of W orthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

( DO NOT PUBLISH )

## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

AUGUST 25 , 2021

NO. 12

- 20

- 00215

- CR

JAMES ALTON SUMRALL, SR. , App ellant V. T HE STATE O F TEXAS , Appellee

Appeal from the County Court at Law No

. 2
of Angelina County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 20

- 0020 ) THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and brief s filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion o f this court that th ere was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore O RDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of
the court below be in all things affirmed , and that this decision be certified to the court below
for observance.
J ames T. Worthen , Ch ief Justice

. Panel c onsisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DIST RICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

AUGUST 25 , 2021

NO. 12

- 20

- 0021 6

- CR

JAMES ALTON SUMRALL, SR. , Appellant V. T HE STATE OF TEXAS , Appelle e

Appeal from the Cou nty Court at Law No

. 2
of Angelina County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 20

- 002 1 )

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the a ppellate record and brief s filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of
the court below be in all things affirmed , and that this decision be certified to the court below
for observance.
J ames T. Worthen , Chief Justice

. Panel consisted of Worth en, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.