UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-1409

RICHARD S. GRIFFIN; GRIFFIN FARM & LANDFILL, INC., 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

 v. 

TOWN OF UNIONVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. 

Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:05-cv-00514-RJC-CH) 

Argued: May 13, 2009 Decided: July 27, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, C. Arlen BEAM, Senior Circuit 

Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 

Circuit, sitting by designation, and Joseph F. ANDERSON, Jr., 

United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, 

sitting by designation. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ARGUED: T. Jonathan Adams, HAMILTON, MOON, STEPHENS, STEELE & 

MARTIN, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellants. Thomas 

Norfleet Griffin, III, PARKER, POE, ADAMS & BERNSTEIN, LLP, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mark R. 

Kutny, Travis W. Moon, HAMILTON, MOON, STEPHENS, STEELE & 

MARTIN, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant Griffin 

Farm & Landfill, Inc.; R. Keith Johnson, R. KEITH JOHNSON, P.A., 

Stanley, North Carolina, for Appellant Richard S. Griffin. G. 
Nicholas Herman, THE BROUGH LAW FIRM, Chapel Hill, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

2 
PER CURIAM: 

Richard Griffin appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of the Town of Unionville, North 

Carolina (“the Town”). We affirm. 

I. 

 In 1992, Griffin began operating a demolition landfill, 

more accurately now known as a “land clearing and inert debris” 

(LCID) landfill, pursuant to a permit issued by the Union County 

Health Department. The permit authorized the LCID landfill to 

accept waste, limited to stumps, limbs, leaves, concrete, brick, 

untreated wood, asphalt, uncontaminated earth, sand or rocks. 

In 1993, Griffin obtained “prior approval” from Union County 

(the county) authorizing him to expand his landfill by ten 

acres. This addition was authorized as a “construction and 

demolition” (C & D) landfill. Griffin did not begin operating 

the C & D landfill at that time, but received the prior local 

approval so that he could get a state permit, which was 

required. In 1995, the state natural resources department 

issued Griffin an operational permit for the C & D installation. 

This permit was amended and renewed by the state a number of 

times through the year 2005. 

3 
 In January 1997, the county approved Griffin’s application 

to expand his landfill again. In the summer of 1997, the county 

changed its land use ordinance to require that a landfill 

operator obtain a special use permit (SUP) from the county, in 

addition to the required state permits. So Griffin applied for 

a SUP and included all of his property—his then-existing LCID 

and C & D landfills, as well as the proposed expansion—in the 

SUP application. In November 1997, the county approved 

Griffin’s request for a SUP. The SUP allowed construction of a 

“demolition landfill.”1 The county land use ordinance in effect 

at that time defined “demolition landfill” to include “debris 

associated with the construction or demolition of housing or 

buildings” and expressly prohibited industrial waste. The SUP 

also required that any modifications to proposed uses on the 

property covered by the SUP be pointed out to the county in 

writing, as required by the county land use ordinance. This 

ordinance provided that insignificant or minor changes were 

 1

 Part of the difficulty with reciting the facts in this 

case is that the county continued to use the term “demolition 

landfill,” while the state administrative regulations changed 

what was known as a demolition landfill to an LCID landfill in 

1993. At the time the SUP was granted, the county’s definition 

of demolition landfill allowed waste authorized by the statedefined LCID and C & D landfills. J.A. 399; 15A N.C. Admin. 

Code 13B.0101(11), (22), & (23); 15A N.C. Admin. Code 

13B.0532(8). When amended by the county in 1998, the term 

“demolition landfill” exceeded what was allowed in an LCID and C 

& D landfill by allowing industrial solid waste. 

4 
permitted without formal written approval, but any changes of 

significance had to be approved in the same manner as a new 

application for a SUP. It is undisputed that Griffin has never 

applied to the county for an amendment or modification to the 

1997 SUP. Following issuance of the SUP in November 1997, 

Griffin retained an engineering firm to perform work on the 

property and incurred expenses. 

 At a June 1998 County Planning Board meeting, Griffin asked 

the county to amend the definition of a demolition landfill in 

the county’s land use ordinance to allow for the disposal of 

nonhazardous industrial solid waste. The matter was considered 

further and approved at a July 1998 public hearing. The crux of 

the instant dispute is Griffin's assertion that this amendment 

was intended to retroactively apply to Griffin's 1997 SUP. 

Throughout this time, Griffin continued to have the engineering 

firm prepare the landfill expansion for waste. 

 In November 1998, the Town revived its corporate charter, 

making it an incorporated municipality within the county of 

Union and in the state of North Carolina. The current and 

proposed landfills were included within its boundaries. 

Nonetheless, because the Town did not have a land use ordinance, 

the Town conferred jurisdiction on the county to regulate zoning 

and land use issues until October 2003 when the land use 

ordinance adopted in June 2003 became effective. 

5 
In July 1999, Griffin applied to the state for a permit 

authorizing him to operate an industrial solid waste landfill on 

his property. In response, in September 2001, the state 

informed Griffin that in order to operate the proposed landfill, 

pursuant to North Carolina General Statute §§ 130A-294(b1)(3) & 

(4), he would need local government zoning approval, and would 

need to obtain a franchise from the local government. 

Griffin accordingly sought to obtain a local franchise, but 

at that time, as previously noted, the Town did not have a land 

use ordinance or a local franchise ordinance, having temporarily 

ceded its authority on these issues to the county. Moreover, 

although the county had a land use ordinance, it did not have a 

franchise ordinance either, and thus Griffin never was able to 

obtain a franchise from the county. 

In March 2003, Griffin asked the Town council to adopt a 

franchise ordinance. The Town council passed a "Solid Waste 

Franchise Ordinance for the Town of Unionville" in June 2003. 

The franchise ordinance allowed for C & D and LCID landfills 

only. Also in June 2003, the Town adopted a Land Use Ordinance, 

to be effective October 1, 2003. The definition of “demolition 

landfill” in the Town’s land use ordinance was the same 

definition as the county’s 1998 amended definition—it authorized 

the inclusion of industrial solid waste in a demolition 

6 
landfill, creating a conflict with the franchise ordinance which 

only allowed C & D and LCID landfill waste within the Town. 

Griffin and the Town entered into a franchise agreement in 

February 2004. The franchise agreement, in keeping with the 

ordinance, only authorized Griffin to operate landfills 

accepting C & D and LCID waste, not industrial solid waste. 

After obtaining the franchise, Griffin also confirmed, by way of 

a letter from the Town's land use administrator, that his 1997 

county-issued SUP was still valid in the Town. Armed with these 

two pieces of information (the franchise and the presumably 

valid SUP), Griffin applied for and received an amended permit 

from the state for the continued operation of his C & D landfill 

in March 2005. 

 At this point, Griffin had official state authorization to 

operate a C & D landfill and though the record is not entirely 

clear on this point, he either did not need state authorization 

for an LCID, or he had the requisite LCID state permit. See

J.A. 274. However, he still did not have state authorization to 

operate an industrial solid waste landfill. So in June 2005, 

Griffin sought a franchise from the Town to operate an 

industrial solid waste landfill. As part of his proposal, 

Griffin asked the Town to amend the franchise ordinance to allow 

for such a landfill. Various public meetings and requests for 

information ensued. Instead of amending the franchise ordinance 

7 
as Griffin suggested, in May 2006, the Town amended the land use 

ordinance to delete from the definition of a demolition landfill 

the term "industrial solid waste." This action effectively 

denied Griffin's request for a franchise to operate an 

industrial solid waste landfill. Because he never obtained 

local approval, Griffin did not seek a permit from the state to 

operate an industrial solid waste landfill, and instead brought 

the current action. 

In his complaint, Griffin alleged that the Town's actions 

denied him due process and equal protection under federal and 

North Carolina law, and that he had a vested right to operate 

the industrial solid waste landfill. Griffin also sought 

specific performance and declaratory relief that the ordinance 

was unconstitutional. He alleged that the Town violated his 

rights by failing to amend the franchise ordinance because he 

had a common law vested right to construct and operate the 

installation as an industrial solid waste landfill and he spent 

over $750,000 in engineering fees to prepare the landfill. On 

cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted 

summary judgment to the Town, finding that Griffin did not have 

a vested right to operate an industrial solid waste landfill. 

The court also refused to declare the local ordinance 

unconstitutional. Griffin appeals the rulings regarding his 

8 
vested right to operate an industrial solid waste landfill and 

specific performance. 

II. 

 Our review on appeal from the district court's grant of 

summary judgment is de novo. Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 

F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2002). 

 Under North Carolina law, whether Griffin possessed a 

vested right to a franchise for an industrial solid waste 

landfill turns on whether (1) he has made substantial 

expenditures; (2) the expenditures were made in good faith; (3) 

the expenditures were made in reasonable reliance on and after 

the issuance of valid governmental approval; and (4) he would be 

harmed by a change in governmental requirements. BrowningFerris Indust. Of S. Atl., Inc. v. Guilford County Bd. of 

Adjustment, 484 S.E.2d 411, 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997). 

 Griffin's vested rights claim is that he spent 

approximately $750,000 in connection with his application to the 

state for a permit to operate an industrial solid waste landfill 

after relying upon (1) the 1997 SUP issued by the county, (2) 

the county's 1998 amendment to the definition of demolition 

landfill allowing industrial solid waste in those landfills, and 

(3) the Town's 2004 letter advising Griffin that it would 

recognize Griffin's 1997 SUP. Griffin alleges that, by virtue 

9 
of these authorizations, he received specific and valid 

approvals from the county and the Town to construct and operate 

an industrial solid waste landfill. 

 It is undisputed that Griffin has made substantial 

expenditures in pursuit of operating the industrial solid waste 

landfill. The remaining prongs from Browning-Ferris require us 

to examine whether Griffin's expenses were made in good faith 

and with reasonable reliance upon purported government approval 

for the project. 

We find that Griffin did not make these expenditures in 

good faith or in reasonable reliance upon the Town, county or 

state approval for the project. When Griffin applied to the 

county for the SUP, there was no mention of industrial solid 

waste in the application or in the resulting permit. In fact, 

the SUP was issued at a time when the county’s land use 

ordinance expressly prohibited landfills from disposing of 

industrial solid waste. Under North Carolina law, the SUP is 

limited by its own terms to those uses presented to the county 

in obtaining it. Westminster Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary Zoning 

Bd. of Adjustment, 554 S.E.2d 634, 638 (N.C. 2001). Griffin 

specifically represented to the county that his landfill would 

be used to dispose of construction and demolition waste. He 

also told the county board that his construction and demolition 

landfill operated under a valid state permit for this type of 

10 
landfill and that no "liner" was required to contain the waste. 

A liner would have been required for an industrial solid waste 

landfill. 

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Griffin did not 

apply to the county or the Town to amend or modify the 1997 SUP. 

Griffin instead chose to rely upon the 1998 amendment to the 

county's definition of a demolition landfill as a retroactive 

“amendment” to his SUP. However, the county's land use 

ordinance, and later the Town's, required specific procedures to 

amend or modify the terms of a SUP, and these actions were not 

taken by Griffin. Even in the 2004 letter from the Town 

recognizing the continued validity of the 1997 SUP, the letter’s 

author reminded Griffin that any changes from the issued SUP 

would require approval of an amended permit by the Town. The 

SUP did not authorize Griffin to operate an industrial solid 

waste landfill. Accordingly, Griffin cannot validly argue that 

his county-issued 1997 SUP permitted him to rely in good faith 

upon the proposition that he would be able to operate an 

industrial solid waste landfill. 

Nor did Griffin undertake his expenditures in reasonable 

reliance upon Town, county, or state government actions. The 

record reflects that he did not obtain all of the government 

permits necessary under North Carolina law to operate an 

industrial solid waste landfill. Although arguably overkill, 

11 
three authorizations are required to construct and operate an 

industrial solid waste landfill: local zoning approval, a local 

government franchise, and a permit from the State of North 

Carolina. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 130A-294(b1)(3) & (4).2

It is doubtful that Griffin obtained any of the required 

state permits for an industrial solid waste landfill. The only 

argument that he obtained zoning approval is that the SUP was 

retroactively amended when the county board changed the 

definition of a demolition landfill to include industrial solid 

waste. In light of our previous discussion, however, this 

argument carries little weight. Further, the franchise 

agreement with the Town in 2003 did not contain authorization 

for industrial solid waste. Likewise, the permit he received 

from the state only allowed him to continue to operate his C & D 

landfill, not an industrial solid waste landfill. None of 

Griffin’s successful permit or franchise applications requested 

specific authorization to operate an industrial solid waste 

landfill. Where multiple permits or governmental approvals are 

required for a project, a landowner has no vested right to 

complete that project unless he makes his substantial 

expenditures in good faith reliance on and after receiving all 

 2

 We reject Griffin’s arguments that this was either not the 

applicable statute or that his operation should be excepted from 

the statute’s requirements. 

12 
13 

requisite permits or other required approvals. See, e.g., PNE 

AOA Media, L.L.C. v. Jackson County, 554 S.E.2d 657, 663 (N.C. 

Ct. App. 2001) (holding that expenditures made prior to 

acquiring necessary permits are not made in good faith reliance 

upon those permits, and company did not have a vested right to 

erect a billboard on a state highway). Because Griffin never 

obtained the required permits for industrial solid waste 

landfills, he could not have expended funds in reasonable 

reliance upon such permits. 

III. 

Though Griffin has been operating landfills in Union County 

and the Town since 1992, his landfills have never accepted 

industrial solid waste, and he has never obtained a valid permit 

to do so. Therefore, he has no vested right to operate this 

category of landfill. The decision of the district court is 

affirmed. 

AFFIRMED