UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-2063

ANITRA N. BOSTIC,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, 

Senior District Judge. (3:10-cv-00630-GCM-DSC)

Submitted: March 27, 2012 Decided: April 10, 2012

Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charlotte Hall, CHARLES T. HALL LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States 

Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; Jason W. Valencia, Special 

Assistant United States Attorney, Boston, Massachusetts; Robert 

J. Triba, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Boston, Massachusetts, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Anitra N. Bostic appeals the district court’s order 

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and 

affirming the Commissioner’s denial of her application for 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006). We must uphold the 

decision to deny benefits if the decision is supported by 

substantial evidence and the correct law was applied. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g); Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) 

(per curiam). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). This court does not reweigh evidence or make 

credibility determinations in evaluating whether a decision is 

supported by substantial evidence; “[w]here conflicting evidence 

allows reasonable minds to differ,” we defer to the 

Commissioner’s decision. Id.

First, Bostic asserts that the administrative law

judge (“ALJ”) erred in failing to give controlling weight to the 

opinion of Dr. Girmay, her primary care physician. The ALJ gave 

little weight to the medical opinion of Dr. Girmay because his

opinion was inconsistent with other evidence in the record. The 

ALJ concluded that the opinion of Dr. Thomason, another of 

Bostic’s treating physicians, was entitled to special 
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significance because it was supported by objective medical 

evidence and it was consistent with other substantial evidence 

in the record. The Commissioner generally gives controlling 

weight to medical opinions of a treating physician, but only if 

that opinion is consistent with the other evidence in the 

record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). The opinions of Dr. Girmay 

and Dr. Thomason do not reflect the same degree of limitation on 

Bostic’s functionality and are therefore not consistent. 

Further, Dr. Girmay’s conclusory determination of disability was 

not supported by evidence in the record, nor was it explained by 

references to any medical condition or by citation to any 

medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e) (an opinion that 

a claimant is disabled is not a “medical opinion”); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(d)(3) (“The more a medical source presents relevant 

evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and 

laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that 

opinion.”). We thus conclude that the ALJ did not err in 

choosing not to give Dr. Girmay’s opinion controlling weight.*

 * Bostic also asserts error in the ALJ’s failure to consider 

the opinion of Dr. Brens. Dr. Brens’ opinion is substantively 

identical to that of Dr. Girmay. Further, Dr. Brens was not 

Bostic’s primary physician. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

The ALJ permissibly chose not to give this opinion controlling 

weight.
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Bostic next argues that the ALJ failed to accurately 

assess her credibility. The ALJ determined that the medical 

evidence and Bostic’s daily activities did not substantiate 

Bostic’s subjective complaints of pain. When making a 

disability determination, the Commissioner considers objective 

medical evidence, evidence of a claimant’s daily activities, 

efforts to work, a claimant’s description of pain, and any other 

relevant information. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The ALJ was 

entitled to disagree with Bostic’s subjective view of her 

physical limitations because the evidence in the record did not 

conclusively establish that Bostic was unable to perform routine

functions, such as maintaining a household and serving as her 

young daughter’s primary caregiver. 

We therefore conclude that the district court did not 

err in upholding the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED