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23–942 PDF 2005

S. HRG. 109–153

TSUNAMI RESPONSE: LESSONS LEARNED

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINETH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 10, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Allen, BG John, U.S. Marine Corps ....................................................................... 59

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware ..................................... 15

Frist, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Tenessee ........................................................ 18

Larson, Hon. Alan, Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural

Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ................................................. 22

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 24

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Lugar ............ 123

Lindborg, Nancy, president, Mercy Corps, Washington, DC ............................... 96

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 99

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 1

Committee tsunami trip reports:

Blank, Jonah, professional staff member ................................................ 2

Rubin, Nilmini, professional staff member ............................................. 7

MCClymont, Mary, president and CEO, Interaction, Washington, DC ............... 81

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 84

Natsios, Hon. Andrew S., Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC ..................................................................................... 35

Slides presented ................................................................................................ 40

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53

Response to question submitted for the record by Senator Lugar ............... 128

Toole, Daniel, Director, Office of Emergency Programs, UNICEF, New York,

NY ......................................................................................................................... 88

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 91

Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 29

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 32

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Lugar ............ 123

ADDITIONAL PREPARED STATEMENTS AND OTHER MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

Human Rights First, prepared statement ............................................................. 108

Indian Ocean—Earthquake and Tsunamis ........................................................... 129

International Organization for Migration (IOM) Briefing to Staff of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee .............................................................................. 117

Siddharth, Veena, Washington director, Human Rights Watch/Asia, prepared

statement .............................................................................................................. 116

Yuan, Nancy, vice president, director, the Asia Foundation, Washington, DC,

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 120

(III)

(1)

TSUNAMI RESPONSE: LESSONS LEARNED

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met at 9:32 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Coleman, Murkowski, Biden,

Sarbanes, Feingold, and Obama.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S.

SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee is called to order.

Today the committee meets to discuss our Nation’s response to

the tsunami that struck on December 26, 2004, causing death and

destruction in at least 12 countries. The tsunami created a humanitarian tragedy of incredible proportions. According to the U.S.

Agency for International Development, more than 160,000 people

are confirmed dead; 140,000 people are still missing; and countless

people were injured. More than 1 million people remain homeless.

Beyond the comprehensive casualty figures, the tsunami has left

deep scars on the societies of the Indian Ocean region. For example, the Government of Indonesia estimates that 700 to 1,100 of its

schools were destroyed and that 1,750 primary school teachers are

dead or missing. Nearly 180,000 students have no schools to attend.

The United Nations International Labor Office estimates that

the tsunami wiped out jobs for 600,000 people in Indonesia alone,

and more than 400,000 in Sri Lanka. An additional 100,000 are

thought to be out of work in Thailand. Many of the people who lost

their jobs were fishermen, farmers, shopkeepers, or workers in the

tourism industry. The tsunami destroyed fishing boats and nets,

and wiped out acres of farmland, leaving behind high concentrations of sea salt that must be washed out before crops can grow

again.

Statistics, however, cannot quantify the psychological impact of

the disaster. They cannot convey the grief of the fisherman who

has lost his family and his livelihood. They cannot explain the defeat of an elderly woman who has lost everything she has worked

her whole life to earn. They cannot capture the fear and disorientation of children who experienced this disaster.

2

On behalf of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, I

want to express our deepest sympathy to the victims of this tragedy. While financial and in-kind assistance cannot compensate for

the huge loss of life that countries in the region have suffered, the

contributions of the United States and many other nations can help

stabilize the region and assist survivors in rebuilding their lives.

As the world leader in international disaster assistance, the United

States is working closely with the international community to implement the most effective response possible in the coming months.

In addition, American citizens, businesses, and organizations have

donated an estimated $700 million directly to international relief

efforts.

Beyond the compelling humanitarian reasons for swift action, a

stable and prosperous Asia is essential to the global effort on a

range of shared challenges, including weapons proliferation, terrorism, narcotics, and contagious diseases. The economic and political consequences of this natural disaster could be even more severe unless we commit ourselves to advancing a strong recovery in

the region. President Bush has requested $950 million in tsunami disaster

relief. I am confident that Congress will come to an agreement on

this aid package. We also must ensure that the United States contribution to tsunami relief does not come at the expense of our

other international commitments, including those related to poverty-stricken Africa.

The Foreign Relations Committee has been working with the executive branch to develop legislative initiatives that will assist in

the tsunami recovery. Committee staff members have traveled to

Indonesia and Sri Lanka to observe the United States and international relief response firsthand. Their reports will be included in

this hearing record.

[The committee travel reports follow:]

TSUNAMI TRIP REPORT SUBMITTED BY JONAH BLANK, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS

COMMITTEE PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER

The following is a brief summary of activities during my recent StaffDel to Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. More detailed findings have been presented to the

ranking member, and staff members of both minority and majority sides.

SUMMARY OF TRIP

From August 2–16, 2005, I conducted a fact-finding trip to Indonesia, Sri Lanka,

and Maldives. The primary focus was post-tsunami reconstruction efforts, with secondary focus on political issues including Aceh peace accords (Indonesia) and

counterterrorism (all three countries). During a brief stopover in London (August

16), I consulted with British Foreign Office officials on counterterrorism issues, particularly focused on alleged linkages between the July 7 Underground bombings and

the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e Taiba.

KEY FINDINGS

INDONESIA

Tsunami reconstruction: In meetings in Medan (base for much of the post-tsunami

reconstruction effort for Aceh, as well as nearly all reconstruction effort in Nias),

local NGO workers, government officials, journalists, and civil society representatives made broadly congruent points:

• The U.S. naval assets and other military personnel deployed to the region had

a tremendously positive impact on local sentiment regarding America. U.S. military personnel were described as very efficient, very effective, and excellent

good-will ambassadors. The efforts of the U.S. military had a ripple effect, in

3

that they prompted the Indonesian military (TNI) to become more effective in

order to avoid being shamed by comparison. Moreover, the human touch

brought by U.S. military personnel helped put a new face on the image of America generally presented to the Indonesian public by news from Iraq and elsewhere: Pictures of servicemen and servicewomen playing with children, helping

rescue elderly people, digging wells, etc., provided better public diplomacy than

any effort currently underway. • In general, however, reconstruction efforts are not proceeding quickly enough to

satisfy the hundreds of thousands of displaced citizens. Acehnese interlocutors

said that as of August, only 10 percent of the post-tsunami promises regarding

reconstruction projects had been kept; they warned that a failure to meet the

expectations of the populace could cause the agreement between the government and GAM (the Acehnese rebel group), signed August 15, to fall apart.

Journalists agreed that popular dissatisfaction with the pace of reconstruction

was growing. There was also concern about possible relocation of fishing communities to inland sites, where they would be forced to live on handouts rather

than being able to earn a living. According to several interlocutors, the

Multidonor Trust Fund (MDTF) had significant amounts of money available for

projects, but access was delayed by Ministry of Finance redtape, and by poor

coordination between the various ministries, donor countries, and NGOs. The

BRR (government coordinating branch) is well-intentioned, but hasn’t yet done

sufficient coordination. More local government input and local autonomy was

advocated. • Religious issues were raised regarding certain foreign NGOs, with some Christian groups accused of proselytization or attempts to place Muslim orphans with

Christian families abroad. Some 300 orphans were reportedly flown to a Christian-run orphanage in Jakarta during the early days of the crisis, leading to a

new federal instruction that all orphans be given to the charge only of Muslim

groups. The hardline Islamist Islamic Defenders Front (FDI) was working in

Aceh and Medan with the Islamist political party PKS, but extremist groups

like Laskar Jihad and Laskar Mujaheddin are said to failed in their efforts to

establish a foothold in Aceh. Despite concerns about the motives of certain

Christian NGOs, foreign NGOs in general were seen in a more favorable light

than local groups. ‘‘Local NGOs want to enrich themselves,’’ said one interlocutor. Among the foreign NGOs and other organizations cited as being most

widely appreciated were IOM, the United Nations, the Red Cross/Red Crescent,

Oxfam, Mercy Corps, and Save the Children.

Site visits in and around Banda Aceh

Over the course of 3 days (Friday, August 5–Sunday, August 7) I visited various

sites within the city of Banda Aceh, and at several villages in the vicinity. The purpose was to see a representative sample of the devestation wreaked by the tsunami,

and the reconstruction efforts underway. My hosts were the personnel of the USAID

mission, accompanied by implementing partners from the NGO subcontractors.

• Village of Gurah: This prosperous seaside community was almost entirely obliterated by the first wave. The cupola of a mosque was carried approximately 2

kilometers inland by the water, and deposited (intact) in the middle of a rice

paddy. The village had about 650 inhabitants before the tsunami, of whom only

155 survived. The economy of the village was based on rice farming and fishing.

• Bazaar around Grand Mosque in Banda Aceh: This site, the economic and religious center of Aceh’s capital, had been a scene of devastation broadcast around

the world in December and January. Now, the sight was far more benign. The

mosque itself sustained little major damage, with the most enduring damage

limited to a freestanding minaret. The debris that had blanketed the mosque

grounds and all surrounding streets after the tsunami has been largely cleared

away. The bazaar, located very close to the masjid, has been moved from a twostorey building into a set of stalls directly abutting the mosque. The site of the

old bazaar remains ruined: The lower level is still full of waterlogged debris,

while the upper level is filled with incinerated waste (trash on the upper level

dried out and could be incinerated, but there was no easy way of disposing of

the waste at ground-level). Throughout the city of Banda Aceh, much of the

worst-afflicted buildings have been destroyed or rebuilt. Many, however, remain

unrepaired: Often this is due to legal challenges regarding ownership (owners

deceased, or documents establishing ownership destroyed and courts unable to

render quick judgements among various claimants).

• Village of UI Lee Lee: More than 7 months after the tsunami, this (like many

villages) remains virtually a wasteland. According to USAID staff, 85 percent

of population here were killed, and 80 percent of houses destroyed.

4

• Village of Lapunk: According to USAID staff, this village suffered devestation

similar to that of UI Lee Lee. About 80 percent of the houses were destroyed,

and about 855 inhabitants were killed. The local mosque was left standing—

giving rise to varying interpretations (either supernatural causes, or superior

building materials).

Meetings in Jakarta

My meetings with Indonesian legislators focused on a recently passed House bill,

requesting a State Department report on legality of Indonesian control of West

Papua. This issue caused considerable concern among Indonesian parliamentarians

of all political parties. My discussions and statements backed up the message being

put forward by the U.S. Embassy and other administration officials.

I also had meetings with U.S. Government personnel on a variety of topics. Appropriately cleared staff are encouraged to seek a detailed debrief.

SRI LANKA

Tsunami reconstruction site visits

On a 2-day trip outside the capital, I visited sites in the region around Galle,

Mathura, and Dondra. USAID and NGO staff emphasized that these southern sites

had not been as badly affected as sites in the north and northeast, which suffered

from the direct tsunami wave rather than the washback.

• CHF transitional housing site. Houses here have concrete foundation and wallbase, with metal frame and plywood walls covered by USAID plastic sheeting,

topped by an aluminum roof. Houses are laid out at angles, rather than like

rows of barracks or trailer parks: This provides more privacy (not staring right

into neighbor’s house), and also avoids the stigma of resembling barracks set

up for plantation workers during colonial times. This last point is of great cultural significance, since the local Sinhalese population maintains significant cultural taboos regarding association with the Tamil plantation workers. In the

days immediately after the tsunami, a local political party (the JVP) set up barracks-type housing, and it was shunned as soon as the inhabitants were able

to find alternate places to camp.

• Transitional housing built by Irish NGO GOAL. Here the structures were similar to those of CHF, but with wooden frame substituted for metal ones, and

sited in rows rather than at angles. Locations were sometimes problematic: One

camp was located so far from the ocean that the residents (members of a fishing

community) would have to take a bus to reach their fishing boats every morning.

• Saw, but did not visit, transitional housing built by WorldVision (between

Colombo and Galle). According to local interlocutors, these structures were not

well designed: The combination of small size and corrugated tin walls made

them into ‘‘convection ovens.’’ Moreover, WorldVision’s evangelical outlook (and

policy of mandating staff attendance at daily prayer meetings) was cited as an

irritant with the local (predominantly Buddhist) population. Catholic Relief

Service, by contrast, was described as a good model of a religiously affiliated

organization that managed to keep its doctrinal identity strictly segregated from

its humanitarian mission.

In discussions with NGO workers at these sites, several common threads of comment emerged:

• Where to put the displaced people? Land is scarce, and almost all of it is already occupied by other families. Fishing communities can’t be relocated inland.

• Government-mandated setbacks are problematic. On the southern coasts, no

new construction is permitted within 100 meters of the high-water mark. In the

north and northeast, the setback is 200 meters. These restrictions puts an enormous amount of scarce land off limits. It also raises equity issues, and the suspicion that the government is favoring Sinhalese (who predominate the southern areas) over Tamils and Muslims (who predominate in the north and northeastern areas). There is also suspicion that the setback ordinance is a ploy, in

order to clear fishing communities from prime seafront land in order to clear

the way for development of tourist resorts.

• Equity issues with other poor people. IDPs from the long-running civil war have

been displaced for years, even decades—yet they get leapfrogged by tsunami

IDPs. And ordinary poor people, who are often equally destitute, get nothing at

all from the new aid influx.

• Unneeded material aid is a burden. Well-meaning, but unprofessional, donors

have sent vast amounts of material to Sri Lanka—everything from tinned food

to children’s toys to clothing. Much of this material is culturally or climatically

5

inappropriate (even ski parkas have been received by this tropical nation). Uncoordinated donations of goods and services by a raft of miscellaneous groups

often does more harm than good: The professional NGOs not only must spend

significant time sorting out the useful from the useless donations, but it finds

the planning and carrying out of reconstruction projects impeded by ad-hoc efforts of amateurs. When an amateur group slaps up a dangerously substandard

housing or well project (for example), this causes popular resentment against

professionals who must work more slowly, and who may have to tear down a

poorly built structure in order to rebuild it correctly.

Meeting in Colombo with Foreign Minister Lakhsman Kadirgamar

On Thursday, August 11, I met (together with Charge ́ d’Affaires James

Entwhistle) with Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakhsman Kadirgamar. We had a

productive discussion on a variety of topics, including tsunami reconstruction, government-LTTE ceasefire, and other political issues. When I asked the Foreign Minister what he considered the most important message he would like me to take back

to Washington, he cited the importance of keeping the LTTE on the FTO list, and

of pressuring our European, Asian, and Canadian allies to join in cutting off foreign

sources of LTTE support. He noted that his own residence had been aggressively

surveilled by LTTE cadres, apparently bent on assassination.

On Friday, August 12, Foreign Minister Kadirgamar was shot and killed while

swimming at his personal residence. The sniper (according to public accounts) had

carried out the operation with great professionalism, staking out the residence for

a long period from a neighboring building, and targeting the Foreign Minister with

a barrage of 7.62mm bullets fired from an automatic rifle equipped with a custombuilt tripod, a silencer, and a night-vision scope. Sri Lankan and international observers have attributed the action to the LTTE.

MALDIVES

Program in the Maldives centered around two issues: Tsunami reconstruction,

and the threat of Islamist extremism.

Tsunami reconstruction

• Site visit to tsunami-hit island, Kaf Guraidhoo. At the height of the tsunami,

approximately 80 percent of the nation of the Maldives was submerged. Some

islands were hit worse than others, and many of the worst-affected are located

too far from the international airport on Male to be reached in a visit as brief

as the one I was able to make. Kaf Guraidhoo was chosen as a site visit not

for the intensity of its damage so much as for the logistics: It could be visited

from Male by speedboat, rather than chartering an expensive seaplane.

• On Kaf Guraidhoo, a very small community, 43 houses were destroyed, four

people were killed, and 400 individuals were (and still are) displaced. The housing is being rebuilt by the UNDP, but progress is going slowly. During our visit,

the frustration of the inhabitants was readily visible: We witnessed an angry

tirade by the village headman, directed at the Maldives Government officials

who accompanied us. He demanded to know why, 7 months on, the community

members still were living in tents that provide little shelter from the sweltering

heat and monsoon rain.

• Traditional building material on the atolls is coral, and the older buildings still

use this as their wall material. It has the advantage of being light, airy, and

free—but has been banned by the government in an attempt to preserve the nation’s one irreplaceable natural resource (without vibrant coral reefs, the

Maldives would lose its vital tourist revenue). Logistical challenges of getting

substitute material (concrete for cinderblocks) out to the remote, far-flung atolls,

however, are not insubstantial.

• A UNDP team was visiting Kaf Guraidhoo during our site visit, and we consulted with them about the difficulties they faced. They were well aware of the

popular discontent at the pace of reconstruction, but noted that this was only

one among an enormous number of sites to be rebuilt. During the tsunami, this

entire island had been submerged, up to the level of a person’s knees. The primary UNDP effort was the building of a community center. In the meantime,

inhabitants took what shelter they could beneath the plastic sheeting bearing

the symbol of USAID—and of the Saudi relief agency.

• Flooding was not limited to the smaller islands. According to government interlocutors, the capital city of Male was entirely flooded as soon as the wave hit

at about 9:20 a.m.

6

Impact of Islamist ideology

The Maldives is an overwhelmingly (indeed, constitutionally) Muslim nation, but

has traditionally been socially and religiously moderate. Several official interlocutors expressed concern at the rise of Islamist ideology, and worried about the impact

this might have upon the nation’s fledgling move toward democratization.

• Minister of Atolls Development Mohamed Waheed Deen (essentially the Minister of Interior for islands beyond Male) noted that many wealthy gulf residents came to Maldives on holiday. While this provides jobs and income, it also

fuels resentment at the disparities of wealth evident between the local inhabitants and their neighbors from the Middle East.

• Minister of Defense and National Security Ismail Shafeeu noted the problem of

drugs, which was closely tied to the rapid opening of the Maldives to visitors

from South Asia and the Middle East. Unprocessed heroin is a major threat,

he noted, with the adult addict population estimated by some studies as high

as 200,000–500,000 (about 10 percent of overall population). Due to the

Maldives’ open economy, it is easy to launder money here: ‘‘We’re in a bad spiral

now, fighting it, but not making headway.’’ This issue is linked with the extremist threat, since various groups have used criminal enterprises to raise money

for terrorism in other parts of the world. During the 1980s and 1990s, many

Maldivian boys went to Pakistani madrasas, often sponsored and funded by

Saudi charities. Many have now come back home, and retained the ideology of

their ‘‘sponsoring agencies.’’ This is a potential threat for the future, he said.

UNITED KINGDOM

On August 16, en route from Sri Lanka back to Washington, I had discussions

in London with officials from the British Foreign Office who specialize on South

Asia and counterterrorism issues. The focus of these discussions was putative linkage between the July 7 bombings in the London Underground and the Pakistanbased terrorist group Lashkar-e Taiba.

These discussions were informative and useful. Due to the sensitive nature of the

topic, appropriately cleared staff are encouraged to seek a detailed debrief from me

in an appropriately secure setting.

ITINERARY

August 2 ...... Depart Washington.

August 4 ...... Arrive Medan, Indonesia.

Meeting at U.S. consulate, on logistics of tsunami/earthquake aid

provision via Medan and other parts of Sumatra.

Participants: R. Simanjuntak, Abo Mutalib Lugus.

Meeting at U.S. Consulate: Acehnese elders.

August 5 ...... Meeting with journalists and NGO workers.

Afternoon: Transit to Banda Aceh.

August 6 ...... Aceh: Site tours of USAID projects and NGO sites in Banda Aceh

and environs. Visit to village of Gurah.

Meeting with subcontractor Muhammad Najib.

Meeting with Asia foundation’s Human Hamid.

August 7 ...... Site tours in Banda Aceh and villages:

Village of UI Lee Lee,

Village of Lapunk,

Transit to Jakarta.

August 8 ...... Jakarta: Embassy brief, meeting with Amb Pascoe, and meetings

with Indonesian Government officials (Sudjadnan

Parnohadiningrat and others).

August 9 ...... Transit to Sri Lanka.

August 10 .... Site visits between Colombo and Mathura (CHF and GOAL).

August 11 .... Site visits between Galle and Colombo (Mercy Corps and others).

Meeting with Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar.

August 12 .... Transit to Maldives.

Meeting with Atolls Minister Mohamed Waheed Deen and other

Maldivian officials.

August 13 .... Site visit to tsunami-hit Kaf Guraidhoo.

August 14 .... Meetings with Maldives Government officials, including Minister of

Defense and National Security Ismail Shafeeu.

Transit to Sri Lanka.

August 15 .... Depart Sri Lanka. Transit to U.K.

August 16 .... Meetings at British Foreign Office. Transit to Washington.

End Mission

7

1 Congressman Leach’s delegation included Senators Brownback and Corzine, Representatives

Blumenauer, Faleomavaega, Ferguson, Flake, Garrett, Gilchrest, Shays, Smith, Watson,

Pallone, as well as staffers Jamie McCormick, Doug Anderson, Landon Fulmer, and Evan

Gottesman. 2Sri Lanka and Maldives Tsunami Disaster Action Response Plan: USAID/OFDA: Bringing

Hope to People. 3 Bruce Vaughn, ‘‘Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations,’’ Congressional Research Service,

February 11, 2004. 4 Europa World Year Book, page 3934.

TSUNAMI TRIP REPORT SUBMITTED BY NILMINI RUBIN, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS

COMMITTEE PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER

From January 8–17, 2005, SFRC staffer Nilmini Rubin traveled to Sri Lanka to

observe the impact of the December 26, 2004, tsunami and the effectiveness of the

relief and aid response. As part of Congressman Leach’s delegation 1 for 2 days, I

traveled to the south of the island and participated in official meetings. Afterward,

I traveled to the mid-eastern part of Sri Lanka with CARE USA President Peter

Bell to observe relief operations and then joined USAID staff to look at recovery in

the southeast part of the island. I made a point to observe the impact on affected

people in Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and Burgher towns and neighborhoods.

The tsunami affected most of Sri Lanka’s coastline, killing more than 30,000 people and destroying more than 100,000 homes leaving nearly 600,000 displaced.2 This

disaster hit 2 years after the ceasefire between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan Government which stopped the violence, mainly

in the north and east, that had resulted in more than 64,000 deaths since 1983.3

In addition, the country was recovering from the loss of between 25,000 and 50,000

people as a result of the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) insurrection

in the south in the 1970s and 1980s.4

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

• Special Envoy. The creation of a Special Envoy could maintain pressure on both

sides to wage peace. • Financial Controls. Insistence that all World Bank-proposed financial controls

are accepted by the Sri Lankan Government and that the central Sri Lankan

Government set up a system to consult with the district governments on spending could thwart corruption. • Housing and land titling. Permanent housing should become the main development focus as it was in terrible need. Land issues are very difficult and Sri

Lanka is a very densely populated country with serious titling problems.

• Early Warning System. An early warning system for tsunamis and other types

of danger should be established. It would have saved lives in Sri Lanka. As the

destruction was in a ring less than a mile wide around the island, even a 15-

minute warning would have allowed people to move to a safe area.

IMPRESSIONS

I learned that there are three levels of response to this and other disasters: Immediate relief; intermediate rehabilitation; and long-term recovery. While there has

been a tremendous focus on immediate relief, the major challenge will be long-term

recovery. One aid worker stated ‘‘we need to do more than restore people to their

impoverished state.’’ He asserted that economic development is, in part, disaster

mitigation as the poor tend to be inordinately affected by natural disasters. Most

observers agreed that the tsunami hit the poorest.

There are a number of complexities in Sri Lanka. Housing and land for internally

displaced people from the ongoing ethnic conflict is still pending—many of them

have been living for years in shacks. Also, many of the villages near the affected

areas are very poor and there are concerns about the fairness of helping the tsunami victims and not their poor neighbors.

The Sri Lankan Government and Sri Lankan civil society were the first responders to the tsunami disaster before the international community was in place. While

many acknowledged that the Sri Lankan Government was doing the best it could

to respond to the tsunami disaster, there was concern that Sri Lanka was taxing

aid provided to the victims. According to Tara de Mel, National Operations Coordinator, the Government of Sri Lanka continues to impose duties (averaging 18 percent) on private donations that are sent directly to Sri Lanka, rather than going

through international NGOs or governments.

Reportedly, U.N. agencies held a meeting 2 hours after the tsunami hit Sri Lanka.

The United Nations helped with information gathering mechanisms and helped the

8

5Sri Lanka and Maldives Tsunami Disaster Action Response Plan: USAID/OFDA: Bringing

Hope to People.

government establish the National Operations Center. UNICEF had already been

working in many of the affected areas to address the impact of the civil conflict.

NGOS

I found international NGOs like Save the Children partnering with local NGOs

to provide assistance. Similarly, CARE, which has been in Sri Lanka since 1956,

used its relationships with the communities to provide assistance. I met a number

of new international NGOs to Sri Lanka that were trying to help but have no sense

of the political situation which makes them vulnerable and could result in unintended consequences. Established NGOs referred to the new international NGOs as

‘‘parachuters.’’

U.S. GOVERNMENT

Shortly after the tsunami, USAID/OFDA provided more than $23.3 million to support emergency relief supplies, health, water and sanitation, cash-for-work, transitional shelters, psycho-social support, and child protection activities.5

USAID has a base of operations in Ampara, where more than 10,000 died as a

result of the tsunami. Along those lines, USAID was one of the few official donors

with offices outside of Colombo (in Trincomalee and Ampara) and it has allowed

USAID to become a nerve center, providing information to the new groups. USAID

had previously worked with fishing communities, so reaching back out to replace

boats will be quite easy for them. I saw USAID boats being used to ferrying people

in an area where a bridge had been washed out. On the other side of the bridge

was a badly affected community.

In Ampara, USAID gave grants in kind and did not distribute any cash so as to

impede the misuse of funds. I was very impressed with the USAID staff and the

local hires. They were an important resource for other NGOs, had a good understanding of the sensitivities in Sri Lanka and were highly professional.

I also saw U.S. Marines assisting in the recovery, clearing destroyed buildings in

preparation for rebuilding.

POLITICIZATION OF THE RECOVERY

According to Peter Harrold of the World Bank, two-thirds of the damage from the

tsunami was in the northeast provinces where many Tamil people live. So, the nature of collaboration between the government and the LTTE adds a complicating

factor that has to be addressed with care. The World Bank official added that the

disaster occurred when the peace process was at its lowest ebb since the ceasefire

in October 2002. At first, many were optimistic that the disaster would lead to renewed interest, by both sides, in peace; but worry was setting in.

The politicization of the recovery was clear. The government seemed to be consolidating power—rather than devolving—in the wake of this crisis. I saw internally

displaced peoples (IDP) camps that were funded by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (allegedly linked to the LTTE) and by the JVP (a socialist nationalist political

party). The JVP and the TRO were separately setting up their own camps. The JVP

was driving around passing out rice, lentils, spices, and pumpkins for people to cook.

They were cleaning up debris as well.

There was concern about the relief reaching all affected people in Sri Lanka—both

in the government-held areas and the LTTE controlled areas. In the East, the Sinhalese (majority) tend to live more inland and the Tamils and Muslims live closer

to the coast. Some felt that it was possible that the inflow of tsunami relief would

inflame ethnic tensions because some—who may be very poor regardless of their impact by the tsunami—would be left out.

Ampara was the part of Sri Lanka most destroyed by the tsunami—more than

10,000 have died here. However, it was the area where I saw the least help. It takes

about 10 hours from Colombo to get to some of the villages that I visited in Ampara.

There was a minimal international presence there. Temporary shelter consisted of

plastic sheeting on sticks. There was food and water. There was serious and obvious

depression—many were afraid to move back to where they lived. The sanitary facilities were poor.

RESPONSE OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANKS

The most critical financing issue to watch was that of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) as the MDBs make up a significant portion of the government’s

9

6World Bank website: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:

20318541∼menuPK:34463∼pagePK:64003015∼piPK:64003012∼theSitePK:4607,00.html. 7 Asian Development Bank website: http://www.adb.org/Media/Articles/2005/6619ltsunamil

impactlSrilLanka/default.asp.

budget. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank are currently conducting

needs assessments in Sri Lanka. The World Bank has announced it will provide

$100 million in initial financial support to Sri Lanka with additional funding for

longer term reconstruction efforts.6 The Asian Development Bank announced that

between $100 million and $150 million in new operations could be processed in the

short to medium term, devoted to the reconstruction effort in Sri Lanka.7

The World Bank Representative, Peter Harrold, explained that the World Bank

was pushing for accountability structures for the tsunami relief money. He said the

World Bank has asked the Sri Lankan Government to (1) create a web-based system

so it is easy to track the money; (2) continue to follow procurement rules and competitive procedures even in the disaster environment; (3) require an international

audit; and (4) have citizen accounting system so the people can say if the money

has translated into impacts on the ground. The Sri Lankan Government has not yet

agreed to this system, Mr. Harrold added.

One accountability structure not mentioned, specifically, by the World Bank in

our meeting that was very important according to Nilan Fernando of the Asia Foundation, was the consultation and involvement of local and provincial governments.

Some others report that the government was trying to secure direct budget support

with minimal controls.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDP) CAMPS

I visited a number of camps, with varying design, for people displaced by the tsunami. Many IDPs were in schools and temples where the bathroom facilities are not

adequate. I saw one of their camps in a Buddhist temple with more than 800 people

and 2 toilets. They were planning to dig more latrines but were inundated with

needs.

Most women I spoke to felt safe—the Sri Lankan military has posted officers at

some of the camps. Yet still, domestic violence was a problem in the camps. Even

though most villages were kept together, domestic violence continues. Statistics do

not exist, but CARE responded to 4 domestic violence complaints on the one day

that I was traveling with them.

SHELTER

Most of the affected people that I spoke to said that they lost everything they

owned. They invested all of their money into the building of their homes. The

women purchased gold jewelry as a store of value. I did not meet anyone who had

insurance to cover their loss.

Each affected person that I talked to said that they wanted a new home and land.

They did not know where the land would come from. Land in Sri Lanka, an island

the size of West Virginia, is scarce and the affected area has a concentrated population. Another major problem in Sri Lanka is titling. Many affected people did not

have legal title to their homes and some of those who did lost their deeds in the

wave.

A significant complication was that many of the people who lost their homes were

‘‘fisherfolk’’ who need to be near the coast. The government’s revised regulation on

how close to the coast structures could be rebuilt was in dispute during my visit.

HEALTH

Disease incidence was lower than initially expected because of high immunization

rates and successful cholera prevention programs in Sri Lanka according to the

World Health Organization representative.

During my 1-week stay in Sri Lanka, I did not observe any public information

on HIV/AIDS. I discussed AIDS with a number of Sri Lankans who, despite their

ethnic and class differences, all asserted that AIDS was not a problem in Sri Lanka

as it was in other countries. Given risk factors in Sri Lanka such as conflict, displacement, tourism, and prostitution, I would be surprised if this assertion was true.

ELDERLY

I did not see any tsunami-relief programs targeted to the needs of the elderly nor

did I meet anyone who knew of any programs for the elderly. My concern was that

10

the elderly who are unable to work and have lost family members may fall through

the cracks.

During my trip, I was deeply moved by my conversations with elderly people. In

Batticaloa, I met an elderly lady named Padida Ismael who asked me what she

should do. For years, she had maintained a small corner shop. It was lost in the

tsunami, as was her home and all her possessions, including all of her clothes. Mrs.

Isamael was wearing a donated sari. She said that ‘‘it is too late for me. My whole

life’s work is gone.’’ Then, she cried.

I met two elderly ladies in Ampara who sat by the rubble that was once their

home. They mourned the loss of their community and said they had ‘‘no place to

go.’’ One woman said that her children are now homeless, too, so she could not depend on them. The other woman said that she lost her son and had no other means

of support. They were in profound grief.

Microenterprise and other employment generation mechanisms don’t help the infirm—who may worked their whole lives for the little they had. I was deeply

touched by the elderly women that I met. Many of them shared a story—she doesn’t

know what she can do, she is too old to work, and she has no one left to take care

of her.

WOMEN AND CHILDREN

In Batticaloa, I saw Muslim, Tamil, and Burgher villages erased by the wave.

Women repeatedly approached me to tell me their stories. They often sobbed. They

clearly wanted to be heard and to get help.

The National Child Protection Authority was in the process of determining the

number of children that are orphaned. They will try to trace family members, then

will turn to fostering, adoption, and orphanages according to the UNICEF representative. According to the UNICEF representative, since the tsunami hit on a

Sunday, most families were together. According to Tammie Wilcuts of Save the Children, more parents are missing children than children are orphaned.

SCHOOLS

As I visited villages in Ampara with staff from USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, I could see that a significant percentage of the coastal schools were damaged completely or partially. Some schools can be salvaged but others cannot.

UNICEF was helping some set up temporary schools. UNICEF provides the plastic sheeting for the roof and the parents are scrounging for wood to make frames.

UNICEF also provides school kits—a box with a blackboard, notebooks, pencils,

etc.—almost everything you need to start classes. However, these temporary schools

will be wholly inadequate in the rain. And everyone thinks the temporary schools

will be in place for at least 6 months. The Canadian Disaster Assistance Response

Team was looking at how they can provide engineering expertise to rebuild some

of the schools, USAID was coordinating masons and providing tools for volunteers.

ENVIRONMENT AND FISHING

Many argued that the destruction from the tsunami was aggravated by the destruction of coral and mangroves in Sri Lanka.

Reportedly, more than half of the 28,000 vessels in Sri Lanka were damaged or

lost in the tsunami. As most of the fishing boats on Sri Lanka are made of fiberglass, repairs are costly. Fishing is an important industry on the island. Not only

does it provide the economic base to coastal villages, the industry provides the main

source of protein in the common Sri Lankan’s diet. The economic ripple effect of the

loss of so many seacraft was very evident at camps around the country. Resurrecting this important industry is vital to the interests of the nation’s coastal areas.

One problem in Sri Lanka before the tsunami was overfishing—especially near

the coast because people here had (and will have again) small boats (40 ft.) that

don’t allow them to go out far. The FAO was working with people to get them to

pool to buy bigger boats that can go out farther and mitigate the coastal problem.

The Sri Lankan Prime Minster asserted that fishermen from other countries fish

in Sri Lankan waters.

The following persons met with me in Sri Lanka:

U.S. Embassy

Jeffrey Lunstead, Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the Maldives

David Willams, Vice Consul

Dean Thompson, Foreign Service Officer

Patricia Mahoney, Foreign Service Officer

Prasad Gajaweera, Political Specialist, U.S. Embassy

11

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Carol Becker, Mission Director

Bill Berger, Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)

Justin Sherman, Country Representative, Office of Transition Initiatives

Benjamin Kauffeld, Health & Humanitarian Assistance Program Manager

Solita Muthukrishna, Project Management Assistant

Lionel Jayaratne

Wayne Brook, Regional Program Manager (Ampara) for Office of Transition Initiatives

Vani Nalayanee, Grants Specialist for Office of Transition Initiatives

Al Sadath, Office of Transition Initiatives

Other U.S. Government

Brigadier General Panter, U.S. Marine Corps

Sri Lankan Government

Prime Minister Rajapakse

Tara de Mel, National Operations Center Coordinator

U.L. Hashim, Director of Education, Zonal Education

Commanding Officer Wickrameratne, Air Force Squadron Leader

M.K. Pathmanathan, Minister of Parliament

International Organizations

Peter Harrold, Country Director, World Bank

Jeremy Carter, Senior Resident Representative, IMF

Miguel Bermeo, Resident Representative, UNDP

Wallaya Pura, Acting Representative, U.N. High Commission for Refugees

Edward Chaiban, Head of Mission/Representative, UNICEF

Dr. Denham Paul, Consultant, World Health Organization

Jeff Taft-Dick, Country Director, World Food Program

Mazlan Jusoh, Representative, Food and Agricultural Organization

Non-Governmental Organizations

Kushil Gunasekera, Unconditional Compassion

Peter Bell, President, CARE USA

Scott Faiia, Country Director, CARE Sri Lanka

Robert Go, Media Adviser, CARE Sri Lanka

Vasuki Jayashankar, Project Director, Prevention of Gender-based Violence, CARE

Sri Lanka

Jose Ravano, Emergency Coordinator, CARE Sri Lanka

Nilan Fernando, Representative in Sri Lanka, The Asia Foundation

Tammie Wilcuts, Save the Children

Matthew Parry, Regional Associate, International Disaster Response Unit, American

Red Cross

Lynne Robinson, Mercy Corps

Sri Lankans affected by the Tsunami

P.H. Punayasiri

Sedhu Segeruma

Megeni Avama

Rosalyn Peralya

M.H. Susilawathie

K. Punyawathie

K. Somawathie

L. Neel Samantha Silva

R.E. Ganatilaka

Manel Galage

D.P. Upasiri

Alageiedh Sarasinamam

Padidah Ismael

Palliani

Other Sri Lankans

P. Perera, KPMG

A. de Silva, volunteer coordinator of Taiwanese doctors

S. de Silva, tourist industry

M. Mahendrajah, retired

S. Weerasinghe, retired

D. Weerasinghe, homemaker

12

8Drawn mainly from State Department http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm.

Canadian Disaster Assistance Response Team

Bill Wyman, coordinates Canadian Military with NGOs

Mr. Gilbert, volunteer coordinator

Mr. Yergeau, field engineer

Mr. D’arcangelo, water and sanitation

Mr. Bettis, construction

My Trip Schedule

1/8 Departed D.C.

1/9 En route to Colombo, Sri Lanka.

1/10 Arrived in Colombo, met with Ambassador Lunstead and USAID Mission Director Carol Becker.

1/11 Toured tsunami-affected areas in Galle, Hikkaduwa, and Seenigama, witnessed U.S. Marines clearing rubble at a school, a cleanup project with

local volunteers, the distribution of aid at a relief center for displaced persons, and a damaged tourist hotel. Observed National Operations Center.

1/12 Met with international organizations including the World Bank, UNICEF,

U.N. Development Program, the World Health Organization, and the World

Food Program.

1/13 Toured tsunami-affected areas in Batticaloa, Kattankudy, Kurukkalmadam,

Dutch Bar, and Navalady, met with CARE staff, observed a relief distribution in affected community.

1/14 Toured tsunami-affected areas in southern Ampara including Oluvil,

Palamanai, Akkarapatu, Tirrukkovil, Komari, and Pottuvil. Observed damaged public schools and saw temporary schools supported in part by

UNICEF. Visited IDP camps.

1/15 Toured tsunami-affected areas in northern Ampara including Kalmunai,

Karaitivu, and Nitavur. Saw political groups providing relief.

1/16 Meetings with individuals and organizations in Colombo.

1/17 Returned to D.C.

Background on Sri Lanka 8

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (formerly known as Ceylon) is an

island in the Indian Ocean with a population of about 19 million.

• Sinhalese make up 74 percent of the population and are concentrated in the

densely populated southwest.

• Ceylon Tamils, citizens whose South Indian ancestors have lived on the island

for centuries, total about 12 percent and live predominantly in the north and

east.

• Indian Tamils, a distinct ethnic group, represent about 5 percent of the population. The British brought them to Sri Lanka in the 19th century as tea and

rubber plantation workers, and they remain concentrated in the ‘‘tea country’’

of south-central Sri Lanka.

• Other minorities include:

• Muslims, about 7 percent of the population;

• Burghers, who are descendants of European colonists, principally from the

Netherlands and the United Kingdom (U.K.); and

• Aboriginal Veddahs.

• Most Sinhalese are Buddhist; most Tamils are Hindu. The majority of Sri

Lanka’s Muslims practice Sunni Islam. Sizable minorities of both Sinhalese and

Tamils are Christians, most of whom are Roman Catholic.

13

The CHAIRMAN. This disaster has taken an incredible toll on children. The United Nations Children’s Fund estimates that children

comprise more than one-third of all deaths. Tens of thousands of

children have lost family members and friends and are coping with

unspeakable trauma. Nearly 35,000 children have been orphaned,

and many more have been separated from their families. In addition to facing the risks of disease, hunger, and exposure, these children are vulnerable to being trafficked for sexual exploitation,

forced labor, conscription, and other purposes.

14

I would like to highlight three initiatives undertaken by this

committee that deal specifically with the problems faced by children and other vulnerable populations.

First, today I am introducing a resolution urging the United

States to ratify ‘‘The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish

Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,’’ and the

underlying ‘‘U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized

Crime.’’ U.S. ratification of these agreements would improve our

ability to coordinate law enforcement efforts designed to protect

children and vulnerable populations. We also must encourage other

nations to ratify these agreements, which require parties to criminalize trafficking in persons and to cooperate with international

law enforcement responses to trafficking.

Second, today I will reintroduce ‘‘The Assistance for Orphans and

Other Vulnerable Children in Developing Countries Act of 2005.’’

I originally introduced this bill in 2004. It would help address the

consequences of the catastrophic growth in the number of children

orphaned by AIDS and other causes. In sub-Saharan Africa alone,

an estimated 14 million children have been orphaned by AIDS, and

this number is projected to soar to more than 25 million by 2010.

The bill would support community-based organizations assisting

these children, reaffirm our commitment to the international school

lunch program, and develop ways to reduce school fees so that orphans are not forced to leave school because of cost, and promote

the establishment and enforcement of inheritance rights for women

and children. Although the bill is aimed at the AIDS orphan crisis,

it would be applicable to the orphans who lost their families in the

tsunami disaster.

I want to thank the five cosponsors of this bill: Senators Boxer,

Chafee, Coleman, Feingold, and Smith. They have been active in

the bill’s development and they have demonstrated an unwavering

commitment to achieving bipartisan success on this important bill.

Third, Senator Biden and I are working on a bipartisan legislative effort targeted at providing greater protection to women, children, and other vulnerable populations in the context of war or disaster. This is an issue of longstanding interest to Senator Biden,

and he introduced the original ‘‘Women and Children in Conflict

Protection Act’’ during the last Congress. We are consulting closely

on how to craft a bill that would gain broad support within the

Senate so it could be passed in this session.

The tsunami disaster has provided a tragic model of what can

happen to women, children, the elderly, and the disabled in the

aftermath of disaster or conflict. These vulnerable populations face

extreme risks during periods of instability or upheaval. In addition

to threats from trafficking, abuse, and other predatory activities,

vulnerable populations are sometimes blocked from assistance flowing to disaster areas by stronger or more politically connected

groups. Our staffs witnessed this problem while traveling in the Indian Ocean region.

And I appreciate Senator Biden’s steadfast leadership on this

issue and his commitment to getting this bill passed. I am hopeful

that our hearing today will provide additional insights that can be

applied to perfecting this legislation.

15

Today we are joined by three distinguished panels. They will discuss the United States and international responses to the tsunami.

On the first panel, we welcome our friend, the distinguished Senator, Majority Leader Bill Frist, who has traveled to the Indian

Ocean region to personally review relief efforts.

On the second panel, we welcome Alan Larson, Under Secretary

of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs; Paul

Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Andrew Natsios, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. We

look forward to the insights of these three friends of the committee

and to hearing how their respective agencies are contributing to

the relief effort.

On our third panel, we welcome Daniel Toole, Director of the Office of Emergency Programs at UNICEF; Mary McClymont, President and CEO of InterAction; and Nancy Lindborg, President of

Mercy Corps. They will provide us with perspectives on the role of

the United Nations and the NGO community.

We thank all of these witnesses for joining us today and for sharing their thoughts on what has been done in response to the disaster and what can be done better in the future.

I recognize now our distinguished ranking member, Senator

Biden.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR

FROM DELAWARE

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

You listed the witnesses we are about to have. One of the witnesses we are going to hear today is a man who has been before

this committee many times and a man whose judgment we relied

on over the years in both Republican and Democratic administrations, Alan Larson. He is going to be leaving Government service

shortly, and I just want to publicly acknowledge what an incredibly

fine job he has done, how well he has served the committee when

he has been here, how well he has served the country. He is a

model of the professionalism that exists in many places in our Government. I want to publicly acknowledge that at this time.

I also want to explain at the outset, Mr. Chairman, at 10:15 I

will have to leave. I am also a member of the Judiciary Committee.

It is hard to believe, but 8 years ago I helped draft a bankruptcy

bill that I think is rational. We have passed it repeatedly with

overwhelming majorities: 89 and 87 and 91 votes, and it is still not

in play. It is being marked up again today. So I apologize to the

witnesses that because of my long, long investment in this piece of

legislation, which I am blamed for having written and I must take

part of the blame for, I will be leaving.

The third point I would like to make, before I read my brief

statement, is that I have taken out of the statement any of the references that you made about the humanitarian disaster. I do it not

to deemphasize how startling and of what biblical proportions this

disaster was, but just in the interest of time.

Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by commending you not only for

calling this hearing but for your continued leadership. The list of

legislation that you have listed today is a testament to how seriously you take your oversight responsibility and how clearly you

16

understand what the core remaining problems are. The idea that

we are going to have millions of homeless children in Africa, that

we have the devastation and the homelessness of the young children in this region of South Asia has not only humanitarian impact, it has phenomenal consequences for the development of those

countries and phenomenal consequences, quite frankly, for our ultimate security. So I compliment you.

Six weeks ago, to state the obvious, the people of Indonesia, Sri

Lanka, India, Thailand, and at least a half a dozen other countries

were struck by a disaster, as I said, of biblical proportions. The

scale of the devastation was literally beyond comprehension. I recall when the first reports came by that, maybe, there were 30,000

dead and how absolutely shocked we were and the world was. But,

my Lord, we are now talking about something between 160,000 and

180,000, maybe as many as above 200,000 dead. These numbers

are mind-numbing, but every single one of these numbers is an individual that represents a dreadful, unique loss for their families

and for humanity.

Americans, like people all over the globe, were heartbroken, and

like people around the world, we responded with generosity and

dedication. The outpouring of private charitable contributions was

something wonderful to behold, a sense of commitment that will,

I hope—I always hope when these things happen—carry over to

other humanitarian crises elsewhere in the world and maybe begin

to change our attitudes slightly about how we look at one another.

But I want to just take a moment to comment on our military,

the sailors and marines, along with a number of other services,

who have earned the deep gratitude not only of the people of the

tsunami-hit nations, but all of the world. The deployment of the

USS Abraham Lincoln carrier group and the military assets demonstrated a point that is of tremendous value: America’s military

might enables us to be a formidable enemy but also a very, very,

very powerful friend. This is a point that, I think, is too often unrecognized. We have shown from Afghanistan to Iraq to the Balkans that our fighting men and women are second to none. We do

not always have the opportunity to demonstrate the other side of

the coin: Our military’s enormous capacity for saving and serving

human lives.

I came to this body, not unlike you, Mr. Chairman, a long time

ago, a product of the Vietnam generation and not particularly enamored with our military when I arrived in 1972. But I must tell

you, in my travels around the world—and I have made it a point,

as many of you have, including our first witness, of going to every

place of conflict that we have men and women in war, in battle,

risking their lives, since I have been a Senator. And without fail,

the single most competent people at restoring life—at restoring

life—not just taking life, restoring life—have been our military.

I was giving Mr. Natsios a little bit of grief earlier today, in a

private meeting here, about why we have not been able to disseminate more of the aid that we voted for for Iraq, the $18.4 billion.

He accurately pointed out AID has done their job well. And I said,

what about Fallujah? I said I go over there and talk to the military

guys and they say, give me some money, we can help get this done.

He said it is being done. We are working with them.

17

But it is astounding. I just think it is important that our people

know that our military—they are the same kids, the second lieutenant who stands there in Brcko in northern Bosnia, that as you

see a group of 25 people carrying axes and sickles, literally walking

down a street of a neighborhood about to reclaim a home that was

theirs, that was a Bosniak home, from a Serb who may be living

there. And it is a young second lieutenant standing in the middle

of the street, going whoa, wait a minute, fellows, and peacefully

taking care of it.

Or the second cavalry in Sadr City, led by Corelli, a general who

can shoot straight and kill if he has to, but who stands there and

he says, give me PVC pipe and let me run it out of the back of

these homes into the Tigris so the sewage does not pile up in their

front streets, and when he does it, the incidents of conflict diminish.

So it is not a mere afterthought, that I point out today, that our

military is involved in saving lives, as well as defending us and

necessarily sometimes taking lives of bad guys.

As a two-star admiral, in command of the USS Abraham Lincoln

carrier group, told a visiting congressional delegation—and I am

paraphrasing because I was not on that delegation. Someone apparently asked him, was this a distraction from all the strains on

the military in terms of fighting the wars we have to fight today.

And he said, I am told the quote was, this is not a distraction from

our job, it is our job.

In humanitarian terms, there is simply no other institution in

the world that could have delivered the assets and capabilities of

the U.S. military. From helicopters to water desalinization plants,

the Navy had it all and they got it on the scene within 1 week of

an initial call.

In political terms—and it may not be politically correct to raise

this—this represents an example of supremely effective and cost effective public diplomacy in the extreme. It demonstrated a simple,

yet often-overlooked point: Good deeds breed good will.

I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, as I try to shorten this statement, that some of the questions that we should explore include—

yesterday the administration announced it will increase our pledge

for relief and reconstruction to $950 million, in other words, an additional $600 million over the $350 million already committed and

basically spent. I applaud the President for that. But the questions

I have are: What can we do to ensure full transparency for our

pledge so Americans and the world know that we are spending this

money wisely?

What can we do to assure equal transparency on the part of the

governments with whom we are working? To be blunt, some of the

governments in the affected countries have a history of endemic

corruption, and some of their militaries have a poor record with respect to human rights.

What can we do to ensure that our money gets to the affected

people themselves long after news cameras have decamped from

four other sites?

And what can we do to ensure that our funding does not help

fuel civil conflicts rather than resolve them?

18

Mr. Chairman, this tragedy is a challenge to the United States,

a challenge to demonstrate to the world just how generous and

open-hearted the American people are and the American Government can be; a challenge to engage in cooperation with the world

community, to show the world, and particularly the Muslim world,

just what sort of powerful friend we can be. We must meet this

challenge, and I believe the administration should be complimented

for the way in which they have approached this challenge.

I want to make it clear about accountability. Given the option between taking a risk on not having sufficient accountability but potentially saving thousands of lives or altering the circumstance of

the people in the region, I am willing to take that risk. But nonetheless, we still should have transparency, as best we can, as it relates to the use of these moneys by the governments to whom we

are providing the money.

Again, I thank you for your leadership. I apologize for delaying

the majority leader who has a busy schedule. As I used to tell his

predecessor, the job is not worth the car, but I am glad he has it.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank the distinguished ranking member.

I compliment him on his conscientious attendance over in Judiciary

for his important work, even as he does the Lord’s work here in

this committee.

It is a real privilege to welcome my friend and our distinguished

Republican leader, Bill Frist, a gifted physician who has, in fact,

throughout his public career, been on the scene to minister to people. Once again, he has done so in this case. We look forward to

your testimony. Thank you for coming. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL FRIST, U.S. SENATOR FROM

TENNESSEE

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be

back in this room with you and your members. I will be brief. You

have an outstanding series of panels to follow, but I do appreciate

the opportunity to share some experiences that I had when I and

Senator Mary Landrieu went to South Asia several days after the

tsunami struck.

Right up front, from that first day that we set foot in Sri Lanka,

it was apparent that the United States was leading in terms of providing relief, assisting with recovery, and the rebuilding of that

part of the world. We must all be thankful for and commend our

Government agencies, especially the military personnel who Senator Biden so appropriately commented on, and the American people, and all who responded in a timely and immediate way. It was

apparent on the ground that the United States was leading that effort.

The death and destruction is not exactly as you see on television

and have read about, but actually much worse. The human face of

this tragedy is terrible: Over 35,000 orphans; the fact that more

than a third of the people who died were children; the fact that the

more than 1 million people who have lost their homes are still

homeless, now a month and a half later.

I do want to stress the compassion that we saw on the ground:

The aid workers, the military men and women, the doctors that

19

came in, the engineers that arrived from the United States to clear

the roads and, indeed, from all over the world. Our friends around

the world, as we saw, also contributed generously.

I know you will be talking a lot about the sum of money that the

administration has requested, and that I encourage us all to be

strongly supportive of. For every dollar that has been requested,

there has been a dollar matched by our private charities, by charitable giving in this country. It is totally different when we compare

our private sector aid and giving to official assistance from around

the world; the degree of generosity and compassion expressed by

individual citizens—that outpouring—is somewhere between $800

million and $900 million thus far.

Mr. Chairman, I want to take the opportunity to focus on one

element that we responded to well, and introduces the success of

the short-term response, but what I would encourage this committee to focus on in the future. It involves the absence of clean

water and access to clean water and sanitation.

In the tsunami area, lack of clean water emerges as one of the

most pressing problems. As the tsunami came in, the salt water

contaminated, immediately, the wells along the coast, and water

containers that had been held in the homes all along the coast. You

would fly for hundreds of miles along this coast with this unending

destruction. But water containers were washed away and, of

course, shelter and homes were washed away as well.

We visited the refugee camps. Many of them were local schools

that were taken over, and clearly not equipped from a sanitation

standpoint, or a water supply standpoint, to provide for the people.

Our military response was superb; over 400,000 gallons of fresh

water were shipped in. Senator Landrieu and I participated in the

delivery of USAID supplies, which focused on water availability,

whether it was chlorine or whether it was private sector sachets to

clean water, or whether it was infant solution called Pedialyte,

where an immediate response of nutrition and water could be provided.

As you flew over the beaches in Sri Lanka, water would come in

and large pools would collect—a real potential breeding ground for

mosquito-borne diseases: malaria, dengue fever, and the like. An

immediate response to prevent disease would be to dredge and remove those pools of water so that we did not have these waterborne illnesses: cholera, dysentery, typhoid fever, and the like. We

did not see outbreaks, however, because of the immediacy of that

response in a number of other areas.

Now, I bring this issue to the attention of this committee in part

to applaud this coming together, almost symphonic approach by our

military, by our USAID personnel, by the private sector in those

first couple of weeks because it prevented what could have been the

No. 1 killer after the tsunami itself. I bring to this committee the

real challenge—that we have to look at long-term solutions that

were highlighted by the tsunami crisis regarding access to clean

water. The facts are this.

One million, six hundred thousand children die every year because of lack of access to clean water; 1.6 million children. Lack of

clean water is the No. 1 killer of children in the world because of

water-borne diseases.

20

One billion, two hundred million people in the world do not have

access to clean water, and this refers back to the bills that the

chairman talked about introducing in terms of our focus on relief,

and a much broader response to global poverty and overall development.

Two billion, four hundred thousand people in the world do not

have access to basic sanitation. Worldwide, in the next 15 years,

135 million people likely will die—135 million people will die in the

next 15 years—because of water-borne illnesses.

Now, there are three points I want to make. First, clean water

should become a major priority in our development programs.

Today, it is not a focus. It is not a major priority. Right now the

United States spends about $600 million a year on clean water programs. That is only about 3 percent of our $20 billion international

aid budget. That proportion is simply not enough as we look at the

impact of what prevention can do in terms of limiting water-borne

illnesses, the No. 1 killer of children in the world today.

I will be continuing to work with members on this committee and

their staff to introduce legislation that will make access to clean

water one of our major foreign aid objectives. The legislation will

coordinate and focus our clean water efforts. It will establish partnerships with a wide variety of governmental agencies, NGOs, and

international bodies. It will require our aid and development agencies to develop an annual strategy to meet specific goals.

Second, I believe that we should leverage private dollars to develop water infrastructure around the world. We know that it

would have an impact. Ultimately it is going to be the private companies, not state entities, who will do the hard work in developing

infrastructure to deliver clean and abundant water. We saw it in

the tsunami ravaged regions. It is the private sector that is coming

in, building on the immediate response of the government sector,

that ultimately will address long-term issues like housing and, in

this case, clean water.

The third point and the last point that I will make, Mr. Chairman, is an issue that really plays out in the three bills that you

mentioned, and I commend you for all three of those bills. And it

also reflects on the comments of Senator Biden. That is, as we look

at diplomacy, issues of health and public health and medicine can

be used as a currency of peace. I am absolutely convinced of this.

That is why I bring up this issue of water because for the investment up front, the outcome, the influence on peace, I am absolutely

convinced there is great promise.

Several things can be done that really center on this personal

contact of addressing public health, of addressing medicine as a

currency of peace. One would be a piece of legislation that I am

working on, again with members on this committee, and that is to

establish a global health corps. A global health corps that can be

mobilized very quickly to go into areas like the tsunami region;

that can be on the ground within hours, but also a global health

corps that can take advantage of the compassion, the outpouring of

support by my colleagues today who, as physicians, do want to be

able to participate on an ongoing basis. Public diplomacy, I believe,

can greatly be improved and heightened by focusing on providing

public health services abroad.

21

This global health corps concept is one that I hope to be introducing shortly. An element of that would be having a Peace Corpslike global health corps available for immediate response, like in

the tsunami, but on an ongoing basis.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I do believe that increasing the number of people with access to clean water will take time and commitment. The long-term goals are bold. It can be approached with incremental steps, and I would encourage this committee to do just

that. The demographic, social, and environmental trends are grim.

Over 130 million people will die because of lack of access to clean

water. It is totally preventable. It offers a currency of peace that

we are all looking for.

So, for the benefit of humanity and for the peace of the world,

I think we need to take this challenge head on over the coming

weeks and coming months. I do ask my colleagues to support these

proposals, to embrace them, to build on them, and to make them

work. By doing so, we can save millions of lives and give millions

more the opportunity to live healthier, more fulfilling lives.

Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the opportunity to participate in this very important hearing, and I commend you for the

legislation that you and the ranking member are introducing to

further these causes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Frist, for these

very important ideas and for your pledge to work on legislation. I

know you will find many supporters in this committee. We look forward to working with you and our colleagues on the health corps

idea and likewise on the need to provide water that is clean and

sanitary to millions of people. We thank you for using this forum

to outline these ideas today.

The chair now calls upon a distinguished panel that will be composed of the Honorable Alan Larson, Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs of the Department of

State; the Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense; the Honorable Andrew Natsios, Administrator,

U.S. Agency for International Development. Gentlemen, we welcome you once again as friends of the committee and thank you for

coming to offer testimony today in this important hearing.

Let me suggest that you try to bring your comments into a 10-

minute framework. The chair will not be excessively rigorous about

this, but to the extent that we start in that framework, there will

be ample time for questions from members.

I will call upon you in the way that I introduced you to begin

with, and that will be, first of all, Secretary Larson, then Secretary

Wolfowitz, and then Administrator Natsios. Would you please proceed.

Let me compliment you, along with our distinguished ranking

member, for your distinguished service. We hope this will not be

your last testimony before our committee, but we thank you for

your particular contributions in this current office that you now

hold.

22

STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN LARSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR

ECONOMIC, BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. LARSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

thank Senator Biden and all the distinguished members of this

committee for your leadership and for holding this hearing.

I appreciate very much the opportunity to brief you on the administration’s response to the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami,

but also and more importantly, I would like to sketch out some of

the actions and issues that we must face in the future. With your

permission, I would summarize my longer written statement which

I would like to see submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of the record in full.

Mr. LARSON. Wonderful.

In our written testimonies, my colleagues and I have outlined

how the United States, our military, our foreign assistance officials,

and our ambassadors and diplomats worked together quickly, collaboratively, and effectively to save lives and to begin the process

of rebuilding. The President’s request for a $950 million supplemental appropriation will not only replenish the costs incurred to date, but it

will also position the United States to continue to play a leading

role in rebuilding infrastructure and in helping the victims of this

disaster restore their livelihoods. It will also enable the United

States to lead in international efforts to create an expanded and

improved early warning system for natural disasters and to participate in any debt deferrals, as may be appropriate. We do ask for

the support of the Congress in quickly approving the President’s request.

Going forward, the State Department will work very closely with

all agencies, and particularly with USAID, to establish policy on

tsunami relief and recovery funding, and the United States will

work closely with host governments, with the United Nations, and

with other donors to make sure that our funding is part of a wellcoordinated and effective effort.

From the very first hours, our embassies in the field were working with local officials to identify needs, to disburse emergency assistance, to obtain overflight clearances, and otherwise facilitate

the work of our military and USAID colleagues.

Here in Washington, the State Department stood up an interagency policy task force, and my colleague, Under Secretary Marc

Grossman, called together an ad hoc international core group to coordinate the first essential stages of the international response.

At the same time, the State Department’s consular affairs officials immediately began responding to over 30,000 requests about

the welfare and whereabouts of Americans who could possibly have

been affected by the tsunami. We have now narrowed down to 12

the number of unresolved cases. At the moment there are 18 Americans confirmed dead and 15 presumed dead.

If I were to draw, Mr. Chairman, some preliminary lessons today

that we have learned and that we want to apply going forward,

they would include the following. The ability of all of us—but I will

speak specifically of the State Department, our embassies and our

consular affairs officials—to respond strongly and effectively was

23

greatly enhanced by our diplomatic readiness program that increased our surge capacity. We thank the Congress for its support

of this diplomatic readiness program and want to work with you

to be able to maintain it in the future.

Second, quick, ad hoc, informal, collaborative coordination, both

within the U.S. Government and between the U.S. Government

and other international players, is crucial at the early stage of a

complex emergency.

Third, military-to-military cooperation is critical. For example,

our cooperation with the Indonesian military was excellent, but

former Secretary Powell commented that it could have been even

better if there had been more opportunities for training, interaction, and cooperation through military-to-military cooperative

programs.

Fourth, the United Nations organizations, including the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the World Food Program, UNICEF, the

World Health Organization, and others, played a crucial role in the

international response. We do not see a need for a new international disaster assistance body separate from the Emergency Relief Coordinator. We do believe, however, that the lines of authority

and communication within the U.N. system could be strengthened.

Fifth, in an era where Americans travel throughout the world,

we are going to need to clarify to the authorities that we need to

extend forensic identification and mortuary services to countries

that experience natural disasters.

Sixth, as has been commented already, the outpouring of over $800 million of private contributions has demonstrated the compassion of the American people, and the capabilities that the private

sector has, to contributing to disaster relief and to longer term development. And we are going to need to work somewhat more systematically with the private sector through organizations like the

Chamber of Commerce to put in place the mechanisms to ensure

that this assistance is well channeled and well targeted.

Seventh, perhaps the most important step we can take going forward, is to work with other countries to improve their capacity to

respond to natural and manmade disasters. This includes sharing

best practices, training first responders, sharing technology. In

fact, that is exactly what we are going to be doing as we work to

expand and strengthen the international early warning systems for

natural disasters such as tsunamis.

In 1993, the General Accounting Office, looking at the United

States noted that—and I am quoting here—‘‘fewer Federal resources are needed to respond to a catastrophic disaster if State

and local governments are integral parts of an effective national

disaster response system.’’ That ends the quote.

I think looking internationally and looking into the future, a critical challenge is to improve the capacity of other nations to be effective and integral parts of an international disaster response system. We need to think carefully about how to stimulate these improved capacities, working through networks such as the G–8,

APEC, ASEAN, and the various regional organizations.

I think this may be similar in some respects to the lessons we

learned after 9/11/2001 about cross-border terrorism. One of those

lessons was that we needed to strengthen political will, and the caVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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pacity of other national governments around the world, to combat

terrorism, to curtail the flow of financing to terrorist organizations,

and to keep their own transportation systems safe and secure. And

since then, we have worked very hard with partners around the

world on new initiatives to strengthen awareness, political will,

and the capacity to deal with these problems.

The final lesson I would draw, Mr. Chairman, is simple; that is,

when danger approaches or disaster strikes, there is no substitute

for active American leadership and engagement. The American response to the Indian Ocean tsunami has given the world fresh insight to the character of America. We need to build on this foundation, and to do that, the President’s supplemental request is of critical importance.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Larson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN LARSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC,

BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Six weeks have passed since a deadly earthquake and tsunamis struck countries

in Asia and Africa. The countries and people struck by this disaster are now beginning to turn from the immediate task of saving the lives of family and friends, to

the long-term and even more difficult work of rebuilding homes, livelihoods and

communities. The best estimates by affected country governments and the United

Nations report more than 161,000 dead in seven countries over two continents, and

another 139,000 still missing. Over 1.1 million people are displaced.

The U.S. Government, in partnership with the affected countries, the international community, and the United Nations, will continue to provide food, shelter,

water and sanitation to those in need. As President Bush said, ‘‘The government of

the United States is committed to helping the people who suffer. We’re committed

today and we will be committed tomorrow.’’ Americans have great sympathy and respect for the people of devastated communities, who have come together to search

for the living, bury the dead, care for those who have lost families and livelihoods

and rebuild their lives.

National and local governments in the countries hit by the tsunami, the multilateral development banks and bilateral donors, including the United States, are working together to assess medium- and long-term damage and needs. Even in the worst

hit areas, such as Aceh and the coastline of Sri Lanka, rehabilitation and reconstruction have begun. Preliminary assessments produced jointly by the tsunami-affected governments, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, USAID and

other partners place damage and loss costs at $4.5 billion in Indonesia and $1.3 billion in Sri Lanka. While Maldives assessment has not yet been completed, Maldives’

own assessment is that $1.3 billion will be required for tsunami reconstruction. We

expect refinements of these studies to be produced in the coming weeks.

To help meet these needs, the Administration is seeking $950 million to support

the rehabilitation and reconstruction of areas devastated by the Indian Ocean Tsunami and to cover the costs of the U.S. Government’s relief efforts to date. As President Bush said when announcing this request: ‘‘From our own experiences, we know

that nothing can take away the grief of those affected by tragedy. We also know

that Americans have a history of rising to meet great humanitarian challenges and

of providing hope to suffering peoples. As men and women across the devastated region begin to rebuild, we offer our sustained compassion and our generosity, and our

assurance that America will be there to help.’’ The President and this Administration look forward to working with Congress to provide these funds quickly.

We recognize that the Committee seeks in this hearing to have a preliminary assessment of ‘‘lessons learned.’’ The transition period now from relief to reconstruction and recovery provides a useful juncture at which to assess the effectiveness of

the immediate response to the tsunami disaster by the U.S. Government, as well

as other actors. We appreciate this opportunity to share with the Committee some

preliminary thoughts. The assessments and recommendations that follow result

from informal interagency discussions, information from the State Department’s embassies and USAID’s missions.

In any disaster, the United States must be coordinated internally, as well as with

other responders; these include government officials and non-governmental groups

25

in impacted countries and regions, the U.N. system, international non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) and other responding nations. The sheer magnitude of the

tsunami presented many challenges to all those who sought to provide assistance—

many of these difficulties were met with remarkable speed and effectiveness. This

is a success story, but as in any complex situation, there is also room to assess how

things might have been done even better and how they can be improved in the future.

The United States is uniquely equipped and willing to contribute our resources

to employ the many tools at our disposal in responding to international crises. The

following series of simultaneous actions undertaken by the United States—often in

conjunction with other actors—illustrate our process for responding to the tsunami

crisis: (1) Taking care of American citizens; (2) coordinating government-wide mechanisms; (3) engaging the international community; and (4) engaging affected countries.

Taking Care of American Citizens: The Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) established within 24 hours of the disaster a consular task force to handle inquiries from

American citizens. Over the course of the first week, the Department received over

30,000 inquiries from all over the country and around the world about missing

Americans. Of those tens of thousands of initial inquiries, we worked 15,112 inquiries on specific individuals who might have been in harm’s way, and nearly all of

these cases are resolved. The number of American confirmed dead is currently 18

and the number of presumed deaths is 15. We are hopeful this number will not rise

any higher.

This remarkable response was facilitated by CA’s standing practice of keeping

‘‘fly-away’’ teams on standby for crisis response. In the tsunami case, given the distance from Washington to the impact zone, CA initially deployed personnel to affected areas from neighboring Asian countries. We then sent in personnel from

Washington as well as some from elsewhere who had specific language fluency. As

in many crises, consular personnel were frequently assisted by locally resident

American citizens who volunteer their services to help fellow citizens through the

‘‘warden’’ program. In this instance, the volunteer wardens were most helpful in getting messages to other Americans to phone home and reassure loved ones that they

were okay.

Consular Affairs and embassies report good cooperation overall with local authorities and across Washington agencies to identify Americans who may have been

harmed by the disaster. Three groups of issues have emerged that could improve

the U.S. Government’s ability to assist Americans overseas when a disaster strikes:

• Technology: Web-based tools, such as on-line inquiry forms, can help supplement telephone queries about missing Americans and improve our ability to

rapidly process and cross check information (e.g., with flight manifests) from a

variety of sources. CA will be expanding its use of technology along these lines,

and sees no statutory impediment to such action in the context of the Privacy

Act.

• Surge Capacity: While CA was able to respond quickly with fly-away teams, it

is worth noting this capacity depends on the overall diplomatic readiness of the

Department. We welcome the opportunity to work with Congress to maintain

this capacity.

• International Coordination: CA maintains regular contact with key allies on crisis management objectives. We all recognize that our most important objective

is to have a prompt, effective means of communicating with each other rather

than fixed plans. During a crisis, it is essential that we share information on

fast-breaking developments and available resources. Our experience during the

tsunami reinforced our belief that this type of regular communication leads to

effective coordination.

Coordinating Government-wide Mechanisms: Within the first day after the tsunami struck, U.S. Ambassadors and Embassy staff, including USAID missions, were

on the ground working with national and regional governments to disburse emergency funds, identify relief needs, and provide rapid assistance. When the need for

transport became apparent in Indonesia, the U.S. Ambassador was on the phone to

Washington urgently requesting helicopters and the first sign of relief that victims

saw in many regions was the helicopters of the United States Navy, bringing water,

food and medicine to those in need. Within 72 hours after the tsunamis struck, the

USS Bonhomme Richard and the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit had been turned

around from their previous mission and sent steaming toward the Indian Ocean.

The State Department played a key role in laying the groundwork for our military

and USAID’s rapid response, including:

26

• On December 27 the State Department stood up a policy task force, established

simultaneously with counterpart task forces at USAID/Response Management

Team, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Pacific Command; • Immediately after the tsunami struck, my colleague, Under Secretary Marc

Grossman, called together and led an international ‘‘Core Group’’ that included

Australia, Japan, India, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Nations to coordinate the first stages of the international response. This Core Group ensured

one country did not duplicate the efforts of others, identified and filled gaps in

the first days and broke logistical bottlenecks. As the United Nations mobilized

and took on a central role in the relief response, the core group passed its coordinating functions to the United Nations; • State worked quickly with DOD on contacting host governments to secure status of forces agreements, permission for our military to use foreign airspace and

territorial waters to conduct relief operations; • Embassies worked with local customs authorities to smooth entry of relief

goods; • The State Department task force processed the voluminous tsunami-related information pouring into Washington from the media and from embassies overseas, summarizing and distributing that information to the interagency via

twice-daily situation reports; and • The State task force also compiled and monitored the extensive USG emergency

assistance in each affected country and the USG resources available to bring

to bear.

The U.S. military and the U.S. Agency for International Development moved

quickly and effectively to help those in need. I especially want to acknowledge the

outstanding contributions of the U.S. Pacific Command. My colleagues on the panel

will supply you with more details on the remarkable things they accomplished to

establish the logistical backbone for the entire relief operation and to facilitate the

work of the United Nations, NGOs and other donors.

The coordination effort required for dealing with the tsunami was one of the most

complex ever attempted by a State Department task force or by the U.S. Government. The process worked extremely well especially in light of the magnitude of the

tragedy. The task force provided vital insight and guidance that helped to shape the

overall U.S. response and ensure coordination of U.S. and international relief efforts.

An initial review of our experience in responding to this disaster also suggested

areas where the Administration and Congress can work together to ensure the

United States has the resources and flexibility needed to speed help to those in

need. For example:

• Mass Casualty Disasters: This disaster required the United States to respond

to a mass casualty incident (other than terrorist-related) involving a large number of victims, both American and foreign, in several foreign countries. Although

identifying the dead is not a foreign assistance issue, President Bush is seeking

to replenish in the supplemental a special State Department account to fund

efforts to identify the remains of Americans killed in a natural disaster overseas.

• Private Donations: The outpouring of donations from private U.S. individuals

and companies to help in a disaster overseas posed new challenges in matching

those who can contribute with those in need and coordinating private efforts

with national governments and bilateral and multilateral donors.

There was close interaction between U.S. and foreign militaries during the crisis,

and foreign militaries played a vital role in providing relief to the people of the region. In that light, it is worth reviewing U.S. capacity to interact with military

forces in response to a humanitarian crisis, and to explore ways the United States

can increase our training and capacity building assistance to foreign militaries for

such operations.

The foreign military that was faced with the most extreme tsunami-related challenges was the Indonesian armed forces (TNI). As my DOD colleagues can attest,

the cooperation between the TNI and the U.S. military was very good. But we believe it could have been better, and I would therefore like to briefly address the

present legislative restriction on IMET for Indonesia.

The Department fully supports justice and accountability for the egregious acts

of violence committed against our American citizens in Timika, Indonesia in 2002.

The Department considers the protection of Americans abroad one of its most important responsibilities. We will continue to emphasize to the Indonesian Government

that resolving this case and ensuring the safety of Americans in general are crucial

to our overall relationship.

27

Our concern is not with the intended purpose of the legislative condition, but with

the limitation on flexibility that it represents. The United States has many priorities in Indonesia, including strengthening democracy, promoting military reform

and enhancing security cooperation, especially against terrorism. IMET is an extremely valuable tool that Congress provides to accomplish these objectives. For that

reason Secretary Rice is examining these issues with a view toward working together with Congress to achieve our many critical interests in Indonesia.

Engaging the International Community: The Core Group model discussed above

provides several good lessons going forward. First, coordinating donor response in

the early stages of a crisis smoothes interactions with authorities in affected regions, maximizing needed assistance while not overwhelming local capacity. Related

to this, a clear channel of interaction with the recipient government gives affected

regions the opportunity to guide support according to their priorities, which is essential for assistance to be delivered effectively.

Second, including affected countries with extra capacity to help other victims

builds regional cooperation and a sense of ‘‘ownership’’ of the relief effort and facilitates good relations with local authorities. For example, the inclusion of India in the

core group smoothed the way for excellent military cooperation with India throughout the crisis. India’s participation was also seen, properly, as an acknowledgement

by the United States of India’s growing international stature, and recognition of its

transformation from being an aid recipient to a strong regional donor.

Finally, a flexible framework is important to responding quickly and effectively

to a disaster situation. The State Department was able to rapidly pull together this

group, which never had a physical meeting and established no bureaucracy in addressing critical issues. The composition of the Core Group was the right formulation to respond to the tsunami crisis. Core Group members were able to reach out

quickly without the structural impediments that any kind of permanent structure

might have imposed.

In addition to bilateral outreach, the State Department, along with USAID and

DOD, coordinate closely on the ground and at the policy level with a range of U.N.

agencies engaged in disaster relief. The U.N. system directs its policy-level and onthe-ground disaster response primarily through the U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). The ERC has a number of U.N. offices it can utilize to coordinate overall response, in particular the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs

(OCHA). On the ground, OCHA sets up Humanitarian Information Centers (HICs)

to coordinate among U.N. agencies and with the affected countries, bilateral donors,

military units and NGOs.

At the same time, independent U.N. agencies, such as the World Food Program

(WFP), the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization

(WHO), take on specific coordination and response leads related to their mandates.

For example:

• The International Organization for Migration was there in the first days, and

with USAID funding, provided the major share of truck transport and logistics

for the crucial first few weeks;

• To combat measles is Aceh, where vaccination coverage was less than 50 percent before the tsunami, UNICEF began a measles campaign to vaccinate approximately 575,000 children;

• WHO established health sector meetings and, along with USAID and the U.S.

Navy, initiated a series of assessments along Aceh’s western coast to determine

the health profile and relief needs among the affected population; and

• WFP set up a logistic pipeline for rice and food commodities to Aceh and

Meulaboh, and began a system of sea transport to reach areas not accessible

by road.

At the policy level, the ERC participated in daily coordination calls of the Core

Group. In addition, on the day of the Indian Ocean earthquake, the ERC dispatched

teams of experts to help Sri Lanka and the Maldives assess the extent of the crisis.

Once the multinational forward hub was established at Utapao, Thailand, the

United Nations also positioned liaison officers there from WFP and the U.N. Joint

Logistics Center (JLC). They worked alongside liaison officers from Thailand and bilateral agencies, including USAID. The HIC was set up quickly to establish coordinating meetings between all actors in the relief operation.

The United States experienced good coordination with the United Nations during

the crisis, and the U.N. role was essential to the success of the overall international

response. At the same time, it would have been helpful if the United Nations had

deployed staff more quickly to the region and set up a more robust command and

control operation to meet logistic and coordination requirements. The somewhat decentralized system wherein OCHA coordinates some aspects of the U.N.’s operVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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ations, while independent U.N. agencies simultaneously coordinate specific sectors,

can lead to bottlenecks and delays.

The Administration does not believe it is necessary to establish a new disaster

body separate from the U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator and the offices it commands. In our preliminary analysis, however, it would be worthwhile to re-examine

how the United Nations conducts disaster planning and response. Some specific

ideas might include:

• Lines of Authority: Strengthening the ERC’s lines of authority would better empower the ERC to manage the U.N. agencies with disaster relief as part of their

mandate.

• Communication: Encouraging better communication between U.N. agencies and

offices; institutionalizing mechanisms for coordination in the wake of a disaster

that requires an immediate humanitarian response.

• Streamlining: Bringing some existing programs, which currently reside in various U.N. entities, under one existing office or agency instead of a new body.

This could save money and improve effectiveness through streamlining, especially if the authority of the ERC were enhanced.

Addressing such reform is currently on the minds of some donors, such as the

United Kingdom, which has raised these issues in context of their Presidency of the

G–8.

Engaging Affected Countries: The people caught in a disaster are frequently also

those who respond most quickly to the immediate needs of those around them. Governments and local authorities in the affected areas also set the priorities and goals

for reconstruction and development as rebuilding begins. Thus, one of the most important ways to bolster disaster response capacity is to strengthen the capacity of

local and national authorities to prepare for and coordinate their response to disasters.

Across the region hit by the earthquake and tsunamis, neighbors saved lives,

brought medical assistance to the injured, and helped each other in heroic fashion.

Many local and national governments responded amazingly well, especially given

the magnitude of the disaster. For example:

• The governments of India, Malaysia, and Thailand marshaled resources quickly

to help their own people and reached out quickly to other affected nations.

India, in particular, has benefited from years of USAID funded training and

support in emergency and disaster management which has greatly improved

their ability to manage disasters on their own;

• The Sri Lankan Air Force, with its limited fleet, flew long hours on relief operations and supported numerous VIP visit requests and aid coordination requests. The Sri Lankan Air Force provided immediate evacuation services to

foreign injured in remote parts of the country;

• Many Americans caught in the tsunami, who often showed up at the embassy

with only their bathing suits left, were taken in immediately by Sri Lankan

families and fed, housed, provided with some basic clothing, and, in some cases,

given enough money to get back to Colombo.

• A group of Indonesian students from Java, with no relatives in Aceh, managed

to get on a C–130 bound for Aceh to offer their help. Relief organizations quickly utilized them moving supplies.

• Thailand allowed the United States, the United Nations and the international

community to use Utapao Air Base in northeast Thailand as a regional hub for

humanitarian assistance to the affected areas.

As the United States considers how international capability to respond to disasters can be improved, we need to look first at how to build local disaster response

capacity. Our own domestic disaster response model can serve as a reference point.

When evaluating U.S. internal disaster response capability, the U.S. General Accounting Office concluded in 1993: ‘‘Fewer federal resources are needed to respond

to a catastrophic disaster if state and local governments’ response capabilities are

greater . . . we emphasized that state and local governments are integral parts of

an effective national disaster response system. The success or failure of any changes

in the federal role in that system will always be heavily affected by the efforts of

state and local responders.’’

Other countries can apply this same concept to augment their own domestic disaster mitigation and emergency response capacities. Within our current resources,

the United States can continue to use such mechanisms as:

• Encouraging countries to review and exercise their disaster response systems:

This will help them to discover ahead of time and prepare for possible problems

like bottlenecks in the distribution network.

29

• Sharing best practices: For example, Florida Governor Jeb Bush is discussing

with Thailand ways to share Florida’s experiences in dealing with the hurricanes that struck Florida last year.

• Enhancing training for first responders: In the wake of the Gujarat earthquake

that struck India, the United States launched and continues to provide first responder training. In Bangladesh, following the typhoon, we helped the country

install storm shelters and initiate first responder training. The United States

can also look to other areas where we have provided extensive training. For example, by the end of 2004, the United States had provided, through the AntiTerrorism Assistance (ATA) program, counterterrorism training to almost

41,000 law enforcement personnel in 148 countries.

• Sharing technology: We are working with United Nations agencies and other

donor nations to develop an early warning system for natural disasters in the

Indian Ocean, and the President’s supplemental budget request supports this

need. We might also consider compiling and exercising internet-based networks

and databases to facilitate coordination in responding to disasters.

The U.S. response to the tsunami shows the value of prompt and effective American action, combined with multilateral support for disaster victims. There are a

number of areas international disaster response can be improved by streamlining

existing mechanisms and, above all, improving the capacity of local authorities to

respond to crises. Every disaster presents a unique set of challenges, but by disseminating best response practices, providing training for first responders and ensuring

clear lines of communication, the United States and the international community

can most effectively deliver its vast quantity of existing support.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Larson.

I would like to call now upon Secretary Wolfowitz.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC, ACCOMPANIED BY BG JOHN ALLEN, U.S. MARINE CORPS

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify and thanks for your leadership and that of the U.S. Congress in helping to lead this international effort in providing relief for what is one of the largest humanitarian disasters in living memory.

As you know, yesterday the President announced a very large request for supplemental funding to help see us not only through this

emergency relief effort, which by our account, I think, will cost

roughly almost $350 million, but an additional $600 million on top

of that to support the long-term recovery.

You have my statement. I would just like to make a few summary points.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made complete in the record.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. First of all, just to observe the sheer scale of

this disaster. It is commonly said that quantity has a quality all

its own, and, I think that is worth thinking about in this circumstance. It hit me first, even before going out to the region,

when I met with an Indonesian from Aceh, who works in Washington, who lost his entire family, except for an aunt and uncle who

live here, in this disaster. I asked him how many people he lost.

He said 200. In other words, it is not just his immediate family,

it is his entire extended family. When you think about that and

you think about the situation of an orphan in that setting who has

not only lost his parents, but probably lost the entire community

that in normal circumstances he could look to for support, I think

you have a sense of how the scale of this disaster has created qualitatively different problems.

30

Another illustration—and it bears very much on this request for

funding—is the scale of the recovery operation, which is something

that I did not fully appreciate until I went out there, and neither

did Admiral Fargo, our commander of Pacific forces. Even though

we had been extensively briefed on the extent of the damage and

we had had detailed briefings in Thailand about the damage to the

bridges along the road on the coast, the two impressions that Admiral Fargo and I took away overwhelmingly was, one, how this

destruction just goes on for mile after mile after mile. And second,

we looked at the 36 bridges and realized that if you repaired all

36 of them, there is still no road in between them. The ground in

many places has subsided 2 or 3 feet and there is a question as

to whether the road should be rebuilt in the same place at all.

The recovery effort here is going to be huge and no country could

undertake that scale of recovery on its own. No developing country

certainly.

Second, to say a word about the U.S. military contribution. You

have heard a lot about it. I am going to repeat things you have

heard already, but I do not think we can say enough good things

about what our incredible men and women have been doing.

Thanks also to the American taxpayer who has put a huge investment in the ships and aircraft that made this possible. We did a

rough count of the 26 ships, 58 helicopters, and 43 fixed-wing aircraft that have engaged in this operation. They represent $28 billion of American taxpayer investment in our military, just the

equipment alone, not to mention the people who are, in many ways,

a bigger investment. Without that, even with this supplemental

funding, we would not have been able to deliver that emergency assistance. But with that, we were able to deliver 10 million pounds

of food and medicine, 400,000 gallons of fresh water. We have been

able to treat 2,500 patients and we are still treating some on board

the hospital ship Mercy.

There is no way to count them, Mr. Chairman, but judging just

from the fact that there were 750,000 or more displaced persons

and in western Indonesia, those people were in locations that were

inaccessible by any other means than helicopter, I think one can

safely assume that tens of thousands of lives were saved by that

effort. And the kind of medical disaster that we all feared did not

happen, probably in no small measure because people were kept

healthy.

Third, to emphasize the importance of this recovery effort. As impressive as the emergency relief operation has been and as much

as we can compliment our military for their contribution, indeed,

the entire international community for coming so quickly to the

rescue, it would be like a relay race where the baton is dropped by

the next runner if we do not continue what is going to be a huge

effort on the recovery side. We have, in my view, very important

reasons to make sure that that baton is not dropped, not only because we owe it to the orphans who are trying to face life without

their families, without their communities as a purely humanitarian

matter, but also having made this large investment in the emergency effort, speaking, at least, for the Department of Defense, we

would hate to see people say, well, it was a nice start but the finish

was terrible.

31

But finally—and this would be my last point. I would like to go

into some detail—the fact that the largest single disaster area happens to be in Indonesia, I think gives it especial importance. As you

know, I was Ambassador to Indonesia for 3 years, but I am not

speaking here as a former Ambassador to Indonesia. I am speaking

as someone who is very concerned about the larger strategic situation we are in, in the world today, who believes in what the President spoke about, about the importance of freedom and democracy

in combating extremism, and the fact, which is often known but insufficiently appreciated, that Indonesia has the largest Muslim

population of any country in the world and it combines that with

a long tradition of religious tolerance. In fact, Indonesia recognizes

not only Islam but Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism as officials religions of the country.

Most importantly, starting about 7 years ago, Indonesia has

emerged as one of the more successful developing democracies in

the third world. It started in 1997 with what was commonly called

an economic tsunami that engulfed not only Indonesia but many

other countries of South Asia and East Asia which led, more or less

directly, to the fall of the Suharto dictatorship in the spring of

1998. That was followed, to summarize a lot in two sentences, by

two free and fair Presidential elections, the first in 1999 and the

second one completed just last September, as remarkable, I think

in its own way, as the elections in Afghanistan and the Palestinian

Authority and Iraq that have gotten more international attention.

One of the things that was impressive about that election is that

it brought into office a President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who

ran on a platform promising effective government, promising to

combat corruption, promising to maintain the religious tolerance

and inclusiveness of the country. And he earned an overwhelming

popular mandate. It speaks to his leadership and it speaks, I think,

to the Indonesian voters.

But that government with its new mandate is now put to the

test, and clearly meeting that test in responding to the recovery efforts in Aceh, if they can do it successfully, will strengthen democratic institutions in Indonesia and reinforce that country’s tradition of tolerance. But it is a huge test and it is a test made all the

more difficult because of the specific circumstances of Aceh.

If you will indulge me for just a minute. Aceh is a small province,

its people with their own language, a very distinctive culture, a

very distinctive and independent history for a long time. The Dutch

only began colonizing Aceh, in fact, in the late 19th century.

In recent years, there has been a bitter war because an armed

movement, seeking independence in that province, has been fighting the Indonesian military. I believe the United States and all the

countries of the Asia Pacific region have an interest in preserving

the unity of Indonesia and that the best way to do that is through

a peaceful resolution of this ongoing struggle. That is going to be

a factor in the recovery efforts. If those tensions between the Government of Indonesia for the Indonesian military on the one hand

and the local population on the other are not managed properly,

they will interfere with the recovery effort. On the other hand, I

am more hopeful that the common interest of all parties in achieving the goal of successful recovery should inspire people to overVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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come those tensions, and doing so, I think might provide a platform

for what would be in its own region a very important contribution

to peaceful diplomacy.

So, I believe, there is a huge stake here. The President obviously

believes there is a huge stake, and that is why he is asking the

Congress for so much additional support for tsunami recovery.

But while our military role is coming to an end next week, the

suffering of the victims of this tragedy will not have ended. This

is not a time for short attention spans or donor fatigue. The whole

international community, I believe, has an interest in helping to

get the tools that these people need to rebuild their shattered lives

and we look forward to getting support from the Congress.

If I might, I would like to introduce Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, John Allen, who has played the leading role for us in

the Office of the Secretary of Defense in coordinating support for

this relief effort, and I would like to say the reason you see—not

only the reason you see, but the team that you see here, symbolizes

the fact that this has been, in my experience, a model of interagency cooperation and collaboration, and I look forward to continuing it.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Wolfowitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

THE EARTHQUAKE/TSUNAMI DISASTER

As you know, this was a double-headed disaster. First was a massive earthquake

that registered at 9.0 on the Richter scale, making it one of the 4 or 5 largest earthquakes of the past century. It lifted the ocean floor overlying the thrust fault between the Indian tectonic plate and the overlying Burma plate by up to 10 feet. The

earthquake was followed almost immediately, in the case of the northwest shore of

the island of Sumatra by a succession of tsunami waves. The region of destruction

was extensive, ranging laterally 2,000 miles from east to west, and from north to

south nearly 500 miles, or two-thirds the width of the United States and nearly half

the distance from the north of the United States to the south. The tsunami waves

created great destruction and disruption in lives and property leaving over 160,000

dead and over 140,000 missing in its wake, over 1 million people displaced, and billions of dollars in reconstruction costs. To put a human face on this disaster, shortly

before I went to the region to survey the damage and review our military relief effort, I met with an Acehnese who resides here in Washington. This one individual

lost 200 members of his immediate family in the tsunami. An aunt and an uncle

who live here are his only surviving relatives in the world. The rest of his family

was swept away in an instant.

I visited the region 3 weeks ago, just after the calamity. By that time, however,

Thailand was already in the recovery stage. Sri Lanka was still conducting some

emergency relief, but it was soon to turn the corner and the U.S. military effort was

starting to shift elsewhere. In Indonesia they were still reeling from the enormity

of this disaster. As terrible as it was throughout the region, the devastation in Indonesia was incomparably greater. Under any other circumstances the toll of over

8,000 dead or missing in Thailand alone would be devastating. Yet in Sri Lanka the

losses of over 35,000 dead or missing is more than four times higher than for Thailand. But in Aceh, one small province in Indonesia, whose population at about 4.2

million is about a fifth of Sri Lanka’s (20 million), the toll of over 114,000 dead and

over 127,000 missing was seven times greater than in Sri Lanka (thirty-one times

greater than Thailand).

THE U.S. RESPONSE

Despite the devastation, there was an encouraging amount of good news—the resilience of the people, the willingness of governments to cooperate to help their people and the readiness of the international community to offer assistance. One of the

good news stories concerned the interagency coordination and cooperation within the

U.S. Government in Washington straight out to the ground level where the execuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
33

tion was occurring. The success in this cooperation and coordination was almost unprecedented, and it benefited directly from lessons learned in previous crises.

However, there is always room for improvement and we are looking closely at our

response effort through an after action review. We have already identified, along

with USAID/OFDA, the need to establish some common operating procedures and

mechanisms to help smooth our coordinated response to future crises.

The ability of the Department of Defense to respond so quickly would not have

been possible without the relationships developed over many years with the militaries of countries in the region, particularly with Thailand. An unexpected consequence of the relief operation was the opportunity to work closely and effectively

with the Indian military, with whom we are expanding ties, as well as the Indonesian military (TNI), with whom we have had difficult relations in the past, but

with whom we have worked well in this crisis.

Thanks to the Department of State, in cases where we required over flight clearances or status of forces agreements we were able to obtain them in a timely manner. This disaster, and our response to it, has demonstrated the importance of having standing agreements like these where possible, as well as bilateral Acquisition

and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) to enable us to cooperatively respond to

humanitarian disasters. The restrictions that many people feared we might encounter from the Indonesian military and bureaucracy were overcome by the decisive

leadership of newly-elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his Administration.

Our early relief efforts in Indonesia would have been somewhat more effective if

we had more experience working with the Indonesian military (TNI) and if the TNI

had better English language capabilities and more modern equipment, but the real

point to emphasize is that the Indonesian government recognized immediately the

need for help and welcomed all who came forward.

This disaster has no doubt focused the minds of other nations on creating some

sort of disaster response capability. The countries in the regional core group were

selected to a large extent because they possessed the ability to respond quickly. It

is in our interest to expand that capability and the number of our partners in the

region who possess it. USPACOM has a program known as the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) to create not a standing response force, but a

cadre of individuals who are accustomed to working together on a multinational

basis to respond to crises. MPAT experience was put to good use in the response

to the tsunami crisis.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

At the height of the Department of Defense (DOD) effort there were nearly 16,000

U.S. military personnel in the region, 26 ships (including one USCG cutter), 58 helicopters of all kinds, and 43 fixed wing aircraft (mostly transport). The capital investment that the American taxpayers have made in the equipment that made this

effort possible reached nearly $30B. With these state of the art resources our extraordinarily capable men and women delivered over 10 million (10,124,059) pounds

of food and supplies and provided over 400,000 (422,324) gallons of fresh water for

the people whose lives were endangered by the specter of starvation and disease.

As well, our military medical system provided care to over 2,500 patients, and the

U.S. hospital ship Mercy remains off the coast of Sumatra rendering vital medical

assistance.

But the real impact can best be measured in the lives saved and assistance provided to the host nations as they tried to come to grips with a disaster of such scope

and extent. It can also be measured by the good will it has generated. Conservatively, the U.S. response to this natural disaster saved thousands, and probably

tens of thousands of lives, particularly in Indonesia, and provided desperately needed hope to hundreds of thousands of others.

A little more than 3 weeks ago, as we flew above the northwest coast of Sumatra

surveying the damage, the sheer scale of the devastation was overwhelming. The

Indonesians were still finding as many as 3,000 human remains a day in the rubble

. . . where there was rubble. At the airfield at Banda Aceh, in the heat and humidity, we saw a human chain of magnificent young American men and women loading

the helicopters with supplies, food and water. All of them had volunteered to come

ashore from the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and make a difference however they could. In those lines were officers and sailors, Chiefs and fighter pilots,

aid workers and Indonesian military (TNI) working side by side to get the food and

water on those helicopters and out to the people of Aceh.

As a result of this effort, in Aceh the USS Abraham Lincoln and her helicopters

have already passed into local legend as the Grey Angels. I had a chance to visit

34

with the crew of the Lincoln during my visit and to share in their zeal for the relief

effort. They were quite proud of what they were accomplishing. As one fighter pilot

told me—and I should say this is quite an admission coming from a fighter pilot—

‘‘we are all helicopter pilots now.’’

In Galle, Sri Lanka, we visited a school that had been undermined and rendered

unsafe by the waves of the tsunami. In 100-degree heat, Marines and Navy Seabees,

working alongside the Sri Lankan Army, operated heavy equipment and bent their

backs into clearing the site for a new school. When we asked the teachers what they

thought of the Marines and Seabees they burst into smiles and rapid-fire comments

of approval.

On the runway at Utapao, Thailand, the young Air Force men and women of the

airlift control elements were pressing themselves to the outer edge of their endurance controlling the flow of relief supplies to airfields from Utapao through to Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The efforts of our service men and women have not only saved

lives but also generated unbelievable goodwill throughout the region.

As we pass the baton to the affected governments and international relief organizations, we have an interest in staying engaged. This crisis was humanitarian. It

has been said that the Chinese character for crisis represents both danger and opportunity. Here then is a danger that failure to properly address the reconstruction

needs, particularly in Indonesia, could harm the affected governments. But here too

is also opportunity. If reconstruction is done the right way in Aceh, it could bolster

the credentials of the Indonesian government. This is also an opportunity for the

Indonesian government to show the people of Aceh the good things that Jakarta can

do for them and to use the attention of the world to help achieve a political settlement to the longstanding separatist problem. Similarly, another country affected by

this disaster, Sri Lanka, is facing a separatist problem. We hope that the opportunity that has been presented to the people of Sri Lanka can contribute to the longterm settlement of its divisions as well.

Any government would be challenged by this crisis and the burden of recovery.

Indonesia in particular finds itself—as an emerging democracy—at the time of the

tsunami not yet 100 days into the Administration of President Susilo Bambang

Yudhoyono. The 1997 economic crisis in Southeast Asia was referred to as an ‘‘economic tsunami’’ and it contributed to the downfall of the Suharto dictatorship. This

real tsunami presents an enormous challenge to the still developing democratic government in Indonesia. However, by meeting the challenge successfully there is an

opportunity to greatly strengthen democratic government and free institutions in

the country that has the largest Muslim-majority population in the world.

We need to support the wave of democracy as it spreads across the Muslim world.

The elections held in Indonesia last year, the second democratic elections in the

country and the first direct election of a President, are as significant as the elections

this year in Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq. While the new democracy in Indonesia

is proving more capable than many thought possible, it must still be nurtured.

President Yudhoyono holds a great deal of promise in terms of increasing good

governance, rooting out corruption, and continuing the already significant reforms

of the TNI. President Yudhoyono is, by the way, a retired general and a graduate

of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College through the International

Military Education and Training (IMET) program.

We have a strong interest in helping this democracy succeed. One of the first

ways we can do this is by ensuring that the job of bringing relief and reconstruction

to the people of Aceh is accomplished.

We can also support democracy by strengthening the civilian government’s capacity to manage defense and security matters and by supporting the process of reform

in the Indonesian military (TNI).

We all recognize why the U.S. Congress and the Administration have put restrictions on military-to-military relations with the TNI. At the same time, I believe we

must take a broad approach to relations with a country as important as Indonesia.

Legal restrictions on assistance we can provide to the TNI have contributed to

some unfamiliarity and suspicions between our military forces. These restrictions

did not overly limit our ability to respond to most of the tsunami-related requirements of the TNI. For example, we had the necessary authorities to provide spare

parts for Indonesian C–130 aircraft.

Nevertheless, I believe that many of the restrictions on our defense relations with

Indonesia have outlived their usefulness. We need to look forward. The Indonesia

of today is simply a different country, and the TNI a significantly different military,

from the one that perpetrated the depredations of East Timor.

During my visit to Jakarta, the new civilian Minister of Defense, Juwono

Sudarsono, recognized the need for improved defense relations. He specifically asked

35

for more assistance from the United States to assist his efforts to continue TNI reform. We should assist him in this effort.

CONCLUSION

Through the hard work of the tsunami victims themselves, the affected nations,

as well as the United States and the rest of the international community, the situation has evolved to the point at which current assistance needs can now be met by

the military and civilian officials from the affected countries in coordination with

the U.N. and relief organizations.

The redeployment of U.S. military assets does not signal the departure of U.S. assistance, but rather is a direct result of host nation, U.S. Government agencies,

international agencies, U.N. and other NGOs assessments that U.S. military assets

and capabilities are no longer required. This is done is close coordination with the

host governments and reflects the transition from direct support to recovery and reconstruction.

The lasting result of U.S. efforts should be that we did the right thing, for the

right reasons—regardless of the nationality, race, or religion of those afflicted. That

when needed, the United States was there to aid in this enormous humanitarian

disaster relief effort and we remained only as long as we were needed and could

be effective.

Although our military role is coming to an end this week, there is no conclusion

to the suffering of the victims of this disaster in South and Southeast Asia. This

is no time for short attention spans or donor fatigue. The entire international community has an interest in helping get the tools that they need to rebuild shattered

lives. We thank the Congress, and this Committee, for your strong support for this

effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Wolfowitz.

We applaud the point you have made of the interagency cooperation. We are very pleased that General Allen could accompany you

and share the very strong work of your colleagues at the Department of Defense.

I would like to call now upon Administrator Andrew Natsios for

his testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW S. NATSIOS, ADMINISTRATOR,

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. NATSIOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the committee for this opportunity to testify.

We have this in front of you and there is a PowerPoint presentation I am going to walk through. It looks like this for those of

you who want to follow along with the document. We have written

testimony that I would like to submit, but let me just go through

this.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made complete in the record.

Mr. NATSIOS. Thank you very much.

I think we think of this as a tsunami. It was actually two events,

an earthquake and then a tsunami. The earthquake is the fourth

worst in recorded history. So, if there had been no tsunami, we still

would have had widespread damage to the infrastructure in Aceh.

In fact, 70 percent of the bridges in the interior of the island that

were unaffected by the tsunami were destroyed by the earthquake.

As Paul Wolfowitz just said, some of the roads have subsided 2 or

3 feet. That was not from the tsunami. That is from the earthquake, but to have both of these simultaneously within an hour of

each other was simply unprecedented in its magnitude.

[Note.—All slides presented by Hon. Natsios can be found at the

end of his statement.]

36

There is a map here, in the presentation, as to where the areas

are that were affected, and the red line are the coast lines of the

area affected. This actually even affected Somalia and Kenya.

There were people killed. Fishermen were killed in Somalia and

Kenya by this tsunami that moved at 500 miles an hour. Most

waves travel at 30 to 40 miles an hour. It was not the wave itself

that killed people. It was the power of the wave, the force of it at

500 miles an hour that actually killed people.

The next slide indicates the way in which the international humanitarian disaster response system of the U.S. Government operates. Under Federal law of the Foreign Assistance Act, the President names an international coordinator of disaster response. I was

named by President Bush, as AID Administrators have for the last

40 years, to take that role. There is a mechanism in Federal regulation that is a State Department AID rule and it says the Ambassador has to declare a disaster before we can mobilize our resources. Those declarations of disaster were done on Sunday, the

day of the event itself.

And we mobilized the disaster assistance response team, which

is sort of a military-like unit in AID that goes out to the field. It

is sort of like a company is, or a battalion is, and it does the response for the U.S. Government. It is composed of people from

many Federal agencies but led by USAID.

We focus on four things in all disaster responses, whether they

are natural disasters or wars or famines, food, water and sanitation, health, and shelter, because these are the things that kill people in an emergency. This is the emergency response phase.

Then we move into rehabilitation and reconstruction. We used to

do these things sequentially, but in the last decade, we have realized these things are all done simultaneously. We will provide humanitarian relief to people 6 months from now, very vulnerable

populations like orphans, for example. And we will move into the

reconstruction phase. We are already doing reconstruction even a

month after the emergency. So these are not sequential. They are

simultaneous.

The next slide, No. 4, indicates one thing we did the first week.

We began cash-for-work programs with small amounts of money,

$4 or $5 a day, particularly in Sri Lanka and in India and in Indonesia, to get people moving again. This is both a therapy for people,

many of whom are in psychological shock. Their entire neighborhood has been wiped out. Their families have been wiped out. Their

businesses are gone. Their jobs are gone. They have no income.

Their houses are gone. So we want to get the people back working,

doing something constructive, because for psychological reasons, it

is very important.

Second, we want to get the economy moving by getting money

moving. Most of these people do not have jobs because the businesses were destroyed by the tsunami or by the earthquake. So we

did this very rapidly. There were thousands of jobs literally created

by our partner organizations with funding from the U.S. Government within the first week.

The next slide. We also moved very rapidly into microfinance.

There were some microfinance institutions, one of which in Indonesia that we started many years ago. We stopped funding it years

37

ago. It has 56,000 chapters to it. This is an AID project from 20

years ago. It is one of the largest microfinance networks in the

world spectacularly successful. There were 14 offices in Aceh of this

organization, chapters just in the capital city; 13 of them were destroyed. They were small banks basically. They were destroyed. All

the staff was killed. All the money is gone and the buildings are

all gone. So only one of the offices was left, but we are using the

microfinance networks that were established many years ago as a

development intervention in Indonesia to begin to recapitalize businesses to get the markets moving and to get money moving

through people’s families so that the business community can reestablish itself. It is very important.

Senator Frist talked about the importance of water. President

Bush has proposed, and we have implemented, the safe water for

the poor program, which is a Federal U.S. Government initiative

administered by AID, funded by the Congress, which we appreciate

very much, to create safe water around the world. It is to purify

water not at the source, which is the traditional means, but at the

consumption level, because lots of bad things happen to water between a water purification plant and when it gets to people’s homes

in many developing countries.

We have a plant that produces a little bottle. This little packet

is what we use in Latin America. I gave away my last bottle to a

media reporter who was interested. It is a little bottle. It costs 50

cents to produce it. That bottle, one capful chlorinates 10 liters of

water, which is enough for a family for a day. And we produce

7,000 of those a day, at a factory in Indonesia, for use among the

poor who have dirty water that they normally would have to drink

around Indonesia. We diverted the production from that plant for

Banda Aceh. We moved 70,000 bottles of this and packets of this

stuff to Banda Aceh within the first week. We simply took the existing production, moved it in there, using U.S. military transport

planes. This is very useful. This is another instance of integration

of USAID and the use of military logistics capacity.

What we did was, we did a mass distribution. So 75 percent of

the families had these available to them within a few days. It was

the NGO community and the U.N. agencies and the IOM, the

International Organization for Migration, and our partner organization, DAI, that distributed this, on the retail level, to people in

the communities that were displaced.

The next slide shows the relief effort where there is a U.S. Government helicopter, U.S. military helicopter, and AID relief supplies. We have four warehouses around the world, the closest of

which to this region is in Dubai, where we moved stuff within a

few days into that region. Then the distribution of this into the

area was done by the U.S. military. We established a system of validation where AID officers were placed in all of the major military

units, and before a logistics task was undertaken by them, we validated it that it conformed to international humanitarian relief protocols because the military said we do not know the protocols. We

really want you to help us. We do not know which NGO or which

is more important than one other NGO. There are partner organizations that have been trained in this and know how to do this,

and we wanted to order these tasks of the U.S. military based on

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these protocols that would save the most lives in the shortest

amount of time. That is the principle. How do you save the most

lives in the shortest period of time? And we did that in a very collaborative, integrated way with the military.

I might add we have never done this with this level of integration before. This was not an individual agency response. This was

a U.S. Government response with the State Department, AID, and

the U.S. military all functioning as an integrated team, which does

not always happen, even though we would like it to. It really did

happen in this case. And our offices are reporting to me we need

to build this into doctrine so we can do this again the same way.

The budget that President Bush announced yesterday in the supplemental is, we think—we are checking this now—the most generous in the history of the United States for a natural disaster, a

single event. Nine hundred and fifty million dollars has been proposed, and I would like to break down for you how on the reconstruction side of this and rehabilitation side of this will be spent.

Three hundred and thirty-nine million dollars will be spent out of this $950 million for infrastructure reconstruction, roads,

schools, water distribution systems, bridges. We are now working

with the ministries of the countries that were most severely damaged because they are in charge of their own reconstruction. We

need to emphasize this. It is not international agencies. It is not

AID agencies. It is not NGOs in charge. It is the government in

charge. These are all democratically elected governments. This is

not Darfur. This is not Rwanda after the genocide. This is not a

post-conflict situation, even though there have been insurgencies in

both countries. These are parliamentary democracies. We need to

respect their leadership and follow their lead and work with them

on what is appropriate, what is not appropriate from our own perspective. We were doing that very cooperatively and very collaboratively.

One hundred and sixty-eight million dollars of this budget will

be spent for the transition of victims and survivors back to their

communities in the form of food aid, shelter, housing reconstruction, education, and programs that help people get back to work

and establish businesses. I just mentioned some of those.

There is $35 million for disaster early warning systems. I might

add the biggest risk in the Indian Ocean is not tsunamis. It is typhoons; 400,000 people died in the great typhoon of 1974, in Bangladesh alone, in 1 hour. We established an early warning system

with the U.S. Weather Service and the Bangladesh Government

after that emergency that set up an alarm system from our weather satellites. We did the same thing at the request of the Government of Vietnam and all of the South Pacific islands, which are at

risk from typhoons. Those systems have saved millions of lives over

the years.

What we should do, I think, is to look at a natural disaster vulnerability system, not just tsunamis, but also typhoons, which is a

greater risk in this region, so that we have an alarm and early

warning system for both simultaneously in the same system.

There are $62 million to provide technical assistance for planning reconstruction activities. If we are going to spend this much

money, we have to ensure that the ministries in the governments

39

we are working with have the logistical capacity, the planning capacity, and the accountability systems and the financial management systems to make sure this works properly. And finally, there are $346 million to replenish costs incurred by

USAID and DOD in the provision of immediate relief so that none

of our programs in other regions of the world will be adversely affected.

We have already begun housing reconstruction for temporary

shelters that will house people until the larger reconstruction program is in full gear, and we are beginning to do that. We hope this

budget goes through quickly.

The next slide indicates the work we are doing with the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers to do assessments. We are doing these

jointly with AID staff and the U.S. Army Corps about what the

condition is of different elements of the road system in Aceh. That

will help us to design, with the Indonesian Government, the infrastructure.

The next slide indicates just a picture of what is left of the major

highway in the area of Aceh that was most affected by the earthquake.

We are beginning to focus our attention on the fishing fleets now.

Of course, these are coastal areas primarily and they were badly

affected by the tsunami and there is a lot of destruction to the

boats you see here on the left. But we are bringing new boats in

now so they can begin to fish again.

Finally, we have the elements of an early warning system. This

will all be done in a coordinated fashion in the international system. We do not do this alone. The governments will have to run

the early warning systems. So we have got to make sure that everybody is trained properly and the sensor devices are in place and

the sensors have a communication system to the national disaster

aid agencies in those countries and then that the communities get

a very rapid response and then people know what to do after they

hear the alarm. The Japanese have just hosted two conferences on

this. We are working with them. They have a lot of expertise in

this, and UNESCO at the United Nations is also expert in this. So

we are working with all of them in an integrated fashion.

So that is a general summary of what the planning is on how we

will spend the $950 million to deal with this terrible tragedy.

[The slides that were presented and prepared statement of Mr.

Natsios follow:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW NATSIOS, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Lugar, Ranking Member Biden, and members of the Committee, thank

you for inviting me to testify today about U.S. strategies for relief and reconstruction assistance in response to the recent devastating tsunami.

The U.S. Government (USG) is authorized under section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act to carry out and coordinate international disaster relief, rehabilitation,

and reconstruction assistance. As USAID Administrator, I am the President’s Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. In this role, I can direct all

of the Agency’s resources, as well as call upon the assistance of other USG departments and offices.

I have delegated the operational coordination for foreign disaster assistance down

through the USAID structure to the Director, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). USAID/OFDA plays a critical role in the international disaster response framework, working at all levels to ensure that an appropriate, effective, and

efficient response is provided to those who are suffering. Because the USG provides

over 40 percent of all humanitarian assistance funds worldwide from all donor governments, our role in disaster assistance has been long-standing, extensive, and

marked by deep involvement.

USAID has developed systems for immediate response to disasters, including rapidly-deployable Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs), and Washington, DCbased Response Management Teams to support the field operations. In order to respond quickly and effectively, USAID/OFDA has refined the Incident Command System (ICS), which was developed by the U.S. Forest Service to fight forest fires. ICS

is a command and control tool in a disaster response. It provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual agencies as they work toward the common goal of saving lives, property, and the environment.

This system has since been adopted by many response organizations, both domestically and internationally. Through these mechanisms and over forty years of experience in responding to international disasters, USAID is able to incorporate a wide

variety of skills and resources in its response. Clearly, the system works.

USAID consistently has received favorable reviews on its disaster relief operations

from the General Accounting Office (GAO) and has helped untold millions of people

affected by disasters worldwide.

Organizational reforms at USAID, improved interagency coordination, and flexibility have marked our response to the unprecedented devastation of the Tsunami

disaster. The United States responded rapidly and as a team—across USG agency

boundaries as well as in partnership with non-government organizations (NGOs),

corporations, governments, and other relief agencies. This enabled us to mobilize the

people and resources that were crucial to saving lives and alleviating suffering. Let

me elaborate on these points.

Coordination

The very day the earthquake hit, USAID mobilized Disaster Assistance Response

Teams (DARTs) and USAID Mission staff within hours after the disaster hit. Approximately 50 DART members and more than 100 USAID Mission staff in Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand were involved in the overall coordination of

relief and reconstruction activities, reviewed NGO, U.N. and host government funding requests, and recommended appropriate USG relief efforts. A round-the-clock

Response Management Team (RMT) was established in Washington as a backstop

to the field staff and point of contact for information, assistance, and coordination.

In disasters of this magnitude, it is absolutely essential to coordinate civilian response activities with those of the U.S. military. Let me take this opportunity to

personally thank the President and the military for rapidly committing the assets

that were needed to the region. Without their strong logistical support and the staff

and equipment they made available, our response would not have been as effective

as it was.

Natural disasters and critical military operations have seen cooperation between

USAID and the Department of Defense expand dramatically over the last several

years. Key to this cooperation has been the creation of effective coordination mechanisms—from the tactical field level all the way up to the strategic headquarters

level—that has involved USAID staff at critical points in the decisionmaking process. What we have witnessed over the past several weeks is substantial progress

toward the seamless cooperation of both organizations and is the result of hard work

long before the earthquake and tsunamis hit. The efforts of both DOD and USAID

to build relationships that bring the capabilities and expertise of each into an effecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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tive partnership have proven their worth in this disaster, and we will continue this

approach of active engagement and planning with DOD.

Let me explain how the relationship is working by citing what took place in Thailand. Thailand generously offered the use of Utapao airbase as the humanitarian

assistance hub for Tsunami relief. There, the DART established a Military Liaison

Cell to validate and prioritize requests for assistance. This helped ensure that U.S.

and other coalition military resources were put to use in the most effective and efficient manner, according to accepted humanitarian relief protocols, as opposed to a

‘‘first come, first served’’ basis. Liaison officers from the affected countries’ militaries

as well as from militaries of other donor nations and the United Nations also participated in the coordination process. The military’s willingness to follow USAID

guidance on the best use of their assets to support local governments and NGOs was

a milestone in our relationship. I am convinced that this coordination was key to

saving lives, feeding people, and relieving great suffering. USAID also placed staff

at the Pacific Command Headquarters in Hawaii, where much of the planning for

the U.S. military’s role in the relief effort originated under Admiral Tom Fargo’s

leadership.

As we move from relief to reconstruction, USAID and DOD are already working

to ensure a seamless and smooth transition from reliance on military assets to those

of civilian agencies. Towards this end, USAID’s Deputy Assistant Administrator for

Asia and the Near East, Mark Ward, just returned from a trip with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to the region where they discussed concrete steps to ensure that

civilian agencies are in position to assume the functions initially provided by the

U.S. military.

One of the more remarkable examples of cooperation involved a USAID Food for

Peace Officer, Herbie Smith, and the USS Abraham Lincoln. The Abraham Lincoln,

offshore at Banda Aceh, could produce tens of thousands of gallons of potable water.

The only problem was that there was no way to get it to people on shore. Herbie

immediately went out and bought a huge number of water jugs from local markets

throughout Indonesia and arranged with the military to get the jugs transported to

the Abraham Lincoln. Military personnel then filled the jugs with clean water, and

helicopters distributed the water in Aceh. This is but one example of how USAID’s

experienced staff, working hand-in-hand with the military, moved assistance to

needy people.

Organizational Reforms at USAID Ensure Integrated Response

USAID’s relief effort in response to the Tsunami was based on the significant procedural and policy changes that govern how the Agency responds to overseas disasters. We have both revamped our organizational approach and accelerated the time

perspective under which we conduct relief operations. These changes have been in

the works for the last several years. They are based largely on our experiences with

Hurricane Mitch, as well as applying the lessons we learned in Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Until recently, a compartmentalized approach was used in responding to disasters

overseas. USAID’s Office of Food for Peace (FFP) would handle emergency food

needs, while USAID’s OFDA would respond to immediate non-food necessities. If the

disaster struck in a ‘‘country in transition,’’ USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives

(OTI) would also be called to respond. After immediate life-saving assistance was

provided, USAID’s respective regional bureau would step in to work on reconstruction and rehabilitation. This approach was very segmented, both chronologically and

organizationally. It resulted in lost opportunities in the use of relief initiatives that

could have been used more strategically to accelerate reconstruction, encourage community participation, and build a foundation for development. In contrast to the

past, USAID now takes a more holistic approach organizationally and a longer term

view operationally.

USAID is now in the position to draw immediately from wide-ranging expertise

found throughout the Agency and in the rest of the USG. In effectively spearheading

the USG’s disaster response, our activities are no longer stove-piped into different

offices and bureaus within the Agency. In the Tsunami relief effort, USAID’s DART

and RMT included staff not only from OFDA, but also from several other USAID

offices and bureaus, including FFP, OTI, the Office of Democracy and Governance,

the Bureau for Global Health, the Bureau for Asia and the Near East as well as

USAID Missions in the affected area and the Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs. Staff from USAID Missions in Jakarta, Colombo, New Delhi, and Bangkok

were embedded into the DART structure from the beginning. In this regard, it is

important to note the value of having a preexisting USAID mission in the region.

We have also recruited staff for the DART and RMT from other federal agencies,

such as DOD, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Health and

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Human Services, including the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry,

the Department of Agriculture, including the U.S. Forest Service, and the Bureau

for Land Management. The DART and RMT also used staff from outside the federal

government, including the Fairfax and Los Angeles Search and Rescue teams, the

University of Texas, and the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance.

Quick Response

USAID has drawn upon its long experience in humanitarian relief to establish the

relationships and agreements necessary to quickly mobilize all available assets

when a disaster strikes. The Agency worked in partnership with the global civilian

humanitarian relief community—NGOs and international organizations—and used

its pre-positioned food stocks in Dubai to rapidly mobilize relief operations in affected countries. Bringing together the NGO experience, technical skills, and resources adds tremendous value to our response efforts. In the Tsunami disaster, you

have seen the fruits of that labor.

The great size and complexity of the response put flexibility and ingenuity at a

premium. This was in evidence in actions that USAID undertook in conjunction

with two of its partners, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and

Development Alternatives (DAI). Prior to the earthquake, humanitarian organizations were not permitted into Aceh province without express permission by the Government of Indonesia. As it turns out, a network of staff from IOM and DAI did

manage to retain a strong relationship with provincial officials in spite of this restriction. USAID and other donors capitalized on the influence of IOM and DAI by

providing them with funding to help move relief commodities into Aceh from Medan.

This was done with the help of 80 trucks contracted by USAID/Indonesia.

The Cuny Principle

USAID’s policy of consolidating and coordinating relief efforts within the Agency

and across the USG is only part of our new approach. Another is our focus on incorporating development objectives for economic and social change into relief efforts

from the very beginning of a response. Our policy is to plan and carry out relief,

rehabilitation, and reconstruction simultaneously.

More than two decades ago the late, legendary disaster expert, Fred Cuny, published a groundbreaking book, ‘‘Disasters and Development’’ which laid out his long

experience in working with the victims of natural disasters around the world. His

vision was revolutionary, yet breathtakingly simple. In a nutshell: The talent and

resilience of people struck by disaster are the most powerful forces for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of societies struck by disaster. The people in their communities are the first responders. Moreover, they embody strengths that exist in no

other group—strengths that absolutely must be harnessed if we are to build positive

change in the affected society.

Natural disasters—earthquakes, volcanoes, hurricanes, tsunamis—hurt people

and cripple economies. They kill; they maim; and they destroy. But victims are

never helpless. These people know their environment. They know their society. They

are very likely to have coped with other disasters in their lives. They, more than

anyone, want to recover. And, as the shock of the disaster subsides, new opportunities emerge that can be exploited to build a more sustainable, more equitable, and,

in many cases, a less violent society. Disaster survivors are often among the strongest voices for change.

External assistance must capitalize on these opportunities. Immediate physical

needs have to be met: Clean water and sanitation, health care, food, and shelter.

But the best way for outsiders to assist is to provide help that is part of a longterm solution defined by local actors, rather than just a hand-out. In practice, this

means that relief assistance efforts should focus on recovery and renewal from the

very beginning. While providing life-saving assistance, we need to get markets functioning again through activities such as cash for work that creates a demand for

goods and services. In short, a return to normalcy depends on reviving the local

economy, and that means restoring local markets.

Relief assistance should help reestablish local government and civil authorities by

responding to their priorities in vital relief efforts. Our interventions should aim at

restarting social services at the local level—schools, primary health care clinics,

water treatment facilities, and so on. And it is vital, early on, that we assist stricken

families with the help they need to rehabilitate destroyed housing and restore ruined livelihoods. Again, the assistance effort should focus on development even as

it provides short-term relief.

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Fred was killed in Chechnya in 1995, almost ten years ago. Yet the Indian Ocean

tsunami shows that his vision is as relevant as ever. In brief, we must work to see

that something good can emerge out of destruction.

This approach to relief and development assistance forms the cornerstone of

USAID’s programming strategy. It applies operating principles that I recently codified as USAID’s ‘‘Nine Principles of Development and Reconstruction Assistance.’’

For example, the Principle of Ownership states that the affected people themselves

own their relief and recovery process. The Principle of Capacity-Building requires

that USAID interventions strengthen local institutions. The Principle of Sustainability says that program impact must endure after assistance ends. I am attaching

a summary of these principles to this testimony.

Relief Efforts Also Address Trauma and the Increased Risk of Human Trafficking

USAID’s programs are helping survivors to deal with trauma and providing for

a return to a sense of normalcy and stability in their communities. The family is

the cornerstone of psychological well-being and the focus of many of our efforts.

USAID is supporting programs that unite dislocated children with extended family

members. We are also funding initiatives that restore a sense of security and stability for children by providing them with a structured environment. In such places,

children can be supervised while adult family members engage in rebuilding efforts

or income-generating activities.

USAID worked with our partners to initiate public awareness campaigns on the

added risks that women and children face and their vulnerability to falling victims

to traffickers. These risks increase when people are displaced, when children are

separated from their families, when livelihoods are ruined, and when infrastructure

is destroyed. While so far there is no evidence to suggest that trafficking has increased, we are redoubling our efforts to educate women and children and relief

workers to these risks, and to help government organizations in affected countries

address issues of protection and abuse among affected populations. In Sri Lanka,

for example, USAID has funded UNICEF and Save the Children/UK to establish a

registry of orphans. We are also funding the Solidarity Center to provide training

for relief workers and to strengthen collaborative efforts on the part of government

and civil society to protect children. In Indonesia, similar public awareness campaigns are being targeted to the displaced and training provided for relief workers

who come in contact with these populations.

Helping Countries Rebuild: The U.S. Tsunami Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program and USAID’s Role

The USG Tsunami Reconstruction Program will support efforts on the part of national governments and local communities to rebuild quickly, restart their economic

engines, and harness the unprecedented resources and support that is coming from

around the world. The goals are to save lives, support reconstruction. priorities of

affected countries and regions and to advance a wide range of development needs

and foreign policy interests. The United States will continue to work closely with

affected countries and other donors as we assess needs and undertake reconstruction activities.

President Bush is seeking $950 million as part of the supplemental appropriations

request to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of areas devastated by the

Indian Ocean Tsunami and to cover the costs of the USG’s relief efforts to date. This

is the most generous USG response to a foreign natural disaster in American history.

Our reconstruction program is built around five themes:

—One, using relief to foster reconstruction, self-sufficiency and build a foundation

for future development. Cash-for-work, micro-finance and livelihood programs are

helping to get markets working, building individual and community self-sufficiency.

—Two, providing technical assistance to affected governments with immediate

survey and planning work to help them make the best decisions about utilizing the

considerable contributions from the world community. This assistance will include

support to assist local authorities, communities and local civil society organizations

and ensure their full participation in planning, prioritizing and undertaking reconstruction programs. Proper emphasis is being placed on inclusion, transparency, and

accountability in all such efforts.

—Three, financial and technical support to rebuild and improve infrastructure, including important, high visibility transportation and public utilities projects such as

schools, roads, bridges, and water treatment plants, which will serve as major USG

interventions. A local communities grants program will support small scale infrastructure reconstruction including clinics, schools, markets and other communitylevel infrastructure identified by communities.

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—Four, helping individuals to rejoin the workforce and return to their communities by helping individuals rebuild their homes, replace lost assets, and get back

to work. Grants, small loans, and cash-for-work programs will pump much needed

money directly into the hardest hit communities. This will allow disaster victims to

take control of their own lives and start rebuilding their businesses and communities. The success of our efforts requires us to expand and build upon ongoing partnerships with U.S. and local NGOs in creating these jobs and income opportunities.

—And, five, building the capacity within the affected governments to prepare for

and respond to future disasters. This will include U.S. support for a regional tsunami early warning system being designed collaboratively by other countries and

donors. We will also support efforts in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and India

to strengthen the communications that alert communities to imminent threats, as

well as a community-based outreach and training program so that people know

what to do when they hear an alarm. We will also aid governments put in place

measures to help national, provincial and local government guide reconstruction

that will be environmentally-sound and infrastructure that is more resilient to likely

natural disasters.

Accountability

As USAID continues to make major improvements in its approach and operations,

we have not forgotten one of our fundamental obligations—ensuring the proper and

effective use of U.S. Government funding. USAID takes its responsibility as steward

of taxpayer money very seriously. For this purpose, USAID meets regularly with

host governments and contractors and grantees to ensure that all USAID-funded activities are well coordinated and complement other programs on the ground. USAID

staff members make regular field visits to observe the progress of USAID-funded

programs. Our missions are also working with civil society organizations in the

countries, such as the Forum on Aceh Recovery, to assist efforts of local organizations to track and monitor relief and recovery budgets.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has been present from the inception of our

response to ensure high levels of accountability for public funds and to help guard

against possible waste, fraud, and corruption. As with USAID projects in Iraq and

Afghanistan, the OIG has been asked to conduct ‘‘concurrent financial and performance audits.’’ These audits are conducted as reconstruction or other activities unfold

rather than after they are largely complete so that any accountability or program

effectiveness issues can be identified and corrected at an early stage. For example,

USAlD/Indonesia has already requested that OIG Regional Inspector General Office

in Manila perform concurrent audits of work being performed by the contractors and

grantees in Aceh and Northern Sumatra. Once supplemental moneys for our efforts

there are received, auditors will be engaged at all levels of programming for these

concurrent audits, from the development of statements of work to implementation

of the contracts.

Partnering to Meet the Challenges Ahead

The President, and former Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush, have asked

people to reach deep into their pockets to help those affected by this disaster. And

the response of the American people—individuals, as well as civic associations,

churches, and corporations—has been overwhelming. Americans have donated more

than $800 million to humanitarian agencies—a total amount second only to 9/11.

As one gauge of public response, it is interesting to note that USAID has had more

than a million visitors to our Tsunami website. Some days early on in the crisis registered more than 80,000.

The Agency is also actively working with the community of private voluntary organizations, as well as large corporate partners, to build public-private alliances in

support of medium to long-term reconstruction efforts in the region. For example,

USAID has already initiated a partnership with Mars, Incorporated, which has generously committed $1 million to assist vulnerable children in the affected area.

Their generosity will be met by a matching grant from USAID. The USAID and

Mars partnership to fund will focus on meeting the needs of vulnerable children in

the tsunami-affected areas of Indonesia and India. Funds will be channeled to international and local relief organizations that are working in the affected areas. This

is a great example of the USG helping channel the generosity of the private sector

to help vulnerable children during this crisis.

I would like to thank President Bush, and the two former Presidents as well, for

mobilizing this remarkable display of public support. And I would like to thank the

American people—for showing the world once again what a compassionate people

we truly are.

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The compassion of Americans is at the very core of what USAID stands for. By

giving the citizens of emerging nations a helping hand as they work to improve their

societies and economies, we show the world the best of the United States. As the

President said, ‘‘Well after the immediate danger passes, USAID is still going to be

in the hard-hit areas . . . helping the people improve their schools and develop

health services and mitigate conflict and reinvigorate local economies, and help

build institutions of democracy, so people can live in peace and freedom.’’

The policy changes that I have described here today, the results of which you have

seen in the remarkable relief efforts underway in South Asia, are all part of living

up to the trust that the American people have placed in us. The world is a complex

place, and interventions have to be designed accordingly. We have to stay flexible,

keep our eye on the long-term objectives, and work together. This is the only way

forward. And this is the new USAID. All Americans can be proud of its performance.

Thank you.

PRINCIPLES OF DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE

The following nine principles are the key tenets of USAID’s work. The principles

are not a checklist. They are a summary of the characteristics of successful assistance programs. They cannot be applied the same way in each situation but should

serve as a reference for development practitioners as they design and implement

programs.

PRINCIPLE OF OWNERSHIP

Recognize that a country and its people own, and participate in, their social and

economic development.

PRINCIPLE OF CAPACITY-BUILDING

Strengthen local institutions and promote appropriate policies essential to economic growth and good governance. Recognize that there are limits to a country’s

and its institutions’ ability to absorb large amounts of assistance.

PRINCIPLE OF PARTNERSHIP

Achieve common development objectives through close collaboration with governments, communities, donors, NGOs, international organizations, universities, and

the private sector.

PRINCIPLE OF SELECTIVITY

Allocate resources to countries and programs based on need, policy performance

and foreign policy interests.

PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABILITY

Design programs in a way that ensures their impact endures after assistance

ends.

PRINCIPLE OF AGILITY

Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities and minimize the

cost of delivering assistance.

PRINCIPLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Assign individual responsibility for managing tax-payer funds, and apply transparent systems for tracking funds and monitoring progress toward objectives.

PRINCIPLE OF ASSESSMENT

Tailor programs based on careful research and understanding of local conditions

and best practices in international development assistance.

PRINCIPLE OF RESULTS

Focus resources through programs of sufficient size and scale to achieve clearly

defined and measurable objectives critical to a country’s needs. Maximize cost efficiency and timely delivery of services while ensuring objectives are met.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Natsios.

We will now have questions.

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Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Just before questions, could I ask General Allen

to say a word on behalf of our wonderful men and women in uniform? He is the one on this panel best positioned to say something

on that score.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. General Allen.

STATEMENT OF BG JOHN ALLEN, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity today to speak on behalf of the men and women.

I have been in the service over 30 years at this point, and I have

to tell you, sir, I was unprepared for the extent of the devastation

that we encountered on the ground in the countries to whom we

brought aid. No verbal picture can ever adequately describe it. No

camera can ever capture the image of desperate suffering that the

populations in this region encountered.

But to this region came the American military, the U.S. men and

women of our country. I have spoken to many of these men and

women who served in Operation Unified Assistance, and not one

was unmoved by the scope and the magnitude of this disaster.

Every person, with whom I spoke, was deeply honored to have been

a part of this relief effort, but also, at the same time deeply humbled, humbled at the opportunity to contribute and at the courage

and the dignity and the gratitude of the victims and the countries

themselves.

America’s sons and daughters serving in these distant regions

embodied all of the finest traditions and the highest values of the

United States of America. They came quickly. They served quietly,

and they departed without fanfare, seeking no recognition for

themselves, deriving pleasure and reward only in the saving of

lives and the easing of suffering.

We had the chance to meet with members of all of the services

on the ground. Our first day, as we landed from a helicopter, in

Banda Aceh, out from the tree line came very quickly, a crowd of

about 100 sailors who had come from the Abraham Lincoln whose

silhouette you could see off the beach. It has now become known

as the Gray Angel. Those hundred sailors had all volunteered to

come ashore, and there were 100 each day coming ashore to volunteer to do nothing less than to carry food or to carry water, to load

the aircraft, to do all that they could. Whether they were otherwise

employed on the nuclear power plant of that aircraft carrier or repairing highly sophisticated equipment, they just wanted to help.

They did that every day for the entire operation.

We went to Sri Lanka to a school in a town called Galle that had

been undermined by the waves and had largely collapsed. And

there in the 100-degree heat were marines and seabees working to

knock down that school to begin to build a new one. We had the

opportunity to speak with the teachers at that school, and we

asked them what they thought of those seabees, those young sailors and those young marines. And instantaneously there were

spontaneous smiles and words of congratulations and thanks.

On the runway at the Thai naval air base of Uttapal, United

States C–130s were parked wing tip to wing tip being loaded and

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offloaded constantly by young Air Force men and women, who were

working in high humidity and high heat around the clock, to push

those supplies forward as fast as they possibly could, working to

the outer edge of their endurance.

And finally, probably one of the most perfect examples came

when I had the opportunity to stand in a tent along the runway

of the airstrip at Banda Aceh. That runway at Banda Aceh was

clearly the single point where all of the aid was coming in to northern Sumatra and coming in and being distributed. It was a true

hub. Airplanes were coming in constantly 24 hours a day. Helicopter activity was going on as the distribution to the further

points was conducted. And all of that was being orchestrated by

young Air Force men and women from the tanker airlift control element, about 20 of them, young airmen. And if that could be called

a symphony or an orchestra, they were all the maestros in moving

those airplanes along the ground and loading and unloading that

cargo. And standing in that tent with a young Air Force major who

commanded that group, I observed, largely in tribute, that if those

20 young men and women went away tomorrow, that would be a

single point of failure, and this would all grind to a halt.

Now, it had been words of tribute. I think he took it a little differently. He took one step toward me in the half-light of the tent,

looked me in the eye, and said, ‘‘we will not fail.’’ Those words were

emblematic of the can-do attitude of every man and woman in uniform that served in Operation Unified Assistance. Those were courageous words and words that described heroic acts.

Let me close, sir, by offering my sincere thanks first to those who

served in this contingency and who are at this very moment, as

Secretary Wolfowitz said, still continuing to save lives and to restore hope to a shattered population.

It is also important to note that we could not have been as effective as we were in this operation had it not been for the immediate

cooperation of Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia who selflessly,

generously, and unhesitatingly made their facilities available for

the rescue and the relief operations. Our longstanding and cordial

relations with these countries converted quickly into access to airfields and port facilities and made all the difference in the emergency of the early response and our continued efforts today.

Finally, sir, I would be remiss if I did not publicly recognize the

role of this committee and the U.S. Congress in supporting the U.S.

military in general and Operation Unified Assistance in particular.

I can say unequivocally no other country in the world could have

responded as did the United States of America. In the earliest moments of this crisis, desperate voices were raised in that region,

and there was a cry that went out, who will help us? Who will

come? The response was from the United States. It was clear and

it was immediate. America will help you. We are coming.

As our military role in this crisis draws to a close, American

units are departing the region, even as I speak, some for home and

for families and loved ones, and others to continue on with other

missions. The fact that we could help, the fact that we could get

there so quickly, and the kinds of capabilities we brought to this

crisis is a direct result of the support of the U.S. Congress for our

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U.S. military. I am not only proud of our services, I am proud of

that support, sir, and I am deeply grateful for it.

Thank you for this opportunity to address the committee and

thank you for your leadership, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, General Allen. Our

hearing is timely because our military forces are still there. We

have an opportunity to express appreciation to them, and we appreciate so much your very thoughtful and compelling testimony

about their contributions. We have an opportunity to pay tribute

today, likewise, to those in our State Department, those in USAID,

in NGOs, and others who will be continuing on.

One of the reasons for the hearing is to recognize the extraordinary leadership that in an interagency way, as Secretary

Wolfowitz said, has been exemplified, but also to indicate, as the

$950 million the President has asked for, that this is a long trail

ahead. So often these emergency situations are overtaken by other

emergencies and other compelling needs. This one will not go away.

The enormity you have been describing is very clear, and the

graphics you have presented to us and to the press and to the public are very important.

Let me suggest that we will have an 8-minute round of questions. If there are more questions after that, we will have another

round. We will have another panel following this. So I think members are mindful of that.

Let me start the questioning by asking you, Secretary Larson.

You have outlined at least seven task forces that have been in operation at the Federal level. Who is ultimately responsible for coordination of all of these efforts that have been described by the

witnesses today?

Mr. LARSON. Now, as we move into a process that, while it continues to have relief elements, is more focused on reconstruction,

the structure that we have set up is one where the State Department will be bringing together the agencies that are involved in

this and trying to work with everyone to establish policy and priorities for the funding the President is requesting. Obviously, USAID

is our principal implementing agency on the ground and is the one

that is doing the work going forward.

We have established, within the Economic Bureau of the State

Department, a very small task force with a handful of additional

people that can help provide the impetus and the ongoing energy

that, I think, you and other members of the committee have suggested has to be there for this to be a sustained effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Wolfowitz, you have mentioned, as we

talked about the $950 million supplemental appropriation, that

this does not include all of the operation costs already incurred by

the Department of Defense for tsunami-related operations. How

will those costs be covered?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I believe, actually, they will be covered out of

this supplemental, but the original request only covered the specific

things that applied from what we call, I guess, ODACA, which is

the specific humanitarian relief. But out of this $950 million, $346

million, we estimate, will cover already incurred expenses of DOD

and USAID. General Allen, do you have the exact numbers? I think

it is about a two-thirds/one-third split.

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The CHAIRMAN. Well, that really answered my question because

essentially we know that the other relief expenditures are being

covered. So, the point is that other obligations, other activities our

country has elsewhere will not suffer. Essentially this appropriation is going to cover the expenditures, and that would be true of

our military operations.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. That is right, with $600 million for reconstruction.

It is worth emphasizing too, Mr. Chairman, we are from the Government, but the private sector is doing amazing things. As you

know, former Presidents Bush and Clinton have led a fundraising

effort, which I am told—I do not mean that effort alone, but the

American people in their various voluntary ways have already

pledged something like $700 million of private assistance. I think

that also deserves a special mention.

The CHAIRMAN. It certainly does. Dr. Frist mentioned that the

meter is still running. It may be moving toward the $800 million

or the $900 million figure.

Secretary Wolfowitz, the seeds of democracy have been implanted

and have been taking hold in Indonesia for some time. As you mentioned, you served as our distinguished Ambassador to the country,

and it was my privilege to visit with you during that period of time.

But now, one of the consequences of this transition is a new role

for the Indonesian military, the TNI. Now, please provide the committee, today, with your assessment of TNI’s changing role. In addition, would it be helpful to have a level of cooperation with our

authorities in connection with the ongoing Timika investigation, as

well as the cooperation that we are hopeful that we will have, as

our military leaves, as our civilians are still there? The complications of all of this are enormous and beyond this hearing today.

But give us some impression of what our goals ought to be with

regard to both democracy and the military, including an increased

level of our participation or cooperation with both.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me take a stab at it. As you know, it is a

big and complicated question, and I know Secretary Rice is engaged currently and, I think, over the coming week or two in consultation with Members of the Congress about this issue, which is

a sensitive issue. Both the executive branch and the Congress have

imposed a number of restrictions in the past on our cooperation

with the Indonesian military, largely in reaction to some pretty significant human rights abuses and most significantly the atrocities

that were committed in East Timor in 1998.

I am not about to sit here and tell you that everything is fine

now by any means, but I would say two important points of

progress that really need to be noted. No. 1, most importantly, it

is a different government there now, and it is a government that

is democratically elected that I believe is deeply committed to the

goals of democratic reform and civilian control of the military. They

have, for only the second time in their history, a civilian Defense

Minister, and he happens to be the same one who was the first civilian Defense Minister, someone I know from my time in Jakarta,

who is very committed to the idea of civilian control and has a big

job in front of him. It is a government, I think, that wants us to

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develop a better relationship with the Indonesian military and deserves our support.

Second, while the record is far from perfect, it is certainly worth

noting that the Indonesian military has stayed in the background,

as it should have, but as some people might have been surprised,

Indonesia transformed to a country that had once been largely run

by the military to one that is now run by democratically elected

government, and, in fact, the 100 seats that they used to have assigned to military in the Indonesian Parliament have been taken

away. There is a lot of change, in short, and, I think, as important

as it is to work for an accounting of things that were done in the

past, I do think this is a new era and the challenges of responding

to the tsunami just underscore the importance of making sure that

we have the right tools going forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Do you have a comment? Yes, Secretary Larson.

Mr. LARSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, if I could just add a couple of

brief comments to what Secretary Wolfowitz said. Clearly, we want

to continue to work hard to ensure accountability and ensure a

strong human rights performance and to make sure there is accountability for the past abuses. We do feel that the cooperation on

the Timika investigations has been constructive and we welcome

that. We do feel that the experience with the tsunami has indicated

areas in which having had more contact cooperation with the Indonesian military could have had some advantages. No decisions have

been made, but as Secretary Wolfowitz said, the Secretary of State

is examining this issue and will be interested, I know, in continuing to consult the Congress on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First,

I want to commend you for holding this hearing. I think it is an

extremely important hearing.

On Tuesday, we had a meeting of the Maryland delegation with

some of the NGOs. Some of the leading NGOs are headquartered

in our State and are very much involved in the tsunami relief. We

met with them and heard what they are doing, the efforts they are

making, the problems they foresee, and so forth.

I might say to you, General Allen, that they were quite complimentary about the role that our military had played and the essential logistics support the military had provided. They even

pointed out while we did not need the military to build the school,

it was a nice touch that they went in there and did that, and it

made quite an impression on the populace. So I just want to state

that up front.

I am concerned, though, that the well-deserved attention on the

tsunami and the tremendous response may end up diverting funds

and attention away from other humanitarian needs, and particularly from development efforts, which have been worked out carefully with local agents on the ground. It takes quite an effort just

to get the confidence of people to enter into these development

plans. And then, if money is not forthcoming to carry through on

that, we lose the momentum that has been built up and sometimes

it is very difficult to reconstruct it.

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So I am seeking an assurance that the supplemental request will

completely reimburse USAID for all tsunami-related expenses so

that we will not have a short-changing of other ongoing programs.

Now, where do we stand on that? I commend the administration’s

statement, just yesterday, about increasing the U.S. contribution.

Of course, we have had a tremendous outpouring from the private sector, a truly staggering response. I think that reflects something very good about the American people.

But I want to ensure that these other efforts will continue.

Where are we on reimbursements for the tsunami-related expenses?

Mr. NATSIOS. Senator, we worked with the OMB and with the

White House on that and provided them the detailed accounting of

what we spent, which is $123 million to date. I was very concerned

myself about this, but the President made very early on a public

statement that all of the money AID has spent on this will be reimbursed. He did not say in a supplemental, but as we know, yesterday he announced the supplemental. If this budget is passed, we

will be whole.

I would say something, though, just in terms of timing. For reasons that may be well understandable, if this part of the budget

does not pass until the third quarter, we will have severe stress on

our humanitarian budget, and then it will affect our operations

elsewhere. But if this budget passes in a reasonably smooth way,

then we will be fine. All the money we have spent will be reimbursed and it will not affect any operations anywhere else in the

world.

Senator SARBANES. Has it up to this point affected those operations to some extent?

Mr. NATSIOS. We are in the beginning of the second quarter of

the fiscal year, and so our humanitarian relief budget has a lot

more money in it, that we can spend this quarter, for other efforts

elsewhere in the world. However, our budget is under severe stress

not because of the tsunami but because of Darfur, but because

there is a major food emergency in east Africa right now in Ethiopia. And we are working on it, and we are working with OMB.

There is money in the budget for Sudan, $150 million for food for

Darfur in southern Sudan. So money is in this for other emergencies that is not in our regular budget, and I would commend

that to you. There is also $100 million for the reconstruction of

southern Sudan, in addition to what is already in the budget.

So there is also money in the budget for Afghanistan and Iraq.

Much of that will go to us. So it is not just the tsunami we are interested in, in this budget. It is all the other accounts that also

fund many of our programs around the world.

Senator SARBANES. Let me give you a specific example that I am

concerned about with respect to long-term development programs.

Since emergency food aid needs were greater than anticipated last

year, you reduced the amount of food aid used to support long-term

development. The budget that was just released cut food aid by another $300 million and transferred it over to disaster relief. But

that, again, raises the question of cutting sustainable development

programs. How are we going to address that problem?

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Mr. NATSIOS. Well, Senator, the budget was not cut $300 million.

It was transferred into an account to do something very innovative

and new, which many of us have been lobbying for when I was in

the NGO community in the nineties for many years. The President

has taken a bold move to change the whole structure of the food

aid account. I will give you an example.

In Afghanistan, we invested United States Government money

that you appropriated in an agricultural development program that

produced a surplus wheat crop 2 years ago, the greatest in the history of Afghanistan. Prices collapsed as a result of that and we imported U.S. Government food under title II bought in the United

States, shipped it in, 200,000 tons, when we could have, if we had

the money, purchased the local food and kept the price at an average level. What happened is that many of those farmers who were

growing wheat said, I am losing money, I am going to grow poppy

now. That is what they did because we could not use our food account to do local purchase of food. The President has proposed of the $1.2 billion budget for food aid, that $300 million of it be used to allow us to do local purchase

of food in development situations, but mostly emergency situations

to help stimulate agricultural production in many countries.

There has been no cut in the food aid budget. The food aid budget, in fact, will be able to buy more food because 30 to 40 percent

of our food aid budget is for transportation. It costs a lot of money

to move food from the United States into rural Afghanistan. If the

food is next door, produced locally, there is very little transportation cost. So this is an innovation. It is not a cut in the food aid

budget. If anything, we will be able to buy more food if the budget

goes through the way it is.

In addition, though, we do recognize there is a problem with total

food because of an emergency. So, in the President’s budget, there

is $150 million for additional food aid for Sudan because there is

a food emergency in Sudan, not just in Darfur. There was a 60-percent crop loss because of a drought in eastern Sudan, the south,

and even in Kordofan Province which is not in the middle of a conflict. So that is in this budget; the supplemental budget.

Senator SARBANES. All too often in emergencies, women and children have found themselves doubly victimized. They flee conflict or

disaster, end up in camps where they are vulnerable to physical

and sexual abuse, as well as, sometimes, discrimination in the distribution of food and medical supplies. What steps are we taking

to provide specific protection for women and children in the wake

of this crisis?

Mr. NATSIOS. Senator, that is a very good question because that

is a serious problem. When we do drops of food—and that is the

last alternative. We have no other way of doing it—we will air drop

food into emergencies, and typically the people who are strongest

get it. So our doctrine over the years has been to ensure that there

is a competent NGO on the ground that knows how to do this or

a U.N. agency like the World Food Program that receives the food

and ensures the most vulnerable get it. We typically target female

heads of household in emergencies because they are the most vulnerable in terms of income and also because of protection issues.

Human traffickers will go after women whose spouses are not

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around to protect them, and they will particularly go after orphaned children or children who have been separated from their

families.

We have been giving money, $2 million, to UNICEF, to Catholic

Relief Services, and to a number of NGOs to set up a protection

system and a registration system for unaccompanied children or

children who have lost their parents in Banda Aceh and in Sri

Lanka because of this problem. In many countries in the developing world, there is no birth recording system to record births,

and so there is no record that any of these children exist except for

the parents saying, well, I had six kids and these are the kids’

names. The parents are dead and the kid is 2 years old. How do

we know who the kid belongs to? The kid cannot even talk yet.

So what is happening now, the NGOs on the ground, with funding from the U.S. Government to set up such a registration system

in the areas where there has been the largest loss of life to ensure

that we know who the kids are. We do not allow traffickers to go

in and prey on these children.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I also want

to commend you for having this very, very timely hearing. It is important as the mission is not over. There is a lot more to be done.

I also want to commend Senator Sarbanes, my colleague, for the

question that he asked. It was a very, very important question. I

am glad that he brought our attention to it.

General, you talked about the fact that we could provide help

and get there so quickly and how critical that was. It was either

yourself or Secretary Wolfowitz.

I had a chance to be in the area with the Senate majority leader.

He was in Sri Lanka. Then we were together in India. We talked

about the Indian response, which was really tremendous. Even

though they suffered great casualties, they had a tremendous military presence. And there were two observations I had, and then I

will get to my question.

One is that the perception of American military might was, in

many ways, kind of transformed in the region. People saw it as a

tremendous positive. They understood the importance of that military might and the way it can be used in a humanitarian capacity.

The second observation—and I got a sense of this when I had a

chance to visit with the Secretary General of NATO at the end of

our trip, after we were in India, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and

then, ultimately, in Brussels. He was talking about the European

response or perhaps lack of military response, lack of ability to

move there so quickly, and indicated that that was cause for reflection on the part of NATO of its capacity.

What does NATO need to do? It is one, obviously, about ensuring

peace. It is also about being able to respond to humanitarian situations.

I would be interested in your reflection of the impact of our response, what it is having in NATO, what it is having upon our European allies in terms of the way they configure their forces, in

terms of the kind of equipment that they may be looking at, the

kind of training that they may be doing. Do you see any kind of

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long-term impact on our allies in terms of their ability to be able

to respond, as they viewed what we were able to do and what, in

fact, the Indians were able to do?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I wish I could say I have seen an impact, but

I think we are dealing with the problem with our NATO allies that

their defense budgets just keep declining, and very few of them

now have the capacity to do even things that they have been trying

to do already. I do not want to diminish it. We have got a significant NATO contribution in Afghanistan, but they still fall short of

what they would like to be doing there. Maybe this will be an extra

impetus.

I am going to be going to the Wehrkunde conference in Germany

this weekend. You make a very good point that there is no reason

why our European allies—and they did contribute. The French had

an aircraft carrier off the Indonesian coast, but, I think, it was 3

or 4 weeks after we got there. The Singaporeans, to pick a different

ally, demonstrated even small countries can make a big difference

if they put their minds to it.

I guess it is worth commenting. We thank the Congress and the

American taxpayer for their support. We thank the American people for their generosity. It has been noticed, I have to tell you, in

Indonesia, that there has been very little generosity so far from

parts of the Muslim world that are big on talking about jihad and

other things, but when 200,000 people, all of them Muslims in the

case of Indonesia, die in this catastrophe, there is not much help

forthcoming. I hope those people might think a little bit about what

they have done and what they have not done also.

Senator COLEMAN. I really do hope that there is an opportunity

here to look at what we were able to do, look at the nature of our

forces, look at the type of equipment that we have. I got a sense,

in talking to Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer from NATO that

there is some reflection going on about whether they could have responded quicker; what type of equipment do they need to be able

to do that. Again, the history has been one of not making the commitment in terms of the budget, but perhaps the public might be

raising their voice to say, you know, there is a purpose for having

forces that can respond quickly.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, and I think the point is worth making. It

is not just a matter of the size of the budget, it is a matter of where

you direct it. We are finding, even with an enormous effort on

transforming our forces, a lot of things that we do that are kind

of legacies from the cold war and do not make a lot of sense anymore. The chairman is familiar with the debates about whether

NATO would go out of area or out of business. And it is worth commenting, no one at the time ever dreamed that NATO would be deploying forces to Afghanistan.

So, even though the budgets are declining, there is a greater

sense of a worldwide mission for the alliance. I think, maybe, if we

say, OK, we do think more resources should go to NATO defense

budgets, but within the resources you have let us allocate them in

a way that can allow you to respond in situations that, during the

cold war, we would never have dreamed of having a NATO response in Afghanistan, much less in Southeast Asia. But it is a different world, and, I think, there is room for progress on that front.

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Senator COLEMAN. I am hopeful that this terrible tragedy provides an opportunity for an awakening or a reflection on the type

of force that can be effective today, again not just in fighting wars,

but in meeting humanitarian needs.

There was very brief mention of the impact of this disaster on

east Africa. I represent a community that has a very significant Somalian population. I am not sure if this is for Administrator

Natsios or Secretary Larson. But with the very difficult political

situation in Somalia, can you tell me what kind of presence there

we have, if any? Have we been able to assess the damage? What

kind of response have we been able to offer?

Mr. NATSIOS. We have given grants to an NGO and to the World

Food Program and I believe—let me just look here. I think it is $1

million to Somalia. We do know there was damage, but it is certainly not on the scale of what happened in Sri Lanka or Aceh. I

have the grants right here. I can read them to you.

Senator COLEMAN. My hope is it is on the radar screen.

Mr. NATSIOS. We have given money to UNICEF, UN OCHA,

World Concern, and the World Food Program, and the UNHCR, the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, $1,034,000 for

the response in Somalia.

Somalia has a regular AID program in it, but we run it out of

Nairobi because there are still serious security problems. It is a

modest humanitarian program with some development parts to it,

but we cannot send our officers in because the situation is not secure. But we work through partner organizations, the NGO community, and U.N. agencies.

Mr. LARSON. Going forward, of course, we will be informed by the

needs assessments that are currently underway, led by the World

Bank, in which we are participating. That will help us make judgments about the division of our funding across countries, as well

as across sectors.

Senator COLEMAN. One last question to you, Secretary Larson.

The impact of relief in terms of dealing with some of these areas

where there has been conflict, Greece/Turkey, 1999, the earthquake, and there seemed to be some positive impact from that

great tragedy. Sri Lanka, Aceh, Somalia. Do you get any sense that

the humanitarian response is having some impact on lessening

some of the civil discord?

Mr. LARSON. There is an opportunity. It has been very notable

in Sri Lanka that the government and the Tamil Tigers have essentially had a cease-fire and that there has been cooperation in

getting relief flowing to where it needs to go.

Similarly, in Aceh, the Indonesian Government has opened up

Aceh. It has cooperated with all of the groups, governments, and

NGOs that are trying to provide humanitarian relief. There have

been some continuing difficulties, but we do believe that it is a moment of opportunity we have to seize to try to work toward developing a peace process in these countries that will resolve these

longstanding conflicts, even as we go about the task of rebuilding

the damaged areas with them.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you.

Mr. NATSIOS. I would just add, Senator, that the peace agreement that was just signed between north and south Sudan—SecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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retary Powell and I were at the signing ceremony in Nairobi 3

weeks ago, coming back from the tsunami region. That whole peace

process started after a humanitarian cease-fire was declared in the

Nuba Mountains, which the State Department and AID helped negotiate, just to bring humanitarian relief in because it was the

worst affected area of the entire country in terms of people dying.

But that led to an improvement in the trust that people had to sit

down and talk and then things improved from there, and it led to

this peace agreement. So it can, in fact, have a profound effect, but

you have to take the opportunity when it is in front of you.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

Senator Feingold.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, could I just add one comment?

I mentioned the French, but it is worth noting Canada, Germany,

and the United Kingdom, as well as France, have made contributions in different forms in this effort, and I will give you the details

for the record. Most importantly, the countries of the region have

really stepped up, and India has taken a real lead not only in dealing on its own with its own problems, but providing contributions

and help to others. It has been outstanding.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to

the witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.

I do not think we can say, obviously, too often how profoundly

saddened the American people were by the loss that so many communities experienced in the tsunami. I want to commend both the

domestic and international response efforts to date, and I want to

say to my colleagues that I will certainly remain committed to

working on this with them.

I want to especially commend our troops. Brigadier General

Allen, I really appreciated your comments, and let me just extend

my thanks for their heroic work on this issue.

Mr. Chairman, the phrase that is probably being used the most

here is ‘‘window of opportunity,’’ and, I think, there are very positive windows of opportunity connected with this issue, but I think

we also have to be careful to be absolutely sure that there are not

inappropriate or perhaps unripe windows of opportunity that come

out of this. I remember this was an issue a little bit in the confirmation of Secretary Rice. We have to be careful how we speak

about this disaster in terms of it being a window of opportunity.

So I had not planned on discussing the issue of our military relationship with Indonesia at this hearing, but it was raised by Secretary Wolfowitz in his testimony. The chairman raised it as a

question, and in light of that, I feel compelled to make a few remarks.

I applaud the tremendous effort that the Indonesian authorities,

including the military authorities, have made to address the horrible tsunami tragedy. Again, I want to commend the U.S. military

efforts to assist in that response.

Mr. Chairman, this does not mean that there is not an ongoing,

urgent need for military reform in Indonesia. We have not seen

progress, in my view, on accountability for some very grave human

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rights abuses. We have not seen a real effort to rein in the many

murky financial and business relationships in which the military

engages. I do not think this mission is even close to being accomplished. And that is why, actually, Secretary Wolfowitz, I strongly

support the E–IMET training that Indonesia currently gets because

it builds capacity to address these critical issues.

I noticed, Mr. Secretary, that you mentioned the President’s

statement in his inaugural. I will tell you one of the things that

I thought of, as I sat there, was the repressive tactics that the military in Indonesia has used in the past not only with regard to East

Timor, which you and I have discussed over the years, but also

within its own borders, including in particular in Aceh. I think the

President’s words should have a meaning with regard to the problem that has existed with regard to the Indonesian military.

So, Secretary Wolfowitz, I appreciated your testimony and obviously appreciate your commitment to Indonesia. I want to reiterate

that because I do think that this topic is essentially a separate discussion about whether the existing restrictions overly limit our

ability to respond to this crisis. And you were candid enough to indicate that certain things were able to be done under the current

rules, but you seem to be concerned about the restrictions that led

to what you called a climate of unfamiliarity and suspicion when

our forces arrived to work with the Indonesians.

As you well know, though, the Indonesian military is the largest

beneficiary of the counterterrorism fellowship program. Indonesia’s

military participates with ours in scores of PAYCOM theater security cooperation program activities. In fact, more than 132 such activities involving Indonesia are programmed for fiscal year 2005.

And Indonesia currently is eligible for and receives, as I have indicated, expanded IMET training. So, I think, we have ample opportunity now to overcome unfamiliarity. I do think that is a good

thing.

So, as you and I discussed before, we hope this will lead to a constructive discussion about where our military relationship with Indonesia goes, but I think that is something that we should pursue

in the future.

I do want to say a word about one other aspect of this, which is

the Timika incident. I am glad that we finally have an indictment

in the Timika case. I believe that the evidence suggests that Indonesian cooperation did improve significantly after Congress took action to link this issue to IMET. I want to thank the chairman for

his willingness to allow me time and various opportunities to make

that case here.

But it seems to me that the indictment in this case is only a first

step. The FBI considers this an ongoing investigation, and the FBI

has not exonerated anyone. A number of questions remain unanswered, and clearly other conspirators were involved. Most importantly, I believe the resolution of this case means that efforts are

made to hold those responsible for the ambush accountable for

their actions in a court of law. But even the one individual indicted

by the United States remains at large and has been neither indicted nor arrested by Indonesian authorities. So, in my view on

this particular matter, apart from the other issues, more remains

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undone than has been accomplished, and I certainly do not consider that to be something that has been resolved.

Finally, on this point, Secretary Wolfowitz, I heard your comments about language and how English training is so important.

My understanding is that there is a difference of opinion or interpretation between those who created the authorities for E–IMET in

the Congress and the way the administration interprets those authorities with respect to English language training. I think you will

find, as we talk constructively in the future, that there is a great

deal of willingness, here in Congress, to ensure that English language training is available to the Indonesian military, even among

those who, like me, believe it would be a mistake, at this point, to

abandon all conditions and create an anything-goes signal to the

TNI, particularly when we still have ongoing investigations into

the murder of Americans in Timika to deal with.

So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your willingness to allow me to

get into that subject a bit.

I want to commend Senator Coleman for his reference to Somalia

and Africa with regard to this matter, and I thank you for that response and want to express my ongoing interest and interest of the

members of this committee in the African aspect of this disaster.

Now, I would like to ask Mr. Larson and Mr. Natsios what mechanisms are in place, not simply to ensure that there is transparency in the use of relief and reconstruction funds, but also to

ensure that the people in affected countries and communities actually have some kind of access to this information. For example, information that is apparent to those of us in Washington, who can

read English language documents on line, may not be so accessible

or useful to people from the affected villages. Could each of you respond to that? Mr. Natsios.

Mr. NATSIOS. Certainly, Senator. In terms of accountability, the

business model that AID went to, perhaps a decade and a half ago,

is to go through, what I would call, civil society organizations,

NGOs, international organizations, contractors, labor unions, faithbased groups, farmers’ cooperatives. We put very little money—I

think there are only four or five countries which are

geostrategically important to the United States in the Muslim

world where we actually transfer our money into the coffers of any

government. We work with the governments. We put technical specialists in government ministries. We plan with them, but we do

not move money through their accounts. We did that for 30 years,

and we had some bad problems. So the accountability level of our

money is not dependent on problems of corruption in any of these

countries.

In fact, the Government of Indonesia knows they have a problem.

They have announced they are considering setting up an independent separate account just for money that will go from some

donor governments and international agencies through their ministries so that they can account for it properly. So I want to commend the efforts of the Indonesian Government to recognize they

have a problem and deal with it through this accounting system.

But our money will go through the traditional mechanisms of partner organizations that we use.

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The third thing that we have done, in terms of accountability, is

I asked the Inspector General to move in, at the same time the relief teams do, to do concurrent audits of everything we were doing,

and if they saw something wrong in terms of process or recordkeeping, they were to inform us immediately on the spot and not

wait till after everything was all over to tell us we made a mistake.

So the Inspector General has played an integrated role as a member of our team to ensure there were high levels of management

and accountability.

Finally, Price Waterhouse offered, as a gift to UN OCHA, the coordination unit of the United Nations Secretariat, an accounting

system to account not only for all donor government contributions,

but all private contributions to the tsunami response. So we have

an integrated system for accountability. Now, this is untested. It is

a new system, but I want to commend the United Nations and

Price Waterhouse for the contribution of that system because that,

in fact, could improve the whole accountability of the entire system

over the longer term.

The last question you asked, Senator, I forgot.

Senator FEINGOLD. People’s ability to access this information

given the fact that it is usually in English.

Mr. NATSIOS. The partner organizations we work through and

our own staffs speak the local languages or we would not send

them there. So, the NGO staffs, the AID staffs speak the local languages in the countries that we are working in and they talk with

them. They deal with people.

There is actually a public information campaign effort, that we

go through at the community level, to inform people of how this

system works and to work with them on planning what is done

with the money. We do not just go into a village and say, oh, we

are going to rebuild something for you. We have to ask them. Do

you want this building rebuilt? Where do you want it rebuilt, and

how do you want it? Are you going to participate in this with us?

We are not going to do this for you. You have to do this with us.

It is a community-based approach. It is the most successful approach because then, if there is a problem, they know they own the

problem along with us. It is a much better approach. So we work

with them in a very integrated fashion at the local level to do any

reconstruction, not just here but anywhere else in the world as

well.

Mr. LARSON. Just a few quick followups, if I could. Indonesia’s

separate account that Mr. Natsios mentioned—they imagine having

the World Bank play a key role in running that and basically providing the fiduciary role. So that is going to be very helpful.

Both Thailand and Indonesia have come to us and asked for help

in management of the ongoing reconstruction process, advice that

we have gained or experience we have gained from responding to

natural disasters in the United States, and we are pursuing that

sort of advice with them.

In Sri Lanka, where the Millennium Challenge Corporation is

also acting, we have a requirement for a very full process of outreach to the communities so it is a sort of community-informed set

of priorities.

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And finally, beyond the immediate efforts of our assistance workers, we are working very hard to get the message out to the broader communities about what the United States is doing. So we put

messages from the President, from our Ambassadors into local language media to explain what we are doing. We are going to continue to make the case about the American response through our

public diplomacy strategy.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Members of the

panel, thank you. I am sorry that I missed your earlier testimony.

I have had an opportunity to read through most of your testimonies. I, too, want to take the time to thank you and your agencies and all that you are doing on behalf of the victims, the families, and all the efforts that have been made to date.

If I ask questions that have already been answered, I apologize

in advance, but it helps me to have the opportunity at this point

in time.

Even with the President’s announcement yesterday that the

United States has pledged the $950 million in assistance, we recognize that this probably is not the full picture. I guess this is a question directed to you, Mr. Wolfowitz. In terms of anticipated final

costs—and I know we are asking you to look into the crystal ball,

but insofar as the military relief operations in Indonesia and the

other nations, can you give me any sense as to the military end of

it and the costs associated?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I will ask General Allen to correct me, but I believe we have incurred about $121 million to date and anticipate

about $244 million—have I got the numbers right—before this operation is finished. So it is well within the $900 million. In fact,

our costs, plus AID’s cost together, are estimated to be $346 million

for the emergency relief operations. So, basically, the supplemental

will cover those costs and provide an additional $600 million for

the reconstruction effort.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And you think that that is realistic then for

the duration as we move into the reconstruction.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think it is realistic as a U.S. Government contribution, recognizing that there are many other countries that are

contributing, more that probably should contribute, and the American private sector has been spectacularly generous with $700 million and still collecting. Administrator Natsios is probably the best

one to estimate what the total requirements will be, but it should

not be the United States that bears the total share of it either.

Andy, do you want to comment?

Mr. NATSIOS. The assessments are now being conducted. They

are joint assessments with the ministries of the governments that

are involved because they have the lead, with the World Bank, the

Asian Development Bank, and the donor governments. For example, the European Commission and AID have officers with the

State Department on these teams to do assessments in different

categories like infrastructure, community reconstruction at the

local level, housing reconstruction, economic interventions to get

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the business community recapitalized and markets started, that

sort of thing. Those are not all out.

I think we have got some initial assessments in, and my memory is in Aceh—Alan, was it $4 billion or $5 billion?

Mr. LARSON. I think the initial estimate in Indonesia is on the

order of $4.5 billion as the estimated total cost of reconstruction

over a number of years.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you.

The Pacific watch center that alerted the authorities in Diego

Garcia—I am assuming that that is a similar type of a system as

we have up north that gives us our tsunami alert, recognizing that

we have got to get those buoys fixed. We are working on that. But

the question is: If we were able to notify those in Diego Garcia,

why was it not communicated beyond that, or was it?

Mr. NATSIOS. The first thing is you can communicate to people,

but what do they do? If you turn an alarm on, they do not even

know what the alarm is for. There was no system in place to communicate with people at the village level to tell them not only is

a tsunami coming, but this is where you have to go to escape it.

If you do not have that system in place, people could go to a more

dangerous place.

There are three elements to an early warning system. One is the

sensor devices, the scientific equipment, that our scientists, Japanese scientists are particularly expert in because we have had a

history of natural disasters. The second part is the communications

system to get the information to the community, and the third and

the most important part of this, when you think about it, is educating the community on what the alarm system means and how

you respond to it. Those systems did not exist.

Diego Garcia was spared not because of the alarm system, but

because, as I understand it, the coral reef stopped the tsunami.

Where would you go in Diego Garcia? It is 3 feet above sea level.

I mean, if the coral reefs had not stopped that tsunami, no alarm

system is going to help you out.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Yes. So, really, it is not just having the system, it is the education that goes with the system.

Mr. NATSIOS. Absolutely. That is part of the system.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. My understanding, Senator, is they got an

earthquake alert. They knew there was a big earthquake. They had

no warning there was a tsunami. And as Mr. Natsios said, the

highest place to go, someone said, is the diving board at the swimming pool. There was no tsunami in Diego Garcia. That is why

nothing happened.

Mr. LARSON. Recognizing there are two parts of the problem; the

detection and then getting the right kind of notice to people who

need to be warned, there is an issue going forward about making

sure that the detection system that we have in the Pacific and that

helps protect Alaska can be expanded and improved. There are a

series of active meetings underway. Mr. Natsios has mentioned

some in Japan. There will be a meeting next week in Brussels

where the scientists and the expert officials who know how these

systems work can help develop a coordinated international approach to make sure that all of the information about earthquake

events and about the movement of tidal waves over the water can

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be systematically collected and made available so that it could be

used to warn populations in the Indian Ocean area, which was not

the case before. Those buoys were not there and the system was

not present.

As Mr. Natsios has said, there is another challenge too and that

is making sure that there is right type of civil defense and warning

systems in place in these countries.

The President’s supplemental request will allow us to be lead

participants in the development of both of those types of systems.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Natsios, in the report that you have included in your package here, you make reference to the psychological impact of the tsunami and make reference to some preliminary results from a Save the Children study of parents and caretakers. You indicate that it suggests there is not a mental health

crisis. As a result of the tsunami, children displayed common reactions to a traumatic event.

In the testimony that we are going to hear in the next panel—

and this will be a question that I will ask the individuals on that

panel—there is considerable reference to the psychological effects

on the survivors, and particularly the children, suggesting that

there is perhaps more of a problem. Can you speak to that?

Mr. NATSIOS. The Save the Children study is very useful but it

is for a discrete population. It is not a comprehensive study of all

of the survivors. We do know from research that has been done in

past natural disasters and manmade disasters that particularly

children but even adults who have lost a large number of members

of their family—Paul Wolfowitz just mentioned on Sri Lankan was

it?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Indonesian.

Mr. NATSIOS. Indonesian who lost 200 members of their extended

family. The notion that has no effect on a person—I mean, it has

an effect. If they also were someone who survived but whose home

was destroyed, business was destroyed, their school and their

neighborhoods were destroyed, it does have an effect.

We do know, in some cases, that people will sort of go into a

state of withdrawal. They will simply sit and stare. I have seen

this in displaced camps. We do not see any of this happening on

a large scale here. But I have been to camps where suicide rates

are high. People will commit suicide because they become so desperate and so despondent over what has happened to them.

We need to monitor this. We need to watch this very carefully.

We put some money into the NGO community to begin to look at

this because we do not want this developing.

I do know a friend of mine, who is a Foreign Minister in East

Timor, was telling me, even though East Timor was not affected,

that there were rumors every day in the capital for several weeks

afterward that there was a tsunami coming, and people would

leave the capital city because of the fear. So they do not have any

trauma in East Timor, but the event in the media did have an effect on people’s behavior in terms of panic.

There was another earthquake yesterday. I do not know if you

noticed that in Banda Aceh. These tectonic plates do not just stop

once. This is not one event. There are going to be several events

potentially. This, fortunately, did not cause any damage and it did

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not cause a tsunami. It was not quite large enough an earthquake

to cause a tsunami. But there is still fear of repetition of this.

So we need to watch this; monitor it. We are not facing a crisis

at this point, but we do not want problems later on.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski.

Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the

members of the committee. This has been a very informative and

timely hearing.

A couple of comments, I guess, I would make before I asked questions. I am encouraged by the testimony indicating that the supplemental should ensure that existing development efforts are sustained and held harmless essentially. I think Senator Sarbanes

raised a very important point which is, our credibility oftentimes

is on the line, and once we get a project started, to divert it would

be a mistake.

A corollary to that is the fact that as significant as this tragedy

was—and I am very mindful of it. I, like Secretary Wolfowitz, spent

a lot of time in Indonesia. I spent time there as a child. My sister

is half Indonesian. So nobody is more sympathetic than I am to the

situation.

I think it is important to note that there are a lot of silent crises

taking place all over the globe that do not generate the same

amount of attention and, as a consequence, do not generate the sort

of private giving that we have seen in this circumstance. A lot

more people, unfortunately, are dying in Darfur than will have died

no matter what the eventual outcome of the tsunami ends up

being. I think it is important for all of you, who are in positions

to help shape U.S. foreign policy and foreign aid, to think about

how do we highlight these other tragedies as they are unfolding

and make sure that our response is equally adequate and that we

have the same sense of urgency about them. That is a difficult

thing to do, but it is one that I think is very important.

Let me just pick up on a couple of questions that have already

been raised to see if I can, maybe, put a little more flesh to the

bone.

I am very interested in the idea of training military in other

countries to respond to these crises, and I am encouraged by that

notion that we are going to be trying to do some institution building there with respect to best practices, first responder training

and so forth. I do not know if you want to select, maybe, an example of Indonesia or Sri Lanka or a couple of other countries where

you think that has already proceeded and what the barriers to that

are and what the opportunities are as well, but I would be interested in hearing a little bit more about how that might proceed.

Maybe I will start with you, Secretary Larson.

Mr. LARSON. Thank you very much, Senator. Thank you for your

remarks about the importance of staying the course on our commitment to development worldwide. I think Mr. Natsios, and I in particular, have worked hard to launch initiatives like ending the cycle

of famine in the Horn of Africa, having effective and increased levels of development assistance. So we are very committed to that.

77

In terms of expanding capacity in these countries, we have had

a very nascent effort in APEC that has begun to discuss this. The

Australians have been leaders of this. It seems clear to us that the

first responders are always the local people and the local communities and governments. It is going to be important to have the capabilities there that are necessary to respond to natural disasters.

We think that the experience of FEMA could be very important for

them, and we think we should be looking at ways to translate some

of that experience.

The Ambassador of Thailand came to me and he said, you know,

we are not asking for international financial assistance, but we

know we have a big task of reconstruction and we want to think

with you about how to do that. We know that Florida had a very

difficult year in responding to the hurricanes. So we have arranged

some informal contact between officials in the State of Florida and

the Thai Government to think through systematically how you respond.

In other areas of policy, we have been able not only to set up best

practices but to begin to set up audit type systems where countries

voluntarily say, why do you not come in and help us assess whether we have put in place the things that we need to have to really

be effective. Those are among the ideas that we are exploring now

generically.

Moving forward, in Indonesia, just to pick up that example, the

Indonesians have been very appreciative of the role our military

has played. They recognize that they have a very big task ahead

of them in coordinating effectively the reconstruction effort, and

they have come to talk to us not only about specific projects and

specific ideas but how, working with USAID and others, can they

make sure that they are managing the entire process of reconstruction in an open, transparent, and effective way. That is just a few

examples of the types of things we have in mind.

Mr. NATSIOS. Senator, if I could just mention Darfur. We have

been engaged as the first donor in Darfur before any news media

was there, I might add. In fact, I had a press conference in Nairobi

after my first trip to Darfur 2 years ago when the conflict was just

starting, and the only reporters to report what was happening were

African reporters. I could not get western media to focus on it. We

had press conferences here and the media would not focus on it.

They all of a sudden did and many have done an excellent job since

then. But we were there long before the American media knew how

you spelled Darfur. I am not trying to be insulting here.

But we do not base our humanitarian responses on media coverage. If we did, the most remote places in the world like eastern

Congo, for example, is among the worst deaths in an emergency in

history, 3.8 million people, according to the International Rescue

Committee and other competent NGO studies that indicate a huge

loss of life. A huge loss of life. It is not in the media at all, even

now.

I have been personally to Darfur four times in the last 2 years,

more than any other place in the world, as a matter of fact. And

we have spent $350 million and most of the food going into Darfur

is from the United States Government. So we have been out in the

forefront. We have led the charge. It is a much more difficult situaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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tion because it is not a natural disaster. It is a manmade disaster

and there are malicious people involved committing horrendous

atrocities. We believe, working with the State Department, we have

an international and diplomatic strategy to deal with what is happening, but it is a highly complex political situation not just a matter of logistically moving things around to help people in a natural

disaster.

Senator OBAMA. General, do you have something to add?

General Allen: Yes, Senator, if I may add. All of our warfighting

commanders who are major regional commanders have a plan

called a theater security cooperation plan. It is a reflection of the

guidance given to them by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

The particular plan in this case that covered this region is implemented by the Pacific Commander, ADM Tom Fargo. His plan has

been extraordinarily active with regard to having extensive bilateral and multilateral relations with the militaries of the region. So

it starts with his own personal relationship with his counterparts,

but we exercise frequently with all of these militaries. We do it bilaterally and we have annual major multilateral exercises that benefit from the contribution of forces but liaison officers and observers as well.

So there were habits of functional cooperation, habits of command and control which we had been developing for years which

paid off huge dividends early in this crisis. In particular, I will tell

you we have an entity known as the multinational planning augmentation team, which is a multinational organization that exists

in Pacific Command which can come together, very quickly, to assist a commander in doing the planning necessary to execute

whether in a combat situation or, in this case, a horrific natural

disaster.

When we had the chance to visit with the commander of the U.S.

forces, LTG Rusty Blackman, Marine Corps, at Uttapal, he gave

the Secretary and me a briefing, and along the back wall of the

briefing room were the liaison officers from 10 different countries.

They had come quickly. We knew each other well. We had been exercising well. There was an excellent exchange both at a cultural

and a language level, and we think that this was a very, very important early ability of the militaries of the region to stem the potential death toll here.

One other point that I would make is that we are going to continue this kind of a relationship. We are very active in something

called the ASEAN Regional Forum, which is an extension of

ASEAN. A subject which has come up more frequently of late—and

we are going to continue to try to offer our very best advice in this

regard—is the dimension of consequence management. We raised

this at the last meeting. We will be going to Berlin which will be

hosting the next intercessional group of the ASEAN Regional

Forum where we are going to continue to talk about the employment of military forces for disaster relief and consequence management.

So we think there has been a very rich experience in terms of

expertised experience, and we are going to take advantage of that

and capitalize on it in the future.

79

Senator OBAMA. That is very encouraging, and I very much commend, obviously, our troops and your office and others that are

doing an excellent job on this.

I know that I am out of time. I am going to, if you do not mind,

Mr. Chairman, just lob another question out there since I have

been fairly patient and it is related. I will just stop there.

I am interested, No. 1, in terms of reconstruction. I know this is

difficult to do in poor countries, but are we able to think about

structural engineering or changes in the reconstruction process

that anticipate natural disasters and lessen their impact? Again,

obviously, this is difficult to carry out where resources are wanting,

but I am wondering whether that is something that we are giving

some consideration to.

The final question I will just have is, Secretary Wolfowitz,

maybe, if you can just flesh out a little bit more the opportunities

and challenges we face as we are working with the Indonesian

military with respect to the Aceh conflict and whether there are

things that we can do to lessen the human-driven dimensions of a

disaster in that area.

Mr. NATSIOS. In terms of whether we build disaster mitigation

measures into our reconstruction, that is standard AID policy and

has been for decades. In the Gugarat earthquake of India which

took place several years ago, if you will recall, with a large loss of

life, we ensured that in the reconstruction we did, that the housing

that was rebuilt was built according to international earthquake

standards. We worked with the U.S. Geological Survey. In fact,

there have been scientists from the U.S. Geological Survey in the

disaster assistance office of AID for a couple decades now. They are

normal transfer of personnel. We use our scientists from other Federal agencies to help us not just in earthquakes but also in storm

construction.

A lot of the housing codes in Latin America and in the Caribbean

were designed through AID mechanisms, working with some universities in Virginia that have expertise at this. Fred Krimgold is

one of the leading earthquake architects and storm architects in

the country. He is a professor at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

We use him. We helped work with these countries to design building codes that meet these standards.

Unfortunately, building codes, even in the United States, are not

always followed and in developing countries they are frequently not

followed. So we have also complemented that with training of contractors in the private sector and of banks and insurance companies to get into private markets and the private system disaster

mitigation, particularly with respect to construction standards so

that the private sector uses them even if the public sector does not

always follow the building codes. So when we do the reconstruction

in the countries in this area, we will be following those standards.

Last, I got a call from my good friend, the Sri Lankan Ambassador to the United States, who asked that we send a land-use

planning expert from AID because they are now rewriting their

land-use planning legislation or statute in Sri Lanka to move people back from the coast. Now, that is more sensitive than it sounds

because people are having to give up very valuable land where they

had their businesses or their fishing fleet or their homes. So we are

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helping them technically. I think the guy is about to go out to help

them design the statute and to work with the communities, so this

is accepted because it is not just a matter of construction. It is also

a matter of land-use regulation that can contribute to better disaster mitigation in the future.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, three points. First of all, on your earlier question about military training, I think it is an interesting

question, which I am going to look into when we get back, as to

whether our IMET programs, military education training programs, sufficiently focus on the possibility of training in this specific area, that is to say, disaster assistance. As General Allen said,

we get enormous side benefits just from general military cooperation, but there are lessons to be learned here about whether,

maybe, specific programs focused on that function would be valuable.

Second, your question about building local capacity. It was striking to me when I spoke with the Indonesian Minister of Planning,

who is in charge of basically economic development, who is in

charge of their reconstruction efforts. She is a very impressive

economist, very thoughtful. She said one of their biggest challenges

is how to develop local capacity in Aceh so that they do not end

up with everything going through a Jakarta bureaucracy, and I

think that is a commendable goal.

Finally, most importantly, on the question you asked about the

role of TNI, the Indonesian military, in this whole thing, they can

be part of the problem or they can be part of the solution. Senator

Feingold earlier suggested, I think, that I had used the word ‘‘window of opportunity,’’ and I do not think one should use those words

in connection with something this horrible.

But I did say it is a crisis and crises have elements of danger

and opportunity. As you look at the role of the Indonesian military

in Aceh, they can continue on the record of the past 10 years,

which is a pretty bad one. It is a difficult circumstance, admittedly,

fighting an armed insurgency, but there has been a great deal of

abuse of the local population. From what I can tell, those practices

have largely been set aside, if not entirely set aside, in this immediate crisis. And they have to be set aside if we are going to succeed in this large-scale reconstruction effort. And that is the danger, but the opportunity is if they are set aside, if 6 months, a year

from now both the Indonesian Government, the Indonesian Army,

and the people of Aceh can say, well, we got together, we dealt with

something far more important than these issues we have been

fighting over, maybe there is a way to resolve those issues. I think

it is a real opportunity.

As I said, I think before you came here, Secretary Rice is consulting with the Congress, currently, about what to do about IMET

restrictions. I do not think we are talking about turning a blind eye

on crimes of the past. I certainly would not. And I do not think we

are talking about anything goes. But I do think, both in terms of

the conditions the Congress set already with respect to Timika—

we can argue about whether more cooperation is required or not required, but I was stunned, myself, at the level of cooperation the

FBI got and the results that they produced. A lot of that is law enforcement-sensitive and cannot be discussed here in open session,

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but I think they clearly responded to what we asked for. And there

is a little bit of a feeling, well, every time we do what you ask for

you, you ask for something else. That is, in my view, not a good

way to get people to cooperate.

One final observation, if I could. A friend of mine, who is a journalist in Indonesia, who has taken considerable personal risks over

his career fighting for human rights and democracy in his country,

said democracy in Indonesia would be much stronger today if there

were 10,000 Indonesian officers who had been through American

training.

I am not saying that our training is perfect or that no one who

goes through our training ever commits abuses, but I think it is a

pretty consistent record that exposure to our military, exposure to

our system has a positive effect from the point of view of decorum

and progress in promoting democracy and freedom. I hope it is in

that spirit that these consultations can take place and we can come

up with a way forward that supports the objectives that I believe

are widely shared on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.

We thank all Senators and thank especially our witnesses for a

very comprehensive hearing and excellent responses.

We will now call upon an additional panel composed of Ms. Mary

McClymont, President and CEO of InterAction; Mr. Daniel Toole,

Director of the Office of Emergency Programs of UNICEF; and Ms.

Nancy Lindborg, President of Mercy Corps.

We thank the witnesses for joining us this morning. I would ask,

as I suggested to the earlier panel, that if possible, you summarize

your comments to within a 10-minute framework. Your full statements will be made a part of the record and questions will follow.

I am going to yield the chair fairly shortly to my distinguished

colleague, Senator Murkowski. She is the chairman of our Subcommittee for East Asia and the Pacific. She will continue to conduct the hearing in my absence.

First of all, I would like to call upon the witnesses in the order

that I introduced them. That would be Ms. McClymont, then Mr.

Toole, and Ms. Lindborg. Ms. McClymont.

STATEMENT OF MARY MCCLYMONT, PRESIDENT AND CEO,

INTERACTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. MCCLYMONT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the

opportunity to testify before this committee to share some initial

thoughts about lessons we have learned in responding to the tsunami to date, as well from other major emergencies. These might

be helpful for the longer term recovery phase of the tsunami and

for future crises.

The committee is to be commended for launching this reflection

so promptly. We also want to commend the President, Members of

Congress, and other administration leaders for their public statements of concern and commitment of resources, along with the

American people for their generous donations.

Seventy-two of InterAction’s one hundred and sixty member

groups are engaged in some way in nine of the crisis-affected countries, working directly on the ground and through local partners,

or shipping commodities to the region for distribution. Most are enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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gaged in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India, and I base my remarks

largely on their experiences.

Many InterAction members have been established for decades in

the region, and this is probably what allowed them to respond so

quickly to immediate needs with hundreds of their local staff and

partners on the ground by providing clean water, food, temporary

shelter, and medical care.

Let me first address three aspects of the crisis on the ground.

First, in every natural disaster, there are impediments to overcome in delivering assistance. It was the very magnitude of the crisis itself in the worst hit countries that compounded these problems. As you know, local officials and service providers were killed,

injured, or missing. With transportation and communications infrastructures destroyed, access was impossible in some areas. Our

members and other aid workers were ready to help, but they faced

major logistical problems. With its helicopters, personnel, and commodities, the United States military was able to extend the reach

of the humanitarian effort into remote parts of Aceh and Sri

Lanka. Their superb performance is a reminder that our Armed

Forces have unrivaled logistical assets unique to these situations.

As the transition from military to unaided civilian services is now

rightly underway, their effort is a fine example of an appropriate

kind of role our Armed Forces can play in such settings.

Second, ongoing civil strife in Indonesia and Sri Lanka posed potential challenges for relief delivery. International aid workers had

been banned for over a year in Aceh, leaving little NGO capacity.

Apprehension that the Indonesian military would ban or impose

tight controls on the programs of foreign relief organizations proved

unfounded. We hope and trust this will remain the case going forward.

As to relief coordination, it works for us at many levels in all the

disasters we operate in through established mechanisms among

our own InterAction members with USAID and with relevant U.N.

agencies and other NGO consortia. That is what happened here.

On the ground, the governments of India and Sri Lanka immediately assumed this responsibility on their own territory and are

playing a strong role. The Indonesian authorities sought U.N. help

in managing the international relief effort.

Although understandably difficult in the first days, we believe

the coordination of relief efforts is becoming more effective each

day. In Aceh, for example, Indonesian and U.N. officials are sharing responsibility and working together increasingly well, while

NGOs, U.N., and government representatives come together to

identify issues, conduct sectoral assessments, and rationally allocate resources.

The most serious impediment to good coordination appears to be

the large number of inexperienced groups and individuals that

have arrived in some of the affected countries. Although apparently

well-intentioned, they are unaccustomed to the way the United Nations, Red Cross movement, and established international NGOs

and local partners work together so frequently in these kinds of

settings. We anticipate that this problem will diminish over the

coming weeks as the initial relief phase winds down.

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Despite the fact that the humanitarian effort has, fortunately,

prevented a second tidal wave of lethal disease among survivors in

the region, hundreds of thousands are displaced, vulnerable to infectious disease and profound psychological problems and dependent on donors for basic needs.

As we look forward, I highlight, now, four relevant reminders we

could bear in mind during the recovery period.

First, accountability by relief providers. The past 6 weeks have

underscored to us the extraordinary generosity of the American

people. Sixty InterAction members report today they have received

in the aggregate an unprecedented $765 million in contributions

from private donors, most of it from individuals. This provides a

sharp reminder of the need for NGO accountability to the public for

the careful, transparent, and effective use of these funds. For the

past decade, our members have abided by a set of program, financial, and fundraising standards guiding their work and helping assure donors that funds are being well spent. We will work to assure

the public has available timely, detailed information on the use of

the funds entrusted to us. By the same token, we, and other humanitarian responders on the ground, must be accountable for our

actions to those we are seeking to assist by conscientiously applying the internationally accepted sphere standards that guide disaster response.

Second, long-term commitment. Experience with myriad natural

disasters has taught us that full recovery and rehabilitation from

such devastation takes between 5 and 10 years. We are encouraged

that leadership roles for the planning process have been assumed

within the United Nations and the international financial institutions.

It will be important that NGOs participate fully in the upcoming

donor conferences given the resources we will bring to the table

and our long engagement and partnerships with local communities

and organizations. Although financial pledges made by the international community have been extraordinary, it is no secret that

many commitments go unfulfilled.

We are gratified by the President’s announcement yesterday; he

will seek $950 million for relief and longer term reconstruction

needs in the tsunami countries. We urge that governmental funding be provided on a multiyear basis and on flexible terms before

attention shifts elsewhere.

In addition, it will be critical that national governments and donors fully consult and coordinate with local communities, authorities, and civil society on the ground. Our job is to respect their

needs and provide the capacity building support necessary to help

them restore their own lives.

Third, forgotten crises. As has been mentioned at this hearing,

sadly this disaster reminds us of all the equally tragic crises in the

world that are not receiving as much attention, such as Sudan’s

Darfur region, northern Uganda, and the Congo. Some crises are

silent like the 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty in the developing world. We hope that our leaders, including Members of

Congress, as well as the media, will now seize the moment and

take the opportunity to help us further educate and sensitize the

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American public to these ongoing humanitarian crises and extreme

poverty in the world.

Finally, funding needs. With these concerns in mind, we are

gratified of the President’s announcement and that it will, in part,

replenish the USAID development and disaster accounts from

which funds were drawn for the initial tsunami response in a timely way, as was underscored by Mr. Natsios. We have also urged

that additional funds be provided for humanitarian needs that otherwise go unmet in Sudan, Congo, Uganda, as well as funds to address the major global shortfalls in emergency food aid, to which

Senator Sarbanes referred.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McClymont follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY E. MCCLYMONT, PRESIDENT AND CEO,

INTERACTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before this Committee

on the ‘‘Tsunami Response: Lessons Learned.’’ I also want to acknowledge the leadership and support that you, Senator Biden, and many others on this Committee

have provided on issues of importance to those of us in the humanitarian and development community. I am grateful for this opportunity to present some of the views

and perspectives of InterAction members on the response to the Tsunami crisis.

InterAction is the largest alliance of U.S.-based international development and

humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. Our 160 members operate in every

developing country and have decades of experience on the ground in working to

overcome poverty, exclusion and suffering by advancing social justice and basic dignity for all. While many of our members have a long and successful history of partnership with U.S. Government agencies, collectively, the members receive $3 billion

in annual contributions from private donors, including direct contributions from the

American people. Both faith-based and secular, InterAction members are

headquartered in 25 states and have branch offices and/or constituencies in every

state in the country. Furthermore, when one looks at the donors, sponsors, and supporters of our member organizations, InterAction reaches millions of Americans who

care about and support in some form our foreign assistance programs.

The world has not seen in recent memory any natural disaster equal to the magnitude of the Tsunami crisis in sheer geographic scope, level of destruction, unprecedented private giving, and extensive international response. These factors make it

all the more important to consider the response and lessons learned to date, as well

as those we know from previous experience. We can apply them in our current relief

activities, in the long-term recovery and rehabilitation phase in which we will be

engaged for years to come, and in the major natural disasters inevitable in the future. The Committee is to be commended for launching this reflection so promptly.

I also wish to commend the President, former Secretary of State Colin Powell,

Members of the Congress, and USAID Administrator, Andrew Natsios, for the personal concern for those affected by the crisis they have demonstrated by their public

statements and commitment of resources. The personal visits to the region undertaken by many prominent American leaders, including members of the Senate and

this Committee, have underlined the depth of American compassion for those now

trying to rebuild their lives and American commitment to assist them. Furthermore,

the response of the U.S. military, in collaboration with the civilian agencies, was

critical in getting relief to vulnerable populations and saving lives in the initial

phase of the crisis response. And finally, I want to thank the American people for

their generous donations to help the victims in this crisis.

Reviewing the Humanitarian Response to Date

Seventy-two InterAction organizations, or almost half of our 160 members, are engaged in some way in this crisis, either by responding directly on the ground operationally, working with local or international partners who are operational, shipping

commodities for the use of partners in the region, or undertaking advocacy. Although our members are working in nine of the affected countries, most are engaged

in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India, which were the worst hit. I therefore will focus

my remarks based largely on their experience in these three nations.

Many of our members had a long-established presence in each of these countries

when the Tsunami struck. In Indonesia and Sri Lanka, for example, many have

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been engaged in humanitarian assistance as well as development for more than a

decade, helping to deal with the consequences of the civil strife each of these nations

has long endured. With hundreds of local staff working at the village level in these

three countries, they were able to respond quickly to immediate needs for clean

water and food, to help reunite family members, and to assist survivors in finding

temporary shelter. Medical personnel arrived from abroad within days of the Tsunami and began to treat physical injuries. Assessments were initiated of water and

sanitation, as well as health needs. Survivors were assisted in digging latrines, collecting the bodies of the deceased, and removing debris from roadways.

In every natural disaster there are impediments to overcome in delivering humanitarian assistance. The magnitude of the crisis in the worst hit countries made some

of these obstacles daunting, such as the immediate creation of coordination mechanisms. Many local officials, health and social service providers and educators were

among those killed, injured, or missing. In Indonesia’s Aceh Province alone, it has

been reported that 70 percent of the health care providers and 1,500 teachers were

killed, missing, or fled the area. Roads were washed away, bridges collapsed, vehicles were sucked into the sea, communications systems were destroyed and fuel supplies quickly were exhausted. Access to some areas became impossible, except by

helicopter. Some airports close to severely affected areas became congested due to

staffing, offloading, and storage capacity shortages. Finally, the ongoing civil strife

in Indonesia and Sri Lanka posed potential challenges to the delivery of relief. In

Aceh Province, for example, international aid workers had been banned for over a

year. There was little NGO capacity already in place and a concern that those from

elsewhere in Indonesia, as well as those arriving from abroad, might be denied permission to enter the region. It was not clear if the ongoing conflicts there and in

Sri Lanka would put survivors at increased risk and imperil relief workers.

While our members were mobilizing staff in the region and assigning personnel

from around the world to respond to the emergency, InterAction formed a working

group to facilitate the exchange of information and coordination between the members responding to the crisis. Our regular meetings almost immediately were supplemented with weekly meetings hosted by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in which NGOs and USAID officials shared information and concerns.

As a member of the InterAgency Standing Committee, the body established by the

United Nations General Assembly more than a decade earlier to coordinate responses to emergencies, InterAction began sharing information and engaging regularly with the U.N. agencies responding to the crisis, as well as with the Red Cross

movement and our NGO colleagues in Europe.

We initiated several actions to facilitate our work and respond to the overwhelming public interest in assisting those affected by the Tsunami. Within 48

hours after the onset of the crisis, we published the initial list of our members accepting contributions with descriptions of their activities. We posted on our website

information on appropriate ways to give, and distributed to the media video and

radio news releases we had prepared earlier on the same topic. Our consistent message in such disasters is that cash is best. We also posted on our web site guidance

for the American public on considerations in selecting a relief agency to which to

contribute. We responded to myriad press inquiries about our members’ responses,

the situation on the ground and how concerned citizens could help.

In the region, the governments of India and Sri Lanka immediately assumed responsibility for coordination of disaster response activities on their territory. The Indonesian authorities asked the United Nations to assist in managing the international effort even as it directed the domestic reply. Disaster Response Teams from

OFDA arrived in the affected countries within days, as the U.N.’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs sent assessment teams and personnel to assist

U.N. officials assigned in the affected countries. U.S. military helicopters, personnel,

and commodities from the Abraham Lincoln and its escorts extended the reach of

the humanitarian community into parts of Aceh cut off by road and addressed other

logistic constraints to effective delivery of assistance. U.S. Navy personnel provided

similar assistance in Sri Lanka. In each country participants in the civil conflicts

seemed to welcome relief activities. Although skirmishes between belligerents have

occurred in Aceh, these incidents did not impair the delivery of humanitarian relief.

Apprehension that the Indonesian military would ban or impose tight controls on

the programs of foreign relief organizations have proved unfounded. We hope and

trust that this will continue to be the case as the relief phase moves to recovery.

Today, an estimated 2 million people throughout the affected region are receiving

some form of assistance from their own governments and the 4,000 humanitarian

personnel who have come from abroad to help them. With over 275,000 known dead

or missing, the casualty toll is indeed catastrophic. But the good sanitation practices

of local populations, several timely immunization programs, generally adequate nuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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trition, and good fortune have so far prevented a second tidal wave of lethal disease

among survivors, many of whom nevertheless remain vulnerable to cholera, dysentery, typhoid fever, measles, malaria, and other contagious illnesses.

The devastating disaster has had major psychological effects on survivors as well,

especially children. While the resumption of normal work and living conditions will

help survivors to regain their mental and emotional equilibrium, many will need

longer-term psychosocial support to deal with the profound trauma, loss and other

repercussions of the disaster. The crisis has amplified the psychosocial needs and

heightened protection risks to children, such as separation, trafficking, and sexual

exploitation. Early fears of trafficking in children, however, have been allayed by

measures taken by the extended families of children whose parents were lost and

by government bans on travel by children without accompanying family members.

But given the prevalence of trafficking in some affected countries this and other protection concerns bear watching in the months ahead, in addition to the ongoing psychosocial needs.

Hundreds of thousands of survivors remain displaced, an estimated 400,000 in

Aceh alone. Many have sought refuge in spontaneous settlements. The Indonesian

government has plans for moving many of these persons to 24 relocation camps.

This may be an appropriate interim solution but past experience suggests that

camps are not always the best answer to the needs of displaced populations. They

may be particularly inappropriate in Aceh, where local people have been moved into

camps in the past for political reasons. Camps should be created only in consultation with the survivors and movement to them should be voluntary.

Although some cash for work programs have been initiated by NGOs, most survivors remain unemployed. As you have read, thousands of fishing boats have been

destroyed, and the fields of many farmers have been washed away or damaged by

salt water. It will be some time before these people will again be self-sufficient.

Meanwhile they will remain dependent on their governments and the donor community for food and other basic necessities.

Coordination of relief efforts is becoming more effective each day, particularly

among agencies working in specific sectors. The governments of Sri Lanka and of

India are playing strong roles. In Aceh, for example, Indonesian and U.N. officials

are sharing responsibility and working together increasingly well. The United Nations has established two offices in Aceh and expects to open two others soon. Regular meetings of humanitarian personnel, including our member groups, around

various sectors of concern—primarily water and sanitation, health, shelter—are

being hosted increasingly under the joint auspices of the Indonesian government

and the United Nations in Aceh. The transition from military to civilian services

in key areas such as transportation is going smoothly.

The most serious impediment to good coordination appears to be the large number

of inexperienced organizations and individuals that have arrived in some of the affected countries. There are an estimated 400 NGOs now present in the region, 150

in Aceh alone. While U.N. organizations, the Red Cross movement, and established

international NGOs and their local partners have been working together on sectoral

assessments and a rational allocation of resources, some of the agencies, unaccustomed to these environments in which they are working and the kind of coordination used, have not been as constructive. We hope and anticipate that this problem

will diminish over the coming weeks as the initial relief phase winds down. The

more experienced international NGOs are making efforts to reach out to those willing to collaborate and to help them benefit from participation in coordination mechanisms.

Learning and Applying Lessons

As we look ahead during the recovery and rehabilitation phases of the Tsunami

crisis and as we anticipate other emergencies that surely lie ahead, I highlight

below several of the lessons from our experience in responding to this crisis to date,

as well as those we know from prior experience and should bear in mind going forward.

Accountability. The past six weeks have reminded us of the extraordinary compassion and generosity of the American people. As of February 7, 60 InterAction members report they have received in the aggregate over $765 million in contributions

from private donors, most of it from individuals. We established the InterAction

‘‘Tsunami Barometer’’ on our website to track these donations. Our members recognize that we are accountable to the public for the careful and effective use of these

funds. Members subscribe to a set of standards adopted by the InterAction alliance

over a decade ago. They address performance, fundraising, governance, program and

financial management. Conformance to these standards guides our members’ work

and helps assure donors that funds are being spent in an accountable and effective

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way. Members are obliged to ‘‘full, honest, and accurate disclosure of relevant information concerning their goals, programs, finances and governance.’’ We are working

with our members to remain true to these important principles, and to provide timely, detailed information on the use of all funds entrusted to them.

Appropriate Giving. In their public comments InterAction and its members promote the theme that cash is the most appropriate contribution a private citizen can

make, a message that appears to have been largely accepted by the American people. It certainly helps enormously when that message is delivered from the White

House by the President, as it was on several occasions after December 26. In contrast to the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, when warehouses in Gulf ports were

crammed with used clothing and other commodities not urgently needed in Central

America, our fellow citizens used their checkbooks, credit cards and wallets to make

their contributions this time.

Military Response. The superb performance of the U.S. military personnel assigned to assist the relief effort is a reminder that our armed forces have capabilities that are indeed unique in situations of natural disasters of this magnitude.

While the armed forces of over 20 countries responded to this crisis, the reach of

our navy and the transport, water purification, and logistic assets it brought to bear

are indeed unrivaled. One indicator of how well the humanitarian and military responders worked together is the U.N.’s report that the military forces on the scene

replied affirmatively to 97 percent of the specific requests from humanitarians for

transportation and other services. Now that the NGOs and the United Nations.

have had time to lease civilian helicopters, ship in trucks and obtain more water

purification equipment, the military will no longer be needed and civilian professionals can carry out relief and reconstruction work unaided. The U.S. military’s

role in Tsunami relief serves as a good example of an appropriate role for our armed

forces in providing assistance in such settings.

Essential Services. An initial assessment of the response in Aceh, and our recent

experiences in the Bam earthquake and in Darfur, indicate the international relief

community can provide adequate emergency medical services but is not as well

resourced in dealing with sanitation and provision of clean water. U.N. Emergency

Response Coordinator Jan Egeland initiated a systematic inventory of the community’s capacities several months before the Tsunami. When the results are available

later this year, IASC members and donors will have to consider whether a reallocation of resources and capacities to cover shortfalls in the essential services would

be appropriate.

Applying Humanitarian Standards. The humanitarian response to the crisis is far

from over. As I already have indicated, hundreds of thousands of those who survived

the Tsunami remain displaced, without employment, and still vulnerable to disease.

As relief activities continue, NGOs and other humanitarian responders must be

careful to maintain a level of care equal to the internationally accepted ‘‘Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response.’’ Incorporated

into our InterAction standards, these are recognized by the U.S. Government and

throughout most of the international humanitarian community as appropriate

guidelines for relief work.

Long-Term Commitment. Experience with myriad natural disasters has taught us

that full recovery and rehabilitation from such devastation takes between 5 and 10

years. There is understandable pressure to show quick results, and, as I have indicated, relief activities to date have preserved hundreds of thousands of lives. But

the task of rebuilding livelihoods and restoring communities requires planning,

strategizing, and realistic timeframes. We are encouraged that leadership roles

within the United Nations and the international financial institutions have been

identified to consolidate assessments and start reconstruction planning. We hope

the Administration and Congress stay the course on what will surely be a lengthy

reconstruction effort, building on the goodwill we have generated through our relief

efforts.

NGO Participation in Reconstruction Planning. We also must remember that

within the InterAction alliance, different agencies perform different functions. Some

respond only in the initial short-term relief phase, providing basic clinical and public health services, water and food, temporary shelter, etc. Others remain for the extended recovery and reconstruction phase, helping to rebuild the communities that

have been destroyed, either where they were or in more secure locations. Many of

the 70 InterAction member agencies responding to the Tsunami are planning to be

engaged over the longer-term. Thanks to the generosity of the American public quite

a few of our members are at or well on their way to meeting their funding targets,

which will enable them to do this. We underscore the importance of NGO participation in the donor conferences expected to be convened later this year. We believe

that the resources we will bring to the reconstruction phase, our long engagement

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with the local communities, and the partnerships we have with local organizations

will enable us to play an important role in the deliberations on reconstruction planning.

Respecting Local Communities and Capacities in the Recovery Process. As we

plan for the future we believe it important to remember, in the words of my colleague Peter Bell, President of CARE, USA, that ‘‘the largest contribution to the reconstruction effort will come from the hard work, ingenuity and capacity of citizens

in affected countries.’’ It will be important that national governments and donors

include in their planning processes consultation and coordination with civil society

and local authorities. The role of local communities in their own development and

rehabilitation is critical, with a focus on helping them rebuild their capacities. Special attention should be paid to vulnerable groups such as women-headed households, low caste individuals, children, and others who are traditionally outside the

formal decisionmaking structures of their communities. Likewise, and particularly

in those countries beset by civil wars, recovery programs must be designed and implemented in a manner that is perceived as fair and equitable, so that they do not

compound mistrust and existing grievances, especially in conflict areas.

Meeting Pledges. Mr. Chairman, the financial commitments made by the international community to relief and recovery have been extraordinary. But it is no secret that many pledges go unfulfilled and that it sometimes is hard to tell how much

funding is ‘‘new money.’’ At this early stage we also have only preliminary estimates

of the full cost of recovery and rehabilitation. Judging by what we have heard from

Members of Congress, we are gratified by what appears to be broad support for a

generous American government contribution to the financing of long-term programs.

Furthermore, my colleagues and I are persuaded that governmental funding to assist those affected by this disaster must be provided on a multi-year basis and on

flexible terms while memories of the devastation and suffering are fresh. We have

been pleased to hear the President and members of the Congress emphasize the

need for a long-term approach.

Forgotten Crises. Sadly, this crisis reminds us of all the equally tragic crises in

the world that are not receiving as much attention, such as Sudan’s Darfur region,

northern Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In just these three

countries many millions of lives have been lost and millions of innocent people continue to suffer the deadly consequences of conflict and violence. Some crises are silent, like the 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty in the developing world.

It is our hope that our leaders, including members of Congress, will take the opportunity to further educate and sensitize the American public to these ongoing humanitarian crises and extreme poverty. We will do our best to keep the spotlight on all

of these crises. The President was helpful on this front when he underscored to

Americans that the funds provided for relief and reconstruction to those affected by

the Tsunami should be seen as ‘‘extra help’’ and not as a replacement for donations

for other important needs.

Funding Needs. With these concerns in mind, we have recommended that the Congress provide $2 billion in emergency supplemental funding to meet needs not

only in the Tsunami-affected countries but also those elsewhere. We have urged that

$500–$600 million be used for non-military relief and reconstruction assistance to

Tsunami-affected countries, including the replenishment of USAID development and

disaster accounts from which funds were drawn for the initial Tsunami response.

An additional $400–$500 million is needed for other humanitarian needs in Sudan,

Congo, Uganda and elsewhere that otherwise would go unmet. Finally, $1 billion

should also be available for addressing the global shortfalls in emergency food aid,

some of which is needed in Tsunami affected countries.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your comments and to responding

to your questions.

Senator MURKOWSKI [presiding]. Mr. Toole.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL TOOLE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

EMERGENCY PROGRAMS, UNICEF, NEW YORK, NY

Mr. TOOLE. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, members of

the committee. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss

what UNICEF has been doing for the tsunami disaster, as well as

the United Nations as a whole.

I guess I would first take an opportunity, as others before me,

to thank the American Government, this administration, President

Bush himself, for the extraordinary response to the tsunami crisis.

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As an American citizen—and it is not so common in the U.N. system—I take real pride in the tremendous efforts of the United

States to alleviate the suffering of the tsunami victims. Americans

have opened their hearts, as well as their pocketbook, as has been

mentioned many times today. UNICEF has already raised over

$300 million for the crisis and over $60 million of that has come

from the American population itself, in addition to funds from the

American Government. I know I speak for the entire humanitarian

population and the community of aid workers saying thank you.

We are very, very grateful for the steadfast support.

I would add to that the incredible logistics and transport support

from the American military that UNICEF has also benefited from,

without which we would not have been able to deliver the assistance, as well as technical assistance from the CDC.

I would also thank the committee for its leadership in organizing

the hearing and hope you will continue your discussions.

Madam Chair, the events of about 6 weeks, as others have said,

were truly cataclysmic. I have traveled to the region twice. I came

back just on Sunday from my second trip. No words, no photo, no

amateur video can possibly show or demonstrate what has happened. Others have mentioned that before me. I will not repeat it.

But communities have suffered enormously and every picture that

you see, every video that you see, every scene of destruction that

you have seen are lives of people. There are pieces of clothing.

There is a CD. There is a photo album or a diploma that you find

on the ground. These are people’s lives that were disrupted. These

are people’s jobs that have been ruined. These are children who

are, indeed, traumatized.

More than a third of the victims were indeed children. In some

communities, UNICEF has found that the number may be as many

as half. Those children who have suffered and who are left are vulnerable because of their loss of homes, parents, family. They are

hungry. They are liable for disease. They are traumatized and they

are at a threat of exploitation and abuse.

Perhaps the saddest portion of the scenes that one sees is that,

indeed, there are more parents without children than children

without parents. Many, many children lost their lives.

Together with our U.N. and nongovernmental partners, UNICEF

is doing everything possible to eliminate the health and other risks

to survivors. That is our first job; to keep children alive. We have

assumed the lead coordination role in education, child protection,

and water and sanitation, as mentioned by others before me. Water

and sanitation is one of the most important strategies that we need

to pursue in the long term.

Indeed, although the sheer scale of the disaster and the numbers

of countries affected has presented enormous logistical problems,

coordination of relief efforts has actually been better than in the

past. It is better than in Darfur. It is better than it has been in

Afghanistan. UNICEF has already delivered more than 8 million

dollars’ worth of supplies and we have $45 million of supplies in

the pipeline to arrive in the next few weeks.

I will not go into detail, Madam Chair, but I do have a long

statement which I am happy to share with you and I am happy to

answer questions, should you have any.

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Early interventions by aid agencies and the swift response of the

international community, as a whole, have given cause for hope.

Thanks to the committed response of the international community,

media attention, and the strong leadership of the affected governments themselves, early fears of massive deaths after the tsunami

have not materialized. For example, though early media reports of

trafficking and abuse proved largely unsubstantiated, they nevertheless galvanized a powerful response that may have not emerged

as quickly without such attention. Early measures to protect children, many of them taken by the affected governments, doubtless

went a long way toward preventing further victimization. This

underlies the need to strengthen and accelerate our collective protection response so that it can become more predictable and ultimately more effective. There is a clear need for automatic and prevention-oriented protection responses in times of emergency.

Some of the other lessons that we have seen already. There is

a clear message that we need to invest in national capacity to respond, and speakers before me have mentioned that. The strength

of the national response in Thailand and India in particular stand

testament to what can be achieved when governments have the

proper tools in place. Here again preparedness should be the watch

word. We know that our assistance cannot stop once these early

interventions are over, once the threat of disease subsides, once the

first day of school has passed.

In UNICEF we often say we work in countries before, during,

and after an emergency. We also work on both sides of crises and

conflict, adhering to the universal humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. That is why, if you travel to Sri Lanka or

Aceh a year or two from now, you will still find our staff and other

NGOs working to help government and civil society to support the

long-term rehabilitation and recovery of all the region, whatever

their political allegiance may be.

Too often in the past, the international community has allowed

its attention to wander; wander away too soon, depleting political

will and resources before the job is truly over. Others before me

have said that we must not let that happen. I echo that theme. We

must invest for the long term. We must invest in a flexible and

long-term support to tsunami victims.

One of the most important outcomes that could arise from the

disaster would be peace-building, as has been mentioned. Madam

Chair, it is clear that despite recent setbacks, an opportunity does

exist to pursue negotiated settlements in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia. I urge this committee to use the tremendous political capital

at its disposal to bring conflicting parties together in both of these

stricken countries. Indeed, the continued leadership and support of

the U.S. Government is vital in every respect. The long-term commitment of the international community, as a whole, is essential to

helping tsunami-stricken communities move from relief to recovery.

I hope the U.S. Senate will remain engaged in this issue, and for

my part, I would be happy to return later to testify and provide an

update on what has actually been accomplished.

Madam Chair, UNICEF has always worked in emergencies, both

natural and manmade. Originally we were called the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund. It has always been

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a part of our business. It comes out of the shattered past of the

Second World War. Much has changed since then, but our fundamental purpose has not. Emergencies today represent 40 percent of

our activities. In health, nutrition, water, sanitation, protection,

education, as well as the protection against HIV/AIDS our core

commitments to children in emergencies are more than a mission

statement. They are a humanitarian imperative.

Therefore, even as we continue our work in tsunami-affected

countries, we must help focus public and government attention to

other forgotten countries. Sudan with a recent peace agreement

gives some cause for hope but also creates the need for rapid, positive change to build confidence and better social services in Liberia,

where we must consolidate the initial steps toward peace and normalcy, and in other countries as far afield as Afghanistan, Cote

d’Ivoire, Haiti, or even the Central African Republic.

Madam Chair, members of the committee, thank you on behalf

of UNICEF. Thank you on behalf of the United Nations for your

continued and strong support. Together we can improve the lives

of millions of children in emergencies across the globe by starting

with this response in the tsunami.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Toole follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAN TOOLE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY

OPERATIONS, UNICEF, NEW YORK, NY

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to

discuss UNICEF’s response to aid victims of the tsunami.

Before I begin, however, I would like to take this opportunity on behalf of

UNICEF to extend our deepest appreciation for the support and leadership of this

Administration, and of President Bush, in responding to the tsunami crisis. As a

citizen of this country, I take real pride in the tremendous efforts of the United

States to alleviate the suffering of tsunami victims. Americans have opened their

hearts—and their pocketbooks—in an unprecedented way; the American public

alone has donated over $60 million to UNICEF in support of the tsunami. I know

I speak for the entire humanitarian community when I say that we are all truly

grateful for the tremendous support of the United States.

The U.S. military has offered key logistical support, particularly in the Aceh region of Indonesia. The inter-agency health assessment on the West Coast of Indonesia would not have been possible without the USS Lincoln. The USNS Mercy has

now moved into Indonesian coastal waters, and has already begun to assist

UNICEF in our efforts to provide primary health care to affected populations there.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has seconded a number of staff to

UNICEF Indonesia, offering technical expertise in malaria prevention, diarrheal diseases, and measles.

In this, as in any emergency, UNICEF does not work alone. I would like to thank

our partners in the NGO community and our sister U.N. agencies, as well as our

government partners around the world for their invaluable support and assistance.

Finally, I would also like to commend this Committee for its leadership in remaining focused on this issue, and for holding this hearing today.

Mr. Chairman, the events of 6 weeks ago can only be described as cataclysmic.

I have travelled the region twice since the tsunami struck, and I can tell you that

no words, no photo, no amateur video could ever capture the devastation I saw

there. Indeed, despite more than 20 years of working in development and humanitarian assistance, I have never seen this sort of destruction before.

No doubt you have all heard the figure: Over 5 million people have been affected

by this calamity. But even a number like this falls short of describing the enormity

of the situation. People have lost family, friends, homes, and livelihoods. They have

also lost doctors and teachers, roads and bridges, schools and hospitals. The very

lifeblood of their communities has been washed away. In some parts of Aceh, the

destruction goes nearly 5 miles inland—scarcely a tree or a building remains. Nor

were these ‘‘little peasant shacks’’ or huts on the beach—these were houses made

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of reinforced concrete, two and three stories high. Now all that remains of these

neighborhoods are ragged walls of perhaps a foot high.

The photos you have seen show miles of rubble, and that is what is left. But remember, the rubble is people’s lives. There are bits of clothing—a CD, a photo

album, a diploma, an intact bottle of chili sauce and a half case of soda—random

bits of thousands of lives now gone.

I flew down the coast to Meulaboh in a helicopter, and—thanks to the U.S. military—returned that way as well. The scene was one of nightmarish destruction.

Near Banda Aceh, where the coastline is one of rugged cliffs, a band of white salt

marks where the swelling sea reached the height of a four-story building. Where

there are depressions and bays, as in Banda Aceh itself, the rushing water destroyed everything in its path. Imagine four waves, each 40 feet high or more, carrying cement, chairs, cars. I could describe for you a litany of surreal images: A bulldozer carried 4 miles inland and discarded in the middle of a withered rice paddy;

a huge petroleum barge hurled into someone’s home a mile and a half from the

coast; palm trees flattened in a row like the tines of a comb.

And this is to say nothing of the damage caused by the earthquake itself. Nine

point zero on the Richter scale—it is difficult to imagine. The aftershocks alone,

measuring 6.5, tore through Aceh with the same force as the earthquake that devastated Kobe, Japan in 1995. We are only now beginning to assess the damage

caused before the waves hit.

But of course it is not the toll upon brick and mortar that is so devastating to

see. It is the human stories that tear your heart out, and they are seemingly endless. Despite my many years cultivating a ‘‘steely exterior’’ in emergencies, it was

still a tremendous effort not to break up in the face of these tragedies. A woman

in Mulativo Sri Lanka, lost two of her children and her husband in an instant. She

managed to get one daughter on a roof and scurry up a tree with her 8-month old,

only to have the baby ripped from her arms. Two weeks later, she sobs inconsolably,

her face the epitome of horror and despair. What can we say? Another woman lost

34 people in her family—three generations. She is left with a grandson who was

away visiting an uncle, and a daughter whose home she was visiting when the

waves hit. Story after story, person after person. Random destruction, random horror that has burrowed deep into the mind. People who just stare at the sea or at

a roof and who won’t speak. It will take a long time to heal; some may never get

there.

More than a third of the victims of the tsunami were children. In some communities, UNICEF has found that the number is much higher—as many as half. Those

children who survived are left vulnerable by the loss of homes, parents and family.

For them, the threat has not yet passed. Hunger, disease, trauma and the threat

of exploitation still pose serious risks.

Together with our U.N. and non-governmental partners, UNICEF is doing everything possible to eliminate these risks. We have helped ensure that there is clean

water in Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, and even as far away as

Somalia. Latrines have been established for the tens of thousands of displaced living

in camps or with local communities. We have distributed health kits and basic supplies like clothing and plastic tarps to provide temporary shelter, ensure good nutrition, and guard against disease. We have supported the affected governments and

our NGO partners to set up protective environments for children, including those

who have lost their parents. And we have undertaken vaccination campaigns

against deadly illnesses such as measles. To date, UNICEF has shipped over 2,000

metric tons of relief supplies in response to this emergency, at a total value of over

$8 million. In all, some $45 million worth of supplies have been ordered.

These early interventions, and the swift response of the international community

as a whole, have given cause for hope. No doubt we all remember the early fears

that disease might double the number of casualties, and the alarming media reports

of trafficking of children. Thanks to the committed response of the international

community and the strong leadership of the affected governments themselves, these

fears have largely failed to materialize.

This is thanks in large measure to the unprecedented degree of coordination

among humanitarian actors. The sheer scale of this disaster and the number of

countries affected has presented an enormous logistical challenge. Even so, however,

coordination of relief efforts among U.N. actors—and between the United Nations,

NGOs and governments—has shown a vast improvement over previous emergencies.

Under OCHA’s overall leadership, humanitarian actors have engaged in regular,

systematized information-sharing and planning to map out response, helping to ensure that every need is covered without unnecessary duplication. In spite of the

large number of agencies operating in the field, we are working well together.

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Under this overall umbrella, UNICEF has assumed the leading coordination role

in certain key sectors—namely, education, child protection, and water and sanitation. In nutrition, we share a leadership role with our partners in the World Food

Program, and in health, we are collaborating with the World Health Organization.

With respect to the latter, vaccination campaigns throughout the affected areas

were one of our earliest priorities. In India, measles and vitamin A drives began

within days of the disaster, and by January 7th these campaigns had already

wrapped up on the mainland. The remote Andaman and Nicobar Islands took longer

to reach, but thanks to the cooperation of the Indian government, immunization of

children is now well underway.

In the Aceh region of Indonesia, where over 75 percent of health care professionals are still unaccounted for, we are working in close collaboration with key

partners including: The World Health Organization, Me ́decins sans Frontie`res,

IFRC, Care, and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to provide measles vaccines and vitamin A supplements to over half a million children between the ages

of 6 months and 15 years. We are also providing basic drugs and supplies for health

facilities to cover 1.2 million people, including 1 million sachets of oral re-hydration

salts, malaria treatment for 3.2 million people, 2,700,000 iron tablets, 68,000 syringes, and 11,500 safety boxes.

UNICEF also participated in the recent inter-agency health assessment on the

west coast of Indonesia. This 24-person assessment team, consisting of U.N. agencies and NGOs, was only possible as a result of logistical support from the United

States. It covered numerous sites previously unassessed on the West Coast, using

four teams operating simultaneously and supported by U.S. helicopters for drop-off

and pick-up. The assessment took 6 days in total, hosted on the USS Lincoln.

As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, our deepest gratitude goes to the U.S. military for this and other crucial assistance. U.S. military support continues to prove

invaluable in Indonesia, and I would especially like to highlight the USNS Mercy,

a floating hospital of exceptional resources. UNICEF and the crew of the Mercy have

already begun technical-level discussions to assess the many ways in which the

Mercy can support key areas of public health such as water quality, malaria prevention and control, emergency obstetrical care and safe motherhood, measles vaccination programs, and psychosocial support.

Needless to say, however, the threat of disease remains. Clean water and proper

sanitation are a critical and growing problem, especially for the hundreds of thousands of tsunami survivors living in temporary camps. The risk of water-borne diseases such as cholera and diarrhea is high, especially for children.

The sanitation situation is particularly worrying in Indonesia, where in some

areas of Aceh Province, only one in 1,000 people has access to a toilet. This shortage

has been exacerbated by heavy rains, which have flooded many toilets in low-lying

camps, forcing displaced people to relocate to higher ground. Heavy rains have worsened the situation in Sri Lanka as well, where only 35 percent of people in camps

have access to safe sanitation. And in the Maldives, water and sanitation has proven to be the greatest challenge. The extremely low altitude of these islands rendered

them especially vulnerable to damage and contamination of water supplies and sewage systems. As early as December 28, UNICEF estimated that one in five islands

in the Maldives was without safe drinking water. Compounding the problem, virtually every household on the affected islands reported blocked or damaged sewage

systems.

In response, we are working with governments to coordinate aid agency relief efforts across the tsunami-affected countries to restore access to safe water and sanitation. In the Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar Districts of Indonesia, UNICEF is pumping and chlorinating 1,500 wells to benefit 15,000 people, and supplying mobile

water treatment units at six locations along both East and West Coasts to benefit

25,000 people. Construction of emergency latrines is ongoing, and we are also providing bathing and washing facilities for 43,000 people in settlements for the displaced.

In Sri Lanka, UNICEF has distributed hundreds of tons of water and sanitation

supplies, including bottled drinking water, water purification tablets, water tanks,

pumps, jerry cans, and family water kits, to name but a few. We have constructed

more than 1,500 temporary latrines, and are supporting the establishment of women’s bathing facilities at relocation sites for the displaced.

And in the Maldives, we have distributed Basic Family Water Kits, containing collapsible buckets, bars of soap and purification tablets, including instructions on

their use in the local language. We are helping the government to construct latrines,

and have supplied hundreds of wheelbarrows, shovels, rakes, disinfectant, and other

cleaning equipment to address the problem of garbage disposal. Across the

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Maldives, UNICEF and its partners are assisting 69 islands with over 13,000 households.

These and other UNICEF water and sanitation projects will be supported by the

Tsunami Water and Sanitation Fund, created last month in partnership with the

Clinton Foundation as part of President Bush’s campaign for private sector support

to the tsunami crisis. The new fund will support a robust series of programs designed not only to restore safe water and sanitation for affected countries, but to

improve upon what existed before. And of course, former President Clinton will now

support the tsunami effort more broadly as Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Special

Envoy for Tsunami-affected Countries.

Turning to the issue of protection, UNICEF and other child protection agencies

have been deeply concerned over reports of children being exploited or trafficked.

For the most part, however, these reports have thankfully remained unsubstantiated. This is in part because the number of separated children—those no longer

in the care of their parents—and unaccompanied children—those no longer in the

care of an adult—is relatively small. Though it varies among countries, the devastation of the tsunami was such that many children simply did not survive; as a result,

there are few children at all in some of the worst hit areas, unaccompanied or otherwise.

In addition, the affected communities generally have a strong tradition of caring

for children who have lost parents, and as a result we can say confidently that the

number of children requiring full-time care from child protection agencies is very

small.

In Indonesia, UNICEF and its partners have registered 440 separated and 31 unaccompanied children. In Sri Lanka, there are 1,500 separated children living with

family, and fewer than 50 children are unaccompanied; 4,000 Sri Lankan children

have lost at least one parent. In neighboring India, we have identified 361 children

who have lost both parents, and over 1,800 who lost one. Approximately 500 children in Thailand have lost one parent or guardian, and 73 lost both parents.

Considering the magnitude of this emergency, the number of unaccompanied children is relatively small; however, it is still crucial to ensure that these children are

protected from those who would prey upon their vulnerability. In this regard,

UNICEF commends the swift and decisive leadership of the affected governments.

Through the imposition of moratoria on international adoptions, the tightening of

port and border security and other measures, affected governments have helped ensure that their children are not victimized yet again by the tsunami. In addition,

I would like to offer our sincere thanks for the statement issued by the U.S. Government in the early days of the crisis underlining the essential role of extended family

and community placement for children who had lost their parents. It was a helpful

initiative prompting national governments to strengthen their own measures to protect children from illicit adoption or trafficking.

UNICEF and its partners have also taken protective measures for unaccompanied

children. In part through generous support from USAID, child centers have been established throughout the affected areas to register unaccompanied and separated

children, and to set up family tracing mechanisms to help locate loved ones. Children who are no longer in the care of their families will be protected and supported

through these centers so that they are not abandoned or left to fend for themselves,

but have the opportunity to go to school, eat well and play. We are distributing

Family Kits to support households who are caring for separated children, and monitoring mechanisms have been put into place to ensure that children living with foster families are being cared for responsibly.

But it is not just separated and unaccompanied children that need our protection.

Thousands of children living in displacement camps are vulnerable to exploitation

and abuse, and in some cases recruitment into local fighting groups. And virtually

every child in the affected areas is experiencing some form of psychological distress

arising from the disaster. For these children, it is crucial to re-establish some sense

of normalcy, and ensure that there are safe places for them to learn, play, and interact.

Throughout the affected regions, UNICEF has been supporting local governments

in their efforts to get children back to school—or, where this is not possible, ‘‘back

to learning.’’ We have shipped literally tons of educational materials, including thousands of school tents, school-in-a-box kits, and recreation kits including sports and

games. We are supporting teacher training, including training in psychosocial support, and are assisting the Government of Indonesia to recruit teachers to replace

the 2,000 education professionals who were killed in the tsunami.

Even once schools have re-opened, however, the psychological impact on ‘‘the tsunami generation’’ is likely to be deep and long term, and will require sustained psychosocial care. Throughout the affected areas, we are supporting community- and

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school-based psychosocial responses to help children cope with the enduring impacts

of this tragedy.

In Sri Lanka, for example, UNICEF is training non-governmental partners, teachers and local authorities in psychosocial response, including developing projects

where children can help each other. In the districts of Batticaloa, Trincomalee and

Kirinda, UNICEF and its partners have established spaces in displacement camps

where children can learn and play safely, where they can interact with each other

in a stable environment. Thousands of play kits, including toys, puzzles and sports

equipment, are being distributed. Through play, drawing and structured recreation

activities, children in Sri Lanka and elsewhere are coming to terms with the terrible

losses they have suffered.

Thus far, there have been only scattered reports of abuse and trafficking, and

those generally unconfirmed. Nevertheless, UNICEF Is taking precautionary measures, including extensive awareness-raising campaigns and the training of military

and police officers in child protection issues.

Mr. Chairman, one of the most important lessons we can draw from these figures

is that, as the old adage goes, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

Though early media reports of trafficking and abuse proved largely unsubstantiated,

they nevertheless galvanized a powerful response that may not have emerged as

quickly otherwise. Just as swift vaccination campaigns, Vitamin A distribution and

the provision of clean water helped stave off disease, early measures to protect children—many of them taken by the affected governments themselves—most likely

went a long way toward preventing the further victimization of children.

This points to a need which has been increasingly apparent to child protection

agencies of late: The need to mainstream our collective protection response so that

it becomes more predictable and, ultimately, more efficient. Just as we know from

experience to distribute oral re-hydration salts and water purification tablets in

times of flood, so too should we have automatic, preventive protection responses in

times of emergency.

But our assistance does not stop once these early interventions are over—once the

threat of diseases subsides and the first day of school has passed. In UNICEF, we

often say we work in a country before, during and after an emergency. We also work

on both sides of a conflict, adhering to the universal humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. That is why, if you travel to Sri Lanka or Aceh in a year

or two, you will see our staff helping governments and civil society to reconstruct

school buildings and health clinics, and to support the long-term rehabilitation and

recovery of all regions, whatever their political allegiance. Too often in the past, the

international community has allowed its attention to wander away too soon, depleting political will and resources before the job is truly over. We must not allow that

to happen here.

Another lesson we can take away from this tragedy is the importance of investing

in national capacity to respond to disasters. The strength of the national response

in Thailand and India stand testament to what can be achieved when governments

have the proper tools in place. The international community will always respond

when disaster strikes, but national capacity is critical. Here again, preparedness is

the watchword.

And it is not only governments who need to be prepared. The international humanitarian community also has a responsibility in this regard. So what about us?

Were we at UNICEF ready for such a massive emergency? Of course not. No one

could have planned for a calamity of this scale. However, the lessons of Darfur, Afghanistan and Liberia have helped us to respond faster and more efficiently. They

have also shown all of us in the United Nations the vital importance of coordination.

Now we need to carry these lessons forward to other emergencies.

Mr. Chairman, UNICEF has always worked in emergencies, both natural and

man-made. Originally called the United Nations International Children’s Emergency

Fund, the organization was created to provide humanitarian assistance to children

living in a world shattered by the Second World War. Much has changed since then,

but our fundamental purpose has not. Emergencies still account for 40 percent of

our activities. In health and nutrition, water and sanitation, protection, education

and HIV/AIDS, our Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies are more than

a mission statement—they are a humanitarian imperative.

Therefore, even as we continue our work in tsunami-affected countries, we must

help focus public and government attention to other, forgotten countries: Sudan,

where the recent peace agreement gives some cause for hope, but also creates a

need for rapid and positive change to build confidence and better social services; in

Liberia where we must consolidate our initial steps toward peace and normalcy; in

Afghanistan where massive support is still necessary to build peace; and in other

countries such as Cote d’lvoire, Haiti and the Central African Republic.

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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you on behalf of UNICEF for

your continued strong support. Together, we can improve the lives of millions of

children in emergencies across the globe, building better opportunities, better futures, for every child.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Toole.

Ms. Lindborg.

STATEMENT OF NANCY LINDBORG, PRESIDENT, MERCY

CORPS, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you, Madam Chair, Senator Biden. We appreciate your leadership on this and so many issues and, at this

point, your stamina. We appreciate your inviting us to share our

early reflections on how the international community has responded to the devastation of the tsunami.

A few weeks ago, I had the opportunity to travel to Sri Lanka

and Indonesia and I stood with our team in the village of Miruk

Lam Reudeup, which is just outside Banda Aceh in Indonesia. I

think it is fair to describe that area as Ground Zero. It suffered

from both the earthquake and the devastation of the tsunami. As

you have heard throughout the morning, it is a scene of some devastation, the churned debris that covers what used to be homes and

villages.

While I was there, we began working with villagers, who had

come from nearby displaced camps, in a cash-for-work program

that paid the villagers to do the projects that they had deemed the

highest priority. In that instance, it was to clear the roads so they

could reenter their villages to see what was left and, on a more

gruesome note, to enable the Indonesian military to come in and

retrieve the bodies that were still under the debris. It was a pretty

sobering and pretty desolate sight.

But, just yesterday, I received an e-mail from a member of our

team on the ground, and he writes that since my visit, the recovery

has really been remarkable. You would not believe this place, if you

saw it, he writes. The village has a new well, a generator that runs

the water pump, lights that extend the workday well into night. All

the roads are cleared. People are returning home and beginning to

rebuild. Small businesses that service the reconstruction effort are

popping up. Jobs are being generated. Markets are open. The people in the village, he writes, are several steps ahead of the government and the international NGOs.

I wanted to share that reflection with you because it captures a

really important point that I would like to make, and that is, relief

and recovery works best when it is planned and executed in close

partnership with the communities affected by a disaster. Many of

these community members, despite the considerable trauma that

we have heard quite a bit about today and the enormous loss

caused by this disaster, are at this point survivors, and many of

them have the will and the know-how to help shape the best response to the disaster.

I was asked to reflect a little bit on where I thought the NGOs

were most effective in this response. I would like to just hit three

points.

The first is that, because of the long-term investments in development that many of us have made, in partnership with the U.S.

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Government, in so many of these countries, we were able to respond quickly through our partnerships with local communities

and local governments, with our own staff members who were

poised and ready to go in, and with local knowledge, networks, and

suppliers. A quick example is that Mercy Corps has worked in Sumatra for several years with a U.S. Department of Agriculture program. Because of our nearby location to Aceh, we were able to be

at the border quickly with a seasoned team, with assets, trucks,

motorcycles, and office supplies ready to go as the border opened.

That is the result of long-term development investments.

Second, I think we have done our best work when we are able

to leverage the energy and the ingenuity of the local communities.

I cited the cash-for-work example in Aceh. This means being able

to see the best ways to support the community as they move forward in their own recovery. It means investing in their efforts. For

example, seeing that there is a brick factory that, with a capital

investment, can get back up and running, supply bricks for the effort, employ individuals, and give them the capacity to earn income

and make their own decisions about how to move forward.

In Meulaboh, for example, we very quickly helped local community members move, within the first 10 days, 28 boats back down

to the ocean, repair them, and get them back out to sea. As one

fisherman told me, I am still afraid to go too far out, but it feels

good to get back into some routine.

Third, as has been noted, there has been an unprecedented response by private donors throughout the world, and Americans

have been extraordinarily generous. That incredible pipeline of

flexible, fast money has enabled the NGOs to mobilize quickly.

From the very first day, we were able to move in with resources

and were able to undertake immediate distributions. It has enabled

us to be so flexible that as the situation, which is extraordinarily

dynamic, has changed, we have been able to adjust our programs

to support recovery efforts as quickly as is needed. It has proven

to be a remarkable asset, if we ever have had any doubt, in enabling that response.

I would like to comment briefly on two challenges that remain,

although, I think we have made great progress on both in this particular response. The first is the challenge of material aid. We have

seen this in many emergencies stemming from extreme good will

and wonderful motivation. Well-meaning people want to respond by

providing things, medicines, clothes and items that, although wellintentioned, end up clogging up our logistical pipelines and are

often not appropriate for the environment. For example, I met with

a Sri Lankan village leader who was a bit perplexed at a shipment

of ties and miniskirts that he had just received. There are many

very important uses of material aid, but it has to be demand-driven, well-targeted, appropriate, and prioritized.

The good news is we have made enormous progress with this response. We have seen messages in mainstream publications to

please donate cash instead of goods. Great credit is due to Presidents Bush and Clinton for their carrying that message so effectively as well.

Second, we have talked a lot through the morning about coordination, and I think that we were challenged to coordinate because

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of the enormity of the response. So, many groups and individuals

who have not previously worked in emergency environments,

through the best of intentions, showed up. But the good news is

that the experienced actors, the U.N. and the NGO community,

they were able to quickly, on the ground, reconstitute the international architecture that does exist.

Just to give you a sense of what that looks like on the ground:

In Indonesia, when I was there, every morning at 7 o’clock, there

was a meeting between U.N. representatives and NGOs to talk

about the key issues for a half-hour, followed by sectoral and regional meetings that appropriate NGO representatives then attended through the day. There is also a humanitarian information

center established by the United Nations. So, if you are new to the

scene, you can plug in, see who is doing what, who has which resources and where.

Just a quick example; a very small example of how that works.

In Meulaboh, Mercy Corps was able to bring in several shipments

of dried fish. We learned that Catholic Relief Services was distributing a food basket that lacked protein but they had the networks

in the displaced camps. We were able to add our fish to their food

basket so that there was a complete food basket distributed to

those families. Those kinds of examples occur every day in many,

many ways.

One way in which all of this coordination becomes very helpful

is that it gives us a mechanism to deal with the sensitive issues,

one of which is shelter. The whole question of shelter is quite complicated in Aceh where there are 450,000 displaced people. The

United Nations, the NGOs, and the Indonesian Government have

been able to form an integrated task force to look at how to ensure

the best setting for the proposed barracks. So, some of the early

concerns have not materialized, although it is an issue that we will

all be looking at closely, but with good dialog and good coordination

among all the various actors there.

Finally, I would like to end with just two recommendations as we

look forward. The first is to really urge that we look again at how

to establish funding mechanisms that distribute money much more

quickly and effectively over longer time periods. We had a great advantage because of the private resources that were available for the

tsunami. We do not always, in fact, we rarely have that advantage.

We see what a great benefit that is for ensuring a very fast and

effective response that can move to meet changing needs as quickly

as the situation demands.

Second—and this is pertinent as you look at both the supplemental request and the FY 2006 budget—it is critical to maintain

our solid investments in development. As important as these emergency responses are, it is critical that we do not forget the value

of long-term development programming, the value that it played in

this response, and also in meeting the many silent tsunamis

around the world.

I will not say more because I was very heartened to hear the concern among many of the Senators on this committee that we not

forget either of those important areas.

As we reflect on this first period of response, I think there is

much to commend. I think that the international community drew

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together and we were able to avert some of the biggest fears that

we had. We were able to access some of these very difficult areas

and meet the immediate needs. Kids are back at school in Aceh

and the risk of widespread disease has been averted.

I will say, however, that now is when the hard work begins.

These are extraordinarily complex situations and there will be rebuilding efforts that will take us through the next 5 to 8 years. It

is important that we not lose that focus. I would urge you all to

consider holding a hearing in another 6 to 12 months to check in

how that longer term effort is going. In the meantime, we will continue to take our cue from the enormous courage of all the survivors with whom we are working.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NANCY LINDBORG, PRESIDENT, MERCY CORPS, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting

me to share my thoughts on the humanitarian response to the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. The tsunami delivered a historic and devastating punch

through a region that spanned 11 nations, requiring a fast and comprehensive response. This disaster severely tested the international relief infrastructure, and I

believe we can draw from this experience valuable lessons that will inform our planning and response to future emergencies. I applaud the committee for taking the

time to explore these issues, appreciate as always the leadership of Chairman Lugar

and Senator Biden, and look forward to working with you to improve our capacity

to respond to future disasters.

A few weeks ago, I traveled to Sri Lanka and Indonesia. I stood with our field

staff in the utterly devastated village of Miruk Lam Reudeup in the Aceh Province

of Indonesia. I think it’s fair to describe that area as Ground Zero for the disaster,

as it was affected both by the earthquake and the massive tsunami that followed.

Most of us have seen the images of churned debris and devastated landscapes.

While I was there, Mercy Corps began working with the villagers in a cash-for-work

program that paid them to do projects they identified as most important. They

began by clearing the road into their village, so they could pick through the remains

of their houses, and most importantly, the Indonesia military could gain access to

recover the many bodies under the wreckage. It was a desolate scene, with villagers

wearing face masks and laboriously clearing the way to their former homes.

But just yesterday, I got an e-mail from Dan Curran, a member of the Mercy

Corps team in Aceh. He writes that since my visit there, the recovery has moved

quickly. ‘‘You would not believe this place if you saw it,’’ he wrote. The village has

a new well, a generator that runs the water pump, and enough lights to extend the

work day well into the night. The roads have been cleared. People are returning

home and re-building with whatever materials they can salvage. Small businesses

that service the reconstruction effort are popping up around town, providing much

needed jobs and building supplies. ‘‘The people in this village,’’ Dan wrote, ‘‘are several steps ahead of the government and the international NGOs.’’

Dan’s observation captures well one of my key points today: Relief and recovery

works best when planned and executed in close partnership with the communities

affected by a disaster, whether natural or man-made. Many of these communities

have the will and the know-how to shape the best response to the situation—the

international community needs to fully use and support these local assets.

In responding to the Indian Ocean tsunami, the international NGO community

was most effective when it leveraged the energy and ingenuity of the affected communities, when we have made long-term investments in building local capabilities,

and when we have the resources and flexibility to support local initiatives.

We have passed the critical first month of response. As we reflect on the response

to date, there is much to commend. The world has responded with incredible generosity. Many nations were able to work together to access difficult areas and provide essential services. Schools have reopened in Aceh. Conflicts have abated. Major

disease outbreaks have been averted. I think we can be proud of the response.

And now the really hard work begins.

I would like to offer a few comments from the perspective of an NGO, about the

NGO response to this tragedy:

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1. Ongoing Investments in Longer Term Development Enabled a Fast, Effective Response

First, many of us had a fast and substantial immediate response to the emergency. Because many of us have been working on the ground in India, Sri Lanka,

Sumatra and elsewhere, we were in a position to deploy the right people and resources on very short notice. We were able to do so because we have existing networks of local teams, local partners and suppliers. In those critical first hours after

the emergency, it is the people on the ground who are able to reach those affected

most quickly.

For example, Mercy Corps teams were waiting at the Aceh border as government

officials opened that border for the first time in a year and able to cross into Aceh

with a seasoned team, an office set-up and supplies. We are able to do so thanks

largely to the fact we have several ongoing development focused USDA programs

in Sumatra. Through these programs, Mercy Corps distributes soy milk to more

than 100,000 schoolchildren and supports local NGOs in microfinance, water and

sanitation, capacity building and relief activities. Due to these USDA programs,

Mercy Corps was able to quickly redeploy staff, equipment, and resources to Aceh

and provide immediate food, temporary shelter, and water to thousands of survivors.

Our familiarity with Sumatra and working with the local NGO sector have also

proved helpful in our effort to move quickly into community recovery activities, a

process that will continue to rely on partnerships with local NGOs and community

groups. Within the week, we were distributing food to more than 60,000 individuals

using World Food Programme resources.

2. Early Developmental Relief Focus Supported Local Capacity

Second, Mercy Corps, like some other NGOs, sought and implemented innovations

that moved the response quickly into recovery programs. As always, Mercy Corps

made an effort to be flexible and entrepreneurial. We looked for gaps in the response and moved immediately to fill them. Mercy Corps participated fully in the

effort to meet urgent needs—distribution of food, health and hygiene supplies,

household kits and other essentials—but we also immediately started working with

local communities to determine the necessary next steps for recovery. The cleanup

and income needs in affected areas were tremendous, but so were the supply of

labor and enthusiasm among local workers.

As I noted earlier, Mercy Corps started a cash-for-work program that paid locals

to clear roads, rebuild schools, and maintain IDP camps. We employed more than

1,600 people in Banda Aceh alone, giving families the income to buy much-needed

staples and making communities livable again. The NGO community was able to

work with communities, to assist kids to return to school, help fisherman repair

their boats and support a return to their homes.

3. Ability to Mobilize Private Resources Enabled a Fast and Innovative Response

Third, we benefited from an unprecedented amount of private resources. If we

ever had any doubt, this crisis proved the enduring value of fast, flexible resource

pipelines. Without having to wait for institutional donors, many NGOs were able

to move quickly into the affected areas and begin delivering vital assistance. We are

essentially the arms and legs of the international response, and this time around,

we were resourced so we could mobilize fully and quickly. All too often, we are

scraping for funding early on in a crisis while institutional funding sources get underway.

As importantly, as the situation changed, we were able to identify innovative solutions and work with communities to devise assistance options that most met their

needs. For example, Mercy Corps was able to begin cash-for-work programs as soon

as community members identified their desire to get back to work. We were then

able to begin investing in small entrepreneurial efforts designed to jumpstart the

local economies, providing income and jobs. Once these efforts demonstrated an effective approach, we could scale them up. A cash-for-work program that began with

100 villagers in Miruk Lam Reudeup is now employing more than 2,000 workers

throughout Aceh, with support from OFDA, OTI and UNDP.

Unfortunately, we can’t count on this level of public support, especially for the

more complicated and hidden emergencies we typically address.

4. Challenges of Material Aid Remain

One of the chronic problems we face in highly publicized humanitarian efforts is

too much material aid. Generous and well-meaning people—though schools, workplaces, places of worship—want to contribute to the relief effort and send clothes,

food, and other supplies. Unfortunately, those donated items tend to clog up our finite transportation and logistics systems with goods that may not always be a top

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priority. While in Sri Lanka, I spoke with one village leader who noted a supply

of neckties and miniskirts he recently received. Although much can be done responsibly with material aid, it must be demand-driven, well-targeted, appropriate and

prioritized.

The good news is that we’ve made significant progress on this issue. Our collective

public reminders that cash donations are most effective in such emergencies seem

to be getting through. Mainstream publications carried this message as did Presidents Bush and Clinton. But we need to continue driving home that message because the wrong donated goods continue to gum up the works.

5. Coordination Systems Worked

Despite the appearance of chaos, there is an effective international infrastructure

for coordinating these responses. It occurs at many levels: Internationally between

donors, at a country level, and in each region. Experienced responders know how

to constitute this system in each new emergency.

In India and Sri Lanka, the governments managed the coordination, while NGOs

worked in sector and regional working groups to share information and resources.

In Indonesia, the government designated its military leadership to coordinate with

the many international militaries that responded, while asking the United Nations

to coordinate the international NGOs and other international organizations.

So what does this look like on the ground? In Indonesia for example, there are

regular—at first daily—morning meetings with the key U.N. agencies and NGO representatives to identify top issues of the day. There are then a series of sector specific and regional meetings that appropriate U.N., NGO and government representatives attend. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has set

up a Humanitarian Information Center to facilitate information exchange. Finally,

there is a group of NGOs that meets each week to identify critical issues as well.

In practice this means that in Meulaboh, for example, Mercy Corps was able to

procure several shipments of dried fish. Catholic Relief Services was distributing a

food basket from the World Food Programme, and although they had established the

distribution network, they lacked any protein component. Aware of this gap, we

gave them the fish for their teams to distribute so villagers would receive a complete food basket.

It also means that as difficult and complex issues such as shelter are addressed,

there are mechanisms for working together. With nearly 450,000 displaced people

in Aceh, the question of shelter is enormous. The majority of those people are living

with host families, in a remarkable tribute to the Indonesian concept of ‘‘Pella

Gandong’’ or taking care of each other. But even so, there is a need to identify temporary options for nearly 150,000 of the homeless. The Indonesia government, U.N.

and NGO community have set up a joint process for an integrated planning approach with the intention to ensure the best site selection, design and operation of

the barracks now proposed in 24 sites.

6. Collective Commitment to Accountability and Standards in Place

NGOs have collaborated extensively with one another and with the U.N. community over the past 8 years to develop increased levels of accountability and effectiveness in our relief operations. The results are evident in the standards agreed by

InterAction, an association of 160 U.S.-based relief and development organizations,

and in the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. Mercy Corps field staff in Aceh report that the level of understanding and

adherence to the Sphere standards among the established NGOs has been unprecedented, which has brought a greater degree of accountability and uniformity to the

effort.

Two critical challenges stem from the inevitable ranks of highly motivated often

brand-new organizations and individuals that are compelled to respond. As is often

the case, they flocked to the tsunami-affected areas, swelled the ranks and made

coordination more difficult. This is not a new phenomenon and usually quiets down

after the first few weeks, but it does increase an impression of chaos that can be

misleading.

In addition, many new or less experienced organizations that don’t meet key

standards undermine the effectiveness of our collective response and divert valuable

resources from the collective effort.

To conclude, I would offer the following recommendations as we assess our performance in the Indian Ocean region and explore ways to plan and execute better

humanitarian responses in the future:

1. Establish a mechanism for rapid disbursement of U.S. Government relief funds.

As I mentioned above, this extraordinary tragedy brought about extraordinary generosity from individual donors; as a result, private funds financed our initial reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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sponse and allowed us to be unusually nimble in our programming. In many of the

most severe crises though, governments provide the vast majority of the funds. We

need to streamline the mechanism for distributing fast, long-term and flexible response funds from the government.

2. Make solid investments in developing countries. Local communities and governments were key to the sound responses in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India. When

we invest in long-term development—building stronger governance structures, expanding educational opportunities, enhancing the health infrastructure—we improve livelihoods and better equip beneficiary communities to deal with disasters.

Furthermore, these investments allow NGOs like Mercy Corps to establish the

kind of presence—a forward position, if you will—that enables us to quickly deploy

knowledgeable local and international staff to the crisis area. Country experience

among NGO staff was especially important in this crisis, since both Sri Lanka and

the Aceh Province of Indonesia have longstanding internal conflict dynamics that

affect response strategies and implementation.

For these reasons, development assistance needs to be a top priority for the U.S.

Government. As the discussion gets underway on the President’s FY2006 budget request, please consider the need to ensure that core development accounts are maintained or improved.

3. Focus immediately on development relief and restoring livelihoods. Delivering

food aid and non-food emergency supplies will remain the immediate priority in humanitarian crises. But as Mercy Corps learned on the ground in Indonesia and Sri

Lanka, we must simultaneously work to get people back on the job: Farmers to their

fields, fishermen to their boats, merchants to their shops, teachers and students to

their classrooms. Instead of focusing on a false distinction between ‘‘relief’’ and ‘‘recovery’’ phases, we need to manage the two in parallel.

4. Prioritize local resources and community partnerships. In procuring relief supplies and staffing our missions, we should use local suppliers and talent whenever

possible. That ensures the most locally appropriate goods and services and pumps

much-needed money into the local economies. Most NGOs do their very best to develop local talent, which is especially important in the two hardest hit areas in the

tsunami-affected regions: Because of the dynamics of local conflicts, governments

are unlikely to permit international staff to stay indefinitely and we will need to

rely heavily on local staff to accomplish recovery goals over the longer term.

Partnerships with local groups and leaders help guarantee that our efforts are

meeting the greatest community needs. Mercy Corps worked closely with survivors

in the devastated Indonesian town of Meulaboh to determine how we could contribute. The town’s profitable fishing fleet was all but demolished by the tsunami,

so we worked with leaders to organize the fisherman and pay them to move and

repair boats that could be salvaged. Within weeks, fishermen were back on the

water generating income for their families.

Challenges Ahead

As I noted earlier, the serious, complex and long-term effort of rebuilding these

communities lies ahead. In Sri Lanka and Indonesia, there are tangled conflicts that

remain just barely below the surface. These countries will have to grapple with the

many complicated issues related to rebuilding an entire human and physical infrastructure. They will have to painstakingly restore whole cadres of government workers killed or wounded by the tsunami.

The role that we as international NGOs can continue to play is a supportive one.

We take our cue from the many people who have survived and now lead the way

with their determination to rebuild their lives. We can and will continue to help

people plug as quickly as possible back into a life in which they can begin the long

process of healing, make a living and rebuild both their houses and their community.

SUMMARY OF MERCY CORPS TSUNAMI RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Mercy Corps is concentrating its relief and recovery efforts in three nations: Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India. At present, our tsunami response operations are assisting more than 250,000 people throughout the region, including over 130,000 in Sri

Lanka, over 75,000 in Indonesia, and over 50,000 in India. More than 150 Mercy

Corps staff members are engaged in these activities, which focus primarily on economic and livelihood recovery and, where necessary, ongoing emergency relief assistance. Mercy Corps is also exploring recovery needs in northern Somalia with an

eye toward providing assistance to tsunami affected communities in that country.

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The emphasis during the initial phase of our response has been to meet the most

urgent emergency needs through the provision of clean water and repair of sanitation facilities, as well as the provision of sanitation supplies, food, blankets, and

other non-food items, shelter materials, tools, and medicines. In addition, we are assisting with psychosocial services, cleanup, and access to other basic services. From

the start, we have worked to tie emergency relief with longer term development activities. Cash for work programs are repairing damaged infrastructure, while providing participants with an opportunity to earn income and regain a sense of normalcy. As always, we are working in coordination with other aid agencies, supporting local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) responding to the disaster,

and moving as quickly as possible to address the significant economic and livelihood

challenges faced by these coastal communities.

Following is a brief summary of Mercy Corps operations in the region:

INDONESIA

A Mercy Corps team was among the first humanitarian workers to gain entry into

Banda Aceh, an area of Indonesia that’s been closed off to the world for years due

to civil war. In addition to helping meet immediate food, water, and shelter needs,

Mercy Corps has been making special efforts to address the long-term needs of children, the most vulnerable of those affected by the tsunami. On January 26—

1 month after the tsunami—Mercy Corps helped students in Banda Aceh return to

15 local schools. This ‘‘back to school’’ success was made possible by community mobilization and the hard work of local citizens employed in cash for work programs.

Mercy Corps’ cash for work programs pay local workers a fair daily wage to help

clean up debris and repair critical infrastructure. This approach is helping accelerate economic recovery among Indonesian families, as well as providing a valuable

service in rebuilding tsunami-damaged areas. Within 3 months, Mercy Corps plans

to employ 6,000 people in cash-for-work programs that will continue to clean up and

restore communities. We are also working to facilitate the stable return of at least

1,000 displaced families to several villages by providing shelter materials and ensuring a clean water supply.

In the coming months, Mercy Corps will increasingly focus its efforts on programs

that stimulate local business and help communities rebuild. Programs already underway included business activities, such as pallet building and loans for brick enterprises, as well as the recapitalization of local businesses to expand employment.

Along these lines, Mercy Corps aims to support at least 100 enterprises in 20 villages in the coming months. Finally, we are supporting the return of at least 1,000

families in several villages, facilitating ‘‘go-and-see’’ visits, distributing family kits

for communities in their area of return, providing basic shelter materials, and conducting basic well water chlorination.

SRI LANKA

Mercy Corps staff members are partnering with local organizations to ensure a

rapid, efficient response in the areas where assistance is most needed, especially the

hard hit Ampara District on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka. Currently, Mercy Corps

has eight international aid workers in the country and offices in Colombo, Pottuvil

and Trincomalee. Senior Mercy Corps staff members have years of experience in Sri

Lanka, and Mercy Corps completed an assessment visit to Sri Lanka in mid-December, less than 2 weeks before the disaster. This presence and expertise allows us

to build on a broad and deep foundation of local contacts.

Mercy Corps has provided school materials to children, and supported children’s

recreation programs in the camps that many on Sri Lanka’s eastern coast temporarily inhabit. Mercy Corps is also helping to rehabilitate the severely damaged

local maritime economy, by supporting the repair of fishing boats. Mercy Corps has

provided materials for cleanup, distributed shelter supplies, initiated a public health

information campaign and is implementing cash for work programs in a number of

communities throughout the country. Much of Mercy Corps’ emergency relief support has been provided in partnership with local non-governmental organizations responding to the disaster.

INDIA

Working with local Indian organizations, Mercy Corps is assisting tens of thousands of people in Tamil Nadu, India. Mercy Corps has partnered with the DHAN

Foundation to launch relief and recovery efforts in 20 of 73 villages in Tamil Nadu’s

Nagappattinam district (population 196,000). Efforts include distribution of temporary shelter and relief supplies, construction of community activity centers, and

cash-for-work programs to help improve and reclaim agricultural land and liveliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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hoods and improve local water sources. Working with the national humanitarian organization DMI (Disaster Mitigation Institute), Mercy Corps has completed construction of roughly 350 temporary shelters, with construction of a further 100 now

underway. Mercy Corps has also distributed household kits and food to almost 800

tsunami-affected families.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Ms. Lindborg. I think your suggestion about a followup hearing in the not too distant future is a

very important one. We do need to continue with the monitoring,

knowing what is happening and knowing what else we could be

doing better.

Ms. Lindborg, both you and Ms. McClymont mentioned the issue

of very good intentions, those who want to come to help but that

the inexperience, perhaps some of the newer organizations or just

individuals that want to assist can be, in fact, an impediment or

get in the way of the operations. I actually had a conversation 2

weeks ago with some friends of the family. He is a dentist in Alaska, and they are looking to go to Indonesia over their son’s spring

break in March to do what they can to help. What I am gathering

from this hearing is they should probably look for another opportunity during that spring break to do what they can to help unless

they have already made advance arrangements to assist.

How do you get the message out? We have been talking about

coordination, collaboration, just educating people on what is needed

to help. Instead you get ties and miniskirts. I read the article about

the down jackets going, and they improvised and used them for

diapers for some of the infants. How do we deal with this? Is it getting better as we are getting further from the actual tragedy itself?

What is the message that needs to go out now?

Ms. MCCLYMONT. Well, let me just begin, Senator, by appreciating your concern about this issue because it is a major one, as

Nancy Lindborg has suggested. InterAction has on its website, for

starters, a guide to appropriate giving. To the extent people are

able to know about our website and come there and understand it

better, that is a start.

Second, we have produced a video news release and a radio news

release that we have distributed to media outlets to try to get the

word out on this. I think what, as Nancy suggested, was so critical

this time around—many of us were speaking to the media about

this concern. I know Members of Congress spoke to the public

about this concern, and as Nancy suggested, it was the powerful

voice of the President saying, cash is best. Please rely on the reliable NGOs that are out there doing the work.

Again, I would hope that we could get the word out that, on our

website are the list of our member organizations where they describe all they are doing overseas in this disaster and many others

with great particularity. I think if people could find their way to

these very reliable, sound organizations, at least that comprise our

membership, they would find that they would be able to provide

funding for certain activities those NGOs might be undertaking

that, as your colleagues, they might find a volunteer opportunity.

There is a particular website which gives guidance on those individuals who do wish to volunteer, but certainly they can come to

our website to observe which of our member organizations might

want to use their help. Admittedly, that is infrequent. You need to

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be trained. You need to be experienced to go out and work in these

difficult situations.

But I think the more we can use your help, the Members of Congress, and the President, to lay out these messages along with us,

I think we have just got to keep at it. It certainly, as Nancy suggested, was better this time than it has been in other disaster incidents.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And I appreciate your comments, Ms.

Lindborg, about relying on the local communities, relying on the

locals first rather than us assuming that we know what to do, but

to take that brick factory that is there, get it up, and get it integrated.

You mentioned that you had morning meetings, I guess meetings

between the U.N. agencies and the NGO representatives to identify

top issues of the day. How did the local community play into that

type of a meeting format? Were they involved?

Ms. LINDBORG. They were not involved in that meeting. The government was involved by virtue of the United Nations holding

meetings every evening with the government, and they then

brought that message forward to the NGOs. The NGOs would bring

the community concerns from our meetings with community leaders and religious leaders throughout the course of our work.

It is important to note, however, that one of the really devastating losses in Aceh was of so many of the leaders that comprised the government and community and religious leadership

throughout the province. So they are trying to rebuild that, along

with the physical infrastructure. But that morning meeting was an

opportunity to bring those strands together and share what were

the critical concerns and issues to focus on.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So they really were integrated, which is so

important.

You also spoke about some kind of a mechanism to get the funding out fast, and the fact that you had flexibility. With all of the

private moneys that were coming in, it enabled you to move rapidly. But you believe you would not have had that flexibility had

that private funding not been available, recognizing that we might

not have it for the next event. How do you recommend that we provide for the flexibility while still having a level of accountability

that, of course, we must have?

Ms. LINDBORG. I think that USAID, through the Office of Foreign

Disaster Assistance, has moved this forward immensely in recent

years, but there is still a lag time before the funds are actually

flowing. During that lag time, the NGOs really rely on the private

funds that we are able to raise, and we are not always able to do

so if the conflict is not well known by the American public. Darfur

presents a very instructive comparison to the tsunami.

This is a conversation that we have had for a number of years,

and we would appreciate the opportunity to continue the dialog

about how we might structure some sort of prequalified mechanism

that would have a fund that accountable partners with agreedupon measures could draw down from and not just for the 3

months that is often the case because it chews up a lot of time to

have to resubmit proposals.

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What we found we could do with this emergency was, in a very

entrepreneurial way, spot the needs, come up with creative solutions, test them, and then bring them to scale. That is not always

possible with more restricted funding.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Toole.

Mr. TOOLE. If I could just add to that. I think it is something

that we have also lived through. I actually called our national committee here in Washington, as well as in London and Berlin, on the

27th and said, basically, I need cash now, and those national committees pull funds from the public sector, the individuals who give,

my mother, aunts, et cetera. So I think we cannot underestimate

the value of that public commitment.

I would also, however, raise that for each of us and in our case,

UNICEF, the U.S. contribution to our regular resources, so the regular budget contributions, are also what allow us to respond quickly. The United States is the largest governmental donor to

UNICEF, and the fact that you give to the regular budget means

that we have those funds ready to react quickly. So, yes, I agree

that we need some sort of standby accounting facility where we can

quickly mobilize funds either from the public sector or from governments, but also do not underestimate the value of your regular contributions to some of these organizations, and the fact that that

gives us the flexibility we need.

Thank you.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And, Mr. Toole, you had mentioned in your

comments that UNICEF has been in these countries before the

tragedy, during, and they will be there after. I think that that sets

you up certainly to evaluate what we do in between the crises. You

have mentioned just one very simple example of making sure that

the fundraising is ongoing so that when there is a tragedy, when

there is a crisis, you have some flexibility.

What else can we do in these in-between times to make sure that

we can, to the extent possible, be prepared? This is not only as it

relates to how we deal with the natural disaster, but how we deal

with the vulnerable populations, such as our children. It is kind of

a big question. I do not know if there are easy answers.

Mr. TOOLE. There are certainly not easy answers, but I will try

anyway.

I think, first, I would come back to your dentist. The one thing

we should not do, in trying to reorient some of the enthusiasm, is

squelch that enthusiasm. What we actually need is greater commitment to long-term issues. It is extraordinary to me that, for example, for the tsunami UNICEF requested $144 million for the relief

phase. We have raised $300 million in about a month. For Sudan,

which is a longstanding difficult crisis, we asked for $288 million

back in November. So far we have raised $20 million. So there is

a very different level of commitment. So I think, on the one hand,

we need to keep that enthusiasm and help to channel it toward

issues that are perhaps more difficult to understand but still can

help us.

Second, I would focus on the preparedness. We talked about the

early warning mechanisms that are possible for natural disasters.

We in the United Nations, but I know also some of the NGOs, are

working on similar early warning features for conflict, for changes

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in political situations and we track the world through our operation

centers, et cetera, to do that.

Could we have foreseen the tsunami? No. It is not possible, nor

would it even be desirable to plan on a disaster at that scale, but

I think we can look at the early warning systems for natural disasters. We can look and track the world for the kinds of changes that

start to happen with markets, with children going to school, et

cetera, to watch the world and make sure that we can respond

quickly.

Senator MURKOWSKI. One of the things that you know you can

count on in a natural disaster, whether it is an earthquake in Alaska or whether it is a tsunami in Indonesia, typhoons, you are always worried about your water source. You are always worried

about the safety of your water. I am curious to know about

UNICEF’s efforts. And I really appreciated the leader’s spotlight on

how we deal with the water situation and really putting a focus on

that for our developing countries.

I am going to sit down with him and remind him that I still have

some issues in my State where we do not have safe water and still

are carrying our water. We have got to deal with that.

But are we getting closer to that point where we have portable

water systems that can move in and respond when we have these

natural disasters, when we have these tragedies? That seems to be

the one area that we just have not kind of got it right, and it leaves

us vulnerable to disease, to infection, and to all kinds of horribles.

Are we getting any better?

Mr. TOOLE. Senator, I think we are. Are we there yet? No. I

think what was good to see in this particular crisis, whether it was

in the Maldives or in Aceh in Indonesia or in Sri Lanka, was that

we did actually get water to people pretty quickly. Was it perfect

water? No. For example, in Sri Lanka there has not been a single

death from a preventable disease since the tsunami. That is extraordinary.

Where we are doing less well is in the complex emergencies. So,

for example, in Darfur we, with our partners, have drilled wells

and provided water to 800,000 people. As director of emergencies,

normally I would be thrilled. That is half the population that we

are trying to reach. So we have got a very long way to go. So, I

think, in natural disasters, particularly because of some of the military assets, because of the capacity to move in quite quickly, we

are responding better than we are in some of the complex emergencies where we need to drill wells, we need to refit springs, have

filters or desalinization. It becomes more complicated in those contexts.

Ms. MCCLYMONT. Senator, if I may, just to add to what Mr. Toole

said. I know that the United Nations, through the Office of Humanitarian Coordination that is headed by Jon Eglund, has been

looking at this question of our capacity, our international response

capacity with respect to the fundamentals of international response, water and medical care and so forth. They have determined

through their inventory recently that there is a concern about the

lack of water and sanitation capacity and resources. Medical care

seems to be reasonable in terms of the capacity of the community

to respond. But I know he will be following up and we, who work

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with the United Nations on this matter, will be following up and

probably coming back to the Congress to discuss that further.

I also just wanted to underscore that we, too, were encouraged

by the leader’s comments about the worry over clean water. We

would simply suggest that even as we go forward and try to find

more resources and capacity to do that, we cannot forget the accompanying pieces of the puzzle, the whole set of development and

disaster response concerns, education, and health care and the like.

I think in response to the question you posed just before, what

do we do between crises; I think that it is so much about what Ms.

Lindborg said and what we, as the InterAction community have

been pushing for, that is to say, to have a very sustainable and

adequate level of funding for longer term development assistance

so that the members of InterAction and other NGOs that are out

there can keep building their local partners on the ground. It is

really through that local capacity that those on the ground can respond, and we work very closely with them.

So I wanted to just underscore the point of the need for our attention to this longer term development assistance. We were concerned to see that in the fiscal year 2006 request, there was a cut

in the development assistance accounts, part of which is about

clean water. So we would want to draw attention to that and see

if we can keep pushing ahead and doing better on that score too.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Good points.

I appreciate the comments from the three of you. I appreciate

your participation here in the hearing this morning. I think it has

been informative for all of us, and I think I certainly will follow up

with your suggestion, Ms. Lindborg, and will recommend to the

chairman that we do a followup to just kind of check and see how

things are going. Hopefully, we will have good reports and we will

be able to say that we, indeed, have learned a great deal from this

tsunami and how to better respond in the future.

So I thank you for your time, and with that, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL PREPARED STATEMENTS AND OTHER MATERIAL

SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST

Human Rights First would like to thank Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for

the opportunity to place this testimony on relief and reconstruction efforts in Aceh

into the committee record. In this testimony we will address a fear in policy circles

that raising human rights concerns will jeopardize the humanitarian mission. Our

belief is that although this is a sensitive issue in Indonesia, as in many countries,

such fear underestimates the positive impact of an informed, coordinated approach

to human rights issues at an early stage and throughout the reconstruction process.

Human Rights First recognizes that both the committee members and witnesses

for this hearing have shown a willingness to publicly address human rights issues

while tackling core development challenges in the tsunami-affected region. Deputy

Secretary Wolfowitz has noted the need to support military reform, and Administrator Andrew S. Natsios is among the many participants who have addressed the

need for accountability in the aid process. We would like to take this opportunity

to add to these lessons by focusing on the role of civil society in Aceh both before

and after the tsunami.

Graffiti on a surviving shard of wall in Banda Aceh serves as a record of the disaster: ‘‘The earthquake began at 7:55. The ocean rose at 8:30. Only the ruins remain.’’ In Aceh, the tsunami seemingly came out of nowhere. But the relief and reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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construction that follows is taking place in a context of low-level conflict, military

control, and weak respect for human rights that long predates December 26, 2004.

This context provides lessons from the recent past, but also warning signs in the

current environment and a few indications of what the next phase may bring.

Human Rights First is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization. Since 1978, it

has worked to protect and promote fundamental human rights, holding all governments accountable to upholding the standards set forth in the Universal Declaration

on Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. Our Human

Rights Defenders program works to support the efforts of human rights activists

around the world through advocacy campaigns on behalf of persecuted human rights

activists, and activities designed to expand the practical realization of the right to

promote and protect human rights.

THE PERSISTENCE OF THE PAST

The Indonesian Government in Jakarta deserves credit for opening Aceh to foreign assistance in the days after the tsunami hit. The Indonesian military has also

played an important role in relief activities to date, including food distribution and

the recovery of bodies. The arrival of an astounding collection of aid workers and

foreign militaries, including American troops, to a province largely closed to outsiders for nearly two years has been accompanied by major changes. These visitors

have saved many lives and helped foster a level of openness, in those areas in which

the international community is present, that one local activist could only sum up

in the word ‘‘unbelievable.’’

But while many Americans first heard of Aceh in the aftermath of the tsunami,

for those who follow human rights in Asia the name was all too familiar. While Aceh

had been the site of anticolonial resistance and regional rebellions for much of the

20th century, the current conflict began with a declaration of independence in 1976

and the creation of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM).

Counterinsurgency operations peaked in the 1990s and then again when martial

law was declared in May 2003.

The continuing impact of abuses committed during this separatist conflict will

have important ramifications for the planning and execution of recovery plans. For

example, any agency seeking working to address trauma, displacement, or lost livelihoods will find that these problems did not begin on December 26. Three decades

of counterinsurgency operations, capped by two years of martial law and civil emergency, provide several important lessons for those working in Aceh today:

The politicization of displacement and attacks on humanitarian workers: Throughout the years of war the Acehnese have acquired long experience with displacement.

Even before martial law, villagers often fled the fighting to seek refuge at mosques

or soccer fields in nearby towns. Civil society organizations, including women’s organizations and student groups, played an important role in providing food and medical care and monitoring the situations in these temporary camps. The camps were

viewed by the military as potential bases of support for GAM. Fearing that the

guerrillas were using the camps to recruit members, obtain supplies, or maintain

a presence in the towns, the military viewed the displaced population with suspicion

and targeted those who sought to assist them. Members of student groups and local

humanitarian organizations were harassed, beaten, and threatened with death by

security forces and their civilian allies. In December 2000 three volunteers with Rehabilitation Action against Torture in Aceh (RATA) were killed together with the

torture victim they were assisting, and staff members of the international aid organization Oxfam UK were tortured in August 2000.

For its part, GAM forced many non-Acehnese migrants to seek safety outside the

province, where many remain in cramped camps. GAM also reportedly used the IDP

population for its own strategic and public relations ends, discouraging some from

returning to their homes.

The displaced civilian population was caught between the GAM rebels and the security forces. With as many as 100,000 displaced Acehnese scheduled to be moved

to semipermanent relocation camps beginning next week, there is reason to fear

that this vulnerable population will again be used as pawns. While access to affected populations has not been problematic to date, if the environment changes due

to renewed conflict or tightened security, local organizations assisting or monitoring

the relocation sites may be singled out for official harassment.

Undermining civilian government and civil society: There is a common impression

that the large military role in Aceh is due to the tsunami’s destruction of the civilian bureaucracy and civil society organizations. The disaster did indeed cause major

losses: Nearly 1,000 civil servants are dead or missing at the provincial level alone,

and 54 of the 241 subdistrict governments are said to be nonfunctioning. More than

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40 NGO activists, including several leading human rights defenders, are missing or

dead, as well as journalists, teachers, religious leaders, and other community leaders. Several prominent human rights organizations have lost their offices and their

records.

But the military’s dominance is also the legacy of years of military operations followed by martial law. Even before martial law the army’s territorial command

structure, reinforced by a series of military operations, created a parallel structure

down to the village level that overshadowed the weak civilian bureaucracy. Even as

military commanders took control of the economic and political life of the province,

many civil servants fled their posts due to fear of GAM attacks. The court system

outside of Banda Aceh had largely ceased to function long before the tsunami

struck.

Under martial law subdistrict heads in contested areas were replaced with retired

military officers. Martial law also had a ‘‘humanitarian component’’ that gave the

Indonesian military a central role in assistance to IDPs and severely restricted NGO

access. Local organizations were shut out of IDP camps they had worked in previously.

Martial law was downgraded to civil emergency status in May 2004, but access

by international organizations and journalists was still severely limited at the time

of the tsunami. Under civil emergency the power was formally vested in civilian authorities (a governor later jailed on corruption charges), but troop strength and military operations were not necessarily scaled back. A respected Jakarta NGO has

identified 84 civilian deaths and 47 disappearances in the first six months of civil

emergency ending November 2004. What’s more, authorities are still empowered to

summarily restrict freedom of expression and assembly, carry out arbitrary

searches, and restrict freedom of movement.

A 6-month extension of civil emergency will end on May 19, the second anniversary of the declaration of martial law. The presidential decree that extended the status calls for a monthly evaluation, but the government has not used this feature

to withdraw emergency status.

PRESENT WARNING SIGNS

The dominant role of the Indonesian military

The Indonesian military has played an often welcome role in relief operations.

Such a role was required immediately after the tsunami by the lack of alternatives

in many areas and the need to reach people in need quickly. But especially as the

emergency phase shifts to reconstruction, military participation in the context of

Aceh raises serious questions.

At the provincial level, the former commander of operations under martial law,

Major General Bambang Darmono (a former martial law commander), serves as

head of humanitarian operations for the army, distinct from the security operations.

But in Meulaboh, the second biggest hub of humanitarian activity, one colonel has

performed both functions. This meant he has run the nightly relief coordination

meetings at the base while simultaneously bearing responsibility for ensuring that

GAM was defeated militarily. While there is not yet evidence of discrimination impacting suspected GAM sympathizers, this dual role raises fears that food aid or relocation programs could be subordinated to military aims.

In addition there have been several credible reports that local military commanders have required that aid be handed over in whole or in part to be distributed

by the armed forces, citing fears that the aid would otherwise end up in guerrilla

hands. But this practice could also lead to discrimination, bottlenecks in aid, and

corruption.

As the government begins massive relocation into semipermanent barracks, the

possibility of an army role is also troubling. Although government officials stated

there would be no army role beyond ‘‘securing’’ the barracks, military documents

and the military role in aid distribution, management, and security in existing

camps raise concerns.

Signs of hostility to humanitarian workers

Given the long track record of hostility toward IDPs and those working to help

them, intimidation or other forms of restriction are a particular point of concern.

Local and international NGOs have not reported that restrictions have significantly

hampered their ability to operate. At the same time, however, there are signs that

some in the military are uneasy with the role played by NGOs, especially local ones.

It has been widely reported that the military has formally restricted access by foreign aid workers beyond the two cities of Banda Aceh and Meulaboh, ostensibly as

protection from attack. International NGOs are expected to clear their travel in adVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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vance and accept a military escort if required. However, these rules are not strictly

enforced, and so far appear to be a form of monitoring rather than control. It is important that these rules are not used to restrict access beyond that required by genuine security concerns. GAM has stated it will not attack foreign aid workers, a

pledge that is consistent with its vested interest in a continued international presence in Aceh.

Travel around some west coast towns such as Lamno is especially circumscribed.

Indonesian volunteers and one international NGO were prevented from traveling in

this region, although this problem was later remedied.

Human Rights First has also learned of isolated, but nevertheless worrisome, efforts to intimidate local NGOs.

• According to press reports on January 10 in the Mata Ie section of Banda Aceh,

a volunteer was beaten by soldiers and needed stitches.

• Several local NGOs have been visited by security officers demanding information on their aid distribution activities. Two of the most active NGOs in Banda

Aceh were visited within half an hour on the night of January 22, one by police

and one by members of the provincial military command in plainclothes.

• Students carrying out a health assessment in Bireuen were approached at an

IDP camp by several soldiers. The officers later came to their office and took

them to the military post where they were questioned for several hours about

their activities before being released.

• The head of the watchdog organization Government Watch, Farid Faqih, was

detained on January 27 in Meulaboh, accused of stealing supplies donated by

army wives. He was badly beaten by soldiers including an army captain. While

his role in the disappearance of the supplies is still unclear, his mistreatment

is a worrying sign.

Lack of local participation

Acehnese have a saying that ‘‘Buya krueng teudong-dong, buya tamong

meuraseuki.’’ This translates roughly as ‘‘the crocodile in the river only watches

while other crocodiles eat his food.’’ Failure to participate in the benefit of Aceh’s

natural resources has long been one of the grievances driving separatism in Aceh.

The influx of NGOs and businesses from other parts of Indonesia and around the

world has raised fears that the main beneficiaries of the billions of dollars pledged

for reconstruction will once again not be the Acehnese. Their exclusion from planning their own future led one Acehnese to tell me in frustration: ‘‘Sometimes I think

it would be better if the wave had just wiped us out, so these people could come

and build whatever they want.’’

The provincial government has signaled its willingness to involve Acehnese society in the development of a ‘‘blueprint’’ for reconstruction. But participation is not

just a matter of good development practice; in the Acehnese context it is also dependent on respect for fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression

and assembly.

Civil society organizations, including NGOs, academics, and religious organizations, should be given a central role in the design, delivery, and monitoring of aid

efforts. The local nonprofit community is reeling from the destruction, and the loss

of several of its leading members. But Aceh’s development and human rights organizations have survived years of war, abuse, and martial law. If conditions allow they

will continue to play an important role.

FUTURE ISSUES

The Indonesian government is still developing a master plan for Aceh’s reconstruction, and the international community has engaged government agencies in a

dialog on internationally accepted principles and standards. However several issues

have already been identified as important and potentially problematic. The role of

human rights defenders and other NGO monitors will be critical to efforts to achieve

transparency and accountability.

Limits to access: Access in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar district, and Meulaboh remains quite good. But even in those areas the fact that civil emergency status and

restrictions on access remain officially in place, coupled with signs of suspicion of

humanitarian workers, lead many to fear that the current levels of openness will

not be sustained.

Land rights: Land rights are contentious in Indonesia under the best of conditions. But the loss of documents by landowners and the destruction of offices of the

regional land board further compounds the problem. An additional source of conflict

and uncertainty is the proposed creation of a buffer zone of up to two kilometers

from the shoreline, with limited construction along the coast. The displaced popuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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1The chair of Artha Graha’s relief effort, the retired general Kiki Syahakri, was martial law

administrator in East Timor during the worst of the violence and has been indicted for crimes

against humanity by the United Nations Serious Crimes Unit in East Timor.

lation has not received any clear information about this plan. If this situation leads

to conflict, the military role in relief and reconstruction may become more problematic.

Human rights defenders play a critical role in allowing people to defend their

rights in the face of the state, the military, and a private sector that often relies

on links to powerful state elites.

Military-linked businesses: Due to a long history of economic exploitation of Aceh’s

resources by the military, there is widespread concern that army-controlled business

and foundations will seek to play a role in reconstruction. Such a role could cause

problems especially where reconstruction plans run into opposition from local communities. As early as January 11, the Artha Graha conglomerate, partly owned by

the military, arranged an invitation by the local government to provide a blueprint

for the reconstruction of the city of Meulaboh, although the offer was later rescinded

in deference to the provincial master plan now under development.1

Military involvement in underground activities such as illegal logging will also be

relevant in the construction boom to come.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the face of these significant concerns, we would offer the following recommendations for all future assistance to Aceh:

1. Support an environment conducive to the participation of Acehnese civil society

The Indonesian Government should revoke civil emergency status and it’s restrictions on freedoms of expression and assembly. Donors, such as the World Bank,

USAID, and United Nations agencies, should include protections for human rights

defenders in their dialog with Indonesia on Aceh’s reconstruction as a necessary

mechanism for transparency and accountability.

2. Ensure access by humanitarian and human rights organizations to all regions of

Aceh

The fear that GAM’s civilian supporters or even active members are among those

seeking aid should not be used as an excuse to unreasonably restrict aid or to intimidate aid workers, whether foreign or domestic. For its part, GAM must not put

the camps’ civilian populations at risk by using them to operate in any way. Indonesian authorities should continue to give local and international humanitarian assistance groups and also human rights organizations full and free access to all IDP

camps to help safeguard the rights of the displaced and ensure that new violations

are not allowed to occur.

Access is about more than the distribution of supplies. It is also important that

information flows freely in both directions. Displaced people must be aware of their

rights and their choices. Human rights defenders need to be able to obtain and provide information about conditions for IDPs and other vulnerable groups throughout

Aceh. The Declaration on Human Rights Defenders states that everyone has the

right ‘‘freely to publish, impart or disseminate to others views, information and

knowledge on all human rights and fundamental freedoms.’’

3. Minimize the role of the Indonesian military in humanitarian operations

A central question for the international community is whether it will reinforce the

dominance of the military or seek to empower civil society and the civilian government through its policies on aid and reconstruction. Any efforts to improve conditions in Aceh, whether in the area of human rights, development, or conflict-resolution, must attempt to reverse the marginalization of civil society.

This debate reaches beyond Aceh. At the national level, a major obstacle to respect for human rights in Indonesia has been the resistance to military reform. And

the biggest sign of military’s failure to reform has been its role in Aceh since the

declaration of martial law.

Aid agencies and bilateral donors should require clear statements on the nature

and extent of the military participation in reconstruction, including through military-linked businesses.

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PREPARED STATEMENT BY RAYMOND C. OFFENHEISER, PRESIDENT, OXFAM AMERICA

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and members of the committee, thank you for the

opportunity for Oxfam America to submit written testimony for the record. We appreciate your interest in gathering a variety of perspectives on the important issues

of the tsunami response and lessons learned when providing relief in the wake of

the terrible tsunami tragedy.

Oxfam America is an international development and relief agency committed to

developing lasting solutions to poverty, hunger, and social justice. We are part of

a confederation of 12 Oxfam organizations working together in more than 100 countries around the globe with an annual budget over $400 million dollars.

OXFAM’S RESPONSE

In response to the tsunami, Oxfam has assisted over 300,000 people across the

disaster zone. In Indonesia we are working with the Government of Indonesia and

UNICEF to oversee the development and management of water and sanitation

projects. Nearly 50 percent of the water pipe network was damaged in Meulaboh

and 70 percent in Banda Aceh. In India we are working with local partners distributing thousands of hygiene kits, repairing water sources and funding a health institute to train volunteers in psychosocial counseling. In Sri Lanka we are rehabilitating water sources and constructing temporary shelters. We also have programs

and are providing assistance in Thailand, Maldives and Somalia.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The United States Government, local charities, and the American public have responded to the tsunami with unprecedented promises of aid and donations demonstrating our country’s compassion and generosity.

It is now over a month after the tsunami and more than 1 million people living

in the Indian Ocean region remain displaced. The death toll is over 200,000 and

could still increase unless the humanitarian response continues to reach all those

in need with appropriate and effective life-saving assistance.

It is important to remember that beyond the immediate threats to life nearly two

million people may face the threat of living in poverty unless the massive reconstruction effort of the next few months and years specifically aims to reduce poverty.

QUALITY OF AID NOT QUANITY MATTERS MOST

Aid groups for the most part have done an admirable job in saving as many lives

as possible, and providing survivors with the basic necessities—food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Quick action has so far prevented major outbreaks

of waterborne disease that could have doubled the death toll from the disaster.

But the sheer scale and complexity of the humanitarian response have also caused

problems that threaten to overwhelm fragile economies and civil society organizations in the affected countries, exacerbate religious and ethnic tensions, and lead to

bitterness and recriminations among survivors and their neighboring communities.

Oxfam is working to ensure a more successful outcome. But it will be impossible

to mitigate these threats unless steps are taken to ensure that aid programs are

designed and implemented as effectively as possible.

First, tsunami survivors must be full participants in planning the rebuilding of

their communities. While the emergency phase of relief delivery is mostly a topdown process, the rehabilitation and reconstruction programs now under way must

be designed with input from the people whom they are intended to benefit. Too

often, their wishes are an afterthought at planning meetings.

Better coordination by the U.N. and government agencies is also essential. The

hundreds of aid organizations that flocked to southern Asia vary widely in their experience levels, skills, missions, and operating styles. Without better guidance in coordinating their activities, aid will be distributed unevenly, leading to resentments

among beneficiaries. To be successful, aid agencies need comprehensive information

about the needs in each affected community to help guide plans for the rebuilding

phase and make sure that no community is passed over because of politics or confusion.

National governments, with support from the United Nations, should implement

a system to accredit international humanitarian organizations, to ensure that their

experience qualifies them for the scope and duration of the work they propose to

do. Not every group that shows up at a disaster scene is qualified to help out, and

their well-meaning efforts can end up hampering relief.

Aid groups, for their part, should stick to doing what they know best. Faced with

myriad urgent needs and fueled by a donation bonanza, some organizations have

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been tempted to expand their programs into areas where they have little experience

and less expertise. With a surfeit of groups on the ground, they should focus on

their core competencies, leaving other tasks to those with the capacity to do them

well.

Best practices in humanitarian response have changed a lot in the past couple of

decades, with the creation of internationally recognized standards set by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Sphere Project, among others. Yet

many aid groups still don’t comply with—or even know about—such benchmarks.

Thus we continue to see aid distributed without the benefit of proper assessment

of needs and resources. Too many groups are simply throwing items out of the back

of a truck to an assembled crowd, without any systematic attempt to ensure that

they benefit the neediest people.

Finally, too much money reaching an impoverished area can be almost as debilitating as too little. International aid organizations must be careful not to overtax

a fragile system of domestic NGOs that lack the capacity to absorb large grants. Nor

should they hire away key staff members from domestic groups, but instead should

consider recruiting highly trained expatriates to return to their country to help

manage rebuilding projects for a specific term. We’ve already seen how a flood of

U.S. dollars in developing economies has caused a steep appreciation of local currencies like the rupee and bhat against the dollar. If not managed closely, that

trend could lead to rapid inflation that could cause further economic calamity on par

with the tsunami itself.

The large volume of aid available should enable countries affected by the tsunami

not only to recover but to put their people on a path toward sustainable long-term

development. To merely return survivors to the marginal lives of poverty many of

them led before the waves came would be unthinkable, leaving them just as vulnerable as they were on that terrible day.

Each successive major disaster offers the humanitarian aid community lessons in

how we can improve our work. But unless those lessons are implemented by the

scores of aid groups flocking to southern Asia, our collective ‘‘best practices’’ will be

submerged in an anarchy of altruism. That would be a discouraging return indeed

on the world’s massive investment in rebuilding the lives and communities devastated by the tsunami.

LESSONS LEARNED

It is already possible to draw some lessons from the tsunami, albeit provisional.

Oxfam and many others will want to revise these in the coming months, but these

six lessons are already clear and should not be ignored.

1. The survivors need appropriate aid, not any aid. Some of the aid provided has

not been appropriate. The two fundamental things that must be remembered are

the need to ask people what they want—and to meet the internationally accepted

‘‘Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards for Disaster Relief.’’ This

is not happening as widely as it should and levels of consultation with beneficiaries

must be increased.

2. The aid effort must do more to apply the lessons from previous crises. International humanitarian agencies have learned more from the inconsistent humanitarian response to the crises in central Africa in the mid 1990s, than most other

emergencies. In order to maintain a consistent response humanitarian guidelines

and principles should be followed. As well as the Sphere technical standards for relief, the Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief sets out acceptable principles for relief,

the People in Aid program outlines acceptable care of aid workers, and the U.N.’s

Guidelines for Internally Displaced People highlights the rights of internally displaced people under international law. All of these are deeply relevant to the posttsunami response and should be consistently upheld by agencies.

3. The collapse in international attention does not bode well for sustained aid. It

may take 5 years—the planning period for Oxfam’s Aceh program—or more to rebuild the affected areas. But we have already seen a gap between what is promised

and delivered. On paper, 93 percent of the U.N.’s humanitarian appeal has been

funded. In reality, governments have donated only about half the total amount

needed. Though more than $4 billion has been promised for reconstruction, will

these promises mean more than massive promises of aid after previous disasters in

Iran, Mozambique and Central America?

4. The need is just as much to find durable solutions for the displaced survivors

as for better early warning to mitigate future disasters. An early warning system

may be ready within 18 months. This is vital. But it is easy to ignore the needs

of those rebuilding their lives after the tsunami. For example, the 600,000 people

displaced in Aceh need more than temporary aid or the temporary camps that are

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planned. They must be given a genuine choice in the short, medium and long term

to overcome poverty. The Indonesian Government and all warring parties should ensure the end to violence, and commit to negotiating a long-term settlement to Aceh’s

conflict. In Sri Lanka, those that have been displaced need their leaders, on all

sides, to show the same commitment to ensure that life after the tsunami will not

be the same as before. Many survivors of the tsunami remain extremely vulnerable

to abuse. They need to be protected as well as given immediate aid.

5. Reconstruction plans should look at the needs of women, men and children differently. In Sri Lanka many women who were on beaches or in markets lost their

lives. There appears to be large numbers of households in which the father is suddenly a single parent—or the woman a new single mother. So far, there has been

insufficient attention placed on the specific needs of these men, women and children,

facing surviving the tsunami under very new circumstances.

6. Aid is only the first kind of international support that the survivors of disasters

need. To a certain extent this was recognized rather quickly. The Paris Club of

creditors welcomed initiatives on debt relief and the access to the EU of tsunamiaffected countries’ exports. These steps have not yet gone far or wide enough but

they show a very positive awareness that a wide range of international policies

should be used to help countries recover after catastrophic crises. This could be followed more widely in future crises—after conflicts as well as natural disasters.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE USG

• Stay the course. Oxfam commends President Bush’s commitment to public efforts to mobilize funding and long-term reconstruction in the tsunami affected

region. However, we have already seen a gap between what has been promised

by donors and what has been delivered. On paper 93 percent of the U.N.’s tsunami Flash Appeal has been funded. In reality, governments have donated only

about half the total amount needed. The USG still has a critical role to play

as a generous funder for relief and long-term rehabilitation.

• Don’t forget about other emergencies. The death toll in Darfur has reached

200,000 with close to 2 million people displaced. While we must respond to the

tsunami, we can’t forget about the millions of people caught up in the midst of

other crises. The U.N. global consolidated appeal of $1.7 billion for the world’s

14 other major humanitarian crises has only been 26 percent funded.

• Confirm that all tsunami-related aid will not be taken from current aid budgets

underfunding other emergencies. Oxfam is asking for the President’s tsunami

supplemental to Congress to include a minimum of $1 billion in emergency assistance to meet the needs of tsunami victims as well as others affected by crises. This would include $500 million for the relief and reconstruction efforts surrounding the tsunami and $500 million for other emergencies such as Sudan

and Ethiopia.

• Trade and Debt Relief. Reconstruct livelihoods not poverty by providing debt relief to affected countries in addition to money for relief and reconstruction and

reduce textile and apparel tariffs:

• Debt relief. The Paris Club of creditors offered to freeze debt repayments from

tsunami-affected countries but should go beyond this and cancel debts above

a sustainable level, so long as the proceeds are spent on reconstruction and

to reduce poverty. For example, Indonesia spends ten times more on debt repayment than health. Debt relief could potentially release billions of dollars

for reconstruction.

• Trade. In order to ensure that the people in the countries that were affected

by the tsunami can begin the process of reconstructing their lives and economies, the United States should reduce textile and apparel tariffs for those

countries. Oxfam is supporting S.191—the ‘‘Tariff Relief Assistance for Developing Economies Act of 2005’’ introduced by Senators Smith, Feinstein, Baucus and Santorum that will provide tariff relief to some of the tsunami-affected countries.

CONCLUSION

In the face of this terrible tragedy we commend the United States for its leadership and hope that you will consider these thoughts to ensure a comprehensive and

effective response for the millions of people who are victims of this catastrophe as

well as other disasters where people are suffering. Thank you again for this chance

to share Oxfam’s perspectives.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF VEENA SIDDHARTH, WASHINGTON DIRECTOR, HUMAN

RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA

I would like to thank Chairman Wolf, Chairman Lantos and the members of the

House Human Rights Caucus for the opportunity to share information we have collected on human rights in Aceh since the tsunami. Human Rights Watch appreciates your recognition of the links between human rights and post-tsunami reconstruction. Prior to the tsunami, Human Rights Watch had documented a range of

abuses in Aceh, including the systematic use of torture against detainees by Indonesian security forces. Because of pre-tsunami prohibitions on access to Aceh, our

reports may have underplayed the scale of human rights abuses. Aceh will not successfully rebuild unless there is recognition of the human rights abuses and steps

taken to prevent them in the future.

I will briefly list six issues that we are monitoring in this reconstruction phase:

1. Access

2. The role of the military

3. Lack of choice in registration and relocation

4. Land Rights

5. Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

6. Need for coordination and transparency of aid

1. ACCESS

Although there has been access to tsunami-affected areas, it is limited.

—The Indonesian military continues to designate most of the province as insecure

for foreign access and is strictly enforcing a no-travel policy to those areas.

—We cannot verify if there are tsunami IDPs in any of these no-travel areas. The

general consensus from agencies on the ground was that there are not, but

given the difficulties of access, Human Rights Watch cannot confirm this.

2. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

We remain concerned by the continued involvement of the military in camp management, coordination and distribution of aid. As a party to the conflict their involvement cannot be viewed as impartial.

—In Banda Aceh a facade of civilian control is apparent but on the west coast

all coordination is still done through the military.

—In Meulaboh the United Nations has its office located directly inside the local

military battalion compound, and continues to have daily coordination meetings

with the local military commander, Col. Gerhan Lentara, despite the presence

of a local civilian head of district. Colonel Lentara was infamously involved in

the East Timor Santa Cruz massacre of 1991.

—At the moment, several international NGOs regularly accept ‘‘military security

escorts’’ when visiting IDPs.

—While much of the civilian infrastructure was decimated on the west coast,

there continues to be an overreliance on the military for logistical support, even

when there are alternatives. There are real concerns that if the aid community

pushes too hard on access they will lose their position altogether. This may explain why there has not been strong opposition to the military’s assertion that

there are no IDPs, tsunami or otherwise, in the no travel zones.

3. REGISTRATION AND RELOCATION OF IDPS: LACK OF INFORMED CHOICE

We are concerned about the manner in which the registration is being carried out,

by whom, and the method in which the relocation will be implemented.

—IDPs lack information. According to credible sources on the ground, IDPs are

often not aware that the tsunami had affected other countries, let alone the

plans for relocation or what their options were.

—Other issues facing IDPs include criteria for site selection, impact on livelihoods, protection mechanisms, sensitivity of the data and fear of military involvement in relocation and camp management.

4. LAND RIGHTS: COMPENSATION, REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

—Disputes over land rights could affect long-term stability in Aceh. This is an

area ripe for corruption and arbitrary decisionmaking.

—Compensation: There is still no articulated policy on how compensation will be

decided, to whom, and under what criteria. It seems most likely that compensaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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tion will be provided on a sliding scale depending on the destruction of property;

but this is not clear.

5. PROTECTION OF IDPS

Despite the amount of money, agencies, and others in Aceh, up to a month after

the tsunami many IDPs still had not received supplementary food or nonfood items.

Protein and staples are lacking.

—There has been no effort at all to consider protection of IDPs in the current

spontaneous camps.

—With regards to the relocation barracks, we are concerned that IDPs have already been moved by the government before donors have sorted out minimum

standards.

—Barracks are ill designed, crowded, and without child friendly or community

spaces. Aside from a UNICEF initiative there are no reporting mechanisms for

the protection of women and children in camps. While there appear to be no

problems at the moment it is expected that IDPs will be in these crowded facilities for up to 2 years, in conditions that are ripe for abuse.

—All distribution of aid is being conducted through heads of communities and

through heads of households. Both are traditionally male held positions. This

process has the potential to exclude women, unaccompanied children, and other

vulnerable groups. Very little aid is being distributed directly to IDPs.

6. AID: DELIVERY, COORDINATION AND TRANSPARENCY

Accountability and transparency of the $4.5 billion that has been pledged for tsunami relief will be essential. While we appreciate that the military has permitted

access to Aceh for tsunami relief, we are concerned about their long-term presence

and involvement in aid coordination, given their history in the province.

—Given the history of corruption in Aceh, there are concerns that most of the reconstruction contracts will be given to military or government owned businesses. —There are credible reports of looting by the police and the military.

—While there is still no road access on the west coast (something like 87 bridges

out on that road alone), it seems that slow and ineffective coordination is the

main reason for the delay in delivery of aid.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While the tsunami has certainly resulted in unprecedented access to some parts

of Aceh it does not change the underlying causes and reasons for the ongoing conflict. The TNI continue to wage their war against GAM. While the reported 200

killings since the tsunami is undoubtedly an exaggeration, civilians are still being

killed. We call on the U.S. Government to:

• Call for access to all parts of Aceh to ensure that pre-tsunami IDPs receive assistance and that there is a monitoring of potential abuses on either side of the

conflict;

• Call for a phase-out of the military’s role in camp management, coordination

and distribution of aid;

• Ensure that U.S. and multilateral assistance incorporates steps for protection

of and equitable treatment of IDPs, including pre-tsunami IDPs; • Ensure that there is a clear and fair policy on compensation for those who have

lost land and property;

• Work with other donors to build in transparency and anticorruption mechanisms into the reconstruction package with genuine involvement of Acehenese

civil society in monitoring and shaping the reconstruction process.

Aceh has gone through a tremendous catastrophe with unimaginable loss and devastation. Indonesia’s long-term stability rests on confidence by the Acehenese people

in the reconstruction process.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM) BRIEFING TO STAFF OF THE

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

1. Introduction to IOM

• Intergovernmental organization, HQ in Geneva

• Created in 1951—outside of the U.N. system—more responsive, flexible

• 2005 budget is app. US$800 million of which 92 percent is earmarked for operational activities and funded by voluntary contributions

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• Service-oriented: working with migrants of all sorts—displaced persons, refugees, asylum-seekers; economic or labor migrants, trafficked migrants

• Primarily operational, logistical—we see migration as a positive force which can

benefit both migrants and societies

2. IOM Activities in Indonesia and Sri Lanka

• Transport and logistics

• Indonesia—The total number of IOM trucks operating between Jakarta-MedanBanda Aceh and Medan-Meulaboh currently stands at 350. Since the first deployment of trucks on 30 December 2004, IOM has moved and distributed some

10,324 Metric Tons (MT) of relief items from Medan in north Sumatra to

Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province. Of that total, IOM has transported 1,670

MT of relief goods to Meulaboh in convoys which began operating on 8 January.

IOM relief good delivery routes also include Medan-Biruen, Medan-Nias and

Medan-Lhokseumwe. IOM Banda Aceh’s truck fleet currently comprises 21

trucks which are used to distribute relief goods in and around Banda Aceh for

IOM, U.N. agencies and international and national NGOs. IOM Banda Aceh has

distributed humanitarian relief items to more than 20 IDP camps and communities hosting Tsunami affected populations throughout the Districts of Banda

Aceh, Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya and Pidie.

• Sri Lanka—IOM continues to provide free emergency transport assistance to

the Government of Sri Lanka, IOs, NGOs and donors. For this purpose 10M

currently leases a vehicle fleet of 45 trucks, each with cargo capacity of 10 Metric Tons. Specialized trucks for container shipments, passenger buses, trailers

and vans can be supplied on request. To date, IOM has operated 820 round

trips for transportation of bottled water, food items, water purification equipment, fishing boats, medical supplies and various other relief items to numerous

locations throughout the country. Vans/four-wheel-drive vehicles have been provided 64 times, 20ft container trucks/trailers have been arranged on 7 occasions

and 19 passenger buses, transporting a minimum of 435 relief workers have

been dispatched.

• Shelter

In both Sri Lanka and Indonesia, IOM has been asked by the respective Governments to coordinate and implement shelter activities:

IN SRI LANKA

Batticaloa district:

• IOM has committed to provide temporary shelter for 327 families in

Onthachimadam, Kaluwanchikudy DS division. Construction of temporary shelters for 20 families in the division has been completed. Development of other

sites is in the initial stages with land leveling and site preparation taking place.

Identification of additional land suitable for shelter construction is ongoing.

Ampara district:

• The construction of 100 temporary family shelters (for 100 families) is progressing in Ullai, Pottuvil DS division. A further total of 45 temporary shelters,

each consisting of four family units (to house 180 families) are currently under

construction on various other sites/divisions in the district.

• Construction of five temporary schools is progressing in Pottuvil, Thambiluvil,

Thampattai and Akkaraipattu DS divisions.

Trincomalee district:

• Development of a temporary shelter site for 180 families is in the final stages

in Mutur DS division. The site holds 45 temporary shelters, each consisting of

four family units. All shelters are completed and ready for occupation while construction of a community centre and additional toilets is still in progress.

Kalutara district:

• IOM agreed to construct temporary shelters for 168 families in Katukurunda

and Paiyagala south and north. The families all have land within the 100m ‘‘no

building zone’’ so 43 shelters, each consisting of four family units will be built

on government allocated land further from the sea. IOM is currently discussing/

identifying suitable shelter sites.

Transitional shelters:

• IOM is examining three different designs of transitional shelters in terms of

suitability, cost and availability of materials. The designs will be presented at

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an agencies shelter coordination meeting at TAFOR (Task Force for Relief) tomorrow.

• IOM is currently committed to constructing 5,608 transitional shelters in

Trincomalee (1,200), Batticaloa (1,539), Ampara (2,200) and Kalutara (769) districts.

IN INDONESIA

• The first IOM model temporary shelter unit arrived by truck from Jakarta on

5 February. Assembly was completed by 7 February. The model temporary shelter unit is now on display at the IOM office in Banda Aceh.

• The Ministry of Public Works has proposed to IOM five temporary shelter sites.

IOM’s shelter experts are currently assessing the viability of the sites. IOM’s

shelter experts are also traveling to Meulaboh to map sites for the shelter program.

• Health

• To date, IOM’s medical team has provided immunizations and Vitamin A supplements to a total of 3,442 children. (Banda Aceh 1,792; Teunom, 1,559 and

Lamno 91.) Figures on children immunized in Calang by the IOM medical team

will be available shortly.

• At this point in time there are three IOM immunization teams fielded: (1) Ministry of Health, UNICEF, IOM and GOAL. This team targets schools in a

sweeping operation to follow up on missed cases. (2) The second team comprises

Ministry of Health, IOM, Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) which is focused

on Teunom. (3) The third team comprising IOM and GOAL is currently in

Panga, on the west coast close to Teunom, on an assessment mission. The vaccination campaign in Panga is due to begin this week.

• A six month pilot project entitled ‘‘Aceh Mental Health Capacity Building

Project,’’ has been funded by IOM and approved by the Indonesian Ministry of

Health/Directorate for Mental Health Services. This three-tier training course

on basic counseling and early detection of mental health disorder skills is aimed

at raising awareness and building competency amongst mental health care personnel, public health caregivers and community leaders. IOM’s psychiatrist attended a WHO/Ministry workshop entitled: ‘‘Psycho Social and Mental Health

Agenda on Aceh’’ in Jakarta on 7 February.

• IOM’s health care specialist continues to liaise and coordinate IOM’s proposed

rehabilitation of five health care centers and training of staff and administrators with the Government of Indonesia and potential partners.

3. Observations on Protection for Vulnerable Persons

• With respect to IDPs—Ensuring the voluntariness of relocations of IDPs from

public buildings into temporary or transitional shelter is an important area of

concern. IOM works closely with the displaced individuals and the Government

authorities to assure that all needs are met.

• Documentation to replace lost IDs is a paramount need to ensure everyone is

restored their proper identity—and so are able to register their property and

livelihood losses, especially as regards land rights.

• Important to use the media better, and assure that they are educated on the

issues; if media is more informed, then media coverage would be of assistance,

rather than letting them focus on nonissues or trying to get new angles on a

story.

• In Sri Lanka, early reports of child abductions, and sexual exploitation and

abuse of children that were carried widely in the media have not been verified

by either the National Child Protection Authority or the police. Sexual and gender-based harassment and violence has been reported from many camps and

hospitals, but only two formal complaints (by adult women) have so far been

made to police.

• With respect to trafficking, IOM is implementing a rapid response trafficking

awareness raising project in two of the tsunami-affected countries, i.e., Indonesia and Sri Lanka, with a primary focus on the over one million internally

displaced. Utilizing its long-term countertrafficking experiences and its efficient

emergency logistics networks already existing in the two countries, IOM will

aim to reduce vulnerability and incidences of trafficking of vulnerable populations, particularly women and orphaned children, from and within the tsunami-affected areas, through multilevel mass information campaigns tailored to

country-specific post-tsunami realities, in close coordination with national governments, U.N. agencies and NGOs.

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1Give2Asia, a U.S. nonprofit organization established by the Asia Foundation, facilitates private giving to charitable causes throughout the Asia region. Give2Asia has raised $1.2 million

to date for the Tsunami Recovery Fund. See www.Give2Asia.org for more information.

4. Lessons Gathered

IOM Director General was just in Sri Lanka and Indonesia and offers his experienced voice with a few key points:

• The international players must not neglect close coordination with host governments at all levels. This sounds obvious, but there are many instances where

agencies went blithely ahead without checking and got themselves in trouble.

Both Sri Lanka and Indonesia have real governments that will not be brushed

aside. One key to IOM’s successful response is precisely our careful attention

to working with the host government, at all levels. • Using national staff in implementing activities can give an agency a big boost.

IOM has benefited enormously from having large numbers of Indonesian,

Acehnese, and Sri Lankan employees in our ranks.

• From the Sri Lanka experience: what is needed is for the country to establish

a response capacity to future sudden natural disasters. But this capacity should

be built not only at the national level, but at all levels—even to the level of ordinary people as well so they can depend on their own resources.

• The existence of civil conflict in both Sri Lanka and Aceh is another complication, requiring deft handling by relief agencies. Of course not all agencies can

be ‘‘old pros’’ in a particular disaster-struck nation, but it sure helps to have

been there and to know some people in advance.

• Coordination of donor responses: Donors often insist that agencies assure proper

coordination so as to avoid duplication; they need to learn to practice what they

preach and be sure to avoid duplication of contributions in some areas, with

other areas experiencing huge gaps. In Sri Lanka, for example, UNICEF and

WFP have been overfunded while other agencies have not received enough

funds.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NANCY YUAN, VICE PRESIDENT, DIRECTOR, THE ASIA

FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC

The international response to the earthquake and tsunami that hit South and

Southeast Asia on December 26, 2004, has been unprecedented. The efforts to date

have, of course, largely focused on immediate and basic food, water, and shelter

needs, and maintaining public health. While these priorities continue, many agencies and governments are also turning to the challenges of the medium and long

term.

Over the past 6 weeks, the Asia Foundation has focused on medium and longterm reconstruction in the tsunami affected areas of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand,

and India. Some relief activities have been supported through its affiliate organization, Give2Asia.1 Notably, the Foundation has also been contacted by a few of the

larger international NGOs focused on relief as a potential grantee for medium- and

long-term programs.

In each affected region, the Foundation has chosen to work with local organizations, as is its usual practice, in order to reach the largest number of people possible

and to rebuild the capacity of local institutions. The Foundation is also working to

encourage local involvement in planning, by establishing a meaningful dialog with

local and central government officials reviewing reconstruction strategies and developing a mechanism for community participation. In some cases, it also means building the capacity of local governments through technical assistance given the number

of local government officials lost in the tsunami. Finally, the Foundation is providing technical assistance for disaster preparedness and management to improve

the planning and training capacity of disaster management. Since 1995, the Foundation has operated a disaster preparedness training program in the Pacific Islands

with the goal of building self-reliance in disaster management.

INDONESIA

In Indonesia, the Asia Foundation is channeling most of its Aceh relief program

through Muhammadiyah, one of its long-term local partners. Muhammadiyah is Indonesia’s second largest mass-based Muslim organization, with a membership of approximately 25 million. Its main function is to deliver social services at the community level—health and education as well as its religious services. In their nationwide

programs, Muhammadiyah has consistently shown their commitment to democratic

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2For example Muhammadiyah produced more than 6,000,000 leaflets focusing on the issue

of tolerance and pluralism (e.g. Accepting Differences: Deliberation and Democracy) and distributed through their network of mosques. Muhammadiyah has also been successful in their nonviolence campaigns among the youth—a perennial problem among urban youths, particularly in

Jakarta. In Aceh, for nearly five years, Muhammadiyah has trained activists to identify and report on human rights violations in the province’s conflict-ridden areas. Likewise, in various partnerships with the Foundation, Muhammadiyah has been on the forefront of nonreligious issues

such as sound elections, good governance, nonviolence, and civic education.

values of pluralism and tolerance. They are effective in actively promoting these values as they have credibility as well as access to their mass-based extensive network.2

In the Aceh context, the Foundation’s decision to work with and through

Muhammadiyah is based on our understanding of two important factors: (1) Aceh

is and was the site of a serious conflict between the Government of Indonesia and

the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) prior to the disaster; (2) Islam plays a heightened

role in Aceh, and is the primary social and cultural force there. Muhammadiyah is

one of the most credible and trusted Islamic groups in Indonesia and, crucially, is

accepted on both sides of Aceh’s conflict. Such community trust and confidence is

and will be crucial to the success of relief efforts.

Aside from the government and the military, Muslim-based organizations such as

Muhammadiyah are among the very few organizations with an extensive network

throughout Aceh. One of the three major universities in Aceh is a Muhammadiyah

University, and Muhammadiyah runs almost 60 schools and eight boarding schools

for the poor in the province. Because it is a nationwide organization, the Aceh

branch of Muhammadiyah has strong backup support from the central board of

Muhammadiyah. Precisely because of the nationwide support and extensive activities in pre-tsunami Aceh, Muhammadiyah was one of the first local organizations

to mobilize an effective response to the disaster. Its four-level University building,

which was not damaged by the disaster, has been transformed into a vital base

camp for Muhammadiyah relief operations—including a temporary clinic, a radio

station, and a volunteer center.

As part of its near-term response in Aceh, the Foundation provided funding for

150 skilled volunteers—doctors, nurses, forensic specialists, paramedics, child care

experts—drawn from Muhammadiyah institutions nationwide for the first month

after the disaster. During this time, for example, eight paramedics served over

12,000 people in the IDP camps and assisted IOM with logistics in Banda Aceh.

Communication networks in the affected regions of Indonesia have been devastated by the tsunami, creating a massive obstacle to recovery and relief efforts.

With private funding, the Foundation has already been able to help reestablish communications networks through support for Radio 68H, which has established radio

communications in 50 IDP camps in Banda Aceh, broadcasting public service announcements about aid distribution, emergency relief coordination, and a missing

persons service. A program in Meulaboh has also been established.

Coordination among both local and international organizations responding to the

crisis has often been lacking in Aceh. To help address this problem, the Foundation

has been leading a collaboration with Save the Children, Oxfam, Hivos and Mercy

Corps, to support a website, www.indotsunamirelief.com. The website, dedicated to

coordination among funding agencies and civil society organizations working in

Aceh, is up and running, though the official launch will be on February 16 in Banda

Aceh.

Another concern raised in the field has been how to ensure that there is active

participation by Acehnese in the reconstruction and planning phase. The Asia Foundation has also been working with the major organizations active in Aceh, (CARE,

Save the Children, PCI, CRS, Oxfam), in the development of a document outlining

Common Operating Principles and Guidelines for Tsunami Reconstruction in Aceh.

We expect that other organizations, including bilateral donors, will also sign on in

the coming weeks.

SRI LANKA

In Sri Lanka, the Foundation has provided assistance through faith-based and

private voluntary organizations, including Buddhist, Hindu and Christian groups,

along with the Rotary and Lions Clubs. These efforts have included the provision

of basic relief supplies and transport in the East and South, and relocation of people

from churches, temples and schools which served as refugee camps, to homes and

other temporary housing. These organizations will also help to rebuild homes and

schools, and purchase fishing boats.

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With USAID funding, the Foundation has supported the Legal Aid Commission

in Sri Lanka to assist survivors with lost documents and pressing legal issues. Special help desks have been established and LAC lawyers are providing assistance to

local government officials and volunteers from local NGOs to help victims obtain

documents, and solve legal issues related to property, adoption, insurance, banking,

and other matters.

With OTI funding through the Asia Foundation, psychosocial services are being

provided through the Psychosocial Support Programme and Psychosocial Forum.

These organizations are providing a range of services, including training, counseling

materials for local and international CSOs, translations of materials from Singhalese into Tamil, a website for district level services, a Missing Persons Desk, and

a database within the Psychosocial desk at the Center of National Operations.

In Sri Lanka, we have also been in discussions with donors about operational

principles for Tsunami reconstruction, which have been incorporated into a World

Bank/ADB/JBIC needs assessment. These principles focus on conflict sensitivity,

local elected government involvement in planning, demand driven response, communication and transparency, and coordination between stakeholders.

THAILAND

In Thailand, the Foundation’s programs have focused largely on legal aid for tsunami survivors, and involve a range of legal NGOs, Shariah law experts, universities and government officials. A handbook will be developed to detail a variety of

government programs available to victims. The Foundation plans to support a onestop legal aid service center, a call center, and website to provide pro bono service

to victims. The Foundation is also working specifically on issues related to the protection of women and children through needs assessments conducted by the Ministry of Social Development and prominent women’s groups, such as the Women and

the Constitution Network and the Children and Family Affairs Committee of the Islamic Center of Thailand.

INDIA

In India, through private funding raised through Give2Asia, the Foundation has

supported CAF India, a local nongovernmental organization, to provide relief supplies, purchase fishing boats and nets, and help local governments to review land

use for reconstruction projects such as schools, hospitals, and microenterprise.

As the U.S. Government, in concert with other international donors, national and

local governments in the affected regions, and private organizations like the Asia

Foundation, work to address the medium- and long-term needs of those areas devastated by the tsunami, it is important to keep a number of important points in

mind.

First, recovery will require large-scale reconstruction that addresses the massive

destruction of physical infrastructure and the loss of valuable human resources. National governments and local communities have some resources, but the majority of

the resources for reconstruction will come through two channels—international

donor assistance and private investment, both foreign and domestic. Given the scale

of the disaster and the magnitude of the anticipated resource flows, coordinating

donor assistance and attracting and accommodating investors will be an enormous

challenge, and requires substantial and thoughtful planning.

Second, effective and responsive government will be essential if successful, accelerated reconstruction is to take place. Central governments will play a key role, but

local governments in coastal areas will also have major responsibilities. Local government, particularly at the municipal, district, and provincial levels, was weak in

many of the affected regions prior to the crisis, and in many areas, capacity has

been diminished, or destroyed, by the loss of local government staff. Governing institutions, particularly at the local level, will need substantial and timely assistance

if they are to undertake critical large-scale planning and management roles that

will be required of them over the next few years.

Third, local credibility and trust will be vital, particularly regarding longer term

efforts in areas that have been wracked by conflict in recent years. The Foundation’s

efforts (both short-term tsunami relief and other long-term program areas) in Aceh,

have been successful to date in large part due to the local trust conferred on its local

partner, Muhammadiyah.

Finally, consistent and substantial local input must be an essential element of

long-term recovery efforts. To further this goal, building the capacity of civil society

organizations will also be critical, as such groups can play an important role in

launching ongoing public-private dialog for reconstruction and recovery, helping to

encourage local ownership, coordination, and effective action at all levels.

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In responding to the tsunami tragedy, both in terms of short-term relief efforts

and longer term planning, the Asia Foundation has drawn on its years of experience

in the region and lessons learned from programs such as enhancing interfaith dialog

in Indonesia; managing conflict in Sri Lanka; and promoting legal aid and rights

in Thailand. Utilizing the valuable experiences, insights, and credibility of local networks of partner organizations and individuals has been a core element of the Foundation’s long-term effectiveness—and likewise such experience can greatly enhance

the efficiency and efficacy of long-term recovery efforts on the part of the United

States and the entire international community.

Thank you.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PAUL WOLFOWITZ TO QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR LUGAR

Question. In coordinating the military relief efforts, has the U.S. strategy of

‘‘places not bases’’ in Southeast Asia proven itself valuable? How have the facilities

and bases in Thailand and Singapore affected relief operations?

Answer. We have close military relationships with many Southeast Asian nations.

These relationships are important to us in many respects and help us to achieve

many of our objectives in the region. In the case of Operation Unified Assistance,

the tsunami relief operation, our longstanding relationships and habits of cooperation in the region were critical to our ability to quickly set up an international coordination center in Utapao and create other staging areas within the region from

which we were able to direct the relief operations. Without the close relationship

with Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and others in the region, our relief efforts would

have certainly been slower and far less effective. Our efforts likely would have been

further enhanced if we had similar ties with other nations in the region, most notably Indonesia.

I should point out as well that this relief operation was a prime demonstration

of the validity of our concept of ‘‘seabasing’’ where U.S. forces can be stationed on

board U.S. naval vessels offshore while still projecting our capabilities ashore. In

this case, seabasing allowed the U.S. military to effectively provide humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief without creating a large, intrusive, and vulnerable

footprint ashore in the affected regions.

Question. Please provide the committee with your impressions of the changing

role of TNI during this phase of the transition to democracy in Indonesia. Also, what

is your assessment of the level of cooperation being provided to the U.S. authorities

reviewing the Timika murder case by Indonesia military authorities?

Answer. The Indonesian military (TNI) continues to wrestle with defining its new

role since the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, as do all the other

parts of the Government of Indonesia and most parts of Indonesian society.

This is clearly still a work in progress, but important and sustained reforms have

been made by the TNI. The TNI has remained a neutral player throughout two electoral processes and political crises. TNI active duty officers can no longer hold government offices and there are no longer any TNI officers sitting in the Parliament

as appointed military representatives. In addition, we have seen important and significant steps taken toward accountability for Suharto-era abuses and an increased

emphasis on respect for human rights and professionalism. The TNI’s reform is by

no means complete, but I believe that progress has been and will continue to be

made. Indonesian Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono has specifically requested

U.S. assistance in supporting reform through the provision of International Military

Education and Training (IMET). We should support him in helping the process of

reform, just as the United States is doing for other institutions within the central

and local governments in Indonesia.

I would refer you to the FBI for a full assessment of the level of cooperation being

provided to the U.S. authorities by the Government of Indonesia and the TNI. Secretary of State Rice on February 25, 2005, made the assessment in a certification

to Congress that the Indonesian Government and armed forces are cooperating with

the FBI investigation into the August 31, 2002, murders of two American citizens

and one Indonesian citizen in Timika, Indonesia.

RESPONSES OF UNDER SECRETARY ALAN LARSON TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR

LUGAR

Question. In identifying the remains of victims from dozens of countries through

DNA testing, the Thai authorities face a challenge similar to the United States folVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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lowing the 9/11 attacks. Are there lessons to be learned from these two experiences

that would better prepare us for disaster responses in the future?

Answer. The December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean Tsunami destroyed major tourist

areas in southern Thailand and left over 5,000 people dead and 3,000 missing, including 10 confirmed American citizen deaths and 14 Americans who are presumed

dead. More than 30 countries provided assistance to the Royal Thai Government

(RTG) to establish the Thailand Tsunami Victims Identification (TTVI) center in

Phuket, Thailand, to handle the enormous task of identifying the remains of the victims. The United States has assisted in this international effort by deploying

forensics experts from the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), the FBI

and the medical examiner’s office in Onondaga County, New York.

In order to better prepare the United States to respond to a future mass casualty

event, consideration should be given to clearly identifying and assigning to a USG

agency, with the know-how and personnel, the authorization to provide immediate

victim identification services to affected areas overseas. While FEMA possesses

many of the capabilities for mass casualty and mass fatality response, its authority

for providing assistance is limited to domestic disasters. Currently no USG agency

has clear authority or funding to provide mortuary and forensic identification services and assistance to foreign countries in need.

Question. From information we have collected throughout the federal government,

it appears at least seven task forces (and perhaps more), have been in operation at

the federal level of our government connected to earthquake/tsunami relief. These

various task forces have been operating out of USAID, Pacific Command (PACOM),

the National Security Council, and the State Department, among others.

Please outline for the committee the total number of U.S. federal task forces

which were or are still operating in connection with the earthquake/tsunami disaster and advise as to whom (what person) in the U.S. Federal Government is ultimately responsible to assure proper coordination of these various task forces.

Answer. The U.S. Government mounted a rapid and comprehensive response to

the Indian Ocean earthquake and resultant tsunamis. In the immediate aftermath

of the disaster, seven agencies and departments stood up task forces to offer direct

assistance in accordance with their mandates and expertise, and to communicate

with the international community and multilateral institutions. As affected countries moved from the relief phase to rehabilitation and reconstruction, the United

States responded in parallel, standing up a coordination system to assist tsunami

victims with rebuilding their shattered lives. The attached diagrams visually display

the relationship between the task forces established in the immediate aftermath of

the disaster (Diagram A), as well as the structure for the relief and reconstruction

phase (Diagram B).

Immediate Aftermath

The following agencies stood up task forces. All of these entities have stood down:

• Department of State (DOS): DOS stood up 3 task forces within 24 hours of the

disaster.

• Task Force 1: The Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) assisted American citizens

to locate the welfare and whereabouts of loved ones. CA received over 30,000

calls, which generated over 15,000 cases that required action. Over the course

of 8 weeks, CA narrowed the unaccounted for to four cases.

• Task Force 2: The East Asia and Pacific (EAP) Bureau headed a task force

that facilitated interaction between the U.S. military and host governments,

accelerated the entry of relief goods into affected countries and acted as the

main clearinghouse for information from embassies, other government agencies, and the media.

• Under Secretary Marc Grossman established the senior level international

Core Group (Australia, Japan, India, Canada, the Netherlands, and the

United Nations).

• On 6 January 2005, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) created

the Tsunami Humanitarian Sharing (THIS) Interagency Working Group to facilitate the management of interagency geospatial information and to coordinate support for field needs related to tsunami relief efforts.

• USAID: USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance stood up a Response

Management Team (RMT) as per standard procedure in a natural disaster scenario. The RMT is activated to provide full support to a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). The DART provides a presence on the ground capable of

carrying out sustained response activities. The RMT provides the necessary support to a DART from USAID headquarters and manages USAID response activities and coordinates interagency cooperation in the initial response phase.

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USAID also stood up an Agency Tsunami Task Force which is responsible for

setting overall USAID policy in response to the disaster in Asia, providing operational guidance of program activities, and recommending resource allocations

for all programs.

• Pacific Command (PACOM): PACOM activated the Combined Support Force

(CSF) 536, headquartered in Utapao, Thailand as part of the DOD’s Operation

UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. CSF–536 was the on-scene military headquarters responsible for U.S. forces involved in relief operations. Additionally, PACOM

stood up three Combined Support Groups—in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand—to transport relief supplies via ground and air to distribution points and

remote locations in support of relief agencies and the host governments.

• Department of Defense (DOD): The DOD response was in support of the larger

U.S. Government response led by the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and in cooperation with the Department of State and the National

Security Council. DOD provided support to indigenous efforts in areas where

unique military capabilities could be of use, for example: logistics, air and sea

borne transportation, search and rescue, water purification capabilities, and

medical support/supplies. In addition, this multifaceted response also involved

the host nations, U.N. organizations, partner states, other military forces, and

nongovernmental organizations.

• National Security Council (NSC): Beginning December 27 and continuing daily

through the first weeks of the crisis, NSC chaired a working level humanitarian

response coordination meeting that addressed needs from the field and ensured

interagency issues regarding the humanitarian response were addressed. Participants met via secure video teleconference and included all the operational

agencies (USAID, Department of Defense, Pacific Command, State, Department

of Homeland Security and Department of Health and Human Services). The

NSC group was disbanded February 8, 2005, as response coordination no longer

required senior level attention.

• Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): HHS created a small headquarters working group on tsunami relief efforts. The working group was led

by the Office of Global Health Affairs in the Secretary’s Office. Its efforts were

coordinated by the NSC as part of the interagency group.

• Department of Homeland Security (DHS): DHS stood up a small workgroup to

support the needs expressed by the Department of State and the Department

of Defense in their humanitarian relief efforts. For example, in the immediate

aftermath, the U.S. Coast Guard deployed air assets in support of the DOD mission to deliver water and food to the impacted region. USCG also provided medical personnel to serve aboard the Mercy.

Relief and Reconstruction

The State Department, in close coordination with USAID, is responsible for coordinating the U.S. Government’s response in the relief and reconstruction phase.

Specifically, Ambassador Doug Hartwick, based in State’s Economic Bureau (EB)

has been designated as the Tsunami Coordinator. State and NSC convened January

7 the first of a now weekly interagency working group (IAWG) meeting on tsunami

reconstruction.

The State Department is working across the U.S Government to set U.S. reconstruction priorities, coordinating especially closely with USAID’s tsunami task force,

which is responsible for setting USAID policy in response to the disaster in Asia,

providing operational guidance of program activities, and recommending resource allocations for all programs in the affected countries. As necessary, smaller interagency working groups on thematic issues (e.g., early warning systems) are convened and report to Ambassador Hartwick. Externally, DOS and USAID will work

with other bilateral donors, the United Nations, the multilateral development banks

and the international financial institutions to help tsunami victims rebuild their

communities and livelihoods. Affected countries and regions have the lead in reconstruction, and the United States will work to respond to the needs and priorities

as identified by these national and local authorities.

[Diagrams A and B follow:]

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RESPONSE OF USAID ADMINISTRATOR ANDREW S. NATSIOS TO QUESTION FROM

SENATOR LUGAR

Question. Is humanitarian aid reaching all affected areas in Sri Lanka sufficiently, including those areas that have majority Tamil and/or Muslim populations

in the North and East of the country?

Answer. The USAID/DART has deployed teams to all nine tsunami-affected districts. These teams have met with the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) officials,

implementing partners and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps. By and

large, all affected people are receiving assistance from one organization or another.

USAID/DART assessments have shown that emergency needs for food, shelter,

water, and clothing are being met, although with difficulty in some areas. Given the

disaffection between ethnic communities in Sri Lanka, it would be hard to imagine

any major operation by the GOSL going uncriticized. For example, a February 7

World Food Program report noted that, ‘‘On Friday 4 February a large number of

tsunami affected Muslims, mainly fisherman, protested simultaneously in several

towns of Ampara district. They claimed that after 41 days since the tsunami struck

they had not received adequate relief supplies. They also asked that in the east,

Muslims be permitted to handle the distribution of relief supplies as well as the

LTTE.’’ The USAID/DART has not encountered any documented cases of malfeasance. USAID does not feel that any community will go without support given the

tremendous response to this disaster by the international community.

The infrastructure and agriculture assets of the country are intact, with damage

restricted to a narrow band of between 100 meters and 1 km inland from the coast.

Therefore, the same support resources are available now that were available prior

to the tsunami. That said, the USAID mission in conjunction with the USAID/DART

will continue to monitor the situation and report on any developments.

INDIAN OCEAN—EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMIS

USAID Fact Sheet No. 32, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, February 8, 2005

Indonesia ...................... 114,000 dead,1 126,000 missing 1 ..................................... 413,000 displaced 2

Sri Lanka ...................... 30,974 dead, 4,698 missing 3 ............................................. 553,287 displaced 3

India ............................. 10,749 dead, 5,640 missing 4 ............................................. 112,558 displaced 4

Maldives ....................... 82 dead, 26 missing 5 ......................................................... 12,698 displaced 6

Thailand ....................... 5,393 dead, 3,062 missing 7 ............................................... N/A

Malaysia ....................... 68 dead, 6 missing 8 ........................................................... 8,000 displaced 8

Somalia ........................ 150 dead 8 ........................................................................... 5,000 displaced,8 54,000 affected 9

Seychelles ..................... 3 dead 8 ............................................................................... 40 households displaced 10

Source Legend:

1 Government of Indonesia, 2/7/05.

2 Government of Indonesia, 2/7/05.

3 Government of Sri Lanka, Center for National Operations, 2/1/05.

4 Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1/18/05.

5Maldives National Disaster Management Center, 1/23/05.

6Maldives National Disaster Management Center, 1/23/05.

7 Government of Thailand, 2/4/05.

8 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 1/18/05.

9 U.N. Consolidated Appeal, 1/6/05.

10 U.N./Seychelles and USAID, 1/12/05.

Total USG Humanitarian and Recovery Assistance Pledged ...................... $350,000,000

Total USAID/OFDA Humanitarian Assistance Committed ......................... 82,970,096

Total USG Humanitarian Assistance Committed 1 ......................................123,009,940

1This figure includes assistance from USAID (including USAID/OFDA), the U.S. Department

of State, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The value of assistance provided by the U.S.

Department of Defense is not included in total USG assistance committed.

CURRENT SITUATION

Indonesia Update

• According to the U.N. World Food Program (WFP), the Government of Indonesia (GOI) declared on February 4 that the first phase of the emergency relief

operation in Aceh Province was over and reconstruction and recovery activities

will begin after the planning phase is completed.

• WFP reported on February 4 that the GOI will register all displaced persons

and catalogue their skills in order to facilitate temporary job placements during

the reconstruction period. In addition, the GOI indicated that a number of relocation barracks will be built throughout affected areas of Aceh Province for inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00132 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23942.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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ternally displaced persons (IDPs). International media report that the GOI

plans to build 754 barracks in 39 locations with 401 barracks scheduled for

completion by the end of February. As of February 8, the USAID/Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) reports that 13 barracks have been constructed.

• According to the USAID/DART, no comprehensive psychological and social assessment of the affected populations has been undertaken to date. However,

preliminary results from a Save the Children study of parents and caretakers

in the worst affected areas of Banda Aceh and Pidie suggest that there is not

a mental health crisis as result of the tsunami. According to focus groups in the

study, parents were aware of how their children’s attitudes and behaviors have

changed. In addition, the study found very few serious cases of impairment or

dysfunction among children. Instead, children displayed common reactions to a

traumatic event, such as the fear that something bad will happen again and

that they will not be with their parents when it does.

• On February 5 and 6, USAID/DART members visited a USAID/OFDA-funded

community health clinic and mobile health services in Darussalam, and Rumah

Sakit Umum Hospital, the primary referral hospital for Aceh Province. Although international medical personnel continue to provide emergency services

to tsunami-affected populations, USAID/OFDA’s implementing partners are

making a concerted effort to increase local capacity and transition activities to

local health providers.

• On February 4, the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta announced the departure of the

USS Abraham Lincoln, the aircraft carrier that dispatched the first helicopters

to provide assistance to Aceh after the tsunami. Since the U.S. military began

providing tsunami relief assistance, U.S. military personnel have flown more

than 2,800 relief missions, provided medical treatment to more than 2,200 people, and delivered 4,000 tons of supplies.

Sri Lanka Update

• In late January, the Ministry of Urban Development and Water Supply issued

a public notice stipulating guidelines for development in coastal areas in government-controlled areas in Sri Lanka. According to the guidelines, residential

and commercial construction along the western and southern coastal zones from

Point Pedro to Dondra must be 100 meters inland from the coast. In the eastern

and northern coastal zones, no construction is allowed within 200 meters of the

coast. According to the Center for National Operations, the difference in buffer

zones between the east and west coasts is due to the high population density

in western coastal areas. According to local media reports, the Liberation Tigers

of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has established a buffer zone of between 300 to 500 meters for construction in LTTE-controlled areas.

India Update

• The Supreme Court of India has relaxed an order banning the removal of timber from protected forests in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands for a period of

six months in order to meet the immediate requirement for reconstruction/

repair of houses. Local officials have stated that temporary housing will be

ready for displaced populations by April, the start of the monsoon season in the

islands. The local administration reports that 40,962 persons remain in camps

in the islands as of February 6.

Maldives

• According to the U.N. country team, multi-sectoral relief activities are underway throughout the islands. The Government of Maldives (GOM) indicates that

transport and logistical coordination remain priority concerns given the dispersion of the affected areas and difficult conditions for aid deliveries. Humanitarian assistance must be delivered to each of the 200 islands individually and

can only be provided through the use of small boats or other light transport.

As a result, the U.N. Resident Coordinator’s Office has requested the deployment of U.N. Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) staff to support logistic coordination between the GOM and U.N. agencies in Maldives.

USG ASSISTANCE

USAID Regional Response

• The USAID/DART and the U.S. military continue to conduct needs assessments

and provide supplies and essential logistic support for the relief efforts in affected countries.

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Indonesia

• To date, the USG has provided more than $41.1 million in emergency food assistance, relief supplies, shelter, water and sanitation, health, livelihoods recovery, psychological and social support, logistics and coordination, and rehabilitation activities for affected communities in Indonesia.

• On February 7, USAID/OFDA committed nearly $4.1 million for activities in

Aceh: $1.3 million to Mercy Corps for community infrastructure rehabilitation

(cash-for-work), micro-finance, and livelihood recovery projects; approximately

$1.3 million to Project Concern International for health, water and sanitation,

and livelihood recovery programs; and nearly $1.5 million to International Relief and Development, Inc. (IRD) for water and sanitation, micro-finance, and

livelihood recovery projects.

Sri Lanka

• To date, the USG has provided more than $62.0 million in emergency food assistance, relief supplies, shelter, water and sanitation, health, livelihoods recovery, psychological and social support, protection and anti-trafficking, logistics

and coordination, and cleanup and rehabilitation activities for affected communities in Sri Lanka. USAID/OFDA-funded cash-for-work and micro-finance programs are fully operational. The USAID/DART in Sri Lanka is now focusing on

program monitoring and evaluation and ongoing situational assessments.

India

• On January 31, the USAID/DART in India closed out more than four weeks of

operations, after providing approximately $4.1 million for shelter, water and

sanitation, cleanup and rehabilitation, education, and cash for work activities

for tsunami-affected residents. During the transition to the recovery phase,

USAID/India will oversee USAID/OFDA-funded programs, and USAID/OFDA

and USAID/India will share responsibility for monitoring.

Maldives

• On January 28, the USAID/DART Field Officer posted to Male’ closed out operations in Maldives. USAID staff and military personnel were stationed on the

ground in Maldives since January 10, conducting assessments and coordinating

and consulting with government officials. During that time, USAID/OFDA provided more than $1.3 million for health, nutrition, water and sanitation, and

emergency relief supplies.

Department of Defense (DOD) Humanitarian Assistance

• As of February 8, 3,594 U.S. military personnel are involved in delivering more

than 24.0 million pounds of relief supplies and equipment to the affected region.

Of the 688 military personnel currently on the ground, 675 are in Thailand, 8

in Sri Lanka, and 5 in Indonesia. With 8 ships and 25 aircraft, the U.S. military

has delivered a total of 9,259,209 pounds of relief supplies to the governments

of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and other affected nations in the last 24

hours.

BACKGROUND

• A magnitude 9.0 earthquake on December 26, off the west coast of Northern

Sumatra, Indonesia, triggered massive tsunamis that affected several countries

throughout South and Southeast Asia, as well as Somalia, Tanzania, Kenya,

and the Seychelles in East Africa. Aftershocks from the December 26 earthquake continue to occur in the region.

• Based on initial findings of USG assessment teams and on the recommendation

of Secretary of State Powell and USAID Administrator Natsios, on December

31, President Bush committed $350 million toward earthquake and tsunami relief and recovery efforts. Dollar amounts in this Fact Sheet are part of the total

pledge of $350 million and refer to specific funding actions that have been committed and programmed.

USAID REGIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ASIA

Implementing partner Activity Location Amount

USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*

IFRC ........................ Response to emergency appeal ..................................................... Regionwide ............ $4,000,000

U.S. Embassy/JTF ... Emergency relief supplies (In-kind contribution) .......................... Regionwide ............ 196,631

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USAID REGIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ASIA—Continued

Implementing partner Activity Location Amount

AirServ .................... Aerial assessment, transport of relief personnel and light cargo Regionwide ............ 2,436,681

WFP ........................ Logistics, air support and coordination ........................................ Regionwide ............ 5,000,000

Multiple .................. Transport of relief supplies ........................................................... Regionwide ............ 523,260

Administrative ................................................................................ ................................ 468,460

Total USAID/OFDA assistance to region ..................................................................................................... 12,625,032

Total USG assistance to region ............................................................................................................................... $12,625,032

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

Implementing partner Activity Location Amount

USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*

ACF/France ............. Water and sanitation and emergency household kits .................. Aceh Province ........ $400,000

CARE ...................... Water purification .......................................................................... Aceh, North Sumatra.256,276

Christian Children’s

Fund (CCF).

Child protection and psychological and social support ............... Aceh Province ........ 396,728

Church World Service.Psychological and social support for children .............................. Aceh Province ........ 221,375

DAI .......................... Immediate relief and rehabilitation interventions through local

and international NGOs.

Aceh Province ........ 5,000,000

$62,688—Muhammadiyah for school clean-up and cash-forwork in Banda Aceh.

$15,000—SATORLAK for disaster management training in Aceh

Province.

$74,725—Yayasan Rumpun Bambu for cash-for-work and rehabilitation in Aceh Province.

$750,000—Mercy Corps for cash-for-work activities in Banda

Aceh and Meulaboh.

$13,900—LPPM for clean-up in Campus Darussalam Complex.

$237,000—Project Concern International (PCI) for cash-for-work

in West Aceh Province.

$132,000—Panglima Laot for cash-for-work in Aceh Jaya.

$79,465—BEM Sya Kuala for cash-for-work in Banda Aceh.

$47,802—IOM for airport rehabilitation in Banda Aceh Airport.

IFRC/Indonesian

Red Cross.

Emergency relief supplies .............................................................. Aceh, North Sumatra.2,200,000

Indonesian Red

Cross.

Emergency relief supplies (In-kind contribution) .......................... Aceh, North Sumatra.99,050

IMC ......................... Health ............................................................................................. Banda Aceh ........... 292,129

IMC ......................... Mobile health units, rehabilitation of local health clinics, malaria control, and psychological and social activities.Aceh and North Sumatra.2,000,000

IOM ......................... Provision of emergency relief supplies, shelter, food, water, and

medicine.

Aceh, North Sumatra.1,000,000

IRC ......................... Water and sanitation, mobile health clinics, support for public

health networks, and psychological and social activities.

Aceh Province ........ 2,564,729

IRC/IOM .................. Emergency relief supplies (In-kind contribution) .......................... Aceh, North Sumatra.523,260

IRD ......................... Water and sanitation ..................................................................... Aceh, North Sumatra.285,428

IRD ......................... Water and sanitation, micro-finance, and livelihoods recovery ... Aceh Province ........ 1,499,769

Johns Hopkins/

JHPIEGO.

Maternal and child health ............................................................. Aceh, North Sumatra.254,023

Mercy Corps ........... Emergency response activities ...................................................... Aceh, North Sumatra.292,060

Mercy Corps ........... Community infrastructure rehabilitation (cash-for-work), microfinance, and livelihoods recovery.Aceh Province ........ 1,321,771

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USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA—Continued

Implementing partner Activity Location Amount

PCI .......................... Mobile health clinics ..................................................................... Aceh, North Sumatra.236,929

PCI .......................... Health, water and sanitation, and livelihoods recovery ............... Aceh Province ........ 1,327,321

SC/US ..................... Emergency health, sanitation, shelter, and protection ................. ................................ 288,533

SC/US ..................... Emergency relief activities ............................................................ Aceh Province ........ 901,239

USAID/Indonesia** Emergency grants for water and sanitation, health, and shelter Aceh, North Sumatra.136,766

UNICEF ................... Child protection and psychological and social activities ............. Aceh Province ........ 1,500,000

UNHCR ................... Shelter ............................................................................................ Aceh, North Sumatra.2,000,000

WHO ........................ Health surveillance ........................................................................ Aceh, North Sumatra.291,500

WVI ......................... Shelter and household kits ............................................................ Aceh, North Sumatra.249,985

Multiple .................. Transport of relief supplies ........................................................... Aceh, North Sumatra.256,002

Administrative ................................................................................ ................................ 114,500

Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Indonesia ................................................................................................ 25,909,373

USAID/FFP ASSISTANCE

WFP ........................ 3,000 MT of P.L. 480 Title II emergency food assistance ............ Sumatra ................. 2,438,560

Total USAID/FFP assistance to Indonesia ................................................................................................... 2,438,560

USAID/INDONESIA ASSISTANCE

CARDI ..................... Emergency response teams ........................................................... Aceh Province ........ 99,960

CARE ...................... Water and sanitation ..................................................................... Aceh Province ........ 98,889

ICMC ....................... Targeting/monitoring of emergency relief supplies ....................... Aceh Province ........ 100,000

IOM ......................... Logistics ......................................................................................... Aceh Province ........ 208,452

I0M ......................... Emergency relief activities ............................................................ Aceh Province ........ 1,650,000

IRD ......................... Emergency food assistance ........................................................... Aceh Province ........ 99,974

Mercy Corps ........... Shelter, health, water, and trauma counseling ............................ Aceh Province ........ 250,000

Naval Medical Research Unit.Procurement and staffing of reference laboratory ........................ Banda Aceh ........... 579,000

Nurani Dunia .......... Emergency relief supplies .............................................................. Aceh Province ........ 99,669

SC/US ..................... Emergency relief supplies and health ........................................... Aceh Province ........ 100,000

Multiple*** ............ Emergency relief activities ............................................................ Aceh Province ........ 2,087,000

Total USAID/Indonesia assistance to Indonesia ......................................................................................... 5,372,944

USDA ASSISTANCE

WFP ........................ 9,417 MT of P.L. 416(b) Title I emergency food assistance ........ Sumatra ................. 7,533,600

Total USDA assistance to Indonesia .......................................................................................................... 7,533,600

STATE/PRM ASSISTANCE

IOM ......................... Anti-Trafficking Initiatives ............................................................. Aceh and Medan ... 200,000

Total State/PRM assistance to Indonesia .................................................................................................. 200,000

Total USG assistance to Indonesia .......................................................................................................................... $41,454,477

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

** USAID/OFDA funding, provided to USAID/Indonesia, will be allocated to implementing partners based on assessments.

*** USAID/Indonesia is using existing funds earmarked for activities in Aceh Province to support grants in response to the earthquake and

tsunami.

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USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SRI LANKA

Implementing partner Activity Location Amount

USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*

ACF/France ............. Emergency relief supplies and water and sanitation ................... Trincomalee,

Mulaitiva, Jaffna.

$403,763

American Center for

International

Labor.

Psychological and social support including antitrafficking ......... All Affected Districts.350,000

The Asia Foundation Child protection and psychological and social activities ............. All Affected Districts.199,408

CARE ...................... Emergency relief supplies, water system rehabilitation ............... Ampara .................. 1,941,787

CCF ......................... Cash-for-work and community rehabilitation ............................... Ampara, Matara,

Hambantola,

Trincomalee,

Galle.

2,310,294

CHF International ... Cash-for-work, debris clean-up, repair of schools and public

buildings, latrine construction, and water and sanatation.

Kalutara, Galle,

Matara.

3,000,000

CRS ........................ Transitional shelter, home repair, latrine construction ................ Batticaloa, Ampara 3,048,000

USAID/OTI ............... Relief and recovery projects through existing DAI contract with

USAID/OTI.

Affected areas ....... 2,500,000

GOAL ....................... Shelter, water and sanitation, and cash-for-work activities ........ Ampara,

Hambantota,

Matara.

3,280,423

IFRC ........................ Emergency relief supplies (In-kind contribution) .......................... Affected areas ....... 750,699

IOM ......................... Provision of emergency relief supplies, shelter, food, water, and

medicine.

Northern, Eastern,

and Southern

coastal areas.

500,000

Mercy Corps ........... Cash-for-work and community rehabilitation ............................... Trincomolee,

Batticaloe,

Ampara,

Hambantota,

Matara.

1,509,447

Nathan Associates Community rehabilitation, livelihoods, and microfinance projects Affected areas ....... 10,000,000

SARVODAYA ............ Cash-for-work, debris clean-up, repair of buildings, and water

and sanitation.

Galle, Hambantota,

Ampara.

1,748,120

SC/UK ..................... Shelter, water and sanitation, and emergency relief supplies ..... Trincomalee,

Matara, Galle.

630,620

Shelter for Life ....... Transitional shelter and latrine construction ................................ Trincomalee ........... 1,026,185

Sri Lanka Red

Cross.

Emergency relief supplies, health, and cash-for-work activities Ampara, Mulaitiva 356,655

UNICEF ................... Water and sanitation and emergency school kits ........................ All Affected Districts.1,000,000

UNICEF ................... Child protection and psychological and social activities ............. Affected areas ....... 500,000

UNHCR ................... Shelter ............................................................................................ Affected areas ....... 1,000,000

USAID/Sri Lanka ..... Emergency relief activities ............................................................ Affected areas ....... 100,000

USAID/Sri Lanka** Emergency relief activities ............................................................ Affected areas ....... 95,449

US Navy .................. Emergency relief supplies (In-kind contribution) .......................... Affected areas ....... 5,225

WVI ......................... Emergency relief supplies and shelter .......................................... Trincomalee,

Ampara.

499,849

Multiple .................. Transport of relief supplies ........................................................... Affected areas ....... 657,553

Administrative ................................................................................ ................................ 76,512

Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Sri Lanka ................................................................................................ 37,489,989

USAID/FFP ASSISTANCE

WFP ........................ 18,220 MT of P.L. 480 Title II emergency food assistance .......... Affected areas ....... 20,028,340

Total USAID/FFP Assistance to Sri Lanka ................................................................................................... 20,028,340

USDA ASSISTANCE

WFP ........................ 5,583 MT of P.L. 416(b) Title I emergency food assistance ........ Countrywide ........... 4,466,400

134

Total USDA assistance to Sri Lanka .......................................................................................................... 4,466,400

Total USG assistance to Sri Lanka .......................................................................................................................... $61,984,729

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

** USAID/OFDA funding, provided to USAID/Sri Lanka, is being allocated to implementing partners based on assessments.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO INDIA

Implementing partner Activity Location Amount

USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*

Prime Minister’s

Relief Fund.

Emergency relief activities ............................................................ Countrywide ........... $50,000

IFRC/Implemented

by Indian Red

Cross.

Emergency relief activities ............................................................ Countrywide ........... 50,000

ACTED ..................... Livelihoods ..................................................................................... Tamil Nadu ............ 297,934

CARE ...................... Water and sanitation, cash-for-work, and livelihoods .................. Tamil Nadu and

Andhra Pradesh.

686,759

CRS ........................ Water and sanitation, psychological and social support ............. Tamil Nadu and

Andhra Pradesh.

1,069,566

EXNORA .................. Cash-for-work and water and sanitation ...................................... Tamil Nadu ............ 115,195

FHI .......................... Livelihoods and debris removal ..................................................... Tamil Nadu ............ 280,147

GOAL ....................... Cash-for-work and rehabilitation of agricultural land ................. Tamil Nadu ............ 250,112

PCI .......................... Shelter, livelihoods, and training .................................................. Tamil Nadu ............ 440,295

WVI ......................... Shelter and cash-for-work ............................................................. Tamil Nadu ............ 859,992

Administrative ................................................................................ ................................ 33,000

Total USAID/OFDA assistance to India ....................................................................................................... 4,133,000

Total USG assistance to India ................................................................................................................................. $4,133,000

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE MALDIVES

Implementing partner Activity Location Amount

USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*

UNICEF ................... Emergency relief supplies (In-kind contribution) .......................... Countrywide ........... $94,600

UNICEF ................... Health, nutrition, water and sanitation ........................................ Countrywide ........... 1,200,000

Multiple .................. Transport of relief supplies ........................................................... Countrywide ........... 68,400

Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Maldives ................................................................................................. 1,363,000

Total USG assistance to Maldives ........................................................................................................................... $1,363,000

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND

Implementing partner Activity Location Amount

USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*

Thai Red Cross ...... Procurement and distribution of relief items ................................ Countrywide ........... $100,000

Administrative ................................................................................ ................................ 215,371

Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Thailand ................................................................................................. 315,371

135

Total USG assistance to Tailand ............................................................................................................................. $315,371

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO MALAYSIA

Implementing partner Activity Location Amount

USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE

Malaysia Red Crescent National

Disaster Management and Relief Committee.

Procurement/distribution of relief items and shelter materials ... Northwest Malaysia $50,000

Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Malaysia ................................................................................................. 50,000

Total USG assistance to Malaysia ........................................................................................................................... $50,000

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SEYCHELLES

Implementing partner Activity Location Amount

USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*

Seychelles Red

Cross.

Emergency relief activities ............................................................ Countrywide ........... $50,000

Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Seychelles ............................................................................................... 50,000

Total USG assistance to Seychelles ......................................................................................................................... $50,000

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA

Implementing partner Activity Location Amount

USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*

UNICEF ................... Health ............................................................................................. Puntland ................ $50,000

UNICEF ................... Health ............................................................................................. ................................ 250,000

OCHA ...................... Coordination ................................................................................... Countrywide ........... 141,369

World Concern ........ Emergency Relief Activities ........................................................... ................................ 392,962

UNHCR ................... Shelter ............................................................................................ Puntland ................ 200,000

Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Somalia .................................................................................................. 1,034,331

Total USG assistance to Somalia ............................................................................................................................ $1,034,331

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

FURTHER INFORMATION ON USG RESPONSE

More detailed information on USG assistance already provided, including DOD

resources, in response to the disaster may be found in previous USAID/OFDA

Fact Sheets: http://www.usaid.gov/ourlwork/humanitarianlassistance/disasterl

assistance/countries/indianlocean/etlindex.html.

136

PUBLIC DONATION INFORMATION

Making a Donation to Relief Efforts

• The most effective way people can assist relief efforts is by making cash contributions to humanitarian organizations that are conducting relief operations.

• For a list of humanitarian organizations accepting donations for South Asia

relief operations, please see ‘‘Tsunami Relief’’ at www.usaid.gov or

www.usafreedomcorps.gov. Or call the Center for International Disaster Information at (703) 276–1914.

• USAID encourages cash donations because they allow aid professionals to procure the exact items needed (often in the affected region); reduce the burden

on scarce resources (such as transportation routes, staff time, warehouse space,

etc.); can be transferred very quickly and without transportation costs; support

the economy of the disaster-stricken region; and ensure culturally, dietary, and

environmentally appropriate assistance.

Additional Information

• Information on making effective donations can be found on the following

websites:

• USAID: www.usaid.gov, Keyword: Donations

• The Center for International Disaster Information: www.cidi.org

• InterAction: ‘‘Guide to Appropriate Giving’’ at www.interaction.org

• Information on choosing a charity to support can be found on the following

websites:

• Better Business Bureau: www.give.org

• GuideStar (A National Database of Nonprofit Organizations):

www.guidestar.org

• The American Institute of Philanthropy: www.charitywatch.org

• Charity Navigator: www.charitynavigator.org

• Information on relief activities of the humanitarian community can be found at

www.reliefweb.int.

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