### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on

Briefs M arch 19, 2003 STATE OF TENN ESSEE v. LATREC E JONES Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Ham ilton County No. 226487 Rebecca J. Stern, Judge

No. E2002-00893-CCA-R3-CD September 15, 2003

A jury found the def

endant guilty of

cri min ally neg ligent homicide. The trial court sentenced her as a mitigated offender to .9 y ears of unsupervised probation. The defenda nt appeals her conviction and allege s that the trial court erroneously allowed the improper admission of evidence reg arding child restraint laws and insufficient evidence to support a conviction. After careful review, w e affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. R. App.P. 3 Appe al as of Right ; Judgme nt of the Cr

iminal Court Affirm

ed
J OHN E VERE TT W IL LI AMS , J., deliver ed the opinion of the

court, in whic h D AVID G. H AYES and T HOM AS T. W OODA LL , JJ., joined.
Ardena J. Garth, D is trict Publi c Defe nder, and Donna Ro

binson Mille

r, Assista nt Distric t Public Defend er, for the appe llant, Latrece

Jones.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter; Thomas E. Williams, II I, Assistant Attorney Genera l; William H. Cox, III , District Attorney Gene ral; and C. Parke Masterson, Jr., Assistant District Attorney Gene

ral, for the appellee, State of Tennessee

.

OPINION
A Hamilton Co

unty Criminal Court jury

found the

defenda nt, Latre ce Jones, guilty of criminally

neg li gent ho micide of

her son, C arlon B owens, Jr. The def endant w as sente

nced as a mitigatedoffende

r to .9 years in the Te

nnessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the defendant’s sentence suspended, to be served on unsupervised proba tion. The trial court denied the defendant’s Motion for New Trial. This appeal timely followed. The def endant contends there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction, and the trial court e rred in allow ing evidence regarding child restra

int laws.-2-

This case relates to the November 9, 1998 car accident in which the victim waskilled. The defendant held the victim, her two-ye ar-old son, on her lap while she rode in the front passeng er seat of a rental sedan driven by

Letitia Abernathy . Six other individuals were in the backseat. During the accident, the vehicle’s air bag s deployed. The only person wearin g a

seat belt was the driver. The victim sustained a broken neck and was declared dead a day a nd a half later by

Erlanger Hospital physicians.
Officer Craig Joel, Investigator G ary L egg, B rooke Pip pinger , Lisa McClain, L

etitia Abernathy, D

r. Joseph Earl Kelley, Jr. and para medics Billy Ble a, Glen King, Scott Pry or, Jr., and Jake Carroll testified at the defendant’s trial.
Officer Craig Joel testified that he has been a p olice infor mati on officer fo r the C hatta nooga Police Department sinc e January of 1998 . He state d that he w as a patr ol office r in Zon e 7, East Brainard area in 1998. Office

r Joel testif

ied that he was ca

lled to re spond to a v ehicle wreck at about 5:40 in the evening at

or near the intersection of Shallowford Road and Jersey Pike. The prosecution showed the witness photographs of the accident, and Officer Joel said the pictures depicte d the scene of the acciden t as he re me mbered it. He testified that one of the pictures accur ately depicte d the layout of the Jersey Pike

and Shallowford Road intersection. Several of the pictures showed the rear of a white Chevrolet at an L-sha pe with a red Buick. Officer Joel testified that nine people occupied the Chevrolet and the airbags were de ployed. He

said the defendant told him that she was seated on the passenger’s side

of the Chevrolet without a seatbelt and held the victim. There were no childrestraint de vices inside t he Chevrolet. The defendant and Carlon Dony ell Bowens, Jr. are the parentsof

the victim

. On cross-examination, Officer Joel testified that the driver of the Buick LeSabre cause d the accident by failing to yield, c

rossing in front of the white Chevrolet Cavalier.
Letit ia Abernathy, a

unt of the victim, testified that she operated a day care business out of

her homeduring November of 1998. She said th at the au tomobile accide nt occur red at a bout 5:40 p. m. on November 9, 1998. At 2:00 p.m. that s ame day , she drov e a rent al car to her brot her’s ho use to pick him up for work. Three children from her day care were passeng ers in her car at the time. The defendant and the victim, who was two ye ars and four months old, were at her brother’s apartment when she arrived. She testified t hat sh e and her brother were in the fr ont seat and the victim, the defenda nt, and three day care children were in the backsea t. Ms. Aber

nathy drove he r brothe r to his workplace, Planters, on Jersey Pike and drop ped him of

f. The de fendant and the vi ctim got into the fr ontseat. Ms. Aberna

thy wore a s eat belt a

nd thought the chi ldren we re also w earing

seat belts

. She testified that there were no child-restraint seats in the c ar. After she dropped off her brother, she drove back to her home to pick up her daughter a nd a ni ne-m onth-old infant who stays in her dayca re. Everyone

got out of the car and then got back in the car after a couple of minutes. She said that when every one got back into the car, the defe ndant and the vi ctim sat in

the fron t seat, and the five children sat in the back seat. She drove the defe ndant to Rand staff and dropped her and the victim off before picking her mother up at Childsplay. After she picked her mother up, she drove back to Randsta

ff to pick up the def

endant a nd the vic tim. At this p oint, she had three adults and six children in her car.-3-

At the time of the wreck, the defendant and the victim we

re seat ed in the f ront pass enger

seat. Her mother and four of the children wer e seated in the back seat, with one of the children holding an infant in her lap. She testified that at the time of the wreck she was on her

way to Cromwell Road to drop off the defendant and the victim. Ms. Abernathy testifie d that her

vehicle was hit from the re arat the intersection of Shallowford and Jersey Pike, and at the time of impact, the victim was sleeping and that s he did not s ee any response from him. Sh

e said para medics and emergency personnel responded within approximately six to eight minutes. She further testified that, with the exception of the victim, all of her other passengerswere wal king and talking. The victim was brought to the emergency

room. She said that she has also been charged in the death of the victim and with violating the child restraint seat law and that her ca se has not been disposed of.
On cr os s- ex am in at io n, Let it ia Ab er na th y te st if ie d t ha t s he no rm al ly d rives a Jeep which contains two car seats and carries up t o five children in her car. She said that on the day of the wreck, one of her car seats remained in he r Jeep and one was left

at home. Ms. Abernathy testified that she only needed one

car seat for

the victim and one for the nine-month-old infant. One of the other children was under

four years old. She fur

ther testified that although she wore a seat be lt, she didnot make a

rrang ements to have child restr aint sea ts for an yon e in the c ar that d ay

because there were too many

people riding in the car. Ms. Abernathy testified that she did not expect to pick up all of the people that

she had in her car. She said that earlier on the day of the wreck, she had a car accident in her van a nd called the day care pa rents to te

ll them tha

t she would

have dif ficulty transporting the children. She did notmake arrangements to ge t a larger car to handle the size of the number of people she had to transport. She decided to transport them without ch

ild restraint seats. She testified that the defendant had nothing to do with the children sitting in the back s ea t of her rental car. She said there were only two lap belts in the back seat for the five people she transporte d. She stated that she has not been charged with failing to have a child restraint seat for the nine-montholdinfant. Ms. Abernathy babysat the victim two or three times per week, but was not considered his care give r when he was with his father. She said that her brother w as the victim’s custod ia l parent, not the defendant. She testified that the victim has his own child restraint seat, but it was at his house on the day of the a ccident.
On redirect, Ms. Abernathy testified that she was aware of the fact that the y ounger children shoul d have been in child safety sea ts. She said that at the time her daughter was born, she wa s instructed by Erlang er Hospital to have a car seat for her child. She did not know if any of the six individuals in the back seat were wearing a seat belt.
Jake Carroll, who works as program manager for the Tennessee Safety

and Health Council and as a paramedic with the Hamilton County Emergency

Medical Service, testified that he treated two of the passengers, age s three and four years old. He said th at his two p atients seemed to be in good condition, despite minor injuries.
Scott Pr yor, Jr. , a Hamilton County paramedic , testified that he was called to respond to a wreck on Shallow ford Roa

d and Jerse

y Pik e betwe en 5:45 p. m. and 6:00 p.m. on November 9, 1998.-4-

He said that h

e was pe rsonally assigned to care f

or the dr iver, the nine-mon

th-old inf ant, and another of the re ar passe

ngers. He testif

ied that a ll three o f his patie

nts had min or injurie s. Glenn King, a Hamilton County par amedic, testified that on November 9, 1998, h e was as signed to care for two of the passenge rs, ages six and seven y ears old. He said that one of the passengers sustained a n abra sion to the lower right leg. He testified that he discove red that the children were not restrained in the car

. Billy Blea, a Hamil ton County paramedic, testified tha t he determined that the victim was to be given priority

for treatment. He said that the initial scene survey reve aled several walking woundedwith the victim receiving CPR from fire fighters on the scene. Blea testified that the victim was apneic a

nd had no pulse. The

victim was im mobilized, and his airway was sec ured and intubated for breathing assistance. Paramedic s had to decompress the victim’s chest to help with the expansion of the chest and lungs to forcefully ventilate him. The victim was giv en int raveno us dru gs to help stimul ate his hear t. Blea testified that his initial primary sur vey of the victim re

vealed a hematoma

to his forehead, but

no other obvious injuries such as fractures or bleeding . As the victim was transported to Children’s Hospital, he showed no signs of neurologic al respo nses and never regained consciou sness or spontaneous respiration. Blea testified that the para medics were able to get a pulse and blood pressure back on the victim, but he was still not breathing whe n they arr ived at the emergency

department. On cross-examination, Blea testified that “it’ s fairly

obvious tha

t” the victim’s “injuries occurred from the wreck.”
Lisa McClain, Administra

tor for th e Women’s and I

nfants Se rvices Division a t Erlanger Hospital, testified that she was the nurse manager of the Neonatal Intensive Car e Unit (NICU) in July of 199 6. She said that the victim spent four months in the NICU after his birth. M s. McClai n testified that it is the policy and procedur e in effect at the NI CU that“parents will place infant in car seat. Nurse may not plac e infant in car seat. If parent is unsure of proper u sage o f car se at, advis e themto follow manufacturer’s instructions. I f car seat is not available, nurse must document in the nurse’s notes and

instruct p arents to

contact the Hea lth Department for a loaner, and remind pa

rents it is a Tennessee State law.” She testified that between 19 93 and 199 7, parents being discharge d from the hospital were given a pamphlet and a videotape concerning

car seat safety . It has been the policy of the hospital to inform about car seat safety since June of 1988. The hospital’s policy wa s given to the defendant at discharge. On cross-examination, she said that the original car seat policy was in effect from

June of 1988 through May of 1996, and the second document concerning c ar seat safety went into effect in May of 1996. M s. Mc Clain testified that the old policy stated that “[i]nfants should be strapped into car seat by parents, a

ccording to State of Tennessee sea t belt law” and that fron

t or back seat wasnot cover

ed speci fically

in th e o ld po li cy. She testif ied that sh e would not have instructed parents on any criminal liability.
Brooke Pippenger testified that she was the assistant director of

programs at the Children’s Wellness Center in

Novembe

r of 1998. She said

that the Ch

ildren’sWellness Ce

nter is a program startedby t

he Siskin Foundation to inform the community about how to pre vent their children from inju ry. Her program provided the community with car seat checkup events free of char ge an d-5-

provided the media with information on injury prevention. Her program was pr oviding information to t he media in O ctober of 1997. On cross-examination, Ms. Pippenger testified that her organization provided information about the child re straint la w, adult restraint law, and seat belt law. She said that she did not find any law making it illega l to put a c hild safe

ty s eat or a

child in front of an air bag. Gary Legg, investigator with the District Attorney ’s office, testified that hetook photographs of the w recked car driven by Letitia Abernathy . One of the photographs depicted the impact ar ea on the windshield and the deploye d air bag. I nvestigator Leg g testified that ther e is a warni ng sign on each of the car visors stating: “De ath or serious injury ca n occur children twelve months – or two and under, can be killed by the air bag. The back seat is the saf est plac e for children. Never put front facing child seat in the front. Sit as far back as possible from the air bag

. Alway s use sea t belts and child restraints.” On cross-examination, hetestified that there is also a warning on the midd

le of the front passenger seat belt, but that he wa s reading the warning fr om the visor.
Dr. Joseph Earl Kelley, Jr., a pediatric surgeon at T.C. Thompson Children’s Hospital and an assistant

profess or of ped

iatricsurger

y w ith the Uni versity

of Tenne ssee Colle ge of Medicine in Chattanooga, testifie d that he w as calle d to the em ergen cy room to deal with the victim’s injuries on Novemb er 9, 199 8. The vic tim arriv ed with CPR in progre ss, was int

ubated, a nd was uns table from the standpoint of his blood pressure and pulse rate. He testified x-ray s revea

led that th e victim suffered a broken neck. Dr. Kelley testified that there was too muc h separa tion between the ba se of the skull and t

he first v ertebr

al body . He said

that the victim

“was not living on his own” when he arrived at the hospital. The victim died after two days of being

maintained on ventilator support and medications for his heart rate and blood pressure. Dr. K elley testified that the ty

pe of injury suffe

red by the victim is always fatal. He said that after neurosurgical consultation and confirmation by a

ll of the other physicians, it was e lected to discontinue life support to the victim. He testified that as a trauma surgeon, he has seen these types of injur

ies before. He further stated that there are no broken bones and that ligaments hold the vertebral bodies and the skull tog ether on top of the vertebral column. Dr. Kelley sa id that the injury

“comes m

ost common

ly from what we refer to as an extension and distraction injury so that there is a hy perextension of

the neck and at the same time a distracting force that’s pulling the skull off of the cervical column.” He testified that the air bag deployment provides the distracting force for this injury

. On cross-examination, Dr. Kelley stated that the force of the unrestrained people in the back seat would have pressed against the people in the fr ontseat. At the moment of impact, a combination of forces from opposite directions existed. Dr. Kelley te stified that the pressure coming from behind w ould not have resulted in this kind of injury and tha t the deployment of the air bag caused the victim’s death.-6- ANALYSIS I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The defendant

claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the convi ction of c

riminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony

. When a defend ant quest ions the su fficiency

of the evidence, our stand ard of r eview is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the esse ntial ele ments of the crime bey ond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virgini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). We do not re weigh the evidenc e but pre sume that t he jury has reso lved all c onflicts in the testimony and drawn all reasona ble inferences from the evidence in fa vor of the State. See State v. She ffield , 676 S.W.2d 542, 54 7 (T enn. 1984 ); Stat e v. Ca bbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions about witness credibility were

resolved by the

jury. See State v. Bland , 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997).
A. Evidence
The defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support her cr iminally neglig ent homicide conviction because the State failed to prove that the death of the victim was the direct and proximate result of the defendant’s criminal neglige nce. One is guilty of criminally negligent homicide

if he or s he eng ages in

criminally neg ligent conduct which results in death. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-212(a). The death of the victim must be the direct and proximate result of the defendant’s criminal neglig ence. State v. A dams , 916 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
Tenness ee Code A

nnotated section 3 9-11-302 (d) def ines crim inal neg ligenc e as follo ws: “Criminal neglig ence” r

efers to a perso n w ho acts w ith crimin al negl igence with respect to the circumstances surrounding the person’s c onduct or the re sult of tha t conduct when the person ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result wi ll occur . The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to per ceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an

ordinary pe

rson would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint.
“In other wo

rds, the a ccused m ust know, o

r should know, that his or her conduct, or theresult of that cond uct, will imperil the life of another given the circumstance s thatexist when the conduct takes place.” Adams , 916 S.W.2d at 474. Testimony

presented at trial revealed that the defe ndant knew that by fa

iling to place her child in a child restraint

seat, she was exposing her child to serious bodily harm or death. Testimony-7-

from hospital personnel reveals that the defendant was verbally

informed of child restraint laws and was given w

ritten inf ormation r

egard ing the d anger s of plac ing a ch ild in the f

ront sea t of a veh icle equippedwith air bags. The rental car in which the defendant and

victim were riding displayed three warning labels regarding the dang er of operati ng the v ehicle w ith childr en under twelve in the front seat and the reminder to alway s use seat belts and child restraints. The two warni n g labels on the vehicle ’s visors r

ead as f ollows:
! WARNING DEATH or SERIOUS I

NJURY can occur 

### ! Chil dren 1 2 and u nder ca n be ki lled b y the air b ag. 

### ! The BACK SEAT is the SAFEST place for children. 

### ! NEVER put a rea

r-fac ing chil d seat in th

e front. 

### ! Sit a s far ba ck as p ossi ble fr om th e air ba g. 

### ! ALWAY S use SEAT B ELTS a nd CHI LD RES TRAI

NTS. Testimony

also revealed that thedefendant and her ex-husband possessed a child restra int seat and had used it to transport the victim on other o ccasions. Furthermore, during the y ear prior to the accide nt, assorted public service announcements in print and television were circulated regarding the importance of using child restraint seats.
The evidence demonstrates that the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of the victim’s death. Testimony revea

ls that the defendant put the victim into the Abe rnath y’ s overcr owded ve hicle three times on the day of the incide nt and placed the victim on her lap on each occasion. The defendant did not use a seat belt for herself or place he r child in a child restraint seat pri or t o the accident. The defendant repeatedly ignored the warnings that the passeng er side air bagcould kill or seriously injure herchild. The evidence demonstrated that the victim died when his neck wa s broken as a result of the force of his body moving forward and the force of the ai r bag mo ving in the opposite direction. None of the back seat passengers sustained serious injuries, despite their not being in proper restraints. The evidence clea rly demonstrates that the vic tim died bec au se the defendant placed the victim

in her la p in front of a pass enger

-side air bag, a s opposed

to placin g him in a child restraint device in the back seat of the vehic le. B. Jury Charge
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding proximate cause. The defenda

nt states t he jury was instr ucted tha t in order “ to find the

defenda nt guilty of crimin ally negligent homicide , the State

must have proven bey ond a

reasonable doubt the following essential elements : 1) that the def endant’s conduct resulted in the death of the victim; and 2) that the defendant acted with criminal negligence .” The def endant states the

jury was told “ it is only necessary that the defendant unlawfully contributed to the death of the dece ased” and that the “intervening cause is no defense . . . if in any other way the

defendant

contribu ted to the death of the deceased.” The defendant argues that the trial court’s instructions regarding “contribution” is “too tenuous a causal connection to meet the requirement of pr oximate cause.” The State argues that the-8-

defendant’s challenge is without merit because the “conce pts of merely c ontributing to a result and being the proximate cause of a result are not mutually exclusive.” We agr ee with the State that the concep ts o f contribut ing to a r esult and being th e proximate

cause of a result a

re not mutu ally exclusive.
An accused is entitled

to a complete and correct charg e of the law. State v. Teel , 793 S.W.2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990). We review a jury charge to determine if it fairly defined the legal issues involved and didnot mislead the jury. See State v. H all , 958 S.W.2d 679, 696 (Tenn. 1997). We review the jury in struction in t he context of the overall charge ra ther than in isolation. See Sandstrom v. Montana , 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979) ; see also Statev. Phipps , 883 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Erroneous jury instructions require a reversal, unless the error is ha rm le ss be yo nd a reasonable doubt. See Welch v. Sta te , 836 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). At trial, t he court gave th e following instr

uction re gardin g caus e of dea th:
Before the defendant can be convicted of a ny deg ree of homicide, the State

must have proven bey ond a rea sonable doubt that the death of the deceased was broug htabout as a result of the criminal agency of the defendant; that is, that the death of the deceased was due to the unlawful act, i.e., the criminal negligence, of the def

endant

. . . To convict t

he defe ndant it is not necessary

that her act or failur e to act b e the sole cause, nor the most immediate cause of death. I t is only necessary

that the defendant unlawfully contributed to the de ath of the deceased.
Wher e it appears that the death was not caused by the defendant, but by

an independ ent, intervening cause, with which the defendant was in no way c onnected, su ch intervening cause is a good def ense to a charge of homicide. How ever, the interve ning ca use is no de

fense if it was the n atural r

esult of th e defendant’s a

ct, or if in any other wa

y the defe ndant contributed to the death of the deceased. If y ou find that the defendant’s act, if any , did not unlawfully cause or contribute to the death of the deceased, or if y ou have a reasonable doubt as to this proposition, then you must acquit her.
In the instan t case, the jury instructions required that the death must be due to the defendant’s unlawful act. As discussed previously , the evidence established that the defend a nt’s conduct substantia lly contribu ted and di

rectly caused t he death of the victim. We conclude that the jury instructions were not misleading. Reviewing the jury instructions as a whol e, it appears that the jury members were clearly

instructed regarding the leg al issues at hand. We conclude that the defendant’s jury

was given clear, complete, and a ccurate instructions.-9-

II. Admission of Evidence
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in de nying he r new trial motion, claiming the improper admission of evidence about Tennessee law requiring restraint of children under age four in moving ve

hicles a s well as e

vidence about the

absence of any car sea ts in the vehicle. The defendant claims that this evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. See Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 403. The defendant argues that she did not have a statutory duty to place her son in a child restraint seat and no evidence demonstrated that a child restraint seat would ha ve protected the victim from the deployment

of an air bag. The

S tate argues that the evidence w as relevant to show the defendant ignored well-known risks to the victim. According to Rule 401 of the Te nnessee Rules of E

vidence , evidenc e is rele

vant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of c onseque

nce to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Relevant evidence may be e xcluded “if

its probative value is substantially outweig hed by the dang er of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .” Tenn. R . Evid. 403. The trial court has discretion in determining whether evidence meets the test for re levancy. State v. Forbes , 918 S.W.2d 431, 449 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Assessing the probative value and d a nger of unfair prejudice regarding the evide nce also falls within the trial court’s discretion. State v. Burlison , 868 S.W.2d 713, 720-21 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). This court will only reverse a

trial court’s decision if the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Williamson , 919 S.W.2d 69, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
The evidence contested by the defendant relates to the testimon y of the St ate’s witnesses regarding information dispersedby t he media into the c ommunity

about the child re straint la

w, adult restraintlaw , and seat belt law. The State’s witness also stated that her prog ram provided th e community

with car seat checkup events. The record does not reflect that the defendant’s attorney objected to the testimony on the basis of re levance.
We conclude that the evidence is relevant to make a co ntribution

to the State ’s total c ase to demonstr ate that the defendant had, in many instances, been m ade awar e of the danger of placing her child in her lap while in a moving vehicle.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-602(a)(1) requi res th at “any per son t ransp ortin g a child under four (4) ye ars of a

ge in a m

otor vehi cle upon a

road, str eet or hi g hway of Tennessee is responsi ble for providing for the protection of the child and properly using a child passenger restraint system meeting f

ederal motor vehicle safety standards.”
We conclude

that the tr

ial cour t d id not err in allowing the State’s witness to testify regarding media covera ge and s tatewide

progra ms involving

community

aware ness of child restr

aint sea ts. The defe ndant ha s failed to show how she was prejudiced by this testimony. Furthermore, the evidence established that the victim was killed because he was sitting in the defendant’s lap in the front seat of a moving vehicle when the vehicle’s air bag deploy

ed. The defendant argues that he r right to a fair trial was compromised by the State’s in troductio n of evide

nce about the lac

k of a chi ld-10-

restraint seat and be c ause the jury w as permitted to consider multiple criminal acts of alleged negligence

throughout her ride with Abernathy , the driver of the rental vehicle. The def endant argues that restraining the victim in the front seat would not have protected the victim fr om the air bag. The testimony estab lishes that the defendant chose to ignore sig ns in the rental car warning her of risks to the victim of placing her child in the front seat with or without child restraint seats. Furthermore, testimonyreveal ed that the victim ha d his own child restr

aint sea t, but, sadly, no one chose to use it on the day of the accident.

Conclusion Based on the foregoing , the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.



### ________________

_________________

_ JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE