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File Name: 23a0023n.06

Case No. 22-5274

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM HILL, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE

OPINION

Before: SILER, BATCHELDER, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges. 

SILER, Circuit Judge. William Hill appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiring to 

possess with the intent to distribute over 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846, and possessing with the intent to distribute over 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). According to Hill, his conviction is invalid because the district court 

wrongly denied his motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment standing grounds, and his sentence 

is unreasonable because the district court wrongly applied an enhancement for maintaining a 

premises for the purpose of distributing drugs under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12). We affirm.

I

The undisputed facts show the following. In 2018, Hill’s friend, James Sneed, checked 

into a hotel room with his girlfriend, Haley Sweat. Hotel staff began receiving complaints of the 

smell of marijuana and heavy foot traffic to and from the room. 
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The next day Hill and his girlfriend, Daphne Cook, arrived from Texas and stayed with 

Sneed and Sweat in their hotel room. Hill made the trip so Sneed could connect him with a drug 

buyer. The morning after Hill arrived, Sneed and Sweat left the hotel, although they intended to 

return. After Sneed and Sweat left, Cook went to the front desk, walking unsteadily and spilling 

things. She said she was Sweat and paid for another night. Hotel staff, recognizing that Cook was 

not Sweat, informed the manager, who called the police. Officers arrived at the hotel and asked if 

the staff wanted to evict the room’s occupants, which they did. Under the hotel’s policies, 

unregistered guests and smoking were prohibited, and the hotel staff could evict people who 

violated these policies or otherwise broke the law. 

The officers accompanied hotel staff to the room and could smell marijuana from the door. 

The housekeeper knocked and received no response. She opened the door and said 

“housekeeping” but received no answer. From the door, she could hear water running. As the 

housekeeper entered the room, she could identify the shower running and saw a meth pipe on the 

bed. At that point, she left the room and told the officers what she had seen. 

The officers then entered the room and found Hill and Cook in the bathroom. En route to 

the bathroom, they saw the glass pipe with residue on the bed and money and marijuana in an 

unlocked safe. The officers exited the room while a colleague applied for a warrant. The officers 

executed the warrant and seized small amounts of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and pills; over 400 

grams of meth; baggies, scales, cutting agent, and the pipe; and $2,530 in cash. 

The government charged Hill with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with intent to distribute 

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Hill moved to suppress the evidence 
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from the hotel room.1 He argued that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the 

hotel room without first obtaining consent or a warrant. The district court denied the motion

because Hill did not have standing as an unregistered guest. It did not address whether there was 

a Fourth Amendment violation. Hill was convicted on both charges. 

During sentencing, the district court applied a two-point enhancement under USSG § 

2D1.1(b)(12) because Hill maintained a hotel room for the purpose of storing and distributing 

meth. It overruled Hill’s objection because Hill remained in the room after Sneed and Sweat left, 

controlled access to the room, opened the door to the room to housekeeping to discuss room issues, 

and purchased a safe for the room. Plus, the district court noted the amount of foot traffic to and 

from the room and the smell of marijuana coming from it. It concluded that Hill maintained the 

room “primarily, or . . . to a significant degree, for the purpose of distributing a controlled 

substance.” The district court calculated Hill’s Guidelines range as 262 to 327 months 

imprisonment and sentenced him to 272 months imprisonment on each count to run concurrently. 

II

Hill raises two issues on appeal. He argues that his conviction is invalid because the district 

court improperly allowed evidence that was fruit of the poisonous tree under the Fourth 

Amendment. He also argues that his sentence was improperly calculated because the court 

incorrectly applied the enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12). Hill is not entitled to relief on either 

issue. 

1Hill also moved to suppress a post-arrest statement he made to police pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 

384 U.S. 436 (1966). On appeal, Hill argues that this statement should have been suppressed but fails to 

cite any authority or explain how the statement violated Miranda. Moreover, the government argues in 

response that the issue is moot because it did not introduce the statement at trial, and Hill makes no reply. 

For these reasons, Hill waived the issue. See, e.g., McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 

1997). 
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A

Courts generally require a warrant before searching or seizing persons or property but will 

excuse the requirement if a valid exception to the warrant requirement exists. United States v. 

Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 698–99 (6th Cir. 1997). Hill argues that the officers violated the Fourth 

Amendment by entering the hotel room and conducting a protective sweep without first obtaining 

a warrant.2 Thus, he says, the evidence seized from the second search, even though supported by 

a warrant, was inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree, and the district court erred by denying his 

motion to suppress it. 

When considering suppression orders, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de 

novo and can affirm a suppression motion’s denial on any basis supported by the record. United 

States v. Gill, 685 F.3d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 2012). To prevail, Hill must show his Fourth 

Amendment rights were violated. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n.1 (1978). But 

where the government conducts a search without a warrant, it bears the burden of showing a 

warrant exception applies. United States v. Killibrew, 560 F.2d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 1977). Here,

the government argues that the officers’ warrantless entry into and protective sweep of the hotel 

room was justified by exigent circumstances. We agree. 

Exigent circumstances excuse the warrant requirement in certain situations when 

immediate police action is needed, including when there is the danger of lost evidence. United 

States v. Haddix, 239 F.3d 766, 767 (6th Cir. 2001). Here, the government argues the entry was 

justified based on the danger of lost evidence, which means it must show that the officers had “a 

2 Hill also challenges the district court’s legal conclusion that Hill lacked standing under the Fourth 

Amendment. However, even if Hill could show he had standing as the unregistered and 

unauthorized guest of a person who had already vacated the hotel, the entry and protective sweep 

were justified under exigent circumstances. We thus decline to address standing here. 
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reasonable belief that third parties [were] inside” and that “loss or destruction of evidence [was] 

imminent.” United States v. Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223, 1230 (6th Cir. 1991). Hill concedes that 

the officers had a reasonable belief that people were inside the hotel room. As for the destruction 

of evidence, the officers could hear running water from the bathroom, knew a meth pipe was in 

the room, and could smell marijuana coming from the door. Because a common method of drug 

disposal is flushing it down a toilet or drain, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to 

think that the destruction of evidence was not just possible, but, in fact occurring while they were 

standing in the hallway. As we have said, the need for exigent circumstances can “be particularly 

compelling where narcotics are involved, for narcotics can be easily and quickly destroyed while 

a search is progressing.” United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1511 (6th Cir. 

1988). So it is here. 

When the officers entered the hotel room, they conducted what amounts to a protective 

sweep to check for weapons, secure the drug evidence, and locate Hill and Cook. Because the 

entry was focused on securing evidence and ensuring officer safety, the “warrantless entry was 

limited in scope and proportionate to the exigency excusing the warrant requirement.” Id. at 1513. 

Once the area was secured, the officers then waited outside while another officer secured a warrant. 

See United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]ecause evidence may be 

removed or destroyed before a warrant can be obtained, an officer does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment by securing the area to be searched and waiting until a warrant is obtained.” (citing 

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984))). For these reasons, the officers conducted 

both the initial entry and protective sweep under a valid warrant exception.

B
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In addition to challenging his conviction, Hill argues his sentence is unreasonable. During 

sentencing, the district court applied an enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12). The § 2D1.1(b)(12) 

enhancement adds two levels to a defendant’s total-offense level when “the defendant maintained 

a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” Hill argues 

that the district court misapplied the enhancement and miscalculated his Guideline range. Thus, 

he asks us to review the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, which we review for an abuse 

of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (explaining that procedural 

sentencing errors include improperly calculating the Guidelines range or assigning a sentence on 

clearly erroneous findings). In determining whether the district court abused its discretion in 

applying the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement, we have applied both de novo and clear error review. 

See United States v. Bell, 766 F.3d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing cases). Here, under either 

standard, Hill’s challenge fails. 

A district court can apply § 2D1.1(b)(12) when the government shows by a preponderance 

of the evidence that a defendant “(1) knowingly (2) open[ed] or maintain[ed] any place (3) for the 

purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” United States v. Johnson, 737 

F.3d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Hill seems to challenge the second element by 

arguing that the district court erred because he did not hold a possessory interest in or exercise 

control over the hotel room sufficient to show that he opened or maintained it. But Hill possessed 

the hotel room for a few days. He slept, bathed, hung out with friends, and stored his clothes, 

drugs, safe, and cash in the room. And he controlled who entered the room and refused to admit 

hotel staff.

That Hill was not a registered guest with a legal right to possess the room, see United States 

v. Lanier, 636 F.3d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a hotel guest has a limited right to 
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occupy a room during the pre-agreed rental period), has no bearing here. Maintaining a premises

can be done illegally, e.g., actual possession can occur without a corresponding right to possession, 

while still triggering the enhancement. To hold otherwise would mean that a defendant could run 

a drug operation in an abandoned house without triggering the enhancement so long as he was not 

the house’s lawful owner. We have said: “Where a defendant lives in the [premises], this element 

is normally easily proved,” even if the defendant does not “lease or own” the property. United 

States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 644 (6th Cir. 2010). For these reasons, Hill has failed to show the 

district court abused its discretion by applying the enhancement. Thus, Hill’s challenge to the 

procedural reasonableness of his sentences fails. 

AFFIRMED.