a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2005 DRUG CONTROL

Air Bridge Denial 

Program in Colombia 

Has Implemented New 

Safeguards, but Its 

Effect on Drug 

Trafficking Is Not 

Clear

GAO-05-970
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-970.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess Ford at 

(202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-970, a report to 

congressional requesters 

September 2005

DRUG CONTROL

Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia 

Has Implemented New Safeguards, but Its 

Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear 

The United States and Colombia developed additional safeguards for the 

renewed ABD program to avoid the problems that led to the accidental shoot 

down in Peru. The safety measures aim to reinforce and clarify procedures, 

bolster safety monitoring, enhance language skills of ABD personnel, and 

improve communication channels. We found the safeguards were being 

implemented by the Colombians and U.S. safety monitors. In addition, the 

program managers perform periodic reviews and evaluations, including an 

annual recertification of the program, and have made efforts to improve 

civilian pilots’ awareness of the ABD program’s procedures. 

 

Our analysis of available data indicates that the ABD program’s results are 

mixed, but the program’s progress cannot be readily assessed because 

performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes do not exist. The 

stated objective for the program—for the Colombian National Police to take 

control of suspicious aircraft—seldom happens. During October 2003 

through July 2005, the Colombian Air Force located only 48 aircraft out of 

about 390 suspicious tracks pursued; and the military or police took control 

of just 14 aircraft—four were already on the ground. Only one resulted in a 

drug seizure. However, many of the suspicious aircraft land in remote 

locations controlled by insurgent groups that require time to enter safely. 

Yet, the air force rarely involves the police besides calling them at the start 

of a mission and before firing at the suspicious aircraft. In addition, many of 

the suspicious tracks are near border areas with Brazil and Venezuela, which 

is too far from an ABD air base for aircraft to intercept without refueling. 

Nevertheless, the number of suspicious tracks has apparently declined from 

49 to 30 per month, but the track counts may not be consistent over time 

because they are based on subjective criteria, such as whether an aircraft 

has inexplicably deviated from its planned flight path. According to U.S. and 

Colombian officials, the reduction in suspicious tracks indicates that 

Colombia is deterring traffickers and regaining control of its airspace. 

Suspicious Tracks Detected Over Colombia Became Concentrated Along Its Borders, 

October 2003 and May 2005 

Lesser Antilles Lesser Antilles

Ecuador Ecuador

COLOMBIA COLOMBIA

0 200 miles

October 2003

Venezuela Venezuela

Nicaragua Nicaragua

Costa

Rica

Costa

Rica

Panama Panama

Peru Peru

Brazil Brazil

May 2005

Sources: JIATF-South (data); GAO (presentation); Map Resources (map); Nova Development (clip art).

In the 1990s, the United States 

operated a program in Colombia 

and Peru called Air Bridge Denial 

(ABD). The ABD program targeted 

drug traffickers that transport illicit 

drugs through the air by forcing 

down suspicious aircraft, using 

lethal force if necessary. The 

program was suspended in April 

2001 when a legitimate civilian 

aircraft was shot down in Peru and 

two U.S. citizens were killed. The 

program was restarted in Colombia 

in August 2003 after additional 

safeguards were established. To 

date, the United States has 

provided about $68 million in 

support and plans to provide about 

$26 million in fiscal year 2006. We 

examined whether the ABD 

program’s new safeguards were 

being implemented and its progress 

in attaining U.S. and Colombian 

objectives. 

What GAO Recommends

We recommend that the Secretary 

of State establish performance 

measures for the ABD program that 

include benchmarks and 

timeframes. We also recommend 

that the Secretary of State 

encourage Colombia to (1) seek 

ways to more actively involve the 

police in ABD missions and (2) 

establish ABD air bases closer to 

the areas with the most suspicious 

tracks. State found the report to be 

an accurate assessment of the 

program, and stated that it is 

developing benchmarks and 

timeframes for its performance 

measures. 
Page i GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

United States and Colombia Implemented New Safety

Requirements 7

Available ABD Program Data Shows Mixed Results, but the Program 

Lacks Well-Defined Performance Measures 11

Conclusions 17

Recommendations for Executive Action 18

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18

Appendixes

Appendix I: ABD Safety Checklist 20

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 22

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State 24

GAO Comments 27

Table Table 1: U.S. Support for the ABD Program, Fiscal Years 

2002–2006 7

Figures Figure 1: Suspicious Tracks Identified, Pursued, and Located by 

the ABD Program, October 2003–July 2005 12

Figure 2: Law Enforcement Activities by Month since Inception of 

ABD Program, October 2003–July 2005 14

Figure 3: Suspicious Tracks Detected Over Colombia Became 

Concentrated Along Its Borders, October 2003 and May 

2005 15

Figure 4: Distance a Typical Interceptor Aircraft Can Travel from 

the Main Air Base in Apiay 17
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Abbreviations

ABD Air Bridge Denial

JIATF-S Joint Interagency Task Force-South

NAS Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Bogotá

State/INL Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

September 6, 2005 Letr

The Honorable Tom Davis

Chairman, Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Mark E. Souder

Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control 

United States Senate

Drug traffickers in South America often move illegal drugs by aircraft in 

and out of Colombia.1

 This is referred to as the “air bridge.” To reduce this 

drug trafficking, the United States began operating a program in the 1990s 

called Air Bridge Denial (ABD) in Colombia and Peru. The ABD program 

identified aircraft suspected of drug trafficking and forced them to land, 

using lethal force if necessary. However, the program was suspended in 

April 2001 after a legitimate civilian aircraft was shot down in Peru, killing 

two U.S. citizens. In August 2003, Colombia and the United States resumed 

ABD operations in Colombia after entering into a Letter of Agreement 

outlining each country’s responsibilities and safety measures to address 

concerns.2

The ABD program’s stated goal is to help Colombia stop the trafficking of 

illegal drugs—primarily cocaine—in its airspace by forcing suspicious 

aircraft to land safely so that law enforcement authorities can take control 

of the aircraft, arrest suspects, and seize drugs. Aircraft suspected of 

involvement in drug trafficking are usually first identified by relocatable 

1

Almost all of the cocaine and nearly half of the heroin entering the United States are from 

Colombia.

2

The United States determined in 2003 not to implement the ABD program in Peru.
Page 2 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

over-the-horizon radar.3 Following this initial identification, a surveillance 

aircraft containing tracking equipment is sent to visually identify the source 

of the suspicious radar track,4

 and, if it appears to be a drug trafficking 

aircraft, an aircraft equipped with weapons is sent to intercept or force the 

aircraft to land using the minimal force necessary. The Colombian Air 

Force operates the ABD program and provides crews for both the U.S.-

owned surveillance aircraft and Colombia’s interceptor aircraft. The 

program is overseen by the Department of State’s (State) Bureau for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which has a 

contract with a U.S. company, ARINC, to maintain the surveillance aircraft 

and provide safety monitors and operational and training support. In 

addition, the Department of Defense’s (Defense) Joint Interagency Task 

Force-South (JIATF-South) provides radar intelligence to the Colombian 

Air Force regarding suspicious tracks in and approaching Colombia, 

collects and analyzes data on the performance of the program, and helps 

ensure that the aircrews perform the required safety procedures.

At your request, we examined the status of the Colombian ABD program. 

Specifically, we examined (1) the changes made to the ABD program to 

address safety concerns raised after the Peru incident and whether these 

new safeguards were being followed and (2) the program’s progress in 

attaining U.S. and Colombian objectives. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed ABD program and budget 

documentation and met with cognizant U.S. officials at the Departments of 

State and Defense in Washington, D.C. We traveled to Colombia and met 

with officials from the Colombian government, Colombian Air Force, and 

the U.S. Embassy, as well as ARINC personnel operating the ABD program. 

We also visited an ABD air base in Apiay, Colombia, where many ABD 

missions originate, and visited the Colombian Air Force’s ABD command 

center in Bogotá. In addition, we met with JIATF-South personnel in Key 

West, Florida, to discuss their role in the program. We performed our work 

3

This type of radar bounces a radio wave off the earth’s ionosphere (from two locations in 

the United States and one in Puerto Rico) and can scan an area up to 1,800 miles wide. The 

radar can determine the location of an aircraft within a 7 to 10 mile radius, its speed, and 

general course of movement. However, the radar cannot detect an aircraft’s altitude. 

4

Radar can identify the path of an aircraft, known as its track. Tracks are considered 

suspicious if the aircraft has not filed a flight plan or is flying at a low altitude. When the 

aircraft is visually located, certain characteristics make it suspicious, such as having 

blacked-out windows, a missing tail number, or flying at night without lights.
Page 3 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

from January 2005 through August 2005 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief To avoid the problems that led to the accidental shoot down in Peru, the 

U.S. and Colombian governments established a number of safeguards, 

which we found were being implemented by the Colombians and U.S. 

safety monitors. Additionally, program managers perform periodic reviews 

and evaluations, including an annual recertification of the program. In April 

2003, Colombia and the United States signed a Letter of Agreement that 

requires the program to operate under the following conditions:

• A set of procedures, developed by the U.S. and Colombian governments, 

must be followed during each ABD mission. All of the ABD participants 

we met with were knowledgeable about the procedures listed in the 

safety checklist and stated that the steps were followed.5

 We viewed 

video recordings of previous ABD missions and observed the start of an 

ABD mission from the Colombian Air Force’s ABD command center in 

Bogotá and noted that the checklist was followed in detail. 

• Some personnel are exclusively assigned to ensure that operations are 

safe and deliberate. Three U.S. safety monitors supervise the 

implementation of the procedural checklist for each mission and can 

stop any mission in which they have safety concerns.

• All U.S. safety monitors must be fluent in Spanish and the Colombian 

pilots and mission directors are required to be proficient in English. 

They are tested annually by the State Department and ARINC. U.S. 

safety monitors are native Spanish speakers or were formerly trained by 

the U.S. military as linguists.

• A dedicated communication channel is reserved for the U.S. safety 

monitors, and an ABD mission will not proceed if communication 

among the monitors is lost. This has occurred three times since the 

restart of the program. 

5

In two ABD missions, the safety procedures were not correctly implemented. Since ABD 

missions that result in locating a suspicious aircraft are recorded and reviewed, U.S. 

program officials were made aware of the mistake and followed up with the aircrews. 
Page 4 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

In addition, in the Peru accident the pilot of the legitimate civilian aircraft 

was not aware that the ABD aircrew was calling him over the radio. The 

Letter of Agreement requires the Colombian government to inform civilian 

pilots about the ABD program—in particular, about the procedures used 

when intercepting an aircraft and the consequences of not complying. 

Our analysis of available program data indicates that the ABD program’s 

results are mixed, but the program’s progress cannot be readily assessed 

because performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes do not 

exist.6

 The Letter of Agreement’s stated objective for the program—for the 

Colombian police to take control of suspicious aircraft—seldom happens. 

As of July 2005, out of about 390 suspicious aircraft tracks pursued, the 

Colombian Air Force located only 48; and the military or police took 

control of just 14 aircraft,7

 arresting four suspects and impounding several 

aircraft. Only one resulted in a drug seizure. However, many of the aircraft 

pursued by the ABD program land in remote locations that are often 

controlled by insurgent groups, where, without sufficient time to prepare, 

the National Police cannot reach the scene to make arrests or seize drugs. 

Yet, the Colombian Air Force rarely involves the police besides notifying 

them when a suspicious aircraft track is first pursued and prior to firing at 

the aircraft. Furthermore, in recent months, many of the suspicious tracks 

have been along Colombia’s border with Brazil and Venezuela8

 where the 

ABD surveillance aircraft cannot reach them before they leave Colombian 

airspace or disappear from radar. Nevertheless, the number of suspicious 

aircraft tracks over Colombia has apparently declined from about 49 to 30 

per month, but the track counts may not be consistent over time because 

they are partly based on subjective criteria, such as whether an aircraft has 

inexplicably deviated from its planned flight path. According to U.S. and 

Colombian officials, the reduction in suspicious tracks indicates that 

Colombia is deterring traffickers and regaining control of its airspace—one 

of Colombia’s goals for the program. 

6

Although State and Defense developed draft performance measures in early 2005, they 

lacked benchmarks and timeframes. 

7

Four of these aircraft were already on the ground when they were identified as suspicious.

8

Much of this area is at least an hour flight from the closest ABD air base. The program’s 

surveillance aircraft are located at three ABD air bases - in Apiay, approximately 60 miles 

south of Bogotá; in Barranquilla, near the coast of the Caribbean Sea; and in Cali, near the 

coast of the Pacific Ocean. 
Page 5 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

To help assess the ABD program’s progress, we recommend that the 

Secretary of State establish performance measures for the program that 

include benchmarks and timeframes. To increase the program’s law 

enforcement activities, we recommend that the Secretary of State 

encourage Colombia to seek ways to more actively involve the National 

Police in ABD missions. Finally, to enhance Colombia’s ability to interdict 

suspicious aircraft, we recommend that the Secretary of State encourage 

Colombia to establish ABD air bases closer to the area of most current 

suspicious tracks. In commenting on a draft of this report, State found it to 

be an accurate assessment of the program. Additionally, State commented 

that they were in the process of establishing benchmarks and timeframes 

for performance measures implemented this year. 

Background After the Peru accident, a joint investigation by the United States and Peru 

reviewed the circumstances of the accident and made several conclusions.9

The investigation team was comprised of U.S. representatives from the 

Departments of State and Defense, as well as Peruvian officials from its 

Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. 

According to U.S. officials, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe requested 

the restart of the ABD program to help combat drug trafficking. After initial 

discussions, the United States decided to assist Colombia in restarting a 

revised ABD program that would be managed by the Colombian Air Force 

and overseen by State/INL. In addition, U.S. officials said that Colombia 

had existing infrastructure that facilitated the program’s restart, such as air 

bases and a national air command center. 

Prior to the restart of Colombia’s ABD program, a committee of 

representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, as 

well as the Colombian government developed a Letter of Agreement 

outlining the program’s goal, safety requirements, operational procedures, 

and each country’s responsibilities. The Letter of Agreement, which was 

signed in April 2003, states that the program’s goal is to increase the 

Colombian government’s ability to stop aerial drug trafficking over 

Colombia. Colombia is required to provide personnel and interceptor 

aircraft, designate the areas where the program can operate in Colombia’s 

9

Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Peru 

Investigation Report: The April 20, 2001 Peruvian Shootdown Accident, (Washington, DC: 

2001).
Page 6 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

airspace, and manage the daily operations. The United States is primarily 

responsible for providing the program with surveillance aircraft, personnel, 

training, and funds to maintain and operate the equipment, while ensuring 

that the program is regularly reviewed. Finally, a U.S. Presidential 

determination was necessary to restart the program, and is required 

annually to allow U.S. employees and its agents to assist Colombia in the 

use of force against civilian aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily 

engaged in illicit drug trafficking.10

Since 2002, the United States has provided $68.4 million and surveillance 

aircraft for the ABD program (see table 1) and plans to provide an 

additional $25.9 million in fiscal year 2006. State/INL provided $57.2 million 

to support ARINC operations, including the U.S. personnel involved in the 

program and maintenance of the surveillance aircraft. State’s Narcotics 

Affairs Section (NAS) in the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá provided $11.2 million 

for training, aircraft operations, logistics support, and construction at ABD 

air bases. At no cost to State, the department also transferred five U.S.-

owned Cessna Citation surveillance aircraft used in the prior ABD 

programs, which are equipped with tracking systems. Also, Defense gave 

Colombia two additional surveillance aircraft, which have yet to be used 

for surveillance. The fiscal year 2006 request for approximately $26 million 

for the program is planned to continue existing operations and construct 

additional infrastructure. U.S. and Colombian officials said they do not 

intend for Colombia to fully finance the program in the near future. 

10The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (P. L.103-337, Sec. 1012) as 

amended, provides civil immunity for U.S. employees and agents assisting a foreign country 

in interdicting drug trafficking aircraft where, among other things the President determines 

that drug trafficking threatens the national security of that country. The President is 

required to provide an annual report regarding the procedures used to interdict aircraft to 

the Congress.
Page 7 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Table 1: U.S. Support for the ABD Program, Fiscal Years 2002–2006

Source: State/INL.

a

In 2003, State/INL began paying ARINC to maintain the surveillance aircraft, supply personnel to 

monitor operations, and provide other operational support. 

Note: Funds from other NAS country accounts were used to support the ABD program and these 

amounts are included above. 

United States and 

Colombia Implemented 

New Safety 

Requirements 

In response to the findings of the Peru investigation and other 

determinations, the United States and Colombia developed new safeguards 

for the renewed ABD program which were implemented consistently in the 

interdiction missions we observed. The program also undergoes multiple 

evaluations to ensure that all elements of the Letter of Agreement are 

followed. 

New Safety Requirements 

Developed for ABD 

Program 

The renewed ABD program has new safeguards in place, which were 

prompted by the review of the Peru accident. The investigation of the Peru 

incident found that crewmembers did not fully perform some procedures, 

neglected the safety of the mission, had limited foreign language skills, and 

were talking on a congested communication system. In response, 

safeguards were developed to reinforce and clarify procedures, bolster 

safety monitoring, enhance language skills of ABD personnel, and improve 

communication channels. Another factor of the accident—the civilian 

pilot’s unawareness of the ABD program’s procedures—was addressed by 

teaching civilian pilots about the program. 

In the Letter of Agreement for the renewed program, U.S. and Colombian 

officials require ABD personnel to follow specific procedures summarized 

in a safety checklist to ensure safe operations and clarify the roles of the 

United States and Colombia (see app. I). According to the Peru 

investigative report, the aircrews involved in the accident did not fully 

execute the program’s procedures, particularly aircraft identification. Also, 

Dollars in millions

Fiscal years

Department 

of State office 2002 2003 2004

2005

(estimated)

2006

(proposed) Total

INLa $9.0 $15.6 $14.0 $18.6 $21.0 $78.2

NAS 3.6 1.9 1.1 4.6 4.9 16.1

Total $12.6 $17.5 $15.1 $23.2 $25.9 $94.3
Page 8 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

the documentation of ABD procedures had become less specific over time. 

The procedural checklist for the renewed program lists the specific steps 

that must be taken to execute an ABD mission, including visually 

identifying the suspicious aircraft; calling to the aircraft over the radio; and, 

if necessary, requesting permission from the Commander of the Colombian 

Air Force to fire at the aircraft. In particular, the list provides the exact 

wording for crewmembers to use when confirming the completion of 

checklist steps to avoid confusion among the participants. While at the 

Colombian Air Force’s ABD command center in Bogotá, we observed ABD 

personnel following the checklist during the start of an ABD mission. 

While, at the time of the accident, the program did not have U.S. personnel 

dedicated to monitoring safety, three U.S. personnel are now responsible 

for safety and implementation of safeguards for each mission. The Peru 

investigation concluded that the interceptor crewmembers were focused 

on forcing aircraft to land and not on the overall safety of the mission. 

Under the renewed program, the three U.S. safety monitors are located at 

the Colombian Air Force’s command center in Bogotá; at JIATF-South in 

Key West, Florida; and onboard the surveillance aircraft. The safety 

monitor onboard the aircraft observes the completion of checklist 

procedures and alerts the U.S. monitors on the ground when each 

procedure is accomplished. If any of the three monitors objects to an 

action taken during the mission, the monitor immediately stops the 

mission. For example, if a monitor objects to the firing of warning shots 

because he is not confident that the suspicious aircraft is involved in drug 

trafficking, he will immediately pull all U.S. resources out of the mission, 

including the surveillance aircraft and U.S. personnel. However, if the 

problem is resolved, the mission can resume. As of June 2005, the U.S. 

monitors had objected to actions in ten missions, two of which were due to 

incorrect implementation of the checklist. 

The Letter of Agreement with Colombia requires all U.S. safety monitors to 

be fluent in Spanish and the Colombian crewmembers, besides the 

weapons controllers, to be proficient in English because language barriers 

among the aircrew members contributed to the Peru accident. The 

aircrews involved in the Peru accident had flown on previous operational 

missions together and had some foreign language skills; however, they 

were not proficient enough to communicate clearly during the high stress 

of an interception. For example, one of the crewmembers in the Peru 

incident obtained the suspicious aircraft’s tail number so that ground 

personnel could determine the owners of the aircraft. However, other 

participants in the mission did not understand the message, and never 
Page 9 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

learned that the plane was a legitimate civilian aircraft. Under the renewed 

program, the U.S. safety monitors are native Spanish speakers or were 

formerly trained as linguists with the U.S. military. Annually, ARINC tests 

the U.S. monitors fluency in Spanish and the NAS tests the Colombians’ 

proficiency in English. 

Additionally, the renewed ABD program has incorporated improved 

communications systems and procedures to ensure the communications 

mishaps that contributed to the Peru accident do not reoccur. An ABD 

interception requires the coordination of many individuals, including 

ground personnel in the ABD command center in Bogotá and JIATF-South 

in Key West, Florida, and aircrews in the surveillance and interceptor 

aircraft. During the Peru accident, the aircrews were talking 

simultaneously over the same radio channels and were not able to hear 

each other clearly. For example, the crew of the suspicious aircraft called 

the closest air control tower when they saw the interceptor aircraft 

following them, but the control tower did not receive the call because it 

was too far away. Although the ABD aircrews were monitoring the tower’s 

radio frequency, they did not hear the call because other communication 

was occurring at the same time. For the new program, a satellite radio 

channel is dedicated to the U.S. monitors, and the Colombian 

crewmembers communicate on various radio channels. A satellite phone is 

also available if radio communication is impaired. The U.S. monitors must 

suspend the mission if communication among them is lost, which has 

happened three times. 

Although not a finding of the Peru investigation, the Letter of Agreement 

with Colombia recognizes that a community of civilian pilots unaware of 

the ABD program can threaten the safety of the program’s operations. 

Pilots who do not know how to respond to an ABD interception may put 

themselves and the ABD aircrews at undue risk. The pilot of the suspicious 

aircraft in Peru was unaware that he was being called over the radio by the 

ABD aircrew. The Letter of Agreement with Colombia requires the 

Colombian government to inform the public of the program’s operating 

procedures, which the government does through publicly posted notices 

and required training courses for pilots and air traffic controllers. The 

government also teaches the civilian pilots how to respond to an ABD 

interception, as well as the consequences of not complying with the 

Colombian Air Force’s commands.
Page 10 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Program Regularly 

Reviewed 

The program managers that we interviewed said that the program’s 

operations are reviewed and evaluated regularly by the program managers 

and cognizant U.S. agency officials. For example: 

• The United States recertifies the program once a year, a process that 

serves as the basis for the President’s annual decision on whether to 

continue supporting the program. The program was first certified in May 

2003 before it could restart and again in July 2004 by a team of 

representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland 

Security, Justice, and Transportation. The 2004 certification team 

ensured that the major components of the Letter of Agreement—

operational procedures, training requirements, logistics support, and 

information to civilian pilots—were in place by reviewing official 

documents, performing interviews, and observing training and 

operational exercises. 

• The crew of the surveillance aircraft records a video of each ABD 

mission once the suspicious aircraft is located. Both Colombian and U.S. 

program managers review the video to determine if the checklist was 

followed. We reviewed recordings of some ABD missions and observed 

the implementation of the safety procedures. 

• U.S. and Colombian managers of the program meet every six months to 

plan for the future and discuss Colombia’s needs for the program. After 

the U.S. managers consider Colombia’s needs, they determine whether 

to fund the requests for such items as repaving runways at ABD 

operating locations. 

In addition, the Congress requires an annual report from the President on 

the program’s resources and procedures used to intercept drug trafficking 

aircraft. The report certifies that the procedures agreed to in the Letter of 

Agreement were followed in the interception of aircraft engaged in illegal 

drug trafficking during the preceding year. 
Page 11 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Available ABD 

Program Data Shows 

Mixed Results, but the 

Program Lacks WellDefined Performance 

Measures

Our analysis of available data—the number of suspicious tracks and law 

enforcement activities—indicates that the ABD program’s progress to date 

is mixed. The Colombian Air Force surveillance aircraft pursued less than 

half of the almost 900 suspicious tracks identified since October 200311 and 

few were located. But the number of suspicious tracks appears to have 

declined, although the consistency of the suspicious track data is unknown. 

The program’s primary objective—to safely force suspicious aircraft to 

land so law enforcement authorities can gain control of it—has not 

happened very often. In addition, the location of most suspicious tracks has 

changed, making them more difficult to locate and intercept. 

State/INL does not have clear performance measures that can be used to 

help assess the ABD program’s progress toward eliminating aerial drug 

trafficking in Colombia. State/INL officials told us that they began 

developing measures in early 2005, but they do not contain benchmarks or 

timeframes. These same officials said they will meet with Defense shortly 

to review data related to these measures for the first time. 

ABD Program Located Few 

Aircraft

Since October 2003, the Colombians pursued about 390 out of 

approximately 880 suspicious tracks, and located 48 of them (see fig. 1).12

Tracks are often difficult to locate because the relocatable over-the-horizon 

radar does not provide the suspicious aircraft track’s altitude or the exact 

location. Furthermore, according to Colombian Air Force officials, drug 

traffickers use hundreds of clandestine airstrips in Colombia. Often the 

airstrips are camouflaged and suspicious aircraft are hidden from view. 

Therefore, when surveillance aircraft do not interdict suspicious aircraft in 

the air, they are unlikely to find them once they land and disappear from 

radar. 

11Complete data for September 2003, the first full month of the program, was not available.

12During October 2003 through March 2004, NAS did not document the number of aircraft 

located. We counted the number of aircraft located as those fired on or involved in a law 

enforcement activity. Beginning in April 2004, NAS began documenting the number of 

aircraft located.
Page 12 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Figure 1: Suspicious Tracks Identified, Pursued, and Located by the ABD Program, October 2003–July 2005

Recently, the Colombian Air Force asked the United States to permanently 

increase the number of flight hours (from 180 to 300 per month) for the 

surveillance aircraft to spend more time training and locating clandestine 

airstrips. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, once these airstrips 

are located, the ABD aircrews can focus on them when searching for a 

suspicious aircraft in the area. To date, based on our review of ABD 

documents, identification of clandestine airstrips has not assisted in 

locating any suspicious aircraft. Some State/INL officials are skeptical that 

more flying time, which would increase maintenance and fuel costs, would 

produce greater results for the program. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Oct. Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. June Dec. May July Aug. Sept. Nov. Oct. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July

2003 2004 2005

Number of suspicious tracks

Not pursued

Pursued and not located

Pursued and located

Time (in months)

49 average 30 average

Source: GAO analysis of State/INL data.
Page 13 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Suspicious Tracks Reduced, 

but Accuracy of Count 

Unknown

The number of suspicious aircraft tracks over Colombia has apparently 

declined from approximately 49 to 30 a month, a decrease of about 40 

percent, between the first 11 months of the program and the last 11 months 

(see fig. 1). According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the reduction in 

tracks indicates that the program is deterring drug traffickers from 

transporting drugs by air, and is allowing the Colombian government to 

meet its goal of regaining control of its airspace, but performance measures 

with benchmarks and timeframes linking the reduction of suspicious tracks 

to the overall goal have not been developed. Moreover, the accuracy of the 

suspicious track data over time is suspect due to the nature of the process, 

which relies on some subjective criteria. The process for determining 

whether a track is suspicious or legitimate is partly based on the judgment 

of JIATF-South and Colombian Air Force personnel, who screen thousands 

of tracks every month looking for suspicious movements. For example, 

personnel consider whether the aircraft has inexplicably deviated from its 

planned flight path or the aircraft’s altitude is unusually low. However, no 

definitive criteria exist for such factors, which can therefore be interpreted 

differently among operators. 

ABD Missions Lack 

Involvement of Law 

Enforcement Personnel

The National Police seldom take control of suspicious aircraft, arrest 

individuals suspected of drug trafficking, or seize drugs. Since October 

2003, law enforcement was involved in 14 instances (see fig. 2), arresting 

four suspects and impounding several aircraft. However, in four of these 

instances, the aircraft was already on the ground. Only one ABD mission 

resulted in a drug seizure—0.6 metric tons (about 1,300 pounds) of 

cocaine.13 Because State/INL has not established performance measures 

regarding law enforcement activities, determining whether the objectives 

of the ABD program are being met is difficult. However, State/INL officials 

said they would like law enforcement authorities to more often take 

control of suspicious aircraft, which may contain drugs, weapons, or cash 

that goes unaccounted for if the military or police do not arrive. 

13By way of comparison, U.S. interdiction efforts seized or disrupted 196 metric tons 

(approximately 432,000 pounds) of cocaine in 2004, according to the Office of National Drug 

Control Policy.
Page 14 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Figure 2: Law Enforcement Activities by Month since Inception of ABD Program, October 2003–July 2005

As steps on the procedural checklist, ABD personnel contact the 

Colombian National Police in Bogotá at the start of an interdiction mission 

and prior to firing at the aircraft. But, besides these calls, the Colombian 

Air Force usually does not involve the police in ABD missions. Further, the 

police face various challenges in reaching the locations where suspicious 

aircraft land—often in remote areas of Colombia that are not accessible by 

road. The police cannot travel to some locations without additional 

resources, including security and transportation, according to INL 

officials.14 But, according to U.S. officials, greater planning and 

coordination between the Colombian Air Force and National Police could 

enable law enforcement to more frequently take control of suspicious 

aircraft. For example, in the February 2005 ABD mission that yielded 1,300 

pounds of cocaine, one armed Colombian Navy helicopter provided cover 

for another Navy helicopter to land and seize as much cocaine from the 

aircraft as it could carry, while the Colombian Army and National Police 

arrived later and confiscated the remaining cocaine. 

Number of law enforcement activities

0

1

2

3

Sept. Oct. Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. June Dec. May July Aug. Sept. Nov. Oct. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July

2003 2004 2005

Time (in months)

Source: GAO analysis of State/INL data.

14Insurgent groups have some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia’s territory and 

can pose a threat to the police.
Page 15 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Changes in Suspicious 

Tracks Locations Limit 

Interdiction Capability 

In recent months, the majority of suspicious tracks are concentrated along 

Colombia’s borders (see fig. 3), making it more difficult for surveillance and 

interceptor aircraft to reach the aircraft before it lands or leaves Colombian 

airspace. Once a suspicious aircraft lands, surveillance aircraft often have 

difficulty locating it. 

Figure 3: Suspicious Tracks Detected Over Colombia Became Concentrated Along Its Borders, October 2003 and May 2005

From November 2003 to July 2005, 141 suspicious tracks were not pursued 

by surveillance aircraft because they were near borders or too far away. In 

particular, suspicious tracks along Colombia’s southeastern border with 

Brazil and Venezuela are at least an hour flight from the closest ABD air 

base in Apiay, leaving surveillance and interceptor aircraft little time to find 

and intercept a suspicious aircraft before having to refuel (see fig. 4). For 

example, one ABD interceptor aircraft, the A-37B Dragonfly, takes 50 

Sources: JIATF-South (data); GAO (presentation); Map Resources (map); Nova Development (clip art).

Costa

Rica

Lesser Antilles

Ecuador

Costa

Rica

Lesser Antilles

Ecuador

COLOMBIA COLOMBIA

0 200 miles

October 2003 May 2005

Brazil Brazil

Peru Peru

Venezuela Venezuela

Panama Panama

Nicaragua Nicaragua
Page 16 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

minutes to fly to Caruru (about 250 miles) in southeastern Colombia, but it 

can remain in that area for only 10 minutes before leaving to refuel.15 ABD 

program managers and safety monitors said it usually takes about 25 

minutes to complete an ABD mission when all resources are in place, from 

visually locating the aircraft to forcing it to land. However, some ABD 

missions have lasted as long as six or seven hours and utilized multiple 

surveillance and interceptor aircraft. 

15Caruru is an area where numerous suspicious aircraft have been located. 
Page 17 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Figure 4: Distance a Typical Interceptor Aircraft Can Travel from the Main Air Base in 

Apiay

Conclusions The United States agreed to help Colombia restart the ABD program at the 

request of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. U.S. funding provided for the 

program through fiscal year 2005 totals over $68 million; almost $26 million 

is proposed for 2006. We found the results of the ABD program mixed. 

A primary U.S. concern regarding the program—the safety of the ABD 

aircrews and innocent civilians—is addressed in detail in the Letter of 

Agreement between the United States and Colombia. However, the 

La Pedrera

Barranquilla

253 miles

Apiay

Cali

Bogota

Caruru

COLOMBIA

0 200 miles

Caribbean Sea

Panama

Nicaragua

Costa

Rica

Lesser Antilles

Venezuela

Ecuador

Peru

Brazil

Flights from Apiay ABD 

air base to areas within 

the radius can be 

completed with at least 

10 minutes’ loiter time.

Flights from Apiay 

beyond the radius 

(i.e., to La Pedrera), are 

not possible with typical 

interceptor aircraft.

Sources: Colombian Air Force (data); GAO (presentation); Map Resources (map).
Page 18 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

agreement does not include performance measures with benchmarks and 

timeframes to help with assessing results. Although State has begun 

developing such measures, assessing the program’s effectiveness and 

determining whether additional resources might contribute to increased 

results is difficult. 

Although the number of suspicious aircraft tracks has apparently 

declined—from about 49 to 30 per month, the Colombian Air Force seldom 

locates the suspicious aircraft. Moreover, drug traffickers do not face a 

great risk of being arrested even if they are detected. Out of about 390 

suspicious tracks pursued since the start of the program, the Colombian 

Air Force located 48; law enforcement or military authorities went to the 

scene of 14, including four that were already on the ground. Besides calling 

the Colombian National Police during a mission, as required by the 

procedural checklist, the Colombian Air Force rarely involves the police. 

Without sufficient notice, the police cannot respond quickly and safely to 

suspicious aircraft on the ground because much of Colombia is not 

controlled by the government. Moreover, many of the suspicious aircraft 

tracks detected in recent months are along Colombia’s border regions with 

Brazil and Venezuela where ABD aircraft are often too far away to threaten 

the trafficking mission. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

First, to help in assessing whether the ABD program is making progress 

toward meeting its overall goal of reducing illegal drug trafficking in 

Colombia’s airspace, we recommend that the Secretary of State work with 

Colombia to define performance measures with benchmarks and 

timeframes. These performance measures, as well as results, should be 

included in the annual report to the Congress regarding the ABD program. 

Second, because the police are seldom involved in ABD missions, we 

recommend that the Secretary of State encourage Colombia to seek ways 

to more actively involve the National Police. Finally, because many of the 

suspicious aircraft tracks are difficult for Colombia to locate and interdict 

given the current location of its ABD air bases, we recommend that the 

Secretary of State encourage Colombia to establish ABD air bases closer to 

the current activity of suspicious aircraft tracks. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see appendix 

III). Overall, it found the report to be an accurate assessment of the intent 

and execution of the program and noted that it is developing benchmarks 
Page 19 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

and timeframes for its performance measures. Defense did not provide 

written comments. However, neither department commented on our 

recommendations. In addition, State and Defense officials provided 

technical comments and updates that we incorporated throughout the 

report, as appropriate. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the 

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to 

interested congressional committees and the Secretaries of State and 

Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call 

me at (202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report 

were Al Huntington, Hynek Kalkus, Summer Pachman, and Kerry Lipsitz. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.

Jess T. Ford, Director

International Affairs and Trade
Page 20 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Appendix I

ABD Safety Checklist ApApenednxidexiIs

ABD event #

Detect and declare

Tracker/interceptor

response

Note: If necessary, this

step may be completed 

out of sequence.

Note: If one of the air

assets reports airborne

proceed to step 5.

Visual identification

Remarks:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Key actions /required

information

Amplifying

information

ATOI declared unidentified

assumed suspect (UAS)

Tracker/interceptor will

respond

Ground safety monitor

reports search and rescue

forces and CNP notified

COL air asset reports

airborne

Air asset visually

identifies the UAS and passes

amplifying information

"COL has requested

and approved Phase I"

"UAS is responding,

continue to monitor until

landing. Phase I complete."

OR

"UAS is NOT

responding, proceed to

Step 8. Phase I complete."

"COL has requested and

approved Phase II"

"Phase II warning calls have

been made in English and

Spanish and the suspect

aircraft is responding"

OR

"Phase II warning calls have

been made in English and

Spanish and the suspect

aircraft is NOT responding."

Time: 

Location:

Detected by:

Air track number

SAR

CNP

Tracker

Tracker

Tracker

Interceptor

Interceptor

Interceptor

Requested

Approved

Responding

Not 

Responding

Requested

Approved

Responding

Not 

Responding

I

N

RR

RR

RR

RR

RR

RR

RR

RR

N

N

RR

N

RR RR

N N

N

N

N N

RR N

N

N

N

Phase I:

Interception

Phase II:Use of

warning shots

x

I or

RR

I or

RR

I or

RR

I or

RR

I or

RR

I or

RR

I or

RR

I or

RR

I or

N

I or

N

I or

N

I or

N

I or

N

I or

N

I or

N

I

I

No

An ABD mission begins 

when relocatable over

-the-horizon radar or 

other intelligence 

sources provide 

information about a 

suspicious flight to 

personnel at the ABD 

command center, who 

then consider various 

questions to determine 

whether the track is 

involved in illegal drug 

trafficking activities. 

Once a track is 

determined to be 

suspicious (checklist 

step 1), a surveillance 

aircraft, with a crew of

Colombian Air Force 

personnel and one U.S. 

government contractor, 

tries to visually locate 

it (step 5). The length 

of time it takes to find 

the suspicious aircraft 

can vary.

Once located, the ABD 

aircrews try to 

determine its identity 

and order it to land in 

English and Spanish

over the radio or 

through the use of 

visual signals (step 7). 

If the suspicious aircraft 

continually fails to

respond, an ABD 

aircrew member gives 

a verbal warning that 

deadly force will be 

used (step 9). 

Checklist

Steps

Involved personnel

JIATF South

CO 1

USG air asset

(air mission commander)

Air safety monitor or if none

the USG tracker MC

Ground safety monitor

or

NA

N

or

NA
Appendix I

ABD Safety Checklist

Page 21 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Remarks:

OR

"Warning shots fired, suspect

aircraft NOT responding,

proceed to Step 10. Phase II

complete."

Not 

Responding

ABD Event #

x Key Actions /Required

Information

Amplifying

Information

Requested

Approved

Responding

Not 

Responding

Remarks:

I or N

RR

I or

RR

I or

N

RR

RR I NN N

I or

N

RR I or N

RR

I or

RR

Phase III: Firing of

Weapons at Suspect

Aircraft in the Air

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

Yes

No

Disabling Fire

Remarks:

Post Disabling Fire

Remarks:

"COL has requested and

approved Phase III."

COL Search and Rescue

Forces have been launched

"Warning of deadly force has

been made on all appropriate

ATC and Guard

frequencies and

..."

"Suspect aircraft responding

to deadly force warnings,

continue to monitor until

landing. Phase III complete."

"Suspect aircraft NOT

responding to deadly force

warnings, proceed to Step 13."

"Shots fired. Phase III

complete."

Continue to relay status,

provide assistance to crash site

personnel, and if able visually

records crash site.

RR

RR

N

RR N

I or

RR

I or

RR

N

I or

N

I or

RR

CO 1

Page 2

Source: State/INL (data); GAO (presentation).

"Warning shots fired, suspect

aircraft responding,

continue to monitor until

landing. Phase II complete."

Warning shots 10.

Responding

RR N I or

N

I or

RR

I or

RR

OR

All use of force by the

interceptor is preapproved by the

Commander of the

Colombian Air Force.

An interceptor aircraft

called to the scene, 

with a Colombian Air 

Force crew, fires warning

shots and direct shots

if the suspect fails to

follow orders (steps 10 

and 14).

Abbreviations:

ATOI-A track of interest

COL-Colombia

CNP-Colombian National Police

I-Initiates action

N-Noted, but no action required

RR-Response required

SAR-Search and rescue

UAS-Unidentified assumed

 suspect

USG-U.S. government

JIATF South

USG air asset

(air mission commander)

Air safety monitor or if none

the USG tracker MC

Ground safety monitor
Page 22 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Appendix II

Scope and Methodology ApendxiI

To review the changes made to the ABD program to address safety 

concerns and to determine whether these safeguards were followed, we 

reviewed ABD program documentation provided by the Department of 

State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

(State/INL) and the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) at the U.S. Embassy, 

Bogotá, and the Department of Defense’s Joint Interagency Task ForceSouth (JIATF-South). We also discussed the new safeguards with 

knowledgeable U.S. officials at State and Defense in Washington, D.C.; 

Bogotá, Colombia; and Key West, Florida; officials from the Colombian 

government and Colombian Air Force in Bogotá; and ARINC contractors 

located in Bogotá and an ABD air base in Apiay, Colombia. We also 

interviewed officials involved in the negotiation of the agreement between 

the United States and Colombia prior to restarting the program. 

To evaluate the program’s progress in attaining U.S. and Colombian 

objectives, we examined data regarding law enforcement activities; 

suspicious tracks; aircraft pursued, located, and fired at. This data was 

documented by NAS in reports prepared monthly for State/INL containing 

the number of missions flown that month and their results. However, 

complete data for August and September 2003 was unavailable, and the 

data for October 2003 to March 2004 did not include the number of tracks 

pursued and identified. By using an event log prepared by NAS with 

narratives of ABD missions beginning in August 2003, we extrapolated 

some of the data and corroborated all law enforcement activities and 

aircraft fired on. We also compared the number of suspicious tracks 

recorded by NAS with JIATF-South’s count. The numbers reported were 

not the same for most months. We used the NAS count of suspicious tracks 

because it is more inclusive of tracks detected by Colombia and does not 

include tracks that were later determined to be friendly aircraft. We 

interviewed cognizant officials at State/INL, NAS, and JIATF-South about 

the data. Further, we discussed the numbers of suspicious tracks with the 

Colombian Air Force. Based on our ability to corroborate most of the data 

with multiple sources, we determined that it was sufficiently reliable for 

our purposes. 

We traveled to Colombia in April 2005 and met with NAS officials and other 

cognizant U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, officials, and with ARINC managers at 

their offices at the Government of Colombia’s Ministry of Defense in 

Bogotá. We also visited an ABD air base in Apiay where we met with 

ARINC contractors serving as monitors onboard the surveillance aircraft. 

Additionally, we visited the Colombian Air Force’s ABD command center in 

Bogotá where we interviewed both ARINC contractors and Colombian Air 
Appendix II

Scope and Methodology 

Page 23 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Force officials. We witnessed the start of an ABD mission at the command 

center and reviewed video recordings of previous ABD missions at the U.S. 

Embassy. 
Page 24 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 25 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 26 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

See comment 3. 

Paragraph is now on 

page 13.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 27 GAO-05-970 Air Bridge Denial Program

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter 

dated August 23, 2005. 

GAO Comments 1. State officials provided us draft performance measures for the ABD 

program that they told us were developed in April 2005 with 

representatives from Defense and the Colombian government. 

2. We recognized the U.S. role of program oversight and the Colombian 

government’s role of operating and managing the program throughout 

the report. 

3. We made no substantive changes. This section addressed only the 

initial identification of a suspect track. Our analysis found that three of 

the six criteria used to determine if a track is suspicious were 

subjective. The checklist and other steps taken to further identify 

suspect aircraft are discussed elsewhere in the report.

4. We gave examples of the criteria used to determine if an aircraft is 

suspected of drug trafficking. 

5. A discussion of U.S. government intelligence support to the ABD 

program was not within the scope of our report. 

(320384)
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