GAO-06-365R Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

February 1, 2006 

The Honorable Thomas Davis 

Chairman 

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

 Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO’s Preliminary 

Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

As you know, GAO has undertaken a body of work to address federal, state, and local 

preparations for, response to, and recovery from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Enclosed is a statement for the record of GAO’s preliminary findings. 

GAO will continue work on a wide range of issues relating to the preparation, 

response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to the hurricanes. We expect to 

provide Congress with more detailed findings, with a comprehensive summary of 

what went well and why, what did not go well and why, and what specific changes, if 

any, are called for in the National Response Plan. If you or your staff has any 

questions about this statement, please contact Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director 

for Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov. 

Sincerely yours, 

David M. Walker 

Comptroller General 

of the United States 

Enclosure 
Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller 

General David M. Walker on GAO’s 

Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita

Page 2 GAO-06-365R Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response

Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller General David M. 

Walker on GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

In recent months, GAO has undertaken a body of work to address federal, 

state, and local preparations for, response to, and recovery from

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. I am here today to provide some preliminary 

observations based on our work to date. GAO is supporting Congress 

through a range of strategic and integrated audit and evaluation

engagements to determine what went well, what did not, and what lessons 

learned are critical to improving government’s abilities to do better in the 

future. The Inspectors General of the various federal departments are 

conducting detailed Hurricane Katrina-related work on fraud, waste, and 

abuse in individual federal programs. 

GAO staff has visited the affected areas. They have interviewed officials 

and analyzed information from the various involved federal agencies such

as FEMA and the Department of Defense (DOD); state and local 

organizations, including state emergency management agencies; state 

adjutant generals; local officials; and representatives from 

nongovernmental agencies. I have also personally toured southern 

Mississippi, southern Louisiana, and the city of New Orleans. I have also 

had discussions with many governmental and other officials, including the 

governors of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas; the mayor of 

New Orleans; the primary federal official on the scene; and the joint task 

force commander of active duty forces. In addition, GAO has done a great 

deal of work on prior disasters, including Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and 

the terrorist attacks in 2001. 

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our nation’s 

history and because of its size and strength, will have long standing effects 

for years to come. It exacted terrible human costs with the loss of 

significant numbers of lives and resulted in billions of dollars in property 

damage. At present, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reports 

that FEMA has distributed nearly $4.4 billion in federal aid to more than 

1.4 million households. Forty-four states and the District of Columbia have 

been given emergency declarations to cover expenses related to sheltering 

millions of evacuees forced from their homes by Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita. Furthermore, many who survived now face the disruption of being 

dislocated and separated from their normal way of life, the prospect of 

rebuilding their lives in other locations, and, for those who desire to return 

home, the continuing uncertainties regarding what kind of life the future 

may hold. 

Significant local, state, and federal resources were mobilized to respond to 

the Hurricane Katrina disaster, along with significant participation from 

charitable and private sector organizations. However, the capabilities of
Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller 

General David M. Walker on GAO’s 

Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita

several federal, state, and local agencies were clearly overwhelmed in 

response to Hurricane Katrina, especially in Louisiana. Therefore, there 

was widespread dissatisfaction with the level of preparedness and the 

collective response. As events unfolded in the immediate aftermath and 

ensuing days after Hurricane Katrina’s final landfall, responders at all 

levels of government—many victims themselves—encountered significant 

breakdowns in vital areas such as emergency communications as well as 

obtaining essential supplies and equipment. 

The causes of these breakdowns must be well understood and addressed 

in order to strengthen the nation’s ability to prepare for, respond to, and 

recover from major catastrophic events in the future-–whether natural or 

man-made. Unfortunately, many of the lessons emerging from the most 

recent hurricanes in the Gulf are similar to those GAO identified more than 

a decade ago, in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, which leveled much 

of South Florida in the early 1990s. For example, in 1993, we 

recommended that the President designate a senior official in the White 

House to oversee federal preparedness for, and response to, major 

catastrophic disasters. 

There are several key themes that, based on our current preliminary work, 

underpin many of the challenges encountered in the response to Hurricane 

Katrina and reflect certain lessons learned from past disasters. The 

following three key themes seem to be emerging. 

First, prior to a catastrophic event, the leadership roles, responsibilities, 

and lines of authority for the response at all levels must be clearly defined 

and effectively communicated in order to facilitate rapid and effective 

decision making, especially in preparing for and in the early hours and 

days after the event. As we recommended in 1993, we continue to believe

that a single individual directly responsible and accountable to the 

President must be designated to act as the central focal point to lead and

coordinate the overall federal response in the event of a major 

catastrophe. This person would work on behalf of the President to ensure 

that federal agencies treat the catastrophe as a top priority and that the 

federal government’s response is both timely and effective. In cases where 

there is warning, such as the high probability of a major hurricane (e.g., a 

category 4 or 5), the senior official should be designated prior to the event,

be deployed appropriately, and be ready to step forward as events unfold. 

Neither the DHS Secretary nor any of his designees, such as the Principal 

Federal Official (PFO), filled this leadership role during Hurricane Katrina, 

which serves to underscore the immaturity of and weaknesses relating to

Clear and Decisive 

Leadership 

Page 3 GAO-06-365R Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response
Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller 

General David M. Walker on GAO’s 

Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita

the current national response framework. More specifically with regard to 

the lessons to be learned from Hurricane Katrina:

• No one was designated in advance to lead the overall federal response 

in anticipation of the event despite clear warnings from the National 

Hurricane Center. Furthermore, events unfolded both before and 

immediately after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina that made it clear 

that governmental entities did not act decisively or quickly enough to 

determine the catastrophic nature of the incident. For example, the 

DHS Secretary designated Hurricane Katrina as an incident of national 

significance on August 30th—the day after final landfall. However, he

did not designate the storm as a catastrophic event, which would have 

triggered additional provisions of the National Response Plan (NRP), 

calling for a more proactive response.1

 As a result, the federal posture 

generally was to wait for the affected states to request assistance. At 

the same time, some federal responders such the Coast Guard and 

DOD did “lean forward” in proactive efforts anticipating a major 

disaster. Furthermore, other federal agencies took proactive steps to 

prepare for and respond to the disaster, such as the U.S. Postal Service 

and the National Finance Center. 

• Although the DHS Secretary designated a PFO to be the federal 

government’s representative under the NRP structure and to 

coordinate the federal response, the efforts of all federal agencies 

involved in the response remained disjointed because the PFO’s 

leadership role was unclear. In the absence of timely and decisive 

action and clear leadership responsibility and accountability, there 

were multiple chains of command, a myriad of approaches and 

processes for requesting and providing assistance, and confusion about 

who should be advised of requests and what resources would be 

provided within specific time frames. 

 1

As defined by the National Response Plan, an incident of national significance is an actual 

or potential high-impact event that requires a response by a combination of federal, state,

and local governments and/or private sector entities in order to save lives and minimize

damage, and provides the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities. 

A catastrophic incident is one that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, 

damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment,

economy, national morale, and/or government functions.

Page 4 GAO-06-365R Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response
Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller 

General David M. Walker on GAO’s 

Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita

Second, to best position the nation to prepare for, respond to, and recover 

from major catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina, there must be strong 

advance planning, both within and among responder organizations, as well 

as robust training and exercise programs to test these plans in advance of

a real disaster. Although the NRP framework envisions a proactive 

national response in the event of a catastrophe, the nation does not yet 

have the types of detailed plans needed to better delineate capabilities that 

might be required and how such assistance will be provided and 

coordinated. In addition, we observed that the training and exercises 

necessary to carry out these plans were not always developed or 

completed among the first responder community. The leadership to ensure 

these plans and exercises are in place must come from DHS in conjunction

with other federal agencies, state and local authorities, and involved 

nongovernmental organizations. More specifically, 

Strong Advance 

Planning, Training, 

and Exercise 

Programs 

• By their very nature, major catastrophic events involve extraordinary 

levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption that likely will 

immediately overwhelm state and local responders, circumstances that 

make sound planning for catastrophic events all the more crucial. Our 

previous work on Hurricane Andrew also highlighted the importance of 

such plans focused specifically on major catastrophic events. Our 

initial review of the NRP base plan and its supporting catastrophic 

provisions as well as lessons based on Hurricane Katrina suggest the 

need for these documents to be supported and supplemented by more 

detailed and robust implementation plans. Our previous work has also 

underscored the need to prepare for both natural disasters and manmade disasters such as terrorist events. 

• Planning should also include further defining and leveraging any 

military capabilities as might be needed in a major catastrophe. Prior 

disasters and the actual experience of Hurricane Katrina show that 

DOD is likely to contribute substantial support to state and local 

authorities, including search and rescue assets, evacuation assistance, 

provision of supplies, damage assessment assets, and possibly helping

to ensure public safety. In fact, military support to Hurricane Katrinaaffected areas reflected an unprecedented domestic response of 70,000 

personnel—far greater than in any other domestic disaster, including 

Hurricane Andrew. This response involved about 20,000 active duty 

troops and about 50,000 National Guard troops. More detailed planning 

would provide greater visibility and understanding of the types of 

support DOD will be expected to provide following a catastrophic 

incident, including the types of assistance and capabilities that might 

be provided, what might be done proactively and in response to 

specific requests, and how the efforts of the active duty and National 

Page 5 GAO-06-365R Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response
Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller 

General David M. Walker on GAO’s 

Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita

Guard would be integrated. It would also avoid the type of confusion 

that occurred in Louisiana regarding the types of military support 

needed and requested, and the respective contributions of active duty 

and National Guard forces. 

• Planning also must explicitly consider the need for and management of 

the contractor community. In this regard, we found that agencies did 

not always have adequate plans for contracting in a major contingency

situation. We also noted the competing tension between the selection 

of national contractors and the requirement under the Stafford Act for 

a preference for contractors from the affected area. Better planning 

could ameliorate those tensions. 

• Regular training and periodic exercises provide a valuable way to test 

emergency management plans. In our previous work on Hurricanes 

Andrew and Hugo, we identified the need for the federal government to 

upgrade training and exercises for state and local governments

specifically geared towards catastrophic disaster response. Hurricane 

Katrina demonstrated the benefits of applying lessons learned from 

training exercises and experiences with actual hurricanes as well as the 

dangers of ignoring them. FEMA’s “Hurricane Pam” exercise—

conducted between 2004 and 2005 to simulate the impacts of a 

category 3 hurricane—identified the impacts such as widespread 

flooding, extensive evacuations, sheltering thousands of individuals left 

homeless after a storm, and disposing of tons of debris similar to 

Hurricane Katrina’s results. Not all capabilities-related issues identified 

in the Hurricane Pam exercise were addressed before Hurricane 

Katrina hit. In addition, we observed that an incomplete understanding 

of roles and responsibilities under the NRP lead to misunderstandings, 

problems, and delays, an area that training might be able to correct. 

One overall challenge is ensuring that key officials participate in 

training and exercises so that they are better prepared to deal with real 

life situations. 

Response and recovery capabilities needed during a major catastrophic 

event differ significantly from those required to respond to and recover 

from a “normal disaster.” Key capabilities such as emergency

communications, continuity of essential government services, and logistics 

and distribution systems underpin citizen safety and security. In addition, 

as these capabilities are brought to bear, streamlining, simplifying, and 

expediting decision making must quickly replace “business as usual” 

approaches to doing business. The following provides examples of 

capabilities we have identified in our preliminary work. All of these areas

require better contingency plans and the resources to carry them out. 

Capabilities for a 

Catastrophic Event 

Page 6 GAO-06-365R Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response
Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller 

General David M. Walker on GAO’s 

Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita

• Hurricane Katrina exposed difficulties in continuing or rapidly 

restoring essential government operations, particularly at the local 

level. Local government infrastructure was destroyed and essential 

government employees, including many first responders, were 

evacuated or victimized themselves by the storms, resulting in limited 

continuity of operations for essential public safety and key service 

agencies. Also, because of storm damage, emergency communications 

to meet everyday internal and emergency communication requirements 

and interoperability needs were severely compromised and backup 

systems were often limited or nonexistent. 

• The scope of the devastation, including the flooding in the New Orleans 

area, made a comprehensive damage assessment and an estimate of 

services victims might need very difficult. After Hurricane Andrew, 

similar to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, it was several days 

before local authorities had a full picture of the situation to determine 

how much and what types of assistance were needed. A catastrophic 

event will overwhelm the capacity of state and local officials to assess 

damage, and our preliminary work indicates that the military’s 

significant capabilities in assessing damage—a capability used for 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and other past disasters—should be an 

explicit part of future major catastrophic disaster plans. 

• While there were aspects that worked well, it appeared that logistics 

systems for critical resources were often totally overwhelmed by 

Hurricane Katrina, with critical resources apparently not available,

properly distributed, or provided in a timely manner. In addition, our 

preliminary work assessing agency acquisition practices for responding 

to the hurricanes indicates that those agencies needed additional 

capabilities to be able to: (1) adequately plan for and anticipate 

requirements for needed goods and services, (2) clearly communicate 

responsibilities across agencies and jurisdictions, and (3) deploy 

sufficient numbers of personnel to provide contractor oversight. These 

capabilities are critical to ensuring that agencies receive the goods and 

services needed to accomplish their missions in a timely manner and at 

fair and reasonable prices. 

• The magnitude of the affected population in a major catastrophe also 

calls for greater capabilities in several areas. For example, evacuation 

capabilities must include evacuating special needs populations such as 

those in hospitals and nursing homes, coordinating transportation 

assets, and ensuring that receiving shelters are not overwhelmed. 

Search and rescue and mass care should work together in a seamless 

Page 7 GAO-06-365R Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response
Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller 

General David M. Walker on GAO’s 

Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita

transition so that victims are not just rescued, but can be taken to a 

place of shelter. 

• Mass care—sheltering, feeding, and related services—following 

Hurricane Katrina required the integrated efforts of many 

organizations, including volunteer groups, charities and other

nongovernmental groups, organizations providing mutual aid, and the 

military. Although many of these efforts were successful, it appeared 

that Hurricane Katrina seriously challenged the capacity of 

organizations such as the American Red Cross and FEMA to provide 

expected services to certain populations and in certain areas and at 

certain times. Housing beyond short-term shelters also became—and 

remains—a major problem, especially for victims who either cannot 

return to their community or require housing options in their 

community if they do return. 

• Additional capability will be needed to effectively manage and deploy 

volunteers and unsolicited donations. Our early work indicates that 

because of the magnitude of the storms, volunteers and donations, 

including from the international community were not generally well 

integrated into the overall response and recovery activities. For 

example, there were challenges in integrating the efforts of the 

Salvation Army and smaller organizations, often local churches and 

other “faith-based” organizations. In addition, federal agencies involved

in managing the international assistance were not prepared to

coordinate, receive, distribute, or account for the assistance. Agency 

officials involved in the cash and in-kind international assistance told

us the agencies had not planned for the acceptance of international 

assistance for use in the United States and, therefore, had not 

developed processes and procedures to address this scenario. 

• Lastly, beginning and sustaining community and economic recovery, 

including restoring a viable tax base for essential services, calls for 

immediate steps so residents can restore their homes and businesses. 

Removing debris and restoring essential gas, electric, oil, 

communications, water, sewer, transportation and transportation 

infrastructure, other utilities, and services such as public health and 

medical support are vital to recovery and rebuilding. In less severe 

disasters, restoring these lifelines is easier. However, the magnitude 

and scope of Hurricane Katrina painfully makes visible the many 

challenges in effectively addressing these issues. 

GAO will continue our work on a wide range of issues relating to the 

preparation, response, recovery, and reconstruction efforts related to the 

Page 8 GAO-06-365R Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response
Enclosure I: Statement by Comptroller 

General David M. Walker on GAO’s 

Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita

hurricanes that I have discussed today. We have over 30 engagements 

underway and look forward to reporting on them throughout 2006. We will 

provide Congress and the American people with a comprehensive 

summary of what went well and why, what did not go well and why, and 

what, if any, specific changes are called for in the National Response Plan.

(440455) Page 9 GAO-06-365R Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response