* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no

precedenti al value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of wellsettled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on

the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 94-50564

Summary Calendar

_______________________

FREDA R. VAUGHAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DONNA SHALALA,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(A-93-CA-260)

_________________________________________________________________

(May 17, 1995)

Before JONES, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

On September 24, 1991, Freda R. Vaughan applied for

disability insurance benefits, alleging disability since December

31, 1986. Her application was denied initially and on

reconsideration. V aughan then reques ted and received a hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). T he ALJ determined that

Vau ghan was unable to perform her past work but had the residual2

functional capacity to perform a wide range of sedentary work.

Thus, the ALJ held that Vaughan was not disabled within the meaning

of the Social Security Act at any time through December 31, 1988,

the date she was last insured for disability benefits. T he

decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Secretary when

the Appeals Council denied Vaughan's request for review.

Vaughan filed suit in the district court seeking review

of the Secretary's decision. Both the magistrate judge and

district court authored opinions rejecting appellant's challenges

to the ALJ's decision. On appeal, Sullivan raises many of the same

objections, and we find them no more persuasive than the other

judges did.

BACKGROUND

The following salient facts were presented for the

Secretary's determination. Vaughan, a high school graduate, was

born on June 1, 1937. Her work experience includes co-owning a

liquor store and a furniture store, and working as a supervisor in

the mail rooms of an oil company and a savings and loan. S he last

met the earnings requirements for disability benefits on December

31, 1988.

Between 1985 and 1990, Vaughan was treated conservatively

for a variety of ailments by a family practitioner, Dr. Norman

Moore. She saw him for hip, leg, and chest pain in 1986, and for

back pain, dizzy spells, and pain in her right arm in 1988. O n May

6, 1988, her blood pressu re was measured at 140/80. O n April 3,3

1990, it had risen to 1 70/90. Dr. Moore's records contain no

specific diagnosis of Vaughan's problems.

In July 1990, after her eligibility expired, Dr. Jorge

Duchicela, also a family practitioner, began treating Vaughan for

headaches and pain in her legs and tailbone, hypertension, and pain

in her back, arms, and legs.

At the July 22 , 1992, hearing before the ALJ, Vaughan

testified that she suffered from progressively worsening pain and

"tingling" in her arms and legs, a condition present to some degree

for 20 years. S he had recently begun taking "Propox," which

r elieved some of the pain. V aughan also testified that sh e had

suffered from high blood pressure for 20 to 25 years. A lthough she

had experienced severe headaches in the past, these were currently

controlled wi th medication. S he also testified that she had

suffered a "mini-stroke" around 1988, resulting i n some memory

loss. A ccording to Vaughan, the blood pressure medication that she

had taken that morning caused her to have difficulty thinking. S he

also testified that her family performed most of the household

chores.

The vocational expert, Robert Marion, testified that

Vaughan's past relevant work was classified as ski lled and that

these skills were transferable to sedentary jobs. S uch jobs

included receptionist, interview clerk, and cashier, which existed

in the hundreds of thousands in the national economy. V aughan's

counsel challenged Marion's figures regarding the number of these1 "Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time" and

also "involves sitting," although "a certain amount of walking and standing is often

necessary in carrying out job duties." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).

4 jobs that were available in the national economy. M arion responded

that his figures were accurate.

In this case, the ALJ determined that although Mrs.

Vaughan cannot perform her past relevant work, she could perform a

wide range of sedentary work 1 from December 31, 1986, the alleged

onset date of disability, through December 31, 1988, the date she

was last insured for benefits. Thus, the ALJ concluded that

Vaughan was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security.

DISCUSSION

Vaughan first argues that the ALJ's determination that

she was not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence. She

states that the ALJ's finding that she could perform the full range

of sedentary work conflicts with Dr. Duchicela's evaluation of her

exertional abilities, the objective medical evidence of high blood

pre ssure and cholesterol, and her testimony at the hearing

regarding her limitations.

Contrary to Vaughan 's allegation, the ALJ did not find

that Vaughan could perform the full range of sedentar y work.

R ather, the ALJ found that Vaughan could perform a wide range of

sedentary wor k. This conclusion is supported by substantial

evidence. First, the record reflects that Vaughan was able to, and

did, work for several years while suffering from ailments she now

asserts are disabling. see Fraga v. Bowen , 810 F.2d 1296, 1305 &5

n.11 (5th Cir. 1987) (ability to work despite pre-exi sting

condition supports ALJ's finding of not disabled). Second, no

physician who examined Vaughan pronounced her disabled. S ee Harper

v. Sullivan

, 887 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1989) (substantial evidence

supported ALJ's finding that claimant's subjective symptomology not

credible when no physician on recor d stated that claimant was

physically disabled). In her "Disability Report," submitted nearly

three years after the date she last met insured status, Vaughan

acknowledged that no physician had advised her to limit her

activities in any way. Accordingly, Dr. Duchicela's November 1991

assessment that Vaughan could lift only five pounds does not alter

the validity of the ALJ's decision.

Third, although Vaughan alleged a very limited activity

level at the hearing, she stated in the "Disability Report" that

her social contacts and driving were not restricted and that she

could perform househo ld chores like cooking, making the bed, and

washing. T he ALJ concluded that several of the symptoms allegedly

pl aguing Vaughan were not consistent with the objective medical

evidence. S ee Anthony v. Sullivan

, 954 F.2d 289, 296 (5th Cir.

1992). Thus, the ALJ's finding that Vaughan's complaints were not

debilitating is supported by substantial evidence.

Vaughan next asserts that the ALJ failed to use proper

legal standards in denying benefits. First, she argues that the

ALJ improperly relied on the "grids" contained in Subpart P

Appendix of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, which presume that

j obs are available in the national economy for claimants meet ing6

cer tain criteria, to direct a decision of not disabled. S ee 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1569 Subpt. P, App. 2. This contention misconstrues

the record. The ALJ found that Vaughan's nonexertional limitations

prevented her from performing the full range of sedentary work

activity, but that she was not disabled within the framework of

Rule 210.07, considered in light of the vocational expert's

identification of jobs available in the national economy that she

could perform.

Vaughan's contention that the ALJ "applied improper legal

standards in failing to make a finding on [her] credibility

regarding statements of disabling pain, dizziness and conf usion

prior to December 31, 1988[,]" is also contradicted by the record.

The ALJ made specific credibility determinations regarding

Vaughan's allegations of pain and discomfort.

Vaugh an also contends that there was not substantial

evidence that there were jobs available in the nationa l economy

that she was capable of perf orming. We disagree. A vocational

expert is called to testify because of his familiarity with job

requirements and working conditions. Fields v. Bowen , 805 F.2d

1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 1986). "The value of a vocational expert is

that he is familiar with the specific requirements of a particular

occupation, including wo rking conditions and the attributes and

skills needed." Id . At Vaughan's hearing, the vocational expert

explained that he determined the availability of the receptionist,

interview clerk, and cashier jobs in the national economy by

referring to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), in7

conjunction with additional sources. The expert also found that

Mrs. Vaughan possesses considerable transferable work skills.

Thus, the vocational expert relied on his expertise to arrive at

the conclusions that he gave to the A LJ, and he explained how he

arrived at his conclusions. S ee Fields

, 805 F.2d at 1170. To

insist, as Vaughan now does, that the ALJ must consider not simply

the existence of generic jobs such as cashier but their specific

working co nditions is incorrect. The contention comes close to

arguing that the vocational expert must identify specific jobs open

to a particular claimant, an exercise both futile, overwhelming,

and unnecessary.

Vaughan finally contends that she was denied a full and

fair hearing because the ALJ asked leading questions of the

vocational expert, misstated her disabling conditions in a

hypothetical question, refused to let counsel fully cross-examine

the vocational expert, and refused to give counsel access to the

vocational expert's notes. These arguments have been addressed

fully in district court. We add only a few observations. First,

the regulations do not require the use of the formal rules of

evidence at an administrative hearing. S ee 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(c).

Second, the ALJ's duty is to develop the facts relative to a claim

for benefits fairly and fully, not merely to sit and listen. K ane

v. Heckler

, 731 F.2d 1216, 1219 (5th Cir. 1984). Third, unlike the

two cases cited by Vaughan, Lidy v. Sullivan

, 911 F.2 d 1075 (5th

Cir. 1990), cert. denied

, 500 U.S. 959 (1991), and Tanner v.

Secretary

, 932 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir . 1991), the ALJ in this case8

allowed counsel to cross-examine the vocational expert extensively,

including the subject matter of the challenged hypothetical.

Accordingly, no reversible error has been shown.

Finally, Vaughan's reliance on Scott v. Shalala

, 30 F.3d

33 (5th Cir. 1994), to show that the ALJ did not properly consider

the vocational expert's testimony is misplaced. Blue brief, 18-19.

In that case, the ALJ made only a "passing reference" to the

vocational expert's testimony in finding that the claimant had the

residual capacity to perform sedentary work. S cott

, 30 F.3d at 35.

By contrast, the ALJ in this case found that Vaughan could not

perform the full range of sedentary work activity and expressly

relied upon the vocational expert's identification of jobs as

evi dence of Vaughan's ability to perform work in the national

economy, despite her nonexertional limitations.

Since Vaughan offered no evidence that she was incapable

of performing the types of work that the ALJ determined were

available and that she was capable of performing, Vaughan failed to

me et her burden of proof under the disability test. S elders v.

Sullivan , 914 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1990).

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED

.