GAO-06-279R 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

December 13, 2005 

The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Issues Related to Navy Battleships

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Until World War II U.S. Navy battleships provided an impressive show of force and 

outgunned and outmaneuvered their ocean-going enemies. From World War II until 

the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the Navy’s Iowa class battleships provided Naval 

Surface Fire Support capabilities with their 16-inch guns. Naval Surface Fire Support, 

together with land- and air-based components, makes up the joint “fires triad”, which 

is used to support Marine Corps amphibious assault operations. The last Iowa class 

battleship was decommissioned in 1992. In 1996, congressional authorizers became 

concerned that the Navy would not be able to produce a replacement Naval Surface 

Fire Support capability comparable to the battleships until well into the twenty-first 

century and directed the Secretary of the Navy to restore at least two Iowa class 

battleships to the naval vessel registry until the Secretary of the Navy certified that a 

capability had been developed equal to or greater than that provided by the 

battleships.1

 Two Iowa class battleships--the U.S.S. Wisconsin and the U.S.S. Iowa--

remain on the naval vessel registry in inactive status. Both ships are considered “in 

reserve”, meaning they are being retained for reactivation in case of full mobilization 

or future need. 

Since 1995 we have reported several times on the status of battleships and their role 

in meeting future Naval Surface Fire Support requirements.2

 In November 2004, we 

reported that the Navy and Marine Corps had only recently begun the process to 

establish validated Naval Surface Fire Support requirements that address the overall 

capabilities needed, that the cost and schedule for reactivating and modernizing two 

 

1

 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, Sec. 1011, H.R. Conf. 

Rep. No. 104-450, at 835 (1996). 

2

 U.S. General Accounting Office, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Evaluation of the Navy’s 1999 Naval 

Surface Fire Support Assessment, GAO/NSIAD-99-225 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 1999); FORCE 

STRUCTURE: Navy Is Complying with Battleship Readiness Requirements, GAO/NSIAD-99-62 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 1999); DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Naval Surface Fire Support Program 

Plans and Costs, GAO/NSIAD-99-91 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 1999); PROGRAM STATUS: Naval 

Surface Fire Support, GAO/NSIAD-97-179R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 1997). 
Page 2 GAO-06-279R 

Iowa class battleships had not been fully developed, and that fielding of a 

replacement Naval Surface Fire Support capability has been delayed.3

An issue confronting Congress in finalizing the National Defense Authorization bill 

for Fiscal Year 2006 is whether or not to allow the two remaining battleships to be 

removed from the naval registry and be donated. Decision makers have at least three 

alternatives to removing the two remaining battleships from the naval vessel registry. 

The Navy could (1) sustain the battleships in inactive status; (2) reactivate the 

battleships to their original warfighting capabilities, with some improvements to 

bring them up to current ship standards for habitability and interoperability; or (3) 

modernize the battleships, their fire support capabilities, and other supporting 

capabilities significantly beyond their original capabilities. 

You requested that we review requirements for fire support and whether or not these 

requirements could be met with Navy battleships. We agreed to focus our work on 

two objectives. Specifically, we identified (1) mission requirements established by 

the Department of Defense (DOD) for fire support to expeditionary operations and 

how DOD officials view these needs and the ability of the battleships and current and 

planned capabilities to meet these requirements, and (2) cost factors that should be 

considered in evaluating whether to sustain, reactivate, modernize or delist the 

battleships. On November 10, 2005, we provided you with a briefing on our 

observations regarding battleships and fire support issues. This letter summarizes 

our observations and transmits the briefing slides as requested. (See enclosure I.) 

To determine DOD requirements for fire support for expeditionary operations in the 

littorals, we reviewed DOD requirements documents and identified current and 

planned capabilities. We also held discussions with officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Chief, Naval Operations, Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command, the Navy’s Inactive Ships Management Office, and the U.S. 

Joint Forces Command to obtain their views on existing and planned joint fires 

capabilities, the adequacy of these plans, and the ability of battleships to perform the 

fire support mission. In addition, we obtained combatant command views on the 

sufficiency of DOD fire support capabilities to carry out operational plans from 

officials at the U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific Command. We also toured 

the battleship U.S.S. Wisconsin to observe its current condition. While on board, we 

discussed the ship’s maintenance schedule, inspection procedures, annual funding, 

and cost factors for options to sustain, reactivate, and modernize the battleships. We 

also discussed these issues with Navy officials and determined whether they have 

completed any recent analysis on the cost of reactivating or modernizing the 

battleships. We did not assess the cost-effectiveness of options to reactivate or 

upgrade battleships because the Navy has not determined what enhancements would 

be required for these options or developed cost estimates. We performed our work 

from July through October 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

 

3

 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support, 

GAO-05-39R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2004). 
Page 3 GAO-06-279R 

Observations 

DOD is in the process of reviewing a draft joint fires requirements document for 

expeditionary operations in the littorals4

 which was developed primarily by the 

Marine Corps in May 2005. The draft requirements document shows that planned 

capabilities will help to mitigate existing gaps in joint fires capabilities if programs 

such as the advanced gun system for the new DD(X) destroyer and the extendedrange munitions for existing DDG destroyers are implemented as currently planned. 

However, current and planned DOD capabilities for joint fires will not fully meet 

DOD’s needs because they will not provide sufficient capabilities such as engaging 

moving targets in restricted weather conditions or providing a sufficient quantity of 

fires over a short period of time. DOD officials believe that although some gaps in 

joint fires capabilities exist now and will continue to exist in the future, the risk 

associated with these gaps is acceptable and will not significantly affect the 

combatant commanders’ ability to execute war plans. Moreover, they do not believe 

that keeping or modernizing battleships would be cost effective nor would the 

modernized battleships significantly reduce the risk in comparison with other 

planned capabilities that DOD is funding. 

While the Navy maintains annual costs to sustain these battleships, the Navy has not 

developed any specific cost estimates for reactivating battleships to their original 

warfighting capabilities or for modernizing them beyond these capabilities. 

Numerous cost factors would have to be considered to assess such options including 

the cost of personnel to operate the ship, materials and labor to improve operating 

systems and habitability, and restoration or improvement of munitions and their 

delivery systems. Moreover, the capabilities and costs of reactivating or upgrading 

battleships would need to be compared to those of other ongoing DOD programs to 

enhance fire support capabilities such as the DD(X) program. Our prior work has 

shown that decisions on acquisition alternatives should be based on analyses of total 

ownership costs during a system’s lifecycle, which include the costs to research, 

develop, acquire, own, and operate systems.5

 

DOD is reviewing joint requirements for fire support 

for expeditionary operations in the littorals

Since May 2005 when the Marine Corps Combat Development Command submitted a 

draft requirements document for Joint Staff review, Naval Surface Fire Support 

requirements have become part of joint fires requirements and are currently being 

reviewed by DOD. 6 Joint fires include a system of weapons delivered from two or 

more components--aircraft, ships/submarines, and ground assets--toward a common 

objective. In order to comply with DOD’s new Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System process, the Joint Staff directed the Marine Corps to submit the 

draft Initial Capabilities Document to determine joint fires requirements in support of 

 

4

 The littoral includes an area extending from a transition point from open ocean, e.g., the sea base, to 

more constrictive and shallower waters, to the shore, and onward to those inland areas that can be 

attacked, supported and defended from the sea. 5

 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could 

Reduce Weapon Systems’ Total Ownership Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C. Feb. 11, 2003). 6

 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in 

Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals, May 31, 2005. 
Page 4 GAO-06-279R 

expeditionary operations in coastal areas. The Initial Capabilities Document 

identified four gaps in existing and planned joint fires capabilities: (1) integrated 

joint command and control are not well-defined, (2) existing and future acquisition 

systems do not provide sufficient capability to engage moving targets under restricted 

weather conditions,.

(3) existing and future acquisition systems do not provide 

sufficient capability to limit collateral damage, and (4) existing and planned systems 

do not deliver a sufficient volume of fires on multiple targets simultaneously or over a 

short period of time. The draft document is in the process of being reviewed by 

subject matter experts within DOD. Prior to the development of this joint 

requirements document, the Marine Corps had established requirements in a 

document titled “Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for Expeditionary 

Maneuver Warfare” in March 2002. This document established specific near-term, 

mid-term and far-term requirements for factors such as system response time, 

accuracy and precision, and range. 

New capabilities being developed will enhance DOD’s joint fires 

capabilities for expeditionary warfare, but some gaps will remain

Current capabilities to provide joint fires in support of expeditionary operations in 

the littorals include the 5-inch 54- or 62-caliber guns for the DDG destroyers and 

cruisers with 5-inch 54-caliber guns. The two battleships in inactive reserve, if 

reactivated, would provide 16-inch 50-caliber guns. Other joint fires capabilities 

include tactical aviation, surface-to-surface rocket systems, and Army and Marine 

Corps 105 millimeter and 155 millimeter artillery. Planned capabilities such as 

weapons systems and/or ships currently under development are expected to largely 

meet near- and mid-term requirements and partially mitigate multiple capabilities 

gaps if implemented as planned. Planned capabilities include the DD(X) destroyers 

with an advanced gun system firing long range land attack projectiles. Another 

planned capability is extended-range guided munitions for existing DDG destroyers. 

The DDG with extended-range guided munitions largely meets near- and mid-term 

Naval Surface Fire Support requirements, while the DD(X) meets mid-term 

requirements and may meet far-term requirements depending on the ultimate range of 

the projectiles. However, neither of these capabilities may be available until early 

next decade. As we have reported, both the DD(X) and extended-range guided 

munitions programs have experienced some technical and funding challenges.7

In 

addition, neither current nor planned Naval Surface Fire Support capabilities fully 

mitigate joint fires gaps identified in the Initial Capabilities Document such as the 

ability to engage moving targets in restricted weather conditions and the ability to 

provide a sufficient quantity of fires over a short period of time. However, the DD(X) 

with the advanced gun system could mitigate those gaps and the DDG firing 

extended-range guided munitions somewhat addresses them. Land- and air-based 

systems, such as long-range bombers, may also help to mitigate these gaps. 

 

7

 U.S. Government Accountability Office, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Progress and Challenges 

Facing the DD(X) Surface Combatant Program, GAO-05-924T (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2005; U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Assessments of Selected Major 

Weapon Programs, GAO-05-301 (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005). 
Page 5 GAO-06-279R 

DOD officials believe risk associated with current and planned capabilities is 

acceptable if programs are implemented as planned

DOD officials believe the level of risk associated with current fire support capabilities 

is acceptable given that other joint capabilities such as tactical aviation and longrange bombers could also contribute to providing joint fires to support theater 

commanders’ war plans. For example, combatant command representatives told us 

they would be able to execute war plans with acceptable risk using current fires 

support capabilities. Also, DOD officials from the joint staff, combatant commands, 

Navy, and Marine Corps do not believe that reactivating battleships would be cost 

effective nor would the modernized battleships significantly reduce those risks or 

provide the best means to meet long-term joint fires capability requirements. Navy 

officials stated that the battleships would be expensive to operate, have munitions 

that lack accuracy, and are manpower intensive. Both Navy and Marine Corps 

officials stated that planned capabilities, including the DD(X) destroyers with the 

advanced gun system firing long-range land attack projectiles and extended-range 

guided munitions for existing DDGs, will help to mitigate existing joint fires gaps if 

executed as planned. However, Marine Corps officials support purchasing a larger 

number of DD(X) ships than are included in current Navy plans. 

Analysis of battleship alternatives would need to consider many types of costs

Decision makers have at least three alternatives to removing the two remaining 

battleships from the naval vessel registry. The Navy could (1) sustain the battleships 

in inactive status; (2) reactivate the battleships to their original warfighting 

capabilities, with some improvements to bring them up to current ship standards for 

habitability and interoperability; or (3) modernize the battleships, their fire support 

capabilities, and other supporting capabilities significantly beyond their original 

capabilities. In addition to weighing the military capabilities associated with these 

alternatives, numerous cost factors would need to be considered for each option 

including the extent to which DOD would incur costs for 

• mechanical and/or technological systems such as the propulsion system or 

communications systems; 

• weapons and munitions such as fire control systems and ordnance and 

propellant safety; and 

• personnel to operate the battleships (e.g., military personnel or contractor 

support), and training required to operate the various types of systems. 

However, the capabilities and costs associated with these options would also need to 

be weighed and compared to those of DOD’s other programs to enhance fire support 

capabilities, such as the DD(X) program with the advanced gun system and extendedrange guided munitions for existing DDGs. Moreover, our past work has shown that 

an effective comparison of costs should focus on total ownership costs during a 

system’s lifecycle. Total ownership costs include estimated operations and support 

cost in addition to research, development and procurement costs. The cost of a 

ship’s crew is generally the single largest expense incurred over a ship’s lifecycle.8

 

8

 U.S. Government Accountability Office, MILITARY PERSONNEL: Navy Actions Needed to Optimize 

Ship Crew Size and Reduce Total Ownership Costs, GAO-03-520 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2003). 
Page 6 GAO-06-279R 

Cost factors involved in sustaining the battleships in inactive ship status include the 

cost of contractor support to maintain the ships for such things as preservation 

painting, interior dehumidification, and maintaining the fire and flood alarm systems. 

The Navy currently incurs expenses of about $1.5 million per year to sustain both 

battleships in inactive status. Of this amount, about $1 million covers additional 

annual preservation maintenance and ongoing paint preservation work on the 

Wisconsin. The ships are inspected twice a year to document electrical, safety, hull 

and general ship conditions. In addition, the deck of the Iowa must be repaired to 

ensure its safety. According to Navy officials, this would cost about $1.6 million 

spread over two fiscal years. 

Costs to reactivate the battleships to their original warfighting capabilities with some 

enhancements for habitability and interoperability would include costs to bring the 

battleships up to current ship standards. For example, the Navy would have to 

replace the analog communications system with digital systems so that they will be 

interoperable with other ships; improve the propulsion system, and update chemical 

and biological protection capabilities, and improve personnel habitability with 

additions such as sit-up berthing and accommodations for women at sea. Moreover, 

Navy officials estimate they would need about 1,500 military personnel to operate a 

reactivated battleship. The fire control system would need to be improved and the 

propellant powder bags for the 16-inch guns, stored off the ships, would need to be 

replaced due to age and deterioration. In addition, the damaged number two gun 

turret on the Iowa would need to be repaired. 

Cost factors that would need to be considered to modernize and reactivate the 

battleships beyond their original warfighting capabilities could include replacing the 

propulsion system with a gas turbine system and developing guided munitions that 

could be launched from the battleships. Ultimately, the costs and time to modernize 

and reactivate the battleships would depend upon the specific missions and 

capabilities desired. However, in addition to the cost of more modern munitions, 

numerous enhancements to upgrade communications, the ship’s deck, mechanics, 

chemical biological protection capabilities, living quarters, and other systems would 

also be required. 

Agency Comments 

We received technical comments from DOD which we incorporated as appropriate.

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact information for our offices of 
Page 7 GAO-06-279R 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page of this 

report. Key contributors to this report were Richard Payne, Susan Ditto, David 

Marroni, Brian Mateja, Donna Rogers, and Malvern Saavedra. 

Sincerely yours, 

Janet A. St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Enclosure 
Enclosure I 

Page8 GAO-06-279R 

Battleships and Naval Surface 

Fire Support

U.S.S. Iowa

Source: Navy Office of Information

U.S.S. Wisconsin

Source: NAVSEA Inactive Ships

2

Objectives 

• Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) requirements 

and how DOD officials view these needs and the 

battleships’ ability to perform the mission

• Cost factors that should be considered in evaluating 

whether to sustain, reactivate, and/or modernize 

battleships
Enclosure I 

Page9 GAO-06-279R 

 

3

Scope & Methodology

• Reviewed NSFS requirements and subsequent Joint Fires gaps identified by Draft Initial Capabilities Document

• Reviewed current and programmed capabilities

• Obtained DOD officials’ views from 

• Office of Secretary of Defense

• Joint Staff

• Office of the Chief, Naval Operations (N76—Surface Warfare)

• Marine Corps Combat Development Command

• Navy Inactive Ships Program Office

• U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Central Command

• Toured battleship USS Wisconsin to observe current condition

4

GAO Observations

• NSFS requirements have been subsumed in Joint Fires Draft Initial 

Capabilities Document (as of May 2005)

• Current capabilities do not fully meet NSFS or Joint Fires requirements

• Programmed capabilities are expected to partially mitigate multiple 

capabilities gaps if implemented as planned

• DOD officials believe level of risk is acceptable given other Joint Fires 

capabilities and that battleships will not reduce risk

• Numerous cost factors would need to be addressed to sustain, reactivate, 

or modernize battleships; however, the Navy maintains only costs to 

sustain the battleships in inactive ship status
Enclosure I 

Page10 GAO-06-279R 

5

Requirements: Key Naval Surface Fire 

Support Documents 

• Marine Corps’ “Operational Maneuver from the Sea” 

(1996)

• Marine Corps’ “Naval Surface Fire Support 

Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare”

(March 2002) 

• “Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in Support 

of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals” (draft May 

2005)

6

Requirements: Marine Corps’ “Operational 

Maneuver from the Sea” (1996)

• Operational concepts drive fire support requirements that can 

be met only by complementary, overlapping, and redundant 

fire support systems: aviation, naval surface, and groundbased fires

• Naval surface weapons will provide long-range, accurate fires 

from over the horizon, supporting maneuver units with highvolume, suppressive, neutralizing, and destructive fires

• Fire support will be capable of providing a range of effects 

appropriate for the situation
Enclosure I 

Page11 GAO-06-279R 

7

Requirements: Marine Corps’ “Naval Surface Fire 

Support Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver 

Warfare” (2002)

Target Acquisition4 50-63 nautical miles 63-97 nautical miles ≥ 97 nautical miles

50 meters-desired 

threshold 

20 meters-optimum 

threshold

50 meters-desired 

threshold 

20 meters-optimum 

threshold

50 meters-desired 

threshold 

20 meters-optimum 

threshold

Accuracy/ Precision3

Range2 41-63 nautical miles 63-97 nautical miles ≥ 97 nautical miles

System Response1 2.5 minutes or less 2.5 minutes or less 2.5 minutes or less

Far Term

(2010-2019)

Mid Term

(2006-2009)

Near Term 

(2004-2005)

Requirement

1. System Response is the time elapsed from call for fire until ordnance fired or launched.

2. Range is the distance from shooter to target. Ranges listed include 25 nautical mile standoff from the shoreline

3. Accuracy is the distance between point of impact to target. Precision is the ability to place ordnance on point of impact.

Source: Marine Corps’ Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare

4. Target Acquisition includes detection, location, tracking, identification, and battle damage assessment.

8

Requirements: “Initial Capabilities Document for Joint 

Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the 

Littorals” (2005-Draft)

Marine Corps requirements now captured in this draft document. 

Document identifies four Joint Fires capabilities gaps:

 Joint environment—Integrated Fires command and control is not well defined 

 Weather restrictions—Existing and future target acquisition systems do not provide sufficient capability to engage moving targets under 

restricted weather conditions

 Collateral damage—Existing and future target acquisition systems do not provide sufficient capability to engage targets when friendly forces are in close contact or when causing collateral damage is a concern

 Fires volume—Insufficiency in existing capability to deliver a large quantity of fires on multiple targets simultaneously or over a short period of time
Enclosure I 

Page12 GAO-06-279R 

9

Requirements: Current Joint Fires Capabilities

• Ships

 30 DDGs with 5” 54-caliber guns 

 15 DDGs with 5” 62-caliber guns

 22 Cruisers with two 5” 54-caliber guns

 2 Battleships (Iowa and Wisconsin) with nine 16” 50-caliber guns. In inactive status; would require time and incur cost to reactivate

• Joint Fires Capabilities

 Tactical aviation

 Surface-to-surface rocket systems (HIMARS, MLRS, ATACMS, Tactical Tomahawks)

 Artillery: 105 mm & 155 mm—Army and Marine Corps

Currently use 

same munitions

10

Requirements: Comparison of Current Capabilities—

5-inch guns and 16-inch guns

Not solely a ship function

150 meters over or short; 

50 meters left or right at 

maximum range

13 nautical miles

1 to 3 minutes

5-inch gun with current 

munitions

Target Acquisition Not solely a ship function 

50-63 nautical miles

Up to 900 meters long or 

short; up to 400 meters left 

or right at maximum range

Accuracy/Precision

50 meters-desired threshold

20 meters- optimum threshold

Range 24 nautical miles

41-63 nautical miles

2 to 5 minutes after first 

shot to adjust fire

System Response

2.5 minutes or less

16-inch gun with standard 

round2

Near Term Requirement1

(2004-2005)

1Even if reactivated, the battleships and their16-inch guns would not be available to support near- or mid-term requirements. 

2Battleship capabilities are based on technologies that existed on the ships at deactivation (1992). There are proposals to improve technologies 

that could extend range and accuracy, but such proposals are not part of DOD plans for joint fires.

Sources: Marine Corps’ Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Naval Gunfire Spotter Handbook (1991), Letter of 

Promulgation for Naval Gunfire Spotters Handbook (1990), Fleet Marine Force Manual (1991), and Navy officials
Enclosure I 

Page13 GAO-06-279R 

11

Requirements: Programmed Capabilities

• For DD(X) and its munitions

 Estimated cost: $3.3 billion for first ship, less for subsequent ships 

 Initial Operational Capability 2014 (as of Nov. 23, 2005); Full Fielding has yet to be determined

 Navy’s fiscal year 2006-2011 Future Years Defense Plan identifies 

funding for one ship per year from fiscal years 2007 to 2011 for a total 

of 5 ships; as of Dec. 1, 2005, Navy plans to build 8-12 DD(X)

 Advanced Gun System (AGS) - 155 mm gun system designed for 

DD(X); uses Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP)

 DD(X) will provide responsive fires in support of forces ashore and 

pre-planned fires as well as Counter-Battery capability

• For DDG and its munitions

 Extended Range Munitions (ERM) - long range and precise global 

positioning system targeting capability 

 Under development since 1996; Initial Operational Capability 2011

12

Requirements: Comparison of Marine Corps’ 

Requirements to DDG and DD(X) Programmed 

Capability and Munitions Goals 

Not Solely a Ship 

Function

GPS; 10-20 meters

63 nautical miles

2.5 minutes

DDG with 5”62-

caliber gun firing 

ERM

Not Solely a Ship 

Function Target Acquisition 50-63 nautical miles 63-97 nautical miles ≥ 97 nautical miles

GPS- Classified

50 meter desired 

threshold

20 meter optimum 

threshold

50 meter desired 

threshold

20 meter optimum 

threshold

50 meter desired 

threshold

20 meter optimum 

threshold

Accuracy/

Precision

83 nautical miles Range 41-63 nautical miles 63-97 nautical miles ≥ 97 nautical miles 1

System Response 2.5 minutes or less 2.5 minutes or less 2.5 minutes or less 1 to 2.5 minutes

DD(X) with AGS 

firing LRLAP

Long Term

Requirement

(2010-2019)

Mid Term

Requirement

(2006-2009)

Near Term 

Requirement 

(2004-2005) Requirement

Sources: Marine Corps’ Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Navy officials

1LRLAP has successfully demonstrated in testing to 63 nautical miles. The DD(X) requirement threshold range is 63 nautical miles with an 

objective range of 100 nautical miles.
Enclosure I 

Page14 GAO-06-279R 

13

Requirements: Ability of Current and Programmed 

Capabilities and Battleships to Mitigate Joint Fires 

Capabilities Gaps

Partially Mitigates 

(within range)

Does Not Mitigate

Partially Mitigates

Does Not Mitigate

BB with 16” gun 

firing standard 

round

Partially Mitigates

Partially Mitigates

Partially Mitigates

Does Not Mitigate

DDG with 5”62-

caliber gun firing 

ERM

Partially Mitigates Partially Mitigates 

(within range) Fires Volume

Collateral Damage Does Not Mitigate Partially Mitigates

Weather Restrictions Partially Mitigates Partially Mitigates

Partially Mitigates Joint Environment Does Not Mitigate 2

DD(X) with AGS 

firing LRLAP

DDG with 5” gun 

firing current 

munitions

Current Joint Fires 

Capabilities Gaps1

1As identified in the draft “Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals”

Sources: Marine Corps and Navy officials

2No single system fully mitigates a joint fires gap; at least two independent capabilities would be needed to fully mitigate gaps

14

Requirements: OSD, Joint Staff, Navy, and Marine 

Corps Officials’ Views on Urgency to Provide Joint 

Fires Capabilities

DOD officials generally stated current capabilities are adequate with an acceptable level of risk and that battleships will not reduce existing joint fires 

gaps

• OSD Position

 Interim measures are adequate to meet current requirements with acceptable risk

 Does not consider reactivating and modernizing battleships as cost- effective; would not result in reduced risk in current Joint Fires gaps 

 Advanced Gun System will provide Joint Fires capabilities that could not be accomplished effectively by 16-inch guns on reactivated battleships; 

new precision round could be built for 16-inch gun but would not be 

available until after AGS is deployed

• Joint Staff Position (J8) 

 Identified and emerging capability gaps are being addressed to an 

acceptable level of risk with current Joint Fires capability; planned programs will further mitigate capability gaps and risk
Enclosure I 

Page15 GAO-06-279R 

15

Requirements: OSD, Joint Staff, Navy, and Marine 

Corps Officials’ Views on Urgency to Provide Joint 

Fires Capabilities (cont.)

• Navy Position (CNO—OPNAV N76)

 Recognizes need to provide Joint Fires capabilities but believes level 

of risk is acceptable; plans to analyze alternatives such as extended 

range munitions and long range land attack projectiles to address 

capabilities gaps

 Does not support reactivation of battleships because the battleships 

will not fully address gaps identified in Initial Capabilities Document

• Marine Corps Position (MROC)

 Need 24 DD(X) to fully support a major combat operation within 

desired timeframes; could accomplish mission with fewer than 24 

ships at risk of added time to operation and hitting fewer targets

 Supports Navy efforts to delist battleships because battleships will not 

meet long-term Joint Fires capability requirements

16

Requirements: Combatant Command Views 

on Urgency to Provide Joint Fires Capabilities

• Current NSFS capabilities sufficient for Joint Fires 

requirements 

• Commands able to carry out OPLANS with current Joint Fires 

capabilities

• Capability is the key, ship platform does not matter
Enclosure I 

Page16 GAO-06-279R 

17

Cost Factors: To Sustain, Reactivate, and/or 

Modernize Battleships

Decision makers have three alternatives to delisting the two 

battleships:

1) Sustain battleships in current inactive ship status

2) Reactivate battleships to current ship standards

3) Modernize battleships

Each alternative has different cost factors

18

Cost Factors: To Sustain, Reactivate, and/or 

Modernize Battleships

Improve Fire Control

Ordnance

Propellant

Develop guided munitions

Improve Fire Control

Ordnance

Propellant

Existing stocks and 

spares

Weapons/

Munitions

Military Manning

Military Training

Military Manning

Military Training

Personnel Contractor Support

Repair Iowa’s Deck

Repair Iowa’s gun turret

Replace Propulsion System 

with Gas Turbine

Replace C4I analog with digital

Improve Chem/Bio Protection 

Improve Personnel Habitability

Repair Iowa’s Deck

Repair Iowa’s gun turret

Improve Propulsion System 

Replace C4I analog with digital

Improve Chem/Bio Protection 

Improve Personnel Habitability

Repair Iowa’s Deck

Maintain Propulsion 

System 

Maintain C4I 

Mechanical/

Technological

Modernize Reactivate

Current ship standards

Sustain

Inactive ship status Cost factors
Enclosure I 

Page17 GAO-06-279R 

19

Cost Factors: To Sustain, Reactivate, and/or 

Modernize Battleships

• Navy has been spending $250,000 per ship, per year to 

sustain two battleships in inactive ship status

• Regardless of decision to sustain, reactivate, or modernize, 

the deck of the Iowa will need to be repaired at a cost of 

about $1.34 million unless it is delisted

• Navy has not developed plans or cost estimates to reactivate 

or modernize battleships

(350730) 
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