San Francisquito Creek—The Problem 

of Science in Environmental Disputes 

Professional Paper 1710

Joint Fact Finding as a Transdisciplinary Approach toward Environmental Policy Making

U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

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U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

USGS Professional Paper 1710

San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science

in Environmental Disputes

Joint Fact Finding as a Transdisciplinary Approach toward Environmental Policy Making

By Nicolas L. Rofougaran and Herman A. Karl
U.S. Department of the Interior

Gale A. Norton, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

P. Patrick Leahy, Acting Director

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia: 2005

For sale by U.S. Geological Survey Information Services

Box 25286, Denver Federal Center

Denver, CO 80225

This report and any updates to it are available online at:

http://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/pp1710/

For additional information write to:

U.S. Geological Survey

Box 25046, Mail Stop 421, Denver Federal Center

Denver, CO 80225-0046

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Any use of trade, product, or firm names in this publication is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply 

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Although this report is in the public domain, it contains copyrighted materials that are noted in the text. Permission 

to reproduce those items must be secured from the individual copyright owners. 

Cataloging-in-publication data are on file with the Library of Congress (URL http://www.loc.gov/).

Produced in the Western Region, Menlo Park, California

Manuscript approved for publication, October 3, 2005

Text edited by James W. Hendley II

Layout and design by Judy Weathers and Susan Mayfield
 iii

Contents

Abstract ................................................................................................... 1

Introduction ................................................................................................ 1

Definition of the issue and overall project design .....................................................1

Background .....................................................................................................1

I. Transdisciplinarity—science in a political and social context .................................... 4

II. A brief history of the controversy .................................................................. 8

III. Science as a source of confusion and distrust ................................................... 12

A science-centered mode of thinking................................................................. 12

The informational decisionmaking model ............................................................ 15

The transdisciplinary decisionmaking model ........................................................ 17

Conclusion ................................................................................................ 19

Acknowledgments ....................................................................................... 20

References ................................................................................................ 20

Appendix 1.—Chronology of the post-World War II community actions with regard to the

 San Francisquito Creek and USGS San Francisquito Creek Project ........................... 22

Figures

1. Boundary of San Francisquito Creek watershed ................................................... 2

2. Jurisdictional boundaries within San Francisqutio Creek watershed ........................... 3

3. Joint fact finding as a step in the consensus building process ................................. 5

4. Six steps of Joint Fact Finding ........................................................................ 6

5. The informational model .............................................................................. 15

6. An example of the informational model ............................................................ 16

7. The zone of overlap among the scientific, political, and public spheres ........................ 17

8. The transdisciplinary decisionmaking model ...................................................... 18

Tables

1. A summary of two series of interviews with the main players in the San Francisquito 

Creek project ..................................................................................... 14
Abstract

We studied the role of scientists and scientific information in the decision-making processes used by local jurisdictions and communities in San Mateo and Santa Clara 

Counties, California, to address a contentious environmental 

dispute involving flooding and habitat restoration of the San 

Francisquito Creek. Although a great number of scientific 

studies have been undertaken and continue to be commissioned, the parties have not used the results to help resolve 

the dispute. We conclude that the absence of an effective 

collaborative process, which is based on consensus seeking 

strategies, is a major reason why science is not effectively 

used and why the communities cannot reach agreement on a 

solution to the dispute. In this regard, we studied the growing demand for greater public participation, as contrasted to 

traditional public involvement, in science-related policy making and in decision-making in general. We suggest that Joint 

Fact Finding as a component of a comprehensive consensus 

building and participatory decision-making process is a better 

approach for incorporating science into environmental policy 

making. Joint Fact Finding enables the active participation 

of citizens as partners with governmental representatives in 

framing the questions that address the issues and in designing and implementing the studies. This process maintains 

the independence of the scientists and their commitment to 

the best science. A well-designed Joint Fact Finding process 

will improve the capacity of all participants to learn from all 

forms of knowledge and to reach resolution of contentious 

environmental disputes.

Introduction

The San Francisquito Creek Project is an experiment to 

engage citizens as active partners in the design and implementation of a project to address environmental issues of concern 

within the San Francisquito Creek watershed in Menlo Park, 

California. The communities in the San Francisquito Creek 

watershed hold different values and cannot agree on landuse planning and environmental policy within the watershed. Messages on a community list server established after 

the creek flooded in 1998 reveal an angry public that is in 

disagreement as to solutions to flooding and habitat restoration. We investigated the potential of the community and 

regulatory jurisdictions in the watershed to take a collaborative problem solving approach to seek consensus on solutions 

to land-use planning and environmental policy concerns. The 

purpose of this paper is to discuss the results of our investigation and to draw lessons about the use of science in this situation. First, we provide background on the overall purpose and 

structure of the project.

Definition of the Issue and Overall Project Design

Thousands of communities in small watersheds across the 

nation are or will be facing issues of flooding, water supply, 

habitat restoration, aging dams, and stream impairment by sediment and pollutants from non-point sources. Communities in 

the San Francisquito Creek watershed face all of these issues.

Background

This watershed encompasses 45 square miles and 

includes a wide diversity of natural habitats and land-use types 

(fig 1). San Francisquito Creek is the last riparian unchannelized urban creek on the southern San Francisco Peninsula. It 

begins as overflow from the Searsville Lake dam built in 1892 

in Stanford University’s Jasper Ridge Biological Preserve. 

The creek flows for 14 miles from its source to its terminus in 

San Francisco Bay. Rural areas and open space characterize 

San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science

In Environmental Disputes

Joint Fact Finding as a Transdisciplinary Approach toward Environmental Policy Making

By Nicolas L. Rofougaran1 and Herman A. Karl2

1 Draft initiated during tenure as a U.S. Geological Survey National 

Research Council Research Associate, Menlo Park, CA. Current address: 

Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, Pound Hall 513, 

1563 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138.

2 U.S. Geological Survey/Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Department of Urban Studies and Planning, 77 Massachusetts Ave., 

Cambridge, MA 02139; author to whom to address correspondence.
2 San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science In Environmental Disputes

the upper watershed. In its lower reaches the creek courses 

through densely populated cities. San Francisquito Creek is 

the boundary between two counties—Santa Clara and San 

Mateo and flows through parts of five municipalities—Menlo 

Park, Palo Alto, East Palo Alto, Portola Valley, and Woodside 

(fig. 2). It empties into San Francisco Bay at the city of East 

Palo Alto. The towns and cities in the watershed vary greatly 

in wealth from tremendous affluence to significant poverty.

The reservoir behind the dam, Searsville Lake, is 

projected to fill completely with sediment in 15 to 40 years 

depending upon future weather patterns. The consequence 

of the reservoir filling on riparian habitat and flooding is 

unknown. In 1998, San Francisquito Creek flooded along its 

downstream reaches, causing $28 million in damage. The 

creek has the last remaining run of steelhead trout (a federally listed threatened species) in the southern part of the San 

Francisco Bay. It has been listed under section 303(d) of the 

Clean Water Act as impaired with regard to Total Maximum 

Daily Load (TMDL). These four issues, flooding, aquatic 

habitat restoration, dam removal, and TMDL impairment, are 

of concern to the communities in the San Francisquito Creek 

watershed. A committee, composed of a subgroup of citizens 

Figure 1 Boundaries of San Francisquito Creek Watershed and subwatersheds.

San

Francisquito

Creek

7 3.5 0 7

Miles

San Francisquito Creek

Drainage

Los Trancos Watershed

San Francisquito Watershed

Corte Madera Watershed

Bear Gulch Watershed

water

Urban Watershed Boundary
Introduction 3

from the Watershed Council and U.S. Geological Survey 

(USGS) scientists, decided that a sediment budget needed to 

be established for the watershed to aid in decisions concerning 

the four issues.

The following questions must be answered to evaluate 

the impact of sediment and to make informed choices about 

the management of the creek: (1) What has been the effect 

of land-use change in contributing sediment to the reservoir 

and on landscape change? (2) Is the watershed impaired with 

regard to sediment? (3) What impact will this sediment have 

on the carrying capacity of the creek and aquatic habitat? (4) 

How can the multiple uses of an urbanized watershed be managed to minimize impact to the ecological habitat? Overarching questions to these are: (1) How do we connect people and 

science so that science becomes an integral part of decisions? 

(2) How can the scientific findings be effectively communicated to decision-makers? (3) How can the competing interests be examined and reconciled to achieve balanced solutions 

to land-use and environmental policy?

The project was designed by a group of citizens in 

dialogue with scientists. Four citizens and one scientist 

comprised the project steering committee. It began in fall of 

Figure 2. Jurisdictional boundaries of municipalities and principal institutional property owners within the San Francisquito Creek watershed.

101

84

280

5 2.5 0 5 10 Miles

Urban Watershed Boundary

San Francisquito Creek

water

Countyline

Major Road

Atherton

East Palo Alto

San

F

rancisquito

Creek

Ladera

Portola Valley

Stanford University

Unincorporated

Menlo Park Woodside

Palo Alto
4 San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science In Environmental Disputes

2000 and it ended in 2004. The project consists of three major 

components divided into specific tasks derived from deliberations of the steering committee. 

(1) Biophysical and Geographic Scientific Studies

• Overland sediment transport in the upper watershed

• Sedimentological interpretation of flooding history

• Land-cover/land-use model

• Native/invasive species (steelhead trout/Chinese mitten 

crab)

(2) Social Dynamics Studies

• Information Technology and decision-making

• Role of science in environmental resource management/

consensus building

• Role of community values versus science

• Role of informal and formal community structures

(3) Communication and Learning

• GIS/web-site development

• Teacher training and school curriculum

• Community education

• Game and simulation development to assist in stakeholder decision-making

A multidisciplinary team of scientists, educators, practitioners and theorists of consensus building and environmental 

negotiation, urban and land-use planners, and local community 

leaders and decision-makers was assembled to accomplish the 

project objectives. Each of the components above is linked 

through a series of feedback loops. The purpose of the project 

is more than just to provide scientific information to help solve 

specific issues in the San Francisquito Creek watershed. An 

overarching goal of the entire team as an objective of the Social 

Dynamics Studies component is to explore the role of science, 

scientists, and scientific analysis in negotiations regarding the 

management of environmental resources. Herein we present 

our findings in that regard.

I. Transdisiplinarity— science in a 

political and social context

The concepts discussed and ideas put forth in this paper, 

especially in this section, are an amalgam of our understanding 

of a diverse literature on the role of science within a political and societal context and participatory decision making 

processes (Raiffa, 1982, Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, 

Jasanoff, 1990, Ozawa, 1990, Lee, 1993, Irwin, 1995, McLain 

and Lee, 1996, Susskind and Field, 1996, Susskind and others, 

1999, Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000, Kates and others, 2001, 

Nowotny and others, 2001, and Andrews, 2002). The scientific 

community across the Western world has long recognized the 

social dimension of ecology and the need for participatory procedures to solve environmental problems. There is little doubt 

left as to the unintended consequences of scientific progress. 

We have gone beyond the stages of our modernity where it was 

unconditionally assumed that science always benefits humanity 

and that socially optimal outcomes are the automatic results of 

scientific research, regardless of its social objectives or its connections with societal needs. As for the laws regulating science 

and technology, the decision-making processes that are implemented today in science-intensive public disputes are often 

ineffective. Scientists, on the other hand, fail to fulfill what is 

traditionally expected from them, namely to solve society’s 

problems. The main reason for these failures is the apparent 

disconnect between research and its social outcomes and our 

inadequate knowledge of the relationships between our science 

programs and their social implications. We must therefore seek 

a better understanding of these relationships and implement 

strategies that are likely to bridge the existing gaps between the 

scientific, political, and public spheres.

Whatever technical or scientific solutions are adopted for 

environmental problems, they must be socially viable. Ecosystems and socioeconomic systems, as it is often acknowledged, are closely interconnected. However, this reality is not 

yet reflected in the ways science is structured, practiced, and 

used today. Typically, citizens are represented by elected and 

appointment officials. At best, this gives them only the most 

indirect involvement in the production of knowledge regarding 

environmental policy decisions. Indeed, public participation in 

environmental decision-making is often ineffective for several 

reasons: (1) not all relevant stakeholders are involved, and for 

those stakeholders who are, their involvement remains partial 

or indirect; (2) the knowledge and the skills that the public 

often lacks is not dealt with in a way as to empower the public 

to articulate its concerns in scientifically meaningful terms; 

(3) the final decisions do not faithfully reflect public concerns 

which makes those decisions less likely to be accepted by the 

public; and (4) most importantly, in the absence of an adequate 

consensus building process, scientific debate, argument and 

multi-hypothesis testing is used in an adversarial way by 

antagonists, which causes additional confusion and distrust in 

the public. These factors hamper the public’s ability and right 

to participate in the process of decision-making. Indeed, the 

negative consequences of using science within an adversarial 

process suggest that the credibility of scientific expertise, i.e. 

the perceived quality of science, depends largely on the manner in which scientific information is gathered (Ehrman and 

Stinson, 1999).

The interdisciplinary aspect of environmental issues is 

traditionally understood as the necessity for scientists from 

diverse disciplines to collaborate in order to cover complex 

ecological phenomena. By contrast, transdisciplinarity is being 
JOINT FACT FINDING IN THE 

CONSENSUS BUILDING PROCESS

Initiate a Consensus

Building Process

(Prepare a Stakeholder Assessment)

Decide Whether or Not to Proceed

(If so, Generate Agreement on Stakeholder Reps, Ground

Rules, Decision Rules, Work Plan and Facilitator)

Initiate a Joint Fact Finding Process

to Handle Complex Scientific

and Technical Questions

Create Value By Generating Options or

Packages for Mutual Gain

Distribute Value in the Form of

 An Agreement

(i.e. Recommendations or Decisions)

Follow Through

(Implementation,

Monitoring and Evaluation;

Reconvene Periodically to Review and Revise 

Policies/Procedures/Resources)

Figure 3. Joint Fact Finding needs to be done within a 

consensus-building process. However, not all consensusbuilding processes need to include Joint Fact Finding.

(Copyrighted image courtesy of the Consensus Building 

Institute, Cambridge, Mass.)

defined today as the necessity to situate scientific research in 

its social and political context (Klein and others, 2001). In this 

sense, transdisciplinarity requires that scientists collaborate 

not only with their colleagues from other disciplines but also 

with concerned decision-makers and relevant stakeholders. 

As a defining element of transdisciplinarity and an alternative to science conducted within an adversarial process, Joint 

Fact Finding is a process of participatory inquiry that fosters 

cooperation between and allows the direct involvement of all 

relevant stakeholders in the decision-making process as well as 

in the actual production of scientific knowledge. The necessity 

of placing Joint Fact Finding within a larger consensus building process cannot be overemphasized. The Consensus Building Institute (Cambridge, Mass.) developed the two diagrams 

reproduced below (figs. 3, 4). Figure 3 shows where Joint Fact 

Finding fits within the framework of a consensus decision 

process and figure 4 illustrates the six key Joint Fact Finding 

steps. When thus used and structured, a Joint Fact Finding 

process should allow citizens’ active participation in framing the questions to be studied in the formulation of research 

designs and in the actual activities of data collection; the 

concerned citizens would thus participate in reviewing early 

drafts of analyses prepared by experts and they would help 

select the experts and research methods to be applied. More 

importantly, they would be involved in the efforts to make 

the normative leap from analysis to prescription, and finally, 

they would participate in the implementation and monitoring 

processes. This may happen by selecting a cross section of 

citizens (or a blue-ribbon committee of citizens) to offer their 

views as observers or advisors and by asking groups involved 

in a controversy to nominate participants to represent them 

throughout the research process as partners with the agencies 

involved. This may also happen through open public comment 

and review either at key moments or in an ongoing fashion or 

through real-time interactive computer-based systems. 

In science-intensive public issues such as environmental 

disputes, knowledge often reflects the power in the hands of 

respective parties. In the context of science used within an 

adversarial process in particular, knowledge becomes a powerful instrument of legitimization and authority. Those parties 

who have the means to “buy” scientific information that 

supports their own position will be perceived as possessing an 

unfair advantage over those parties who do not have the same 

access to scientific expertise. The information gap—that is the 

perceived imbalance between stakeholders who have scientific 

competence (or have access to scientific expertise) and those 

who do not constitute a serious obstacle in the way to negotiated agreement. In contrast with adversarial science, Joint Fact 

Finding leaves room for the parties to negotiate on a more 

equal footing by avoiding the information gap. Collaboration 

among parties should also help them deal more effectively 

with the difficulties of multiple interpretations of the data 

and the problem of distrust that follows almost mechanically 

from contradictory interpretations between decision-makers, 

scientists, and the public. Indeed, in adversarial contexts, parties with conflicting interests interpret data differently. In the 

absence of cooperative relationships between parties, partisanship and neutrality become survival strategies and, as suggested above, science itself becomes a strategic tool (Andrews, 

2002).

 A direct and cooperative involvement of the non-expert 

stakeholders in the process of knowledge production should 

lead not only to a better understanding of the science at stake 

but also to a common understanding of often complex issues. 

This better and common understanding, in turn, should lead to 

I. Transdisiplinarity— science in a political and social context 5
6 San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science In Environmental Disputes

better and more durable agreements. For example, when the 

data that is jointly gathered, analyzed, and synthesized appears 

to be inconclusive, the stakeholders who happen to be the 

“coauthors” of the study, are likely to see why that is the case, 

and for this reason, they are also likely to accept the negative results of the study as well as the subsequent decisions 

that are based on them. By contrast, when adversarial science 

prevails, each party will typically seek to discredit the science 

used by the opponents, and any decisions reached under such 

conditions will be subject to rampant criticisms and will be in 

danger of ultimate rejection. 

Joint Fact Finding will be treated here as a working 

hypothesis, the validity of which may be verified on the 

ground, that is in the context of real world science-intensive 

public disputes. Joint Fact Finding is a procedure for involving those affected by policy decisions in the continual process 

�������

STEP 1

Take account of how 

JFF ought to fit into a 

larger consensus building 

process.

Document the interests

of all relevant policymakers and stakeholders 

using a formal 

stakeholder analysis. 

Work with a professional

“neutral” (i.e. facilitator 

or mediator) to determine 

the most useful role for

scientists. 

Convene a joint fact 

finding process.

SCOPE

STEP 2

Work with stakeholders 

to draft ground rules 

specifying the roles 

scientists will and 

won’t be expected 

to play.

Generate technical 

questions that need to 

be answered given the 

goals of the process 

and the interests of the 

parties.

Identify existing information and knowledge 

gaps likely to affect the 

group’s ability to 

answer its questions.

Advise on methods for 

dealing with conflicting 

data and interpretations 

of facts and forecasts.

DEFINE

 STEP 3

Assist parties in translating general questions 

into researchable 

questions.

Identify relevant 

methods of information 

gathering and analysis; 

highlight the benefits 

and disadvantages of

each.

Determine costs and 

benefits of alternative 

information collection 

strategies and “the 

expected value” of

further study.

Determine whether 

proposed data collection and technical 

studies will enable 

stakeholders to meet 

their interests.

 STEP 4

Undertake the work as 

appropriate. Ensure the 

credibility and transparency of the process by 

consistently checking 

in with the parties and 

staying in touch with 

the constituencies.

Draw on expertise and 

knowledge of 

stakeholders

(including non-experts) 

as needed.

Review drafts of the 

final joint fact finding

report. 

Assist in determining 

whether and how the 

results of the JFF process have (or have not) 

key to the consensus 

building effort.

 EVALUATE

 STEP 5

Use sensitivity analysis 

to examine the overall 

significance of assump

tions, data variability, 

and outcomes.

Compare findings to 

the published literature.

Analyze the findings to 

determine what they 

“mean.” Assist parties 

in translating findings 

into a menu of possible 

policy responses.

Clarify remaining 

uncertainties and 

appropriate contingent 

responses.

 COMMUNICATE

 STEP 6

Jointly present findings 

and answer stakeholder 

and policy-maker 

questions about how 

the work was done.

Scientists communicate 

JFF results to various 

constituencies and 

policy-makers via face 

to face discussions, fact 

sheets, presentations, 

panels, etc., to be sure 

findings are understood.

Assist stakeholders in 

determining if further 

JFF is necessary.

 CONDUCT 

 THE 

STUDY

JOINT FACT FINDING: KEY STEPS IN THE PROCESS

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Figure 4. Understand, determine, scope, define, evaluate, and communicate are the six key steps that constitute the Joint Fact Finding 

process as defined by the Consensus Building Institute. (Copyrighted image courtesy of the Consensus Building Institute, Cambridge, Mass.)
of generating and analyzing the scientific information used to 

inform those decisions, while preserving the best practices of 

scientific inquiry. It allows for the consideration of local/cultural knowledge as well as expert knowledge. Three minimal 

conditions must be met for a consensus-based approach that 

includes Joint Fact Finding:

• Representation: All key stakeholders need to be 

involved in framing the inquiry. They need to choose 

who will do the research.

• Engagement: A trained professional neutral must 

manage the conversations and all the stakeholders—

including the scientists and technical experts— must 

be engaged in the conversations. The scientists and 

technical experts cannot leave the table when they 

finish the scientific report. They need to be part of the 

conversation about the implications of the research 

and its application to policy. An important condition 

for USGS scientists is that they must not advocate a 

particular policy or decision.

• Agreement: The convener must agree to a written statement binding the convener to implement the decision 

reached by the group.

Testing the Joint Fact Finding hypothesis is a central 

task of INCLUDE (Integrated-science and Community-based 

Values in Land-use Decision-making), an experimental project 

launched by U.S. Geological Survey in late 1998. INCLUDE 

fosters a broad range of research that analyzes the role of 

scientists in ecosystems, natural resource management, and 

environmental policy decisions. This research includes experimenting with collaborative approaches that use Joint Fact 

Finding, whereby citizens cooperate with discipline experts to 

work together on complex, science-intensive environmental 

disputes. Central to the INCLUDE project are three hypotheses that ought to be tested in the context of San Francisquito 

Creek Project and in other watershed and land-use based 

disputes. The three hypotheses are as follows:

 (1) “The direct involvement of non-expert citizens (including decisionmakers) in the knowledge-production and 

decision-making relevant to any environmental policy 

controversy increases the acceptance, on the part of 

those citizens, of the environmental policy decisions that 

are made.”3

(2) “The more you involve the people affected by a policy 

decision in the design of the supporting scientific inquiry, 

the greater the chance that they will use and value the 

results in the decisions that get made.”

(3) “The selection and mix of scientists and disciplinary 

experts involved in science-intensive policy studies 

need to be open to scrutiny by the affected parties. The 

public needs to be consulted in the selection of disciplinary experts.”

This paper attempts to contribute to the body of applied 

social-science scholarship that can be used to inform the 

design of public involvement programs, particularly those 

related to the science-intensive choices typical of environmental policymaking. The paper is based on written artifacts generated by the participants during the San Francisquito Creek 

controversy and semistructured interviews with most of the 

scientists, policymakers and citizen activists involved in the 

controversy, The methodology adopted for this study draws 

on the growing body of academic work that uses case studies 

(see for example, Gillham, 2000) to test various hypotheses 

about public policymaking. Our field research consisted of 

two series of interviews focused on the history of the controversy and the problems that scientists and decisionmakers 

have encountered in their interactions with each other and with 

the community. It also involved the collection and analysis of 

primary and secondary documents concerning the case. 

One of the goals of INCLUDE is to find favorable testing 

grounds to verify the validity of an adaptive and collaborative approach that is based on Joint Fact Finding. Despite the 

obstacles that this study attempts to identify, the three working 

hypotheses on the impact of Joint Fact Finding on the effectiveness of environmental decisionmaking and the causal mechanisms of that impact find a particularly propitious testing ground 

in the San Francisquito Creek watershed. When compared with 

other watersheds in the United States, where the collaborative processes are either dysfunctional or non-existent, the San 

Francisquito Creek watershed displays a capacity to generate a 

model of integrated science and citizen-based decisionmaking 

as defined in the guidelines of the INCLUDE project. In this 

sense, the existing decisionmaking process in this watershed 

may be described as a precollaborative process. The formation, 

in 1998, of a Joint Powers Authority (JPA) indicates that the 

decisionmakers of the watershed have recognized the necessity for cooperation between the different jurisdictions sharing 

San Francisquito Creek as their principal natural resource. The 

formation (and the continued functioning) of the JPA is, in 

itself, a major accomplishment and an important step towards 

the establishment of a collaborative decisionmaking process. 

However, in order for the above hypotheses to be tested, the 

scientists must be willing to collaborate with the public and the 

decisionmakers with scientists and vice versa. This implies that 

new incentives must be created for the parties to open sufficient 

space for a zone of overlap in which a transdisciplinary model 

could be adopted and a Joint Fact Finding process implemented. 

The five local governments with jurisdiction in the Creek 

have differing regulations and permit requirements, as well as 

unequal financial structures and seemingly diverging economic 

and political interests. However, the case has a strong potential 

for a collaborative and mediated solution. The San Francisquito 

3

The independent variable here is the direct involvement of citizens in the 

processes of knowledge-production and decision-making. The dependent 

variable is the level of acceptance on the part of those citizens (and (or) possibly others) of the policy decisions that are made.

I. Transdisiplinarity— science in a political and social context 7
8 San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science In Environmental Disputes

Creek cuts across many political jurisdictions. This fact has 

hampered its management for decades, but at the same time, 

this fact is the very cause of the Creek’s ecological uniqueness. 

Indeed, it is the last remaining creek on the peninsula that has 

not been diverted into a concrete channel in its downstream 

reaches. Paradoxically, the impossibility of appropriately 

managing the Creek has saved it. However, over the last decade, 

an effort has been made to develop a cooperative, large-scale, 

long-term watershed management plan. “What used to be an 

obstacle,” as a local environmental activist declared, “is now an 

opportunity.” Realizing that no sustainable and comprehensive 

decision could be made unless it is made in a collaborative 

fashion, local political leaders have responded to the situation 

by forming the JPA, a group that gathers the main decisionmakers of the watershed. 

To take only the example of the most urgent problem, 

JPA has considered several options for the flood control issue. 

The first possible option is no project at all. In that case, the 

local jurisdictional authorities would intervene in critical situations and property owners would be required to purchase flood 

insurance if they are within Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) designated flood zones. The second option 

is natural channel widening. Even though environmentally 

friendly, this option would entail the acquisition of several 

dozens of rather expensive properties along the Creek, which 

would be a politically sensitive process and would take a 

very long time. The third option is creating a detention basin 

upstream. With this option, a loss of riparian habitat below 

the dam and the elimination of upstream fish passage would 

be two among other environmental impacts. The construction 

of an underground concrete diversion conduit is the fourth 

option. Again, riparian habitat would be lost and the social 

impact would be significant. Even though this option would 

provide full protection against major flood events, it would 

entail the relocation of several hundreds of families, utilities 

would be often interrupted, and traffic would be disrupted for 

several years. Moreover, this last option would be extremely 

costly and State and Federal funds would become necessary. 

Since the beginning of its history in 1998, JPA has repeatedly 

commissioned scientific and technical studies corresponding to each of the above options, and accumulated information without being able to make much use of it to form its 

decisions. In order to remedy this problem with prescriptive 

insights, we must inquire about the causes of the ineffectiveness in the interface between involved scientists, local decisionmakers, and the concerned public.

Local history plays a major part in determining the present terms and structure of the controversy. The decisionmaking procedures established by the JPA and the general focus 

of the agency, for instance, are largely determined by its 

historical background, in particular by two major events that 

we will describe in our historical section, namely the incorporation of East Palo Alto as a city in 1983 and the flood of 

February 1998. These events have prompted the agency’s 

formation and shaped its political configuration, while 

impairing trust among its members and, as we will show, 

among decisionmakers, scientists, and the public. However, 

we will argue that, although distrust among the parties has 

historical causes, the more immediate and actionable conditions that have contributed to the growth of distrust among 

the parties and have hampered the collaborative process are 

essentially social factors. Indeed, the lack of an appropriate 

collaborative decisionmaking process may be shown to be 

the main reason why trust cannot be built among the parties. 

The seeming circularity of this argument is due to a conception of trust as the precondition for collaboration (Sabel, 

1992). Experience in the fields of negotiation and conflict 

resolution, however, suggests that, if designed and managed 

adequately, a collaborative process may well generate trust, 

even in the most desperate situations (p. 720, 814, 999, 1033-

1034 in Susskind and others, 1999).

II. A brief history of the controversy

On the 22nd of December 1955, San Francisquito Creek 

overflowed its banks in the reach between Bayshore Freeway 

and Middlefield Road into the northern portions the City of 

Palo Alto, resulting in $2 million of damage from the inundation of 700 homes.4

 This brought the creek problem to a head 

in a disastrous hurry for the first time. Indeed, the creek had 

flooded its surroundings many times before this date but the 

confluence of three events made the 1955 flood significantly 

more destructive than previous floods—(1) an exceptionally 

high tide had interfered with the creek’s flow of water; (2) a 

large amount of rain fell during the days prior to the storm that 

hit the region on the day of the flood saturating the ground, in 

an area that was already highly developed and as such had lost 

much of its natural water absorption capacity; and (3) the lack 

of attention in keeping the creek clean of debris, including a 

drainage system that was in place at the Bayshore Highway, 

had made dams out of old and ill designed bridges on the 

creek. These three components or causes of the flood capture 

the notion that this natural disaster was also a human one. 

Once a source of gravel and a place for fishing and recreation 

activities, San Francisquito Creek had become a dumping 

place for residents, public agencies, and Stanford University. 

Following the flood event of 1955, different collaborative community initiatives helped keep the creek cleaner and 

a political collaboration between the concerned jurisdictions 

led to the construction of levees downstream that aimed at 

minimizing the risk of flood. The problem, however, remained 

unsolved and a multijurisdictional controversy emerged, the 

general structure of which is still unchanged. By the end of 

1958, an agreement was signed between San Mateo County 

and Santa Clara County to maintain levees, but for some 

mysterious reason, the concrete meaning of “maintenance” 

4 The Chronology of the San Francisquito Creek Project that we have 

established (see the appendix) contains a more complete list of events than the 

above historical section. The latter includes only the more significant events. 
was never clearly defined by the two parties. As a result of this 

lack of clarity in the initial agreement between the two counties, Santa Clara County was soon accused of not fulfilling its 

own share of the maintenance of the Creek.

The levees being only a partial solution for the flood 

problem, a long series of discussions on how to keep the creek 

within its banks followed that culminated, in 1960, with a 

decision to ask the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to make a 

study for flood control measures on the creek. In 1961, the 

Army Engineers performed an extensive control survey and 

released a “Report of Survey for Flood Control and Allied 

Purposes, San Francisquito Creek.” The latter identified 

several flood control alternatives including bank protection and floodwalls, levees, concrete channelization, and a 

multipurpose reservoir. The Corps recommended the construction of a dam near Ladera. The Ladera Dam alternative, 

as it was called, was found to be economically feasible as a 

flood control solution when combined with the recreation 

and water supply benefits of a permanent storage reservoir. 

As mentioned above, the proposal generated considerable 

local opposition and various studies were performed to refute 

the Corps’ findings and recommendations. Graduate civil 

engineering students at Stanford University performed the 

most significant and thorough study, with a report authored 

by James Robert Vincent (1968). This report provided new 

hydraulic analyses and stated that estimated flood flows were 

significantly lower than the Corps of Engineers Study had 

claimed. It recommended that improvements to increase the 

capacity of the channel down stream of the Pope-Chaucer 

Bridge would alleviate the potential flood problem and that 

the channel should be maintained on a continuing basis to 

keep the channel clear of debris and other obstructions to 

the flow of water. After long and heated discussions, the 

Stanford report was finally accepted both by local agencies 

and the Corps of Engineers. The San Mateo County Flood 

Control District and the Santa Clara Valley Water District 

initiated negotiations that led to an agreement to construct 

the improvements as recommended by the Stanford Report. 

Again, a collaborative process was initiated that did not 

survive for long. A citizens advisory committee composed 

of representatives of the cities that were part of the San 

Francisquito Creek watershed was formed for the San Mateo 

County side to provide citizen input for the project. The 

committee met occasionally to discuss issues concerning the 

creek for about 5 years and eventually disappeared in the 

early 1980’s. The Stanford proposal was nonetheless implemented. The creek’s banks were lined with concrete riprap 

at many locations downstream of the Pope-Chaucer Bridge 

and construction of walls along sections of the creek downstream of University Avenue. By the end of the 1970’s, local 

environmental awareness had grown higher, and citizens of 

the watershed were increasingly concerned about what they 

considered as their main local natural resource. Attempts 

were therefore made to provide for trees and other natural 

vegetation within the project area in order to preserve the 

natural habitat wherever possible.

During the 1960’s, small segments of the population 

living near the creek, in particular those living outside the 

flood zone, had strongly opposed both constructions inside 

the channel and engineered solutions for the flood problem. 

Their priorities were focused on the preservation of the creek 

as a natural resource. However, what saved the creek from 

being paved with concrete or channelized was not the influence of, or the political pressure exerted by environmental 

groups. Rather, it was the political complexity, that is the 

multijurisdictional geography of the watershed that made it 

impossible for the decisionmakers to agree on the solution to 

adopt. The State legislature created the San Mateo County 

Flood Control District in 1967, and it became a major player 

in the controversy over the creek owing both to its financial 

capacities and technical expertise. The legislature requires 

that a flood control district be established over an entire 

watershed. San Francisquito Creek is the boundary between 

San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties. During the same 

year, San Mateo County formed the San Francisquito Creek 

Flood Control Zone to finance improvements in cooperation 

with the Santa Clara County Water District. The San Mateo 

County Board of Supervisors, adopted, in 1969, a regulation 

for construction in San Francisquito Creek, still in effect. It 

was and remains ineffective, because it is applicable only in 

San Mateo County and affects only one side of the creek.

The high costs of engineered solutions, and thereby, the 

difficult problem of cost allocation among different jurisdictions led the controversy to an impasse that has lived on to 

this day. This left enough room for environmental groups to 

take important steps toward the protection of the Creek. On 

September 25, 1969, the Menlo Park Beautification Commission held a meeting to develop a policy for the preservation 

of San Francisquito Creek as a natural asset. The agenda 

and the minutes of that meeting indicate that the attendance 

included representatives from Palo Alto, Stanford University, 

the San Mateo Flood Control District, Santa Clara County, 

San Mateo County, East Palo Alto Municipal Council, Portola Valley, and Woodside. The diversity of the attendance is 

a good reflection of the collaborative efforts made by these 

agencies, institutions, and cities for the preservation of the 

creek. By then, it was clear to all the major decision-makers 

that the “concrete” solution as a way of flood prevention was 

not acceptable. These collaborative efforts culminated with 

a series of protective resolutions adopted by decisionmakers 

representing the above entities. The first among those resolutions designated, on March 14, 1972, San Francisquito Creek 

as a “scenic stream (City Council of the City of Menlo Park, 

1972).” The last in date among those resolutions was adopted 

on January 30, 1990, and it designated the entire length 

of the San Francisquito Creek lying within the boundaries 

of Menlo Park as “The San Francisquito Park.” Although 

environmentally friendly, these efforts remained partial with 

respect to the full length of the Creek and lacked both a 

systemic coordination and an holistic understanding of the 

watershed. In 1976, the City of Menlo Park took the leadership in forming a creek protection board that consisted of one 

II. A brief history of the controversy 9
10 San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science In Environmental Disputes

council member from Menlo Park, one Council member from 

Palo Alto and a representative from Stanford University. 

This protection board managed to mobilize a group of local 

individuals for volunteer work, and for several years, it managed relatively well to develop some erosion measures, to 

control water pollution, and to keep the creek bed and banks 

clear of man-made debris. By the end of the 1970’s, however, the committee fell apart before the pollution or erosion 

plans it had developed could be fully implemented. Indeed, 

the committee had interest in only one section of the creek5

and had neglected to approach the creek as one element of a 

watershed as a whole. In June 1973, the Planning Commission of Menlo Park adopted an Open Space and Conservation 

Element of the Menlo Park General Plan. Again, this plan 

was never implemented. 

As mentioned above, the jurisdictional map of the 

watershed—especially in the vicinity of San Francisquito 

Creek—is complex, that is both multiple and interlocked. In 

addition to two counties and five cities, several agencies have 

jurisdiction over portions or all of the Creek. The Federal 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has jurisdiction over the 

Creek because it falls within their definition of “navigable 

waterway.” For obvious reasons, State agencies such as the 

Water Quality Control Board and the Department of Fish 

and Game also have jurisdiction over the Creek. The San 

Mateo County Flood Control District and the Santa Clara 

County Water District are the principal local agencies that 

have responsibilities for the maintenance of San Francisquito Creek. Stanford University, as the main landowner and 

research institution in the watershed has also a strong interest 

in the Creek. In addition to being complex, however, the 

jurisdictional map of the watershed has changed during the 

last two decades. In 1983, East Palo Alto was incorporated as 

a city. This change in the political geography of the watershed still has a strong impact on the structure of the controversy today. A number of physical structures and a relatively 

important amount of lands were handed off to East Palo Alto 

when it was incorporated, and it did not have the resources 

necessary for their maintenance. Also, decisions that were 

made between the two counties such as the 1958 agreement 

for the maintenance of the levees could not legally bind East 

Palo Alto because it did not formally exist when those decisions were made.

During the 1980’s, various groups were formed to protect 

the creek and foster a healthy environment for the watershed, 

while seeking viable solutions for the flood problem. None 

of these initiatives, however, were comprehensive enough to 

be capable of building any durable consensus on the issues at 

hand. In the early 1990’s, a small portion of the inhabitants of 

the watershed started a movement that aimed at promoting a 

watershed approach of environmental and technical problems 

posed by the creek. On November 30, 1993, representatives 

from 40 organizations, ranging from government agencies to 

community groups and landowners, met at Stanford University 

and established a Coordinated Resource Management Planning (CRMP) group for the San Francisquito Creek watershed. CRMP operated under the auspices of the Peninsula 

Conservation Center, a local nonprofit organization, but it had 

no formal authority. In principle, all interested stakeholders 

were welcome to participate in a process that the founders of 

CRMP envisioned as deliberative and informal. In fact, CRMP 

did succeed in raising the public ecological awareness in the 

watershed and became an excellent catalyst for research and 

public participation in the debates. Few people, however, were 

reached by and included in the CRMP process.

The flood of February 1998 prompted the formation of the JPA in May 1999. Contrary to CRMP, the JPA 

was provided with a formal structure—it was set to follow 

government processes and be subject to the Brown Act.6 

Despite its mission of a collaborative and holistic approach, 

however, the JPA was subject to internal tensions and diverging agendas from the very beginning of its history. Each 

agency within the JPA tended to pursue its own political and 

economic interests without paying much attention to the 

concerns common to the watershed as a whole. The flood 

event of February 1998 had determined the focus of the JPA. 

Much attention, as a result, was given to the flood issue, and 

indeed, short-term solutions were devised while other problems persisted in the watershed that were both related to the 

flood issue and important for their own sake. The question 

posed on the removal or reconstruction of the Searsville dam 

upstream is one example of such issues. Stanford University, an associate nonvoting member of the JPA, is a major 

stakeholder in this particular aspect of the controversy. It is 

the owner of the Searsville dam as well as a major research 

entity, and thereby, a major social—if not political—player 

in the region. Yet, despite the wealth of both useful scientific 

and relevant historical knowledge that it could provide and 

its socioeconomic weight in the watershed, Stanford University was not made a full decisionmaking partner by JPA, nor 

was it used to help design and implement collaborative science programs. A similar observation could be made on the 

rather ambiguous role of CRMP (now called The Watershed 

Council), another major stakeholder in the controversy. From 

the first years of its formation, CRMP formed extremely 

educated opinions on what issues were at stake and what 

was needed for the watershed. It produced highly instructive 

studies such as the “Reconnaissance Investigation Report of 

San Francisquito Creek,” published in 1997 and updated in 

1999. CRMP’s position as formulated in its mission statement, however, was poorly understood. CRMP’s studies were 

recognized as valuable but no one knew how to use them. Its 

6

 The Ralph Brown Act is California’s open meeting statue. It requires all 

regular meetings to be open and the public permitted to attend. It also requires 

the dissemination of information to the public and the media. As a government 

agency, the JPA is governed by the Brown Act. The original JPA agreement 

states, “each regular, adjourned, regular, or special meeting of the Board shall 

be called, notified, held and concluded in accordance with the Ralph Brown 

Act.” (Sections 54950 of Government Code.)

5

 More precisely from the Southern Pacific railroad bridge to Alpine Road, 

that is one third of the full length of the Creek.
steering committee tried to influence decisions, but in vain, 

as it was not a nonprofit entity in its own right, or a government agency, or an important local institution. As a purely 

volunteer group, and despite its vision and competence, 

CRMP was practically excluded from the decisionmaking 

process in the watershed and again, as a result of this, the 

valuable information it provided was unevenly distributed 

and poorly utilized. 

The close connections between purely ecological issues 

(such as the invasion of non-native species or the problem of 

endangered species) and the more technical issue of floods 

emerged in specific terms during the late 1990’s. In February 

1998, the first Chinese mitten crab was found in the creek at 

Jasper Ridge Biological Preserve. Stanford researchers then 

suggested that the burrowing of this non-native crab had been 

contributing to the accelerated erosion of the creek’s banks 

and more dangerously to the gradual destruction of the levees 

downstream, increasing in this way the risk of flood. In addition, the crab’s preying on native fish species and eggs was 

thought to be altering the natural ecosystem in undetermined 

ways. Concerns about the general health of the creek’s ecosystem led to water quality studies during the winter of 1999. 

As a result, in May 1999, San Francisquito Creek and its 

watershed were officially listed under the Clean Water Act of 

1972 (sect. 303, d.) as impaired owing to excessive levels of 

both diazinon and sediment. 

This and other ecological, hydrological, and geological problems related to the creek and its watershed 

attracted the attention of Robert Barrett, a local mediator 

for environmental disputes, who suggested the idea of San 

Francisquito Creek as a project for USGS in a meeting 

with Herman Karl, USGS marine geologist at the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation. Karl had started 

thinking about a collaborative problem solving approach 

to environmental disputes during the mid 1990’s and the 

idea of a San Francisquito Creek Project was an opportunity for him to implement INCLUDE, Integrated-science 

and Community-based Values in Land-use Decision-making. INCLUDE was, therefore, launched in 1998 at USGS 

and was headquartered at the Western Geographic Science 

Center (Menlo Park, Calif.) as a core element of an interdivisional research agenda. On April 21, 1999, Herman Karl 

addressed the San Fancisquito Creek Watershed Council 

Steering Committee. Following that address, collaboration between USGS (INCLUDE) and CRMP began and 

a subcommittee was formed by volunteers from CRMP 

to design and implement an INCLUDE citizen-centered 

project. The subcommittee was named “Sediment Work 

Group.” In July 1999, gathering of background information 

on the creek and previous studies began at USGS as part of 

the collaboration between USGS and CRMP. A Geographic 

Information System (GIS) was initiated with the guidance 

of the creek project steering committee and GIS maps of 

the San Francisquito Creek watershed were produced. This 

collaborative effort was unvield to the local public in May 

2000 at a USGS Western Region open house, through an 

interactive public exhibit on the creek project. Two months 

later, on the 1st of October, an “Integrated Study of an 

Urbanized Watershed” was awarded funds by the USGS 

Geography Discipline research prospectus to conduct a 

one-year study ending September 30, 2001. This, in turn, 

led USGS to establish an Assistance Award with the Consensus Building Institute to conduct research on the role 

of science and scientists in science-intensive public issues 

and on the potential effectiveness of Joint Fact Finding in 

collaborative decision-making processes.7 

While the local agencies and institutions made uncoordinated and unilateral decisions that affected both the 

natural and the social systems of the watershed8, the decisionmakers of the different jurisdictions who were concerned with the flood issue gathered to form an interjurisdictional agency with the intent of approaching the issue 

from the perspective of the watershed as a whole. In May 

1999, the San Francisquito Creek Joint Powers Authority 

(JPA) was created through a creek coordinating committee. 

It was formed as a cooperative effort to improve community storm preparation and flood management. The Cities of Palo Alto, Menlo Park, and East Palo Alto and the 

Santa Clara Valley Water District and San Mateo County 

Flood Control District were included as voting members of 

the JPA, and Stanford University joined the agency a few 

months later as a nonvoting member. The representatives 

of these institutions and agencies gathered on September 

21, 1999 to hold the first official and public meeting of the 

JPA. The creation of the agency showed to the public that 

the local decisionmakers were willing to cooperate in order 

to solve the problem of flood. However, it became clear 

that the mere creation of the agency was insufficient to 

change the respective attitudes and the political configuration of the controversy. Indeed, the local agencies continued to make uncoordinated and unilateral decisions. 

Nevertheless, the JPA soon gained relative independence and started working on its mission. In March 2001, 

the agency assumed inkind services of the Clerk of the 

Board role from the Santa Clara Valley Water District 

and Legal Counsel services from the City of East Palo 

Alto, and later in the month of July of the same year, it 

8 In 1999, San Mateo County started the process of writing a 12-page 

ordinance to establish riparian corridors and buffer zones along the San 

Francisquito Creek in order to prevent further erosion of the banks. This 

meant that physical structures located within the buffer zone would be subject 

to restrictions—additions or renovations to homes, garages, or swimming 

pools, for example, would not be allowed. As a result, the property values of 

homes and buildable lots, if labeled non-conforming by the County ordinance, 

would collapse. Thus, the ordinance prompted the formation of Families for 

Fair Government, a protest movement of concerned property owners who 

fought the planned buffer zone as well as other related projects proposed by 

local agencies. This is an example of a unilateral public policy decision that 

affected the local social system. Indeed, it provoked the formation of new 

obstacles on the way to building consensus on fair and durable solutions.

7 This paper is among the studies initiated through the collaboration 

between the Consensus Building Institute and the INCLUDE Project at U.S. 

Geological Survey.

II. A brief history of the controversy 11
12 San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science In Environmental Disputes

was empowered by the JPA Board to operate as its own 

fiscal agent and independent employer. The same board 

approved, in September 2001, a resolution for the Levee 

Restoration Project. This represented the first capital 

improvement undertaken by the JPA. The levees in Palo 

Alto and East Palo Alto had settled and eroded and plans 

to restore them to 1958 levees began in earnest. In May 

2002, the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure passed a resolution authorizing 

an U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Reconnaissance Study. 

This was the first step in the bringing a long-term flood 

management project to San Francisquito Creek watershed. 

And finally, in August 2002, construction broke ground on 

the Levee Restoration Project. In a public meeting, Duane 

Bay, then East Palo Alto mayor, called this “the first major 

visible success for the JPA.” The problems, however, 

remained unsolved and even though there were sporadic 

communications between INCLUDE at USGS and the 

JPA on the possibilities of a collaborative problem solving 

approach and of Joint Fact Finding, the JPA did not engage 

in implementing these processes. To this date, the great 

wealth of scientific information that both USGS and Stanford University could provide on San Francisquito Creek 

remains underutilized and scientists, therefore, cannot play 

the constructive role they could in the decisionmaking 

process. 

III. Science as a Source of Confusion 

and Distrust

A science-centered mode of thinking

As we emphasized earlier in the paper, the issues that 

the inhabitants and decisionmakers of the San Francisquito 

Creek watershed must face are typical of most small watersheds. The presence of Stanford University and of USGS in 

this watershed, however, makes this case particularly interesting for the study of the role of science in environmental 

disputes. With this regard, it is the very role of science, or 

rather the perception thereof, and the shared assumptions on 

the nature of science and its relations with society that seem 

to constitute major obstacles on the way to collaborative 

and sustainable solutions for environmental disputes. In this 

sense, our findings as to the role of science in the San Francisquito Creek controversy may also be generalized. Indeed, 

the assumptions on the nature of science and the perceptions 

of the role scientists that we were able to identify through our 

interviews with the main players in the controversy can be 

traced back to the foundation of our scientific culture during 

the seventeenth century. 

Since the advent of the Scientific Revolution during the 

seventeenth century and more markedly since the Industrial 

Revolution of the nineteenth century, Western societies center 

around the values and ideals represented by scientific communities and institutions. We tend to view science mainly as 

a source of solutions to the problems posed to humanity and 

to the environment. This fact and its multiple ramifications 

allow a qualification of Western societies as science-centered. 

In the Postmodern era, by contrast, science is often viewed 

as a source of uncertainty, despite its now traditional role of 

provider of objective truth. This recent critical characterization 

of science remains, however, science-centered, as the notion of 

uncertainty is itself appropriated by science and fully integrated among the established parameters of scientific culture. 

Scientists are all well familiar with uncertainty. They define, 

quantify, and manipulate it in ways that serve the purpose of 

science as a source of truth. Paradoxically, “uncertainty,” as 

implied and applied by scientists helps to confirm conventional perception of science as a source of certainties. 

It is not the object of this analysis to discuss the intrinsic 

nature of science, even though the very notion that science has 

a nature that may be known independently from its social and 

political contexts is subject to serious questioning.9 However, 

public science as it is perceived outside the scientific community is both more and less than just a source of truth or uncertainty. The decisionmakers involved in the San Francisquito 

Creek Project speak of their experience with science in terms 

and tones that imply confusion and distrust as the main effects 

of the ways science has been used in their decisionmaking. 

When interviewed on the subject, most representatives serving 

as board members of the JPA, did not express their concerns 

about science in terms of quantified margins of error as scientists do. Rather, they complained about their inability to rely 

on scientists’ competence to make consistent and useful recommendations. These views are remarkable when contrasted 

with other views that express and confirm the reputation of 

excellence shared by USGS and Stanford scientists. “I don’t 

know what to believe any more,” said a local decisionmaker, 

“our local scientists change their mind too often and they disagree with each other too radically.”10 Another decisionmaker 

confessed off record that he did not even trust some scientists 

as far as their real intentions are concerned, let alone their 

capacity to produce useful studies. He described, as a way of 

illustrating his opinion, a recent episode in which a scientific 

study was commissioned not for the benefit of local communities or for a better understanding of the San Francisquito 

Creek’s ecosystem, but seemingly for the purpose of postpon9

 Since the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s seminal work, “The Structure of 

Scientific Revolutions” in 1969, the literature in the fields of history, sociology, and anthropology of science abounds in studies showing the deep impact 

of local contexts on all aspects of science. Some authors such as S. Shapin, go 

as far as arguing for a characterization of scientific discourse as a mere social 

construction. Lawrence E. Susskind and Louise Dunlap raise the same issue 

but from a contemporary and practical perspective in their analysis of the role 

of non-objective knowledge in ecological issues in “The Importance of Nonobjective Judgments in Environmental Impact Assessments,” Environmental 

Impact Assessment Review, December 1981, v. 2, no. 4, December 1981, p. 

335-366. 

10 Dena Mossar, City of Menlo Park, interview on March 12, 2001.
III. Science as a Source of Confusion and Distrust 13

ing a decision that would have compromised the implementation of a housing project with important prospective tax 

incomes for the City of East Palo Alto and political benefits 

for its elected representatives. He saw a connection of complicity between the board members of the JPA who proposed 

and pushed for the study and the scientists who conducted it. 

The JPA, the mentioned decisionmaker concluded, was used 

both by its own members and by “their scientist allies” to 

protect special interests. This usage of science is more than 

just adversarial. Some decisionmakers and informed citizens 

of the San Francisquito Creek watershed perceive this usage 

of science as both strategic and illegitimate. Indeed, it is this 

perception of science that makes science a source of distrust 

rather than just a source of uncertainty. 

A lack of collaborative relationships between the parties 

in the San Francisquito Creek watershed constitutes a major 

obstacle on the way to building trust. The consequences resulting from lack of trust in our case is consistent with the idea that 

distrust in general is a serious obstacle in any decision-making 

context. The difficult question, however, is posed as to how to 

explain, and thereby, how to remedy a situation in which the 

very individuals and institutions that are expected to produce 

objective truth and propose impartial solutions are disqualified 

on both accounts. Lack of trust is a real barrier, just as ineffective communication of scientific information, inadequate 

distribution of power, or conflicting interests among stakeholders are often identified as obstacles on the way to effective 

environmental policymaking. However, it may be argued that 

these obstacles, although real, are in fact surface effects. More 

specifically, there is a lack of an adequate collaborative process, the establishment of which would help overcome distrust 

between the parties as the main barrier to achieving solutions. 

An effective collaborative process would also help overcome the 

other obstacles just mentioned, in particular ineffective communication of scientific information.

 As far as the communication and usage of science are 

concerned, the actual obstacles are the causes of the failure 

of stakeholders to collaborate effectively in the processes of 

decisionmaking and of knowledge production. These causes 

may be identified at three levels—social, epistemological, 

and cultural. From a practical perspective, the social level is 

concerned mainly with the process and structure of decisionmaking. The causes found at this level are actionable on a 

relatively shortterm and they can be subject to negotiations. 

They stress the notion that the real obstacles on the way to 

sustainable solutions for environmental issues are not mainly 

technical but rather social. The epistemological level is that 

of the underlying assumptions shared both by scientists and 

nonscientists on the nature and role of science in contemporary society. These assumptions are often deeply rooted in 

individuals’ psyche and well established in their intellectual 

and professional ethos. As such, they may be more difficult 

to transform. However, although abstract in nature, these 

assumptions, as we will see, determine the structure of scientific practice, that is the way science is institutionalized and 

the scientists’ behavior with respect to the usage of science in 

both the scientific and the public spheres. As for the cultural 

level, it is to be approached from the perspectives in which 

sociologists and anthropologists of science study scientific 

communities and the ways they participate in their disciplinary 

and local cultures. Fundamental institutional change is needed 

at this level in order to promote a transdisciplinary culture. 

Indeed, in order for transdisciplinarity to be established in 

Western societies, governments, agencies, and institutions of 

higher learning must understand but also actively support and 

effectively integrate collaborative processes, such as Joint Fact 

Finding, and more generally deliberative approaches to science-intensive public issues.

The three dimensions or levels of explanation of the role of 

science in environmental disputes, namely the social, epistemological, and cultural levels, were the subject matter of two 

series of interviews conducted with the main players in the San 

Francisquito Creek controversy. Through a number of overarching questions addressed to all the interviewees, we attempted to 

explore the ways in which scientists perceive their own role in 

the creek project as well as the ways in which they are perceived 

by nonscientists such as the local decisionmakers, science 

managers, and the citizens of the watershed who were involved 

in the creek project. A close analysis of the answers then led 

us to the underlying assumptions that ought to account for the 

mentioned perceptions. The interviews, therefore, were essentially designed as qualitative inquiries and were not structured 

as a survey. They did, however, provide us with indications as to 

the perceptions and assumptions concerning the role of science 

and scientists in the creek project.

Table 1 is a summary of the answers to five of the main 

questions. Represented in the table is the common denominator found in the answers of each category of interviewees. 

The latter belonged to five categories—(1) the interviewed 

scientists were selected from the USGS and Stanford scientists 

who were involved in the San Francisquito creek project; (2) 

the engineers were chosen from the technical staff of the local 

agencies; (3) the science managers were those employed by 

USGS and Stanford University; (4) the decisionmakers were 

chosen from the members of the JPA and from representatives of other communities in the watershed who have not 

(yet) joined the JPA; and (5) local citizens interviewed were 

selected from the most active and informed volunteers for the 

San Francisquito creek project. The questions are abbreviated in the table and were formulated as follows— (A) How 

satisfied are you with the interactions between the scientists 

and decision-makers in the San Francisquito Creek Project? 

(B) What is the role of scientists in the project? (C) How do 

scientists handle the fact-value dilemma11? (D) How do scientists and the technical people, that is engineers, interact? and 

(E) What kind of change would you like to see in the role of 

scientists in the project? 

11 The “fact-value dilemma” refers to situations where an individual, say an 

expert-scientist, must report on facts that may contradict his or her values; or 

situations where reported facts may lead to decisions that are not desired by 

the author of the report.
14 San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science In Environmental Disputes

Scientists’ unwillingness to participate in public 

decision-making is one of the most unequivocally shared 

attitudes that emerged from our interviews with both 

USGS and Stanford scientists. Most scientists involved in 

the San Francisquito Creek Project acknowledged the fact. 

However, they found it nonproblematic as far they are concerned. When questioned on the reasons why they prefer 

not to cross what they call the “neutrality line” between the 

scientific and the public spheres, the first motive they often 

mentioned was unsurprisingly lack of time. Management 

decisionmaking, they complained, is a long process. They 

found themselves unable to justify spending time in what 

they often consider as “chaotic public meetings.” However, 

when asked to explain and further develop on the issue of 

time, other motives emerged that are enlightening as to 

their underlying assumptions on the nature of science and 

their perception of what role a scientist ought to play in 

science related public issues. “Well, it takes a tremendous 

amount of time to educate the public and the decisionmakers” (David Freyberg, Stanford University, interview on 

June 3rd, 2001). 

“Management decisions,” he continued, “take time 

and the decisions are made interdependently. We’re 

not used to this. We are used to making our own 

decisions in our own time frame. And the notion 

that scientific knowledge exists independently of the 

decision-making process, that there is a correct fact 

associated with the decision is built into the way we 

are educated and the way we do our research.”

The assumption that science is independent from society 

and that, contrary to the public and politicians, scientists are 

“free thinkers” is deeply rooted in the ways scientists understand science and its role in society and thereby in the ways they 

perceive themselves. However, the most pervasive assumption 

from the scientists’ part, but also from the nonscientists’ point 

of view is that the former must educate the latter. Science is the 

only legitimate source of truth and therefore nonscientists can 

only be passive receptacles of knowledge provided by scientists. 

The idea of the public’s passivity with respect to science is also 

closely linked to a notion of the public as a homogeneous entity, 

which is a blatant denial of a social reality that stands out with 

clarity in the San Francisquito Creek watershed where the public is very diverse as far as its environmental awareness and its 

general access to expert knowledge are concerned. The presence 

of Stanford University and USGS in the watershed, of course, 

play a major role in the local cognitive diversity. The cognitive 

diversity of the public may seem to create a pedagogic obstacle 

for scientists in their interactions with the public as they must 

adapt their language to an audience the background of which 

is heterogeneous. However, scientists do not acknowledge this 

heterogeneity. Instead, they perceive the public as homogeneous 

with regard to its assumed scientific illiteracy. Lack of time on 

the scientists’ side and lack of scientific understanding on the 

public’s side do not provide a convincing explanation for the 

lack collaboration between scientists and nonscientists. Scientists’ unwillingness to participate in public decisionmaking must 

therefore be accounted for from a perspective other than that 

adopted by the scientists themselves.

Questions ñ

òInterviewees

A. Science 

and 

Decisions?

B. Scientists’ role? C. Fact-Value 

Dilemma?

D. Science 

and 

Engineering?

E. What should 

change?

1. Scientists Highly 

dissatisfied

Neutral providers 

of objective truth

Not perceived as 

a problem

Engineers think in 

short terms

More freedom for 

scientists

2. Engineers Relatively 

satisfied

Providers of useful 

opinions, sometimes

Scientists can 

separate facts 

and values

Scientists think in 

abstract (irrelevant) 

terms

Scientists must 

improve their 

communication skills

3. Science-ManagersDissatisfied Neutral providers

of objective truth

Scientists can 

separate facts 

and values

Do not always 

understand each

other

Science programs

 must be provided 

with more funds

4. Decision-

 makers

Highly 

dissatisfied

Advisers, often 

tools in the hand of 

the “opponent”

Suspicious as 

to scientists’ 

capacity to 

distinguish facts 

from values

Engineers are the 

indispensable 

“translators” of 

scientific studies

Scientists must 

demontrate 

their neutrality and 

competence

5. Citizens Dissatisfied Experts are often 

manipulated by 

decision-makers

A real problem 

with Stanford 

scientists but 

not with USGS

scientists

Scientists and Engineers don’t always 

understand each 

other

Scientists must be

 neutral and more 

present and active in 

public meetings

Table 1. A summary of two series of interviews with the main players in the San Francisquito Creek Project.
III. Science as a Source of Confusion and Distrust 15

A science-centered view of society, and more generally, a science-centered mode of thinking emerge from 

answers to the question on scientists’ lack of participation 

in the decisionmaking process, despite critical statements 

suggesting scientists’ awareness of the problematic aspect 

of such a view. For instance, a USGS scientist admitted to 

the following:

“Scientists have a problem with people doubting 

whether what a scientist says is true. They have a lot 

of trouble making a case beyond what they perceive 

as facts. We have difficulties admitting that there is a 

lot more fuzziness to scientific discourse than there 

appears to be. And it is very difficult for a scientist 

to be in a situation where he is not believed,” (Ken 

Bencala, USGS. Interview on June 5, 2001).

It is remarkable, however, that science-centered assumptions are not threatened in any way by scientists’ awareness of 

the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of these assumptions. This 

could be explained with the consideration of scientists’ material and institutional interests to remain within the boundaries 

of academia. Along these lines, a scientist spoke of “negative 

reward” for those who cross the neutrality line:

“There is, in the academia, a certain distrust for the 

colleagues who are adept at working in the public 

sphere or in the political environment. How could 

they be good scientists if they are able to work in a 

context in which they must compromise? There is 

negative reward for academics to spend time in the 

public sphere.” (Mary Lou Zoback, USGS. Interview 

on June 6, 2001.)

Negative reward combined with the assumption of 

an essentially passive and homogeneously ignorant public 

make it seem a plausible description of the reasons why the 

very possibility of a dialogue or a mutual learning process 

may not even be considered. However, when asked in which 

situations scientists found less difficulty communicating 

with nonscientists or for that matter with colleagues from 

other disciplines, some scientists answered “in the field,” 

meaning in situations where they had to work closely with 

one another. Contrary to conditions in which scientists and 

decisionmakers communicate through formal reports or 

summaries of scientific studies, in the field or in the laboratory where there is a face-to-face communication or actual 

collaboration, language barriers, often invoked as a serious 

obstacle, tend to fall. 

The informational decisionmaking model

The consequences of assuming that the public is essentially ignorant and passive and that science is objective, 

value-free, and independent from society appear to be highly 

disruptive.12 Indeed, once these notions are admitted, any 

problematic relationship between scientists, decisionmakers, 

and citizens is bound to be attributed to either public ignorance or public irrationality. The only legitimate goal then 

follows uncritically—to inform the public of what scientific 

thinking is about. Although a critical evaluation of scientific 

institutions may be in order, considerable and often useless 

efforts are made to confirm and reinforce the obsolete and 

indeed deceptive centrality of science. The decisionmaking 

process so far adopted by the decision-making bodies in the 

San Francisquito Creek watershed is a good illustration of 

the disruptive consequences of science-centered assumptions. 

The process follows an informational model (fig. 5), namely 

a transfer of information from scientists to the decisionmakers via the technical staff of agencies such as the Santa Clara 

Flood Control District (fig. 6). Relying on the information 

gathered in public meetings, the board of the JPA commissions studies to be conducted on often-isolated issues. 

Then, after a few months of little or no contact between the 

scientists and the decisionmakers, the results of those studies 

reach the board members of the JPA in a prepackaged form. 

The latter form is a summarized and reinterpreted version of 

the scientific studies prepared by the technical staff of the 

government agencies for the decisionmakers. 

The lack of personal contact between scientists and decisionmakers allows an instrumentalization of science and opens 

room for misinterpretations and mishandlings of scientific 

information, which in turn leads to the implicit view among 

scientists that the “uneducated” decisionmakers and the “ignorant public” form a barrier to intelligent and constructive deciTechnical

People

Decision

Makers

Scientists

Figure 5. The informational model. For an alternative view of 

visualizing the informational model, see Ozawa, 1991.

12 In his work “Citizen Science,” Alan Irwin examines the disruptive consequences of science-centered assumptions in great detail and in various cases. 

See Irwin, 1995.
16 San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science In Environmental Disputes

sionmaking. As a result of this, language barriers and distrust 

are perceived as the ultimate obstacles to overcome. In fact, 

the lack of personal contact and cooperation between decisionmakers and scientists, as well as the exclusion of the public 

from the decisionmaking process favor—not to say cause—

distrust between the parties. It is in this sense that, despite its 

reality, distrust among decisionmaking partners may be said to 

be a surface effect. As redundant or circular as it may seem, it 

appears that the real obstacle to a collaborative decisionmaking process is the very lack of a collaborative decisionmaking 

process. The members of the JPA failed to see the distinction 

between a true collaborative Joint Fact Finding process and the 

standard mode of passive public involvement. Collaboration 

is unlikely to occur as long as the public sphere is separate 

from the political and the scientific spheres, as it is the case in 

the informational model. We need to create a zone of overlap 

between the three spheres, within which zone collaboration 

between all stakeholders is legitimized, if not institutionalized, 

by the political and academic authority. A transdisciplinary 

decision-making process would then be possible within that 

zone of overlap. A Joint Fact Finding process as described 

above may be designed and implemented only if the creation 

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Figure 6. An example of an informational model. This diagram is an excerpt from the “Long-Term Monitoring and Assessment Plan for the 

San Francisquito Creek Watershed” published by the San Francisquito Watershed Council (formerly Coordinated Resource Management 

Planning) in February 2002. It is meant to visualize the information management process followed by the San Francisquito Creek Joint Powers Authority. The diagram separates the scientists from the decisionmakers, with the agencies’ technical staff as an intermediate. Moreover, the model excludes the public, and symptomatically, it neglects to represent the stakeholders and their differing interpretations of the 

relevant information as well as their differing notions of the information management process itself.
ii. A brief history of the controversy 17

 “The study by Balance Hydrologics,” he said, 

“clearly demonstrated that we were getting extraordinarily high levels of sediments coming in, and that 

these high levels of sediments appeared to be the 

result of natural background erosion, though one 

could argue that the erosion was the result of the 

clear cutting that occurred in the middle of the 19th 

century. But I think that that would be a very difficult case to make. I think it would be really hard to 

show that that’s the case because most of that upper 

watershed is open space preserve; it’s unbroken 

canopy, and it’s in very good shape... So we got 

this study done, we got this analysis, we met with 

the residents, and they rejected all the findings. It 

was sort of an Alice-in-Wonderland-experience for 

me.” (Philippe Cohen, Director of the Jasper Ridge 

Preserve, Stanford University; interview on March 

29, 2001).

Had he consulted both the scientists and the residents for 

the design and the implementation of his study, he would have 

collected better results as far as the social acceptance of his 

research is concerned. And had the residents participated in all 

the stages of the study, the conclusions would most probably 

be different, and in any case, less likely to be rejected by the 

residents. Indeed, having different needs and goals, lay people 

and scientists also have different perspectives on how to investigate and interpret environmental data (Brown, 1992; Chambers, 1997, Collin and Collin, 1998; Dryzek, 1997; Epstein, 

1996; Ezrahi, 1990; Gibbons, 1999; Gieryn, 1995; Jasanoff, 

1991; Wynee, 1996; Yearley, 2000). Their methods of data 

collection, the theoretical scope of their studies, and their 

timing differ, to mention only a few differences. The latter are 

often disruptive and lead to paralyzing miscommunications 

that could be avoided if the processes of knowledge production and of decisionmaking were integrated. Accounting for 

these differences in terms of public irrationality, as scientists 

often do, stems, as we saw, from science-centered presuppositions. 

The transdisciplinary decision-making model (fig. 8) is 

based on three main principles:

(1) Narratives, whether popular, historical, political, or scientific, are the starting point of environmental disputes. 

Therefore, they should all be heard. The sine qua non 

condition for any sustainable decision making process 

is constant reference or regular return to the relevant 

narratives. For this reason, the diagram represents a cycle 

that starts and ends with narratives. Practically speaking, 

this principle could be realized in the form of mediated 

public meetings where everyone is free to tell his or her 

story.

(2) A zone of overlap between the three spheres is needed. 

The boundaries that separate the public, the political, and 

the scientific spheres are obstacles on the way to sustainable solutions. Following a Joint Fact Finding process, 

JFF

Political

Public

Scientific

Figure 7. Joint Fact Finding (JFF) within a zone of overlap 

between the public, scientific, and political spheres.

of a zone of overlap between the three spheres is possible (fig. 

7).

The transdisciplinary decisionmaking model

In the San Francisquito Creek Project as in any other science-intensive public dispute, there is a critical need for open 

processes, that is processes that are open to public scrutiny, 

open to change over time (see Susskind and Cruikshank, 

1987), and open to a wider range of information sources. In 

other words, we must abandon the “public ignorance” model. 

Management decisions and environmental policies cannot 

be sustainable unless the needs of lay groups are addressed 

and their understandings captured. This means that forms of 

knowledge other than scientific must be recognized as legitimate and used as useful sources of information. Local narratives, for instance, constitute a wealth of knowledge that may 

not only complement scientific knowledge but also inform the 

process of knowledge production with regards tp public interests and concerns. Indeed, knowledge whether scientific or 

popular is not neutral; it reflects the perspectives and interests 

of its producers. 

Several Stanford scientists who were involved in 

research projects in the Jasper Ridge Preserve upstream of 

San Francisquito Creek recalled episodes where the results of 

their research were, often to their utter amazement, rejected 

by lay groups. In each case, there was a clear incompatibility 

between scientists’ technical conclusions and the public’s 

empirical knowledge of the issue. When confronted with 

public’s total rejection of what he thought to be a “scientific 

truth,” a scientist spoke of an “Alice-in-Wonderland-experience,” expressing in this way his incomprehension of the 

reason why people would not accept conclusions logically 

drawn from a study conducted by professional scientists on 

the sediment issue in Searsville Lake:
18 San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science In Environmental Disputes

scientists and decisionmakers together with the public’s 

representatives may collaborate in all the phases of the 

processes of decisionmaking and of the production and 

usage of scientific knowledge. For this to happen, it is 

crucial that scientists be provided with sufficient intellectual, institutional, and financial incentives. New reward 

structures should therefore be created for them within 

the scientific community and without. Moreover, a class 

of scientific synthesizers (Karl and Turner, 2002) could 

be developed whose functions would be threefold—(1) 

to facilitate communication and collaboration between 

scientists from different disciplines, (2) to facilitate 

communication and collaboration between scientists and 

decisionmakers, (3) to report both to competent academics and to the concerned communities in the appropriate 

form and language and engage both sides in an ongoing feedback system. On the academic side, this would 

ensure peer reviewing, that is scientific quality control 

as well as an intellectual recognition of the value of scientists’ public involvement, and on the community side, 

the synthesizers would support and fortify the democratic structure of the decisionmaking process. Indeed, 

scientific synthesizers must make sure that scientists are 

selected according to impartial criteria, that sound science is practiced, and that the stakeholders are informed 

of and “understand” the science.

(3) Mediation and Consensus Building are necessary for 

two reasons—(1) the stakeholders are usually numerous 

and have very different interests and positions, and (2) 

due to diverging expert opinions, science can be a source 

of additional controversy and confusion. Assisted by 

scientific synthesizers, a mediator or a team of mediators 

can handle both the collaborative problem-solving and 

the conflictual aspects of the decisionmaking process. As 

part of a consensus building process, Joint Fact Finding 

must be led by a mediator.

One of the dangers of having scientists and decisionmakers collaborate on a regular basis is to create a destructive 

interference between the political and scientific spheres and 

see the purely theoretical and often open ended controversies 

between experts complicate or paralyze the decisionmaking 

process. Mediators may therefore lead parallel and provision-

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Figure 8. The transdisciplinary decisionmaking model. DMs, decisionmakers; Reps, stakeholder’s representatives.
Conclusion 19

ally separate negotiations between experts on one hand, and 

between decisionmakers on the other and use the results of 

these negotiations as a basis for the selection of experts and 

additional relevant decisions. The crucial issue of the selection of experts is one among other critical issues that could 

be represented on the diagram above according to the specific 

context of each science-intensive public dispute. The first 

question with this regard of course is who should select the 

experts? A general answer to this question is: the stakeholders’ representatives in close association with the decisionmakers. However, the more specific questions as to how they 

should proceed to the selection, according to which criteria, 

and at what point in the decisionmaking process may not be 

answered independently from the circumstances that define the 

context of each particular case. Indeed, in a collaborative process, the mentioned questions must be subject to negotiation 

between the parties. Once the experts are selected and their 

role determined, comes the time when the stakeholders and the 

scientists must select the methods of analysis. The guidelines 

of Joint Fact Finding as drawn above could be followed here. 

However, the methods of analysis must also be the outcome 

of negotiated agreements. Another important issue that could 

be represented on the diagram is the way experts are supposed 

to interact with decisionmakers and with the stakeholders’ 

representatives—how they must communicate their findings; 

how they should scope their analysis; how they should adapt 

the timing of their interventions to the decisionmaking time 

frame; and how they should act when sought after information 

is not available in order to prevent what often occurs when 

information is not ready for usage, namely the blockage of the 

decisionmaking process. Along with the lack of information, 

there are often irreducible differences between scientists that 

the mediator must handle and use to build consensus around. 

He or she must then present those differences to the decisionmakers in a way as to avoid confusion and distrust. The discussion among scientists must remain open at all stages in the 

process and political concerns should not affect the quality of 

science that is produced. However, it is of vital importance in a 

transdisciplinary process that the normative leap from analysis 

to prescription be made by the scientists themselves. This must 

be done without compromising scientific impartiality. Indeed, 

the main danger for scientists to make prescriptive statements 

about policy is to fall into the trap of “advocacy science,” 

which is often perceived as incompatible with scientific excellence. For this reason, rather than actually prescribing a policy, 

scientists may advise on the consequences of policy options 

leaving prescription of specific policy options to policymakers. 

In this way scientists can make the normative leap from analysis to prescription without actually prescribing policy. Indeed, 

scientists must participate in the decisionmaking process for 

the practical reasons that we mentioned above. However, scientists also have a social responsibility that they often refuse 

to acknowledge. Participating in the decisionmaking process is 

one way for scientists and scientific institutions to be socially 

responsible, but it is also a way to reestablish the eroded trust 

between the scientific community and the public. 

Conclusion

Although science has become central to modern societies, its public status and, in particular, its role in environmental disputes, are increasingly contentious. The traditional 

image of the neutral and disinterested science expert who was 

expected to be the rational and authoritative arbiter of public 

disputes is no longer a credible image. Indeed, environmental 

disputes often start with or lead to disputes between experts 

themselves. As it is the case in the San Francisquito Creek 

controversy, when experts do not actively participate in political processes as declared or implicit advocates, they may be 

perceived as tools in the hands of decisionmakers. And often, 

when these experts are expected to cross the boundaries of 

their disciplines in order to take part in the decisionmaking 

process, they invoke scientific neutrality as the sine qua non 

condition of good science in order to justify their reluctance 

to collaborate with nonscientists. As a result of this, science 

conducted within the traditional adversarial process fosters 

major difficulties for decisionmaking. It burdens communities 

and societies with enormous and often useless costs. It creates 

disruptive confusion among decisionmakers and the public. 

And, as we saw in the San Francisquito Creek case, science 

conducted within an adversarial process erodes both political 

and public trust in the objectivity and neutrality of scientific 

expertise. Indeed, the absence of an effective collaborative 

process in the San Francisquito Creek Project led to numerous problems that impaired the trust between the players—(1) 

the scope of scientific studies were often narrowly defined; 

(2) enough time was not given to scientists for the design of 

their studies and the coordination of their research programs 

with the actual management needs; (3) the cost allocations 

for the common projects were never structured in a satisfactory way for all parties; (4) even when sufficient, the available 

information was not properly used; (5) there was a mismatch 

between the capabilities of involved agencies and decisionmakers and their responsibilities as to how to fund the studies 

or how to implement the recommendations drawn from those 

studies; and (6) the public was never adequately involved in 

the processes of knowledge production and of decisionmaking. Finally, these problems led to a perception of science as a 

source of confusion and distrust.

In the face of these disruptive problems in the case we 

studied but also in general, the growing demand for greater 

public participation in science-related policy making becomes 

an understandable phenomenon as well as a clear indication 

as to the road to take towards an integrated approach to these 

problems. Considering that, on one hand, citizens are impacted 

by environmental policy making, and that the sustainability of 

policy decisions, on the other hand, may depend on the degree 

and quality of citizens’ participation in the decisionmaking 

process, there are both ethical and practical imperatives to 

respond to the demand for more and better public participation in policymaking. A transdisciplinary approach of 

environmental issues is integrated in the sense that it does not 
20 San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science In Environmental Disputes

privilege scientists and their knowledge. Instead, it includes 

scientists as participants into the wider political debate. This 

means that the prominent role of nonexperts in the decisionmaking process is acknowledged and an enhanced public 

space is created for the concerned citizens to participate in 

the decisionmaking process. Science then may become more 

visible to the public, and the role of scientists in environmental disputes may become easier to redefine and reevaluate. 

Thus, a transdisciplinary approach to environmental disputes 

and the implementation of Joint Fact Finding within the larger 

framework of consensus building strategies may not only 

democratize decisionmaking and produce more sustainable 

results. It may also provide societies with an informal but 

effective means of science and technology assessment. The 

traditionally institutionalized methods of science and technology assessment are based on the artificial and misleading 

separation of the public and scientific spheres. These methods 

tend to protect the authority of scientific experts, disadvantage 

the public, and perpetuate a social distribution of power that 

has proved to be counterproductive and undemocratic, that 

is ineffective and unfair. Indeed, if the socially conditioned 

and contingent nature of scientific knowledge and practice is 

acknowledged and understood, then the methods of assessing 

the role of science in environmental disputes as well as the 

methods of resolving those disputes may not remain science 

centered.

Both the scientific community and the public must revise 

their understanding of science as a neutral human activity. 

If scientific research is to bear an unambiguous prescriptive 

value and if public trust in science is to be reestablished, 

decisionmakers must create opportunities for adopting 

consensus building strategies and allow integrated collaborative methods of research such as Joint Fact Finding to be 

tried on the ground. We presented, in this paper, Joint Fact 

Finding as a set of testable hypotheses, the essence of which 

consists of the contention that the direct involvement of 

nonexpert citizens in the processes of knowledge production 

and of decisionmaking increases the acceptance, on the part 

of those citizens, of the environmental policy decisions that 

are made. Increased acceptance would render policy making 

more effective and the science that is used in support of the 

policy decisions more relevant to societal needs. Furthermore, 

with increased relevance, the direct involvement of citizens in 

the mentioned processes will provide science with enhanced 

credibility and legitimacy. Ultimately, if the Joint Fact Finding hypotheses are tested and the transdisciplinary approach 

to environmental problem solving is proved to be more 

effective than the traditional disciplinary or multidisciplinary 

approaches, it is the very role of science in environmental 

disputes that will be transformed and, indeed, improved.

Aknowledgments

For their knowledge and insight during the course of this 

investigation and suggestions for improvement of the manuscript, we thank Professor Howard Raiffa, Frank P. Ramsey Professor (Emeritus) of Managerial Economics, Harvard University 

and Professor Lawrence Susskind, Ford Professor of Urban and 

Environmental Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

We appreciate the thoughtful reviews of the manuscript by Dr. 

Kathi Bertan, Duke University, and Dr. Scott Miles, University 

of Washington. We acknowledge the support NLR received 

from the National Research Council Associateship Program. 

We also acknowledge funding support through the USGS Director’s Venture Capital Fund, the Geography Discipline Research 

Prospectus, and the Geography Discipline Geographic Analysis 

and Monitoring Program.

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22 San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science In Environmental Disputes

1946-55: Post war urbanization boom. Residential homebuilding takes off along the San Francisquito Creek. More area 

previously relied upon as flood plain and for water absorption 

becomes developed. 

1955: Different collaborative community initiatives help keep 

the Creek cleaner and a political cooperation between the 

concerned jurisdictions leads to the construction of levees 

downstream in order to minimize flood risks. 

December 22nd, 1955: San Francisquito Creek overflows its 

banks into the northern portions the City of Palo Alto, flooding 750 homes and resulting in $2 million of damage. 

June 1957: Congress approves funds to begin United States 

Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) study on San Francisquito 

Creek.

April 1958: The San Francisquito Creek over flows its banks 

again. The creek reaches the top of sand bag emplacements 

at Edgewood and Greer Roads. Levee near Palo Alto airport 

collapses. 

December1958: An agreement is signed between San Mateo 

County and Santa Clara County to maintain levees along San 

Francisquito Creek.

January 1961: USACE performs an extensive flood control 

survey and releases a “Report of Survey for Flood Control 

and Allied Purposes, San Francisquito Creek.” The report 

recommends a Ladera Dam flood control project. Proposed 

plan calls for 97-foot-high, 500-acre multipurpose dam and 

reservoir on Stanford University lands near Sand Hill Road 

between Searsville and Felt Lakes.

1962: Stanford University opposes Ladera Dam Project, saying it goes against plans they had to build Stanford Linear 

Accelerator Center (SLAC) on the site. Stanford University 

also objects that the proposed dam would directly threaten 

the university’s Jasper Ridge Biological Preserve. Ladera 

Dam flood control project is defeated. USACE declares that it 

would not consider other flood control plans unless the community is of the mind and public opinion is unified before they 

would move ahead with any project. 

1967: The State legislature creates the San Mateo County 

Flood Control that is to become a major player in the controversy over the San Francisquito Creek both for its financial 

capacities and its technical expertise. During the same year, 

San Mateo County also creates a San Francisquito Creek 

Flood Control Zone to finance improvements in cooperation 

with the Santa Clara County Water District.

1968: Urbanization intensifies, Willow Road Expressway is 

proposed. The plan calls for covering the San Francisquito 

Creek with expressway interchanges at Alma Street near El 

Palo Alto.

June 1968: The most significant and thorough report on flood 

control along the creek, entitled “Alternative Methods of Flood 

Control, San Francisquito Creek, California,” is written as a Ph.D. 

dissertation by James Robert Vincent, a graduate civil engineering 

student at Stanford University. 

1969: Small but rapidly growing environmental movement 

in the local community helps defeat Willow Road interchange 

plan. Cities consider the construction of a diversion channel 

underneath Willow Road and out to the San Francisco Bay. 

One element of the plan calls for creating a concrete channel 

between El Camino Real and Middlefield Road and diverting 

water north under Middlefield road to Willow Road.

July 1969: A regulation of construction in San Francisquito 

Creek is adopted. 

September 25, 1969: The Menlo Park Beautification Commission held a meeting to develop a policy for the preservation 

of San Francisquito Creek as a natural asset. 

March 14, 1972: San Francisquito Creek is declared a “scenic stream” and an open space plan is proposed for the creek 

and its environment.

August 1972: A Stanford University proposal is implemented, 

the San Francisquito Creek’s banks are lined with concrete 

rip-rap at many locations downstream of the Pope-Chaucer 

Bridge and construction of walls along sections of the Creek 

downstream of University Avenue.

October 1972: Diversion channel proposal is scrapped after 

USACE releases a study that suggests that the diversion channel would not be a viable solution for flood control. 

June 1973: The Planning Commission of Menlo Park adopts 

the Open Space and Conservation Element of the Menlo Park 

General Plan. 

1976: The City of Menlo Park takes leadership in forming a 

San Francisquito Creek Protection Board that consists of one 

council member from Menlo Park, one from Palo Alto, and a 

representative from Stanford University. The Protection Board 

manages to mobilize a group of local individuals for volunteer 

work on the creek.

1979: Flood mitigation measures are proposed as an alternative flood control approach. A good example of this kind of 

initiatives is a “Flood Insurance Study of Palo Alto” prepared 

by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

January 1982: Rising water as the result of winter storms 

comes to within one foot of overflowing San Francisquito 

Creek’s banks and causing flooding in Menlo Park and Palo 

Alto at Pope-Chaucer Street Bridge. 

1983: East Palo Alto is incorporated as a City. This event 

significantly changes the political geography of the watershed.

March 1988: Jim Johnson, the stream keeper of the San 

Francisquito Creek finds two 30-inch long steelhead trout 

floating dead in the creek near El Palo Alto near downtown 

Palo Alto. Nobody knew steelhead trout were still swimming 

up the creek. The event becomes a turning point in public 

Appendix 1. Chronology of the post-World War II community actions with 

regard to San Francisquito Creek and the USGS San Francisquito Creek Project
Appendix 1. 23

environmental awareness. Jim Johnson brings to light the 

garbage and homeless encampment problems along the creek 

near El Palo Alto.

1989: Friends of San Francisquito Creek, an important environmental activist group, is formed.

1990: Dena Mossar, a local decisionmaker, and Trish Mulvey, a environmental activist, convene a series of round-table 

meetings to discuss issues related to San Francisquito Creek 

with representatives from Santa Clara Valley Water District 

(SCVWD), California Fish and Game, City of Palo Alto staff 

and environmental leaders.

Summer 1993: Jim Johnson convenes several meetings 

of agency representatives, neighborhood people, Stanford 

University staff, and environmental groups to discuss creating a Coordinated Resource Management Planning (CRMP) 

organization.

November 30, 1993: Representatives from 40 organizations, 

ranging from government agencies to community groups and 

landowners, meet at Stanford University and establish a Coordinated Resource Management Planning Program (CRMP) for 

the San Francisquito Creek watershed. 

September 1995: Stanford Fish Ladder opens at confluence 

of Los Trancos Creek and San Francisquito Creek.

Late 1995: FEMA begins a restudy of the flood insurance 

requirements for Palo Alto, Menlo Park, and East Palo Alto. 

(The flood zone map and damage analysis in this report are 

based on preliminary maps provided in 1996 from the restudy. 

These maps will be finalized in 1999.)

1997: CRMP starts a Reconnaissance Study on the Creek.

August 1997: Alma Street pedestrian/bike bridge between 

Menlo Park and Palo Alto is completed. This brings the public 

in closer contact with the San Francisquito Creek. 

February 1998: The San Francisquito Creek over flows its 

banks, flooding 1,700 homes and resulting in $27 million in 

damage across 11,000 acres of East Palo Alto, Menlo Park, 

and Palo Alto. 

March 1998: CRMP’s “Reconnaissance Investigation Report 

of San Francisquito Creek” is completed. The report offers 

different alternatives for the Creek.

Early 1998: First Chinese mitten crab (Eriocheir sinensis) 

found in the Creek at Jasper Ridge Biological Preserve. The 

burrowing of this nonnative crab has been determined to accelerate erosion of banks and levees. The crab preys on native 

fish species and their eggs and is thought to be altering the 

natural ecosystem in other undetermined ways.

Late 1998: INCLUDE (Integrated-science and Communitybased Values in Land-use Decision-making) is launched at 

USGS with a Geologic Division Venture Capital award.

Early December 1998: Dr. Herman Karl, formerly USGS 

Western Geographic Science Center chief scientist responsible 

for development of INCLUDE, and Dr. Richard Bernknopf, 

currently USGS Western Geographic Science Center chief 

scientist responsible for development of risk communication 

strategies, meet with Richard Reuben, Associate Director of 

the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation, and Robert 

Barrett, Mediator and founder of Collaborative Decisions. 

Robert Barrett suggests that San Francisquito Creek would 

make a good case study.

January 1999: INCLUDE is headquartered at the USGS 

Western Geographic Science Center (USGS, Menlo Park, 

Calif.) as a core element of an interdivisional research 

agenda.

January 1999: San Francisquito Creek Bank Stabilization 

and Revegetation Master Plan is completed. The scope of the 

three-part study is 6.5-mile-long portion of the creek between 

Junipero Serra Boulevard and Highway 101. The report 

details bank stabilization and revegetation measures and provides extensive site data and maps to support the findings.

April 21, 1999: Herman Karl addresses the San Fancisquito 

Creek Watershed Council Steering Committee. Collaboration between USGS (INCLUDE) and CRMP begins and a 

subcommittee is formed by volunteers from CRMP to design 

and implement an INCLUDE citizen-centered project. The 

subcommittee is named “Sediment Work Group.”

May 1999: San Francisquito Creek Joint Powers Authority (JPA) is created through a creek coordinating committee. 

It is formed as a cooperative effort to improve community 

storm preparation and flood management. Cities of Palo Alto, 

Menlo Park, and East Palo Alto, and the Santa Clara valley 

Water District and San Mateo County Flood Control District 

are included as voting members.

May 1999: San Francisquito Creek and its watershed are 

listed under the Clean Water Act of 1972 (sect. 303, d.) as 

impaired due to excessive levels of both diazinon and sediment. 

July 1999 Gathering of background information on the San 

Francisquito Creek and previous studies begins at USGS as 

part of the collaboration between USGS and CRMP. A geographic information system (GIS) is started with the guidance 

of the Creek Project Steering Committee, and GIS maps of 

the San Francisquito Creek watershed are produced.

September 1999: JPA holds its first meeting.

May 2000: An interactive public exhibit on the Creek Project 

is displayed to the public at a USGS Open House, Menlo 

Park, Calif.

August 2000: JPA Executive Director Cynthia D’Agosta is 

hired to develop a JPA work plan and direct the agency.

October 1, 2000: An Integrated Study of an Urbanized 

Watershed awarded funds by the USGS Geography Discipline research prospectus to conduct a one-year study ending 

September 30, 2001.

December 2000: Prof. Lawrence Susskind presents a seminar 

at USGS, as part of the INCLUDE Seminar Series, on the role 

of science and scientists in collaborative processes.

March 2001: JPA assumes inkind services of the Clerk of 

the Board role from the Santa Clara Valley Water District and 

Legal Counsel services from the City of East Palo Alto.

June 2001: Stanford University releases the draft Searsville 

Lake Sediment Study that begins to look at the fate of altering 

or removing of Searsville Dam.
24 San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science In Environmental Disputes

July 2001: The Alma Street pedestrian/bike bridge is dedicated and named after Ira Bonde, former mayor of Menlo 

Park, who made efforts in the 1960’s and 70’s to improve San 

Francisquito Creek.

August 2001: USGS establishes an Assistance Award with 

the Consensus Building Institute (CBI) to conduct research on 

the role of science and scientists in collaborative processes. 

The San Francisquito Creek watershed is a case study in that 

respect. Dr. Lawrence Susskind is the principal contact at 

CBI.

August 2001: USGS establishes an Assistance Award with 

Duke University’s Nicolas School of the Environment to 

conduct research and to advise on aspects of the San Francisquito Creek Project. Dr. Kathi Beratan is the principal contact 

at Duke.

January 2001: A proposal entitled, “A collaborative problem 

solving approach toward watershed-based land-use planning: 

empowering citizens to use integrated multidiscipline information in community-based decision-making” is submitted to 

the USGS Director’s Venture Capital fund requesting support 

to develop the community values/social issues component of 

the INCLUDE project. Funding is awarded for a 3-year study 

beginning March 2001.

July 2001: The JPA is empowered by the JPA Board to operate as its own fiscal agent and independent employer.

September 2001: JPA Board approves a resolution for the 

Levee Restoration Project. This represents the first capital 

improvement undertaken by the JPA. The levees in Palo Alto 

and East Palo Alto have settled and eroded and plans to restore 

them to 1958 levels begin in earnest.

May 2002: JPA Board authorizes the JPA to be the Local 

Lead Sponsor to work with the USACE on a new Reconnaissance Study and a Feasibility Study on alternative flood 

control along San Francisquito Creek.

May 2002: The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure passes a resolution authorizing a USACE Reconnaissance Study. This is the first step in 

the bringing a long-term flood management project to San 

Francisquito Creek watershed.

August 2002: Construction breaks ground on the Levee Restoration Project. East Palo Alto mayor Duane Bay calls it the 

first major visible success for the JPA.
Rofougaran and Karl—San Francisquito Creek—The Problem of Science in Environmental Disputes—U.S.Geological Survey Professional Paper 1710 � �� �

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