[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-13799

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20914-WPD-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CHUCK WAYNE BOYD,

a.k.a. Dred,

a.k.a. Jamaican,

a.k.a. Bumble Bee,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(July 31, 2014)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Chuck Wayne Boyd appeals his total sentence of 300 months’ 

imprisonment, imposed after he pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana, and one count of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine. Boyd 

saw Julius Wade, a codefendant and a cooperating government witness, during an 

attorney visit at the jail where both men were incarcerated. It is undisputed that 

Boyd told Wade to “change [Wade’s] life,” and Boyd allegedly then said to Wade: 

“I got something for you for trying to rush out there to them hos.” On appeal, 

Boyd argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for 

obstruction of justice based on these two statements. 

We review the district court’s findings of fact underlying an obstruction-ofjustice enhancement for clear error, and the district court’s application of the 

factual findings to the sentencing guidelines are reviewed de novo. United States 

v. Doe, 661 F.3d 550, 565 (11th Cir. 2011). Under the clear-error standard, we 

“must affirm the district court unless review of the entire record leaves us with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. 

McPhee, 336 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We will not reverse the district court’s plausible fact findings even if we would 

have decided the case differently. Id. Additionally, we give substantial deference 

to a district court’s credibility determinations. Id. 

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The Sentencing Guidelines provide a two-level enhancement for obstruction 

of justice if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to 

obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, 

prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 

The enhancement is appropriate where the district court finds that the defendant 

“threaten[ed], intimidate[ed], or otherwise unlawfully influenc[ed] a co-defendant, 

witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempt[ed] to do so.” Id., cmt. n. 4(A). 

In United States v. Rubio, we held that an obstruction-of-justice enhancement was 

appropriate based on the defendant’s assault on a witness after trial, rejecting 

Rubio’s argument that because the assault occurred after trial, it could not impact 

the prosecution of his case. 317 F.3d 1240, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2003). 

On appeal, Boyd argues that the district court erred in imposing the 

obstruction-of-justice enhancement because the government failed to meet its 

burden of proving that the enhancement applied through reliable and specific 

evidence, and failed to show that Boyd acted with the purpose of obstructing 

justice. Any finding that Boyd’s statement to Wade—specifically, that Boyd had 

“something” for Wade—was intended as a threat against Wade or Wade’s family 

was based on speculation. Also, because Boyd made the statement several months 

after Wade had been debriefed and about a month after pleading guilty, Boyd’s 

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statements could not have been made in an attempt to influence Wade’s testimony 

or to obstruct justice. 

In response, the government argues that Boyd did not object to the 

application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement on the ground that the 

district court erred in construing his remarks against Wade as a threat, and instead, 

argued before the district court that he had not threatened Wade at all and that, 

even if he did, he did not do so with the intent to obstruct justice. Further, having 

heard the differing accounts of the encounter between Boyd and Wade, the district 

court found that Boyd threatened Wade in retaliation for Wade’s cooperation with 

the government, and in light of the entire record Boyd has not shown that this 

determination was clear error. The obstruction-of-justice enhancement applies to 

the actual or attempted obstruction with respect to investigation, prosecution, or 

sentencing, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. , cmt. n. 4(A), and at the time Boyd confronted 

Wade, Boyd did not know whether Wade’s testimony would be used against him at 

sentencing. It is irrelevant whether Boyd’s statement actually obstructed justice, 

and the record fully supports the district court’s findings. 

Upon review, we find that the district court did not err in applying the 

obstruction-of-justice enhancement.1

 The district court found that both statements 

 1

 As a preliminary matter, Boyd adequately presented the various grounds for his 

objection to the obstruction-of-justice enhancement to the district court to preserve the entire 

claim for appeal. The government argues that Boyd failed to specifically argue that his statement 

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were intended as threats against Wade, concluding that Wade’s testimony was 

believable and that another witness’s testimony, which indicated that Boyd did not 

intend to threaten Wade and that Boyd never made the second statement, was not 

credible. Here, there were two potentially permissible views of the evidence, and 

the district court’s determination, after hearing both Wade’s and Bradshaw’s 

testimonies firsthand, to adopt Wade’s version of events cannot be clearly 

erroneous. See McPhee, 336 F.3d at 1275. 

Boyd’s argument regarding the timing of his statements to Wade is also 

unavailing. By its plain language, the obstruction-of-justice enhancement applies 

to any threats made against a witness during any stage of the proceedings, 

including sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 & cmt. n.4(A). Although Boyd had 

already entered into a plea agreement with the government at the time of the 

comments, he had not yet been sentenced, and the threat made against Wade could 

still have obstructed justice by impacting Boyd’s sentencing. See Rubio, 317 F.3d 

at 1244–45. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

 

 

to Wade was too ambiguous to constitute a threat. However, the district court’s findings indicate 

that it clearly understood and specifically rejected Boyd’s alternative position that, regardless of 

what was said, Boyd did not intend to threaten Wade. See United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 

1256, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court’s response to an objection 

demonstrated that it was aware of defense counsel’s contention underlying the objection, such 

that the issue was properly preserved for appeal). 

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