FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 05-50698 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-04-03237-LAB

DENNIS EVAN INGHAM,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 18, 2006—Pasadena, California

Filed February 6, 2007

Before: Harry Pregerson, Ronald M. Gould, and

Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould

1435
COUNSEL

Steven L. Barth, San Diego, California, for defendantappellant Dennis Evan Ingham. 

Sherri Walker Hobson and Stephen Tokarz (argued), Assistant United States Attorneys, San Diego, California, for

plaintiff-appellee United States of America. 

1438 UNITED STATES v. INGHAM
OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge: 

Dennis Evans Ingham entered a plea of guilty on one count

of conspiracy to distribute marijuana under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841

and 848. In light of a four-point increase in the offense level

for Ingham’s aggravating role as organizer/leader under section 3B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines

(“the Guidelines”), the district court imposed a 100-month

sentence, which was three months more than the top of the

calculated guideline range due to Ingham’s extensive criminal

history. Ingham argues that the district court did not reconcile

his objection under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

32(i)(3) that only a two-point increase in the offense level was

proper because the district court did not explicitly address the

question of whether Ingham exercised control over his fellow

co-conspirators. Ingham also argues that the Presentence

Report (“PSR”) that recommended the four-point enhancement in the offense level included unreliable hearsay. Ingham

argues additionally that, under United States v. Booker, 543

U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004);

and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the facts

underpinning the organizer/leader role must be admitted by

the defendant or proved by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finally, Ingham contends that the district court’s application

of the advisory Guidelines under Booker was contrary to the

Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses of the United States

Constitution. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 

I

On December 21, 2004, an indictment was filed against

Ingham, alleging two felony counts for conspiracy to import

and distribute marijuana in excess of 100 kilograms. On April

28, 2005, Ingham waived the indictment and was charged on

a superseding information with a single count of conspiracy

UNITED STATES v. INGHAM 1439
to distribute forty-six kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 848. That same day, Ingham

entered into a plea agreement acknowledging that he was subject to a maximum statutory sentence of 120 months, a

$500,000 fine, and at least four years of supervised release.

Under the plea agreement, Ingham also admitted the factual

basis of a narcotics smuggling conspiracy that began in February 2004 and ended on June 23, 2004, and that “he acted as

a leader and manager of this importation conspiracy.” 

On June 27, 2005, a PSR was filed that made the following

undisputed factual findings regarding the conspiracy: In

August 2003, a special agent with United States Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) learned that Ingham may

have been leading an organization involved in smuggling

large quantities of narcotics into the United States by boat. As

of February 24, 2004, federal customs agents intercepted

phone conversations indicating Ingham’s desire to coordinate

a maritime smuggling operation covering Mexico, Panama

and Iraq. On March 9, 2004, a cooperating source (“CS”)

approached Ingham in Canada to discuss a more immediate

plan to smuggle drugs from Canada into the United States, the

proceeds of which Ingham contemplated using to finance the

larger maritime venture involving Mexico, Panama and Iraq.

In initiating the more immediate plan, Ingham contacted a

pilot, who was an undercover officer, with an offer to pay up

to $50,000 to fly loads of marijuana into the United States

where Ingham would arrange for transport to California. On

June 1, 2004, Ingham gave the CS $65,000 to start a front corporation to further the maritime smuggling venture. Ingham

also directed the CS and Ingham’s former wife, Kay Samuelson, to exchange a total of $13,000 for small denominations

to be used in aid of the smuggling operation. On June 20,

2004, federal agents observed Samuelson visit three separate

banks where she exchanged $3,000 for $100 bills. 

Also on June 20, 2004, Ingham, Ritch and the undercover

officer discussed routes and time schedules for transporting

1440 UNITED STATES v. INGHAM
the narcotics within Orange County, California. On June 23,

2004, three other co-conspirators and the CS gathered at an

airstrip in Kalso, British Columbia, a location selected by

Ingham, where the co-conspirators would meet the pilot/

undercover officer who in turn would undertake the first trip

to the United States. Before the plane’s arrival, however, the

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who were conducting surveillance of the airstrip in concert with U.S. border patrol

agents, interdicted the operation and arrested the coconspirators, seizing a total of 99.45 kilograms of marijuana

and nearly 19,000 ecstasy pills. 

A fourth co-conspirator, Daniel Hall, was also arrested on

June 23, 2004 in Seattle, Washington while under surveillance

by ICE agents. According to Hall, Ingham had previously

provided him with a cell phone, $900 and airplane tickets

from California to Seattle. At the Seattle airport, Hall met an

unknown man with a vehicle that, without Hall’s knowledge,

had been equipped with a tracking device. Hall drove the

vehicle to meet three other individuals who led him to a Seattle neighborhood to pick up several bags. When ICE agents

triggered the kill switch on the vehicle, Hall was arrested with

a total of forty-six kilograms of marijuana. In a post-arrest

statement, Hall stated that Ingham had provided him with

funds and instructions to drive the narcotics shipment to California. Later that day, after the transaction with Hall, the three

individuals traveled to the Canadian border where their car

was searched and $160,000 was discovered behind the glove

box. 

On January 28, 2005, Ingham was arrested in Laguna

Beach, California on charges arising out of the marijuana

smuggling conspiracy. 

The district court conducted two sentencing hearings on

August 1 and 8, 2005. At the August 8 hearing, the district

court addressed the main issue of whether Ingham should

receive a two-point (supervisor) enhancement under U.S.S.G.

UNITED STATES v. INGHAM 1441
§ 3B1.1(c) or a four-point (organizer/leader) enhancement

under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for his role in the conspiracy.1 In

the plea agreement, the parties stipulated to the following

baseline calculations: a base offense level of 26 due to 145

kilograms of marijuana that reflected Ingham’s relevant conduct, a two-point enhancement for an aggravating role, and a

three-point deduction for acceptance of responsibility. These

calculations would have resulted in a maximum guideline sentence of seventy-eight months. The PSR, however, recommended a four-point aggravating role enhancement,

describing Ingham’s role as follows:

[Because of Ingham’s plan to fund a larger maritime

venture], authorities learned of Ingham’s more

immediate plan to import marijuana from British

Columbia into the United States. But in order to do

that, he needed help, which came in the form of

codefendants Ritch, Walsh, Mehan, Hall, the UC

pilot, and the CS, all of whom worked at the direction of Ingham. Other parties, like Kay Samuelson,

were tangentially connected to the offense, but not

1The district court also addressed the PSR’s recommendation that a

criminal history category IV was appropriate because Ingham was a career

offender. Ingham had five prior convictions: (1) a 1972 conviction in the

Southern District of Florida for importing 4,000 pounds of marijuana, for

which Ingham served five years; (2) a 1985 conviction in the Northern

District of California for conspiracy to import marijuana with nineteen

others, for which Ingham served seventy-eight months; (3)-(4) two convictions in 1988 in the District of Hawaii and the Western District of Washington for criminal enterprise and conspiracy to distribute more than 1,000

pounds of marijuana; and (5) a 1988 conviction in the Central District of

California for failure to appear. At the August 1 hearing, the district court

postponed sentencing until August 8, 2005 because the government could

not provide adequate documentation of Ingham’s earlier convictions to

support the recommended enhancement based on Ingham’s purported

career offender status. At the August 8 hearing, the district court found

that the documentation of the 1988 convictions did not show that they

were separate offenses under Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13

(2005), which barred a career offender enhancement. 

1442 UNITED STATES v. INGHAM
charged in the underlying indictment. This conspiracy stretched from San Diego, California, to Kalso,

British Columbia, and included a drug seizure in

Seattle, Washington. These events were Ingham’s

brainchild, and . . . he oversaw just about everything

that transpired. USSG § 3B1.1(a) provides for a

four-level increase if the defendant was an organizer

leader of a criminal activity that involved five or

more participants. . . . This adjustment accurately

reflects Ingham’s role in the instant conspiracy. 

In his objections to the PSR, Ingham claimed that he could

not be an organizer/leader because he did not “exercise control over others.” The probation officer amended the PSR to

address Ingham’s objection to the enhancement: 

Ingham did not report to anyone; everyone reported

to him and acted at his direction because he conceived the marijuana importation conspiracy.

Because it was a far-reaching operation . . . from San

Diego to British Columbia, Ingham needed to bring

others in to help him, including the three codefendants, a pilot, the CS, and Kay Samuelson. There is

no indication Ingham was managing the conspiracy

for anyone else. Every organization requires a

leader, and in this case, Ingham was the leader. 

The district court agreed with the PSR’s “factually based”

analysis, with explicit reference to the events that precipitated

the June 23, 2004 operations as detailed in the PSR. Judge

Burns prefaced his ruling with a recognition that the guideline

calculation was advisory and made the following observations

about his rationale: “Ingham did have a supervisory role over

a plot involving five or more participants. . . . The Probation

Officer finds—and I agree this is an astute observation—all

of the events were Mr. Ingham’s brainchild. . . . To one extent

or another, he oversaw everything. . . . He was extensively

involved [in the criminal activity].” 

UNITED STATES v. INGHAM 1443
Based on the four-point enhancement, a three-point

decrease for acceptance of responsibility, and a base offense

level of 26, the district court found that the applicable advisory guideline range was 78 to 97 months and imposed a 100-

month sentence and four years supervised release. Although

both parties recommended a 78-month prison term, the district court sentenced Ingham to three months above the top of

the guideline range due to Ingham’s extensive criminal history. Stressing that Ingham was a “kingpin,” the district court

overruled Ingham’s renewed objection that the plea agreement called for a two-point aggravating role increase. This

timely appeal followed. 

II

[1] Ingham first argues that the district court did not comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3) (“Rule

32”) when it failed to resolve the controverted fact of whether

Ingham exercised control over the other co-conspirators in

imposing a four-point aggravating role enhancement.2 Rule

32(i)(3) provides in pertinent part:

At sentencing, the court (A) may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding

of fact; [and] (B) must — for any disputed portion

of the presentence report or other controverted matter — rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling

is unnecessary either because the matter will not

affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing. 

2We review “the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines

to the facts of this case for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Kimbrew, 406 F.3d 1149,

1151 (9th Cir. 2005). If the sentence resulted from an incorrect application

of the Guidelines, and the error is not harmless, we remand to the district

court for further proceedings. See United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d

1269, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006). 

1444 UNITED STATES v. INGHAM
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A)(B). “It is well settled in this circuit that when the district court fails to make the required

Rule 32 findings or determinations at the time of sentencing,

we must vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.”

United States v. Carter, 219 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2000). A

district court “may not adopt conclusory statements unsupported by facts or the guidelines.” United States v. Williams,

41 F.3d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Rule 32 findings “must be ‘express’ or

‘explicit,’ ” United States v. Houston, 217 F.3d 1204, 1208

(9th Cir. 2000), but need not be detailed and lengthy. United

States v. Karterman, 60 F.3d 576, 583 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather,

“they need only state the court’s resolution of the disputed

issues.” Id. 

Section 3B1.1 of the Guidelines informs the district court’s

determination of an increase in offense level based on the

defendant’s aggravating role in the offense:

(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a

criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4

levels.

(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but

not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity

involved five or more participants or was otherwise

extensive, increase by 3 levels.

(c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than

described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels.

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)-(c). The district court should be further

guided by the following factors relevant to the defendant’s

conduct: 

[the] exercise of decision making authority, the

nature of participation in the commission of the

UNITED STATES v. INGHAM 1445
offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed

right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the

degree of participation in planning or organizing the

offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity,

and the degree of control and authority exercised

over others. 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4 (2005)

[hereinafter “U.S.S.G. Manual”]. 

[2] In United States v. Avila, the case on which Ingham

stakes his argument, we held that “to sustain a finding that a

defendant was an organizer or a leader [under § 3B1.1(a)],

there must be evidence that the defendant exercised some

control over others involved in the commission of the offense

or was responsible for organizing others for the purpose of

carrying out the crime.” 95 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1996)

(emphasis added). Ingham cites Avila for the incorrect proposition that a defendant must exercise control and organizational authority to merit the four-point leader/organizer

enhancement. In other words, Ingham claims that the rule in

Avila is conjunctive.3 In construing the interpretation of

§ 3B1.1(a) under Avila to require a showing on both elements

of control over others and organizational authority, Ingham

misreads the plain language in Avila, which consistently states

the rule in the disjunctive. See, e.g., Avila, 95 F.3d at 890

(“The cases in which this court has upheld a four-level

upward adjustment . . . involved defendants who . . . exercised

some degree of control or organizational authority over others.”) (emphasis added). See also United States v. SalcidoCorrales, 249 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating rule in

the disjunctive) (citing United States v. Harper, 33 F.3d 1143,

1151 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

3To complete his argument, Ingham asserts that the district court erred

because there was no showing that he exercised “control” over the plan

where each co-conspirator was “an equal partner in the scheme, . . . and

the plans were agreed to by all.” 

1446 UNITED STATES v. INGHAM
[3] The facts of Ingham’s role in organizing the drug smuggling conspiracy can be distinguished from the defendant in

Avila who merely functioned as a “go-between” by negotiating for a fee the sale of a kilogram of cocaine between the

seller and an undercover officer posing as a buyer, and then

later delivering the cocaine to the buyer, along with two coconspirators. 95 F.3d at 888, 890. By contrast, Ingham’s role

reflected organizational authority over the conspiracy where

he devised and oversaw the entire importation scheme:

Ingham negotiated with the pilot to fly the marijuana to the

United States, and with Ritch to be the source for the marijuana; coordinated travel routes in the United States; selected

the airstrip at Kalso, British Columbia; directed the CS and

Samuelson to exchange a total of $13,000 for small denominations to facilitate smuggling; supplied expense money in

anticipation of the airborne dimension of the June 23, 2004

operation; and gave funds and instructions to Hall to transport

the forty-six kilograms of marijuana from Seattle to California. The amended PSR reinforces the finding that Ingham was

the organizer/leader by emphasizing that the co-conspirators

reported to Ingham whereas Ingham reported to no higher

authority. Unlike the defendant in Avila, Ingham’s role far

exceeded that of a go-between. 

[4] Our cases have consistently upheld a four-point

enhancement for those whose role, like Ingham’s, was that of

organizing or leading a drug distribution conspiracy. For

example, in United States v. Varela, we affirmed a four-point

enhancement where defendant located drug suppliers, negotiated and transacted a series of drug deals, and delivered drugs

to undercover officer. 993 F.2d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1993). Similarly, in United States v. Roberts, we held that it was not

clear error to impose a four-point enhancement where defendant negotiated sale of chemicals for production of methamphetamine with an undercover agent and gave an order to coconspirator to make delivery. 5 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1993).

And again in United States v. Ponce, we upheld a four-point

enhancement where defendant oversaw procurement and disUNITED STATES v. INGHAM 1447
tribution of large quantities of cocaine. 51 F.3d 820, 827 (9th

Cir. 1995). See also Salcido-Corrales, 249 F.3d at 1154-55

(upholding two-point organizer/leader enhancement in conspiracy involving fewer than five participants where defendant “coordinated the distribution of drugs that he received

from out-of-state sources[,] . . . initiated drug deals with the

undercover officer[,] negotiated the terms of the deals and set

their locations and times”). 

[5] The district court complied with Rule 32(c)(1) without

explicitly addressing Ingham’s contention that he did not

exercise control over the co-conspirators. The district court

found expressly that the conspiracy was Ingham’s “brainchild”; that it was extensive and involved five or more participants whom Ingham recruited; and that Ingham provided

funds and operational direction for the June 23, 2004 plans.

The record leaves no room for doubt that Ingham had organizational authority warranting a four-point increase under

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). The district court rested these conclusions on the undisputed factual basis of the conspiracy recited

in the PSR. The district court’s findings were based on evidence sufficient to satisfy five of the seven criteria for a

§ 3B1.1(a) enhancement: (1) he “exercise[d] . . . decision

making authority,” (2) his conduct involved extensive “participation in the commission of the offense,” (3) he engaged in

“the recruitment of accomplices,” (4) he thoroughly participated “in planning [and] organizing the offense,” and (5) “the

nature and scope of the illegal activity” was far-reaching. See

U.S.S.G. Manual § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4. 

[6] Under the disjunctive rule stated in Avila, a finding that

Ingham “exercised control over others” is superfluous where,

as here, the sentencing court properly concludes that the

defendant organized or led a conspiracy of the scope depicted

under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Thus the district court correctly

resolved Ingham’s objections under Rule 32(c)(1) in light of

the material disputed issues. Once it was determined that

Ingham organized and led the conspiracy of five or more par1448 UNITED STATES v. INGHAM
ticipants to import drugs from Canada, that was sufficient to

sustain a four-point increase of offense level irrespective of

whether Ingham controlled the day-to-day operations of those

he had recruited to implement his scheme.

III

[7] In reliance on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36

(2004), Ingham contends that the use of hearsay statements by

the CS in preparing the PSR violates the Confrontation Clause

of the Sixth Amendment because Ingham did not have an

opportunity to cross examine the CS at the sentencing hearing.4

Ingham’s argument under Crawford is foreclosed by our

authority in United States v. Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir.

2006). In Littlesun, we held that “the law on hearsay at sentencing is still what it was before Crawford: hearsay is admissible at sentencing, so long as it is accompanied by some

minimal indicia of reliability.” 444 F.3d at 1200 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Williams v. New

York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949). 

Ingham alternatively argues that the district court erroneously failed to consider the basis of the PSR, which consisted

of hearsay statements by the CS that allegedly lacked sufficient indicia of reliability because the CS was biased and/or

motivated to lie. In lodging his due process challenge, Ingham

relies on United States v. Corral, 172 F.3d 714 (9th Cir.

1999), and United States v. Huckins, 53 F.3d 276 (9th Cir.

1995). 

We reject Ingham’s arguments relying on these precedents.

In Corral, the sentencing judge denied a minor role adjust4

“Alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause are reviewed de

novo.” United States v. Boone, 229 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000). “A

district court judge’s determination that a particular item of evidence is

sufficiently reliable is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” United States v.

Marin-Cuevas, 147 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 1998). 

UNITED STATES v. INGHAM 1449
ment, as recommended in the PSR, without stating whether

his denial was affected by the accomplice hearsay incorporated into the PSR that defendant was the “right hand man”

to the main conspirator. 172 F.3d at 715. We concluded in

that case that the district court “relied on unreliable hearsay”

because the government admitted the unreliability of the statements and the facts indicated that defendant was not substantially involved in the conspiracy. Id. at 716. In Huckins, the

defendant received a sentence enhancement as recommended

by the PSR where an accomplice stated that the defendant carried a gun during a robbery, an account that was uncorroborated by a witness bank teller. 53 F.3d at 278. We held in that

case that this statement was unreliable hearsay because it was

unsupported by extrinsic evidence and “made in the context

of plea negotiations . . . [possibly] to curry favor with law

enforcement officials by implicating his accomplice.” Id. at

279. 

Denying that he was the conspiracy’s leader, Ingham disputed two factual assertions in the PSR that were conceivably

connected to hearsay statements by the CS:5 He objected to

(1) “the insinuation . . . that he was instigating an attempt to

smuggle marijuana into the United States from Mexico (by

way of Iraq) on oceangoing vessels . . .” ; and (2) that “it was

the CI that approached [him] after not having worked together

for twenty years [, and that Ingham] had no plans to smuggle

marijuana . . . prior to being approached by the CI.” 

As to the first objection, any allegedly unreliable hearsay

is irrelevant because the district court stated that the maritime

plan involving Mexico and Iraq was only “background information” that would not affect the sentence.6

 Stated another

5While the government characterizes the individual who assisted in the

investigation as a “confidential source,” Ingham describes the same person

as a “confidential informant” (“CI”). 

6

In doing so, the district court satisfied Rule 32(i)(3)(B). “[In regard to

disputed facts, the district court must] determine that a ruling is unnecessary . . . because the matter will not affect sentencing or because the court

will not consider the matter in sentencing.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).

1450 UNITED STATES v. INGHAM
way, whatever were Ingham’s aims concerning a plan involving Mexico and Iraq, these did not affect his role as “organizer” of the conspiracy to import drugs from Canada within the

meaning of § 3B1.1(a). As for the second objection, whether

Ingham first sought out the CS, or whether the CS first

approached Ingham, is also irrelevant to the assessment of

Ingham’s role in the drug importation conspiracy and does not

bear on the reliability of the PSR’s remaining factual predicate for the conspiracy. 

[8] As discussed above, there is ample evidence in the

uncontroverted facts that Ingham pursued the plans to smuggle drugs from Canada, whatever his motivations; enlisted the

co-conspirators and directed their roles; selected air and land

transportation routes from British Columbia to distribution

points in the United States; and provided funding and operational support for the scheme. Even if the CS had first suggested the idea, as Ingham alleges, Ingham was nevertheless

the leader with “organizational authority” from the conspiracy’s inception. See Avila, 95 F.3d at 890. The organizer/leader

role determination under § 3B1.1(a) does not hinge on the

issue of which co conspirator first conceives of the idea to

commit the offense. Cf. U.S.S.G. Manual § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4

(stating that the four-point “adjustment does not apply to a

defendant who merely suggests committing the offense”)

(emphasis added). Whether or not the CS first approached

Ingham is immaterial to the factual findings in support of the

four-point enhancement.7 Accordingly, the district court did

not abuse its discretion in relying on the PSR despite possible

7By contrast, in United States v. Ortiz, 993 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1993), we

reversed the district court when it relied on unreliable hearsay from a confidential informant to establish a material point for sentencing purposes,

i.e. that the defendant sold 163 kilograms of marijuana over an 18-month

period. Id. at 206-07. There the government could corroborate the informant’s hearsay with only one intercepted telephone conversation indicating that the defendant had purchased approximately one kilogram of

marijuana in a single transaction. We held in that case that the district

court clearly erred in relying on the informant’s unreliable hearsay. Id. at

208. In sharp contrast to Ortiz, where the challenged hearsay was improperly used to support the findings on the pivotal issue of the quantity of

marijuana sold, here the allegedly unreliable hearsay statements concern

only the peripheral and immaterial issue of whether the CS first prompted

the smuggling scheme that Ingham ultimately organized. 

UNITED STATES v. INGHAM 1451
inclusion of hearsay statements by the CS. 

IV

Ingham argues under Booker, 543 U.S. 220; Blakely, 542

U.S. 296; and Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, that facts supporting

the aggravating organizer/leader role should have been submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[9] Ingham’s argument is foreclosed by our precedents: “In

the aftermath of Booker, we have noted that . . . the preponderance of the evidence standard will still generally satisfy

due process concerns . . . . [B]ut, where an extremely disproportionate sentence results from the application of an

enhancement, the government may have to satisfy a clear and

convincing standard.” United States v. Staten, 450 F.3d 384,

392-93 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2005)

(stating same rule in context of mandatory minimums)); see

also United States v. Lyons, 453 F.3d 1222, 1236 (9th Cir.

2006) (rejecting theory that facts in support of sentence

enhancement are subject to reasonable doubt standard). 

[10] The district court did not announce the standard of

proof under which it determined the facts in support of the

§ 3B1.1(a) enhancement, and Ingham does not argue here that

his is the exceptional case that requires the clear and convincing evidence standard. We need not decide here whether an

“extremely disproportionate sentence” resulted from the

application of § 3B1.1(a) that added twenty-two months over

the 78-month maximum advisory guideline sentence calculated according to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). We conclude that

there was no clear error in any event because the conceded

fact that Ingham organized the conspiracy is sufficient to find

the sentence-enhancing facts under either standard of proof. 

V 

Ingham asserts that the district court’s use of the Guidelines

as advisory was an unconstitutional retroactive application of

1452 UNITED STATES v. INGHAM
Booker under the Fifth Amendment’s Ex Post Facto and Due

Process Clauses. 

[11] Again, Ingham’s argument runs into a stone wall of

our prior precedent, in which we have stated the following

rule: “The Ex Post Facto Clause . . . by its terms, applies only

to changes in the law resulting from legislative or executive

action, but the Court has extended similar principles to the

Due Process Clause to cover ‘unforeseeable [judicial] construction of a criminal statute.’ ” United States v. Dupas, 419

F.3d 916, 921 n.3 (2005) (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia,

378 U.S. 354-55 (1964)).8“[I]n Booker, the Supreme Court

expressly stated that both holdings should be applied to cases

on direct review.” Dupas, 419 F.3d at 920 (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.

Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding

opportunity to cure Sixth Amendment defect under Booker by

remand for re-sentencing under advisory Guidelines necessarily implies permissible retroactive application of Booker

remedial opinion). Dupas also re-affirmed that the ex post

facto bar under Bouie “applied only to after-the-fact increases

in the scope of criminal liability and not to retroactive sentence enhancements.” 419 F.3d at 921 (citing United States v.

8

In Dupas, we considered a defendant’s argument under the Fifth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause that Booker should not apply retroactively. Dupas, 419 F.3d at 918. In resolving the case against the Dupas

defendant, we also concluded that a retroactive application of the Booker

remedial opinion comported with ex post facto principles. See id. at 919-

21. Ingham attempts to sidestep the effect of Dupas by arguing that its discussion of ex post facto principles was dicta and thus not controlling. We

believe that the careful three-page treatment of the subject in Dupas was

not a dictum, i.e. it was not “made casually and without analysis, . . .

uttered in passing without due consideration of the alternatives, or . . .

[done as] a prelude to another legal issue that commands the panel’s full

attention.” See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir. 2001)

(Kozinski, J.); see also Staten, 450 F.3d at 392-93 (adopting Dupas analysis to reject identical due process argument reviewed as “traditional ex

post facto argument”). Whether or not Dupas is dictum on this point, we

follow the persuasive reasoning of Dupas in rejecting Ingham’s claim. 

UNITED STATES v. INGHAM 1453
Newman, 203 F.3d 700, 703 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Webster v. Woodford, 369 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting

that “Bouie does not apply to sentencing schemes”). 

[12] When Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory,

Ingham had yet to be sentenced, i.e. his case had not proceeded through direct review. Thus Booker, under its express

terms, applies.9

AFFIRMED. 

9We also reject Ingham’s due process challenge, which is similarly foreclosed by Dupas. Dupas underscored that fair warning was “the touchstone of retroactivity analysis under the Due Process Clause.” 419 F.3d at

921 (relying on Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 458 (2001) (“[Bouie’s]

rationale rested on core due process concepts of notice, foreseeability, and

. . . the right to fair warning as those concepts bear on the constitutionality

of attaching criminal penalties to what previously had been innocent conduct.”)). Ingham did not suffer a due process violation here, despite a postconviction application of Booker, because when he committed the crime,

entered his plea agreement and was sentenced, the statutory maximum

sentence was 120 months under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). Ingham thus at

all times had notice and fair warning. 

1454 UNITED STATES v. INGHAM