U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

49–006 PDF 

" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 109TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REPORT

2005

109–352 

Union Calendar No. 193 

THE METHAMPHETAMINE EPIDEMIC: INTERNATIONAL ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM, AND 

RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 

FOURTH REPORT 

BY THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/ 

index.html 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

DECEMBER 16, 2005.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

JON C. PORTER, Nevada 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

TOM LANTOS, California 

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

(Independent) 

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director 

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director 

KEITH AUSBROOK, Chief Counsel 

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian/Counsel 

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk 

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

J. MARC WHEAT, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

NICK COLEMAN, Counsel 

MALIA HOLST, Clerk 

JULIAN ANTHONY HAYWOOD, Minority Counsel 


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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

Washington, DC, December 16, 2005. 

Hon. J. DENNIS HASTERT, 

Speaker of the House of Representatives, 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee’s fourth report to 

the 109th Congress. The committee’s report is based on a study 

conducted by its Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources. 

TOM DAVIS, 

Chairman. 

(III) 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1 

Methamphetamine: An Overview ........................................................................... 2 

The Consequences of Meth Abuse .......................................................................... 2 

Sources of Methamphetamine ................................................................................ 3 

Meth Precursors: Fuel for the Fire ........................................................................ 4 

Squeezing the Balloon: Why U.S. Anti-Meth Strategy Needs an International 

Component ............................................................................................................ 5 

Recommendations .................................................................................................... 5 

Executive ........................................................................................................... 5 

Legislative ......................................................................................................... 6 

Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 7 

(V) 


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1Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, National District Attorneys Association meeting, Portland, ME, July 18, 2005. 2 National Association of Counties surveys: ‘‘The Impact of Meth on Children: Out of Home 

Placement’’ and ‘‘The Criminal Effect of Meth on Communities,’’ July 5, 2005. 

Union Calendar No. 193 

109TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 109–352 

THE METHAMPHETAMINE EPIDEMIC: INTERNATIONAL 

ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM, AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 

DECEMBER 16, 2005.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State 

of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. DAVIS, from the Committee on Government Reform 

submitted the following 

FOURTH REPORT 

On December 15, 2005, the Committee on Government Reform 

approved and adopted a report entitled, ‘‘The Methamphetamine 

Epidemic: International Roots of the Problem, and Recommended 

Solutions.’’ The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the 

Speaker of the House. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Of the many drug threats facing our Nation, few can compare in 

their growth or destructiveness to methamphetamine abuse. The 

methamphetamine problem has grown at a dramatic rate; in the 

words of U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, ‘‘meth is now the 

most dangerous drug in America.’’ 1 According to surveys conducted 

by the National Association of Counties, meth is now the No. 1 

drug problem for the majority (58 percent) of county law enforcement agencies, and the drug is having far-reaching impacts on 

child welfare services.2

Although a great deal of attention has been paid to the local production of meth in small, clandestine (or ‘‘clan’’) laboratories, the 

majority of the U.S. supply of illegal meth is now believed to come 

from Mexico, or is controlled by Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Moreover, virtually all of the world’s supply of the major 

meth precursor chemical—pseudoephedrine—is manufactured overVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:12 Dec 23, 2005 Jkt ?????? PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR352.XXX HR352

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3The subcommittee has held 11 hearings on methamphetamine trafficking and abuse since 

Representative Mark Souder (R–IN) became chairman in 2001, including 7 field hearings outside Washington, DC. 4See http://www.nida.nih.gov/Infofacts/methamphetamine.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2005). 

5See http://www.methamphetamineaddiction.com/methamphetamine—meth.html (last visited 

Aug. 23, 2005). 6Statement of Betsy Dunn, Child Protection Services, Tennessee Department of Children’s 

Services. 

seas, in only relatively few factories. As such, meth is as much an 

international problem as it is a local problem. 

This report, the first report by the committee on the methamphetamine problem, focuses on this international aspect of the 

epidemic. Building on the oversight work done by the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources 

since 2001, this report describes how the international trade in precursor chemicals fuels the large-scale foreign production of the 

meth that poisons our local communities.3 The report also points 

the way toward solutions that may help dramatically reduce the 

supply of this most dangerous drug. 

METHAMPHETAMINE: AN OVERVIEW

Methamphetamine, commonly referred to as ‘‘meth,’’ is among 

the most powerful and dangerous stimulants available. Referred to 

by many names, such as ‘‘speed,’’ ‘‘meth,’’ and ‘‘chalk,’’ meth is a 

derivative of amphetamine that severely impacts the central nervous system. The drug can be smoked, snorted, orally ingested, or 

injected. In powder form meth resembles granulated crystals, and 

in a rock form it is known as ‘‘ice.’’ 4

Meth produces extremely powerful feelings of euphoria, increases 

energy, and reduces appetite. Smoking meth produces a high that 

lasts 8–24 hours compared to a 20–30 minute high produced by 

smoking cocaine.5 After the initial rush of intense feelings, users 

are prone to become highly agitated and nervous, which can lead 

to violent behaviors. Because the effects of meth are usually pleasurable at first, many users wish to repeat the experience, which is 

the beginning of a cycle of psychological addiction. 

THE CONSEQUENCES OF METH ABUSE

Meth abuse takes a severe toll, not simply on the user, but on 

the entire community. Meth has particularly harmful consequences 

for children who spend time in the presence of parents or other 

adults who abuse the drug. Unlike abuse of most other drugs (including alcohol), meth abuse does not follow the typical paradigm 

of a single abuser within an enabling family. Instead, meth abuse 

is very frequently a ‘‘family affair’’ in which both parents are addicts, leading to child neglect and abuse. According to one state 

child services official, this kind of meth abuse is ‘‘the worst form 

of child endangerment that I have ever seen.’’ 6

Second, the increasing supply of meth has generated increasing 

numbers of meth addicts who then begin to manufacture meth in 

small, makeshift labs, primarily for personal use. The small-scale 

manufacture of meth in ‘‘clandestine’’ labs involves the use of highly volatile chemicals and the labs generate significant quantities of 

highly toxic waste. Dangerous explosions are common, 

compounding the danger to children and relatives of meth ‘‘cooks,’’


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7 National Association of Counties survey, ‘‘The Criminal Effect of Meth on Communities,’’ July 5, 2005. 8 Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring [ADAM] Program, 2004, National Institute of Justice. 

9See Chemical Diversion and Synthetic Drug Manufacture, joint report of the Office of International Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration and the Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/intel010621.html. 

and finding, securing, and cleaning up meth lab sites consumes tremendous amounts of State and local resources. 

Finally, meth abuse fuels criminal conduct. According to the National Association of Counties, of 500 counties in the past year, 67 

percent reported increases in meth related arrests. Counties in the 

Southwest reported particularly disturbing results, with 76 percent 

reporting such increases. Over half of the agencies surveyed stated 

that at least 1 in 5 jail inmates are serving methamphetamine related sentences.7 In some Western cities, nearly one-third to onehalf of arrestees for any crime test positive for meth; for example, 

in Honolulu, 40.3 percent of men jailed tested positive for methamphetamine in 2003.8

SOURCES OF METHAMPHETAMINE

Meth began as a West Coast phenomenon, with most use and 

production concentrated in a few cities in California and Hawaii. 

Use of the drug was spread in other Western states by motorcycle 

biker gangs during the 1980’s. It was during the 1990’s, however, 

that the meth epidemic as we now know it began to take shape. 

That decade saw the development of two parallel currents in 

methamphetamine production and trafficking. First, neighborhood 

clandestine or small toxic labs [STL’s] began to spread in response 

to the growing numbers of meth addicts. These labs rely on precursor chemicals obtained from retail stores—most notably the 

pseudoephedrine contained in most cold medicines. These STL’s 

have continued to proliferate throughout the country, following the 

spread of methamphetamine abuse eastward and creating epidemic 

crime, environmental hazards, and social problems. 

Second, Mexican criminal organizations, based in Mexico and 

California, began to produce high-purity, low-cost methamphetamine in ‘‘superlabs.’’ These Mexican trafficking organizations have 

relied on their established networks for smuggling cocaine, heroin, 

and marijuana to spread crystal meth throughout the country. 

Today, it is estimated that over 70 percent of the U.S. meth supply 

is controlled by these groups. These organizations have the additional advantage over their smaller competitors of being able to import huge quantities of precursor chemicals like pseudoephedrine. 

Increasing reliance on importation of precursors is a consequence 

of the fact that domestic acquisition of precursors has been sharply 

curtailed through tougher penalties and aggressive enforcement by 

DEA and other law enforcement agencies). 

Until just a few years ago, most of those illegal precursors came 

from Canada, which lacked any effective regulation. In fact, the 

Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA] and the Royal Canadian 

Mounted Police estimated that imports of pseudoephedrine to Canada were 14 times higher in 2001 than in 1995, in response to congressional enactment of tougher precursor chemical controls in the 

mid-1990’s.9 However, joint U.S.-Canadian law enforcement operations and increased Canadian regulation have led traffickers to 


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10Testimony of Timothy J. Ogden, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Chicago Field Division, 

Drug Enforcement Administration, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, June 27, 2005. 11See http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs11/12620/meth.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2005). 12 Id. 13 Id. 14Suo, Steve, ‘‘The Mexican Connection,’’ the Oregonian, June 5, 2005. 15 Id. 

shift their precursor chemical supply routes directly to Mexico. 

That has also resulted in a geographic shift of the superlabs from 

California to Mexico. According to the DEA, the number of 

superlabs seized in the United States dropped from 246 in 2001 to 

only 55 in 2004.10

That shift of production from California to Mexico is a testament 

to the success of U.S. law enforcement agencies, but, paradoxically, 

it has made reducing the supply of meth more difficult. The Mexican superlabs are larger than their California counterparts, capable of producing multihundred-pound quantities of methamphetamine per production cycle. By comparison, domestic data indicates 

that the largest reported methamphetamine laboratory seized in 

the United States in 2003 was capable of producing only 50 pounds 

per production cycle.11

Increased methamphetamine production in Mexico has, not surprisingly, led to increasing seizures of meth in Mexico and at U.S. 

ports of entry along the Southwest border. Data from the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report [INCSR] indicates that 

the amount of methamphetamine reported seized in Mexico increased from 400 kilograms in 2001, to 457 kilograms in 2002, and 

652 kilograms in 2003.12 Furthermore, 2003 data shows that the 

amount of methamphetamine seized along the Southwest border 

increased from 1,130 kilograms in 2002, to 1,733 kilograms in 

2003, and 1,168 kilograms through July 2004.13

METH PRECURSORS: FUEL FOR THE FIRE

Most of our meth problem can be attributed to one simple fact: 

the United States and the international community have failed to 

set up an effective control system for pseudoephedrine and other 

precursor chemical products. Unlike meth, pseudoephedrine can’t 

be made clandestinely—it can only be manufactured in large facilities using very sophisticated equipment. As a groundbreaking report by the Oregonian newspaper recently showed, only a few companies worldwide make the chemical, and virtually all of the 

world’s supply comes from three countries: Germany, India, and 

China.14 As such, it would not be very difficult for the United 

States and its allies to get better control of the chemical and prevent its large-scale diversion. 

That hasn’t happened, yet, however. Instead, huge amounts of 

pseudoephedrine products are being shipped all over the world, 

with little or no tracking or control. Many nations are importing 

far more than they can legitimately consume, meaning that the excess is probably being diverted to meth production. Mexican imports of pseudoephedrine, the primary meth precursor, have risen 

from almost 100 tons in 2001 to nearly 224 tons in 2003. Mexican 

authorities estimate their legitimate demand for pseudoephedrine 

to be only 70 tons per year.15


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16Suo, Steve, ‘‘As Laws Dry Up Home Meth Labs, Mexican Cartels Flood U.S. Market,’’ the 

Oregonian, Sept. 25, 2005. 

Without pseudoephedrine (or two other, similar chemicals, namely ephedrine and phenylpropanolamine) neither small meth lab 

cooks, nor Mexican drug traffickers, can manufacture this deadly 

drug. If there is one ‘‘choke point’’ in the international supply of 

meth, it is there. 

SQUEEZING THE BALLOON: WHY U.S. ANTI-METH STRATEGY NEEDS

AN INTERNATIONAL COMPONENT

Although many proposals for Federal anti-meth legislation have 

focused primarily on the domestic production of the drug—in particular by cutting down on the domestic supply of precursors available for small meth labs—such measures will do little, by themselves, to cut down on the supply of meth. Merely tackling small 

clandestine labs is like squeezing a balloon—the meth supply will 

expand elsewhere to meet the demand. Mexican meth will more 

than replace the supply from small labs, unless Congress addresses 

the problem in a comprehensive way. 

The recent experience of Oklahoma illustrates this problem. 

Oklahoma passed one of the toughest laws regulating the domestic, 

retail sale of certain pseudoephedrine products, making it far more 

difficult for meth cooks to obtain the precursor chemical. Although 

the Oklahoma law apparently resulted in a significant reduction in 

local clan labs, there has been a corresponding increase in imported 

Mexican crystal meth to meet the demand.16 In other words, while 

laws focusing on local production are specifically vital to curtail the 

serious problem of the clean-up of local production sites, all other 

effects to the local community, including crime and child abuse, 

continue to remain once Mexican methamphetamine replaces local 

meth. As one U.S. Attorney in Georgia recently put it, ‘‘The Mexico 

cartels will replace the meth supplied by local labs with double the 

volume, double the purity, and double the quality.’’

RECOMMENDATIONS

EXECUTIVE

The executive branch of the Federal Government—in particular, 

the Departments of State and Justice—will have to take the lead 

in getting better control of the international supply of meth. This 

is because success will largely depend on three factors: first, whether multilateral or bilateral agreements can be reached with precursor chemical exporting and importing countries to track and 

control those chemicals; second, whether greater international pressure can be brought against meth ‘‘superlabs’’ around the world; 

and third, whether improvements can be made in stopping the trafficking of meth into the United States, particularly through the 

Southwest Border. 

First, the United States should seek to extend the reach of international drug control treaties to finished drug products made from 

pseudoephedrine, ephedrine, phenylpropanolamine and other precursor chemicals. This step would allow a truly comprehensive, 

international tracking system for precursor chemicals to take 

shape. It is imperative that the United States and other nations be 


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17See National Synthetic Drugs Action Plan, U.S. Department of Justice and Office of National Drug Control Policy, October 2004. 18These changes were included in legislation introduced this year by Chairman Souder; see 

the ‘‘Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act,’’ H.R. 3889. 

able to follow the entire ‘‘chain of custody’’ of these chemicals, from 

manufacturer, through export, import, and wholesale market, 

through use in (legitimate) drug production, to retail. This will 

allow for greater transparency and help prevent the diversion of 

the chemicals during shipment or transfer. If an international 

agreement cannot be reached, or until one can be concluded, the 

United States should seek bilateral agreements with the major precursor chemical producing and importing nations. 

Second, the United States should seek to improve its bilateral 

and multilateral enforcement efforts against international 

‘‘superlabs’’—particularly those in Mexico. Recent history provides 

some hope for success from such efforts. As described above, joint 

U.S.-Canadian law enforcement operations, coupled with tougher 

Canadian regulations (requested by the United States), significantly slowed the flow of precursor chemicals through Canada to 

the United States across the Northern border. The United States 

should seek, whenever possible, to duplicate those efforts in Mexico, by assisting the Mexican government in stopping the diversion 

of imported precursor chemicals, and in shutting down the 

‘‘superlabs.’’ Finally, reducing the flow of meth into the United States will require greater control of our borders, particularly the Southwest 

border with Mexico. Improved inspection and patrol technologies 

and facilities, and well as increased numbers of trained, capable 

customs inspectors and Border Patrol officers, will be critical to 

success. However, as our success on the Northern border showed, 

the most important tasks will be the dismantling of smuggling 

rings and improved regulations in the source zone. 

LEGISLATIVE

Congress cannot negotiate treaties (the Senate can only ratify an 

already-concluded treaty), but there is much that the legislative 

branch can do to assist and encourage the executive branch in its 

efforts. First, it is vital that Congress plug any gaps or loopholes 

in U.S. precursor chemical regulations. The United States should 

not be put in the position of asking other countries to enact laws 

or regulations that Congress itself will not pass. Congress should 

therefore follow the advice of the administration (contained in its 

National Synthetic Drugs Action Plan) and enact import and domestic production quotas for precursor chemicals (to ensure that 

only the legitimate demand for these chemicals is supplied, thus 

cutting back on any oversupply that might be diverted), and tighten domestic import and wholesale market regulations.17 In short, 

the United States must ‘‘practice what it preaches’’ to remain credible in the international arena.18

Second, Congress should strengthen the existing international 

drug certification reporting requirements, to include a separate report on precursor chemical production and diversion. The existing 

drug certification procedures—which consist of an annual report by 

the State Department listing the major drug producing and transit 

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19This proposal was also included in H.R. 3889; it was also approved by the House of Representatives on July 19, 2005 as part of the ‘‘Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 

2006 and 2007,’’ H.R. 2601. As stated by Representative Tom Lantos, the provision is intended 

to ‘‘persuade [such nations] to cooperate fully with us and end this abhorrent trade [in methamphetamine].’’ Congressional Record, H6045 (July 19, 2005). 

tions do not cooperate with the United States in enforcing international drug control obligations—have been a very useful tool in 

strengthening worldwide efforts against drug traffickers. At 

present, however, there is no separate treatment for the burgeoning problem of meth precursor chemical trafficking. The 

United States needs to hold precursor producing, exporting, and 

importing nations accountable for their efforts to stop the diversion 

of these chemicals to meth traffickers. Revising the existing certification procedures will help achieve that accountability.19

Finally, Congress can help the administration guard our borders 

against meth and other drug traffickers by increasing appropriations for border technology, inspectors, patrol agents, and investigators. Although merely throwing money at the Southwest border 

problem will not solve it, judicious application of new resources can 

greatly help our national efforts to protect the borders and ports 

of entry from criminal smugglers of all kinds. 

CONCLUSION

An effective response to the methamphetamine epidemic must 

address both its international and domestic aspects; it is not 

enough simply to deal with local symptoms of the problem. With 

so much of our Nation’s meth supply coming from outside the country, Congress and the administration need to find ways to engage 

the international community to reduce that supply. 

But there is hope; the supply of meth can be reduced, and dramatically, if the United States and other key nations work together 

to bring the supply of precursor chemicals (like pseudoephedrine) 

under control. Although that task may not be easy, policymakers 

owe it to local law enforcement agencies, communities, and families 

to bring this deadly scourge to an end. 

Æ 


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