United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 97-1668

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Western

John Bradford Bond, * District of Missouri.

* [PUBLISH]

Appellant. *

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 Submitted: September 10, 1997

 Filed: February 6, 1998

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Before McMILLIAN, ROSS and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

John Bradford Bond pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846, and was

sentenced to 210 months imprisonment. On appeal Bond challenges the

voluntariness of his guilty plea and a sentence enhancement for his role

in the offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). We reject his arguments and

affirm.
The Honorable Russell G. Clark, Senior Judge, United States District Court 1

for the Western District of Missouri.

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Bond argues that his plea was involuntary because at the plea hearing

his counsel estimated that Bond would be subject to a guidelines sentencing

range of 121 to 151 months. His argument is without merit. A defense

counsel's erroneous estimate of a guidelines sentence does not render an

otherwise voluntary plea involuntary. United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d

839, 843 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1122 (1991); cf. United

States v. Fortney, 957 F.2d 629, 631 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) ("government's

incorrect estimate of [defendant's] criminal history category" does not

necessarily "render[] the guilty plea invalid"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 902

(1992). In this case, before accepting Bond's guilty plea, the district

court complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Among other 1

things, the court advised Bond that the guidelines would determine his

sentence unless the statute overrode the guidelines. The court further

advised that the statutory minimum sentence was ten years and the maximum

sentence was life. We note that "[i]n accepting [Bond's] guilty plea, the

district court was not obligated to inform [Bond] of the applicable

guideline range or the actual sentence he would receive." United States

v. Marks, 85 F.3d 396, 398 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 205 (1996).

Following his plea and before sentencing, Bond filed a pro se motion

to withdraw his guilty plea. At the sentencing hearing, the court asked

Bond whether he wanted to be heard on the motion. He said no and withdrew

the motion. On appeal Bond argues that the court erred in allowing him to

withdraw his pro se motion, asserting that he had inadequate representation.

We need not address this argument, since Bond failed to raise the issue

below. In any event, even if Bond's motion to
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withdraw had been before the district court, the court would not have abused

its discretion in rejecting it. "A defendant's misapprehension of the

application of the Guidelines to his sentencing does not constitute a fair

and just reason for withdrawing a plea so long as the defendant was told the

range of potential punishment and that the Guidelines would be applied to

determine his sentence." United States v. Burney, 75 F.3d 442, 445 (8th

Cir. 1996). "This remains true even where such a misunderstanding is based

on an erroneous estimation by defense counsel." Id. 

In this case, it appears that counsel's miscalculation was based on

his belief that Bond would not receive an enhancement for his role in the

offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), which provides a four-level enhancement

"[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that

involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive." However,

the plea agreement specifically informed Bond that the district court at the

time of sentencing would decide whether the enhancement applied. 

Contrary to Bond's argument on appeal, the district court did not err

in imposing the enhancement. Bond does not challenge the scope of the

activity, but argues that the government failed to prove that he was an

organizer or leader. We disagree. "The terms 'organizer' and 'leader' are

to be broadly interpreted." United States v. Guerra, 113 F.3d 809, 820 (8th

Cir. 1997). "Factors the court should consider include the exercise of

decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission

of the offense, . . . and the degree of control and authority exercised over

others." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, application note 4. At the sentencing hearing,

an undercover officer testified that Bond "was at the top with individuals

underneath that were distributing methamphetamine." In particular, the

officer noted that Bond "fronted" drugs,
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maintained control over the proceeds, required distributors to "pair up" for

safety, and directed the activities of a "mule." Because the district

court's finding that Bond was an organizer or leader is supported by the

evidence, it is not erroneous. See, e.g., Guerra, 113 F.3d at 820. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest: 

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT