NUMBER 13-23-00110-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

AMY ELIZABETH ODEM, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 36th District Court 

of Aransas County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

Appellant Amy Elizabeth Odem appeals her convictions for three counts of injury 

to a child, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a). Appellant 

received three sentences of fifteen years’ confinement to run concurrently. By two issues, 

appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and (2)

her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We affirm.
2

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

The grand jury indicted appellant for three counts of injury to a child. The three 

counts in the indictment were identical except for the dates of the alleged offenses: Count 

1 allegedly occurred “on or about December 2019”; Count 2 allegedly occurred “on or 

about December 2020”; and Count 3 allegedly occurred “on or about March 2021.”

Specifically, the indictment accused appellant of recklessly causing “serious bodily injury 

or serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury to [the complainant], a child younger 

than 14 years of age . . . by taking [the complainant] to be in contact with Ralph Hubbard 

and leaving [the complainant] alone with [Hubbard] after being informed that [Hubbard]

was acting sexually inappropriate with [the complainant]. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 

§ 22.04(a)(1), (2), (c)(1). Hubbard previously pleaded guilty to continuous sexual abuse 

of the complainant.

By her first issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support 

her conviction. Specifically, appellant argues as follows:

[T]he State failed to prove that [appellant] committed injury to her child by 

acting recklessly as stated in the indictment because (1) no evidence 

showed that she acted unreasonable or reckless as a parent, or (2) that she

knew about . . . [Hubbard’s] predatory nature prior to his arrest, and (3) she 

relied on a CPS [child protective services] investigation that indicated no 

wrongdoing on her part.

A. The Evidence

The complainant’s father J.W. testified that, after breaking up with appellant in 

2013, he moved from Texas to Florida, and eventually married his current wife and the 

complainant’s stepmother, N.W., in 2018.1 Appellant and the complainant continued 

1 To protect the identity of the alleged child victim, we will refer to her as “the complainant” and to 
3

living in Texas.

According to J.W., during the Thanksgiving holidays in 2019, the complainant 

visited the couple in Florida, and N.W. inspected the complainant’s phone. J.W. stated 

that, after N.W. inspected the phone and found concerning text messages, she contacted 

CPS, and CPS then investigated concerns about a relationship Hubbard, appellant’s 

friend, had with the complainant. J.W. informed appellant of the concerns in a phone 

conversation. According to J.W., the concern stemmed from “[s]ome very vulgar 

conversations between [Hubbard,] a grown man, and [the complainant,] a young child.”

On redirect examination, the State asked J.W. to describe the text messages 

between Hubbard and the complainant. J.W. said, “There was a text message that said 

if sucking . . . such and such was a sport, this would be you, and then it had a person in 

a room full of trophies . . . .”2 According to J.W., there were other messages, “plus many 

pictures of [Hubbard] and [the complainant] at a bar with her hands around an alcoholic 

her relatives by their initials. See Salazar v. State, 562 S.W.3d 61, 63 n.1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2018, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8 cmt.).

2 J.W. did not further explain what the text messages said. However, Erica Gerstenberger, a former 

CPS unit supervisor familiar with the CPS investigation, testified about the text messages as follows:

[The complainant] sent a meme of a man standing in front of trophies. Let’s see. Yes. “This is you 

if sucking dick were a sport” with the caption.

In return [Hubbard] replied with a meme . . . by saying, “Study for your exam and get a good grade.”

He also said that he missed her in text messages. And the dog’s penis was hard and visible in a

picture and then [Hubbard] texted that he is waiting for you.

Gastenburger stated that “there was a concern that [the complainant] had been sexually abused”; 

however, the complainant failed to make an outcry at the CPS interview. When the State asked if appellant 

was informed that Hubbard and the complainant had been discussing “oral sex” and about the specific text 

messages, Granstenberger replied, “Yes.” Gastenberger testified that CPS informed appellant that 

although she is not prohibited from allowing Hubbard continued access to the complainant, if in the future 

he sexually abused her, “then [CPS] will hold [appellant] accountable for it, because you were well aware 

of the concern whenever we conducted our investigation.”
4

beverage together. I mean she was 11 years old at the time.” J.W. stated that all the text 

messages had been reported to CPS.

J.W. testified that, when he informed appellant of the concerns, he did not “believe 

there was much of a response from her about it. It was nothing concerning [to her].” J.W. 

stated that, after the CPS investigation, CPS informed him that he and N.W. had “[taken] 

things out of context.”

Subsequently, in April 2021 “full custody, primary custody” of the complainant was 

given to J.W., and the custody court also issued “a no-contact order between [the 

complainant and] . . . Hubbard.” J.W. explained that the order disallowed either parent 

from allowing Hubbard to have contact with the complainant. The complainant then 

moved to Florida to live with J.W. in April 2021. During the Christmas vacation in 2021, 

the complainant visited appellant in Texas.

On cross-examination, appellant asked J.W. if he thought that appellant “knew of 

this sexual inappropriateness the whole time,” and he responded, “[Y]es, I do believe she 

did.” J.W. acknowledged that the complainant “did not make any outcries” during the CPS 

investigation in 2019. On redirect examination, J.W. testified that while in appellant’s care, 

the complainant “stayed with [Hubbard] a lot, and he took care of her a lot.” 

The complainant, a fourteen year old child, testified that appellant is her mother 

and that Hubbard, her former neighbor, had sexually assaulted her on numerous 

occasions too frequent to count, beginning when she was approximately six years of age.

The complainant was unable to count how many times that Hubbard was around her while 

he was naked.
5

The complainant stated that she eventually told appellant that Hubbard was 

touching her “in inappropriate places,” including her “chest area and [her] butt,” and that 

she did not like it. According to the complainant, appellant told her that she was 

“overreacting . . . and got mad at [the complainant].” The complainant stated that after 

she told appellant that Hubbard was touching her inappropriately, appellant continued to 

allow Hubbard to be alone with the complainant, and Hubbard continued to be “sexually 

inappropriate” with her. The complainant testified that “maybe a month or two” later she 

again told appellant that Hubbard was “still touching [her] in inappropriate places [and 

that she didn’t] like it.” According to the complainant, she told appellant the specific areas 

of her body that Hubbard had been touching, and appellant “got mad” “and [told the

complainant] not to bring it up again.” The complainant stated that appellant continued to 

allow Hubbard to be alone with the complainant, and the abuse continued. The 

complainant said that she never told her father because she did not believe it was a “big 

deal” because appellant “said it wasn’t . . . .” 

The complainant testified that she visited her father for Thanksgiving in Florida, 

and she had a cell phone that her stepmother examined. When the complainant returned 

to Texas, an investigation by CPS ensued. According to the complainant, appellant drove 

her to an interview with CPS, and appellant “told [her] not to talk about [Hubbard], 

[appellant], or [appellant’s husband] Harold [Odem].” Therefore, according to the 

complainant, she did not tell the interviewer about Hubbard. The complainant testified 

that, after the CPS interview, appellant continued to allow Hubbard to be alone with her, 

and Hubbard continued to sexually abuse her.
6

The complainant eventually moved to Florida, and in 2021, she returned to Texas 

to visit her mother for Christmas. During that visit, appellant informed her that Hubbard 

would be visiting her, and she was able to see Hubbard because “[h]e drove to 

[appellant’s] new RV park, and he gave [her] a present.”

After the Christmas visit, the complainant returned to Florida, and she eventually 

made an outcry about Hubbard’s abuse. The complainant stated that she finally made the 

outcry because she “felt safer” because she “knew that [appellant] couldn’t do anything 

and [Hubbard] couldn’t do anything, and [she] just felt really comfortable at the time.”

The complainant testified that she has been in treatment with a counselor “[f]or 

over a year,” which the complainant agreed was “actually helping.” The complainant 

stated that she has been diagnosed with depression and is taking antidepressants; she

has “trouble” sleeping “every other day”; she has “issues with anxiety” in that she “always 

[has] anxiety with being in a group,”; she has had five or six panic attacks, with the last 

one occurring “[a] few weeks” prior to her testimony; she had a “mental breakdown” about 

one week prior to her testimony; and she has them “[l]ike once a month maybe, every 

other month.” The complainant explained that when she has a mental breakdown, she 

“start[s] crying and shaking and [she] can’t breathe.”

N.W. testified that the complainant has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD) and attention deficit disorder. According to N.W., the complainant has 

three different forms of depression and “a parental withdrawal type of depression.” N.W.

explained that the complainant has had physical manifestations of her mental disorders 

in that she cannot calm down and cries uncontrollably. On one occasion, the complainant 
7

was crying uncontrollably and was unable to calm down, so N.W. put her to bed. However, 

the next morning, the complainant had no recollection that this had transpired. These 

instances “happened at least three to four times.” N.W. relayed that on another occasion, 

the complainant woke up screaming, complaining that she had a nightmare that she was 

back in Rockport, and she wanted to be held because “she just needed to feel safe for a 

minute.” N.W. was unable to “describe all of the different instances that she has just had 

a complete panic attack, a meltdown.” N.W. testified that the complainant had been on 

medication for her disorders. At the time of trial, the complainant was still in counseling, 

and her last panic attack had occurred the Wednesday prior to the trial. N.W. agreed that 

it is “fair to say that even to this day, [the complainant] still has some serious mental and 

emotional things that she is working through?”

3

Hubbard testified that, at the time of trial, he was serving a prison sentence after 

being convicted of sexually abusing the complainant. Hubbard acknowledged that he 

pleaded guilty to “certain acts of sexual abuse against” the complainant in September of 

3 N.W. explained that when she inspected the complainant’s cell phone she observed the following:

Puggie was [Hubbard’s] dog––was in his lap. The dog’s penis was hanging out, and [the text] was saying 

that we were missing you and ready for you to be home.

I come across . . . like a meme of Bill Clinton, and he has got a coffee with like this sarcastic face and he 

says, “We sure do miss you.”

I come across . . . another meme, that is a wall of trophies. And it said, “If sucking dick were a sport, this 

would be you.”

And underneath it was a baby meme holding a fist where [Hubbard] had told her that she better study so

she can get a good grade on her exam.

N.W. told appellant, “[T]here is no reason for a sixty-year old man to be talking about sucking dick 

with a ten-year-old child. I don’t care if it’s a friend or not,” and appellant replied, “[O]h, she is just trying to 

find herself.”
8

2022. State’s Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, the judgments of conviction, show that Hubbard 

pleaded guilty to continuous sexual abuse of a child under fourteen and two counts of

indecency with a child by exposure. Specifically, according to State’s Exhibit 1, Hubbard 

was indicted for continuous sexual abuse of the complainant by committing indecency 

with a child by sexual contact, in that he engaged in sexual contact with the complainant 

by causing her to touch his genitals with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desires 

and he committed indecency with a child by exposure by exposing his genitals to her 

when she was younger than seventeen years’ of age with the intent to gratify his sexual 

desires.4

Hubbard stated that appellant allowed him to be alone with the complainant for 

years starting from when she was approximately seven years old. According to Hubbard,

he took the complainant to and from school, he bought food for her, he fed her “at least 

five days a week,” he “spent a lot of money on” her, he bought shoes and computer tablets 

for her, he purchased an iPhone 11 Pro for her, he paid her cell bill, and he transported 

her to and from a theatre program. He also testified that he gave appellant money.

When the State asked Hubbard if appellant had seen him and the complainant 

naked together, he responded that he was not sure. However, according to Hubbard, 

when the complainant was around eight or ten, appellant “got close” to seeing that the 

pair were naked multiple times. The first incident occurred when the complainant and 

Hubbard were at the beach. Hubbard explained, “Me and [the complainant] had our 

bathing suits on our bed, and [appellant] left and I didn’t know she came back, and we[’]re 

4 The indictment is redacted, and we are unable to read it fully.
9

out there [in the water]. You know, what else are you wearing besides your bathing suit?”

Another incident involved the complainant at Hubbard’s home. Appellant opened 

the door to his home without knocking, which Hubbard explained was unusual. He 

testified that he came downstairs from taking a shower: “I’m coming down. . . . I’m wet. 

She [appellant] didn’t ask what is [the complainant] doing up there; nothing else.” The 

State asked, “So as you are coming out of the shower where is [the complainant]?”

Hubbard replied, “Up there with me.”

Lastly, the State asked Hubbard if he recalled telling a police investigator that 

appellant saw him skinny dipping with the complainant. Hubbard explained, “Well, that’s 

when we had our bathing suits on our head, but we didn’t get out of the water.” Hubbard 

said that the complainant had worn a t-shirt and trunks to the beach, and he had worn 

trunks; however, when appellant saw them, the complainant had her t-shirt and trunks on 

her head and Hubbard had his trunks on his head. Thus, they were naked in the water.

Hubbard testified that, after CPS investigated allegations that he had acted 

inappropriately with the complainant, appellant allowed Hubbard access to the 

complainant. Specifically, Hubbard saw the complainant approximately two weeks after 

CPS interviewed her. Hubbard stated that the complainant moved to Florida in March 

2021, and she visited appellant in December 2021. According to Hubbard, appellant 

allowed him to visit the complainant, and he gave the complainant Christmas gifts, which 

were “hoodies,” “a mask,” and an “iPhone Apple watch.”

Investigator Stephen Nanny testified that a detective from Florida contacted the 

Aransas County Sheriff’s Office reporting that the complainant made an outcry that 
10

Hubbard had sexually abused her in Aransas County. The Florida detective sent the 

forensic interview of the complainant occurring in 2022 to Investigator Nanny. Investigator 

Nanny initiated his own investigation into the allegations that Hubbard committed the 

offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child. Due to his investigation, Investigator Nanny 

acquired “flash drives containing child pornography” belonging to Hubbard.

On January 20, 2022, Investigator Nanny interviewed appellant, and she told him 

that she had received “small amounts” of money from Hubbard. Appellant informed 

Investigator Nanny that she had been aware of the CPS investigation in 2019 and “[t]hat 

there were sexual allegations made between [Hubbard] and [the complainant].” Appellant 

admitted to Investigator Nanny that, during the Christmas holidays in 2021, Hubbard saw 

the complainant when he “dropped off some hoodies for” her, and appellant 

acknowledged that she was aware of a court order prohibiting the complainant “from 

having contact with” Hubbard. The trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 1A, which is the 

indictment against Hubbard, and State’s Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, which are the judgments 

against Hubbard and “include some of the sexual acts [Hubbard] plead[ed] guilty to.”

Mike Monahan, a criminal investigator with “US Homeland Security Investigations 

in Corpus Christi,” Texas, testified that he inspected digital media belonging to Hubbard. 

Investigator Monahan found videos “produced on hidden camera devices.” According to 

Investigator Monahan, he found a still picture with “markings on the photograph” 

indicating that the complainant was “eight years of age.” The photograph was a “closeup” of “a child’s vagina and anus nude exposed.” Investigator Monahan testified that there 

were eight videos featuring Hubbard and the complainant, “with [the complainant] 
11

touching Hubbard’s penis or touching generally his genital area while Hubbard was either 

masturbating or naked.” “There were another 143 of those secretly recorded videos 

featuring Hubbard completely nude and masturbating while he was seated on the sofa 

behind [the complainant] as she was playing video games and seated on the floor in front” 

of him. Investigator Monahan testified that

[t]he reason why I [questioned appellant about receiving money from 

Hubbard] is because I had learned early on in the investigation when we 

were requested by the Aransas County Sheriff’s Office to assist that there 

was some information, some belief, that . . . Hubbard had given [appellant]

money and that also I believe the gifts had been . . . purchased for 

[appellant], and that set investigators to thinking that there might possibly 

have been child sex trafficking activity in this situation.

Appellant informed Investigator Monahan that she had received money from 

Hubbard “over the years.” “She stated . . . that she received various amounts of money 

from [Hubbard], and [Hubbard] . . . advised that he had given her money over the years 

at different points.”

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational fact finder could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the 

evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 

159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally

probative. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The fact finder 

is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight to be given 

to their testimony. Ghanem v. State, No. 13-22-00447-CR, 2024 WL 116932, at *9 , 
12

S.W. 3d , (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 11, 2024, no pet. h.) (citing 

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.)). We resolve 

any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the judgment. Id.

We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the 

offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 

321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the 

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily 

restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for 

which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d 

at 240).

Consistent with the indictment, a hypothetically correct charge in this case would 

instruct the jury to find appellant guilty if she recklessly caused serious bodily injury or 

serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury to the complainant who was then a child 

younger than fourteen years of age. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1), (2), (c)(1). 

“A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to . . . the result of her conduct when 

she is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that . . . the 

result will occur.” Id. § 6.03(c). “The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 

disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 

would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.” Id.

C. Analysis

The evidence showed that appellant was aware that her daughter was being 
13

sexually abused by Hubbard. The complainant told appellant twice that Hubbard was 

sexually abusing her, and instead of calling the police on either occasion, appellant 

became angry and told the complainant not to repeat her allegations. In addition, 

appellant told the complainant not to talk about Hubbard when she was interviewed by 

CPS even though the complainant had told her about the sexual abuse. Nonetheless, the 

evidence also shows that appellant continued to allow Hubbard to be alone with the 

complainant, and Hubbard continued to sexually abuse her. Furthermore, Hubbard 

testified that appellant saw him coming out of the shower naked while the complainant 

was present. Finally, from the testimony, the jury could have inferred that the complainant 

suffered “serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury” due to appellant’s awareness

of and apparent acquiescence to the sexual abuse by Hubbard, which caused the 

complainant to suffer PTSD. See Ghanem, , S.W. 3d at ; Hooper v. State, 

214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“The reviewing court must give deference to 

‘the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the 

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” (quoting 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979))); see also Franco v. State, No. 13-14-

00108-CR, 2016 WL 3389967, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 16, 2016, 

no pet.) (concluding that a rational trier of fact could have found from evidence that the 

child victim suffered from PTSD and the child’s “mental deficiency, impairment or injury 

was caused by [the] appellant”).

Therefore, we reject appellant’s assertions that there is no evidence showing that 

she “acted unreasonable or reckless as a parent.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 22.04. We 
14

also reject appellant’s claim that there is no evidence that she knew that Hubbard had a

“predatory nature” or that “she relied on a CPS investigation that indicated no wrongdoing 

on her part.”5 Accordingly, we conclude that a rational fact finder could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and 

reasonable inferences from that evidence. Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166; Brooks, 323 

S.W.3d at 898–99. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

By her second issue, appellant contends that her trial counsel was ineffective 

because he failed to properly investigate her case, failed to present an expert witness on 

child witness testimony, and failed to present evidence that the complainant did not suffer 

from a serious mental impairment. Appellant does not specifically address the Strickland

prongs in her brief.6 See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (setting out the two-part test applicable to claims of ineffective 

5 Appellant does not elaborate.

6 This is appellant’s entire argument regarding ineffective assistance of counsel:

Appellant contends that she was denied a meaningful adversarial trial and/or effective counsel 

based on defense counsel’s actions in failing to investigate her case, failing to present an expert witness 

on child witness testimony, and/or failing to present evidence showing child . . . did not suffer any serious 

mental impairment. The trial record shows no expert witnesses were called by defense counsel. Appellant 

also contends Defense counsel did not properly prepare her to testify on her own behalf. Third, Appellant 

argues that defense counsel’s strategies were ill-chosen as to render her trial fundamentally unfair. See 

United States v. Rusmisel, 716 F.2d 301, 310 (5th Cir. 1983). She requested new counsel but was refused 

by the court. Hence, Appellant contends this action compromised the proper functioning of the adversarial 

process such that her trial cannot be said to have produced a reliable result. Therefore, her convictions 

should be overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel or lack of an adversarial trial process.

Appellant merely makes several bald assertions in her brief regarding her trial counsel’s alleged 

mistakes. She has not explained with citation to appropriate authority how these alleged acts amount to 

deficient performance. See Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (providing 

that the burden is on appellant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel’s performance 

was deficient). Moreover, appellant does not explain how but for her trial counsel’s alleged mistakes, there 

is a reasonable probability that she would have been acquitted of the offense. See id. at 812.
15

assistance of counsel). 

Nonetheless, appellant’s issue lacks merit. It is appellant’s burden to prove counsel 

was ineffective by a preponderance of the evidence, and we review counsel’s 

performance in the totality of the representation, not by isolated acts or omissions. 

Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Appellant must 

overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance and that his actions could be considered sound trial 

strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Jaynes v. State, 216 S.W.3d 839, 851 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2006, no pet.). We do not second-guess legitimate 

tactical decisions made by trial counsel. State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d 686, 696 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2008). Therefore, an allegation of ineffectiveness must be “firmly founded in 

the record.” Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting 

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14).

Here, the record is silent regarding trial counsel’s reason for failing to do the 

complained-of acts. Moreover, there is nothing in the record indicating that trial counsel 

failed to conduct a proper investigation. Therefore, appellant has not overcome the strong 

presumption that trial counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance and that trial counsel’s actions could be considered sound trial 

strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Finally, without more, we are unable to 

conclude that appellant has met her burden to prove that, but for trial counsel’s alleged 

failure to present an expert witness on child witness testimony and failure to present 

evidence that the complainant did not suffer from a serious mental impairment, there is a 
16

reasonable probability that appellant would have been acquitted of the offenses. See 

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. We overrule appellant’s 

second issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAIME TIJERINA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

Delivered and filed on the

15th day of February, 2024.