See Orde r of July 29, 2008 [Dkt. No. 20] , denying de fenda nt’s motion to di smiss or for 1 judgme nt on the pleading s. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

K e vin M yle s, P la in t if f, v. Ci vilAc ti on N o. 08 -0 11 7 ( JD B) St e ve n P oli n, Defendan t.

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION In this lega l malprac tice ac tion filed pro s e , plaintiff sues his forme r def ense c ounsel based on the latter’s r epre sentation duringcriminal proc eeding s in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in 2004-05. Defe ndant moves for summary judgme nt under Rule 56 of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e [Dkt. No. 41]. Als o pendingis plaintiff’s subsequently filed “motion for dispositive relief” based on his mistaken be lief that def endant ha d not filed a summary judgme nt motion [ Dkt. No. 44]. Bec ause de fenda nt had alre ady

filed his dispositi ve mot ion , th e Court

wi ll d e ny pla int if f’ s mo tio n a s mo ot. Up on c on sid e ra

tio n o f t he pa rt ie s’
su bmi ssi on s and

the de ve lop e d r e c or d, the Court fi nd s a s a

matte r o f l aw that pl a int if f i s 1 collater ally

estopped fr om liti g atingthe leg al malpra ctice c laim and, thus, g rants def endant’ s mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt.Def endant’ s fac ts are pr operly supported by

the followingexhibi ts: Ex . 1 (Aff idavit of 2 Steven G. Polin, Esq. [ Dkt. No. 41-3]); Ex . 2 (Sentenc ing T ransc ript [Dkt. No. 41-4] ); Ex. 3 (Plaintiff’s Memora

ndum of L aw in Support of Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Corr ect Sentenc e and Judgment Pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110 [Dkt. No. 41-5]); Ex . 4 (Orde r deny ing § 23- 110 relief [Dkt. No. 41-6] ); Ex. 5 (Brief of the De fenda

nt-Appellant [Dkt. No. 41-7]); Ex . 6 (Judgment of the D .C. Court of Appeals [Dkt. No. 41-8]). 2 I. BACKG ROUND The followingfac ts taken mostly from def endant’ s statement of mate rial fa cts are not disputed. In May

2004, defe ndant was a

ppointed under the Criminal J ustice Ac t to repre sent 2 plaintiff on cha

rg es of possession with intent to distribute heroin and possession of c ocaine (S up e ri or Court c a se numbe r 2 00 4- CF 2- 33 86 ). De f. ’s F a c ts ¶ 4. Pla int if

f w a s r e le a se d o n h is
own re cog nizance and sc heduled to re turn for a preliminary

hear ing on June 15, 2004. Id . After pla int if f f a ile d to a pp e ar f or the pr e lim ina

ry he ari ng , th e Sup e ri or

Court iss ue d a n a rr e st w arr ant; howeve r, prior to its execution, plaintiff was a rre sted for distribution of coc aine a nd held without bond. Id . ¶

¶ 2 -3 . Pl a int if

f w a s in dic te d o n th e dis tr ibutio n c ount a s w e ll a s f or po sse ssi on

wi th intent to dist ribute coc aine a nd possession of coc aine ( case number 2005-CF 2-1381). Id
. ¶ 3
. In addition, plaintiff was indicted f or violating the B ail Reform Ac t based on his fa ilure to appe ar at the ea rlier pr eliminary

hear ing ( case number 2005-CF 2-1383). Id . D e fe nd ant w a s a pp ointe d to repr esent plaintiff in the a dditional two cases in Mar ch 2005. Id . ¶ 4. In M ay 20 05 , p la int if

f, a pp e ari ngbe fo re Judg e Rob e rt R. R ig sb y , p le d guil ty

in c a se numbe r 3 38 6 to atte mpt e d p os se ssi on wi th i nte nt t o d istri bute he ro in a nd in c a se numbe r 1 38 1 to attempted distribution of coca ine and attempted possession with intent to di stribute coca ine; the United States dismissed case numbe r 1383. Id . ¶ 5. Plaintiff was se ntence d on August 18, 2005, to consec utive terms of 25 months’ imprisonment on eac h offe nse, for a total of 75 months.3

Compl. Ex . A. In response to defe ndant’s and pla intiff’s claim that the c ocaine sentenc es we re re qu ir e d to ru

n c on c ur re ntl y , Jud g e Rig sb y

state d th at he wo uld

e nte rt a in a

tim e ly mot ion to
re c on sid e r. De f. ’s F a c ts Id . ¶¶ 11- 13. “At [a] post -sentenc ing c ellblock meeting ” with plaintiff, defe ndant “a dvised [plainti ff] that he would file a Rule 35(a) motion only

if his leg al re sear ch supported the f

iling of suc h a motion based on the illeg ality of the c onsecutive se ntence s.” Id . ¶ 15. Be cause defe ndant’s subseque nt resea rch did not support a c laim of an illeg al sentenc e, he d i d n o tfi l e am o t i o nt o re co n s i d er , an d th e p art i es h adn o td i s cu s s eda m o t i o n“s ee k i n g a discretionar

y reduc tion of modification of [the] sentenc e.” Id . ¶¶ 16- 17. On Oc t o b er

9 , 2 0 0 7 , p l ai n t i ff

, p ro ce ed i n g pro s e , f

ile d a mot ion in S up e ri or

Court to
vacate, set aside or

corr ect the se ntence under D .C. Code § 23-110, claimingerr or in the imposit ion of consec utive sentenc es on the c ocaine counts and inef fec tive assistance of counse l b as edo nd ef

en d an t ’s fa i l ure t o fi l e am o t i o nt o re co n s i d er th e s en t en ce . De f. ’s E x . 3
. J u d ge Rigsby denied plaintiff’ s motion on November 4, 2008, De f.’s Ex. 4, and the District of Columbi a Court of Appe als aff irmed that dec ision on March 12, 2009, De f.’s Ex. 6. Meanwhile, plaintiff commenc ed this civil action on J anuar y 22, 2008, seeking$5 milli on in monetary dama g e s. II. DI SCU SSIO N Collateral estoppe l “means simply that when a

n issue of ultimate fac t has once been de te rm ine d b y

a va lid a nd fi na l ju dg me nt, tha

t is su e c ann ot a g a in b e lit ig ate d b e tw e e n th e same parties [or their privies] in any future la wsuit.” Ashe v. Swe nson , 397 U.S. 436, 443-44 (1970). In order to preva il in a leg al malpra ctice a ction, plaintiff must show that “the attorne y neg lected a
rea sonable duty” of c are , Cha sev . G ilb e rt , 499 A.2d 1203, 1211 (D.C. 1985) ( citing Niosi v.4

Ai e llo , 6 9 A .2 d 5 7, 60 (D .C. 19 49 )) , a nd tha t th e “ atto rn e y ’s ne g lig e nc e c a us e d a le g a lly cog nizable injury ” beyond the spec ulative level. Id
. at1 2 1 2 (c i t i n g McCord v. Bailey , 636 F.2d 606, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). In the District of Columbia, “a la wy er must exercise that deg ree of
rea sonable c are and skill ex pecte d of lawyers a ctingunder similar c ircumstance s.” Morrison v. Ma c Nam ara , 4 0 7 A. 2 d

5 5 5 , 5 6 1 (D
. C
. 1 9 7 9 ) ( ci t i n g Nio si, su pra ). Th e Di str ic t of

Col umb ia Circuit has deter

mined under similar c ircumstance s that “[t] he leg al standar ds for inef fec tive assistance of counse l in [ the] criminal proce eding s and for leg al malpra ctice in this ac tion are equivalent.” Mc Cor

d , 636 F.2d at 609; accor d Hi nto n v . R ud

as ill , 6 24 F .Su

pp .2 d 4 8, 52 (D .D .C. 20 09 ); Bigelow v. Knight , 737 F.Supp. 669, 671 (D.D .C. 1990). Plaintiff theref ore c annot relitig ate “ issues conce rningthe quality of his criminal trial counse l that he ra ised [and had adjudicate d] i n the cour se of the c riminal proce eding s,” Mc Cor d , 6 3 6 F. 2 d

at6 1 1 , o r p ro ce ed i n gs collater al there to, id . at 61 0 ( “ [e]s top pe l is no t in a pp ro pr iate be c a

us e a c on te ste d is su e is f

ir st raised a fter tr ial,” i.e . in a motion for a wr it of err or c oram no bis ). Se e als o Sm ith v . P ub lic De fe nd e r S e rv ic e for theDi str ic t of Colum bia , 686 A.2d 210, 211 (D.C. 1996) ( “Smith is barr ed from re litigatinghis claims beca use all of the issues of

fac t were litigated a

nd deter mined befor e J udg e Ke ssler in the § 23-110 he aring .”). In d e nyingpla int if

f’ s § 23 -1 10 mot ion

ba se d o n f

a c ts i de nti c a l to tho se un de rl yingthi s action, Judge Rig sby

conclude d that “[t] he De fenda nt’s convictions and sente nces f or Attempted Distribution and Attempted Possession with t he Intent to Distribute were permissible as the
c ounts aro se fr om s e pa

rate a c ts o r t

ra ns a c tio ns ” and

“ the De fe nd ant’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l w a s n ot d e nie d e ith e r at se nte nc ingor by his c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to file a Rule 35 motion.” De f.’s Ex. 4 (Order at 6). In its one-pag e summary aff irmance , the5

District of Columbia Court of Appea ls cited ca ses for the propositions that “the failure to file a
me ri tle ss m oti on

do e s n ot c on sti tut e ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l” and

tha t “ on e wh o s e lls a drugand re tains a quantity of the drugfor f

uture sale s has committed two crimes: distribution of the forme r quantity

and possession with intent to dist ribute the latter quantity .” De f.’s Ex. 7. Be cause the District of Columbia courts have previously decide d the fa cts formingthe basis of plaintiff’s a ction here , plaintiff is collatera lly estopped fr om liti g atingthe alre ady adjudicate d claim ane w as leg al malpra ctice. Se e Mc Cor d , 636 F.2d at 609 (finding“alleg ations . . . encompa ss[ ing] . . . the same c laims [ ] presented in [] cora m nobis petiti on and [criminal
a pp e a l]” no t mate ri a lly

dif fe re nt a lth ou g h “ c ou c he [d] . . . p ri mari ly in t or t” ); Bigelow , 737 F .Su pp . at 67 1 ( g ivi ngpr e c lus ive e ff e c t to “ a lle g atio ns . . . e nc omp a ss[i ng ] in a ll m ate ri a l a sp e c ts the same c laims [ that wer e] presente d in [ ] § 23-110 moti on.”). H ence , the Court conclude s that the pr e se nt a c tio n is ba

rr e d b y c oll ate ra l e sto pp e l ( or

iss ue pr e c lus ion ) a

nd de fe nd ant i s e nti tle d to judgme nt as a matter

of law. Asepar ate Or der a ccompa nies this Memorandum Opinion.

s / J OHN D. B ATES Da t ed : No v em b er

9 , 2 0 0 9 Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge