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21–711PS 2005

NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 16, 2005

Serial No. 109–18

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

KEN CALVERT, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

JOHN J.H. ‘‘JOE’’ SCHWARZ, Michigan

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

VACANCY

VACANCY

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

BRAD SHERMAN, California

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

JIM MATHESON, Utah

JIM COSTA, California

AL GREEN, Texas

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois, Chair

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

JO BONNER, Alabama

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

JOHN J.H. ‘‘JOE’’ SCHWARZ, Michigan

VACANCY

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

JIM MATHESON, Utah

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

BRAD SHERMAN, California

AL GREEN, Texas

BART GORDON, Tennessee

KEVIN CARROLL Subcommittee Staff Director

DAHLIA SOKOLOV Republican Professional Staff Member

CHARLES COOKE Democratic Professional Staff Member

COLIN HUBBELL Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

June 16, 2005

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Judy Biggert, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................... 8

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 9

Statement by Representative Michael M. Honda, Minority Ranking Member,

Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................................................................................... 10

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12

Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member, Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................................................................................... 13

Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Member, Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................................................................................... 14

Witnesses:

Mr. Robert Shane Johnson, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Energy,

Science, and Technology; Deputy Director for Technology, U.S. Department

of Energy

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 14

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16

Biography .......................................................................................................... 19

Mr. Matthew Bunn, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the

Atom, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 19

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 22

Biography .......................................................................................................... 28

Dr. Roger Hagengruber, Director, Office for Policy, Security, and Technology;

Director, Institute for Public Policy; Professor of Political Science, University of New Mexico

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 29

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 31

Biography .......................................................................................................... 66

Dr. Phillip J. Finck, Deputy Associate Laboratory Director, Applied Science

and Technology and National Security, Argonne National Laboratory

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 66

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 68

Biography .......................................................................................................... 80

Financial Disclosure ......................................................................................... 81

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 82

Page

IV

Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Mr. Robert Shane Johnson, Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy,

Science, and Technology; Deputy Director for Technology, U.S. Department

of Energy ............................................................................................................... 138

Mr. Matthew Bunn, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the

Atom, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government .............. 142

Dr. Roger Hagengruber, Director, Office for Policy, Security, and Technology;

Director, Institute for Public Policy; Professor of Political Science, University of New Mexico ............................................................................................... 145

Dr. Phillip J. Finck, Deputy Associate Laboratory Director, Applied Science

and Technology and National Security, Argonne National Laboratory ........... 147

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NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING

THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Judy Biggert

[Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

2

3

HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing

THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2005

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

1. Purpose

On Thursday, June 16, the Energy Subcommittee of the House Committee on

Science will hold a hearing to examine the status of nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies in the United States.

Report language accompanying the House-passed H.R. 2419, the Energy and

Water Development Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2006, directs the Department

of Energy (DOE) to accelerate efforts to develop reprocessing technologies and to

recommend a specific technology by September 2007.

The hearing will examine the status of reprocessing technologies and the impact

reprocessing would have on energy efficiency, nuclear waste management and weapons proliferation.

2. Witnesses

Mr. Robert Shane Johnson is the Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy,

Science and Technology and the Deputy Director for Technology at the Department

of Energy.

Dr. Phillip J. Finck is the Deputy Associate Laboratory Director, Applied Science

and Technology and National Security at Argonne National Laboratory.

Dr. Roger Hagengruber serves at the University of New Mexico as Director of the

Office for Policy, Security and Technology; Director of the Institute for Public Policy;

and Professor of Political Science. He also chairs the Nuclear Energy Study Group

of the American Physical Society, which issued a May 2005 report, Nuclear Power

and Proliferation Resistance: Securing Benefits, Limiting Risk.

Mr. Matthew Bunn is a Senior Research Associate in the Project on Managing the

Atom at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.

3. Overarching Questions

• What are the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear reprocessing in terms

of efficiency of fuel use, disposal of nuclear waste, and proliferation of nuclear

weapons?

• What is the current state of reprocessing technologies? What criteria should

be used to choose a technology? What do we still need to know to make this

decision? Would choosing a reprocessing technology in 2007 limit future

choices regarding other nuclear technologies, such as reactor designs?

4. Brief Overview

• Nuclear reactors generate about 20 percent of the electricity used in the U.S.

No new nuclear plants have been ordered in the U.S. since 1973, but there

is renewed interest in nuclear energy both because it could reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil and because it produces no greenhouse gas emissions.

• One of the barriers to increased use of nuclear energy is concern about nuclear waste. Every nuclear power reactor produces approximately 20 tons of

highly radioactive nuclear waste every year. Today, that waste is stored onsite at the nuclear reactors in water-filled cooling pools, or at some sites, after

sufficient cooling, in dry casks above ground. About 50,000 metric tons of

commercial spent fuel is being stored at 73 sites in 33 states. A recent report

issued by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that this stored waste

could be vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

4

• Under the current plan for long-term disposal of nuclear waste, the waste

from around the country would be moved to a permanent repository at Yucca

Mountain in Nevada, which is now scheduled to open around 2012. Yucca

continues to be a subject of controversy. But even if it opened and functioned

as planned, it would have only enough space to store the nuclear waste the

U.S. is expected to generate by about 2010.

• Consequently, there is growing interest in finding ways to reduce the quantity of nuclear waste. A number of other nations, most notably France and

Japan, ‘‘reprocess’’ their nuclear waste. Reprocessing involves separating out

the various components of nuclear waste so that a portion of the waste can

be recycled and used again as nuclear fuel (instead of disposing of all of it).

In addition to reducing the quantity of nuclear waste, reprocessing allows nuclear fuel to be used more efficiently. With reprocessing, the same amount of

nuclear fuel can generate more electricity because some components of it can

be used as fuel more than once.

• The greatest drawback of reprocessing is that current reprocessing technologies produce weapons-grade plutonium (which is one of the components

of the spent fuel). Any activity that increases the availability of plutonium increases the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.

• Because of proliferation concerns, the U.S. decided in the 1970s not to engage

in reprocessing. (The policy decision was reversed the following decade, but

the U.S. still did not move toward reprocessing.) But the Department of Energy (DOE) has continued to fund research and development (R&D) on nuclear reprocessing technologies, including new technologies that their proponents claim would reduce the risk of proliferation from reprocessing.

• The report accompanying H.R. 2419, the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2006, which the House passed in May, directed DOE to focus research in its Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative program

on improving nuclear reprocessing technologies. The report went on to state,

‘‘The Department shall accelerate this research in order to make a specific

technology recommendation, not later than the end of fiscal year 2007, to the

President and Congress on a particular reprocessing technology that should

be implemented in the United States. In addition, the Department shall prepare an integrated spent fuel recycling plan for implementation beginning in

fiscal year 2007, including recommendation of an advanced reprocessing technology and a competitive process to select one or more sites to develop integrated spent fuel recycling facilities.’’

• During Floor debate on H.R. 2419, the House defeated an amendment that

would have cut funding for research on reprocessing. In arguing for the

amendment, its sponsor, Mr. Markey, explicitly raised the risks of weapons

proliferation. Specifically, the amendment would have cut funding for reprocessing activities and interim storage programs by $15.5 million and shifted

the funds to energy efficiency activities, effectively repudiating the report language. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 110–312.

• But nuclear reprocessing remains controversial, even within the scientific

community. In May 2005, the American Physical Society (APS) Panel on Public Affairs, issued a report, Nuclear Power and Proliferation Resistance: Securing Benefits, Limiting Risk. APS, which is the leading organization of the Nation’s physicists, is on record as strongly supporting nuclear power. But the

APS report takes the opposite tack of the Appropriations report, stating,

‘‘There is no urgent need for the U.S. to initiate reprocessing or to develop

additional national repositories. DOE programs should be aligned accordingly:

shift the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative R&D away from an objective of laying the basis for a near-term reprocessing decision; increase support for proliferation-resistance R&D and technical support for institutional measures for

the entire fuel cycle.’’

• Technological as well as policy questions remain regarding reprocessing. It is

not clear whether the new reprocessing technologies that DOE is funding will

be developed sufficiently by 2007 to allow the U.S. to select a technology to

pursue. There is also debate about the extent to which new technologies can

truly reduce the risks of proliferation.

• It is also unclear how selecting a reprocessing technology might relate to

other pending technology decisions regarding nuclear energy. For example,

the U.S. is in the midst of developing new designs for nuclear reactors under

DOE’s Generation IV program. Some of the potential new reactors would

5

1The ‘‘half-life’’ of a radioactive substance is the period of time required for one-half of a given

quantity of that substance (e.g., plutonium) to decay either to another isotope of the same element, or to another element altogether. The substances with shorter half-lives tend to generate

more heat. 2 Board on Radioactive Waste Management, National Research Council of the National Academies, Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, April 2005

produce types of nuclear waste that could not be reprocessed using some of

the technologies now being developed with DOE funding.

• Finally, the economics of nuclear reprocessing are unclear. (The Committee

intends to examine the economic questions in a later hearing.) The U.S. nuclear industry has not been interested in moving to reprocessing because

today it is cheaper to mine uranium and turn it into fresh fuel (through ‘‘uranium enrichment’’) than it is to reprocess and recycle spent fuel.

5. Background

Current U.S. Practice: The open fuel cycle

Current U.S. nuclear technology uses what is called an ‘‘open fuel cycle,’’ also

known as a ‘‘once-through cycle’’ because the nuclear fuel only goes through the reactor one time before disposal, leaving most of the energy content of the uranium

ore unused. In an open cycle, the uranium is mined and processed, enriched, and

packaged into fuel rods, which are then loaded into the reactor. In the reactor, some

of the uranium atoms in the fuel undergo fission, or splitting, releasing energy in

the form of heat, which in turn is used to generate electricity. Once the fission efficiency of the uranium fuel drops below a certain level, the fuel rods are removed

from the reactor as spent fuel. Spent fuel contains 95 percent uranium by weight,

one percent plutonium, with the remaining four percent consisting of fission products (Strontium, Cesium, Iodine, Technetium) and a class of elements known as

actinides (Neptunium, Americium and Curium).

Actinides are a class of radioactive metals that are major contributors to the longterm radioactivity of nuclear waste. The fission products and actinides have halflives1 ranging from a few days to millions of years. The ongoing radioactivity of the

spent fuel means that it still generates a lot of heat, so after removal, the spent

fuel rods are cooled in deep, water-filled pools. After sufficient cooling, the fuel rods

may be transferred to dry cask storage pending ultimate disposal at a geologic waste

repository such as Yucca Mountain. Often they are just left in the cooling pools

while awaiting disposal.

A recent National Academy of Sciences study examined the vulnerability of interim spent fuel storage to terrorist attack. After a dispute with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Academy released a declassified version of the study in

April, titled Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage.2 That

report concluded that the pools, under certain conditions, could be vulnerable to attack, resulting in a large release of radioactivity, and recommended steps to reduce

the risk of such an incident. Dry cask storage has inherent security advantages, according to the study, but can be used only after the fuel has cooled for at least five

years in a water-filled pool.

If the licenses for most currently operational nuclear power plants are extended

to allow a 60-year operational lifetime as anticipated, the U.S. will need to make

a choice: increase the statutory storage capacity of Yucca, build a second repository,

close the fuel cycle, or change the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to allow indefinite

above-ground dry storage until another solution is found. Some suggest that such

a decision is a necessary prerequisite to any expansion of the nuclear industry in

this country, in large part because the public needs to be convinced that the U.S.

has a long-term strategy for waste disposal. In addition, by law, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must make a ‘‘waste confidence determination’’—that the waste

created can be safely disposed of—in order to continue issuing facility licenses.

Closing the fuel cycle: Reprocessing and Recycling

The ‘‘closed’’ fuel cycle requires the same mining, processing and fuel fabrication

as the open cycle, prior to initial loading of the fresh fuel rods into the reactor. However, in the closed cycle, the cooled spent fuel is reprocessed, or separated into its

individual components. In this approach, some components of the spent fuel can be

used to fabricate new fuel for the reactor. The unusable waste is either safely encased and disposed of as is (which means it is still very hot and radioactive), or

‘‘burned’’ in a different type of reactor to reduce the heat and radioactivity and then

disposed of. In theory, the fuel can go around this cycle many times until most of

6

the energy content is converted into electricity and only unusable products remain

for disposal.

Several countries around the world, including Japan, Russia and France, currently reprocess their spent fuel with a process known as PUREX, short for plutonium-uranium extraction, in which plutonium and uranium streams are isolated

from the remaining waste products. The fission products and minor actinides are

cooled and then vitrified, or encased in glass, for long-term disposal. The uranium

separated through PUREX is impure and can’t be fabricated into fuel without further processing. As a result, the separated uranium is disposed of as low-level

waste. The plutonium, on the other hand, can be mixed with freshly mined and enriched uranium to fabricate a mixed-oxide fuel known as MOX, which is recycled

into reactors to generate more power. Plutonium can also be used to make weapons.

Current practice in these countries is to reuse the plutonium only once and then

dispose of the remaining waste rather than reprocessing and recycling a second

time.

The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative at DOE

The Administration’s May 2001 National Energy Policy recommended that the

United States ‘‘develop reprocessing and fuel treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant.’’ The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) in the Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology

Office at DOE has existed in various forms for many years, but adjusted its mission

in response to the President’s call for a return to reprocessing. The primary goals

of the AFCI program are to: ‘‘develop technologies that will reduce the cost of geologic disposal of high-level waste from spent nuclear fuel, enhancing the repository

performance [and] develop reactor fuel and fuel cycle technologies to support Generation IV nuclear energy systems.’’

Scientists working on AFCI are developing at least two reprocessing technologies,

UREX+ and pyroprocessing, while continuing research on a new generation of technologies. The Department claims that both UREX+ and pyroprocessing have the potential to reduce U.S. nuclear waste problems while effectively managing proliferation and safety concerns. In UREX+, plutonium is never extracted in a pure

stream—it remains mixed with neptunium and americium, two long-lived actinides

that may act as proliferation deterrents by making the plutonium too toxic to handle without special equipment. In pyroprocessing, also known as ‘‘electro-metallurgical’’ processing, spent fuel rods are mechanically chopped, and the fuel is electrically separated into constituent products. This isolates the uranium while leaving

the plutonium and other actinides mixed together. UREX+ is closer technologically

to PUREX and is better suited than pyroprocessing for reprocessing the spent fuel

from the current type of U.S. nuclear reactors, known as light water reactors.

Optimizing the fuel cycle

Reprocessing is only one of several steps that could be used to address nuclear

waste problems. After actinides are separated from the waste stream, they can be

further processed—‘‘burned’’—through a process called ‘‘transmutation.’’ Transmutation, which requires a different type of nuclear reactor (such as a ‘‘fast reactor’’), can

generate electricity while reducing the toxicity of the actinides. Transmutation reduces the temperature of the waste products (radioactive materials are literally hot).

This is significant because disposal sites, such as Yucca Mountain, can be limited

in terms of the heat content they can accept as well as in terms of volume. Transmutation technologies have not yet been developed for other components of the nuclear waste stream.

Unless the U.S. also put into use transmutation technologies, reprocessing might

be of less use. Reprocessing could increase the efficiency of nuclear fuel use and reduce the volume of waste, but without transmutation, it could not reduce the temperature (‘‘heat load’’) of the waste sufficiently to allow Yucca Mountain to store

more years of byproducts from nuclear generation.

In addition to pursuing reprocessing technologies, DOE has a program to develop

the next generation of nuclear plants, known as Generation IV reactor designs that

would be more energy efficient, proliferation-resistant and safer than the current

fleet of reactors. Once DOE settles on a particular Generation IV design, it intends

to sponsor a demonstration project, known as the Next Generation Nuclear Plant

(NGNP) in Idaho. The NGNP also has the potential to make more efficient use of

recycled plutonium as well as the other actinides to produce more electricity, possibly reducing the need for separate transmutation facilities in the future. However,

spent fuel from some of the kinds of reactors being considered for the NGNP might

not be able to be reprocessed using UREX+.

7

6. Witness Questions

Mr. Johnson

• What are the advantages and disadvantages of using reprocessing to address

efficiency of fuel use, waste management and non-proliferation? How would

you assess the advantages and disadvantages, and how might the disadvantages be mitigated?

• What are the greatest technological hurdles in developing and commercializing advanced reprocessing technologies? Is it feasible for the government

to select a technology by 2007?

• To what extent will the Department have to modify its plans in order to comply with the report language accompanying the House-passed fiscal year 2006

Energy and Water Appropriations bill?

• What reprocessing technologies are currently under consideration? Is there

one particular technology that is considered more promising than others?

• How should technology and policy decisions about other components of the

fuel cycle influence the selection of a reprocessing technology?

Dr. Finck

• What are the advantages and disadvantages of using reprocessing to address

efficiency of fuel use, waste management and non-proliferation? How would

you assess the advantages and disadvantages, and how might the disadvantages be mitigated?

• What are the greatest technological hurdles in developing and commercializing advanced reprocessing technologies? Is it feasible for the government

to select a technology by 2007?

• What reprocessing technologies currently are being developed at Argonne or

at other National Labs? What technical questions must be answered?

• What reprocessing technologies are still in the basic research stage, what advantages might they offer, and what is the estimated timeline for development of laboratory-scale models?

• How would you contrast what is being done internationally with U.S. plans

for reprocessing, recycling and associated waste management? What countries

recycle now? What components of the waste fuel are or can be used to make

new reactor fuel?

Dr. Hagengruber

• What are the advantages and disadvantages of using reprocessing to address

efficiency of fuel use, waste management and non-proliferation? How would

you assess the advantages and disadvantages, and how might the disadvantages be mitigated?

• What are the greatest technological hurdles in developing and commercializing advanced reprocessing technologies? Is it feasible for the government

to select a technology by 2007?

• What kinds of research and development should the Department of Energy

fund to ensure the proliferation resistance of future reprocessing technologies?

Mr. Bunn

• What are the advantages and disadvantages of using reprocessing to address

efficiency of fuel use, waste management and non-proliferation? How would

you assess the advantages and disadvantages, and how might the disadvantages be mitigated?

• What are the greatest technological hurdles in developing and commercializing advanced reprocessing technologies? Is it feasible for the government

to select a technology by 2007?

• How should technology and policy decisions about other components of the

fuel cycle influence the selection of a reprocessing technology? From your perspective, is the Department of Energy conducting the systems analysis required to make sound near-term technology decisions and guide long-term research and development?

8

Chairwoman BIGGERT. The hearing of the Subcommittee on Energy of the Committee on Science will come to order.

Good morning to you all. I want to welcome everyone to this

hearing on nuclear fuel cycle and the potential for reprocessing and

recycling to help us better manage the Nation’s growing inventory

of spent nuclear fuel.

To start, I want to quickly review our current situation to put today’s hearing into some context. Twenty years from now, electricity

demand in the United States is expected to increase by 50 percent.

If we are to meet this incredible growth in demand without significantly increasing emissions of greenhouse gases, we must maintain

a diverse supply of electricity, and nuclear power must be part of

that mix. Nuclear energy is the only carbon-free source of electricity that is currently operating on a commercial scale nationwide. We know how to use nuclear energy, and we know how to

use it safely. But if we are to continue to benefit from safe, emissions-free nuclear power for at least 20 percent of our electricity,

there is at least one more issue that must be resolved: what do we

do with the growing inventories of spent nuclear fuel?

Yucca Mountain was to be the solution. However, its intended

opening slipped from 1998 to 2010, and now it is likely to slip

again to 2012 or 2014, according to the Department of Energy. This

failure to open Yucca Mountain as scheduled or deal with the spent

fuel accumulating at our nuclear power plants in other ways may

soon cost the Federal Government up to $1 billion annually in legal

liability and interim storage costs. And when it does finally open,

Yucca Mountain will be full. It is limited by statute to store only

as much spent fuel as will have been created by 2010.

That Yucca Mountain, for all its intents and purposes, already is

full should come to no surprise. If you think of nuclear fuel like a

log, we currently burn only three percent of that log at both ends

and then pull it out of the fire to bury it in a mountain. The bulk

of what we call nuclear ‘‘waste’’ is actually nuclear ‘‘fuel’’ that still

contains over 90 percent of its original energy content. Does that

make any sense? No, but that is our current policy, and it is just

plain wasteful. Unless we do something different or take another

approach, a second repository, or an expanded Yucca Mountain,

will be required. Politically, fiscally, and logistically, this will be no

easy task, and could preclude greater use of emissions-free nuclear

power.

For years now, scientists at DOE and a number of its national

laboratories have been working on ‘‘new approaches’’ to dealing

with commercial spent nuclear fuel and solving the long-term

Yucca Mountain problem. More specifically, they have developed

technologies and processes to do something with spent nuclear fuel

besides bury it all in a mountain, like reprocess and then recycle

parts of it into new fuel for reactors.

There are many advantages to these technologies, which have

names like UREX+ and pyroprocessing. Let me just name a few.

First, they are proliferation resistant unlike the 30- to 40-yearold technologies already in use.

Second, they reduce the volume of our nuclear waste, which

could render another Yucca Mountain unnecessary.

9

And third, they could reduce the toxicity, the heat and radioactivity, of the waste.

To fully realize these benefits and deal with the growing inventory of spent fuel, the fiscal year 2006 Energy and Water Appropriations bill, passed by the House last month, requires the Department of Energy to develop an integrated spent fuel recycling plan

by the start of fiscal year 2007, and select a reprocessing technology by the end of fiscal year 2007. I am pleased, timing was perfect, that my colleague and author of that bill, Chairman Hobson,

has joined us here today.

These activities could be the key to better managing our spent

fuel. Reprocessing is just one step in the entire fuel cycle, the cradle-to-grave path of nuclear fuel. However, it is the first step to

better managing our waste. We can learn lessons from what the

French and Japanese have done with reprocessing. I know I did

after visiting the French reprocessing facilities with Chairman

Hobson in early April. We can continue to improve upon their technologies, processes, and monitoring capabilities.

But we almost certainly won’t achieve these improvements without first doing a comprehensive systems analysis. Technology decisions for reprocessing must take into account technology and policy

decisions for the entire fuel cycle. For example, we need to know

if the reprocessing technologies under discussion here today are

compatible with designs for the next generation nuclear plant.

Through modeling that incorporates the relevant technical, economic, and policy considerations, this ‘‘systems approach’’ will

allow us to optimize the fuel cell and make an informed decision

about reprocessing.

Finally, how much could all of this cost? And that is a good and

important question, which is why it will be the subject of another

hearing at a later date.

This is a complex topic and one that involves many interrelated

technical and policy issues. Yet the technologies and policies we

will discuss today could help determine whether nuclear energy becomes an even more significant source of emissions-free electricity

when we need it most in the years to come.

And so to conclude, I want to thank the witnesses for agreeing

to share their knowledge and insight with us today. I look forward

to an open and spirited debate on this very important subject.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Biggert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JUDY BIGGERT

I want to welcome everyone to this hearing on the nuclear fuel cycle, and the potential for reprocessing and recycling to help us better manage the Nation’s growing

inventory of spent nuclear fuel.

To start, I want to quickly review our current situation to put today’s hearing into

some context. Twenty years from now, electricity demand in the United States is

expected to increase by 50 percent. If we are to meet this incredible growth in demand without significantly increasing emissions of greenhouse gases, we must

maintain a diverse supply of electricity, and nuclear power must be part of that mix.

Nuclear energy is the only carbon-free source of electricity that is currently operating on a commercial scale nation-wide. We know how to use nuclear energy, and

we know how to use it safely. But if we are to continue to benefit from safe, emissions-free nuclear power for at least 20 percent of our electricity, there is one more

issue that must be resolved—what we do with growing inventories of spent nuclear

fuel.

10

Yucca Mountain was to be the solution. However, its intended opening slipped

from 1998 to 2010, and is now likely to slip again to 2012 or 2014 according to the

Department of Energy (DOE). This failure to open Yucca Mountain as scheduled—

or deal with the spent fuel accumulating at our nuclear power plants in other

ways—may soon cost the Federal Government up to $1 billion annually in legal liability and interim storage costs. And when it does finally open, Yucca Mountain

will be full. It is limited by statute to store only as much spent fuel as will have

been created by 2010.

That Yucca Mountain, for all intents and purposes, already is full should come

as no surprise. If you think of nuclear fuel like a log, we currently burn only three

percent of that log at both ends, and then pull it out of the fire to bury it in a mountain. The bulk of what we call nuclear ‘‘waste’’ is actually nuclear ‘‘fuel’’ that still

contains over 90 percent of its original energy content. Does that make any sense?

No, but that’s our current policy, and it’s just plain wasteful. Unless we do something different or take another approach, a second repository, or an expanded Yucca

Mountain, will be required. Politically, fiscally, and logistically, this will be no easy

task, and could preclude greater use of emissions-free nuclear power.

For years now, scientists at DOE and a number of its national laboratories have

been working on ‘‘new approaches’’ to dealing with commercial spent nuclear fuel

and solving the long-term Yucca Mountain problem. More specifically, they have developed technologies and processes to do something with spent nuclear fuel besides

bury it all in a mountain, like reprocess and then recycle parts of it into new fuel

for reactors.

There are many advantages to these technologies, which have names like UREX+

and pyroprocessing. Let me just name a few.

First. They are proliferation resistant unlike the 30- to 40-year-old technologies

already in use.

Second. They reduce the volume of our nuclear waste, which could render another

Yucca Mountain unnecessary.

Third. They also could reduce the toxicity—the heat and the radioactivity—of the

waste.

To fully realize these benefits and deal with the growing inventory of spent fuel,

the Fiscal Year 2006 Energy and Water Appropriations bill, passed by the House

last month, requires the DOE to develop an integrated spent fuel recycling plan by

the start of fiscal year 2007, and select a reprocessing technology by the end of fiscal

year 2007. I am pleased that my colleague and the author of that bill, Chairman

Hobson, has joined us here today.

These activities could be the key to better managing our spent fuel. Reprocessing

is just one step in the entire fuel cycle—the cradle-to-grave path of nuclear fuel.

However, it is the first step to better managing our waste. We can learn lessons

from what the French and the Japanese have done with reprocessing. I know I did

after visiting French reprocessing facilities with Chairman Hobson in early April.

We can continue to improve upon their technologies, processes, and monitoring capabilities.

But we almost certainly won’t achieve these improvements without first doing a

comprehensive systems analysis. Technology decisions for reprocessing must take

into account technology and policy decisions for the entire fuel cycle. For example,

we need to know if the reprocessing technologies under discussion here today are

compatible with designs for the next generation nuclear plant (NGNP). Through

modeling that incorporates the relevant technical, economic, and policy considerations, this ‘‘systems approach’’ will allow us to optimize the fuel cycle and make

an informed decision about reprocessing.

Finally, how much could all this cost? That’s a good and important question,

which is why it will be the subject of another hearing at a later date.

This is a complex topic, and one that involves many interrelated technical and

policy issues. Yet the technologies and policies we will discuss today could help determine whether nuclear energy becomes and even more significant source of emissions-free electricity when we need it most in the years to come. And so to conclude,

I want to thank the witnesses for agreeing to share their knowledge and insight

with us today, and I look forward to an open and spirited debate on this very important subject.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. And with that, I now recognize the—Mr.

Honda, the Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee, for an

opening statement.

Mr. HONDA. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman, and thank you

for holding this very important hearing today.

11

From early on in the Nation’s nuclear energy program, the ‘‘plan’’

to recycle, reprocess is the technical term, the fuel used in the reactor, to reduce the amount of material defined as waste and stretch

the supply of available material needed for the generation of electricity.

Indeed, scattered across America are facilities that were built in

anticipation of a ‘‘closed’’ back end fuel cycle, such as those at West

Valley, New York, Morris, Illinois, and Barnwell, South Carolina.

These facilities never fulfilled their mission, however, because of

two principal factors.

First, the Carter Administration’s decision to abandon the reprocessing in the 1970s based on concerns raised about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and second, economics.

The Reagan Administration reversed course on the issue of

whether domestic reprocessing should serve as a tool in our nonproliferation policy, but even then no reprocessing began.

Then, as now, it didn’t make economic sense to develop a domestic recycling capacity, partly because of the stagnation that developed in the U.S. nuclear energy construction program.

Also, the so-called ‘‘megatons to megawatts’’ program that takes

Russian weapons-grade uranium and down-blends it to the lower

concentrations needed for nuclear power reactors has helped to

keep down the cost of reactor fuel, making reprocessing uneconomical.

Whether we like it or not, it seems clear that this Administration

is leading us to a new era in the use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity over the next several decades.

This will create new demand for fuel, and the changing conditions may well make the economics of reprocessing as a means of

supplying material for fuel more favorable.

Additionally, our nation is left with 50,000 metric tons of commercial spent fuel currently being stored at 73 sites in 33 states,

and each nuclear power reactor continues to produce 20 tons of

highly radioactive waste every year.

Even if a waste repository at Yucca Mountain opens and functions as planned, it would have only enough space to store the nuclear waste the United States is expected to generate by 2010.

If reprocessing can facilitate either a reduction in ultimate waste

volumes or positively affect the challenge of isolating the ultimate

waste form from the accessible environment, then perhaps we

should assign some ‘‘value’’ to those societal goods, further affecting

the economic balance.

In short, we may need to take a long-term approach to this issue

and see if, indeed, it is not time to reexamine some fundamental

tenets of U.S. fuel cycle policy.

But in doing so, we must be sure to be mindful of the threat any

changes might pose in terms of nuclear proliferation.

At a time when the United States is seeking to discourage other

nations from acquiring technologies that would produce weapon-usable plutonium, we do not want to send the signal that the United

States is seeking to commercialize those very technologies.

I look forward to learning more from the witnesses about the

state of the technology today, the economics surrounding that technology, and its nonproliferation implications.

12

Thank you again, Madame Chairwoman, and I yield back the

balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Honda follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL M. HONDA

Madam Chairwoman, thank you for holding this important hearing today.

From early on in the Nation’s nuclear energy program, the ‘‘plan’’ was to recycle,

reprocess is the technical term, the fuel used in the reactor, to reduce the amount

of material defined as waste and stretch the supply of available material needed for

the generation of electricity.

Indeed, scattered across America are facilities that were built in anticipation of

a ‘‘closed’’ back end fuel cycle, such as those at West Valley, NY, Morris, IL, and

Barnwell, SC.

These facilities never fulfilled their mission, however, because of two principal factors:

First, the Carter Administration’s decision to abandon reprocessing in the 1970’s

based on concerns raised about the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and second, economics.

The Reagan Administration reversed course on the issue of whether domestic reprocessing should serve as a tool in our non-proliferation policy, but even then no

reprocessing began.

Then, as now, it didn’t make economic sense to develop a domestic recycling capacity, partly because of the stagnation that developed in the U.S. nuclear energy

construction program.

Also, the so-called ‘‘megatons to megawatts’’ program that takes Russian weaponsgrade uranium and down-blends it to the lower concentrations needed for nuclear

power reactors has helped to keep down the cost of reactor fuel, making reprocessing uneconomical.

Whether we like it or not, it seems clear that this Administration is leading us

to a new era in the use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity over the

next several decades.

This will create new demand for fuel, and the changing conditions may well make

the economics of reprocessing as a means of supplying material for fuel more favorable.

Additionally, our nation is left with 50,000 metric tons of commercial spent fuel

currently being stored at 73 sites in 33 states, and each nuclear power reactor continues to produce 20 tons of highly radioactive waste every year.

Even if a waste repository at Yucca Mountain opens and functions as planned,

it would have only enough space to store the nuclear waste the U.S. is expected to

generate by about 2010.

If reprocessing can facilitate either a reduction in ultimate waste volumes or positively affect the challenge of isolating the ultimate waste form from the accessible

environment, then perhaps we should assign some ‘‘value’’ to those societal goods—

further affecting the economic balance.

In short, we may need to take a long-term approach to this issue and see if indeed

it is not time to re-examine some fundamental tenets of U.S. fuel cycle policy.

But in doing so, we must be sure to be mindful of the threat any changes might

pose in terms of nuclear proliferation.

At a time when the United States is seeking to discourage other nations from acquiring technologies that would produce weapon-usable plutonium, we do not want

to send the signal that the U.S. is seeking to commercialize those very technologies.

I look forward to learning more from the witnesses about the state of the technology today, the economics surrounding that technology, and its non-proliferation

implications.

Thank you again Madam Chairwoman, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you.

At this time, I would like to extend a warm welcome to my colleague from Ohio, Mr. Hobson, Chairman of the Energy and Water

Development Appropriations Subcommittee. And I would ask unanimous consent that Chairman Hobson be allowed to sit in with the

Committee and participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so

ordered.

Chairman Hobson, would you like to say a few words?

13

Mr. HOBSON. Well, it is hard to say a few words when you are

a Congressman, but I will try.

I want to thank the Chairwoman for allowing me to be here with

all of you today, and I am really here to listen for a few moments.

I do have to leave, but I want to demonstrate our support together

with this committee and my Committee for the work that you are

doing.

I think this is most important to the future of our country. Recycling, or reprocessing, is something that I think we need to do. Recently, we sent some material to France, and it was recycled and

returned to this country where it is going to be burned in a nuclear

power plant in this country. There aren’t any dire consequences of

doing all of that. It is too bad we couldn’t do it here. This has a

lot of economic benefit to this country in the future, and what we

are trying to do is get the dialogue going and to get some real action.

I know that what we did in our bill is a little controversial, but

it is a way to kick the can over to try to start people to talk about

things and to get some new processes, if necessary. This is being

done in the rest of the world. We need to relook at our policies that

were determined probably 50 years or so ago. But I want to also

say that I am very supportive of Yucca Mountain. I just don’t want

to get the Yucca Mountain II any sooner than we have to, and this

is a way of not doing that.

But I want to thank you for the courage that you have taken to

step forward, Madame Chairwoman, to raise this issue and to look

at it from your Committee’s standpoint, and I commend you for

that. And thank you for allowing me to be here.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you very much for coming today.

And let us see. Any additional opening statements submitted by

the Members may be added to the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO

Good morning. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before our committee

to examine the status of nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies in the United States.

Every nuclear power reactor produces approximately 20 tons of highly radioactive

nuclear waste every year. Today, the waste is stored on-site at the nuclear reactors

in water-filled cooling pools, or at some sites, after sufficient cooling, in dry casks

above ground. It is important to note that a recent report issued by the National

Academy of Sciences concluded this stored waste could be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Therefore, it is critical we begin to review our current nuclear waste policies

and access possible policy options that may come before the Congress in the next

few years.

Today’s hearing marks the beginning of an important policy discussion on reprocessing technologies and the impact it will have on energy efficiency, nuclear waste

management and weapons proliferation. I believe we should carefully examine the

advantages and disadvantages of using reprocessing, and evaluate the policy options

before making any decisions. At the same time, we cannot back away or retract from

addressing critical national security concerns, such as nuclear waste management

and weapons proliferation just because nuclear reprocessing is a controversial issue.

Within my home State of Illinois, the only nuclear engineering department is at

the University of Illinois. This is particularly alarming because our state has 11 operating nuclear power reactors, Argonne National Laboratory, where Dr. Phillip

Finck is from, and other nuclear facilities. Illinois residents have paid more than

$2.4 billion on the federal Nuclear Waste Fund. My state has a large stake in nuclear power and technology and under-supported programs and initiatives that could

improve upon our nuclear capabilities are quite troubling.

14

I am interested in hearing from our witnesses about the feasibility of selecting

a reprocessing technology by 2007. Over time, technology will develop, interest will

continue to grow, and economic circumstances may change in ways that point clearly in one direction. I believe we have an obligation to set aside sufficient funds so

that we are not passing unfunded obligations on to our children and grandchildren,

but not at the risk of implementing decisions prematurely, thereby depriving future

generations of what might turn out to be better options developed later.

I welcome our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

Examining nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies is a vital step in developing energy policy for the United States. Currently, this country relies on nuclear reactors

for roughly 20 percent of our total energy. While nuclear energy provides less reliance on foreign oil and produces no greenhouse gas emissions, there is the persistent concern about nuclear waste. Today, this waste is stored on-site at the nuclear reactors power facilities. This is not only a safety concern, but also makes

these facilities prime targets to terrorist attack. In order to move towards the future, we must examine the best methods to deal with this waste—whether it’s

through reprocessing or moving it to another location. This hearing is a key step

in beginning this dialogue for the future.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. And with that, we will turn to our witnesses.

And I thank you all for coming this morning. And first of all, we

have Mr. Shane Johnson, who is the Acting Director of the Office

of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology and the Deputy Director for Technology at the Department of Energy. Next is Mr. Matthew Bunn, who is a Senior Research Associate in the Project on

Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy

School of Government. Thank you for coming. And then Dr. Roger

Hagengruber. I am going to stumble over that all day long.

Hagengruber. He serves at the University of New Mexico as Director of the Office for Policy, Security, and Technology, Director of

the Institute for Public Policy, and professor of political science,

and he chairs the Nuclear Energy Study Group of the American

Physical Society, which issued a May 2005 report: ‘‘Nuclear Power

and Proliferation Resistance: Securing Benefits, Limiting Risks.’’

And last, but not least, is Dr. Phillip Finck, who is the Deputy Associate Laboratory Director, Applied Science and Technology and

National Security at Argonne National Laboratory right in Illinois

in my District. Welcome. And welcome to you all.

As the witnesses know, spoken testimony will be limited to five

minutes each, after which the members will have five minutes each

to ask questions.

And we will begin with Mr. Johnson. You are recognized for five

minutes.

STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT SHANE JOHNSON, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY; DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR TECHNOLOGY, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. JOHNSON. Chairman Biggert, Congressman Honda, Members

of the Committee, and Chairman Hobson, I would like to thank you

for the opportunity to speak today on the Department of Energy’s

efforts to develop and demonstrate advanced spent fuel separations

and recycling technologies.

15

I have submitted a written statement for the record, but would

like to provide a few summary remarks.

As you know, the President’s National Energy Policy recommended the expansion of nuclear energy in the United States.

To do this, we must also develop and apply advanced technologies,

including advanced proliferation resistance, spent fuel treatment

technologies, and next generation reactor technologies.

These fuel treatment technologies are aimed at safely and securely reducing the amount of commercial spent fuel requiring disposal in a geologic repository. These technologies, in combination

with Generation IV reactors, hold the promise of deferring, perhaps

indefinitely, the need for a second repository while reducing the inventory of civilian plutonium.

While the United States is a leader in the development of these

technologies, it is important to note that other nations with domestic nuclear programs are also investigating similar technologies.

The policy underpinnings of our Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative

and our international cooperation is found in the May 2001 National Energy Policy, which states that the United States should

consider technologies in collaboration with international partners

with highly-developed fuel cycles and a record of close cooperation

to develop fuel treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant.

The technologies being developed in our Advanced Fuel Cycle

program present a significant advantage in proliferation resistance

over separation technologies currently being used in other parts of

the world and which were previously used in the United States,

namely the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction process, or PUREX.

PUREX is an aqueous separations process that was deployed in the

United States in the mid-1950s to separate high-purity plutonium

and uranium from fission products and minor transuranic elements

in irradiated nuclear fuels.

Over the last several years, our Advanced Fuel Cycle program

has made significant progress in the development of advanced separation processes. We have successfully demonstrated the feasibility of the Uranium Extraction Plus, or UREX+, process at laboratory scale using actual spent nuclear fuel and are planning integrated experiments at larger scale. The UREX+ process is an advanced process that separates uranium from spent nuclear fuel at

a very high level of purity. Unlike the PUREX process, UREX+

does not produce a separated plutonium product and thus provides

a considerable advantage in reducing proliferation risks.

The Department is also investigating alternative separations

technology, called pyroprocessing. Pyroprocessing technology employs high-temperature operations that use selective reduction and

oxidation steps in molten salts and metals to recover nuclear materials.

The scale-up of these technologies from laboratory-scale to engineering-scale is possible with minimal technical risk. Using existing facilities, engineering-scale verification experiments could be

underway in five to six years with possible commercial-scale operations possible in 10 to 12 years. Fuel fabrication experiments, as

well as commercial-scale operations, would lag the demonstration

of the separations technology by two to four years. However, modiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Dec 08, 2005 Jkt 021711 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\ENER05\061605\21711 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
16

fying existing structures presents numerous technical and regulatory challenges.

An option to existing facilities is a greenfield approach for the engineering-scale demonstration. If such an engineering-scale operation were conducted in a new facility, the demonstration experiments could begin in approximately nine years, and it is anticipated that commercial—that would—that the technology would be

commercially available within about 20 years. Again, fuel fabrication would lag, the separations work by about two to four years.

The Administration is currently examining recommendations of

the Congress contained in the U.S. House of Representatives report

accompanying the Energy and Water Development Appropriations

bill for fiscal year 2006 specifically that the Department should inform a decision by fiscal year 2007 on a preferred separations technology and develop an integrated spent fuel management plan by

that time that will ensure safe, secure, and efficient deployment of

nuclear power around the globe.

We look forward to working closely with the Congress on what

is a key issue to spent nuclear fuel management today and into the

future.

Madame Chairman, this completes my statement, and I would be

pleased to answer any questions you might have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT SHANE JOHNSON

Chairman Biggert, Ranking Member Honda, and Members of the Committee, I

would like to thank you for the opportunity to speak before the Committee on

Science, Subcommittee on Energy concerning United States and international efforts

to develop and demonstrate advanced spent fuel separations and recycling technologies. Also, I thank you for your leadership in the area of nuclear energy technologies and for your interest in pursuing solutions to the Nation’s challenges with

the disposition of commercial spent nuclear fuel.

As you know, the President’s 2001 National Energy Policy recommended the expansion of nuclear energy in this country to reduce our dependence on imported

fuels needed for electricity generation and to reduce emissions. To meet these challenges, we must develop and apply advanced technologies, including advanced nuclear fuel cycles and next generation reactor technologies, and development of advanced fuel treatment technologies. These efforts are aimed at developing new advanced proliferation-resistant spent fuel treatment technologies to reduce the

amount of commercial high level waste and spent fuel requiring storage in a geologic repository. If successful, these efforts could substantially improve repository capacity. In the longer-term future, these technologies in combination with advanced

nuclear reactor technologies hold the promise of deferring, perhaps indefinitely, the

need for a second repository, while reducing the inventory of civilian plutonium.

My testimony today focuses on U.S. efforts to develop new advanced separations

technologies technologies that are more efficient, less waste intensive and more proliferation resistant—our progress in developing these technologies, and additional

work that is needed to demonstrate commercial viability of these technologies. While

the United States is a leader in development of these technologies, it is important

to recognize that other nations (e.g., France, Japan, the United Kingdom, China,

India, and Russia) with domestic nuclear programs are also investigating these

technologies. Collaborations are also underway between the United States and several of these countries. A fundamental objective of U.S. collaborations is development of advanced proliferation resistant fuel cycle technologies that will set the

standard for future international deployment of fuel cycle facilities.

BACKGROUND

The policy underpinnings of the Department of Energy’s Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative and its program for international cooperation with other countries is contained in the May 2001 National Energy Policy, which states that:

17

‘‘. . .in the context of developing advanced nuclear fuel cycles and next generation technologies for nuclear energy, the United States should re-examine its

policies to allow for research, development and deployment of fuel conditioning

methods that reduce waste streams and enhance proliferation resistance. In

doing so, the United States will continue to discourage the accumulation of separated plutonium, worldwide.’’

The policy further states that the United States should consider technologies, in

collaboration with international partners with highly-developed fuel cycles and a

record of close cooperation, to develop fuel treatment technologies that are cleaner,

more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant.

Inherent in this recommendation is the recognition that regardless of anticipated

growth in nuclear generation, the Nation needs to establish a permanent geological

repository for spent nuclear fuel from the operation of our existing commercial nuclear power plants. Further, growth in nuclear energy in the United States using

the current spent fuel management approach would require construction of additional geologic repositories to address spent nuclear fuel inventories generated by

the operation of additional nuclear power plants. However, development of advanced

separations technologies present a potential alternative to building new repositories,

optimizing the current geologic repository, and enabling more efficient use of our nuclear fuel resources.

As such, separations technologies are under development in the United States and

by other countries to reduce the volume, toxicity, and fissile material content of

spent nuclear fuel requiring the disposal in a permanent geologic repository. These

advanced technologies are aimed at avoiding the proliferation issues associated with

separated plutonium while resulting in significantly smaller quantities of high-level

radioactive waste, enabling optimization of the geological repository.

These new technologies present a significant advantage in proliferation resistance

over existing separations technologies being used in other parts of the world today

and which were used previously in the United States—the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PURER) technology. PURER is an aqueous separations process that was

deployed initially in the mid-1950s to recover high purity plutonium and uranium

from fission products and minor transuranic elements (elements heavier than uranium). PURER has been deployed commercially in several countries—principally

France, the United Kingdom, Japan and Russia.

In the future, we believe that advanced separations technologies, such as URanium EXtraction Plus (UREX+), could enable us to further extend the useful life of

any geologic repository and reduce the radiotoxicity of the waste it contains such

that it would decay to the toxicity of natural uranium ore in less than 1,000 years—

instead of over 100,000 years as is the case with our current, untreated spent nuclear fuel. This technology could also allow our nuclear plants to use a far higher

fraction of the energy contained in uranium ore, potentially expanding the lifetime

of the world’s nuclear fuel resources from around 100 years up to 1,000 years.

DEVELOPMENT OF INNOVATIVE SEPARATIONS TECHNOLOGIES

Over the last several years, the Department’s Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative has

made significant progress in the development of new fuel treatment technologies,

particularly as applied to the development of the UREX+ technology, a technology

that separates uranium from spent nuclear fuel at a very high level of purity. This

is important because it demonstrates the feasibility of greatly reducing the mass of

material that would require disposal in a geologic repository. The research has also

successfully demonstrated the ability to separate the short-term heat generating

constituents of spent fuel and the partitioning of the transuranic elements. Unlike

the PUREX process, the UREX+ process does not produce a separated plutonium

product which provides a considerable advantage in reducing proliferation risk.

Presently, the Department has demonstrated the feasibility of the UREX+ process

based on laboratory-scale tests using actual spent nuclear fuel. While the results

from our laboratory-scale tests coupled with general industrial-scale experience

could provide a high level of confidence that the general direction being recommended is technically feasible, integrated processing experiments carried out successfully at a larger engineering-scale would be needed before there is sufficient information to design and build new facilities or make needed major modifications to

existing facilities for commercial-scale operations.

While the UREX+ process has great potential to address the spent fuel challenges

associated with today’s commercial light water reactors, the Department has also

been investigating an alternative separations technology called pyroprocessing,

which is more appropriate for treating advanced fuels from fast reactors like those

under investigation in the Department’s Generation IV reactor program that may

be developed and deployed in the long-term future. The pyroprocessing technology

18

employs high-temperature operations that use selective reduction and oxidation in

molten salts and metals to recover nuclear materials. The pyrochemical processing

technology is also supportive of nonproliferation objectives in that the resulting separated fuel material is adequate for use in fueling advanced fast-neutron spectrum

reactors but represents a significant reduction in proliferation risk as the plutonium

remains mixed with the other transuranic elements and fission products. The largest scale application of this technology is found at the Idaho National Laboratory

where engineering-scale treatment of sodium-bonded spent nuclear fuel from the

shutdown Experimental Breeder Reactor II has provided several years of research

and operations data. At maximum capacity, this engineering-scale demonstration is

capable of processing up to three metric tons of spent nuclear fuel annually.

DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED FUEL CYCLE TECHNOLOGIES

The United States presently employs a once-through fuel cycle—that is, the spent

fuel is not recycled but rather discharged from the reactor and maintained in interim storage at the reactor site pending future shipment to a geologic repository.

However, as discussed previously, a number of countries operate a partially closed

fuel cycle in that the plutonium is removed from the spent fuel at a reprocessing

facility and is sent to a fuel fabrication facility to be blended with fresh uranium

and re-fabricated into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel pellets. The pellets are placed into

cladding material and bundled into fuel assemblies for subsequent return to light

water reactors capable of using MOX as fuel. The other spent fuel constituents are

immobilized in glass for storage in a geologic repository. The Department is pursuing an approach similar to this one used by other countries to create MOX from

surplus weapons grade plutonium.

The Department’s Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative fuels development includes proliferation-resistant fuels for light water reactors, fuels that will enable transmutation of transuranics in Generation IV reactors, and all fuels for the fast reactor

group of Generation IV reactors. The objective of these technologies is to avoid separating plutonium in a pure form. The resultant mixed oxide fuel would contain some

or all of the minor actinides (neptunium, americium and curium) contained in the

spent fuel to enhance its proliferation resistance and allow for further reductions

in the volume and radiotoxicity of the resulting high-level wastes. In each of these

technologies, the benign residual fission products would be sent to a geologic repository with the exception of iodine-129 and strontium/cesium which would be disposed

by means other than a geologic repository. These approaches are anticipated to increase the effective capacity of a geologic repository by a factor of 50 to 100.

In fast reactor scenarios, actinides from spent fuel can be processed to separate

them from the bulk of the fission products and uranium. The actinide stream can

then be used to manufacture fuel for use in fast reactors. Because the fuel is highly

radioactive, the fuel fabrication process must be conducted in shielded facilities, conferring an additional degree of proliferation resistance.

Commercial scale-up of these spent fuel technologies can, based on our recent

analysis, be performed relatively rapidly, if existing domestic facilities could be substantially modified and utilized. Using existing facilities, engineering-scale

verification experiments for a chosen separation technology could be underway in

five to six years and commercial-scale operations could begin in ten to twelve years.

Fuel fabrication experiments and commercial-scale operations would lag the demonstration of the separations technology by two to four years. However, retrofitting

existing structures to demonstrate commercial viability of spent fuel treatment presents numerous technical and regulatory challenges and may not be the most reasonable approach. For example, a down-side to retrofitting existing structures would

be the current age of the structure and inherent inflexibilities such as the introduction and testing of modern instrumentation for process control, accountability and

proliferation resistance.

An alternate scenario could be to build a ‘‘greenfield’’ engineering-scale demonstration facility that could provide assurance of the commercial viability of spent

fuel treatment and fuel fabrication technologies. If both the engineering-scale and

commercial-scale operations were conducted in new facilities designed from the

ground up, engineering-scale experiments of a selected separations process could

begin in approximately nine years and commercial operation, in about twenty.

Again, fuel fabrication would lag by two to four years.

CONCLUSION

Over the last few years, the Department has successfully demonstrated the technical feasibility of advanced, proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technologies. Engineering-scale demonstrations, however, are needed to demonstrate with reasonable confidence the commercial feasibility of these technologies. We look forward to working

19

closely with the Congress on the key issue of spent nuclear fuel management today

and in the future.

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR ROBERT SHANE JOHNSON

Shane Johnson is the Acting Director of DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Science

and Technology. He was appointed to this position in May 2005, upon the resignation of the prior Director.

In this capacity, Mr. Johnson leads the Department’s nuclear energy enterprise,

including nuclear technology research and development; management of the Department’s nuclear technology infrastructure; and support to nuclear education in the

United States. Mr. Johnson also serves as the Lead Program Secretarial Officer for

the Idaho National Laboratory, the Department’s lead laboratory for nuclear technology research, development and demonstration.

Since 2000, Mr. Johnson has led the Office’s nuclear technology initiatives, serving a key leadership role in the initiation and management of all of the Office’s

major research and development initiatives, including the Generation IV Nuclear

Energy Systems Initiative, the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, and the Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative. In 2004, Mr. Johnson was promoted to the position of Deputy Director for Technology, where his responsibilities also include management of the Nuclear Power 2010 program and initiatives aimed at strengthening university nuclear

science and engineering programs in the United States.

Mr. Johnson serves a central role in the Department’s efforts to reassert U.S.

leadership in nuclear technology development. He led the formation of the Generation IV International Forum (GIF), an international collective of ten leading nations

and the European Union’s Euratom, dedicated to developing advanced reactor and

fuel cycle technologies. He leads the Office’s international cooperation activities, including establishment of cooperative research agreements with other countries and

the development by the GIF of the Generation IV technology roadmap, which resulted in the selection of six promising reactor and fuel cycle technologies by the

GIF for future development efforts. Mr. Johnson currently serves as the acting

chairman of the GIF, pending election of a permanent chairman, and has served as

the U.S. representative to the policy committee since 2001.

Mr. Johnson has over twenty years of relevant management and engineering experience within Government and industry. Prior to joining DOE, Mr. Johnson was

employed for five years by Duke Power Company and Stoner Associates, Inc. where

he was responsible for performing engineering studies for nuclear, natural gas, and

water utilities.

Mr. Johnson received his B.S. degree in Nuclear Engineering from North Carolina

State University and his M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering from Pennsylvania

State University. He is a licensed professional engineer.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson.

And now Mr. Bunn, you are recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF MR. MATTHEW BUNN, SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM, HARVARD

UNIVERSITY, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

Mr. BUNN. Madame Chairwoman and Members of the Committee, it is an honor to be here today to discuss a subject that is

very important to the future of nuclear energy and efforts to stem

the spread of nuclear weapons, that is reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

I support limited continued R&D on advanced fuel cycle concepts

that may offer promise for the future, but I believe a near-term decision to reprocess U.S. commercial spent nuclear fuel would be a

serious mistake, with costs and risks far outweighing its potential

benefits.

Let me make seven points to support that view.

First, reprocessing, by itself, does not make any of the nuclear

waste go away. It simply separates—it is a chemical process that

separates the radioactive materials into different components. Only

20

if the added complexity of recycling or transmutation follows reprocessing is there a potential, not yet demonstrated, for destroying

many of the long-lived radioactive materials. Whatever course we

choose, we will still need nuclear waste repositories, such as Yucca

Mountain.

As we heard, in the traditional process, known as PUREX, the

spent fuel is separated into plutonium, which is weapons-usable,

recovered uranium, and high-level waste. More advanced processes,

like UREX+ and pyroprocessing, attempt to address some of the

problems of PUREX, but whether they will do so successfully remains to be seen.

Second, reprocessing using current technologies or technologies

available in the near-term would substantially increase, not decrease, the costs of nuclear waste management. In a recent Harvard study, we found, making assumptions quite favorable to reprocessing, that the costs of reprocessing and recycling would be

about 80 percent higher than those of direct disposal, and other

studies, including government studies in countries that are enthusiastic about reprocessing, such as France and Japan, have come

to similar conclusions.

The one mill per kilowatt-hour nuclear waste fee would no longer

be sufficient. Either the fee would have to be substantially increased, or tens of billions of dollars in taxpayer subsidies would

have to be provided, or onerous regulations would have to be imposed to force the industry to build and operate the needed facilities itself.

The UREX+ technology now being researched adds a number of

complex separation steps to the traditional PUREX approach and

appears likely to further increase costs. Other processes might

some day reduce costs, but this remains to be demonstrated. Official studies in recent years have predicted that the advanced processing and transmutation technologies being pursued would be

more expensive than traditional approaches, not less.

Third, reprocessing and recycling using the technologies now

commercially available means separating, fabricating, and transporting tons of weapons-usable plutonium every year, when even a

few kilograms is enough for a bomb, inevitably raising proliferation

risks not posed by direct disposal. It is crucial to understand that

any state or group that could make a bomb from weapon-grade plutonium would also be able to make a bomb from the reactor-grade

plutonium separated by reprocessing.

Moreover, a near-term U.S. return to reprocessing would make

it more difficult to achieve President Bush’s goal of convincing

other countries not to build their own reprocessing facilities. The

new approaches, as Mr. Johnson mentioned, are designed not to

separate pure plutonium, but the plutonium-bearing materials that

would be separated in either the UREX+ process or by

pyroprocessing would not be radioactive enough to meet international standards for being very difficult to steal. And if these

technologies were widely deployed in the developing world where

most of the future growth in electricity demand will be, that would

contribute to the spread of expertise, experience, and facilities that

could be readily turned to a nuclear weapons program.

21

Fourth, while unfortunately no complete life cycle comparison of

the safety and terrorism risks of reprocessing and direct disposal

has yet been done, it seems clear that extensive processing of intensely radioactive fuel in the presence of highly volatile chemicals

presents more opportunities for radioactive releases than simply

leaving the fuel untouched in large casks.

Fifth, the waste management benefits that might be derived are

quite limited. While the new technologies have, as their goal, reducing both the volume of waste to be disposed and its long-term

hazard, the reality is that the projected radiological doses from geologic repositories are already quite low, and there are a variety of

approaches to providing additional disposal capacity at Yucca

Mountain or elsewhere without recycling, and these have not yet

been adequately examined.

Sixth, the potential energy benefits are also quite limited. There

is, indeed, quite a lot of energy in spent fuel, but in today’s market,

it is like oil shale: there is a lot of energy in it, but the cost of getting that energy out is much more than that energy is worth.

World resources of uranium recoverable at prices far below those

at which reprocessing would make sense are sufficient to fuel a

growing global nuclear enterprise for many decades without recycling.

Seventh, and perhaps most important, there is no need to rush

to make this decision. We have today a proven, commercially-available technology that will manage spent fuel cheaply, safely, and securely for decades, and that is dry casks, which utilities around the

country are buying today. We can, and should, allow time for technology to develop further and for this decision to be made with

care. Our generation does have an obligation to set aside enough

funds so that future generations are not left with an unfunded obligation, but we have no obligation to rush to judgment. Our grandchildren will not thank us for implementing a technology today and

depriving them of options that might be better that might be developed later.

Indeed, because the repository will remain open for 50 to 100

years, with spent fuel readily retrievable, proceeding forward with

direct disposal would leave all options open for the future. It is a

good thing that there is no need to rush, because the technologies

available are at a very early stage of development. Only the most

limited, as we heard, laboratory-scale experiments have been completed to date, and serious systems analysis of the costs of the different options, their safety and terrorism resistance, their proliferation impacts, prospects for licensing, and public acceptance have

not yet been done.

I recommend that we follow the bipartisan advice of the National

Commission on Energy Policy, which concluded that the United

States should continue its moratorium on reprocessing, should expand interim spent fuel storage capacities, should proceed with all

deliberate speed toward opening a permanent geologic waste repository, and should continue R&D on advanced fuel cycle approaches.

At the same time, the U.S. Government should redouble its efforts: to limit the spread of reprocessing and enrichment technologies around the world, as a critical element of President Bush’s

efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons; to ensure that every

22

1Some residents of Nevada seem to see reprocessing, incorrectly, as an alternative to Yucca

Mountain, but none of the strategies now proposed would eliminate the need for a repository

for highly toxic nuclear waste. Indeed, it might surprise Nevadans to know that a stated purpose of the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative is to make it possible to bury the nuclear waste from

a much larger quantity of electricity generation in Yucca Mountain—albeit after transmutation

that, it is hoped, would reduce the long-term radioactive dangers posed by this waste.

nuclear warhead and every kilogram of both plutonium and highlyenriched uranium worldwide is secure and accounted for, as a key

element of our efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism; and to convince

other countries to end the accumulation of plutonium stockpiles

while working to reduce stockpiles of both plutonium and highlyenriched uranium around the world.

Some day, approaches to reprocessing and recycling may be developed that make sense. Research and development should explore

such possibilities, but we should not rush to judgment now. If we

want nuclear energy to grow enough to make a significant contribution to meeting the climate change challenge, that will require

building support from governments, publics, and utilities around

the world, and doing that means making nuclear energy as cheap,

as simple, as safe, as proliferation-resistant, and as terrorism-proof

as possible. Reprocessing using any of the technologies we have

now or will have in the near-term points in the wrong direction on

every count. And therefore, those who hope for a bright future for

nuclear energy ought to oppose near-term reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

I would be happy to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bunn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MATTHEW BUNN

The Case Against a Near-Term Decision to Reprocess Spent

Nuclear Fuel in the United States

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee: It is an honor to be here

today to discuss a subject that is very important to the future of nuclear energy and

efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons—reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

I believe that, while research and development (R&D) on advanced concepts that

may offer promise for the future should continue, a near-term decision to reprocess

U.S. commercial spent nuclear fuel would be a serious mistake, with costs and risks

far outweighing its potential benefits. Let me make seven points to support that

view.

First, reprocessing by itself does not make any of the nuclear waste go away.

Whatever course we choose, we will still need a nuclear waste repository such as

Yucca Mountain.1 Reprocessing is simply a chemical process that separates the radioactive materials in spent fuel into different components. In the traditional process, known as PUREX, reprocessing produces separated plutonium (which is weapons-usable), recovered uranium, and high-level waste (containing all the other transuranic elements and fission products). In the process, intermediate and low-level

wastes are also generated. More advanced processes now being examined, such as

UREX+ and pyroprocessing, attempt to address some of the problems of the PUREX

process, but whether they will do so successfully remains to be seen. Once the spent

fuel has been reprocessed, the plutonium and uranium separated from the spent

fuel can in principle be recycled into new fuel; in the more advanced processes, some

other long-lived species would also be irradiated in reactors (or accelerator-driven

assemblies) to transmute them into shorter-lived species.

More Expensive

Second, reprocessing and recycling using current or near-term technologies would

substantially increase the cost of nuclear waste management, even if the cost of

both uranium and geologic repositories increase significantly. In a recent Harvard

study, we concluded, even making a number of assumptions that were quite favorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Dec 08, 2005 Jkt 021711 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\ENER05\061605\21711 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
23

2See Matthew Bunn, Steve Fetter, John P. Holdren, and Bob van der Zwaan, The Economics

of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel (Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing

the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, December 2003, available as of June 9, 2005 at http://

bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA¥content/documents/repro-report.pdf). For quite similar conclusions, see John Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz, co-chairs, The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003, available

as of June 9, 2005 at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/). The MIT study presents the results of

its fuel cycle cost calculations differently, comparing the cost of a new low-enriched uranium fuel

element to those of a new plutonium fuel element, assigning all the costs of reprocessing to the

plutonium incorporated in the new fuel element, rather than considering reprocessing as part

of the cost of spent fuel management and comparing the cost of managing a fuel element by

direct disposal to those of managing it by reprocessing and recycling, as the Harvard study does.

But these are differences of presentation, which have no effect on the estimated per-kilowatthour costs of the two fuel cycles; with the exception of a few differences in assumptions (more

favorable to reprocessing in the case of the Harvard study), the conclusions of the two studies

on the economics are very similar. 3France and Japan have been two of the countries most dedicated to reprocessing spent nuclear fuel; in both countries, and in the U.K., reprocessing continues not because it is economic

but because of the inertia of past decisions and investments, the lack of available space for

multi-decade interim storage of spent fuel, and arguments that the process will eventually have

environmental and energy-security benefits. The French study compared a scenario in which all

of the low-enriched uranium fuel produced in French reactors was reprocessed to a hypothetical

scenario in which reprocessing and recycling had never been introduced, and found that not reprocessing would have saved tens of billions of dollars compared to the all-reprocessing case,

and would have reduced total electricity generation costs by more than five percent. See JeanMichel Charpin, Benjamin Dessus, and Rene ́ Pellat, Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear

Power Option (Paris, France: Office of the Prime Minister, July 2000, available as of December

16, 2003 at http://fire.pppl.gov/eu¥fr¥fission¥plan.pdf), Appendix 1. In Japan, the official esti- mate is that reprocessing and recycling will cost more than $100 billion over the next several

decades. Studies performed by both the government and the utilities a decade ago concluded

that direct disposal of spent fuel would be much less costly; new analyses performed for an advisory committee to the Japan Atomic Energy Commission in 2004 came to similar conclusions.

See, for example, Mark Hibbs, ‘‘AEC Advisory Panel Clears Japan’s Rokkashomura for Reprocessing,’’ Nuclear Fuel, November 8, 2004; and Mark Hibbs, ‘‘Japan’s Look at Long-Term Policy

May Solve Rokkashomura Puzzle,’’ Nuclear Fuel, July 19, 2004. The government’s withholding

of the data on these past studies caused a scandal in Japan. In France, the electric utility is

state-owned, and so can be directed to pursue reprocessing even if it is the more expensive approach; in Japan, the utilities are seeking legislation that would subsidize the costs of reprocessing with a government-imposed charge to all electricity users. 4George F. Vandegrift et al., ‘‘Designing and Demonstration of the UREX+ Process Using

Spent Nuclear Fuel,’’ paper presented at ‘‘ATALANTE 2004: Advances for Future Nuclear Fuel

Cycles,’’ Nimes, France, June 21–24, 2004, available as of June 10, 2005 at http://

www.cmt.anl.gov/science-technology/processchem/Publications/Atalante04.pdf. 5See, for example, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Nuclear Energy

Agency, Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles: A Comparative Study (Paris, France: NEA, 2002, available as of December 16, 2003 at

http://www.nea.fr/html/ndd/reports/2002/nea3109-ads.pdf), p. 211 and p. 216; U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Generation IV Roadmap: Report of the Fuel Cycle

Crosscut Group (Washington, DC: DOE, March 18, 2001, available as of July 25, 2003 at http:/

/www.ne.doe.gov/reports/GenIVRoadmapFCCG.pdf.), p. A2–6 and p. A2–8.

able to reprocessing, that shifting to reprocessing and recycling would increase the

costs of spent fuel management by more than 80% (after taking account of appropriate credits or charges for recovered plutonium and uranium from reprocessing).2

Reprocessing (at an optimistic reprocessing price) would not become economic until

uranium reached a price of over $360 per kilogram—a price not likely to be seen

for many decades, if then. Government studies even in countries such as France and

Japan have reached similar conclusions.3 The UREX+ technology now being pursued

adds a number of complex separation steps to the traditional PUREX process, in

order to separate important radioactive isotopes for storage or transmutation,4 and

there is little doubt that reprocessing and transmutation using this process would

be even more expensive. Other processes might someday reduce the costs, but this

remains to be demonstrated, and a number of recent official studies have estimated

costs for reprocessing and transmutation that are far higher than the costs of traditional reprocessing and recycling, not lower.5

To follow this course, either the current one mill/kilowatt-hour nuclear waste fee

would have to be substantially increased, or billions of dollars in tax money would

have to be used to subsidize the effort. Since facilities required for reprocessing and

transmutation would not be economically attractive for private industry to build, the

U.S. Government would either have to build and operate these facilities itself, give

private industry large subsidies to do so, or impose onerous regulations requiring

private industry to do so with its own funds. All of these options would represent

dramatic government intrusions into the nuclear fuel industry, and the implications

24

6For an authoritative unclassified discussion, see Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives,

DOE/NN–0007 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, January 1997), pp. 38–39. 7The Royal Society, Management of Separated Plutonium (London: Royal Society, 1998, summary available at http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=11407 as of June 10, 2005. 8See Jungmin Kang and Frank von Hippel, ‘‘Limited Proliferation-Resistance Benefits From

Recycling Unseparated Transuranics and Lanthanides From Light-Water Reactor Spent Fuel,’’

Science & Global Security, forthcoming. 9For a discussion of the importance of these elements of proliferation resistance, see Matthew

Bunn, ‘‘Proliferation Resistance (and Terror-Resistance) of Nuclear Energy Systems,’’ lecture for

‘‘Nuclear Energy Economics and Policy Analysis,’’ Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April

12, 2004, available as of June 10, 2005 at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA¥content/documents/prolif-resist-lecture04.pdf.

of such intrusions have not been appropriately examined. I am pleased that the

Subcommittee plans a later hearing with representatives from the nuclear industry

to discuss these economic and institutional issues.

Unnecessary proliferation risks

Third, traditional approaches to reprocessing and recycling pose significant and

unnecessary proliferation risks, and even proposed new approaches are not as proliferation-resistant as they should be. It is crucial to understand that any state or

group that could make a bomb from weapon-grade plutonium could make a bomb

from the reactor-grade plutonium separated by reprocessing.6 Despite the remarkable progress of safeguards and security technology over the last few decades, processing, fabricating, and transporting tons of weapons-usable separated plutonium

every year—when even a few kilograms is enough for a bomb—inevitably raises

greater risks than not doing so. The dangers posed by these operations can be reduced with sufficient investment in security and safeguards, but they cannot be reduced to zero, and these additional risks are unnecessary.

Indeed, contrary to the assertion in the Energy and Water appropriations subcommittee report that plutonium reprocessing in other countries poses little risk because the plutonium is immediately recycled as fresh fuel—a conclusion that would

not be correct even if the underlying assertion were true—the fact is that reprocessing is far outpacing the use of the resulting plutonium as fuel, with the result that

over 240 tons of separated, weapons-usable civilian plutonium now exists in the

world, a figure that will soon surpass the amount of plutonium in all the world’s

nuclear weapons arsenals combined. The British Royal Society, in a 1998 report,

warned that even in an advanced industrial state like the United Kingdom, the possibility that plutonium stocks might be ‘‘accessed for illicit weapons production is

of extreme concern.’’ 7

Moreover, a near-term U.S. return to reprocessing could significantly undermine

broader U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies. President Bush has announced an effort to convince countries around the world to forego reprocessing and enrichment

capabilities of their own; has continued the efforts of past administrations to convince other states to avoid the further accumulation of separated plutonium, because of the proliferation hazards it poses; and has continued to press states in regions of proliferation concern not to reprocess (including not only states such as

North Korea and Iran, but also U.S. allies such South Korea and Taiwan, both of

which had secret nuclear weapons programs closely associated with reprocessing efforts in the past). A U.S. decision to move toward reprocessing itself would make

it more difficult to convince other states not to do the same.

Advocates argue that the more advanced approaches now being pursued would be

more proliferation-resistant. Technologies such as pyroprocessing are undoubtedly

better than PUREX in this respect. But the plutonium-bearing materials that would

be separated in either the UREX+ process or by pyroprocessing would not be radioactive enough to meet international standards for being ‘‘self-protecting’’ against

possible theft.8 Moreover, if these technologies were deployed widely in the developing world, where most of the future growth in electricity demand will be, this

would contribute to potential proliferating states building up expertise, real-world

experience, and facilities that could be readily turned to support a weapons program.9

Proponents of reprocessing and recycling often argue that this approach will provide a nonproliferation benefit, by consuming the plutonium in spent fuel, which

would otherwise turn geologic repositories into potential plutonium mines in the

long-term. But the proliferation risk posed by spent fuel buried in a safeguarded repository is already modest; if the world could be brought to a state in which such

repositories were the most significant remaining proliferation risk, that would be

cause for great celebration. Moreover, this risk will be occurring a century or more

25

10For a discussion, see John P. Holdren, ‘‘Nonproliferation Aspects of Geologic Repositories,’’

presented at the ‘‘International Conference on Geologic Repositories,’’ October 31–November 3,

1999, Denver, Colorado; available as of June 10, 1995 at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=presentation&item¥id=1. 11See, for example, Brian G. Chow and Gregory S. Jones, Managing Wastes With and Without

Plutonium Separation, Report P–8035 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999). 12This is because the uranium and plutonium separated by the traditional PUREX process,

not being very mobile in the geologic environment, are not significant contributors in models

of the long-term radiation releases from a geologic repository. 13 Nuclear Energy Study Group, American Physical Society Panel on Public Affairs, Nuclear

Power and Proliferation Resistance: Securing Benefits, Limiting Risk (Washington, D.C.: American Physical Society, May 2005, available as of June 9, 2005 at http://www.aps.org/public¥affairs/proliferation-resistance), p. 17.

from now, and if there is one thing we know about the nuclear world a century

hence, it is that its shape and contours are highly uncertain. We should not increase

significant proliferation risks in the near-term in order to reduce already small and

highly uncertain proliferation risks in the distant future.10

As-yet-unexamined safety and terrorism risks

Fourth, reprocessing and recycling using technologies available in the near-term

would be likely to raise additional safety and terrorism risks. Until Chernobyl, the

world’s worst nuclear accident had been the explosion at the reprocessing plant at

Khystym in 1957, and significant accidents at both Russian and Japanese reprocessing plants occurred as recently as the 1990s. No complete life-cycle study of the safety and terrorism risks of reprocessing and recycling compared to those of direct disposal has yet been done by disinterested parties. But it seems clear that extensive

processing of intensely radioactive spent fuel using volatile chemicals presents more

opportunities for release of radionuclides than does leaving spent fuel untouched in

thick metal or concrete casks.

Limited waste management benefits

Fifth, the waste management benefits that might be derived from reprocessing

and transmutation are quite limited. Two such benefits are usually claimed: decreasing the repository volume needed per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated (potentially eliminating the need for a second repository after Yucca Mountain); and

greatly reducing the radioactive dangers of the material to be disposed.

It is important to recognize that reprocessing and recycling as currently practiced

(with only one round of recycling the plutonium as uranium-plutonium mixed oxide

(MOX) fuel) does not have either of these benefits. The size of a repository needed

for a given amount of waste is determined not by the volume of the waste but by

its heat output. Because of the build-up of heat-emitting higher actinides when plutonium is recycled, the total heat output of the waste per kilowatt-hour generated

is actually higher—and therefore the needed repositories larger and more expensive—with one round of reprocessing and recycling than it is for direct disposal.11

And the estimated long-term doses to humans and the environment from the repository are not noticeably reduced.12

Newer approaches that might provide a substantial reduction in radiotoxic hazards and in repository volume are complex, likely to be expensive, and still in an

early stage of development. Most important, even if they achieved their goals, the

benefits would not be large. The projected long-term radioactive doses from a geologic repository are already low. No credible study has yet been done comparing the

risk of increased doses in the near-term from the extensive processing and operations required for reprocessing and transmutation to the reduction in doses thousands to hundreds of thousands of years in the future that might be achieved by

this method.

With respect to reducing repository volume, while the Department of Energy

(DOE) has not yet performed any detailed study of the maximum amount of spent

fuel that could be emplaced at Yucca Mountain, there is little doubt that even without reprocessing, the mountain could hold far more than the current legislative

limit. There are a variety of approaches to providing additional capacity at Yucca

Mountain or elsewhere without recycling. Indeed, as a recent American Physical Society report noted, it is possible that even if all existing reactors receive license extensions allowing them to operate for 60 years, Yucca Mountain will be able to hold

all the spent fuel they will generate in their lifetimes, without reprocessing.13 While

proponents of reprocessing and transmutation point to the likely difficulty of licensing a second repository in the United States after Yucca Mountain’s capacity is

filled, it is likely to be at least as difficult to gain public acceptance and licenses

for the facilities needed for reprocessing and transmutation—particularly as such faVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Dec 08, 2005 Jkt 021711 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\ENER05\061605\21711 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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14For an initial discussion of these points, see Bunn, Fetter, Holdren, and van der Zwaan,

The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, pp. 64–66. 15 John Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz, co-chairs, The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003, available as of

June 9, 2005 at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/), p. 123. They present this result as uranium

consumption per kilowatt-hour being 15 percent less for the recycling case; equivalently, if uranium consumption is fixed, then electricity generation is 18 percent higher for the recycling

case. 16For discussion, see ‘‘Appendix B: World Uranium Resources,’’ in Bunn, Fetter, Holdren, and

van der Zwaan, The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel. 17See, for example, Allison Macfarlane, ‘‘Don’t Put Waste on Military Bases,’’ Boston Globe,

June 4, 2005.

cilities will likely pose more genuine hazards to their neighbors than would a nuclear waste repository.14

Limited energy benefits

Sixth, the energy benefits of reprocessing and recycling would also be limited. Additional energy can indeed be generated from the plutonium and uranium in spent

fuel. But in today’s market, spent fuel is like oil shale: getting the energy out of

it costs far more than the energy is worth. In the only approach to recycling that

is commercially practiced today—which involves a single round of recycling as MOX

fuel in existing light-water reactors—the amount of energy generated from each ton

of uranium mined is increased by less than 20 percent.15 In principle, if, in the future, fast-neutron breeder reactors become economic, so that the 99.3 percent of natural uranium that is U–238 could be turned to plutonium and burned, the amount

of energy that could be derived from each ton of uranium mined might be increased

50-fold.

But there is no near-term need for this extension of the uranium resource. World

resources of uranium likely to be economically recoverable in future decades at

prices far below the price at which reprocessing would be economic are sufficient

to fuel a growing global nuclear enterprise for many decades, relying on direct disposal without recycling.16

Nor does reprocessing serve the goal of energy security, even for countries such

as Japan, which have very limited domestic energy resources. If energy security

means anything, it means that a country’s energy supplies will not be disrupted by

events beyond that country’s control. Yet events completely out of the control of any

individual country—such as a theft of poorly guarded plutonium on the other side

of the world—could transform the politics of plutonium overnight and make major

planned programs virtually impossible to carry out. Japan’s experience following the

scandal over BNFL’s falsification of safety data on MOX fuel, and following the accidents at Monju and Tokai, all of which have delayed Japan’s plutonium programs

by many years, makes this point clear. If anything, plutonium recycling is much

more vulnerable to external events than reliance on once-through use of uranium,

whose supplies are diverse, plentiful, and difficult to cut off.

Premature to decide—and no need to rush

Seventh, there is no need to rush to make this decision in 2007, or in fact any

time in the next few decades. Dry storage casks offer the option of storing spent

fuel cheaply, safely, and securely for decades. During that time, technology will develop; interest will accumulate on fuel management funds set aside today, reducing

the cost of whatever we choose to do in the long run; political and economic circumstances may change in ways that point clearly in one direction or the other; and

the radioactivity of the spent fuel will decay, making it cheaper to process in the

future, if need be. Our generation has an obligation to set aside sufficient funds so

that we are not passing unfunded obligations on to our children and grandchildren,

but it is not our responsibility to make and implement decisions prematurely, thereby depriving future generations of what might turn out to be better options developed later. Indeed, because the repository will remain open for 50–100 years, with

the spent fuel readily retrievable, moving forward with direct disposal will still

leave all options open for decades to come.

Similarly, there is no need to rush to set up new interim storage sites on DOE

or military sites, and no possibility of performing the needed reviews and getting

the needed licenses to do so by 2006, as the Energy and Water appropriations subcommittee proposed.17 There is a legitimate debate as to whether such interim spent

fuel storage prior to emplacement in a geologic repository should be centralized at

one or two sites, or whether in most cases the fuel should continue to be stored at

existing reactor sites. In any case, the government should fulfill its obligations to

the utilities by taking title to the fuel and paying the cost of storage. At the same

27

18 Vandegrift et al., ‘‘Designing and Demonstration of the UREX+ Process Using Spent Nuclear Fuel.’’

time, we should continue to move toward opening a permanent geologic repository

as quickly as we responsibly can—in part because public acceptance of interim spent

fuel storage facilities is only likely to be forthcoming if the public is convinced that

they will not become permanent waste dumps.

Nor is there any need to rush on deciding whether a second nuclear waste repository will be needed. While existing nuclear power plants will have discharged

enough fuel to fill the current legislated capacity limit within a few years, the reality is that it will be decades before sufficient fuel to fill Yucca Mountain has in

fact been emplaced. We can and should defer this decision, and take the time to consider the options in detail. Congress should consider amending current law and giving the Secretary of Energy another decade or more before reporting on the need

for a second repository.

Proponents of deciding quickly on reprocessing sometimes argue that such decisions are necessary because no new nuclear reactors will be purchased unless sufficient geologic repository capacity for all the spent fuel they will generate throughout

their lifetimes has already been provided. I do not believe this is correct. I believe

that if the government is fulfilling its obligation to take title to spent fuel and pay

the costs of managing it, and clear progress is being made toward opening and operating a nuclear waste repository, investors will have sufficient confidence that they

will not be saddled with unexpected spent fuel obligations to move forward. By contrast, if the government were seriously considering drastic changes in spent fuel

management approaches which might major increases in the nuclear waste fee, investors might well wish to wait to see the outcome of those decisions before investing in new nuclear plants.

It is a good thing there is no need to rush, as we simply do not have the information that would be needed to make a decision on reprocessing in 2007. The advanced

reprocessing technologies now being pursued are in a very early stage of development. As of a year ago, UREX+ had been demonstrated on a total of one pin of real

spent fuel, in a small facility—and had not met all of its processing goals in that

test.18 Frankly, in my judgment there is little prospect that further development of

complex multi-stage aqueous separations processes such as UREX+ will result in

processes that will provide low costs, proliferation resistance, and waste management benefits sufficient to make them worth implementing in competition with direct disposal. Pyroprocessing has been tried on a somewhat larger scale over the

years, but the process is designed for processing metals, and significant development

is still needed to be confident in industrial-scale application to the oxide spent fuel

from current reactors. Other, longer-term processes might offer more promise, but

too little is known about them to know for sure.

So far, we do not have a credible life-cycle analysis of the cost of a reprocessing

and transmutation system compared to that of direct disposal; DOE has yet to do

any detailed estimate of how much spent fuel can be placed in Yucca Mountain, and

of non-reprocessing approaches to extending that capacity; we do not have a realistic

evaluation of the impact of a reprocessing and transmutation on the existing nuclear

fuel industry; we do not have a serious evaluation of the licensing and public acceptance issues facing development and deployment of such a system; we do not have

any serious assessment of the safety and terrorism risks of a reprocessing and

transmutation system, compared to those of direct disposal; and we do not yet have

assessments of the proliferation implications of the proposed systems that are detailed enough to support responsible decision-making. In short, now is the time for

continued research and development, and additional systems analysis, not the time

for committing to processing using any particular technology.

Recommendations

For the reasons just outlined, I recommend that we follow the advice of the bipartisan National Commission on Energy Policy, which reflected a broad spectrum of

opinion on energy matters generally and on nuclear energy in particular, and recommended that the United States should:

(1) ‘‘continue indefinitely the U.S. moratoria on commercial reprocessing of

spent nuclear fuel and construction of commercial breeder reactors;’’

(2) establish expanded interim spent fuel storage capacities ‘‘as a complement

and interim back-up’’ to Yucca Mountain;

(3) proceed ‘‘with all deliberate speed’’ toward licensing and operating a permanent geologic waste repository; and

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19 National Commission on Energy Policy, Ending the Energy Stalemate: A Bipartisan Strategy

to Meet America’s Energy Challenges (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Energy Policy,

December 2004, available as of June 9, 2005, at http://www.energycommission.org/

ewebeditpro/items/O82F4682.pdf), pp. 60–61. 20For detailed recommendations, see Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb

2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2005, available as of

June 10, 2005 at http://www.nti.org/cnwm). 21 John Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz, co-chairs, The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003, available as of

June 9, 2005 at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/). 22 Nuclear Energy Study Group, American Physical Society Panel on Public Affairs, Nuclear

Power and Proliferation Resistance: Securing Benefits, Limiting Risk (Washington, D.C.: American Physical Society, May 2005, available as of June 9, 2005 at http://www.aps.org/public¥affairs/proliferation-resistance). 23For earlier discussions of this point, see, for example, John P. Holdren, ‘‘Improving U.S. Energy Security and Reducing Greenhouse-Gas Emissions:The Role of Nuclear Energy,’’ testimony

to the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives, July 25, 2000, available as of June 10, 2005 at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=testimony&item¥id=9; and Matthew Bunn, ‘‘Enabling A Significant Future For Nuclear Power: Avoiding Catastrophes, Developing New Technologies, Democratizing Decisions—And Staying Away From Separated Plutonium,’’ in Proceedings of Global

’99: Nuclear Technology—Bridging the Millennia, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 30-September

2, 1999 (La Grange Park, Ill.: American Nuclear Society, 1999, available as of June 10, 2005

at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=book&item¥id=2).

(4) continue research and development on advanced fuel cycle approaches that

might improve nuclear waste management and uranium utilization, without

the huge disadvantages of traditional approaches to reprocessing.19

At the same time, the U.S. Government should redouble its efforts to: (a) limit

the spread of reprocessing and enrichment technologies, as a critical element of a

strengthened nonproliferation effort; (b) ensure that every nuclear warhead and

every kilogram of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) worldwide are secure and accounted for, as the most critical step to prevent nuclear terrorism;20 and (c) convince other countries to end the accumulation of plutonium

stockpiles, and work to reduce stockpiles of both plutonium and HEU around the

world. The Bush Administration should, in particular, resume the effort to negotiate

a 20-year U.S.–Russian moratorium on separation of plutonium that was almost

completed at the end of the Clinton Administration.

Similar recommendations have been made in the MIT study on the future of nuclear energy,21 and in the American Physical Society study of nuclear energy and

nuclear weapons proliferation.22

It remains possible that someday approaches to reprocessing and recycling will be

developed that make security, economic, political, and environmental sense. Research and development should explore such possibilities. Continued investment in

R&D on advanced fuel cycle technologies is justified, in part to ensure that the

United States will have the technological expertise and credibility to play a leading

role in limiting the proliferation risks of the fuel cycle around the world. But the

leverage of these technologies in meeting the most serious energy challenges of the

21st century is likely to be somewhat limited in comparison to the promise of other

potential future energy technologies, and the emphasis that nuclear fuel cycle R&D

should receive in the overall energy R&D portfolio should reflect that.

The global nuclear energy system would have to grow substantially if nuclear energy was to make a substantial contribution to meeting the world’s 21st century

needs for carbon-free energy. Building the support from governments, utilities, and

publics needed to achieve that kind of growth will require making nuclear energy

as cheap, as simple, as safe, as proliferation-resistant, and as terrorism-proof as possible. Reprocessing using any of the technologies likely to be available in the nearterm points in the wrong direction on every count.23 Those who hope for a bright

future for nuclear energy, therefore, should oppose near-term reprocessing of spent

nuclear fuel.

BIOGRAPHY FOR MATTHEW BUNN

Matthew Bunn is a Senior Research Associate in the Project on Managing the

Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. His current research interests include

nuclear theft and terrorism; security for weapons-usable nuclear material in the

former Soviet Union and worldwide; verification of nuclear stockpiles and of nuclear

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warhead dismantlement; disposition of excess plutonium; conversion in Russia’s nuclear cities; and nuclear waste storage, disposal, and reprocessing.

Before joining the Kennedy School in January 1997, he served for three years as

an adviser to the Office of Science and Technology Policy, where he played a major

role in U.S. policies related to the control and disposition of weapons-usable nuclear

materials in the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, and directed a secret study for

President Clinton on security for nuclear materials in Russia. Previously, Bunn was

at the National Academy of Sciences, where he directed the two-volume study Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. He is a consultant to the

Nuclear Threat Initiative, and a member of the Board of Directors of the RussianAmerican Nuclear Security Advisory Council (an organization devoted to promoting

nuclear security cooperation between the United States and Russia), the Arms Control Association, and the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

Bunn is the author or co-author of a dozen books and book-length technical reports (most recently including Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives), and dozens of articles in magazines and newspapers ranging from Foreign

Policy and The Washington Post to Science and Nuclear Technology. He appears regularly on television and radio. Bunn received his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees

in political science, specializing in defense and arms control, from the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology in 1985. He is married to Jennifer Weeks, and lives in Watertown, Massachusetts. They have two daughters, Claire and Nina.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you.

Dr. Hagengruber, you are recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROGER HAGENGRUBER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE FOR POLICY, SECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY; DIRECTOR,

INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY; AND, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. Thank you, Madame Chairman, and I appreciate the invitation by the Committee to——

Chairwoman BIGGERT. If you could, pull the mike a little bit closer to you. Thank you.

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. Thank you, Madame Chairman. I appreciate

the invitation of the Committee to testify today.

As you mentioned earlier, the Nuclear Energy Study Group was

convened by the American Physical Society’s Panel on Public Affairs. We have a report, which we have submitted for the record.

I—it treats several matters related to nuclear energy.

The first is related to the question of reprocessing. At this point,

we don’t see a foreseeable expansion of nuclear power in the United

States that would make a qualitative change to the need for spent

fuel storage, at least for a few decades. Even though Yucca Mountain may be delayed considerably, the interim storage of spent fuel

in dry casks, it—the current sites, or at a few regional sites, is, we

believe, safe and affordable, at least for a couple of decades into the

future. So we believe that there is time to be able to take a more

enduring and prudent decision with respect to reprocessing in regard to the issue of proliferation.

We have identified a number of areas in our report of proliferation-resistant and cost-effective technologies that we think should

be pursued. Some of these are, in fact, being addressed in the Department of Energy. They include issues of integration of advanced

safeguards into reprocessing systems, additional approaches to

adulterating or making the material less attractive. But I think

that a detailed examination by nuclear weapon experts of the viability of this material in a true national nuclear weapons program

is desperately needed, and that is an extensive and rather detailed

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classified portion of research, which I do not believe, at this point,

has been accomplished.

We think, in a way, it is in the best interest of the United States

to maintain a reprocessing research program and to seek proliferation-resistant and cost-effective reprocessing technologies if they

can be found. We don’t oppose the eventual reprocessing but believe an early decision, given the current status, could threaten the

growth of the use of nuclear energy in the future. And by the way,

nuclear energy growth is something that the American Physical Society supports and supports quite strongly.

We don’t think that we should force a decision that might diminish the growing momentum for nuclear energy. An early decision

on reprocessing may not have the policy robustness that can sustain it through the next two decades of almost certain persistent

threat of proliferation. From our decade’s worth of work and public

survey on nuclear matters at the University of New Mexico, we

know that energy and waste management issues are not as volatile

in the minds of the public as the issue of proliferation.

The goal of our recommendations here is straightforward. If reprocessing technology is determined to be adequately proliferationresistant and cost-effective, reprocessing can emerge then as a consensus decision with industrial, scientific, political, and public support. The stronger the consensus, in my view, the more sustainable

the momentum for nuclear energy, and the more assured that the

schedule for proceeding with the nuclear fuel cycle for the rest of

this century.

On the other hand, we recognize the importance of timetables

and respect Chairman Hobson’s desire to have people appear by

2007 with some decisions made, and we certainly applaud that, because it does tend to force people to move. We would suggest, perhaps, that maybe 2007 is a good time to look at the status of the

development of technologies for this purpose. Maybe they will be

ready to go forward. But when those hearings are held, we think

that strong and vigorous discussions should occur over the proliferation-resistance associated with these technologies, not just in

the United States, we are not the threat of proliferation, but if, in

fact, pursued across the world.

Now we want to address one last item before completing my testimony, and that is the importance of reinvigorating research and

development in technical safeguards for the International Atomic

Energy Commission. Most of the technology today that has provided safeguards that detected programs in North Korea and in

Iran is technology that was developed in a vigorous program conducted during the 1970s. This program at the time, in today’s dollars, probably numbered some tens of millions of dollars. Today’s

investment in research and development for international safeguards is only a few million dollars, and is a very small amount

of money considering the opportunities provided by the advanced

technologies of this decade and the decade before. In addition, the

expansion of enhanced safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Commission during the 1990s offers opportunities for monitoring that are unprecedented in the first two decades of the NPT.

There are a number of areas, just to illustrate the point, we

know today how to produce cost-effective, internationally-acceptVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Dec 08, 2005 Jkt 021711 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\ENER05\061605\21711 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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able, continuous monitoring through satellite links, providing assured security for an instance of air sampling systems that can be

used in conjunction with reprocessing or enrichment facilities. It is

literally impossible for such facilities to, in fact, create unapproved

procedures or material without being detected in some fashion by

that type of rigorous sampling. In addition, the control that we use

frequently in our nuclear weapons, the things that have assured us

with this very high reliability associated with nuclear things, can,

in fact, be integrated into the operations of facilities, assuring more

detectable capability on the part of the United States to be able to

see the operation of facilities in unauthorized ways.

In conclusion, the extent to which nuclear power will be an enduring option to meet future energy requirements in many regions

of the world depend upon the steps that Congress takes now to

manage the associated proliferation risks. Prudent management requires pursuing proliferation-resistant technologies exclusively and

developing international agreements that limit the spread of enrichment facilities and investing in a strong safeguards program.

Subject to your questions, that is my testimony, Madame Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hagengruber follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER HAGENGRUBER

Thank you Congresswoman Biggert and Members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify.

I’m Roger Hagengruber. I am a physicist by training and currently Director of the

Office for Policy, Security and Technology (OPS&T) at the University of New Mexico. From 1991 to 1999, I was Senior Vice President of Sandia National Laboratory

directing their nuclear weapons programs. I spent much of my more than 30 years

at Sandia in arms control and non-proliferation activities including several tours in

Geneva as a negotiator.

I am also Chair of the Nuclear Energy Study Group (NESG), convened by the

Panel on Public Affairs of the American Physical Society. We examined technical options for raising the barrier between nuclear power and nuclear weapons proliferation. With your permission, I would like to include a copy of the report in the hearing record.

We reached conclusions in three general areas: technical safeguards, proliferation

resistance evaluation & design, and reprocessing.

Let me first say that I am presenting the consensus view of a diverse group of

scientists who are experts on nuclear power and proliferation issues. Over the

course of their careers, members of the NESG held positions as DOE Undersecretary of Energy, Chair of the DOE Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee,

director of research for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and acting Assistant

Secretary of Defense.

Over the course of several months of discussion, we developed a consensus position on reprocessing. Here are our three main points:

• There is no urgent need to reprocess.

• Take the time to get the science right.

• Do no harm.

Let me say a few words about each point.

No Urgency

No foreseeable expansion of nuclear power in the U.S. will make a qualitative

change to the need for spent fuel storage over the next few decades. Even though

Yucca Mountain may be delayed considerably, interim storage of spent fuel in dry

casks, either at current reactor sites, or at a few regional facilities, or at a single

national facility, is safe and affordable for a period of at least 50 years.

The U.S. can take some of the next ten years to evaluate technologies and make

a more enduring and prudent decision on reprocessing.

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Get the Science Right

A decision on reprocessing shouldn’t outpace the science. DOE should take the

necessary time to carry out more thorough reprocessing research to identify the

most proliferation resistant and cost effective technology. Examples of areas of research that could be most useful are:

— Detailed evaluations by nuclear weapons experts regarding the implications

of the reprocessed material on a reliable yet concealable weapons program

by a proliferating country.

— Concepts for the integration of advanced safeguards (e.g., use control) into

reprocessing systems.

— Additional approaches to increasing the inherent protection of the reprocessed material by additional adulteration or other means.

And let me be clear, it is in the best interests of the U.S. to maintain a reprocessing research program and seek a proliferation resistant and cost-effective reprocessing technology. We do not oppose eventual reprocessing, but believe an early decision,

given the current status, could threaten future growth in the use of nuclear energy.

We believe that by pursuing appropriate reprocessing technology that gives the

highest priority to proliferation resistance, the U.S. retains the ability to influence

future directions, both technical and institutional, of the international community.

Do No Harm

We should not force a decision that might diminish the growing momentum for

nuclear power.

We should take a lesson from the past. More than forty years ago, the Atomic Energy Commission, in an effort to establish a self-sufficient, domestic commercial nuclear power industry, set in motion the transfer of nuclear fuel reprocessing from

the Federal Government to private industry. In response to this call, Nuclear Fuel

Services, a private company, built the West Valley plutonium reprocessing plant in

upstate New York but without addressing economic and safety issues adequately.

The plant began operating in 1966 and closed six years later to address safety, environmental and efficiency problems. It never re-opened. The costs for retrofitting

were too high, and public concern about the plant had grown too large.

I think the lesson is clear: we must be cautious and not rush into reprocessing

again until the safety, proliferation and cost issues are well understood and have

been addressed properly.

The goal of our recommendations is straightforward: If a reprocessing technology

is determined to be adequately proliferation resistant and cost-effective, reprocessing can emerge as a consensus decision with industrial, scientific, political, and public support.

That said, I have to make a confession. As a former VP of Sandia, I recognize

the value of timetables. I understand the importance of Congressman Hobson requiring action by 2007.

Timetables keep programs from becoming endless academic exercises.

And while the science may not be able to deliver a proliferation resistant and costeffective technology by 2007, that doesn’t mean you don’t try.

So, I applaud Congressman Hobson for challenging the scientists to deliver. That

is an effective way to motivate programs.

Nevertheless, I think we should be cautious about our expectations. The lesson

from the Nation’s West Valley foray is that we must proceed carefully.

So, I would make a modest suggestion.

Yes, as Congressman Hobson requires, have the DOE report on the state of reprocessing science in 2007. But, instead of having DOE recommend a particular

technology that ‘‘should’’ be implemented in 2007—I suggest that DOE identify the

most promising technology at that juncture were a decision to be made to begin development and that its report include a detailed discussion of the relationship of the

technology to the prospect of proliferation. And we must be realistic in our expectations. It may be that despite the best efforts of all involved, the most promising

technology in 2007 may still not be satisfactory to all the necessary stakeholders.

I’m recommending a modest change of tone. The change keeps a reprocessing decision as a goal but maintains an open view on the ability to deliver a cost-effective

and truly proliferation resistant technology by 2007.

The DOE is currently researching reprocessing technologies including

pyroprocessing and UREX+. An aspect of assessing proliferation resistance is determining whether the intensity of radioactive ‘‘self-protection’’ of the resulting waste

is sufficient to prevent or deter its clandestine development into a nuclear weapon.

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Our study group considered the proliferation resistance of UREX+. Some members

believed that the current version of UREX+ would create a plutonium byproduct so

hot that it was incapable of being used to make a weapon. Others thought that

UREX+ ‘‘self-protection’’ is lower than the ‘‘self-protection’’ of current U.S. fuel cycle

waste.

Research is on going at DOE to settle this question. We’ll see what the research

bears out. But, based on my nearly 20 years of involvement in nuclear weapons design I’ll make one observation. The ultimate assessment should not be based on

whether it is theoretically possible to make a weapon from the waste. A meaningful

assessment must evaluate practical factors associated with making a weapon: the

level of technical sophistication, the willingness to assume risk, the financial resources available, and the likelihood of success. These are difficult factors to evaluate—some of them will require extensive classified treatment—but I urge DOE to

approach the assessment in this manner.

If no cost-effective and proliferation resistant reprocessing technology emerges in

2007, then the U.S. will continue to promote its current path of open-cycle & enrichment. A number of experts are concerned that this path presents significant proliferation risks, as evidenced by Iran. I concur; the spread of centrifuge technology

is a significant national security risk.

There are numerous proposals for new international agreements to limit the

spread of enrichment technologies. In our report we examined technical steps to

limit proliferation. These steps will be most effective when coupled with changes in

institutional arrangements.

The first technological step is to improve the primary line of defense against proliferation—international technical safeguards.

Technical safeguards used by the International Atomic Energy Agency sound

alarms as soon as nuclear systems stray from peaceful use. They have proven value.

In North Korea, environmental sampling helped show that North Korea was making

false claims about its reprocessing activities. In Iran, disclosures by opposition

groups plus surveillance technologies and environmental sampling are revealing the

status of Iran’s nuclear program.

Most of the implemented safeguards technologies are the result of scientific work

done decades ago. Proliferators are adaptive and motivated adversaries; yet, we are

currently relying on technology that is almost as dated as a rotary phone. We must

re-invigorate our safeguards R&D program. I’ll mention two of the ten R&D focus

areas identified in our report.

More inspectors carrying out more inspections is not a sustainable path—instead,

next generation safeguards must spur a transition from the current system of periodic manual inspections to a reliable and cost-effective system of continuous remote

monitoring. Also, more aggressive safeguards should be explored that would shut

down a facility found to be violating international operating agreements. There are

numerous other examples that represent ‘‘fruit ripe for the picking’’ as opposed to

research that may never become practical. Additional progress in safeguards should

involve collaborative research with international partners. In this regard, the large

programs to improve the security of nuclear material in Russia and to assist in conversion offer major opportunities to advance joint safeguards concept to the IAEA.

Unfortunately, as we understand it, the current fiscal year 2005 international

safeguards-related technology budget in NNSA (which we believe is already several

times too small) was just reduced. At the very time when some would seek more

rapid progress on the future of nuclear energy, modern safeguards and a deeper

analysis regarding proliferation may be left in the dust. As a nation, we may live

to regret our inadequate resources and emphasis in this area because for the future

of nuclear energy, ‘‘ignorance is not bliss.’’

Another technical step to manage global proliferation risks is designing proliferation resistance technology directly into the new nuclear power plants and enrichment facilities. Making proliferation resistance a design criterion would re-shuffle

the priority of future reactors. Some fuel-cycles would be deferred, while smaller,

modular, reactor designs might receive more emphasis. By carrying out this step

with commercial participation, proliferation resistance can emerge as a strength of

our nuclear industry. We think that Congress should be very demanding regarding

measures of proliferation resistance in any proposed further technical initiatives.

In conclusion, the extent to which nuclear power will be an enduring option to

meeting future energy requirements in many regions of the world depends upon the

steps Congress takes now to manage the associated proliferation risks. Prudent

management requires exclusively pursuing proliferation resistant technologies, developing international agreements that limit the spread of enrichment facilities and

investing in a strong safeguards program.

I’m happy to answer any questions.

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BIOGRAPHY FOR ROGER HAGENGRUBER

Roger Hagengruber, Ph.D., is the Director of the Office for Policy, Security and

Technology (OPS&T) and the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) and a Professor of Political Science at the University of New Mexico. He was formerly a Senior Vice

President at Sandia National Laboratories. From 1991–99, he directed Sandia’s primary mission in nuclear weapons during the transition following the end of the Cold

War. He spent much of his 30-year career at Sandia in arms control and non-proliferation activities including several tours in Geneva as a negotiator. In recent

years, he has focused on the nuclear transition in the former Soviet Union and in

security issues associated with counter-terrorism and has chaired or served on numerous panels that have addressed these areas. He has traveled widely including

many visits to Russia where he led the large interactive program between Sandia

and the FSU.

His work at the University of New Mexico includes directing the IPP work in public survey including sampling of U.S. and European views on a wide range of security issues. The OPS&T is a relatively new function at UNM that creates multidisciplinary teams from labs and universities to execute projects that explore policy options in areas where security and technology are interrelated.

Dr. Hagengruber has a Ph.D. in experimental nuclear physics from the University

of Wisconsin and is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He

has been associated with UNM since 1975.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you very much, Doctor.

Dr. Finck, you are recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF DR. PHILLIP J. FINCK, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE

LABORATORY DIRECTOR, APPLIED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY, ARGONNE NATIONAL

LABORATORY

Dr. FINCK. Madame Chairwoman, Representative Honda, Members of the Subcommittee, it is my pleasure to be here today to testify on technical aspects of nuclear fuel reprocessing, and I have

submitted a more detailed written statement for the record.

I am going to discuss how advanced nuclear fuel cycles can help

mitigate the accumulation of spent nuclear fuel, and I will also describe the major options available and their respective advantages

and disadvantages.

And I have brought two charts to help frame this discussion.

[Chart.]

The first chart that is on your right illustrates projected scenarios for the accumulation of spent nuclear fuel in the United

States until the end of this century. Two limits to—related to the

Yucca Mountain repository are important.

First is the legislative limit of 70,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel that will be reached around 2010.

Second is a technical limit of the repository’s capacity of approximately 120,000 metric tons, which will be reached around 2030, assuming nuclear maintains its current market share. But if we can

implement advanced fuel cycles rapidly enough, the amount of

spent nuclear fuel could be systematically managed to remain

below the Yucca Mountain technical limit, as indicated by the blue

curve on the plot on the left.

The right-hand side of that chart illustrates also a key technical

point for spent nuclear fuel. It is compromised primarily of uranium that, if separated from the fuel, can be disposed of as lowlevel waste or reused. The technical difficulties for disposal lie with

the remaining elements that create short- and long-term heat loads

and contribute to estimated doses at the boundary of the reposiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Dec 08, 2005 Jkt 021711 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\ENER05\061605\21711 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tory. In particular, it must be noted that the technical capacity of

Yucca Mountain is limited by the very long-term heat generated by

isotopes of plutonium, americium, and neptunium. To effectively

manage repository space, these should be eliminated or significantly reduced. Reprocessing can separate these elements from the

spent fuel, which makes it a first necessary step to eliminate them

and must then be followed by recycle.

[Chart.]

The second chart on your left illustrates the three major options

for managing spent nuclear fuel. The once-through cycle, that we

are doing today in the United States, consists of sending the unprocessed spent fuel to the repository. Costs are fixed to one mill

per kilowatt-hour, but the repository is not yet available. The

mountain picture on the right illustrates how much repository

space the United States needs to deal with the spent fuel.

Limited recycle is currently implemented in France and will soon

be implemented in Japan. And that is the second picture. The

spent fuel is reprocessed, and pure plutonium is separated and recycled as mixed-oxide fuel, partially burned in a commercial reactor

and then stored or sent to disposal. The benefits to our repository

would be quite limited, only an improvement of about 10 percent.

This scheme as implemented today also raises the flag of proliferation risk. Claims that this scheme is overly expensive are not correct. The life cycle cost of limited recycle, using real actual French

data, is only a few percent higher than that for the once-through

option.

The last option, full recycle, is being researched intensely in the

United States, France, Japan, and to some extent, in Russia. The

U.S. approach relies on advanced technologies that significantly

mitigate the disadvantages of the limited recycle option.

The first step, separations, could rely on the UREX+ technology

that minimizes liquid waste streams, separates key elements in

groups that are well suited for transmutation in different reactors.

It offers a significant advantage for nonproliferation as we can effectively eliminate the risk of material diversion or facility misuse

by developing advanced monitoring, modeling, and detection technologies, and integrating these technologies within the plant design. Also, consolidation of reprocessing facilities could be a key aspect for increasing proliferation resistance.

The second step consists of partially recycling plutonium, neptunium, and some other elements in thermal reactors. This step is

not necessary, but may have an economic advantage that must be

balanced with proliferation concerns.

The last step consists of closing the fuel cycle by transmuting all

remaining elements in fast reactors using pyroprocessing separations technology, with enhanced proliferation resistance.

The full recycle option, as presented here, has major benefits.

It increases repository space utilization by a factor of more than

100 and delays the need for a second repository well into the next

century. It eliminates all isotopes that are a proliferation concern.

It allows adoption of modern separations and safeguards technologies that will greatly increase its proliferation resistance. The

increase in life cycle costs is 10 percent or less according to OECD

studies, and this must be contrasted with the significant benefits

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of this approach, particularly with regard to the cost and difficulties of a second repository.

To conclude, we believe that the technologies being considered

today are mature enough to justify a down-selection by 2007 and

the startup of an engineering-scale demonstration that could lead

to large-scale commercialization. It is critical that the down-selection and demonstration be performed not only for reprocessing

technologies but in concert with research in recycle technologies,

including fast reactors.

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify before you on

this timely and very important subject, and I would be pleased to

answer any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Finck follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILLIP J. FINCK

SUMMARY

Management of spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear reactors can be addressed in a comprehensive, integrated manner to enable safe, emissions-free, nuclear electricity to make a sustained and growing contribution to the Nation’s energy needs. Legislation limits the capacity of the Yucca Mountain repository to

70,000 metric tons from commercial spent fuel and DOE defense-related waste. It

is estimated that this amount will be accumulated by approximately 2010 at current

generation rates for spent nuclear fuel. To preserve nuclear energy as a significant

part of our future energy generating capability, new technologies can be implemented that allow greater use of the repository space at Yucca Mountain. By processing spent nuclear fuel and recycling the hazardous radioactive materials, we can

reduce the waste disposal requirements enough to delay the need for a second repository until the next century, even in a nuclear energy growth scenario. Recent studies indicate that such a closed fuel cycle may require only minimal increases in nuclear electricity costs, and are not a major factor in the economic competitiveness

of nuclear power (the University of Chicago study, ‘‘The Economic Future of Nuclear

Power,’’ August 2004). However, the benefits of a closed fuel cycle can not be measured by economics alone; resource optimization and waste minimization are also important benefits. Moving forward in 2007 with an engineering-scale demonstration

of an integrated system of proliferation-resistant, advanced separations and transmutation technologies would be an excellent first step in demonstrating all of the

necessary technologies for a sustainable future for nuclear energy.

Nuclear Waste and Sustainability

World energy demand is increasing at a rapid pace. In order to satisfy the demand and protect the environment for future generations, energy sources must

evolve from the current dominance of fossil fuels to a more balanced, sustainable

approach. This new approach must be based on abundant, clean, and economical energy sources. Furthermore, because of the growing worldwide demand and competition for energy, the United States vitally needs to establish energy sources that

allow for energy independence.

Nuclear energy is a carbon-free, secure, and reliable energy source for today and

for the future. In addition to electricity production, nuclear energy has the promise

to become a critical resource for process heat in the production of transportation

fuels, such as hydrogen and synthetic fuels, and desalinated water. New nuclear

plants are imperative to meet these vital needs.

To ensure a sustainable future for nuclear energy, several requirements must be

met. These include safety and efficiency, proliferation resistance, sound nuclear materials management, and minimal environmental impacts. While some of these requirements are already being satisfied, the United States needs to adopt a more

comprehensive approach to nuclear waste management. The environmental benefits

of resource optimization and waste minimization for nuclear power must be pursued

with targeted research and development to develop a successful integrated system

with minimal economic impact. Alternative nuclear fuel cycle options that employ

separations, transmutation, and refined disposal (e.g., conservation of geologic repository space) must be contrasted with the current planned approach of direct disposal, taking into account the complete set of potential benefits and penalties. In

many ways, this is not unlike the premium homeowners pay to recycle municipal

waste.

69

The spent nuclear fuel situation in the United States can be put in perspective

with a few numbers. Currently, the country’s 103 commercial nuclear reactors

produce more than 2,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel per year (masses are

measured in heavy metal content of the fuel, including uranium and heavier elements). The Yucca Mountain repository has a legislative capacity of 70,000 metric

tons, including spent nuclear fuel and DOE defense-related wastes. By approximately 2010 the accumulated spent nuclear fuel generated by these reactors and the

defense-related waste will meet this capacity, even before the repository starts accepting any spent nuclear fuel. The ultimate technical capacity of Yucca Mountain

is expected to be around 120,000 metric tons, using the current understanding of

the Yucca Mountain site geologic and hydrologic characteristics. This limit will be

reached by including the spent fuel from current reactors operating over their lifetime. Assuming nuclear growth at a rate of 1.8 percent per year after 2010, the

120,000 metric ton capacity will be reached around 2030. At that projected nuclear

growth rate, the U.S. will need up to nine Yucca Mountain-type repositories by the

end of this century. Until Yucca Mountain starts accepting waste, spent nuclear fuel

must be stored in temporary facilities, either storage pools or above ground storage

casks.

Today, many consider repository space a scarce resource that should be managed

as such. While disposal costs in a geologic repository are currently quite affordable

for U.S. electric utilities, accounting for only a few percent of the total cost of electricity, the availability of U.S. repository space will likely remain limited.

Only three options are available for the disposal of accumulating spent nuclear

fuel:

• Build more ultimate disposal sites like Yucca Mountain.

• Use interim storage technologies as a temporary solution.

• Develop and implement advanced fuel cycles, consisting of separations technologies that separate the constituents of spent nuclear fuel into elemental

streams, and transmutation technologies that destroy selected elements and

greatly reduce repository needs.

A responsible approach to using nuclear power must always consider its whole life

cycle, including final disposal. We consider that temporary solutions, while useful

as a stockpile management tool, can never be considered as ultimate solutions. It

seems prudent that the U.S. always have at least one set of technologies available

to avoid expanding geologic disposal sites.

Spent Nuclear Fuel

The composition of spent nuclear fuel poses specific problems that make its ultimate disposal challenging. Fresh nuclear fuel is composed of uranium dioxide (about

96 percent U238, and four percent U235). During irradiation, most of the U235 is

fissioned, and a small fraction of the U238 is transmuted into heavier elements

(known as ‘‘transuranics’’). The spent nuclear fuel contains about 93 percent uranium (mostly U238), about one percent plutonium, less than one percent minor

actinides (neptunium, americium, and curium), and five percent fission products.

Uranium, if separated from the other elements, is relatively benign, and could be

disposed of as low-level waste or stored for later use. Some of the other elements

raise significant concerns:

• The fissile isotopes of plutonium, americium, and neptunium are potentially

usable in weapons and, therefore, raise proliferation concerns. Because spent

nuclear fuel is protected from theft for about one hundred years by its intense

radioactivity, it is difficult to separate these isotopes without remote handling

facilities.

• Three isotopes, which are linked through a decay process (Pu241, Am241, and

Np237), are the major contributors to the estimated dose for releases from the

repository, typically occurring between 100,000 and one million years, and

also to the long-term heat generation that limits the amount of waste that

can be placed in the repository.

• Certain fission products (cesium, strontium) are major contributors to the repository’s short-term heat load, but their effects can be mitigated by providing

better ventilation to the repository or by providing a cooling-off period before

placing them in the repository.

• Other fission products (Tc99 and I129) also contribute to the estimated dose.

The time scales required to mitigate these concerns are daunting: several of the

isotopes of concern will not decay to safe levels for hundreds of thousands of years.

Thus, the solutions to long-term disposal of spent nuclear fuel are limited to three

70

options: the search for a geologic environment that will remain stable for that period; the search for waste forms that can contain these elements for that period; or

the destruction of these isotopes. These three options underlie the major fuel cycle

strategies that are currently being developed and deployed in the U.S. and other

countries.

Options for Disposing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Three options are being considered for disposing of spent nuclear fuel: the oncethrough cycle is the U.S. reference; limited recycle has been implemented in France

and elsewhere and is being deployed in Japan; and full recycle (also known as the

closed fuel cycle) is being researched in the U.S., France, Japan, and elsewhere.

1. Once-through Fuel Cycle

This is the U.S. reference option where spent nuclear fuel is sent to the geologic

repository that must contain the constituents of the spent nuclear fuel for hundreds

of thousands of years. Several countries have programs to develop these repositories,

with the U.S. having the most advanced program. This approach is considered safe,

provided suitable repository locations and space can be found. It should be noted

that other ultimate disposal options have been researched (e.g., deep sea disposal;

boreholes and disposal in the sun) and abandoned. The challenges of long-term geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel are well recognized, and are related to the uncertainty about both the long-term behavior of spent nuclear fuel and the geologic

media in which it is placed.

2. Limited Recycle

Limited recycle options are commercially available in France, Japan, and the

United Kingdom. They use the PUREX process, which separates uranium and plutonium, and directs the remaining transuranics to vitrified waste, along with all the

fission products. The uranium is stored for eventual reuse. The plutonium is used

to fabricate mixed-oxide fuel that can be used in conventional reactors. Spent mixedoxide fuel is currently not reprocessed, though the feasibility of mixed-oxide reprocessing has been demonstrated. It is typically stored or eventually sent to a geologic

repository for disposal. Note that a reactor partially loaded with mixed-oxide fuel

can destroy as much plutonium as it creates. Nevertheless, this approach always results in increased production of americium, a key contributor to the heat generation

in a repository. This approach has two significant advantages:

• It can help manage the accumulation of plutonium.

• It can help significantly reduce the volume of spent nuclear fuel (the French

examples indicate that volume decreases by a factor of four).

Several disadvantages have been noted:

• It results in a small economic penalty by increasing the net cost of electricity

a few percent.

• The separation of pure plutonium in the PUREX process is considered by

some to be a proliferation risk; when mixed-oxide use is insufficient, this material is stored for future use as fuel.

• This process does not significantly improve the use of the repository space

(the improvement is around 10 percent, as compared to a factor of 100 for

closed fuel cycles).

• This process does not significantly improve the use of natural uranium (the

improvement is around 15 percent, as compared to a factor of 100 for closed

fuel cycles).

3. Full Recycle (the Closed Fuel Cycle)

Full recycle approaches are being researched in France, Japan, and the United

States. This approach typically comprises three successive steps: an advanced separations step based on the UREX+ technology that mitigates the perceived disadvantages of PUREX, partial recycle in conventional reactors, and closure of the fuel

cycle in fast reactors.

The first step, UREX+ technology, allows for the separations and subsequent

management of highly pure product streams. These streams are:

• Uranium, which can be stored for future use or disposed of as low-level waste.

• A mixture of plutonium and neptunium, which is intended for partial recycle

in conventional reactors followed by recycle in fast reactors.

• Separated fission products intended for short-term storage, possibly for transmutation, and for long-term storage in specialized waste forms.

71

• The minor actinides (americium and curium) for transmutation in fast reactors.

The UREX+ approach has several advantages:

• It produces minimal liquid waste forms, and eliminates the issue of the

‘‘waste tank farms.’’

• Through advanced monitoring, simulation and modeling, it provides significant opportunities to detect misuse and diversion of weapons-usable materials.

• It provides the opportunity for significant cost reduction.

• Finally and most importantly, it provides the critical first step in managing

all hazardous elements present in the spent nuclear fuel.

The second step—partial recycle in conventional reactors—can expand the opportunities offered by the conventional mixed-oxide approach. In particular, it is expected that with significant R&D effort, new fuel forms can be developed that burn

up to 50 percent of the plutonium and neptunium present in spent nuclear fuel.

(Note that some studies also suggest that it might be possible to recycle fuel in

these reactors many times—i.e., reprocess and recycle the irradiated advanced

fuel—and further destroy plutonium and neptunium; other studies also suggest possibilities for transmuting americium in these reactors. Nevertheless, the practicality

of these schemes is not yet established and requires additional scientific and engineering research.) The advantage of the second step is that it reduces the overall

cost of the closed fuel cycle by burning plutonium in conventional reactors, thereby

reducing the number of fast reactors needed to complete the transmutation mission

of minimizing hazardous waste. This step can be entirely bypassed, and all transmutation performed in advanced fast reactors, if recycle in conventional reactors is

judged to be undesirable.

The third step, closure of the fuel cycle using fast reactors to transmute the fuel

constituents into much less hazardous elements, and pyroprocessing technologies to

recycle the fast reactor fuel, constitutes the ultimate step in reaching sustainable

nuclear energy. This process will effectively destroy the transuranic elements, resulting in waste forms that contain only a very small fraction of the transuranics

(less than one percent) and all fission products. These technologies are being developed at Argonne National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory, with parallel

development in Japan, France, and Russia.

The full recycle approach has significant benefits:

• It can effectively increase use of repository space by a factor of more than

100.

• It can effectively increase the use of natural uranium by a factor of 100.

• It eliminates the uncontrolled buildup of all isotopes that are a proliferation

risk.

• The fast reactors and the processing plant can be deployed in small co-located

facilities that minimize the risk of material diversion during transportation.

• The fast reactor does not require the use of very pure weapons usable materials, thus increasing their proliferation resistance.

• It finally can usher the way towards full sustainability to prepare for a time

when uranium supplies will become increasingly difficult to ensure.

• These processes would have limited economic impact; the increase in the cost

of electricity would be less than 10 percent (ref: OECD).

• Assuming that demonstrations of these processes are started by 2007, commercial operations are possible starting in 2025; this will require adequate

funding for demonstrating the separations, recycle, and reactor technologies.

• The systems can be designed and implemented to ensure that the mass of accumulated spent nuclear fuel in the U.S. would always remain below 100,000

metric tons—less than the technical capacity of Yucca Mountain—thus delaying, or even avoiding, the need for a second repository in the U.S.

Conclusion

A well engineered recycling program for spent nuclear fuel will provide the United

States with a long-term, affordable, carbon-free energy source with low environmental impact. This new paradigm for nuclear power will allow us to manage nuclear waste and reduce proliferation risks while creating a sustainable energy supply. It is possible that the cost of recycling will be slightly higher than direct disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Dec 08, 2005 Jkt 021711 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\ENER05\061605\21711 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
72

posal of spent nuclear fuel, but the Nation will only need one geologic repository

for the ultimate disposal of the residual waste.

73

74

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APPENDIX 1:

Reprocessing Technologies

There are currently three mature options to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.

PUREX—Is the most common liquid-liquid extraction process for treatment of light

water reactor spent fuel. The irradiated fuel is dissolved in nitric acid, and uranium

and plutonium are extracted in the organic phase by an organic solvent consisting

of tributyl phosphate in kerosene, while the fission products remain in the aqueous

nitric phase. Further process steps enable the subsequent separation of uranium

from plutonium.

Advantages—fully commercialized process, with over 50 years of experience.

Disadvantage—it is not efficient enough to achieve the present requirements for

separations of technetium, cesium, strontium, neptunium, americium and curium.

UREX+—Is an advanced liquid-liquid extraction process for treatment of light

water reactor spent fuel. Similar to PUREX, the irradiated fuel is dissolved in nitric

acid. The UREX+ process consists of a series of solvent-extraction steps for the recovery of Pu/Np, Tc, U, Cs/Sr, Am and Cm.

Advantages—meets current separations requirements for continuous recycle.

Builds on engineering experience derived from current aqueous reprocessing facilities such as La Hague.

Disadvantage—can not directly process short-cooled and some specialty fuels

being designed for advanced reactors.

Pyroprocessing—These technologies rely on electrochemical processes rather than

chemical extraction processes to achieve the desired degree of conversion or purification of the spent fuel. If oxide fuel is processed, it is converted to metal after the

irradiated fuel is disassembled. The metallic fuel is then treated to separate uranium and the transuranic elements from the fission product elements.

Advantages—ability to process short-cooled and specialty fuels being designed for

advanced reactors.

Disadvantages—does not meet current separations requirements for continuous

recycle in thermal reactors, but ideal for fast spectrum reactors.

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APPENDIX 2:

Answers to Specific Questions

1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using reprocessing to address efficiency of fuel use, waste management and non-proliferation?

How would you assess the advantages and disadvantages, and how

might the disadvantages be mitigated?

Reprocessing of spent fuel is a necessary step in an advanced fuel cycle, but is

insufficient to yield any significant benefits by itself: benefits are only incurred once

the reprocessed materials are recycled and partially or totally eliminated. Two types

of recycle schemes are typically considered: limited recycle in conventional reactors,

and full recycle in advanced reactors.

Limited Recycle

Limited recycle options are commercially available in France, Japan, and the

United Kingdom. They utilize the PUREX process, which separates uranium and

plutonium, and directs the remaining transuranics to vitrified waste, along with all

the fission products. The uranium is stored for eventual reuse. The plutonium is

used to fabricate mixed oxide (MOX) fuel that can be used in conventional reactors.

Spent MOX fuel is currently not reprocessed (though feasibility of MOX reprocessing

has been demonstrated) and is typically stored or eventually sent to a geologic repository for disposal. Note that a reactor partially loaded with MOX fuel can destroy

as much plutonium as it creates. Nevertheless, this approach always results in an

increase in the production of americium (a key contributor to the heat generation

in a repository). This approach has several advantages:

• It can help manage the accumulation of plutonium.

• It can help significantly reduce the volume of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) (the

French examples indicates a volume decrease by a factor of four).

Several disadvantages have been noted:

• It results in a small economic penalty, as the increase in the net cost of electricity is a few percent.

• The separation of pure plutonium in the PUREX process is considered by

some to be a proliferation risk; when MOX utilization is insufficient, this material is stored for future use as fuel.

• This process does not significantly improve the utilization of the repository

space (the improvement is around 10 percent, as compared to a factor of 100

for closed fuel cycles).

• This process does not significantly improve the utilization of natural uranium

(the improvement is around 15 percent, as compared to a factor of 100 for

closed fuel cycles).

Full Recycle (the Closed Fuel Cycle)

Full recycle approaches are being researched in France, Japan, and the United

States. This approach is typically comprised of three successive steps: an advanced

separations step based on the UREX+ technology that mitigates the perceived disadvantages of PUREX, partial recycle in conventional reactors, and closure of the

fuel cycle in fast reactors.

The first step, UREX+ technology, allows for the separations and subsequent

management of very pure streams of products. It produces the following streams of

products: uranium, that can be stored for future use or can be disposed of as lowlevel waste; a mixture of plutonium and neptunium that are intended for partial recycle in conventional reactors followed by recycle in fast reactors; separated fission

products intended for short-term storage, possibly for transmutation, and for longterm storage in specialized waste forms; and the minor actinides (americium and

curium) for transmutation in fast reactors. The UREX+ approach has several advantages: it produces minimal liquid waste forms (and eliminates the issue of the

‘‘waste tank farms’’); through advanced monitoring, simulation and modeling it provides significant opportunities for detecting misuse and diversion of weapons usable

materials; it provides the opportunity for significant cost reduction; and, finally and

most importantly, it provides the critical first step in managing all hazardous elements present in the SNF.

The second step, partial recycle in conventional reactors can expand the opportunities offered by the conventional MOX approach. In particular, it is expected that

77

with significant R&D effort, new fuel forms can be developed that can burn up to

50 percent of the plutonium and neptunium present in the SNF. (Note that some

studies also suggest that it might be possible to recycle fuel in these reactors multiple times (i.e., reprocess and recycle the irradiated advanced fuel) and further destroy plutonium and neptunium; other studies also suggest possibilities for transmuting americium in these reactors. Nevertheless, the practicality of these schemes

is not yet established and requires additional scientific and engineering research.)

The advantage of the second step is that it reduces the overall cost of the closed

fuel cycle by burning plutonium in conventional reactors, and reducing the number

of fast reactors needed to complete the transmutation mission of minimizing hazardous waste. This step can be entirely bypassed, and all transmutation performed

in advanced fast reactors, if recycle in conventional reactors is judged to be undesirable.

The third step, closure of the fuel cycle, using fast reactors to transmute the fuel

constituents into much less hazardous elements, and pyroprocessing technologies to

recycle the fast reactor fuel, constitutes the ultimate step in reaching sustainability

for nuclear energy. This process will effectively destroy the transuranic elements,

resulting in waste forms that contain only a very small fraction of the transuranics

(less than one percent) and all fission products. These technologies are being developed at Argonne National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory, with parallel

development in Japan, France, and Russia.

The full recycle approach has significant benefits:

— It can effectively increase the utilization of the repository space by a factor

in excess of 100.

— It can effectively increase the utilization of natural uranium by a factor of

100.

— It eliminates the uncontrolled buildup of all isotopes that are a proliferation

risk.

— The fast reactors and the processing plant can be deployed in small co-located facilities that minimize the risk of material diversion during transportation.

— The fast reactor does not require the use of very pure weapons usable materials, thus increasing their proliferation resistance.

— It finally can usher the way towards full sustainability to prepare for a time

when uranium supplies will become increasingly difficult to ensure.

— These processes would have limited economic impact: the increase in the cost

of electricity would be less than 10 percent (ref: OECD).

— Assuming that demonstration of these processes is started by 2007, commercial operations are possible starting in 2025; this will require adequate funding for demonstrating the separations, recycle, and reactor technologies.

— The systems can be designed and implemented to ensure that the mass of

accumulated SNF in the U.S. would always remain below 100,000MT, (Note:

less than the technical capacity of Yucca Mountain) thus delaying, or even

avoiding, the need for a second repository in the U.S.

Several disadvantages have been noted:

— These processes would have limited economic impact: the increase in the cost

of electricity would be less than 10 percent (ref: OECD).

— Management of potentially weapons-usable materials may be viewed as a

proliferation risk.

These disadvantages can be addressed by specific actions:

— Fuel cycle and reactor R&D is currently going on in the DOE Advanced Fuel

Cycle Initiative (AFCI) and Gen-IV programs to reduce the costs of processing, fuel fabrication, and advanced reactors.

— Advanced simulation, modeling, and detection techniques can be used in fuel

cycle facilities to improve material accountability and decrease the risk of

misuse or diversion.

— An aggressive development and demonstration program of the advanced reactors and recycling options is needed to allow commercialization in a reasonable timeframe.

2. What are the greatest technological hurdles in developing and commercializing advanced reprocessing technologies? Is it possible for the government to select a technology by 2007?

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To answer the first part of the question, the first major hurdle is the current inability to test the chemical processing steps at a pilot-scale using spent nuclear fuel

(both as individual process steps and in an integrated manner simulating plant operations) to verify that both the process itself and the larger scale equipment will

function as intended, and to minimize the technical risks in designing the commercial-scale plant. The processing methods currently being refined under the scope of

the DOE AFCI program are being designed to very high standards for purity of

products and efficiency of recovery, in order to reduce costs and minimize the hazardous content of high-level wastes. The processes have been successfully tested at

laboratory scale (about one-millionth of industrial scale). Normal expectations for

scale-up of industrial chemical processes are that the processes proven in the laboratory will perform well at full scale, provided that the process and equipment function as intended. In order to test process operations and equipment designs, it is

necessary to conduct pilot plant operations at one/one-hundredth to one/one-thousandth of industrial scale with the complete process.

The second major hurdle is related to the first, in that there is an insufficient supply of some of the various chemical elements needed for the development and testing of product storage forms and waste disposal forms. However, it is anticipated

that these would become available as a result of pilot-scale testing, but the lack of

materials will hinder progress prior to that time.

For the second part of the question, yes, it is completely reasonable to select a

processing technology by 2007, given the present state of development for the processing technologies. The level of success achieved in the DOE AFCI program to date

indicates that the development of at least one processing technology satisfying program goals, UREX+, will be advanced to the stage where pilot-scale testing is warranted. At that time, it should also be possible to evaluate whether any of the other

promising technologies currently being studied have proven capable of meeting program goals, and are also near to pilot-scale testing.

However, it must be emphasized that the reprocessing technology by itself will not

provide any significant benefits unless the development of such capability is

matched by similar advances in recycling technologies. In the case of full recycle,

the development of both suitable reactors for recycling transuranics and appropriate

nuclear fuel forms containing transuranics must proceed in parallel to testing and

implementation of spent fuel processing. Only with all of the pieces in place will

substantial benefits be achievable.

3. What reprocessing technologies currently are being developed at Argonne or at other national labs? What technical questions must be answered?

AFCI processing (chemical separations) technology is being developed at Argonne

National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory,

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, and Savannah River

National Laboratory. All are involved with the development of aqueous solvent extraction technologies (the suite of UREX+ processes), while ANL and INL are also

developing the pyrochemical processing technology that will be required for the nuclear fuel cycle associated with Gen-IV reactors. The aqueous technology is needed

for near-term application, and the emphasis is on process optimization, equipment

development, and plant design. The pyrochemical technology is needed for deployment of the Gen-IV reactors, and requires large scale demonstration. Emphasis on

pyroprocessing is in testing of process features, with some work in progress on process equipment and facility design.

The UREX+ solvent extraction demonstrations have shown that it can meet separations criteria; however, integrated, engineering-scale testing is required to complete development. Continuing work is required to optimize flowsheets and increase

process robustness and operations efficiency. An adequate facility is required for engineering-scale demonstrations to test equipment, advanced instrumentation for

process control and PR&PP (Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection), conversion of product and waste forms.

Pyroprocessing requires continued process development followed by engineeringscale demonstration of flowsheets developed for reprocessing the many alternative

advanced reactor fuels. Improvements in the areas of transuranic element recovery

and process equipment design needs to be completed. Similar to the UREX+ process

an adequate facility is required for engineering-scale demonstration.

4. What reprocessing technologies are still in the basic research stage,

what advantages might they offer, and what is the estimated timeline for

development of laboratory scale models?

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There are currently two mature technologies for reprocessing, UREX+ and

pyroprocessing. For industrial scale implementation optimization of these technologies is still necessary:

• Off-gas treatment from fuel decladding and dissolution for retention of tritium, carbon-14, ruthenium, and technetium to prevent their migration to

downstream operations where they are harder to sequester. Development of

high efficiency scrubbers is currently an effort in other countries.

• Advanced instrumentation and process-sampling techniques for near real

time accounting for process control and material accountability.

• Process diagnostics for early on-line detection using signals from process instrumentation to differentiate legitimate process operation versus clandestine

product diversion.

• Waste forms optimization for preventing migration of radionuclides and reduce potential heath hazard to the public.

Nevertheless, there are a number of novel technologies where basic research could

provide an alternative to the current technologies, with the potential of minimizing

dose to the public and workers and environmental impacts. These research areas

are:

• Development of ligands, chelating agents, and advanced extractant molecules

based on fundamental principles to guide their preparation. Advantages—

molecules could be tailored to perform a specific function such as separations

of a given transuranic element. Estimated timeline 20 years.

• Development of environmentally benign separations processes such as based

on magnetic and electronic differences. Advantages—produce minimum secondary wastes and significantly decrease the consumption of chemicals. Estimated timeline 30 years.

• Development of bio-based separations. Advantages—identify methods and

replicate biological compound functions leading to new separation schemes,

for example, separations of actinides over lanthanides. Estimated timeline 50

years.

5. How would you contrast what is being done internationally with U.S.

plans for reprocessing, recycling and associated waste management?

What countries recycle now? What components of the waste fuel are or

can be used to make new reactor fuel?

Commercial reprocessing plants in France, the United Kingdom and Japan utilize

the PUREX process, which separates uranium and plutonium and directs the remaining transuranics (americium, neptunium, and curium) to vitrified waste along

with all of the fission products. Reprocessing operations in the U.K. may be terminated within the next 10 years, primarily because the shutdown of gas-cooled power

reactors is limiting the need for the Sellafield B–205 plant. BNFL’s THORP plant

at Sellafield is principally used for light water reactor (LWR) spent fuel processing;

the U.K. has only one LWR in operation and the market for foreign LWR fuel processing is decreasing. A shutdown of THORP has been announced for 2010. In contrast, a vigorous reprocessing activity is in progress in France at the La Hague

plant of COGEMA. This plant is processing spent fuel from foreign sources as well

as from the 57 power reactors of Electricite ́ de France. Plutonium is recovered for

recycle to the EdF reactors as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. Research on means for improving waste management through reprocessing have been stimulated by the 1991

law, and research is in progress now at the laboratories of the Commissariat a`

l’E ́ nergie Atomique (CEA) that is following much the same lines as that pioneered

in the AFCI program of DOE. Commercial reprocessing will begin soon in Japan at

the Rokkasho-mura plant of Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. The Rokkasho Reprocessing

Plant is designed for the production of a mixed uranium-plutonium product that can

be used to produce mixed oxide fuel for recycle in Japanese light water reactors.

Japanese laboratories are also experimenting with advanced spent fuel processing

methods.

The U.S. program represents a transition to an advanced nuclear fuel cycle. In

the U.S., emphasis is being placed on technologies that can be successfully deployed

in the next 20 years or so and be economically competitive as well as secure against

all threats. The wastes arising from future U.S. process plants will be virtually free

of radiotoxic elements, and there will be no generation of liquid wastes requiring

underground tank storage. We expect our efforts to help us regain international

leadership in the field of nuclear energy.

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Both Japan and France are currently developing advanced fuel cycles, similar to

the ones described in this paper, where there first would be partial recycle in conventional reactors, followed by closure of the fuel cycle in fast reactors. The U.S.

program has had significant international collaborations with these two countries,

and there have been excellent exchanges of research results. The approaches in the

three countries are relatively well aligned, with a stronger emphasis on the shortterm development of separations technologies in the U.S., and a stronger emphasis

on the long-term development of fast reactors in France and Japan.

BIOGRAPHY FOR PHILLIP J. FINCK

Phillip Finck received his Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from MIT in 1982, and

a MBA in 2001 from the University of Chicago. He was a mechanical engineer at

NOVATOME, France from 1983 to 1986, and was involved in the safety and design

of fast reactors, including Superphenix. In 1986, he joined Argonne National Laboratory and was involved in neutronics methods development for the Integral Fast Reactor concept, and later for the New Production Reactor. In 1991, he became the

lead for EBR–II neutronics analyses at ANL–E. In 1993 he joined the French Atomic Energy Commission where he became the head of the Reactor Physics Laboratory

at the Cadarache Center, with activities in LWR and LMR physics, criticality safety,

fuel cycle physics, and nuclear data. In 1995, he was elected to chair the European

nuclear data project—JEF. Dr. Finck rejoined ANL in 1997, where he became the

Associate Director of the Technology Development Division. He has led the ANL activities in the Advanced Accelerator Applications program since 2000, and has been

heavily involved in transforming the program from accelerator-based to reactorbased transmutation. In 2003 he was named Deputy Associate Laboratory Director,

Engineering Research, where he was responsible for coordination of all nuclear energy related activities at ANL, including AFCI and Gen-IV programs, and development of new initiatives. Since 2004, Dr. Finck is the Deputy Associate Laboratory

Director for Applied Science and Technology and National Security; in this position,

he coordinates all energy-related activities at ANL.

Dr. Finck is a Fellow of the American Nuclear Society.

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DISCUSSION

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you very much for your testimony.

We will now turn to the questions, and I will yield five minutes

to the—Chairman Hobson.

Mr. HOBSON. I just have, quickly, a couple of things, because I

have to leave, but I want to thank you all for your testimony. I

may not agree with all of it, but I like it. I like the fact that we

are having this dialogue, because it wasn’t happening.

Mr. Bunn, I would like to ask you, in your numbers that you

have put together, do you include any costs associated to the liability increase each year that this government has to pay the utilities

for not removing the waste from their site?

Mr. BUNN. We include—one of the assumptions that we make

that is favorable to reprocessing, we tried to make assumptions, in

general, that were favorable to reprocessing in order to be, you

know, fair and ironclad in our conclusions. And we assigned to the

cost of the direct disposal option 100 percent of the cost of interim

storage for many decades prior to disposal, and we assumed that

there was zero cost for interim storage with respect—on the reprocessing side. So yes, we did include that. And the costs of storage

are actually——

Mr. HOBSON. Oh, no, no, no. I am talking about the liability——

Mr. BUNN. I understand that, but the liability——

Mr. HOBSON.—cost. There is $500 million——

Mr. BUNN. The liability to the government depends on the costs

to store that fuel. The—if the government takes title to that fuel

and pays for its storage, then its liability is the——

Mr. HOBSON. No, but you are making an assumption that would

take legislation, as I understand it, to do. Is that correct?

Mr. BUNN. I am saying that the government should not be in the

business of paying the utilities amounts that far exceed their actual cost for storing the amount of nuclear fuel, and therefore, one

should look at what the cost of storing spent fuel actually is. The

cost of providing 40 years of dry cask storage for spent fuel is less

than $200 a kilogram. The cost of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel,

even in a new facility, financed entirely with government money at

a low government rate of interest, would be more than $1,000 a

kilogram if its capital and operating costs were identical to the

costs of the plants built in France and Britain, and much more

than that if it were identical to the cost of the most recent plant

built in Japan, whose costs are astronomical.

So it is really—it is quite a large difference. You will find, if you

talk to utilities, that none of them are particularly interested in

paying for reprocessing of their spent fuel if they can simply buy

dry casks.

Mr. HOBSON. Well, a lot of them are trying to move them out of

the area that they have got them in, so——

Mr. BUNN. Yes, they would love to have the government take it

away. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. HOBSON. No. No. Excuse me. They are providing a site in

Utah—they are attempting to provide a site in Utah, because they

want to move them——

Mr. BUNN. That is right.

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Mr. HOBSON.—out of the cities where they have got them.

Mr. BUNN. Right.

Mr. HOBSON. And the security problems that they have, which I

am suspect of the—let me put it this way. I am suspect of the numbers, but we will look at the numbers.

I would also like to ask you, have you visited the sites in France?

Mr. BUNN. I have.

Mr. HOBSON. And have you written the same negative situation

with the sites in France and encouraged them to do away with

their sites and get away from reprocessing? Because if you look

where those sites are, there are vineyards growing up. And if you

go to the Netherlands, there is a playground on the other side. Obviously, there are differing opinions in the world, and I am always

interested how we always write about our side of it, but we have

not written—maybe you have, and I don’t know the answer. You

should never ask a question you don’t know the answer to, but I

am concerned that I don’t see the same concerns expressed about

these existing facilities, which what I have seen, seem to try to do

it in a responsible way, and have—don’t have the reliance upon fossil fuels in their country that we do, don’t have the proliferation

of the air that we do from the plants. And my point is, we need

to move forward in this, but I don’t see the same negatives written

about that that is written about our ability to try to sustain our

country. So I will let you answer that, and then I will——

Mr. BUNN. Well, first of all, I am not against nuclear energy. I

am a supporter of nuclear energy, and as I made the point at the

end of my testimony, I believe that if—those who support nuclear

energy ought to be trying to make it as cheap, as simple, as safe,

and as non-controversial as possible in order to build the support

needed to grow nuclear energy. And I think that reprocessing with

traditional PUREX type technologies, as implemented in France

and Britain and Japan, points in the wrong direction on every

count. I have expressed concern about the facilities in France and

Britain and Japan for many years, as have many of my colleagues.

But the reality is those facilities exist. Large investments have

been made. Those countries are not going to change their process—

their approaches any time soon. However, it is worth noting that

when those facilities were first built, they had substantial foreign

customers, and now the foreign customer base is dwindling away

to almost nothing, because utilities around the world are realizing

increasingly that dry cask storage offers a cheaper alternative,

which leaves all options open. There is nothing that says that after

you have stored spent fuel for 30 years in a dry cask you can’t then

take it out and reprocess it later if technology develops that is, in

fact, more promising than the traditional technologies. I should say

that all of the numbers we used with respect to the cost of reprocessing are drawn from official French and British studies.

Mr. HOBSON. Yes.

Mr. BUNN. They are the French and British numbers.

Mr. HOBSON. Well, I like your final conclusions that you came to

on the processing. When you talked about—I will just finish with

this. When you talked about drying up, you mean on the reprocessing side of it? Because the Germans, as I understand it, are buying

energy, as we speak, from——

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Mr. BUNN. Yes, I mean, I——

Mr. HOBSON.—the French——

Mr. BUNN. No, I mean the customers for the reprocessing plants.

Mr. HOBSON.—facilities. Okay.

Mr. BUNN. I mean the customers are——

Mr. HOBSON. Okay. I am sorry.

Mr. BUNN.—from the reprocessing plants.

Mr. HOBSON. Well, again, thank you all for—and I want to thank

the Chairwoman for this dialogue, because we weren’t having this

dialogue. And what we need to do is continue having this dialogue,

in my opinion, so that we do move forward and not just be in a

stagnant situation, because every year that—and I want to say in

this forum before I leave, I am a big proponent of Yucca Mountain.

I will have a huge fight with the Senate over that in getting it

done. But I also understand that there are some things we have

got to do along the way. And what we are both trying to do here

is to create a dialogue that we move forward, and if we don’t put

some things into legislation and if we don’t move and talk about

this, we continue to be in a stagnant position, and we will continue

our reliance upon fossil fuel, which I firmly believe we can not do.

I don’t think environmentally it is appropriate, and we just physically can’t afford it in the future to continue in this way.

So I want to thank you again. I am going to have to leave, and

I want to thank the indulgence of the Committee for allowing me

to intrude to show support and to listen to all of your testimony.

Mr. BUNN. Thank you.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. And thank you, Chairman Hobson, for all

of the work that you are doing on this. And thank you for coming

today.

And with that, I would recognize Ranking Member, Mr. Honda,

for five minutes.

Mr. HONDA. Thank you very much.

I am going to set aside my written questions. I am going to submit them, if you don’t mind, Madame Chair, to the witnesses and

expect a written response from them.

What I heard this morning is a range of opinions, but what I

think I heard was that there is agreement that we need to continue

on R&D. And I am judging by the nod of the heads that it sounds

like that is correct.

Then the question is really is the process or the steps that we

need to take in order to get to a point where we think that the disposition of spent fuel is the most appropriate and the most safe

way without rushing into a solution because of political timelines

and things like that? So I was just wondering from each witness

what their response is to each other’s comments and why they feel

the way they do. I am not trying to pit one against the other, but

we have witnesses here who have a lot of——

Mr. JOHNSON. A broad range of views.

Mr. HONDA.—knowledge and experience, and I would sort of like

to listen to that before I ask any more questions. And we could

start with Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.

I guess I would like to begin my answer by agreeing with your

observation. I believe that what you heard this morning is there is

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more agreement among us than, possibly, disagreement with respect to the need of moving forward with a robust research and development program on the issue of spent nuclear fuel, recycle technologies, safeguard technologies. And the Department very much is

supportive of that, and as you have seen in our budget request for

the last couple of years, we are continuing to move forward in trying to walk through in a step-wise, reasonable fashion the development of the technologies needed to address the issues associated

with spent nuclear fuel.

I believe I will leave my comments at that. Thank you.

Mr. HONDA. Oh, okay.

Mr. BUNN. I am a supporter of continued research and development, but I think even with respect to research and development,

we need to be very careful with respect to the proliferation implications. For example, I am somewhat concerned over pursuing research and development on reprocessing technologies with South

Korea, which is a country that has a formal agreement not to have

either enrichment or reprocessing on its soil. It is a country that

had a secret nuclear weapons program that was stopped under U.S.

pressure that was based on plutonium reprocessing. And some of

these technologies, while they may reduce some of the hazards of

PUREX, are not as proliferation-resistant if you look at the contribution they could make to the acquisition of the needed expertise

and facilities if they were broadly deployed in the developing

world—the contribution to a proliferating state’s nuclear weapons

program.

Moreover, some of the technologies, the amount of other things

that are being separated and cycled with the plutonium is pretty

minor. In the case of UREX+, essentially, as I understand it, what

you are—what is separated with the plutonium is the neptunium.

Neptunium-237 is also a potentially attractive nuclear weapons

material. So one has to worry about the possibility of theft of materials containing plutonium and neptunium-237 perhaps somewhat

less than one would about theft of pure plutonium. But that is the

kind of thing that requires the fact-finding examination that Dr.

Hagengruber was talking about.

I should mention, since I have been questioned on the subject of

our economic assumptions and so on, that I did bring a number of

copies of the full study, which has the complete references and so

on. It is available on-line at a link that is included in my testimony, and I would like to submit, for the record, the article-length

version of which is in the current issue of Nuclear Technology.

[The information follows:]

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Chairwoman BIGGERT. Without objection.

Mr. HONDA. Thank you.

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. Yeah, a very interesting question to be done

with an answer to be compact. Unfortunately, I am the age where

I started more than 35 years ago, my first study was to look at

long-term and short-term technical approaches to nuclear waste.

The reactors cost $1 billion at the time. There wasn’t a Three Mile

Island. There wasn’t a study on it, and there wasn’t a Carter decision on reprocessing. And it seems like I have seen all of this before. We knew how to reprocess material in a way that produced

the closed fuel cycle. We knew what the nuclear waste issues were,

including interim storage as a very attractive option. We had lots

of technical opportunities that were demonstrated up in Idaho and

other places and Hanford for how to dispose the material, maybe

not as good as today, but it is hard to see the last 30 years as having made that much progress.

The issue, in the end, wasn’t the cost of nuclear power and the

issue of interest rates and—I mean, West Valley was built and

then shut down not—in part not because the technology failed, but

the basic decision of the infrastructure and the supporting infrastructure had a hole in it. The hole is that proliferation became an

increasing concern, not just because it was President Carter. It was

a national concern. There were the London Suppliers Group and

other people got together, and decisions were struggled with, not

consensus, to decide whether or not to reprocess in order to have

this plutonium appear as an economy, whether it was in the

United States. Whatever we did, the world would, in fact, eventually do. And today, even after all of these years of being out of the

business, the world still waits for us to make the decision on Generation IV, to make the decisions on reprocessing, to make the decisions on Yucca Mountain. I mean, with all deference to France and

the other countries making these choices, people are looking to us

for leadership in the future of nuclear energy.

Our position at APS and the position that is not in controversy

with anything that has been said here, the technical information

about the processes, the work of the Department in trying to pursue it, Matt’s comments about it, I mean, we all—we would agree

with many of these. We represent 44,000 physicists, and you can

probably not get two of them to have the same opinion on anything.

But where they divide on the business of plutonium is simple. They

believe that if this plutonium appears in the economy, one group

believes that it is so unattractive that it will never be made into

a weapon. The other group believes that it is explosive. From a

physics point of view, interestingly enough, they are both absolutely right. You could make it into an explosive. On the other

hand, no country sophisticated enough to do that, in my judgment,

would ever choose to use that material for a weapons program. But

we face the important decision, and you face the decision, that we

can make all of the technical decisions about waste and reprocessing, and there will be good decisions. The Department of Energy

will do good research, and laboratories like Argonne will provide

good technologies. But if you wish to avoid another West Valley, if

you wish to have a robust leadership of nuclear energy that will

last for 30 or 40 years, the issue of proliferation has got to be cenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Dec 08, 2005 Jkt 021711 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\ENER05\061605\21711 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tral in the decision about whether to go forward. And these technologies not only have to be robust, there has to be a consensus in

this country that they are, because what we do, the rest of the

world will take as leadership. Thank you.

Dr. FINCK. Yes, I want to make five comments. And the first one

is one of the most important one. And Madame Chairwoman made

the right comment that we need to have a systems look at this

issue. If when you look at the trees, we will forget to look at the

forest. And the ‘‘forest’’ here is our future. The future where we

need to have energy sources. We need to have a total look and integrate a nuclear energy system that needs to deal with its waste,

needs to deal with its resources.

And my second comment is about—is to Mr. Bunn about the

UREX+ technology. The UREX+ can actually lure you to do a coseparation of all of the transuranics. When we talk about proliferation resistance, we should actually not concentrate on what the

separation technology is, but on where the recycle technology is for

the following reasons. Thermal reactors for physics reasons need

relatively pure products. You can not recycle fission products in

thermal reactors, for example. Therefore, it is difficult to put dirty

products, or proliferation-resistant products, back in a thermal reactor. The first reactor—pure physics reasons that we cannot

change—can take much dirtier product. So the issue of proliferation resistance should be put on the level of what reactors you

want to use, what spectrum we are going to use. I mean, it is a

real physics question.

My third comment is on safeguards, and I absolutely agree with

what Dr. Hagengruber has been saying. We are at a stage where

we today can make major impacts on what we are doing with new

technologies having developed new computing technologies, new

modeling capabilities, and we can really change the future drastically there to avoid any risk of diversion of misuse of any plant.

Comment number four on economics. Again, we should not look

at a tree. We need to look at the forest. We need to do a full life

cycle analysis for the economics of the nuclear system. The disposal

part of the disposal component of the nuclear fuel cycle is only a

few percent, changing the cost of a few percent by even 50 percent

might not be that important in view of the benefits we can get out

of that change.

Lastly, a comment on research and development. I think this

country in the last four or five years, I have been here about eight

years, and we have made major progress in nuclear R&D. We have

basically come from a place where there was not much going to a

place where we can be the leaders of the world. But the objective

here is not to be a leader of the world in R&D. The objective, to

me, is very different. We are going to need nuclear power, because

we are going to need clean energy. Global warming is probably a

very major concern. Energy security is a concern. We are going to

need to build these reactors. What I would like, personally, is to

build them with U.S. technology in U.S. plants by creating hightech U.S. jobs. It is important that we do this R&D so that the

plants are fabricated here and we don’t import them from elsewhere.

Thank you.

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Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you. Thank you very much.

And I will recognize myself for five minutes.

Dr. Finck’s testimony points out that the technology decisions

link to reactor design and fuel cell choices. How is the Department

coordinating a decision on reprocessing with the decisions for a

next generation nuclear plant design, transmutation, technology,

and overall fuel cycle choices? Are you working with industry on

these choices?

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. With respect to the future and the

linkage between our advanced reactor technology development program and our advanced fuel cycle program, those two programs are

actually very much intertwined where we have laboratory personnel across the complex working cooperatively across laboratory

boundaries with one another, such as Argonne, Idaho, Los Alamos

working together. The decisions that we are making with respect

to the Generation IV reactor technologies, those decisions are being

made in the context of the fuel technologies and recycle technologies that are being investigated or are under investigation

within the advanced fuel cycle program. So it is very much a very

well integrated activity. We are working in the Generation IV program on an international basis so that it also brings in our international laboratory partners in France, Japan, and others. So the

decisions—it is, at this point, very early in the Generation IV reactor development, actually the fuels program, I believe rightly so, is

leading the reactor development, trying to look at what type of reactor fuels are best for getting to the key issues of minimization

of waste generation, maximizing the transmutation of the various

waste products within an existing fuel cycle for a Generation IV

program. We have much work left to do, don’t get me wrong, but

the—with respect to the execution of the Department’s advanced

reactor and fuel cycle program, it is highly integrated from top to

bottom, both in the federal staff, laboratory staff. You asked with

respect to the industry participation, we probably do not have as

much industry participation as we could. The commercial industry

today is focused on the near-term deployment, looking through our

Nuclear Power 2010 program getting plants built in the next, you

know, five- to 10-year time frame whereas the work we are doing

in our advanced fuel cycle engine programs are longer-term looking

20 to 30 years out.

Thank you.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. One of the big differences, it seemed like,

in particularly, France where the—it is a government subsidy, really, to operate these plants, which is a big difference than we have

in the United States.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, ma’am.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Then Dr. Finck, how long would it take

Argonne or another DOE lab to develop a detailed engineering system of the fuel cycle, including the economics, the waste, proliferation-resistant, and general safety and security characteristics? I

mean, is anyone working on such a model now?

Dr. FINCK. Yes. We are actually working in collaboration with all

of other labs, including Idaho, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, I think, yes,

on the systems analysis. And I think we have been doing this for,

now, three years in an integrated manner. We have made a lot of

111

progress where I would say by 2007, which is a deadline that

comes up often, and even maybe before, we already have many of

the technical answers. I think we are in the stage of integrating

them and we look at the systems. And so 2007 seems to me with

a focused effort to be absolutely reachable.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Well, I seem to recall, since I have been

on this committee and since I have been in Congress, that you have

been working on EMT and pyroprocessing and things that it seems

like it is not something new that has just come up this year that

we are planning on doing.

Dr. FINCK. Yes, indeed. Many of the technologies we have put

through these systems are relatively mature and the technical answers are well understood.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Yeah, and it is true that France is really

operating on a system that really was developed years and years

ago. Is it 30 years or so that——

Dr. FINCK. Well, I think the PUREX technology was first published integrally in 1957. I mean, this is a well-known technology,

which is quite accessible. I think the book was published in 1957,

if I recall. So they are using many of the technologies—actually

U.S. technologies that we exploited——

Chairwoman BIGGERT. That is what they told us that they have

gotten them from——

Dr. FINCK. These are extremely well known, and then they improved them after—of course, after they acquired them. For example, one of the big improvements is to reduce the volume of waste

by a factor of about four in the last 10 or 15 years. So there have

been major incremental changes, but the basis is roughly the same.

Yes.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. And then are the safeguards in monitoring research and development part of Argonne’s research program?

Dr. FINCK. We do very little bit of it. I think the places that have

real expertise would be places like Los Alamos. But I think what

is important is to integrate the research we do on separations and

reactors with the research done in other labs. If we run these research programs in parallel, we have had good discussion with—

certainly with integration. I think here is key.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you very much.

My time has expired.

And I will recognize Mr. Matheson from Utah for five minutes.

Mr. MATHESON. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.

Mr. Johnson, in your testimony on page four, you state that a

commercial scale-up of spent fuel technologies could be accomplished relatively rapidly if existing domestic facilities could be

modified and used. What—which facilities were you talking about

in terms of where are they and who owns those facilities?

Mr. JOHNSON. I apologize. I am not able to recall the exact three

locations. I would be more than happy to answer that question in

writing, but off the top of my head, I don’t want to give you the

wrong answer.

Mr. MATHESON. No, that is okay. All right.

How—when you look at how DOE is looking at selecting a reprocessing technology, you know, this is coming back on Mr.

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Honda’s line of questioning a little bit in terms of as we move forward, the direction you have been given now, do we need to change

the policy direction we have given you as Congress in terms of how

you are going about your research and development in terms of

looking at developing new technologies? What do you think? Do you

need more flexibility? Do you need more direction? Or are you

happy with the current circumstance?

Mr. JOHNSON. I believe we are very happy with the current policy and direction that we have. We have tried to lay out a reasoned, logical process for stepping through various laboratory investigations in stepping, again, through looking at what technologies, whether it is a UREX+ type process, whether it is a crystallization process, a volatilization process. So there are—we do

have several processes that have been—being investigated at the

laboratory scale. Again, it just takes some time to take and develop

these technologies, refine them in the laboratory, and then make

decisions based on the technical data that has generated in moving

and making a selection to move up a technology into a larger scale

experiment. So what—one thing we are trying to do is to walk

through the investigation of the issues and the potential treatment

technologies and then make a sound technical decision of how we

take those from the smallest investigation in the laboratory scale

and scale-up the technologies to whether it is the next step up, an

engineering scale, and that what would ultimately be used as the

basis for a decision to move forward for a commercial-scale application. I mean, for example, we are currently looking at spent fuel

on the order of kilograms of spent fuel material in the laboratory

that if you did it for a year, it would be—but what we are talking

about in a commercial scale would be, you know, thousands of metric tons. So we are—very small-scale work going on right now.

Mr. MATHESON. In your testimony, you also said the development

of advanced fuel treatment technologies would improve repository

capacity. Do you have an estimate of how much repository capacity

would be increased under the different reprocessing options you are

looking at right now?

Mr. JOHNSON. An exact number, no. The—for example, uranium

constitutes about 90 percent—96 percent of the mass in commercial

spent fuel. So the—a process such as a UREX+ process that would

take out the uranium would see a resulting reduction in the mass

of heavy metal needing to go into a repository by an equivalent

amount. But we are talking—but the issue in the repository isn’t

just volume. It is a heat generation. It is——

Mr. MATHESON. Right.

Mr. JOHNSON. There are other constituents in the spent fuel,

both in near-term, such as strontium, which is really a near-term

heat issue, and then the longer-term heat issue associated with

americium. So it is really the—it is a complex problem, multi-faceted. It is both a volume issue as well as a heat-generation issue.

And the heat-generation issue, I believe, as Dr. Finck said, if really

addressed, by taking it from the next step of the reprocessing and

then the destruction of these higher actinides in a fast reactor system.

Mr. MATHESON. Thanks.

I yield back, Madame Chairman.

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Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you.

Now we will hear from our resident—one of our resident physicists, Mr. Bartlett, for five minutes.

Mr. BARTLETT. I am a physiologist rather than a physicist. The

physicist is sitting to my right.

I get very different estimates as to the world’s supply of economically recoverable fuel for light wire reactors. Could each of you tell

me, in terms of years at present use rates, what you understand

that supply to be? It is not infinite.

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir, it is not infinite, as all our resources are

not necessarily infinite. There have been some studies that have

been produced, both within the Department and outside of the Department, and as you can imagine, they come up with different

numbers. Those numbers have gone—range anywhere from—there

is, you know, a 50- to 100-year supply of uranium around the globe

to the fact that, you know, there is a 1,000-year supply. So there

really is no firm, strong agreement with respect to the energy resources available in the uranium ore around the globe, but the

range—again, the range is anywhere from, you know, 50 to 100

years to 1,000 years.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Bunn.

Mr. BUNN. Yes, this—we have—in the Harvard study that I mentioned, there is an extensive appendix on this subject. The range

of estimates comes from, I think, in part, differences of understanding of the terms by which the estimates are described. Very

often, people refer to reserves, which is a term really used to describe, basically, uranium that you have actually struck a pick to,

as though that were all of the uranium in the world, as opposed

to resources, which is the amount of uranium that might be available in the future as technology develops and more uranium is

found and so on. The reality is, because of, until very recently, very

low prices for decades for uranium, there has been very little

searching for uranium, particularly at higher prices than existed

for the last couple of decades. And as a result, it seems certain to

those who have looked at it in detail, I think, that there is a lot

more uranium out there than is currently reported as reserves.

Mr. BARTLETT. What is currently reported as reserves?

Mr. BUNN. Currently, the—let us see. The red book, which is the

IAE document, suggests that there is something of the order of several million tons that are—there is basically 17.1 million tons of

uranium available at prices in the range of $40 to $80 a kilogram

of uranium, which is——

Mr. BARTLETT. Which is how many years’ supply?

Mr. BUNN. Let us see. That would be a couple of century’s

worth——

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay.

Mr. BUNN.—at current rates, but, of course, if you expect nuclear

energy to grow in the future, which I think many people in this

room hope that it will, then, of course, you know, that—the amount

of material used every year would grow. But the—that is what is

sort of reported so far. And the reality is, as I said, there is a lot

more out there. And particularly as you develop improved mining

technology in the future, the record on, essentially, every mineral

that is mined, if you look, over the past century or so, the price in

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real terms of extraction, rather than increasing as the good stuff

gets mined out, has been decreasing because the technology has

been developing faster than the good stuff gets mined out. And I

would expect that to occur for uranium in the future as well.

Mr. BARTLETT. Let me ask you each very quickly to tell me how

your testimony might have been different if you knew oil was going

to be $100 a barrel next year.

Mr. JOHNSON. I can guarantee you my testimony would not

change.

Mr. BUNN. I can guarantee you exactly the same, because as I

say, I believe in the future of nuclear energy, and I believe the future of nuclear energy is best assured by not making a near-term

decision to reprocess.

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. And my testimony would have been

unaltered as well.

Dr. FINCK. My testimony would even be more optimistic. We

need more nuclear power, certainly. But we also need ways to use

nuclear power to fuel our cars. We don’t have these ways today.

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, I hope there is a lot of additional uranium

remaining in the world, because I suspect, as we run down Hubbard’s Peak, we are going to need it.

Thank you very much, Madame Chairman.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you.

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis, is recognized for

five minutes.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Madame Chairman.

In South Carolina, you know, we have some sites that have done

some work on reprocessing spent fuel from weapons used at Savannah River Site, and also some at Barnwell, South Carolina. If we

went to a reprocessing approach, how attractive would those sites

be as places to do that work? Mr. Johnson, particularly you. Could

you comment on that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Thank you.

The sites that you noted would be, I would expect, part of the

evaluation that the Department would conduct as part of any national environmental policy act review that we would be required

to undertake before moving forward with any kind of large scale

demonstration. So I would say pretty confidently that those sites

would be among the list of sites that would be evaluated for such

a future use.

Mr. INGLIS. Let us see—other countries, and I have been at a

markup, so I am not sure whether this has already been addressed,

but other countries, Japan, France, England, Germany have all

pursued reprocessing. And Mr. Johnson, do you have any comments about the success of their programs and what we can learn

from those?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I believe that in those countries where reprocessing technologies have been used in support of their domestic

commercial nuclear power plant operation, they have been successful, with success being defined as the ability to safely and securely

separate spent fuel into its constituent parts, refabricate fuel for

use for power production. And in that case, I would say yes, the

programs have been very successful. And there is no reason to

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think that the same type of success could not be seen elsewhere as

well.

Mr. INGLIS. Mr. Bunn, do you agree with that or——

Mr. BUNN. I don’t. If you define it in purely technical terms, they

eventually manage to become successful, although in both France

and Britain and particularly in Japan now they had tremendous

difficulties with cost and startup problems and so on at these reprocessing plants. But if you look at the official government studies

in both France and Japan, they conclude that their nuclear energy

is noticeably more expensive—because they have pursued reprocessing—than it would have been had they not done so. And that

is not me saying that. That is the official government studies in

both of those countries saying that. And so it is hard for me to

characterize that as a success when an alternative technology of

dry cask storage would have provided nuclear energy with a way

to manage its fuel more cheaply, more safely, and more securely.

Mr. INGLIS. Dr. Finck, do you agree or disagree with that?

Dr. FINCK. Well, I absolutely disagree, if I may. And I used to

be French years ago, and I would characterize—it is not the case

anymore, but I still have a little bit of pride left.

First of all, I think the French program, in my mind, has been

incredibly successful. They did meet their objective. They know

how to deal with their waste. And it is true their reports say there

were small costs associated with closing—that cost is very small.

And in view of the benefit they are getting out of it, they have accepted that small cost. I mean, nothing is free in life. Where I live,

we recycle our household things, and I pay a cost to the city to recycle, so I think it is well worth it in view of the benefits of not

having to bury it in my own backyard. So I—you know, as a society, we have to take into account not only the small cost increase

but the whole benefits. I think the French programs, I view those

as having been extremely successful. And the demonstration of success is that they have not decided to stop. If it weren’t worth it,

they would not go on. They are doing it. And they will continue,

I believe.

Mr. INGLIS. Germany, however, has suspended their program,

right?

Dr. FINCK. Germany has suspended. Basically, they are going

to—they want to suspend their whole nuclear program. They want

to shut down all of their nuclear plants; therefore they don’t want

to do anything, no nuclear energy, no reprocessing, et cetera. This

is a——

Mr. BUNN. But they decided to stop reprocessing before they decided to shut down——

Dr. FINCK. Yes, let me finish. This is a political decision. My only

question will be in 2015 and 2020, where will they get their electricity? They might have a real problem. They might import it

across the French boundary using reactors and using reprocessing.

They just happen to be down on the other side of the Rhine River,

which two—the bottom line would be the same effect.

Mr. INGLIS. My time has expired.

Thank you, Madame Chairman.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Sodrel.

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Mr. SODREL. I don’t have any questions at this time. Thank you.

We don’t have any nuclear power plants in Indiana. We do have

a lot of coal.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr.

Schwarz.

Mr. SCHWARZ. I want to make sure that I am getting this correct,

and Mr. Bunn, I guess you would be the one that I would like to

have answer this, so anyone else jump in, if you feel like it.

You feel that the—we should not proceed to build any sort of reprocessing facility in this country now, that we should continue the

open fuel cycle, storing the waste product, and that when we do,

hopefully soon, start building new nuclear power plants, that is the

technology that would be—that should be used, and if we go to the

reprocessing and recycling, that would put off, significantly into the

future, any expansion of the number of nuclear power plants we

have in the United States. Do I have that right?

Mr. BUNN. Except for the last bit. I think my argument is not

that it would inevitably put off construction of new power plants,

but that it would make—because of the increased complexity of

cost, safety issues, and so on, it would make public acceptance and

utility acceptance of new power plants somewhat more problematic

to achieve.

Mr. SCHWARZ. You led right into my next observation and question.

What is the position of the investor-owned regulated utilities in

this country who potentially would build these new plants? What

is their position on the issue of the open fuel cycle versus using reprocessed and recycled fuel?

Mr. BUNN. You would not be able to find a utility in the country

who—that is willing to pay the cost of reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel or who would be interested in investing in a reprocessing

plant today.

Mr. SCHWARZ. So for anyone on the panel, then, if we are going

to—if there is a need to build new nuclear power plants, and I believe there is, the sooner the better, in my opinion, why would we

be considering building any sort of a reprocessing recycling facilities or be pushing that technology now when it is not a technology

we are going to use?

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. Let me just venture a comment here.

I—the industry—I can’t speak for the industry, and I don’t think

any of us here can speak for the industry itself. But what I have

heard from the industry would lead me to believe that the number

one priority that they have, as far as nuclear energy is concerned,

is to get a new reactor licensed and get something under construction in this country, a plan for one or several reactors. I think part

of the industry that builds reactors would like to also sell a reactor

to China and have some influence on that process.

I think the number two thing is they would like to get something

done on the waste, that they don’t want to watch another licensing

period go on without some hope. So whether it is interim storage

of waste or dry cask storage at an interim site or Yucca Mountain,

and there, one of the issues they would like to see is something,

you know, that would lead them to believe that this 100,000-year

standard, which is, you know, the—gotten into the way of Yucca

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Mountain, somehow that will be dealt with. I think in the case of

the reprocessing, it is so far off in the future that from an economic

horizon point of view, as businesses, they have to look at the issues

of the reliability of the Federal Government to have a regulatory

environment that allows them to predict cost so that they can transition over interest rates. And I think the last thing is not reprocessed fuel. I mean, I think technically they are interested in all of

these questions, but I think it is really beyond the scope of them

as a business, but we are, in fact, going to use some fuel from the

nuclear weapons program, and I think they would like to actually

see that successfully done and like to see a process that would actually burn these fuels, because before you start believing that

these are going to have a major influence on the business you are

in, you would like to really believe that there will be a business

that will be predictable from a cost point of view. And so when I

talk with the industry people, they are always very courteous about

Generation IV and reprocessing. But it is really not on the horizon

of the time that they are going to be in charge of the business.

Mr. SCHWARZ. Thank you, sir.

I yield back, Madame Chairman.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you.

I might note that we will be having a hearing later on focusing

on the utilities and having them here.

And also, the utilities do pay a fee to the Nuclear Trust Fund,

and that is what provides for the waste, and that is why the Federal Government takes over at that point.

I would like to recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson

Lee, for five minutes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Madame Chairperson,

and to the Ranking Member.

I can’t imagine, even in the calmness and quietness of this room,

that there could not be a more important hearing to talk about reconfiguring how we deal with nuclear waste, particularly when we

mention a favorite President of mine, Jimmy Carter, but that you

can describe his legacy as decades ago. And certainly, nuclear

waste is not something that should be described in the concept of

decades ago.

And so I would—I just would like to focus on the vitality of the

question of reprocessing spent fuel. When I say the vitality, the

good things that can happen by doing that. And then I would like

to also—and I would like each of the witnesses to comment on that,

since our friends in Japan and France have seemingly already done

that. Those of us in Texas are still mourning the loss of a superconductivity lab, which is a parallel, not necessarily in sync with

this, but new technology.

At the same time, I would like to wear the hat of the many concerned persons about the danger of nuclear waste, and of course,

as was noted in some of the information, the concern about

PUREX, but also the concern about the potential of weapons. And

some of my colleagues may have asked this question. I was interestingly just in a meeting on homeland security, and so I apologize

for not hearing the totality of your testimony. But I would like to

hear a balanced response of the answer back on the potential

threat of the creation of terrorist weapons, but the vitality of doing

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this processing of finding a creative way to advise the Administration, meaning Congress to advise the Administration, or set policies

and standards on how we do this.

Let me also say that this question is in the backdrop of a great

deal of concern and opposition that comes from both sides of the

aisle with any traveling of nuclear waste, and certainly the concern

that Nevadians have expressed, or persons from Nevada, in their

utilization right now as to the storage place of nuclear waste.

So my first question, the vitality of reprocessing this nuclear

waste, the way that we can answer the question regarding the ability of terrorists accumulating or using this for weapons, and then

guidance that might be helpful now decades later in a policy that

would be effective in providing a way to transport and also to, if

you will, handle nuclear waste.

I could start with Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Before I start, let me just reiterate that the Administration

stands firmly behind Yucca Mountain and the need to proceed as

expeditiously as possible with the completion and the opening of

that facility, and that the talk that we are—the work that we are

engaged in at the Department and the investigation of recycle reprocessing technologies is looked at as complementary to that activity.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And may I just, for a moment, so I can make

the record, there are many of us that don’t stand behind that, but

we are certainly interested in the complementary part being more

than a complementary part and maybe being a fixed part. But let

me hear your answer to the complementary part. Some of us are

in disagreement with the Administration’s position on Yucca Mountain. But you may proceed.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Yes, well, we are very much committed to continuing to investigate the possibilities that exist in treating spent fuel, not necessarily as a pure waste, but looking at what kind of energy content—the energy content that it has, how can we recapture that,

how can we minimize the waste burden on future generations

through the need—or through the positive impacts in geologic disposal.

With respect to the commercial viability of the technologies, we

are not there yet. We are continuing to work within the laboratories. Things look very promising at the laboratory, on the laboratory scale. There are technologies, as you know, being deployed and

being in use worldwide. We think we can improve upon those, that

the investigations we have going on within the Department are, we

believe, vastly improved technologies over what are being used

commercially worldwide.

With respect to the—your question on security, as you know,

spent nuclear fuel is being stored at, roughly, 60 nuclear sites

around the country. So there is a need to look at the issue of where

does the spent nuclear fuel reside, for how long does it reside, and

can there be some increased safety assurances by consolidation to

less than the number of sites that are currently being used.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. Can I get questions—answers from the

panelists? Thank you.

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Mr. BUNN. I would argue that the reprocessing industry today is

not a very vital one, to use your words. British Nuclear Fuels,

which operates one of the world’s largest commercial reprocessing

plants, has announced that they are going to be out of the business

in less than a decade, because they simply don’t have customers

anymore. France is running out of foreign customers, will continue

its domestic reprocessing, but will end up using significantly less

than the total reprocessing capacity that it has. Japan is about to

open its new reprocessing plant after a prolonged struggle in which

the utilities sort of tried without saying so publicly to get out of

having to pay for it and have now—are now talking to the government about imposing a huge lines charge on all users of electricity

in order to pay the immense costs of reprocessing. No other country

is seriously thinking about getting into the business. I should mention that Russia is struggling to keep its last commercial reprocessing plant open, because it has so little business, and the costs are

so high.

So this is, in a sense, a dying industry that we are thinking of

joining here.

With respect to the terrorist risks, as I mentioned in my testimony, there has not yet been a good, credible study, a life cycle

comparison of the terrorist risks of the once-through fuel cycle

versus reprocessing and recycling. But if you just look at the situation, it is—the National Academy of Sciences, and others, have concluded that the risk of terrorist attack on a thick dry cask is very

modest. The risk of a terrorist attack on fuel in a pool is somewhat

more, particularly if the fuel is fresh enough that there is potential

for a fire if the water is drained. But when you are processing

the—you know, in this kind of intensely radioactive material, in

huge facilities with volatile chemicals, often at high temperatures,

there are more potentials for accident or for dispersing that radioactive material than there are if it is just sitting in a thick steel

or concrete cask. And similarly, then you are going to be—for the

transportation part, you are going to be shipping some pretty radioactive stuff from place to place in order to send it to the transmutation reactors, and that will require significant investments in security.

More broadly, with respect to actual nuclear weapons terrorism,

I hope that we will not proceed with any technology that won’t be

reasonably resistant against theft of nuclear material for that purpose, although I have some doubts about some of the technologies

we are looking at now. But the traditional approach to reprocessing

involves a huge number of shipments of directly weapons-usable

plutonium from place to place every year. And those—you know,

the part of the nuclear materials life cycle, when it is most vulnerable to sort of overt, forcible theft, is when it is being shipped from

place to place.

As I mentioned in my testimony, there is a problem worldwide

with security and accounting for nuclear stockpiles, both nuclear

warheads and nuclear material that could be used to make a nuclear bomb. Regardless of what we do about reprocessing, our government needs to step up its efforts very substantially to make

sure that every kilogram of plutonium, every kilogram of highly-enriched uranium, every nuclear warhead worldwide, wherever it

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may be, is secure and accounted for, because our homeland security

starts there. It starts wherever there is a vulnerable cache of nuclear material anywhere in the world that terrorists might use for

a nuclear attack.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. The gentlelady’s time has expired. If the

next two witnesses could give very short answers, please.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairwoman.

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. I will only address one part of it. I spent my

whole career on issues relating to security, nuclear security. I have

done many security studies, including 9/11 studies for the Department of Energy, their facilities. So let me address this in particular.

The worst places in the fuel cycle are the reactor, as the National

Academy Report on Terrorism said, would be something happening

at the reactor, because there is a lot of energy stored there. It can

be dealt with.

The other place is when fissile material, that is plutonium or

highly-enriched uranium, which is weapon-like materials, appear.

Plutonium is particularly bad, because when you scatter it about,

it costs an enormous amount of money to clean it up. I would disagree with my colleague, Matt Bunn, on the business about weapon-useable, because many of these things, unless they are really

fuel grade, the plutonium’s biggest risk is this dispersal risk. It is

not easy to make a weapon out of it. Even in fuel grade, weapons—

it is just very hard to make that. So just—my view of this is the

reprocessing opens a door up for plutonium to be available in transport.

And here I would agree with them that, in fact, opens this risk

up. And so it needs to be done with the greatest of care in terms

of looking at—over at that overall system or there will be another

panel like this meeting on that issue.

Thank you.

Dr. FINCK. I will try to answer very quickly.

As far as terrorist use, I think there are many options today for

increasing proliferation resistance. We have heard them. The bottom line, to me, is to never separate pure weapons-useable material, and we can do that. Therefore, we never have to ship it, and

it won’t be very attractive to potential terrorists.

As far as vitality, Shane Johnson made a very good point. Yucca

Mountain is needed whatever we do. And what we are trying to do

is making better use of the one Yucca Mountain we might have

soon. So we raise a real complementary effort between repository

work and transmutation work.

Finally, for the question of vitality in Europe Mr. Bunn addressed, I think the issue is not deciding to go out of reprocessing.

Several countries have decided to go out of nuclear in Europe,

therefore, they are not doing reprocessing anymore. When the time

comes, and I think it is now, where energy costs are going up and

the gentleman asked the question of the cost of oil at $100, when

that time comes, nuclear, I believe, will be reborn in Europe and

many other countries, and the fuel cycle will have to follow, because they will need as much as I know. They will try to avoid having to build many repositories in the countries that are very dense.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.

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Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you.

The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Bonner, is recognized.

Mr. BONNER. Thank you, Madame Chair, and this is a very timely conversation, I agree.

Mr. Bunn, you say in your testimony that there is little doubt

that Yucca Mountain could hold far more than the current legislative limit, perhaps even all of the waste produced over the life of

the existing nuclear fleet. Why are you so confident of Yucca Mountain’s ability to hold more waste? And would this require an expansion of the repository? And if so, would you be willing to venture

a guess of what it costs?

Mr. BUNN. Well, the costs of the repository are not—it is only a

very minor portion of those costs that are related to digging more

tunnels. And I am confident in part because my colleagues, Mr.

Johnson and Dr. Finck, have both published reports that indicate

that their view of the technical limit is 120,000 tons of heavy

metal, as opposed to 70,000, which is the legislative limit. But I—

the reality is that the Department hasn’t really looked at the subject in the—of how you could go about expanding that capacity in

any significant detail. For example, there are—you can go outward

in some directions until you get to the edges of the areas that have

sufficient geologic stability to deal with that situation. You can

think about whether it is possible to have a second or a third tier,

because currently it is just one tier, a flat repository. I have talked

to a number of analysts within the Yucca Mountain program who

think it is quite plausible that you could do a second or a third tier.

So there are a variety of things that, as I said in my testimony,

need to be looked at in more detail. The American Physical Society

Panel that Dr. Hagengruber chaired also talked about the potential

that it could hold all of the fuel from the existing nuclear fleet.

I should also mention, with respect to other countries, the United

States is, I believe, the only country that has made the mistake of

locating its repository in a mountain with fixed sides. In most other

countries, they are looking at giant blocks of granite that you could

put centuries of spent fuel into simply by extending the size of the

tunnel. So it is, in most countries, not an issue of having to build,

you know, lots and lots and lots of Yucca Mountains all of the time.

I should also mention, in respect to Dr. Hagengruber’s disagreement with me, it is not just my view. It is the published view of

the U.S. Government in a report sited in my prepared testimony.

It is also—was gone through in some considerable detail in a report

of the National Academy of Sciences that included the former Director of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, a former Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and so on, among its panelists. So Roger

and I can talk about that more off-line after the hearing.

Mr. BONNER. If I could just ask the panel, anyone willing to take

a stab at this, hearing the questioning from the gentlelady from

Texas. In respect that there are many people who have different

views on Yucca Mountain, but as a Nation, we are in an energy crisis, and we are depleting fossil fuels faster than we are replenishing them, and we are more and more dependent on foreign countries for energy. That would have to be a problem that we could

all agree to, and yet I sit back sometimes, when I hear my friends

who do not want to proceed with Yucca Mountain and yet want the

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benefits of nuclear power, and wonder, ‘‘What are the other alternatives out there if we don’t proceed, as Chairman Hobson said before he left, with the plan that we have in front of us?’’ Are there

other reasonable plans out there that can allow us to continue

down the path of pursuing nuclear but being responsible with what

we do with its waste?

Mr. BUNN. To me?

Mr. BONNER. To any of the four of you.

Mr. BUNN. Ultimately, we are going to need a nuclear waste repository. We are going to need that whether we go direct disposal

or whether we pursue reprocessing and transmutation. That is

clear. There isn’t—unfortunately for Ms. Jackson Lee, there isn’t

an alternative to a nuclear waste repository. There—one could potentially cancel the Yucca Mountain and try to find a different nuclear waste repository. My own view is that that would—the prospects of political success in licensing a different nuclear waste repository somewhere in the United States before I retire are probably pretty modest.

Mr. BONNER. Anyone else disagree?

Dr. FINCK. I would like to answer that.

With the technology we have discussed today, we have a path towards sustainability on energy security in the United States by—

we will need the repository, certainly, but we will need a unique

repository where we will use it much better than we plan to use

it today. It will last us well beyond this century. So there are ways

to make nuclear much more sustainable than what we are doing

today.

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. I would like to just offer a comment on that.

I—that was the first study I did back in 1972. And at the time,

we were classifying separated waste from reprocessing at Hanford.

We were also doing work at Savannah River Site. And there was

waste being stored in tanks in Idaho. It was very obvious, at the

time, that engineered storage, which is storage that might be monitored—retrievable storage that might be monitored for hundreds of

years into the future as a concept with something that was not

hard to do, that trying to get a solution that would meet people’s

acceptable standard of permanent disposal with no chance of anything ever being returned to the environment was too hard. It is

just as hard, in fact, it is even worse now, because the legal barriers to making any kind of progress are higher. The prospect—you

know, I don’t know how you will deal with the 100,000-year standard. It is too ice age for—and we don’t know of any technology that

is going to survive that. So practically speaking, I think a permanent disposal repository for nuclear waste is something that probably 30 years from now, somebody will be sitting here talking

about the same thing, because it still hasn’t happened. I think that

what people will have to face is that we have very poor interim intermediate storage capabilities by using reactors as places to store

stuff. We need to get on with the business of accepting the fact that

it is not 100,000 years later some guy with a burrow digging a hole

in the ground is going to be the measure whether we did a good

job on permanent storage. But the fight over Yucca Mountain is a

fight that existed, by the way, very strongly in the 1970s, but for

different things. It wasn’t Yucca Mountain then. It was deep-sea

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beds and granitic disposal, glass rods. It was the same kind of arguments you see today. It is 30 years later, and we still haven’t

made any progress. I am not a cynic, but I guess, realistically, I

have—a physicist that has become an engineer. I would just get on

with the job of some regional intermediate storage with dry cask

storage and just expect to take care of it for the rest of our existence.

Mr. BONNER. Thank you, Madame Chair.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you.

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin, is recognized.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Madame Chair.

I had a bunch of questions, and I hope a couple of them maybe

have fairly short answers.

The first one was, somewhere or other I had heard that if you

were just volumetrically to take the spent nuclear fuel that we

have so far and stack it on a football field, it would end up about

a meter or so deep. I understand that, from a thermal point of

view, that wouldn’t work very well, but just volumetrically, if you

stacked it on a football field, is that about right? About a meter?

Mr. BUNN. I haven’t done that calculation, but it sounds like the

right order of magnitude.

Mr. AKIN. Reasonable? Okay.

The second question——

Mr. BUNN. It is not huge volumes of stuff, you know, but——

Mr. AKIN. It generates a lot of heat, that is the——

Mr. BUNN. The total amount is less than, you know, the waste

from a coal power plant—one coal power plant every year.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. The second question is the small, inexpensive

reactors possibly with—what generation would they be? Third generation or fourth or what?

Mr. BUNN. Probably fourth.

Mr. AKIN. Fourth generation? First of all, my question is, are

they available now, if we said, all of a sudden, we are so sick of

paying for this oil. We are just going to build them, how long would

it take us to get to the point where we would actually start digging

some dirt and pouring some concrete and all?

Mr. JOHNSON. If you are referring to some of the small, Generation IV reactor technologies that we have just begun, essentially,

conceptualizing, we are, you know, a decade or more away from

seeing any kind of commercialization of that particular technology,

although I would——

Mr. AKIN. So those are the things that people talk about that it

is pelletized, kind of, in ceramic pellets and that they are very

small——

Mr. JOHNSON. Oh, you are talking about the pebble bed? The

pebble bed could be done somewhat sooner, potentially. There are

smaller, as Mr. Bunn has eluded to, what is called a pebble bed,

gas-cooled reactor technology that has been under development

both in Japan and South Africa predominately that builds upon

earlier German technologies. Those have been looked at by U.S. industry recently, although there is no one in industry currently pursuing that particular technology.

Mr. AKIN. Would that be called third generation? Maybe?

Mr. BUNN. Probably.

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Mr. JOHNSON. Probably.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. So you are saying we are 10 years away, at a

minimum, from a small, fourth generation type of facility?

Mr. JOHNSON. At least, yes.

Mr. AKIN. At least. Okay. If you had to build something now,

what would you build?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, as you may know, the commercial industry

in this country is looking at the next generation light water reactor

technologies, which build off the technology base that is currently

deployed at 103 sites—or 103 reactors across our country. So they

are looking at, essentially, an evolution of the current technology

that is——

Mr. AKIN. A further improvement of what we have already had?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. Is that the same thing the Navy uses in their

different ships and all? The same general technology?

Mr. JOHNSON. The base technology of a pressurized reactor, or a

boiling water reactor, yes. But there are considerable differences in

fuel and the operation of those facilities.

Mr. AKIN. Just because the nature of what they are trying to accomplish is a lot different?

Mr. JOHNSON. Correct.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. And now is it true that what you said that depending on how you come out on reprocessing might change the design somewhat of the power plant?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, what I was trying to address was the

Chairlady’s question on the integration of our Generation IV reactor program and our fuels development program that those are integrated. They are interrelated. And it is an integrative process of

trying to optimize the fuel to meet both power production requirements, waste minimization, and also enhances proliferation resistance to——

Mr. AKIN. So dry cask storage, that—would you take that off of

the table, if you were talking about reprocessing then it may

change your design parameter somewhat? Because if you are dry

cask storage, you could use whatever gives you the most power out

of the material and then you get rid of what is left over, right?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, but I don’t want to say that you would not

have, somewhere in the process, the need for dry cask storage at

some point in the process.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. The third thing was—and this was a point, I

think, that you were making, Mr. Bunn, pretty heavily, and that

is this reprocessing cost can drive the thing out of economic range.

Relative to relative cost, and that was where, I gather, you disagreed with Mr. Finck. You are saying it is a relatively small cost

and a responsible cost to add. Mr. Bunn, you are saying it is just

disproportionately so large it makes it impractical. Better to postpone the problem until the technology develops a little bit more.

We can always come back and catch it later at a lower cost. What

is the relative cost of the reprocessing in the overall process? Are

we talking about adding five percent or doubling the cost of electricity, or what would be the effect on the cost of electricity to the

consumer if——

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Mr. BUNN. The effect on the cost of electricity, actually Dr. Finck

and I don’t disagree, is relatively modest, because the advantage of

nuclear power, when you look at—when you compare it to other

electricity sources, is that its whole fuel cost is pretty modest, because the energy in its fuel is so concentrated. So the main cost in

nuclear energy is the capital cost of the nuclear plant that you

have built. And so the total contribution to electricity generation

costs would be relatively modest, a few percent, probably, depending on how expensive the reprocessing and the recycling ended up

being.

But that is a little bit like saying, ‘‘Well, I should be willing to pay $300 rather than $100 for a pair of shoes, because it is still

a small proportion of the cost of my wardrobe.’’ And the reality is,

if you look at the cost of nuclear waste management, which is one

of the few costs that the owner of a nuclear power plant that is already built can still control going forward, you are, of order, doubling that cost of nuclear waste management, if you are going forward with reprocessing and recycling, as traditionally practiced,

using the cost—you know, if we had a plant that was governmentfinanced at low cost, and if it had the same—managed to achieve

the same capital and operating costs as the most efficient plants

that exist today in France and Britain. So you know, a utility is

not going to want to do that. So they—if left to the private market,

reprocessing wouldn’t happen. So then, as I said, you have to do

one of three things. You either have to substantially increase the

nuclear waste fee, which utilities are going to scream bloody murder about, or you are going to have to have the government provide

tens of billions of dollars in subsidies over decades, and you know,

while it is a small contribution to electricity, tens of billions of dollars is significant money. If we were talking about a weapons system, we would agree that that was an expensive weapons system.

Or third, you are going to have to impose regulations that force the

industry to take it out of their own bottom line and build these facilities themselves.

Mr. AKIN. And let me just stop you for a minute. Somehow or

another there was a little leap here of reasoning that I didn’t catch.

Okay. What I was asking was, let us say—first of all, let us start

with the assumption that the government is not going to subsidize

anything. We are just going to try to keep the lawyers at bay and

the politics at bay and let us just deal with it just from an engineering—let us—a perfect world.

Mr. BUNN. Right.

Mr. AKIN. My question is, the total cost for generating, obviously

you have got to put the plant cost in and your cost of capital to

build it all. And so I am saying that is built into the cost to the

consumable electricity.

Mr. BUNN. Right.

Mr. AKIN. What you are saying is the reprocessing is still a small

portion of——

Mr. BUNN. It is a small portion of that——

Mr. AKIN.—the overall——

Mr. BUNN.—total cost.

Mr. AKIN.—electrical establishment?

Mr. BUNN. Correct.

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Mr. AKIN. Okay.

Mr. BUNN. Correct. That is what I am saying. And what—all I

was saying, with respect to the regulations or the fee was how do

we make that money for that small additional cost appear. You

have got to either charge the utilities for it or force them to pay

for it themselves or the government has to pay for it itself. Those

are the only three options I can think of anyway.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. We

will have a second round of questioning.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. We are experiencing technical difficulties.

We will also be having a hearing on cost later on.

So the gentleman from Michigan, the physicist, Dr. Ehlers.

Mr. EHLERS. That puts a heavy burden on me.

I—it is interesting listening to this, because the first in-depth

look I took of this was in the late 1970s, slightly after you did, Dr.

Hagengruber. And it doesn’t seem much has changed. But I look

at—I took a good look at this, because I was teaching a course on

the environment, and I was also a member of the Sierra Club,

which was adamantly opposed to nuclear power. And so I looked

very carefully at the various forms of generating electricity and

came to the conclusion that nuclear power and fossil-generated

power are about equally bad. And I ended up disagreeing with the

Sierra Club, which I was a member then and still am, in spite of

occasional difficulties with them. I came down on the side of nuclear power, because the base—the biggest problems that you had

to deal with, with the fossil-fueled plants, is the greenhouse gas effect. The biggest problem of the nuclear plants is the disposal of

the radioactive waste. In other words, in both cases, dealing with

the waste products. And I felt much, much more comfortable dealing with a compact, solid material that is a waste product than a

gaseous dispersed product, which is virtually impossible to deal

with capture, and we talk about a lot of solutions, but none of them

look as easy as either reprocessing or storage of waste.

I would also pick up on Dr. Hagengruber’s comment on the—I

am supposed to be at another meeting, so I am sure I am being

summoned.

Dr. Hagengruber’s comment was about disposal versus storage.

And he is absolutely right. I got into politics because of an environmental problem in my area. That was ordinary, solid waste. And

one of the things I proposed is that we change the name of our

landfill from the Kent County Solid Waste Disposal Facility to the

Kent County Solid Waste Storage Facility, because it is still there.

And it is still there and it is still creating problems. And we have

to recognize that. Yucca Mountain, I think the legislative language

that we put on Yucca Mountain is just impossible to fulfill, and we

ought to wake up to that, and I have tried to wake my colleagues

up to that. Monitored, retrievable storage is the only viable solution politically, because you can not guarantee that this will—that

if you just stick it in the ground and leave it there it is never going

to leak, never going to create problems.

I always thought that recycling of waste was a good idea. And

Mr. Bunn, you seem to argue against it on, primarily, economic

grounds. I would point out, if there is that much excess capacity

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in other parts of the world, I would be perfectly happy to ship it

over there and let them reprocess it and pay for it.

The—I also would disagree, and this is because I have to leave

for another meeting. I am not—I am just stating my opinions here

and will not—probably not have time to listen to your responses,

but the economic argument, I don’t think, is a valid one in this

case. I find it hard to believe that the cost of recycling the waste

is going to be greater than the perpetual care over the long-term

of the stored waste, because I think the only way to do it is to set

up a trust fund to make sure the money is always there, otherwise

there are going to be political hassles every year about the cost of

that.

I would also point out that this is not a cost on the utilities. It

is a cost on the customers. We have been talking about the utilities

pay this fee that they are paying now. That goes right into the rate

base, and since they are mostly regulated industries, it is the customers who really pay the bill. And so I feel comfortable just—if,

in fact, recycling is a better alternative, I feel comfortable just telling the customers that that is a fee that has to be paid as part of

the total cost of the system.

So I haven’t quite exhausted my time. There are probably 30 seconds, if any of you would like to respond and argue with me or say

something different about it.

Mr. BUNN. Well, I would like to argue with you a bit. I think that

you and I are supporting the same option, which is monitored retrievable storage. I believe that if we put the fuel in storage while

moving forward in a responsible way with a geologic repository,

that we are going to leave open whatever option we take. Then we

can allow time for technology to develop. We can allow time for interest to accumulate on funds that we set aside today. And I completely agree that the only way to manage a geologic waste repository, which we are going to need, again, no matter what path we

take, is to set aside a trust fund so that the money will always be

available. But with the wonders of compound interest, that is possible to do without spending enormous amounts of money today.

So I think that that is really the best path forward: to continue

looking at the technology, but not to make a rush to judgment

today on technologies that currently are more expensive, more

risky, and more proliferation-prone than the alternatives.

Mr. EHLERS. Okay. And I don’t have that much argument with

that. Obviously, we have to know what we are going to do. But I—

the difficulty of siting, I think, is the biggest problem with the storage system. And I think it is a large enough problem that recycling

will have to—just so that you don’t have to cite as many sites. And

the economics may not win in this case. The politics may win.

Mr. BUNN. But then you have to site the reprocessing and transmutation facilities, and since they will pose greater hazards to

their neighbors than a repository will, that may be even more difficult.

Mr. EHLERS. Well, possibly, but I am not convinced that it would

pose greater hazards, if it is done properly. And after all, we have

two polluted sites we can start with and just build a large perimeter fence around them and say, ‘‘Okay. Keep on doing it.’’ But I

don’t—I think your view of the dangers is somewhat exaggerated.

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Madame Chairwoman, I appreciate your consideration, and I

yield back the balance of my time.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Ehlers.

And we will start a second round now. And Mr. Honda, why don’t

you——

Mr. HONDA. Madame Chairwoman, let me yield to Mr. Matheson,

please.

Mr. MATHESON. Well, thank you, Mr. Honda.

The question I would like to ask about is in the evaluation of reprocessing, I am assuming that there would—if we moved ahead

with the commercial effort of reprocessing at some point, we would

have it at a few sites around the country, or perhaps fewer than

a few?

Mr. BUNN. Maybe only one. Who knows?

Mr. MATHESON. In terms of looking at all of this effort for R&D

and reprocessing, what effort is being looked at in assessing the

risk of transporting of the waste to another site?

Mr. BUNN. Do you want to handle that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, with respect to our Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, we are not looking at transportation issues. Probably the

only part of the Department that is looking at transportation issues

associated with spent nuclear fuel would be the Office of Civilian

Radioactive Waste Management, and to their work, I apologize, but

I can’t really address.

Mr. BUNN. There is a fairly substantial R&D effort in the Department related—not—I wouldn’t say—R&D is the wrong word. A

fairly substantial effort to look into what measure should be applied to secured transports of spent fuel, and there is a—what is

called the Transportation Safeguards Division within DOE that

today safeguards shipments such as how weapons are shipped from

place to place.

Mr. MATHESON. It may be getting a little outside of the scope of

this hearing, but as a member of the Transportation Committee,

we held a hearing in Las Vegas talking about transportation relative to moving waste to Yucca Mountain. I was not given a lot of

assurance that the Department has really done a lot of work on assessing transportation risk of nuclear waste, and so it would be an

interesting issue to——

Mr. BUNN. I don’t disagree with the—your assessment of the adequacy of what has been done so far.

Mr. MATHESON. Well, since I am from a state where 95 percent

of that waste would go through, I have a certain interest in this

issue.

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. Let me just speak, because on that—I think

people have said the right thing. The RW Office actually is the one

that is taking the responsibility for the security aspects of transportation. There has been work done. I know, because some of the

work was done at—you know, involving Sandia National Labs.

Some of the work in the transportation area, including the transportation of casks, for instance, fuel casks and accidents that occur,

the idea of people shooting weapons at fuel casks or transport

casks, that work goes back 25 or 30 years. So there is—if you look

at the integrated total of the amount of money that has gone into

both purposeful and accidental attacks on the transportation of

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fresh fuel and spent fuel, there has been a lot of work, and we are

talking about many, many millions of dollars.

Now in particular, RW has been looking at—was looking at the

question of whether or not to federalize the transportation or to

make it commercial in its nature. Transportation Security Division,

one that Matt mentioned, transports, in effect, trigger quantities of

material weapons and pits and other types of material. And it is

a very, very expensive thing. The trucks cost a couple of million

dollars. They have a full cadre of highly trained, armed forces with

them. They have constant communication. If you were to move to

that, the implications in cost and transportation of anything,

whether you have a reprocessing plant, spent fuel, or doing anything, would become staggering.

The question of federalization of the forces, that is to actually

have federal people driving those trucks, has additional cost implications. But I think it is wrong to believe that there hasn’t been

work done. I mean, you may have been talking with people that

don’t know the historical work that was done. You may have been

talking about people that don’t know what RW was trying to do.

Whether it is adequate or not, in light of this, I don’t know, but

I know that it has gone far enough to do studies looking at all of

the donor sites, of which there are—I think there are 106 or 108,

not just the operating reactors. And there are certainly—there is

a stack of documents this thick on security at Yucca Mountain, including the transportation from the entry to Yucca Mountain to the

location at the Yucca Mountain site. I know this, because I—the

National Academy panel that I am part of was asked to consider

doing a study on research and development and the security at

Yucca Mountain. So we have seen some of those reports. I don’t

think—it may not be enough, sir, but there is a substantial amount

of work out there.

Mr. MATHESON. Thank you, Madame Chair.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you.

Do you have any more questions, Mr. Honda?

Mr. HONDA. Just a quick question, and this is probably reflective

of my ignorance. But what I have heard is that, and I think it was

Mr. Johnson that indicated that the reprocessing of uranium is,

what, 96 percent or 94 percent of its total weight in volume, I

guess. And encapsulating that for storage, that is one step, but

aren’t there other byproducts of reprocessing or of creating the

waste that other materials have to be encapsulated, also, so that

in practice it appears that there will be more volume than just the

waste itself. There are other wastes that are created so that the

volume is really more. If that is the case, then how does that really

solve our storage and our nuclear waste problem?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. What I was referring to was that, by mass,

uranium constitutes 96 percent of the mass of spent nuclear fuel,

and that uranium is primarily uranium—the isotope uranium-238.

The fissile content of the uranium-235 in spent nuclear fuel is

slightly above that of natural uranium. It is roughly—it is a little

less than 1 percent, on average. You are correct in that the separations technologies that we are currently investigating within our—

the Department’s programs, is looking at partitioning spent fuel

into different—into its different constituents, separating out the

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uranium. That does provide significant volume reduction, but as I

mentioned earlier, the primary concern in repository performance

is the heat generation. And that heat generation is driven both in

a short-term and a long-term component. By separating the spent

fuel into these different elemental constituents, yes, you have not

really reduced the amount of material, it—the amount of material

that has to be stored, but it is the recognition that all of that material doesn’t then have to go into a geologic repository. For example,

the uranium can be extracted at such purity that it could possibly

be stored as a low-level class C waste. It would meet that type of

requirement that would therefore not need to go into a repository—

into a geologic repository. The other constituents could be stored

for future destruction or transmutation in future fast reactor systems that would minimize the volume of the highly radioactive materials that would have to go into a repository.

Mr. BUNN. I think that—I agree with Dr. Finck that what we

need is an end-to-end systems analysis on this kind of thing, because when you look at reprocessing, you have got, depending on

which technologies you are using, a variety of different streams of

high-level waste or species you are going to send for transmutation,

but you also then have to look at intermediate-level waste, lowlevel waste. You have to look at, when you are done with the reprocessing plant, when it has outlived its lifetime, the decommissioning waste, the same for the transmutation facilities and so on.

And then you have to compare the costs of managing those various

different waste streams and the hazards of managing those various

waste streams and hazards with other options. So I think that is

the kind of examination that needs to be done. The cost—the volumes of, for example, decommissioning waste projected from the reprocessing plants in France are quite large.

Dr. FINCK. If I may, volume in Yucca Mountain is not the issue,

as the gentleman is saying. The issue is heat load generation, and

most of the heat load comes from a few percent of the waste. That

is what we have to deal with. Essentially, we have to get rid of that

heat to increase the capacity of Yucca Mountain. No, I fully agree.

We have to look at an integrated cycle to see where the benefits

and costs are and to gain where we can.

Mr. HONDA. So the other wastes that are created that have to be

contained, you are saying that those are safe and all we have to

do is find a storage place for them?

Dr. FINCK. No, the ones that are toxic. What we want to do is

transmute them. Basically take them, let us say, americium-241,

and fission it into elements or isotopes that are much less toxic.

And you do this by running it through a—in a reactor.

Mr. HONDA. And is this what is happening in France and in

Japan and in the UK where they are completely being able to deal

with their waste or——

Dr. FINCK. No.

Mr. HONDA.—do they have waste issues, also?

Mr. BUNN. Go ahead.

Dr. FINCK. They take the first step there. They take care of one

of the elements, one of the isotopes. They take care of plutonium239 by burning it partially, but they plan, in the future, to do exactly what we described earlier, take care of the other elements,

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which we usually call minor actinides. And their plans for the

years to come, roughly when we plan to do it, is also to find ways

to destroy these minor actinides. But right now, they only burn

plutonium-239 partially, and they store the resulting fuels and the

resulting minor actinides are stored for future use.

Mr. BUNN. But the way that they are implementing reprocessing

today, with, as Dr. Finck said, one round of recycling of the plutonium as in plutonium mixed-oxide, or MOX, fuel, in their existing

light water reactors, has essentially no noticeable waste management benefits. As Dr. Finck and Mr. Johnson have both said, the

volume and cost of a repository is determined by the heat output,

while if you go to a system with one round of reprocessing and

MOX and then disposal, you actually have more heat rather than

less for—compared to a direct disposal per unit—you know, per

number of kilowatt hours generated. And you don’t have any significant reduction in the radiological toxicity, the doses from the repository, because the only thing you are separating is the uranium

and the plutonium, and those, basically, don’t contribute significantly to the doses—from geologic repositories. So you really have

to go to the kinds of transmutation technologies that Dr. Finck is

developing in order to get the kinds of benefits that——

Dr. FINCK. If I may complement. We actually get a very small

benefit from MOX. It is like 10 percent, not really big.

Mr. BUNN. The studies I have seen go the other direction, but we

can talk about that.

Dr. FINCK. Well, I like to do my own studies.

Mr. HONDA. Well, through the Chair and—I just want to thank

you for your testimony, but my sense is that it is much more complicated of an issue that requires a systems approach to look at the

entire problem and look in that—some matrix that would address

the issues of proliferation and the dangers intermittently——

Mr. BUNN. And for that reason——

Mr. HONDA.—combined together rather than just talking about

storage and transferring to other countries for processing and coming back. It is much more complicated than that, and I appreciate

the—your input in providing this insight for me.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you.

I am glad that Mr. Honda brought this back to the systems analysis, because I think that is where we needed to go back. I would

like to go one step further back, and I think in my opening statement I talked about the log and how we take three percent off one

side and three percent on the other end and throw the rest into the

fire to burn and then we take it out and put it in a mountain, or

we are going to try.

When I was—in the 1960s and I first went to France, and I can

remember going to these hotels. We used to go in Europe on $5 a

day. That doesn’t happen anymore, but it was—we would go to

these hotels, and you would walk into the hotel, and you would

come in at night, and to turn on the lights to go up the stairs, you

would push a little button and the lights would go on, and then you

would get—try and make it to the top of that staircase to push the

next button, because the next staircase the lights were going to—

and having been to France since then, you know, things have

changed. They—the electricity that is there, you don’t drive with

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your—just the car headlights anymore, the buildings are lit up like

it was never before. And 80 percent of France’s electricity is nuclear. Ours is 20 percent. Now I live in a state that is over 50 percent electric, because we have had a lot of nuclear facilities there.

My point is that, you know, here we have a clean, environmentallyfriendly energy source, and we keep saying, ‘‘Well, we should wait.

We should wait and, you know, just use that small amount of the

energy, the fuel, and let the—just burn up the rest or—and then

put it away.’’ And that concerns me that in—you know, for future

generations, we have got to find means of energy that is going to

be—to have that rather than being oil now—oil dependent. Now we

don’t need electricity, but we need natural gas. We need different

fuels that are not going to be around, fossil fuels. And I think that

this is imperative that we start to work on it, because the time it

is going to take to create the fast reactor where we are going to

have the closed fuel cycle and be able to do all of this in one place

and really, you know, time after time use this fuel until it is gone

and then have this small amount to put into Yucca Mountain. And

it always seems to come down to the issue of non-proliferation.

That is the first—everything everybody says, and I know that this

has been worked on for years and years. France is using something

that is really outdated, compared to what we can do now, and just

for one thing that Mr. Bunn said that—you know, you had said

that there are 240 tons of separated—where—weapons-usable plutonium already exists throughout the world. So you know, I know

we have to be concerned about terrorists, but—seeking nuclear material, but if there is plutonium that is being used and produced

by UREX+ and even if it isn’t lethal, wouldn’t somebody—you

know, somebody go after the pure plutonium that they can find

rather than something that has, you know, been reprocessed like

that?

Mr. BUNN. Well, I, for one, agree that there are a huge number

of places in the world that, today at least, are sufficiently vulnerable that have either highly-enriched uranium or plutonium that

they would be the places of choice for terrorists to get that kind of

material. And one of the points I made in my testimony is that we,

as a Nation, have to be working as fast as we can to lock down all

of those stockpiles.

I don’t think that proliferation is the only issue here. I agree

with you that nuclear energy is something that I would like to see

grow as one of the potential answers to climate change——

Chairwoman BIGGERT. And don’t you think that——

Mr. BUNN.—but I don’t think we need reprocessing as part of

that. In fact, I think a near-term decision to reprocess would be

more likely to undermine than to promote the future of nuclear energy.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. But don’t you think that we really need

to take in the cost consideration of the global climate?

Mr. BUNN. Absolutely. And because we need to take into the cost

consideration, that is one of the reasons why I think we shouldn’t

reprocess. The cost of climate change is an issue of nuclear

energy——

Chairwoman BIGGERT. But what we will be spending for other

types of—like the carbon that is—you know, that is creating the

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problems, and if we have the nuclear, then that is going to change

the costs that we are going to have to spend on the environment.

Mr. BUNN. But what I am saying is you can have nuclear energy

without reprocessing. In fact, I believe you are more likely to have

growth in nuclear energy if we don’t pursue reprocessing with the

technologies that are available now or in the near-term.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. But having been over in France and having seen those pools and the way that the storage is, I mean, they

are getting to—you know, like the big rooms, like the football field

with the cask, and then you have got the water pool in the other

room. And that is—you know, they are doing well, but when we

can reduce, you know, the amount of radioactivity and the heat to

where—to—down to, let us say, 300 years versus 10,000 years, that

is a big difference in a cost to us as far as, you know, having the

ability to put that some place.

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. If I could just make a comment.

I think it is really important in the systems analysis to also look

at the history of how the government participated in the industry,

not only in this country, but in France, and how they participate

today, just like Airbus and Boeing, are interesting issues.

I think the other thing is that from a systems point of view, this

is the only energy source that we are going to look at, that attractive energy source, where the government will bear an enormous

burden. It is worse than ethanol or solar energy or geothermal in

terms of the subsidy, because you will not be able to create an industry that would freely build this reprocessing plant, would freely

move and recycle the material, would freely build the generations

of reactors in which it would most efficiently be done if the entire—

almost the entire research and development burden for this, not

just the reprocessing facility, the Generation IV reactors, everything, will be borne by the government, and that is quite unlike

any other energy source. If you put that into the context, then, of

how much we spend dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons or

the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it means

that—I mean, I actually believe, from a physicist’s point of view,

recycling makes sense for the very reasons that you say. On the

other hand, proliferation has been a persistent problem. It is an

emotional problem. It is one that gets into the deepest sense of fear

that people have. And it affects the political environment, the cycles of support and non-support for nuclear energy. We have seen

those cycles now since the Manhattan Project, and we will see

them again. It seems to me that it behooves us then to make a decision that is most robust that draws the most constituency across

the political spectrum. And I think that decision should include the

closed cycle. But I think the time—the timing of the closed cycle

is something where there should be an exquisite attention paid not

to how efficiently we could get the Department of Energy to do the

research, but how much the Congress, committees like this, could

demand that the standards of proliferation be reasonably answered

when they see the alternative technologies, because in the end, Madame Chairman, you and your colleagues will bear almost the entire cost of the development of this part of the cycle.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Well, I know that, you know, the Administration has come out and said we need to move forward with the

134

advanced fuel. And there has been some discussion that, you know,

the cost of doing the first fast reactor or doing the first—the whole

process is going to be huge. But once that is built, then it will reduce the costs that the utilities will be able to come in and do that,

is that something that you think is possible?

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. We have—we built a fast reactor in Tennessee, essentially completed. And it did not run. We built the

West Valley field facility for recycling, and it ran for a few years

and was shut down.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. But we actually had one in Illinois, too,

that was built but never opened.

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. Right. And it seems to me that it goes back

to the——

Chairwoman BIGGERT. But that was political.

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. But it is just, in a way—well, but that is my

point is it is not physics. And it is—and we are not the threat of

proliferation. Our material is very unlikely to be truly the threat

to terrorists, even in this country, because we do provide a high

level of security. It certainly is true in France. The security is exquisite. In the end, the question is whether or not the international

regime we launch now, as we did in the 1950s, launched the nuclear regime that is around the world, whether or not that regime

will be one we want to live with, you know, in the—for the next

20 years.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Well, we launched that, but I would say

in the 1970s, you know, we said shut down all of the reprocessing.

The United States did. Nobody else did, and they haven’t followed

our lead on that. Do you think we are still a leader in this industry

at the moment?

Dr. HAGENGRUBER. I think that the—I believe that the international community still looks to the United States in terms of,

like, the permanent geologic repository, I know from my discussions with the RW people, that people in France and everywhere

look to the United States asking, ‘‘What are you going to do?’’ They

look at Yucca Mountain to see. I think in the question of reprocessing and what will happen to an economy, a plutonium economy in

the world, the question about Generation IV reactors, the investments that our government makes will be the ones that set the

standards. So even though there have been countries that are successfully reprocessing, et cetera, is that the reactors the French are

trying to sell to China are the reactors that were developed in the

technology here in the United States. It is changed somewhat, but

they are not an original design. And so, you know, in the end, we

will have a major influence. The decisions made, you know, in

these next few years will have a major influence on what the world

decides. And even though we should have lost our leadership, I

mean, we have been sitting still for 25 years, we have not. I mean,

there is still—they will look to us to see how much of an investment we make. Generation IV, the advanced fuel cycle, these decisions are ones in which the U.S. leadership will have a profound

effect on the world’s decisions.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Dr. Finck.

Dr. FINCK. Yeah, if I may, two comments.

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I would like the United States to regain leadership in the nuclear

business. I wouldn’t be as optimistic as Dr. Hagengruber that we

have kept everything. For example, in the repository, sure they

look at our solution, but as Matt Bunn was saying, we are the only

one to have put it in a mountain with limited walls. They are looking at very different solutions. Maybe, possibly, they are learning

from our mistakes. I don’t know.

But you know, one more thing I would comment on, we need to

stop thinking the same way we were thinking 30 years ago. The

world has really changed. Global warming is, today, a recognized

issue, at least by many scientists, and it is going to affect the future, maybe not mine, but certainly my children and grandchildren.

It will affect more than any other program we had in our civilization before. We—oil, the price of oil has gone up, and I believe, unlike in the past where we have oil crisis due to a supply of political

issue on the supply side, this time it has to deal with a major increase in demand, mostly in China and India. And I believe, I

might be wrong, and hopefully I am wrong, the price of oil will be

up for a very, very long time, maybe forever because these countries are consuming more. So the world has really changed, and the

way we look at nuclear must address these changes, too. We need

to increase nuclear to have a cleaner environment, to have more secure energy, and if we do not deal with the waste problem, that

will prevent nuclear from moving forward. We need to deal with it.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Bunn.

Mr. BUNN. I believe that we do have some leadership and some

influence on other countries, and that is part of the reason that I

am concerned that President Bush’s approach, where he has made

stopping the spread of reprocessing to additional countries a key

element of his nonproliferation policy, will be more difficult to carry

out if we, ourselves, are moving forward with large-scale commercial reprocessing in our country. If we are doing it, it will be more

difficult to convince others not to. Countries like South Korea and

Taiwan have both expressed interest in reprocessing. They have

been not pursuing it, because of U.S. pressure, and they both had

secret nuclear weapons programs based on reprocessing in the past

that were stopped under U.S. pressure. We just read in the newspaper this morning about additional secret reprocessing work in

Iran that the IAEA has reported. So I think a nontrivial part of the

consideration is what influence will this have on our ability to convince other countries to follow what is a significant part of President Bush’s nonproliferation——

Chairwoman BIGGERT. So I guess what you are saying is that we

shouldn’t move forward in our research and development if another

country might do it, too?

Mr. BUNN. That is not correct. I have strongly supported continued research and development in my testimony. What I am saying

is we should allow time for the technology to develop. We have

available today commercially safe, cheap, reliable ways to manage

our nuclear fuel for decades to come. We should allow the time for

a responsible decision with more development of the technology.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Mr. Johnson, do you have anything to

add?

136

Mr. JOHNSON. No, ma’am.

Chairwoman BIGGERT. No? Okay. Thank you, all. Thank you, all

of the panelists today, for testifying before this subcommittee, and

I really appreciate all that you have—the expertise that you have

brought to this Committee. And obviously, this is a very complex

issue, and we will be holding further hearings, and I know that it

is—I think we do have a responsibility to know all of the facts and

make decisions based on that, and I appreciate all that you have

contributed to that.

So if there is no objection, the record will remain open for additional statements from the members and for answers to any followup questions the Subcommittee may ask the panelists. Without objection, so ordered.

The hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(137)

Appendix:

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

138

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Robert Shane Johnson, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Energy,

Science, and Technology; Deputy Director for Technology, U.S. Department of

Energy

Questions submitted by Chairman Judy Biggert

Q1. There was some discussion during the hearing about the economics of reprocessing, once it becomes commercial scale. What are the major steps necessary before

the technology is mature enough for commercial deployment? For each of those

steps, do we have enough information to estimate the associated costs? If so,

what are the costs?

A1. Assuming that any near-term (e.g., within twenty years) commercial deployment in the United States would involve one of the UREX+ flow sheet variations,

the major steps remaining are (1) completion of both laboratory-scale experiments

and modeling efforts to characterize the selected flow sheet and its associated control/accountability system, and (2) successful testing at an engineering scale of the

integrated flow sheet and controls. Some preliminary cost estimates have been made

based on laboratory experience to date plus related data from commercial scale separations operations in foreign countries. Additional research and development is

needed to identify the losses between process steps and the scalability of the technology.

Questions submitted by Representative Dave G. Reichert

Q1. I understand that there is likely to be a shortfall of trained professional nuclear

engineers, nuclear scientists, health physicists, radiochemists and actinide specialists brought on in part by the impending retirement of a substantial portion

of the national lab staff with experience in these fields. I am further advised that

Universities in my state with leading radiochemistry programs are hindered in

attracting nuclear science and engineering students.

• How will a renewed development of the nuclear fuel cycle, including nuclear

reprocessing, in the U.S. be staffed with competent scientists and engineers?

A1. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology’s (NE) supports nuclear science, radiochemistry, health physics, and engineering programs at U.S. colleges and universities through the University reactor

Infrastructure and Education Assistance program (University Programs). This program has been in place for over a decade and it along with the efforts of universities

and industry has led to a significant increase in enrollments in these programs. For

example, nuclear engineering programs in the U.S. increased from 490 students in

1998 to more than 1,500 today. Additionally, the Department provides targeted opportunities to outstanding students interested in disciplines related to nuclear fuel

cycles, through fellowships awarded through the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative.

Q2. Numerous National Academy studies have emphasized the need for international cooperation and collaboration in the development of future nuclear fuel

cycles.

• What role might international agreements play in the growth of our involvement in closing the loop on the nuclear fuel cycle? In other words, how might

we achieve a mutual benefit through cooperation with the French, the Japanese or the Russians who are all involved in advanced fuel cycle work?

A2. The Department is actively engaged with several other countries in developing

next-generation nuclear energy systems including advanced, proliferation-resistant

fuels and fuel cycles. Through the Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems Initiative,

the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) and the International Nuclear Energy

Research Initiative (INERI), collaborative research and development (R&D) into advanced fuel cycles, including treatment and recycling of spent nuclear fuel, has been

underway for over four years. The United States is currently collaborating with

France, Japan, and the European Union. The United States is gaining insight into

other countries’ recent operational experience and sharing in their expertise as new,

improved, proliferation-resistant advanced fuel cycle technologies are jointly developed. These cooperative activities involving spent fuel reprocessing and advanced

plutonium-bearing fuel fabrication technologies are sensitive and subject to technology transfer export controls.

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Questions submitted by Representative Michael M. Honda

Q1. The House report language mentions the West Valley reprocessing plant. How

much has it cost to clean up the reprocessing waste left over from operation of

West Valley from 1966–1972? How much is it expected to cost? How long will

the clean-up take?

A1. The Department’s cost from the 1980 inception of the West Valley Demonstra- tion Project (WVDP) through 1996 was $1.1 billion and included design, construction and initiation of hot operation of the high-level waste vitrification facility. Since

1997 (when the Office of Environmental Management began formally collecting cost

information) through Fiscal Year 2004, the Department spent an additional $832

million (current year dollars). Per the WVDP Act (P.L. 96–368, 1980), this represents the Federal Government’s contribution of 90 percent; the State of New York

contributes 10 percent.

The Department plans to address its responsibilities under the WVDP Act in two

phases. The preliminary estimated cost to complete the first step (associated with

interim end state completion on or before 2010) is an additional $443 million for

a total of $1.275 billion since 1997. The scope associated with this phase of the work

includes completion of off-site low-level and transuranic waste disposition, and decontamination and demolition of facilities previously utilized to support tank waste

solidification. The preliminary cost estimate associated with storage, surveillance,

and monitoring of the vitrified waste canisters through 2035 (when off-site disposition is planned for completion) is $390 million.

The second step includes tank decommissioning. DOE and the State of New York

are jointly developing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for Decommissioning and/or Long-term Management of the West Valley Demonstration Project to

evaluate various options for the site, including the technical, cost, and schedule considerations. The cost estimate and schedule associated with this final phase of the

WVDP will be developed based on the outcome of the EIS, to be published in 2008.

Q2. Do you have an estimate of what it would cost to implement the plan proposed

by Chairman Hobson to reprocess 50,000 metric tons of commercial nuclear

waste at one or more Department of Energy (DOE) sites?

A2. No, the Department does not have an estimate for these costs. This is a very

large undertaking and the Department is pursuing order of magnitude estimates

during FY 2006.

Q3. Is the estimate for reprocessing of $280 billion from DOE’s roadmap over 117

years still current? What fraction of this cost estimate was from reprocessing?

Does this include cost for physical protection and safeguards of plutonium created? What design basis threat is assumed? Are you assuming a 9/11 magnitude threat in these estimates?

A3. These cost estimates are out of date. New technologies are under development

that would represent a fraction of the costs that were estimated in 1999 with different technologies.

Q4. What are the principal technological uncertainties related to the development of

the UREX+ process?

A4. While there are five technology variations under the UREX+ technology, the

Department believes that one of these variations is most advantageous from a proliferation resistance perspective (in that it does not separate pure plutonium or separate pure plutonium plus neptunium). For that reason, most of the research and

development is expected to be focused on that variation.

Q5. On page 4 of your testimony you state that commercial scale-up of spent fuel

technologies could be accomplished relatively rapidly if existing domestic facilities could be modified and used. Where are these facilities and who owns them?

A5. There are four such facilities that could possibly be used in demonstrating the

technologies. Two are private facilities built in the 1970s but never completed or operated with spent fuel. One is the Barnwell plant on the edge of the DOE Savannah

River Site in South Carolina, designed and built by the Allied Chemical Company.

The second is the General Electric Company’s Morris Plant, at the edge of the Dresden Power Reactor south of Chicago, which is an active fuel storage facility containing about 800 tons of spent fuel originally slated for processing in the plant.

The other two facilities are at DOE sites: Savannah River Site and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The Savannah River facility is known as the H Canyon,

previously used for processing spent reactor fuel for weapons purposes and now

used as part of the site cleanup. The INL facilities are at the Idaho Nuclear TechVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Dec 08, 2005 Jkt 021711 PO 00000 Frm 00143 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\ENER05\061605\21711 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
140

nology and Engineering Center (INTEC), consisting of several buildings previously

used or intended to be used to process spent naval nuclear reactor fuel.

Q6. How will DOE select a reprocessing technology for the future? What factors will

be taken into account?

A6. The selection of a reprocessing technology is dependent on economics, reliability, ease of scale-up and considerations related to safety and proliferation resistance. Advanced aqueous processing are best suited to treat spent nuclear fuel being

stored and generated today and therefore are the technologies likely to be selected

for reprocessing of those fuels. Pyrochemical processes may be better suited for

spent fuel from advanced fast reactors.

Q7. Does the use of MOX fuel in light water reactors in conjunction with reprocessing actually reduce the amount of waste that will ultimately need to go into

Yucca Mountain from the existing fleet of reactors in the U.S.? Please provide

some specific numbers to illustrate your answer.

A7. The present technical capacity of Yucca Mountain is limited not as much by the

amount of waste, but rather by the long-term heat produced by the waste and certain repository design restrictions. The principal sources of long-term heat are the

transuranic elements in the waste. The most important of these are plutonium–241,

americium–241 and neptunium–237. Aqueous reprocessing and the recycle of plutonium/neptunium into a modified form of MOX fuel to light water reactors can be

used to transmute the critical transuranic isotopes and eliminate uranium (95 percent of the spent fuel by weight) from the final waste going to the repository. Therefore, by using these two processes together, it is possible both to decrease the

amount of waste and to increase the technical capacity of the repository by a factor

of about two.

Q8. Is MOX a U.S. technology? If MOX is used, will the U.S. have to pay royalties

to the owners of the technology?

A8. The MOX technology was originally developed in the United States and therefore the U.S. would not need to pay royalties if MOX technology is used.

Q9. Does reprocessing itself create additional waste? If so, what is it?

A9. Reprocessing using a technology such as UREX+ would not create additional

liquid high level waste as is associated with current generation PURER technology.

The purpose of reprocessing is to reduce the total quantity of high level waste requiring repository disposal as compared with direct disposal of the same fuel. The

French reprocessing experience with the PURER process has demonstrated a factor

of four reduction in waste volume. Advanced aqueous recycling processes under development in the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) program have the potential

for further volume reductions. This is because the high level waste would not have

short or long term heat producing isotopes and therefore, would be superior to the

PURER technology.

Q10. Are there other ways to burn nuclear waste in a reactor than MOX? What are

they?

A10. MOX is the only fuel technology that has been commercially deployed for light

water reactors. Research has been ongoing for several advanced technologies:

— Multi-recycle schemes based on MOX fuels have been investigated that provide greater benefits than the standard MOX approach, but come at a cost

of significant difficulties in designing and operating fuel cycle plants.

— Advanced fuels, called Inert Matrix Fuels, that contain no uranium are

being investigated and could provide additional benefits beyond MOX fuel.

However, the development of Inert Matrix Fuels is not sufficiently advanced

for commercialization.

Q11. Can high temperature gas cooled reactors burn nuclear waste after it has been

reprocessed? If a gas cooled reactor is built at the Idaho National Lab, could

it be used to demonstrate another means of getting rid of nuclear waste?

A11. Spent fuel from existing light water reactors contains plutonium and other

transuranic elements (higher actinides) which are the most important contributors

to the long-term radiological hazards and performance uncertainties for a geologic

repository. Reprocessing can be used to separate these isotopes, which can then be

fabricated into fuel for light water reactors or gas cooled reactors. By burning this

fuel, thermal reactors (light water and gas cooled reactors) could destroy higher

actinides, the plutonium.

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Q12. DOE has many nuclear related issues that must be addressed including nuclear waste, non-proliferation, building new reactors in the near term, Gen IV

reactors, rebuilding nuclear capability and industry in the U.S., nuclear hydrogen production and so on. I have the sense that many of these issues have been

treated as unrelated and that there has not been an effort to take a systems

view at DOE of these opportunities and issues. Is this the case? Would there

be benefits from trying to see whether certain technologies or strategies would

address two or more of these issues?

A12. The Department agrees that an integrated approach is needed to address the

front and back end of the nuclear fuel cycle as well as reactor technologies. To that

end, the Department has employed a systems approach to its research, specifically

treating the issues such as waste minimization, energy optimization, proliferation

resistance, economics and safety in an integrated fashion. The performance criteria

associated with Generation IV reactors are closely coordinated with the advanced

fuel cycle research and development. For example, as part of the fuels development

effort, the Department is pursuing fuels that are proliferation resistant and recyclable, and are integrating the research and development on the fuels to meet both fuel

cycle and reactor performance requirements.

In addition, in FY 2006, the Administration is proposing to commission a comprehensive review of NE program goals and plans by the National Academy of

Sciences. The evaluation will validate the process of establishing program priorities

and will result in a comprehensive and detailed set of policy and research recommendations, including performance targets and metrics for an integrated agenda

of research activities.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Matthew Bunn, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the

Atom, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Questions submitted by Representative Michael M. Honda

Q1. If the United States made a decision to proceed with reprocessing its commercial

spent nuclear fuel what impact would that have on our efforts to limit the

spread of reprocessing and enrichment technologies around the world, and convince other countries not to pursue this technology themselves?

A1. If the United States undertakes large-scale reprocessing of its own commercial

spent nuclear fuel, it will become significantly more difficult to convince other states

that it is not in their national interest to pursue similar technology. The United

States will have little ability to ensure that other states adopt proliferation-resistant

approaches to reprocessing. Thus, the effort to stem the spread of reprocessing technology, a key element of President Bush’s nonproliferation strategy, could be significantly undermined. At the same time, the magnitude of this effect should not be

overstated; there are only a limited number of countries that do not already have

operating reprocessing capabilities but are interested in establishing such capabilities (or might plausibly become interested in the next decade). Over the longer-term,

the effect might be more significant.

Q2. It is vital to ensure that plutonium already separated by reprocessing is adequately secured against terrorist theft. What more should the U.S. Government

be doing to ensure that nuclear stockpiles around the world are secure and accounted for and cannot fall into terrorist hands?

A2. A sea-change in the level of sustained White House engagement focused on

sweeping aside the bureaucratic and political obstacles to rapid progress in locking

down the world’s nuclear stockpiles is urgently needed. An accelerated and strengthened effort would have many ingredients, but three are essential:

• accelerating and strengthening the effort in Russia, where the largest stockpiles of potentially vulnerable nuclear materials still exist, with the goal of

ensuring that all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials there are

secure enough to defeat demonstrated insider and outsider threats in Russia

by the end of 2008, in a way that will last after U.S. assistance phases out;

• removing the potential bomb material entirely from the world’s most vulnerable sites (particularly research reactors fueled with highly enriched uranium), with the goal of removing nuclear material or providing highly effective security for all of the most vulnerable sites within four years, and eliminating the civilian use of highly enriched uranium worldwide within roughly

a decade; and

• building a fast-paced global coalition to improve security for nuclear weapons

and weapons-usable nuclear materials around the world, with the goal of ensuring that every nuclear weapon and every kilogram of weapons-usable nuclear material, wherever it may be in the world, is secure and accounted for.

In addition to securing nuclear material at its sources—the critical first line of

defense—strengthened efforts are also needed to beef up the inevitably weaker lines

of defense that come into play after a nuclear weapon or nuclear material has already been stolen, including particularly strengthened police and intelligence operations (including sting operations and the like) focused on preventing nuclear smuggling and identifying potential nuclear terrorist cells.

The effort to lock down nuclear stockpiles around the world should be considered

a central part of the war on terrorism. Homeland security begins abroad; wherever

there is an insecure cache of potential nuclear bomb material, there is a potentially

deadly threat to the United States. As Senator Richard Lugar (R–IN) has argued,

the war on terrorism cannot be considered won until all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide are demonstrably secured and accounted

for, to standards sufficient to prevent terrorists and criminals from gaining access

to them.

President Bush should issue a directive identifying prevention of nuclear terrorism as a top national security priority, and appoint a senior official, with the access needed to get a presidential decision whenever necessary, to lead the many disparate efforts now underway to keep nuclear capabilities out of terrorist hands. A

detailed set of recommendations is available in Securing the Bomb 2005: The New

Global Imperatives, available on-line at http://www.nti.org/cnwm.

143

Q3. You state in your testimony (p. 8) that if the government is fulfilling its obligation to take title to spent fuel and clear progress is being made on the waste repository then potential investors in nuclear plants will have sufficient confidence

to make a commitment. Given that the repository is about 10 years late in opening the government has yet to take possession of significant volumes of fuel, how

much longer do you believe investors will give the benefit of the doubt to the government that it will ultimately fulfill its contractual obligations to take possession of existing spent fuel and open a permanent repository?

A3. From the perspective of a potential investor in a new nuclear plant—or the

owner of an existing one—the most important thing is that the spent fuel must not

become an indefinite political and economic liability hanging around the neck of the

privately owned plant. If it was clear that the government was going to pay all the

costs of the fuel’s storage, or better yet, take it to an off-site location (for example,

an interim storage facility), that would address the most important investor concerns; what happens to it after that, whether reprocessing or storage followed by

direct disposal, is less critical from the investor’s point of view.

Indeed, a decision to reprocess U.S. spent nuclear fuel would be more likely to

undermine than to strengthen investor interest in new nuclear power plants. Reprocessing would be significantly more costly than direct disposal, meaning that either (a) the nuclear waste fee would and would have to be substantially increased;

(b) the government would have to pass onerous regulations forcing industry to build

and operate facilities that would not be economic in themselves; or (c) the government would have to provide many billions of dollars in subsidies for this approach

to spent fuel management. From the point of view of a potential investor in nuclear

power, options (a) and (b) are quite unattractive, and whether the government

would actually fulfill its obligations in option (c) is, if anything, more uncertain than

Yucca Mountain (and a permanent repository would still be needed in any case).

Moreover, it is clear that reprocessing would provoke substantial political controversy in the United States, which would also be a negative from an investor’s

perspective. If we want nuclear energy to have a bright future, we need to make

it as cheap, as simple, as safe, as proliferation-resistant, and as non-controversial

as possible, and near-term reprocessing points in the wrong direction on every

count.

In short, the government must meet its contractual obligations, but that does not

help make the case for reprocessing of the fuel. The actual cost of storage of U.S.

spent fuel for another decade—to the utilities, or to the government—is actually

quite modest; estimates that storage will cost the government $1 billion per year

are vastly overstated. That being said, it is important, regardless of what decisions

are made about reprocessing, to move forward in a timely way with licensing and

opening a permanent repository.

Q4. You note that the Department of Energy (DOE) has not performed a credible life

cycle cost analysis of the cost of a reprocessing and transmutation system compared to that of direct disposal. Do you recommend that the Committee direct

DOE to conduct such an analysis? Is that a necessary first step, in your opinion?

A4. Such an analysis is certainly needed, but it should be only one part of a broader

assessment of the costs and benefits of near-term reprocessing, compared to interim

storage followed by direct disposal. If advocates argue that separations and transmutation are needed to make more repository space available, then a credible study

is needed—which does not yet exist—of all the available options for achieving that

goal, with their costs, risks, and benefits, not just of reprocessing. If advocates argue

that separations and transmutation will reduce the toxicity and lifetime of the

waste to be disposed, then a credible study is needed—which does not yet exist—

of the total life-cycle environmental hazards posed by direct disposal compared to

those of separations and transmutation (including near-term doses from operations

of the relevant facilities, not just long-term doses from a permanent repository, and

including not only doses from normal operations but from plausible accidents as

well). In the post-9/11 era, detailed analyses of the terrorist risks of both approaches

are needed, and these, too, have not yet been done. No realistic evaluation of the

impact of a reprocessing and transmutation on the existing nuclear fuel industry

has yet been done. No serious evaluation of the licensing and public acceptance

issues facing development and deployment of a separations and transmutation system has yet been done. No serious assessment of the safety and terrorism risks of

a reprocessing and transmutation system, compared to those of direct disposal has

yet been done. Assessments of the proliferation implications of the proposed systems

that are detailed enough to support responsible decision-making have not yet been

done. In short, virtually none of the most important information on which to base

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a responsible decision to carry out reprocessing of U.S. nuclear fuel is yet available.

The Committee should consider directing DOE to carry out studies of all these matters, or assigning such studies to the National Academy of Sciences. In either case,

the Committee should allow enough time for careful consideration of the relevant

issues.

Q5. You recommend the establishment of expanded interim storage facilities ‘‘as a

complement and interim backup’’ to the Yucca Mountain repository. Is there any

reason why that interim facility shouldn’t also be located at Yucca Mountain?

A5. The area around Yucca Mountain is one plausible location for such an interim

facility, but there are others, and the different possible locations have both advantages and disadvantages. Obviously, there are advantages to shipping the fuel to a

site close to where it will ultimately be disposed of. There are also disadvantages,

however. Technically, the area around Yucca Mountain has a high level of seismic

activity, which is more of a problem for an above-ground interim storage facility

than a below-ground repository (just as a storm at sea is more of a problem for surface ships than for submarines). Politically, Congress has in the past judged that

it would not be fair to burden Nevada with both the permanent repository and an

interim storage facility. For any interim site, detailed analysis of the best approaches to providing safe and secure transportation of spent fuel to the site is

needed, and such analyses may reveal that some sites have significant safety or security advantages over others.

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147

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Phillip J. Finck, Deputy Associate Laboratory Director, Applied Science

and Technology and National Security, Argonne National Laboratory

Questions submitted by Chairman Judy Biggert

Q1. There was some discussion during the hearing about the economics of reprocessing, once it becomes commercial scale. What are the major steps necessary before

the technology is mature enough for commercial deployment? For each of those

steps, do we have enough information to estimate the associated costs? If so,

what are the costs?

A1. The UREX+ aqueous reprocessing technologies have already been demonstrated

at the laboratory scale with spent nuclear fuel. As these processing technologies are

similar to the mature PUREX process currently being used in France and the

United Kingdom (U.K.) at an industrial scale, it is likely that scale-up to industrial

size will be successful and relatively straightforward if similar equipment is used.

If advanced equipment, reducing size and cost, is desired, then an intermediate

stage of pilot plant demonstration would be prudent, and represents the only major

step in development. The UREX+ technologies are candidates for processing spent

fuel from light water reactors (LWRs), typical of present-day nuclear power plants.

Less developed technologies, such as pyroprocessing, should be viewed as being

further from commercialization at an industrial scale. Ongoing research and development of this method in the DOE Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) program

is aimed at facilitating the large-scale commercialization of this technology as well.

However, at this time, the likely use for pyroprocessing is to process spent fuel from

fast neutron reactors that are used for actinide transmutation and uranium resource

extension. Since the U.S. currently does not have any reactors of this type, but

would likely implement them in the future as part of an overall energy strategy,

there is sufficient time for this technology to mature.

The proposed Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility in the AFCI program would address

the need for pilot scale demonstration of both UREX+ and pyroprocessing. Results

from testing in this facility should allow the competent design of industrial facilities

using these technologies. While cost estimates for such a facility are necessarily

highly uncertain, due to the lack of recent experience in building such a facility, it

is likely that the current cost estimate for this facility would be in the range of $1B

(including not only processing demonstration but fuel fabrication capabilities as

well), with an estimated annual operating cost to demonstrate these technologies of

$100M/year. Although admittedly large, these costs need to be placed in the context

of the existing nuclear power industry in the United States, with capital investment

of several hundred billion dollars, and electricity generation of about $50B or more

per year. Payments into the nuclear waste fund also approach $1B per year, with

the anticipated cost of the Yucca Mountain repository in the neighborhood of $50B.

Questions submitted by Representative Michael M. Honda

Q1. The House report says that European countries ‘‘recycle’’ (plutonium) as they go,

but actually MOX fuel is not made and used immediately. (Nor is the high-level

liquid waste generated from reprocessing immediately vitrified; rather it is

stored in stainless steel tanks to cool.) More than 200 metric tons of commercial

plutonium worldwide is separated and has not been used as MOX and the surplus is building up each year. Many reactors need costly modifications to use

MOX and some reactors cannot be modified. There are about 80 metric tons of

surplus plutonium at La Hague in France and similar amounts at Sellafield in

the United Kingdom (U.K.) and more than 30 metric tons in Chelyabinsk, Russia. The UK has no reactors which can use plutonium fuel and no operating

MOX factory. How can you explain that this is a recycling program when the

UK has amassed about 80 metric tons of civil weapons-usable plutonium and

has no plans to use this material? (For Pu amounts reported to the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—see INFCIRC 549, on IAEA web site.)

A1. At this time, there is a mismatch in the ability to process commercial spent fuel

and the ability to re-use the separated materials in reactors, both in Europe and

elsewhere. As a result, substantial stockpiles of separated materials have been accumulated, although that was not the original intent. In France and other countries,

the spent fuel processing activity was intended to be part of an integrated system

where the recovered plutonium would be used in thermal and fast reactors. However, due to shifting program emphasis and priorities, the construction and operVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Dec 08, 2005 Jkt 021711 PO 00000 Frm 00151 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\ENER05\061605\21711 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ation of the processing plants has proceeded mostly as planned, while the reactor

systems to use the plutonium have not. A similar situation also exists in the U.K.

and in Russia, for basically the same reason.

One can ask why the current situation has developed, and the answer is probably

found in a combination of factors. First, electricity demand, and hence reactor construction, did not grow as envisioned, but stagnated instead, driven mainly by large

improvements in efficiency for a wide variety of electricity-driven products, including electronics, appliances, etc., and by a drop in heavy industrial use. Second, opposition to the use of nuclear power increased dramatically in the wake of the Three

Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. This opposition exacerbated the situation,

leading to the large mismatch in capabilities that exist today. Other minor reasons

can also be cited, but the point is that when the plans were originally conceived,

the systems were intended to balance, and achieve the ‘‘recycle as they go’’ condition.

That being said, it should be noted that France is engaged in recycling the plutonium in those reactors capable of using this material. Newer reactor designs are intended to allow for increased use of MOX fuel, which should address the stockpile

concern as these reactors are constructed and brought into service to replace reactors being decommissioned. The situation in the U.K. and Russia is different, where

the future direction of nuclear power has still not been decided. Until the time that

these countries decide to adopt plutonium recycling as originally planned, or another

disposition path is taken, the accumulated stockpile of separated plutonium will

continue to exist with no specified purpose, and should be considered as either a

resource for the future or as a separate waste stream for eventual disposal. The

Russian position has been made quite clear many times: they regard separated plutonium as a valuable energy resource and plan to utilize this material in the fast

reactors that are planned for deployment in the future.

It is correct that many reactors would need costly modifications to use MOX, and

some cannot be modified to use MOX. But it is also correct to state that many reactors are ready to use MOX with only minor and no modifications. Furthermore, I

believe that the U.S. should move towards a close fuel cycle, where the MOX approach would be at best of limited relevance; this approach would involve the transition towards a new generation of fast reactors, with novel fuel types and separations

techniques, that would eliminate a very high fraction of radiotoxic elements.

Q2. France uses plutonium fuel (MOX) in 20 out of 58 reactors, but the stockpile of

civil plutonium continues to increase with no end in sight. How can this growing

stockpile be presented as ‘‘recycling’’? MOX fuel produces only about 15 percent

of France’s nuclear electricity and imposes about $1 billion per year in added

electricity costs, according to an official French report. Why does Electricite de

France, the state-owned utility forced to use MOX fuel, place a negative value

on plutonium they must take from the state-owned processing company

(Cogema)?

A2. I am, of course, not able to speak for the French utility industry. As to the question of recycling, the fact is that the recovered plutonium is being recycled, but that

the rate of recycling is lower than the design rate of production at the processing

plant. As more reactors become available to use the MOX fuel, this mismatch in production and demand will diminish, and eventually reverse, gradually consuming the

current stockpile of separated plutonium. This would be consistent with the original

intent of the French planning, but it has not yet been put into place.

The question of the added cost would need to be examined carefully to determine

what is included and what is not included. The negative value on plutonium compared to standard enriched uranium fuel appears reasonable, as any fuel made from

separated materials is likely to cost more than enriched uranium fuel as long as

uranium ore costs remain low—it is not at all clear that this situation will remain

stable for the foreseeable future. Basically, enrichment to the required level is currently cheaper than fuel processing, separation, and MOX fabrication. However, this

probably does not account for the changes that have been made in the resulting

waste stream. In France, and in other countries, such an accounting may be difficult, as no waste disposal strategy has been determined. Without a strategy in

place, one cannot place a value on the reduction in waste volume and toxicity arising from spent fuel processing. Depending on the ultimate cost of disposal, the cost

savings from the reduced amount of waste may be sufficient to offset or even exceed

the additional costs of processing, or they may not. It is important to realize,

though, that these costs still only represent a minute fraction of the cost of generating nuclear electricity, and when one examines the value of pursuing a given

strategy, such as plutonium recycling, the entire system must be considered, from

mining to geologic disposal.

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Q3. Japan is in the start-up phase of a massive new $20 billion reprocessing factory

(Rokkasho). Its reprocessing program is estimated to cost $166 billion over 40

years (including construction, operating, and decommissioning costs). Japan has

committed itself to keeping its plutonium supply and demand in balance but

Japan already has 40 MT (35 MT in Europe, five MT domestic) supply of plutonium. How can operation of Rokkasho and failure to implement a domestic

MOX program be presented as balancing supply and demand? Especially when

the utilities are wary of the program? Japanese politicians have spoken in recent

years of making a weapon and one has suggested that Japanese commercial plutonium stocks could be used to make large numbers of weapons. What would

this mean for global non-proliferation measures? What would this mean for stability of the region?

A3. It is highly desirable to construct and operate a reprocessing plant with the

plant being part of an integrated system, where the recovered materials are quickly

re-used in nuclear reactors. This is why the need for an integrated system is

stressed, and one needs to either implement the entire system, or to not implement

anything. It is surely the intent of the Japanese to re-use the recovered plutonium

in their nuclear reactors to help increase the security of this part of their overall

energy supply, although it would appear that there was not agreement by all parties

involved in the government and industry as to how and when this would be accomplished. As to why the Japanese utilities are wary of the program, it is difficult to

say why without explicit statements on their part. Presumably a great part of this

concern is the uncertainty in future fuel cycle costs; this is countered to a degree

by the assurance of a domestic fuel supply in a world economy in which the price

of uranium may increase significantly.

Although some Japanese politicians have spoken about constructing a nuclear

weapon, I believe that the context for such comments is likely to be in response to

what the Japanese perceive as an increasing instability in the region due to the recent actions of China and North Korea. As a result, comments about global non-proliferation and the impact to the stability of the region are probably best left to the

diplomats.

It does need to be noted, however, that the Japanese commercial plutonium stocks

are already ill-suited for weapons use, and is part of the reason that civilian reprocessing activities are only marginally related to the issue of non-proliferation. Plutonium obtained from commercial spent fuel with a typical amount of irradiation in

the reactor not only has an isotopic composition that makes weapon fabrication

problematic (although not impossible), but storage of this plutonium leads to further

degradation such that the plutonium would need to be refined again before weapons

use could even be contemplated. It is likely that such refining may be necessary for

the fabrication of new nuclear fuel as MOX, depending on the storage time. This

is one reason why a mismatch between spent fuel processing rate and the ability

to use the separated plutonium is undesirable, and should be avoided if possible.

Q4. Dr. Finck, in your presentation before the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative’s SemiAnnual Review Meeting in August of 2003, you stated that, ‘‘Expect that proposed dual tier fuel cycle cannot be made intrinsically proliferation resistant.’’

Why don’t you consider UREX-plus proliferation-resistant? What are the issues

here?

A4. I do stand by my statement of 2003. Nevertheless, I never stated that UREXplus is not proliferation resistant.

The use of dual tier systems requires that relatively pure streams of Plutonium

and Neptunium be separated from the Spent Nuclear Fuel, as Light Water Reactors

have a limited ability to recycle other materials such as Americium and fission products. That clean separated material can be viewed as a proliferation concern. Nevertheless, the same system can be made proliferation resistant by the use of advanced

safeguards measures, which are currently being vigorously pursued in the AFCI

program. Furthermore, the single tier system, that does not utilize recycle in thermal reactors, but directly transmutes elements in fast reactors, can accommodate

much less pure mixtures of elements, and therefore presents interesting proliferation resistance attributes. Even in this system, we would insist on the incorporation

of advanced safeguards features in fuel cycle facilities.

Q5. You state in your testimony that nuclear energy could produce process heat that

could be used in the production of transportation fuels such as hydrogen. However, you also included synthetic fuel in the product slate. What synthetic fuels

would be possibly produced at a nuclear plant?

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A5. I apologize if my inclusion of synthetic fuels in the product slate has created

some confusion. The application of nuclear power to the production of synthetic fuels

is to provide either process heat, electricity or hydrogen, to a plant that is making

synthetic fuels from other feedstocks such as coal or gas. The synthetic fuels are

basically the same concepts that were heavily investigated in the 1970’s in response

to the energy crisis at that time, and include coal gasification and liquid synfuels.

Q6. In your statement (p. 1–2) you say that the U.S. needs to take a more comprehensive approach to nuclear waste management and you mention that resource optimization and waste minimization as two objectives that must be pursued with

targeted R&D to minimize their economic impact. With respect to waste minimization, what is the potential for reducing the volume and/or heat contained

in the waste? What are the tradeoffs necessary to achieve maximum waste reduction?

A6. For the Yucca Mountain repository, the utilization of space in the repository is

constrained by the amount of decay heat generated in the spent fuel. If this fuel

is processed, and the actinide elements are removed along with the fission products

cesium and strontium, it is possible to reduce the decay heat of the resulting waste

by a factor in excess of 200. This can be used to greatly increase the utilization of

the Yucca Mountain repository in terms of the amount of space needed to store the

waste resulting from the production of a given amount of energy. At the same time,

a lower total inventory of hazardous materials is placed in the repository as compared to the current plan for direct disposal of spent fuel, postponing the need for

consideration of a second repository until the next century or beyond.

Processing of the spent fuel removes the uranium, which accounts for over 95 percent of the waste volume. Removal of the other actinide elements accounts for another two percent, while the cesium and strontium would account for about two percent. As a result, less than one percent of the original spent fuel material remains

for disposal. The volume required to dispose of this material depends on the waste

form, and is a current area of research. It is anticipated that about a factor of 50

to 100 reduction in waste content for a given amount of energy production can be

achieved, perhaps greater. This would translate into an equivalent increase in the

utilization of space in the Yucca Mountain repository.

There are not any ‘‘tradeoffs’’ required to achieve these reductions, although all

of the removed materials need to be treated in some manner and in some respects

that can be viewed as the tradeoff: any materials that are removed need subsequent

treatment. The higher actinide elements can be efficiently recycled in nuclear reactors, preferably fast neutron reactors, and can be recycled as many times as required to consume the more troublesome elements. The separated fission products,

cesium and strontium, can be placed in separate storage for 100–300 years to allow

sufficient decay, and then disposed in the repository with no additional impact. Lest

this sound like an unreasonably long time, it is useful to remember that some spent

fuel has already been in storage for almost 50 years.

Q7. You assert that with a ‘‘significant R&D effort’’ new forms can be developed that

can burn up to 50 percent of the plutonium and neptunium present in the spent

nuclear fuel. What are the R&D challenges to being able to achieve a burn rate

at this level?

A7. These consumption amounts in a single irradiation in a light water reactor can

only be achieved with the development of what is known as ‘‘inert matrix fuel’’ or

IMF. This fuel consists only of recycled materials, and uses an inert matrix material

for the rest of the required fuel volume instead of using additional natural or depleted uranium. In this way, further creation of higher actinide elements from the

uranium is avoided, and the recycled materials provide the only fission sources. The

R&D challenges center on the development of an appropriate inert matrix material,

which has become more complicated as explained in the next paragraph. This approach was briefly in favor for certain applications, such as the destruction of weapons-grade plutonium, and has been examined in the DOE AFCI program as a potential approach for recycling the higher actinide elements.

However, detailed studies have shown that the IMF approach does not provide

substantial benefits either to waste management or resource utilization by itself,

but would also need to be recycled to provide the opportunity for greater benefits.

The major difficulty is in formulating an inert matrix that can be reprocessed easily,

and is the subject of some ongoing research. It should be noted, though, that even

if such a fuel form can be developed, the utility of the IMF approach is greatly inferior to that of the fast neutron reactors. For this reason, the IMF approach is not

being actively considered for either the single tier or dual tier strategy. An advanced

LWR with MOX-type fuel can already be implemented as the first tier of the dual

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tier strategy with maximum overall benefit, and the IMF approach would not add

to this benefit.

Q8. The U.S. has entered into an international framework agreement for the development of the Generation IV nuclear reactor. Is the reprocessing necessary for this

reactor design covered under the agreement? If not, why not? What other countries are engaged in reprocessing R&D for the Gen IV reactors?

A8. The reprocessing activities associated with the Gen IV reactors are the same

as are being discussed here, as are the advanced reactors being considered in the

DOE AFCI program for a single tier or dual tier system. All of the fast reactor concepts that would be part of a two tier system are represented in the Gen IV program.

As for the other countries that are engaged in reprocessing R&D, virtually all of

the members of the Gen IV International Forum are conducting research to one degree or another. The most active members in this area are France and Japan along

with the United States. We have active technical collaboration agreements in place

with a number of countries involved in the development of reprocessing technologies

for advanced nuclear reactors.