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Filed 5/3/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re RANDY C., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RANDY C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A167331

 (Marin County

 Super. Ct. No. JV27345A)

This is an appeal from a juvenile court order denying the motion of 

defendant Randy C. (minor) to suppress evidence pursuant to Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 700.1 (motion to suppress). Following this ruling, 

minor admitted multiple felony offenses and the juvenile court issued an 

order declaring wardship over him. Minor asks this court to reverse the 

denial of his motion to suppress, vacate his admissions, and vacate the 

wardship order on the grounds that the search and seizure conducted by 

police were unlawful. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 15, 2022, a wardship petition was filed pursuant to 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that 

minor committed the following offenses: possession of an assault weapon by 

a minor (Pen. Code, § 30605, subd. (a); count one); possession of a concealed 
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firearm and ammunition in a vehicle by a minor (Pen. Code, § 25400, subds. 

(a)(1), (c)(6); count two); carrying a loaded firearm, nonregistered owner (Pen. 

Code, § 25850, subd. (a); count three); possession of a firearm by a minor 

(Pen. Code, § 29610; count four); possession of ammunition by a minor (Pen. 

Code, § 29650; count five); and resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. 

(a)(1); count six).

On November 29, 2022, minor moved to suppress evidence, arguing 

there was no probable cause to search the vehicle he was driving. Following 

a contested hearing, the juvenile court denied his motion.

On December 6, 2022, minor admitted the felony offenses charged in 

counts one, two, and six, and the remaining counts were dismissed pursuant 

to a negotiated plea deal.

On January 3, 2023, a dispositional hearing was held. The juvenile 

court declared wardship and committed minor to juvenile hall for 274 days 

with 55 days of credit for time served. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks reversal of the order denying his motion to suppress,

vacation of his admissions to the allegations against him, and vacation of the 

wardship petition. Defendant reasons the police search of his vehicle was not 

justified since the marijuana that was discovered was in the exclusive 

possession of the adult passenger, there was no substantial evidence that the 

marijuana was of an illegal amount or in an open container, and the odor of 

marijuana without evidence of illegal activity does not furnish probable cause 

to search a vehicle for additional marijuana.

I. Legal Framework.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects 

against unreasonable searches and seizures. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) To 
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that end, an officer generally must secure a warrant before conducting a 

search of private property. “Warrantless searches ‘are per se unreasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established 

and well-delineated exceptions.’ (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 

357 [19 L.Ed.2d 576, 88 S.Ct. 507], fns. omitted; [citation].)” (People v. Lopez

(2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 359.) The prosecution bears the burden of proving the 

applicability of an exception. (People v. Castro (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 314, 

319 (Castro).)

“One such exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile

exception, under which an officer may search a vehicle without a warrant so

long as the officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains

contraband or evidence of a crime. [Citation.] ‘Probable cause is a more

demanding standard than mere reasonable suspicion.’ [Citation.] Probable

cause exists when ‘the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to

warrant a [person] of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or

evidence of a crime will be found.’ ” (People v. Hall (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 

946, 951 (Hall).) “[W]here probable cause to search a vehicle under the 

automobile exception exists, ‘ “a law enforcement officer may search the 

vehicle ‘irrespective of whether [the offense] is an infraction and not an 

arrestable offense.’ ” ’ ” (Castro, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 321.) Moreover, 

“[w]here the court finds that officers have probable cause to search, the 

officer’s subjective intent in performing the search is irrelevant.” (People v. 

McGee (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 796, 805, fn. 3 (McGee).)

“ ‘In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence,

we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are

supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent

judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or
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seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (People v. Silveria

and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232.) As such, we affirm so long as the

ruling is correct no matter the lower court’s reasoning. (People v. Session

(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 723, 730–731.)

II. Factual Record.

The relevant factual record comes from the testimony of San Pablo 

Police Officer Dugonjic at the hearing on minor’s motion to suppress. Officer 

Dugonjic was an 11-year veteran of the department, with training and 

experience in marijuana identification, marijuana consumption, and the 

legality of tinted windows.

Around 11:00 p.m. on November 10, 2022, Officer Dugonjic conducted a 

traffic stop on a black BMW with tinted windows that appeared to be in 

violation of Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a). Officer Dugonjic 

contacted minor, the driver of the BMW, who stated that he was 17 years old, 

the car belonged to his girlfriend, and he did not have a driver’s license. 

Officer Dugonjic noticed the smell of unburnt marijuana coming from inside 

the vehicle. He asked minor for identification, but minor was unable to 

produce a government-issued identification card.

Officer Dugonjic observed a passenger in the BMW who appeared to 

have a “marijuana blunt”1 on his lap. The marijuana appeared to be a usable 

amount and was not in a closed container. Minor denied smoking any of the 

marijuana and offered to take a test, but there is no evidence that one was 

conducted. Officer Dugonjic acknowledged the marijuana blunt was not 

1 Officer Dugonjic knew from his training and experience that 

marijuana is often smoked in paper taken from tobacco products. The 

tobacco is then removed from the product and replaced with marijuana. 

According to Officer Dugonjic, if the amount of marijuana is enough to be 

manipulated, it is useable.
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burned or smoked. A photograph of the blunt, showing “a little bit of green at 

[its] tip,” was admitted into evidence after Officer Dugonjic testified that it 

fairly and accurately depicted his observation of the blunt in the vehicle.

Another officer at the scene talked to the BMW’s passenger and 

determined he was 22 years old and in possession of the blunt.

Officer Dugonjic conducted a patdown of minor outside the BMW and 

found no contraband or identification. He also “ran” minor’s name and did 

not find a match. According to the police report, Officer Dugonjic searched 

the car’s front passenger compartment to try to find identification for minor 

or the passenger.2 In doing so, Officer Dugonjic found a handgun in the glove 

compartment and an airsoft rifle which was visible behind the driver’s seat.

When Officer Dugonjic went to handcuff minor, minor attempted to flee 

on foot but was apprehended. Officer Dugonjic then searched the entire 

vehicle, including the trunk, where he found an AR-15 firearm with no serial 

number.

After this testimony, the juvenile court found that the total elapsed 

time from the traffic stop to when Officer Dugonjic asked minor to exit the 

car was several minutes, and from when minor exited the car to when Officer 

Dugonjic found the gun in the glove compartment was about two minutes. 

Further, the court found based on Officer Dugonjic’s credible testimony that 

he had reasonable suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop based on his belief 

that the BMW’s tinted windows were in violation of the law. Officer Dugonjic 

also had probable cause to then search the BMW’s passenger compartment 

based on the unburnt marijuana smell emanating from the BMW and his 

2 On cross-examination, Officer Dugonjic clarified that trying to find 

identification was one of the reasons why he searched the vehicle. Another 

reason was the visible marijuana blunt on the passenger’s lap, which he could 

smell from outside the vehicle.
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observation of an “open-ended blunt” in the passenger’s lap that appeared to 

be a usable amount in an open container in violation of Health and Safety 

Code section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4).

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III. Analysis.

Minor does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that he was 

legally stopped for driving a car with illegally tinted windows. Rather, minor 

challenges the court’s finding that the marijuana blunt on his passenger’s lap 

was an “open container” within the meaning of section 11362.3, 

subdivision (a)(4), which provided probable cause for Officer Dugonjic to

search the BMW’s passenger compartment. His challenge fails.

To begin, the law is settled that the lawful possession of marijuana in a 

vehicle does not provide probable cause to search the vehicle. (E.g., People v. 

Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 865–867; Hall, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 948.) The question raised here, however, is whether the unlawful

possession of marijuana provided probable cause to search the BMW driven 

by minor.

Section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4) clearly states that no one is 

permitted to “[p]ossess an open container or open package of cannabis or 

cannabis products while driving, operating, or riding in the passenger seat or 

compartment of a motor vehicle . . . .” (§ 11362.3, subd. (a)(4).) In addition, 

section 11357 makes it unlawful for a person under 21 years of age, such as 

minor, to possess any amount of recreational marijuana. (§ 11357.)

As recently explained by our appellate colleagues in the Second 

Appellate District, “section 11362.1, added by Proposition 64,

‘ “fundamentally changed the probable cause determination by specifying

3 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the 

Health and Safety Code.
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lawfully possessed cannabis is ‘not contraband’ and lawful conduct under the

statute may not ‘constitute the basis for detention, search or arrest.’

[Citations.]” [Citation.] But this applies only to activities “deemed lawful” by

Proposition 64.’ ” (Castro, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 320–321.) In Castro, 

it was unlawful for the defendant, a minor, and his minor passengers to 

“possess any amount of recreational marijuana due to their age.” (Id. at 

p. 321.) The officer thus had probable cause to search the defendant/minor’s 

car for “contraband or evidence of a crime (e.g., marijuana)” based on the 

smell of marijuana coming from inside the car and defendant’s admission he 

had smoked marijuana. (Id. at pp. 320–321.)

Similarly, in McGee, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at page 804, the officer had 

probable cause to search the passenger’s purse, “as a ‘compartment[] [or] 

container[] within the vehicle whose contents [were] not in plain view,’ ” after 

witnessing the passenger in possession of an unsealed container of marijuana 

in violation of section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4). According to the court, 

“[t]he presence of this contraband provided probable cause to believe the 

passenger possessed other open containers,” thereby justifying the officer’s 

search under the automobile exception. (McGee, at p. 804.)

Following this authority, we conclude Officer Dugonjic had probable 

cause to search the BMW that minor was driving based on the officer’s 

observation of the unburned marijuana blunt—a usable amount of marijuana 

in an open container in violation of section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4)—in his 

passenger’s possession. This open container of marijuana was contraband 

that, along with the smell of unburnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle,

provided probable cause to believe minor or his passenger may also have 

possessed additional marijuana in violation of section 11357 and/or section 
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11362.3, subdivision (a)(4). (McGee, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 804; Castro, 

supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 320–321.)

Minor is mistaken that a marijuana blunt, wrapped in paper but for a 

“speck of marijuana” on the flattened end, was not an “open container” of 

marijuana within the meaning of section 11362.3. “Section 11362.3 does not 

define the phrase ‘open container or open package.’ In the absence of a 

specifically defined meaning, we look to the plain meaning of a word or 

phrase as understood by the ordinary person, which would typically be a 

dictionary definition.” (People v. Johnson (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 620, 632–

633.) The plain and commonsense meaning of an “open container” is one in 

which there is no barrier to accessing the marijuana contained inside. (Id. at 

p. 633 [concluding a knotted plastic baggie is not “open” because the knot 

“presents a barrier to accessing the content”].) In this case, the paper 

wrapping enclosing the marijuana presented no barrier to accessing the 

marijuana. On the contrary, as Officer Dugonjic explained, paper wrapping

holds the marijuana so that it can be smoked, thereby facilitating its 

consumption. (Cf. Hall, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 958–959 [officer lacked 

probable cause to search vehicle where there was no evidence the plastic bag 

containing marijuana in the center console was open and not sealed or that 

the loose marijuana on the driver’s lap was a usable amount].)

Accordingly, the juvenile court order stands.

DISPOSITION

The denial of minor’s motion to suppress is affirmed.

Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Burns, J.

Chou, J. A167331/People v. Randy C.
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A167331/People v. Randy C.

Trial Court: Superior Court of the County of Marin

Trial Judge: Beverly Wood

Counsel: Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and 

Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General, 

Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.