SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1384-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

LATIF GADSON, a/k/a 

QUAMIR WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Argued May 21, 2019 – Decided July 8, 2019

Before Judges Suter, Geiger and Enright.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 15-12-1001.

Stefan Van Jura, Deputy Public Defender, argued the 

cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

Sarah C. Hunt, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Sarah C. Hunt, of counsel and on the 

brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

Defendant Latif Gadson appeals his judgment of conviction for thirddegree aggravated assault. He contends the trial court's jury instruction about 

"extreme indifference to human life" was "manifestly" incorrect. He also 

contends that his discretionary extended term sentence was excessive because 

the court double counted his convictions. We reject these arguments, finding no 

basis to reverse the judgment of conviction or sentence.

While waiting near the Temple Street Bridge in Paterson to pick up her 

grandson from school, Cynthia Pilgrim saw a man take off his clothes and cross 

the bridge dressed only in socks. As he passed an older woman on the bridge,

who held shopping bags in her hands, he savagely hit her in the head. He

repeatedly punched her body and tried unsuccessfully to throw her off the 

bridge. Pilgrim, who was minding another grandchild, directed her daughter,

Atilla Bundick, to help the woman, and gave Bundick a can of mace and a taser. 

Bundick kicked defendant between his legs, tased him and gave him a "face 

mace bath." She chased him when he ran to a nearby store. Pilgrim assisted the 

victim who was not then responsive. 

The victim testified she was on the bridge talking to a man when she "felt 

a punch . . . on the left side of [her] head." When she "came to . . . somebody 
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[was] holding [her] arms in the back" and her head was pounding. She testified 

the pain continues to come and go.

Defendant was indicted for second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-1(b)(1). He was convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of 

third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7). The State's motion to 

sentence defendant as a persistent offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) was 

granted. He was sentenced to a term of seven and one-half years to be served 

consecutively to a five-year term of incarceration imposed by another judge for 

violation of probation.1 This appeal followed.

Defendant raises the following issues: 

POINT I

THE DEFINITION OF THE OFTEN-USED PHRASE 

"UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES MANIFESTING 

EXTREME INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE" 

SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO CHANGE 

FROM CRIMINAL STATUTE TO CRIMINAL 

STATUTE; RATHER THE DEFINITION OF THAT 

PHRASE AS FIRST INTERPRETED IN STATE V. 

CURTIS, AND APPROVED THEREAFTER BY THE 

NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT, SHOULD APPLY 

WHENEVER IT IS USED IN THE CODE. 

CONSEQUENTLY, THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON 

THIRD-DEGREE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WAS 

MANIFESTLY INCORRECT. 

 

1 That sentence is not part of this appeal. 
4

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POINT II

THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS MANIFESTLY

EXCESSIVE. 

We do not agree that either issue warrants reversal of defendant's 

conviction or sentence. 

Because there was no objection made to the jury instruction at trial, we 

review that issue for plain error, meaning that our inquiry is to determine 

whether this was an error that was "clearly capable of producing an unjust 

result." R. 2:10-2; see State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971). Under that 

standard, reversal of defendant's conviction is required if there was error 

"sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [it] led the jury to a result 

it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Green, 447 N.J. Super. 317, 325 

(App. Div. 2016) (quoting Macon, 57 N.J. at 336). 

We consider the charge as a whole in determining whether it was 

prejudicial. State v. Outland, 458 N.J. Super. 357, 372 (App. Div. 2019) (citing 

State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420, 422 (1973)). "[A]ppropriate and proper [jury]

charges are essential for a fair trial." State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 158-59 (2016) 

(quoting State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 613 (2004)). Where no objection is 

made to a jury instruction, this creates "a presumption that the charge was not 
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error and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant's case." State v. Singleton, 

211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012) (citing Macon, 57 N.J. at 333-34).

Defendant argues that use of the phrase "under circumstances manifesting 

extreme indifference to human life" should mean "circumstances that indicate a 

probability of death," but that in the instruction given here, the phrase referred

to "a probability of only a significant bodily injury." Defendant contends the 

legislature used the same phrase in other related statutes and that it is supposed 

to mean the same thing each time. He argues the court did not properly define 

this phrase for the jury because in this case, involving a third-degree aggravated 

assault, it was defined to mean a probability of significant injury, rather than of 

death. Defendant argues this "could easily affect the verdict in a case where the 

risk of significant injury was likely probable, but the risk of death perhaps only 

possible." We find no merit in this argument.

The judge instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of third-degree 

aggravated assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7). Under that statute, a person is 

guilty of aggravated assault if one:

attempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or 

causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly

or, under circumstances manifesting extreme

indifference to the value of human life recklessly 

causes such significant bodily injury.
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[N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7).]

The jury charge followed this statutory language. The court defined "significant 

bodily injury" consistent with its definition in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(d)2, adding only 

that the five senses are "sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell." The court told 

the jury that the State must prove defendant acted "purposely or knowingly or 

acted recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 

value of human life." The court separately defined "purposely" consistent with 

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1), and "knowingly" consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(2), 

because either type of culpability would satisfy N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7).

Defendant challenges the jury instruction on the third type of culpability: 

"recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 

of human life."3In the jury charge, the court defined "recklessly" consistent 

with N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3). It then discussed the phrase "manifesting extreme 

indifference to the value of human life."

The phrase "under circumstances manifesting extreme 

indifference to the value of human life" does not focus 

 

2

 N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(d) states, "'[s]ignificant bodily injury' means bodily injury 

which creates a temporary loss of the function of any bodily member or organ 

or temporary loss of any one of the five senses."

3

 The verdict sheet contained a single question on the lesser included offense 

that included all three types of culpability. Thus, we do not know if the jury 

convicted based on this type of culpability. 
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on the state of mind of the actor, but rather on the 

circumstances under which you find that he acted. If, 

in light of all the evidence, you find that the conduct of 

the defendant resulted in a probability as opposed to a 

mere possibility of significant bodily injury, then you 

may find that he acted under circumstances manifesting 

extreme indifference to the value of human life.

In determining whether the defendant acted purposely 

or knowingly or acted recklessly under circumstances 

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 

life, you may consider the nature of the acts themselves, 

and the severity of the resulting injuries to [the victim].

The court's jury instruction made clear that defendant could be found guilty if 

he caused bodily injury to another or "attempted to cause significant bodily 

injury to another." The court defined "attempt" consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:5-

1(a). 

Defendant simply is incorrect that the court instructed the jury using the 

phrase "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life." 

That is not what the court said. It is not part of the definition of aggravated 

assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1. Defendant is citing to language from the

aggravated manslaughter statute, which provides that "[c]riminal homicide 

constitutes aggravated manslaughter when . . . the actor recklessly causes death 

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life." N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-4(a)(1). The assault statutes are in Chapter Twelve of Title 2C and use a 
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different phrase: "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 

value of human life." 

In interpreting a statute, we first "look to the plain language of the statute." 

Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 209-10 (2014). The assault statute does 

not refer to death. If the legislature meant to require an assault that would likely

cause death, it would have said so. The legislature used the phrase "value of 

human life." We have said previously that "[t]his [phrase] differs from a 

probability of death resulting from the defendant's conduct . . . ." State v. Scher, 

278 N.J. Super. 249, 272 (App. Div. 1994). Therefore, there is no reason to 

assume the legislature meant to restrict the statute as defendant suggests.

This charge also was consistent with the model charge on third-degree 

aggravated assault. Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Aggravated Assault 

(N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7))" (rev. May 16, 2005). Jury instructions given in 

accordance with model charges, or which closely track model charges, are 

generally not considered erroneous. Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate 

Grp., Inc., 162 N.J. 449, 466 (2000). We are satisfied there was no error in this 

instruction and certain none that would constitute plain error.

We disagree with defendant's suggestion that we should not follow Scher. 

In State v. Moore, 158 N.J. 292, 302 (1999), our Supreme Court accepted Scher's 
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standard that "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 

value of human life means a probability as opposed to a mere possibility of 

causing such injury." The instruction given here was consistent with this,

because it required the jury to find a probability of significant injury rather than 

just a possibility. We see no basis to question Scher's continued viability based 

on this or other case law cited by defendant. 

Defendant was sentenced to an extended sentence as a persistent offender

under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). Because he was convicted of a third-degree offense, 

he was subject to a term of incarceration between five and ten years. N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-7(a)(4).

In sentencing defendant, the court gave "great weight" to aggravating 

factors three (the risk that defendant will commit another offense), six (the 

extent of defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of 

which he has been convicted), and nine (the need to deter defendant and others 

from violating the law). N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6) and (9). The court noted

defendant's "violent history in addition to a longstanding criminal history 

involving indicatable offenses, a total of [sixteen] adult arrests with [seven] 

indictable convictions." His involvement in drug treatment programs while on 

probation did not "sufficient[ly] . . . deter [defendant] from criminal behavior." 
10 A-1384-17T4

The court found aggravating factor twelve, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(12), ("[t]he 

defendant committed the offense against a person who he knew or should have 

known was [sixty] years of age or older, or disabled"), but found it to be a 

"nominal" factor in the sentencing. The court also found certain "non-statutory 

mitigating factors," such as defendant's "underlying psychopathology," drug 

use, efforts to rehabilitate while in jail, remorse, and educational achievements, 

weighed against imposing the maximum extended term. The court "temper[ed]" 

defendant's sentence from a possible ten-year term to a term of seven years and 

six months, even though defendant committed this offense while on probation. 

Defendant does not dispute that he satisfied the statutory definition of a 

persistent offender: he was twenty-one or older when the assault occurred, he 

had been convicted "on at least two separate occasions of two crimes, committed 

at different times, when he was at least [eighteen] years of age," and the "latest 

of the crimes" or the "date of his last release," was within ten years of this 

offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a).

Defendant argues the sentence was excessive because the trial court 

double counted his convictions by not separating "the prior offenses that 

triggered the extended-term from those used to set the length of that term," 
11 A-1384-17T4

contrary to State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80 (1987). Defendant does not dispute that 

his criminal record was extensive. 

The convictions relied on for extended term sentencing would not have 

the same "qualitative weight" for sentencing, according to Dunbar,

4 but the 

court's decision rested on its "weighing and balancing of the aggravating and 

mitigating factors that it found." State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 169 (2006). As 

Dunbar said, "the primary focus [is] on the conduct that occasions the sentence." 

108 N.J. at 92. The court gave great weight to the aggravating factors. It also 

considered other factors in sentencing defendant, such as prior attempts at 

rehabilitation while on probation, the need to protect the public because of the 

violent nature of the crime and the victim's age, and defendant's violent history. 

We are satisfied that the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing 

defendant within the extended term range. Pierce, 188 N.J. at 169-70. The

findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were based upon competent and 

credible evidence in the record. Defendant's sentence did not violate the 

sentencing guidelines nor was it excessive for this offense. 

Affirmed.

 

4

 108 N.J. at 92.