SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2562-16T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

COREY M. TAYLOR a/k/a 

COREY SIMPKINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

Submitted September 5, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 14-11-2771 

and 15-12-2989.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Cody T. Mason, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Robert D. Laurino, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Matthew E. Hanley, Special 

Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is 

posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other 

cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 10, 2018
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PER CURIAM

On January 20, 2017, defendant Corey Taylor was sentenced in accord 

with his plea agreement with the State on the following offenses: third-degree 

possession of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a); thirddegree unlawful possession of a weapon (a rifle), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(1); and 

second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (a handgun), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

5(b). On the second-degree offense, the judge sentenced defendant to seven 

years subject to forty-two months of parole ineligibility, in accord with the 

Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), on the rifle possession, defendant received five 

years subject to three years of parole ineligibility, again, pursuant to the Graves 

Act. A concurrent five year term was imposed on the third-degree drug 

possession offense. The remaining numerous counts of the two separate 

indictments were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Defendant appeals 

the denial of his pretrial motions to suppress. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm.

I.

With regard to the third-degree unlawful drug possession, Newark police 

officer Christopher Segarra testified that on the morning of June 4, 2014, he was 

dispatched with two other officers to an area he patrolled on a daily basis. All 
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the officers were in civilian clothing, but wearing police badges around their 

necks. Over the time he was assigned there, Segarra had made several arrests 

for weapons and narcotics. Prior to going to the location, he was informed of 

an anonymous call to the station stating that a heavy-set male wearing a white 

shirt and yellow shorts had been seen brandishing a gun. When the officers 

arrived, they saw two men engaging in a conversation "pretty much in the middle 

of the street." As they approached, the men were observed exchanging items in 

a "possible hand-to-hand transaction." The officers announced themselves after 

stepping out of the vehicle; the two men looked towards them and fled. The 

officers chased after the man wearing the white shirt and yellow shorts, later 

identified as defendant. While running, defendant "was pretty much grabbing 

his left side." After defendant and Segarra vaulted a fence, defendant tossed a 

Ziploc bag, which Segarra grabbed as he continued to give chase. Defendant 

ran down a driveway, where he was stopped by the other officers. The Ziploc 

bag was later found to have numerous bags of heroin and cocaine. When 

defendant was searched incident to his arrest, the officers found eight bags of 

marijuana and sixty-two dollars in cash. 

The judge relied on several factors in denying the motion to suppress. 

Segarra, whom he found credible, had ten years of experience with narcotics 
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investigations. The area was known to be an open air drug market, and had been 

the subject of many calls by citizens. Segarra immediately noticed defendant 

because he matched the anonymous caller's description of a man brandishing a 

handgun, and appeared to be engaging in a drug transaction. Furthermore, the 

men fled when the officers showed their badges and directed defendant to stop. 

During the ensuing chase, Segarra saw defendant toss a bag onto the ground. 

Hence, the judge held the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to 

detain defendant initially, and to pursue defendant and seize the bag he tossed. 

The judge also found the arrest and search incident to arrest lawful.

II.

The weapons convictions stemmed from seizures made under the authority 

of a search warrant. East Orange Police Department Sergeant Anthony Ricks 

applied for the warrant. In the supporting affidavit, he said he and an undercover 

officer had previously made a buy from a codefendant who was standing in front 

of a particular address listed in the warrant and affidavit. During the purchase, 

the undercover officer was instructed by the codefendant to go next door. A 

codefendant entered the address for about two minutes before returning to hand 

the undercover officer two small bags of marijuana in exchange for twenty 

dollars. During surveillance, Ricks observed several individuals——including 
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defendant——going in and out of the house and seemingly engaging in narcotics 

activities. 

In Ricks's search warrant affidavit, he stated that the undercover officer 

"was equipped with an audio/video recording device which would be used to 

record any conversations and/or transactions which may take place." No 

recordings were produced by the return date of the motion to suppress. In the 

affidavit, Ricks said that "[i]ntelligence gathered as well as prior undercover 

narcotics purchases led [him] to believe that narcotics (namely marijuana), was 

being distributed at the said location from [the codefendant] and a Mr. Cory 

Taylor." 

In his written motion decision, the judge opined that the details of the 

controlled buy sufficed to establish probable cause for the search warrant. The 

description of the interaction established the necessary nexus between the 

contraband and the relevant address. Therefore, he concluded, defendant fell 

short of meeting his burden to demonstrate no probable cause existed. 

The judge also addressed defendant's objection that the information was 

stale, stating that in addition to the details of the July 1 buy, which took place 

nine days prior to the application for a search warrant, Ricks mentioned prior 

undercover narcotics purchases connecting defendant to the relevant address. 
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The judge therefore concluded that the nature of the alleged activity was 

ongoing, making the issue of staleness irrelevant. Additionally, nine days was 

not so extended a delay as to warrant suppression based on staleness. 

Accordingly, he denied this motion as well.

III.

Defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

THE FIRST MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 

SHOULD

HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE OFFICERS 

LACKED

REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE 

DEFENDANT WAS

ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY PRIOR TO 

SEIZING

HIM. 

POINT II

THE SECOND MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 

SHOULD

HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE SEARCH 

WARRANT

WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE 

SPECIFIC

TO THE HOME THAT WAS SEARCHED.

POINT III

A REMAND FOR RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED 

BECAUSE

THE COURT DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN 

THE
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SENTENCE AND IMPROPERLY WITHHELD TWO 

DAYS OF

JAIL CREDIT. 

A. A Remand Is Required Because the 

Court Did Not Adequately Explain the 

Sentence Imposed.

B. A Remand Is Required Because 

Defendant is Entitled to Two Additional 

Days of Jail Credit.

C. A Remand Is Required to Vacate the 

Parole Bar Imposed on the Rifle 

Conviction.

The State concedes that no parole bar should have been imposed on the 

third-degree possession of a rifle, as it did not fall under the purview of the 

Graves Act. Accordingly, the matter must be remanded for correction of the 

judgment. On remand, the court should also consider whether defendant is 

entitled to additional days of credit. The police report referenced by defendant 

in support of his argument does appear to indicate that defendant was taken into 

custody on July 10, 2015, as opposed to July 12, 2015——the date listed on the 

pre-sentence report. It is also true that defendant was actually taken into custody 

on an unrelated arrest warrant for other narcotic offenses. The credits cannot be 

resolved on this record, and require additional information to be presented to the 

sentencing judge before the matter can be resolved.
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IV.

Defendant contends that his motion to suppress the drugs should have 

been granted because the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion for the stop. 

This argument lacks merit. 

The determination as to whether the State has met its preponderance of 

the evidence burden to show officers had adequate reasonable suspicion is 

highly fact-sensitive and requires careful consideration of the totality of the 

circumstances. State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014); State v. Mann, 203 

N.J. 328, 338 (2010). The decision calls for an objective evaluation of the 

circumstances and the facts available at the time of the encounter. State v. 

Pineiro, 183 N.J. 13, 21-27 (2004); State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 361 (2002). 

In this case, as the judge observed, multiple factors established reasonable 

suspicion. A credible police officer testified that the area was an open air 

narcotics market about which numerous civilian complaints had been received. 

Although that factor alone would not be dispositive, it may be considered in 

conjunction with others. State v. Bard, 445 N.J. Super. 145, 158-59 (App. Div. 

2016). Additionally, defendant was dressed precisely as an anonymous caller

reporting a man with a gun described and had the same physical build. That 

would have warranted at least a field inquiry, but when the officers arrived, they
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also observed defendant engaged in a drug transaction. That the officer did not 

fully detail his observations is not sufficient to discount his interpretation of 

events. The officer had ten years of experience witnessing drug trafficking. The 

judge properly credited Segarra's belief that he saw a drug transaction. 

V.

Defendant also contends that the motion to suppress the evidence seized 

on the warranted search should have been granted because Ricks's affidavit did 

not establish probable cause. This claim also lacks merit. 

Defendant argues that Ricks's statement about prior intelligence and the

controlled buy was insufficient to demonstrate probable cause. But an 

undercover agent conducted the drug buy from the premises. The personal 

observations of law enforcement officers are generally regarded as highly 

reliable and sufficient to establish probable cause. See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 

601, 613-14 (2007); State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 46-47 (2004); State v. Myers, 

357 N.J. Super. 32, 39-40 (App. Div. 2003). Thus, the information in the 

affidavit sufficed. 

That nine days elapsed before the search warrant application is entirely 

insignificant. Accordingly, the court also did not err in denying the motion to 

suppress evidence seized during the execution of the search warrant.
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VI.

Finally, defendant argues that the matter should be remanded for 

resentencing. He characterizes the judge's discussion of the aggravating and 

mitigating factors as too superficial. However, it is black letter law that we will 

affirm a sentence——after deferential review——so long as the sentencing 

guidelines were not violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors found by 

the trial judge were based upon competent and credible evidence, and the 

sentence does not shock the judicial conscious. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57,

70 (2014) (citing State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)). When sentencing 

defendant in accord with the terms of the plea bargain in this case, the judge

noted defendant's personal circumstances and extensive prior contacts with the 

system. At thirty-six, defendant had nine prior juvenile adjudications, seven 

indictable convictions, two disorderly persons offenses, and had been 

unsuccessfully placed on probation and parole. Against this backdrop, the judge

found aggravating factors three, six, and nine. N.J.S.A. 2C:44(a)(3), (6), and 

(9). Clearly, the aggravating factors preponderated, but he nonetheless

sentenced defendant to the agreed upon term. We are satisfied that the

sentencing calculus was supported by the record and did not violate sentencing 

guidelines. It does not shock our conscience. 
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Affirmed, except that the matter is remanded to modify the parole 

ineligibility term on the possession of a rifle count and for consideration of 

defendant's claim that he is entitled to two additional days of jail credits.