United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-1629

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Dominique D. Tipler

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri 

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Submitted: January 13, 2023

Filed: May 3, 2023

[Unpublished]

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Before GRASZ, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Dominique D. Tipler pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a 

convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district 

court1 calculated an advisory sentencing range of 77 to 96 months of imprisonment 

1

The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for 

the Eastern District of Missouri.
-2- 

under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) and 

then imposed a sentence of 96 months. The Guidelines calculation was higher than 

it otherwise would have been because the district court concluded Tipler had two 

prior felony convictions that were “either a crime of violence or a controlled 

substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1; see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (defining a 

“crime of violence” as including “any offense under . . . state law, punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . has as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”). 

Tipler’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court wrongly determined 

his past conviction under Missouri law for exhibiting a lethal weapon was a “crime 

of violence.” See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4) (prohibiting “knowingly . . . 

[e]xhibit[ing], in the presence of one or more persons, any weapon readily capable 

of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner”). Tipler acknowledges we have 

held convictions under this Missouri statute qualify as a crime of violence under 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)’s force clause. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 851 F.3d 

807, 809–10 (8th Cir. 2017). Nonetheless, Tipler argues the Supreme Court’s 

plurality decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), changed the 

legal landscape, effectively nullifying precedent such as Hudson. Because of

Borden, Tipler contends, a criminal statute must include force (or threatened force) 

“targeted against the person of another intentionally designed to cause them harm”

in order to fit within § 4B1.2(a)(1)’s force clause. Because the Missouri statute at 

issue lacks such an intent-to-harm (or threaten harm) requirement, Tipler argues it 

does not qualify as a crime of violence.

Tipler’s reading of Borden conflicts with our more narrow interpretation of 

its holding. We have read Borden as holding “only that the force clause categorically 

excludes offenses that can be committed recklessly.” United States v. Larry, 51 

F.4th 290, 292 (8th Cir. 2022). Under this view, we held in Larry that a conviction 

under this Missouri statute still qualifies as a crime of violence because it requires 

the prohibited exhibition of the lethal weapon “be committed with knowledge.” Id. 

We are bound by this holding. See Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th
-3- 

Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by 

the decision of a prior panel” (quoting Owsley v. Luebbers, 281 F.3d 687, 690 (8th

Cir. 2002)). Thus, the district court was correct to conclude Tipler’s prior conviction 

was a crime of violence. 

We accordingly affirm the district court’s judgment. 

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