a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

October 2005 MILITARY 

READINESS

DOD Needs to Identify 

and Address Gaps and 

Potential Risks in 

Program Strategies 

and Funding Priorities 

for Selected 

Equipment

GAO-06-141
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

Highlights of GAO-06-141, a report to 

congressional committees 

MILITARY READINESS

DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps 

and Potential Risks in Program Strategies 

and Funding Priorities for Selected 

Equipment 

October 2005

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-141.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

While the fleet-wide condition of the 30 equipment items GAO selected for 

review varied, GAO’s analysis showed that reported readiness rates declined 

between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 for most of these items. The decline in 

readiness, which occurred more markedly in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, 

generally resulted from (1) the continued high use of equipment to support 

current operations and (2) maintenance issues caused by the advancing ages 

and complexity of the systems. Key equipment items—such as Army and 

Marine Corps trucks, combat vehicles, and rotary wing aircraft—have been 

used well beyond normal peacetime use during deployments in support of 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD is currently performing its 

Quadrennial Defense Review, which will examine defense programs and 

policies for meeting future requirements. Until the department completes 

this review and ensures that condition issues for key equipment are 

addressed, DOD risks a continued decline in readiness trends, which could 

threaten its ability to continue meeting mission requirements. 

The military services have not fully identified near- and long-term program 

strategies and funding plans to ensure that all of the 30 selected equipment 

items can meet defense requirements. GAO found that, in some cases, the 

services’ near-term program strategies have gaps in that they do not address 

capability shortfalls, funding is not included in DOD’s 2006 budget request, 

or there are supply and maintenance issues that may affect near-term 

readiness. Additionally, the long-term program strategies and funding plans 

are incomplete for some of the equipment items GAO reviewed in that future 

requirements are not identified, studies are not completed, funding for 

maintenance and upgrades was limited, or replacement systems were 

delayed or not yet identified. Title 10 U.S.C. § 2437 requires the military 

services to develop sustainment plans for equipment items when their 

replacement programs begin development, unless they will reach initial 

operating capability before October 2008. However, most of the systems that 

GAO assessed as red had issues severe enough to warrant immediate 

attention because of long-term strategy and funding issues, and were not 

covered by this law. As a result, DOD is not required to report sustainment 

plans for these critical items. For the next several years, funding to sustain 

or modernize aging equipment will have to compete with other DOD 

priorities, such as current operations, force structure changes, and 

replacement system acquisitions. Without developing complete sustainment 

and modernization plans and identifying funding needs for all priority 

equipment items, DOD may be unable to meet future requirements for 

defense capabilities. Furthermore, until DOD develops these plans, 

Congress will be unable to ensure that DOD’s budget decisions address 

deficiencies related to key military equipment. 

GAO’s red, yellow, and green assessments of the condition, program 

strategies, and funding plans for the 30 selected military equipment items are 

shown on the following page. 

With continued heavy military 

involvement in operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, the Department of

Defense (DOD) is spending billions 

of dollars sustaining or replacing 

its inventory of key equipment 

items while also planning to spend 

billions of dollars to develop and 

procure new systems to transform 

the department’s warfighting 

capabilities. GAO developed a red, 

yellow, green assessment 

framework to (1) assess the 

condition of 30 selected equipment 

items from across the four military 

services, and (2) determine the 

extent to which DOD has identified 

near- and long-term program 

strategies and funding plans to 

ensure that these items can meet 

defense requirements. GAO 

selected these items based on input 

from the military services, 

congressional committees, and our 

prior work. These 30 equipment 

items included 18 items that were 

first assessed in GAO’s 2003 report. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD 

reassess and report annually on its 

near- and long-term programs for 

all key equipment items until 

replacements are fielded. DOD 

partially agreed that it needs to 

reassess its program strategies but 

did not agree that it needed to 

provide this information in an 

annual report to Congress. As a 

result, GAO is recommending that 

Congress require DOD to report 

this information to ensure that key 

equipment deficiencies are 

addressed in DOD’s budget. 
GAO’s Assessment Summary of 30 Selected Equipment Items 

Army

Abrams Tank

Bradley Fighting Vehicle

M113 Armored Personnel Carrier

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles

AH-64 A/D Apache Helicopter

CH-47 D/F Chinook Helicopter

OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter

Marine Corps

M1A1 Abrams Tank

Light Armored Vehicle Command and Control and 25 variants

Assault Amphibian Vehicle- Personnel, C2, and Recovery variants

Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement

AV-8B Harrier Jet

AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter

CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter

CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter

Navy

DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer

FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate

LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship

F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft

EA-6B Prowler Aircraft

P-3 Orion Aircraft

Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile

Air Force

F-15 Eagle/Strike Eagle Aircraft

F-16 Fighting Falcon Aircraft

B-1 Lancer Bomber

B-2 Spirit Bomber

C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft

KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft

Equipment Condition

Near-term program

strategy and funding plan

Long-term program

strategy and funding plan

Source: GAO analysis of military service data. 

Red indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough to warrant immediate attention by 

DOD, the military services, and/or Congress.

Yellow indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants attention by DOD, the military services, 

and/or Congress, and if left unattended may worsen.

Green indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or issues at the time of our review or that 

any existing problems or issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant additional 

action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress.
Page i GAO-06-141 

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5

Background 9

Condition of Some Selected Equipment Has Been Degraded by the 

High Pace of Operations and the Advanced Age or Complexity of 

the Systems 10

Services Near- and Long-Term Program Strategies and Funding 

Plans Exist for Most Equipment Reviewed, but Some Gaps 

Remain 15

Conclusions 25

Recommendations 26

Matter for Congressional Consideration 26

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 31

Appendix II: Assessments of Selected Equipment Items 39

Army 40

Marine Corps 70

Navy 94

Air Force 112

Appendix III: Agency Comments from the Department of Defense 131

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 142

Tables Table 1: Primary Reasons for Rating Condition as Yellow or Red for 

Selected Equipment Items 12

Table 2: Primary Reasons for Rating Near-term Program Strategies 

and Funding Plans as Yellow or Red for Selected 

Equipment Items 17

Table 3: Unfunded Requirements for Four Selected Marine Corps 

Equipment Items, Fiscal Year 2006 (dollars in millions) 18

Table 4: Primary Reasons for Rating Long-term Program Strategies 

and Funding Plans as Yellow or Red for Selected 

Equipment Items 21

Figures Figure 1: Assessment Summary of 30 Selected Equipment Items 6

Figure 2: Abrams Main Battle Tank 40
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-141 

Figure 3: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Abrams Tanks, 

Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 42

Figure 4: Bradley Fighting Vehicle 44

Figure 5: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Bradley 

Fighting Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 45

Figure 6: M113 Armored Personnel Carrier 47

Figure 7: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army M113 Vehicles, 

Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 48

Figure 8: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck 49

Figure 9: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army HEMTTs, 

Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 51

Figure 10: High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle 54

Figure 11: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army High 

Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles, Fiscal Years 

1999 – 2004 55

Figure 12: 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle 57

Figure 13: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army Family of 

Medium Tactical Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 58

Figure 14: AH-64 Apache Helicopter 60

Figure 15: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army AH-64 A/D 

Apache Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 62

Figure 16: CH-47D Chinook Helicopter 64

Figure 17: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Chinook 

CH-47D/F Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 65

Figure 18: OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter 67

Figure 19: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army OH-58D 

Kiowa Helicopters, Calendar Years 1999 – 2004 68

Figure 20: M1A1 Abrams Tank 70

Figure 21: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps M1A1 

Abrams Tanks, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 71

Figure 22: Light Armored Vehicle 73

Figure 23: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps 

LAV-25 and LAV C-2, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 74

Figure 24: Assault Amphibian Vehicle 76

Figure 25: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps 

Assault Amphibian Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 77

Figure 26: Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement 79

Figure 27: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps 

Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement Fleet, Fiscal Years 

2003 – 2004 80

Figure 28: AV-8B Harrier Jet 81
Contents

Page iii GAO-06-141 

Figure 29: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps AV-8B 

Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 82

Figure 30: AH-1W Super Cobra 84

Figure 31: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps AH-1W 

Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 85

Figure 32: CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter 86

Figure 33: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps CH-46E 

Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 88

Figure 34: CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter 90

Figure 35: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps CH-53E 

Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 92

Figure 36: DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer 94

Figure 37: FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate 96

Figure 38: LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship 98

Figure 39: F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft 100

Figure 40: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy F/A-18 Aircraft, 

Calendar Years 1999 – 2004 101

Figure 41: EA-6B Prowler 103

Figure 42: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy EA-6B Aircraft, 

Calendar Years 1999 – 2004 104

Figure 43: P-3 Orion Aircraft 106

Figure 44: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy P-3 Aircraft, 

Calendar Years 1999 – 2004 107

Figure 45: Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile 109

Figure 46: F-15 Eagle 113

Figure 47: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force F-15 Eagle 

and Strike Eagle Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004 114

Figure 48: F-16 Fighting Falcon 116

Figure 49: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force F-16 

Fighting Falcon Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 117

Figure 50: B-1 Lancer Bomber 119

Figure 51: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force B-1 Lancer 

Bombers, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004 120

Figure 52: B-2 Spirit Bomber 122

Figure 53: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force B-2 Spirit 

Bombers, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004 123

Figure 54: C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft 125

Figure 55: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force C-5 Galaxy 

Transport Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004 126

Figure 56: KC-135 Stratotanker 128

Figure 57: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force KC-135 

Stratotanker Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004 129
Contents

Page iv GAO-06-141 

Abbreviations

AAV Assault Amphibian Vehicle

ARNG Army National Guard

C2 Command and Control or Command and Communications 

DOD Department of Defense

FMTV Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck 

HMMWV High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle 

LAV Light Armored Vehicle

MTVR Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

USAR U.S. Army Reserve

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Page 1 GAO-06-141 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

October 25, 2005 Letr

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) is spending billions of dollars sustaining 

and transforming the current military force structure while it is heavily 

involved in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. All of the military services 

have been utilizing selected equipment items for operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and must plan to sustain, recapitalize, or replace their existing 

equipment, while concurrently planning to spend billions of dollars to 

develop and procure new systems that will transform DOD’s war-fighting 

capabilities. 

In December 2003, we reported that the condition of 25 selected military 

equipment items varied from very good to very poor and that, although the 

services had program strategies for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing 

most of the items reviewed, there were some gaps in those strategies.1

 The 

report further stated that for 15 of the items reviewed, the funding 

requested by DOD did not appear to match the services’ program strategies 

to sustain or replace the items. In that report, we recommended that the 

Secretary of Defense reassess the program strategies and funding priorities 

for key equipment items to ensure that the equipment items are sustained 

until replacement items are fielded. We also recommended that DOD 

highlight for Congress the risks involved in not fully funding the 

sustainment of these equipment items and the steps the department is 

taking to address those risks. Congress included a provision in the Ronald 

W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20052

 that 

amends Title 10 of the U.S. code to require that, whenever a new major 

defense acquisition program begins development, the defense acquisition 

authority responsible for that program shall develop a sustainment plan for 

the existing system until the system under development replaces that 

system. 

Since our December 2003 report, DOD’s continued operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan have resulted in additional wear and tear on military 

equipment. In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the President requested, and 

1

GAO, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Reassess Program Strategy, Funding Priorities, 

and Risks for Selected Equipment, GAO-04-112 (Washington, D.C.: December 2003).

2

Pub. L. No. 108-375 § 805 (2004) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2437).
Page 2 GAO-06-141 

Congress appropriated, supplemental funds for ongoing military activities 

in Iraq and Afghanistan that included funds to refurbish and replace 

vehicles, weapons, and equipment used in the operations.3

 In February 

2005, the President presented Congress with his fiscal year 2006 budget 

request and out-year projections that contained changes in DOD spending 

plans and delayed the fielding of some equipment replacement systems, as 

documented in DOD’s Program Budget Decision 753. Congress is currently 

considering this request as well as over $40 billion in additional fiscal year 

2005 supplemental appropriations to include in the fiscal year 2006 regular 

defense appropriation. The military services have also begun developing 

the justification to request additional 2006 supplemental appropriations. 

While supplemental funds may enable DOD to meet near-term war-related 

equipment needs, the toll of continuing operations has raised concerns 

about the ability of DOD’s long-term programming and funding strategies to 

meet equipment needs. 

DOD recognizes that additional wear and tear is being put on equipment 

used to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and has 

conducted a study to measure the effects of the sustained use of equipment 

at levels beyond normal peacetime use and in operations outside of the 

equipment’s normal operating parameters. According to this study, 

equipment is being used at much higher rates in combat operations than it 

is in routine peacetime missions. In Iraq and Afghanistan, usage rates have 

run two to eight times higher than comparable peacetime rates. In Iraq, for 

example, Army Bradley Fighting Vehicles have been used at six times their 

peacetime rates. Moreover, equipment is also employed in harsher 

environments and in more demanding ways in these combat operations. 

Although initial results of this study and related costs have been released, 

DOD is continuing to assess the effects of high operating rates and harsh 

conditions on equipment. 

Since congressional interest in the wear and tear being placed on military 

equipment and the funding needed to reconstitute this equipment remains, 

we conducted an analysis of 30 selected military equipment items, 

including 18 items from our December 2003 report, to update your 

committees on which key equipment items warrant attention by DOD 

3

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of 

Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106 (2003); Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L No. 108-287, (2004); and Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. 

No. 109-13.
Page 3 GAO-06-141 

and/or Congress. The specific objectives of this review were to (1) assess 

the fleet-wide condition of selected key equipment items and (2) determine 

the extent to which DOD has identified near- and long-term program 

strategies and funding plans to ensure that selected key equipment items 

can meet requirements. Our assessments apply only to the 30 equipment 

items we reviewed; therefore, the results cannot be projected to the entire 

inventory of DOD equipment.

We selected the 30 equipment items based upon input from the military 

services, congressional committees, and our prior work. To assess the 

condition of these equipment items, we obtained fleet-wide data on 

equipment age, expected service life, and other specific service 

performance indicators such as mission capable rates,4

 utilization rates,5

and various other metrics for fiscal years 1999 through 2004. Our 

observations and assessments were made across the military services—

Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps—for both the active duty 

inventory as well as equipment in the National Guard and reserve forces. In 

assessing fleet-wide equipment condition, we also considered the extent to 

which each equipment item was used for operations in Iraq or Afghanistan 

and its associated performance indicators while deployed.6

 Our review of 

DOD’s near- and long-term program strategies for these equipment items 

focused on the extent to which the services have developed or updated 

their plans to sustain, modernize, or replace7

 the equipment items in order 

to meet mission requirements. Our review of near- and long-term funding 

plans focused on the extent to which the funding for the strategies is 

projected in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).8

 According to DOD 

officials, the FYDP takes the services’ priorities into consideration, while 

4

Mission capable rates are measures of material condition that indicate the equipment can 

perform at least one and potentially all of its designated missions.

5

Utilization rates refer to flying hours, tank miles, and steaming days. 

6

If we were able to collect data on deployed mission capable rates for the selected 

equipment items, we discussed this information in the relevant appendix section.

7

Sustaining refers to maintaining the equipment to prolong its operations; modernizing 

refers to upgrading equipment items or replacing specific parts; and replacing refers to 

complete replacement of one equipment item with a new equipment item, e.g., the Marine 

Corps plans to replace the CH-46E with the MV-22 Osprey.

8

The Future Years Defense Program reflects the department’s official projection of the 

forces and resources needed to support the programs approved by the Secretary of Defense 

for the biennial budget years and the following 4 years.
Page 4 GAO-06-141 

balancing future investment and risk. We defined the near term as fiscal 

years 2005, 2006, and 2007, and the long term as fiscal years 2008 and 

beyond.

To determine which equipment items require additional attention by the 

department, the military services, and/or Congress, we developed an 

assessment framework based on three criteria: (1) the extent of the 

existence of a problem or issue, (2) the severity of the problem or issue, 

and (3) how soon the problem or issue needs to be addressed. To indicate 

the existence, severity, or urgency of problems identified for the 30 

selected equipment items, we used a traffic light approach—red, yellow, or 

green—as follows:

• Red indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe 

enough to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, 

and/or Congress.

• Yellow indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 

attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 

unattended may worsen.

• Green indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 

issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or issues 

we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 

additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 

services, and/or Congress.

While we attempted to obtain consistent metrics for each of the three 

categories across all four of the military services, data availability varied 

significantly by service and type of equipment. Our assessments, therefore, 

are based on the data available from multiple sources; however, we did not 

independently verify the data provided by these sources. Our assessments 

also represent the problems and issues we identified at the specific point in 

time that we conducted our work, and can change quickly given current 

events. Although our assessments for each of the three categories—

condition, near-term program strategies and funding plans, and long-term 

program strategies and funding plans—are largely qualitative in nature and 

are derived from consensus judgments, our analyses are based on data 

provided by the military services and discussions with military service 

officials and program managers for the individual equipment items. We 

assessed the reliability of the services’ equipment readiness data by

(1) comparing key data elements to our observations of equipment items at 
Page 5 GAO-06-141 

selected units, (2) reviewing relevant documents, and (3) interviewing 

knowledgeable officials. We determined that the data obtained from DOD, 

the military services, and the combatant commands were sufficiently 

reliable for our use. For a complete description of our methodology, see 

appendix I. Appendix II contains our detailed assessments for each of the 

30 equipment items. We performed our review from July 2004 through July 

2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.

Results in Brief Our assessments of the fleet-wide condition and near- and long-term 

program strategies and funding plans for the 30 military equipment items 

that we included in our review indicate that the items range from some that 

have severe problems and require immediate attention to those that do not 

have problems or issues warranting action by the DOD, military services, 

and/or Congress, as shown in figure 1. Specifically, we identified severe 

problems and issues related to the fleet-wide condition and/or program and 

funding strategies of the Army’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle, M113 Armored 

Personnel Carrier, and CH-47D/F helicopter; the Marine Corps’ M1A1 tank, 

CH-46E helicopter, and CH-53E helicopter; the Navy’s P-3 aircraft and 

Standard Missile-2; and the Air Force’s KC-135 aircraft and we rated all of 

these military equipment items as red in figure 1. For example, the Marine 

Corps’ CH-46E helicopter received a red rating for its near-term program 

strategy and funding plan because the service may be unable to meet its 

near-term requirements due to potential aircraft and repair parts shortages. 

The fleet-wide condition or program strategies of many of the other 

equipment items shown as yellow in figure 1, while not yet severe enough 

to warrant immediate action by DOD, the military services, and/or 

Congress, also showed signs of problems that, if not addressed, could 

become severe. For example, we assessed the fleet-wide condition of the 

Army’s Abrams tank as yellow because, while it generally met or exceeded 

the service mission capable goal, the rates were on a downward trend as a 

result of shortages of both spare parts and the trained personnel needed to 

replace these parts and to repair the equipment items. Reserve military 

technicians who repair this equipment at home are, in many cases, 

currently deployed overseas. 
Page 6 GAO-06-141 

Figure 1: GAO’s Assessment Summary of 30 Selected Equipment Items 

Army

Abrams Tank

Bradley Fighting Vehicle

M113 Armored Personnel Carrier

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles

AH-64 A/D Apache Helicopter

CH-47 D/F Chinook Helicopter

OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter

Marine Corps

M1A1 Abrams Tank

Light Armored Vehicle Command and Control and 25 variants

Assault Amphibian Vehicle- Personnel, C2, and Recovery variants

Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement

AV-8B Harrier Jet

AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter

CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter

CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter

Navy

DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer

FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate

LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship

F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft

EA-6B Prowler Aircraft

P-3 Orion Aircraft

Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile

Air Force

F-15 Eagle/Strike Eagle Aircraft

F-16 Fighting Falcon Aircraft

B-1 Lancer Bomber

B-2 Spirit Bomber

C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft

KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft

Equipment Condition

Near-term program

strategy and funding plan

Long-term program

strategy and funding plan

Source: GAO analysis of military service data. 

Red indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough to warrant immediate attention by 

DOD, the military services, and/or Congress.

Yellow indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants attention by DOD, the military services, 

and/or Congress, and if left unattended may worsen.

Green indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or issues at the time of our review or that 

any existing problems or issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant additional 

action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress.
Page 7 GAO-06-141 

While the fleet-wide condition of 30 equipment items we selected for 

review varied by service, level of current use, and age, our analysis showed 

that reported readiness rates9

 are declining between fiscal years 1999 and 

2004 for most of these items, particularly for those equipment items we 

rated as red or yellow in figure 1. The decline in readiness, which occurred 

more markedly in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, generally resulted from 

(1) the continued high use of equipment to support current operations and 

(2) maintenance issues resulting from the advancing ages (such as 

equipment that is more than 20 years old) and complexity (such as Navy 

ships, which are systems of systems) of the equipment items. Some key 

equipment items—such as Army and Marine Corps trucks, combat 

vehicles, and helicopters—have been used well beyond normal peacetime 

use while deployed. For example, according to Marine Corps officials, the 

Assault Amphibian Vehicles experienced utilization rates as high as 11 

times the normal peacetime rates while operating in Iraq. Army and Marine 

Corps officials stated that a complete inspection of the deployed equipment 

will be necessary once it returns from theater before the full extent of its 

readiness deficiencies can be known. Many of the selected systems have 

either a fleet-wide average age of more than 20 years, such as the Navy’s 

LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship, or entered the inventory prior to 

the 1980s, such as the Air Force’s KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft. These 

systems are likely to reach the end of their useful lives in this decade unless 

major modernizations, some of which are planned or underway, are made. 

Some of the problems degrading the fleet-wide condition of these aging 

systems include maintenance problems due to parts shortages or 

obsolescence, shortages of trained maintenance personnel, corrosion, 

deferred maintenance, and airframe fatigue. For 8 of the 30 items in this 

review we did not identify any specific problems that warrant additional 

attention by DOD, the military services, or Congress, or that previously 

identified problems were already being addressed, so we assessed their 

fleet-wide condition as green. Also, DOD is currently performing its 

Quadrennial Defense Review, which will examine defense programs and 

policies for meeting future requirements.10 Until the department completes 

this review and ensures that condition issues for key equipment items are 

9

The military services report readiness on selected military equipment based upon mission 

capable or operational readiness rates.

10The Quadrennial Defense Review is a comprehensive internal review of its forces, 

resources, and programs that DOD performs every 4 years. The next review is scheduled to 

be completed in February 2006.
Page 8 GAO-06-141 

addressed, DOD risks a continued decline in readiness trends, which could 

threaten its ability to continue meeting mission requirements. 

The military services have not fully identified near- and long-term program 

strategies and funding plans to ensure that all of the 30 selected equipment 

items can meet defense requirements. For the 30 selected equipment items, 

we found that some of the services’ near- and long-term program strategies 

have gaps, and we rated them as red or yellow, as shown in figure 1, 

depending on the severity of the problem and how soon it needs to be 

addressed. Our analysis found, in some cases the services’ near-term 

program strategies do not address capability shortfalls, full funding is not 

included in DOD’s 2006 budget request, or there are supply and 

maintenance issues that may affect near-term readiness. For example, the 

Marine Corp’s CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter was rated red because the 

service may not be able to meet near-term requirements because of 

potential aircraft and parts shortages caused by the age of the aircraft. 

Additionally, the long-term program strategies and funding plans are 

incomplete for some of the equipment items we reviewed in that future 

requirements are not fully identified, studies are not completed, funding for 

maintenance and technological upgrades may not be available, or 

replacement systems were delayed or not yet identified. For example, the 

Army’s Bradley Fighting Vehicle received a red rating because the Army has 

not fully identified the future requirements and funding for this item. 

Services’ near-term program strategies to sustain or modernize equipment 

and address current condition issues include “resetting” or “reconstituting” 

(i.e., restoring) equipment back to its predeployment status, 

remanufacturing or recapitalizing equipment, procuring new equipment, 

improving equipment through safety or technological upgrades, or 

improving maintenance practices. Services’ long-term program strategies 

include improving the equipment through more complex maintenance or 

upgrades, or replacing the equipment with newer, more modern equipment, 

including those associated with DOD’s force structure changes. Title 10 

U.S.C. § 2437 requires the military services to develop sustainment plans 

for equipment items when their replacement programs begin development, 

unless they will reach initial operating capability before October 2008. 

Many of our selected military equipment items are not currently covered by 

this law because their replacement systems have either not begun 

development or will reach operational capability before October 2008. As a 

result, DOD is not required to report sustainment plans for these critical 

items. Most of the equipment items rated red and warranting immediate 

attention because of long-term planning and funding issues were not 

covered by this act. For the next several years, funding to sustain or 
Page 9 GAO-06-141 

modernize aging equipment will have to compete for funding with other 

DOD priorities, such as current operations, force structure changes, and 

replacement system acquisitions. Without sufficient plans that provide for 

sustaining and modernizing all key equipment systems through the end of 

their expected useful lives and without identifying the risks associated with 

not fully funding or developing sustainment plans, DOD may be unable to 

meet future requirements for defense capabilities. Furthermore, until DOD 

develops these plans, Congress is unable to track the progress of 

equipment sustainment and modernization, or provide effective oversight.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 

the secretaries of the military services, reassess the near- and long-term 

program strategies for sustaining and modernizing key equipment to ensure 

that the plans for those items that are needed to meet future defense 

capabilities, particularly those items not covered by 10 U.S.C. § 2437, are 

complete and will ensure that DOD can sustain the equipment until it 

reaches the end of its serviceable life or a replacement system is fielded. 

We are further recommending that the Secretary of Defense provide this 

information in a report to Congress, at the same time the department 

submits its annual budget request, to ensure that Congress has the visibility 

it needs to provide effective oversight over DOD’s program strategies. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the department partially concurred 

with our first recommendation but did not agree that it should report their 

plans to Congress. Therefore, we are also suggesting that the Congress 

require the Secretary of Defense to report on program strategies and 

funding plans to ensure that DOD’s budget decisions address deficiencies 

related to key military equipment. DOD’s comments and our evaluation are 

discussed in detail in a later section of this report. 

Background The September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review outlined a strategy to 

sustain and transform the military force structure that had been in place 

since the mid-1990s. In that review, DOD committed to selectively 

recapitalize older equipment items, which the department recognized as 

being neglected for too long, to meet near-term challenges and to improve 

near-term readiness. DOD is currently conducting a new Quadrennial 

Defense Review, with the report scheduled to be issued in February 2006. 

The results of this Quadrennial Defense Review could identify changes to 

DOD’s future force structure and capabilities, thereby impacting the 

funding needed for both current and replacement systems.
Page 10 GAO-06-141 

Based on DOD guidance, the services develop a Program Objective 

Memorandum that details the specific programs and funding needed to 

meet DOD requirements as determined by the Quadrennial Defense 

Review. As part of this process, the services analyze alternative force 

structure, weapons systems, and support systems together with their 

multiyear resource implications and evaluate various trade-off options. 

Basically, it is a process for balancing and integrating resources among the 

various programs according to service and DOD priorities.

The annual FYDP contains DOD’s estimates of future funding needs for 

programs and priorities. Through the FYDP, DOD projects costs for each 

element of those programs through a period of either 5 or 6 years on the 

basis of proposals made by each of the military services. The Office of the 

Secretary of Defense considers the service proposals and the policy 

choices made by the current administration and, where needed, makes 

adjustments. For example, in preparing its 2006 budget, DOD made a 

number of significant changes in its long-term acquisition plans to meet 

budget targets established by the White House, as documented in Program 

Budget Decision 753. The 2005 FYDP extended from fiscal year 2005 to 

fiscal year 2009 and the 2006 FYDP extended from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal 

year 2011. 

Condition of Some 

Selected Equipment 

Has Been Degraded by 

the High Pace of 

Operations and the 

Advanced Age or 

Complexity of the 

Systems 

While the condition of the 30 equipment items11 we reviewed varied, we 

found that average fleet-wide readiness rates for most of these items 

declined between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. The decline in readiness 

generally resulted from the high pace of recent operations and the 

advanced age or complexity of the equipment systems. Therefore, we rated 

the fleet-wide condition of 22 of the selected equipment items as red or 

yellow. However, 8 of the 30 items—including several tactical fighter 

aircraft and some newer equipment items such as the Marine Corps’ 

Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement—were assessed as green (see fig. 1), 

indicating that we found no specific problems that warrant additional 

attention by DOD, the services, or Congress or that problems were already 

being addressed. DOD is currently conducting a Quadrennial Defense 

Review that will examine defense programs and policies and may change 

some equipment requirements.

11Appendix II contains our detailed assessments for each of the 30 equipment items.
Page 11 GAO-06-141 

Eighteen of the equipment items we reviewed for this report were also 

included in our December 2003 report, and 12 of these equipment items 

received the same condition assessment in both analyses.12 For example, 

the surface ships examined in this study, the Navy’s DDG-51 Arleigh Burke 

Class Destroyer, the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate, and the LPD4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship received yellow condition ratings in 

both studies, as did the Air Force’s B-2 Spirit Bomber, the C-5 Galaxy 

Transport Aircraft, and the KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft. However, for 6 of 

the items, the assessment changed—3 systems’ fleet-wide condition 

improved, 2 going from red to yellow and 1 from yellow to green, and 3 

systems’ condition degraded, going from green to yellow. The condition 

assessments for the Marine Corps’ CH-46E helicopter and the Navy’s F/A-18 

aircraft and Standard Missile-2 improved due, in part, to additional 

maintenance efforts and improvements that appear to address the 

condition concerns noted in our previous report. The condition 

assessments for the Army’s Abrams tank and Heavy Expanded Mobility 

Tactical Truck and the Marine Corps’ Light Armored Vehicle went from 

green to yellow largely as a result of increased use in ongoing operations 

overseas.

Some Selected Equipment 

Items Have Significant 

Condition Issues that 

Warrant Additional 

Attention by DOD, the 

Military Services, and/or 

Congress

For many of the equipment items included in our assessment, average fleetwide readiness rates have declined, generally due to the high pace of recent 

operations or the advanced age or complexity of the systems. We assessed 

the fleet-wide condition of 3 equipment items as red, indicating that 

immediate attention is warranted by DOD, the services, and/or Congress to 

address problems or issues. In addition, we assessed the fleet-wide 

condition of 19 items as yellow, indicating that attention is warranted to 

address existing problems that, if left unattended, may worsen. Table 1 

below shows the primary reasons used to rate selected equipment items’ 

condition and our assessment of those items as either red or yellow.

12The only question that appeared in both reports concerned the condition of equipment. In 

the earlier report, strategy and funding were assessed separately. See GAO-04-112.
Page 12 GAO-06-141 

Table 1: Primary Reasons for Rating Condition as Yellow or Red for Selected 

Equipment Items

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

High Pace of Operations 

Increasing Utilization Beyond 

Planned Usage 

Although selected equipment items have been able to meet wartime 

requirements, the high pace of recent operations appears to be taking a toll 

on selected equipment items and fleet-wide mission capable rates have 

been below service targets, particularly in the Army and Marine Corps. 

Further, according to officials, the full extent of the equipment items’ 

degradation will not be known until a complete inspection of deployed 

equipment is performed. Elevated flying hours in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

coupled with the harsh desert environment, have negatively impacted 

helicopters. For example, our assessment of the Army’s CH-47D/F Chinook 

helicopter’s condition as red reflects this platform’s mission capable rates, 

which were consistently below service goals. Officials stated that the 

aircraft is currently being flown in Iraq and Afghanistan at three times more 

than planned peacetime rates. This usage has increased the amount of 

maintenance and number of parts needed to sustain the aircraft, which in 

turn has negatively impacted overall readiness. Ground equipment has also 

Reason Yellow rating Red rating

High pace of 

operations 

increasing 

utilization beyond 

planned usage

Army

• Abrams Tank 

• Bradley Fighting Vehicle 

• Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

• AH-64A/D Apache Helicopter

Marine Corps

• Light Armored Vehicle

• Assault Amphibian Vehicle 

• AV-8B Harrier Jet

• AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter

• CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter

• CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter

Army

• CH-47D/F Chinook 

Helicopter

Marine Corps

• M1A1 Abrams Tank

Maintenance issues 

resulting from the 

advancing ages 

and complexity of 

the equipment 

items 

Navy

• DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer

• FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class 

Frigate

• LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock 

Ship

• EA-6B Prowler Aircraft

• Standard Missile-2 

Air Force

• B-1 Lancer Bomber

• B-2 Spirit Bomber

• C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft

• KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft

Navy

• P-3 Orion Aircraft
Page 13 GAO-06-141 

been affected by high wartime usage. For example, the Marine Corps’ M1A1 

Abrams tank fleet, also rated as red for condition, is being negatively 

impacted by operations in Iraq and a shortage of equipment maintainers 

due to transfers of personnel to units that are deploying. This system failed 

to meet its service readiness goals and recent trends indicate a steady 

decline away from these targets. 

Several heavily used equipment items included in our review did not have 

mission capable rates below their target; however, these rates have 

recently declined, primarily due to the high wartime usage. For example, 

while the Army’s Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles met or 

exceeded the Army mission capable goals, they are both on a downward 

trend due to a shortage of spare parts and trained technicians. The shortage 

of spare parts is driven by the number of vehicles either deployed or being 

reset to a predeployment condition and the shortage of trained technicians 

is primarily due to the number of deployed National Guard military 

technicians. Both of these tracked vehicles have experienced high use in 

operations overseas in the past and will likely do so in the future. Similarly, 

while the readiness rates of the Marine Corps’ Assault Amphibian Vehicle 

varied by vehicle type in recent years, the gap between mission capable 

rates and service goals increased, indicating a decline in the material 

condition of this equipment.

Maintenance Issues Resulting 

from the Advancing Ages and 

Complexity of the Equipment 

Items

While not all of the equipment included in our review has been heavily used 

in recent overseas operations, in some cases, the advanced age or 

complexity of the equipment items have contributed to readiness declines. 

Many of the selected systems have either a fleet-wide average age of more 

than 20 years, such as the Navy’s LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship, 

or entered the inventory prior to the 1980s, such as the Air Force’s KC-135 

Stratotanker aircraft. These systems are likely to reach the end of their 

useful lives in this decade unless major modernizations, some of which are 

planned or underway, are made. Some of the problems degrading the fleetwide condition of these aging systems include maintenance problems due 

to parts shortages or obsolescence, shortages of trained maintenance 

personnel, corrosion, deferred maintenance, and airframe fatigue. For 

example, the Navy’s P-3 Orion aircraft, while not as heavily tasked as Army 

and Marine Corps helicopters, have played an important role in overseas 

operations as a reconnaissance and surveillance asset despite consistently 

missing their mission capable goals by a significant percentage. The 

condition of the P-3 fleet, which has an average age of over 24 years, has 

been primarily degraded by the effects of structural fatigue on its airframe 
Page 14 GAO-06-141 

and the obsolescence of communication, navigation, and primary warfighting systems in this aircraft. 

Some Air Force equipment also has age-related condition issues that 

warrant attention and therefore received yellow ratings. For example, 

mission capable rates for the C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft were 

consistently below Air Force goals between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. 

Officials stated that the size and age of the C-5 aircraft make it maintenance 

intensive, and that component items on the aircraft are older, making it 

difficult to find manufacturing sources for some parts, particularly avionics 

and engine components. In addition, the KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft has 

not met its mission capable goals due to issues associated with age and 

corrosion, such as problems with the landing gear’s steel brakes. 

Similarly, Navy surface ships examined in this study had a number of issues 

related to condition and these vessels also received yellow ratings. The 

Navy is challenged to maintain surface ships that are, in reality, a system of 

systems. The failure of any one of these complex systems affects the entire 

ship. For example, the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, the FFG-7 

Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate and the LPD-4 Amphibious Transport 

Dock Ship all had problematic subsystems, for example, operating with 

limited communication ability or bandwidth, which affects their day-to-day 

operations such as on-line training and personnel activities. Older ships, 

such as the FFG-7 class which is, on average, almost 21 years old and the 

LPD-4 class with an average age of 37 years, may be more challenging 

because as the ships age, more maintenance will be required. Other older 

Navy equipment also had condition issues in need of attention. For 

example, the EA-6B Prowler consistently missed the Navy’s mission 

capable goal due to problems with communications equipment and wings. 

Some Selected Equipment 

Items Are in Favorable 

Condition

Our analysis showed that the fleet-wide condition of over one quarter of the 

equipment items included in our review was generally favorable, and 

consequently, we assessed the condition of 8 of the 30 selected military 

equipment items as green, as shown in figure 1. Not all equipment has been 

heavily used for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for some items, 

use has not increased significantly from that of planned peacetime 

operations. This was the case for several tactical fighter aircraft. In our 

assessment, all three selected aircraft that provide this capability, the Air 

Force’s F-15 Eagle/Strike Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon, and the Navy’s 

F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet, were at or near- service mission capable rate 

goals.
Page 15 GAO-06-141 

Moreover, we found that new equipment that has been heavily tasked in 

recent operations appears to be performing well. For example, the Family 

of Medium Tactical Vehicles has exceeded the Army’s fully mission capable 

rate goals despite operating overseas at a rate that is nine times higher than 

in peacetime. In addition, the Marine Corps’ Medium Tactical Vehicle 

Replacement vehicles are being aggressively used in support of operations 

in Iraq, but also met their mission capable goals for fiscal years 2003 and 

2004. These trucks are both relatively new; the Family of Medium Tactical 

Vehicles is on average 6 years old and the Medium Tactical Vehicle 

Replacement is on average 3 years old. 

In addition, we assessed the fleet-wide condition of some older equipment 

items favorably. For example, the average age of the Army’s OH-58D Kiowa 

is about 13 years with a life expectancy of 20 years; however, these 

reconnaissance helicopters have met or exceeded their mission capable 

goals from 1999 through 2004 while exceeding their planned flight hours in 

recent operations. With an average age of almost 16 years, the M113 

Armored Personnel Carrier has not experienced a significant decline in 

mission readiness as a result of recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The Army’s High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) are 

experiencing usage (i.e., operational tempo)13 that is six times their normal 

peacetime rate. Despite concerns over the availability of their armored 

protection,14 these vehicles exceeded Army readiness goals for the past 6 

years and received a green rating.

Services Near- and 

Long-Term Program 

Strategies and Funding 

Plans Exist for Most 

Equipment Reviewed, 

but Some Gaps Remain

The military services have identified near- and long-term program 

strategies and funding plans to ensure that most of the 30 selected 

equipment items can meet defense requirements, but some gaps remain. 

For the 30 selected equipment items, we found that 20 of the services’ nearterm program strategies have gaps in that they do not address capability 

shortfalls, full funding is not included in DOD’s 2006 budget request, or 

there are supply and maintenance issues that may affect near-term 

readiness. Additionally, the long-term program strategies and funding plans 

are incomplete for 22 of the equipment items we reviewed in that future 

requirements are not fully identified, studies are not completed, funding for 

13An operational tempo of 6:1 equates to putting 6,000 miles in a war-time 1-year period 

versus 1,000 miles under a normal peacetime operational tempo.

14In early 2005, officials stated that all vehicles entering Iraq would have armor.
Page 16 GAO-06-141 

maintenance and technological upgrades may not be available, or 

replacement systems are delayed or not yet identified. DOD is required to 

develop sustainment plans in 10 U.S.C. § 2437, but this statute only applies 

to 9 of the selected equipment items.15 Although the services have 

identified near- and long-term program strategies and funding for most of 

the equipment items we reviewed, the gaps we identified may threaten 

DOD’s ability to meet some future capability requirements. 

Services Have Not Fully 

Identified Near-Term 

Program Strategies and 

Funding Plans for Some 

Selected Equipment

The services have not fully identified near-term program strategies and 

funding plans for 20 of the 30 equipment items we reviewed, including 7 of 

the 9 selected items covered by 10 U.S.C. § 2437. One of the items that will 

not be covered by this statute, the Marine Corps’ CH-46E Sea Knight 

helicopter, was the only item we assessed as red for its near-term program 

strategy and funding plan because it may be unable to meet its near-term 

requirements. We assessed the near-term program strategies and funding 

plans of 19 of the 30 equipment items in our review as yellow because the 

services’ program strategies for sustaining equipment lack sufficient 

planning or full funding to meet near-term requirements. Alternatively, the 

services have planned program and funding strategies to correct equipment 

deficiencies or improve equipment capabilities and safety for 10 of the 30 

equipment items in our review so that the equipment items can meet nearterm requirements, so we assessed their near-term program strategies and 

funding plans as green as shown in figure 1. The services’ near-term 

program strategies to sustain or modernize equipment and address current 

condition issues include restoring equipment back to its predeployment 

condition, remanufacturing or recapitalizing equipment, procuring new 

equipment, improving equipment through safety or technological upgrades, 

or improving maintenance practices. Table 2 below shows the primary 

reasons used to rate selected equipment items’ near-term program 

strategies and funding plans and our assessment of those items as either 

red or yellow. Without developing complete near-term plans and identifying 

the associated funding needs to ensure that all key equipment items can be 

sustained and modernized—and assessing the risk involved if gaps in these 

strategies are not addressed—DOD may be unable to meet some future 

requirements for defense capabilities.

15This act applies or will soon apply to the following equipment items included in our review 

based upon the replacement system beginning development : Marine Corps’ M1A1, Light 

Armored Vehicle, Assault Amphibian Vehicle, AV-8B Harrier jet, and CH-53E; the Navy’s F/A18, EA-6B, and P-3; and the Air Force’s F-16.
Page 17 GAO-06-141 

Table 2: Primary Reasons for Rating Near-term Program Strategies and Funding 

Plans as Yellow or Red for Selected Equipment Items

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

Existing Near-Term Plans for 

Some Selected Equipment Items 

Do Not Address Capability 

Shortfalls

Some of the services’ near-term program strategies do not address the 

issues that affect the condition of the equipment in the near-term, thus 5 of 

the 30 selected equipment items received a yellow rating as shown in table 

2. For example, the Marine Corps identified a shortfall in the capability of 

the Assault Amphibian Vehicle to conduct parts of their war-fighting 

doctrine; however, instead of upgrading its capabilities, their plan is to 

return the capability of the vehicle to its original condition while they await 

its replacement. Although the Navy has a plan to correct serious LPD-4 

Amphibious Transport Dock ship class deficiencies, those ships that are

Reason Yellow rating Red rating

Existing plans do 

not address 

capability shortfalls

Marine Corps

• Assault Amphibian Vehicle

Navy

• FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate

• LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship

• EA-6B Prowler Aircraft

• P-3 Orion Aircraft

Strategy not fully 

funded in DOD’s 

fiscal year 2006 

budget

Army

• Bradley Fighting Vehicle

• M113 Armored Personnel Carrier

• Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

• High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled 

Vehicle

• Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles

Marine Corps

• M1A1 Abrams Tank 

• Light Armored Vehicle 

• AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter

• CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter

Anticipated parts 

shortages and 

maintenance issues 

Army

• Abrams Tank 

• CH-47D/F Chinook Helicopter

Navy

• F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft

Air Force

• C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft

• KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft

Marine Corps

• CH-46E Sea 

Knight Helicopter
Page 18 GAO-06-141 

within 5 years of decommissioning can, by law,16 only receive safety 

modifications, resulting in a wide variance in the condition of ships in the 

class. Furthermore, while the Navy is making structural inspections and 

repairs to ensure that there will be sufficient P-3 Orion aircraft to meet dayto-day requirements next year, they have not funded some improvements to 

communications and defense systems, which will continue to degrade the 

ability of this aircraft to fulfill all of its missions. 

Some Near-Term Strategies Are 

Not Fully Funded in DOD’s 

Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request 

The full funding requirements for nine of the Marine Corps and Army nearterm strategies we reviewed were not included in DOD’s fiscal year 2006 

budget request; therefore, we rated these equipment items as yellow as 

shown in table 2. According to service officials, the services submit their 

budgets to DOD and the department has the authority to increase or 

decrease the service budgets based upon the perceived highest priority 

needs. As shown in table 3 below, the Marine Corps identified requirements 

that were not funded in DOD’s 2006 budget request totaling $314.7 million 

for four of its selected equipment items. 

Table 3: Unfunded Requirements for Four Selected Marine Corps Equipment Items, 

Fiscal Year 2006 (dollars in millions)

Source: DOD data.

The four equipment items for which the Marine Corps did not request 

funding are a concern because a capability or need that the service 

identified as a priority may not receive funding unless Congress intervenes. 

For example, the Marine Corps identified but did not request $113 million 

in funding needed to complete the standardization of its older Light 

1610 U.S.C. § 2241, note provides that, except for safety modifications, funds should not be 

used for the modification of an aircraft, weapon, ship, or other equipment that the military 

department concerned plans to retire or otherwise dispose of within 5 years after 

completion of the modification.

Marine Corps equipment item Unfunded requirements

M1A1 Abrams Tank $ 86.4

Light Armored Vehicle 113.0

AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter 63.6

CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter 51.7

Total $314.7
Page 19 GAO-06-141 

Armored Vehicles. The Marine Corps also identified funding shortages in its 

tank remanufacturing program for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, noting that 

only 33 percent of the plan has been funded.

In addition, for five of the selected Army items, DOD has not included 

funding for part of the near-term program strategies in its regular 2006 

budget request. Instead the Army is relying on supplemental appropriations 

or congressional adjustments to their regular appropriations to fund these 

activities and we rated these items yellow given the uncertainty of future 

supplemental appropriations or congressional adjustments. For example, 

the Army requested $1.4 billion in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental in 

order to accelerate recapitalization of the Bradley Fighting Vehicles by 

producing 93 vehicles to replace combat losses and 554 to meet its 

modernization needs, and has begun planning another request for 

supplemental appropriations to fund other near-term procurement 

requirements associated with their transformational objectives. Further, in 

the past, the Army has consistently relied on supplemental appropriations 

and congressional adjustments for the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, 

and included $132 million in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding 

request to recapitalize vehicles deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Anticipated Parts Shortages and 

Maintenance Issues May Affect 

Equipment Condition and 

Indicate Near-Term Planning and 

Funding Concerns

Anticipated parts shortages or maintenance issues may affect the services’ 

ability to maintain adequate condition of 6 of the 30 selected equipment 

items we reviewed; therefore, we assessed their near-term program 

strategies and funding plans as yellow or, in one case, red as shown in table 

2. Of the 30 equipment items we reviewed, the Marine Corps’ CH-46E Sea 

Knight helicopter received a red rating for its near-term program strategy 

and funding plan because the service may be unable to meet its near-term 

requirements due to potential aircraft and repair parts shortages caused by 

the age of the aircraft. Because of fielding delays of its replacement 

aircraft, the MV-22, the CH-46E will not be retired as originally scheduled, 

which may lead to additional repair parts shortages. The uncertainty in 

whether the near-term program strategy addresses existing parts shortages 

is also a concern for items such as the Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet 

aircraft and resulted in a yellow rating. Although the Navy is currently able 

to maintain readiness for the Super Hornet fleet, there is an anticipated 

shortage for critical spare parts like extra fuel tanks and bomb racks, and 

the current program strategy does not fund the efforts necessary to ensure 

adequate replacements. Additionally, we rated the Air Force’s KC-135 

Stratotanker aircraft as yellow because officials expect its age-related 

maintenance issues, such as fuel bladder leaks and parts obsolescence, to 

increase, resulting in additional maintenance requirements. Officials also 
Page 20 GAO-06-141 

stated that the severity of potential problems from newly discovered 

corrosion remains unknown, so the potential exists for additional 

maintenance requirements.

Some Selected Equipment Items 

Have No Near-Term Program 

Strategy or Funding Issues of 

Concern 

We rated 10 of the 30 equipment items examined in this review as green, as 

shown in figure 1, because we did not identify any significant program or 

funding issues in the near term. The services had identified program and 

funding strategies to correct these equipment items’ immediate 

deficiencies, or to improve the platforms’ capabilities. For the selected 

equipment items that are being heavily used for operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and received a green rating, such as the Army’s AH-64A/D 

Apache helicopter and the Marine Corps’ AV-8B Harrier jet, the services are 

using a combination of activities, including restoring the equipment to 

predeployment status, remanufacturing or recapitalizing the equipment, or 

procuring new equipment. For example, the Army is restoring the Apache 

helicopters being used in combat while concurrently remanufacturing the 

older AH-64A variants into newer AH-64D variants. In some cases, the 

services have funded plans that upgrade the equipment items to address 

structural or safety concerns and improve combat capabilities, such as for 

the Air Force’s F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft and the Navy’s DDG-51 Arleigh 

Burke Class destroyers. For other items, the services modified their 

maintenance practices to increase efficiencies and address concerns. For 

example, the Air Force modified its stealth maintenance procedures on its 

B-2 Spirit bomber, thus reducing the steps and time required to conduct it. 

Services Lack Complete 

Long-Term Program 

Strategies and Funding 

Plans for Selected 

Equipment

The services have not developed or fully funded the long-term program 

strategies for 21 of the 30 selected equipment items. Title 10 U.S.C. § 2437, 

which requires that DOD develop sustainment plans, applies to only 9 of 

the selected equipment items. We assessed 7 of the selected equipment 

items as red, only 2 of which will be covered by this statute, because the 

services’ program strategies and funding plans to meet long-term 

requirements are not fully identified, studies to determine future system 

requirements are not complete, funding for maintenance or technological 

upgrades may not be available, or replacement systems were delayed or 

not identified, and in some cases, the selected equipment items may be 

unable to meet their long-term requirements. We assessed the long-term 

program strategies and funding plans of 14 of the selected equipment items 

in our review as yellow because they are experiencing similar gaps in their 

long-term program strategies and funding plans, but the consequences 

would be less severe. Alternatively, we assessed the long-term program 

strategies and funding plans of 9 of the 30 equipment items in our review as 
Page 21 GAO-06-141 

green, as shown in figure 1, because the services have program strategies 

and funding planned to improve or upgrade equipment capabilities and 

safety or replace the equipment items so that they can meet long-term 

requirements. Some of the services’ long-term program strategies include 

improving or modernizing the equipment through upgrades, recapitalizing 

older models to newer ones, or replacing the equipment with newer, more 

modern equipment, including those associated with DOD’s force structure 

changes. 

Table 4 below shows the primary reasons used to rate selected equipment 

items’ long-term program strategies and funding plans and our assessment 

of those items as either red or yellow. As with incomplete near-term 

strategies, without complete long-term plans to ensure that all key 

equipment items can be sustained and modernized—and assessing the risk 

involved if gaps in these strategies are not addressed—DOD may be unable 

to meet some future defense requirements.

Table 4: Primary Reasons for Rating Long-term Program Strategies and Funding 

Plans as Yellow or Red for Selected Equipment Items

Reason Yellow rating Red rating

Future strategy 

and funding 

requirements are 

not fully identified 

Army

• Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical 

Truck 

• High Mobility Multi-purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle 

• Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles

Marine Corps

• M1A1 Abrams Tank 

• Light Armored Vehicle

Army

• Bradley Fighting Vehicle

• M113 Armored Personnel 

Carrier

DOD awaiting 

studies needed to 

develop strategies

Air Force

• C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft

Air Force

• KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft

Availability of 

funding for 

maintenance and 

technological 

upgrades affecting 

strategies

Marine Corps

• AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter

Navy

• DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class 

Destroyer 

• FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class 

Frigate 

• LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock 

Ship

• EA-6B Prowler Aircraft

Navy

• P-3 Orion Aircraft

• Standard Missile-2 
Page 22 GAO-06-141 

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

Future Strategy and Funding 

Requirements Are Not Fully 

Identified 

At this time, DOD has not fully identified the future requirements or the 

long-term funding needs for seven of our selected equipment items, 

resulting in red or yellow assessments as shown in table 4, depending on 

the urgency or severity of the gaps in program strategies or funding plans. 

The Army’s lack of identified future requirements and funding plans led us 

to assess its Bradley Fighting Vehicle and M113 Armored Personnel Carrier 

as red. In some cases, follow-on system requirements have not been 

established, but the services have plans to sustain the items until the 

replacement system is available, so we assessed these items as yellow. For 

example, the Marine Corps plans to replace its M1A1 Abrams tank and 

Light Armored Vehicle with the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

Expeditionary Force Fighting Vehicle, although at the time of our review, 

they had not completely identified the program requirements or funding 

needed for the replacement vehicle. However, they do have plans in place 

to ensure that both the M1A1 and Light Armored Vehicle are available until 

the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Expeditionary Force Fighting Vehicle is 

fielded and have received supplemental funding for these plans. 

The Army recently finalized the strategy for its wheeled vehicles, such as 

the HMMWV, but some procurement and recapitalization plans have not 

been fully funded or specific actions or time frames were not included. 

Therefore, we assessed the three Army wheeled vehicles’ long-term 

program strategies and funding plans as yellow. For example, we noted that 

the Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and 

Modernization Strategy showed anticipated procurements for the HMMWV 

that were not reflected in DOD’s 2006 budget request. Further, while the 

strategy notes that future block upgrades for the Family of Medium Tactical 

Vehicles are planned and describes the sustainment programs it will 

include, it does not identify any specific actions or time frames for these 

upgrades. 

DOD Awaiting Studies to 

Develop Strategies

DOD has not yet completed studies so that it can fully identify the program 

strategies and funding plans needed for 2 of the 30 selected equipment 

Replacement 

systems are 

delayed or not 

identified

Marine Corps

• Assault Amphibian Vehicle 

• AV-8B Harrier Jet

Navy

• F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet 

Aircraft

Marine Corps

• CH-46E Sea Knight 

Helicopter

• CH-53E Super Stallion 

Helicopter

(Continued From Previous Page)

Reason Yellow rating Red rating
Page 23 GAO-06-141 

items assessed in this review. As shown in table 4, we assessed the longterm program strategy and funding plan for the Air Force’s KC-135 

Stratotanker aircraft as red because the congressionally mandated study to 

determine its replacement has experienced, and may continue to 

experience delays. Meanwhile the KC-135 fleet, with an average age of 

about 44 years, continues to experience age-related problems and delays in 

fielding a replacement further exacerbate problems in maintaining the 

existing fleet over the long term. We assessed the long-term program 

strategy and funding plan for the Air Force’s C-5 transport aircraft, with an 

average fleet age of about 26 years, as yellow because the Air Force 

remains uncertain about the size of the final C-5 fleet and whether to fund 

some additional C-5 aircraft upgrades while awaiting completion of DOD’s 

Mobility Capabilities Study. This study is expected to be completed in the 

summer of 2005; however, at the time this report was issued, results were 

not available.

Availability of Funding for 

Maintenance and Technological 

Upgrades Affecting Strategies

The availability of funding for ongoing maintenance and technological 

upgrades in past and future years may affect the long-term program 

strategies and funding plans for seven of the selected equipment items. As 

shown in table 4, we assessed the long-term strategies and funding plans 

for two items, the Navy’s P-3 Orion aircraft and the Standard Missile-2, as 

red because the limited funding for maintenance and technological 

upgrades may have serious consequences, such as negatively affecting 

their ability to meet war-fighting requirements. The Navy has identified a 

plan to address the obsolescence of the mission systems in the P-3 Orion 

aircraft over the long term, but at this time has not officially approved or 

funded this plan. In addition, the Standard Missile-2, which has recently 

seen improved readiness ratings because DOD increased operation and 

maintenance funding, is not scheduled for the same level of funding in the 

long term, which may reduce the number of available missiles.

DOD budget decisions to reduce funding for maintenance and upgrades 

have the potential for adversely affecting five items, so we assessed the 

long-term program strategies and funding plans for these items as yellow. 

For example, decreases in the Navy’s planned operation and maintenance 

funding across all surface ships in the fleet may result in deferred 

maintenance and may adversely affect the future material condition of the 

three classes of ships included in this review, the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke 

Class destroyers, the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates, and the 

LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock ships.
Page 24 GAO-06-141 

Long-Term Program Strategies 

Affected Because Replacement 

Systems for Selected Equipment 

Are Delayed or Not Identified

Replacement systems have either been delayed or are not yet identified for 

5 of the 30 selected equipment items examined in this review and we rated 

these items as red or yellow as shown in table 4. Two of these items were 

assessed as red because of the urgency and severity of the delays impact on 

the services’ capabilities and ability to meet future requirements. For 

example, we assessed the long-term program strategy and funding plan for 

the Marine Corps’ CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopters as red because the 

Marine Corps has not identified a replacement for the CH-53E Super 

Stallion despite an initial fielding planned for 2015. According to officials, 

the Marine Corps must maintain enough CH-53E helicopters to support 

Marine Corps operations until the initial fielding of the Heavy Lift 

Replacement aircraft. Officials estimate that, if the current high usage rate 

and expected attrition rates hold true, the number of CH-53E helicopters 

may fall below the number necessary to remain in service until the Heavy 

Lift Replacement becomes available.

The remaining three items’ long-term program strategies and funding plans 

were assessed as yellow because the effect of the uncertainties or delays 

do not appear to be as urgent or severe. In some instances, delays and 

uncertainties affecting the sustainment programs of selected equipment 

items are related to DOD difficulties in acquiring their replacements. For 

example, uncertainty over the potential for delays in the Joint Strike 

Fighter Program affects the long-term strategy and funding for the Marine 

Corps’ AV-8B Harrier jet and the Navy’s F/A-18 fighter aircraft and these 

systems were rated yellow.17

Some Selected Equipment Items 

Have No Long-Term Program 

Strategy and Funding Issues of 

Concern

We determined that 9 of the 30 selected equipment items examined in this 

review have no significant program or funding issues in the long term and 

therefore received green ratings as shown in figure 1. For example, the Air 

Force’s F-15 aircraft upgrades are fully funded and designed to keep the 

aircraft viable and functioning through at least 2025. In addition, the Marine 

Corps’ plans provide sufficient numbers of Medium Tactical Vehicle 

Replacement vehicles to equip all of its units in the long term. Moreover, 

the Army has reprogrammed funds from the cancellation of the Comanche 

program to fund other aviation modernization strategies, including those 

17GAO reviews over the past 30 years have found consistent problems with weapon 

acquisitions such as cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In our 

most recent study of these problems, GAO assessed 54 programs, including the Joint Strike 

Fighter, and found that the majority of the programs assessed are costing more and taking 

longer to develop. See, GAO, Defense Acquisition: Assessment of Selected Major Weapons 

Programs, GAO-05-301 (Washington, D.C.: March 2005).
Page 25 GAO-06-141 

that improve the capability and lifespan of the CH-47D/F Chinook and the 

AH-64A/D Apache helicopters. 

Conclusions Since our last review of the condition of selected military equipment in 

2003, overall readiness rates for most selected equipment items have 

continued to decline and some of the services’ near- and long-term program 

strategies lack complete sustainment and modernization plans or are not 

fully funded. Continued high use of these equipment items to support 

current operations and the advancing ages of the systems suggest that DOD 

will be challenged in meeting future equipment requirements without 

significant upgrades to its inventory. Furthermore, because activities to 

refurbish and replace vehicles, weapons, and equipment used for 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are being funded primarily through 

supplemental appropriations as opposed to being programmed in DOD’s 

Future Years Defense Program, future funding is uncertain. Moreover, DOD 

faces challenges to sustain and modernize its current equipment while 

continuing these operations and transforming to a new force structure. 

DOD is currently conducting its Quadrennial Defense Review, which could 

change the future requirements for some military equipment. In light of 

these challenges, it is increasingly important that DOD focus its resources 

on the equipment items that are key to meeting future defense 

requirements. Without a more focused investment strategy, DOD runs the 

risk of a continued decline in future equipment readiness. While DOD is 

required to provide sustainment plans, including time frames and projected 

budgetary requirements, for some military equipment in accordance with 

10 U.S.C. § 2437, this statute does not apply to many key military equipment 

items we reviewed. For example, those equipment items that do not have a 

replacement system in development are not covered by this statute. In fact, 

most of the equipment items that we assessed as red because of long-term 

strategy and funding issues were not covered by this statute. Without 

developing complete sustainment and modernization plans and identifying 

funding needs for all priority equipment items, including those not already 

covered by law through the end of their expected useful lives, DOD risks 

not being able to meet some future equipment requirements. Furthermore, 

without communicating these plans and funding needs to Congress, 

lawmakers will not have the clear picture of DOD’s progress on equipment 

sustainment and modernization they need to provide effective oversight 

over these processes.
Page 26 GAO-06-141 

Recommendations To ensure that DOD can sustain key equipment items to meet future 

equipment requirements and to provide greater visibility over key 

equipment items to Congress, we recommend that, after the department 

completes its Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense, in 

consultation with the Secretaries of the Military Services, take the 

following two actions: 

• Reassess the near- and long-term program strategies for sustaining and 

modernizing key equipment, particularly those items not covered by 10 

U.S.C. § 2437, to ensure that the plans are complete and that the items 

are sustainable until they reach the end of their serviceable life or a 

replacement system is fielded. Specifically, this reassessment should

• detail the strategies to sustain and modernize key equipment systems 

until they are retired or replaced;

• report the costs associated with the sustainment and modernization 

of key equipment and identify these funds in the Future Years 

Defense Program; and

• identify the risks involved in delaying or not fully funding the 

strategies, and the steps the department is taking to mitigate the 

associated risks, for those strategies that are delayed or are not fully 

funded.

• Provide the information in the above recommendation to Congress at 

the same time the department submits its annual budget request, to 

ensure that Congress has the visibility it needs to provide effective 

oversight over DOD's program strategies.

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

Congress should require the Secretary of Defense to report on program 

strategies and funding plans to ensure that DOD’s budget decisions address 

deficiencies related to key military equipment. We suggest that this report 

be provided in conjunction with DOD’s annual budget submissions and 

reflect the results of the department’s Quadrennial Defense Review. 

Specifically, as stated in our recommendations, the report should (1) detail 

the strategies to sustain and modernize key equipment systems until they 

are retired or replaced; (2) report the costs associated with the sustainment 

and modernization of key equipment and identify these funds in the Future 

Years Defense Program and; (3) describe the risks involved in delaying or 
Page 27 GAO-06-141 

not fully funding the strategies, and the steps the department is taking to 

mitigate the associated risks, for those strategies that are delayed or are 

not fully funded.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with 

our recommendation that it should reassess the near and long-term 

program strategies for sustaining and modernizing key equipment after the 

department’s Quadrennial Defense Review, but did not concur with our 

recommendation that the department report these plans to Congress. The 

department’s written comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix 

III.

In partially concurring with our first recommendation that it should 

reassess the near- and long-term program strategies for sustaining and 

modernizing key equipment, the department stated that, through its current 

budget processes, it is already executing an annual procedure to assess 

program strategies to ensure equipment sustainment and modernization 

that can support the most recent defense strategy. According to the 

department, these budget reviews consider strategies and costs to sustain 

and modernize equipment, and the risks incurred by not fully funding these 

strategies; therefore, the resulting budget reflects the department’s best 

assessment of a balanced, fully funded budget that most efficiently 

accomplishes the national security mission within its limited resources. 

While we acknowledge that these budget processes may provide a 

department-level review of what is needed to accomplish the national 

security mission, the department’s budget processes and the Future Years 

Defense Program do not provide detailed strategies that include identifying 

both the costs associated with sustaining and maintaining key equipment 

and the risks involved in delaying or not fully funding the strategies. 

Without detailed plans, the department does not have sufficient 

information to ensure that adequate funding is provided or that it is taking 

the necessary steps to mitigate risks associated with strategies that are 

delayed or are not fully funded. We continue to believe that the department, 

in conjunction with the military services, needs to develop a more 

comprehensive and transparent approach for assessing the condition of 

key equipment items, developing program strategies to address critical 

equipment condition deficiencies, prioritizing the required funding, and 

mitigating risks associated with delaying or not fully funding these 

strategies upon completion of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Therefore, 

we continue to believe our recommendation has merit.
Page 28 GAO-06-141 

The department did not concur with our second recommendation that the 

Secretary of Defense provide detailed strategies and costs of sustaining key 

equipments items and the associated risks in delaying or not fully funding 

these strategies in an annual report to Congress to ensure that Congress 

has the visibility it needs to provide effective oversight over DOD’s program 

strategies. DOD believes that submitting an additional report concurrent 

with the annual budget would be a duplication of effort. 

We believe that the information included in the President’s Budget does not 

provide Congress with sufficient information on the strategies, funding, 

and risks associated with maintaining key equipment items until their 

replacement systems are fielded. In our report, we identify a number of 

examples of inconsistencies between the program strategies and the 

funding needed to sustain and maintain key equipment items not reported 

in the department’s budget documents. The department is not currently 

required to report sustainment plans for some of these critical items to 

Congress. We believe that Congress needs to be assured that DOD’s budget 

decisions address deficiencies related to key military equipment that must 

be maintained and sustained until the end of their serviceable lives, 

including those currently not covered by Title 10 U.S.C§ 2437. Therefore, 

we have added a Matter for Congressional Consideration.

Lastly, DOD provided technical comments concerning our assessments of 

specific equipment items in appendix II. We reviewed and incorporated 

these technical comments, as appropriate. In some instances, the data the 

department provided in its technical comments resulted from program and 

funding decisions that were made subsequent to our review. In one case, 

we changed our original color-coded assessment of a key equipment item 

based on these decisions. The Army approved the replacement for the OH58D Kiowa Helicopter, the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, and 

therefore we changed our original assessment of the Kiowa’s long-term 

program strategy and funding plans from a yellow rating to a green rating. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps; and other interested parties. We will also make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have questions, please contact me on (202) 512-8365 or 

by e-mail at solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 
Page 29 GAO-06-141 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Major contributors to this report are included in appendix IV.

William M. Solis

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 30 GAO-06-141 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 31 GAO-06-141 

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To update congressional committees on key equipment items that warrant 

immediate attention by the Department of Defense (DOD) and/or 

Congress, we conducted an analysis of 30 selected military equipment 

items. We performed an independent evaluation of the (1) condition of key 

equipment items and (2) services’ near- and long-term program strategies 

and funding for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of these 

equipment items. 

This report follows our December 2003 report1

 which assessed the 

condition, program strategy, funding, and wartime capability of 25 selected 

military equipment items. The current report increases the number of 

equipment items to 30, and instead evaluates the condition, near-term 

program strategy and funding plans, and long-term program strategy and 

funding plans of each system. These changes reflect the current 

operational environment, and the critical linkage between a successful 

program strategy and funding. We examined the near and long terms 

separately to delineate the impact of current operations on the near term 

and their possible effect on long-term transformational efforts.

To select the 30 equipment items we reviewed, we included 18 of the 

equipment items reviewed in our December 2003 report, and based upon 

input from the military services, your offices, and our prior work, we 

judgmentally selected an additional 12 items. We did not include 7 of the 25 

items from our previous review so that we could focus on other selected 

systems that we believed were more in need of examination. Our final 

selections included those items that the military services believed were 

most critical to their missions, and which have been in use for a number of 

years. The 30 equipment items include 9 from the Army, 6 from the Air 

Force, 7 from the Navy, and 8 from the Marine Corps. Our observations and 

assessments were made on active duty inventory as well as equipment in 

the National Guard and reserve forces; including reserve equipment 

represents another difference between this review and our December 2003 

report. Our assessments apply only to the 30 equipment items we reviewed, 

and the results of our assessments cannot be projected to the entire 

inventory of DOD equipment. Because Section 805 of the Ronald W. Reagan 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005—which amends 

Title 10 of the U.S. code (Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 805.)—does not apply to 

existing systems for which a replacement system will reach initial 

1

GAO, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Reassess Program Strategy, Funding Priorities, 

and Risks for Selected Equipment, GAO-04-112 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2003). 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 32 GAO-06-141 

operational capability before October 1, 2008, we did not assess 

compliance with this section of the act. 

Each equipment item was assessed individually on its condition, and nearand long-term program strategy and funding. To determine which 

equipment items require additional attention by the department, the 

military services, and/or Congress, we developed an assessment 

framework based on three criteria: (1) the extent of the existence of a 

problem or issue, (2) the severity of the problem or issue, and (3) how soon 

the problem or issue needs to be addressed. To indicate the existence, 

severity, or urgency of problems identified for the 30 selected equipment 

items, we used a traffic light approach–red, yellow, or green–as follows:

• Red indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe 

enough to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, 

and/or Congress.

• Yellow indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 

attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and that if left 

unattended may worsen.

• Green indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 

issues at the time of our review, or that any existing problems or issues 

we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 

immediate action, or already being addressed by DOD, the military 

services, and/or Congress.

Individual assessments were based on systematic decisions with clear and, 

wherever possible, measurable criteria. Input from relevant officials—

program managers, unit staffs, operators, maintainers, and engineers—was 

incorporated in every step of the process.

We interviewed officials from components (active, guard, and reserve 

forces) of all four of the military services, two selected combatant 

commands, and several major service commands. We visited selected units 

and maintenance facilities to observe the equipment items during operation 

or under maintenance. We also discussed deployed and nondeployed 

equipment condition, program strategy, and funding with program 

managers and equipment operators and maintainers, and included these 

indicators where appropriate. The specific military activities we visited or 

obtained information from include the following:
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 33 GAO-06-141 

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, Arlington, 

Va.; 

• U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va.;

• U.S. Air Force, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.;

• U.S. Air Force Materiel Command, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, 

Ohio;

• U.S. Air Force, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base, Utah;

• U.S. Air Force, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force 

Base, Okla.;

• U.S. Air Force, Pacific Command, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii;

• U.S. Air Force, Plans and Programs, Air Force Headquarters, Arlington, 

Va.;

• U.S. Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Ga.;

• U.S. Air Force, Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force 

Base, Ga.;

• U.S. Air National Guard, Headquarters, Andrews Air Force Base, Md.; 

• U.S Air National Guard, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii;

• U.S. Army, Headquarters, Arlington, Va.;

• U.S. Army National Guard, Headquarters, Arlington, Va.;

• U.S. Army National Guard, 81st Brigade, Washington National Guard, 

Camp Murray, Wash.;

• U.S. Army National Guard, Hawaii National Guard, Ft. Ruger, Hawaii;

• U.S. Army, Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Ala.;

• U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala.;
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO-06-141 

• U.S. Army, Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi, Tex.;

• U.S. Army, Directorate of Logistics, Fort Lewis, Wash.;

• U.S. Army, First Army, Ft. Gillem, Ga.;

• U.S. Army, Fifth Army, Ft. Hood, Tex.;

• U.S. Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, Ga.;

• U.S. Army, 4th Infantry Division, Ft. Hood, Tex.;

• U.S Army Headquarters, Arlington, Va.;

• U.S. Army Material Command, Ft. Belvoir, Va.;

• U.S. Army, Pacific, Ft. Shafter, Hawaii;

• U.S. Army Reserve Command, Ft. McPherson, Ga.;

• U.S. Army Tank – Automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, 

Mich.;

• U.S. Army, III Corps, Ft. Hood, Tex.; 

• U.S. Central Command, McDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Fla.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Aviation Plans, Policies, Programs, Budgets, Joint 

and External Matters Branch, Arlington, Va.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Aviation Weapons Systems Requirements Branch, 

Pentagon, Arlington, Va.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Installations and Logistics, Navy Annex, Arlington, 

Va.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Logistics Plans, Policies and Strategic Mobility 

Division, Navy Annex, Arlington, Va.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, 3rd Marine Air Wing, Miramar, Calif.;
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-06-141 

• U.S. Marine Corps, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, 

Calif.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Forces Pacific, Camp Smith, Hawaii;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Forces Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Va.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Air Station, 

Patuxent River, Md.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Programs and Resources, Office of the Deputy 

Commandant, Pentagon, Arlington, Va.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Reserve Command, New Orleans, La.;

• U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Army Tank Automotive and Armaments Command, 

Warren, Mich.;

• U.S. Navy, Commander Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.;

• U.S. Navy, Commander Electronic Attack Wing, Pacific, Whidbey Island, 

Wash.; 

• U.S. Navy, Commander Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 10, Whidbey, 

Island, Wash.; 

• U.S. Navy, Commander Strike Fighter Wing, Atlantic, Virginia Beach, Va.;

• U.S. Navy, Commander Strike Fighter Wing, Pacific, Lemoore, Calif.;

• U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii;

• U.S. Navy, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; 

• U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Depot, Jacksonville, Fla.; 

• U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Depot, North Island, Coronado, Calif.; 

• U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md.; 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-06-141 

• U.S. Naval Reserve Command, New Orleans, La.; 

• U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command Washington, D.C.; 

• U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Force/US Naval Air Force—Atlantic, Norfolk, 

Va.; 

• U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Force/US Naval Air Force—Pacific, San Diego, 

Calif.; 

• U.S. Navy, Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach, Calif.; and

• U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii.

Assessments on the condition of these 30 equipment items were based on a 

comparison of readiness metrics against service goals, and the existence, 

severity, or urgency of condition problems. We obtained data on equipment 

age, expected service life, mission capable rates,2

 utilization rates,3 and 

various other metrics for fiscal years 1999 through 2004. Readiness metrics, 

such as material readiness rates and mission capable rates, were a primary 

component of our assessments. We were particularly cognizant not only of 

whether the equipment item met its readiness goals but, if it failed to meet 

this metric, we examined the gap between the readiness achieved by these 

equipment items and the services readiness objectives-–and the 

significance of that difference. Equipment items were further evaluated 

against metrics such as utilization rates, cannibalization rates, failure rates, 

and depot maintenance data. We gauged the significance of the rates and 

data as they reflected on the item’s condition. Further, this analysis also 

evaluated the extent to which each of the equipment items is being used for 

current operations, and their performance while deployed. Finally, we 

assessed specific problems with each item that may or may not have been 

captured in other metrics. 

Our evaluations of DOD’s near- and long-term program strategy and funding 

plans were based on the existence of near- and long-term plans, and the 

extent to which there were gaps in funding for these plans as projected in 

2

Mission capable rates are measures of material condition that indicate the equipment can 

perform at least one and potentially all of its designated missions.

3

Utilization rates refer to flying hours, tank miles, and steaming days.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-06-141 

DOD’s Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).4 Both near- and long-term 

plans include sustainment, modernization, or recapitalization of the 

equipment items in order to meet mission requirements.5

 Near-term plans 

are those that address current condition problems, as well as those 

projected until 2007; long-term plans address issues anticipated from 2008 

until the replacement system enters the inventory or until the system 

reaches the end of its expected service life. We first assessed whether nearand long-term plans were realistic and comprehensive. For our short-term 

assessment, we examined whether the plans meet near-term requirements 

and address issues related to current condition and the need for near-term 

technological upgrades. For our long-term evaluation, we considered if 

modernizations or sustainment plans were sufficient given the timing of the 

replacement and the expected service life of the equipment item. Next, we 

determined the extent to which there were gaps in funding for both nearand long-term programs as projected in the FYDP. We then considered 

whether the strategy and its funding, in the near and long term, addressed 

other concerns which might significantly affect the program.

While we attempted to obtain consistent metrics for each of the three 

categories across all four of the military services, data availability varied 

significantly by service and type of equipment. Our assessments are based 

on the data available from multiple sources, and represent the problems 

and issues we identified at the specific point in time that we conducted our 

work. These can change quickly given current events. Although our 

assessments for each of the three categories-–condition, near-term 

program strategies and funding plans, and long-term program strategies 

and funding plans-–are largely qualitative in nature and are derived from 

consensus judgments, our analyses are based on data and information 

provided by the military services and discussions with military service 

officials and program managers for the individual equipment items. We 

assessed the reliability of the services’ equipment readiness data by 

(1) comparing key data elements to our observations of equipment items at 

selected units, (2) reviewing relevant documents, and (3) interviewing 

knowledgeable officials. We determined that the data obtained from DOD, 

the military services, and the combatant commands were sufficiently 

reliable for our use. We performed our review from July 2004 through July 

4

The Future Years Defense Program reflects the department’s official projection of the 

forces and resources needed to support the programs approved by the Secretary of Defense 

for the biennial budget years and the following 4 years.

5

We did not independently verify or validate the requirements as part of this audit.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-06-141 

2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 
Page 39 GAO-06-141 

Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items ApendxiI

For the 30 equipment items, each assessment provides the status of the 

equipment item at the time of our review. The profile presents a general 

description of the equipment item. Each assessment area—condition, nearterm program strategy and funding, and long-term program strategy and 

funding—includes a green, yellow, or red rating indicating the existence, 

severity, or urgency of problems identified based on our observations of 

each equipment item, discussions with service officials, and reviews of 

service-provided metrics.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 40 GAO-06-141 

Army

Abrams M1A1/M1A2 Tank First delivered in the early 1980s, the Abrams is the Army’s main battle tank 

and destroys enemy forces using enhanced mobility and firepower. 

Variants of the Abrams include the M1,1

 M1A1, and M1A2 and there are a 

total of 5,848 tanks of all variants in the fleet. The M1A1 and M1A2 have a 

120 mm main gun, a powerful turbine engine, and special armor. There are 

5,109 M1A1 and M1A2 tanks in the inventory, and their estimated average 

age is 12 years. Officials state that in the future, the Army is planning to use 

only a two-variant fleet of the Abrams, consisting of the M1A1 Abrams 

Integrated Management and the upgraded M1A2 System Enhancement 

Program—the primary difference being the digital architecture of the 

System Enhancement Program variant. The M1 variant is expected to be 

phased out by 2015. The Abrams is expected to remain in the Army’s 

inventory until at least 2045. 

Figure 2: Abrams Main Battle Tank

1

There are 739 M1 tanks in the Army’s inventory averaging 20 years in age and they are found 

primarily in the National Guard. The M1 is similar to the M1A1 and M1A2 except that it 

possesses a 105 mm cannon and lacks the special armor protection. Due to its age and 

limited usage, our analysis did not include this variant.

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 41 GAO-06-141 

Condition 

In our previous report we assessed the condition of the Abrams Tank as 

green because it consistently met its mission capable goal of 90 percent 

from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002.2

 However, in this review we 

assessed the condition of the Abrams Tank as yellow because, while it 

generally met or exceeded the Army’s mission capable goal between fiscal 

years 1999 and 2003 as shown in figure 3 below, the rates declined between 

fiscal years 2003 and 2004. According to program officials, the recent 

downward trend is a result of parts and technician shortages. Officials 

stated that the shortage in parts is driven by the number of vehicles either 

deployed or being reset to a predeployment condition and the shortage of 

technicians is primarily due to the number of deployed National Guard 

military technicians. Additionally, as of September 2004 there were a 

relatively small percentage of Abrams tanks, around 5 percent, deployed in 

support of operations in Iraq. Due to the high use in theater, these 

operations may accelerate the aging process of the tank fleet.

2

GAO, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Reassess Program Strategy, Funding Priorities, 

and Risks for Selected Equipment, GAO-04-112 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2003).
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 42 GAO-06-141 

Figure 3: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Abrams Tanks, Fiscal Years 1999 

– 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the Abrams 

tank as yellow because while the Army possesses plans for resetting tanks 

as they return from operations in Iraq and recapitalizing the fleet to ensure 

that the tank’s systems remain updated, they continue to identify shortages 

of repair parts and technicians as major causes of decreased material 

readiness. Without adequately addressing these issues, the condition of the 

Abrams fleet could be significantly impacted in the near term. Another 

potential issue affecting the Abrams in the near term is a break in the 

production line, which is being used to retrofit a lesser variant Abrams to 

the M1A2 System Enhancement Program, occurring in fiscal years 2006 and 

2007. Army officials plan to mitigate this issue by providing $40 million to 

maintain critical skills at the production facilities until production resumes 

in fiscal year 2008.

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

Active M1A2

Active M1A1

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 43 GAO-06-141 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the Abrams 

tank as green because the Army has identified a plan to reduce the current 

inventory of 5,109 to about 3,000 tanks in keeping with current Army 

transformation plans and has programmed funding to recapitalize the 

remaining fleet. The Army plans to move to a two-variant fleet of the 

Abrams, the M1A1 Abrams Integrated Management and M1A2 System 

Enhancement Program, which they plan to utilize until at least 2045. 

Officials believe this plan should reduce maintenance costs as the service 

will have reduced maintenance and logistics requirements from the current 

fleet arrangement. As noted in our previous report, the Army reduced the 

original number of recapitalized M1A2 System Enhancement Program 

tanks from 1,174 to 588. In the fiscal year 2006 President’s Budget, the Army 

identified funding to increase the number of M1A2 System Enhancement 

Program tanks to 803. This increase realigns the recapitalization funding 

with the Army’s upgrade schedule so that they are on target to meet their 

current transformation plans.

Bradley Fighting Vehicle Brought into service in 1981, the Army uses the family of Bradley Fighting 

Vehicles to provide armored protection and transportation to infantry 

units. The Bradley is able to close with and destroy enemy forces in 

support of mounted and dismounted infantry and cavalry combat 

operations. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle family currently consists of two 

vehicles: the M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the M3 Cavalry Fighting 

Vehicle. There are four variations of each of these two vehicles: the A0, A2, 

A2 Operation Desert Storm, and A3, each having different capabilities and 

technology. For example, the A3 variants possess all of the capabilities as 

the A2 variants, but utilize a digital architecture, which is compatible with 

the Army’s net-centric warfare plans and the M1A2 System Enhancement 

Program Abrams tank. The Army currently maintains 6,583 M2 and M3 

variants of the Bradley in their fleet and plans to use the Bradley Fighting 

Vehicle until at least 2045. 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 44 GAO-06-141 

Figure 4: Bradley Fighting Vehicle

Condition

We assessed the condition of the Bradley as yellow because, as shown in 

figure 5 below, the vehicles nearly met or exceeded the Army’s readiness 

goal of 90 percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2002; however, the mission 

capable rates showed a downward trend between fiscal years 2002 and 

2004. According to officials, Operation Iraqi Freedom demands and efforts 

to reset the vehicles to their predeployment status have had a significant 

impact on repair parts availability. The National Guard has experienced 

further difficulty with availability of trained maintainers due to the high 

pace of operations that has resulted in the need to transfer personnel 

among units to fill shortages. Additionally, program officials stated that the 

composition of the fleet of Bradley Fighting Vehicles is insufficient to meet 

all of the Army’s current requirements, especially those associated with 

training and predeployment exercises. However, the Bradley vehicles are 

able to meet all of their operational requirements. 

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 45 GAO-06-141 

Figure 5: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Fiscal 

Years 1999 – 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the Bradley 

program as yellow because the Army does not currently possess a funding 

strategy through regular appropriations for developing the proper 

composition of the Bradley Fighting Vehicles fleet to meet the Army’s nearterm transformation requirements. The Army requested $1.4 billion in the 

fiscal year 2005 supplemental for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle in order to 

accelerate the recapitalization of vehicles by producing 93 vehicles to 

replace combat losses and 554 others for the Army’s modularity needs. 

Without having funding programmed for the A2 or the A3 variants of the 

Bradley, Army officials have begun planning for the fiscal year 2006 

supplemental in order to fulfill Army transformation plans. Program 

officials stated that the Army is relying on supplemental funding and Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reprogramming actions in order to meet 

equipment requirements for the Army’s transformation plans. 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

ARNG

Active

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 46 GAO-06-141 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the Bradley 

Fighting Vehicles as red because the Army plans to significantly increase 

the number of vehicles and change the composition of the fleet but has not 

established a long-term funding strategy. Officials stated that the Army 

plans to convert to a fleet of Bradley vehicles which will be aligned with the 

Abrams tank fleet. The A3, matched with the M1A2 System Enhancement 

Program tank, and a lesser variant, operating with the M1A1 Abrams 

Integrated Management tank, will make up the Army’s future Brigade 

Combat Teams.3

 Neither the A3 variant nor the lesser variants, which 

officials believe will be the A2 and the Operation Desert Storm variant, 

have long-term program funding identified.

M113 Armored Personnel 

Carrier

The Army uses the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier in its primary mission 

of personnel transportation on the battlefield, though there are many other 

combat support missions for the family of vehicles, including command 

and control, cargo transportation, and battlefield obscuration. The Army 

originally introduced the M113 family of vehicles in 1960. The current fleet 

of M113A2 and A3 Personnel Carriers, totaling 7,579, has an average age of 

almost 16 years.4

 Prior to operations in Iraq the Army planned to 

discontinue use of the M113; however, the Army now plans to utilize the 

M113 Armored Personnel Carrier through 2045 in accordance with its latest 

modularity plans. The A3 variant of the M113 has a digital architecture, 

increased suspension, and is capable of carrying add-on-armor kits to 

provide additional protection for the troops. 

3

Brigade Combat Teams are the foundation of the Army’s new modularized force structure.

4

There are approximately 15,785 vehicles that use the common M113 chassis. However, our 

analysis only focused on the M113A2 and A3 personnel carriers.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 47 GAO-06-141 

Figure 6: M113 Armored Personnel Carrier 

Condition 

We assessed the condition of the M113 as green because, as shown in figure 

7 below, the mission capable rates have been near the Army’s goal of 90 

percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. As of September 2004, the 

Army had 666 A2 and A3 variants in Operation Iraqi Freedom, or roughly 10 

percent of the combined fleet. The M113 family of vehicles has not 

experienced a significant decline in mission readiness as a result of recent 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The National Guard has generally 

maintained its M113 vehicles at a higher readiness rate than the active units 

of the Army. 

Source: GAO.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 48 GAO-06-141 

Figure 7: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army M113 Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 

– 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the M113 as 

yellow because the Army has consistently relied on supplemental funding, 

congressional adjustments, and OSD reprogramming actions in order to 

complete modifications on the M113 family of vehicles. The Army 

requested $132 million in DOD’s fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding 

request to Congress in order to recapitalize 368 M113s. This represents 

about 55 percent of the vehicles that were deployed to Operation Iraqi 

Freedom in September 2004. Due to its armor protection, the M113 has 

been used in place of less armored vehicles, such as High Mobility MultiPurpose Wheeled Vehicles, in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

ARNG

Active

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 49 GAO-06-141 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the M113 as 

red because the Army has not identified either a long-term procurement or 

maintenance strategy for the M113. The Army’s funding strategy for the 

M113 family of vehicles has been impacted by the Army’s plans to remove 

these vehicles from service. However, according to Army officials, the 

M113 family of vehicles will continue to play a significant role as the Army 

transitions into the new modular force. 

Heavy Expanded Mobility 

Tactical Truck 

The Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) is used extensively 

to provide transport capabilities for resupply of the combat vehicles and 

weapons systems used by heavy combat forces and support units. The five 

basic HEMTT variants are used to transport ammunition, petroleum, oils 

and lubricants, and missile systems, and can also serve as a recovery 

vehicle for other vehicle systems. There are approximately 12,700 HEMTTs 

in the Army’s inventory. The average age of the HEMTT fleet is about 15 

years, and although the expected useful life is 20 years, the HEMTTs are 

expected to remain in the Army’s inventory through 2030.

Figure 8: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck 

Source: Oshkosh Truck Corporation.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 50 GAO-06-141 

Condition

In our previous report we assessed the condition of the HEMTT as green 

because the mission capable rates were close to the Army’s goal for fiscal 

years 1998 to 2002.5

 However, in this review we assessed the condition as 

yellow. While the fully mission capable rates for the HEMTTs were near the 

Army’s goal from fiscal years 1999 through 2003, the trend since fiscal year 

2002 for both active and reserve components has been declining, as shown 

in figure 9 below. In one of the Army’s fiscal year 2004 readiness reports to 

DOD, the high pace of operations and aging fleet were cited as factors 

affecting HEMTT readiness for the active component. The decline in 

readiness rates for the U.S. Army Reserves was attributed to the lack of 

maintenance technicians. Program management officials said that the 

failure to meet readiness goals was also due to parts problems. According 

to Army officials, approximately 12–15 percent of the HEMTT fleet is in 

theater and is being used at rates 10 times higher than during peacetime. In 

a February 2005 statement to congressional committees, Army officials 

stated that all wheeled vehicles being used in Iraq and Afghanistan would 

be armored by March 2005. Despite concerns over armor protection, Army 

officials that we visited stated that the HEMTTs have performed as 

intended in theater without any significant issues. 

5

GAO-04-112.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 51 GAO-06-141 

Figure 9: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army HEMTTs, Fiscal Years 1999 

– 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the HEMTT as yellow 

because the Army’s near-term strategy for sustaining, modernizing, and 

procuring HEMTTs has not been fully funded. In addition, the program 

received significant funding from supplemental appropriations and a 

congressional adjustment in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the remanufacture 

and upgrade program has continued at a slower pace than planned, and at 

the time of the fiscal year 2006/2007 budget estimate submission, the 

impact of modularity changes on the final acquisition objective was still 

unknown. The Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

USAR

ARNG

Active

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 52 GAO-06-141 

Modernization Strategy6 has been updated several times and has undergone 

significant changes. In addition, the strategy states that while investment is 

not sufficient to meet the Army’s goals, it does address its most critical 

requirements. In fiscal year 2004 the family of heavy tactical vehicles, 

which includes the HEMTTs, was authorized an additional $47 million in 

supplemental funding and another $39 million in congressional 

adjustments and DOD’s fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding request for 

$74.3 million was to replace combat losses and procure additional vehicles 

to equip, backfill, and modularize various Army units. The Army is planning 

to include another request for additional HEMTTs in DOD’s fiscal year 2006 

supplemental budget request. The Extended Service Program, which the 

Army uses to remanufacture and upgrade existing HEMTTs, has continued 

at the slower pace noted in our December 2003 report,7

 but the justification 

for an additional $90.3 million included in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental 

funding request cited the program’s importance to the Army’s 

modularization efforts. Finally, while the Army’s acquisition objective for 

HEMTTs has continued to increase, it still may not meet the Army’s 

modularity requirements. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the HEMTT as 

yellow because the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and 

Modernization Strategy for both procurement and recapitalizations8

 has 

not been fully funded and the Army’s plans and funding for procurement, 

recapitalization, and sustainment of its oldest models are continuing to 

evolve. The strategy has been updated several times and has undergone 

significant changes. The June 2005 version of the strategy concluded with a 

statement that while investment is adequate to address the Army’s most 

critical requirements, it still falls short of the Army’s goals. In addition, the 

goals have changed significantly. For example, in the fiscal year 2006/2007 

budget estimate, dated February 2005, the Army acquisition objective for 

6

The Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy 

lays out a comprehensive strategy for meeting modularity requirements and modernizing 

the current tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. 

7

GAO-04-112. 

8

The HEMTT Extended Service Program is a recapitalization program that supports 

modularity by remanufacturing and upgrading existing HEMTT vehicles. 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 53 GAO-06-141 

HEMTTs was 14,269, but in July 2005 the goal was 17,850. Funding plans 

also continue to change. In our December 2003 report, we noted that the 

Army had reduced funding for the recapitalization program which was used 

to upgrade HEMTTs. Currently, the June 2005 version of the strategy shows 

that the Army plans to recapitalize 4,726 HEMTTs between fiscal years 2012 

and 2018. However, past history shows that this may not occur. For 

example, while the fiscal year 2003 budget estimate shows that the Army 

originally planned to recapitalize 608 HEMTTs in fiscal year 2004, the fiscal 

year 2005 budget estimates show that only 129 were recapitalized. The 

Army’s plans to eliminate its oldest HEMTT models, which can reduce fleet 

operating and support costs, have also been scaled down. In a fiscal year 

2004 draft, the strategy stated that 9,200 of the oldest HEMTT models 

would be eliminated by fiscal year 2018. In a 2005 version however, that 

number was reduced to 7,728. In addition to receiving regular 

appropriations for procuring, recapitalizing, and sustaining HEMTTs, the 

Army is also relying on funds received through OSD’s reprogramming 

actions to support its long-term strategy for HEMTTs. The June 2005 

version of the Army’s strategy shows that between fiscal years 2006 and 

2011, an additional 3,559 HEMTTs and other heavy vehicles will be 

procured with funds received through OSD’s reprogramming actions.

High Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle

The High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) is a light, 

highly mobile, diesel-powered, four-wheel-drive vehicle that has six 

configurations: troop carrier, armament carrier, shelter carrier, ambulance, 

missile carrier, and Scout vehicle. There are approximately 120,000 

HMMWVs in the Army’s inventory. HMMWVs entered the Army’s inventory 

in 1985. Currently, the average age of the HMMWV fleet is about 13 years 

and the expected service life of HMMWVs is 15 years. The HMMWV 

represents 50 percent of the Army’s total tactical truck fleet.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 54 GAO-06-141 

Figure 10: High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle 

Condition

We assessed the condition of the HMMWV as green because, as shown in 

figure 11, it exceeded the Army’s fully mission capable goal from fiscal 

years 1999 through 2004 for both the active and reserve components.

However, Army officials noted that the HMMWVs supporting Operation 

Iraqi Freedom are experiencing usage (i.e., operational tempo)9

 that is six 

times their normal peacetime usage rate. HMMWV production has now 

transitioned primarily to the Up-Armored platforms to enhance force 

protection and mobility for deployed units. While the Up-Armored variant 

is built to support the weight of the vehicle’s armor, Army officials have 

expressed concern regarding the long-term impact from the stress placed 

on the frame, engines, and transmissions by the additional weight of add-on 

armor that the HMMWVs were not reinforced to handle. DOD has initiated 

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

9

An operational tempo of 6:1 equates to putting 6,000 miles in a wartime 1-year period versus 

1,000 miles under a normal peacetime operational tempo. 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 55 GAO-06-141 

a Stress Study to try and quantify the effects of high usage, additional 

weight, and harsh operating conditions on future maintenance/replacement 

needs of vehicles such as the HMMWV. In February 2005, in a statement to 

congressional committees, Army officials stated that all wheeled vehicles 

being used in Iraq and Afghanistan would be armored by March 2005.

Figure 11: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army High Mobility MultiPurpose Wheeled Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the HMMWV 

as yellow because the Army has not fully funded its Tactical Wheeled 

Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy and the Army 

Acquisition Objective continues to change. In the near term, in addition to 

receiving regular appropriations, the Army has received additional funding 

for HMMWVs from supplemental appropriations and congressional 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

USAR

ARNG

Active

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 56 GAO-06-141 

adjustments. In fiscal year 2004, the Army received $239 million of 

supplemental funds and about $39 million in congressional adjustments. In 

fiscal year 2005 the Army requested almost $290 million in supplemental 

funds to procure HMMWVs to activate units and to supply existing units. 

An additional $31 million in supplemental funds was requested to replace 

combat losses and another $123 million was requested to begin 

recapitalizing older HMMWV models and converting them to newer models 

capable of accepting the add-on armor. The June 2005 version of the Army’s 

strategy shows that it is planning to request additional supplemental 

funding in fiscal year 2006. The Army’s Acquisition Objective for HMMWVs 

has increased significantly since 2001. In the Army’s fiscal year 2002 

amended budget estimate, submitted in June 2001, the Army’s Acquisition 

Objective for HMMWVs was about 121,000 whereas in an April 2004 version 

of the Army’s plan, the Army was projecting a need for 145,000 HMMWVs. 

Currently, neither the fiscal year 2006/2007 nor the June 2005 version of the 

Army’s plan show the Army’s Acquisition Objective for HMMWVs. Army 

officials noted in an August 2004 version of the strategy that they had 

resourced all known Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requirements and 

their projected battle losses.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the 

HMMWV as yellow because again, the Army has not fully funded its 

Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and Modernization 

Strategy. In addition, the Army’s initial plans for the HMMWV 

recapitalization programs have been significantly reduced. The June 2005 

version of the Army’s strategy shows anticipated procurement 

requirements of about 30,000 vehicles between fiscal years 2008 and 2011. 

However, the Army’s fiscal year 2006/2007 budget request is only for about 

18,000 vehicles during those years. The Army is planning on using funds 

resulting from OSD reprogramming actions to procure the additional 

12,000 vehicles needed to meet requirements for those fiscal years. In the 

long term, according to an August 2004 version of the strategy, the Army 

plans to eliminate about 45,000 of its oldest models by fiscal year 2018. 

About 19,000 of the oldest models would be converted to newer models 

capable of handling add-on armor kits in order to provide better soldier 

protection through a recapitalization program. However, those plans, and 

the associated costs, continue to change. For example, a February 2005 

version of the strategy estimated a cost of about $1.8 billion to recapitalize 

20,114 HMMWVs for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, but the Army’s fiscal 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 57 GAO-06-141 

year 2006/2007 budget request, dated February 2005, contained about $1.9 

billion in order to recapitalize 17,694 vehicles during those years. The June 

2005 version of the Army’s plan shows an estimated cost of about $2 billion 

to recapitalize 16,522 HMMWVs between fiscal years 2008 and 2011.

Family of Medium Tactical 

Vehicles 

The Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) is a series of vehicles 

based on a common chassis which vary by payload and mission 

requirements. It is currently the only medium fleet vehicle that is in 

production with state-of-the-art technology. The FMTV includes the Light 

Medium Tactical Vehicle with a 2.5-ton capacity in both the cargo and van 

models and the Medium Tactical Vehicle with a 5-ton capacity in the cargo, 

tractor, wrecker, and dump truck models. The FMTV is the replacement for 

the obsolete and maintenance-intensive 2.5- and 5-ton trucks, some of 

which have been in the Army’s inventory since the 1960s. The FMTV’s 

missions include performing local and line hauling, unit resupply, and other 

missions in combat, combat support, and combat service support units. 

FMTVs are rapidly deployable and can operate in various terrains and in all 

climatic conditions. The commonality of parts across the various models is 

intended to reduce both the logistics burden and operating and support 

costs. The FMTVs entered the Army inventory in 1996 and currently there 

are approximately 19,400 vehicles with an average age of about 6 years. The 

average useful life is expected to be between 20 and 22 years.

Figure 12: 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle

Source: U.S. Army.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 58 GAO-06-141 

Condition

We assessed the condition of the FMTV as green because, as shown in 

figure 13, it exceeded the Army’s fully mission capable goal from fiscal 

years 1999 through 2004 for both the active and reserve components with 

the exception of the National Guard in fiscal year 2000. Despite operating 

during GWOT operations at a rate that is nine times higher than in 

peacetime, officials stated that the FMTVs are not experiencing any 

problems. However, in response to concerns about armored protection, 

Army officials, in a February 2005 statement to congressional committees, 

stated that all wheeled vehicles being used in Iraq and Afghanistan would 

be armored by March 2005.

Figure 13: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army Family of Medium Tactical 

Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

USAR

ARNG

Active

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 59 GAO-06-141 

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the FMTV as 

yellow because the Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity 

and Modernization Strategy is not fully funded and states that although 

planned investment is adequate to address critical requirements, it still falls 

short of the Army’s goals. According to an April 2004 version of the 

strategy, the Army did not consider it to be either cost or operationally 

effective to recapitalize older model vehicles. Instead, the Army’s plan is to 

meet readiness and operational shortfalls through replacement with newer, 

technologically improved vehicles. However, this plan will not fill the 

Army’s goals in the near term. For example, the fiscal year 2005 budget 

estimate states that procurement of FMTVs through fiscal year 2005 will 

only fill approximately 32 percent of the Army’s Acquisition Objective for 

FMTVs. Funding for FMTVs in the near term relies on supplemental 

appropriations, congressional adjustments, and OSD reprogramming 

actions, in addition to regular appropriations. For example, in fiscal year 

2004, the FMTV program was authorized about $3.4 million from DOD’s 

supplemental funding request and received another $34 million as a 

congressional adjustment. DOD’s fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding 

request included $217 million for the Army to procure FMTV trucks to 

replace those lost in theater and to support modularity requirements. The 

Army also added an additional $122.5 million in the fiscal year 2005 

supplemental funding request to meet modularity requirements and to 

replace combat losses of the 2.5-ton FMTV vehicles. The June 2005 version 

of the plan shows that for fiscal year 2006, the Army is not planning to 

request supplemental funding, but in fiscal year 2007, they are planning to 

use additional funds received as a result of OSD reprogramming actions to 

procure additional FMTVs to fill unit shortfalls.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the FMTV as 

yellow because again, the Army has not fully funded its Tactical Wheeled 

Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy and although an 

April 2004 version of the strategy states that an incremental upgrade 

modernization strategy that will include a combination of field 

modernizations and new procurement is envisioned, no specific actions or 

time frames are identified. The June 2005 version of the Army’s plan shows 

that, between fiscal years 2008 and 2011, the Army is planning to continue 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 60 GAO-06-141 

using OSD reprogrammed funds to procure FMTVs in order to fill unit 

shortfalls. In addition, the June 2005 plan shows that the Army plans to 

remove 25,000 of the old model 2.5-ton and 5-ton trucks from the inventory. 

FMTV production has been done in phases. As reported in an April 2004 

version of the strategy, the first two phases together will deliver over 20,000 

vehicles. The third phase is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2005 and the 

fourth phase, an outgrowth of vehicle component design and integration 

under ongoing program technology/insertion efforts, does not have an 

identified start date but is planned to begin shortly after the completion of 

the current production contract. 

AH-64 A/D Apache 

Helicopter

The Apache is a multimission aircraft designed to perform rear, close, deep 

operations and precision strikes, armed reconnaissance, and security 

during the day, at night, and in adverse weather conditions. There are two 

Apache variants: the AH-64A, which entered service in 1984, and the AH64D Longbow, an improved version of the AH-64A, which entered service in 

1998. The Army plans to convert most of the AH-64A helicopters into AH64D models, and to improve the safety features on the remaining AH-64A 

models. In total, there are about 703 Apache helicopters in the Army’s 

inventory: 263 A models and 440 D models. The average fleet age of the A 

model is about 13 years, and the average age of the D model fleet is about 4 

years.

Figure 14: AH-64 Apache Helicopter

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 61 GAO-06-141 

Condition 

Our assessment of the Apache’s condition as yellow is unchanged since our 

prior report. As shown in figure 15, the average mission capable rates for 

the AH-64A models have been below the Army’s goal between fiscal years 

1999 and 2004, and the average mission capable rates for the AH-64D fleet 

have been above goal for 3 of the 6 years. In our December 2003 report, 

safety restrictions were cited as the cause of not meeting mission capable 

goals but since then, all of the issues have been addressed throughout the 

fleet.10 However, according to officials, elevated flying hours in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, coupled with the harsh environment, continue to increase 

demands for limited spare parts and for maintenance for such items as 

engines and rotor blades. Officials further stated that the peacetime usage 

rate for the AH-64 is 15 hours a month and the actual number of flight hours 

is averaging 31 hours per month in Iraq and 55 per month in Afghanistan. 

Despite these challenges, officials stated that the AH-64 is capable of 

conducting its mission and, between February 2003 and December 2004, its 

mission capable rates in both Iraq and Afghanistan exceeded the Army’s 

goal.

10The five restrictions identified in last year’s report were aircraft Teflon bushings, 

transmissions, the main rotor blade attaching pins, generator power cables, and the 

auxiliary power unit clutch. The bushings, rotor blade attaching pins, and power cable 

issues have been resolved. The corrections for the transmission should be completed across 

the fleet by 2009 and the clutch should be completed in July 2005.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 62 GAO-06-141 

Figure 15: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army AH-64 A/D Apache 

Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the Apache as 

green because the Army has recapitalization and sustainment strategies, 

both of which are funded. As stated in our December 2003 report, the 

Apache Recapitalization Program addresses cost, reliability, and safety 

problems, fleet groundings, aging aircraft, and obsolescence. The Army is 

continuing to remanufacture the AH-64A models to AH-64D models with 

the remaining helicopters beginning conversion during fiscal year 2005. In 

addition, Apaches that have been deployed are being returned to 

predeployment conditions through a combination of unit and contractor 

actions. The Army received an additional $321.1 million in the fiscal year 

2005 supplement to replace 13 Apaches that were lost in theater.

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Goal

64D Actual

64A Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 63 GAO-06-141 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the Apache as 

green because the Army’s modernization strategy to improve combat 

capability and aircraft safety appears likely to allow the Apache to remain 

in service until 2040 and, as we reported previously, is consistent with the 

Army’s stated requirements. A total of 597 AH-64A models will be 

converted to AH-64D models by fiscal year 2010. All remaining AH-64A 

models are scheduled to receive additional reliability and safety 

modifications as part of the Army’s response to concerns of the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense and Congress. There are plans for additional 

upgrades to AH-64D models and funding to support the Army’s current 

long-term strategy has been programmed through fiscal year 2020.

CH-47D/F Chinook 

Helicopter

The CH-47 helicopter is a twin-engine, tandem rotor helicopter designed for 

transporting cargo, troops, and weapons, and is the only Army helicopter 

that can operate at high altitudes. By 1994, all CH-47 models were upgraded 

to the CH-47D version, which comprises the Army’s heavy lift fleet. The CH47D will be replaced by the CH-47F, a remanufactured version of the CH47D with a new digital cockpit and modified airframe to reduce vibrations. 

The CH-47F was approved for full-scale production in November 2004, and 

officials state the Army plans to convert the entire fleet by fiscal year 2018. 

There are 395 CH-47D models and 3 CH-47F models in the Army inventory, 

but the CH-47F models are not assigned to units. The average age of the 

CH-47D model is about 17 years. Army aircraft generally have life cycles of 

20 years.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 64 GAO-06-141 

Figure 16: CH-47D Chinook Helicopter

Condition 

Our assessment of the CH-47D’s condition as red is unchanged since our 

prior report.11 Mission capable rates for the fleet, as shown in figure 17, 

were consistently below service goals for fiscal year 1999 through fiscal 

year 2004. Officials stated that the aircraft is currently being flown in Iraq 

and Afghanistan three times more than planned peacetime rates, with the 

CH-47D flying 200 hours in 6 months when it was originally planned to fly 

200 hours in 18 months. Deployment cycles for the CH-47D are often longer 

than other equipment. While most Army helicopters remain in theater for 

about a year, officials report that some CH-47D helicopters have been in 

theater for almost 2 1⁄2 years. This usage, particularly in a desert 

environment, has increased the amount of maintenance and number of 

parts needed to sustain the aircraft, which in turn has negatively impacted 

overall readiness. According to officials, current shortages of CH-47D 

helicopters and the requirement to fill nearly simultaneous competing 

priorities with limited resources may require additional CH-47D helicopters 

to remain in theater as stay-behind equipment. Despite these challenges, 

officials state that the CH-47D has proven itself in theater. For example, 

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

11GAO-04-112.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 65 GAO-06-141 

between February 2003 and December 2004 the CH-47D’s mission capable 

rates in Afghanistan exceeded the Army’s goal.

Figure 17: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Chinook CH-47D/F 

Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the Chinook as yellow 

because the Army has plans to address the issues affecting the current 

condition but has yet to implement all of the solutions. Officials stated that 

the components that affect readiness the most can be repaired at the depot; 

however, the emphasis (e.g., transportation priorities) is on pushing parts 

to units but not necessarily returning the broken parts to the depot for 

repair. According to officials, the Army is working in coordination with 

depot personnel to become more efficient at identifying and returning the 

broken parts for repair, as well as developing relationships with original 

equipment manufacturers to allow for a faster replacement of spare parts. 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Goal

ARNG/USAR

Active

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 66 GAO-06-141 

However, whether these efforts will be successful and the degree to which 

they resolve parts shortages remains to be seen.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy for the CH-47 as green because 

the Army has and is funding a modernization strategy to improve the CH-47 

capability and lifespan. The Army plans to have a final CH-47F fleet size of 

452 aircraft, to include 397 CH-47F aircraft that were remanufactured from 

the CH-47D and 55 new build CH-47F aircraft. Officials stated that 

conversion from the CH-47D to the CH-47F adds about 20 years to the 

service life of an aircraft, as well as improving performance and reducing 

overall operations and sustainment costs.

OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter The Kiowa is a multimission armed reconnaissance helicopter designed to 

support combat and contingency operations. Deliveries of the OH-58D 

began in 1985, and the last new one was delivered to the Army in 1999. 

There are 354 Kiowa helicopters in the Army’s inventory, and their average 

age is about 13 years. While the expected service life for an OH-58Ds is 20 

years, the Army plans to retire the entire OH-58D fleet by fiscal year 2013 

and to replace it with the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 67 GAO-06-141 

Figure 18: OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter 

Condition 

We assessed the condition of the Kiowa as green because the mission 

capable rates have been consistently above service goals for calendar years 

1999 through 2004. As seen in figure 19, the OH-58D has remained at or 

above the 80 percent mission capable rate. Further, 96 OH-58Ds have 

deployed to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have exceeded 

their planned flight hours; specifically, peacetime average usage for the OH58D is about 20 hours per month, but the actual flight hours for 

deployments has averaged between 80 and 100 hours per month. The Army 

attributes higher readiness rates of the OH-58D in part to simple design and 

a lighter airframe. For example, the OH-58D’s mission capable rates in Iraq 

between February 2003 and December 2004 almost met the Army’s goal. In 

addition, routine maintenance is performed on the Kiowa after every 40 

hours of operation instead of the 300-400 hours for other aircraft, and the 

original equipment manufacturer, Bell Helicopter, conducts the depot-level 

repairs.

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 68 GAO-06-141 

Figure 19: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army OH-58D Kiowa 

Helicopters, Calendar Years 1999 – 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the OH-58D as 

green because the Army’s plans and funding will allow the aircraft to meet 

its requirements in the near term. The OH-58D reset and safety 

enhancement programs, which are fully funded, include safety 

enhancements, weight reduction, and other maintenance actions. Funding 

for the Kiowa since fiscal year 1999 has been near Army requests.12

Additionally, due to the planned replacement of the Kiowa beginning in 

fiscal year 2008, public law limits funds that can be spent on the aircraft to

Year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

12Fiscal year 2003 funding authorizations were about 7 percent less than requested, and 

fiscal year 2004 funding authorizations were about 11 percent more than requested.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 69 GAO-06-141 

basic sustainment, maintenance and safety measures.13 For that reason 

Kiowa battle losses are not being replaced; however, according to the 

Army, the existing fleet is sufficient to meet requirements over the next 1–3 

years, even at higher usage rates.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the Kiowa as 

green because the Army has a funded strategy to field its replacement, the 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. According to the Army, this aircraft is a 

relatively inexpensive armed aerial platform that will integrate a 

commercial off the shelf aircraft with non-developmental mission 

equipment packages to the extent possible. The Army’s acquisition 

objective is to have a fleet of 368 armed reconnaissance aircraft. The plan is 

for the Kiowa to be phased out of the Army’s inventory beginning in fiscal 

year 2008 as the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter is fielded.

1310 U.S.C. § 2241, note. This law provides that, except for safety modifications, funds 

should not be used for the modification of an aircraft, weapon, ship, or other equipment that 

the military department concerned plans to retire or otherwise dispose of within 5 years 

after completion of the modification. 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 70 GAO-06-141 

Marine Corps

M1A1 Abrams Tank First delivered to the Marine Corps at the beginning of Operation Desert 

Storm, the Abrams is the Marine Corps’ main battle tank and destroys 

enemy forces using enhanced mobility and firepower provided by a 

powerful turbine engine and a 120 millimeter main gun. The Marine Corps 

possesses only one variant of the Abrams, the M1A1. The M1A1 variant 

fleet consists of a depleted uranium turret version and a “Plain Jane” 

version, which lacks the enhanced armor. There are 403 M1A1 tanks in the 

inventory, and the estimated average age is 16 years. The Marine Corps 

plans to use the M1A1 as its main battle tank until it is replaced by the 

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles 

which is planned to be fielded in 2025.

Figure 20: M1A1 Abrams Tank

Condition 

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 71 GAO-06-141 

We assessed the condition of the Abrams tank fleet as red because the 

Marine Corps has failed to meet its stated readiness goal of 90 percent on 

several occasions during the fiscal years 1999 to 2004 period and, as shown 

in figure 21, recent readiness trends indicate a steady decline away from 

the readiness goal. Marine Corps officials attribute the decline of the 

condition of the tank fleet to the demand on equipment as a result of 

operations in support of the Operation Iraqi Freedom and Marine Corps 

manpower levels. Since 2003, the Marine Corps has deployed tanks to 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, a theater where equipment has been used 

aggressively in rugged environments. Shortages of maintenance personnel 

are a result of the transfers of personnel to units that are deploying and unit 

staffing levels.

Figure 21: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps M1A1 Abrams Tanks, 

Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 72 GAO-06-141 

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the M1A1 

Abrams tank fleet as yellow because the Marine Corps has not fully funded 

its tank remanufacture program and has identified additional unfunded 

priorities for fiscal year 2006. The Marine Corps is conducting a 

remanufacture program on the M1A1 tank that is intended to improve the 

quality of the existing equipment by applying all equipment modifications 

and replacing worn components. The Marine Corps has fully funded the 

remanufacture of 79 tanks during fiscal year 2005; however, it only 

identified funding for about 33 percent of the scheduled tank 

remanufactures during fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Marine officials believe 

that they will be able to meet all remanufacturing requirements because the 

tank program has identified similar funding requirement to Marine Corps 

Logistics Command in the past and has received sufficient funding to meet 

the remanufacture needs. The Marine Corps identified $77 million in 

unfunded priorities for the Abrams program in fiscal year 2006. The 

majority of this amount, $40 million, is to support continued depot 

maintenance operations and the remainder is to procure Firepower 

Enhancement Program suites, which increase the detection, recognition, 

and identification of targets.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the M1A1 

Abrams tank fleet as yellow because the Marine Corps has not completely 

identified the program requirements or funding for its replacement system, 

the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Expeditionary Family of Fighting 

Vehicles; however, they are taking steps to increase the service life of the 

M1A1. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Expeditionary Family of Fighting 

Vehicles is scheduled to be the replacement for the Abrams tank and other 

Marine Corps ground fighting systems. In order to extend the life of the 

current fleet of Abrams tanks, the Marine Corps has identified funding for 

80 percent of the scheduled tank remanufactures during fiscal years 2008 

and 2009. The Marine Corps has tentatively established plans to conduct a 

Service Life Extension Program for the M1A1 fleet in future years. As this 

program is to start in years beyond the current Future Years Defense 

Program budget, no funding has been identified currently. The Service Life 

Extension Program may be essential to ensure that the current fleet of 

Abrams tanks remains serviceable until the replacement vehicle is fielded.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 73 GAO-06-141 

Light Armored Vehicle – C2 

and 25 Variants

The LAV-C2 Command and Control and the LAV-25 are two variants from 

the family of Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) that we included in our review. 

Both variants are all-terrain, all-weather vehicles with night capabilities 

and can be fully amphibious within 3 minutes. The LAV-C2 variant is a 

mobile command station providing field commanders with the necessary 

resources to command and control Light Armored Reconnaissance units. 

The average age of the LAV-C2 is 18 years and there are 50 in the inventory. 

The LAV-25 provides rapid maneuverability, armor protection, and 

firepower to the Light Armed Reconnaissance units. The average age of the 

LAV-25 is 19 years and there are 407 in the inventory. The family of Light 

Armored Vehicles is expected to be replaced by the Marine Air-Ground 

Task Force Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles. 

Figure 22: Light Armored Vehicle

Condition

In our previous report we assessed the condition of the LAV-C2 as green 

because the Marine Corps had initiated a fleet-wide Service Life Extension 

Program to extend the service life of the vehicle.14 However, in this review 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps.

14GAO-04-112.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 74 GAO-06-141 

we assessed both the LAV-C2 and the LAV-25 variants of the Light Armored 

Vehicles and we assessed the condition of these vehicles as yellow. While 

the material readiness rates15 for the two variants were near the readiness 

goal of 85 percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 (see fig. 23); the 

overall material readiness rate trend declined during this period. Marine 

Corps officials stated that despite the fact that the vehicles did not meet the 

Marine Corps’ readiness goal they were able to fulfill all mission 

requirements during this period. However, the vehicle’s high usage in 

support of contingency operations has placed a strain on the supply system 

and has led to shortages of key Light Armored Vehicle components, such as 

struts and drive train components. 

Figure 23: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps LAV-25 and LAV C-2, 

Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 

15The material readiness rate reflects the operational capability of Marine Corps ground 

equipment and is comparable to mission capable rates.

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

LAV-25 Actual

LAV-C2 Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 75 GAO-06-141 

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the Light 

Armored Vehicle as yellow because although a service life extension 

program and some upgrades are planned and funded, there are some 

essential program requirements that remain unfunded. A service life 

extension program designed to improve the quality and extend the life of 

the vehicles has already been performed on a majority of the vehicles. In 

addition to the service life extension program, the LAV-C2 and LAV-25 are 

planned to receive upgrades to address capabilities deficiencies. The 

upgrade to the LAV-C2 will enhance communications capabilities, affording 

more commonality with other vehicles and helicopter systems. The 

upgrade to the LAV-25 will enhance target recognition and the lethality 

upgrade will increase the fire power of the vehicle’s 25-millimeter main 

gun. A program is also funded to address any obsolescence issues. 

Additionally, as a result of force structure changes, the Marine Corps is 

establishing five new light armored reconnaissance units and has received 

fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriations to purchase new upgraded 

vehicles to equip these units and begin upgrades on the legacy fleet. 

However, the Marine Corps has identified $113 million as an unfunded 

requirement that is needed to complete the standardization of the older 

LAVs. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the Light 

Armored Vehicle as yellow because while the Marine Corps has not 

completely identified the requirements for its replacement system or 

established associated program strategy or funding, the completion of the 

near-term plans may help the Marine Corps sustain its fleet of LAVs until 

the replacement is fielded. Both the LAV-C2 and the LAV-25 upgrades to 

address capabilities deficiencies have achieved or will achieve initial 

operational capability by fiscal year 2009. 

Assault Amphibian Vehicle Three variants represent the family of Assault Amphibian Vehicles (AAV). 

The AAVs are armored full-tracked landing vehicles. The Personnel variant 

carries troops from ship to shore and to inland objectives and there are 

930 in the inventory. The C2 Command and Communications variant 

provides a mobile task force communication center in water operations 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 76 GAO-06-141 

and from ship to shore and to inland areas and there are 76 in the inventory. 

The Recovery variant recovers similar or smaller sized vehicles. It also 

carries basic maintenance equipment to provide field support maintenance 

to vehicles in the field. There are 51 Recovery variants in the inventory. The 

average age of the vehicle is 28.6 years. All of the AAVs will be 

remanufactured under the Reliability, Availability and 

Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard upgrade program, which began in 1998 

to lengthen the vehicle’s expected service life. The fleet of AAVs is 

scheduled to be replaced by the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle beginning 

in 2010.

Figure 24: Assault Amphibian Vehicle

Condition 

Our assessment of the condition of the AAV fleet as yellow is unchanged 

since our prior report.16 Although the fleet material readiness rates varied 

by vehicle type and by year, as shown in figure 25, the overall readiness 

trend for the fleet during the fiscal years 1999 to 2004 period declined. 

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

16GAO-04-112.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 77 GAO-06-141 

Despite the declining material readiness, Marine Corps officials stated that 

the AAVs were able to meet all operational requirements. Wartime 

utilization rates for the vehicles in Operation Iraqi Freedom were as high as 

11 times the normal peacetime rate. 

Figure 25: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps Assault Amphibian 

Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the condition of the near-term program strategy and funding of 

the AAV fleet as yellow because while the Marine Corps is completing the 

Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard upgrade on 

all of the remaining 377 vehicles in its fleet, this upgrade only returns the 

vehicle to its original operating condition and does not add any upgraded 

capability. While Marine Corps officials stated that the vehicles have been 

able to perform all of their operational requirements, the AAVs lack some 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

AAV-Recovery

AAV-Command/Communications

AAV-Personnel

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 78 GAO-06-141 

capabilities in areas such as target acquisition (day and night) and 

land/water mobility, which are needed to carry out their warfighting 

doctrine—Operational Maneuver from the Sea. The Reliability, Availability, 

and Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard upgrade program for 327 of the 

377 vehicles has been funded through regular Marine Corps procurement 

appropriations, supplemental appropriations, and congressional 

adjustments over the past few years. Funding for the conversion of the 

remaining 50 vehicles, plus 8 for future replacements of combat losses, was 

included in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental request. In addition to 

funding the upgrades, the requested procurement will also fund 

engineering changes to help sustain the AAV fleet and purchase add-on 

armor. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the AAV fleet as 

yellow because while the Marine Corps will have completed an extensive 

upgrade of the fleet with the Reliability, Availability, and 

Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard program, the timely fielding of the 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle remains in question. DOD reduced funding, 

thus delaying the initial fielding of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle to 

fiscal year 2010, 4 years past the original date. Operators and maintainers 

we spoke with are concerned about the delay because the Reliability, 

Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard program is expected 

to help the AAV fleet serve until the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is fully 

fielded, but the current rate of usage in Operation Iraqi Freedom could 

significantly shorten the serviceable life of the current fleet. Officials 

expect that all Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to 

Standard vehicles will need to go through an Inspect and Replace Only As 

Necessary maintenance program17 since they will have to stay in the fleet 

longer than expected. 

17During an Inspect and Replace Only As Necessary maintenance program, vehicles are 

disassembled and inspected for deficiencies and only those deficiencies that are identified 

are repaired or replaced.
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Marine Corps Medium 

Tactical Vehicle 

Replacement 

The Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) is a family of trucks 

with 7-ton capacity that consists of six variants. Comprising the Medium 

Tactical Vehicle Replacement fleet is a standard 7-ton cargo variant, an 

extended bed 7-ton vehicle, a dump truck, and a wrecker. The MTVR began 

replacing two aging variants of 5-ton vehicles in fiscal year 2002. The MTVR 

is capable of moving personnel and cargo cross country in support of 

maneuver units. The MTVR has increased capabilities compared to the 

5-ton truck and is capable of being delivered by cargo aviation assets. 

Figure 26: Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement

Condition 

We assessed the condition as green because, as can be seen in figure 27, the 

Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement fleet has met the Marine Corps’ 

stated material readiness goal of 85 percent for the 2 years that data were 

available, fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Though the MTVRs are being 

aggressively used in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, officials stated 

that they are fairly easy to maintain and there are sufficient repair parts to 

meet current requirements. Officials also attribute much of the Marine 

Corps’ success at keeping high material readiness rates to the maintenance 

personnel.

Source: U.S. Marine Corps.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 80 GAO-06-141 

Figure 27: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps Medium Tactical 

Vehicle Replacement Fleet, Fiscal Years 2003 – 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the MTVR as 

green because, despite experiencing some combat losses and the lack of 

funding to replace these losses, the Marine Corps has made plans to meet 7-

ton vehicle demands of the Marine Corps in the short term. The Marine 

Corps possesses an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract with 

Oshkosh Trucks, which allows it to increase the number of vehicles in the 

fleet without negotiating a new contract. The Marine Corps has utilized this 

contract to procure an additional 1,850 MTVR upgrade armor kits, which 

will be used to provide additional protection to deploying Marine 

Expeditionary Units and as a reserve for Marine Expeditionary Brigades. In 

the fiscal year 2006 Unfunded Programs List, the Marine Corps identified 

$1.4 million to procure seven new MTVRs that will help replace actual and 

projected combat losses.

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Actual

Goal

2003 2004

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 81 GAO-06-141 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the MTVR as 

green because the Marine Corps plans provide sufficient numbers of 

MTVRs to equip all Marine Corps units in the long-term. Marine Corps 

officials stated that they have plans to reconstitute equipment returning 

from deployment and may rotate equipment between deploying units and 

prepositioned forces. The officials believe that these actions could balance 

out the usage rates of the fleet and therefore maintain the fleet’s life 

expectancy. As discussed in the near-term program strategy and funding, 

the Marine Corps possesses an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity 

contract with the original equipment manufacturer and program officials 

believe the Marine Corps can source equipment in the future to meet 

requirements. 

AV-8B Harrier Jet The AV-8B Harrier Jet’s mission is to attack and destroy surface targets 

during day and night conditions and to escort assault support aircraft. It 

has a short takeoff and vertical landing capability to enable it to deploy and 

operate from amphibious assault ships and remote tactical landing sites. 

There are 154 in inventory (131 combat capable aircraft, 17 noncombat 

capable training aircraft, and 6 aircraft in storage), with an average age of

9 years. The Joint Strike Fighter is expected to replace the AV-8B beginning 

in 2012.

Figure 28: AV-8B Harrier Jet

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
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Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 82 GAO-06-141 

Condition 

We assessed the condition of the AV-8B as yellow because it consistently 

failed to meet the Marine Corps’ mission capable rate goal of 76 percent 

between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 (see fig. 29 below). However, despite 

missing the mission capable goal, the mission capable trend showed some 

improvement through fiscal year 2003. Further, the AV-8B aircraft 

nonmission capable rates for maintenance and supply also showed 

improvement during that time frame. Marine Corps officials commented 

favorably on the aircraft’s performance in support of operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, and the aircraft’s wartime utilization was about one and onehalf times the normal peacetime rate. A defense panel has analyzed past 

problems with the aircraft and they have recommended improvements to 

maintenance cycles and technician availability. 

Figure 29: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps AV-8B Aircraft, Fiscal 

Years 1999 – 2004 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 83 GAO-06-141 

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the AV-8B as 

green because the Marine Corps has several initiatives and programs 

established and funded to improve the capabilities, safety, and reliability of 

the aircraft. The Marine Corps has procured, either through upgrades or 

remanufacture, 93 aircraft with radar/night attack which increases the 

ability of the aircraft to complete assigned missions in a greater variety of 

weather and light conditions. Officials also report that they have fully 

equipped all AV-8B aircraft with LITENING pods which increase image 

resolution for ground targeting. The Marine Corps has also developed new 

maintenance practices and policies that will increase readiness and 

decrease downtime spent in maintenance. According to Marine Corps 

officials, as a result of these policies the Marine Corps has seen an 

approximately 66 percent increase in the serviceable life of the aircraft.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the AV-8B as 

yellow given the potential for delays in the Joint Strike Fighter program 

which will require the AV-8B to fly longer than expected. Increasing 

program costs and unproven critical technologies could further delay the 

Joint Strike Fighter program’s initial entry into service, which is currently 

planned for 2012 with complete fielding in 2024. The Marine Corps 

currently plans to fly the AV-8B until the 2011-2020 time frame. Marine 

Corps officials note that funding is sufficient to execute the long-term 

program strategy for the AV-8B through the Future Years Defense Program. 

AH-1W Super Cobra 

Helicopter

The AH-1W Super Cobra is a day/night, marginal weather, Marine Corps, 

attack helicopter that provides en route escort and protection of troop 

assault helicopters, landing zone fire suppression during the assault phase, 

and fire support during ground escort operations. There are 179 aircraft in 

the inventory with an average age of 15 years. 
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Figure 30: AH-1W Super Cobra

Condition 

As in our prior report,18 we assessed the condition of the AH-1W Super 

Cobra as yellow because the aircraft consistently failed to meet its mission 

capable rate goal of 85 percent during the fiscal year 1999 to 2004 period, as 

shown in figure 31. Despite the aircraft’s low mission capable rates, 

officials stated that the AH-1W was able to meet all of its mission 

requirements during this period. Further, the AH-1W upgrade program may 

decrease maintenance needs due to parts commonality with other Marine 

Corps utility helicopters. The AH-1W has served in both Operation 

Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and deployed mission 

capable rates were higher than for those aircraft that were not deployed. 

The aircraft wartime utilization is about two times that of peacetime 

operations. The Marine Corps rotates the Super Cobras out of these 

theaters and conducts depot-level maintenance on the aircraft upon their 

return. 

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

18GAO-04-112.
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Figure 31: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps AH-1W Helicopters, 

Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the AH-1W as 

yellow because while the Marine Corps has established a program to 

remanufacture the current fleet of AH-1W Super Cobras to a more capable 

AH-1Z, they may experience a shortage of AH-1Ws during the 

remanufacturing process. Officials stated that they may be short as many 

as 40 AH-1Ws due to operational requirements and forecasts for future 

attrition. Marine Corps officials further stated that if there is a shortfall, it 

would largely occur in the reserves due to the current operational 

requirements for the active squadrons. This could seriously impact the 

reserve air wing’s ability to train pilots and meet operational requirements 

in the future. Additionally, the Marine Corps identified $50 million in 

unfunded requirements for engineering efforts associated with the 

remanufacturing program.

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

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Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the AH-1W 

Super Cobra as yellow because, as discussed in the near-term program 

strategy and funding, the Marine Corps potentially faces many years of AH1W shortages as the remanufacturing effort and future operational 

requirements place demands on the fleet. According to Marine Corps 

officials, if the upgrade program remains on schedule, the entire fleet of 

AH-1W will be upgraded to the AH-1Z by fiscal year 2017. 

CH-46E Sea Knight 

Helicopter

The CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter provides all-weather, day/night, and 

night vision goggle assault transport of combat troops, supplies, and 

equipment during amphibious operations ashore. The total inventory of 

CH-46Es is 223 and the average age is 36 years. The Marine Corps plans to 

replace the fleet of CH-46E with the MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft beginning in 

2007.

Figure 32: CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
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Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

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Condition 

In our previous report, the CH-46E received a red rating because the 

aircraft consistently failed to meet mission capable goals.19 However, in this 

review we rated the condition of the CH-46E as yellow because although 

the mission capable rate trend is declining as shown in figure 33, rates were 

near the goal of 80 percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. Further, 

deployed mission capable rates were higher than nondeployed aircraft. 

Marine Corps officials noted that the CH-46E was able to meet mission 

requirements for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the aircraft’s 

wartime utilization was three times the normal peacetime rate. To help 

improve the condition of the aircraft, the Marine Corps has completed an 

analysis on the airframe and all major aircraft subsystems and has 

established a calendar-based depot maintenance cycle. Additionally, as of 

the end of August 2005, 234 engine upgrades have been completed. The 

engine upgrade is expected to improve capability and reduce maintenance 

requirements. However, Marine Corps officials stated that sustainment of 

the aircraft is still a concern due to its age and the fact that the aircraft may 

have to be in service longer due to fielding delays and funding cuts for the 

MV-22. 

19GAO-04-112.
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Figure 33: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps CH-46E Helicopters, 

Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the CH-46E as 

red because the Marine Corps may be unable to meet its near-term 

operational requirements due to aircraft and potential repair part shortages 

caused by the age of the aircraft. Despite funding upgrades and 

modifications to the CH-46E to improve its safety, reliability, and 

survivability, repair parts may not be available through normal 

procurement lines because some of the original production lines have been 

closed. The Marine Corps is planning to rely on retiring aircraft to provide 

replacement parts for operating aircraft. Due to fielding delays of the MV22, the CH-46E will not be retired at the pace anticipated and, according to 

Marine Corps officials this could lead to some repair parts shortages. Given 

the continued demands to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, pilot 

training, and the current scheduled fielding of the MV-22, the Marine Corps 

may be short one CH-46E squadron for a period of 2 years starting in 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

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January 2006. Marine Corps officials stated that this squadron is necessary 

to support current contingency operations and operational plans developed 

at combatant command headquarters. They also stated that they are 

considering options to mitigate these issues by engineering repair parts to 

extend the serviceable life of aircraft components and utilizing other types 

of aircraft to fill in for the decommissioned squadron.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the CH-46E as 

red because delays in the MV-22 fielding will force the CH-46E to continue 

flying much longer than planned and this could impact the Marine Corps’ 

ability to support future operations. DOD reduced procurement funding for 

the MV-22 aircraft in its 2006 budget request, which delays the full 

authorized fielding of all MV-22 squadrons until fiscal year 2016 versus 

2011. This delay will force some squadrons, especially in the reserves, to 

continue to fly the older CH-46E despite the fact that it may not be able to 

support Marine Corps operational doctrine. Operational Maneuver from 

the Sea, a Marine Corps war-fighting doctrine, calls for forces to cross great 

distances to engage an enemy. These requirements currently exceed the 

capabilities of the CH-46E. 

CH-53E Super Stallion 

Helicopter

The CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter provides assault support by 

transporting heavy weapons, equipment (such as High Mobility MultiWheeled Vehicles and Light Armored Vehicles), supplies, and troops. The 

CH-53E is capable of in-flight refueling. The average age is 17 years and 

there are 147 CH-53Es in the inventory. The expected replacement for the 

CH-53E is the Heavy Lift Replacement, but the requirements are still being 

determined. The Heavy Lift Replacement is expected to enter service in 

2015. 
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Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 90 GAO-06-141 

Figure 34: CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter

Source: U.S. Marine Corps.
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Page 91 GAO-06-141 

Condition 

We rated the condition of the CH-53E as yellow because the aircraft did not 

meet its mission capable goal of 70 percent in some years and between 

fiscal years 2003 and 2004 the mission capable rates declined as shown in 

figure 35. The aircraft wartime utilization is about two times that of 

peacetime operations, and the aircraft mission capable rates for deployed 

aircraft are higher than those for aircraft that are not deployed. According 

to Marine Corps officials, fatigue issues related to age, as well as structural 

cracks in the tail boom area of the aircraft, have been ongoing problems 

with the CH-53E fleet. The higher-than-expected usage rates in Operations 

Iraqi and Enduring Freedom have accelerated the need to repair these 

areas. The Marine Corps is addressing the structural cracks and engine 

upgrades through several programs. The engine upgrades are expected to 

improve capability and reduce maintenance requirements. Further, despite 

the declining readiness rates, officials stated that the CH-53E was able to 

meet all operational requirements.
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Page 92 GAO-06-141 

Figure 35: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps CH-53E Helicopters, 

Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004 

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the CH-53E as 

yellow because, although the Marine Corps has several initiatives 

underway that will help sustain and improve capabilities of the CH-53E, 

some of the upgrades and safety issues are on the service’s fiscal year 2006 

unfunded program list. The Marine Corps has received funding from 

congressional adjustments and supplemental appropriations to fully outfit 

their CH-53E squadrons with aircraft armor systems, but it lacks sufficient 

funds to upgrade all engines or completely field diagnostic systems. 

According to Marine Corps officials, the diagnostic systems assist 

maintainers by identifying maintenance issues ahead of scheduled 

maintenance programs and will reduce the maintenance man hours 

required to support the aircraft. The Marine Corps identified $30.6 million 

for these diagnostic systems and engine upgrades as unfunded priorities in 

fiscal year 2006. 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

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Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We rated the long-term program strategy and funding of the CH-53E as red 

because the requirements for the Heavy Lift Replacement, the replacement 

aircraft for the CH-53E, are still being established despite an initial fielding 

planned for 2015. According to officials, the Marine Corps must maintain at 

least 120 CH-53Es until the initial fielding of the Heavy Lift Replacement in 

order to support Marine Corps operations. Repair of the structural cracks 

found in the aircraft is critical to maintaining an adequate inventory of CH53Es until the Heavy Lift Replacement becomes operational. Officials 

estimate that, if the current high usage rate and estimates of attrition hold 

true, the number of CH-53Es may fall below the number necessary to 

remain in service until the Heavy Lift Replacement becomes available 

unless required funding and maintenance are available. 
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Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 94 GAO-06-141 

Navy

DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class 

Destroyer

Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers (DDG-51 class) provide multimission 

offensive and defensive capabilities and can operate independently or as 

part of a carrier strike group, surface action group, or expeditionary strike 

group. The primary missions of the Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers are the 

destruction of enemy cruise missiles, aircraft, surface ships, and 

submarines and to attack land targets in support of joint or combined 

operations. The first ship of this class was commissioned in 1991. The Navy 

plans to build 62 ships of this type and 47 of these platforms have been 

commissioned to date. The average age of DDG-51s in the fleet is 6.45 

years. The final DDG-51 class ship will be delivered in fiscal year 2011. 

Figure 36: DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer

Condition 

We assessed the condition of the DDG-51 class as yellow due to 

maintenance issues related to major ship systems and bandwidth 

limitations experienced by this ship class. Similarly, this ship class received 

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
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Page 95 GAO-06-141 

a yellow rating in our previous report.20 Each year a number of ships in the 

DDG-51 class are evaluated by Navy inspectors; most of the DDG-51 class 

ships inspected in recent years have done well in important inspection 

areas, such as the destroyer’s electrical and combat systems. However, 

areas such as the environmental protection systems and damage control 

systems performed poorly in these evaluations. For example, watertight 

doors are problematic in this type of ship and generally are in poor 

condition in all surface ships. In addition, the DDG-51 also has issues with 

corrosion, insufficient bandwidth for Web-based communication, and 

cracks on its bow, or the front, of the ship. Sufficient bandwidth is critical 

to the ability of these ships to operate with the rest of the Navy, which 

relies heavily on the internet for day-to-day operations.

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the DDG-51 

class as green because the Navy has an effective strategy to address nearterm condition and concerns and sufficient funding is available for these 

plans. The Navy strategy identifies classwide deficiencies, prioritizes their 

importance, and then addresses the most significant issues. The Navy 

closely monitors corrosion, and has taken preventative measures to reduce 

its impact. Finally, the Navy will install Super High Frequency capabilities 

in the DDG-51 class to improve bandwidth limitations, and a review of the 

bow cracks is in progress. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the DDG-51 

class as yellow because the Navy has a strategy to address long-term 

condition and concerns, but it is not fully funded. The Navy plans a Midlife 

Modernization to ensure that the DDG-51 class of ships remains a relevant 

fleet asset for its full life expectancy. The fully funded modernizations are 

scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2010, and include upgrades to DDG-51 

combat systems that may reduce personnel costs. However, the Navy has 

reduced planned future operation and maintenance funding across all 

surface ships in the fleet. These reductions have the potential to affect the 

20GAO-04-112.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 96 GAO-06-141 

material condition of the DDG-51 class, and cause higher costs in later 

years to make up for deferred maintenance. The DDG-51 class is expected 

to remain in the fleet until fiscal year 2046.

FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry 

Class Frigate

Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates (FFG-7 class) are surface combatants 

with antisubmarine warfare and limited antiair warfare capabilities. 

Frigates conduct escort for amphibious expeditionary forces, protection of 

shipping, maritime interdiction, and homeland defense missions. There are 

30 FFGs in the fleet, with an average age of 20.8 years. The FFG-7 class is 

expected to remain in service until 2019. There is no planned replacement 

for this ship; however, the Littoral Combat Ship will perform many of the 

missions currently performed by these ships.

Figure 37: FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
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Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 97 GAO-06-141 

Condition 

We assessed the condition of FFG-7 class as yellow, the same rating it 

received in the last report,21 due to maintenance issues related to major 

ship systems and bandwidth limitations experienced by this ship class. 

These frigates operate using diesel engines and these systems’ older 

engines need more maintenance than modern gas turbine engines. 

Additionally, the water and ventilation systems must be replaced to ensure 

that the ship can operate until it reaches the end of its required service life. 

Each year a number of ships in the FFG-7 class are evaluated by Navy 

inspectors, and they have also found shortfalls in damage control 

equipment and the environmental protection systems of these ships. 

Moreover, these frigates have only a limited amount of bandwidth and this 

affects their ability to operate with the rest of the Navy, which relies heavily 

on electronic communications for its day-to-day operations. Naval 

inspectors determined that other systems on board FFG-7 class ships were 

in good condition, including its propulsion and combat systems. 

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the FFG-7 

class as yellow because the Navy’s near-term plan to correct FFG-7 class 

condition problems does not address all issues. The Navy has decided not 

to install a Super High Frequency communication system on these ships to 

improve their access to bandwidth and improve their access to Web-based 

communication. Instead, these ships will continue to operate with a limited 

amount of available bandwidth in the future, despite the Navy’s increasing 

use of the internet to share operational, training, and personnel data. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term strategy of the FFG-7 class as yellow because of 

plans to decrease future operation and maintenance funding. The Navy 

plan to modify and modernize the FFG-7 fleet will be complete by fiscal 

year 2011; however, these modifications may not address all of the 

21GAO-04-112.
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problems that may arise in the aging FFG-7 class. DOD intends to decrease 

the amount of operation and maintenance funding available for its surface 

ships in the future, which may limit the Navy’s ability to address any 

emerging maintenance issues. While all surface ships will likely have 

maintenance funding cuts, the FFG-7 class and other older ships may be 

the most affected by these shortfalls. 

LPD-4 Amphibious 

Transport Dock Ship

Austin-class amphibious transport dock ships (LPD-4 class) are warships 

that embark, transport, and land elements of a Marine landing force and its 

equipment. Austin class ships also act as helicopter refueling stations and 

limited casualty receiving and treatment ships. There are currently 11 LPD4 class ships in the inventory with an average age of 37 years. The LPD-4 

class ships are expected to remain in the fleet until 2014. The San Antonioclass LPD-17 is beginning to replace the LPD-4 class in fiscal year 2005. 

Figure 38: LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship

Condition 

We assessed the condition of the LPD-4 class as yellow due to maintenance 

issues related to major ship systems and bandwidth limitations 

experienced by this ship class. The LPD-4 received the same yellow rating

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
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Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

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in our previous report.22 Insufficient air conditioning is a habitability 

concern on many LPD-4 class ships, especially given current operations in 

high-temperature regions. The LPD-4 class also has issues with electrical 

systems, propulsion, and insufficient bandwidth for Web-based 

communication. Sufficient bandwidth is critical to the ability of these ships 

to operate with the rest of the Navy, which relies heavily on the internet for 

day-to-day operations. While these maintenance issues are significant, 

some LPD-4 class ships have completed an Extended Sustainability 

Program that addressed the most severe maintenance problems affecting 

this class.

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the LPD-4 class 

as yellow because the Navy has a plan to address near-term condition and 

concerns, but it excludes those ships scheduled to decommission within 

5 years and the decommission dates have historically slipped. The Navy is 

in the midst of an Extended Sustainability Program that corrects serious 

LPD-4 class deficiencies, for example, its inadequate onboard electrical 

system. The Navy has selected 5 of 11 LPD-class ships for this program, and 

will have completed 4 by the end of fiscal year 2005. The ships that will not 

undergo the Extended Sustainability Program are all within 5 years of 

decommissioning, and therefore can only undergo normal repairs and 

maintenance. In the past, this decommissioning date has been moved back 

by several years, but ships have retained their decommissioning status—

thus preventing any upgrades or modernizations. This will lead to a wide 

variance of condition between different ships in the LPD-4 class. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the LPD-4 class 

as yellow because of plans to decrease future operation and maintenance 

funding, and uncertainty concerning the LPD-4’s service life. The Navy has 

reduced planned future operation and maintenance funding across all 

surface ships in the fleet. These reductions have the potential to affect the 

material condition of the LPD-4 class. Additionally, procurement of the 

22GAO-04-112.
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LPD-4 class replacement, the LPD-17 class, has been reduced from 12 ships 

to 9. However, the Navy requirement remains the same—the ability to 

transport two and a half Marine Expeditionary Brigades. 

F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet 

Aircraft

The F/A-18 is an all-weather fighter and attack aircraft with 6 models: the 

F/A-18 A, B, C, and D, also known as the Hornet; and the E and F also 

known as the Super Hornet. The capabilities of the Hornet and Super 

Hornet include fighter escort, fleet air defense, force projection, and close 

and deep air support. The current inventory of F/A-18’s is 914: A, 123; B, 28; 

C, 396; D, 139; E, 102; and F, 126. The average age in years is: A, 18.5; B, 20.2; 

C, 12.7; D, 12.1; E, 2.5; and F, 2.4. The Navy plans to gradually replace the 

Hornet with the Super Hornet and the Joint Strike Fighter.

Figure 39: F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft 

Condition 

We assessed the condition of the F/A-18 as green given that it generally is 

available in sufficient numbers to meet Navy requirements and though 

mission capable goals vary, all models are close to or exceed mission 

capable goals between calendar years 1999 and 2004, as shown in figure 40. 

Additionally, all variants of the F/A-18 consistently meet their daily 

availability requirements. In our previous study, the condition of the F/A-18 

was rated yellow because it missed its mission capable goals, but including 

the daily availability factor in our analysis improved its rating to green. 

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
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However, both the Hornet and Super Hornet have deficiencies with fuel 

systems and the Super Hornet also has deficiencies with cockpit canopies, 

all of which degrade mission capable rates. In addition, the Navy is 

beginning a long-term effort to replace the overstressed center section of 

the Hornet fuselage, the center barrel. This effort addresses the predictable 

rate of wear and deterioration on the aircraft due to factors such as carrier 

takeoff and landings and increases the expected service life of the aircraft. 

The aircraft is not available for operations during the 1 year scheduled for 

this process. According to officials, during this period the Navy takes 

advantage of aircraft time out of service to conduct scheduled maintenance 

and other modifications on those aircraft.

Figure 40: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy F/A-18 Aircraft, Calendar Years 1999 – 2004

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

F/A-18D Goal

F/A-18C Goal

F/A-18D Actual

F/A-18C Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

F/A-18F Goal

F/A-18E Goal

F/A-18F Actual

F/A-18E Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Year

Percent

Year

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

Percent
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 102 GAO-06-141 

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the F/A-18 as 

yellow because some funding is not identified for their program strategy, 

which includes important Hornet modernizations, and the Super Hornet 

lacks critical spare parts. The Navy is unable to fund improved detection 

and targeting systems for the Hornet, for example, the Advanced Targeting 

Forward Looking Infrared system, and the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing 

System. Similarly, the Super Hornet will, in the near term, experience 

shortfalls in the availability of Government Furnished Equipment: 

equipment directly acquired by the government and subsequently made 

available to a contractor. These equipment shortfalls for the Super Hornet 

include extra fuel tanks and bomb racks. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the F/A-18 as 

yellow because of the uncertain status of its replacement, the Joint Strike 

Fighter, and the complexity of the center barrel replacement effort. The 

Navy has plans to maintain enough operational F/A-18 aircraft to meet the 

Navy’s tactical air requirements until the Joint Strike Fighter is available by 

replacing the center barrels of 40 Hornets per year, a challenging goal given 

the complex nature of this effort. The Joint Strike Fighter is already behind 

schedule and a number of its critical technologies are immature, indicating 

that it may be delayed even further. Program officials confirmed that 

another delay in arrival of the Joint Strike Fighter would require the F/A-18 

program to seek other alternatives to meet requirement goals, such as to 

replace more center barrels on Hornets, manage the normal wear and tear 

on the aircraft, or procure additional Super Hornets. Moreover, center 

barrel stress is not the only factor used when determining the expected 

service life of an aircraft; flying hours and takeoff and landings also impact 

the F/A 18’s life expectancy. If Hornets are required to operate longer than 

currently planned, these aging aircraft may not be available in sufficient 

numbers to meet Navy requirements for tactical aircraft.

EA-6B Prowler Aircraft The EA-6B Prowler provides Electronic Attack and Anti-Radiation Missile 

capabilities against enemy radar and communications systems. The 

Prowler’s primary mission is to support strike aircraft and ground troops by 

jamming enemy radar, data links, and communications. The current 
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inventory is 119 with an average age of 21.9 years. The Prowler fleet 

consists of carrier-based squadrons, and land-based expeditionary 

squadrons. The expeditionary capability will be replaced by the Air Force’s 

B-52 electronic jammer suites, while the EA-18G Super Hornet Airborne 

Electronic Attack aircraft will begin to replace the carrier-based 

capabilities in 2009.

Figure 41: EA-6B Prowler

Condition 

We assessed the condition of the EA-6B as yellow, as we did in our previous 

report,23 because it consistently misses the Navy’s mission capable goal of 

73 percent between calendar years 1999 and 2004, as shown in figure 42, 

due to a number of maintenance problems. However, Navy officials believe 

the EA-6B will meet its daily availability requirements later this year. Much 

of this improvement is due to replacement of the center wing, which had 

shown signs of fatigue due to the stress of operations, on a number of these 

aircraft. The Navy will have completed this complex effort, which removed 

aircraft from the fleet for a number of months, on enough Prowlers to meet 

their requirements. Despite this improvement, the EA-6B’s mission capable 

rates have been degraded by problems with communications equipment, 

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

23GAO-04-112.
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canopies, and wings. Other problems with fuel cells and environmental 

control systems have also diminished mission capable rates. The EA-6B’s 

utilization rates have also been high, given its role as a high-demand asset 

in current operations.

Figure 42: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy EA-6B Aircraft, Calendar Years 

1999 – 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the EA-6B as 

yellow because the Navy has not funded all of its short-term requirements. 

The Navy has plans to address the major degraders of mission capable 

rates; however, not all of these plans are fully funded. Navy plans include 

replacing aging center wing sections in the EA-6B fleet. The condition of 

the Prowler fleet will continue to improve in the near term because of this 

funded initiative. Additionally, EA-6B officials have been working with 

manufacturers to correct canopy deficiencies and have resolved this 

problem. Current Navy plans for purchasing canopies are also fully funded 

Year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

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Page 105 GAO-06-141 

for all aircraft. However, currently no plans or funding have been identified 

to correct communications equipment issues. Furthermore, the Navy has 

not fully funded equipment that improves the EA-6B’s ability to use its 

unique electronic warfare capabilities to counter an emerging threat.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the EA-6B as 

yellow because only a limited number of aircraft will receive an upgrade 

that is critical to transition the EA-6B fleet to the EA-18G aircraft. In the 

long term, the Navy has outlined an effective strategy to modernize and 

replace the Prowler. This strategy includes wing replacement and 

Improved Capability III upgrades on the EA-6B. The Prowler’s capabilities 

will be replaced by the EA-18G and Air Force B-52 electronic jammer 

suites. However, this strategy has not been fully funded. Specifically, the 

Navy has a stated requirement to provide the Improved Capability III 

upgrade on 21 aircraft, but has only funded the upgrade for 14 aircraft. This 

improved third-generation capability is a significant technology leap 

beyond the EA-6B’s current jamming capabilities, and according to 

program officials, an important component in the Navy’s transition to the 

EA-18G. Moreover, aircraft with this capability will be used by the Marine 

Corps until 2015, at which time they plan to replace their EA-6B aircraft 

with a version of the Joint Strike Fighter. The Joint Strike Fighter is already 

behind schedule and a number of its critical technologies are immature, 

indicating that it may be delayed even further. 

P-3 Orion Aircraft The P-3 Orion is a four-engine turboprop antisubmarine and maritime 

surveillance aircraft. It provides undersea warfare; antisurface warfare; 

and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities to naval and joint 

commanders. There are 173 aircraft in the fleet and their average age is 24.4 

years. The Navy will replace P-3 capabilities with the Multi-mission 

Maritime Aircraft in 2013, and the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 106 GAO-06-141 

Figure 43: P-3 Orion Aircraft

Condition 

We assessed the condition of the P-3 as red because it has consistently 

missed its mission capable goals by a significant percentage, as shown in 

figure 44, and the Orion is not available in sufficient numbers to meet dayto-day Navy requirements. Overall, the condition of the P-3 has been 

primarily degraded by the effect of structural fatigue on its airframe and the 

obsolescence of communication, navigation, and primary war-fighting 

systems. To address airframe issues, specifically cracks in the aircraft’s 

wings, the Navy has instituted a special structural inspection and repair 

program. A number of aircraft are currently undergoing these special 

structural inspections and repairs, and are not available for fleet 

operations. Moreover, the obsolescence of the communication, navigation, 

and war-fighting systems resulted in only about 26 percent of these aircraft 

being rated as fully capable of performing all of their missions last year. 

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 107 GAO-06-141 

Figure 44: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy P-3 Aircraft, Calendar Years 

1999 – 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the P-3 as 

yellow because the Navy’s near-term plans do not address all condition and 

obsolescence issues. However, the Navy will have completed enough 

structural inspections and repairs to ensure that there are sufficient P-3 

Orions available to meet day-to-day requirements next year. While this 

mitigates serious airframe issues, obsolescence of electronics and avionic 

systems will continue to degrade the ability of this aircraft to fulfill all of its 

missions. The Navy will address some of these obsolescence issues in the 

short term, such as installing an improved high-frequency radio. However, 

other needed improvements have not been funded, for example, efforts to 

improve the aircraft’s over the horizon communications and upgrades for 

the aircraft’s missile defense system. 

Year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 108 GAO-06-141 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the P-3 as red 

because while the Navy has identified what can be done to address the 

obsolescence of the mission systems over the long term, this program has 

not been approved or funded. The Navy plan, known as the Anti-submarine 

Maritime Improvement Program, ensures the continued relevance of the P3 mission systems until the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft is operational. 

This improvement program has not been fully approved, nor has it been 

funded. The obsolescence of its mission system may have a significant 

impact on its war-fighting capabilities. Moreover, it is still not certain that 

the fixes identified for the P-3 airframe will ensure that sufficient numbers 

of this aircraft will be available until it is fully replaced in 2019.

Standard Missile-2 Surfaceto-Air Missile

The Standard Missile-2 is a medium to long-range, shipboard surface-to-air 

missile. The primary mission of the Standard Missile-2 is fleet area air 

defense and ship self-defense; its secondary mission is antisurface ship 

warfare. There are four different blocks of the Standard Missile-2 in service 

(III, IIIA, IIIB, and IV). The inventories of these blocks are classified, but 

over 88 percent of the inventory is greater than 11 years of age, and some 

blocks are older and less capable than others The capabilities of the 

Standard Missile-2 will be replaced by the Standard Missile-6 Extended 

Range Active Missile beginning in fiscal year 2009.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 109 GAO-06-141 

Figure 45: Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile

Source: U.S. Navy.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 110 GAO-06-141 

Condition 

We assessed the condition of the Standard Missile-2 as yellow because it 

has consistently failed to meet its asset readiness goal of 87 percent. The 

asset readiness goal is the missile equivalent of the mission capable goal. 

Timely certifications of missiles—assessments of equipment condition and 

necessary repair and replacement of missile components—are critical to 

these readiness rates. These certifications must be done approximately 

every 4 years and a missile is not ready for issue until certified. These 

assessments have not been done at a rate sufficient to meet asset readiness 

goals. In GAO’s previous study, the condition of the Standard Missile-2 was 

rated red; however, the asset readiness rates of these missiles have 

improved since that time. 

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the Standard 

Missile-2 as green because the Navy has a plan to address near-term 

condition, and the missile’s inventory meets Navy requirements in the near 

term. The Navy has been able to deliver a more maneuverable version of 

this missile—the Block IIIB-MU—ahead of schedule. In addition, the Navy 

has increased the amount of operation and maintenance funding over the 

next couple of years to maintain the asset readiness rate close to the goal. 

Both of these steps will allow the Navy to meet inventory requirements in 

the near term.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the Standard 

Missile-2 as red because future funding shortfalls will significantly affect 

missile availability. The Navy plans to meet requirements by procuring new 

missiles and modernizing existing ones. However, the new procurements 

and missile modernizations are not in sufficient numbers to allow the Navy 

to meet inventory requirements in the long term. Furthermore, the 

operation and maintenance funding planned for the long term is not 

sufficient for the Navy to meet asset readiness goals. Funding for 

certifications was limited until fiscal year 2004; subsequently, increased 

funding improved assets readiness rates. Funding will be limited again 

beginning in fiscal year 2007, affecting the long-term availability and ready-
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 111 GAO-06-141 

for-issue rate of the Standard Missile-2. While the Standard Missile-6 is 

currently ahead of schedule, this weapon will not be available in a timely 

manner or in sufficient numbers to allow the Navy to meet long-term 

inventory requirements.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 112 GAO-06-141 

Air Force For the six Air Force aircraft in this appendix, fiscal year 2004 data are 

through July 2004.

F-15 Eagle and Strike Eagle There are two types of F-15 aircraft: the F-15 Eagle (A-D variants) and the 

F-15E Strike Eagle. The F-15 A and F-15C are single-seat, supersonic fighter 

aircraft used for air-to-air combat, and the B and D variants are their dualseat training counterparts. The F-15E Strike Eagle is a dual-seat, supersonic 

fighter aircraft used for both air-to-air combat and air-to-ground combat. 

There are 513 F-15 Eagles and 221 F-15E Strike Eagles in the Air Force 

inventory, and the average age depends upon the variant, with F-15 Eagles 

ranging from about 21 years to 26 years, and the F-15E Strike Eagles 

averaging about 12 years. The F/A-22 is the designated replacement for the 

F-15 Eagle. The Air Force plans to retire most of the F-15 Eagle fleet, 

retaining 179 F-15C/D variants beyond 2015 to augment the F/A-22 through 

2025, while maintaining the entire fleet of F-15Es through at least 2025. 

Figure 46: F-15 Eagle

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 113 GAO-06-141 

Condition 

We assessed the condition of the F-15 C/D and F-15E as green because 

mission capable rates have been near the Air Force’s stated goal and have 

either improved or remained constant between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. 

The Air Force’s stated goal depends on the variant, and ranges from 79 

percent to 82 percent. As shown in figure 47, mission capable rates for the 

F-15 C/D and F-15 E variants, which are expected to remain in the fleet 

after retirement of the older F-15 aircraft, have increased to about 79 

percent. Officials stated that cracks and issues related to the age of the 

aircraft are the most common problems affecting the aircraft, but noted 

that the Air Force is addressing these issues through programmed depot 

maintenance. Officials also stated that the F-15 is a viable and capable 

system, noting that the F-15E models were used during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 114 GAO-06-141 

Figure 47: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force F-15 Eagle and Strike Eagle 

Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the F-15 and F-15E as 

green because the Air Force has developed and funded a strategy to 

address known problems, to include retirement of the older F-15 C/D 

variants. For capability and reliability upgrades, the Air Force has funded 

and is currently implementing replacements and upgrades for a variety of 

different systems on 179 F-15C/D variants, to include engines, radars, and 

various structural improvements. For the F-15E, the Air Force has funded 

modernization of different systems—computer processors, avionics, and 

software—which is collectively known as a Suite 5E upgrade. This 

upgrade, which is fully funded for the F-15E fleet, is scheduled to occur 

from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2011, and is expected to increase 

the survivability and weapons delivery capability of the aircraft. Officials 

also stated that technological obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

F15 E Goal

F15 C/D Goal

F15 E Actual

F15 C/D Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 115 GAO-06-141 

sources are a concern for the entire F-15 fleet; however, they also stated 

that it is manageable, and were confident that the Air Force had the correct 

procedures to address the issue.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy for the F-15 fleet as green 

because the Air Force near-term upgrades are fully funded and designed to 

keep the aircraft that will remain in the fleet viable and functioning through 

at least 2025. The F/A-22 Raptor is the F-15 Eagle's designated replacement, 

and officials stated that delays to its fielding schedule will not impact the 

retirement schedule of the F-15 fleet. Retirements for the F-15A/B aircraft 

are scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2005 with a total of 84 retirements 

expected to occur through fiscal year 2009, and retirement of 26 F-15 C/D 

aircraft is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2009. The F/A-22 is expected to 

achieve operational capability in December 2005, and the entire fleet of 179 

aircraft is currently scheduled to be procured through fiscal year 2008. 

Officials stated that the effect of changes in the F/A-22 fleet composition on 

further F-15 C/D aircraft retirements beyond fiscal year 2009 remains to be 

seen, as the total structure of the combat air fleet will be reviewed during 

the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.

F-16 Fighting Falcon The F-16 is a compact, multirole fighter with air-to-air combat and air-tosurface attack capabilities. There are four F-16 variants – the A and C 

models are designed for one pilot, while the B and D models are two-seat 

tandem cockpit aircraft, which are used for training and can also be flown 

individually. Of the four variants, the F-16 C and D models incorporate the 

latest technology and have the capability to suppress or destroy enemy air 

defenses. The Air Force currently has 1,353 F-16 aircraft in its inventory, 

and the average age is about 15 years. The Air Force plans to retire the A 

and B variants because they are not expected to be structurally viable past 

2008, although the specific schedule has yet to be published. The Air Force 

also plans to replace the F-16 with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter beginning in 

2013.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 116 GAO-06-141 

Figure 48: F-16 Fighting Falcon

Condition 

Consistent with the findings of our December 2003 report,24 we assessed 

the condition of the F-16 as green because mission capable rates have been 

near the Air Force’s stated goal and have remained relatively constant. For 

the A/B variants, mission capable rates were about 72 percent with an Air 

Force stated goal of 75 percent in fiscal year 2004 and, as shown in figure 

49, mission capable rates for the C/D variants were about 76 percent 

compared to a goal of 81 percent. Officials stated that the most significant 

factor affecting the F-16 is cracks, which occur mostly on older aircraft and 

because of the stress caused by repeatedly landing without dropping its 

two 2,000 pound bombs. Despite these concerns, the Air Force has plans to 

address cracking. Further, although the rates for all variants are below the 

goals, officials stated the F-16 was able to meet operational requirements.

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

24GAO-04-112.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 117 GAO-06-141 

Figure 49: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon 

Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 – 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the F-16 as green because 

the Air Force has developed and funded a strategy to address known 

problems. As we noted in our December 2003 report, structural issues 

related to age and use are affecting the F-16. To address these concerns, the 

Air Force began a structural augmentation program that strengthens the 

airframe in areas prone to cracking, namely the wings and fuselage. The 

structural augmentation program is expected to affect over 1200 of the 

aircraft and be completed by 2013. Other near-term initiatives that are 

being implemented to improve combat capabilities include the common 

configuration implementation program, which incorporates improvements 

to targeting, communications, and computer systems, and improvements to 

radar, avionics, and targeting systems. Officials stated that these programs 

are currently funded and being implemented, although not for the entire F16 fleet.

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 118 GAO-06-141 

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy for the F-16 as green because 

current and projected funding for aircraft modernizations identified in the 

near-term program strategy are designed to ensure longer-term viability for 

the next 15 years. Although the Air Force has yet to publish an F-16 

retirement schedule, officials indicate that the older variants will be retired, 

as will be reflected in future budget documents. The F-35 Joint Strike 

Fighter is the designated replacement for the F-16 but, according to 

officials, the retirement of the older F-16 variants will not be affected by the 

F-35 fielding schedule, since operational capability of the Air Force F-35 

aircraft is not expected to occur until fiscal year 2013 and the exact 

quantity remains to be determined.

B-1 Lancer Bomber The B-1 Lancer Bomber is a long-range, high-speed, large payload global 

attack aircraft that was originally designed for nuclear missions but was 

transitioned to a conventional role. In 2002, the Air Force began 

consolidating the fleet, reducing the B-1 inventory from 93 to 67 aircraft 

and transferring all remaining B-1 bombers to the active component. 

Beginning operations in 1986, the average age of the B-1 is about 17 years. 

The Air Force plans to keep the B-1 in use through at least 2040,25 so there 

are no immediate plans to replace the aircraft.

25Officials state that the calculated service life for a B-1 is 18,000 hours, and they estimate 

that the fleet would reach that point in 2040.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 119 GAO-06-141 

Figure 50: B-1 Lancer Bomber

Condition 

We assessed the condition of the B-1 as yellow because mission capable 

rates were below the Air Force stated goal most of the time between fiscal 

years 1999 and 2004. As shown in figure 51, mission capable rates have 

increased between 1999 and 2004. Parts shortages were identified as a 

reason keeping rates below goals, and officials identified generators, 

automatic pilot controllers, and various pump and hydraulic systems as the 

items that were most often in short supply. After consolidation of the B-1 

fleet in fiscal year 2002, the numbers of parts in the supply system 

increased as parts were taken from retired B-1 aircraft. To compensate for 

the smaller fleet size, the Air Force increased the mission capable goals 

from 67 percent in fiscal year 2002 to 76 percent in fiscal year 2003. The 

increase in the goal occurred as B-1 usage to support operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan increased. Although the aircraft’s mission capable rate was 

about 69 percent in fiscal year 2004, the rate for deployed aircraft was 80 

percent. Additionally, officials noted that the B-1 is capable of 

accomplishing the Air Force’s current needs.

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 120 GAO-06-141 

Figure 51: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force B-1 Lancer Bombers, Fiscal 

Years 1999 - 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the B-1 as green because 

the Air Force has planned and funded programs to address the near-term 

sustainment issues affecting the aircraft. According to officials, the 

forecasted number of flight hours serves as the basis for funding planned 

maintenance activity and expected number of parts required for the 

aircraft. The fluctuations in the fleet size, coupled with the increase in 

usage for operations overseas, caused instability in the supply chain and 

increased the difficulty in efficient planning of maintenance cycles. For the 

near term, the Air Force has addressed this concern by increasing the 

number of forecasted flight hours for fiscal year 2005, which increases the 

funding for supply and maintenance activities and is expected to correct 

the disparity. In addition to addressing near-term sustainment issues, the 

Air Force has already funded and will complete plans to increase the 

sustainability and wartime capabilities of the B-1, to include the planned 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 121 GAO-06-141 

fielding of increased munitions capabilities, and upgrades to the central 

computer systems and radar.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy for the B-1 as green because 

the Air Force has a proactive strategy to address anticipated shortages and 

deficiencies in the aircraft, and has funded modernization efforts to meet 

requirements. Although a newer system in the Air Force’s fleet, officials 

stated that technology has advanced significantly since the B-1 was fielded 

in the 1980s, resulting in a reduction in the number of manufacturers that 

make the original B-1 component parts. For example, the original computer 

technology in the B-1 used processors that, while cutting edge at the time, 

are slower than home computer processors. To address these issues, the 

Air Force has funded efforts to modernize and upgrade B-1 components, to 

include cockpit flight instrument displays and navigation systems. In 

addition to resolving potential supply chain concerns, these upgrades are 

also expected to enhance the aircraft’s combat capability.

B-2 Spirit Bomber The B-2 is a multirole heavy bomber with stealth characteristics, capable of 

employing nuclear and conventional weapons. The aircraft was produced 

in limited numbers to provide a low observable (i.e., stealth) capability to 

complement the B-1 and B-52 bombers. Its unique stealth capability 

enables the aircraft to penetrate air defenses. The Air Force has 21 B-2 

aircraft in its inventory, and the average age is about 10 years. The B-2 was 

deployed to support both Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. The B-2 is expected to remain in the Air Force’s 

inventory until 2058, so there are no immediate plans to replace the 

aircraft.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 122 GAO-06-141 

Figure 52: B-2 Spirit Bomber

Condition 

For the reasons associated with maintenance of stealth characteristics that 

we identified in our December 2003 report,26 we continue to assess the 

condition of the B-2 as yellow. As shown in figure 53, the B-2 did not 

consistently meet the Air Force mission capable goal of 50 to 51 percent 

between fiscal years 1999 and 2004.27 Officials stated that the small B-2 fleet 

size increases the difficulty in achieving goals, noting that a change in the 

mission capable status of one aircraft results in about a 7 percent change in 

the overall mission capable rate; however, when viewing other metrics, the 

B-2 condition is comparable with other bombers. Maintenance of stealth 

characteristics continues to be the primary driver of lower mission capable 

rates, and the Air Force is continuing to implement solutions. Despite 

difficulties associated with stealth maintenance, the B-2 is capable of 

accomplishing its wartime missions, achieving mission capable rates of 64 

percent for Operation Enduring Freedom and 73 percent during the initial 

months of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

26GAO-04-112.

27The Air Force did not have a mission capable goal for the B-2 in fiscal year 1999.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 123 GAO-06-141 

Figure 53: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force B-2 Spirit Bombers, Fiscal 

Years 1999 - 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the B-2 as green because 

the Air Force has developed and funded the strategy for sustaining the B-2 

inventory. The Air Force funded and continues to implement its Alternate 

High Frequency Material modification, which reduces the number of steps 

and the overall length of time required to conduct stealth maintenance. 

Thus far, three aircraft have received the modification, and the entire fleet 

has been funded and scheduled to receive the upgrade by the end of the 

decade. Other areas of concern include cracking on the aft deck and 

cracking in the windshield. For the aft deck cracks, officials stated that the 

extremely high temperatures from the engine cause the cracking, and have 

fielded kits to stiffen the aft decks, making them less affected by the 

extreme heat. For windshield cracks, officials stated that redesigning the 

spacing of drill holes will address the problem; delivery of the new 

windshields is scheduled to begin in late 2005. Additionally, the Air Force 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 124 GAO-06-141 

has funded and is implementing improvements in B-2 connectivity and 

interoperability, to include integrating advanced weapons.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the long-term program strategy for the B-2 as green because 

the Air Force is addressing immediate issues for the aircraft while 

concurrently developing and funding longer-term solutions. In addition to 

continuing efforts to address stealth maintenance and aft deck cracks, the 

Air Force is also addressing the issue of diminishing manufacturing 

sources. Officials stated that technological advancements and the small 

size of the B-2 fleet are a disincentive for manufacturers to continue 

making B-2 unique parts. To compensate, the Air Force is modernizing 

components and systems within the B-2, developing internal processes to 

contract out management of B-2 unique parts, and closely monitoring all 

parts to ensure that the supply chain has ample time to adjust.

C-5 Galaxy Transport The C-5 Galaxy is the largest Air Force transport aircraft, and can carry 

large cargo items over intercontinental ranges at jet speeds and can take off 

and land in relatively short distances. The C-5 is one of only two aircraft 

that can carry very large military equipment. With aerial refueling, the 

aircraft’s range is limited only by crew endurance. The first C-5 was 

delivered in 1970. There are 112 C-5 aircraft in the Air Force’s inventory, 

and their average age is 26 years. Although the C-5 is expected to remain in 

service through 2040, the exact length of service and composition of the C5 fleet is dependent upon the Mobility Capabilities Study28 and the 

Quadrennial Defense Review, which were not completed at the time of our 

review.

28The Mobility Capabilities Study is a DOD effort to address the size of the required number 

of mobility airframes and aircrews necessary to support implementation of the National 

Defense Strategy.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 125 GAO-06-141 

Figure 54: C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft

Condition 

For the reasons identified in our December 2003 report,29 we continue to 

assess the condition of the C-5 as yellow. As shown in figure 55, mission 

capable rates for the C-5 consistently remained below Air Force goals 

between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. Officials stated that the size and age of 

the aircraft make the C-5 maintenance intensive, and provided the example 

of fatigued metal and adhesives, which take time to replace. They further 

stated that the age of the C-5 makes it difficult to find manufacturing 

sources for some parts, particularly avionics and engine components. 

Additionally, the avionics systems and engines are noncompliant with 

upcoming global airspace and air traffic requirements, potentially limiting 

where and how the aircraft can be used. Despite these challenges, officials 

stated that the C-5 can currently perform its missions, including providing 

transport for tsunami relief efforts and moving supplies for operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan.

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

29GAO-04-112.
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 126 GAO-06-141 

Figure 55: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force C-5 Galaxy Transport 

Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the C-5 as yellow because 

of delays and funding shortages in key modernization efforts. The two 

modernizations for the C-5 are to improve avionics and engines; avionics 

upgrades must occur before engine modernization can begin. When 

complete, the programs are expected to address many manufacturing 

source issues, ensure compliance with global air traffic standards, and 

increase the aircraft’s capability. However, officials stated that the avionics 

upgrades are experiencing software integration problems, resulting in a 

delay of at least 3 months and cost increases of $20 million. Since engine 

modernization is predicated on avionics upgrades, the costs for engine 

modernization have also increased by $30 million. Additionally, after a 

projectile attack damaged a C-5 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, officials 

stated that defensive systems became a top priority, and the Air Force 

requested and received funding through fiscal year 2005 supplemental 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 127 GAO-06-141 

appropriations to upgrade defenses against infrared guided surface-to-air 

missiles for 51 C-5 aircraft.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the Air Force’s long-term strategy for the C-5 as yellow 

because requested funding is inconsistent with long-term requirements to 

sustain and modernize the inventory. With upgrades to avionics and 

engines, officials stated that the C-5 could last through 2040. The Air Force 

has requested funding for engine upgrades for the entire fleet of 112 C-5 

aircraft; however, the Air Force has only funded the procurement and 

installation of avionics upgrades for 59 aircraft, resulting in 53 aircraft not 

receiving the necessary avionics upgrades to support the new engines. 

Officials stated that the Air Force remains uncertain about the size of the 

final C-5 fleet and whether to fund the remaining C-5 upgrades, but will 

have a better idea following the completion of the Mobility Capabilities 

Study.

KC-135 Stratotanker The KC-135 is among the oldest aircraft in the Air Force’s inventory and 

represents 90 percent of the aircraft in the tanker fleet. Its primary mission 

is air refueling fixed-wing aircraft and it supports Air Force, Navy, Marine 

Corps, and allied aircraft. There are three KC-135 variants currently in the 

fleet: the E, R, and T models. Each model is a reengined version of the 

original KC-135A. Of these three variants, the E model belongs to the Air 

Force Reserve and Air National Guard. The first KC-135 was delivered in 

June 1957. There are 531 KC-135 aircraft in the Air Force’s inventory and 

the average age is about 44 years. Currently, there is no replacement 
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 128 GAO-06-141 

Figure 56: KC-135 Stratotanker

Condition 

Consistent with our December 2003 report,30 we assessed the condition of 

the KC-135 aircraft as yellow because, as shown in figure 57, it has not met 

its mission capable goals and issues associated with age and corrosion 

continue to be a concern. Officials stated that age is the primary driver of 

KC-135 maintenance issues, and that maintainers discover new problems 

with the aircraft every time it undergoes scheduled depot maintenance. 

Age-related issues with the aircraft include fuel bladder leaks, parts 

obsolescence, and problems with the landing gear’s steel brakes. Corrosion 

has regularly been discovered in new areas on the aircraft, requiring 

increased amounts of depot maintenance time. The Air Force has yet to 

determine the extent of problems caused by newly discovered corrosion. 

The older variants also have a higher incidence of problems; for example, 

the Air Force removed 29 KC-135E aircraft from flight status due to engine 

strut problems and corrosion. 

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

30GAO-04-112
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 129 GAO-06-141 

Figure 57: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker 

Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004

Near-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the Air Force’s near-term strategy for the KC-135 as yellow 

because age-related maintenance issues are expected to increase and the 

severity of potential age-related issues remains unknown. Although 

officials stated that maintenance problems with the aircraft are currently 

manageable during programmed depot maintenance, they expect the 

number of maintenance man-hours to increase by 2.5 percent each year. 

Officials also stated that the severity of potential problems from newly 

discovered corrosion remains unknown, so the potential for additional 

maintenance requirements is likely to occur. Officials further stated that 

the effects of KC-135 operations to support Iraq and Afghanistan are still 

unknown, but the Air Force has instituted additional inspections and 

procedures to address potential effects associated with higher usage. The 

only major modification for the KC-135, Global Air Traffic Management 

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: GAO analysis of military service data.

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Goal

Actual

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix II

Assessments of Selected Equipment Items

Page 130 GAO-06-141 

avionics system upgrades, remains on schedule and is fully 

funded.

Long-Term Program Strategy and 

Funding 

We assessed the Air Force’s long-term strategy for the KC-135 as red 

because the future of the KC-135 fleet and the Air Force’s tanker strategy 

are unknown. Before acquiring new tankers, the Air Force must complete a 

Recapitalization Analysis of Alternatives, which is a study to narrow the 

field of possible future tanker options. Originally scheduled for completion 

in December 2004, the analysis has been delayed until at least August 2005. 

Regardless of the option, officials stated that all recapitalization efforts will 

require use of the KC-135 in the near term and delays in fielding a 

replacement exacerbate problems in maintaining the existing fleet over the 

long term, as well as delaying modernization efforts that are predicated on 

the replacement time line. In fiscal year 2005, $100 million was 

appropriated for a tanker replacement transfer fund, and $9.7 billion has 

been requested for the tanker replacement program in DOD’s 2006 Future 

Years Defense Program.For the six Air Force aircraft in this appendix, 

fiscal year 2004 data are through July 2004.
Page 131 GAO-06-141 

Appendix III

Agency Comments from the Department of 

Defense ApendxiI
Appendix III

Agency Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 132 GAO-06-141 
Appendix III

Agency Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 133 GAO-06-141 
Appendix III

Agency Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 134 GAO-06-141 
Appendix III

Agency Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 135 GAO-06-141 
Appendix III

Agency Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 136 GAO-06-141 
Appendix III

Agency Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 137 GAO-06-141 
Appendix III

Agency Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 138 GAO-06-141 
Appendix III

Agency Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 139 GAO-06-141 
Appendix III

Agency Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 140 GAO-06-141 
Appendix III

Agency Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 141 GAO-06-141 
Page 142 GAO-06-141 

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contact William M. Solis, (202) 512–8365 or SolisW@gao.gov

Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals also 

made major contributions to the report: David Schmitt, Assistant Director; 

Patricia Lentini; Vipin Arora; Janine Cantin; Alissa Czyz; Barbara Hills; 

Barbara Gannon; Stanley Kostyla; Josh Margraf; Brian Mateja; Kimberly 

Mayo; Jim Melton; Kenneth Patton; Malvern Saavedra; and John Trubey.

(350548)
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