United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on AirLand, 

Committee on Armed Services, 

U.S. Senate

DOD ACQUISITION 

OUTCOMES 

A Case for Change 

Statement of Katherine V. Schinasi, Managing Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:30 p.m. EST 

Tuesday, November 15, 2005

GAO-06-257T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 15, 2005

DOD ACQUISITION OUTCOMES

A Case for Change 

Highlights of GAO-06-257T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Airland, 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 

Senate 

The Department of Defense (DOD)

is shepherding a portfolio of major 

weapon systems valued at about

$1.3 trillion. How DOD is managing 

this investment has been a matter 

of concern for some time. Since 

1990, GAO has designated DOD’s 

weapon system acquisitions as a

high-risk area for fraud, waste, 

abuse, and mismanagement. DOD

has experienced cost overruns, 

missed deadlines, performance 

shortfalls, and persistent 

management problems. In light of 

the serious budget pressures facing

the nation, such problems are

especially troubling. GAO has 

issued hundreds of reports 

addressing broad-based issues,

such as best practices, as well as 

reports focusing on individual 

acquisitions. These reports have

included many recommendations. 

The subcommittee asked GAO to

testify on possible problems with

and improvements to defense 

acquisition policy. In doing so, we

highlight the risks of conducting

business as usual and identify some

of the solutions we have found in

successful acquisition programs 

and organizations. 

DOD is facing a cascading number of problems in managing its acquisitions. 

Cost increases incurred while developing new weapon systems mean DOD 

cannot produce as many of those weapons as intended nor can it be relied 

on to deliver to the warfighter when promised. Military operations in 

Afghanistan and Iraq are consuming a large share of DOD resources and 

causing the department to invest more money sooner than expected to 

replace or fix existing weapons. Meanwhile, DOD is intent on transforming 

military operations and has its eye on multiple megasystems that are 

expected to be the most expensive and complex ever. These costly 

conditions are running head-on into the nation’s unsustainable fiscal path. 

DOD knows what to do to achieve more successful outcomes but finds it 

difficult to apply the necessary discipline and controls or assign muchneeded accountability. DOD has written into policy an approach that 

emphasizes attaining a certain level of knowledge at critical junctures before 

managers agree to invest more money in the next phase of weapon system 

development. This knowledge-based approach results in evolutionary—that 

is, incremental, manageable, predictable—development and inserts several 

controls to help managers gauge progress in meeting cost, schedule, and 

performance goals. But DOD is not employing the knowledge-based 

approach, discipline is lacking, and business cases are weak. 

Persistent practices show a decided lack of restraint. DOD’s requirements 

process generates more demand for new programs than fiscal resources can 

support. DOD compounds the problem by approving so many highly 

complex and interdependent programs. Once too many programs are 

approved to start, the budgeting process exacerbates problems. Because 

programs are funded annually and departmentwide, cross-portfolio priorities 

have not been established, competition for funding continues over time, 

forcing programs to view success as the ability to secure the next funding 

increment rather than delivering capabilities when and as promised. 

Improving this condition requires discipline in the requirements and 

budgetary processes. Determining who should be held accountable for 

deviations and what penalties are needed is crucial. If DOD cannot discipline 

itself now to execute programs within fiscal realities, then draconian, 

budget-driven decisions may have to be made later. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-257T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Katherine V. 

Schinasi, 202-512-4841. 
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss why and how to get a better 

return from the Department of Defense’s (DOD) weapon system 

investments. U.S. weapons are the best in the world, but the programs to 

acquire them frequently take significantly longer and cost more money 

than promised and often deliver fewer quantities and other capabilities 

than planned. It is not unusual for estimates of time and money to be off

by 20 to 50 percent. When costs and schedules increase, quantities are cut,

and the value for the warfighter—as well as the value of the investment 

dollar—is reduced. 

DOD’s planned investment in research, development, and procurement of 

major weapon systems is approximately $1.3 trillion for its current 

portfolio, with over $800 billion of that investment yet to be made. The 

planned annual investment is expected to rise from around $149 billion in 

fiscal year 2005 to $178 billion in fiscal year 2011. Marquee programs 

include the Army’s Future Combat Systems; the Missile Defense Agency’s

suite of land, sea, air, and space systems; the Navy’s advanced ships, such 

as the DD(X) Destroyer; the Air Force’s Transformational Satellite 

Communications System; and the Joint Strike Fighter. Programs like 

these—and the Global Information Grid that is designed to interconnect 

them—are likely to dominate the budget and doctrinal debate well into the

next decade. Not only do these programs represent huge technological

leaps over their predecessors, DOD is proposing to deliver them faster. 

The persistent nature of acquisition problems has perhaps made decision 

makers complacent about cost growth, schedule delays, and quantity 

reductions in weapon system programs. But fiscal realities, coupled with 

the larger scale of acquisitions, will not allow budgets to accommodate the 

typical margins of error. Thus, we must either make tough decisions now 

to increase the chances for programs to be executable within fiscal 

realities or brace ourselves for more draconian decisions later driven by 

those fiscal realities. The means to make the thoughtful decisions are 

known. 

My statement today highlights the risks of conducting business as usual 

and identifies some of the solutions we have found in successful 

acquisition programs and organizations. 

Page 1 GAO-06-257T
The way DOD develops and produces its major weapons systems has had 

disappointing outcomes. There is a vast difference between DOD’s 

budgeting plans and the reality of the cost of its systems. Performance, if it

is defined as the capability that actually reaches the warfighter, often falls 

short, as cost increases result in fewer quantities of produced systems and 

schedule slips. Performance, if it is defined as an acceptable return on 

investment, has not lived up to promises. 

The Case for Change 

Table 1 illustrates seven programs with a significant reduction in buying

power; we have reported similar outcomes in many more programs. For 

example, the Air Force initially planned to buy 648 F/A-22 Raptor tactical 

aircraft at a program acquisition unit cost of about $125 million (fiscal year 

2006 dollars). Technology and design components matured late in the 

development of the aircraft, which contributed to cost growth and 

schedule delays. Now, the Air Force plans to buy 181 aircraft at a program 

acquisition unit cost of about $361 million, an almost 189 percent increase. 

Table 1: Examples of DOD Programs with Reduced Buying Power 

Program 

Initial

investment Initial quantity Latest investment Latest quantity

Percent of unit 

cost increase 

Joint Strike Fighter $189. 8 billion 2,866 aircraft $206.3 billion 2,458 aircraft 26.8%

Future Combat Systems $82.6 billion 15 systems $127.5 billion 15 systems 54.4%

F/A-22 Raptor $81.1 billion 648 aircraft $65.4 billion 181 aircraft 188.7%

Virginia Class Submarine $53.7 billion 30 submarines $80.4 billion 30 submarines 49.7%

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle $15.4 billion 181 vehicles $28.0 billion 138 vehicles 137.8%

Space Based Infrared System High $4.1 billion 5 satellites $10.6 billion 5 satellites 160.2%

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle $8.1 billion 1,025 vehicles $11.1 billion 1,025 vehicles 35.9%

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Furthermore, the conventional acquisition process is not agile enough for 

today’s demands. Congress has expressed concern that urgent warfighting 

requirements are not being met in the most expeditious manner and has 

put in place several authorities for rapid acquisition to work around the 

process. The U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Limited Acquisition Authority 

and the Secretary of Defense’s Rapid Acquisition Authority seek the ability 

to get warfighting capability to the field faster. According to U.S. Joint 

Forces Command officials, it is only through Limited Acquisition Authority 

that the command has the authority to satisfy the unanticipated, 

unbudgeted, urgent mission needs of other combatant commands. With a 

formal process that requires as many as 5, 10, or 15 years to get from 

Page 2 GAO-06-257T
program start to production, such experiments are needed to meet the 

warfighters’ needs. 

Today we are at a crossroad. Our nation is on an unsustainable fiscal path.

Long-term budget simulations by GAO, the Congressional Budget Office, 

and others show that, over the long term, we face a large and growing 

structural deficit due primarily to known demographic trends and rising 

health care costs. Continuing on this unsustainable fiscal path will 

gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our standard of 

living, and ultimately our national security. Federal discretionary 

spending, along with other federal policies and programs, will face serious

budget pressures in the coming years stemming from new budgetary 

demands and demographic trends. Defense spending falls within the 

discretionary spending accounts. Further, current military operations, 

such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, consume a large share of DOD 

resources and are causing faster wear on existing weapons. Refurbishment 

or replacement sooner than planned is putting further pressure on DOD’s 

investment accounts. 

At the same time DOD is facing these problems, programs are 

commanding larger budgets. DOD is undertaking new efforts that are 

expected to be the most expensive and complex ever and on which DOD is 

heavily relying to fundamentally transform military operations. And it is 

giving contractors increased program management responsibilities to 

develop requirements, design products, and select major system and 

subsystem contractors. Table 2 shows that just 5 years ago, the top five

weapon systems cost about $291 billion combined; today, the top five 

weapon systems cost about $550 billion. 

Table 2: Total Cost of DOD’s Top Five Programs in Fiscal Years 2001 and 2006 (in 2006 dollars) 

2001 2006

Program Cost Program Cost

F/A-22 Raptor aircraft $65.0 billion Joint Strike Fighter $206.3 billion 

DDG-51 class destroyer ship $64.4 billion Future Combat Systems $127.5 billion 

Virginia class submarine $62.1 billion Virginia class submarine $80.4 billion 

C-17 Globemaster airlift aircraft $51.1 billion DDG-51 class destroyer ship $70.4 billion 

F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter 

aircraft $48.2 billion

F/A-22 Raptor aircraft $65.4 billion 

Total $290.8 billion Total $550.0 billion

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Page 3 GAO-06-257T
If these megasystems are managed with traditional margins of error, the 

financial consequences can be dire, especially in light of a constrained 

discretionary budget. 

Success for acquisitions means making sound decisions to ensure that 

program investments are getting promised returns. In the commercial 

world, successful companies have no choice but to adopt processes and 

cultures that emphasize basing decisions on knowledge, reducing risks 

prior to undertaking new efforts, producing realistic cost and schedule 

estimates, and building-in quality in order to deliver products to customers 

at the right price, the right time, and the right cost. At first blush, it would 

seem DOD’s definition of success would be very similar: deliver capability 

to the warfighter at the right price, the right time, and the right cost. 

However, this is not happening within DOD. In an important sense, 

success has come to mean starting and continuing programs even when 

cost, schedule, and quantities must be sacrificed.

DOD knows what to do to improve acquisitions but finds it difficult to 

apply the controls or assign the accountability necessary for successful 

outcomes. To understand why these problems persist, we must look not 

just at the product development process but at the underlying

requirements and budgeting processes to define problems and find 

solutions. 

Over the last several years, we have undertaken a body of work that 

examines weapon acquisition issues from a perspective that draws upon 

lessons learned from best product development practices. Leading 

commercial firms expect that their program managers will deliver highquality products on time and within budget. Doing otherwise could result 

in the customer walking away. Thus, those firms have created an 

environment and adopted practices that put their program managers in a 

good position to succeed in meeting these expectations. Collectively, these 

practices comprise a process that is anchored in knowledge. It is a process 

in which technology development and product development are treated 

differently and managed separately. The process of developing technology 

culminates in discovery—the gathering of knowledge—and must, by its 

nature, allow room for unexpected results and delays. Leading firms do 

not ask their product managers to develop technology. Successful 

programs give responsibility for maturing technologies to a science and 

technology organizations, rather than the program or product 

development managers. The process of developing a product culminates in 

delivery, and, therefore, gives great weight to design and production. The 

firms demand—and receive—specific knowledge about a new product 

A Knowledge-Based 

Process Can Lead to 

Better Outcomes 

Page 4 GAO-06-257T
before production begins. A program does not go forward unless a strong 

business case on which the program was originally justified continues to 

hold true. 

Successful product developers ensure a high level of knowledge is 

achieved at key junctures in development. We characterize these junctures 

as knowledge points. These knowledge points and associated indicators 

are defined as follows: 

• Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. This point occurs 

when a sound business case is made for the product—that is, a match 

is made between the customer’s requirements and the product 

developer’s available resources in terms of knowledge, time, money, 

and capacity. Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start 

of system development is an important indicator of whether this match 

has been made. This means that the technologies needed to meet 

essential product requirements have been demonstrated to work in 

their intended environment. 

• Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when 

a program determines that a product’s design is stable— that is, it will 

meet customer requirements, as well as cost, schedule and reliability 

targets. A best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-level 

critical design review, usually held midway through development. 

Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at the 

system design review provides tangible evidence that the design is 

stable. 

• Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature. This point is 

achieved when it has been demonstrated that the company can 

manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A 

best practice is to ensure that all key manufacturing processes are in 

statistical control—that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, and 

capable of consistently producing parts within the product’s quality 

tolerances and standards—at the start of production. 

A result of this knowledge-based process is evolutionary product 

development, an incremental approach that enables developers to rely 

more on available resources rather than making promises about unproven 

technologies. Predictability is a key to success as successful product 

developers know that invention cannot be scheduled and its cost is 

difficult to estimate. They do not bring technology into new product 

development unless that technology has been demonstrated to meet the 

user’s requirements. Allowing technology development to spill over into 

Page 5 GAO-06-257T
product development puts an extra burden on decision makers and 

provides a weak foundation for making product development estimates. 

While the user may not initially receive the ultimate capability under this 

approach, the initial product is available sooner and at a lower, more 

predictable cost. 

There is a synergy in this process, as the attainment of each successive 

knowledge point builds on the preceding one. Metrics gauge when the 

requisite level of knowledge has been attained. Controls are used to attain

a high level of knowledge before making additional significant 

investments. Controls are considered effective if they are backed by

measurable criteria and if decision makers are required to consider them 

before deciding to advance a program to the next level. Effective controls

help decision makers gauge progress in meeting cost, schedule, and 

performance goals and ensure that managers will (1) conduct activities to

capture relevant product development knowledge, (2) provide evidence 

that knowledge was captured, and (3) hold decision reviews to determine 

that appropriate knowledge was captured to move to the next phase. The 

result is a product development process that holds decision makers 

accountable and delivers excellent results in a predictable manner. 

A hallmark of an executable program is shorter development cycle times, 

which allow more systems to enter production more quickly. DOD itself

suggests that product development should be limited to about 5 years. 

Time constraints, such as this, are important because they serve to limit 

the initial product’s requirements. Limiting product development cycle 

times to 5 years or less would allow for more frequent assimilation of new

technologies into weapon systems, speeding new technology to the 

warfighter, hold program managers accountable, as well as make more 

frequent and predictable work in production, where contractors and the 

industrial base can profit by being efficient. 

DOD’s policy adopts the knowledge-based, evolutionary approach used by 

leading commercial companies that enables developers to rely more on 

available resources rather than making promises about unproven 

technologies. The policy provides a framework for developers to ask 

themselves at key decision points whether they have the knowledge they

need to move to the next phase of acquisition. For example, DOD 

Directive 5000.1 states that program managers “shall provide knowledge 

about key aspects of a system at key points in the acquisition process,” 

such as demonstrating “technologies in a relevant environment ... prior to 

program initiation.” This knowledge-based framework can help managers 

gain the confidence they need to make significant and sound investment 

decisions for major weapon systems. In placing greater emphasis on 

Despite Policy, DOD 

Is Not Employing a 

Knowledge-Based 

Process

Page 6 GAO-06-257T
evolutionary product development, the policy sets up a more manageable 

environment for achieving knowledge. 

However, the longstanding problem of programs beginning development 

with immature technologies is continuing to be seen on even the newest 

programs. Several programs approved to begin product development 

within only the last few years began with most of their technologies 

immature and have already experienced significant development cost 

increases. In the case of the Army’s Future Combat Systems, nearly 2 years 

after program launch and with $4.6 billion invested, only 1 out of more 

than 50 critical technologies is considered mature and the research and 

development cost estimate has grown by 48 percent. 

In March 2005, we reported that very few programs—15 percent of the 

programs we assessed—began development having demonstrated high

levels of technology maturity. Acquisition unit costs for programs 

leveraging mature technologies increased by less than 1 percent, whereas 

programs that started development with immature technologies 

experienced an average acquisition unit cost increase of nearly 21 percent 

over the first full estimate. 

The decision to start a new program is the most highly leveraged point in 

the product development process. Establishing a sound business case for 

individual programs depends on disciplined requirements and funding 

processes. Our work has shown that DOD’s requirements process 

generates more demand for new programs than fiscal resources can 

support. DOD compounds the problem by approving so many highly 

complex and interdependent programs. Moreover, once a program is 

approved, requirements can be added along the way that increases costs 

and risks. 

Establishing a Sound 

Business Case 

Depends on 

Disciplined 

Requirements and 

Funding Process 

Once too many programs are approved to start, the budgeting process 

exacerbates problems. Because programs are funded annually and 

department wide, cross-portfolio priorities have not been established, 

competition for funding continues over time, forcing programs to view 

success as the ability to secure the next funding increment rather than 

delivering capabilities when and as promised. As a result, there is pressure 

to suppress bad news about programs, which could endanger funding and 

support, as well as to skip testing because of its high cost. Concurrently,

when faced with budget constraints, senior officials tend to make acrossthe-board cuts to all programs rather than make the hard decisions as to 

which ones to keep and which ones to cancel or cut back. In many cases, 

the system delivers less performance than promised when initial 

investment decisions were made. 

Page 7 GAO-06-257T
So, the condition we encounter time after time describes a predictable 

outcome. The acquisition environment encourages launching product 

developments that embody more technical unknowns and less knowledge 

about the performance and production risks they entail. A new weapon 

system is encouraged to possess performance features that significantly 

distinguish it from other systems and promises the best capability. A new 

program will not be approved unless its costs fall within forecasts of 

available funds and, therefore, looks affordable. Because cost and 

schedule estimates are comparatively soft at the time, successfully 

competing for funds encourages the program’s estimates to be squeezed 

into the funds available. Consequently, DOD program managers have 

incentives to promote performance features and design characteristics 

that rely on immature technologies and decision makers lack the 

knowledge they need to make good decisions. 

A path can be laid out to make decisions that will lead to better program 

choices and better outcomes. Much of this is known and has been 

recommended by one study or another. GAO itself has issued hundreds of 

reports. The key recommendations we have made have been focused on

the product development process: 

The Path to Better 

Decisions 

• constraining individual program requirements by working within 

available resources and by leveraging systems engineering; 

• establishing clear business cases for each individual investment; 

• enabling science and technology organizations to shoulder the 

technology burden; 

• ensuring that the workforce is capable of managing requirements 

trades, source selection, and knowledge-based acquisition strategies; 

and 

• establishing and enforcing controls to ensure that appropriate 

knowledge is captured and used at critical junctures before moving 

programs forward and investing more money. 

As I have outlined above, however, setting the right conditions for 

successful acquisitions outcomes goes beyond product development. We 

are currently examining how to bring discipline to the Department’s 

requirements and budgetary process and the role played by the program 

manager. 

As we conduct this work, we will be asking 

• who is currently accountable for acquisition decisions; 

• who should be held accountable; 

Page 8 GAO-06-257T
• how much deviation from the original business case is allowed before 

the entire program investment is reconsidered; and 

• what is the penalty when investments do not result in meeting 

promised warfighter needs? 

We can make hard, but thoughtful, decisions now or postpone them, 

allowing budgetary realities to force draconian decisions later. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to

respond to any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee 

may have. 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact 

Katherine V. Schinasi at (202) 512-4841 or schinasik@gao.gov. Individuals

making key contributions to this testimony included Paul L. Francis, 

David B. Best, David J. Hand, Alan R. Frazier, Adam Vodraska, and 

Lily J. Chin. 

Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 9 GAO-06-257T
Page 10 GAO-06-257T

Related GAO Products 

Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and Investment 

Planning Needed to Address Continuing Problems. GAO-05-891T.

Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005. 

Air Force Procurement: Protests Challenging Role of Biased Official 

Sustained. GAO-05-436T. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2005. 

Tactical Aircraft: F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and Implications 

for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. GAO-05-591T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 6, 2005.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.

GAO-05-301. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects 

for Success. GAO-05-428T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.

Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to 

Improve DOD’s Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. GAO-04-393. 

Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2004. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices, 

but More Controls Are Needed. GAO-04-53. Washington, D.C.: November 

10, 2003. 

Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon 

Systems’ Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February 

11, 2003. 

Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early 

Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,

2002. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best 

Practices. GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 

Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 

2001. 

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better 

Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 

2000. 
Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better 

Weapon System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April 

26, 2000. 

Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System 

Program Implement Best Practices. GAO/NSIAD-99-206. Washington, 

D.C.: August 16, 1999. 

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can 

Improve Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington, 

D.C.: July 30, 1999. 

Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program 

Outcomes. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999. 

Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1998. 

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires

Changes in DOD’s Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.: 

February 24, 1998. 

Major Acquisitions: Significant Changes Underway in DOD’s Earned 

Value Management Process. GAO/NSIAD-97-108. Washington, D.C.: May 5,

1997. 

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer 

Improvements for DOD. GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.: August 26, 

1996.

(120503) Page 11 GAO-06-257T
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