IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50943

MARIA TEJADA, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

THE TRAVIS ASSOCIATION FOR THE BLIND, 

 Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:12-CV-997

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Maria Tejada brought retaliatory-hostile-work-environment and 

constructive-discharge claims under Title VII against her former employer, the 

Travis Association for the Blind (TAB). The district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of TAB. We affirm.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 13, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I

TAB is a nonprofit organization in Austin, Texas, “with a mission of 

employing, training, educating and empowering blind and visually impaired 

individuals to gain work skills and job experiences.” Tejada, a legally blind 

woman with partial vision in one eye, began employment at TAB in December 

2006.

Tejada worked in the binders department under the supervision of Sal 

Guzman. Guzman made comments about how he liked Tejada’s breasts and 

buttocks. On several occasions, Tejada observed Guzman kissing another TAB 

employee, Clara Benavides. Before Tejada complained about Guzman’s 

behavior, there was animosity between Tejada and Benavides. Tejada believes 

that Benavides treated her poorly because Guzman said that Tejada was 

beautiful. Benavides called Tejada names, made vulgar insults, and on one 

occasion, threatened Tejada with a knife.

In September 2007, Guzman told Tejada that if she smoked marijuana,

she would have enough energy to have sex with Guzman and another 

employee. Tejada reported Guzman’s behavior to TAB’s Executive Director, 

Jerry Mayfield, and TAB’s Human Resources Manager, Renee Penz. TAB 

suspended Guzman immediately, and after Tejada’s account of the incidents

was corroborated, Guzman’s employment was terminated.

After Guzman’s 2007 termination, Tejada alleges that TAB management 

and employees, including Benavides, subjected her to a hostile work 

environment because she complained about Guzman and caused his 

termination. We discuss Tejada’s various allegations in detail below.

Tejada filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on October 12, 2010, in which she stated 

“[o]n or about August 23, 2010, I was told that management had received 

complaints from my coworkers that I was harassing them. A management 

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official told me what happened to Sal Guzman could happen to me.” Tejada 

stated that she believed TAB was retaliating against her because of her 2007 

complaint against Guzman. Neither the parties nor the record indicate the 

disposition of Tejada’s 2010 EEOC charge.

On June 2, 2011, Tejada could no longer “take the stress and pressure 

that [she] was forced to work under” and resigned.

Tejada filed her second charge with the EEOC on March 1, 2012. She 

alleged that TAB harassed and retaliated against her for filing a complaint 

against Guzman. After receiving her right-to-sue letter, Tejada filed suit in 

federal district court alleging a retaliatory hostile work environment and 

constructive discharge in violation of Title VII. Tejada alleged that because 

she filed an EEOC charge in 2010 and lodged a complaint against Guzman in 

2007, TAB retaliated against and harassed her through disparate treatment

and isolation, threatening to suspend her without pay, and the various 

confrontations and allegations involving other TAB employees.

TAB moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge recommended 

granting the motion because the evidence did not support a prima facie case 

on either of Tejada’s claims and because her constructive-discharge claim was 

untimely. The district court agreed and granted TAB’s motion for summary 

judgment. Tejada appeals.

II

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.1 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

 

1 Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778 F.3d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 

2015) (citing Ford Motor Co v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2001)).

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as a matter of law.”2 “If the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational 

trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, then there is no genuine issue for 

trial.”3 The evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the 

nonmovant, in this case, Tejada.4

III

Tejada complains that (1) in retaliation for reporting Guzman’s 

inappropriate comments leading to Guzman’s termination in 2007 and for 

filing an EEOC charge in 2010, she was subject to a hostile work environment, 

and (2) the harassment against her rose to such an intolerable level that she 

was constructively discharged in 2011. We address each claim in turn.

A

This court has yet to determine whether a Title VII retaliation claim 

based on a hostile work environment is cognizable.5 Because Tejada failed to 

establish a prima facie case of a retaliatory hostile work environment, we need 

not decide this issue.6

To establish a prima face case of Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must 

show that “(1) he engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) he was 

subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists 

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”7 “[T]he 

 

2 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

3 Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 F.3d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Steadman v. 

Tex. Rangers, 179 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 1999)).

4 Etienne, 778 F.3d at 475 (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014)).

5 See Fallon v. Potter, 277 F. App’x 422, 424 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Bryan 

v. Chertoff, 217 F. App’x 289, 293 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

6 See Fallon, 277 F. App’x at 424 n.3; Bryan, 217 F. App’x at 293.

7 Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Dall. Area 

Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 319 (5th Cir. 2004)); see also, e.g., Clegg v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 

496 F.3d 922, 928-29 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying the standard for a prima facie case of Title VII 

retaliation in the context of a retaliation claim based on hostile work environment); Noviello 

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plaintiff must show that the protected activity was the ‘but for’ cause of the 

retaliation.”8 Because “[e]mployers rarely leave concrete evidence of their 

retaliatory purposes and motives,”9 we may consider certain factors when 

determining causation: the employee’s disciplinary record; whether the 

employer followed its typical policy and procedures when managing the 

employee; and the temporal connection between the employee’s conduct and 

the alleged retaliation.10 The parties do not dispute that Tejada’s 2007 

complaint against Guzman for sexual harassment and 2010 EEOC charge 

constitute protected activities.

Tejada describes numerous events that she alleges amount to a 

retaliatory hostile work environment. The first incident occurred two months 

after Tejada’s September 2007 complaint against Guzman. At this time, 

Tejada was working in TAB’s trouser-belts department. After being 

temporarily reassigned to the binders department due to an equipment 

malfunction, Tejada left work without permission and without providing an 

explanation. Corinne Randall, TAB’s Production Manager, subsequently 

warned Tejada that if she walked off the job again, she would be subject to a 

three-day suspension. Tejada did not explain to Randall why she left. Tejada

now asserts that she refused to work in binders because Benavides worked in 

binders, and Tejada worried that Benavides would harass her. Tejada also 

states the binders department reminded her of Benavides’s and Guzman’s 

 

v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 88-90 (1st Cir. 2005) (same); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 

1240, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).

8 Willis, 749 F.3d at 318 (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 305 n.4 (5th Cir. 

1996)).

9 Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 508 (5th Cir. 1994).

10 See id.

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harassment. There is no record evidence linking Randall’s warning to Tejada’s 

complaint against Guzman.

The second incident occurred in May 2009, nearly two years after 

Tejada’s complaint against Guzman. Benavides and Tejada were involved in 

a confrontation during which Benavides told Tejada to “clock out and step 

outside” and blamed Tejada for Guzman’s termination. Benavides also said 

that she would beat up Tejada if she saw Tejada “around town.” However, even 

before Tejada complained of Guzman’s inappropriate behavior, Benavides had 

engaged in similar behavior by calling Tejada names and threatening Tejada 

with a knife. Furthermore, after a supervisor informed Tim Gates, the Senior 

Production Manager, of the issue, Gates responded by speaking separately

with Tejada and a witness to understand the situation and then met with

Benavides in his office to inform her that such behavior was not acceptable. 

Benavides said that she would no longer threaten employees. Tejada states 

that Benavides’s subsequent promotion to assistant supervisor contributed to 

the hostile work environment; however, the incidents of which Tejada 

complains did not occur while Benavides was the assistant supervisor over 

Tejada.

The next incident occurred on April 28, 2010, when George Adams, a 

TAB employee, complained that Tejada had been speaking poorly about him to 

coworkers. Randall interviewed another employee who corroborated the 

information that Adams had given. When Randall discussed Adams’s 

complaint with Tejada, she denied any wrongdoing, but Randall warned 

Tejada that the complained-of behavior was unacceptable and could result in 

a three-day suspension if it continued. Tejada was upset by her conversation 

with Randall and decided to place herself on three-day suspension. Randall 

reiterated to Tejada that she had not been suspended, but Tejada left work 

determined to “prove” that she had not harassed her coworkers. When Tejada

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returned to work, Penz, the Human Resources Manager, suspended her for 

three days for suspending herself in contravention of TAB policy. There is no 

record evidence linking Randall’s warning or Penz’s suspension of Tejada to 

Tejada’s complaint against Guzman.

On August 19, 2010, approximately three years after Guzman’s 

termination, Tejada overheard Benavides calling Tejada a “bruja,” the word 

for “witch” in Spanish, and laughing. Tejada informed her supervisor, Irene 

Pineda. Pineda documented the allegation and notified Penz, who decided the 

allegation did not warrant further action because it was speculation on 

Tejada’s part that Benavides was talking about Tejada. The same day, 

Benavides filed a complaint against Tejada alleging that Tejada made 

disparaging comments about Benavides’s family and Mexican immigrants.

A few days later, Mayfield met with Tejada and Penz to discuss 

Benavides’s complaint. Using Guzman as an example, Mayfield told Tejada 

that harassment is not tolerated and can result in termination. Mayfield 

advised Tejada “that she is not to laugh at, mimic, or make negative comments 

to or about anyone.” Tejada inquired if Mayfield investigated her complaints 

about Benavides, and Mayfield said that he had no complaints from Tejada 

and that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the complaints against her. 

Again, there is evidence that the sour relationship between Tejada and 

Benavides predated Tejada’s complaint about Guzman, and Mayfield’s 

warning regarding termination was in the context of addressing the allegations 

made by Benavides. To the extent Tejada complains that TAB failed to 

investigate her complaint against Benavides in violation of TAB policy, there 

is no indication that this failure was because of Tejada’s complaint against 

Guzman. There is also a significant gap in time between Tejada’s complaint 

about Guzman in September 2007 and the events in August 2010.

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Tejada asserts that TAB management, including Penz and Mayfield, told 

her coworkers to stay away from Tejada because she was “trouble” and that 

she was forced to work in isolation. The record does not include dates for these 

incidents, and there is no evidence linking these actions to Tejada’s protected 

activities.

Tejada filed her EEOC charge in October 2010. The events postdating 

the charge are as follows. On May 16, 2011, TAB employee Jose Garza 

complained that Tejada would curse at him both verbally and in sign language. 

Randall told Garza “to just ignore Ms. Tejada.” Human Resources concluded 

because there were no witnesses to the complained-of behavior, no further 

action could be taken. That same month, Ricardo Piedra, Tejada’s friend and 

coworker, was called to Mayfield’s office over the loudspeaker. Tejada alleges 

that “[a]t that time, [Piedra] was one of only a very few of the employees left at 

TAB that would still communicate with [Tejada].” But after Piedra was called 

to Mayfield’s office, “Piedra stopped speaking to [Tejada] and would simply not 

respond when [she] would speak to him.” During that month, Tejada was also 

issued a written warning and placed on probation for sixty days for attendance 

issues. On June 1, 2011, another employee, Andy Mireles, complained that 

Tejada shoved her out of his way because he accidentally hit her foot with his 

cane. Tejada maintains that all of the various allegations made by her 

coworkers about her conduct are false. Tejada also alleges she continued to be 

isolated from “the majority of [her] co-workers and supervisors” and assigned 

to work alone.

Regarding Garza’s complaint, after TAB’s Human Resources department 

determined that there were no witnesses to the alleged behavior, no further 

action was taken, an outcome favorable to Tejada. Garza’s and Mireles’s

complaints make no mention of the EEOC charge or Tejada’s complaint against 

Guzman. Additionally, Tejada conceded that she had attendance problems 

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leading up to her probation. Lastly, there is no evidence in the record that 

Mayfield told Piedra to ignore Tejada, and even if he did, there is no evidence 

linking this instruction to Tejada’s complaint against Guzman or Tejada’s 

EEOC charge.

Mayfield had a second “follow-up” meeting with Tejada; the parties 

dispute whether this meeting occurred in September 2010 or May 2011. Either 

way, it is temporally removed from both Tejada’s complaint about Guzman in 

2007 and the October 2010 EEOC charge. Tejada alleges that when she 

entered Mayfield’s office, Mayfield asked her how long it had been since 

Guzman had been fired. He stated that it had been about three years. 

According to Tejada, Mayfield then said that if Tejada did not stop harassing 

her coworkers, she would be fired like Guzman was. Tejada again inquired 

about her complaints against Benavides, and Mayfield reiterated that he had 

received no such complaints and that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss 

the complaints against Tejada. Like the first meeting, this meeting was part 

of Mayfield’s response to the allegations that Tejada had harassed coworkers, 

and there is no record evidence indicating that Tejada’s complaint against 

Guzman or the EEOC charge was the but-for cause of Mayfield’s warning 

regarding termination.

For these reasons, Tejada has failed to raise a genuine factual dispute 

regarding the requisite causal link between the protected activities and the 

alleged retaliation.

B

Tejada also argues that the hostile work environment rose to such an 

intolerable level that she was constructively discharged. 

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Title VII proscribes an employer from discharging an employee “because 

of” his or her “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”11 “An employer ‘is 

responsible for a constructive discharge in the same manner that it is 

responsible for the outright discriminatory discharge of a charging party.’”12 

To establish a constructive discharge under Title VII, “a plaintiff must first 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that she: (1) is 

a member of a protected class; (2) was discharged; (3) was qualified for the 

position from which she was discharged; and (4) was replaced by a member of

an unprotected class.”13 Tejada does not argue that she was subject to 

constructive discharge “because of” her “race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin”; rather, she claims she was subject to a hostile work environment in 

retaliation for her protected activities that rose to such a high level that she 

was constructively discharged. Accordingly, Tejada cannot establish 

constructive discharge under Title VII’s substantive provisions.14

To the extent Tejada argues that she was constructively discharged in 

retaliation for her protected activities, she must establish the same prima facie 

case as is required for a retaliation claim.15 Tejada’s claim relies on the same 

 

11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); accord Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 318

(5th Cir. 1997).

12 Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 142 (2004) (quoting 2 EEOC Compliance 

Manual § 612.9(a) (2002)).

13 Faruki, 123 F.3d at 318 (citing Meinecke v. H & R Block of Hous., 66 F.3d 77, 83 

(5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) and Vaughn v. Edel, 918 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1990)); accord 

Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 137 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169 

F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999)).

14 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (“The 

substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., their 

status. The antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what 

they do, i.e., their conduct.”); see also Faruki, 123 F.3d at 318-19.

15 See Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 439-40 (5th Cir. 2005) 

(outlining the requirements for a prima facie case of retaliation based on constructive 

discharge).

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set of facts as her retaliatory-hostile-work-environment claim, and thus, it fails 

for the reasons already stated.

* * *

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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