United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 21-1035

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jeffrey Allen Schlegel

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Central

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 Submitted: December 13, 2021

Filed: August 12, 2022

[Unpublished]

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Jeffrey Schlegel pleaded guilty to federal narcotics charges. He now challenges

his sentence of 324 months’ imprisonment as substantively unreasonable and argues
that the district court1

 committed procedural error by failing to adequately consider

the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We affirm. 

I. Background

From approximately December 2018 to May 2019, Schlegel distributed

methamphetamine, fentanyl, acetyl fentanyl, and heroin in the Des Monies, Iowa area.

Schlegel distributed approximately 1,300 grams of heroin, 50 grams of actual

methamphetamine, 340 grams of methamphetamine mixture, 2.59 grams of fentanyl,

and .47 grams of acetyl fentanyl. Schlegel also directed his girlfriend, a co-defendant,

to sell and purchase drugs for him. Schlegel controlled a storage unit that stored

methamphetamine and drug trafficking tools.

One of Schlegel’s drug customers, Zachary Rhodes, purchased drugs from

Schlegel through a confidential informant (CI) that contained fentanyl on January 23,

2019. Rhodes used the substance, overdosed, and died. Rhodes’s death was caused

by the fentanyl-tainted drugs purchased from Schlegel. Subsequently, law

enforcement used the CI to conduct four controlled buys of a fentanyl mixture from

Schlegel in February and March 2019. During the third controlled buy, Schlegel

directed the CI to meet him at Schlegel’s father’s residence to purchase heroin. While

at the residence, the CI observed significant amounts of methamphetamine, heroin,

and multiple handguns. 

Based on the facts gathered in the investigation, the government charged

Schlegel in a seven-count indictment. Schlegel pleaded guilty to possession with

intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a

detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(C) (Count 1), and distribution of a mixture and substance

1The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District 

Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.

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containing a detectable amount of fentanyl, in violation of § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C)

(Count 2).

The presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated Schlegel’s base offense

level at 38. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2) (increasing base offense level for selling drugs

if they cause a “death or serious bodily injury”). The PSR recommended the following

enhancements: (1) a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon,

see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); (2) a two-level enhancement for maintaining premises

for purposes of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,

see id. § 2D1.1(b)(12); (3) a two-level enhancement for Schlegel’s role as an

organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity, see id. § 3B1.1(c);

and (4) a chapter four enhancement for career offender status under the Sentencing

Guidelines.2

The court also applied a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility. See id. § 3E1.1(a). As a result of Schlegel assisting authorities in the

investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct, the court applied an additional

decrease by one level. See id. § 3E1.1(a).3 After applying the adjustments, the court

calculated Schlegel’s total offense level as 41 and determined that he was a category

2Schlegel’s first attorney filed objections to the PSR before the sentencing

hearing. Schlegel was represented by different counsel at the sentencing hearing due

to the death of Schlegel’s first attorney. Schlegel objected to these recommendations

before the sentencing hearing. The district court addressed the objections and

overruled them. Schlegel initially objected to the career offender enhancement but

later withdrew this objection at an objection meeting held in July 2020. Schlegel did

not object to any of the enhancements recommended in the final PSR.

3The court noted that even if Schlegel’s objections weren’t overruled, the

Guidelines range would remain the same. 

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VI criminal offender.4

 Schlegel’s advisory Guidelines range was 360 months to life

imprisonment. Before the court imposed its sentence, Schlegel asked for a belowGuidelines sentence of 240 months, noting that while he had made a lot of bad

decisions, he had suffered through a difficult life.

The court explained the § 3553(a) factors used in determining the appropriate

sentence for Schlegel and its reasons supporting the specific sentence imposed. The

court particularly noted the timing of the offenses. The court pointed out that even

after Rhodes’s death due to Schlegel’s drug distribution in January 2019, Schlegel

continued to make illicit drug sales. The court also considered the seriousness of the

charges, the dangerousness of the activity, its community impact, the amount of drugs

located in the storage unit, and the possession of firearms connected to this case. The

court further noted that Schlegel was under state supervision at the time of the

offenses and qualified as a career offender. 

The court considered mitigating factors as well. It specifically noted that

Schlegel experienced childhood trauma and has a long-term substance abuse problem.

Accordingly, the district court applied a 36-month downward variance and sentenced

Schlegel to 324 months’ imprisonment on Count I and 240 months’ imprisonment on

Count II; it ordered the terms to be served concurrently.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Schlegel challenges his sentence as procedurally unsound and

substantively unreasonable. We first “ensure that the district court did not commit a

significant procedural error.” United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 855 (8th Cir.

2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such errors include “failing to consider the

§ 3553(a) factors” and “failing to adequately explain why a sentence was chosen.” Id.

4Schlegel had accumulated 18 criminal history points, and it was not disputed

that he qualified for career offender status. 

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(internal quotation marks omitted). “If the district court’s decision is procedurally

sound, then we will consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed,

applying an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Procedural Error 

Schlegel contends that the district court committed procedural error by failing

to fully consider the § 3553(a) factors and adequately explain the reason for its

sentence. However, Schlegel “concedes that he did not object at [s]entencing to any

alleged procedural error” and that our review of his claim is for plain error.

Appellant’s Br. at 10. 

A sentence survives plain-error review unless the defendant shows that the

sentencing court committed “(1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) that affects

substantial rights.” United States v. Thigpen, 848 F.3d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 2017)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Schlegel acknowledges that the court “engage[d]

in some recitation of the § 3553(a) factors at [s]entencing and indicate[d] that it had

considered them in crafting a sentence.” Appellant’s Br. at 11 (emphasis omitted).

But Schlegel nonetheless contends that the court procedurally erred in not conducting

“a more meaningful on-the-record examination,” id. at 12, of Schlegel’s family

history because its “failure to do so constitutes failure to adequately consider the

characteristics of the defendant under § 3553(a)(1),” id. at 12–13.

We disagree. Schlegel has not shown the district court erred at all, let alone

plainly so. “A district court need not ‘categorically rehearse’ each of the § 3553(a)

factors . . . ‘as long as it is clear that they were considered.’” United States v. Clayton,

828 F.3d 654, 657 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Richart, 662 F.3d 1037,

1049 (8th Cir. 2011)). On this record, it is evident the district court properly

considered the required sentencing factors. As the government noted, “[t]he district

court explicitly stated that it had reviewed all of the relevant materials for sentencing,

to include the PSR and the sentencing memoranda, which both contained robust

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discussions of Schlegel’s childhood, including the absence of his father, and his

mental and emotional health.” Appellee’s Br. at 12. At the sentencing hearing, the

district court expressly identified the sentencing considerations required by § 3553(a)

and stated that it had “considered each and every one of them.” R. Doc. 148, at 30.

Schlegel faults the district court’s lack of detailed discussion weighing his

absent father and mental health issues in determining his sentence. However, the

record reflects that the court reasonably considered Schlegel’s unfortunate past when

determining an appropriate sentence. The court stated: 

[T]he [c]ourt considers and recognizes that there are significant

mitigating factors in this defendant’s history and characteristics. The

defendant had significant trauma as a child. He recently lost his mother.

As a child, he suffered abuse. His father was not a part of his life. And

while he’s had some father figures step in and a stepfather, the [c]ourt

recognizes those traumas significantly affected this defendant. 

Id. 

On this record, we discern no procedural error, plain or otherwise, in the

district’s court sentencing of Schlegel. 

B. Substantive Reasonableness 

Schlegel also asserts that despite the district court’s 36-month downward

variance, his 324-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. See Zastrow, 534

F.3d at 855 (“If the district court’s decision is procedurally sound, then we will

consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, applying an

abuse-of-discretion standard.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

 To support his claim, Schlegel argues that he “provided compelling reasons”

for a greater downward variance, including (1) his family history and (2) his history

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of substance abuse and mental health issues. Appellant’s Br. at 17. Schlegel’s father

left his family when Schlegel was three years old. This fact was noted in the PSR, and

the court mentioned it at the sentencing hearing. “[A] sentencing court ‘has wide

latitude to weigh the [§] 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater

weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.’” United States v. Lozoya,

623 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374,

379 (8th Cir. 2009)). The district court does not abuse its discretion simply by

weighing the relevant factors in a manner contrary to the defendant’s preferences. See

Lozoya, 623 F.3d at 627; Bridges, 569 F.3d at 379. 

Based on our review of the record, Schlegel’s claim of abuse of discretion is

without merit. “[I]t will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court

sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as

substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Hager, 768 F. App’x 583, 585 (8th Cir.

2019) (unpublished per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Schlegel’s

proffered reasons and authorities do not show an abuse of discretion in this case.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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