53784 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 182 / Thursday, September 20, 2007 / Notices 

program that has been regularly 

evaluated. These data will serve as a 

baseline for future evaluations. The two 

primary data collection strategies will 

include open-ended interviews and 

web-based surveys. Interviews will be 

conducted with Federal staff involved 

in the administration of the SAPT BG 

and State staff from all States and 

Territories involved in their State’s 

implementation of the SAPT BG 

Program. Two web-based surveys will 

be administered to all individuals who 

formally participate in monitoring the 

SAPT BG as part of the Technical 

Review or State Prevention and Synar 

System Review Teams. 

The interview protocol for Federal 

staff includes 80 questions (mostly 

open-ended), and, on average, should 

take 90 minutes to complete. The 

interview protocol for the State staff 

includes 99 questions (again, mostly 

open-ended), and should take, on 

average, 3 hours to complete. Both the 

Federal staff interviews and the State 

staff interviews will be conducted as inperson interviews. While the Federal 

staff will each be interviewed 

individually, a single group State staff 

interview will be conducted for all 

relevant State staff. The SSA Directors 

will be asked to select those State staff 

who they believe are most 

knowledgeable about the SAPT BG for 

participation in the interviews. It is 

anticipated that, at a minimum, the 

State Planner, the State Data Analyst, 

the State Prevention Lead, the State 

Treatment Lead, one additional State 

staff member, and the State SSA 

Director will participate. 

The two web-based surveys will be 

distributed to the two current sets of 

formal reviewers for the SAPT BG: 

Technical Reviewers and State 

Prevention and Synar System 

Reviewers. The web-based surveys are 

designed so that each stakeholder group 

receives survey questions designed to 

capture their specific knowledge of and 

experience with the SAPT BG. The 

Technical Reviewer survey contains 47 

questions and the State Prevention and 

Synar System Reviewer survey has 27 

questions. Each survey should take 

approximately 1 hour or less to 

complete. Reviewers will submit their 

responses to the survey online over a 

3-week period. 

Table 3 summarizes the estimated 

annual total burden hours for the inperson and web-based surveys for the 

Federal and State staff stakeholders and 

Technical Reviewers, Synar Reviewers. 

TABLE 3.—ESTIMATED REPORTING BURDEN OF INTERVIEWS AND WEB-BASED SURVEYS

Respondents Number of 

respondents 

Average hours 

per interview/ 

survey 

Estimated total 

burden (hours) 

In-person Interviews: 

State Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Agency Commissioner ................... 60 3 180 

State Planners .................................................................................................................. 60 3 180 

State Data Analysts .......................................................................................................... 60 3 180 

State Prevention Lead ...................................................................................................... 60 3 180 

State Treatment Lead ....................................................................................................... 60 3 180 

Additional State Staff ........................................................................................................ 60 3 180 

Federal SAPT Block Grant Staff ...................................................................................... 35 1 .5 52 .5 

Subtotal ..................................................................................................................... 395 1,132 

Web-based Interviews: 

Technical Reviewers ........................................................................................................ 15 1 15 

State Prevention and Synar System Reviewers .............................................................. 30 1 30 

Subtotal ..................................................................................................................... 45 .......................... 45 

Total ................................................................................................................... 440 .......................... 1,177 

This Federal Register Notice is 

focused on the interviews and surveys 

that will be administered to the SAPT 

BG stakeholders as those methods of 

data collection require OMB approval. It 

is anticipated that in future independent 

evaluations of the SAPT BG Program 

focus will be given to the NOMs and 

their implications for program 

performance and goals. 

Written comments and 

recommendations concerning the 

proposed information collection should 

be sent by October 22, 2007 to: 

SAMHSA Desk Officer, Human 

Resources and Housing Branch, Office 

of Management and Budget, New 

Executive Office Building, Room 10235, 

Washington, DC 20503; due to potential 

delays in OMB’s receipt and processing 

of mail sent through the U.S. Postal 

Service, respondents are encouraged to 

submit comments by fax to: 202–395–

6974. 

Dated: September 12, 2007. 

Elaine Parry, 

Acting Director, Office of Program Services. 

[FR Doc. E7–18555 Filed 9–19–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4162–20–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Transportation Security Administration 

[Docket No. TSA–2006–24191; USCG–2007–

27415] 

Transportation Worker Identity 

Credential (TWIC) Biometric Reader 

Specification and TWIC Contactless 

Smart Card Application 

AGENCY: Transportation Security 

Administration; United States Coast 

Guard; DHS. 

ACTION: Notice of availability. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland 

Security, through the U.S. Coast Guard 

(Coast Guard) and the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA), 

announces the availability of the 


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1Pub. L. 109–347; October 13, 2006. 

working specification for Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 

biometric readers and the TWIC 

contactless smart card application. This 

specification is based on 

recommendations to the Coast Guard 

and TSA from the National Maritime 

Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC); 

comments from the public following 

publication of the NMSAC 

recommendations and request for 

comment; and, the government’s review 

of the NMSAC recommendations and 

comments received. The working 

specification is available to review at 

www.tsa.gov/twic and at http:// 

dms.dot.gov in docket USCG–2007–

27415. 

DATES: The reader specifications and 

card application are available 

September 20, 2007. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John 

Schwartz, Office of Transportation 

Threat Assessment and Credentialing 

(TSA–19), Transportation Worker 

Identification Credential Program 

Transportation Security Administration, 

601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 

22202–4220; telephone (571) 227–2177; 

facsimile (703) 603–0409; e-mail 

john.schwartz@dhs.gov. 

Reviewing Comments and the TWIC 

Working Technology Specification in 

the Docket 

Please be aware that anyone is able to 

search the electronic form of all 

comments received into any of our 

dockets by the name of the individual 

submitting the comment (or signing the 

comment, if submitted on behalf of an 

association, business, labor union, etc.). 

You may review the applicable Privacy 

Act Statement published in the Federal 

Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 

19477), or you may visit http:// 

dms.dot.gov. 

You may review the comments in the 

public docket by visiting the Dockets 

Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The Dockets Office is located 

in the West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, at the Department of 

Transportation address, previously 

provided under ADDRESSES. Also, you 

may review public dockets on the 

Internet at http://dms.dot.gov. 

Availability of Document 

You can get an electronic copy of this 

Notice and the actual working 

specifications using the Internet by—

(1) Searching the Department of 

Transportation’s electronic Docket 

Management System (DMS) Web page 

(http://dms.dot.gov/search); 

(2) Accessing the Government 

Printing Office’s Web page at http:// 

www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html 

(Notice only); or 

(3) Visiting TSA’s Security 

Regulations Web page at http:// 

www.tsa.gov and accessing the link for 

‘‘Research Center’’ at the top of the page. 

In addition, copies are available by 

writing or calling the individual in the 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

section. Make sure to identify the docket 

number of this action. 

I. Background 

The National Maritime Security 

Advisory Council (NMSAC) was created 

pursuant to the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act, 5 U.S.C., App. 2 (FACA) 

in 2003. The membership of NMSAC, 

which includes 21 voting members, was 

selected to represent a broad range of 

viewpoints regarding maritime security 

challenges and to advise the Secretary of 

Homeland Security through the 

Commandant of the Coast Guard of 

relevant maritime security issues. 

At the NMSAC meeting of November 

14, 2006, the Coast Guard and TSA 

asked NMSAC to provide advice on a 

contactless biometric smart card 

application and reader specification for 

TWIC by February 28, 2007, taking into 

account expertise from the biometric 

credentialing industry and maritime/ 

TWIC industry stakeholders. The 

specification is necessary for biometric 

readers and the TWICs that will be 

issued to individuals in the initial 

rollout of the TWIC program, beginning 

in the fall of 2007, and that will be used 

in pilot programs required by the 

Security and Accountability for Every 

Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act).1

TSA and Coast Guard provided 

NMSAC the following baseline 

requirements for the specification: 

1. Be non-proprietary; 

2. Incorporate appropriate security 

and privacy controls; 

3. Be interoperable with FIPS 201–1 

credential specifications; 

4. Be capable of serving as a platform 

for future capabilities; 

5. Be capable of supporting maritime 

operations; and 

6. Be suitable for manufacturing. 

TSA and Coast Guard recommended 

that the task be addressed by dividing 

responsibilities to construct operational 

maritime requirements and technology 

specifications. We recommended that 

members of the maritime industry 

develop operational maritime 

requirements and address credential 

authentication (e.g. authentication time 

and process, and alternate 

authentication procedures) 

requirements; durability requirements; 

and credential management procedures, 

including key management. We 

recommended that the biometric 

credentialing experts develop 

technology specifications, including a 

smart card, reader, and keying 

specifications. 

In the course of our discussions with 

NMSAC, members of the committee 

stated that they did not wish to 

recommend a specification that 

included encryption of the biometric 

and corresponding processes to decrypt 

the biometric when the card engages the 

reader. Many of the NMSAC members 

asserted that encryption was not 

necessary because the biometric—a 

fingerprint minutiae template, rather 

than an actual fingerprint—should not 

require the added protection that 

encryption provides. Also, members of 

NMSAC did not want to take on the 

additional responsibility of key 

management, which would be necessary 

if the recommended specification 

included encryption. However, TSA and 

Coast Guard disagreed with NMSAC’s 

suggestion that the fingerprint template 

does not need to be encrypted and 

therefore asked NMSAC to provide one 

specification with encryption of the 

biometric and a corresponding process 

to decrypt the biometric when the card 

engages the reader. The formal request 

from the TWIC program to NMSAC is 

available at the following URL: http:// 

homeport.uscg.mil, and in the docket for 

this notice. 

On March 1, 2007, the Coast Guard 

received NMSAC’s report, entitled 

‘‘Recommendations on Developing a 

Contactless Biometric Specification for 

the TWIC.’’ The report included two 

specifications. The first recommended 

specification, preferred by NMSAC for 

the reasons discussed in the paragraph 

above, does not provide for encryption 

of the TWIC cardholder’s biometric 

fingerprint minutiae template. Without 

encryption, the template is transmitted 

in the clear and could be read by a third 

party whenever the card is energized by 

a contactless reader. Therefore, there is 

a risk that the template on the TWIC 

could be read without the knowledge or 

overt action of the cardholder. 

NMSAC’s second specification 

includes encryption of the biometric 

fingerprint minutiae template, which 

will protect the template from being 

decrypted unless information on the 

card’s magnetic stripe or contact 

integrated circuit chip (ICC), is also 

provided to the reader. The information 

on the card’s magnetic strip (or ICC) is 

needed to decrypt the template, which 

is obtained contactlessly from the card. 


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This method of encryption protects the 

template from being read even if it is 

obtained covertly since the information 

on the card’s magnetic stripe (or ICC) 

cannot be obtained without physical 

possession of the card. If a TWIC is 

physically obtained by someone other 

than the rightful owner, the information 

necessary to obtain and decrypt the 

template would be available to them. 

Note that each TWIC will contain 

three magnetic stripes and the first is 

reserved exclusively for TSA’s use to 

store encryption information. Owner/ 

operators may use the remaining two 

magnetic stripes for information that 

facilitates the use of local access control 

systems so long as doing so does not 

interfere with the information encoded 

by TSA on the first magnetic stripe that 

allows contactless operation of the 

TWIC. Technical specifications for the 

magnetic stripe and areas reserved for 

TSA use are contained in the TWIC 

contactless card and reader working 

specification. 

In March 2007, the Coast Guard 

published a Notice of Availability of the 

NMSAC Recommendations and 

requested comments from all interested 

parties. (72 FR 12626, March 16, 2007.) 

In addition to requesting general 

comments, Coast Guard asked the 

public to respond to specific questions, 

including: (1) Whether the use of a 

Personal Identification Number (PIN) is 

justified to further minimize the chance 

that a fingerprint template from a lost or 

stolen credential could be obtained by 

an unauthorized individual; (2) what, if 

any, privacy concerns exist if the 

fingerprint template is obtained by an 

unauthorized individual; (3) how the 

recommended specifications impact 

maritime security and operations; (4) 

how the recommended specifications 

impact existing physical access control 

systems (PACS); (5) whether TSA and 

Coast Guard should consider alternative 

designs; (6) how the recommended 

specifications impact product, system, 

and operational costs; (7) how quickly 

the recommended specifications could 

be incorporated into the design and 

manufacture of access control 

equipment; and (8) whether there 

should be a qualified products list (QPL) 

or equivalent regime. 

Over thirty separate entities submitted 

comments to these questions. The 

majority of commenters represented the 

maritime industry, but several 

technology companies and trade 

associations also responded. Generally, 

the commenters praised the work of the 

NMSAC TWIC Contactless Specification 

Workgroup. TSA and Coast Guard agree 

that NMSAC delivered excellent 

recommendations in a very short timeframe, and we greatly appreciate 

NMSAC’s efforts in this important 

security endeavor. In the following 

section, we summarize all comments 

received. 

II. Summary of Comments 

Question 1—Additional Security 

Features 

Commenters generally agreed that the 

additional security feature mentioned, a 

PIN, was not a good idea for general use 

due to operational concerns. Others 

stated that a PIN should be considered 

only if it could be used in a way that 

does not adversely impact maritime 

operations. Many commenters stated 

that TWIC holders would likely forget 

their PINs, which would become 

burdensome to TWIC users and 

maritime operations. As for PIN length, 

the few who commented prefer a 4-digit 

PIN over a longer PIN. 

Only one commenter discussed an 

alternative security feature—the use of a 

smart card holder that protects 

information stored on the card’s 

integrated circuit chip until the holder 

is activated by the card holder’s live 

biometric. At least one commenter 

suggested that to help deter fraudulent 

use of the TWIC, fingerprint scanners 

associated with card readers should be 

able to confirm that the fingerprint 

being presented is that of a live person 

rather than an artificial replica of a 

fingerprint or fingerprint template. This 

capability is called ‘‘liveness’’ detection. 

Question 2—Privacy Concerns 

Most commenters from the maritime 

industry stated that maintaining the 

privacy of the information stored on the 

card is important, but they do not 

believe additional measures are 

necessary to protect the privacy of 

biometric fingerprint templates. 

However, commenters from the 

technology industry generally asserted 

that biometric fingerprint templates 

should be protected, and that the TWIC 

Privacy Key (TPK) scheme provided in 

NMSAC’s alternative recommended 

specification is sufficient to protect the 

template. 

Question 3—Vessel and Facility 

Security Operations 

A number of maritime commenters 

stated that use of a PIN and TPK card 

swipe scheme, and, encryption of the 

fingerprint biometric template have the 

potential to adversely impact port and 

facility operations. Specifically, 

commenters expressed concern about 

error rates that might impact gate 

throughput, particularly during times of 

high-volume access; and, the effect of 

requiring the use of both PINs and 

biometrics at certain Maritime Security 

(MARSEC) levels. Commenters also 

mentioned that the upcoming TWIC 

pilot program that TSA and Coast Guard 

are implementing to test card and reader 

interaction will be helpful in identifying 

impacts on facility and vessel 

operations. 

Question 4—Impacts on Existing 

Physical Access Control Systems 

Commenters generally agreed that the 

TWIC program will have a significant 

impact on existing PACS if the two are 

integrated and will be duplicative if 

they are not. They cited the need for 

replacing or enhancing existing systems; 

additional trenching and related 

construction activities; and, installing or 

upgrading electrical power supplies and 

wiring to readers as examples of the 

impacts TWIC will have on existing 

PACS. Some commenters mentioned 

that the use of TPK would impact legacy 

PACS by requiring the modification or 

replacement of existing readers to 

include a magnetic stripe reading 

capability. Some commenters expressed 

concern that multiple credentials may 

be required of certain workers at certain 

locations and that multiple credentials 

would have to be processed to allow 

entry. Several commenters asserted that 

the cost of integration should be 

supported by Federal grant funding. 

One commenter suggested that TWIC 

PACS requirements should have a long 

phase-in period to allow facilities to use 

legacy equipment through the end of its 

useful life. 

Question 5—Alternative Designs 

Commenters mentioned that any 

alternative designs should be evaluated 

in the context of the maritime operating 

requirements established by the NMSAC 

working group. Several commenters 

suggested that the short time period 

allotted for development of the 

technical specification may have 

prevented alternative designs from 

emerging. However, a technology 

industry commenter stated that 

alternatives were considered and 

rejected by the technology team during 

their deliberations. The commenter 

stated that the following alternative 

designs were considered and rejected: 

1. Shared Symmetric Keys 

Key management is operationally 

complex and exposure of the key would 

have a negative impact on the entire 

TWIC system. Shared symmetric keys 

rely on one secret key to be distributed 

among all readers and cards to establish 

secure communications between card 

and reader. Keys must be changed 


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regularly, and securely distributed and 

stored to maintain system security. 

Secure key management would be 

difficult to accomplish due to the 

number and dispersion of TWIC readers. 

2. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 

In a PKI system, secure 

communication and authentication are 

done using public key certificates which 

require online communication. The 

fragmented TWIC PACS would lack the 

real-time network access required of a 

PKI system. 

3. Biometric Match-on-Card (MOC) 

MOC involves matching a biometric 

sample against a reference biometric 

template stored inside the secure 

environment of a smart card. The 

reference template cannot be read 

outside of the card, but is only used 

internally by the matching process 

inside the smart card. MOC is a 

relatively new approach within the 

smart card and biometrics industries 

and provides a good level of security 

and privacy. This is because the user’s 

biometric information is protected by 

the smart card and is never released 

from the card. Internal to the smart card, 

MOC matches the user’s live biometric 

template provided by an external 

biometric reader with the user’s stored 

reference template. A major advantage 

to MOC over other approaches is that 

the card never releases personally 

identifying information (the biometric 

template) to the reader. Thus, the 

biometric could not be lifted or 

‘‘skimmed’’ by an unauthorized 

individual. Also, under the MOC 

process, the need for reader 

authentication and associated reader 

key management is minimized because 

the reader only stores public keys that 

do not need to be protected from 

disclosure by using a Secure Access 

Module (SAM) to store secret keys to 

identify a particular smart card. With 

MOC, the transmission of the biometric 

template from the reader to the card is 

done using the public key and can only 

be decrypted using the private key that 

is stored securely on the smart card. For 

all of these reasons, MOC is a very 

promising technology to pursue. 

However, it has not been fully tested in 

a variety of laboratory or field settings 

and currently, there are no approved 

MOC standards. Therefore, we have 

determined that it would not be 

advisable to implement MOC for the 

upcoming TWIC rollout. We will 

continue to follow the development of 

MOC and if it matures for operational 

use, we will again consider its use in the 

maritime environment. 

One commenter requested that the 

distance between the card reader and 

the card be increased from four to 18 

inches to allow truck drivers to remain 

in their cabs while their TWICs are read. 

Some commenters reiterated their view 

that the specification should not include 

encryption in any form. 

Question 6—Cost Impacts 

A number of commenters reiterated 

their endorsement of NMSAC’s nonencryption recommendation to 

minimize costs. Commenters who 

operate existing PACS expressed 

concern about integrating TWIC into 

their operation, particularly if 

encryption of the biometric is required 

and if wiring upgrades are necessary to 

support TWIC readers. Commenters 

who do not have PACS now expressed 

concern about how much it will cost to 

purchase, install, and maintain TWIC 

systems. 

Question 7—Incorporation of TWIC Into 

Existing Access Control Equipment 

Maritime industry commenters 

generally deferred this question to the 

technical experts. Technical 

commenters stated that the 

specifications TSA and Coast Guard 

choose for the TWIC program will 

determine the ease of design, 

manufacture, and integration. They also 

stated that knowledge gained through 

experience with designs for other PACS 

that share common attributes with 

TWIC will lessen the time needed to 

create TWIC PACS products. 

Conversely, features that are unique to 

TWIC will have to be created, but some 

commenters believe TWIC-unique 

features can be accommodated through 

software or firmware (i.e., computer 

programming instructions that are 

stored in a read-only memory unit 

rather than being implemented through 

software) applications for existing 

readers. The commenters estimate that it 

may take from only a few months up to 

36 months to integrate TWIC with 

certain PACS designs. 

Question 8—Quality Products List 

Process & Creation 

Almost universally, commenters 

agreed that TSA and Coast Guard 

should use a QPL process to help 

stakeholders know what equipment is 

best for use in the maritime 

environment. Many commented that the 

process the U.S. General Services 

Administration uses should be 

considered as a starting point for 

development of a TWIC QPL. 

Commenters also stated that product 

testing should include harsh maritime 

conditions. 

III. Working Specification Selected 

A. Summary of Selection 

TSA and the Coast Guard have 

selected the NMSAC alternate 

recommendation that requires 

encryption and use of the TWIC Privacy 

Key (TPK) as the working specification 

for readers that will be used during the 

pilot programs. If the readers that meet 

this working specification perform as 

planned during the pilot testing, we will 

finalize the specification as we complete 

the rulemaking that requires the use of 

readers. Also, it is important to note that 

the TWICs that will be issued this fall 

in the initial rollout of the TWIC 

program will operate as designed when 

engaged in readers that are built to this 

working specification. 

We are choosing to adopt this 

specification to protect the personally 

identifiable information (PII) contained 

in the TWIC from unintended disclosure 

while the TWIC is in the possession of 

the credential’s rightful owner. Even 

assuming individuals suffer no real 

injury today if their template is taken or 

lifted through an unauthorized process, 

the template is personal information 

connected to that individual. Using a 

fingerprint template in lieu of a 

fingerprint image does not necessarily 

prevent the long-term potential for 

unauthorized use of personally 

identifying fingerprint information, if 

intercepted by unauthorized persons. 

Even assuming the fingerprint template 

cannot be reverse-engineered to produce 

an accurate duplicate fingerprint today, 

we cannot be certain that such a 

capability will not arise in the future. 

With the use of the TPK model, security 

and privacy protection are provided 

without the burden that other 

encryption models would place on 

PACS owners and operators. 

TSA and Coast Guard take the 

industry’s concerns about adverse 

operational impacts very seriously. 

Consequently, as the card and readers 

are envisioned to operate when TWIC is 

fully implemented, use of a PIN will not 

be necessary to release the biometric 

unless the owner/operator chooses to 

use contact readers and the contact side 

of the credential. In addition, we are in 

the process of finalizing plans for the 

pilot tests required by the SAFE Port 

Act and we are working with experts 

within DHS to establish a very thorough 

test plan to evaluate the card-reader 

interface under a variety of conditions 

and assess its impact on operations. 

Through the pilot tests, we will 

investigate the impacts of requiring 

biometric identity verification on 

business processes, technology, and 

operations on facilities and vessels of 


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various size, type, and location. As 

detailed below, while the government 

has removed any specific language 

about MARSEC levels from the 

specifications, the pilot testing process 

will be used to evaluate various use case 

scenarios that will influence the 

upcoming TWIC reader rulemaking 

process, including TWIC card and 

reader use requirements at various 

MARSEC levels. 

We understand that the decision to 

implement the TPK model for 

contactless biometric identity 

verification will have impacts on the 

installed base of PACS systems. 

However, the TPK model allows 

facilities to integrate the model with 

their local PACS in several different 

ways. The TPK model allows use of: (1) 

The magnetic stripe to transfer TPK 

information by swiping the card through 

a magnetic strip reader and then 

presenting the card to a contactless 

reader to securely transmit the biometric 

template; (2) pre-registration of the 

information on the magnetic stripe into 

the local PACS and then presenting the 

card to a contactless reader; or (3) preregistering the biometric minutiae 

templates into the local PACS until 

retrieved upon presentation of the TWIC 

to a contactless reader. The TPK model 

also allows several options for handheld 

readers. Handheld reader options 

include the use of either the contact or 

contactless portion of the TWIC to 

enable biometric identity verification. 

We do not wish to implement any 

alternative designs at this time. 

However, we may add additional 

security features to the card or card 

reader with due notice to the industry 

and regard for operational impacts. One 

alternative technology of particular 

interest to the government is match-oncard (MOC) technology. The TWIC 

program and Coast Guard remain in 

close contact with the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 

their consideration of MOC technology 

for various Federal smart card and 

personal identification initiatives. 

We are mindful that cost is a strong 

consideration in the operational 

implementation of TWIC and we are 

working to minimize costs on the 

operational users of TWIC where 

possible. Also, we are working closely 

with other DHS components to continue 

to make available Port Security Grant 

funds to mitigate some of the costs to 

vessel and facility operators and owners 

of implementing the TWIC program. 

We have worked closely with the 

NMSAC working group to understand 

the impacts of the TWIC program on the 

maritime sector. Our choice of the TPK 

model is grounded in the specific 

recommendation of smart card, PACS, 

and biometrics industry experts 

involved in the NMSAC working group 

process and a thorough review of 

technology choices and impacts by 

government experts. These experts 

leveraged other similar technologies 

from contactless identification regimes 

in their deliberations. While 

implementation of the TWIC program 

should be as timely as possible, we 

understand that technical 

implementation timelines must 

incorporate engineering and 

manufacturing time, field testing, 

facility adaptation, and final field 

installation. 

We are encouraged by the positive 

responses we received regarding the 

creation of a QPL. However, unlike 

other government smart card programs, 

TWIC card readers, in most cases, will 

not be procured by the government. 

This lessens the ability of the 

government to leverage existing QPLtype programs already in existence, 

such as those supporting the Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 

(HSPD)—12 Personal Identity 

Verification (PIV) Program. 

B. Technical Changes to the TPK 

Working Specification 

TSA and Coast Guard are making 

some technical modifications to the TPK 

working specification recommended by 

NMSAC. We believe these changes are 

necessary to further protect privacy and 

security for the TWIC program. There 

are four important changes involving 

verification of the cardholder unique 

identifier (CHUID) data, MARSEC level 

operations, biometric liveness detection, 

and contactless transmission speed that 

are discussed in detail below. In 

addition, we made minor changes to the 

specification that is discussed below. 

B.1. Signature Verification of CHUID 

Data 

The NMSAC specification 

recommends that verification of the 

signature on the CHUID be optional. 

However, regardless of whether the 

credential is digitally signed, CHUID 

data can be copied or ‘‘cloned’’ to 

another card. Signature verification 

mitigates counterfeited CHUID data 

from being accepted as authentic. For 

this reason, verification of the digital 

signature on any CHUID unknown to a 

PACS is mandatory and is included in 

the final specification. Signature 

verification will have minimal 

performance impact to the contactless 

transaction and minimal impact on 

reader implementation. 

B.2. Authentication Methods Used at 

MARSEC Levels: 

NMSAC recommended that CHUID 

authentication should be used at 

MARSEC 1 and biometric 

authentication should be used at 

MARSEC 2. Specifying authentication 

methods for various threat or risk levels 

is outside of the scope of a technical 

specification for contactless cards and 

readers, and is more appropriately 

addressed separately in the risk 

management and security requirements 

for maritime operators. Therefore, we 

have removed the MARSEC guidance 

relating to use of specific authentication 

levels at different MARSEC levels from 

the working specification. 

B.3. Biometric Liveness Detection 

NMSAC recommended that biometric 

liveness detection may be employed in 

TWIC readers, making liveness 

detection optional. Liveness detection is 

an important means to prevent spoofing 

of a biometric sensor and is generally 

something that is strongly 

recommended by the reader industry. 

Because standards for liveness detection 

are currently not available, and there is 

no conformance testing protocol to 

validate its effectiveness, it is difficult to 

specify liveness detection as a 

mandatory requirement. However, we 

have changed the language for liveness 

detection from may to should, to stress 

that liveness detection (or attended 

verification) in TWIC readers is a highly 

desirable feature. This change will have 

no operational impact on TWIC 

contactless transactions. 

B.4. Contactless Transmission Speed 

The contactless reader performance 

requirements in the NMSAC 

specification are based upon transaction 

completion time. We have determined 

that specific requirements for 

contactless transmission speed should 

be specified so that the reader will 

support negotiation of a contactless 

speed with the card that achieves at 

least 400K bits per second. This will 

minimize transaction timings based on 

transmission capabilities of both current 

and future TWIC card versions. This 

change will not adversely impact TWIC 

contactless transactions. 

C. List of All Changes to the TPK 

Specification 

Listed below is a complete list of the 

changes TSA and Coast Guard have 

made to the TPK specification that 

NMSAC recommended. The changes of 

interest are discussed in detail above in 

Section III.B. 

1. Section 4, TWIC Modes of 

Operation. Requirement for specific 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 182 / Thursday, September 20, 2007 / Notices 53789 

authentication modes to be used at 

specific MARSEC levels has been 

removed and available authentication 

modes have been clarified. 

2. Section 4, TWIC Modes of 

Operation. Ability to configure specific 

authentication modes depending on a 

given perimeter security requirement 

and to be used at differing MARSEC 

levels has been added. 

3. Section 4, TWIC Modes of 

Operation. Verification of CHUID 

signature changed to mandatory. CHUID 

signature is either verified once, either 

when the card holder’s CHUID is 

registered in a local PACS, or read by 

the TWIC reader each time the card is 

presented for access. 

4. Section 5.1.1, Device Dimensions. 

Note added to stress contactless reader 

sensitivity to location and 

electromagnetic conditions of their 

environment. 

5. Section 6, Portable Reader 

Requirements. Requirements for 

confidentiality and authentication 

added for wireless devices used in 

physical access systems. 

6. Section 7, Operational 

Requirements. Contactless transmission 

speed requirement changed to support 

106kbit/s, 212kbit/s or 424kbit/s, based 

on the card’s capabilities. 

7. Section 7, Operational 

Requirements. Requirement added to 

reject transaction if multiple cards are 

simultaneously detected in the reader’s 

contactless field. 

8. Section 8, Performance 

Requirements. Support for biometric 

liveness detection strengthened from 

‘‘may’’ to ‘‘should’’ indicating a strong 

preference for liveness detection. 

9. Appendix A.1, CHUID 

Authentication. CHUID authentication 

clarified. 

10. Appendix A.2, TWIC Biometric 

Authentication. Biometric 

authentication clarified. 

11. Appendix A.3, Card 

Authentication Key Authentication. 

Card Authentication data object 

reference corrected. 

12. Appendix A.3, Card 

Authentication Key Authentication. 

Card Authentication Key usage clarified 

to indicate that it is only available via 

the PIV application, and is not shared 

with the TWIC application. 

13. Appendix D, TWIC Reader 

Compatibility with Other Card Types. 

Reader compatibility and default card 

support clarified and modified to allow 

configuration of default AID. 

14. Appendix E.4, Alternate 

Implementations. Minor clarifications to 

PACS enrollment. 

15. Appendix F, Proposed TWIC AID 

Structure. TSA RID added, AID 

structure clarified. 

D. Future Changes to Specification 

TSA and Coast Guard will continue to 

evaluate and test the working 

specification as we implement the TWIC 

Pilot Program. We anticipate that, as 

with any testing program, we will 

encounter technical issues that can be 

corrected by making minor changes to 

the working specification. We will make 

such changes available to the public as 

they occur, through use of the following 

link/Web site: www.tsa.gov/twic. In 

addition, we will address any necessary 

changes to the working specification 

prior to finalizing the regulations 

requiring TWIC readers. 

Issued in Arlington, Virginia, on 

September 14, 2007. 

Stephanie Rowe, 

Assistant Administrator, Transportation 

Threat Assessment and Credentialing, 

Transportation Security Administration. 

[FR Doc. 07–4649 Filed 9–19–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–15–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Bureau of Customs and Border 

Protection 

Automated Commercial Environment 

(ACE): National Customs Automation 

Program Test of Automated Truck 

Manifest for Truck Carrier Accounts; 

Deployment Schedule 

AGENCY: Customs and Border Protection; 

Department of Homeland Security. 

ACTION: General notice. 

SUMMARY: Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), in conjunction with 

the Department of Transportation, 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration, is currently conducting 

a National Customs Automation 

Program (NCAP) test concerning the 

transmission of automated truck 

manifest data. This document 

announces the final group, or cluster, of 

ports to be deployed for this test. 

DATES: The ports identified in this 

notice, in the state of Alaska, are 

expected to be fully deployed for testing 

no earlier than August 30, 2007. 

Comments concerning this notice and 

all aspects of the announced test may be 

submitted at any time during the test 

period to the contact listed below. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

James Swanson via e-mail at 

james.d.swanson@dhs.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The National Customs Automation 

Program (NCAP) test concerning the 

transmission of automated truck 

manifest data for truck carrier accounts 

was announced in a notice published in 

the Federal Register (69 FR 55167) on 

September 13, 2004. That notice stated 

that the test of the Automated Truck 

Manifest would be conducted in a 

phased approach, with primary 

deployment scheduled for no earlier 

than November 29, 2004. 

A series of Federal Register notices 

have announced the implementation of 

the test, beginning with a notice 

published on May 31, 2005 (70 FR 

30964). As described in that document, 

the deployment sites for the test have 

been phased in as clusters. The ports 

identified belonging to the first cluster 

were announced in the May 31, 2005 

notice. Additional clusters were 

announced in subsequent notices 

published in the Federal Register 

including: 70 FR 43892, published on 

July 29, 2005; 70 FR 60096, published 

on October 14, 2005; 71 FR 3875, 

published on January 24, 2006; 71 FR 

23941, published on April 25, 2006; 71 

FR 42103, published on July 25, 2006; 

71 FR 77404, published on December 

26, 2006; 72 FR 5070, published on 

February 2, 2007; 72 FR 7058, published 

on February 14, 2007; 72 FR 14127, 

published on March 26, 2007; and 72 FR 

32135, published on June 11, 2007. 

New Cluster 

Through this notice, CBP announces 

that the final cluster of ports to be 

brought up for purposes of deployment 

of the test, to be fully deployed no 

earlier than August 30, 2007, will be the 

following land border ports in the state 

of Alaska: Alcan, Dalton Cache, and 

Skagway. This group of ports is the last 

remaining group, nationwide, to be 

tested; the ACE truck manifest test will 

be complete once it is effectuated in 

Alaska. 

This deployment is for purposes of 

the test of the transmission of automated 

truck manifest data only; the Automated 

Commercial Environment (ACE) Truck 

Manifest System is not yet the mandated 

transmission system for these ports. The 

ACE Truck Manifest System will 

become the mandatory transmission 

system in these ports only after 

publication in the Federal Register of 90 

days notice, as explained by CBP in the 

Federal Register notice published on 

October 27, 2006 (71 FR 62922). 

Previous NCAP Notices Not Concerning 

Deployment Schedules 

On Monday, March 21, 2005, a notice 

was published in the Federal Register 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES