Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 23, 2023.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00303-CV

ALAN W. NALLE, SR., Appellant

V.

KATHRYN HALE, Appellee

On Appeal from the 459th District Court

Travis County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-20-005928

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a summary judgment case. Appellant Alan W. Nalle, Sr. sued 

appellee Kathryn Hale alleging various causes of action related to a dispute with 

his community’s homeowner’s association. Hale eventually filed a motion for 

summary judgment on Nalle’s causes of action, which the trial court granted. 

Because we conclude that the trial court committed no reversible error when it 

granted Hale’s motion for summary judgment, we affirm.
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BACKGROUND

This litigation originally arose out of a dispute between Nalle and his 

homeowner’s association, the Westlake Oaks Property Owners Association, Inc. 

(Westlake). Nalle believed that Westlake, its Architectural Control Committee 

(the Committee), and Board of Directors violated Westlake’s protective covenants

by approving plans and then granting a construction variance for a new house

being constructed on the lot next to Nalle’s house. At the time the variance was 

approved, Hale was serving as a voluntary member of the Committee. Hale signed

the variance in her capacity as a representative of the Committee. 

Appellant filed suit against Westlake alleging claims for breach of contract

for failing to enforce protective covenants, negligence, and “intentional conduct” 

that violated Nalle’s “right to privacy and right to quiet enjoyment of his home.” 

Among other allegations, Nalle alleged that the Committee “did not act reasonably 

in granting approval” of the new construction “and instead acted arbitrarily without 

fair, solid and substantial cause or reason and took action without consideration 

and in disregard of the facts and circumstances of the matter.” Nalle further 

alleged that he had provided “a list of errors in the approval process made by the 

architect and by the [Committee] that demonstrated that the [Committee] had failed 

to properly conform to the requirements of the [protective covenants] in granting

its approvals and that such approvals were in violation of the [protective 

covenants].” In addition to other allegations against the Committee, Nalle alleged 

that the Board and then the Committee “did not act reasonably in granting the 

variance, and instead acted arbitrarily without fair, solid and substantial cause or

reason and took action without consideration and in disregard of the facts and 

circumstances of the matter.” Finally, Nalle sought recovery of the following 

damages:
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(a) Actual or economic damages for at least $1,000,000.00, and

(b) Special or consequential damages to be determined by a jury, in an 

amount of at least $1,000,000.00, including for the violation of 

plaintiff’s right to privacy and right to quiet enjoyment of his home, 

and

(c) Additional damages, past and future, for loss of use and enjoyment 

of his property until elimination of the nuisance described above, and

(d) Pleading further, and alternatively, if necessary, Defendant is 

guilty of misconduct which was committed in reckless and callous 

disregard of the legitimate rights of the Plaintiff so far as to justify the

imposition of exemplary damages. Plaintiff seeks recovery of such 

exemplary damages from Defendant. 

Westlake made an offer to settle Nalle’s lawsuit pursuant to Rule 167.2 of 

the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Chapter 42 of the Texas Civil Practices and 

Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 42.001 et seq; Tex. R. App. 

P. 167.2. Among other provisions, the settlement offer provided that Westlake was 

offering “to settle all claims that have been asserted or that could have been 

asserted by Plaintiff against any Defendant who have been named as parties to this 

cause of action in any way related to, based upon, or arising out of any of the facts, 

events, occurrences, circumstances, acts, omissions, transactions, or relationships 

described in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition.” The settlement offer further 

provided that Westlake would pay Nalle $300,000 in full and final settlement of all 

claims “including all monetary damages, statutory or exemplary damages, 

attorney’s fees, court costs, and interest that could be recoverable against any 

Defendant who have been named as parties to this lawsuit as of the date of this 

offer.” Finally, the settlement offer provided that it was “subject to the execution 

of a written settlement agreement, and the dismissal with prejudice of all claims 

against Defendant Westlake and its current and former officers, board members, 

agents, attorneys, representatives, heirs, and assigns.”
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Nalle timely accepted Westlake’s offer. Efforts to draft the required written 

settlement agreement stalled over whether the individual Board members, officers, 

agents, and other representatives of Westlake should be included. Nalle filed a 

motion to enforce the settlement and the trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing

and eventually issued its decision in a letter. The parties then executed a written 

settlement agreement based on the trial court’s letter. The executed Settlement 

Agreement recited that:

WHEREAS . . . Defendant Westlake offered to settle all claims that 

have been asserted or that could be asserted by Plaintiff against any 

Defendant who have been named as parties to this cause of action in 

any way related to, based upon, or arising out of any of the facts, 

events, occurrences, circumstances, acts, omissions, transactions or 

relationships described in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Original 

Petition.

WHEREAS, Defendant offered to pay [$300,000.00] to Plaintiff Nalle 

in full and final settlement of all claims described in the paragraph 

above, including all monetary damages, statutory or exemplary 

damages, attorney’s fees, court costs, and interest that could be 

recoverable against any Defendant who have been named as parties to 

this lawsuit as of the date of this offer.

WHEREAS Defendant made its Offer of Settlement, and Plaintiff 

accepted the Defendant’s Offer of Settlement, subject to the execution 

of a written settlement agreement, and the dismissal with prejudice of 

all claims against Defendant Westlake and its current and former 

officers, board members, agents, attorneys, representatives, heirs and 

assigns.

The Settlement Agreement further provided:

In consideration of the total sum of [$300,000.00] (“the Settlement 

Amount”) from Defendant, the receipt and sufficiency of which is 

hereby acknowledged by Plaintiff, and in consideration of the mutual 

agreements, conditions, representations, warranties, recitals, 

covenants and statements of intention contained herein, Plaintiff, Alan

W. Nalle, Sr. hereby accepts the above-referenced payment in full 

settlement, compromise and release of all claims as [sic] arising out of 
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or in connection with the Lawsuit, pursuant to this Settlement

Agreement, against Defendant Westlake Oaks Property Owners 

Association, Inc.

The trial court then signed an Agreed Order Dismissing with Prejudice,

which provided that:

All claims against Defendant Westlake Oaks Property Owners

Association, Inc. and its current and former officers, board members,

agents, attorneys, representatives, heirs, and assigns are DISMISSED,

With Prejudice. 

(emphasis in original).

Nearly eighteen months after the agreed dismissal order, Nalle filed this 

lawsuit against Hale. Nalle alleged claims of fraud and breach of contract against 

Hale in her individual capacity. Nalle alleged that Hale “could not have signed the 

variance acting within her authority, if any.” Nalle sought recovery of the

following damages:

39. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ [sic] fraud 

Defendant caused injury to [Nalle]. [Nalle] is therefore entitled to 

recover for any diminishment of his property’s fair market value, and 

for the loss of intrinsic value of [Nalle’s] damaged property, physical 

damage to the [Nalle’s] property, along with loss of use and 

enjoyment of his property, personal injuries, past and future, harm to 

[Nalle’s] health, and harm to [Nalle’s] peace of mind in the use and 

enjoyment of his property.

40. [Nalle] has sustained damages in excess of this Court’s 

jurisdictional minimum, as a result of the actions and/or omissions of 

Defendant described hereinabove, including but not limited to:

41. Actual or economic damages for at least $1,000,000.00, and

42 Special or consequential damages to be determined by a jury; 

and 

43. Additional damages for loss of use and enjoyment of his 

property; and 
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44. Pleading further, and alternatively, if necessary, Defendant is 

guilty of misconduct which was committed in reckless and callous 

disregard of the legitimate rights of [Nalle] so far as to justify the

imposition of exemplary damages. [Nalle] seeks recovery of such 

exemplary damages from Defendant.

Hale filed an answer and asserted a counterclaim against Nalle. Hale moved 

for summary judgment arguing that Nalle’s claims were barred by the doctrines of

res judicata, the one satisfaction rule, and the election of remedies. Hale also 

included a request for sanctions in her motion. The trial court granted Hale’s 

motion for summary judgment on Nalle’s claims against her without specifying the 

grounds. Hale then non-suited her counterclaim. The trial court denied Hale’s 

request for sanctions in a separate order. The trial court subsequently signed an 

order of nonsuit making the summary judgment final. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS1

Nalle challenges the trial court’s summary judgment in a single issue with 

multiple sub-parts. Because we conclude Nalle’s claims against Hale are barred by 

application of the one satisfaction rule affirmative defense, we need not address the 

remainder of Nalle’s arguments raised in this appeal. See Carr v. Brasher, 776 

S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989) (“When a trial court’s order granting summary 

judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, summary 

judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of the theories advanced are 

meritorious.”).

1 The Texas Supreme Court ordered the Third Court of Appeals to transfer this case to 

our court. Under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, “the court of appeals to which the case 

is transferred must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under 

principles of stare decisis if the transferee court’s decision otherwise would have been 

inconsistent with the precedent of the transferor court.” Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
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I. Standard of Review

We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary 

judgment. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 

844, 848 (Tex. 2009). In a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant 

must establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). When reviewing 

a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and 

indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s 

favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); 

Provident Life & Accid. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). A 

genuine issue of material fact exists if the nonmovant produces more than a 

scintilla of probative evidence regarding the challenged element. See Ford Motor 

Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). A defendant moving for 

traditional summary judgment on an affirmative defense must conclusively 

establish each element of that affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 

941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997).

II. The one satisfaction rule bar’s Nalle’s lawsuit against Hale.

“The one satisfaction rule applies to prevent a plaintiff from obtaining more 

than one recovery for the same injury.” Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 

S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1991); see also Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 

390 (Tex. 2000). Under this rule, a plaintiff is entitled to one recovery for 

damages suffered when multiple defendants commit the same act as well as when 

multiple defendants commit technically different acts resulting in a single injury. 

Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 390; see El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Berryman, 858 S.W.2d 

362, 364 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (“The one satisfaction rule provides that a party 

which suffers but one injury can recover only one satisfaction for damages arising 
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from that injury.”). Because the rule focuses on whether the plaintiff has suffered 

a single, indivisible injury and not the alleged causes of action, the rule can apply

to both tort and contract claims. Sky View at Las Palmas, LLC v. Mendez, 555 

S.W.3d 101, 113–15 (Tex. 2018). A trial court can grant summary judgment based 

on application of the one satisfaction rule. See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 858 

S.W.2d at 363 (“Because we find Berryman’s claims barred by the one satisfaction 

rule and collateral estoppel, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 

affirm the [summary] judgment of the trial court.”).

As detailed above, Nalle filed two lawsuits wherein he sought to recover the 

same damages allegedly caused his neighbor was granted a variance from two 

different defendants: Westlake and Hale. Nalle’s alleged damages all related to the 

allegedly negative impact the variance had on Nalle’s property and his use and 

quiet enjoyment of that property. Nalle accepted $300,000 in full and final 

settlement of his claims against Westlake “in any way related to, based upon, or 

arising out of any of the facts, events, occurrences, circumstances, acts, omissions, 

transactions, or relationships that he described in his Second Amended Petition.” 

In addition, Nalle expressly settled his claims for “all monetary damages, statutory 

or exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, court costs, and interest.” (emphasis added) 

Hale moved for summary judgment on Nalle’s claims against her. See Tex. 

R. Civ. P. 166a(b). Hale attached the Westlake Settlement Agreement as evidence 

to her motion for summary judgment. It is undisputed that the settlement amount 

was paid to Nalle. We hold that, as a result of the full and final settlement of 

Nalle’s claims against Westlake, Hale proved as matter of law that Nalle is barred 

by the one satisfaction rule from recovering the same damages against her. See

Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. AMKO Resources, Intern., LLC, No. 14-13-00113-

CV, 2014 WL 3512836, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 15, 2014, no 
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pet.) (holding that because judgment creditor suffered only one injury, the one 

satisfaction rule barred judgment creditor’s claims against second defendant

because judgment creditor accepted settlement payment from first defendant in 

“full satisfaction of the judgment”).

In an effort to avoid this result, Nalle, citing Cohen v. Arthur Andersen, 

L.L.P., 106 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.),

argues the one satisfaction rule is inapplicable because it does not apply to claims 

for punitive or exemplary damages. While it is true that the one satisfaction rule is

often inapplicable to punitive damage awards, here, Nalle chose to fully settle his 

claims for both compensatory damages and exemplary damages arising out of 

Westlake granting his neighbor a variance when he executed the Westlake 

Settlement Agreement. See Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 482 

(Tex. 2017) (“Freedom of contract is a policy of individual self-determination; 

individuals can control their destiny and structure their business interactions 

through agreements with other competent adults of equal bargaining power, absent

violation of law or public policy.”); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 

124, 129 (Tex. 2004) (“As a rule, parties have the right to contract as they see fit as 

long as their agreement does not violate the law or public policy.”). 

There is no dispute that Nalle received the full settlement amount. It is these

two facts, settlement of all claims and full payment, that take this case out of the 

general rule. See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 858 S.W.2d at 364 (holding that 

because the full settlement amount had been paid to the plaintiff by one defendant, 

the one satisfaction rule extinguished plaintiff’s claims against second defendant).

As a result of this contractual agreement, the one satisfaction rule bars Nalle’s

claims against Hale. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W.2d 917, 928 (Tex. 

1998) (recognizing that one satisfaction rule can apply to settlement agreements 
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resolving claims for actual and punitive damages). Having determined that Hale 

proved as a matter of law that the one satisfaction rule bars Nalle’s claims against 

her, we need not address the remainder of the arguments Nalle raised in his single 

issue on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We overrule Nalle’s issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Nalle’s single issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ Jerry Zimmerer

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Zimmerer, Spain, and Hassan.