a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Subcommittee on 

Readiness, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

September 2005 DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Better Management 

and Oversight of 

Prepositioning 

Programs Needed to 

Reduce Risk and 

Improve Future 

Programs 

GAO-05-427
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-427.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William Solis at 

(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-427, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee 

on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

September 2005

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Better Management and Oversight of 

Prepositioning Programs Needed to 

Reduce Risk and Improve Future 

Programs 

DOD faces some near-term operational risks should another large-scale 

conflict emerge because it has drawn heavily on its prepositioned stocks to 

support ongoing operations in Iraq. And, although remaining stocks provide 

some residual capability, many of the programs face significant inventory 

shortfalls and in some cases, maintenance problems. For example, the Army 

has drawn equipment from virtually all of its prepositioned stocks to support 

operations in Iraq. Some of its storage sites have shortfalls of equipment and 

sustainment items, like spare parts, and some stocks are in poor condition. 

Additionally, the Marine Corps has used a significant portion of the stocks 

downloaded from 5 of its 16 prepositioning ships to support operations in 

Iraq and it is unclear when this equipment will be refilled. The Air Force is 

also continuing to use a considerable amount of its prepositioned stocks to 

support combat operations in Iraq and it is unclear when these stocks will be 

refilled. The precise operational risk created by these shortfalls is difficult 

to assess. However, should a new conflict arise in the near term, the 

combatant commander would likely face difficult operational challenges. 

The department and the military services have provided insufficient 

oversight over DOD’s prepositioning programs. This inattention has allowed 

long-standing problems with determining program requirements and 

managing inventory to persist. DOD has not enforced its directive that could 

provide centralized oversight over its prepositioning programs. Officials told 

us they did not enforce this directive because they were able to provide 

adequate oversight through other mechanisms. Even if the department had 

enforced its directive, however, the requirements underpinning some of 

DOD’s prepositioning programs are questionable and the services do not 

have sufficient information on the inventory level and maintenance 

condition of some prepositioned stocks. Without reliable information on 

requirements, inventory levels, and maintenance condition, DOD cannot 

provide sufficient oversight over its programs, which potentially leaves war 

fighters at risk of not having needed stocks in the future. 

DOD has not developed a coordinated departmentwide plan or joint doctrine 

to guide the future of its prepositioning programs, despite the heavy use of 

prepositioned stocks in recent conflicts and the department’s plans to rely 

on them in the future. DOD’s recently published defense strategy indicates 

that prepositioning programs should be more innovative, flexible, and joint. 

In the absence of a departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to coordinate the 

reconstitution and future plans for these programs, the services have been 

recapitalizing stocks and developing future plans without an understanding 

of how the programs will fit together to meet the evolving defense strategy. 

Without a framework that establishes priorities for prepositioning among 

competing initiatives, DOD cannot provide assurances to Congress that the 

billions of dollars that will be required to recapitalize the stocks and develop 

future programs will produce programs that operate jointly, support the 

needs of the war fighter, and are affordable. 

The importance of prepositioned 

stocks to the U.S. military was 

highlighted during recent 

operations in Iraq, as much of the 

equipment and supplies stored at 

land sites in the region and aboard 

prepositioning ships were used to 

support operations. Long-standing 

problems in the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) prepositioning 

program are systematic of the 

inventory management issues, and 

more recently supply chain 

management issues, that GAO has 

considered as high-risk areas since 

1990. 

GAO was asked to review the risks 

facing DOD’s prepositioning 

programs, including an assessment 

of (1) the near-term operational 

risk given the continuing use of 

these stocks, (2) the sufficiency of 

DOD and service-level oversight of 

these prepositioning programs, and 

(3) whether DOD has developed a 

coordinated plan for the future of 

the department’s prepositioning 

programs that would meet the 

goals of the recently published 

defense strategy. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making several 

recommendations to address the 

risks of inventory shortfalls and 

improve DOD’s management and 

oversight of its prepositioning 

programs. 

In commenting on a draft of this 

report, DOD partially or fully 

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations. 
Page i GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 7 

Inventory Shortfalls and Poor Equipment Condition Leave Many of 

DOD’s Prepositioning Programs at Risk 10 

DOD and Some of the Military Services Have Provided Insufficient 

Oversight Over Their Prepositioning Programs 19 

DOD Lacks A Plan To Coordinate Future Prepositioning Programs 26 

Conclusions 33 

Recommendations for Executive Action 34 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35 

Appendix I Past Products Identifying DOD Inventory Management 

and Prepositioning Challenges 37 

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 43 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 46 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 50 

Tables 

Table 1: Description of DOD’s Prepositioning Programs 8 

Table 2: Current Status and Operations and Maintenance Funding 

for Army Prepositioned Stocks at Key Locations as of 

January 2005 11 

Table 3: GAO Products 37 

Table 4: Other Products 40 

Figures 

Figure 1: Locations of Army (USAR), Marine Corps (USMC), Navy 

(USN), and Air Force (USAF) Prepositioned Stocks 9 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Figure 2: Sustainment Stocks Stored Outside at Camp Carroll, 

South Korea 13 

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Page 1 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

September 6, 2005 

The Honorable Joel Hefley 

Chairman 

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

With fewer troops permanently stationed overseas, prepositioned stocks 

of equipment and supplies have become an integral part of the Department 

of Defense’s (DOD) ability to project forces into conflict areas faster. The 

importance of prepositioned stocks to the U.S. military was highlighted 

during recent operations in Iraq. The military used equipment and supplies 

stored at land sites in the region and offloaded much of the stocks from its 

prepositioning ships. Perhaps more importantly, the availability of the 

sites gave the United States the facilities it needed to assemble forces for 

combat. Recognizing the importance of the department’s prepositioning 

programs, Congress has made significant investments in these programs. 

In recent years, the services have collectively used over $1 billion each 

year to operate and maintain their prepositioning programs; by fiscal year 

2005 this amount had declined to about $724 million, since a large portion 

of these stocks were used to support military operations in Iraq. However, 

billions of dollars in future investments will be needed to recapitalize 

equipment and develop future programs. The recently published National 

Defense Strategy indicates that prepositioning will continue to be an 

important aspect of DOD’s defense posture in the future.1

 The strategy 

establishes several goals for the future of these programs, including the 

need for the programs to be more flexible and increasingly joint in 

character. 

Each of the military services prepositions combat or support equipment 

and supplies in order to speed response times of U.S. forces to operating 

locations and reduce the strain on scarce airlift or slower sealift assets. 

For example, the Army stores sets of combat brigade equipment and 

 1

 The Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of 

America (March 2005). 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

supporting supplies at land sites in several countries and aboard 

prepositioning ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Marine Corps 

stores equipment and supplies for its forces aboard squadrons of maritime 

prepositioning ships located around the world and at land sites in Norway. 

The Navy stores equipment and supplies to support ship offloading, 

deployable hospitals, and construction projects also aboard the maritime 

prepositioning ships and at land sites around the world. The Air Force 

stores ammunition at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships and 

prepositions base support equipment, vehicles, and supporting supplies at 

several land sites. 

In 1998, we reported on problems ranging from poor inventory visibility to 

unreliable requirements-setting processes in the Army and Air Force 

prepositioning programs.2

 Similar problems were more recently identified 

in numerous after-action assessments of the war in Iraq, and we testified 

in March 2004 before the Subcommittee about the performance of the 

Army and Marine Corps’ prepositioning programs during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom.3

 We found that although the programs performed well in 

general, some Army units faced equipment shortfalls and there were 

instances where certain types of equipment were outdated or did not 

match unit needs. We stated that DOD may need to rethink its 

prepositioning programs to ensure that they are compatible with overall 

transformation goals and the evolving military strategy. Following our 

testimony, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report 

on its prepositioning plans by October 1, 2005.4

 Inventory management 

issues, and more recently supply chain management, have been 

considered high-risk areas by GAO since 1990. To further assist the 

Subcommittee in its oversight, you asked that we assess the status and 

plans for DOD’s prepositioning programs in advance of the department’s 

report. Specifically, you asked us to review the risks facing the 

department’s prepositioning programs, including an assessment of: (1) the 

near-term operational risk given the continuing use of these stocks, (2) the 

sufficiency of DOD and service-level oversight of these prepositioning 

programs, and (3) whether DOD has developed a coordinated plan for the 

 2

 GAO: Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need to Be Reassessed, 

GAO/NSIAD-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 1998). 

3

 GAO, Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs 

During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond, GAO-04-562T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 

2004). 

4

 Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 1046, (2004). 
Page 3 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

future of the department’s prepositioning programs that would meet the 

goals of the recently published defense strategy. 

To assess the near-term operational risk given the continuing use of 

prepositioned stocks, we obtained reports prepared by the military 

services on the inventory levels of their prepositioned stocks compared to 

program requirements5

 and discussed the potential near-term operational 

and long-term program risks associated with inventory shortfalls and 

maintenance deficiencies. We visited selected prepositioning sites and 

reviewed available maintenance reports or other data used by the services 

to measure the condition of the prepositioned stocks. To assess the 

sufficiency of DOD and the services’ oversight of these programs, we 

discussed the processes used by DOD to oversee its prepositioning 

programs with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Joint Staff, and the military services. To assess whether DOD has 

developed a coordinated plan for the future of its prepositioning programs 

that would meet the goals of the recently published defense strategy, we 

reviewed the recently published National Defense Strategy and discussed 

the future direction of the department’s prepositioning programs with 

officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the 

military services. We also collected and analyzed information from the 

military services on the future plans for their prepositioning programs. We 

also discussed the time frames and costs needed to repair or replace 

prepositioned stocks used in recent military operations. We conducted our 

work from July 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Our assessments of data 

reliability revealed significant concerns that are discussed later in the 

report. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is 

contained in appendix II. 

DOD faces some near-term operational risks should another large-scale 

conflict emerge because it has drawn heavily on its prepositioned stocks 

to support ongoing operations in Iraq. And, although remaining stocks 

provide some residual capability, many of the programs face significant 

inventory shortfalls and in some cases, maintenance problems.6

 There is 

 5

 We will refer to stocks on hand as compared against required levels as “inventory fill” in 

this report. 

6

 As discussed later in this report, reliable data needed to assess inventory fill and 

maintenance condition were unavailable in many cases. Therefore, the precise readiness of 

prepositioned stocks and the impact of any shortfalls are difficult to determine. 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

currently no strategy in place to mitigate the operational risks created by 

inventory shortfalls and poor maintenance condition of prepositioned 

equipment. Combatant commanders rely on prepositioned stocks being 

available and in good maintenance condition; otherwise U.S. forces must 

bring needed stocks with them or spend valuable time repairing 

equipment. The current status of the services’ programs is summarized as 

follows: 

• The Army has drawn equipment from virtually all of its prepositioned 

stocks to support operations in Iraq and little of the equipment has been 

returned. Some stocks are currently stored in South Korea, or are afloat on 

prepositioning ships near Guam/Saipan and Diego Garcia. However, these 

sites have shortfalls of equipment and sustainment items like spare parts. 

Some of these shortfalls have existed in these and other Army programs 

for years, however, and are not attributable to the war in Iraq. In addition, 

we found that some of these stocks were in poor maintenance condition, 

especially those stored in South Korea. 

• The Marine Corps is currently using a significant portion of the stocks 

offloaded from 5 of its 16 prepositioning ships to support ongoing 

operations in Iraq. It is unclear when this equipment will be returned to 

prepositioned stocks because much of this equipment will be left in Iraq to 

support the continuing deployment of Marine Corps forces there. 

Conversely, while the Navy used prepositioned assets like field hospitals 

in Iraq, it currently reports few shortfalls. 

• The Air Force also has a reduced capability in its prepositioned stocks 

because it is continuing to use a considerable amount of these stocks to 

support combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, it 

used approximately 43 percent of the total number of its prepositioned 

bare base sets7

 to house deployed forces supporting Operations Enduring 

Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. It is unclear when these stocks will be 

refilled. The precise operational risk created by these shortfalls is difficult 

to assess. Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed significant issues with the 

status of prepositioned stocks, such as shortages in spare parts and lessthan-modern equipment. These problems still exist today. While the 

military planners we spoke with told us that they would find a way to 

work around the shortfalls, they offered little in the way of concrete plans. 

Should a new conflict arise in the near term—especially one where U.S. 

forces did not control the timing—the combatant commander would likely 

face even more difficult operational challenges. 

 7

 The term “bare base sets” refers to tents for troops, latrines, kitchens, aircraft hangers, 

maintenance shops, generators, and environmental controls. The sets support earlyarriving combat forces and are especially critical in austere environments. 
Page 5 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

DOD and the military services have provided insufficient oversight over 

the department’s prepositioning programs. This inattention has allowed 

long-standing problems with determining program requirements and 

managing inventory to persist. Management principles, such as those 

embraced in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, 

provide federal agencies with a framework for effectively implementing 

and managing programs.8

 Management principles include sufficient 

information to support sound decision making and enable Congress to 

provide proper oversight. However, DOD has not implemented its 

directive on war reserve materiel policy that could provide centralized 

oversight over its prepositioning programs.9

 Officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense told us they did not implement this directive because 

they did not believe they had the authority to enforce its provisions. In 

addition, officials told us they were able to provide adequate oversight 

over the department’s prepositioning programs through other 

mechanisms, such as reviewing quarterly readiness assessments and the 

services’ budget submissions. While these mechanisms provide DOD with 

important information on gaps in capabilities and resource allocations, 

they provide only a vague and broad description of shortfalls or readiness 

problems and, therefore, are not effective as an oversight tool. Based on 

our analysis, even if the department had implemented its directive, the 

requirements underpinning some of DOD’s prepositioning programs are 

questionable and the Army and Air Force do not have reliable information 

on the inventory fill and maintenance condition of some prepositioned 

stocks. For example, as recently as February 2005, information contained 

in the Army’s readiness reporting system showed the maintenance 

condition of prepositioned equipment in South Korea to be at a high level. 

However, during our work we found that much of the Army’s 

prepositioned combat equipment stored in South Korea had not been 

properly maintained. Without reliable information on requirements, 

inventory levels, and maintenance condition, DOD cannot provide 

sufficient oversight over its programs, which potentially leaves war 

fighters at risk of not having needed stocks in the future. 

DOD has not developed a coordinated departmentwide plan or joint 

doctrine to guide the future of its prepositioning programs, despite the 

heavy use of prepositioned stocks in recent conflicts and the department’s 

 8

 Pub. L. No. 103-62. 

9

 DOD Directive 3110.6, War Reserve Materiel Policy (Nov. 9, 2000—certified current as of 

Dec. 1, 2003). 
Page 6 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

plans to rely on them in the future. The 2005 National Defense Strategy 

specifically notes the importance of prepositioning in the future and 

indicates that prepositioning programs should be more innovative, 

flexible, and joint in character, but provides few details on how it will 

accomplish these goals. The independent Overseas Basing Commission 

recently echoed the continued importance of the department’s 

prepositioning programs in the future. DOD officials told us that the future 

of its prepositioning programs is unclear and dependent on the outcome of 

several interrelated studies ongoing within the department, especially 

reviews of mobility and an additional study being led within the 

department on overseas presence and basing. In the absence of a 

departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to coordinate the reconstitution10

and future plans for these programs, the military services have been 

recapitalizing some stocks and developing future plans for their programs 

without a clear understanding of how they will fit together to meet the 

evolving defense strategy. This service-centric approach to prepositioning 

is out of step with the department’s goals of transforming the military to 

be more joint and expeditionary, and potentially misses opportunities to 

achieve greater efficiencies where service programs overlap in making 

future investment decisions. For example, the Army and Air Force 

maintain separate service-centric bare base programs, although the basic 

capabilities of these programs are the same. Furthermore, the Navy and 

Marine Corps are proposing multibillion dollar procurement programs to 

support new concepts, such as sea basing, while the Defense Logistics 

Agency is proposing floating depots to resupply troops in theater. Without 

an overarching framework that establishes priorities for prepositioning 

among competing initiatives and identifies the resources required to 

implement the future programs, DOD cannot provide assurances to 

Congress that the billions of dollars that will be required to recapitalize the 

stocks and develop future programs will ultimately produce programs that 

will operate jointly, support the needs of the war fighter, and are 

affordable. 

We are making several recommendations to address the risks of inventory 

shortfalls and improve DOD’s management and oversight of its 

prepositioning programs. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD 

 10Reconstitution includes the costs to clean, inspect, maintain, replace, and restore 

equipment to the required condition at the conclusion of a contingency operation or unit 

deployment. 
Page 7 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

partially or fully concurred with our recommendations and indicated that 

it had initiated several actions to address our recommendations. 

Prepositioning is an important part of DOD’s overall strategic mobility 

framework. It allows DOD to field combat-ready forces in days rather than 

the weeks it would take if the forces and all necessary equipment and 

supplies had to be brought from the United States to the location of the 

conflict. The U.S. military can deliver equipment and supplies in three 

ways: by air, by sea, or by prepositioning. While airlift is fast, it is 

expensive to use and impractical for moving all of the material needed for 

a large-scale deployment. Although ships can carry large loads, they are 

slower than airlift. Prepositioning lessens the strain of using expensive 

airlift and reduces the reliance on slower sealift deliveries. Concerned 

about the reduction in U.S. forces overseas and their ability to move forces 

in the time required to resolve potential conflicts quickly, the services have 

expanded prepositioning programs ashore and on ships in potential areas 

of conflict. 

The military services have prepositioning programs to store combat or 

support equipment and supplies near areas with a high potential for 

conflict and to speed response times and reduce the strain on other 

mobility assets. The Defense Logistics Agency prepositions food and bulk 

fuel to support a range of contingency operations and training exercises. 

The Special Operations Command relies on the military services to 

preposition common support items for its forces, such as base support 

items and vehicles. 

The Army’s program involves three primary categories of stocks: combat 

brigade sets, operational projects, and war reserve sustainment stocks 

stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships around the world. The 

Marine Corps also prepositions equipment and supplies aboard 

prepositioning ships and at land sites in Norway. The Navy’s 

prepositioning efforts are comparatively small, used mainly to support the 

Marine Corps’ prepositioning program and deploying forces. The Navy 

prepositions equipment and supplies at land sites and aboard the maritime 

prepositioning ships. The Air Force prepositions stocks of war reserve 

equipment and supplies to meet initial contingency requirements and to 

sustain early deploying forces. The Air Force’s prepositioned war reserve 

stocks include bare base sets; vehicles; munitions; and a variety of 

consumable supplies, such as rations, fuel, support equipment, aircraft 

accessories, and medical supplies. DOD’s prepositioning programs are 

briefly described in the table below. 

Background 
Page 8 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Table 1: Description of DOD’s Prepositioning Programs 

Service Types of stocks Description 

Combat brigade 

sets 

• Stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships 

• Sets are designed to support 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers 

• Heavy weaponry such as tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles 

• Support equipment such as trucks and High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles 

• Spare parts and other sustainment stocks to support the early stages of a conflict 

Sustainment 

stocks 

• Stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships 

• Replacement equipment for losses in early stages of operations or until resupply is established 

• Includes major end-items such as aircraft engines and tracked vehicles 

• Secondary items such as meals, clothing, petroleum supplies, construction materials, 

ammunition, medical materials, and repair parts 

Army 

Operational 

project stocks 

• Stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships 

• Authorized material above unit authorizations designed to support Army operations or 

contingencies 

• Equipment and supplies for special operations forces, bare base sets, petroleum and water 

distribution, mortuary operations, and prisoner-of-war operations 

Maritime 

prepositioning 

force 

• Consists of 16 prepositioning ships organized into three squadrons 

• Each squadron supports about 15,000 Marines for up to 30 days 

• Includes combat systems, communications systems, construction equipment, munitions, 

medical supplies, and sustainment stocks 

Prepositioning 

program—

Norway 

• Several land sites located in central Norway 

• Designed to support 13,000 Marines for up to 30 days 

• Includes vehicles, weapons, munitions, rations, and other equipment that will be used to 

support any geographic combatant command 

Navy/Marine 

Corps 

Navy 

prepositioned 

assets 

• Assets are stored aboard maritime prepositioning ships and at land sites 

• Equipment to offload prepositioning ships, including material handling equipment, ramps and 

barges, landing and amphibious craft, and bulk fuel 

• Construction equipment such as cranes, forklifts, trucks, and tractor trailers 

• Includes six 500-bed fleet hospitalsa 

Bare base sets • Base operating support equipment used to house forces, and equipment and supplies needed 

to support airfield operations 

Vehicles • Includes trucks, buses, and High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles 

Air Force 

Other support 

equipment and 

supplies 

• Includes materiel handling equipment, rations, fuel, fuel support equipment, aircraft 

accessories, and medical supplies at land sites and munitions aboard four prepositioning ships 

Source: GAO. 

a

The Navy is in the process of transitioning from 500-bed fleet hospitals to smaller modular units. 

The military services preposition these stocks of equipment and supplies 

at several land sites and aboard prepositioning ships around the world. 

Most of the military services preposition equipment and supplies in 

southwest Asia, the Pacific theater, Europe, and aboard prepositioning 

ships. Figure 1 shows the locations of DOD’s prepositioned stocks. 
Page 9 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Figure 1: Locations of Army (USAR), Marine Corps (USMC), Navy (USN), and Air Force (USAF) Prepositioned Stocks 

Note: DOD also prepositions smaller stocks of equipment and supplies at other locations not 

identified on this map. 
Page 10 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

DOD faces some near-term operational risks should another large-scale 

conflict emerge due to inventory shortfalls and poor maintenance 

condition of some of its prepositioned stocks. For example, the 

department has drawn heavily on its prepositioned stocks to support 

ongoing operations in Iraq and relatively little has been reconstituted. In 

addition, while remaining stocks provide some residual capability, many 

have significant inventory shortfalls and in some cases, maintenance 

problems. Combatant commanders rely on prepositioned stocks being 

available and in good maintenance condition; otherwise U.S. forces must 

bring needed stocks with them or spend valuable time repairing 

equipment. Since these stocks are typically used in the early stages of a 

conflict, it is important for DOD to determine the operational risk 

associated with any shortfalls. Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed 

significant issues with the status of prepositioned stocks, such as 

shortages in spare parts and less-than-modern equipment. The same 

problems continue to exist today in some programs. 

The Army is currently reporting low inventory fill for the combat brigade 

sets, operational project stocks, and sustainment stocks that comprise its 

prepositioning program, and some stocks not used in recent operations 

are in poor maintenance condition. For example, the Army used much of 

the equipment and supplies associated with the combat brigade sets stored 

at land sites in Kuwait and Qatar and aboard prepositioning ships afloat 

near Diego Garcia to support operations in Iraq. In addition, the Army 

used some equipment from its other prepositioned stocks in Europe, 

South Korea, and from other prepositioning ships located near 

Guam/Saipan. 

The Army is also reporting low inventory fill for its operational projects 

and sustainment stocks. The Army has a total of 14 operational projects 

that contain equipment and supplies needed for unique mission 

requirements, such as special operations forces, mortuary operations, and 

prisoner handling. Sustainment stocks provide replacement equipment 

and supplies, such as repair parts, petroleum items, and tracked vehicles, 

until normal resupply channels are established. The Army is reporting 

inventory fills for operational projects and sustainment stocks—

approximately 26 percent and 20 percent respectively—that are 

considerably lower than the program requirements. Some of the Army’s 

shortfalls have been long-standing, however, including shortfalls in critical 

Inventory Shortfalls 

and Poor Equipment 

Condition Leave Many 

of DOD’s 

Prepositioning 

Programs at Risk 

The Army Is Reporting 

Low Inventory Fill and 

Poor Maintenance 

Condition for Some 

Prepositioned Stocks 
Page 11 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

areas like spare parts, and are not attributable to the war in Iraq. For 

example, we reported in 2003 that DOD experienced equipment readiness 

problems because of a lack of key spare parts.11 Table 2 provides an 

overview of the inventory levels, maintenance condition, and operations 

and maintenance funding of the Army’s prepositioned stocks. 

Table 2: Current Status and Operations and Maintenance Funding for Army 

Prepositioned Stocks at Key Locations as of January 2005 

Dollars in millions 

Location Current status 

 Total funding fiscal 

years 2000-2005

Europe Low inventory fill, with limited combat 

equipment, operational projects, and other 

stocks stored at sites in Germany, Italy, 

Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Some 

stocks were taken out to support operations 

in Iraq, while stocks from Italy were used to 

temporarily refill the prepositioning ships 

now positioned near Diego Garcia. 

$277.6

Kuwait/Qatar Equipment in use in Iraq and storage 

warehouses in Qatar have been converted 

to become Central Command’s regional 

headquarters. 

$304.2

South Korea As of March 2005, the brigade set had most 

of its authorized equipment on hand, though 

a recent maintenance inspection revealed 

maintenance deficiencies. The Army plans 

to correct the maintenance problems with 

the set in September 2005, as well as 

reconfigure it to be consistent with the 

Army’s new modular configuration. 

$245.9

Afloat near Diego 

Garcia and 

Guam/Saipan 

Two squadrons, each with a partial brigade 

set, are available. 

$1,835.8

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Some stocks that were taken from prepositioned storage locations and 

used during operations in Iraq are either still in use, or have experienced 

extreme wear and tear. For example, the Army continues to use equipment 

taken from prepositioned stocks to support its units in Iraq, delaying the 

reconstitution and redistribution of the equipment. According to Army 

officials, this equipment may not be returned to the prepositioned stocks 

 11 GAO, Defense Inventory: The Army Needs a Plan to Overcome Critical Spare Parts 

Shortages, GAO-03-705 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003). 
Page 12 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

because the Army is giving priority to transforming its forces into more 

deployable and expeditionary brigade-based formations and may use 

formerly prepositioned equipment to fill additional equipment 

requirements associated with the new formations. Importantly, this heavy 

stress on equipment is a problem across much of the Army’s equipment 

that has been used in Iraq, not just the equipment taken from 

prepositioned stocks. 

We also found that some other prepositioned stocks in storage were in 

poor maintenance condition, even though they had not been used in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example, during a March 2005 visit to Camp 

Carroll, South Korea, we found that some of the Army’s prepositioned 

stocks at this location were in poor maintenance condition and that much 

of the equipment was overdue for periodic maintenance. Army officials 

confirmed that required cyclic maintenance had not been performed on 

the equipment in the brigade set, operational projects, and sustainment 

stocks for several years. To address this, the Army has stepped up its 

maintenance efforts by bringing in contractor support and setting up 

temporary maintenance facilities to assist in repairing the equipment to 

standard. Moreover, as shown in figure 2, certain stocks were stored 

outside and had been for many years and corrosion was evident on some 

pieces of equipment. Corrosion can significantly affect the readiness of 

prepositioned equipment: DOD spends an estimated $20 billion each year 

to repair the damage to military equipment and infrastructure caused by 

this problem. In this regard, we have called for improvements to DOD’s 

long-term corrosion strategy, including better planning and establishment 

of a long-term funding mechanism.12 Because of continuing concerns over 

corrosion, we are currently conducting a congressionally directed review 

of its impact on DOD’s overall prepositioned assets. 

 12 See GAO, Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and Increase 

Readiness, GAO-03-753 (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003), and Defense Management: 

Opportunities Exist to Improve Implementation of DOD’s Long-Term Corrosion 

Strategy, GAO-04-640 (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2004). 
Page 13 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Figure 2: Sustainment Stocks Stored Outside at Camp Carroll, South Korea 

Source: GAO. 

The Army also maintains European prepositioning storage sites in 

Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. However, few stocks 

remain there because they have been drawn out to support operations in 

other locations, including Bosnia and Iraq. The mission in Europe has 

steadily declined since the European drawdown of the early 1990s, and the 

remaining sites are the last remnants of the Army’s large-scale 

prepositioning program developed during the Cold War. Army officials 

told us that they are currently using the local national workforce at these 

locations to perform other maintenance workloads, including fixing 

equipment from Iraq. In past reports, we have recommended that the Army 

align its workforce and facilities to meet the reduced post-Cold War 

mission in Europe.13 Officials told us that they have reduced infrastructure 

in response to our recommendations, and are contemplating further 

reductions. In Italy, however, the Army has requested about $55 million to 

construct new storage and maintenance facilities that it has said will 

become the centerpiece of its land prepositioning in the region. This 

region still receives considerable funding, as shown in table 2. The Army 

 13 GAO, Army War Reserves: DOD Could Save Millions by Aligning Resources With the 

Reduced European Mission, GAO/NSIAD-97-158 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 1997) and 

Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need to Be Reassessed, 

GAO/NSIAD-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 1998). 
Page 14 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

spent nearly $290 million during fiscal years 2000-2004, even though the 

sites have had an uncertain mission and reduced stocks for much of that 

time. 

The Marine Corps has offloaded about 75 percent of the major end-items 

stored on 5 of its 16 prepositioning ships to support combat operations in 

Iraq. The remaining 11 prepositioning ships are reporting inventory fills of 

95 percent or greater and good maintenance condition for major end-items 

and sustainment stocks. The Marine Corps also used some of its 

prepositioned major end-items stored at several land sites in Norway to 

support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and to fill shortfalls at Marine 

Corps bases and on some of the prepositioning ships. As a result, these 

sites are currently reporting an inventory fill of about 71 percent. 

It is unclear when this equipment will be returned to prepositioned stocks 

because, according to a Marine Corps official, a large portion of the 

Marine Corps’ equipment offloaded from prepositioning ships to support 

the deployment of the I Marine Expeditionary Force to Iraq is currently 

being kept in Iraq to support the rotation of the II Marine Expeditionary 

Force. In a recent congressional testimony on the status of its military 

equipment, a Marine Corps official reported that in addition to higher 

usage rates, equipment is being used under extreme conditions which have 

increased the maintenance requirements. For example, to date, more than 

1,800 equipment items have been destroyed and an additional 2,300 

damaged equipment items will require depot maintenance.14

For the Norway stocks, the Marine Corps is in the process of updating the 

requirements for its program there so that it will be capable of providing a 

global response capability to any regional combatant commander. During 

our September 2004 visit to the prepositioning sites in Norway, we 

discussed this change in the scope of the program and Marine Corps 

officials confirmed that the facilities in Norway can support any 

combatant commander and the stocks are globally deployable via air, rail, 

and sea. This shift in scope is in response to concerns about the continued 

 14 Statement of the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, United States 

Marine Corps, before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, 

Concerning Requirements to Reconstitute Military Equipment, April 6, 2005. 

The Marine Corps Is 

Reporting Low Inventory 

Fill for Some 

Prepositioned Stocks, 

While the Navy Reports 

Few Shortfalls 
Page 15 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

relevance of land stocks in Norway.15 According to Marine Corps officials, 

however, these stocks are important to Norway, cost relatively little to 

maintain (about $3.9 million in operational costs per year), are stored in 

excellent facilities, and can be taken out to respond to crises as needed. 

The Navy is reporting high inventory fill for its prepositioned assets. 

According to Navy officials, most of its equipment used to offload the 

maritime prepositioning ships was not used in direct combat and has not 

required extensive reconstitution, and other equipment was available to 

backfill the field hospitals and construction forces deployed to support 

operations in Iraq. 

The Air Force has used a considerable amount of its prepositioned 

equipment and supplies to support combat operations in Afghanistan and 

Iraq and, as a result, the inventory fill of many of these stocks is low. For 

example, it used approximately 43 percent of the total number of its 

prepositioned bare base sets to support Operations Enduring Freedom and 

Iraqi Freedom, and due to the extreme desert conditions, many of these 

sets will have to be replaced. A U.S. Central Command, Air Forces, official 

told us that the command is continuing to issue prepositioned base 

operating support equipment and vehicles to forces that have been 

deployed to the area of responsibility. While the Air Force is working on 

refilling its prepositioned equipment and supplies, if a conflict arises in the 

near term, these stocks may not be available for use as it is unclear when 

these stocks will be refilled. 

In addition, the Air Force is experiencing shortfalls in its inventory of fuel 

bladders. These bladders are used to store fuel for Air Force aircraft at 

austere operating locations. Air Force officials stated that to support 

combat operations in Iraq, Central Command, Air Forces, has used a 

considerable number of its prepositioned war reserve fuel bladders. As 

combat operations continue, the Air Force is depleting its supply of these 

bladders, and officials have characterized the impact of potential shortfalls 

in these bladders as its “highest operational risk.” At the same time, the Air 

Force is undergoing an initiative to modernize its fuel support equipment, 

including its fuel bladders. As part of this initiative, the Air Force 

 15 Naval Audit Service: The Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

Prepositioning Program, N2003-0079 (September 2003) and Final Report of the 

Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States 

(Arlington, Va.: Aug. 15, 2005). 

The Air Force Is Reporting 

Low Inventory Fill and 

Some Stocks in Poor 

Condition 
Page 16 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

requested that Central Command, Air Forces, officials not purchase the 

type of fuel bladders that had previously been used. To mitigate the risk, 

the Air Force has allowed Central Command, Air Forces, to purchase 

some replacement fuel bladders; however, it is unclear when its 

modernization initiative will be fully implemented. 

During our review, we were also told that some bare base sets that the Air 

Force prepositions at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam are in poor 

maintenance condition and are unusable. According to a Pacific Air Forces 

official, the sets stored at Andersen Air Force Base have deteriorated due 

to a lack of required maintenance. Air Force maintenance personnel are 

responsible for the war reserve stocks prepositioned at this location as an 

additional duty to the maintenance of operating stocks also stored at the 

base. The official told us that the quality of maintenance performed by Air 

Force personnel on the war reserve bare base sets has been a longstanding problem at this location. Air Force officials told us that bare base 

sets stored in Southwest Asia and South Korea did not have these same 

maintenance problems because contractors have been hired to maintain 

these sets. 

When we discussed these issues with Air Force officials, they told us that 

they believed they could overcome shortfalls and any maintenance 

problems in the event of a conflict by using supplemental funding or crossleveling equipment from other theaters. Additionally, Pacific Air Forces 

officials told us that they would be able to obtain some vehicles from 

countries where they will operate by using contracts already in place. 

The Army, Air Force, and Navy preposition common support equipment 

and supplies for use by their special operations forces.16 However, the 

services have traditionally underfunded these stocks and, as a result, 

inventory shortfalls exist in most of these stocks. Lessons learned from 

recent military operations in Iraq further highlighted the need for special 

operations forces to have stocks of prepositioned equipment and supplies 

to support these forces in multiple austere environments. Special 

Operations Command officials told us that special operations forces are 

often among the first units to deploy and, therefore, have a need to draw 

 16 Common support equipment and supplies include items adopted by a military service for 

use by its own forces and their activities, including standard issue military items, base 

support items, and the supplies and services provided by the military service to support 

and sustain its own forces. 

Shortfalls in Inventory Fill 

Exist for Stocks 

Prepositioned to Support 

Special Operations Forces 
Page 17 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

prepositioned stocks. The department recognized this and recent guidance 

issued by DOD directs the military services to fully fund inventory 

shortfalls in these stocks of common items prepositioned to support 

special operations forces.17 The military services have agreed to provide 

funding for prepositioned stocks for special operations forces beginning in 

fiscal year 2006. 

Since prepositioned stocks are integral to the military’s war plans, 

shortfalls in these programs create risks that combatant commanders 

would have to mitigate in the event of a new conflict. It could cost time or 

manpower to fill shortages or fix equipment. Since these stocks are 

typically used in the early stages of a conflict, it is important for DOD to 

determine the operational risk associated with any shortfalls. The military 

planners we spoke to told us that they would find a way to work around 

the shortfalls, but offered little in the way of concrete plans. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed significant lessons for DOD’s 

prepositioning managers, especially in the Army, such as shortages in 

spare parts and less-than-modern equipment. Prior to the onset of combat 

operations in Iraq, the Army had significant shortages in its prepositioned 

stocks, especially in spare parts. The Army overcame these shortfalls by 

having the units that were drawing the prepositioned stocks bring their 

own spare parts, in addition to obtaining spare parts from nondeploying 

units.18 However, according to the Army’s after-action assessments of the 

war, the Army had shortages in these and other items, including food, 

water, fuel, construction materials, and ammunition. The available stocks 

of these supplies were insufficient to meet sustainment requirements at 

the outset of the deployment and it took the supply chain months to 

respond. At the time of our work, we found that many of the same 

shortfalls that existed in the Army’s program are still evident, and may be 

getting worse. For example, as of mid-March 2005, the Army had only 21 

percent of its authorized prepositioned repair parts on hand in South 

Korea. According to Army officials, if a military conflict should arise there, 

 17 Department of Defense, (U) Joint Programming Guidance for Fiscal Years 2006-2011, 

June 2004. 

18 GAO, Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs 

During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond, GAO-04-562T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 

2004). 

Shortfalls Create Some 

Operational Risks 
Page 18 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

their strategy to mitigate these shortfalls would be to cross-level required 

parts from available sustainment stocks as needed. 

Although the precise operational risks created by shortfalls in the Marine 

Corps and Air Force’s prepositioned stocks are difficult to assess, officials 

from these services told us that these risks can be managed. This is 

because the Marine Corps has kept about two-thirds of its prepositioned 

combat capability available for potential contingencies and that equipment 

is reported to be in good condition. Moreover, Air Force officials stated 

that if a conflict arises, they will be able to fill shortfalls and repair 

equipment as needed by using supplemental funding and obtaining some 

vehicles and other stocks in other countries through contracts already in 

place. Air Force officials stated, however, that this presumes that they will 

have the time and necessary funding available to address the shortfalls. 

Combatant commanders rely on prepositioned stocks being available and 

in good maintenance condition. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 

combatant commander built up the required forces over a period of 

months, and had time to overcome any inventory shortages in the 

prepositioned stocks or resolve any maintenance issues with 

prepositioned equipment. However, should a new conflict arise in the near 

term—especially one where U.S. forces did not control the timing—the 

combatant commander would likely face even more difficult operational 

challenges. During our visit to South Korea, officials told us that their 

strategy to mitigate maintenance issues with the Army’s prepositioned 

stocks stored there, should a conflict arise, would be to surge maintenance 

personnel as needed to fix equipment, use arriving personnel to assist in 

maintenance execution, and cross-level required parts from available 

sustainment stocks. Officials acknowledged, however, that it could take 

longer than planned to get the equipment ready in the event of a conflict. 

Another factor making it difficult to assess the potential operational risks 

is the lack of sound information available to assess and manage DOD’s 

prepositioning programs. Such programs need valid inventory 

requirements that meet the needs of the war fighters, and reliable 

information about inventory levels and maintenance condition for those 

requirements. These long-standing management problems are discussed in 

the next section of this report. 
Page 19 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Oversight over prepositioning programs by DOD and the military services 

has been insufficient, despite the importance of prepositioning to the 

military. This inattention has allowed long-standing problems to linger. 

Management principles, such as those embraced in the Government 

Performance and Results Act of 1993,19 provide federal agencies a 

framework for effectively implementing and managing programs. 

Management principles include sufficient information to support sound 

decision making and enable Congress to provide proper oversight. 

However, DOD has not adhered to its directive on war reserve materiel 

policy that could provide oversight over its prepositioning programs. In 

addition, service oversight has been inadequate, particularly in the Army’s 

processes for determining requirements and the Army and Air Force 

processes for assessing inventory shortfalls and maintenance condition. 

This limited oversight unnecessarily leaves the programs at risk of being 

unavailable when required and lacking the right mix of equipment and 

supplies to support the war fighter. 

The overarching departmental guidance is contained in DOD directive 

3110.6, updated in December 2003, which provides policy guidance on the 

department’s war reserve materiel program and assigns oversight and 

accountability responsibilities within the department. The secretaries of 

the military departments, directors of defense agencies, and the combatant 

commands are responsible for setting program requirements and the 

Defense Logistics Agency has responsibility for storage and distribution of 

the stocks. At the department level, their responsibilities are as follows: 

• The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

is required to assess the adequacy of war reserve stocks annually. 

• The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy is required to provide planning 

guidance that includes war reserve requirements. 

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to validate the 

operational requirements of the geographic combatant commands. 

A provision of the directive related to oversight states that the department 

is to assess the adequacy of its war reserve stocks. In order to assess 

adequacy, the directive requires the secretaries of the military departments 

and the directors of defense agencies to submit annual reports on war 

reserve materiel levels to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

 19 Pub. L. No. 103-62. 

DOD and Some of the 

Military Services Have 

Provided Insufficient 

Oversight Over Their 

Prepositioning 

Programs 

Oversight Has Been 

Insufficient 
Page 20 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Technology, and Logistics within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

Officials within the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain 

Integration told us that this oversight responsibility had been delegated to 

their office. However, the directive has not been implemented and, 

therefore, the reporting requirement contained in the directive has not 

been enforced. Neither the services nor the Under Secretary’s office could 

provide us with copies of these reports. Officials told us that they had 

suspended this reporting requirement in 2002; however, the directive had 

been updated in late 2003 and the reporting requirement was maintained. 

Officials also stated that although they had been given responsibility for 

implementing the oversight provisions of the directive, since their office 

primarily deals with only sustainment issues, they did not have sufficient 

authority or personnel to meet the requirements stated by the directive, 

specifically to assess the adequacy of the services’ prepositioning 

programs. 

Officials further told us they did not believe the reporting requirement in 

the directive was necessary because they were able to provide adequate 

oversight of the department’s prepositioning programs through other 

mechanisms, such as reviewing the services’ budget submissions and 

quarterly readiness assessments. Quarterly readiness reviews and 

integrated priority list submissions allow the combatant commanders and 

others to identify issues that have reached critical thresholds that may 

limit war-fighting capabilities. These assessments, some of which have 

included issues related to prepositioned stocks, are briefed to DOD’s 

senior leadership and may be included in a legislatively mandated 

quarterly readiness report to Congress. However, we have previously 

reported that these reports provide a vague and broad description of 

readiness problems and, therefore, are not effective as an oversight tool.20

Furthermore, officials at one combatant command told us that these 

assessments do not provide a sufficient mechanism to determine the 

inventory readiness of stocks prepositioned in their area of responsibility. 

Also, a DOD official told us that they review the budget submissions from 

the military services and approve how much the services allocate to their 

prepositioning programs. In our view, while such mechanisms provide the 

department with important information on gaps in capabilities and 

 20 GAO, Military Readiness: Reports to Congress Provide Few Details on Deficiencies and 

Solutions, GAO/NSIAD-98-68 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 1998) and Military Readiness: 

New Reporting System Is Intended to Address Longstanding Problems, but Better 

Planning is Needed, GAO-03-456 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003). 
Page 21 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

resource allocation, they do not constitute sufficient, sustained program 

oversight. 

Such oversight problems have existed for years and several prior reports 

have cited the lack of centralized oversight and direction in the 

department’s prepositioning programs, particularly in the Army. For 

example, the Institute for Defense Analyses concluded in a 1997 report 

that the military services do not coordinate their war reserve planning 

among themselves or with the combatant commanders. The report 

specifically called on the Army to reinvent the entire war reserve process, 

and work with the unified combatant commands and other Army 

commands to build credible requirements and better planning factors. The 

Army Materiel Command Inspector General also reported in 2001 that the 

Army and the combatant commands had not uncovered, mitigated, or 

elevated issues about the readiness of the Army’s prepositioning programs 

to the department level. Further, the report stated that the lack of 

centralized oversight fostered inefficiencies and impacted the 

effectiveness of the Army’s prepositioning program. 

The Army does not have sound requirements for some of its prepositioning 

programs and both the Army and Air Force do not have sufficient 

information about inventory levels and maintenance condition, making 

oversight difficult. Without valid requirements underpinning the services’ 

prepositioning programs, it is impossible to reliably assess the impact of 

reported shortfalls or equipment in poor maintenance condition. As a 

result, the services cannot assess the overall readiness of their 

prepositioning programs, which potentially leaves war fighters at risk of 

not having needed stocks in the future. In addition, assessing the readiness 

of prepositioned stocks requires reliable information about inventory 

levels and maintenance condition. Inventory levels are measured against 

requirements set by the services, while maintenance condition describes 

whether on-hand items work well enough to perform their mission. 

Because prepositioned stocks are intended to be used in the early stages 

of a conflict, the stocks need to be completely filled and in working order. 

Otherwise, the purpose of prepositioning is likely defeated. Such problems 

with questionable requirements and insufficient information are longstanding, and make it difficult for the services and the department to 

assess readiness, provide oversight, and support sound decision making 

about where to make program investments. 

During our review, we found that the requirements underpinning some of 

the Army’s prepositioning programs are questionable, which may make the 

Lack of Valid 

Requirements and 

Insufficient Information 

Makes Oversight Difficult 

Questionable Requirements 
Page 22 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

impact of shortfalls difficult to assess. Specifically, Army officials told us 

that the war reserve information system used to calculate the 

requirements for some sustainment stocks had not been successfully 

updated since 1999, although Army officials told us that they are required 

to compute these requirements on an annual basis.21 While the Army is 

planning on recalculating these requirements by the end of 2005, it is 

currently unclear what the requirements for these stocks should be. As a 

result, program managers cannot be sure what to buy because they do not 

know if inventory shortfalls are valid. We reported on the operational 

impacts of this problem in our March 2004 testimony on prepositioned 

stocks used during Operation Iraqi Freedom.22 Additionally, in our April 

2005 report, we found that because the process used to determine 

requirements for Army war reserve spare parts had not been updated, the 

war reserve inventories for some spare parts were inadequate in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom and could not meet initial wartime demands.23 In addition, 

inaccurate and inadequately funded Army war reserve requirements 

contributed to shortages in other items, such as track shoes for Abrams 

tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles and lithium batteries. 

Additionally, we identified problems with DOD’s process for establishing 

requirements for prepositioned munitions. For example, during our visit to 

U.S. Forces Korea, officials told us that the command is not afforded the 

opportunity to proactively participate in the determination of either total 

munitions requirements or, more specifically, prepositioned munitions 

requirements. In October 2002, we reported that DOD’s munitions 

requirements determination process did not fully consider the combatant 

commander’s preferences for munitions and weapon systems that will be 

used against targets identified in projected scenarios.24 We recommended 

that the Secretary of Defense establish a direct link between the munitions 

needs of the combatant commands and the munitions requirements 

determinations and purchasing decisions made by the military services. In 

 21 The Army uses the Army War Reserve Automated Process to determine its requirements 

for spare parts in the war reserve. 

22 GAO, Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs 

During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond, GAO-04-562T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 

2004). 

23 GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items 

during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005). 

24 GAO, Defense Management: Munitions Requirements and Combatant Commander’s 

Needs Require Linkage, GAO-03-17 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2002). 
Page 23 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

October 2003, DOD issued instruction 3000.4, which required that the 

munitions requirements developed by each of the military services address 

the operational objectives of the combatant commanders against potential 

threats. In addition, it directed the military services to work directly with 

the military service component and the combatant commands to develop 

near- and out-year munitions requirements. Finally, it directed combatant 

commanders to review the military services’ generated munitions 

requirements and report any issues needing resolution during the planning 

and programming process. We found that these requirements are not being 

met. Only the Air Force visits the command prior to developing total 

munitions requirements to support purchasing decisions. The other 

services do not coordinate with the command prior to generating 

munitions requirements. Further, U.S. Forces, Korea, officials told us that 

they do not have the opportunity to review the service-generated 

munitions requirements prior to purchasing decisions and have no input to 

what munitions will be prepositioned or where those munitions will be 

located. While officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint 

Staff expressed skepticism about the way U.S. Forces, Korea, had 

developed their munitions requirements, they agreed that the proper 

coordination was not occurring. As a result, the needed linkage between 

the combatant command’s needs and the munitions purchases made by 

the services continues to be inadequate and raises questions as to whether 

combatant commands will have what they need should a conflict arise. 

We also found that the Army and Air Force lack reliable information on 

the inventory fill and maintenance condition for some prepositioned 

stocks. The lack of reliable inventory information may provide program 

managers with an unrealistic view on the preparedness of these programs. 

• Army officials told us that its information management system does not 

provide reliable information on the inventory levels and maintenance 

condition of its operational projects and sustainment stocks. Army 

managers told us that this lack of inventory visibility has persisted for 

many years, and sometimes the only way to get reliable information is to 

contact the storage site directly. 

• As recently as February 2005, the Army reported in the unclassified 

inventory information that it extracts from its main readiness reporting 

system25 that a high percentage of the combat brigade set prepositioned in 

 25 The Army’s Status of Resources and Training System is the counterpart to the Global 

Status of Resources and Training System, which is an automated system that assesses the 

extent to which military units possess the required resources and training to undertake 

their wartime missions. 

Unreliable Information 
Page 24 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

South Korea was fully mission capable. However, in an October 2004 Army 

assessment, inspectors had found that a high percentage of the equipment 

reviewed was not mission capable. 

• Air Force officials also told us that they do not have adequate information 

available to assess the overall readiness of their prepositioned stocks. 

While this information is decentralized and available in some cases to base 

and component commanders, information on inventory levels and 

maintenance condition is not available to Air Force managers overseeing 

the war reserve materiel program. Air Combat Command and Central 

Command, Air Forces, officials told us that in order to obtain information 

on the readiness of most prepositioned stocks, they had to contact the 

storage locations since this information is not readily available to them. 

Pacific Air Forces officials told us that they developed their own 

automated system to track the inventory levels and maintenance condition 

of the war reserve materiel prepositioned in their area of responsibility 

because the Air Force lacked a comprehensive system that provides 

reliable and timely readiness information on its war reserve program. 

The problems we found during our review with requirements 

determination and reliability of inventory information are not new. Our 

review of past reports going back to 1995 revealed that similar issues have 

been reported repeatedly, but have not been resolved. The findings from 

several past studies are described below, and appendix I provides a more 

comprehensive summary of the major findings from more than 30 past 

reports by us and the department’s own studies. 

Inventory management issues, and more recently supply chain 

management, have been considered high-risk areas by us since 1990. 

Specific to the prepositioning programs, we have previously reported 

numerous times on long-standing management problems. For example, we 

reported in our last review of prepositioning programs in 1998 that the 

Army and Air Force had poorly defined, outdated, and otherwise 

questionable requirements in their programs.26 Our 1998 report also noted 

that it was difficult for DOD to assess the readiness of its prepositioned 

stocks and the impact of any shortfalls due to the poor information the 

services used to manage these programs. We also reported in 2001 that, 

among other things, a potential mismatch existed between the Army’s 

methodology for determining spare parts requirements and the Army’s 

 26 GAO, Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need to Be Reassessed, 

GAO/NSIAD-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 1998). 

Problems with Requirements 

and Reliability of Information 

Have Been Long-standing, but 

Remain Unresolved 
Page 25 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

anticipated battlefield needs.27 And more recently, we reported in January 

2005 that DOD does not have the ability to provide timely or accurate 

information on the location, movement, status, or identity of its supplies 

due to long-standing data accuracy and reliability problems within existing 

inventory management systems.28

The department’s own auditors and an Army command have also been 

sharply critical of program management, especially how program 

requirements have been determined. For example, the Army Materiel 

Command reported in 2003 that the requirements computation for war 

reserve stocks and stockage lists for prepositioned stocks did not 

accurately portray what was needed for Operation Iraqi Freedom. These 

stockage lists did not contain the most critical items needed to sustain 

combat equipment during the operation.29 In addition, the Army Audit 

Agency reported in 2004 that Army program managers had not reviewed 

the requirements for many of the operational projects it examined. As a 

result, some operational projects contained inaccurate, overstated, or 

questionable requirements. Of $1.5 billion in requirements examined, 

about $727 million were valid, $472 million were invalid, and about $280 

million were questionable.30 In addition, the Air Force Audit Agency 

reported in May 2003 that Air Force personnel did not properly segregate 

certain war reserve requirements from peacetime operating spare parts 

requirements, resulting in more than $118.8 million of overstated 

requirements for peacetime.31

Past reports have also revealed problems with the reliability of inventory 

information. In 2001, Army auditors reported that the lack of reliable data 

on operational projects and sustainment stocks impeded the overall 

readiness capability of the Army’s prepositioning program. In addition, the 

Army reported that there was a general lack of confidence in the 

 27 GAO, Defense Inventory: Army War Reserve Spare Parts Requirements Are Uncertain, 

GAO-01-425 (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001). 

28GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

29 U.S. Army Materiel Command, Iraq Lessons Learned Conference (Redstone Arsenal, 

Ala.: Sept. 10-11, 2003). 

30 Army Audit Agency, Operational Project Stocks Phase II, Report A-2004-0108-AML 

(Alexandria, Va.: Feb. 12, 2004). 

31 Air Force Audit Agency, Other War Reserve Materiel, F2003-0010-FC4000 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 2003). 
Page 26 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

information management system used to provide information on inventory 

levels.32 More recently, the Army Materiel Command’s 2003 report on 

lessons learned in Iraq also found that different automated systems 

provided different inventory levels at the same storage location during 

operations in Iraq.33 Similarly, a June 2004 CNA Corporation after-action 

report on the Marine Corps’ prepositioning program in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom found that the Marine Corps did not have reliable information on 

the status of some prepositioned equipment used to support operations in 

Iraq.34 Specifically, due to a lack of automated tracking systems, the Marine 

Corps had to use manual methods for tracking equipment with hand 

counts and written reports. As a result, Marine Corps commanders did not 

have clear and accurate tools for determining where cargo was in the 

pipeline, and more importantly, forecasting when equipment would arrive 

and when integration would be complete. 

DOD has not developed a coordinated departmentwide plan or joint 

doctrine to guide the future of its prepositioning programs, despite the 

heavy use of prepositioned stocks in recent conflicts and the department’s 

plans to rely on them in the future. The 2005 National Defense Strategy 

specifically notes the importance of prepositioning in the future and 

indicates that prepositioning programs should be more innovative, 

flexible, and joint in character, but provides few details on how DOD plans 

to accomplish these goals. In addition, the independent Overseas Basing 

Commission recently echoed the continued importance of the 

department’s prepositioning programs in the future. In the absence of a 

departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to coordinate the reconstitution and 

future plans for these programs, the military services have been 

recapitalizing some stocks and developing future plans for their programs 

without a clear understanding of how they will fit together to meet the 

evolving defense strategy. Without an overarching framework that 

establishes priorities for prepositioning among competing initiatives and 

identifies the resources required to implement the future programs, DOD 

 32 U.S. Army Materiel Command Inspector General, Systematic Inspection of the Material 

Condition of Army War Reserve Sustainment Stocks (Ft. Belvoir, Va.: August 2001). 

33 U.S. Army Materiel Command, Iraq Lessons Learned Conference (Redstone Arsenal, 

Ala.: Sept. 10-11, 2003). 

34 CNA Corporation, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Maritime Prepositioning Force 

(MPF) Reconstitution, Regeneration, and Reembarkation Operations: Summary 

Findings (Alexandria, Va.: June 2004). 

DOD Lacks A Plan To 

Coordinate Future 

Prepositioning 

Programs 
Page 27 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

cannot provide assurances to Congress that the billions of dollars that will 

be required to recapitalize the stocks and develop future programs will 

ultimately produce programs that will operate jointly, support the needs of 

the war fighter, and are affordable. 

The most recent National Defense Strategy published in March 2005 states 

that to strengthen DOD’s capability for prompt global action and flexibility 

to employ military forces where needed, prepositioned stocks “will be 

better configured and positioned for global employment.”35 This 

overarching defense strategy establishes key goals for the future of 

defense capabilities such as the prepositioning of support materiel and 

combat capabilities in critical regions of the world and along key 

transportation routes, and a greater reliance on joint prepositioning 

capabilities that will be in accordance with other aspects of 

transformation. However, while such goals confirm that prepositioning 

will continue to play a key role in the evolving military strategy,36 the 

National Defense Strategy provides no specific details on how the 

department and the military services will accomplish them. 

In addition, the recently released report of the Overseas Basing 

Commission states that where DOD puts prepositioned stocks, what they 

are comprised of, and how they are maintained is central to the 

department’s operational capability.37 The report states that prepositioning 

is “imperative” for quick response of U.S. forces in areas of the world 

where access may be difficult, and calls for tight integration of service 

concepts, doctrines, and plans as a first step in ensuring the sustainability 

of prepositioning. Importantly, the Commission recommends that given 

the centrality of these stocks to the operational capability of U.S. forces, 

their high costs, and their anticipated heavy use over time, Congress 

should periodically review the status of prepositioned stocks. 

 35 DOD, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 2005). 

36 Recent changes in DOD’s defense posture have shifted the department’s focus from being 

capable of winning two major theater wars to including having the capabilities needed to 

(1) defend the United States, (2) deter aggression and coercion in four critical regions, (3) 

swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts, and (4) preserve the option to win 

decisively in one conflict. 

37 Final report of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the 

United States (Arlington, Va.: August 15, 2005). 

National Defense Strategy 

and Overseas Basing 

Report Indicate a Reliance 

on Prepositioning in the 

Future 
Page 28 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

While it seems certain that DOD will continue to rely on prepositioning in 

the future, it is unclear how prepositioning will fit into its future plans 

since DOD currently has no department-level prepositioning plan that 

provides specific details on how the department and the military services 

will work together to plan the future of their prepositioning programs or 

joint doctrine for its prepositioning programs. DOD officials told us that 

the future of its prepositioning programs has not yet been determined, in 

part because the future is dependent on the outcome of several 

interrelated studies ongoing within the department. For example, DOD is 

currently reviewing the mobility capabilities required to meet the full 

range of mobility needs for all aspects of the national defense strategy. 

According to DOD officials, the recommendations from this study will 

likely have a significant impact on the services’ prepositioning programs 

since requirements for prepositioning are being factored into the mobility 

deliberations. In addition, in March 2003, the Secretary of Defense 

requested that the department develop a comprehensive and integrated 

presence and basing strategy for the next 10 years. This strategy will build 

upon multiple DOD studies and will use information from the combatant 

commanders to determine the appropriate location of the basing and 

associated infrastructure necessary to execute the U.S. defense strategy. 

DOD officials told us that the basing study will also likely have an impact 

on prepositioning as the services will need to determine where to 

preposition their stocks to support the new defense strategy. Although 

some preliminary results have been released, DOD officials stated that 

once these studies are completed, they will have a better understanding of 

how prepositioning will be able to support the war fighter. 

Similarly, DOD has not developed joint doctrine to guide the planning and 

employment of its prepositioning programs. DOD defines joint doctrine as 

the fundamental military principles that guide the employment of forces of 

two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective. 

DOD’s transformation guidance states that part of the department’s 

transformation efforts is developing concepts to operate in a joint 

environment, and placing a continuing emphasis on the importance of 

expeditionary operations.38 DOD has published joint doctrine in a number 

of areas, including deployment and redeployment operations, 

multinational operations, and military operations other than war. 

However, in the absence of a departmentwide plan and joint doctrine for 

prepositioning, the military services currently plan and implement 

 38 DOD, DOD Transformation Planning Guidance (Washington, D.C.: April 2003). 

DOD Has Not Developed a 

Plan or Joint Doctrine for 

Its Prepositioning 

Programs 
Page 29 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

separate programs in an independent, service-centric manner. A servicecentric approach to prepositioning potentially misses opportunities to 

achieve greater efficiencies where service programs overlap. In a 2003 

Joint Staff-sponsored study on strategies for prepositioning, the Logistics 

Management Institute found that the military services continue to program 

for prepositioning materiel to meet individual service rather than joint 

requirements. As a result, the services may overstate operational 

requirements and put unnecessary burdens on limited transportation 

assets that would be required to move these prepositioned assets from 

their storage locations to the operational sites.39 For example, although the 

Army and Air Force have separate bare base programs, there is a lack of 

commonality among the design and components of these programs even 

though basic capabilities are the same.40 Moreover, this service-centric 

approach to prepositioning is out of step with DOD’s transformation 

guidance, which states that developing concepts to operate in a joint 

environment and a continuing emphasis on the importance of 

expeditionary operations is key to the department’s transformation 

efforts.41

Clearly prepositioning figures prominently in the department’s future 

plans, but the services do not have precise estimates of the costs and time 

required to reconstitute their prepositioned stocks since the services 

continue to use these stocks in Afghanistan and Iraq. In a recent report to 

Congress, DOD estimated that the costs to reconstitute the Army and 

Marine Corps’ prepositioned equipment will be between $4 billion and $5 

billion.42 The report acknowledges, however, that these estimates may 

change depending on several factors, including the length of time the 

equipment is in use, the number of combat losses, and any changes in the 

future plans for its prepositioning programs. However, most of the costs 

required to reconstitute and recapitalize the Army and Marine Corps’ 

 39 Logistics Management Institute, Strategies for Worldwide Prepositioning (McLean, Va.: 

August 2003). 

40 Science Applications International Corporation, Bare Base Assets Study (McLean, Va.: 

Aug. 31, 2004). 

41 DOD Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003; Air Force Transformation Flight 

Plan, November 2003. 

42 DOD, Ground Force Equipment Repair, Replacement, and Recapitalization 

Requirements Resulting From Sustained Combat Operations (Washington, D.C.: April 

2005). 

Reconstitution Likely to Be 

Delayed Due to Ongoing 

Operations, but Delay 

Offers DOD Opportunities 

to Set Clear Direction for 

Programs 
Page 30 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

prepositioned stocks have not been budgeted for in the department’s 

baseline submissions or supplemental funding requests. In the absence of 

a departmentwide plan that coordinates the reconstitution of these 

programs with the future plans of the department’s prepositioning 

programs, the services are developing plans to reconstitute and 

recapitalize their prepositioned stocks without a clear understanding of 

how the future of these programs will fit together in support of the 

evolving defense strategy. 

According to Army officials, plans to reconstitute the equipment and 

return it to the combat brigade sets are uncertain because, in some cases, 

Army units are continuing to use prepositioned stocks to support 

operations in Iraq instead of bringing their own equipment. In addition, the 

Army is placing a higher priority for its resources on supporting ongoing 

operations and on its modular conversion initiative—restructuring its 

forces to make them more flexible and rapidly deployable. As a result of 

this initiative, the Army is planning to use combat equipment that was part 

of the prepositioned brigade sets to meet the increased equipment 

requirements. For example, over 11,000 pieces of prepositioned combat 

equipment used in Iraq—such as tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and 

armored personnel carriers—are slated to be repaired and turned over to 

active duty units. Furthermore, Army officials told us that decisions have 

not been made as to whether the sustainment and operational project 

stocks will be reconstituted because of the large investments required and 

the uncertainty of the future plans for the Army’s prepositioning program. 

DOD’s recent report to Congress estimates the costs to reset and 

reconfigure the Army’s prepositioned stocks to be more than $4 billion. 

According to the report, however, these costs are not currently captured in 

DOD’s baseline submissions or in any of its supplemental funding 

requests. 

The Marine Corps’ prepositioning programs are expected to have a 

reduced capability until 2008, at least. The department’s April 2005 report 

to Congress estimates the cost to reconstitute the Marine Corps’ 

prepositioned equipment is approximately $490 million. Of this amount, 

about half ($247 million) was requested in the department’s most recent 

supplemental request. In the past year, the Marine Corps considered its 

options to reconstitute the equipment stored aboard the prepositioning 

ships given its continuing commitment to support operations in Iraq. The 

Marine Corps recently decided to partially refill the five ships offloaded to 

support operations in Iraq; however, due to the limited availability within 

the Marine Corps of equipment needed, such as heavy cargo trucks and 

High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles, the Marine Corps forecasts 
Page 31 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

that these ships will have major end-item fill rates of less than 50 percent. 

Additionally, Marine Corps officials stated that the reconstitution of the 

stocks in Norway is scheduled to be completed by 2008, at which time the 

fill rate of these stocks is projected to be approximately 88 percent. 

Air Force officials stated that they do not know when they will be able to 

reconstitute prepositioned stocks and return them to storage. As part of its 

reconstitution effort, the Air Force is in the process of replacing or 

converting all of its existing bare base sets into a smaller and more 

modular configuration.43 However, it is uncertain when the new sets will 

be available. For example, the Air Force had budgeted approximately $320 

million in fiscal year 2005 for procurement of the new bare base sets. 

However, according to an Air Force official, Congress reduced the Air 

Force’s budget by $53 million because it was concerned about the large 

increase in the Air Force’s procurement budget for that year. As a result, 

the official stated that the Air Force will not be able to procure all of the 

required sets. In addition, Air Force officials told us that they do not know 

when reconstitution for other categories of prepositioned stocks will be 

completed since much of this equipment is still in use. 

Each of the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency are 

planning the future of their prepositioning programs without the benefit of 

an overall plan or joint doctrine to coordinate their efforts. Thus, it is 

unclear to us how the programs will fit together to meet the evolving 

defense strategy. DOD officials representing the Joint Staff and the 

services shared our assessment and concerns. And, according to these 

officials, the Joint Staff has formed a working group that is focused on 

establishing common definitions for prepositioning as a first step in 

developing joint doctrine and setting a future plan for the department’s 

prepositioning programs. 

The future of the Army’s prepositioning program, the largest of DOD’s 

programs, is still unclear, and the Army acknowledges that it faces 

 43 Formerly known as Harvest Eagle and Harvest Falcon, the new bare base sets are called 

Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources (BEAR). Rather than deploying all of the assets 

that are part of the larger Harvest Eagle and Harvest Falcon sets, the Air Force established 

a more tailored basing capability. This tiered approach establishes a new 150-person set 

and replaces the Harvest Eagle/Falcon sets with 550-person initial and 550-person followon sets. The plan for deployment is for the 150-person set to support the forces that open 

the airbase, followed by a 550-person initial set to establish the airbase. The 550-person 

follow-on sets would then be set up as the base capability expands, on an as-needed basis. 

Without a Plan and Joint 

Doctrine, the Military 

Services and Defense 

Logistics Agency’s 

Prepositioning Plans Are 

Uncoordinated 
Page 32 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

continuing funding challenges as it attempts to modernize, support 

ongoing combat operations, and reconstitute its prepositioned equipment, 

leaving the future direction of its prepositioning program uncertain. The 

Army has a major effort ongoing to transform its units into more flexible, 

rapidly deployable forces at the same time it is supporting ongoing combat 

operations. The Army’s future prepositioning strategy was being revised 

during our review, so we could not assess how this overall 

transformation—commonly called “modularity” by the Army—will affect 

the prepositioning program. In addition, the Army’s prepositioned stocks 

will have to be reconstituted due to their heavy use in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. According to Army officials, however, the Army is nearing 

completion on a new strategy for its prepositioning programs. They told us 

that prepositioning will continue to be important in the future and that the 

prepositioned sets would be converted to the “modular” configuration by 

2012 or sooner. 

While the Marine Corps and Navy have identified concepts for future 

prepositioning programs, they have not developed firm schedules and cost 

estimates for these programs. For example, the Marine Corps is planning 

on changing the focus of its prepositioned stocks in Norway from their 

Cold War configuration to a more global support capability. Additionally, 

the Marine Corps is considering a fundamental change to the future of its 

prepositioning program that would replace existing Maritime 

Prepositioning Force ships with an undetermined number of new ships 

with a wider range of capabilities. These ships are intended to be an 

integral part of a future Navy sea base. The seabasing concept provides 

maritime platforms capable of supporting at-sea arrival of forces, assembly 

of those forces, rapid movement ashore, and combat sustainment without 

reliance on shore facilities. While such seabasing is envisioned by DOD to 

be a joint service capability, it is not clear how this will be accomplished. 

Furthermore, the affordability of the program is in question—this new 

concept could cost billions of dollars.44

The Defense Logistics Agency began developing a global stock positioning 

strategy in 2004 to support its overseas customers for the items it 

 44 Issues of joint service participation and affordability are discussed in more detail in two 

reports: Congressional Budget Office, The Future of the Navy’s Amphibious and Maritime 

Prepositioning Forces (Washington, D.C.: November 2004) and Congressional Research 

Service Report for Congress, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime 

Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2004). 
Page 33 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

manages. The strategy involves a combination of fixed-forward depots, a 

floating distribution center, and a deployable distribution depot. Fixedforward stocking depots have been established at the following locations: 

Germersheim, Germany; Yokosuka, Japan; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; 

Sigonella, Italy; Kuwait; Guam; and South Korea. The floating distribution 

center involves a mobile floating depot which will be capable of providing 

immediate distribution within the first 30 days of a contingency and could 

operate as part of the seabasing concept. The deployable distribution 

depot will be able to provide a full range of distribution capabilities in a 

theater of operations early in a contingency in developed or remote 

operating areas. These last two capabilities are still being developed and 

the Defense Logistics Agency does not yet have firm estimates for the 

costs of these capabilities. 

The Air Force is also planning changes for its prepositioning programs. It 

is transforming its bare base sets into a smaller, more modular 

configuration and is considering new prepositioning sites to support the 

new defense strategy. However, Air Force officials told us that it cannot 

make some decisions related to new storage sites for its prepositioned 

stocks until DOD’s basing study is complete. 

Without a plan or joint doctrine to guide their efforts, the services are 

planning for the future of their programs without an overarching 

framework that establishes priorities for prepositioning among competing 

initiatives, develops performance goals to measure success, and identifies 

resources to implement plans. Until the department determines how 

prepositioning fits into future military plans, it cannot provide assurances 

to Congress that the substantial investments required to recapitalize the 

stocks will be affordable. 

Prepositioning seems certain to be a key component of U.S. military 

strategy for years to come, but the department must make it a priority for 

it to overcome past management problems and ensure its future. In the 

near term, operational risks may exist should other military contingencies 

arise given the current inventory shortfalls and poor maintenance 

condition of some prepositioned stocks. However, the department has not 

developed concrete plans to overcome these challenges, even though 

inventory shortfalls and maintenance issues exist in the prepositioned 

stocks in potential trouble spots such as South Korea. 

Despite the importance of prepositioning to the military, however, longstanding management problems persist and the programs seem to have 

Conclusions 
Page 34 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

received little attention at the department level. Oversight mechanisms are 

in place, but they have been ineffective or ignored. Leadership and 

accountability begin at the top. Until DOD fully implements its own 

directive on war reserve materiel, oversight of its prepositioning programs 

will likely continue to be inadequate and the department will be unable to 

assess risks associated with any shortfalls in the programs. Moreover, 

DOD lacks reliable information in regard to its prepositioning programs 

and will be unable to make reliable assessments of the readiness of these 

programs. This could result in failure to obtain the right amount and types 

of equipment for the designated prepositioning locations, which could 

ultimately jeopardize the ability of U.S. forces to accomplish their warfighting missions and leave them at risk. 

Congress is also concerned about these issues and directed the Secretary 

of Defense to submit a report on its prepositioning plans by October 1, 

2005. Looking toward the future, without a coordinated plan and joint 

doctrine that identifies the role of prepositioning in the transformed 

military, the department cannot plan the future of its programs in a 

comprehensive manner. As a result, DOD cannot provide assurance to 

Congress that its prepositioning programs will be coordinated, effective, 

and affordable. 

Taking all these problems together—and considering them against the 

backdrop of growing operational and fiscal strains on the military—we 

believe the future of the prepositioning programs are at risk. Unless the 

department addresses long-standing management issues and sets a clear 

plan for the future, the department and Congress cannot make informed 

decisions about the significant investments needed to reconstitute or 

recapitalize the stocks. 

To address the risks and management challenges facing the department’s 

prepositioning programs and improve oversight, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense take the following five actions: 

• Direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to assess the near-term 

operational risks associated with current inventory shortfalls and 

equipment in poor condition should a conflict arise. 

• Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics to provide oversight over the department’s prepositioning 

programs by fully implementing the department’s directive on war reserve 

materiel and, if necessary, revise the directive to clarify the lines of 

accountability for this oversight. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 35 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

• Direct the Secretary of the Army to improve the processes used to 

determine requirements and direct the Secretary of the Army and Air 

Force to improve the processes used to determine the reliability of 

inventory data so that the readiness of their prepositioning programs can 

be reliably assessed and proper oversight over the programs can be 

accomplished. 

• Develop a coordinated departmentwide plan and joint doctrine for the 

department’s prepositioning programs that identifies the role of 

prepositioning in the transformed military and ensures these programs will 

operate jointly, support the needs of the war fighter, and are affordable. 

• Report to Congress, possibly as part of the mandated October 2005 report, 

how the department plans to manage the near-term operational risks 

created by inventory shortfalls and management and oversight issues 

described in this report. 

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. These 

comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD partially or fully concurred 

with our recommendations. However, in its response, DOD disagreed with 

the implementation of two of our recommendations because it had already 

taken actions to address them. In subsequent discussions with DOD, 

officials indicated that this disagreement was not related to the substance 

of our recommendations. In fact, the department has already initiated 

several actions to address our recommendations including conducting an 

assessment of risk, improving requirements and inventory visibility, and 

conducting a departmental assessment on future prepositioning. Further, 

DOD agreed that oversight policy as discussed in its directive does not 

reflect appropriate oversight roles and responsibilities. To address this 

issue, DOD plans to clarify policy and roles and responsibilities for 

oversight. With respect to our recommendation to improve requirements 

determination and the reliability of inventory data, the initial efforts taken 

by the Army and Air Force represent progress, but the planned actions 

should address all categories of the Army and Air Force’s prepositioned 

stocks, as discussed in our report, and not just a portion of these 

programs. For example, the planned actions should also include the 

Army’s operational project stocks and the Air Force’s vehicle stocks, 

among others. Overall, we acknowledge the actions already taken by the 

department to address these issues, but DOD will need sustained 

management focus to resolve these deeply rooted and long-standing 

problems. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 36 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the 

date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air 

Force, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine 

Corps. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

If you or your staffs have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-

8365. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

William M. Solis, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD 

Inventory Management and Prepositioning 

Challenges 

Page 37 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) prepositioning programs have faced 

long-standing challenges including poor asset visibility; equipment 

excesses and shortfalls; and invalid, inaccurate, poorly defined, and 

otherwise questionable requirements. GAO, military service auditors, 

DOD’s Inspector General, and others have called attention to these 

problems in products issued over the years. In 1990, we identified DOD’s 

inventory management as high risk because inventory levels were too high 

and the supply system was not responsive to the needs of the war fighters.1

With the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, other supply chain issues 

related to inventory management have been reported as impediments. In a 

January 2005 update, we expanded this high-risk area to include DOD’s 

management of its entire supply chain, which includes distribution, 

inventory management, and asset visibility. 

Table 3 provides summaries of challenges identified in select GAO reports 

and testimonies issued between January 1995 and March 2005. Table 4 

provides summaries of issues identified in select products released by 

other organizations during the same time period. 

Table 3: GAO Products 

Title Key challenges identified 

Defense Inventory: Actions 

Needed to Improve the 

Availability of Critical Items 

during Future Military Operations 

(GAO-05-275, March 2005) 

In March 2005, we reported on DOD’s supply-chain management during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

We developed detailed case studies of nine supply items that were reported to be in short supply 

and could have had operational impacts, and found that U.S. troops experienced shortages of 

seven of the nine items that led, in some cases, to a decline in the operational capability of 

equipment and increased risk to troops. We identified five systemic deficiencies that contributed to 

shortages of the selected items, including (1) inaccurate and inadequately funded Army war 

reserve requirements, (2) inaccurate supply forecasts, (3) insufficient and delayed funding, (4) 

delayed acquisition, and (5) ineffective distribution. 

High-Risk Series: An Update, 

GAO-05-207 (January 2005) 

In January 2005, we reported that DOD’s supply-chain management had experienced significant 

weaknesses in its ability to provide efficient and effective supply support to war fighters. While 

DOD reports showed the department owning about $67 billion of inventory, shortages of certain 

critical spare parts were adversely affecting equipment readiness and contributing to maintenance 

delays. DOD also lacked visibility and control over the supplies and spare parts it owned and did 

not have the ability to provide timely or accurate information on the location, movement, status, or 

identity of its supplies. 

 1

 In 1990, we began a special effort to review and report on the federal program areas we 

considered high risk because they were especially vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and 

mismanagement. In December 1992, we issued a series of reports on the fundamental 

causes of problems in designated high-risk areas, including one entitled: High-Risk Series: 

Defense Inventory Management, GAO/HR-93-12 (Washington, D.C.: December 1992). 

Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD 

Inventory Management and Prepositioning 

Challenges 
Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD 

Inventory Management and Prepositioning 

Challenges 

Page 38 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Title Key challenges identified 

Military Prepositioning: 

Observations on Army and 

Marine Corps Programs During 

Iraqi Freedom and Beyond, 

GAO-04-562T (March 2004) 

In March 2004, we testified that during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army’s prepositioning 

program had some equipment that was outdated or did not match unit needs. The program also 

faced shortfalls, such as trucks, spare parts, and other items. We noted that shortages in Army 

prepositioned and war reserve spare parts had been a long-standing systemic problem. We 

likewise reported that the theater supply-and-distribution system became overwhelmed and was 

worsened by the inability to track assets available in theater, which meant that war fighters did not 

know what was available. 

Defense Logistics: Preliminary 

Observations on the 

Effectiveness of Logistics 

Activities During Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, GAO-04-305R

(December 2003) 

In December 2003, we reported that during Operation Iraqi Freedom poor asset visibility and 

insufficient and ineffective theater distribution capabilities contributed to substantial logistics 

support problems. DOD and military service officials raised a number of issues that may have 

contributed to the logistics problems, including (1) shortages of some spares or repair parts needed 

by deployed forces, (2) a reported mismatch between Army prepositioned equipment and unit 

needs, (3) DOD contractors used for logistics support during Operation Iraqi Freedom were not 

always effective, and (4) physical security at ports and other distribution points in the theater was 

not always adequate to protect assets. 

Military Readiness: New 

Reporting System Is Intended to 

Address Long-Standing 

Problems, but Better Planning Is 

Needed, GAO-03-456 (March 

2003) 

In March 2003, we reported that DOD used readiness measures that varied 10 percentage points 

or more to determine readiness ratings and often did not report the precise measurements outside 

DOD. We additionally reported that DOD had complied with most, but not all, of the legislative 

readiness-reporting requirements and, as a result, Congress was not receiving all the information 

mandated by law. DOD issued a directive in June 2002 to establish a new comprehensive 

readiness-reporting system. However, as of January 2003, DOD had not developed an 

implementation plan containing measurable performance goals, identification of resources, 

performance indicators, and an evaluation plan to assess progress in developing the new reporting 

system. 

Major Management Challenges 

and Program Risks: Department 

of Defense, GAO-03-98 (January 

2003) 

In January 2003, we reported that inefficient inventory management practices represented one of 

the most serious weaknesses in DOD’s logistics operations. While DOD’s inventory value had 

been declining for the previous 10 years, GAO’s past and current work in the area indicated that 

DOD (1) continued to store unnecessarily large amounts of material, with about half of its 

secondary inventory exceeding then-war reserve or current operating requirements; (2) purchased 

material for which there was no valid requirement; (3) experienced equipment readiness problems 

because of a lack of key spare parts; and (4) maintained inadequate visibility over material being 

shipped to and from military activities. 

Defense Management: Munitions 

Requirements and Combatant 

Commanders’ Needs Require 

Linkage, GAO-03-17 (October 

2002) 

In October 2002, we reported that a fundamental problem in DOD’s munitions requirements 

process remained unaddressed—inadequate linkage between the near-term munitions needs of 

the combatant commands and the purchases made by the military services based on computations 

derived from the department’s munitions requirements-determination process. This disjunction had 

resulted in the combatant commands and the services identifying different munitions needs and, 

ultimately, in the combatant commanders reporting shortages. A more fundamental reason for the 

disconnect, however, was because DOD’s munitions requirements-determination process did not 

fully consider the combatant commanders’ preferences for munitions and weapon systems that 

would be used against targets identified in projected scenarios. 

Defense Inventory: Improved 

Industrial Base Assessments for 

Army War Reserve Spares Could 

Save Money, GAO-02-650 (July 

2002) 

In July 2002, we reported that the Army’s approach to industrial-base capability assessments 

lacked key attributes that included the collection of current industry data, the analysis of that data, 

and the creation of management strategies for improving wartime spare parts availability. We noted 

that out-of-date data could result in reduced readiness and inflated or understated war reserve 

spare parts funding requests within budget submissions to Congress, and the Army’s ability to 

identify long lead times and create management strategies to reduce lead times and thus the 

amount of inventory needed. 
Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD 

Inventory Management and Prepositioning 

Challenges 

Page 39 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Title Key challenges identified 

Defense Inventory: Army War 

Reserve Spare Parts 

Requirements Are Uncertain, 

GAO-01-425 (May 2001) 

In May 2001, we reported that notwithstanding the apparent shortfall in funding for war reserve 

spare parts, our review showed uncertainties about the accuracy of the Army’s requirements and 

funding needs in that area. Specifically, we found that (1) the best available data regarding the rate 

at which spare parts would be consumed during wartime had generally not been used in 

determining war reserve requirements for spare parts, (2) a potential mismatch existed between 

the Army’s methodology for determining spare parts requirements and the Army’s planned 

battlefield maintenance practices, (3) the capacity of the industrial base to support the parts 

requirements of the two major theaters of war scenario was not well defined or based on industry 

data, and (4) emerging issues, such as force restructuring actions, could significantly affect future 

war reserve requirements. 

Defense Inventory: 

Improvements Needed to 

Prevent Excess Purchases by 

the Air Force, GAO/NSIAD-00-5

(November 1999) 

In November 1999, we reported that the Air Force requirements model included prestocked 

requirements in computing the amount of inventory that needed to be purchased, but this inventory 

was not considered important enough to be funded. However, when the model identified contract 

quantities to be cancelled, these items were counted as valid. Thus, the model decreased the 

quantity to be cancelled by the amount of these requirements. 

Military Prepositioning: Army and 

Air Force Programs Need to Be 

Reassessed, GAO/NSIAD-99-6

(November 1998) 

In November 1998, we reported that the Army and Air Force had poorly defined, outdated, or 

otherwise questionable requirements in the major programs that GAO reviewed. The Army and the 

Air Force had reported significant shortages and poor maintenance conditions in their 

prepositioning programs. In some cases, however, reliable data to assess inventory fill and 

maintenance condition were unavailable. Thus, the precise readiness of the prepositioned stocks—

and the impact of any shortfalls—was difficult to determine because of the questionable 

requirements that underpinned the programs and the poor information that the services used to 

manage the programs. 

Afloat Prepositioning: Not All 

Equipment Meets the Army’s 

Readiness Goal, GAO/NSIAD97-169 (July 1997) 

In July 1997, we reported that of the Army’s unit sets considered when reporting the readiness of 

the brigade set of war reserve equipment, about 25 percent did not meet the Army’s readiness goal 

for full-mission capability. According to Army maintenance records, some equipment aboard 

prepositioning ships had been reported as nonmission capable since September 1995. These 

records also erroneously identified some nonmission-capable equipment as repairable aboard 

ship, although Army officials said that many repairs could not be made until the equipment was 

downloaded. One factor that contributed to lower readiness rates was that some equipment was 

not fully mission capable when it was originally loaded on prepositioning ships. Other factors 

include the deterioration of the equipment while in storage aboard ships and the limited ability to 

conduct maintenance on the equipment while in storage. 

Army War Reserves: DOD Could 

Save Millions by Aligning 

Resources With the Reduced 

European Mission,GAO/NSIAD97-158 (July 1997) 

In July 1997, we reported that DOD could have saved about $54 million per year in personnel costs 

once the Army removed unneeded war reserve equipment from central Europe and aligned its 

resources with the reduced mission. Army data showed that of 128,000 items in central Europe 

identified as available for redistribution outside of Europe, the Army had firm plans for about 54,000 

items, had proposed—but had not funded or implemented—the plans for about 27,000 items, and 

had no plans for about 46,000 items because it found no known requirement for them in the war 

reserve program. 

Defense Inventory Management: 

Problems, Progress, and 

Additional Actions Needed, 

GAO/T-NSIAD-97-109 (March 

1997) 

In March 1997, we testified that inventory management problems had plagued DOD for decades. 

We had recently reported that about half of DOD’s secondary inventory was not needed to support 

war reserve or current operating requirements. Most of the problems that contributed to the 

accumulation of this unneeded inventory still existed, such as outdated and inefficient inventory 

management practices that frequently did not meet customer demands, inadequate inventory 

oversight, weak financial accountability, and overstated requirements. We noted that while we 

continued to see pockets of improvement, DOD had made little overall progress in correcting 

systemic problems that had traditionally resulted in large unneeded inventories. 
Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD 

Inventory Management and Prepositioning 

Challenges 

Page 40 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Title Key challenges identified 

Defense Logistics: Much of the 

Inventory Exceeds Current 

Needs, GAO/NSIAD-97-71

(February 1997) 

In February 1997, we reported that $34 billion of DOD’s $69.6 billion secondary inventory on hand 

as of September 30, 1995, exceeded then-current operating and war reserve requirements. 

Although DOD had reduced its inventory from $77.5 billion since September 30, 1993, about half of 

the inventory continued to exceed current operating and war reserve requirements. Further 

analysis showed that inventory valued at $1.1 billion represented 100 or more years of supply. 

Defense Inventory: Spare and 

Repair Parts Inventory Costs 

Can Be Reduced, GAO/NSIAD97-47 (January 1997) 

In January 1997, we reported that $2.7 billion of DOD’s $8.3 billion in inventory at nonmajor 

locations was not needed to meet the services’ then-current operating and war reserve 

requirements. We estimated the services could save about $382 million annually in inventoryholding costs by eliminating the excess inventory. 

Defense Programs and 

Spending: Need for Reforms, 

GAO/T-NSIAD-95-149 (April 

1995) 

In April 1995, we testified that inventory management was an area where DOD had experienced 

long-standing problems in managing its resources. While we had seen some improvements over 

the previous several years, DOD continued to waste billions of dollars buying, maintaining, and 

storing supplies that became excess. For example, as of September 1993, about $1.7 billion of the 

$9 billion of inventory that DOD was buying at that time was not needed to meet war reserve or 

operational requirements. 

Source: GAO. 

Table 4: Other Products 

Title Key challenges identified 

Bare Base Assets Study, 

Science Applications 

International Corporation (August 

2004) 

In August 2004, the Science Applications International Corporation completed a comprehensive 

review and assessment of DOD bare base capabilities across the services, and identified a number 

of problems. The study, prepared for the Joint Staff Director of Logistics, found that the primary 

deficiency was the lack of a common understanding of doctrine that should provide the foundation 

for the services’ bare base programs. This lack of understanding of doctrine (1) impacted all 

aspects of bare base support, to include its relationship to other basing operations, the methods of 

providing bare base support, and the responsibilities associated with bare base support; and (2) 

inhibited the ability of combatant commanders to articulate requirements, and the ability of the 

services to develop the appropriate capabilities. The study also found no simple solutions to the 

challenge of bare base, that the procurement of additional or new bare base assets was not the 

key, and those material solutions that were not linked to doctrinal requirements and not part of a 

coordinated solution would result in inefficient and less effective support. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 

Maritime Prepositioning Force 

(MPF) Reconstitution, 

Regeneration, and 

Reembarkation (R3) Operations: 

Summary Findings, Center for 

Naval Analyses, CAB 

D0009974.A2/Final (June 2004) 

In June 2004, the Center for Naval Analyses reported that although Marine Corps Maritime 

Prepositioning Force operations in Iraq could be characterized as a success, the execution of 

reconstitution, regeneration, and reembarkation was neither simple nor easy. Challenges and 

issues included (1) a lack of detailed published policies and guidance, and servicewide knowledge 

and experience, in planning and executing operations; (2) simultaneous conduct of combat and 

operations; and (3) a lack of effective systems, organizations, and procedures for tracking and 

accounting for prepositioned equipment after it was downloaded. 

Operational Project Stocks – 

Phase II, Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, U. S. 

Army Audit Agency, A-2004-

0108-AML (February 2004) 

In February 2004, the Army Audit Agency reported that some operational projects—one of four 

categories of Army prepositioned stocks—had (1) invalid intended purposes; (2) inaccurate, 

overstated, outdated, or questionable requirements; (3) insufficient quantities of equipment on 

hand; or (4) a lack of requirements for essential equipment. Consequently, about $472 million of 

the roughly $1.5 billion in requirements reviewed were invalid and $280 million were questionable. 
Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD 

Inventory Management and Prepositioning 

Challenges 

Page 41 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Title Key challenges identified 

The Norway Air-Landed Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade 

Prepositioning Program, Naval 

Audit Service, N2003-0079 

(September 2003) 

In September 2003, the Naval Audit Service reported that the Marine Corps continued to store and 

maintain prepositioned stocks in Norway despite the program’s original strategic purpose having 

ended with the fall of the Soviet Union. The Naval Audit Service further reported that none of the 

inventory was sourced to an approved or planned Joint Chiefs of Staff war scenario and that the 

stocks were in excess of Marine Corps-wide requirements. 

U.S. Army Materiel Command 

(USAMC) Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF) Lessons Learned 

Conference, 10-11 September 

2003, Redstone Arsenal, 

Alabama 

In September 2003, the U.S. Army Materiel Command sponsored an Operation Iraqi Freedom 

lessons learned conference during which 27 major issues were identified in such areas as 

personnel, supply, maintenance, and distribution. For example (1) supply-related lessons learned 

included the need to relook at requirements determinations, asset management and visibility, 

prepositioned stocks, and ammunition warfighter support; (2) maintenance-related lessons learned 

included the need to improve prepositioning maintenance, readiness and other reporting, 

accountability, and forward repair activity; and (3) distribution-related lessons learned included the 

need to modify force structure and doctrine to support the distribution system, appoint a single 

DOD distribution manager, and develop and implement a business system. 

Other War Reserve Materiel, Air 

Force Audit Agency, F2003-

0010-FC4000 (May 2003) 

In May 2003, the Air Force Audit Agency reported that Air Force personnel did not properly 

segregate Other War Reserve Materiel requirements from peacetime operating spares 

requirements for about 16 percent of items, resulting in more than $118.8 million of overstated 

peacetime operating spares requirements. The audit agency likewise reported that Air Force 

supply personnel inappropriately applied $4.3 million of excess war reserve materiel assets to 

offset unfunded requirements rather than using the excesses to offset funded peacetime operating 

spares requirements. 

Systematic Inspection of the 

Material Condition of Army War 

Reserve Stocks, U.S. Army 

Materiel Command Inspector 

General (August 2001) 

In August 2001, the Army Materiel Command Inspector General reported the following problems 

with Army war reserve sustainment stocks related to the Army Prepositioned Stock program: (1) a 

lack of centralized strategic operational direction; (2) insufficient funding for program requirements; 

(3) a lack of data integrity in automated systems; (4) adverse mission impact caused by readiness 

reporting procedures and overall operational practices; (5) mismatches between recorded condition 

codes of materiel and true conditions; (6) no established procedures for test, measurement, and 

diagnostic equipment support; (7) an inability of the command to effectively support the Army’s 

wartime mortuary affairs mission; (8) materiel excess to requirements stored at prepositioned sites; 

(9) ineffective government oversight of a contractor allowing decreased readiness and increased 

costs; and (10) bulk fuel, potable water, and other assets to support forces during deployment were 

not part of the package. 

Medical Unit Readiness 

Reporting, Air Force Audit 

Agency, 00058007 (December 

2000) 

In December 2000, the Air Force Audit Agency reported that medical unit personnel inconsistently 

apportioned Air Force resources among the Aerospace Expeditionary Forces and improperly (1) 

reported war reserve materiel condition status, (2) accomplished readiness training, (3) monitored 

expiration-dated war reserve materiel items, and (4) controlled sensitive readiness data. 

Inventory Management of Navy 

Fleet Hospitals by the Fleet 

Hospital Support Office, 

Cheatham Annex, Virginia, 

Department of Defense Inspector 

General, D-2000-191 

(September 2000) 

In September 2000, the DOD Inspector General assessed the Navy’s prepositioned fleet hospitals. 

It found that the Naval Fleet Hospital Support Office (1) improperly managed its approximate $108 

million inventory warehoused at Cheatham Annex, Virginia; (2) fielded two fleet hospitals without 

key pieces of equipment; and (3) did not properly manage unliquidated obligations. 

Prepositioned Aircraft Fuel Drop 

Tanks, Air Force Audit Agency, 

00062006 (July 2000) 

In July 2000, the Air Force Audit Agency reported that Air Force managers did not validate, 

quantify, and correct suspected parts shortages in more than 9,000 prepositioned, unassembled 

drop tanks resulting in a possible inability to meet wartime tank requirements and consequent 

delays in critical wartime fighter sorties. 
Appendix I: Past Products Identifying DOD 

Inventory Management and Prepositioning 

Challenges 

Page 42 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Title Key challenges identified 

Selected War and Mobilization 

Planning Factors, Air Force Audit 

Agency, 99058006 (September 

1999) 

In September 1999, the Air Force Audit Agency reported that the Central and Pacific Air Forces 

planning personnel did not always correctly prepare War and Mobilization Plan, Volume 4 data or 

consistently and correctly use program planning factors to determine war reserve materiel 

requirements. 

Civil Engineer Support 

Equipment Assigned to Naval 

Mobile Construction Battalions, 

Naval Audit Service, 036-99 

(May 1999) 

In May 1999, the Naval Audit Service reported that (1) 1,587 of 5,289 assets assigned to fulfill the 

table of allowances for 20 naval mobile construction battalions could not satisfy the requirements, 

and (2) 37 civil engineering support equipment assets not assigned to a table of allowances but 

kept as backup in case of a contingency could possibly satisfy up to $1.1 million in planned 

procurements for other Navy activities. 

Accountability and Inventory 

Levels of Air Force Medical War 

Reserve Material at Fort Worth, 

Texas, Department of Defense 

Inspector General, 98-163 (June 

1998) 

In June 1998, the DOD Inspector General reported that while the Air Force maintained adequate 

accountability over medical war reserve material warehoused at Fort Worth, about $33 million of 

the medical war reserve material was not needed to satisfy its deployable medical systems 

requirements. 

Army Prepositioned Stock 

Program, Combat Equipment 

Group – Europe, U.S. Army Audit 

Agency, AA 98-138 (March 1998) 

In March 1998, the Army Audit Agency reported that while the Army Combat Equipment Group 

properly accounted for its war reserve stocks stored in Europe, improved accounting procedures 

were needed for its war reserve stocks loaned in support of Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. 

The audit agency additionally reported that repair parts had been identified during the audit that 

were not needed to support the deployable unit sets authorized for the war reserve program. 

Moreover, while war reserve equipment was generally maintained and stored properly, some of the 

combat equipment companies retained too many line items, maintained excess stockage levels, 

and didn’t establish an effective method to monitor maintenance operations. 

Sustainment Requirements for 

the Army Prepositioned Stock 

Program, U.S. Army Audit 

Agency, AA 98-99 (February 

1998) 

In February 1998, the Army Audit Agency reported that a substantial number of undesignated war 

reserve assets were stored in Europe that could have been used to satisfy new sustainment stock 

requirements. 

Total Asset Visibility-Operational 

Projects, U.S. Army Audit 

Agency, AA 98-31 (November 

1997) 

In November 1997, the Army Audit Agency reported problems in the Total Asset Visibility capability 

for Army operational projects, including (1) incomplete or unreliable onhand asset balances, (2) a 

lack of visibility over loaned assets, (3) inadequate identification of key management controls in 

Army policy regulations, (4) weaknesses in data integrity, and (5) failure of Army managers at both 

the wholesale and retail levels to redistribute assets to improve readiness and reduce 

requirements. 

Equipment Pre-positioned Afloat, 

Department of Defense Inspector 

General, 97-054 (December 

1996) 

In December 1996, the DOD Inspector General reported that the Army had rapidly expanded its 

afloat prepositioning program without first publishing criteria, policy, plans, and doctrine resulting in 

a possible inability to ensure effective equipment management in support of the combatant 

commanders. 

Source: GAO. 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Page 43 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

To assess the near-term operational risk given the continuing use of 

prepositioned stocks, we obtained reports prepared by the military 

services on the inventory levels of their prepositioned stocks compared to 

program requirements. We also reviewed available maintenance reports or 

other data used by the services to measure the maintenance condition of 

the prepositioned stocks. We also observed the physical condition of 

materiel stored by the Marine Corps at its prepositioning locations in 

Norway and aboard a prepositioning ship at its maintenance facility 

located at Blount Island, Florida; and observed the maintenance condition 

of the Army’s prepositioned stocks at Camp Carroll, South Korea and 

Sagami Army Depot, Japan. We interviewed program managers at each of 

the military services to determine the impact of reported shortfalls and 

poor maintenance condition in the prepositioned stocks and discussed the 

time frames and costs needed to repair or replace prepositioned stocks 

used in recent military operations. 

To assess the sufficiency of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) and 

service-level oversight of these prepositioning programs, we discussed the 

processes used by DOD and the services to oversee their prepositioning 

programs with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Joint Staff, and the military services. We reviewed relevant DOD directives 

and readiness reports prepared by the services and the Joint Staff to 

determine the extent to which the information contained in these reports 

could be used by DOD or the services to provide oversight. We also 

reviewed past reports prepared by GAO, the Army Audit Agency, the Air 

Force Audit Agency, the Army Materiel Command Inspector General, and 

the CNA Corporation that identified problems with the reliability of data 

regarding the preparedness of the services’ prepositioned stocks and 

problems with the requirements determination processes for some of 

these stocks. We discussed issues regarding the sufficiency of data on the 

preparedness of DOD’s prepositioned stocks with program managers from 

each of the services. 

To assess whether DOD has developed a coordinated plan for the future of 

its prepositioning programs that would meet the goals of the recently 

published defense strategy, we collected and analyzed information from 

the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency on the future plans 

for their prepositioning programs. We also reviewed the recently 

published National Defense Strategy and discussed the future direction of 

the department’s prepositioning programs with officials in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military services. 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Page 44 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

We conducted our review from July 2004 through May 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. We reviewed 

available data for inconsistencies and discussed the data with DOD 

officials. Our assessments of data reliability revealed significant concerns 

that are discussed in the report. 

We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the following 

locations: 

Army 

• U.S. Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

• U.S. Army Materiel Command, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 

• U.S. Army Field Support Command, Rock Island, Illinois 

• U.S. Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia 

• U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina 

• Eighth U.S. Army, Yongsan Garrison, South Korea 

• Combat Equipment Battalion-Northeast Asia, Camp Carroll, South Korea 

• Materiel Support Center-Korea, Camp Carroll, South Korea 

• Sagami Army Depot, Camp Zama, Japan 

Marine Corps 

• U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia 

• Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia 

• Blount Island Command, Jacksonville, Florida 

• Frigaard Storage Facility, Norway 

• Hammerkammen Storage Facility, Norway 

• Vaernes Aviation Storage Facility, Norway 

• Marine Corps Logistics Command, Albany, Georgia 

Navy 

• Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C. 

• CNA Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia 

• Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Washington, D.C. 

• Naval Special Warfare Command, San Diego, California 

• Naval Audit Service, Falls Church, Virginia 

• Naval Medical Logistics Command, Fort Detrick, Maryland 

• Military Sealift Command, Washington, D.C. 

Air Force 

• U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Page 45 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

• Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 

• Headquarters, Central Command, Air Forces, Shaw Air Force Base, South 

Carolina 

• Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii 

• U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany 

• 49th Materiel Maintenance Group, Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico 

• Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida 

Unified Commands 

• U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii 

• U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 

• U.S. Forces Korea, Yongsan Garrison, South Korea 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 46 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 47 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 48 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 49 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 50 GAO-05-427 Defense Logistics 

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 

In addition to the contact named above, John Pendleton, Assistant 

Director, Harold Reich, Assistant Director, Aisha Cabrer, Katherine 

Chenault, Lee Cooper, Jeff Kans, Renee McElveen, John Nelson, Emmy 

Rhine, Enemencio Sanchez, Patricia Sari-Spear, Kimberly Seay, Robyn 

Trotter, Matthew Ullengren, Eddie Uyekawa, Hector Wong, and Ignacio 

Yanes also made key contributions to this report. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(350568) 
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