U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

64–650 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

H.R. 3137, A BILL TO AMEND THE PRESIDENTIAL

TRANSITION ACT OF 1963

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,

INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H.R. 3137

TO AMEND THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION ACT OF 1963 TO PROVIDE

FOR TRAINING OF INDIVIDUALS A PRESIDENT-ELECT INTENDS TO

NOMINATE AS DEPARTMENT HEADS OR APPOINT TO KEY POSITIONS

IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OCTOBER 13, 1999

Serial No. 106–119

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian

CARLA J. MARTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY

STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

JIM TURNER, Texas

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

J. RUSSELL GEORGE, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

BONNIE HEALD, Director of Communications/Professional Staff Member

CHIP AHLSWEDE, Clerk

TREY HENDERSON, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on October 30, 1999 .......................................................................... 1

Text of H.R. 3137 .............................................................................................. 7

Statement of:

Ink, Dwight, former Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget; Paul Light, director, Center for Public Service, Brookings Institution; and Norman J. Ornstein, resident scholar, American Enterprise

Institute for Policy Research ........................................................................ 26

Richardson, Elliot, attorney general to President Nixon; and Lee White,

former assistant counsel to President Kennedy and counsel to President

Johnson .......................................................................................................... 11

Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:

Horn, Hon. Stephen, a Representative in Congress from the State of

California:

Letter dated October 7, 1999 .................................................................... 61

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 9

Presidential Transition Act of 1963 ......................................................... 2

Task Force Reports to the National Commision on the Public Service 16

Ink, Dwight, former Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget, prepared statement of ............................................................................. 28

Light, Paul, director, Center for Public Service, Brookings Institution,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 43

Ornstein, Norman J., resident scholar, American Enterprise Institute

for Policy Research, prepared statement of ................................................ 54

Turner, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 67

(1)

H.R. 3137, A BILL TO AMEND THE

PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION ACT OF 1963

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,

INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen Horn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Horn, Ose, and Turner.

Staff present: Russell George, staff director/ chief counsel; Matthew Ebert, policy advisor; Bonnie Heald, director of communications/professional staff member; Chip Ahlswede, clerk; P.J. Caceres

and Deborah Oppenheim, interns; Trey Henderson, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority staff assistant.

Mr. HORN. A quorum being present, this hearing of the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology will come to order.

Until 1963, the primary source of funding for Presidential transitions was the incoming President’s political party and the contributions of volunteer staff. The Presidential Transition Act of 1963

was enacted to authorize Federal funding and assistance for incoming Presidents. It also provided the authority for the outgoing

President and Vice President to use the funds for their transition

into private life for up to 6 months. The act authorized the appropriation of $900,000 to be divided equally between the incoming

and outgoing administrations.

In 1976, Congress amended the Presidential Transition Act of

1963 to increase the funding provided in the 1963 act.

In 1988, Congress passed the Presidential Transition Effectiveness Act, which again raised the funding for Presidential transitions, and included a provision that calls for annual adjustments

for inflation. In addition, the 1988 act required that all preelection

transition funds must be acquired privately, and the names of all

transition personnel and private contributors are publicly disclosed.

[The information referred to follows:]

2

3

4

5

6

7

Mr. HORN. Over the years, there have been many examples of missteps and outright errors made by newly appointed officials in

the White House. However capable and well-intentioned, new and

unseasoned appointees are especially susceptible to misjudgments

that, at a minimum, can be politically embarrassing, but can also

have serious consequences on the administration’s credibility. As we have seen, sometimes the errors tumble out in

misstatements or ill-advised recommendations; other times, they

have resulted in ethical lapses by an appointee who was unaware

of the ethical standards required by Federal law. These errors

could have been avoided if these appointees had properly understood the scope of their responsibilities, or, I might add, if they

thought what this action would look like on the front page of the

Washington Post or any major paper before you do it.

Accordingly, I am introducing a bill that would amend the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 to authorize the use of Presidential

transition funds for a formal orientation process for incoming appointees to top White House positions, including Cabinet members.

This bill would encourage the orientations to take place between

the general election and 30 days after the inauguration. By establishing this timeframe for top appointee orientations, this bill

would increase the likelihood that a greater number of lower-level

appointees might also receive White House orientations earlier in

the new administration.

[The text of H.R. 3137 follows:]

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION

H. R. 3137

To amend the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 to provide for training of individuals a President-elect intends to nominate as department heads or appoint to key

positions in the Executive Office of the President.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 25, 1999

MR. HORN (for himself, Mr. TURNER, Mrs. BIGGERT, Mr. KANJORSKI, and Mrs.

MALONEY of New York) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Government Reform

A BILL

To amend the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 to provide for training of individuals a President-elect intends to nominate as department heads or appoint to key

positions in the Executive Office of the President.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States

of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AMENDMENTS TO PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION ACT OF 1963.

Section 3(a) of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note) is

amended—

(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking ‘‘including—’’ and inserting ‘‘including the following:’’;

(2) in each of paragraphs (1) through (6) by striking the semicolon at the

end and inserting a period; and

8

(3) by adding at the end the following:

‘‘(8)(A) Payment of expenses during the transition for briefings, workshops,

or other activities to acquaint key prospective Presidential appointees with the

types of problems and challenges that most typically confront new political appointees when they make the transition from campaign and other prior activities to assuming the responsibility for governance after inauguration, including

interchange with individuals who held similar leadership roles in prior administrations, agency or department experts from the Office of Management and

Budget or an Office of Inspector General of an agency or department, and relevant staff from the General Accounting Office.’’.

‘‘(B) Activities funded under this paragraph shall be conducted primarily for

individuals the President-elect intends to nominate as department heads or appoint to key positions in the Executive Office of the President.’’.

Æ

Mr. HORN. This bill is an important step toward restoring confidence in the ability of the Executive Office of the President to run

its affairs in a responsible manner.

At today’s hearing, we will hear from a group of distinguished

witnesses. On our first panel, we have two gentlemen who hold a

unique perspective on the Presidency. We welcome Mr. Lee White,

who was assistant counsel to President John F. Kennedy and counsel to President Lyndon B. Johnson; and Mr. Elliot Richardson,

former Attorney General for President Richard Nixon and a holder

of at least four other Cabinet positions, including Defense.

On panel two, we have Mr. Dwight Ink, former Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget; Mr. Paul Light, Director of the Center for Public Service at the Brookings Institute; and

Mr. Norman J. Ornstein, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research.

We welcome each of you and look forward to your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen Horn follows:]

9

10

11

Mr. HORN. I now yield to the subcommittee’s ranking member,

Mr. James Turner of Texas, for a statement.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend you on the

legislation you have brought forward. It seems to me a very good

idea, and you have brought together a very distinguished panel to

discuss it. Obviously anything that we can do to assist the transition of a newly elected President and his appointees and Cabinet

members to make the transition smoother, we ought to do it. There

have been plenty of examples, as the chairman mentioned, of cases

where new appointees showed some indication that they were not

quite ready for the new job that they had assumed. I think your

idea here of providing an opportunity for briefings and workshops

and other activities for key prospective appointees is a very good

one.

I would like to thank the two panels who have come to discuss

the issues with us today.

Mr. HORN. I thank the gentleman.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. HORN. We will now proceed with panel one and begin with

a very distinguished public servant who a lot of us have known for

20 and 30 years. The Honorable Elliot Richardson was Attorney

General to President Nixon. He was Under Secretary of State, Secretary of HEW, and then Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of

Defense.

Mr. Richardson, it is all yours.

STATEMENTS OF ELLIOT RICHARDSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL

TO PRESIDENT NIXON; AND LEE WHITE, FORMER ASSISTANT

COUNSEL TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND COUNSEL TO

PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Mr. RICHARDSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and

members of the subcommittee. I feel not only privileged to have the

opportunity to lead off the testimony in this hearing, but I also believe that it probably is one of the more important hearings that

will be held in the Congress this year. It is fair to say that one

would be aware of its importance only with the kind of experience

one acquires through seeing the process whereby people are coming

from their roles in the private sector, going to their new assignments in government, and the need for supplementation of their

knowledge by as rapid as possible an exposure to the very integral

kind of environment they are coming into. It is different, of course,

in a whole lot of ways that I don’t need to enumerate, but one is

in the controversiality of many of the issues that they will address,

the degree of public attention focused on them, and not the least

the necessity of dealing with the legislative branch of the government, which at the end of the day has power and responsibility to

dispose of the issues that are addressed by the executive branch.

There is also the relationship between the new Presidential appointees and the career services and their members who were there

before the Presidential appointees arrived and will be there after

they are gone.

I think these are among the reasons for the legislation that you

have before you.

12

I was pleased to have the opportunity to read the testimony of

Dwight Ink, at least the statement that he prepared, and I think

that is a very comprehensive and persuasive presentation of the

kinds of considerations that I have briefly touched on, and a range

of other considerations which are also relevant to this legislation.

I strongly support everything he has said.

I would also suggest, however, that beyond the problem which,

I take it, has to be addressed through legislation for appointees of

an incoming President before he takes office in order to meet the

expenditures thereby entailed, that we should not lose sight of the

need for the orientation and briefing of new Presidential appointees

who come into office after the administration has taken over. The

same considerations that apply to them due to the appointees before the administration takes office apply to the new Presidential

appointees who are recruited who come in after the administration

is already in place. That may not need legislation, but the considerations that do require legislation should be recognized as having

continued importance, and perhaps the committee in its own report, I hope, recommending legislation for adoption with whatever

modifications it may see fit to make will call attention to this second point.

The testimony of Dwight Ink, which is the only statement that

I have seen, touched on a great many of the considerations which

bear on the needs for this legislation. I want to stress one of them;

and to that end, Mr. Chairman, I have brought with me, which I

have submitted to the committee staff, a copy of a recommendation

of a task force of the so-called Volcker Commission, more formally

known as the National Commission on the Public Service, on which

I sat in 1998. My task force addresses the relations between political appointees and career executives.

It is fair to say that not only is considerable time lost in development of a clear understanding by new appointees of the importance

of this relationship, but also there is a good deal of unnecessary

strain that arises out of the misunderstandings and misperceptions

brought to their new posts by Presidential, which is to say political,

appointees to the government insofar as their relationships with

public servants of the executive branch agencies are concerned.

The word, ‘‘bureaucrat,’’ as we all know, carries many negative

connotations. It need not have negative connotations. I would advise to pretend that it doesn’t deserve any negative connotations.

I will emphasize, however, that a bureaucracy is any large organization requiring staff and addressing several important purposes.

AT&T is a bureaucracy. IBM is a bureaucracy, and so on.

I personally regard myself as, first of all, a politician, although

I seldom, I think, have been recognized as such, but I have long

believed that John B. Fisher, then editor of Harvard Magazine was

right when I heard him tell a Harvard audience that politics is the

most difficult of the arts and the noblest of the professions. I wish

not only that more members of the general public understood and

believed that, but also wished that more politicians understood and

believed it.

I presently do believe it, even though I think I am seldom—let

me restate that. I am not often enough thought of as a politician.

13

Second, I regard myself as a bureaucrat with equal pride. To be

a good bureaucrat, particularly as a Presidential appointee, requires that you undertake a very complex and demanding administrative job fraught also with the necessity for addressing difficult

and controversial public issues. You are the head of an organization which is responsible to the policy leadership of the President

under whom you serve, but also accountable to the general public

through, in the first instance, contact and accountability to the

Congress of the United States, but also to the general public via

media, via all kinds of organizations around national and regional

and local through whom the policy and purposes that you serve are

communicated to the American people.

You need—in order to be able to achieve any of the public purposes of the public organizations in which you serve, and especially

for those who head the organizations, you need to understand that

everything you do depends at the end of the day on the people who

are permanent members of the organizations of which you are a

part. And you need to know that the great majority of them are

people who would not be there if they were not genuinely dedicated

to serving the public interest in the post that they hold. You need

to presume that and proceed on that assumption, and only qualify

it to the extent that in your relationships with a given individual

over time, you find that assumption may not be entirely warranted.

I want to emphasize, Mr. Chairman, my first Presidential appointment was by President Eisenhower. I was Assistant Secretary

for Legislation. I dealt with every committee and subcommittee of

the Congress of the United States that dealt with any legislation

involving health or education or welfare. There were only about

five Presidential appointees in HEW in those days, maybe seven.

I was No. 3 in rank order, you might say, and I served for substantial periods as Acting Under Secretary and Acting Secretary of

HEW under President Eisenhower. As you pointed out, I headed

four Cabinet departments and served as No. 2 in State.

I think I speak with not only firsthand knowledge, but complete

realism toward the necessity for constructive relationships between

Presidential appointees and media, the very real potential for those

relationships. This is undercut if the Presidential appointee is a

smart aleck and a cynic and stupid enough to suppose that you

have to be a businessman or a Republican or a Democrat of your

own basic orientation in order to be devoted to the best interests

of the United States.

Presidential appointees, I am sorry to have to say, in most cases

need to be made aware of that. They are becoming, you might say,

officers in an institution in which there are people ready to be led

who know that they need leadership in the resolution of political

issues that it is not their job, they know it is not their job, to have

to resolve, but who are quite ready to follow that leadership, especially if it is intelligent and articulate, and especially if the political

appointees take the trouble to engage them in a process which communicates understanding of those policy decisions.

I would like to give one example going back to the Eisenhower

administration which I think is very telling in this respect. There

was a bill which had been introduced at that time by a senior

Member of Congress from Rhode Island whose name eludes me at

14

the moment, but it was the first piece of legislation proposing the

establishment of what we now call Medicare.

I believed that the Eisenhower administration needed to have its

own initiative in addressing health care needs and the financing of

those needs for the elderly, so I put together a small group. There

were hardly any political people in the Department at that time.

We relied on career people to develop the Eisenhower administration’s counterpart with a Republican slant and perspective on how

to vote. This group came forward with what I thought was a not

very coherent or convincing approach, and I met with them and we

talked about it, and they came back with a new version which

wasn’t much better. And then it struck me their problem was not

that they were trying to impose something that reflected their own

political biases, the problem was that I had not made clear enough

what were the fundamental political decisions and policies that we,

the Eisenhower administration, saw as necessary to approaching

that problem.

I had to do the work of singling out what these were, and the

approach that I came up with was one which essentially gave in

a different context we now call vouchers with which the Social Security beneficiary could buy health insurance coverage. That is

enough for present purposes.

The point is that when I gave them a clear idea of what the political objectives were, then they could begin to apply it intelligently.

I came into the Nixon administration as what we now call Deputy Secretary of State. I had never had a foreign policy job before.

I never worked with the Foreign Service. But one thing I learned

very early on, when I saw somebody smile or look at another member of the Foreign Service around the table when we were discussing some issue with a wink, or sort of a smirk, I knew that I should

ask that person a question, and if I asked a question about what

they thought about what I had been saying up to that point and

the direction of policy, they gave me a straight answer drawing on

their knowledge and experience of the issue. They had been kicked

around by enough political appointees so they didn’t necessarily

volunteer the answer, but if I got any clue to whatever didn’t seem

to be going across and asked, I got one.

The relationship between political appointees in the Department

of State is very much like the relationship between political appointees and the military services. I think there is something about

the uniform and the stature of the military from day one ready to

speak up, but I found in those early weeks that these people were

dedicated, competent professionals and very ready to take political

leadership.

Now, I emphasize these things, Mr. Chairman, because the

United States and the public are damaged by the wrong assumptions brought by political appointees to their positions. This is by

no means the only reason why there needs to be an orientation at

a transition stage, not only before an administration comes in, but

for new appointees after the administration comes in.

Other reasons are spelled out in Mr. Ink’s testimony, which is

the only statement that I have seen. But, Mr. Chairman, I want

to emphasize the point that I have emphasized because in the first

place I think I have almost a unique background for having acVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Aug 22, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\64650.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
15

quired the point of view I have expressed, but also because I think

it is a consideration that is far too little recognized, and it is important to the success of political issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. I am going to put in the record without objection the

task force reports to the National Commission on the Public Service which was chaired by Mr. Volcker and the Task Force on the

Relations Between Political Appointees and Career Executives

which was chaired by our witness Mr. Richardson. It is a very

worthwhile document, and I will put it at this point into the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

16

17

18

19

20

Mr. HORN. We deeply appreciate your sharing those experiences

with us. You might be interested to know that when one of your

successors, the current incumbent, as Attorney General was testifying before us in this room, I asked if she recalled Attorney General

Richardson’s courageous retirement when he didn’t believe it was

possible for him to be persuaded by the White House and interfered

with by the White House and what he did. I suggested that she

might want to think about that experience when the White House

was pressuring her, which they have.

You have been a courageous, honest, and dedicated public servant, and our Nation is very much in your debt in this. You’ve been

a role model for many of us, and we thank you for sharing those

ideas. If you like, we are going to have Mr. White, and then we

might ask a few questions. I know that you probably have a schedule of your own.

We will ask Mr. White, who has had a long experience on Capitol

Hill, and who is quite knowledgeable about White House work of

quite different types.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Turner. Frankly

this is a pretty easy assignment. I would have expected that this

is already part of the law, and if it isn’t, it ought to be. I certainly

believe that I could work for 3 or 4 days and not find anybody who

would not think that it is a good idea. It should be done, and I certainly support the concept and the legislative proposal that I have

seen.

One thought that may be worth mentioning is in the language

of other activities in ‘‘briefings, workshops and other activities,’’ either in the committee report language or—I am not much on micromanaging in the bill. I should think that we should authorize development of a handbook or pamphlet or memo or whatever. One

of general character for those people across the board, especially

those who are going to face confirmation, but perhaps a specialized

one for those people who are going into the departments and the

agencies and who should know something about the problems that

are there.

I was very fortunate to be part of the transition team from President Eisenhower to President Kennedy, and as you said, the statute that you are attempting to amend was adopted in 1963. In the

fall of 1960, there were—I am not kidding you, there were six people working with the Eisenhower administration from the Kennedy

group. There were others involved in recruiting important players,

but the actual substantive involvement was a group of only six.

Happily, President Eisenhower had made it clear to everybody in

his administration that cooperation was required, and we got it, especially from what was then the Bureau of the Budget. Since those

days things have grown as things do grow in government and elsewhere, and I can tell you that the notion of trying to have an opportunity to explore with and explain to Presidential appointees

some of the pitfalls, some of the requirements and some of the

ideas that they should bear in mind as they go into these new jobs

is absolutely essential.

In the Kennedy White House, although the President didn’t ever

put it this way, we tried to make sure if anybody was ignorant, he

also wasn’t arrogant, because that is a terrible combination. In the

21

White House, I will tell you, even if you are not at the top tier, just

in the middle, the kids who knew you in grade school are going to

call you. I remember going home and telling my wife I must have

gotten terribly, terribly bright overnight because before nobody

gave a damn what I said, and now everybody wants to know what

my views are. I said I wonder if it works in reverse when you

leave, and the answer is yes, it does work in reverse. But it is

heady stuff, and I think not only the Cabinet officers, but the

White House staff has to have instruction.

It would be a good idea, if the President were so minded, to make

sure that his designated Chief of Staff was the one who made this

happen and that he himself could partake of it.

The pitfalls are many: ethical questions, financial disclosure. You

know, that is a very important thing, but I would also urge that

we go back a step and that the recruiters know some of these

issues so they are not blindsiding the person who is flattered to be

considered for a high position.

President Kennedy had intended to appoint a fellow to the D.C.

Board of Commissioners. It was going to be a very significant one.

He was going to be the first black Commissioner in the District of

Columbia, Frank Reeves. Unfortunately, it came out later that

Frank had forgotten to pay his income tax. Nobody had asked him

if he had paid his income tax.

Now there is a checklist, I am sure, and those are the types of

issues, but also you have to try to inculcate in them, especially the

White House staff, what their relations are to the Cabinet. Cabinet

officers get very, very testy, I can promise you, when some White

House staff guy calls him up and says, the President says—he is

thinking, why didn’t the President call me?

That is another part of the necessary skills and judgment, and

hopefully you don’t make too many mistakes. We can’t kid ourselves, you cannot legislate or mandate common sense and good

judgment in people. What you can do is tell them some of the basic

rules that you want as President, that you want followed, and hope

that it will take.

One of the benefits of mankind is to profit by other people’s mistakes, and so anybody who is part of this teaching team is going

to be able to find a whole host of mistakes which have been made

by others in the past to illustrate the point of how difficult it can

be. Everybody is busy. Everybody is flattered. There are receptions

around town, and you can hardly believe your good fortune to be

part of a brand new administration. But people have to understand

that if the President wants it, don’t forget, we are here recommending that the President in his transition, the President-elect in his

transition do certain things, and hopefully he will, and if it is institutionalized, there is a better chance of it happening that way.

And without wanting to beat a dead horse to death, I want to

say that I do support the idea, the concept and the legislative proposal. And as I said at the outset, please let me know if anybody

is opposed to it. I would like to talk to them.

Mr. HORN. You remind me of a few experiences in that point in

time. I was administrative assistant to Secretary of Labor Mitchell

under President Eisenhower the last year and a half, and we were

involved in some of what the President wanted done in the transiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Aug 22, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\64650.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
22

tion, such as preservation of papers, where do they go, and so forth

and so on.

I think one of the problems that I have observed in both Republican and Democratic White Houses is the younger members of the

staff who go in like they are still running a campaign in both parties. I have seen it, and I think it is pathetic, shall we say. I remember one young Kennedy aide who got a lesson in executive legislative relations when he left a note on the door of a southern Congressman. He said, the President wants you to vote this way. Needless to say, Larry O’Brien heard about that and educated the young

man, since Larry was one of the greatest Ambassadors from the

White House to Congress in probably this century.

Mr. WHITE. He did not require a checklist of things to do. The

gentleman was innately a gentleman, and crafty and smart and

very obliging. I remember he called a Congressman from Nebraska

and with tears in his eyes told him that they were going to close

the Veterans’ Administration Hospital in Lincoln, and the guy was

so pleased that Larry had called him ahead of time that he almost

was grateful. Can you believe that?

Mr. HORN. That is true. Courtesies are important, but I don’t

think that we can just worry about the high-level Presidential appointees, we need to get down into the grass roots of some of the

red-hots on the campaign trail who feel that they have personally

elected the President alone, and I have run into that type in both

Democratic and Republican administrations.

Mr. WHITE. That may be why a little booklet would be helpful.

Mr. HORN. Plus a good talking to by people who have had positions in other administrations. I think that helps.

I want to yield time to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner,

the ranking member, to open with questions. It is all yours.

Mr. TURNER. I think Mr. White said it all. If this is not in the

law, it should be. I found it fascinating to hear Secretary Richardson recount some of his experiences. Both of you have a wealth of

knowledge in government, and I appreciate very much Secretary

Richardson’s reference to the fact that we need to be careful how

we use the word ‘‘bureaucrat’’ because it is the people who have

committed their entire lives to government service that really hold

this place together. If we understand that partnership between the

political appointees and the career public servant, I think this

place can function to the benefit of the American people.

Mr. White, listening to your comments, it made me wonder if

there are not some other things that we should be thinking about

putting in this legislation. The period of time between a November

election and the inauguration is really very short, and some of the

stories that I have heard in my period of public service oftentimes

shock me. I heard one story related to me by an appointee who was

recounting how he was shocked to learn that he was actually the

appointee to a major head of an agency of our government. The announcement came at a press conference, and he had only a brief

conversation with the President about the possibility of serving.

Those kinds of stories do remind us that a President-elect and

transition is a very hectic time and difficult time.

As the chairman said, oftentimes those who run the campaign

are not those who you would select to run the Presidency. Yet it

23

is those people who were involved in the campaign that oftentimes

are making many of the decisions.

So perhaps there are some other ideas that we should consider

in this legislation, and if there are, we have a distinguished panel

here, and we would certainly welcome your suggestions. I know

that the chairman would.

But I really have no questions, Mr. Chairman. I have just enjoyed the depth of experience that has been shared with us.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.

I now yield to Mr. Ose, the gentleman from California.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I find myself somewhat in

awe. There is not a person alive of my generation who does not

know of Secretary Richardson, and I am pleased to have the opportunity to visit with Mr. White.

I think the thing that troubles me on this whole issue of transition is when I got here in January as a new Member, having come

straight from business, I kind of felt like I was on the wrong end

of a fire hose, and in that regard I find great merit in this transitional training idea between the November election and the January swearing in. And I am curious as to the specific criteria at the

level that you both served that you find most critical to impart to

the new appointees.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The most——

Mr. OSE. The most critical—when someone comes into one of

these agencies, there is a whole bunch of stuff that they have to

learn, and they only have 60 days roughly to learn it. What are the

most critical things that those new appointees need to learn?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think that is a good question, and I think I

have an almost unique background for answering it, having had to

deal with many new jobs. I ended up with 10 Presidential appointments. Some of them I held very briefly, but invariably in a new

job the first thing that I came to understand is that you need to

come to know as fast as you can the people you are going to be

working with, including the other Presidential appointees in your

department.

At the outset you may not have had a whole lot to say about it.

In time you do have. But also the key thing is the career positions.

The second thing you need to know is what are the significant

issues or problems that have to be addressed and what are the relative priorities in time. What do you have to resolve first, and what

do you have to know in order to be able to reach either a decision

or to give a recommendation to the President. And then as time

permits, what are the new undertakings or recommendations or

changes of direction that you may want to initiate as time goes on.

That, I think, is the sequence that is relevant to any new Presidential appointment.

Once you get outside the walls of the organization to which the

new appointee—in which the new appointee will be serving, you

then need to look at the relationships, starting with the Congress

and the committees that have most to do with the initiatives, the

budget and so on, of that governmental entity. You try to make the

most of the first round of contacts with the most senior people, and

liaison as you can. Beyond them are the national organizations

24

which have the greatest interest and influence on the issues you

address, and whose support or opposition may be important.

And then you have to be thinking in terms of the media, the

press, television and radio, both the general ones and the more specialized people who address parts of what you do.

I would like to add, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, that I am reminded by Mr. White when he talked about

the relationship between new appointees and the Congress, with

respect to all of these relationships, I learned one thing which I

would want to emphasize to anyone coming into government. That

is that you’ve got to understand that the person you are dealing

with in a position where there is a strained relationship, even hostility perhaps, further down the road is by and large somebody like

yourself but with a different job than you.

I think one of the best, most important lessons that I learned

when I became the legislative assistance to the then senior Senator

from Massachusetts, who was also Majority whip and chairman of

Armed Services, it is amazing to think that—this was in 1953—he

had only one legislative assistant. He had a chief of the office staff

and one other political person on his staff, but I was the one, it

turned out, who dealt with the press. One of the people that I dealt

with is still around town, Rollie Evans, who later came to Congress. He was the AP reporter who covered us, and there were a

number of others.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Attorney General, if I may, I wrote down those five

things, the people who were also similarly appointed to yourself, for

instance, in this transition; what are the significant issues or problems; what are the congressional committees with jurisdiction;

what are the nongovernmental groups who have interest; and who

in the media cover this issue.

Mr. White, do you share that analysis?

Mr. RICHARDSON. One quick point. Bearing in mind what I said

about the press is, I assumed and found out that these guys had

their own job to do, and if I simply understood that, as it turned

out, there would be no problem. That is a very simple point that

applies to all of these relationships. If you understand well enough,

use your imagination well enough to recognize these other functions and their demands, it becomes a hell of a lot simpler.

Mr. OSE. Thank you. Mr. White.

Mr. WHITE. I would only add a couple of things. Of course I

would agree with everything. I should point out that when I first

met Elliot Richardson, he was administrative assistant to the senior Senator from Massachusetts. I was a legislative assistant to the

junior Senator from Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy, so that is

how far we go back. Elliot was always erudite then and, as you

said, an icon of the way a public servant should conduct himself,

and he has always been that way.

What I would add to his list, I think you have to get a good hold

on who are the interest groups that you are going to meet because

you are sure going to meet them. They will be there, you can bet

on that.

Next, I think you ought to get to the—what is now the OMB, the

old Bureau of the Budget. Those folks, I don’t know if it is politicized these days, but it didn’t used to be. You could really get the

25

low-down on what is going on in any particular department and

agency. So I think you ought to make that stop.

And then if you are skillful, I would think that you would find

that particular character in the White House staff who you want

to be your entree and establish as good a relationship as you can.

Obviously not everybody, every Cabinet or agency head is going

to be able to get to the President on every issue. They have to call

their shots, unless, of course—I would exclude some of the more

important ones, in my view, State, Defense, the Attorney General,

probably Treasury, but the Secretary of HUD doesn’t normally go

right smack into the President, so he ought to be able to identify

who in that staff is his person.

Above all, I think you have to shake yourself a little bit. As Elliot

said, this is a temporary assignment. Political appointees come and

go, but the people in the agencies for the most part will be there

when you get there, and they will be there when you leave, and it

is very important that you know who the key people are. One of

the ways to get a fix on that is to talk to your predecessor who held

that job, so I would add that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think those are important additions. I left

them out, but I totally endorse what Mr. White said.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. If I might add a few things to what Mr. White has

said as a fellow legislative assistant just a few years after you two

gentlemen, besides going to the budget examiner, which I think is

what Mr. White is referring to, I regret to say that function has

been politicized. In other words, Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower had career people, and you kept them between administrations, and they gave you a lot of good advice. I think we ought to

get back to a lot of that, but that is another story. But the budget

examiner is certainly one.

The people that come to see me that are Presidential appointees,

I say, look, go over to GAO. There is an expert over there in that

department. Take a look and they will give you a lot of studies and

so forth, and then go to the Inspector General, you are going to

have to deal with that person, and find out what are the key problems that everybody has shoved under the rug, and you will find

that.

So I would think those are a few of the things that you might

want to tack onto the list here.

Are there any questions that the gentleman has?

I thank you both for coming. We appreciate it very much, and

any thoughts you have on what we can add to this bill. It is simply

a draft bill. It hasn’t been put in yet. I hope our Democrat colleagues and Republican colleagues will go on it. It might sound a

little small, but that is OK, we make progress step by step.

I thank both of you for coming. It is a great experience to see

both of you again, and we will go to panel two now.

We have Mr. Ink, Mr. Light, and Mr. Ornstein.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. HORN. We will start with Mr. Ink, former Assistant Director,

Office of Management and Budget in charge of General Services

Administration and all sorts of things in a very valuable career in

government.

26

We hope to get you all out of here by noon, so I think we are

in pretty good shape. You have sent us very fine papers here. If you

could just summarize it and don’t read it.

Mr. Ink.

STATEMENTS OF DWIGHT INK, FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET; PAUL LIGHT,

DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION; AND NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH

Mr. INK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is always a pleasure to have the opportunity to testify before

this committee and particularly today on behalf of this Presidential

Transition Act bill which you plan to introduce.

I believe it can improve government in two important ways.

First, it can reduce costly missteps by well intentioned incoming

political appointees. Second, it can improve the performance of appointees on whom a new President will have to rely in launching

his or her administration. I have worked with scores of Presidential

assistants over the years, and their performance certainly varies

from outstanding to just plain awful.

An incoming administration brings in a number of new political

appointees, as you have said, who are very able people with impressive backgrounds, but except for those who have had prior experience, almost none of them realize what awaits them in Washington. The pressures from all sides, the intrusive scrutiny that

characterizes Washington, are a shock for which they are not prepared, and they find they are expected to develop new programs

and legislative proposals that have to be advanced through a maze

of processes and procedures with which they are not familiar. Yet

time is of the essence in the first days of an administration when

the opportunities are greatest.

The steep learning curve needed for these officials to get on top

of their job is made more difficult because so many of them have

been immersed in campaigns that are very negative toward Washington. They arrive, therefore, loathe to take advice from anyone in

Washington, neither the Washington bureaucrats nor outgoing political leaders whom they feel have been captured by inside-theBeltway creatures who have lost touch with the real America.

As a result, these new political figures, no matter how capable,

are in real danger of stumbling during these first crucial weeks,

not so much from what they are striving to do as from how they

are functioning and their lack of familiarity with the techniques

that are most likely to get things done in this complex Washington

environment. These mistakes produce headlines and grist for the

TV programs, and they reinforce the negative view that the public

has of government.

Further, ignorance of the techniques and approaches that can

best transform policy objectives into actions weakens the ability of

an administration to advance the agenda on which the voters have

placed it in office.

27

This bill would help meet the critical need for more transition attention to how incoming political leaders can manage the challenging processes of governing.

What type of subject matter to include? The bill, I think, properly

leaves flexibility to a President-elect, but my written testimony

does list several critical areas in which I think orientations could

be especially helpful. Approaches to working effectively with Congress, for example, should be an important subject. Some incoming

appointees have never read the Constitution and look down upon

the Congress as simply a problem institution to deal with as little

as possible, rather than as a partner in government.

Confusion over the roles of White House staff and their relationship to departments, mentioned in the prior panel, is another area

in which new administrations tend to flounder at first and another

subject to be included.

An area that is perhaps least understood by new political appointees is one which Elliot Richardson talked about at some

length. That is the value of the career service and how to provide

it with positive leadership, a gap in knowledge that can be very

costly. The career leadership is a tremendous and indispensable resource of incoming political appointees, but it needs to have positive leadership.

Although orientations are not going to reduce the conflicting

pressures, the number of pressure groups, or the incessant scrutiny

that characterizes Washington, they can be of great help in preparing new appointees to cope with these circumstances.

Finally, as to style, I would certainly hope that the orientations

authorized by this bill would be organized much more as informal

discussions and workshops with particular emphasis on involving

those who have served in these kinds of positions in prior administrations, and not as lectures or briefings.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think there are many things that

can be done to help improve the Presidency. I think the work that

Norm Ornstein and his organization are doing and that of Paul

Light and the Center for the Study of the Presidency may provide

grist for this committee to consider other legislative suggestions.

I think this bill deserves strong bipartisan support as one of

those steps that can make the American Presidency more effective

in the 21st century. Thank you.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much. That is a very thorough document that you have presented, and we appreciate it.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ink follows:]

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

Mr. HORN. Next is one of my favorite authors, Dr. Paul Light,

and I urge anyone who thinks that we don’t have problems to read

Thickening Government. Those in the Eisenhower administration,

as a number of us were in this room, it is just unbelievable the

royal titles that have been added on, Councilor to the Secretary, it

is like Bismarck had been reincarnated in America. I must say, the

legislative assistant is bad enough. It is now called the legislative

director, and there are numerous legislative assistants, and I think

we got just as much done in those days as they are getting done

now with five more people.

Mr. LIGHT. It is a pleasure to testify before one of my favorite

readers; one of my few readers, I might add.

The last time I was here, we were talking about raising the

President’s salary, and a particularly nasty conversation with a colleague from another perspective, but you got that done, and congratulations to this subcommittee for being the engine of a rather

significant amount of reform in these past years. It is rather quite

remarkable what the chairman and the members of this committee

have been able to accomplish. I look now on this subcommittee as

a real treasure for actually producing meaningful reform in relatively small bites, but you show the value of making those small

steps, and they add up.

Mr. HORN. We had good bipartisan support.

Mr. LIGHT. I wish I could have given your e-mail address rather

than mine in the wake of raising the President’s salary because I

got a ton of e-mail from people who thought that was not necessarily the best idea of all time. It was a good idea, and I am glad

that you were able to do it. I mean, I am obligated whenever I testify with Dwight Ink to endorse whatever Dwight Ink says. It is

part of the obligation that I have, and this is an easy one to do.

The National Academy of Public Administration has long supported

this idea. The Volcker Commission has supported it. Al Gore and

National Performance Review had buried in one of their appendices

in their first report in 1993 an endorsement of this idea. They

didn’t do anything about it even though the vice president could

have, I suspect, persuaded the President to institute an orientation

program. It was not done. The Council for Excellence in Government does do orientations now. They have some private funding to

do so, and the Pew Charitable Trust, which has funded Norm

Ornstein’s project and mine, did include in our grant some funds

to do orientation. We would be delighted to have the orientation

adopted as an ongoing responsibility of government.

As you know, in the statement I can’t resist an opportunity to

expand an idea, no matter how good. My concern about this bill is

simply that if you are going to open up the Presidential Transition

Act of 1963, perhaps we can add one or two ideas to that legislation

that would address other issues that I think we have broad general

agreement need to be fixed.

My general point in the statement is that the Presidential appointments process as it is currently operating today is teetering

on the edge, if not completely broken. We are not generating appointments in a timely fashion. We have more vacancies now in

this administration than I daresay existed in Disney World during

Hurricane Floyd. We are in a situation now where we do not make

41

timely appointments. The Senate is unable to discharge its responsibilities in a timely fashion, and I think it is fair to argue that no

matter how good the orientation program might be that this subcommittee would design and produce, and no matter how good it

would be actually implemented, we are now in a situation where

there are serious problems with the appointments process. No appointees equals no value from an orientation program.

I summarize the role of citizen service by invoking Thomas Jefferson’s tremendous commitment to the notion that all citizens are

obligated to serve, but in reality we are seeing increases in vacancy

rates, increases in delays, increases in refusals to accept appointment, and an increase in departures. There is no question that the

thickening of government has something to do with it, a small

piece to do with it. Pay has something to do with it. The general

climate in this country toward service has something to do with it.

We are working now as part of the Presidential Service Initiative

at Brookings in collaboration with other organizations and in partnership with others who are working on this issue to generate

meaningful pragmatic bipartisan ideas for reform, and we will be

bringing those forward in the future.

However, I cannot resist remembering being in this room in 1988

when the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and the House

Government Operations Committee were debating the 1988 Presidential Transitions Effectiveness Act. As you know, most of these

kinds of conferences are staff-driven, but a gentleman who is remembered through this painting to my left and your right entered

this room through that door to argue against, and reasonably argue

against, the notion of providing a little bit of preelection transition

planning support for the two major party committees, and we

dropped that provision.

It had bipartisan unanimous support from the Senate. We could

not make the case here in this Chamber. Certainly it was a thin

reed on which to make the case that giving the parties $250,000

each to do a little bit of advance planning in the preelection period

might improve the odds that they could get their appointees in

place in time so they could take advantage of this wonderful idea

for an orientation program that this subcommittee is now considering.

I strongly urge the subcommittee to take another look at that

provision. It is a tiny amount of money, a mere pile of balloons that

we could easily take out of the funding that we are giving the two

national party committees to host their conventions next summer.

It is a nice little idea. I haven’t asked Dwight how he feels about

it.

Mr. INK. I support the idea. I think there are a number of things

that can be done in addition to this. I just—this is one that I

thought would have bipartisan support that we could probably get

passed rather easily.

Mr. LIGHT. These are good little ideas for improving the odds

that the next administration, be it Democrat or Republican, will hit

the ground running, and we have examples from past history of administrations that have hit the ground going backward and that

have hit the ground going forwards. And I think the model transition is the 1980 Reagan administration, which is clearly a product

42

of thoughtful preelection transition planning and the courage of a

Presidential candidate that said, I am going to be governing if I am

elected, and I need to start planning today. Whether this subcommittee needs to get in the business of telling candidates to do

that is a judgment call, but I would be remiss if I didn’t take advantage of this opportunity to thicken the legislative agenda.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Light follows:]

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

Mr. HORN. I might add that the gentleman up there that you

pointed to, when I went from the Hill down to the Brookings Institution as a senior fellow, I had a big dinner for a lot of leaders from

the Hill and key staff people on bringing computers to Congress,

which I had started in the Senate.

At the end of the dinner the individual to whom you referred

said, ‘‘You’re going to get that done over my dead body.’’ So, when

I came here, I introduced myself again to the chairman. He wasn’t

chairman of Government Operations at that time. And I said, Mr.

Chairman, I am just curious. A mutual friend of yours and mine

in Texas told me the story that when you first ran for office, you

didn’t like what your opponent was saying about you, it was a

Democratic primary fight, and you put a .45 on the podium and

said, if my opponent says in this debate what he said the last time,

I am going to blow his brains out. And he paused on that and

chomped on his cigar and said, ‘‘My opponent didn’t have any

brains,’’ a colorful Member of the House.

Mr. Ornstein.

Mr. LIGHT. He was a great chairman.

Mr. ORNSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be testifying

with this group of four individuals. I had the wonderful honor of

serving on the National Commission of Public Service with Elliot

Richardson and working closely with him, as I did with Paul.

I did not have the privilege, I am thankful to say, of testifying

in favor of the Presidential pay raise. I say it thankfully because

I was out front the last time in 1988 and 1989, and I remember

especially the only time I did Crossfire, I don’t like to do a screaming shows, but I felt a public service commitment, and I got ganged

up on by Pat Buchanan and Ralph Nader, which I continue to view

today as a badge of great honor.

Mr. HORN. Saint Peter will pass you through.

Mr. OSE. Were you able to tell which one was which?

Mr. ORNSTEIN. I couldn’t then, and I can’t now, as a matter of

fact. They merge into Ross Perot, I’m afraid.

I, of course, am very supportive of this piece of legislation, and

I thank Dwight Ink for not only his decades of public service, but

for continuing to champion some of these goals. Like Paul, I believe

this is a small, essential step. We need to clarify the law in this

regard, even though it could be done as the law is today. I also believe that the subcommittee should use this opportunity to broaden

its focus into a number of other areas.

I very strongly endorse the notion of committing some money for

preelection transition planning as a part of a broader effort, it

seems to me, to move away from the notion that candidates have

that it is presumptuous of them to even think of the notion of governing before the election. What happens is that after the election,

they are exhausted. The winner is triumphant and needs some

time to catch his breath. Everything that a new President-elect

does is viewed by the press as wonderful, building them up before

they tear them down, and there is no focus of preparing oneself or

one’s team generally. We drift through until the inauguration and

then stumble along.

Steps that we can take now suggest that it is appropriate and

necessary to think ahead so you can actually be prepared to govVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Aug 22, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\64650.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
53

ern, and that governing itself is something to be considered during

the campaign by everybody.

At the same time it seems to me we have an ideal opportunity

with an open Presidential contest, neither side seeing the strong

need to tear down the other to keep things from working well afterwards, to really rethink or think through the whole gamut of issues

surrounding the transition and the governing process. And I would

like you look at the layering of political appointees, something that

we dealt with very directly, that Elliot and I did in the Volcker

Commission. The appropriate level of financial disclosure of political appointees. The desirability of reducing and standardizing the

clearly confusing and overlapping forms that appointees must fill

out, and rethinking the number and nature of nominees who require full FBI background checks.

The amount of time at every layer of this process and every level

when you begin to think about making appointments is expanding.

It is discouraging people from getting in, and it is keeping them

from moving in when they take the jobs.

I would also like to see this as an opportunity to step back and

see if we can take some small steps for a larger goal. I think of

the broken window thesis of James Wilson that would send a signal that we want to change a culture that says if you come into

public service, you are guilty until proven innocent, and begin to

reestablish the notion that it is not such a bad thing to serve a period of time for your country.

As for the orientations themselves, for the last couple of decades

I have been very active in a variety of the orientation programs

that AEI and Brookings have done for new Members of Congress

and that the Kennedy School does up at Harvard. Every Member

who has been through those orientations knows when you come to

Congress, it is a very different experience, whether you come from

the business world or a legislative body. That is at least as true

if not more so of top political appointees or lower-level political appointees, and it clearly is something that ought to be done and we

ought to do now.

Let me just note, finally, Mr. Chairman, that I am heading up,

along with Tom Mann at Brookings, and we are working very closely with Paul Light on a project that we call the Transition to Governing Project, and we are doing a variety of things to try to assist

along this way. All of us want to work carefully with you.

One of the things that we are doing in conjunction with Martha

Kumar, who is here today, is we are trying to prepare a piece of

software that we hope will be the functional equivalent of turbo tax

maybe crossed with the college applications software for appointees

to make it easier to fill out those forms which now are a daunting

task and probably discourage a number of people from serving at

all. We really ought to rethink what goes into them in the first

place.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ornstein follows:]

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

Mr. HORN. We thank you all. Given the situation on the floor and

the voting schedule, I want to thank all of you as witnesses. If you

don’t mind, we would like to send you some questions that we

might insert at this point in the record.

I should add to this that we have testimony not only from our

witnesses today, but General Andrew J. Goodpaster, who I knew

as Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower, the first time the

White House had such a position, when he was a young major, and

he will give us some documents, and then so will Pendleton James,

Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel during the

Reagan administration, and he has submitted an item for the

record. These are two very distinguished gentlemen who have a

unique perspective on the Presidency and the transition process,

and we welcome their process.

[The information referred to follows:]

61

62

63

64

65

66

Mr. HORN. The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks for

additional insertions.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jim Turner follows:]

67

68

69

Mr. HORN. I want to thank the staff that prepared this hearing

on both sides, Mr. George, the staff director and chief counsel for

the subcommittee; Mr. Ebert on my left, policy advisor; Bonnie

Heald, director of communications. She is in the back, seated back

there; and Chip Ahlswede, our clerk; and P.J. Caceres, intern; and

Deborah Oppenheim, intern.

And for minority we have Trey Henderson, counsel, and Jean

Gosa, minority staff assistant; and we have our faithful court reporter Doreen Dotzler. Thank you very much.

With that, we will adjourn this session and go and vote.

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

Æ