[Cite as Stephens v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. , 2012-Ohio-4980.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR CLARK COUNTY, OHIO DARLENE STEPHENS : Plaintiff-Appellant : C.A. CASE NO. 2011 CA 102

v. : T.C. NO. 06CV700 GRANGE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., : (Civil appeal from et al. Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellee :

:

. . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 26th day of October , 2012.

. . . . . . . . . . RICHARD W. SCHULTE, Atty. Reg. No. 0066031 and STEPHEN D. BEHNKE, Atty. Reg. No. 0072805, 812 East National Road, Suite A, Vandalia, Ohio 45377 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant JAMES L. SCHULLER, Atty. Reg. No. 0003234, 3450 W. Central, Suite 242, Toledo, Ohio 43606 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee

. . . . . . . . . . DONOVAN, J. {¶ 1} This matter is before the Court on the Notice of Appeal of Darlene Stephens2 and Leslie Daniel, filed December 29, 2011. They appeal from the tria l court’s November 30, 2011 decision granting summary judgment in favor of Grange Mutual Insurance Company (“Grange”). We hereby a ffirm the trial court’s judgment. {¶ 2} On August 24, 2002, Daniel failed to yield the right of way and struck Stephens’ vehicle, causing serious injury to Stephens. Daniel was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Stephens sued Daniel, and following trial, the jury awarded Stephens $31,478.50 in compensatory damages, and $20,000.00 in punitive damages. Grange is Daniel’s auto insurance carrier. {¶ 3} On May 30, 2006, Stephens and Daniel filed a complaint against Grange, in which they asserted that Daniel assigned his rights as against Grange to Stephens 1 , and that Daniel was insured under a policy that provide d bodily injury liability coverage in the amount of $100,000.00 per person, and $300,000.00 per occurrence. According to the complaint, Grange acted in bad faith “in its investigation, evaluation and attempt to protect Daniel from personal liability.” The compla int further alleged that only $31,478.50 of the judgment in favor of Ste phens has been satisfied, a nd the remaining $20,000.00 is the uninsured and personal responsib ility of Daniel. Stephens soug ht compensatory damages in the amount of $20,000.00, to satisfy the punitive judg ment award in her favor, and Stephens and Daniel further sought compensatory damages in the amount of $40,000.00, and punitive damages in the amount of $50,000.00, “as a result of Defendant’s egregious bad faith.”

1 There is no evidence of this assignment in the record before us. {¶ 4} In July, 2006, Stephens and Daniel noticed the submission of interrogatories and request for production of documents to Grange, and in August, 2006,3 Grange noticed the submission of its first se t of interrogatories, re quests for production of documents, and requests for admission to Ste phens and Daniel. An agreed entry was subsequently filed granting Stephens and Daniel, and Gr ange, until November 9, 2006 to respond to the discovery requests. {¶ 5} On September 11, 2006, Grange filed a “Motion for Disqualification and Stay of Discovery,” in which it asserted that a conflict of interest existed, in that Matthew Jewson, who represented Grange in the underlyi ng litigation, was currently employed at the firm representing Daniel and Stephens. On October 18, 2006, the court issued an entry providing that, subsequent to the filing of Grange’s motion, substitute counsel from a different firm entered an a ppearance on behalf of Stephe ns and Daniel. The court determined that the matter of disqualification was moot and ordered th at discovery proceed. {¶ 6} On January 29, 2007, Grange filed a motion for summary judgment, in which it argued that it acted in good faith dur ing settlement ne gotiations in the underlying action, and further that Ohio law prohibits insurance coverage for punitive damages. Attached to the motion is the affidavit of Don Hammond, a litigation specialist at Grange, who was primarily responsible fo r handling Stephens’ claim, as well as the affidavit of Paul Winterhalter, an attorney and partner at Pi ckrel, Schaeffer and Ebeling, who handled Daniel’s defense at the reque st of Grange. According to Hammond, Stephens’ original settlement demand was $60,000.00, before suit was filed, a nd the demand was increased to $75,000.00 after Stephens filed he r complaint. Hammond avers that Grange offered $28,000.00 to settle the matter before trial. After Stephens refused to negotiate, Hammond avers that he made a final settlement offer of $30,000.00. Hamm ond states that Grange had4 no obligation to negotiate or pay punitive damages to Stephens. The affidavit concludes as follows: Given the jury verdict of $31,478.50 (compensitive (sic) damages), the very close assessment of that verdict as reflected in Grange’s settlement offer of $30,000.00 prior to trial, and the substantial earlier offer of $28,000 seven months before trial, I believe that my assessment of the case, in conjunction with the advice of counsel , was not only reasonable but also made in good faith, a nd was quite accurate. {¶ 7} Winterhalter’s affidav it is consistent with Hamm ond’s, and it provides that Winterhalter advised Daniel at all times that Grange was not obligated to negotiate or pay punitive damages on Stephens’ claim. The following exhibits are also attached to the motion: correspondence dated April 30, 2004, from counsel for Stephens, to Scott Feltner, an insurance adjuster at Grange, seek ing settlement in the amount of $60,000.00, and requesting that Feltner “advise me if you are able to increase your offer beyond the $25,420.00 you have already extended”; co rrespondence dated March 30, 2005, to Hammond, from Winterhalter, indicating receipt of a demand from Stephens in the amount of $75,000.00, and further indicating an offe r in response, in the amount of $28,000.00, “which is $3,000 above collosus”; the verdict form in the underlying litigation, along with an interrogatory indicating compensatory dama ges in the amount of $31,478.50; the September 19, 2005 judgment entry awarding Stephe ns $31,478.50 in compensatory damages and $20,000.00 in punitive damages; correspondence from counsel for Stephens dated August 23, 2005, to Jewson, at Pickrel, Schaeffer and Ebelin g, which states “I am rather sure that5 Mr. Daniel will readily find counsel to pursue an extra contractual cl aim if he knows this case could have likely settled for $50,000.00,” and that undersigne d counsel “would strongly recommend” that Stephens accept settlement in the amount of $50,000.00; a copy of a portion of Daniel’s Personal Au to Policy with Grange, which provides in part: “Regardless of any other provision of this policy, we do not provide coverage for punitive or exemplary damages, or any legal fees or costs associat ed with them.”; correspondence dated August 3, 2005, to Daniel from Jewson, in which Jewson introduces himself as the attorney who will try the matter at Winterhalter’s request. The letter provides in part, “* * * any judgment against you in this case for punitive damages, as opposed to damages for bodily injury within policy limits, may not be covered by insurance,” and Jewson concludes by advising Daniel that he has the right to retain a lawyer of his own choosing. {¶ 8} On January 29, 2007, Grange filed notice that it responded to Stephens’ and Daniel’s written requests for discovery on January 29, 2007. On February 5, 2007, the Magistrate issued an order notifying the parties that the motion for summary judgment would be decided on February 26, 2007. {¶ 9} An agreed entry extending the time for Stephens and Daniel to respond to the motion for summary judgment, until Ma rch 5, 2007, was filed on February 21, 2007. On March 5, 2007, Stephens and Da niel filed a motion to con tinue the deadline for their response, in which they asserted that, havi ng received written discovery responses, they “need to take the depositions of * * * Paul Winterhalter and one or more of the four individuals who worked on the bodily injury claim in this matter. These depositions are necessary to assist Plaintiffs in their analysis of whether Defendant acted in bad faith in the6 handling of this claim. ” On March 12, 2007, th e Magistrate issued an order which provides that Stephens and Daniel “are hereby grante d an extension of three months, until June 15, 2007, to complete discovery” and respond to the motion for summary judgment. {¶ 10} On March 16, 2007, Grange filed a motion for protective order and a response to the motion to continue deadline, and Stephens and Daniel opposed Grange’s motion for protective order. Grange replied in support of its motion for protective order. On April 11, 2007, the trial court overruled Grange’s motion for protective order. {¶ 11} On June 22, 2007, the parties filed a “Motion for Agreed Entry for Extension of Time to Respond to Motion for Su mmary Judgment,” in which they asserted that due to the busy trial sche dule of counsel for Stephens a nd Daniel, depositions could not be scheduled prior to June 15, 2007, and that the parties “have tentatively set the depositions” for August 24, 2007. The trial court granted the parties’ request for an order allowing Stephens and Daniel until August 31, 2007 to oppose summary judgment. On July 25, 2007, Stephens and Daniel noticed the depositions of Donald Hammond and Robin Schwartz-Harris for August 24, 2007. {¶ 12} On August 31, 2007, Stephens and Daniel filed a second motion to continue the deadline, arguing that more time was needed to depose Winterhalter, Jewson, and Feltner. The motion provides in part that undersigned counsel served as ”co-counsel in a two-week quadruple wrongful death trial,” from March 19 - 29, 2007, and also served as “co-lead counsel on a two-week class acti on trial,” from April 16- 30, 2007. The motion asserts that undersigned couns el was unable to schedule de positions until June 8, 2007, and that two depositions (of Schwartz-Harris a nd Hammond) were then scheduled over two7 months away, “because of difficulty scheduling on the calendar of the adjusters themselves.” According to the motion, “[t]wo business days later,” undersigned c ounsel notified Grange that it wanted to depose Winterhalter, Jews on and Feltner. The motion concludes, “Not only is undersigned counsel unaware of any ‘d eadline for completing discovery,’ but defense counsel has repeatedly blocked Plaintiffs’ attempts to conduct depositions after they received responses to written discovery.” {¶ 13} Attached to the motion is the affi davit of Richard Schulte, counsel for Stephens and Daniel, which pr ovides that he has “reviewed the items contained in this Motion and they are true and accurate to the be st of my knowledge,” and that he is “not making this Motion to unduly delay these pro ceedings or for any other improper purpose.” Also attached to the motion is email corre spondence, dated August 28, 2007, from the office of counsel for Stephens and Da niel, requesting to depose the a bove three individuals, as well as the response from the office of Grange’s counsel, dated August 29, 2007, which provides in part: “* * * we cannot c onsent to additional depositions. The deadline for completing discovery passed many months ago and your office made no attempt to schedule these depositions within that timeline. We consented to the late depositions of Robin Schwartz-Harris and Don Hamm ond.” Finally, the correspondence provides, “ * * * your office did not seek to depose any additional persons at that time despite the fact that you were in possession of the entire Grange Claims file and were fully aw are of any involvement of the individuals you now request to de pose.” On September 10, 2007, Stephens and Daniel noticed the depositions of Wint erhalter and Jewson for October 12, 2007. {¶ 14} On September 11, 2007, Grange res ponded to Stephens’ and Daniel’s8 second motion to continue the deadline to oppose summary judgment, and it asserted that it sent counsel for Stephens and Daniel a le tter dated April 17, 2007, st ating that it would cooperate in arranging the de positions during the month of May. According to Grange, counsel for Stephens and Daniel did not cont act Grange until one week before the June 15, 2007 deadline. A copy of the April 17, 2007 co rrespondence is attached to the response, and it provides: “In light of th e court’s ruling, please advise whom you wish to depose and I will make the arrangements. Your deadline for doing this is June 15th, and I think that is plenty of time. I will coopera te in arranging the depositions during the month of May.” Also attached to the response is a copy of email correspondence, dated June 8, 2007, from counsel for Stephens and Daniel, to counsel for Grange, requesting a continuance of the deadline. The email specifically indicates that Stephens and Daniel wanted to depose Robin [Swartz-]Harris and Don Hammond, and that “[d]ue to your busy June calendar, the first day that both attorneys had availabl e was June 25 and June 27.” {¶ 15} On September 12, 2007, the trial c ourt granted the second motion to continue deadline in part, extending the d eadline for response to the motion for summary judgment until September 24, 2007, but ter minating discovery. On September 20, 2007, Stephens and Daniel replied to Grange’s response to their second motion to continue deadline. On October 10, 2007, Grange filed a motion to quash the subpoenas issued to Winterhalter and Jewson. {¶ 16} On November 26, 2008, the trial cour t ordered Stephens and Daniel to show cause why their claims against Grange should not be dismissed, and on December 4, 2008, they responded, asserting that their sec ond motion to continue deadline as well as9 Grange’s motion for protective order were still pending before the court. On June 25, 2009, Grange filed a “Motion for Ruling and/or Hearing and/or Pretrial Conference,” and the trial court scheduled the matter for a telephone scheduling conferen ce before the Magistrate on November 29, 2011. {¶ 17} On November 30, 2011, the trial c ourt granted Grange’s motion for summary judgment as follows: * * * In particular, the Court finds defendant’s argument that its pre-trial settlement offe r of $30,000.00 constituted a good -faith effort to settle the claim, persuasive. Therefore, for the reasons set forth in [Grange’s] Motion for Summary Judgment, and based upon the Rule 56 evidence submitted in support thereof, the Court hereby grants Summary Judgment in favor of the defendants. {¶ 18} Stephens and Daniel assert two assignments of error. Their first assignment of error is as follows: “THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANTS’ SECOND MOTION TO CONTINUE THE DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO GRANGE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.” {¶ 19} Civ.R. 56(F) provides: Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion for summary judgment that the party cannot for sufficient reasons stated present by affidavit facts essen tial to justify the part y’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit10 affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. {¶ 20} As this Court noted in Doriott v. MVHE, Inc ., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20040, 2004-Ohio-867: Pursuant to Civ.R. 7[B], the grounds for a Civ.R. 56(F) motion for a continuance must be stated with pa rticularity. In addition, Civ.R. 56(F) requires the motion to be supported by an affidavit containing “sufficient reasons why (the nonmoving party) cannot present by affidavit facts sufficient to justify its opposition” to the summary judgment motion. Id . “Mere allegations requesting a continuance or deferral of action for the purpose of discovery are not sufficient reasons why a party cannot present affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary judg ment.” * * * “There must be a factual basis stated and reasons given within an affidavit why a party cannot present facts essential to its opposition to the motion.” * * *. A party who seeks a continuance for further discovery is not required to specify what facts he hopes to discove r, especially where the facts are in the control of the party moving for summary judgment. * * * However, the court must be convinced that there is a likelihood of discovering some such facts. Further, a claim that the party has not completed discovery is more likely to be rejected by the court where the party has not shown some diligence in attempting discovery. * * * .” Id ., ¶ 40-41. {¶ 21} “Whether to grant or deny a Civ.R. 56(F) continuance is committed to the11 sound discretion of th e trial court.” Doriott , ¶ 52. As the Supreme Court of Ohio determined: “Abuse of discretion” has been defined as an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. (Internal citation omitted). It is to be expected that most instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary. A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision. It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo , would not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would support a contrary result. AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Redevelopment , 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).

{¶ 22} Having thoroughly reviewed the reco rd before us, including the court’s discovery schedule and the multiple extensions of time it granted Stephens and Daniel to engage in discovery, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion terminating discovery on September 12, 2007, given Stephens’ and Daniel’s lack of diligence in pursuing the depositions of attorneys Winter halter and Jewson, and adjuster Feltner. Grange filed its motion for summary judgment at the end of January, 2007, and the identities of these individuals were appa rent in either the affidavits supporting summary judgment or the attachments thereto, and counsel for Stephe ns and Daniel was accordingly aware of their12 involvement in the underlying litigation. Gran ge provided written discovery responses at the end of January, 2007, and the motion wa s set for decision on February 26, 2007. Pursuant to an agreed entry, the deadline fo r response was then extended to March 5, 2007. On that date, Stephens and Da niel filed their first Civ.R. 56( F) motion, asserting that they needed to depose Winterhalter and “one or more of the four individuals” who worked on the claim (Hammond, Jewson, Swartz-Ha rris and Feltner). The magist rate granted an extension of three months, until June 15, 2007, “to complete discovery” and respond to the motion for summary judgment. Grange’s motion for a st ay and protective orde r was overruled on April 11, 2007, and pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the deadline for Stephens’ and Daniel’s response was again extended, until August 31, 2007. Hammond and Sw artz-Harris were deposed prior to that deadline. While counsel for Stephens and Daniel asserted in his second motion that he was consumed in trial from March 19 - 29, 2007, and April 16 - 30, 2007, it is not clear why he was unable to atte mpt to schedule depositions until June, 2007; in April, 2007, Grange indicated it would coopera te in arranging depositions in the month of May, to comply with the court’s then d eadline of June 17, 2007. There is nothing to indicate that counsel fo r Stephens and Daniel attempted to sche dule the depositions of Winterhalter, Jewson and Feltner before Augu st, 2007. In fact, in response to the court’s order to show cause, Stephens and Daniel responded, “On August 24, 2007, Plaintiffs took the depositions of Don Hammond and Robin Sw artz-Harris * * * . Two days later, Plaintiffs’ counsel notified Defenda nt’s counsel that they also sought to take the depositions of Paul Winterhalter and Matthew Jewson * * * as well as Sco tt Feltner.” Since Stephens and Daniel did not exercise diligence in seeking discovery, the trial court did not abuse its13 discretion in overruling their second Civ.R. 56(F) motion. {¶ 23} Stephens’ and Daniel’s second assi gnment of error is as follows: “THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED GRANGE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.” {¶ 24} As this court has previously noted: Civ.R. 56(C) provides that summary judgment may be granted when the moving party demonstrates that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. * * * Our review of the trial court’s d ecision to grant summary judgment is de

novo. Fifth Third Mtge Co. v. Bihn , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24691, 2012-Ohio-637, ¶ 15. “‘De Novo review means that this court uses the same standard that the trial court should have used, and we examine the evidence to de termine whether as a matter of law no genuine issues exist for trial.’ * * * Therefore, the trial court’s decision is not granted any deference by the reviewing appellate court.” CARE Risk Retention Group v. Martin , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24791, 2012-Ohio-1426, ¶ 12. {¶ 25} “In Ohio, an insurer has a duty to act in good faith toward its insured in carrying out its responsibilities under the policy of insurance. * * * ‘An insurer fails to exercise good faith in the processing of a cla im of its insured where its refusal to pay the14 claim is not predicated upon circ umstances that furnish reasonabl e justification therefor.’” Mundy v. Roy , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2005-CA-28, 2006-Ohio-993, ¶ 17. {¶ 26} Stephens’ and Daniel’s complaint alleges that Grange failed to act with “reasonable justification in attempting to settle and resolve claims made against Daniel to protect him from excess judgments.” We note that the complaint refers to “the original judgment of $51,478.50,” and alle ges that only $31,478.50 of that amount has been satisfied, but the complaint does not specify, consistent with the jury verdict, that Stephens was awarded both compensatory damages (in the amount or $31,478.50), as well as punitive damages (in the amount of $20,000.00). {¶ 27} “Compensatory damages are intended to make whole the plaintiff for the wrong done to him or her by the defendant. * * * Compensatory damages are defined as those which measure the actual loss, and are allowed as amends therefore.” Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Products Co. , 64 Ohio St.3d 601, 612, 597 N.E.2d 474 (1992). {¶ 28} “Punitive damages are awarded only upon a finding of actual malice. * * * ‘Actual malice’ has been defined as that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm.” Daniels v. Fraternal Order of Eagles Aerie of Tecumseh #979 , 162 Ohio App.3d 446, 2005-Ohio-3657, 833 N.E.2d 1253 (2d Dist.), ¶ 22. In contrast to compensatory damages, the “purpose of punitive damages is not to compen sate the plaintiff, but to punish and deter certain conduct. * * * .” Id . Punitive damages are not insurable, and the use of insurance proceeds to satisfy an award of punitive dama ges is against public policy. R.C. 3937.182;15 Ruffin v. Sawchyn, 75 Ohio App.3d 511, 599 N.E.2d 852 (8th Dist. 1991). Further, the portion of Daniel’s policy attached to Gran ge’s motion for summary judgment excludes coverage for punitive or exemplary damages, and in their responses to Grange’s request for admissions, filed August 31, 2006, Stephens and Daniel admit that Grange “had no contractual obligation to pa y punitive damages under the term s of the insurance policy issued to” Daniel. {¶ 29} Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Stephe ns and Daniel, we agree with Grange that there is no evidence that it acted in bad faith in negotiating Stephens’ compensatory damages. Hammond’s and Winter halter’s affidavits establish that Grange offered to settle the matter for $28,000.00 seven months before trial. Winterhalter’s affidavit establishes that Stephens then increased he r original demand of $60,000.00 to $75,000.00. Winterhalter’s affidavit pr ovides that a week before trial, Stephens requested that Daniel increase his settlement offer to $50,000.00 but Stephens refused to decrease her
demand. Hammond’s affidavit es tablishes that Grange increased its offer to $30,000.00. Compensatory damages were awarded by the jury in an amount only $1,478.50 more than Grange’s final offer. {¶ 30} The record reflects that Grange satisfied its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material f act regarding Stephens’ and Daniel’s bad faith claim. In response, Stephens and Daniel fa iled to set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial; Ste phens and Daniel did not respond to Grange’s motion for summary judgment, and when ordered to show cause, they responded that they “await an order from this Court as to whether it may conduct additional discove ry.” However, on16 September 12, 2007, the court granted Stephe ns and Daniel until September 24, 2007, to respond to the motion and further ordered that “[n]o additional discove ry will be permitted prior to a ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment.” {¶ 31} Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Stephe ns and Daniel, we conclude that the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Grange, and their second assignment of erro r is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . VUKOVICH, J., concurs. HALL, J., concurring: {¶ 32} While driving under the influence of al cohol, Daniel failed to yield the right of way to Stephens. Daniel st ruck Stephens’s car and inju red Stephens. A jury awarded Stephens $31,478.50 in compensatory damage s and $20,000 in punitive damages. Daniel had an auto insurance policy with Grange, a nd Grange provided him with defense counsel. The coverage provided by the policy wa s more than enough to satisfy the compensatory-damage award. But the policy did not cover the punitive-damage award. R.C. 3937.182, and our case law, prohibit a policy fro m doing so. R.C. 3937.182(B) (“No policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance * * * shall provide covera ge for judgments or claims against an insured for punitive or exemplary damages.”). Daniel assigned to Stephens his right to bring a claim against Grange for failing to protect him from personal liability resulting in the punitive damage award. {¶ 33} The evidence that Daniel was intoxi cated formed the basis of the punitive damage award. Undoubtedly, Grange had an oblig ation to consider the effect that this17 evidence could have had on the compensatory da mage award. But Grange was not obliged to consider whether to make a greater settlement offer solely in order to shield Daniel from the potential of punitive damage liability. As a matter of law, if compensatory damage exposure, and eventual judgment, is well within policy limits, an insurer need not consider whether to make a greater settlement o ffer solely to shield the insured from a punitive damage judgment. {¶ 34} I agree with my colleagues and concur in affirming the judgment of the trial

court.

. . . . . . . . . .

(Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich, Seventh District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio). Copies mailed to: Richard W. Schulte Stephen D. Behnke James L. Schuller Hon. Richard J. O’Neill