I

107TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 931

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war

in Sudan.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 7, 2001

Mr. TANCREDO (for himself, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. WOLF, Mr. WATTS

of Oklahoma, Mr. PITTS, Mr. CAMP, Mr. Evans, Mr. WELDON of Florida,

Ms. PELOSI, Mr. MCNULTY, Mr. WHITFIELD, Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky,

Ms. RIVERS, Mr. BISHOP, Mrs. TAUSCHER, Mr. KUCINICH, Mr. NEAL of

Massachusetts, Ms. NORTON, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr. LAMPSON, Mr.

UPTON, Mr. HEFLEY, and Mr. CLEMENT) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

A BILL

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive

solution to the war in Sudan.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sudan Peace Act’’.

5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

6 Congress makes the following findings:

7 (1) The Government of Sudan has intensified

8 its prosecution of the war against areas outside of
2

•HR 931 IH

1 its control, which has already cost more than

2 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than

3 4,000,000.

4 (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally

5 sponsored peace process, protected from manipula6 tion, presents the best chance for a permanent reso7 lution of the war, protection of human rights, and

8 a self-sustaining Sudan.

9 (3) Continued strengthening and reform of hu10 manitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential

11 element in the effort to bring an end to the war.

12 (4) Continued leadership by the United States

13 is critical.

14 (5) Regardless of the future political status of

15 the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Gov16 ernment of Sudan, the absence of credible civil au17 thority and institutions is a major impediment to

18 achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people

19 and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace

20 process.

21 (6) Through manipulation of traditional rival22 ries among peoples in areas outside their full con23 trol, the Government of Sudan has effectively used

24 divide and conquer techniques to subjugate their

25 population, and internationally sponsored reconcili-
3

•HR 931 IH

1 ation efforts have played a critical role in reducing

2 the tactic’s effectiveness and human suffering.

3 (7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and

4 organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and

5 other irregular units for raiding and slaving parties

6 in areas outside of the control of the Government of

7 Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the ability of

8 those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic

9 is in addition to the overt use of bans on air trans10 port relief flights in prosecuting the war through se11 lective starvation and is used to minimize the Gov12 ernment of Sudan’s accountability internationally.

13 (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly

14 stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds

15 from future oil sales to increase the tempo and

16 lethality of the war against the areas outside its con17 trol.

18 (9) Through its power to veto plans for air

19 transport flights under the United Nations relief op20 eration, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Gov21 ernment of Sudan has been able to manipulate the

22 receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the

23 United States and other donor countries as a dev24 astating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the
4

•HR 931 IH

1 Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan out2 side of the Government’s control.

3 (10) The efforts of the United States and other

4 donors in delivering relief and assistance through

5 means outside OLS have played a critical role in ad6 dressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Gov7 ernment of Sudan’s manipulation of food donations

8 to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.

9 (11) While the immediate needs of selected

10 areas in Sudan facing starvation have been ad11 dressed in the near term, the population in areas of

12 Sudan outside of the control of the Government of

13 Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of

14 their ability to sustain themselves.

15 (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in

16 Bahr al Ghazal, the Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile

17 regions have been excluded completely from relief

18 distribution by OLS, consequently placing their pop19 ulations at increased risk of famine.

20 (13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded

21 $1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on

22 providing only for the immediate food needs of the

23 recipients, the current international relief operations

24 are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long

25 term.
5

•HR 931 IH

1 (14) The ability of populations to defend them2 selves against attack in areas outside the Govern3 ment of Sudan’s control has been severely com4 promised by the disengagement of the front-line

5 sponsor states, fostering the belief within officials of

6 the Government of Sudan that success on the battle7 field can be achieved.

8 (15) The United States should use all means of

9 pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solu10 tion to the war in Sudan, including—

11 (A) the multilateralization of economic and

12 diplomatic tools to compel the Government of

13 Sudan to enter into a good faith peace process;

14 (B) the support or creation of viable demo15 cratic civil authority and institutions in areas of

16 Sudan outside government control;

17 (C) continued active support of people-to18 people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in

19 areas outside of government control;

20 (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms

21 to provide humanitarian relief to those areas;

22 and

23 (E) cooperation among the trading part24 ners of the United States and within multilat25 eral institutions toward those ends.
6

•HR 931 IH

1 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

2 In this Act:

3 (1) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term ‘‘Gov4 ernment of Sudan’’ means the National Islamic

5 Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.

6 (2) OLS.—The term ‘‘OLS’’ means the United

7 Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the

8 World Food Program, and participating relief orga9 nizations known as ‘‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’’.

10 SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN

11 RIGHTS ABUSES, AND TACTICS OF THE GOV12 ERNMENT OF SUDAN.

13 Congress hereby—

14 (1) condemns—

15 (A) violations of human rights on all sides

16 of the conflict in Sudan;

17 (B) the Government of Sudan’s overall

18 human rights record, with regard to both the

19 prosecution of the war and the denial of basic

20 human and political rights to all Sudanese;

21 (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and

22 the role of the Government of Sudan in abet23 ting and tolerating the practice;

24 (D) the Government of Sudan’s use and

25 organization of ‘‘murahalliin’’ or

26 ‘‘mujahadeen’’, Popular Defense Forces (PDF),
7

•HR 931 IH

1 and regular Sudanese Army units into orga2 nized and coordinated raiding and slaving par3 ties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains,

4 the Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile regions; and

5 (E) aerial bombardment of civilian targets

6 that is sponsored by the Government of Sudan;

7 and

8 (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on

9 air transport relief flights by the Government of

10 Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a

11 tool for creating food shortages and is used as a sys12 tematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and

13 economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in

14 a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

15 SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED

16 PEACE PROCESS.

17 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress hereby recognizes that—

18 (1) a single viable, internationally and region19 ally sanctioned peace process holds the greatest op20 portunity to promote a negotiated, peaceful settle21 ment to the war in Sudan; and

22 (2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best

23 made through a peace process based on the Declara24 tion of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July

25 20, 1994.
8

•HR 931 IH

1 (b) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The

2 Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel

3 of the Department of State for the support of—

4 (1) the ongoing negotiations between the Gov5 ernment of Sudan and opposition forces;

6 (2) any necessary peace settlement planning or

7 implementation; and

8 (3) other United States diplomatic efforts sup9 porting a peace process in Sudan.

10 SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

11 It is the sense of Congress that—

12 (1) the United Nations should be used as a tool

13 to facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and

14 (2) the President, acting through the United

15 States Permanent Representative to the United Na16 tions, should seek to—

17 (A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline

18 Sudan to end the veto power of the Government

19 of Sudan over the plans by Operation Lifeline

20 Sudan for air transport of relief flights and, by

21 doing so, to end the manipulation of the deliv22 ery of those relief supplies to the advantage of

23 the Government of Sudan on the battlefield;
9

•HR 931 IH

1 (B) investigate the practice of slavery in

2 Sudan and provide mechanisms for its elimi3 nation; and

4 (C) sponsor a condemnation of the Govern5 ment of Sudan each time it subjects civilians to

6 aerial bombardment.

7 SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

8 Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

9 (22 U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the

10 following:

11 ‘‘(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections

12 (d) and (f), the report required by subsection (d) shall

13 include—

14 ‘‘(1) a description of the sources and current

15 status of Sudan’s financing and construction of oil

16 exploitation infrastructure and pipelines, the effects

17 on the inhabitants of the oil fields regions of such

18 financing and construction, and the Government of

19 Sudan’s ability to finance the war in Sudan;

20 ‘‘(2) a description of the extent to which that

21 financing was secured in the United States or with

22 involvement of United States citizens;

23 ‘‘(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial

24 bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in
10

•HR 931 IH

1 areas outside its control, including targets, fre2 quency, and best estimates of damage; and

3 ‘‘(4) a description of the extent to which hu4 manitarian relief has been obstructed or manipu5 lated by the Government of Sudan or other forces

6 for the purposes of the war in Sudan.’’.

7 SEC. 8. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR

8 RELIEF EFFORTS.

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con10 gress that the President should continue to increase the

11 use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief sup12 plies in southern Sudan.

13 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date

14 of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a de15 tailed report to Congress describing the progress made to16 ward carrying out subsection (a).

17 SEC. 9. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANS18 PORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

19 (a) PLAN.—The President shall develop a contin20 gency plan to provide, outside United Nations auspices if

21 necessary, the greatest possible amount of United States

22 Government and privately donated relief to all affected

23 areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains and the

24 Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions, in the event the
11

•HR 931 IH

1 Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incre2 mental ban on OLS air transport relief flights.

3 (b) REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY.—Notwith4 standing any other provision of law, in carrying out the

5 plan developed under subsection (a), the President may

6 reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for

7 support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for

8 the purposes of the plan.

Æ