PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-7529

JESUS EMMANUEL JEHOVAH, a/k/a Robert Gabriel Love, a/k/a 

Gabriel Alexander Antonio,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

HAROLD W. CLARKE, Director; A. DAVID ROBINSON, Deputy 

Director,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; LORETTA K. KELLY, Warden, Sussex I 

State Prison; ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, in their official, individual, and private 

capacities, jointly and severally; EDDIE L. PEARSON, Warden; 

KEISHA FOWLKES, Unit Manager; MS. EVANS, Records Officer; MS. 

ANSAH, Corporal; ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.; 

ANTHONY KING, Dr.; MESELE GEBREYES, Dr.; BENJAMIN ULEP, Dr.,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

district of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior 

District Judge. (1:12-cv-00087-JCC-IDD)

Argued: May 12, 2015 Decided: July 9, 2015

Before TRAXLER, Chief Circuit Judge, GREGORY, and FLOYD, Circuit 

Judges.
2

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote 

the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Floyd joined.

ARGUED: Lola Abbas Kingo, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, 

Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Trevor Stephen Cox, OFFICE OF 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellees. ON BRIEF: Steven H. Goldblatt, Director, 

Clay Greenberg, Student Counsel, Elizabeth Purcell, Student 

Counsel, Appellate Litigation Program, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW 

CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Mark R. Herring, Attorney 

General of Virginia, Cynthia E. Hudson, Chief Deputy Attorney 

General, Linda L. Bryant, Deputy Attorney General, Public Safety 

& Enforcement, Richard C. Vorhis, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General, Kate E. Dwyre, Assistant Attorney General, Stuart A. 

Raphael, Solicitor General of Virginia, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
3

GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

Inmate Jesus Emmanuel Jehovah appeals from the district 

court’s dismissal of his pro se claims against the Commonwealth of 

Virginia and various employees and contractors of the Virginia 

Department of Corrections (“VDOC”). Jehovah claims that Appellees 

violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment and 

the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 

(“RLUIPA”) by a) prohibiting him from consuming wine during 

communion, b) requiring him to work on Sabbath days, and c) 

assigning him non-Christian cellmates. Jehovah also alleges that 

Appellees demonstrated deliberate indifference to his medical 

needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court 

dismissed sua sponte Jehovah’s Sabbath claims, cell assignment 

claims, and deliberate indifference claim, and granted Appellees 

summary judgment on the communion wine claim. We reverse the 

district court’s judgment in its entirety and remand for further 

proceedings.

I.

Jehovah is a VDOC inmate who was incarcerated at Sussex I 

Prison (“SIP”) in Waverly, Virginia when he filed this lawsuit. 

In his pro se complaint, he alleges four courses of action taken 

by VDOC employees that he claims violated his rights under RLUIPA 

and the First and Eighth Amendments.
4

First, Jehovah claims that various policies have prevented 

him from taking communion in the manner required by his religious 

beliefs. Jehovah’s religion1 mandates that he take communion by 

drinking red wine and consuming bread dipped in honey, olive oil, 

sugar, cinnamon, and water. While he was incarcerated at Nottoway 

Correctional Center (“NCC”) from September 2009 to March 2010, 

Jehovah was not permitted to take communion at all pursuant to a 

memorandum prohibiting the practice for inmates in segregation. 

In April 2010, Jehovah was transferred to SIP and placed in the 

general population. Jehovah requested permission from the warden 

to take communion but did not receive a response, so he filed a 

grievance. In January 2011, while Jehovah’s grievance was pending, 

VDOC issued a new policy prohibiting all inmates from consuming 

wine during communion. Jehovah filed another grievance, which 

VDOC denied. VDOC revised its policy in January 2012 to allow 

inmates to consume bread dipped in wine but not to drink wine. 

Jehovah filed a third grievance, which was also denied. In 

 1 Jehovah appears to adhere to his own particular brand of 

Christianity, citing to a version of the Bible written by himself. 

See J.A. 23 (Compl. n.1). Appellees do not challenge the sincerity

of his beliefs, and it is not within the courts’ purview to 

“question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a 

faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of 

those creeds.” Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 

680, 699 (1989).
5

December 2012, VDOC changed its policy yet again to ban inmates 

from consuming communion wine by any method.2

Second, Jehovah asserts that he has been unable to secure a 

job that will allow him to observe his Sabbaths. Jehovah’s faith 

prohibits him from working during the “Old Jewish Sabbath” (Friday 

sundown to Saturday sundown) or the “New Christic Sabbath” (Sunday 

at sunset to Monday at sunrise).3 VDOC requires inmates to 

participate in programming –- including work and educational 

activities -- for a certain number of hours per week in order to 

be eligible for good conduct allowances and earned sentence 

credits. See Va. Code § 53.1-32.1. In February 2011 Jehovah was 

assigned to a cleaning position, and his supervisor required him 

to work seven days a week. Jehovah requested that VDOC accommodate 

his observance of the Sabbaths, but VDOC refused, informing him 

that his failure to work could lead to sanctions. He filed a 

grievance, which VDOC denied. VDOC staff has not approved him for 

any job for which he has applied since December 2011, including 

jobs for which they had previously approved him.4 According to 

 2 This policy, like the January 2011 policy, allows clergy to 

consume wine during services but permits inmates to drink only 

wine substitutes such as grape juice.

3 Jehovah is required to devote these days to religious 

observance and instruction.

4 Jehovah lost his cleaning job on May 17, 2011 after being 

placed in segregation.
6

Jehovah, “there are few prison jobs available to him at SIP and 

other prisons which he can work and keep observing the Sabbaths.” 

J.A. 27 (Compl. ¶ 32).

Third, Jehovah states that VDOC has housed him with “people 

who are anti-Christian and unbelievers,” contrary to his religious 

beliefs. J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 34). Jehovah “is directed by God not 

to be yoked to unbelievers.” J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 34). At one point 

Jehovah was housed with a “self-proclaimed Satanist and antiChristian,” even though VDOC knew of Jehovah’s religious views. 

J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 35). This inmate harassed Jehovah and subjected 

him to “anti-Christian, anti-Jewish, anti-God . . . rhetoric.” 

J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 35). After several requests to be reassigned, 

Jehovah filed a grievance to which VDOC never responded. Since 

July 2011, Jehovah has been assigned to live with “an atheist, an 

agnostic, a worldly Muslim, a false/non-practicing insincere 

Christian, a racist black anti-Christian atheist, a selfproclaimed ‘Hell’s Angel’ biker, and a black anti-Christian from 

an anti-white gang.” J.A. 29 (Compl. n.18). Other VDOC prisons 

had been able to accommodate Jehovah’s requests to be housed only 

with Christians.

Finally, Jehovah alleges that he has suffered various medical 

ailments that VDOC medical staff have deliberately ignored. In 

2009 while incarcerated at NCC, Jehovah experienced, among other 

things, tongue lesions, chest and throat pain, difficulty 
7

swallowing, coughing, nausea, lethargy, and unexplained weight 

loss. After medical staff at NCC “detected and acknowledged” 

Jehovah’s symptoms but before they could diagnose them, Jehovah 

was transferred to SIP on March 26, 2010. J.A. 30 (Compl. ¶ 43). 

Jehovah developed further symptoms after arriving at SIP, and after 

testing negative for strep throat he was referred to Dr. King. On 

April 15, 2010, Dr. King examined Jehovah for the first time. He 

found holes in Jehovah’s tonsils but “did not acknowledge” any of 

Jehovah’s other symptoms; he ordered a test for HIV, which was 

negative, and then did not provide any further care. J.A. 30 

(Compl. ¶ 45). Jehovah’s symptoms worsened, and he sought 

additional treatment from Dr. King on June 17, 2010. Dr. King 

ignored all of Jehovah’s symptoms except his coughing, neck lesion, 

and nasal drip.5 Dr. King ordered a chest x-ray and urine and 

blood tests: the x-ray appeared normal but the urine and blood 

tests revealed abnormalities consistent with infection. Jehovah 

maintains Dr. King ignored these results and provided no further 

treatment. Jehovah saw Dr. King again on July 30, 2010, and 

 5 At this point in time, Jehovah’s alleged symptoms included:

“coughing with unusual whitish phlegm, [a] patch of hair loss and 

neck lesion on His neck, fatigue, dizziness, night sweats, nasal 

drip, weight loss, a lump under [h]is left ear, chest pains, chest 

burning sensations, involuntary muscle spasms throughout [h]is 

body, headaches, difficulty sleeping, swollen lymph nodes, and 

other symptoms.” J.A. 30 (Compl. ¶ 46).
8

Dr. King referred him to mental health staff, who ultimately 

determined that he had no psychological problems. Jehovah’s 

condition continued to deteriorate.6 When Jehovah next saw 

Dr. King on August 30, 2010, Dr. King “disregarded most” of his 

symptoms and treated him for gastroesophageal reflux disease with 

Prilosec, which made many of Jehovah’s symptoms worse. J.A. 31 

(Compl. ¶ 48). Dr. King also referred Jehovah to mental health 

staff again to be evaluated for bipolar disorder, of which staff 

found no symptoms. This pattern continued into 2012, with Dr. 

King and other VDOC doctors allegedly acknowledging only some of 

Jehovah’s symptoms, ignoring test results indicating infection, 

and failing to improve Jehovah’s condition.7

 6 Additional symptoms included “tinnitus/ringing sensations 

in [h]is hearing/ears, popping and bubbling sounds and sensations 

and pains in [h]is ears and ear canals; episodic problems 

concentrating, slowed cognitive functioning, malaise, and 

dizziness; abdominal pains, abnormal stools, and rapidly passing 

consumed meals; more difficulty swallowing and persistent 

sensations of something being caught in [h]is throat, neck pain, 

and sore and tender swollen nodes and tissues in his neck; more 

chest pains and of greater intensity, and bones in [h]is sternum 

area slightly, audibly, and painfully popping and moving out of 

place; worsening muscle spasms, and spontaneous irregular and 

painful heartbeats.” J.A. 31 (Compl. ¶ 47).

7 In 2013, Jehovah filed a notice with the district court 

stating that an ultrasound electrocardiogram had revealed that for 

two years he had been suffering from pulmonary hypertension with 

right ventricle hypertrophy, an irreversible and often fatal 

condition.
9

Jehovah filed this lawsuit on July 11, 2012, seeking 

compensatory and injunctive relief for these alleged violations of 

RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. On 

September 27, 2012, the district court sua sponte dismissed all of 

Jehovah’s claims except his communion claim pursuant to the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Appellees moved 

to dismiss the remaining claim on December 21, 2012. In support 

of their motion they submitted a declaration from VDOC Chief of 

Corrections Operations A. David Robinson discussing the purposes 

of the wine ban. Jehovah responded with numerous discovery 

requests to which Appellees responded in part and otherwise 

objected. He then filed a motion to compel discovery and to hold 

an evidentiary hearing, which the district court denied on May 17, 

2013. On August 20, 2013, the court granted Appellees’ summary 

judgment motion and dismissed Jehovah’s RLUIPA and First Amendment 

claims regarding the communion wine ban. Jehovah timely appealed 

the dismissal of all his claims.

II.

On appeal, Jehovah argues that the district court erred in 1) 

dismissing his Sabbath, cell assignment, and deliberate 

indifference claims under § 1915A, and 2) granting Appellees 

summary judgment on his communion wine claim.
10

We review de novo a § 1915A dismissal for failure to state a 

claim. Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248 (4th 

Cir. 2005). Dismissal is proper only if the plaintiff has failed 

to “present factual allegations that ‘state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.’” Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 

178 (4th Cir. 2014). Similarly, we review de novo a grant of 

summary judgment. Seabulk Offshore, Ltd. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 

377 F.3d 408, 418 (4th Cir. 2004). We must “view[] the facts and 

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. Summary judgment is inappropriate if “the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986).

We must construe pro se complaints liberally, Jackson, 775 

F.3d at 178, and “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is 

particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se 

complaint raising civil rights issues,” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 

736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original).

III.

The First Amendment’s protection of the right to exercise 

religious beliefs extends to all citizens, including inmates. 

O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). In Turner 

v. Safley, the Supreme Court held that “when a prison regulation 
11

impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is 

valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 

interests.” 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The Turner Court laid out a 

four-factor test for determining whether a prison regulation that 

infringes on an inmate’s First Amendment rights is nonetheless 

reasonable and therefore constitutionally valid. First, is there

“a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and 

the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it[?]” 

Id. Second, are there “alternative means of exercising the right 

that remain open to prison inmates[?]” Id. at 90. Third, what is 

“the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right 

will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of 

prison resources generally[?]” Id. And finally, do there exist 

“obvious, easy alternatives” suggesting that the regulation is “an 

‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns[?]” Id. Under this 

framework, “[t]he burden . . . is not on the State to prove the 

validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove 

it.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).

RLUIPA provides more stringent protection of prisoners’ free 

exercise rights than does the First Amendment, applying “strict 

scrutiny instead of reasonableness.” Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 

174, 186 (4th Cir. 2006). It prohibits any government entity from 

imposing a “substantial burden” on an inmate’s religious exercise 

unless the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
12

interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering 

that . . . interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The inmate bears 

the initial burden of showing a substantial burden on her religious 

exercise, but the government must establish that the burden is the 

least restrictive way to further a compelling governmental 

interest. Id. § 2000cc-2(b). “The least-restrictive-means 

standard is exceptionally demanding, and it requires the 

government to show that it lacks other means of achieving its 

desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise 

of religion by the objecting party.” Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 

853, 864 (2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted).

A.

Jehovah and Appellees agree that summary judgment of 

Jehovah’s RLUIPA claim regarding VDOC’s wine ban was improper for 

two reasons. First, Jehovah did not have the opportunity to brief 

the issue of whether the wine ban substantially burdened his 

religious exercise. The district court held that Jehovah had not 

demonstrated a substantial burden. But the court had previously 

found, during the motion-to-dismiss stage, that “[p]rohibiting 

plaintiff from taking wine with communion burdens the exercise of 

his religion.” J.A. 55. Because of this, the parties did not 

address the substantial burden prong of RLUIPA in their summary 

judgment briefing. A district court may resolve a motion for 
13

summary judgment on grounds not raised by a party, but it must 

first provide notice and a reasonable time to respond. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(f); see also Coward v. Jabe, 532 F. App’x 328, 329 (4th 

Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (“After giving notice and a reasonable 

time to respond, the district court may grant a motion for summary 

judgment on grounds not raised by a party.”). Jehovah was not 

afforded the requisite opportunity to demonstrate an issue of 

material fact regarding the burden imposed by the wine ban.

Second, the parties agree that the record is insufficient to 

support the conclusion that the wine ban is the least restrictive 

means to address the government’s purported security interest.8 

The Robinson Affidavit, which Appellees proffered in support of 

their summary judgment motion, does not even attempt to explain 

why an absolute ban is the least restrictive measure available. 

At the very least, the government must “acknowledge and give some 

consideration to less restrictive alternatives.” Couch v. Jabe, 

679 F.3d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 2012).9 Both Jehovah and Appellees 

 8 Jehovah also argues that a genuine issue of material fact 

exists as to whether the government’s security interest is 

compelling. Appellant’s Br. 38-40.

9 Jehovah has put forth a number of less restrictive 

alternatives, including: 1) to apply the same security measures 

used for medication to wine, 2) to allow Jehovah an accommodation 

to drink wine, and 3) to exclude inmates who have been convicted 

of infractions involving stealing or alcohol and inmates with a 

history of alcoholism.
14

agree that this burden has not yet been satisfied, and we agree. 

Therefore, we reverse the district court’s summary dismissal of 

Jehovah’s RLUIPA wine ban claim and remand for further proceedings.

Although we must subject Jehovah’s First Amendment claim to 

a standard more deferential to VDOC, we find that a reasonable 

jury could rule in Jehovah’s favor. Under Turner, Jehovah bears 

the burden of showing not only that his religious exercise was 

substantially burdened, but also that the wine ban is not 

“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 482 

U.S. at 89; see also Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. The district court 

based its First Amendment holding on its finding that Jehovah 

failed to demonstrate a substantial burden on his religious 

exercise. As with the RLUIPA claim, the court failed to provide 

notice that it would be considering this alternative ground for 

summary judgment. However, we may affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment on any ground in the record. Bryant v. 

Bell Atlantic Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2002). 

Therefore, we must determine whether a genuine issue of material 

fact exists regarding whether the wine ban is unreasonable under 

Turner.

Turner’s first prong asks whether there is a rational 

connection between a legitimate penological interest and the 

policy infringing on an inmate’s free exercise. 482 U.S. at 89. 

The Robinson Affidavit attests that the communion wine policy is 
15

motivated by “safety and security concerns,” specifically intended 

to avoid the mishandling of alcohol and to prevent inmates who 

have struggled with alcoholism from engaging in unhealthy 

behavior. J.A. 81-82. Promoting the inmates’ safety and health 

is a legitimate concern. See McRae v. Johnson, 261 F. App’x 554, 

558 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (finding that “in the prison 

setting, suppression of contraband . . . [and] maintaining the 

health and safety of inmates and staff . . . constitute compelling

governmental interests.” (emphasis added) (citing Cutter v. 

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005)). It also seems clear that 

the communion wine ban is, in the most general sense, logically 

connected to its asserted goal: restricting inmate wine 

consumption is a rational approach to preventing alcohol misuse 

and abuse. What is unclear, however, is whether the other Turner

prongs – the availability of alternative means of exercising the 

right, the impact of accommodation, and the existence of 

alternatives -- support the conclusion that the wine ban is 

reasonable.

In the First Amendment context, “the availability of 

alternative means of practicing religion is a relevant 

consideration.” Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862; see also O’Lone, 482 

U.S. at 351-52 (analyzing an absolute ban on attending Jumu’ah and 

addressing whether inmates “retain the ability to participate in 

other Muslim ceremonies” (emphasis added)). Although the ban at 
16

issue prohibits drinking wine at communion, it does not prevent 

inmates from engaging in other aspects of communion, nor does it 

affect other religious practices. It is noteworthy, however, that 

a previous version of the ban permitted inmates to consume wafers

dipped in wine. That version, like the current one, allowed clergy

to bring one fluid ounce of wine into the prison. Neither version 

categorically prohibits alcohol on the premises. The only 

difference between the two policies is that inmates used to have 

an alternative means of consuming communion wine in a controlled 

environment, whereas now they are completely barred from 

participating in that practice.

Regarding the impact of an accommodation on other inmates, 

guards, and prison resources, the record is largely silent. 

Drawing reasonable inferences in Jehovah’s favor, however, a 

reasonable jury could find that exempting Jehovah from the ban 

would have a minimal impact on prison resources. Wine is already 

permitted on the premises, and religious services take place in a 

controlled environment in which Jehovah would be supervised. 

Furthermore, a jury could find that the prison population would 

not be endangered by a single inmate with no history of alcohol 

abuse consuming a small amount of wine in this setting.

Finally, Jehovah has proposed several alternatives to the 

ban, including: 1) to apply the same security measures used for 

medication to wine, 2) to allow Jehovah an accommodation to drink 
17

wine, and 3) to apply the ban only to inmates who have been 

convicted of infractions involving stealing or alcohol and inmates 

with a history of alcoholism. A reasonable jury could find that 

at least one of these alternatives is so “obvious” and “easy” as 

to suggest that the ban is “an exaggerated response.” Turner, 482 

U.S. at 90. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s summary 

dismissal of Jehovah’s First Amendment wine communion claim.

B.

The district court dismissed Jehovah’s Sabbath work claims 

because “prisoners have no constitutional right to job 

opportunities while incarcerated.” J.A. 56. As Jehovah rightly 

points out, however, this is not the correct focus of the RLUIPA 

and First Amendment inquiries. The constitutional right in 

jeopardy is Jehovah’s right to free exercise of his religious 

beliefs; the unavailability of prison jobs accommodating his 

Sabbath schedule is the alleged burden on that right.

To state a RLUIPA claim, Jehovah need only plead facts tending 

to show a substantial burden on his exercise of sincerely held 

religious beliefs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); see also Hartmann v. 

Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013)

(“To survive a motion to dismiss on their RLUIPA claim, plaintiffs 

must allege facts plausibly showing that the challenged policy and 

the practices it engenders impose a substantial burden on the 

exercise of their religious beliefs.”). “[A] substantial burden 
18

on religious exercise occurs when a state or local government, 

through act or omission, puts substantial pressure on an adherent 

to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Lovelace, 472 

F.3d at 187 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Here, Jehovah has alleged that his religion requires him to 

abstain from working during the “Old Jewish” and “New Christic” 

Sabbaths. He has pled that his cleaning job would not accommodate 

his Sabbath observances, that his requests for job transfers were 

denied, and that VDOC staff has not approved him for any job for 

which he has applied since December 2011. He has further alleged 

that he will face sanctions and lose the opportunity to accrue 

good conduct allowances and earned sentence credits if he fails to 

work for 30-40 hours per week.

Appellees argue that Jehovah simply wishes more jobs would 

accommodate his Sabbath schedule, and that therefore he is not 

substantially burdened. They rely on Jehovah’s assertion that

“there are few prison jobs available to him at SIP and other 

prisons which he can work and keep observing the Sabbaths.” See

J.A. 27 (Compl. ¶ 32) (emphasis added). However, viewing the facts 

in the light most favorable to Jehovah, and applying the requisite 

liberal construction to his pro se pleadings, Jehovah’s assertion 

that there are few jobs available to him is not inconsistent with 

his having applied for and been rejected from all of those jobs. 

As Jehovah puts it, these other jobs are available to him “in 
19

theory,” but he has “plainly alleged that these jobs were made

unavailable to him.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 14 (emphasis in 

original). Jehovah has alleged facts that support a plausible 

claim to relief. We therefore reverse the district court’s 

dismissal of Jehovah’s RLUIPA claim and remand for further 

proceedings.

The standard for stating a free exercise claim under the First 

Amendment is more stringent. Jehovah bears the burden not only of 

demonstrating an infringement of his religious beliefs, but also 

of showing that VDOC’s refusal to accommodate his Sabbath work 

schedule is not rationally related to a legitimate penological 

interest. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Still, Jehovah’s pro se civil 

rights complaint meets the low bar of the motion-to-dismiss stage. 

It is difficult to see what interest is served by making it 

impossible for Jehovah to perform his required work hours entirely 

during the week. One reasonably could determine that granting 

Jehovah an individual accommodation is an “obvious, easy 

alternative[]” that suggests VDOC’s actions are unreasonable.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Jehovah’s favor, he has set 

forth a plausible claim for relief. See Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178. 

Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing Jehovah’s First 

Amendment claim.
20

C.

The district court dismissed Jehovah’s housing claims because 

it found that Jehovah “has no right to choose a cellmate based on 

that person’s religious preferences or background.” J.A. 57. As 

discussed above, however, the proper inquiry is whether and to 

what extent VDOC burdened Jehovah’s right to exercise his sincerely 

held religious beliefs by assigning him cellmates who did not share 

his religious views.

Jehovah’s RLUIPA claim must survive the motion-to-dismiss 

stage if he has pled facts tending to show that VDOC’s refusal to 

accommodate his housing requests “put[] substantial pressure on 

[him] to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” 

Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187 (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted). Jehovah has alleged that VDOC required him to “share a 

cell or anything with persons who are anti-Christian and 

unbelievers” in contravention of his religious beliefs. J.A. 28 

(Compl. ¶ 34). This allegation alone does not demonstrate that 

being housed with non-Christians has pressured him to change his 

religious conduct. Jehovah takes issue with the exposure to nonChristians, not with any effect it has on his religious activities. 

As Appellees note, the few jurisdictions to address this question 

have found that being housed with an inmate who does not share the 

plaintiff’s religious beliefs “does not inhibit or constrain [the 

p]laintiff’s religious conduct.” Steele v. Guilfoyle, 76 P.3d 99, 
21

102 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003); see also Rogers v. Hellenbrand, No. 

03-C-230-C, 2004 WL 433976, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 4, 2004) (“There 

is no indication in his briefs, evidence or proposed facts that 

simply being exposed to the religious views of others hinders [the 

plaintiff’s] ability to exercise his own religion in any 

way . . . .”), aff’d, 118 F. App’x 80 (7th Cir. 2004).

In addition to his general complaints of being assigned nonChristian cellmates, however, Jehovah asserts that he was housed 

with a particular inmate who subjected Jehovah to “anti-Christian” 

rhetoric. J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 35). Jehovah states that he was 

“burdened, mocked, and harassed on account of [h]is religious views 

by being housed in a cell with” this inmate. J.A. 28 (Compl. 

¶ 37). Construing Jehovah’s pro se complaint liberally, it is 

reasonable to infer that Jehovah’s religious practices were 

chilled by his cellmate’s religiously motivated harassment. At 

the motion-to-dismiss stage, this qualifies as a sufficient prima 

facie showing under RLUIPA.10 We therefore reverse the district 

court’s dismissal of Jehovah’s RLUIPA cell assignment claim.

For his First Amendment cell assignment claim to survive, 

Jehovah must allege sufficient facts showing that VDOC’s refusal 

 10 Since Jehovah has sufficiently pled that his housing

assignments substantially burdened his religious exercise, the 

parties agree that remand is appropriate because the record does 

not establish whether VDOC’s housing assignment policy is the least 

restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest.
22

to assign him a different cellmate was not reasonably related to 

a legitimate penological interest. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Giving 

his complaint its due liberal construction, we find that he has 

done so. Jehovah states that his cell assignments were 

“deliberately done . . . to harass and cause conflict and problems 

for [him].” J.A. 29 (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 41 & n.18). Furthermore, he 

asserts that his cell assignments have contravened a SIP housing 

policy requiring an equivalence in cellmates’ criminal and 

disciplinary records. J.A. 29 (Compl. ¶ 41 n. 18). He filed two 

grievances regarding his issues with the inmate who allegedly 

harassed him but never received a response.11 J.A. 28 (Compl. 

¶ 37). Given these allegations suggesting that VDOC was motivated 

not by a legitimate penological concern but by animus, Jehovah has 

successfully alleged facts supporting a plausible claim to relief. 

Therefore, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Jehovah’s 

First Amendment cell assignment claim.

IV.

A claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment requires two showings, one objective and one subjective. 

First, the inmate must prove that “the deprivation of a basic human 

 11 Jehovah’s residence with this inmate came to an end when 

Jehovah was placed in disciplinary segregation.
23

need was objectively sufficiently serious.” De’Lonta v. Angelone, 

330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted, emphasis in original). Second, she must prove 

that “subjectively the officials acted with a sufficiently 

culpable state of mind.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted, emphasis in original).

“Only extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the 

objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim regarding 

conditions of confinement.” Id. Therefore, Jehovah must allege 

a serious injury or a substantial risk of such. Id. Taking the 

facts in the light most favorable to Jehovah, they are sufficient 

to support such a finding. Jehovah’s alleged ailments fill two 

pages of his complaint and include constant chest pain, chronic

headaches, and diminished hearing and eyesight. J.A. 37-38 (Compl. 

¶ 69). Furthermore, Jehovah asserts that he has since been 

diagnosed with pulmonary hypertension with right ventricle 

hypertrophy, a serious and sometimes fatal condition.

Appellees do not appear to dispute that Jehovah’s innumerable 

alleged symptoms constitute serious health issues. Rather, they 

focus on the subjective component of Jehovah’s claim. Jehovah 

must show that his doctors were deliberately indifferent, or 

rather, that they “actually kn[e]w of and disregard[ed] an 

objectively serious condition, medical need, or risk of harm.” 

De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634.
24

Appellees argue that Jehovah cannot meet this bar because he 

received extensive treatment from Dr. King and his other doctors. 

But the fact that Jehovah received some treatment is consistent 

with the allegation that his doctors ignored and failed to treat 

many of his symptoms. See id. at 635 (finding that the fact that 

the plaintiff received some treatment did not mean she received 

treatment for a particular ailment or that the treatment was 

reasonable). Jehovah has alleged that his doctors acknowledged 

some symptoms but ignored most, disregarded abnormal test results, 

and failed to treat any of his symptoms effectively. In other 

words, he has pled facts that, if true, would establish that his 

doctors “actually kn[e]w of and disregard[ed] an objectively 

serious condition, medical need, or risk of harm.” Id. at 634.

Dismissal of Jehovah’s claim is not appropriate unless he has 

failed to present factual allegations supporting a plausible claim 

to relief. See Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178. That is not the case 

here. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing Jehovah’s 

Eighth Amendment claim.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court 

is

REVERSED AND REMANDED.