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THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CHALLENGE:

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD?

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND 

NONPROLIFERATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 17, 2005

Serial No. 109–79

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Vice Chairman 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

JAMES W. MCCORMICK, Subcommittee Staff Director 

LISA M. WILLIAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS ANDERSON, Professional Staff Member & Counsel 

TIERNEN M. DONALD, Staff Associate

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NONPROLIFERATION

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

DARRELL ISSA, California, Vice Chairman 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

TOM SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DON MACDONALD, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member 

GREG GALVIN, Staff Associate 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS ................................................. 10

Nicholas Eberstadt, Ph.D., Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy, American Enterprise Institute ..................................................................................... 16

Robert Sutter, Ph.D., Professor of Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service, 

Georgetown University ........................................................................................ 21

Mr. Jon Wolfsthal, Deputy Director for Non-Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .............................................................................. 28

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable James A. Leach, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Iowa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 8

Mr. Ralph Cossa: Prepared statement ................................................................... 13

Nicholas Eberstadt, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................... 19

Robert Sutter, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 23

Mr. Jon Wolfsthal: Prepared statement ................................................................. 33

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................ 55

Mr. Ralph Cossa: Article written by Mr. Cossa from PacNet, February 10, 

2005, entitled ‘‘Pyongyang Raises the Stakes’’ .................................................. 56

Nicholas Eberstadt, Ph.D.: Article written by Dr. Eberstadt from The Weekly 

Standard, November 29, 2004, entitled ‘‘Tear Down this Tyranny’’ ................ 58

(1)

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CHALLENGE: 

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD? 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

AND NONPROLIFERATION, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James A. Leach (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. LEACH. The Committee will come to order. On behalf of the 

Committee, I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses to 

the first hearing of the Subcommittee of Asia and the Pacific in 

this Congress. 

I am especially pleased we are holding the Subcommittee hearing 

jointly with Chairman Ed Royce and his colleagues in the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation. 

Chairman Royce will be here in a minute. We both have an awkward situation that there is another Committee we are both on 

which is meeting with Chairman Greenspan at the same time. 

In any regard, at the outset I would like to express my appreciation to our panel for agreeing on short notice to appear before us 

this morning. In particular, I would like to extend a word of 

thanks, or perhaps commiseration, to Mr. Cossa in Honolulu for 

getting up well before dawn in order to contribute to our discussion. 

A housekeeping note is in order. As my colleagues are aware, 

Secretary Rice is scheduled to appear before the Committee later 

this afternoon. In addition, at least one of our witnesses is under 

some time constraints and must leave before noon. 

In order to expedite our proceedings today, I therefore intend to 

keep my opening rather brief. 

There are few parallels in history in which the United States has 

found itself with a less appealing menu of options than with North 

Korea. 

Pyongyang’s ongoing nuclear program and the potential export of 

weapons of mass destruction have profound implications for regional stability, the international nonproliferation regime, United 

States leadership in Asia and the Pacific, and even terrorist threats 

to the American homeland. 

As we all understand, the North Koreans have lit a firecracker 

with the foreign ministry statement last week that Pyongyang will 

2

increase its nuclear weapons arsenal and indefinitely suspend its 

participation in the multilateral Six-Party Talks. It is difficult and 

usually presumptuous to apply motives to others. A possibility exists that North Korea’s intentions are entirely negative and the 

provocative rhetoric may be followed by provocative actions. On the 

other hand, the possibility also exists that this is classic North Korean saber-rattling to alter what they regard as unfavorable diplomatic dynamics, to increase their leverage, and to seek additional 

economic incentives prior to returning to the negotiating table. Indeed, the last sentence of the announcement which stated that 

there is no change in the North’s stance of resolving the issue 

through dialogue and negotiations with the ultimate goal of 

denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula suggests that the announcement may well be a negotiating ploy and therefore may provide 

grounds for cautious optimism. 

The judgment call of the day on the Korean Peninsula is a question of time: Whose side is it on? With each passing month, North 

Korea increases its nuclear weapons capacities. As a consequence, 

the odds may have increased that Pyongyang could export nuclear 

weapons or fissile material to foreign governments, shadowy middlemen or even terrorists. On the other hand, the history of the 

20th century has shown that governments which lack democratic 

legitimacy and fail to give their people the opportunity for a decent 

life are vulnerable to rapid internal implosion. Military might is 

simply no substitute for societal attention to human concerns. 

In this setting, the only prudent approach is to maintain wariness and concomitant preparedness, while seeking to de-escalate 

tension. Given our lack of credible options, there is no alternative 

to attentive engagement. 

The Six-Party Talks, as currently configured, are a reasonable 

way to proceed, but there is nothing theological about process approaches. Reasonable questions must be raised whether additional 

approaches might also be considered. 

In this context, the Subcommittee has a number of questions for 

our panelists, including: Is the United States’ strategy for dealing 

with North Korea consistent and viable? Given the lack of substantive progress to date in the Six-Party process and the importance of U.S. diplomatic engagement to alliance management, is it 

time to think out of the box about creative ways to demonstrate a 

concomitant or a commitment to peacefully resolving the nuclear 

issue? 

Should our hard diplomacy be fine tuned to include any softer 

cultural elements? For example, despite the abhorrent nature of 

the DPRK regime, should the United States explore the feasibility 

of expanding people-to-people and other technical exchanges with 

elements of North Korean society? 

In many regards, North Korea today politically resembles 

Stalinless Russia. It is therefore interesting by analogy to note the 

importance during Eisenhower’s term of certain nonpolitical exchanges, such as Khrushchev’s visit to an Iowa farm. And, 

bizarrely, ping-pong diplomacy played a role in leading to the normalization of relations with China. 

3

Cultural exchanges involve no political content, but at the people-to-people level they betoken the prospect of mutual respect and 

therefore, are at times of more than slight consequence. 

Hence the question whether artist or professional exchanges in 

fields such as medicine or agriculture are in order. Would it not be 

wise for the United States to proffer such options, including the 

possibility of North Korean leadership visits to the west coast or 

heartland? 

These are some of the kinds of questions the panel might address. We look forward to your testimony and the discussion to follow. 

At this point, if it is all right with Chairman Royce, why don’t 

I turn to Andy or would you like to go next? 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leach follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND

THE PACIFIC

On behalf of the Committee, I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses 

to the first hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific for the 109th Congress. I am especially pleased that we are holding this hearing jointly with Chairman Ed Royce and his colleagues on the Subcommittee on International Terrorism 

and Nonproliferation. 

At the outset, I would like to express my appreciation to our panel for agreeing 

on short notice to appear before us this morning. In particular, I would like to extend a word of thanks, or perhaps commiseration, to Mr. Cossa in Honolulu for getting up well before dawn in order to contribute to our discussion of this critical national security issue. 

A housekeeping note is also in order. As my colleagues are aware, Secretary of 

State Rice is scheduled to appear before the Committee in open testimony later this 

afternoon. In addition, at least one of our witnesses is under some time constraints 

and must leave before noon. In order to expedite our proceedings today I therefore 

intend to keep my opening statement brief. 

There are few parallels in history in which the U.S. has found itself with a less 

appealing menu of options than with North Korea. Pyongyang’s ongoing nuclear program and the potential export of weapons of mass destruction have profound implications for regional stability, the international nonproliferation regime, United 

States leadership in Asia and the Pacific, and even terrorist threats to the American 

homeland. 

As we all understand, the North Koreans have lit a firecracker with the Foreign 

Ministry statement last week that Pyongyang will increase its ‘‘nuclear weapons arsenal’’ and indefinitely suspend its participation in the multilateral six-party talks. 

It is difficult and usually presumptuous to apply motives to others. A possibility exists that North Korea’s intentions are entirely negative and that provocative rhetoric may be followed by provocative actions. On the other hand, a possibility also 

exists that this is classic North Korean saber rattling to alter what they regard as 

unfavorable diplomatic dynamics, to increase their leverage, and to seek additional 

economic ‘‘incentives’’ prior to returning to the negotiating table. Indeed, the last 

sentence of the announcement, which stated that there is no change in the North’s 

‘‘stance of resolving the issue through dialogue and negotiations’’ with the ‘‘ultimate 

goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula,’’ suggests that the announcement may 

well be a negotiating ploy and therefore may provide grounds for cautious optimism. 

The judgment call of the day on the Korean Peninsula is the question of time. 

Whose side is it on? With each passing month, North Korea increases its nuclear 

weapons capacities. As a consequence, the odds may have increased that Pyongyang 

could export nuclear weapons or fissile material to foreign governments, shadowy 

middlemen, or even terrorists. On the other hand, the history of the 20th century 

has shown that governments which lack democratic legitimacy and fail to give their 

people the opportunity for a decent life are vulnerable to rapid internal implosion. 

Military might is simply no substitute for societal attention to human concerns. 

4

In this setting the only prudent approach is to maintain wariness and concomitant preparededness while seeking to de-escalate tension. Given our lack of credible 

options, there is no alternative to attentive engagement. 

The six-party talks as currently configured are a reasonable way to proceed, but 

there is nothing theological about process approaches. Reasonable questions must 

be raised whether additional approaches might also be considered. In this context, 

the Subcommittee has a number of questions for our panelists, including:

• Is United States strategy for dealing with North Korea consistent and viable?

• Given the lack of substantive progress to date in the six-party process and 

the importance of U.S. diplomatic engagement to alliance management, is it 

time to think ‘‘out of the box’’ about creative ways to demonstrate a commitment to peacefully resolving the nuclear issue?

• Should our ‘‘hard’’ diplomacy be fine-tuned to include any ‘‘softer’’ cultural elements?

• For example, despite the abhorrent nature of the DPRK regime, should the 

United States explore the feasibility of expanding people-to-people and other 

technical exchanges with elements of North Korean society?

• In many regards North Korea today politically resembles Stalinist Russia. It 

is therefore interesting, by analogy, to note the importance during Eisenhower’s term of certain non-political exchanges, such as Khrushchev’s visit to 

an Iowa farm. And, bizarrely, ping-pong diplomacy played a role in leading 

to the normalization of relations with China.

• Cultural exchanges involve no political content, but at the people-to-people 

level they betoken the prospect of mutual respect and therefore are at times 

of more than slight consequence.

• Hence the question of whether artist or professional exchanges in fields such 

as medicine or agriculture are in order. Would it not be wise for the U.S. to 

proffer such options, including the possibility, particularly if progress in the 

six-party context is made, of North Korean leadership visits to the West coast 

or heartland?

These are some of the kinds of questions the panel might address. We look forward to your testimony and the discussion to follow.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like 

to thank Chairman Royce and your being able to put this hearing 

together this morning. 

I also would like to personally welcome our distinguished witnesses who will be giving us their sense of expertise on this very 

important issue of North Korea. 

Mr. Chairman, on the 10th of this month, the North Korean foreign ministry issued a statement in which Pyongyang announced 

that he would increase his nuclear weapons arsenal and suspend 

its participation in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear 

weapons program. 

North Korea claims its stance is in response to comments made 

recently by Secretary of State Rice, during her confirmation hearings of which she referenced North Korea as, and I quote, ‘‘an outpost of tyranny.’’

North Korea interpreted these remarks to mean that the United 

States, ‘‘cannot find one single word on coexistence with us and 

Pyongyang upped the ante as a result.’’ Somewhat of a similar vintage when President Bush described North Korea as one of the 

three axis of evil. 

The reaction by the Six-Party participants has been low key. 

However, the United States intelligence community estimates that 

North Korea has possessed enough weapons grade plutonium for 

one and possibly two nuclear weapons since the early 1990s. 

5

In fact, the United States intelligence community believes that 

North Korea has enough weapons grade plutonium for about six to 

eight nuclear weapons. 

North Korea has been operating a reactor at Yongbyon since late 

February 2003, which has produced or can produce enough plutonium for about one bomb per year. 

North Korea has also two larger nuclear reactors that were 

under construction, but frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework 

within President Clinton’s Administration. If completed, these reactors would provide enough plutonium for about 37 to 50 nuclear 

bombs per year. 

This said, Mr. Chairman, the situation with North Korea, I humbly submit, is very serious. The Six-Party Talks were established 

to energize the regional players most affected and to apply collective pressure and offer collective solutions. 

Nevertheless, North Korea continues to escalate its challenges 

and in June 2004, the United States tabled an extensive proposal, 

which includes, as a first step, commitment from North Korea to 

dismantle all of its nuclear weapons. 

In return, South Korea and Japan would supply North Korea 

with heavy fuel oil and the United States would be prepared to discuss lifting remaining economic sanctions against North Korea. The 

Six-Party participants would also begin a study of North Korea’s 

energy needs. 

In short, Mr. Chairman, North Korea would receive a more enduring security guarantee, as well as a lasting non-nuclear solution 

to its energy needs. 

In light of North Korea’s recent announcement that it was suspending participation in the Six-Party Talks the Administration 

has emphasized, the June 2004 proposal remains on the table. 

But is a diplomatic solution still possible? Should the United 

States engage in direct talks with North Korea? And under what 

conditions will countries in the region consider more coercive alternatives? 

In a yesterday’s New York Times article, it is quoted under Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s views suggesting that here again 

North Korea is just saber rattling and just bluffing and not much 

to depend in terms of all the rhetoric that we have heard recently 

from North Korea. 

That being said, I don’t know if this means a major shift in our 

foreign policy with a statement from Mr. Zoellick, but these are the 

questions that must be answered, and I certainly welcome our witnesses and look forward to their comments and especially I want 

to welcome Mr. Cossa—it is about 4:30 or 5 o’clock in the morning 

right now in Honolulu—for his being able to listen in to our hearing this morning and certainly look forward to hearing his comments about the issue that we are discussing this morning. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. 

Chairman Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I want to thank you, Chairman Leach, 

for conducting this joint Subcommittee hearing. In past Congresses, 

Chairman Leach and I have worked closely together on Korean 

issues, and I look forward to continuing that work in my new role 

6

as Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and 

Nonproliferation. 

Some of us in Congress were skeptical about the 1994 Agreed 

Framework, which only seemed to strengthen the hand of North 

Korea. North Korea’s announcement last week that it would 

counter what it called United States’ ‘‘hostile policy’’ by increasing 

its nuclear weapons arsenal and suspending its participation in the 

Six-Party Talks is just the latest in Pyongyang’s well-established 

pattern of deceit. 

I have also been skeptical of policies designed to bolster the 

North Korean economy, the so-called Sunshine Policies. 

Since 2000, I have chaired the U.S. Republic of Korea Interparliamentary Exchange, which is an ongoing series of meetings 

between members of the Korean National Assembly and the U.S. 

House of Representatives. 

A large part of our discussions in Korea have focused on Korean 

Peninsula security. The policy of investing in North Korea, propping up the Kim Jong Il regime, promises little but its continued 

disdain and continued noncooperation of that regime. I wish advocates of this policy in Northeast Asia showed greater concern for 

the plight of the North Korean people. 

Instead, many would prefer to ignore the brutality in the North, 

including the camps that torture and work several hundred thousand North Koreans to death every year. Thankfully, last year 

Congress passed and President Bush signed into law the North Korean Human Rights Act, authored by Chairman Leach. I was an 

original coauthor of that. 

Ignoring the human rights condition in North Korea gives us a 

false picture of the regime which we are confronting. The United 

States must employ a broad approach to nonproliferation policy, 

using all the tools at its disposal. 

While treaties and talks are important, new and effective efforts, 

like the Proliferation Security Initiative, should be advanced. 

The Illicit Activities Initiative, aimed at curbing North Korean 

exports of drugs, counterfeit currency, and other contraband, must 

be vigorous because this is the main infusion of cash for the regime 

that supports its WMD activities. 

Radio broadcasting must be employed in the same way as it was 

in Eastern Europe in order to crack Kim Jong Il’s monopoly on information. 

The human rights agenda must be pushed. All of these tools 

make for a broadened and more effective nonproliferation policy. 

Lastly, I will note that 2 years after withdrawing from the Nonproliferation Treaty, no action has been taken against North Korea. 

We should work with like-minded countries to challenge this 

step. Anything less erodes the NPT, which has been the cornerstone of nonproliferation policy and it emboldens others like Iran 

to follow suit. 

Thank you again, Chairman Leach, for holding this hearing jointly with our Committee. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce. 

Does anyone else wish to make an opening statement? 

Yes, Mr. Sherman? 

7

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, sorry I am late. We have got 

Greenspan in the Committee on Financial Services, almost as illustrious as the panel before us here. 

Obviously a nuclear North Korea is very dangerous. The Administration appears to be immobilized between those who have a messianic view that we must concur, or a regime change in North 

Korea, because it is a bad government and I wish that it was that 

easy. 

There is another group that believes in real politic, that believes 

that the safety of the people of America ought to be our highest priority and that eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons program 

verifiably, permanently, with total inspection would make America 

much safer. 

I clearly want to identify with the second camp, in that destabilizing North Korea is not sure to be possible, but if it were possible, you might end up with Yugoslavia with nukes. 

What we have is an Administration, though, that time and time 

again is willing to put corporate interests first. In order to deal 

with the weapons of mass destruction threat posed by Saddam 

Hussein, we have lost 1,200 of our finest, but the weapons of mass 

destruction program of Iraq was tiny and of almost no significance 

compared to the nuclear and missile programs of North Korea. 

In order to deal with North Korea, we have to inconvenience 

American corporations and international corporations. We have to 

tell China that they must play with us, work with us and even act 

in a way that is not in their immediate short-term interests, in 

order to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. 

That means we would have to say that maybe the next load of 

tennis shoes isn’t coming into the United States. That would inconvenience the corporation, and inconveniencing corporations is something this Administration is not willing to do simply to protect 

Americans from a nuclear weapons program. 

This is shameful, in light of their willingness to send 1,200 of our 

finest in order to stop a much smaller threat. 

We can bring enormous pressure on North Korea if we are willing to pressure China. We can also offer North Korea the carrot 

they have been asking for and that is a nonaggressive pact. 

That would, of course, offend the messianic wing of this Administration. We have to do that as well. Maximum carrots, maximum 

sticks and vicarious sticks if necessary. That is to say, pressuring 

China to pressure North Korea. 

The other approach is what we followed for the last 4 years: Immobilization and unwillingness to do anything and an announcement of great success every time there is a hint, usually false, that 

the North Korean’s are willing to lie to us around a six-sided table, 

instead of a two-sided table. 

I am tired of telling my constituents that nuclear weapons are 

available to be smuggled across the border inside a bale of marijuana and destroy our city and that we are not doing anything 

about it, except some day we may get them back to a six-sided 

table and they should go to sleep soundly knowing that that possibility exists. 

The unwillingness of this Administration to inconvenience perhaps the corporate sector and psychologically inconvenience its 

8

messianic wing has led to this possibility of a nuclear weapon being 

smuggled into your city or into mine and it is particularly shameful 

in light of the losses that we have suffered to deal with a much 

smaller threat. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. 

Does anyone else on this side wish to make an opening statement? 

Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. I have one I would like to submit for the record. 

Mr. LEACH. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Chairmen, Kim Jong Il is attempting to blackmail his neighbors by withdrawing from the Six-Party Talks indefinitely and playing the nuclear card. In recent weeks we have learned that North Korea sold uranium hexaflouride—which 

can be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons—to Libya in 2001. Last week 

North Korea announced that it had ‘‘manufactured nukes,’’ and that these weapons 

would be kept ‘‘for self-defense under any circumstances.’’ In the past North Korea 

has made repeated claims that its nuclear arsenal is purely defensive. That was 

clearly not true. 

Now more than ever we need to have five parties talking to North Korea: South 

Korea, Japan, Russia, China, and the United States. President Bush has argued 

that we need to have five voices talking to Kim Jong Il because if Kim breaks commitments to one party, he is not only doing injustice to America, but the other parties as well. I support the determination that President Bush has made that it 

would be a mistake to open up a separate, bilateral dialogue between the United 

States and North Korea. Staying unified in a five-nation coalition is the most effective way to send a clear message to Kim Jong Il. 

The bilateral approach taken by President Clinton between 1993 and 2000 did not 

bring about desirable results. Kim Jong Il failed to honor agreements signed with 

the Clinton Administration and with South Korea. We learned this in October 2002, 

when North Korea admitted it was conducting a major clandestine nuclear weapons 

program in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. We were reminded of Kim 

Jong Il’s ambitions in January 2003 when Pyongyang served notice of its intention 

to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The following month, it declared it had reactivated its Yongbyon reactor. 

What we are watching unfold on the Korean Peninsula now is familiar 

brinksmanship between a paranoid tyrant and the outside world. This threatens to 

escalate tensions with the North to a dangerous new level. Pyongyang’s statement 

last week referred to The ‘‘Bush Doctrine’’ calls for the use of pre-emptive force to 

prevent an imminent attack on the United States, but President Bush has made it 

clear on several occasions that he wants a peaceful, negotiated settlement on the 

Korean Peninsula and has no intention of initiating the use of force against North 

Korea. 

Mr. Chairman, complete, irreversible, verifiable dismantlement of the North’s nuclear arsenal and weapons program must remain non-negotiable. I believe the 

framework of the Six-Party Talks is the way to proceed. More active involvement 

of China, one of the few countries to have any influence over the North, is essential. 

The longer there is no progress on talks, the more time North Korea has to add to 

its nuclear arsenal. Thank you.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Blumenauer, did you want to make an opening 

statement? 

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate the 

opportunity for us to spend some time reflecting on the North Korean situation. 

I heard my friend from California refer to his problems with the 

approach of the Clinton Administration, which I think they would 

admit was the best of a series of unpalatable alternatives, but it 

9

is not clear at all that the approach of this Administration has 

been any more effective at all. 

We have no inspectors. We have more hostility. They are still 

dealing with terrorists. I find great irony that all of the justifications that were mustered to deal with an attack against Iraq were 

even stronger against North Korea. 

North Korea has, in all probability, weapons of mass destruction. 

They were dealing with terrorists. Where Saddam Hussein had 

gassed and killed thousands of his people, this Korean Government 

has deliberately starved 2 million of their people, slave labor, the 

things that have been referenced here before, and it wasn’t lost on 

the North Koreans that these justifications are there. Now we are stretched very thin, $300 billion later in Iraq. Our 

troops are frayed. If hostilities were to break out on the Korean Peninsula, we would be hard pressed. And if it were to involve nuclear weapons, it would be troubling indeed. 

But I must confess that this is an area where I welcome the discussion. It is not clear to me at this point what better alternatives 

there are. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

I do think, however, that the solution of engagement that has 

been pursued by the South Koreans, the Sunshine Policy, is not 

something that I think we should be dismissing. 

I think it shows great courage on the part of some of their officials and I think ultimately some variation of that has to be a part 

of an ultimate solution that brings North Korea back from the 

abyss to which they have reached. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much. 

Yes, of course. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, I hadn’t planned on making an 

opening statement. I will be very brief, but in light of some of the 

things that I have heard from some of my friends across the aisle, 

I just want to say very briefly that much of the blame is now being 

heaped upon the Bush Administration for the difficulties that we 

see ourselves face with respect to North Korea, and I think it is 

very important to keep in mind that the previous Administration 

and the agreement that they reached, I think, is one of the principle reasons that we find ourselves in this dilemma. 

I think when Jimmy Carter has gone over there, just as he has 

gone in many other parts of the world to try to make things better, 

it has ultimately resulted in making them one heck of a lot worse 

than they were before he got there. 

I was at the demilitarized zone awhile back and talked with an 

awful lot of high-ranking officials, both Americans and South Koreans, and I oftentimes hear this comparison of our action in Iraq 

and Afghanistan and a so-called lack of reaction to what is perceived as a greater threat in North Korea. 

I think one thing one has to take into consideration is that North 

Korea has thousands of artillery pieces in the mountains, within 

about 30 miles of Seoul, South Korea, which could essentially, 

within a matter of a couple of days, kill hundreds of thousands, 

possibly millions of people and lay Seoul in ruins. 

That is a factor that we have to take into consideration. That is 

a very serious situation. I think the Administration, whereas not 

10

perfect in the way they have handled this, has handled it with 

great care and with considerable attention. 

I do agree with one of the things that my friend Mr. Sherman 

mentioned with respect to pressuring China. I think that is one 

thing that we need to do a lot more of, because they are the key 

to this and we absolutely have to have their cooperation, because 

they are the one country that can pressure North Korea and anything that we can do to put pressure, and if it does affect business 

here, then so be it. 

I would be pleased to discuss that particular aspect of his statement with him and work and cooperate and perhaps move forward 

on that particular issue. Thank you. 

Let me just say one other thing. I think the President was absolutely right in naming the so-called ‘‘Axis of Evil,’’ just as Ronald 

Reagan was correct in calling the former Soviet Union the ‘‘Evil 

Empire,’’ and we are seeing that right now. 

I would say perhaps we might want to add Syria to that list. I 

yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much. 

Let me now turn to our witnesses and I will briefly introduce 

them by their background and then ask them to speak. 

First, Ralph A. Cossa is President of the Pacific Forum CSIS in 

Honolulu. He is the Senior Editor of the Pacific Forum’s quarterly 

electronic journal, Comparative Connections. Mr. Cossa has served 

in the United States Air Force from 1966 to 1993. 

Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt is a Henry Wendt Scholar in Political 

Economy at the American Enterprise Institute. He has written extensively on Korea, East Asia, and countries of the former Soviet 

Union. He has numerous degrees from Harvard as well as the London School of Economics. 

Robert Sutter has been Visiting Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. He specializes in Asian and Pacific affairs in U.S. foreign policy. He has written a number of books and 

has worked—and we are very proud of this—for the Library of Congress, the United States. He has a Ph.D. from Harvard. 

John Wolfsthal is Associate and Deputy Director for Nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

Prior to his position at the Carnegie Endowment, Mr. Wolfsthal 

worked at the U.S. Department of Energy. He is co-author of Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

We are honored that this panel has agreed to assemble and I 

thought we would first give deference to our most distant scholar, 

and we would like now to turn to Mr. Cossa. 

Can you hear us well, Mr. Cossa? You are welcome to proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RALPH COSSA, PRESIDENT, PACIFIC 

FORUM CSIS 

Mr. COSSA. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is a 

great pleasure for me to participate in this session. 

To answer the Committee’s key question, I think yes, there is a 

way forward, but only if the other five members of the Six-Party 

process can come up with a common position and jointly pressure 

North Korea to come back to the table. 

11

I would also add that while it is easy and appropriate to find 

fault with both the Bush and the Clinton Administrations’ previous 

approaches, we need to keep in mind that the real problem of 

course is North Korea’s behavior and policies and not our own. 

One thing that the Bush Administration has done correctly is to 

insist on a multilateral approach and solution. This is the only realistic way to proceed. 

This does not preclude bilateral dealings with Washington and 

Pyongyang, between them and along the sidelines of the—I am 

sorry. I am getting a lot of feedback. Am I coming through clearly? 

Mr. LEACH. You are being heard quite fine, sir. 

Mr. COSSA. Okay. Thank you. I will proceed. 

I think that there is nothing to preclude bilateral dealings between Washington and Pyongyang, along the sidelines of the SixParty Talks, but addressing the problem has to be a regional and 

not a bilateral approach. 

Seoul was consulted closely during the 1994 Agreed Framework 

process, one which I, in fact, supported as the best deal we could 

get at the time, but nonetheless felt insulted that it did not have 

a seat at the table. 

President Clinton was right in 1996 when he promised that in 

the future the United States would not enter into any agreement 

with North Korea dealing with peace on the peninsula, unless 

Seoul was present, and the Bush Administration has wisely stuck 

by this policy. 

Likewise, Tokyo deserves to be present since Japan falls under 

the shadow of Pyongyang’s missiles, and we need to ensure that 

Tokyo’s legitimate security concerns are addressed. 

China’s continued role is obvious as an honest broker, facilitator 

and interlocutor and while Russia brings considerably less to the 

table, Moscow’s good insights into North Korea can be helpful and, 

along with Beijing, it is necessary to underwrite future security 

guarantees. 

I think it is essential to continue a multilateral approach and to 

make it clear to Pyongyang that we will not cut a separate deal 

outside the Six-Party process. 

Mr. Chairman, the challenge before us today can be simply stated. By its actions, North Korea is telling us that it believes that 

there are more benefits to be gained by staying away from the 

talks and from pursuing a nuclear weapons program, or at least in 

leading us to believe that it is pursuing such a program, than there 

are consequences. 

The pluses outweigh the minuses in their strategic calculation. 

Our challenge is to convince them that pursuing nuclear weapons 

makes them less, rather than more secure. 

If survival is North Korea’s ultimate objective, then we must convince the North that continuing down its currently chosen path—

regardless of whether this is being done for tactical or strategic 

reasons, to acquire bargaining chips, or as an insurance policy—is 

hazardous to the regime’s health. 

Pyongyang has to believe that the potential consequences, not 

just military but economic and political, outweigh the perceived 

benefits. And the U.S. cannot do this alone. 

12

Our primary instrument of persuasion is military. This has only 

limited utility. Many have argued that if the United States was not 

so overextended in Iraq and Afghanistan, Pyongyang might be 

more responsive and they are probably right, but we are overextended and even if we were not, marching on Pyongyang is not 

a realistic option. 

The Administration has been right in stressing that regime 

change is not the goal. Individuals who infer otherwise, I believe, 

make diplomacy more difficult. 

Let me add as an aside that private diplomatic efforts, regardless 

of how well intended, normally do more harm than good. 

Publicly announcing that Pyongyang expected President Bush to 

include conciliatory statements in his State of the Union address 

helped to ensure that this would not happen. Leading Pyongyang 

to believe that it might created unhelpful illusions and more importantly provided a vehicle for subsequently blaming Washington for 

the continued stalemate, and this serves to further negate our political leverage. 

One final word on our military leverage. Note that I said the 

military option had ‘‘limited’’ utility, not ‘‘no’’ utility. Part of the 

way forward, as has been mentioned by other Members, is to continue to expand the proliferation security initiative to ensure that 

whatever nuclear capability that may exist in North Korea stays in 

North Korea. 

While publicly pronouncing red lines is probably counterproductive, one hopes that Pyongyang understands that exploiting 

nuclear weapons or fissile material will result in serious consequences. 

This message needs to be delivered most clearly by Beijing and 

by Moscow. Washington’s political and economic leverage is limited. 

We do possess important positive incentives, but are right not to 

offer these prematurely. 

At the end of the day, we will likely wind up rewarding North 

Korea’s bad behavior, but we should not be paying in advance. 

Today we have little left to withhold so we must look to Beijing, 

Seoul, and others to waive their much more influential political 

and economic sticks. 

I agree with those Members that have said that Beijing can and 

should do more. Its efforts to appear evenhanded are becoming increasingly counterproductive. 

I believe the country with the greatest degree of unused leverage 

is South Korea. This is not only leverage over North Korea, but 

also leverage over China. Since the historic 2000 North/South Summit, North Korea has become increasingly dependent on Seoul. 

President Roh has consistently argued that the ROK would not tolerate nuclear weapons in the North, that Pyongyang could either 

go down the road to political and economic cooperation and reap 

those benefits, or it could choose to pursue nuclear weapons and 

face political and economic consequences. 

It was not either/or. The North could not have it both ways, or 

at least that is what President Roh has claimed. If he is serious, 

I think at a minimum it is up to South Korea now to announce that 

it is temporarily suspending its participation, to use the North Korean phrase, in the economic assistance programs with North 

13

Korea until Pyongyang provides a satisfactory explanation regarding its declared nuclear capabilities and attentions. 

The next step would be for Beijing, ideally at Seoul’s request, to 

call in an emergency plan or recession of the Six-Party Talks, inviting Pyongyang to attend, but making it clear that the meeting will 

occur regardless. 

Mr. Chairman, North Korea has played an effective divide and 

conquer game throughout the nuclear standoff. If it receives conflicting signals in the face of this latest provocation, it will be encouraged to continue this tactic. 

The time has come for the other five to finally speak with one 

voice to Pyongyang to hold it accountable for its words and actions, 

and it is time for South Korea to play a more assertive, constructive role. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cossa follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. RALPH COSSA, PRESIDENT, PACIFIC FORUM CSIS 

Chairman Leach, members of the subcommittee, colleagues: 

It is a great pleasure for me to participate in this important session on the North 

Korean nuclear challenge. To answer the Committee’s key question: Yes, there is 

‘‘a way forward,’’ but only if the other five members of the six-party process—the 

U.S., ROK, Japan, China, and Russia—can craft a common position and jointly pressure North Korea to stop playing its dangerous game of ‘‘divide and conquer’’ and 

finally come to the negotiating table. 

Let me say at the onset that there are no simple or ready solutions to this crisis. 

In analyzing how we got to where we are today, there is also plenty of blame to 

go around—all the parties have made mistakes and followed paths or policies that 

have proven counterproductive. My remarks this morning will include some criticism of past actions by Washington, Seoul, Beijing, and others. It is easy, and appropriate, to find fault with both the Clinton and Bush administrations’ approaches. 

But we cannot lose sight of the simple fact that the problem, at its core, lies in 

North Korea’s behavior and policies, not our own. Had Pyongyang chosen to honor 

the Agreed Framework that it had negotiated with the Clinton Administration—an 

agreement that I have always supported, not as ideal but as the best deal we could 

have reasonably expected at the time and one that could have served the broader 

interests of peace on the Peninsula, had Pyongyang chosen to honor it—we would 

not be facing the challenges we are dealing with today. North Korean behavior lies 

at the root of the problem and we cannot lose sight of this fact, even as we second 

guess our own approaches to dealing with Pyongyang. 

As we look toward the future, it is important not to overreact, but it is likewise 

important not to fail to react. I believe Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s initial 

response to Pyongyang’s surprise announcement that it was ‘‘suspending its participation’’ in the Six-Party Talks and that it had ‘‘manufactured nucs’’ was exactly 

right. As you will recall, she said:‘‘I think we just have to first look at the statement 

and then we need to talk with our allies.’’

One thing that the Bush administration has done, and continues to do right, from 

the Oct 2002 onset of the current crisis until today, is to insist on a multilateral 

approach and solution; this is the only realistic way to proceed. This does not mean 

that there should not be bilateral dealings between Washington and Pyongyang 

along the sidelines of the Six-Party Talks—there should and, indeed, have been—

but addressing the North Korean security challenge, in all its dimensions, is a regional, not just a bilateral problem. 

While Seoul was closely consulted during the Agreed Framework process, South 

Koreans were nonetheless insulted that they did not have a seat at the table in 

1994 when it was their lives, much more than American lives, that were directly 

under the gun. President Clinton was right, in 1996, when he pledged in Cheju-do 

that, in the future, the U.S. would not enter into any agreement with North Korea 

dealing with peace on the Peninsula that excluded the ROK. The Bush administration has wisely stuck by this policy and ROK President Roh Moo-hyun, since the 

day of his inauguration, has made it clear that South Korea wants to play—indeed, 

insists upon playing—a key role, as well it should. Frankly speaking, I have been 

disappointed with Seoul’s performance while at the table. (I have laid out some of 

14

the reasons why in a recent Pacific Forum PacNet article which I believe has been 

provided for the record, and upon which I will expand shortly.) But, I firmly believe 

that Seoul must be an equal partner in the process and must be an active participant in the deliberations. 

Likewise, Tokyo deserves to be present, since Japan also falls under the shadow 

of Pyongyang’s missiles and suspected nuclear (as well as conventional, chemical, 

and suspected biological) weapons. The good news over the past two years is that 

Washington and Tokyo have been virtually in lock-step on this and many other important security issues and we need to ensure that Tokyo’s legitimate security concerns are addressed in crafting a final solution to the current crisis. Another lesson 

learned in 1994 was that, if we expect an ally to help foot the bill, they ought to 

also have a say in crafting the agreement. This provides added rationale for continuing to include Tokyo in the Talks. 

China has played, and must continue to play, a constructive role as an honest 

broker, facilitator, and interlocutor with Pyongyang. While Beijing’s leverage over 

Pyongyang is clearly less than absolute, China has more clout than it has chosen 

to use—or has used only selectively and too infrequently—in the past. 

Frankly speaking, Russia brings considerably less to the table but can potentially 

play a constructive role, since Moscow has long had good access and good insights 

into North Korean thinking and behavior and can help to reinforce messages today 

and, along with Beijing, help underwrite security guarantees in the future. 

So, I think it is essential as we try to figure out how best to proceed, that we 

continue with a multilateral approach and make it clear to Pyongyang, as the Bush 

administration has once again done, that there will not be a separate deal or a bilateral track outside of the Six-Party process. To do otherwise is to insult our Korean 

and Japanese allies and deny ourselves the leverage and potential security contributions that Beijing and Moscow are uniquely capable of providing if and when we 

ever craft a workable solution to the current stand-off. 

Mr. Chairman, the challenge before us today can be simply stated. By its actions, 

North Korea is telling us quite clearly that it believes that there are more benefits 

to be gained from staying away from the talks and from pursuing a nuclear weapons 

program—or at least in leading us to believe that it is pursuing such a program—

than there are consequences; the pluses outweigh the minuses, in their strategic calculus. 

I understand why the Bush administration and especially South Korea have attempted to downplay Pyongyang’s assertion that it has ‘‘manufactured nukes’’ as 

nothing new. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to disregard this latest pronouncement 

as mere rhetoric. Pyongyang has taken a significant step out of the nuclear closet. 

Those still in denial may argue that Pyongyang is bluffing; that there is no more 

reason to believe Pyongyang’s claim of possessing nuclear weapons than there was 

to believe previous assertions that it did not have them. But it seems foolish, and 

foolhardy, to ignore the intended message , or to fail to hold Pyongyang accountable 

for its own actions and assertions. 

The challenge for the other five members of the six-party process, individually and 

collectively, is to convince Pyongyang that pursuing nuclear weapons and boycotting 

the talks makes it less rather than more secure; that the potential consequences outweigh the perceived gains. If regime and national survival is North Korea’s ultimate 

objective—and this is one of the few things that virtually all North Korea ‘‘experts’’ 

(a term I use advisedly) agree upon—then we must convince the North that continuing down its currently chosen path—regardless of whether this is being done for 

tactical or strategic reasons, to acquire bargaining chips, or as an insurance policy—

is hazardous to the North Korean regime’s health. Pyongyang has to believe that 

the potential consequences—not just military, but political and economic—outweigh 

the perceived benefits; this is the only way we can persuade Pyongyang to change 

its behavior and current course of action. 

The U.S. cannot do this alone. Our primary instrument of persuasion is military 

and this has only limited utility. Many have argued that if the U.S. was not so overextended in Iraq and Afghanistan, Pyongyang might be more responsive . . . and 

they are probably right. But we are overextended and, even if we were not, marching on Pyongyang is not a realistic option, given the stakes involved. 

Regime change a la Iraq is not an option under the current circumstances and 

the administration has been right in stressing that regime change is not the goal, 

as much as we would all like to see Kim Jong-il go away. Individuals, including 

some inside the administration and inside the Congress, who infer otherwise, make 

diplomacy more difficult. They also hurt Washington’s credibility with allies such as 

South Korea, whose cooperation is essential to finding a peaceful solution to the 

problem. 

15

Let me add as an aside that private diplomatic efforts, whether by academics, congressional delegations, or others, however well-intended, normally do more harm 

than good. Publicly announcing that Pyongyang expected President Bush to include 

conciliatory statements about North Korea in his State of the Union address helped 

ensure that this would not happen. Leading Pyongyang to believe that it might created unhelpful illusions and, more importantly, provided a vehicle for subsequently 

blaming Washington rather than Pyongyang for the continued stalemate. This 

serves to further negate our political leverage. 

One final word regarding our military leverage: please note that I said that the 

military option had limited, as opposed to no, utility. Part of the ‘‘way forward,’’ in 

my view, is to continue to expand—and continually demonstrate the effectiveness 

of—the Proliferation Security Initiative and other multilateral military efforts to ensure that whatever nuclear capability that may exist in North Korea stays in North 

Korea. This includes implementing, if not strengthening international protocols such 

as UNSC Resolution 1540. While publicly pronouncing ‘‘red lines’’ is probably counterproductive, one would hope that the other five participants have made it clear 

to Pyongyang, individually if not collectively, that exporting nuclear weapons or 

fissile material will result in serious consequences to include, at a minimum, UNSCapproved international sanctions. If not, they certainly should. This message needs 

to be delivered most clearly by Beijing and Moscow since they have thus far kept 

the North Korea nuclear crisis off the UNSC agenda. 

As another aside, let me say that it is beyond my comprehension why the Bush 

administration has been so non-supportive of IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed 

ElBaradei—his comments regarding North Korea and regarding other non-proliferation efforts such as closing the current ‘‘loopholes’’ in the NPT have not only been 

right on the mark, they have been completely consistent with and supportive of 

Bush administration policies. We should be figuring out how to work more closely 

with him and take advantage of his credible voice on this issue, rather than trying 

to block his renewal. 

Washington’s political and economic leverage is also limited. We do possess important positive incentives or rewards but are right not to offer these prematurely 

(even if we could be more forthcoming in indicating what they might be). At the end 

of the day, administration assertions notwithstanding, we will likely wind up rewarding North Korea’s bad behavior . . . but we should not be paying in advance. 

Today, we have little left to withhold, so we must look to Beijing, Seoul, and the 

others to wave their much more influential political and economic sticks. 

Most eyes have shifted toward Beijing, which has acted as an ‘‘honest broker’’ for 

the six-way dialogue. The PRC has continually urged patience while openly questioning Washington’s assertions about Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities and intentions. While Beijing continues to argue that it has no control over its erstwhile 

neighbor, its political and economic leverage over Pyongyang clearly exceeds Washington’s. Beijing can and should do more. Its efforts to appear ‘‘even-handed,’’ while 

perhaps understandable from a Chinese point of view, are becoming increasingly 

counterproductive. I would argue that since last June, and certainly since 

Pyongyang’s Feb 11 nuclear pronouncement, Chinese calls for ‘‘both sides to be flexible’’ increasingly miss the point. The diplomatic prowess of President Hu Jintao and 

China’s ‘‘fourth generation’’ leadership will now be put to its most severe test. 

But, as I argued in my submitted article, the country with the greatest degree 

of largely unused and untested leverage over North Korea is not the U.S. or China, 

but South Korea. To give credit where credit is due, this is largely a result of former 

President Kim Dae-jung’s ‘‘Sunshine Policy’’ of economic engagement with the North 

(maintained through the current administration’s ‘‘Policy of Peace and Prosperity’’). 

Since the historic 2000 North-South summit, North Korea has become increasingly 

dependent on Seoul economically, while its (increasingly tentative) political acceptability internationally also has its roots in Seoul’s continued encouragement to others to likewise engage the North. 

(I should add that Seoul also has considerable leverage with Beijing, which understands that in the long run, it is Seoul, not Pyongyang, that will prevail on the Peninsula. As a result, Beijing has been more responsive to Seoul’s needs and requests 

than to Washington’s. Conversely, Washington needs to avoid reinforcing the view—

that already exists among many in South Korea—that Beijing is the solution and 

that Washington is part of the problem; this hardly serves America’s long-term strategic interest on the Peninsula.) 

President Roh has consistently argued, since his inauguration, that the ROK 

‘‘would not tolerate’’ nuclear weapons in the North. Pyongyang, Roh asserted, could 

either go down the path of political and economic cooperation with the South and 

reap the considerable rewards inherent in this choice or it could choose to pursue 

nuclear weapons and face political and economic isolation from Seoul and the rest 

16

of the international community. It was an ‘‘either-or’’ choice; North Korea could not 

have it both ways . . . or can it? However else you choose to interpret the North’s 

latest statement, it clearly is calling Seoul’s hand on this issue. 

If President Roh is serious about not tolerating a nuclear North Korea, at an absolute minimum he should immediately announce that South Korea is temporarily 

‘‘suspending its participation’’ in all economic cooperation and assistance programs 

with North Korea, including in their joint development zone, until Pyongyang provides a satisfactory explanation to Seoul, and to the other dialogue partners, regarding its declared nuclear capabilities and intentions. Others (especially in Washington and Tokyo) are likely to call for more drastic measures, including immediate 

economic sanctions against the North, but this could be a step too far (at least initially). It also puts others in the driver’s seat that President Roh has long aspired 

to occupy. The other six-party participants should support this action and announce 

that they are taking (or at least considering) similar steps. But the measure will 

be most meaningful (and can only truly be effective) if it is initiated by Seoul. 

The next step would be for Beijing, ideally at Seoul’s request, to call an emergency 

plenary session of the six-party talks, inviting Pyongyang to attend and provide further explanation of its current stance, but making it clear that the meeting will proceed regardless of whether or not the North participates. 

North Korea has effectively played a ‘‘divide and conquer’’ game throughout the 

nuclear stand-off. If it receives conflicting signals from Washington, Seoul, Beijing, 

Tokyo, and Moscow in the face of this latest provocation, it will be encouraged to 

continue this tactic. The time has come for the other five finally to begin speaking 

with one voice to Pyongyang, to hold it accountable for its own words and actions. 

It’s also time for Seoul, along with Beijing, to play a more assertive, constructive 

role. 

If this problem cannot be handled within the six-party context, then the only alternatives are collective action through the United Nations Security Council—the 

desired alternative but one that Beijing, Seoul, and Moscow previously believed to 

be ‘‘premature’’—or unilateral actions that will likely only make matters worse.

Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS [pacforum@hawaii.rr.com], 

a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies in Washington and senior editor of Comparative Connections, a quarterly electronic journal [www.csis.org/pacfor]. The opinions expressed 

are exclusively his own.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Cossa. 

Dr. Eberstadt. 

STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, PH.D., HENRY WENDT 

SCHOLAR IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 

INSTITUTE 

Mr. EBERSTADT. Mr. Chairman, Members of Congress, it is always an honor to be invited to the International Relations Committee and it is a pleasure to be here today. 

The most surprising part of last week’s momentous development 

with North Korea, I think, was that North Korea’s bold move was 

so widely regarded as genuinely unexpected, both in Washington 

and abroad. 

The North Korean Government did not opt to join the world’s nuclear weapons club suddenly on a bizarre and inexplicable whim. 

To the contrary, last week’s announcement represents the entirely 

predictable culmination of decades of steady, deliberate effort and 

careful, methodical progress on a multifaceted program of weapons 

of mass destruction, a program that includes work not only on nuclear weapons, but also on chemical weapons, biological weapons, 

and long-range ballistic missiles. 

The WMD program is propelled not by irrational impulses, but 

rather by a carefully considered strategy, a strategy so deeply wedded to purposes of state that it can be described as integrally fused 

into the very logic of the North Korean system. 

17

That strategy and the logic that undergirds it may be intuitively 

unfamiliar to those of us with a modern globalization sensibility, 

but unless and until we appreciate the thinking that animates 

North Korea’s WMD quest, we will face the prospect of ever more 

unpleasant and expensive surprises from Pyongyang. 

In a very real sense, the DPRK is a state unlike any other state 

on the face of the earth. It is a political construct, specially and 

particularly built for three intertwined purposes: To conduct a war, 

to settle a historic grievance, and to fulfill a grand ideological vision. 

That vision is the reunification of the now divided Korean Peninsula under the unfettered independent socialist rule of the 

Pyongyang regime. In other words, unconditional annexation of the 

present day South Korea and liquidation of the Government of the 

ROK. 

The grievance is the failure of the famous 1950 surprise attack 

against South Korea, an assault that might well have unified all 

of Korea on Pyongyang’s terms, but for America’s unexpected military intervention. 

In that telling, only America’s continuing support has permitted 

an otherwise rotten, unstable and utterly irredeemable ROK Government to survive since 1950. 

Although we are sometimes inattentive to it, the historical fact 

is that the Korean Wars’ battles were only halted through a 

ceasefire agreement. There has never been a peace treaty bringing 

the hostilities to a formal and conclusive end. 

The Korean War is, from the DPRK’s standpoint, an ongoing 

war. The North Korean leadership is committed to an eventual, unconditional victory in that war, however long it may take, however 

much it may cost. 

Despite the ingenuity and bravery of North Korea’s army, officers, and soldiers, its forces cannot hope to prevail over the combined U.S.-ROK alliance that awaits them on the other side of the 

DMZ. 

Thus, the neutralization and effective removal of the United 

States and the United States alliance system from the Korean 

equation remains utterly essential from Pyongyang’s perspective. 

That objective, however, cannot be achieved by the DPRK’s conventional capabilities. To deter, coerce and punish the United 

States, the DPRK must possess nuclear weaponry and ballistic missiles capable of delivering these into the heart of the American 

enemy. 

This central strategic fact explains why North Korea has been 

assiduously pursuing its nuclear development and missiles program for over 30 years, at terrible expense to its people’s livelihood 

and despite all adverse repercussions to its international relations. 

Several important implications flow from the DPRK’s conception 

of and strategy for its WMD program. First, continuing and escalating international tensions are not accidental and unwelcome side 

effects of the program. They are instead central to its purpose. 

Second, WMD threats and especially nuclear and missile threats 

have already been used by North Korea with great success, as an 

instrument for extracting international extortion payments from 

the United States and its allies and as a lever for forcing the 

18

United States to engage Pyongyang diplomatically on Pyongyang’s 

own terms. 

The greatest potential dividends for North Korea in nuclear and 

ballistic diplomacy, however, still lie in store and that brings us to 

a third point. 

For half a century and more, U.S. security policy has been 

charged with imposing deterrence upon Pyongyang. Shouldn’t we 

expect that Pyongyang has also been thinking about how to deter 

the U.S. over those same long decades? 

Nuclear weapons and especially long-range nuclear missiles 

might well answer the deterrence question for the North Korean 

State, as former Secretary of Defense William Perry incisively recognized. 

Faced with the risk of nuclear attack on the United States mainland, he warned, Washington might hesitate in a time of crisis on 

the Korean Peninsula, but if Washington’s security commitment to 

the ROK were not credible in a crisis, the military alliance would 

be hollow, vulnerable to collapse under the weight of its own internal contradictions. 

North Korea’s WMD program in short may be the regime’s best 

hope for achieving its long cherished objectives of breaking the 

U.S.-ROK military alliance and forcing United States troops out of 

the Korean Peninsula. 

Fourth, those who hope for a win-win solution to the North Korean nuclear impasse must recognize the plain fact that Pyongyang 

has never engaged in win-win bargaining. Pyongyang believes in 

win-lose solutions, preferring outcomes that entail not only DPRK 

victories, but also face-losing setbacks for its opponents. From the 

DPRK’s perspective, win-win solutions are not only impractical, 

they are immoral. 

Finally, those who believe that a peaceful and voluntary 

denuclearization of the DPRK is still possible through yet further 

rounds of international conference diplomacy or through some future negotiating breakthrough must be ready to consider what such 

an outcome would look like from North Korea today. That is to say: 

From the standpoint of the real existing North Korean Government, not some imaginary DPRK we would rather be talking to. 

No matter how large the payoff package, no matter how broad 

and comprehensive the attendant international formula for recognition and security, the Western desideratum of CVID (complete 

verifiable, irreversible denuclearization), would irrevocably consign 

North Korea to a world in which it is the metrics of peaceful competition that matter and thus irrevocably to a role in international 

affairs for the DPRK more in consonance with the size of its GNP. 

No North Korean leader is likely to regard such a proposal as a 

bargain. 

The unsettling thrust of this analysis, if it is correct, is not just 

that North Korea’s leadership today may positively prefer a strategy that augments WMD capabilities, it may also positively fear a 

strategy that does anything less. 

To conclude, the task now before us is to make the world safe 

from North Korea. Kim Jong Il, by contrast, is doing his best to 

make the world safe for North Korea. 

19

1Parts of this testimony draw upon the author’s contributions to a recent study by the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) on the North Korean challenge to US missile defense. 

Thanks go to NIPP’s Dr. Keith A. Payne and Amb. David J. Smith for supporting and encouraging my research in that effort. 

Making the world safe from North Korea promises to be a difficult, expensive and dangerous undertaking for America and our 

allies. However, the costs and dangers of making the world safe for 

North Korea stand to be incalculably higher. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Eberstadt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, PH.D., HENRY WENDT SCHOLAR IN

POLITICAL ECONOMY, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Last week’s declaration by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, aka 

North Korea) that Pyongyang possessed nuclear weapons, and would hold on to its 

nuclear arsenal ‘‘under any circumstances’’, was greeted with shock and astonishment around the world. The most surprising part of last week’s momentous development, however, was that North Korea’s bold move was so widely regarded as genuinely unexpected, both in Washington and abroad. 

The North Korean government did not opt to join the world’s nuclear weapons 

club suddenly, on a bizarre and inexplicable whim. To the contrary: last week’s announcement represents the entirely predictable culmination of decades of steady, deliberate effort and careful, methodical progress on a multifaceted program of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—a program that includes work not only on nuclear 

weapons, but also on chemical weapons, biological weapons, and ballistic missiles. 

This WMD program is propelled not by irrational impulses, but rather by a carefully considered strategy—a strategy so deeply wedded to purposes of state that can 

be described as integrally fused into the very logic of the North Korean system.1

That strategy, and the logic that undergirds it, may be intuitively unfamiliar to 

those of us with modern, ‘‘globalization era’’ sensibilities. But unless and until we 

appreciate we appreciate the thinking that animates North Korea’s WMD quest, we 

will face the prospect of ever more unpleasant and expensive surprises from 

Pyongyang. 

In a very real sense, the DPRK is a state unlike any other on the face of the earth 

today. It is a political construct specially and particularly built for three entwined 

purposes: to conduct a war, to settle a historical grievance, and to fulfill a grand 

ideological vision. 

That vision is the reunification of the now-divided Korean peninsula under the 

unfettered ‘‘independent, socialist’’ rule of the Pyongyang regime—in other words, 

unconditional annexation of present-day South Korea and liquidation of the government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) so that Kim Jong Il & Co. might exercise total 

command over the entire Korean race (minjok in Korean). 

If that vision sounds preposterous and utterly impracticable to us, please understand that it looks very different from Pyongyang. North Korean statecraft has been 

predicated on that very vision for over half a century. To this day, ‘‘Sunshine Policy’’ 

and all the rest notwithstanding, Pyongyang grants diplomatic status to only one 

‘‘government mission ‘‘ from Seoul: this being the legation of the so-called ‘‘South 

Korean National Democratic Front (SKNDF)’’, an invented resistance group supposedly based in the South, which regularly uses North Korean airwaves to denounce the Republic of Korea as an illegitimate colonial police state. 

The grievance is the failure of the famous June 1950 surprise attack against 

South Korea—an assault that might well have unified all Korea on Pyongyang’s 

terms but for America’s unexpected military intervention in defense of the ROK. In 

Pyongyang’s telling, it is only America’s continuing and malign imperialistic support 

that has permitted an otherwise rotten, unstable and utterly irredeemable ROK 

government to survive since 1950 (and more recently, to take on the trappings of 

prosperity and democratization). 

The total-mobilization war state that Pyongyang has painfully erected over the 

decades (at among other costs, the North Korean famine of the 1990s) is a response 

to this grievance, and an instrument for fulfilling this vision. And the war that 

North Korea has prepared for is not some future theoretical contingency. Quite the 

contrary: in the view of North Korean leaders, their country is at war today, here 

and now. 

Although we ourselves are sometimes inattentive to it, the fact of the matter is 

that the Korean War’s battles were only halted through a cease-fire agreement (the 

Armistice of 1953)—there has never been a peace treaty bringing the hostilities to 

20

2There is no indication, incidentally, that North Korean decision-makers view WMD as ‘‘special weapons’’, to be held in reserve—on the contrary, missiles and nuclear devices seem to figure integrally in North Korean official thinking and are already being used on a regular basis 

in North Korean statecraft, as the government’s ongoing foray’s in ‘‘blackmail diplomacy’’ attest. 

And despite Pyongyang’s emphasis of race doctrine, there is no indication whatsoever that North 

Korean leadership would hesitate to use such weapons on minjok—race brothers—in South 

Korea. Pyongyang did not blink at starving perhaps one million of its own people for reasons 

of state in the 1990s. It regards the South Korean state as a cancerous monstrosity, and those 

who support it as corrupt and worthless national traitors. 3Despite the North Korean regime’s seemingly freakish face to the world, North Korean leadership’s capabilities for making subtle and skillful calculations is underscored by the bottom line 

in its negotiations with the United States government over the past decade. Between 1995 and 

2004, by calculations of the Congressional Research Service, Pyongyang secured more than $1 

billion in foreign aid from the US—a state the DPRK regards as its prime international enemy. 

a formal and conclusive end. The Korean War is, from the DPRK’s standpoint, an 

ongoing war—and North Korea’s leadership is committed to an eventual, unconditional victory in that war, however long that may take, however much that may 

cost. 

Against all odds, North Korean leadership still attempts to support a vast conventional military force—long rehearsed for an anticipated reprise of June 1950—on a 

dysfunctional and failing Soviet-type economy. Despite the ingenuity and bravery of 

North Korean People’s Army officers and soldiers, this force cannot hope to prevail 

over the combined ROK–US alliance that awaits them on the other side of the DMZ. 

Thus the neutralization, and effective removal, of the United States and the US alliance system from the Korean equation is utterly essential from Pyongyang’s perspective. 

That objective, however, cannot be achieved by the DPRK’s conventional capabilities—today or in any foreseeable future. To deter, coerce, and punish the United 

States, the DPRK must possess nuclear weaponry and the ballistic missiles capable 

of delivering these into the heart of the American enemy. This central strategic fact 

explains why North Korea has been assiduously pursuing its nuclear development 

and missile development programs for over thirty years—at terrible expense to its 

people’s livelihood, and despite all adverse repercussions on its international relations. 

Although Pyongyang rails against ‘‘globalization’’ in other contexts, North Korea’s 

own conception of the uses of WMD are fully ‘‘globalized’’. Thanks largely (though 

not exclusively) to its short-range ‘‘SCUD’’-style missiles and bio-chemical weapons, 

primarily targeted on South Korea, Pyongyang can always remind counterparts in 

the Blue House that the enormous metropolis of Seoul is a hostage to fate, to be 

destroyed at a moment on Kim Jong Il’s say-so. Intermediate No ‘‘Dong type’’ missiles capable of striking Japan (and American bases in Japan) with nuclear warheads put Japanese political leaders on permanent warning of the possible costs of 

incurring North Korea’s anger, and the potential dangers of siding with the United 

States in any time of Peninsular crisis. Finally, long-range missiles of the improved 

‘‘Taepo Dong’’ variety may be capable of striking the United States mainland, now 

or in the relatively near future.2

Several important implications flow from the DPRK’s conception of, and strategy 

for, its WMD program. 

First, continuing and escalating international tensions are not the accidental and 

unwelcome side-effects of the program: they are instead its central purpose. Simply 

stated, the DPRK’s growing WMD arsenal, and the threats it permits the North Korean regime to pose to other governments, are the key to the political and economic 

prizes Pyongyang intends to extract from an otherwise hostile and unwilling world. 

Second, WMD threats—and especially nuclear and missile threats—have already

been used by North Korea with great success: as an instrument for extracting de 

facto international extortion payments from the United States ands its allies, and 

as a lever of forcing the United States to ‘‘engage’’ Pyongyang diplomatically, and 

on Pyongyang’s own terms.3

The greatest potential dividends for North Korean nuclear and ballistic diplomacy, however, still lie in store—and this bring us to a third point. For half a century and more US security policy has been charged with imposing ‘‘deterrence’’ upon 

Pyongyang. Shouldn’t we expect that Pyongyang has also been thinking about how 

to ‘‘deter’’ the US over those same long decades? 

Nuclear weapons (especially long-range nuclear missiles) might well answer the 

‘‘deterrence question’’ for the North Korean state, as former Secretary of Defense 

William J. Perry incisively recognized in his 1999 ‘‘Perry Process’’ report: faced with 

the risk of nuclear attack on the US mainland, he warned, Washington might hesitate at a time of crisis in the Korean peninsula. But if Washington’s security comVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:49 Nov 08, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\021705\98813.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
21

mitment to the ROK were not credible in a crisis, the military alliance would be 

hollow: and vulnerable to collapse under the weight of its own internal contradictions. North Korea’s WMD program, in short, may be the regime’s best hope for 

achieving its long-cherished objectives of breaking the US–ROK military alliance, 

and forcing American troops out of the Korean peninsula. 

Fourth, those who hope for a ‘‘win-win’’ solution to the North Korean nuclear impasse must recognize the plain fact that Pyongyang does not now engage in ‘‘winwin’’ bargaining, and never has. The historical record is completely clear: Pyongyang 

believes in ‘‘zero-sum’’ solutions, preferring outcomes that entail not only DPRK victories, but also face-losing setbacks for its opponents. From the DPRK’s perspective, 

‘‘win-win’’ solutions are not only impractical—they leave adversaries unnecessarily 

strong—but actually immoral. 

Finally, those who believe that a peaceful and voluntary de-nuclearization of the 

DPRK is still possible through yet further rounds of international ‘‘conference diplomacy’’, or through some future ‘‘negotiating breakthrough’’, must be ready to consider what such an outcome would look from North Korea today—that is to say, 

from the standpoint of the real existing North Korean state, not some imaginary 

DPRK we’d rather be talking to. 

No matter how large the pay-off package, no matter how broad and comprehensive the attendant international formula for recognition and security, the Western 

desideratum of ‘‘complete verifiable irreversible denuclearization’’ (CVID) would irrevocably consign North Korea to a world in which it is the metrics of peaceful 

international competition that matter—and thus irrevocably to a role in international affairs for the DPRK more in consonance with the size of its GNP. No 

North Korean leader is likely to mistake such a proposal for a bargain. 

Even worse from Pyongyang’s standpoint: a genuine agreement to denuclearize 

might well threaten to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the North Korean 

state. Since its founding in 1948, the DPRK has demanded terrible and continuing 

sacrifices from its population—but it has always justified these in the name of its 

historic vision for reunifying the Korean race. Today, however, forswearing its WMD 

options would be tantamount to forswearing the claim to unify the Korean peninsula on Pyongyang’s own terms. Shorn of its legitimating vision, what then, exactly, 

would be the rationale for absolutist North Korean rule? 

The unsettling thrust of this analysis is not just that North Korean leadership 

today may positively prefer a strategy that augments the government’s WMD capabilities: it may also positively fear a strategy that does anything less. 

To conclude: the task now before us is to make the world safe from North Korea. 

Kim Jong Il, by contrast, is doing his best to make the world safe for North Korea. 

Making the world safe from North Korea promises to be a difficult, expensive, and 

dangerous undertaking . For America and her allies, however, the costs and dangers 

of making the world safe for North Korea stand to be incalculably higher.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much, Dr. Eberstadt. 

Before hearing from Dr. Sutter, I just want to make one very 

clear distinction. Sometimes when you read something it is different than the paper. 

When you said the ROK Government, the South Korean Government, was irredeemable, you meant the North Korean view of the 

ROK Government. 

Mr. EBERSTADT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LEACH. Not your own of course. 

Mr. EBERSTADT. Absolutely. Yes. 

Mr. LEACH. Dr. Sutter. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT SUTTER, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF 

ASIAN STUDIES, SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a real 

pleasure to be here and speak with you about this issue. 

I have submitted a statement for the record and I would encourage people with an interest to read that statement. 

Mr. LEACH. Without objection, all the statements will be fully 

placed in the record. 

22

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to make some points from that statement, particularly in 

light of some of the remarks that have been made up to this point. 

I was asked to look at this problem from the point of view of the 

context of U.S. interest in the region. This is something that often 

gets lost when we consider dealing with this issue. Obviously the 

United States has tremendous national security concerns in dealing 

with North Korea. Obviously we are worried about proliferation to 

a considerable degree, but we need to keep in mind, too, that Asia 

is extremely important for the United States and how the United 

States manages this issue with North Korea will be a very important determinant as to how influential the United States is and is 

going to be in Asia. 

This kind of emphasis, of course, leads you to the conclusion that 

Mr. Cossa raised, that you really have to do this in a regional context. You cannot try to do this by yourself. If you do, you run the 

risk of being isolated and your interest in Asia will suffer greatly. 

So that is my main message today, that it needs to be kept in 

mind that the United States interests in Asia are extremely important for the United States and they have to be dealt with as well, 

along with these other very serious concerns that we are dealing 

with. 

It is obvious that the North Korean announcement reflects a failure of United States policy, but it reflects a failure of the regional 

countries. They are all concerned about this too. So it is a collective 

failure. 

I think the record shows that this is a long-term problem. We are 

in this for the long haul in dealing with this issue. It has developed 

over a long period of time and it is likely to continue. 

In my statement, I underline how the North Korean regime has 

really belied a lot of predictions about North Korea being weak and 

collapsing and so forth. It has not done so. 

The upshot of this situation is that we have a long-term difficulty 

in dealing with this and, again, this underlines the importance of 

the region. We have to have a cooperative relationship with the 

various countries in the region in order to deal with this over the 

long-term. 

We will have great difficulty dealing with this by ourselves and 

so in this context, too, I would argue that it is very important that 

we keep our relationships with the countries in the region very 

much in our minds as we go forward. 

In my statement, I go through and examine some of the options 

we have and, unfortunately, I come down on a position that there 

really aren’t any good options at this point that would depart significantly from what we are doing at present. 

If we move toward the bilateral talks with North Korea, there 

are real downsides to doing that. If we adopt a harder policy, military pressures, or unilateral pressures on our part, this too has 

major downsides for American interests in the area. 

So what I argue is that we need to continue a consultative approach with our allies and with our associates in the region. 

How much pressure we are able to bring to bear on South Korea, 

as Mr. Cossa suggests, on China, as several of the Members have 

suggested, this is a very difficult proposition. We should certainly 

23

1Testimony before the US Congress, House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee 

on Asian and Pacific Affairs, February 17, 2005 by Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, 

Georgetown University. 

try it. We should certainly consider these kinds of options and pursue them, up to a point, but we have to keep together. We have 

to keep somewhat of a united front in dealing with this issue and 

develop a closer consultative approach as we move forward. 

This is leading, it seems to me, toward containment, toward a 

constrainment on North Korea’s provocative options and this 

should be our goal, to contain this sort of thing with this kind of 

a construct, but in the process please keep in mind, at least in the 

back of your minds, that we need to maintain American leadership 

in Asia. 

This is very important for the United States. Asia is a critically 

important area and it is very easy for the United States to lose its 

leading position in this area through some sort of unilateral or misguided approach that doesn’t enjoy any support in the region. 

This kind of approach, it seems to me, is not in the interest of 

the United States, as we follow this long-term approach in dealing 

with this long-term problem with a leadership in North Korea that 

is very difficult to predict, and hopefully we will be able to come 

up with mechanisms to at least constrain and contain this type of 

difficulty. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, my statement indicates that we 

need to follow a steady and incremental approach, leading toward 

a greater containment policy of North Korea. We need to strengthen proliferation curbs, such as seen in the PSI. We need to avoid 

unilateral actions that would isolate the United States from our 

important allies and associates in the region, and we need to recognize that we will need Asian cooperation to deal with this issue 

that will probably, almost certainly, not be settled quickly. 

This is going to take a long time and so we will need a lot of support as we go forward in the years ahead. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sutter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT SUTTER, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF ASIAN STUDIES, 

SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH—PRESERVING US

LEADERSHIP IN ASIA1

Abstract 

This assessment acknowledges that North Korea’s announced development of nuclear 

weapons highlights a continuing policy failure of the United States and concerned 

powers. However, an examination of the risks and likely negative consequences of alternative US policies shows the relative advantages of the US administration’s current consultative approach with concerned powers in Asia in endeavoring over time 

to bring greater pressure to bear on North Korea and to contain North Korean provocative actions. The current US approach avoids abrupt or unilateral actions that 

could isolate the United States and reinforces US leadership in Asia, a critically important region for a wide range of US interests. It places the United States in a 

stronger position to deal with a wide range of challenges likely to come from the unpredictable but resilient North Korean regime in the years ahead.

North Korea’s announcement last week that it has nuclear weapons underlines 

a continuing failure of US policies and the efforts of American allies and associates 

in Asia to halt North Korea’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. This failure is well 

known by those following reports over the past two years of North Korea’s secret 

24

nuclear weapons development and North Korea’s public repudiation of previous 

agreements against nuclear weapons development. In a sense, the North Korean announcement is not news but confirmation of a grim reality that officials in the 

United States and a wide range of concerned governments have been dealing with 

for some time. 

There is grave concern in the United States and among US allies and associates 

in Asia that the North Korean leadership will follow its announcement with more 

provocative actions including a nuclear weapons test or the transfer of nuclear 

weapons materials and technology to terrorists. Media reports earlier this year said 

that the Bush administration has strong evidence that North Korea engaged in the 

past in the clandestine transfer of nuclear material to Libya that could have assisted in the development of a nuclear weapon. 

How to prevent the North Korean leadership from taking the provocative actions 

noted above is subject to debate among specialists and officials of concerned governments. The task might be easier if the outside world had a reasonably reliable understanding of the motives of the North Korean leadership, but it doesn’t. Even 

those in the US government with access to special information have to be cautious 

in predicting what the North Korean leader may do. Kim Jong Il is at the top of 

this leadership and has shown an ability to switch policies and reverse course seemingly unconstrained by domestic and international interests and concerns that limit 

the options and decision making of more conventional world leaders. Thus, those 

who tell us with seemingly authority that they know what Kim Jong Il ‘‘wants’’ and 

how US and international policies should change in order to meet those wants, are 

engaging at best in speculation, in my judgment. 

Reexamining US Policy Options 

US policy makers in the Bush administration and the Congress are considering 

changes in US policy following the North Korean announcement. Most of these 

changes appear to have serious negative consequences for US interests. 

On one side are options advocated by some specialists that would see the United 

States go further in meeting North Korea’s demand for bilateral talks on the nuclear issue, US security guarantees, and greater US aid. The Bush administration 

seems prepared to offer security guarantees and greater aid, but on condition that 

North Korea truly ends its nuclear weapons programs. The US government resists 

bilateral talks with North Korea. It appears concerned that without other foreign 

powers being involved in the talks, North Korea would manipulate the bilateral 

talks and thereby pressure the United States to provide assurances and aid but 

with no guarantee of North Korea’s fully ending nuclear weapons development. 

On the other side are specialists who argue for greater US pressure, with some 

seeking the use of military force against North Korea. The balance of military power 

along the Korean Demilitarized Zone gives North Korean forces the ability to kill 

hundreds of thousands of South Koreans along with thousands of Americans in an 

initial battle. This sobering reality and North Korea’s possible possession of nuclear 

weapons head the list of factors arguing against US military attack against North 

Korea. 

US efforts in the Proliferation Security Initiative to work with other concerned 

powers to build mechanisms to deal with North Korean and other international proliferation activities have garnered wide international support, though China and 

South Korea remain reluctant to participate. Japan is ready to cut aid and apply 

greater pressure against North Korea, but South Korea seems committed to a policy 

of asymmetrical normalization with North Korea involving extensive economic aid 

and exchanges beneficial to North Korea. China tends to back the South Korean position. At present, strong US efforts to pressure and isolate North Korea likely 

would be resisted by South Korea and China, and possibly Russia, Australia and 

the European Union. 

Careful US consultation with China and North Korea’s continued provocations 

over time have resulted in some change in China’s approach toward North Korea. 

Beijing currently shows less willingness to defend North Korean actions and more 

willingness to use pressure as well as positive incentives in order to keep North 

Korea from undermining China’s primary interest in preserving stability on the peninsula. Though China has opposed US suggestions to use the United Nations to 

exert greater pressure on North Korea and US suggestions to restrict aid to the 

North Korean regime, North Korea’s continuing nuclear weapons development and 

provocative posturing appear to be wearing down Chinese opposition to such pressure on the North Korean regime. If China were to change its stance in favor of 

greater pressure against North Korea, South Korea would be more likely to follow, 

allowing for a more unified international front against North Korean provocations. 

25

2See notably, America’s Role in Asia: American Views, and America’s Role in Asia: Asian 

Views. San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2004

Preserving US leadership for the Long Haul 

It is probably wise that US policy makers are resisting abrupt changes in policy 

in seeking a solution to the North Korean nuclear weapons development. The North 

Korean announcement does not fundamentally change the problems associated with 

the North Korean regime and its nuclear weapons development that are likely to 

be with us for some time. The North Korean regime has shown remarkable resiliency, belying predictions of regime collapse that were prevalent in the years after 

the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994. We can measure North Korean military power 

and economic performance to some degree, but our understanding of the political 

strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean regime is weak. Given the North Korean regime’s resilience in the face of great adversity in the 1990s, it seems prudent 

to forecast its continuation for years to come. 

As the United States seeks to deal with the problems associated with the North 

Korean regime, it needs not only US military strength and resolve, but the support 

of the concerned powers in Asia. The above review of US options shows that the 

United States cannot deal with the North Korean problems alone or in a position 

isolated from key Asian powers. If the United States hopes to contain North Korean 

proliferation activities and establish an international environment compelling greater moderation by the North Korean regime, it will need to exert positive leadership 

in Asia, eliciting the support and backing of the concerned Asian powers. Moreover, 

the United States will continue to have vital interests in the security, prosperity, 

and political orientations of Asia. How the US government deals with the North Korean issue will be an important determinant in whether the United States continues 

to play a leading role in this vibrant world area or is marginalized as other rising 

powers, notably China, move into positions of greater regional prominence. 

Looking out, a number of authoritative commentators have expressed concern 

over a perceived decline in US leadership and influence in Asia on account of US 

preoccupations elsewhere, military assertiveness, and poor diplomacy, and a concurrent rise of Chinese influence.2 They see US emphasis on geo-strategic issues, notably the war in Iraq and combating international terrorists, much less attractive to 

Asian governments and people than China’s accommodating geo-economic emphasis. 

In fact, however, the actual decline of US influence relative to China or others 

seems relatively small amid continued evidence of US leadership in Asia. 

Elite and public opinion in many Asian countries remains strongly critical of the 

US government, but Asian governments by and large have reacted pragmatically to 

US policies, seeking to keep relations with the United States on a good foundation. 

The United States is important for their economic development and the security environment in Asia. They remain wary of rising China and its possible ambitions, 

and see the United States as a needed counterweight. Even in South Korea, a country swept by anti-US sentiment and pro-China fever in recent years, government officials are clear eyed in assessing that continued good South Korean ties with the 

United States are essential in South Korea’s ability to deal effectively with international powers, notably China. 

One way to assess the perceived US decline relative to China is to compare the 

recent situation in Asia with past periods of US decline and rise of other powers. 

In the past few decades, there have been two notable periods of perceived or actual 

US decline in Asia. The first was the post Vietnam War period which saw a marked 

rise of Soviet military-backed expansion in Asia. The second was in the latter part 

of the 1980s when Japan seemed to dominate much of East Asia while the United 

States seemed unable to compete with Japan, even in the US domestic market. In 

both cases, the perceived US weaknesses turned out to be exaggerated as did the 

strengths of the newly rising powers. It is unclear if this third major episode of perceived US decline, along with China’s rise, is subject to the same exaggeration and 

misinterpretation. What is clear to seasoned observers is that whatever decline has 

taken place in US power relative to China does not compare in scope or importance 

to the challenge to US power and influence in the 1970s and the late 1980s. 

It seems logical to conclude that the impact of China’s rising influence will add 

to recent challenges to the United States in Asia such as the North Korean nuclear 

crisis and disagreements over Iraq and the war on terrorism, to have the effect of 

weakening and diverting US leadership in the region. Nevertheless, such actual or 

potential challenges will remain balanced to a considerable degree by many continuing strengths and favorable trends in Asia for US policy and interests. US leaders have options to build on those strengths and favorable trends to insure US leadership in Asia relative to China or others for many years to come. The Bush adminVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:49 Nov 08, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\021705\98813.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
26

3 Because of North Korea’s military power, US military options against North Korea are more 

limited and difficult that those in the case of Iraq; US strategic deployments in Southwest Asia 

in 2003–2005 further limited US military options against North Korea. 4 Robert Sutter, ‘‘United States: Leadership maintained amid continuing challenges,’’ in Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.) Strategic Asia 2004–2005 Seattle: National Bureau of Asian 

Research, 2004, p. 37–66. What the world thinks in 2002, The Pew research center, December 

2002, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165, p. T–45, T–50. 5Michael Swaine, ‘‘Reverse Course? The Fragile Turnaround in US-China Relations,’’ Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 22, February 2003, p.1–3. Bonnie Glaser, ‘‘China 

and US disagree, but with smiles,’’ Comparative Connections, April 2003. Robert Sutter, ‘‘Grading Bush’s China Policy,’’ PACNET 10, March 8, 2002. http://www.csis.org/pacfor 6 Ralph Cossa, ‘‘Bush-Roh: Closing the gap,’’ PACNET 20, May 20, 2003. http://www.csis.org/

pacfor. Greg Jaffe, ‘‘Pentagon Prepares to scatter soldiers to remote corners,’’ Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2003, p.1. Paul Wolfowitz, ‘‘Sustaining the US commitment in Asia,’’ PACNET 22A, 

June 5, 2003; and Ralph Cossa, Force restructuring anxiety,’’ PACNET 22, June 3, 2003, both 

available at http://www.csis.org/pacfor 7What the world thinks in 2002, The Pew research center, December 2002, http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165, p. T–45, T–50. 8 Robert Sutter, ‘‘Why China matters,’’ Washington Quarterly Winter 2003–2004 p. 75–89. 

istration’s response to the Tsunami disaster in December 2004 underlined the kinds 

of options the US can follow to secure its influence in Asia. The Bush administration’s response to the North Korean nuclear weapons problem poses another opportunity for constructive efforts sustaining US leadership in Asia. 

US Strengths in Asia 

At a time of US preoccupation with Iraq and other priorities, the Bush administration has adjusted in generally pragmatic ways to unexpected Asian challenges, 

notably in the Korean peninsula—an area of much more salient concern than Iraq 

to most Asian governments. While it justified US pre-emption and unilateral action 

in other parts of the world, the Bush administration in practice has sought to deal 

with the North Korean crisis and other issues in Asia through broad international 

consultation and engagement that is welcomed by concerned Asian powers.3 Of 

course, as is graphically illustrated by last week’s North Korean announcement, 

North Korea’s ongoing efforts to develop nuclear weapons continue. A North Korean 

nuclear weapons test or transfer of a weapon to a terrorist organization could precipitate sharper divisions between the United States and Asian powers or within the 

US government. 

Several key strengths in US-Asian relations sustain US regional leadership.4 Government leaders on both sides of the Pacific support the US security commitment 

and military presence in Asia. The global war on terrorism has strengthened US 

resolve to remain actively involved in regional security. The strong US military 

presence is generally welcomed by Asian government leaders. Chinese leaders have 

modified their past criticism of the US security role.5

Despite debate over the size and deployment of US forces in South Korea, the 

South Korean and US governments endeavor to manage the debate without jeopardizing strong mutual interests supported by a continued US military presence in 

South Korea.6 Meanwhile, polls that showed setbacks for the US image in certain 

countries in Asia also showed that most of those polled retained overall positive 

views of US leadership and that clear majorities in Asia agreed that their interests 

would suffer if the United States were no longer the world’s dominant power.7

Under the Bush administration, the United States maintains open markets despite occasional aberrations such as moves in 2002 to protect US farmers and steel 

manufacturers, or US official complaints in 2004 about US job losses to Asia and 

unfair currency values by China and Japan. Asian governments view the US economy as more important to Asian economic well being, especially after the Asian economic crisis and Japan’s persisting economic difficulties. Though China is a new engine of regional growth, US economic prospects remain much more important for 

Asian development. The United States in recent years has absorbed a very high percentage (about 40 percent, according to US government figures) of the exports from 

China, which is emerging as the export-manufacturing base for investors from a 

wide range of advanced Asian economies. The US market continues to absorb one 

third of the exports of Japan. The economies of South Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN 

rely on the US market to receive around 20 percent of their exports. Much is written 

about growing Asian trade with China, and indeed China’s share of inter regional 

trade is important and expanding.8 However, US trade continues to surpass China’s 

trade with the region, especially in the key area of absorbing completed manufactured exports from Asia. Meanwhile, US direct foreign investment has grown notably in China; the level there is less than US investment in Australia, Hong Kong, 

27

9Figures from US Department of Commerce, 2003, 2004. Chinese government figures show 

Chinese exports to the United States as much less than seen in US government figures. 10The United States did not seek to bring China’s human rights conditions before the UN 

Human Rights Commission in 2003. George Gedda, ‘‘US won’t propose resolution on China,’’ Associated Press April 11, 2003 (internet version). It offered a resolution in 2004. 11Greg Jaffe, ‘‘Pentagon prepares to scatter troops to remote corners,’’ Wall Street Journal, 

May 27, 2003. See also discussion in US Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region. Washington DC: 

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003. 12 ‘‘The acceptability of American power,’’ Economist June 29, 2002 (internet version). See also, 

G. John Ikenberry, Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence. US National Intelligence 

Council Conference Report, July 28, 2003 available at http://www.odci.gov/nic/

confreportslstratreact.html. 13See the chapters on China, Japan, India, and Russia in Richard Ellings et. al. (eds.) Strategic Asia 2003–2004 Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003. 14 Benjamin Self, ‘‘China and Japan: a fac ̧ade of friendship,’’ Washington Quarterly 26:1, p 77–

88 (winter 2002–2003). Robert Sutter, The United States and East Asia. Lanham MD: Rowman 

and Littlefield, 2003, p. 199–200, 222–223. Francine Frankel and Harry Harding. The IndiaChina relationship: what the United States needs to know. New York: Columbia University 

Press, 2004. 

Singapore, or Japan. China is only beginning to play a significant role in investing 

abroad.9

Despite strong rhetorical emphasis, Bush administration policy has been pragmatic in promoting human rights, democracy and political values in Asia. As the 

United States sought allies and supporters in the global war on terrorism and other 

endeavors, it has moderated its approach in these areas, an adjustment generally 

welcomed in Asia.10

After the September 11, 2001 attacks on America, the United States mobilized 

military, political, and economic power that proved overwhelming to adversaries and 

duly impressed Asian states. US power contradicted earlier predictions of US decline; the United States became more powerful and influential in Asia and the Pacific than at any time since the Vietnam War and perhaps earlier. 

Amid criticism by some US non-government experts and grumblings in the ranks 

of the US military, US defense planners moved ahead with planned realignment 

and downsizing of US forces in Asia and elsewhere abroad, while sustaining large 

ground force commitments in Iraq.11 On balance, the changes did not appear to 

change the prevailing situation where some in the Asian region might wish to challenge or confront the United States, and might be more inclined to do so if the US 

were seen as ‘‘bogged down’’ in Iraq; but most remained reluctant to do so given the 

dangers they would face in opposition to the world’s dominant power, with a leadership seemingly prepared to use that power against its enemies.12

The major regional powers, including Japan and such rising powers as China and 

India, continued to be domestically preoccupied and are likely to remain so for some 

time to come.13 Focused on internal issues, they seek support from the United 

States and other powers, and do not seek difficulties in their foreign relations. 

Japan, China, India, Russia, and other Asian states are actively maneuvering and 

hedging, seeking new and more multifaceted arrangements to secure their interests 

in the uncertain regional environment. They sometimes cooperate together. However, the leading Asian powers reflect deep divisions and competition in Asian and 

world affairs. Their mutual suspicions and competing interests indicate that any 

meaningful cooperation among them seriously detrimental to US interests remains 

unlikely. Moreover, this situation of hedging and rivalry also means that should one 

of these Asian powers emerge as a dominant power, as China appears to be doing, 

the others have the option of aligning more closely with the United States and one 

another in order to protect their interests. The recent behavior of Japan, Russia, 

and India in improving relations with the United States seems to support this conclusion.14

Another recent strength in US policy toward Asia has to do with managing US 

domestic pressures on US policy toward Asia. In general, US policy makers have 

done a better job in managing the often-strong US domestic pressures that in the 

post cold war period tended to drive US policy in extreme directions detrimental to 

a sound and balanced approach to Asia. President Bill Clinton’s engagement policy 

toward China in his second term was more coherent than the policy in his first term 

that appeared driven by competing US domestic interests. President George W. 

Bush’s policy is better suited to mainstream US opinion regarding China and has 

the added advantage of avoiding the need for significant US concessions toward 

28

15 Hugo Restall, ‘‘Tough love for China,’’ The Wall Street Journal October 21, 2002 (internet 

version) 

China on sensitive issues like Taiwan that seriously exacerbate the US domestic debate about China policy.15

Meanwhile the Bush administration has improved US relations with all the great 

powers in Asia. This strengthens US leadership in the region, and reinforces the US 

government’s ability to deal with crises and regional difficulties. The United States 

having good relations with Japan and China at the same time is very rare. The 

United States being the dominant power in South Asia and having good relations 

with both India and Pakistan is unprecedented, as is the current US maintenance 

of good relations with both Beijing and Taipei. 

Conclusion 

On balance, the Bush administration appears wise in pursuing a policy toward 

North Korea that preserves a leading role and influence for the United States in 

Asia that will be essential in US efforts to deal with the North Korean nuclear 

weapons problem in the years ahead. The policy also preserves broader US security, 

economic, and political interests in this very important world region. 

The North Korean announcement of the past week should not prompt unilateral 

US actions that would be likely to seriously alienate Asian powers and isolate the 

United States in the region. The steady and incremental US efforts to build international support to contain and pressure the North Korean regime to end nuclear 

weapons development seem more advisable under existing circumstances. In consultations with allies and associates who have been exposed to North Korean provocations and maneuvers in the Six Party Talks, the United States may eventually 

be able to come up with a way to conduct bilateral talks with North Korea with 

the supervision and support of other concerned powers, thereby avoiding North Korean manipulation of the talks to pressure the United States for concessions without 

North Korea truly ending nuclear weapons development. 

Strengthening internationally popular US-backed efforts to curb North Korean export of weapons of mass destruction represents a key element in a US containment 

policy. Unilateral use of US military force is a last resort risking disastrous consequences for South Korea and overall US interests in Asia.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Dr. Sutter. 

Mr. Wolfsthal. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JON WOLFSTHAL, DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

FOR NON-PROLIFERATION, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 

INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Subcommittee. I want to thank you for the honor of appearing before you today to discuss the urgent and serious problem of North 

Korea’s nuclear program, and yet I am sorry to say that the security of America is increasingly threatened by the continuing nuclear crisis in North Korea and that America is not prepared to 

deal with the full implications of that threat. 

The failure of American efforts, stemming from both Democratic 

and Republican Administrations, has allowed North Korea to consolidate its nuclear capabilities and has increased the risk that nuclear weapons will be used against the United States, its allies, and 

its interests worldwide. 

It would be irresponsible, however, to assume that the worst case 

about Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities is the most likely case. The 

United States cannot be certain that North Korea has any nuclear 

weapons or that it can even produce nuclear weapons, and our policies should be based on facts, not assumptions. 

But in the end, regardless of North Korea’s actual nuclear capabilities, United States policy must fully test whether North Korea 

is willing to verifiably trade its nuclear capabilities away for some 

as yet undetermined set of incentives or disincentives. 

29

This has never been done. Diplomatic efforts, as many knowledgeable analysts and officials have predicted and, as some of the 

Members here have said, may well fail. But the sincere public attempt to pursue this path by the United States is an absolute prerequisite if we are to gain the support we need from states in the 

region and around the world to deal with the consequences of a 

‘‘no’’ answer from the North. 

We should never forget that within South Korea and even China, 

leaders must manage their own internal political processes and, especially in South Korea, demonstrating our bona fide effort to pursue a diplomatic solution is a critical step to gaining support for 

stronger measures, should they become necessary. 

My testimony today will touch on two main themes. The first, as 

I was asked to do, was to assess what we know and do not know 

about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. 

Much has been said in public about the nature of the North Korean nuclear threat, but a close examination suggests our information is not quite as conclusive as some would believe. 

The second theme is in many ways more important and has already been raised here today, as it touches not on the narrow issue 

of North Korea’s nuclear status, but to the larger role of the United 

States in East Asia. 

On almost all counts, in my opinion, the assumptions that guide 

Administration policy in the region today appear questionable and 

could put American interests in long-term jeopardy. 

In assessing the nuclear capabilities of North Korea, policymakers and analysts are bombarded with a lot of soft information 

and speculation and very few facts. 

Thus, I find it useful to divide information into categories of 

what we know for sure and what we don’t know for sure. And the 

bottom line, looking at this information, is that North Korea may, 

as they themselves now claim, possess enough nuclear material to 

produce nuclear weapons. 

Those responsible for our national security cannot assume otherwise. Yet despite our best efforts to uncover the truth, very little 

is known with certainty about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. 

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld finally got it right on February 10 when he said, ‘‘I don’t want to confirm that North Korea 

has nuclear weapons, because I just can’t do that.’’

We can also not totally dismiss the possibility that North Korea 

is undertaking the greatest nuclear bluff in history. United States 

intelligence cannot confirm that North Korea possesses enough material for even one nuclear weapon, despite the language used in 

the intelligence assessments. I would be surprised if this were the 

case, but it cannot be ruled out. Moreover, as North Korea has a 

major incentive to exaggerate its capabilities, we have to take all 

of their statements with a serious grain of salt. 

The bottom line is that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities remain 

in doubt. We know they have produced some plutonium, but we 

don’t know how much. We know where they produced their nuclear 

materials, but we don’t know where they are stored. We know they 

have tried to buy equipment for uranium enrichment, but we don’t 

know if they have built any uranium production facilities. 

30

We know they have received help from Pakistan, but we don’t 

know if that help is ongoing or if they can perfect the uranium enrichment process on their own. We know they have ballistic missiles, but we don’t know if they can produce a nuclear warhead 

small or reliable enough to be placed on a missile. 

In sum, we know the plot, but we don’t know the outcome or 

even the full list of characters. 

Mr. Chairman, the title of the hearing captures the key question 

for all of us: Is there a way forward? And we all want the same 

thing: A Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. 

Yet regardless of North Korea’s current or projected nuclear capabilities, what is needed is a concrete set of recommendations for 

how the United States and its partners in the region can best bring 

about an end to North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and in this, 

there are no easy answers and no silver bullets. 

The Bush Administration is now apparently prepared to actively 

test the willingness of North Korea to negotiate away its nuclear 

program, even though they suspect North Korea will balk at the 

opportunity. 

In this, they should be supported. The question is whether the 

effort comes too late and I do not believe it does. We can still succeed, but it will require the U.S. and its partners to work more 

closely together, as Dr. Sutter just said, and to be more flexible in 

their positions. 

North Korea’s February 10 declaration that it has nuclear weapons also contains the clear statement quoted by our Chairman 

today that it was prepared to continue negotiations with the 

United States to achieve a non-nuclear peninsula. 

For U.S. policy to work, we must demonstrate, in the clearest 

possible way, that the U.S. is serious about pursuing a diplomatic 

solution. 

If North Korea refuses to accept the Six-Party format, United 

States officials should announce that they will meet anytime, anywhere with a North Korean official empowered to make real 

progress. 

The Bush Administration is right to keep other players involved, 

but it is wrong to reject any deviation from the Six-Party formula. 

China, South Korea, and Japan would all support bilateral talks 

and have stated their support for bilateral efforts, as long as we 

maintain open channels to all three countries. 

A final deal can easily be signed or endorsed in a larger multilateral process. North Korea could either accept this serious proposal 

with serious Chinese and South Korean encouragement, or North 

Korea could well, as I suspect they will, refuse, and the question 

of North Korea’s willingness to negotiate will finally be resolved. 

We should be prepared for either response, but today, in my opinion, we are prepared for neither. 

If North Korea says yes, the United States should work to make 

fast progress. Washington should be prepared to engage in continuous negotiations—not what Dr. Pritchard, our former Ambassador 

to North Korea or Ambassador to talks, has called hit and run negotiations or drive-by negotiations—and we should do these at a 

high level, and the talks should include the offer of both near-term 

31

and long-term economic and security incentives directly and 

through our allies. 

These should include, as the President has said, security guarantees to North Korea, but this Administration must demonstrate 

that United States officials are serious when they say they have no 

higher priority than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. 

Avoiding bad precedents, not rewarding bad behavior, and never 

paying blackmail, as important as those efforts are, should be secondary to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to protecting this country. 

Bad precedents cannot destroy cities or kill millions. Nuclear 

weapons can. 

As part of our efforts, North Korea must be made to understand 

that any final agreement must include a complete accounting and 

elimination of any uranium enrichment equipment and materials 

they possess or have acquired. 

But this can be accomplished in a way that does not require a 

public admission of guilt by North Korea. Such a process is similar 

to what most United States out of court settlements with polluters 

or corporate criminals, who are punished without publicly accepting blame. This model should be considered as a way out of the 

current standoff. 

But, as I believe is likely, North Korea may well refuse any serious and concerted United States offer to resolve the standoff 

through negotiations. Here again, I believe we are not prepared for 

this answer. 

How will the United States engage in coercive measures if we are 

not supported by one of our closest allies in the region, South 

Korea? 

Seoul would likely resist any United States attempt to increase 

troop levels in the South, to deploy additional missile defense, antiartillery radar, or other equipment needed to reinforce deterrents 

on the peninsula in the face of a nuclear adversary. 

How can we prevent North Korea from trying to export some of 

its nuclear capabilities? While an important tool, the proliferation 

security initiative is not a panacea. We cannot block every grapefruit-sized shipment out of that country. 

A broad legal basis for action can only be established if necessary 

through the U.N. Security Council, a forum in which, I am sorry 

to add, North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty 

and violations has never been brought up by the United States. 

None of these steps would be possible, however, unless we demonstrate that all of the other options have been exhausted. 

Despite the number of years that North Korea’s nuclear program 

has been a concern and the amount of time that United States officials and experts have invested on the issue, I am worried that 

America fundamentally seems to be misjudging some of the broader 

dynamics and key players in the region and I will touch only briefly on South Korea and China. 

Within the small community of experts who work on U.S.-ROK 

alliance, there are two main perceptions. The first, found mostly 

among current government officials and more senior experts who 

engage with the traditional power centers in Seoul, is that South 

Korea and the United States have identical security interests. This 

32

in turn leads these experts to believe that in the worst case, the 

United States and South Korea will be able to stand together in 

confronting North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and that, 

should worse come to worse, Seoul will endorse a series of coercive 

steps, including even those that increase the risk of conflict with 

the North. 

The second perception, which I hold, is found mainly among analysts and experts who engage with the so-called ‘‘386 Generation’’ 

of political leaders and experts in South Korea, who are in their 

30s, graduated from university in the 1980s, and were born in the 

1960s. 

This block forms the core of the Uri-dong party of President Roh 

Moo-hyun. Many experts in close contact with 386ers are concerned 

about the overall view of the United States and of the growing 

frustration with this stratum of South Korean society. 

This emerging generation of Korea feels they owe less to the 

United States than do their parents and increasingly view the 

North Koreans as their brethren, not their enemy. 

Moreover, it is not clear to many 386ers that the United States 

truly has the best security and political interests of South Korea 

as a primary driver. 

Members of this new generation are less likely to risk conflict 

with the North on ideological grounds, and on a basic level, I think 

it is understandable that people in the South, at least some of 

them, want to preserve stability and pursue engagement with their 

countrymen to the North and to avoid those policies often enunciated by the United States that might put those two goals at risk. 

Thus, to an increasing degree, in my opinion, United States policy toward North Korea is based on the flawed assumption that the 

U.S.-ROK alliance will prove solid enough for the United States to 

pursue a credible policy of coercion and, if necessary, offensive military action against North Korea. 

On the contrary, I believe that moves by the United States to 

tighten pressure on the North, absent over provocation by 

Pyongyang, will result in an unraveling of the U.S.-ROK alliance. 

To prevent this disaster, we must understand and be sensitive to 

the political dynamics that the Uri-dong and President Roh must 

deal with to ensure that our alliance can withstand the threat 

posed to both of us by North Korea. 

The Bush Administration also appears to believe that United 

States and Chinese interests in North Korea are identical, namely 

keeping North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. 

President Bush’s commitment to the Six-Party diplomatic process 

has been publicly justified on the need to keep China integrally engaged. United States officials have stated their belief, as many 

have here today, that only China has the leverage required to force 

North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions, yet this only captures part of China’s perspective. 

On a recent visit to Beijing, a Chinese colleague reminded me 

that China has two goals in Korea. The first is to keep the peninsula non-nuclear and the second is to preserve stability and prevent a collapse of the regime in Pyongyang. 

He asked: ‘‘Why China, now that the first goal appears lost, 

should throw away the second?’’ Thus, at least in some parts of the 

33

Chinese community, there is a real disconnect between Chinese 

and American goals. 

The concern that stems from this disconnect is, over the long 

run, convinced the Chinese possess the leverage needed to bring 

North Korea to heel, United States officials will increasingly wonder why China has chosen not to use that leverage. 

Convinced that their strategy is right, some American officials 

may increasingly view China as a scapegoat for the failure of 

American policy. This in turn can reignite some longstanding concerns about China and its role within the region, held by some of 

the more conservative personalities within the Administration. 

Mr. Chairman, it may be too late to keep North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons and we may, despite any and all efforts, 

be unable to roll back whatever capabilities they currently possess. 

History may well look back at our failed efforts with North Korea 

as a turning point, when the nuclear dam bursts and nuclear weapons became widespread and commonplace in the arsenals of scores 

of countries. 

If such a future were to pass, despite our best efforts, it would 

be horrific and hard to live with, but knowing we have not done 

our best and have not pursued all avenues available to us makes 

such a future even harder to face. 

This is true not just because of the implications for North Korea, 

but because it will lay bare the fallacy that the top priority of this 

and past Administrations—to prevent the spread of weapons of 

mass destruction—has not, in fact, been true. 

All recent Presidents have used the words to demonstrate that 

they understand the unique threat posed by these weapons. Finding out that we have not meant what we have said will reduce the 

credibility of the United States worldwide at the very time that its 

conventional capabilities are increasingly challenged by emerging 

nuclear arsenals in various states. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfsthal follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JON WOLFSTHAL, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR NONPROLIFERATION, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

NO GOOD CHOICES—THE IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA

I want to thank the Chairman and members of the subcommittees for the honor 

of appearing before you today to discuss the urgent and serious issue of nuclear 

weapons on the Korean peninsula. It is a great privilege to provide any insight or 

information I can to Congress, the heart of our great American democracy. And yet 

I am sorry to say that the security of America is increasingly threatened by the 

long-standing and continuing nuclear crisis in North Korea and that America is not 

prepared to deal with the full implications of that threat. The failure of American 

efforts—stemming from both democratic and republican administrations—has allowed North Korea to consolidate its nuclear capabilities and has increased the risk 

that nuclear weapons will be used against the United States, its allies and its interests worldwide. As a result, nuclear weapons could become the currency of power 

in East Asia and elsewhere, to the detriment of American interests. 

That being said, it would be irresponsible to assume that the worst case about 

Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities is the most likely case. The United States cannot 

be certain that North Korea has nuclear weapons or even that it can produce nuclear weapons. Our policies should be based on facts, not assumptions. But, in the 

end, US policy must fully test the proposition that North Korea would be willing 

to verifiably trade all of its nuclear capabilities away for some as yet undetermined 

set of incentives/disincentives, regardless of North Korea’s actual nuclear capabilities. This has never been done. I repeat, the US has no conclusive way of knowing 

34

if North Korea would be willing to eliminate its nuclear capabilities as part of a diplomatic settlement. We have pieces of information and partial evidence that can 

help us predict, but no conclusive answers. Diplomatic efforts, as many knowledgeable analysts have predicted, may well fail and I am personally skeptical that North 

Korea will trade away its nuclear program, in current circumstances. But the sincere and public attempt to pursue this path by the United States is an absolute prerequisite if we are to gain the support we need from states in the region and around 

the world to deal with the consequences of a ‘‘no’’ from the North. In addition, a 

true diplomatic attempt is also a first step to taking those measures needed to protect ourselves and our allies, to reinforce deterrence on the peninsula, to prevent 

North Korea’s capabilities from spreading to others, and to prevent North Korea’s 

proliferation from becoming a ‘‘how-to guide’’ for others such as Iran. It appears, at 

least from press reports, that the administration is trying to move too quickly to 

the next step in the process—coercive steps against the North—without laying the 

adequate ground work by truly exhausting diplomatic avenues. We must never forget that within South Korea and even China, the leaders must manage their own 

internal political processes and especially in South Korea, demonstrating our bone 

fide efforts to pursue a diplomatic solution is a critical step to gaining support for 

stronger measures that may become necessary. 

My testimony today will touch on two main themes. The first is to assess what 

we know and do not know about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Much has been 

said in public about the nature of the North Korean nuclear threat, but closer examination suggests our information is not quite as conclusive as some would believe. 

While currently holding no clearances, I worked at the Department of Energy during the 1990s, served as the US Government on-site monitor at North Korea’s nuclear facilities in 1995 and 1996, and tracked North Korea closely for 15 years—

experiences which give me at least a basic capability to assess what we do and do 

not know. The second theme is in many ways more important as it touches not on 

the narrow issue of North Korea’s nuclear status, but to the larger role of the US 

in East Asia. Current US policy toward the North is based on a set of assumptions 

about how our partners in the region see us and our objectives, and where their key 

interests lie. On almost all counts, the assumptions of the current administration 

in the region are appear questionable and put American interests in long-term jeopardy. 

NATURE OF THE THREAT

In assessing the nuclear capabilities of North Korea, policy makers and analysts 

are bombarded with a lot of soft information and speculation, but very few facts. 

I have previously referred to North Korea as an intelligence black hole. Thus, I find 

it useful to divide information into categories of what we ‘‘know’’, what is ‘‘reasonable’’ to believe, and what we cannot know for sure. 

The bottom line is that North Korea may, as they themselves now claim, possess 

enough nuclear material to produce nuclear weapons. It is reasonable to assume 

that given the capabilities of North Korea’s facilities and the amount of time they 

have spent on nuclear pursuits that they have enough technical skill and material 

to produce at least a basic nuclear device. Those responsible for our national security cannot assume otherwise. Yet despite our best efforts to uncover the truth, very 

little is known with certainty about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Secretary of 

Defense Donald Rumsfeld got it right when he said on February 10th that ‘‘I don’t 

want to confirm that [North Korea has nuclear weapons] because I just can’t do 

that.’’

However, we cannot totally dismiss the possibility that North Korea is undertaking the greatest nuclear bluff in history. US Intelligence cannot confirm that 

North Korea possesses enough nuclear material for even one nuclear bomb. I would 

be surprised if this was the case, but it cannot be ruled out. Moreover, as North 

Korea has a major incentive to exaggerate its capabilities, we have to take all of 

their statements with a grain of salt. 

PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION AND STOCKS

What we ‘‘know’’

North Korea has produced and separated an unknown amount of plutonium. 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors were allowed to take samples of North Korea’s declared plutonium inventory of 62 grams in the early 1990s, 

and the agency believes that more than that amount was produced prior to 1992. 

North Korea now claims it possesses at least 25–30 kilograms of plutonium—enough 

for several weapons—extracted from 8000 spent fuel rods removed from its 5MW 

reactor in 1994 and previously frozen under IAEA inspection until 2003. 

35

What is ‘‘reasonable’’ to believe? 

US intelligence stated repeatedly throughout the 1990s that it believed North 

Korea had enough plutonium to produce 1 or maybe 2 nuclear weapons. Since 2002, 

North Korea may have been able to process the plutonium from 8000 spent fuel rods 

and could now have enough plutonium to produce perhaps 10 nuclear weapons, depending on how much plutonium was in the fuel and how much material North 

Korea requires for each device. This, however, is a worst-case scenario based on 

what is known about the technical capabilities of North Korea’s nuclear facilities 

and cannot be publicly confirmed. Any official responsible for the security of the 

United States must plan for the possibility that North Korea does possess a nuclear 

device, and perhaps several such devices. 

What we don’t know 

It is not publicly known with any certainty if North Korea possesses a nuclear 

weapon or if it has actually produced enough plutonium to build a weapon. Not 

enough conclusive evidence has been collected to discount the possibility that North 

Korea’s nuclear program is anything but a Trojan horse. If North Korea does possess nuclear weapons or large stocks of plutonium, the location of these assets is 

unknown. 

Conclusion 

National security officials must assume that North Korea has a basic nuclear 

weapon arsenal, but should be open to the possibility that it has none at all. North 

Korea has been very effective at hiding information about its nuclear activities from 

both the United States and the IAEA, keeping alive the possibility that its capabilities are less advanced than it would like others to believe. 

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES

In the summer of 2002, US intelligence concluded that North Korea was actively 

pursuing the production of uranium for use in nuclear weapons. Unclassified materials sent to Congress stated that the intelligence community had ‘‘recently learned 

that the North is constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade 

uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational—which 

could be as soon as mid-decade.’’

What we ‘‘know’’

It is known that North Korea transacted business with the nuclear black market 

operation run by A.Q. Khan out of Pakistan and that it sought to import large 

amounts of specialized uranium enrichment equipment (known as centrifuges). 

North Korean officials reportedly acknowledged pursuing a uranium program during 

bilateral meetings with US officials in Pyongyang in October 2002, but have publicly 

denied it ever since. North Korea has large deposits of uranium ore, but would need 

to perfect a number of highly sophisticated and demanding operations to produce 

weapon-usable uranium. US intelligence has not publicly identified any uranium enrichment facilities in North Korea. 

What is ‘‘Reasonable’’ to believe? 

It is reasonable to believe that North Korea has a uranium enrichment program. 

North Korea has sold missiles to Pakistan and A.Q. Khan is alleged to have taken 

almost a dozen trips to North Korea in the 1990s. However, there is great skepticism in the technical community whether North Korea can perfect the uranium 

enrichment process (highly demanding for a technically backward but industrious 

state) and North Korea may still be many years away from being able to produce 

weapons uranium, if such an effort is actually underway. 

What we don’t know 

We don’t know if North Korea is really building a uranium capability, and if so, 

where it is. It is possible that North Korea received specialized equipment for uranium as part of the A.Q. Khan network, but then transshipped them to another recipient such as Iran or Libya. We also don’t have any public confirmation about 

whether North Korea continues to receive outside technical assistance in its pursuit 

of a uranium enrichment capability. 

WEAPONS PRODUCTION

What we know 

Very little is known about weapon production activities in North Korea. North 

Korea has a highly developed conventional weapons and high explosives production 

capability and is a leading exporter of basic military equipment (rifles, mortars, 

36

landmines, etc). This experience with explosives and manufacturing would be helpful in producing a first generation nuclear weapon. 

What is ‘‘reasonable’’ to believe? 

It is reasonable to assume that North Korea has the ability to produce a basic 

nuclear device, along the lines of those produced by the United States in the 1940s. 

It is also possible that North Korea gained access to more advanced nuclear designs 

through the A.Q. Khan network, which provided weapon designs to Libya and possibly Iran. US intelligence believes that North Korea is capable of producing a small 

enough nuclear device to put on a short and possibly a medium range ballistic missile (in range of Japan),but the extent of North Korea’s ability to miniaturize a nuclear device for a long-range missile is in doubt. A recent South Korean intelligence 

assessment stated that delivery by aircraft was more likely and technically feasible 

than delivery by missile. The US has yet to publicly authenticate its most recent 

assessment that North Korea might be able to deliver a nuclear sized payload by 

ballistic missile to the United States via the Taepo-Dong 2 missile. 

What we don’t know 

It is unknown if North Korea has produced actual nuclear weapons and, if so, how 

many. It is also not known if North Korea can produce small enough nuclear devices 

to place them on missiles for delivery or if the warheads are reliable enough to work 

if delivered by missile system. 

The bottom line is that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities remain in question and 

public statements by US officials, or by North Korean officials, should be consumed 

with a healthy dose of skepticism. A prime example is the recent press reporting 

that North Korea may have shipped uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to Libya. Such a 

transaction may have taken place. There is not enough publicly available information, however, to conclude that such a transfer actually took place or indeed that 

North Korea is even able to produce the material in question. However, the reports 

that this determination was made on the basis of technical work done at the US 

laboratories and is not the result of an intelligence community wide assessment 

raises red flags in the minds of many concerned about the lessons learned from the 

run up to the war with Iraq. To be sure, North Korea may have the ability to 

produce UF6 and could have exported this material to Libya, with clear and serious 

implications for their willingness to engage in other, more dangerous transfers. But 

the certainty with which people speak about the case does not appear supported by 

what is known publicly and the public’s faith in information the intelligence community uses to increase its certainty has, at the very least, been shaken. 

A brief discussion of this issue was posted to the Carnegie Endowment’s Webpage 

www.proliferationnews.org in early February. It states: 

‘‘Not So Fast 

US officials recently briefed Chinese and South Korean officials on information 

they maintain proves North Korea shipped uranium hexafluoride to Libya. The material is a precursor for nuclear weapons production. The new claims are based on 

two pieces of evidence uncovered by US laboratory experts, most likely at Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory where Libya’s nuclear equipment is being studied. The first is 

that the isotopic composition of the uranium may reveal a North Korean source. The 

second is that the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) containers from Libya revealed 

traces of plutonium identical to those previously found in North Korea. An examination of publicly available information, however, suggests the evidence is far from 

conclusive. 

1. Uranium composition 

Uranium is made up of several different isotopes, including Uranium-235 (used 

in nuclear weapons at high levels of enrichment), Uranium-238, and Uranium-234, 

which is very rare. Reports indicate that US experts compared the U-234 percentages in the Libyan material against known samples of uranium from around the 

world. As the US does not have samples of uranium from North Korea, the experts 

concluded that the sample must have come from North Korea by process of elimination. 

This raises the possibility, however, that the Libyan material comes from another 

uranium mine for which the US has no sample or record, or that the uranium ore 

was exported from North Korea, converted to UF6 in another country, and then 

shipped to Libya. Pakistan has large-scale UF6 conversion capabilities and was at 

the heart of the A.Q. Khan supply network. Recent press reports indicate that several canisters of UF6 are believed to be missing from the A.Q. Khan laboratories 

in Pakistan, a charge Pakistani officials have denied. In addition, technical experts 

have confirmed that U-234 content can vary greatly even within the same mine or 

37

even within the same sample of ore, raising the possibility that the uranium sample 

does come from a known source. 

2. Plutonium Traces 

According to media sources, the UF6 shipping containers moved from Libya to the 

United States revealed samples of plutonium that match those previously taken in 

North Korea. This suggests some link between North Korea and Libya (possibly 

through an intermediary country such as Pakistan) but could be the result of crosscontamination between the canisters and other equipment. UF6 containers are routinely packaged for transport in larger over packs and shipping crates, many of 

which can be used for a variety of functions. Although the circumstantial link cannot be ruled out, the plutonium samples would not in themselves provide a conclusive link that the uranium contained in them was produced or, indeed, was ever in 

North Korea. One possible alternative explanation is that the canisters were sent 

from somewhere else to North Korea and then transshipped to Libya. 

Pyongyang is known with certainty to have a plutonium production capability and 

may possess enough separated plutonium to produce a small arsenal of nuclear 

weapons. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry claimed on February 10 that the government has already produced nuclear weapons. Less information is known about their 

alleged uranium enrichment program. US government officials have yet to publicly 

identify any uranium enrichment sites in North Korea, and it is not known with 

certainty that North Korea can produce uranium hexafluoride. It is possible that 

North Korea can produce limited amounts of UF6, and the evidence of North Korea’s previous attempts to purchase uranium enrichment technology through the 

A.Q. Khan supply network seems credible. However, the link between Libya and 

North Korea appears tenuous, based on what is publicly known. 

If the information is not fully supported by the US intelligence community and 

is not as conclusive as US officials appear to be asserting to Chinese and other officials, it risks further damaging US credibility with key countries in the Far East. 

China has been openly skeptical of the US claims that North Korea has an enrichment program. Should these links between North Korea and Libya prove false, it 

may be hard to reestablish China’s confidence in US diplomatic and intelligence efforts.’’

IS THERE A PATH FORWARD?

The title of this hearing captures the key question for all of us. We all want the 

same thing—a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. Yet regardless of North 

Korea’s current or projected nuclear capabilities, what is needed is a concrete set 

of recommendations for how the United States and its partners in the region can 

best bring about the end to North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. In this, there are 

no easy answers and no silver bullets. The suggestions I will make today are also 

contained in a forthcoming policy document authored with my colleagues at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace named Universal Compliance: A Strategy 

for Nuclear Security. This report is the result of an intensive, international 18-

month effort to develop a new effective nonproliferation policy that can gain broad 

international support. The main conclusions from this report on North Korea inform 

my testimony and, and this brief section is attached as an appendix to my formal 

statement. 

Before I continue, however, a word about the past. The past cannot be undone 

and, as they say, there is plenty of blame to go around. Yet for all of the criticism 

levied at the Clinton administration and the 1994 Agreed Framework—one thing is 

clear to me. President Clinton, despite the unpopularity of the move within Congress and even within the security community, was willing to make tough decisions 

and do what was necessary to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program and protect the 

United States from the inherent threat posed by the acquisition of nuclear weapons 

by North Korea. He put the national interest above his political interests or personal ideology. Within his time in office, he was successful. Whatever plutonium 

North Korea has today was acquired either before he was elected or since the Bush 

administration took office. 

Moreover, the past four years are littered with missed opportunities for the Bush 

administration to take the same leadership and make the hard decisions—either for 

real engagement or real coercion—to reverse North Korea’s nuclear program. For 

the first few years, internal disputes and ideological positions prevented the US 

from adopting any consistent policy and officials deliberately downplayed the nature 

of the developments in North Korea. We are now living with the consequences. We 

cannot make up for this lost time, but neither can we ignore the implications of our 

past and current policies for how our future efforts will be judged in the region. 

38

The Bush administration is now apparently prepared to actively test the willingness of North Korea to negotiate away its nuclear program, even though they expect 

North Korea to balk at the opportunity. I believe the administration is now prepared to offer Pyongyang a concrete set of long-term incentives in exchange for the 

total and monitored elimination of its nuclear capabilities, providing more specifics 

to flesh out the proposal tables last June at the 3rd round of the 6 party talks. In 

this, they should be supported. The question is whether this effort comes too late. 

I do not believe it does. We still have an opportunity to succeed, but it will require 

the US and its partners to work more closely together and to be more flexible in 

their positions. North Korea’s February 10th declaration that it has nuclear weapons also contained a clear statement that it was prepared to engage in negotiations 

with the United States to achieve a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. The Foreign 

Ministry stated that ‘‘[T]he DPRK’s principled stand to solve the issue through dialogue and negotiations and its ultimate goal to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula 

remain unchanged.’’ It is possible that the statement was designed simply to raise 

the price North Korea could charge China for Pyongyang’s attendance at the six 

party talks. Now is the time to find out. 

For any US policy to work, we must demonstrate in the clearest possible way that 

the US is serious about pursuing a diplomatic solution. If North Korea refuses to 

accept the six party format, the US should be prepared to announce that it would 

meet anytime, anywhere with North Korean officials empowered to make real 

progress on the nuclear issue. The Bush administration is right to keep other key 

players involved, but is wrong to reject any deviation from the 6 party formula. 

China, South Korea and Japan would all support such a move as long as we maintained open channels to all three countries. Any final agreement, on the slim chance 

that one can be reached, could be completed in a multilateral format and endorsed 

by the six parties or even the UN Security Council. North Korea could accept the 

serious proposal, with Chinese and South Korean encouragement, and if so the US 

will have the opportunity to lay out a detailed, reasonable proposal to the North. 

However, North Korea could well refuse and the question of North Korea’s willingness to negotiate will be resolved. We should be prepared for either response. Today, 

we are prepared for neither. 

If North Korea says yes to negotiations and the outlines of an agreement, the 

United States should work to make fast progress. Washington should be prepared 

to engage in continuous negotiations at a high level and to include both near-term 

and longer term economic and security incentives to the North directly, and through 

our allies. These should include, as the President has said, security guarantees to 

North Korea. But this administration must demonstrate that US officials are serious when they say that they have no higher priority than preventing the spread of 

nuclear weapons. Avoiding bad precedents, not rewarding bad behavior, and never 

paying blackmail—as unpleasant as they are—should be secondary principles to 

preventing nuclear proliferation and protecting the country. Bad precedents cannot 

destroy a city or kill millions. Nuclear weapons can. 

There is much work to be done to negotiate a verifiable agreement. Once the basic 

parameters are set, the US should be prepared to endorse certain temporary incentives for North Korea to adopt a full freeze on their nuclear program and, as they 

have offered to do, place all of the plutonium recovered from spent fuel in the past 

few years back under inspection. Thus, we would freeze the clock and stop losing 

ground while negotiations proceed. North Korea must be made to understand that 

any final agreement must include a complete accounting and elimination of any uranium enrichment equipment and materials they may possess or have acquired, but 

that this can be accomplished in a way that does not require a public admission 

of guilt by North Korea. Such a process is similar to most US out-of-court settlements with polluters and corporate criminals who are punished without publicly accepting blame. This model should be seen as a way to escape the standoff over uranium enrichment in which the US and North Korea find themselves. 

Despite several years of effort the US is still not sure how it would move to implement a comprehensive agreement with North Korea. While much work has been 

done on verification, little preparation has been made for how to secure and dismantle North Korea’s capabilities. Exactly how North Korea’s facilities would be dismantled, by whom and under what kind of monitoring remains to be worked out. 

It is also not clear what role China, South Korea and Japan might play in Cooperative Threat Reduction-style efforts in North Korea such as reactor dismantling, 

spent fuel and nuclear waste removal and disposal, etc. Much more work on these 

critical issues, including learning the lessons from Russia, Iraq and Libya, needs to 

be done and I am pleased to note that some useful work is being carried out as part 

of a joint project between the Carnegie Endowment and the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies. 

39

But, as I believe is likely, North Korea may refuse a serious and concerted US 

offer to resolve the standoff through negotiations. Here again, the US is not prepared for this answer. How will the US engage in coercive measures if they are not 

supported by one of our closest allies in the region—South Korea? Today, most 

South Koreans blame the US for the crisis and most would resist any US attempt 

to increase troop levels in the South or to deploy additional missile defenses, antiartillery radar, and other equipment needed to reinforce stability and deterrence in 

the face of a nuclear North Korea. How can we prevent North Korea from trying 

to export some of its nuclear capabilities? How would we react if the North resumed 

testing of ballistic missiles or conducted a nuclear weapons test? While an important 

tool, the Proliferation Security Initiative is not a panacea. A broad, legal basis for 

action can only be established through the UN Security Council, a forum in which 

North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT has never been brought up by the United 

States. Yet none of these steps will be possible unless we demonstrate that other 

options have been exhausted. 

BROADER ISSUES

The state of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is an important issue for American 

security and for the security of US friends and allies in East Asia and beyond. Yet, 

despite the number of years the North’s nuclear program has been a concern and 

the amount of time US officials and experts have invested on the issue, America 

appears to be fundamentally misjudging the dynamics in key regional states. Managing nuclear diplomacy toward North Korea has always been a complicated dance 

with multiple partners. There has rarely been a moment when all of the major actors are on the same page, or have pursued a common approach toward the North. 

THE US–ROK ALLIANCE

Within the small community of experts who work on the US–ROK alliance, there 

are two main perceptions. The first, found mostly among current government officials and more senior experts who engage with the traditional power centers in 

Seoul, is that the relationship between the US and South Korea is stable and that 

South Korea and the United States have identical security interests. This in turn 

leads these experts to believe that in the worst case, the United States and South 

Korea will be able to stand together in confronting North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear 

weapons and that, should worse come to worse, that Seoul will endorse a series of 

coercive steps, including those that increase the risk of conflict with the North. 

The second perception is found among analysts and experts who engage with the 

386 generation of political leaders and experts in South Korea (those currently in 

their 30s, graduated university in the 80s and born in the 60s) who now form the 

core of the Uri-Dong party of President Roh Moo-hyun. These experts, who closely 

track public attitudes among the younger generation in South Korea, are concerned 

about the overall view of the United States and of the growing frustration within 

this stratum of society. The emerging generation in Korea feels they owe less to the 

United States than their parents do, and increasingly view North Koreans as their 

brethren, not their enemy. Moreover, it is not clear to many 386ers that the US has 

the best security and political interests of South Korea at heart. The treatment of 

former President Kim Dae Jung by Washington in 2001, the redeployment of US 

troops from Korea to Iraq, and the blunt manner in which large-scale troop reductions were handled last year reinforce this perception. 

Moreover, members of this new generation are less likely to risk conflict with the 

North on ideological grounds. On a basic level, I think it is understandable that people in the South was to preserve stability and to pursue engagement with their 

countrymen to the North, and to avoid those policies—often put forward by the 

United States—that might put those two goals at risk. This is sometimes thought 

of as anti-Americanism, a perception I do not share. In fact, the sentiments sometimes expressed as ‘‘anti-American’’ are just as often expressions of frustration with 

the slow pace of economic reform, a resistance to adopt traditional Korean cultural 

obligations, and a natural desire to peace, stability and prosperity. There are clearly 

anti-American elements in South Korea, but the reality is more complicated that it 

seems. 

Thus, to an increasing degree, US policy toward North Korea is based on the 

flawed assumption that the US–ROK alliance will prove solid enough for the United 

States to pursue a credible policy of coercion and, if necessary, offensive military actions against North Korea. Based on my admittedly limited experience with South 

Korean politics, I believe that moves by the United States to tighten pressure on 

the North—absent overt provocation by the Pyongyang—will result in an unraveling 

of the US–ROK alliance. As a consequence, some in South Korea may also begin 

40

to reassess their nuclear options. The only way this can be avoided is if the US can 

demonstrate that it has truly exhausted diplomatic efforts with North Korea, including the possibility of multilateral and bilateral talks, and the offering of explicit incentives to the North to abandon its nuclear efforts. We must understand and be 

sensitive to the political dynamics that the Uri-dong and President Roh must deal 

with to ensure that our alliance can withstand the threat posed by North Korea. 

US-CHINA

The Bush administration appears to believe that US and Chinese interests in 

North Korea are identical—namely keeping North Korea from acquiring nuclear 

weapons. President Bush’s commitment to the 6-party diplomatic process has been 

publicly justified on the need to keep China engaged, and to use their perceived leverage over North Korea. US officials has stated their belief that China alone has 

the leverage required to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Yet, 

this only captures part of the picture from China’s perspective. As a Chinese colleague recently reminded me, China has two main goals in Korea. The first goal is 

to keep the peninsula non-nuclear, and the second goal is to preserve stability and 

prevent a collapse of the regime in Pyongyang. He asked why China—now that the 

first goal appears lost—should throw away the second. Thus, at least in some parts 

of the Chinese leadership, there is a real disconnect between Chinese and US goals. 

The concern that stems from this disconnect is that over the long run, convinced 

that China possesses the leverage needed to bring North Korea to heel, US officials 

will wonder why China has chosen not to use its leverage. Convinced their strategy 

is right, some American officials may increasingly view China as a scapegoat for the 

failure of US policy. This, in turn, can reignite some longstanding concerns about 

China and its role in the region among some of the more conservative personalities 

within the administration. 

Chinese officials have played a positive role in orchestrating the 6-party talks and 

in ensuring North Korea’s past participation in those talks, yet China continues to 

see its role as a mediator between the United States and North Korea, whereas 

Washington wants to ensure that China is a protagonist supporting US goals and 

applying its leverage on North Korea to abandon its nuclear activities. For its part, 

however, China has not conditioned its efforts with North Korea on the continuation 

of the 6 party talks, and in fact China has consistently counseled the US to engage 

directly with North Korea. President Bush and his administration deserve credit for 

the positive trends in the US–PRC relationship and more should be done to reinforce these developments. But we must have better communication, listen more effectively, and keep the DPRK from driving a wedge between our two countries. 

US-JAPAN

Here, too, the Bush administration deserves great credit for the strong condition 

of the US-Japanese alliance. Almost all of my Japanese colleagues have expressed 

their belief that the alliance is stronger today than at any time in recent memory. 

Moreover, due to the unpleasant kidnapping issue with North Korea, Japanese public sentiment has turned strongly against engagement with North Korea and is now 

more closely in turn with American policy. The central question is whether this 

emotional political issue will sustain anti-North Korean sentiment over the longterm, or if the risk of conflict in the region increases, whether Japanese concerns 

about instability and the military and economic consequences of military action will 

force the Japanese public to modify its position vis a vis the United States and 

North Korea. 

CONCLUSIONS

It may be too late to keep North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons and we 

may, despite any and all efforts, be unable to roll back whatever nuclear capabilities 

North Korea has acquired. History may well look back at our failed efforts with 

North Korea as the turning point when the nuclear dam burst and nuclear weapons 

became widespread and commonplace in the arsenals of scores of countries. If such 

a future were to come to pass despite our best efforts, it would be horrific and hard 

to live with. But knowing that we have not done our best and pursued all avenues 

available to us makes such a future even harder to face. This is true not just because of the implications for North Korea, but because it will lay bare the fallacy 

that the top priority of the administration is to prevent the spread and use of these 

weapons. All recent presidents have used the words to demonstrate that they understand the unique threat posed by these weapons. Finding out that we have not 

meant what we have said will reduce the credibility of the United States worldwide 

41

at the very time that its conventional capabilities are increasingly challenged by 

emerging nuclear arsenals in various states. 

Most immediately, we must be concerned that Iran is taking its cues from the 

North Korea playbook. I am increasingly concerned that Iran has now learned that 

its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons can be successful is pursued not in leaps and 

bounds, but step by small step. Here again, I believe out efforts do not reflect the 

seriousness of the issue or take advantage of the opportunities that are available. 

But in North Korea, this has and continues clearly to be the case. 

Thank you. 

APPENDIX

Excerpt from Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2005

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) AND NORTHEAST

North Korea (formally, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has 

an active nuclear weapons program and likely possesses enough nuclear material 

for up to nine nuclear weapons. U.S. troops, allies in the region, and strategic interests are directly threatened by North Korea’s growing nuclear capability, pursued 

in violation of Pyongyang’s commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and 

other agreements. Acceptance of a North Korean nuclear weapons capability is inconsistent with vital U.S. national security interests. Given North Korea’s economic 

strains, it is conceivable that Pyongyang might sell nuclear materials or weapons 

to other states or terrorist groups, taking a regional threat to the global level. In 

such a scenario, U.S. policy makers could face the truly appalling choice between 

acquiescing in North Korea’s transfer of its weapons technology or fighting a fullfledged war on the Korean peninsula. 

Even if North Korea does not make nuclear exports, its nuclear status is untenable. A failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear threat would undermine the 

cause of nuclear nonproliferation and make it far more likely that South Korea and 

Japan would reconsider their own nuclear status. 

The United States and its partners in dialogue with North Korea must move more 

aggressively to determine whether and under what conditions North Korea is willing to relinquish its nuclear capabilities. Finding Pyongyang’s bottom line will allow 

the United States and its allies either to negotiate a verifiable end to North Korea’s 

nuclear program or to build a consensus on responding to the threat posed by North 

Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons. The status quo is rapidly becoming a permanent 

crisis that threatens to undermine U.S. influence in the region and weaken the regional commitment to nonproliferation. 

The creation of a six-party negotiating mechanism was a positive development, 

but it has not yet produced tangible results. While the talks have enabled the 

United States to more closely engage China on the issue of North Korea’s nuclear 

future, it remains unclear how far Beijing can or is willing to go in pressuring North 

Korea to abandon its program. China may not have an interest in a nuclear North 

Korea on its border, but it is also averse to regime collapse or a war between the 

United States and North Korea that could result in U.S. troops being placed on the 

Chinese border. All in all, China may find the status quo tolerable, and the United 

States cannot assume that China will be able or willing to deliver North Korea’s 

consent or compliance with a denuclearization agreement. Moreover, some in China 

may prefer keeping the North Korean nuclear issue—a threat to U.S. interests—

alive as a counterweight to U.S. interests in Taiwan, an overriding Chinese concern. 

A new U.S. policy designed to achieve positive results in East Asia must follow 

a new course. First, it is essential that the United States and its allies develop an 

international consensus through the UN Security Council that North Korea’s actions 

are a threat to international peace and security and that North Korea’s attempt to 

withdraw from an agreement it has violated is unacceptable. Once this is done, it 

may prove more feasible for the United States to test the will of North Korea to 

fully, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle all its nuclear weapon capabilities in exchange for a fundamentally different relationship with the United States, including 

diplomatic relations and peaceful reconstruction assistance. This will involve real 

negotiations with North Korea, although these could take place in the broad context 

of the six-party talks. 

Regardless of the forum, the United States should pursue rapid and ongoing negotiations with North Korea led by a presidentially appointed envoy. This person must 

be fully committed to the negotiations, prepared and empowered to make serious 

progress, and meet with North Korean counterparts of sufficient rank to make 

42

progress. However, for any talks—bilateral or six-party—to succeed, the United 

States must also work steadily to enhance its alliances with South Korea and Japan 

so as to broaden support for U.S. security objectives in the region, including the absence of nuclear weapons. 

At the same time, the United States must prepare itself and its closest allies for 

the possibility that North Korea will not abandon its nuclear capabilities. Preparations can best be made by reinforcing diplomatic and military capabilities in the region to enhance deterrence and stability on the Korean peninsula and reduce incentives for other countries to follow North Korea’s nuclear lead. A key part of avoiding 

a crisis during this period, however, is for to the United States to lay down clear 

‘‘red lines’’ and make clear at a minimum that any attempt by North Korea to export nuclear materials or weapons will be considered a threat to international peace 

and security. 

The regional security consequences of an ongoing North Korean nuclear weapon 

capability are dire. So too are the implications of allowing North Korea’s violations 

of the international treaty regime to go unpunished. By violating and then attempting to withdraw from the NPT, North Korea has undermined the fundamental 

premise of the regime—that the international community is prepared to hold countries to their commitments. In keeping with the UN Security Council’s presidential 

statement of January 1992, which declared the proliferation of nuclear weapons a 

threat to international peace and security, Security Council members have a responsibility to respond to North Korea’s actions. Yet even now, the Security Council has 

yet to respond to North Korea’s violations and withdrawal as reported to the council 

by the IAEA. If a negotiated settlement cannot be reached after a determined goodfaith effort, then the United States must work with its allies to obtain a Security 

Council resolution that North Korea’s violations are a threat to international peace 

and security and that its withdrawal from the NPT was invalid. The United States 

must then prepare for the consequences, including the possibility of sanctions, an 

embargo, and even military conflict. 

Summary of Policy Recommendations 

• Determine whether and under what conditions North Korea is willing to relinquish its nuclear capabilities.

• Develop an international consensus through the UN Security Council that 

North Korea’s actions are a threat to international peace and security and 

that North Korea’s attempt to withdraw from an agreement it has violated 

is unacceptable.

• Fully test the will of North Korea to verifiably implement the irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapon capabilities in exchange for a fundamentally different relationship with the United States and other countries, including diplomatic relations and reconstruction assistance.

• Further enhance U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan to broaden support for U.S. security objectives in the region, including the absence of nuclear 

weapons.

• End the state of permanent crisis by pursuing rapid and ongoing negotiations 

with North Korea led by a presidentially appointed envoy. This person must 

be fully authorized to negotiate, prepared and empowered to make serious 

progress, and in a position to meet with North Korean counterparts of sufficient rank to conduct substantive negotiations.

• Prepare for the possibility that North Korea is unwilling to abandon its nuclear capabilities by reinforcing the diplomatic and military capabilities in the 

region with a view to enhancing deterrence and stability on the Korean peninsula and reducing incentives for other countries to follow North Korea’s 

nuclear lead.

• Make clear that any attempt by North Korea to export weapon-usable nuclear 

materials or weapons will be considered a threat to international peace and 

security as defined by the UN Charter.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you all very much for your very insightful testimony. Everyone has added something of great significance. 

In your written testimony, let me begin Mr. Wolfsthal, you mentioned the necessity of a Presidentially-appointed envoy. Now as 

you know, the Administration has designated someone to play this 

role. Does this fit your description? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I believe it does. 

43

Mr. LEACH. Could you pull the microphone closer? 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Sorry. Yes, sir. I believe it does. Although I 

have never met Ambassador Hill, everyone I have spoken with has 

the highest admiration for him and I believe that the stars have 

aligned within this Administration, both from the President and 

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, to empower Ambassador Hill to 

truly test the diplomatic efforts. And as long as it is publicly recognized that he has the Secretary of State’s and the President’s authorization to pursue that, I think it is very consistent with what 

we have been suggesting. 

Mr. LEACH. Let me just ask a little different kind of question. I 

think there appears to be unanimity on the notion of containment 

and the notion of multilateral negotiations. 

Is there a role for out-of-the-box contacts that aren’t part of the 

political negotiations? I think the Six-Party framework makes eminently good sense. 

If there is a psychology that people want to directly deal with the 

United States, is there a way to put that in another kind of box? 

I am thinking in two ways. One, as we know, in the Six-Party 

context, there are informal discussions that occur bilaterally. One 

might upgrade that bilateral to a more significant status. 

By the same token, might one take totally out of politics some 

sort of exchange that implied people-to-people relations and is that 

helpful or just foolish that might have some symbolism? 

Dr. Sutter? 

Mr. SUTTER. I tend to endorse Mr. Eberstadt’s view of North Korea’s intentions and so when you have these informal discussions 

with North Korea, you have to calculate that you are dealing with 

a regime that is pretty ruthless and therefore extremely manipulative. 

This has to be done, I think, carefully so that you don’t get exploited. I think it is extremely easy to get exploited by the North 

Korean regime. 

My sense is that this should be on the table. We should be discussing this and I think I would judge that this might be well done 

in coordination with the U.S. Government so that it isn’t so outof-the-box that the Administration would be surprised by it or so 

forth. 

Mr. LEACH. It would have to be an Administration initiative. It 

couldn’t be anything else. 

Mr. SUTTER. I am sorry. I thought you were talking about a private——

Mr. LEACH. An Administration initiative to suggest that there 

might be bilateral discussions, for example in the field of agronomy, in the field of medicine. 

Mr. SUTTER. I see what you mean. 

Mr. LEACH. In arts. In this regard, let me say it would be United 

States’ leadership, not North Korean manipulation, and the reason 

I stress this is that almost any exchange is the type of thing that 

I think we hold the upper edge in, in basic quality and the only 

conceivable purpose is to make it clear that there is a respectful 

relationship and to manage alliances. 

Mr. SUTTER. I see. 

44

Mr. LEACH. But only an Administrative initiative and nothing 

outside of that. 

Mr. SUTTER. I see. The issue is much clearer to me now. That 

does seem sensible, sir. Yes. That does seem like a workable approach. 

The timing is very important and how you do this and not look 

like you are rewarding North Korea’s provocative behavior. I think 

the goal of the international effort to constrain North Korea is to 

constrain them from provocative actions. How do we do that? If 

this type of approach fits, I think it would work fine, but I think 

it——

Mr. LEACH. The only theory behind it is, are you looking for some 

way also to take a country that is deeply antagonistic, potentially 

irrational, and giving them a way to get out of a box of their own 

making? 

If that is conceivable that it looks more forthcoming when the 

rest of the world thinks we are not forthcoming, it might have 

some trivial advantage. 

I personally think the Six-Party framework is the most sensible 

way to proceed on any political issues. 

Mr. SUTTER. I tend to agree with you and I think it would have, 

under the right circumstances, a very good effect on our allies and 

associates in Asia, this kind of approach. I wouldn’t think right 

now is the time to do it, but I think over time. 

Mr. LEACH. At some point. 

Mr. SUTTER. This is something to talk to them about to come up 

with something and maybe to have some efforts in that regard. I 

think that would help. 

Measuring it with North Korea. I worked as the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia for 21⁄2 years. I never could get a fix 

on what the North Korean regime wanted. I never could get a fix 

on why they were in power. 

There are lots of speculations, lots of analysis, and so what reaction this would have on the North Korean regime, I think you are 

dealing with something that is very vague. We really don’t know, 

it seems to me, and so as far as what they would do, the North 

Koreans would do, I think it is very difficult to predict. 

What effect it would have on our containment efforts and our 

multilateral efforts to constrain the North Koreans, I think would 

be positive. 

Mr. LEACH. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Somewhat of a perspective perhaps differently in terms of what 

I have heard, not only from the Members of the Committee, but 

also from our expert witnesses this morning. 

Mr. Cossa, you indicated in your statement to say that North 

Korea, by pursuing nuclear weapons, makes them less secure. I 

wonder who really is less secure, who we are talking about. 

It seems that this is the sense of threat and concern and anxiety 

that countries like Japan and all the other countries in the Asian 

rim, it seems to me that they are the ones that are less secure than 

North Korea. 

45

I know perhaps that the meaning of your statement here is that 

if you develop these nuclear weapons, we are going to blast the hell 

out of you and I don’t think that is a possible option to pursue either, given the fact that they do have the capability of giving the 

ballistic missiles that seems to go over Japan, potentially reaching 

Hawaii and now the capability that it can even reach the north or 

the western portions of the United States. 

I am trying to say there is somewhat of a contradiction to say 

that who are we really talking about being less secure? It seems 

that our security is being less secured, simply by the fact that 

North Korea makes this claim that it is necessary that they also 

develop a nuclear weapon system. 

I think some of the most profound changes of our national foreign policy has taken place in the period of the last 4 years, and 

I make this reference to President Bush’s statements as it was 

taken into action in terms of our relationship with Iraq. 

The most central theme, in my humble opinion as to why we 

waged war in Iraq, was this mushroom cloud that Secretary Condi 

Rice had indicated probability, just say even if to think that Iraq 

and Saddam Hussein has nuclear weapons in his possession, suggestions by the highest levels of the Bush Administration officials, 

that yes, they do have nuclear weapons. We know where they are. 

This presumption were two basic doctrines as it now evolved and 

please clarify for me, because I am not an expert on these doctrines, preemption. The doctrine of unilateralism now seems to be 

the focus. 

As I recall, the first thing that the Bush Administration did was 

to condemn President Clinton’s efforts to conduct a bilateral relationship to work with the North Koreans. Treat them as coequals. 

But now North Korea is an outpost of tyranny. It is an axis of 

evil, and I think by implication of what my Chairman has tried to 

say here is, where is the people-to-people relationship? 

It is almost like a Rodney Dangerfield, ‘‘I get no respect,’’ from 

these people so I am going to develop my own nuclear bomb and 

see who is going to come up to me and say, ‘‘Look, let us be sensible. Let us talk.’’ Positives. 

Also, the question of, say, putting pressure on China disturbs me 

in the sense that I am a proud Chinese who says, ‘‘What am I? 

Your messenger to do this?’’

Culturally to me it is an insult that I would be pressured to become a little doll to go over there and do the biddings of these 

Western nations who are concerned about their own security because of North Korea’s potential capability of developing nuclear 

weapons. 

I think what we are dealing with here basically, I guess the word 

that I put here in my notes is trust. North Koreans don’t trust us. 

Why should they trust us, when some of these policies that we 

have enunciated in the past and applied by use of force in the last 

4 years? 

If I was a Chinese official, I would be confused myself as to what 

exactly our foreign policy is. A sense of consistency to deal with 

countries who potentially may possess nuclear weapons is dangerous, because this is what we have done by applying the policy 

46

of preemption, not necessarily verifying if Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons. 

Even to believe that he may have nuclear weapons, let us blast 

the heck out of him, because of the fear that it may be too late for 

us to act rather than to react and to know later that Saddam Hussein may have these nuclear weapons. 

As you mentioned, Mr. Wolfsthal, we don’t have accurate information or data on the whole question of what nuclear capabilities 

that North Korea has, and that is dangerous too, in my humble 

opinion. 

I really enjoyed your statements because it really raises some 

very serious issues. 

Now some may suggest that our relationship or what we are 

doing with Iraq has no relationship with North Korea. I beg to differ. 

The fact that the nuclear weapons issue was one of the central 

issues that led us to wage war against Saddam Hussein, I think 

we have got some very serious issues to deal with as well with 

North Korea. 

This is where I am a little confused and I would love you gentlemen to help me along this line of thinking. If I am way off line, 

please educate me on this question. Thank you. Start off with Mr. 

Eberstadt. 

Mr. EBERSTADT. Yes, sir. As you quite correctly indicated, there 

is no trust on either side in Pyongyang and Washington’s dealings 

with each other. 

They have a zero sum negotiation going on. Under those circumstances, I suppose the best we can hope for, at least at the beginning, is some respect, avoiding big misunderstandings between 

the two sides to understand very clearly where each side is coming 

from and what the objectives of the two sides happen to be. 

One of the unfortunate aspects of United States diplomacy with 

the DPRK is that we don’t always listen to what they say. Sometimes you can actually learn from what people say; sometimes people even mean what they say. 

North Korean leadership revealed some very interesting objectives in the highest level visit the DPRK has yet enjoyed with the 

United States. That was during the Clinton Administration when 

Vice Chairman Jo Myong Rok came to the United States, to the 

State Department, to meet at the White House with the President. 

At the State Department dinner, Vice Chairman General Jo gave 

a toast, and I won’t get the words perfectly right, but I will try to 

get the essence of them. 

Jo said he had been instructed by Chairman Kim Jong Il to tell 

Washington that we could move from hostility to friendship and 

from confrontation to cooperation, as soon as the United States was 

prepared to provide guarantees for the DPRK’s territorial integrity 

and its national sovereignty. 

Nobody seemed to listen to what he said at that dinner. I happened to be there: I looked around to see if anybody was paying 

attention, but everybody seemed to be caught up in the bon. 

Those were striking words, striking especially if we ask what the 

North Korean Government means by the ‘‘territorial integrity of 

the DPRK.’’

47

We could start by looking at the North Korean Constitution. 

What does the North Korean Constitution say the territory of the 

DPRK is? That is the whole thing. 

This was a very bold opening bid. If these are the terms on which 

we have to become friends, it would be a very expensive friendship. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Congressman, I just have a brief word because 

I know Ralph was up early and we want to keep him awake. 

I wouldn’t use the word trust, although I think that is an element, but I think the word that comes to mind most is tone, and 

I think that is in large part what the North Koreans have said and 

what I think we need to keep in mind. 

I think as Nick just said, North Koreans are convinced that we 

want to kill them and I think there are a lot of people inside the 

Administration, outside of the Administration, who would be very 

happy, myself included, to see North Korea go away. 

However, they know that and they are going to act accordingly, 

just as we would in their shoes. However, as we work through 

these problems, there is no reason that we have to adopt a tone 

that makes that clear and in the end, I think the Administration 

also says things that sometimes people don’t hear. 

Director for Policy Planning, Mitchell Reiss, last year at the Heritage Institute gave a talk in which he said bluntly, ‘‘If we can 

solve the nuclear question, we are prepared to live with the North 

Korean regime as it exists. We don’t like it. We want to work to 

change their human rights behavior, all the rest.’’

Unfortunately, that wasn’t really picked up and it became overwhelmed by other statements. My hope is that the Administration, 

my belief is that they now really have taken this to heart. 

The second issue, very briefly, on the link between Iraq and 

North Korea, I agree with you entirely, sir. I don’t think the nuclear program in North Korea started because of George Bush. It 

clearly goes on. We have had it for decades. It started in the 1960s. 

However, I think we have a lot of evidence to suggest that the 

nuclear program has accelerated both in North Korea and Iran 

with the drumbeat to the war in Iraq. 

Again, I think when you try, it is always dangerous to put yourself in North Korean shoes because they don’t always fit, but I 

think it is understandable from their security perspective that they 

feel insecure. 

They look at what happened to East Germany. They have lost 

their client state in the Soviet Union and they have said pretty 

openly, ‘‘We want you to be our new client state.’’ We are not ready 

to buy in yet, because they have pretty high demands, but I think 

it is at least something we need to consider strategically. 

Mr. SUTTER. I would like to address your comment on China, if 

I might, just for a moment. I think it is important to keep in mind 

that China will adjust its policy in the region according to its own 

interest. 

We are not in the business of making deals with China. You did 

this for us. No. They do it for their own interests and I think this 

is illuminating, because the North Korean behavior makes it in 

China’s interest to be more active. 

48

The North Koreans are more dangerous. The Chinese have to 

react to this and I think this kind of dynamic is taking place 

throughout the region. 

It takes awhile for it to sink in to the region, but I think it 

makes it easier in that context. It makes it easier for the United 

States, if it follows a consultative approach. And I think in the case 

of North Korea, particularly in the last several years, the Bush Administration has been consultative. It hasn’t been unilateral or preemptive. 

In that context, it makes it easier for the United States to build 

up a united front to deal with this issue. North Korea is the problem, not the United States as far as China and the region are concerned. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Blumenauer. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, whether Ralph Cossa 

is on the line. 

Mr. LEACH. Excuse me, Mr. Blumenauer, if you would restrain 

for a second. 

Mr. Cossa, did you want to add——

Mr. BLUMENAUER. I will fight myself, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Cossa, did you want to add anything? 

Mr. COSSA. I would like to comment just very briefly on the comments that have been made. First of all, I would say while we 

could debate whether or not the Iraq model worked or will work 

in Iraq, I think it is very clear that one size does not fit all and 

that we ought to learn from mistakes and learn from the Iraq experience and not try to repeat it on the Korean Peninsula. It is certainly a completely different scenario and I think the Administration is wise to make the distinction between the two. 

I also, to perhaps further explain my earlier comments, I think 

the North Koreans clearly believe that today their tactics are serving their interests and we need to convince them otherwise. 

My point was that the military instrument alone is not effective, 

because we have very limited options. So we have to put more political and economic pressure on North Korea, and that pressure 

can most effectively be done by South Korea and by China, and 

South Korea has a lot of influence over the North if they choose 

to use it. 

They also have a lot of influence over China, because at the end 

of the day, China understands that the real prize is South Korea, 

not North Korea, and they want to have a situation where South 

Koreans believe that the United States is part of the problem and 

China is part of the solution. That, I don’t believe serves our national interest and, therefore, I think we need to be more proactive. 

I would argue in response to your comments about thinking out 

of the box, et cetera, I think outreach programs are central. They 

are very good to help open up North Korea. 

This was part of the point of the Sunshine Policy. Part of the 

brilliance, if you will, of the Sunshine Policy, but I think we have 

to understand that when it comes to serious negotiations, if we 

were to agree to a separate channel, a bilateral channel, the North 

49

Koreans would immediately and conclusively ignore the Six-Party 

process. 

Therefore, the only way we should do bilateral serious negotiations is within the context of the Six-Party process, in side meetings. 

I think we were wrong to delay doing that for way too long, but 

the point is, as Jon and others have pointed out, the Administration now appears willing and, in fact, has demonstrated a willingness to have bilateral sessions within the multilateral context and 

we have to insist that that is the only way that we can move forward. Thank you. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If the Chairman would yield, just 30 seconds. 

Mr. LEACH. Of course. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Unfortunate situation, as I recall, when Secretary of State Colin Powell publicly stated that it was his intention to continue the dialogue with the fact that even our own Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, the first ever to go to North 

Korea, the Sunshine Policy was condemned initially by the Bush 

Administration. 

In fact, it was very embarrassing for Secretary Colin Powell to 

learn, after making these public statements, that we are going to 

change this thing. And it was very, very bad medicine, the signals 

that we sent not only to North Korea, but to Asia, with how we 

treated the President of South Korea, when he came here, almost 

with contempt. Very embarrassing. Losing face. Giving them a 

sense like they don’t even count in the process. 

And I think this is where, when we send mixed signals, there is 

no consistent policy coming out and I don’t say just of the Bush Administration, any Administration for that matter, I think this is 

what complicates the matter and I just wanted to add that this is 

what happened, as I recall, when the Secretary of State Colin Powell first came out in a very positive attitude and says let us continue this. 

I think there are some positives coming out of the 1994 agreement, even though there are problems, but let us correct them. But 

that wasn’t the case and we just completely shut everything off, 

and I just wanted to note that for the record, Mr. Chairman. I 

know my time is way over now and I will hold it at that. Thank 

you. 

Mr. LEACH. This Committee has a Sunshine Policy. 

Mr. Blumenauer. 

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I must say that I 

found Mr. Eberstadt’s analysis very interesting, in terms of how 

you portrayed the approach of the North Koreans, the role that its 

nuclear capacity played and its continuing state. 

It is to be very useful. I appreciated the clarity with which you 

expressed your assessment and I do think that is a very useful 

mindset to approach this question. 

The hearing is late. You have given us a great amount of material to digest. Each of you has more than you have put forth, and 

I will spend some time on the plane riding home this afternoon 

kind of going over it, but I would like to just refer to the last paragraph, Mr. Wolfsthal. 

50

You didn’t elaborate, you didn’t mention your conclusion that we 

should be concerned that Iran is taking its clues from the situation 

with North Korea and its nuclear capacity. I was curious if you 

wanted to elaborate on that briefly. 

And Mr. Eberstadt, just given your mindset, you may be steering 

a little bit from your area of expertise, but if you had some 

thoughts as well about the implications of this adventure with 

North Korea on what is going on in Iran and what we can do. 

If that would be all right, Mr. Chairman? It is a little——

Mr. LEACH. Of course. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Congressman, thank you. I am happy to, although I will admit that while we cover all of the scary nonproliferation issues at the Carnegie Endowment, I do some work on 

Iran. 

I have actually been to North Korea and my main focus has been 

there, but I think there are some parallels that are important for 

us as we try and get the policy toward Iran correct as well. 

I think the main lesson that Iran—well there are two main lessons that Iran is pulling. One is they look at the difference between 

Iraq and North Korea and they say, ‘‘Well why did the United 

States go to war with one and not the other?’’ I think they pulled 

the answer that North Korea may have nuclear weapons and a conventional ability to deter the United States through the artillery 

that was mentioned earlier and that that suggests that they need 

as large a military deterrent as they can achieve. 

That doesn’t mean I think that is all Iran is interested in with 

a nuclear capability. I think they have much grander designs, 

which suggests why it is so important that we prevent them from 

acquiring a nuclear capability. 

But I think the other important lesson is that they have watched 

very closely our policy on North Korea. They have seen that when 

push came to shove, we did not go to the U.N. Security Council. 

When we talked about it, we could not get unanimity among the 

permanent members, which is unlikely to happen in the case of 

Iran as well, and they recognized that if they tried to make a large 

leap in capability, they are more likely to get caught and to be punished than if they try and—as we always talk about with North 

Korea—slice the salami very thin and their attention span is probably a lot longer than ours. 

Their political cycle is longer than ours and I think what North 

Korea has done is waited for the opportunity, an Administration, 

a focus on another part of the world, to push ahead with their nuclear capability, and I think that Iran is likely to do the same, 

whether we are focused on Syria, whether they are hoping we turn 

to focus on North Korea so that they can then move in, in the vacuum. That is my assessment of where their program is likely to 

head. 

As the negotiations between the Europeans and Iran continue, 

most of the people I have spoken with expect that will play out 

sometime this summer, when the Iranian elections are completed 

and the negotiations have played out and then they will push and 

see how far they can go. 

51

If they get pushed back, they will retreat. If they feel no resistance, they will push ahead a little more, because that is how North 

Korea has been able to succeed. 

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you. 

Mr. Eberstadt, do you have a thought? 

Mr. EBERSTADT. Congressman, I am only a newspaper reader 

about Iran, but I concur with everything that Jon has just said. 

One of the points I suppose I would offer is that one of the 

asymmetries in the North Korean nuclear drama is that the United 

States is the only truly global actor involved. The precedents that 

we establish in our nuclear dealings with the DPRK will have consequences that are much more likely to be direct for us in other 

parts of the world. 

Of course the Tehran leadership is reading the newspapers and 

surfing the Web and trying to understand what the consequence for 

them of our approach in the DPRK will be. 

Jon put his finger on the contradistinction between Iraq being 

rather less threatening and DPRK being rather more threatening. 

There are consequences one might conclude from that. 

Tehran may have noticed that the DPRK has suffered almost no 

penalties from its continuing provocative violations—its state-ofthe-art violations—of all international nonproliferation agreements. 

This may be read and interpreted in Tehran as well. 

I am concerned about the possibility of what Tehran might 

‘‘learn’’ from any eventual deal that we offer the DPRK. 

If we eventually come to a settlement which denuclearized the 

DPRK without penalties but instead with additional benefits, that 

outcome would have implications for Tehran and other would-be 

proliferators in other parts of the world. That symmetry is one that 

will affect the United States rather more than the ROK Government or even the Japanese and Chinese Governments. 

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. I want to thank all four of our witnesses 

for a very profound and insightful testimony. I want to make one 

very clear point, because it relates to several things that have been 

said, and that is that several of you have noted the importance of 

an envoy. 

You have also noted the importance that an envoy has to have 

clear Executive Branch support, and I just want to make it clear 

that this Committee holds an exceptionally high regard in Ambassador Hill and his new role as Assistant Secretary of State for Asia. 

We also hold in very high regard the Ambassador Joseph 

DeTrani, who will be involved with North Korean issues; and the 

Congress and the Executive, I think, have a more similar mind 

than many might suspect. 

Several of you have hinted that maybe there has been a misstep 

or two in the past Administration, maybe even earlier in this Administration, but we are all in the same boat together and we are 

all very supportive of what the Administration is now trying to do. 

I was going to conclude, but I see our good friend from Indiana, 

Mr. Burton, has returned and we are delighted to open to your 

questions. 

52

Mr. BURTON. I am going to be brief, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize profusely for leaving the chamber, because I probably missed 

some things and may ask some questions that you have already answered. 

The thing that bothered me the most, I guess, was Mr. Eberstadt 

in particular, it was like not a dark cloud, but a black cloud has 

descended over our foreign policy, regarding North Korea. 

What I would like to hear, if any of you can tell me, or our friend 

in Hawaii, and I envy you being in Hawaii where the sun is still 

shining and it is so beautiful and they have beautiful golf courses, 

but what I would like for you to do is give me and the remaining 

Members of the Committee some idea on what you think—and you 

may have already done this so I apologize if I am being redundant—what you think the Administration can do to solve the problem. 

When I listened to you, Mr. Eberstadt, it sounded like there is 

no solution. The guy wants nuclear capability so he can literally 

blackmail the United States. He can blackmail South Korea and he 

is not going to change no matter what we do, and appeasing him, 

as we appeased Hitler in World War II, could only lead to more of 

a problem. 

Do you have any kinds of proposed solutions to the problem? We 

know what it is now. We understand the gravity of it, but what can 

the Administration or the State Department or the Defense Department do to make this thing work? 

Mr. EBERSTADT. Congressman Burton, I submitted for the record 

an essay that I contributed to the Weekly Standard a few months 

ago where I tried to suggest some possible directions for threat reduction with regard to DPRK. 

I agree with the other panelists that there is a strong and indeed 

essential case for multilateral diplomacy. Most of that diplomacy, 

I would say, lies in coordinating a response to the DPRK, rather 

than necessarily probing North Korean intentions. I think we know 

those intentions pretty well already. 

There is much more room, I believe, for economic diplomacy with 

the DPRK than is often the case. The record of economic sanctions 

has been pretty miserable in the 20th century, but the DPRK isn’t 

your garden variety economy. It is much more vulnerable to economic pressures than most economies in the world would be. 

At the end of the day, I would say we have to be very clear that 

the nuclear problem is the North Korean Government. It is the 

Kim Jong Il Government and we are not going to solve the nuclear 

problem in the DPRK until we get a better class of dictator in that 

country. 

Mr. WOLFSTHAL. Congressman Burton, I have a slightly different 

view and I will preface it by saying, I agree with your characterization, and many of the words that have been used about the nature 

of the North Korean regime, one that we don’t want, one that we 

don’t want to support, but I think we have to recognize fundamentally they have something we want. 

They have succeeded in developing something that threatens us 

and just as we engaged in arms control, successful arms control 

with the former Soviet Union in the darkest days of the Cold War, 

in a way that benefitted our security, it also happened to benefit 

53

the Soviet security as well. I think we need to be as realistic as 

that. 

If I can devise for you a plan that would eliminate the North Korean regime at the same time that I could get rid of their nuclear 

capability, without destroying Seoul, I would give it to you. There 

isn’t one and we have to choose. 

In the end, my belief is that North Koreans will balk at any set 

of incentives, but as I said in my testimony, we can’t do the other 

hard things that the Administration is, I think, rightfully beginning to think about. 

How do we think about successfully truly blockading North 

Korea? How do we really squeeze their economy? How do we convince the Chinese in the end that there is a way to get rid of nuclear weapons in North Korea? 

Until we prove to our closest allies and our colleagues that we 

have tried everything else, we are not going to get those things, 

and so we have a long list of recommendations that we are releasing as part of a new nonproliferation strategy called universal compliance—which we will be pummelling your office with soon—which 

talks about the Presidentially-appointed envoy, demonstrating we 

are serious, but also looking at ways to reinforce stability and deterrence on the peninsula. 

What do we have to deploy? What sort of military capability do 

we have to increase? We have obligations in Iraq. We need to be 

able to demonstrate to North Korea that we are able to handle a 

military contingency on the Korean Peninsula. I think there are 

questions about that and so we need to do all of those things at 

the same time. 

Mr. SUTTER. If I could add a couple of points on this. I somewhat 

disagree with Jon on the U.S. responsibility for taking all the actions first before the region can be expected to react positively to 

U.S. leadership. 

It seems to me that North Korea is doing a very good job of galvanizing the region on the need for cooperative efforts to deal with 

North Korea. As they pursue this kind of a path, they increasingly 

identify themselves as the regional problem and so here I would 

argue that perhaps Jon is right in looking at these U.S. initiatives. 

We certainly should look at things and maybe they will work, but 

I think what definitely will work is a very close United States consultative arrangement with the countries in the region, based on 

the notion that North Korea is a problem. 

I think if we are looking at this over the long haul, and I submit 

that this is a long haul problem, this is the way to deal with it, 

from a position of leadership, U.S. leadership in the region. 

We should definitely take those steps that will strengthen our 

leadership in the region that will add to a constrainment of North 

Korea provocative behavior. 

We have common ground with countries like China. We don’t 

want provocative behavior by North Korea, and so we should build 

on this and I think we can. 

It actually is more broad than that, when we look at things like 

the proliferation security initiative. And so these kinds of approaches are definitely areas of positive reinforcement for the 

United States. 

54

The areas of bilateral interaction with North Korea are more 

questionable. How the North Koreans will react, I think, is not well 

known and not easy to predict. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Cossa, you have the last word. 

Mr. COSSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would agree with much 

of what Bob Sutter has said and particularly what he said earlier, 

which is while it may not be very satisfying, really, more of the 

same policy is probably the best approach. 

We need to coordinate more. We need to be more flexible, but we 

need to keep things within the context of the Six-Party Talks. 

We need to use more economic and political diplomacy, as Nick 

said, but we have to recognize that most of this comes from Beijing 

and Seoul. They can do it much more effectively. 

Jon pointed out that we had not gone to the U.N. Security Council. That is not because of lack of trying on the United States’ part. 

China and Russia have blocked that. I think they need to reassess 

that position. 

The most important thing from Washington’s standpoint is we 

need to get our own act together. There has been much division 

within the Administration between the so-called hawks and the 

engagers and we need to be sending a consistent message to North 

Korea. 

One, that we are prepared to talk, but only within the context 

of the Six-Party Talks and then we need the other members, in 

particular Seoul and Beijing, to reinforce that message and to use 

some of the leverages they have. Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will read with great 

interest the documents that you have submitted. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. Let me just thank you all again. You presented compelling and thoughtful testimony. Thank you, sir. The 

Committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(55)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DIANE E. WATSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

U.S.-North Korean relations are indeed in a dangerous state. Certainly no one 

wants another Korean war. Yet is appears that both sides are inching towards a 

situation where there appear to be fewer options for a diplomatic solution. This is 

a sad state of affairs. 

In a worse case scenario, I fear that the Administration may become entangled 

in a military conflict on the basis of limited, or inconclusive, intelligence and that 

pressures put on North Korea, designed to bolster a failing diplomatic process, could 

backfire and result in a full-scale war. 

I can’t believe that any sane person desires such a worse case scenario. The question now is how do we step back from the precipice, from the brink, and reinvigorate 

the diplomatic process that will result in a constructive and peaceful outcome. 

I trust that today’s witnesses will enlighten us on how to move forward in a constructive manner. 

56

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY MR. RALPH COSSA, PRESIDENT, PACIFIC FORUM CSIS


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ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, PH.D., HENRY WENDT SCHOLAR IN

POLITICAL ECONOMY, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE


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Æ


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