United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Secretary of Defense

March 1998 ELECTRONIC

WARFARE

Test Results Do Not

Support Buying More

Common Sensor

Systems

GAO/NSIAD-98-3

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-276172 

March 24, 1998

The Honorable William S. Cohen

The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We have completed our follow-up review of the Intelligence and

Electronic Warfare Common Sensor (IEWCS) program, which is to provide

the Army and the Marine Corps with improved signals intelligence

capability. In 1995, we suggested the Army’s fiscal year 1996 IEWCS

procurement request be reduced because operational testing to prove the

system worked properly was not scheduled until fiscal year 1997.1

 In 1996,

we reported the Army had prematurely committed to low-rate production

the prior year and recommended that additional IEWCS production planned

for fiscal year 1997 be canceled.2

 In response, the Department of Defense

(DOD) reduced the number of systems to be procured, but permitted the

Army to proceed. To assist the Congress in its oversight of DOD’s

management of systems acquisitions, we conducted this follow-up review

to determine whether results of testing conducted since our previous

review support continued IEWCS production.

Background

IEWCS Objective Is to

Provide Improved Signals

Intelligence

IEWCS is being concurrently designed and produced to provide select Army

and Marine Corps units with improved signals intelligence and electronic

attack capability against communications systems used by hostile forces.

Through fiscal year 1997, the Army and the Marine Corps have spent a

total of $750.8 million to develop IEWCS and procure 17 systems for the

Army and the Marine Corps. These IEWCS systems have been or are to be

fielded on Army light vehicles, heavy armored vehicles, or EH-60

helicopters, and Marine Corps light armored vehicles. (See fig. 1.)

1

1996 Defense Budget: Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and Restrictions in RDT&E and Procurement

(GAO/NSIAD-95-218BR, Sept. 15, 1995).

2

Electronic Warfare: Additional Buys of Sensor System Should Be Delayed Pending Satisfactory

Testing (GAO/NSIAD-96-175, Sept. 27, 1996).

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-98-3 Electronic Warfare
B-276172 

Figure 1: EH-60 Helicopter Hovers Over (l. to r.) Army Light and Heavy and Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicles

Source: U.S. Army.

IEWCS is expected to be capable of intercepting enemy communications

signals, locating the source of those signals, and jamming them

electronically. It is also expected to be capable of locating enemy radars.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-3 Electronic Warfare
B-276172 

The Army started low-rate initial production (LRIP) in fiscal year 1995 on an

urgent basis to field IEWCS on light vehicles to counter a particular type of

communications system. To further address its urgent need, the Army also

planned to add IEWCS to seven EH-60 helicopters using 2 additional years

of LRIP. The first three EH-60 IEWCS systems were planned for fiscal 

year 1996 and the remaining four systems for fiscal year 1997.

Commitment to IEWCS

LRIP Was Premature

The DOD Comptroller considered our 1995 report in evaluating the Army’s

fiscal year 1997 budget request and reduced the Army’s planned second

procurement of EH-60 IEWCS systems from four to one. Subsequently, we

monitored the IEWCS program in anticipation of forthcoming 1996

developmental tests.

In September 1996, we concluded on the basis of the developmental test

results that the Army had prematurely committed to LRIP of the unproven

IEWCS system and planned additional LRIP that was not justified by test

results. We also pointed out that the Army had plans to enter full-rate

production without demonstrating that IEWCS could meet minimum

acceptable operational performance requirements. Furthermore, we

concluded that unless this acquisition strategy was changed, the Army was

at risk of becoming committed to procuring an unsatisfactory system

requiring redesign and retrofit to achieve acceptable system performance.

We recommended that the Secretary of Defense require the Army to

cancel the planned fiscal year 1997 procurement of one EH-60 IEWCS

system; establish specific, measurable, minimum acceptable performance

requirements; and demonstrate IEWCS capability to meet these

requirements before proceeding with additional procurement. DOD did not

cancel planned fiscal year 1997 production, but did agree that the Army

should establish key performance parameters before conducting Initial

Operational Test and Evaluation planned for fiscal year 1997. (Operational

testing is DOD’s primary means of determining if a system will be effective

and suitable in a realistic combat environment.)

Results in Brief Test results now available do not support continued IEWCS production. The

Army postponed operational testing scheduled for fiscal year 1997 that

was to demonstrate IEWCS operational effectiveness and suitability in a

realistic combat environment. The Army replaced operational testing with

less-rigorous developmental testing, which showed that the system has

serious hardware and software problems. Furthermore, fiscal year 1996

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-3 Electronic Warfare
B-276172 

tests of IEWCS on a Marine Corps vehicle showed that the Marine Corps’

IEWCS prototype also has serious problems, including inaccurately

identifying the direction to hostile communication systems by as much as

100 degrees. Although the Army plans to conduct additional research and

development work on IEWCS, in the interim, it still intends to contract for

five more systems while trying to correct the problems. Lastly, despite the

IEWCS system’s many problems, the Marine Corps has joined with the Army

and is procuring two IEWCS systems.

Operational Testing

Canceled While

Serious Problems

Remain

Subsequent to our 1996 report, the Army postponed the planned fiscal 

year 1997 operational test of IEWCS. Instead, the Army conducted additional

less-rigorous developmental testing of the system on Army vehicles and an

operational assessment of IEWCS on a Marine Corps vehicle. These tests

revealed that serious problems remain to be corrected for IEWCS on both

the Army and the Marine Corps platforms.

Army Addressing

Hardware and Software

Problems

According to the IEWCS Project Manager, the Army is concentrating on

overcoming 47 software-related technical issues and 19 hardware and

maintenance issues identified during additional developmental testing on

Army vehicles. While many of the specifics of the problems are considered

classified by the Army, in general, the software issues focus on system

robustness, system accuracy, ease of use, and system throughput.

According to program officials, there are several software problems for

which no short-term fixes exist and additional systems engineering will be

required at some later date. The hardware issues deal generally with

system accuracy, and the maintenance issues with reliability. In addition

to those problems, the Army remains concerned about the inability of

IEWCS systems to demonstrate the ability to share data with each other.

This is necessary for precisely locating hostile communication sources so

they can be attacked, the primary reason why the Army wants IEWCS.

Test of Marine Corps

IEWCS Revealed Serious

Problems

Tests of the Marine Corps’ prototype IEWCS system have also revealed

serious problems. In September 1996, after the planned Army operational

test was postponed, the Army’s Test and Experimentation Command

(TEXCOM) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, conducted a less rigorous operational

assessment of an IEWCS system mounted in a Marine Corps light armored

vehicle.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-3 Electronic Warfare
B-276172 

In preparation for the test, the Marine Corps identified criteria to measure

46 parameters of the system. During the assessment, however, Army

testers only attempted to achieve 26 of the Marine Corps’ criteria, and the

system experienced significant problems. For example, the system was

expected to identify the direction to the source of an intercepted

communications signal within 5 degrees, but experienced inaccuracies of

up to 100 degrees.

In addition, other significant weaknesses observed during the assessment

of the Marine Corps’ IEWCS system included ineffective active noise

reduction headsets, leaving operators unable to hear intercepted

communications, and IEWCS system crashes when operators used the

digital tape recorder storage system. The Marine Corps system also

required frequent recalibration to try to get accurate readings of the

direction of intercepted signals. As a result of these and other problems,

the system failed every 4.08 hours on average, though the desired mean

time between operational mission failure rate is 65 hours. Upon

completion of the Operational Assessment, TEXCOM described it as an

“extremely complex, maintenance heavy, contractor dependent system.”

Additionally, the assessment of the Marine Corps’ IEWCS system was not

representative of expected operational conditions and was hampered due

to mechanical problems with the vehicle’s generator and air conditioning.

As a result, instead of being tested on-the-move, the vehicle sat in place,

connected to external electrical power and air conditioning to keep the

IEWCS components activated. This limitation precluded testing of the

system’s capability to operate while moving and therefore 20 of the 46

performance parameters could not be tested.

Marine Corps Begins

IEWCS LRIP Despite

Poor Test Results

Despite the poor test results, the Marine Corps approved LRIP of two IEWCS

systems. According to officials of the Marine Corps Operational Test and

Evaluation Activity who reviewed the results, the assessment

(1) demonstrated that the Marine Corps’ IEWCS system had potential,

(2) provided a yardstick to measure future progress, and (3) provided

focus for continued development. Therefore, the Marine Corps decided to

award an $11 million contract for two IEWCS systems in December 1996.

Revised Acquisition

Strategy Still Allows

Some Production

Since the 1996 test of the Marine Corps’ IEWCS prototype, the Army has

revised its acquisition strategy and now plans to conduct additional

research and development work on the IEWCS system to try to improve its

performance. In addition, the Congress denied the Army’s fiscal year 1998

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-3 Electronic Warfare
B-276172 

budget request for $26.8 million for continued IEWCS production, citing the

failure of the Army to submit the system to operational testing.

However, even though the Army acknowledges the system’s problems, it

still intends to use funds provided by the Congress prior to fiscal year 1998

to contract for two more IEWCS systems for light vehicles and three more

IEWCS for EH-60 helicopters. The Army plans to contract for these five

systems before the results of its additional research and development

efforts are known and before a rescheduled operational test is conducted

in May 1998.

Recommendation The Army plans to contract for five more IEWCS systems without

demonstrating that additional research and development efforts have

corrected known deficiencies. Therefore, we recommend that you direct

the Secretary of the Army to delay contracting for additional IEWCS systems

until operational testing demonstrates that the system’s many problems

are fixed.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the

report and our recommendation. According to DOD, the Army has revised

its plans, taken steps to reduce the technical problems we cited, and no

longer intends to procure additional IEWCS systems in fiscal year 1998.

Furthermore, DOD stated that the Army has adjusted the program’s

schedule to ensure that no further procurement decisions will be made

without supporting operational test results. DOD’s comments are reprinted

in appendix I.

Scope and

Methodology

To address our objective of determining whether test results support

continued IEWCS production, we interviewed Army IEWCS program officials

and reviewed briefing, budgetary, and planning documents from the office

of the Army Project Manager, Signals Warfare, Vint Hill Farms Station,

Warrenton, Virginia (now located at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey). We also

interviewed Marine Corps test officials and obtained test plan and report

documents from the Office of the Mobile Electronic Warfare Support

System Project Manager and the Marine Corps Operational Test and

Evaluation Agency, Quantico, Virginia. We obtained, reviewed, and

analyzed test results prepared by the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare

Test Directorate, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

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B-276172 

We conducted our review between January and December 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit

a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on

Government Reform and Oversight not later than 60 days after the date of

the report. A written statement must also be submitted to the Senate and

House Committees on Appropriations with an agency’s first request for

appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this letter to interested congressional

committees, the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy, and the Director of

the Office of Management and Budget. We will also provide copies to

others upon request.

If you or your staff have questions, please contact me at (202) 512-4841.

Major contributors to this assignment were Robert Coleman, 

Charles Ward, and Paul Latta.

Sincerely yours,

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisition Issues

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-3 Electronic Warfare
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-3 Electronic Warfare
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

(707229) Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-3 Electronic Warfare
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