NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VAN DUNG LE, AKA Van Lee Dung, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-70995 

Agency No. A025-054-726 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted July 9, 2020

Portland, Oregon

Before: BENNETT and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and NAVARRO,** District 

Judge.

Van Dung Le petitions for review the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) 

denial of his motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and 

grant the petition in part and deny the petition in part. 

Le based his motion to reopen his 2000 immigration proceeding on a change 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Gloria M. Navarro, United States District Judge for 

the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

FILED

AUG 18 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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in the law brought about by two cases—Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006),

and Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014)—that invalidated one of the 

two bases for his removal (that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony).

Thus, Le contended he was entitled to “equitable tolling” of the deadline for filing 

a motion to reopen. He also asserted that he was entitled to equitable tolling based 

on his mental illness. In addition, Le argued that an extraordinary circumstance 

justified sua sponte reopening—that he was mentally incompetent during his initial 

immigration proceedings. Le’s final argument was that changed country conditions 

show he would likely be persecuted upon his return to Vietnam.

Le first sought reopening before an Immigration Judge (IJ) and appealed the 

IJ’s denial to the BIA. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial. The BIA first affirmed the 

IJ’s rejection of Le’s claim to equitable tolling based on Lopez and Rendon, stating 

that “[a] subsequent change in the law over 14 years after the issuance of [his] final 

removal order is not, however, a valid basis for equitably tolling the 90-day 

deadline on a motion to reopen” and that “[t]he [IJ] properly declined to equitably 

toll the 90-day deadline for the respondent’s motion for over 18 years.” In doing 

so, the BIA cited to the IJ’s entire discussion denying equitable tolling, in which 

the IJ determined that a change in the law did not serve as a proper basis for 

equitable tolling and that Le did not present evidence that he acted with due 

diligence. 
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The BIA rejected Le’s claim to equitable tolling due to a mental illness and 

further found he did not present evidence that demonstrated that he was mentally 

incompetent during his underlying immigration proceeding. The BIA then declined 

sua sponte reopening as Le did not present an exceptional circumstance, pointing 

in part to his lengthy criminal history. Finally, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of 

sua sponte relief based on changed country conditions as the record did not reflect 

that Le would be persecuted in Vietnam for being Catholic, mentally ill, or having 

applied for asylum elsewhere.

We review the BIA’s “denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.” 

Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 2005). But our review of the 

exercise of sua sponte power is limited only to legal or constitutional error. Bonilla 

v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).

As we have recently confirmed, changes in the law can serve as a basis for

equitable tolling. Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1230 (9th Cir. 2020). Because the 

BIA decided to the contrary, it legally erred. Even though certain changes in the 

law can serve as a basis for equitable tolling, a petitioner must still establish that he 

was prevented from filing because of a “deception, fraud, or error” and that he 

acted with due diligence to discover such a defect. Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 

889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003). Although the BIA does not specifically discuss Le’s due 

diligence, it cites with approval the IJ’s opinion, including the IJ’s discussion of 
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equitable tolling, in which the IJ analyzed Le’s diligence. The IJ noted, for 

example, that Le “does not state when he first learned about Lopez and Rendon, 

and does not list what efforts he undertook to rectify the issues he now raises with 

respect to his removal proceeding. Thus, the Court is not persuaded that 

Respondent acted diligently . . . .” The IJ also expressly found that Le did not show 

“that he exercised due diligence during the years between the changes in law and 

when he filed his Motion.” 

Reasonable minds could perhaps differ as to whether the BIA’s opinion

sufficiently indicates that the BIA adopted the IJ’s due diligence findings so as to 

require us to deny the Petition on this ground. However, given that the BIA

committed legal error, that it never used the words “due diligence,” that it did not 

explicitly state that it was adopting the IJ’s reasoning, and that it did not cite to 

Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (B.I.A. 1994), we find that the BIA did not 

adopt the IJ’s due diligence findings, and thus we may not review those findings.

Cf. Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (reviewing 

an IJ decision where the BIA cited Burbano and did not express disagreement with 

the IJ); Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing 

the IJ’s decision to the extent incorporated by the BIA). Thus, we remand to the 

BIA for it to determine whether Le is entitled to equitable tolling of the deadline 
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for filing a motion to reopen in light of Lona, including whether he demonstrated 

that he acted with the requisite due diligence.

Le argues that the BIA erred in declining to exercise its sua sponte authority 

by improperly finding that there was no fundamental change in the law and failing 

to follow “its own precedent.” Le does not raise a legal or constitutional issue for 

us to review. The term “fundamental change” is not a “legal premise” but an 

“expression of discretion” against which we have no applicable standard to review. 

Lona, 958 F.3d at 1235 (quoting Barajas-Salinas v. Holder, 760 F.3d 905, 908 (8th 

Cir. 2014)). And our review of the BIA’s sua sponte authority “does not 

encompass alleged inconsistencies between the BIA’s grants or denials of 

discretionary relief.” Id. at 1238. 

Le’s argument that the BIA should have exercised its sua sponte authority to 

reopen based on humanitarian asylum also fails as he admits that he did not raise 

such a claim before the BIA, and, considering the BIA’s unfettered discretion in 

exercising its sua sponte authority, Le identifies no legal or constitutional 

requirement that the BIA recognize and raise the issue of humanitarian asylum on 

its own.

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Le failed to show 

that his 2000 immigration proceeding was fundamentally unfair. The record does 

not demonstrate that Le was then mentally incompetent or that he had any mental 
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illness that resulted in his inability to meaningfully participate in his removal 

proceedings. See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 480 (BIA 2011).

The petition for review is GRANTED in part; DENIED in part; 

REMANDED.1

1 Each party shall bear its own costs.