[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 11-15816

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 6:05-cr-00037-BAE-GSR-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

EARL TYRONE PITTMAN,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

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(June 11, 2013)

Before HULL, JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Earl Tyrone Pittman appeals pro se the district court’s grant of his motion 

for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), arguing that the 

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district court should have further reduced his sentence. Pittman’s original 

sentencing guideline range was 151 to 188 months, and he was sentenced to 166 

months. In granting Pittman’s instant § 3582(c)(2) motion, the district court found 

that his amended guideline range was 97 to 121 months, but because he engaged in 

an ongoing effort to influence a witness to change his story, the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors warranted a lesser reduction only to a new sentence of 151 

months. On appeal, Pittman argues that the district court failed to address his 

request for a sentence reduction to the amended range of 97 to 121 months. 

Pittman also argues that his 151-month amended sentence was substantively 

unreasonable.

We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision whether to 

reduce a sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Smith, 568 

F.3d 923, 926 (11th Cir. 2009). Under § 3582(c)(2), “in the case of a defendant 

who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range 

that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . [a district 

court] may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth 

in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is 

consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 

Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 

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The district court must follow a two-step process in ruling on a § 3582(c)(2) 

motion. United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780-81 (11th Cir. 2000). First, the 

court must recalculate the defendant’s sentence “by substituting the amended 

guideline range for the originally applied guideline range, and then using that new 

base level to determine what ultimate sentence it would have imposed.” Id. at 780. 

Under the second step, the court must decide whether, in its discretion, to retain the 

original sentence or to resentence the defendant under the amended guideline 

range. Id. at 781. When considering whether and to what extent a reduction is 

warranted, the district court shall consider the § 3553(a) factors and public safety 

concerns, and it may consider the defendant’s post-sentencing conduct. U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.10, comment. (n.1(B)). “[A] district court commits no reversible error by 

failing to articulate specifically the applicability—if any—of each of the section 

3553(a) factors, as long as the record demonstrates that the pertinent factors were 

taken into account by the district court.” United States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 

1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1997). We have affirmed the grant of a § 3582(c)(2) motion 

when the district court used a “brief form order,” and the record showed that the 

court had considered the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Smith, 568 F.3d 923, 

926-29 (11th Cir. 2009).

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In an appeal from an original sentencing proceeding, we review the 

reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The party challenging 

the sentence bears the burden of proving the sentence is unreasonable. United 

States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). In making a reasonableness 

determination, we conduct a two-step review, first ensuring that the sentence was 

procedurally reasonable, and then examining whether the sentence was 

substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 

§ 3553(a) factors. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. With regard to 

substantive reasonableness, “[a] district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails 

to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) 

gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear 

error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 

F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1813 (2011) 

(quotation omitted). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pittman’s 

§ 3582(c)(2) motion. The district court’s order reflects that the district court 

properly recalculated Pittman’s applicable guideline range based on the amended 

guidelines. The order further reflects that the district court properly took into 

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account the relevant § 3553(a) factors when it granted Pittman’s motion and 

reduced his sentence to 151 months. Even though it was not required to do so, the 

district court specifically articulated that it had considered certain § 3553(a) 

factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense and Pittman’s history 

and characteristics. Finally, Pittman has not met his burden of demonstrating that 

his reduced sentence was substantively unreasonable. 

AFFIRMED. 

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