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******************************************************U.S. BANK, N.A., TRUSTEE v. DONNA L. FOOTE (AC 35632)
DiPentima, C. J., and Beach and Keller, Js. Argued March 11—officially released July 22, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Aurigemma, J. [motion for summary judgment, strict foreclosure judgment]; Domnarski, J.

[summary judgment].) ChristopherG. Brown, forthe appellant (defendant).
Fletcher W. Moore, for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion KELLER, J. The defendant, Donna L. Foote, appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court following the granting of a motion for summaryjudgment in favor of the plaintiff, U.S. Bank, N. A., as trustee. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for summaryjudgment because (1) the action is barred by the doctrines ofresjudicata and collateral estoppel; (2) the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for foreclosure; and (3) a prior judgment of dismissal against the plaintiff created a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to the plaintiff’s status as holder of the note at the time the present action was commenced. The defendant further claims that, because the plaintiffwas notentitledto summaryjudgment, the courtimproperly renderedjudgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm thejudgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On October 20, 2006, the defendant executed an adjustable rate note intheprincipalamountof$528,000,payabletothe order ofAmTrust Funding Services (AmTrust). Appended to the note was an allonge1 endorsed in blank. As security for the note, the defendant conveyed by way of mortgage deed her interest in real property located at 474 Main Street in Old Saybrook to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for AmTrust and its ‘‘successors and assigns.’’2 On December 17, 2010, MERS assigned the mortgage to the plaintiff, as trustee for MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1. The assignment was recorded in the Old Saybrook land records on December 28, 2010.
On May 29, 2012, the plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action seeking reformation ofthe mortgage and
ajudgment offoreclosure.3Inits complaint, theplaintiff alleged, inter alia, that it was the holder and owner of the note and mortgage, and that the note was in default because the plaintiff had failed to make payments. Accordingly, the plaintiff sought to accelerate the balance due and foreclose on the mortgage. The defendant filed a motion for summaryjudgment
on August 31, 2012, in which she referred to aprevious foreclosure action broughtbythe same plaintiffagainst the same defendant, involving the same note and mortgage. See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Foote, Superior Court, judicialdistrictofMiddlesex, DocketNo. CV-11-6004322 (January 5, 2012). In that case, the court, Abrams, J., grantedthedefendant’smotiontodismissontheground thatthe plaintifflacked standing. Specifically, the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to sustain its evidentiaryburden ofestablishingthatitwasthe holderof the note at the time the action was commenced because the plaintiff’s witness could not unequivocally statethattheplaintifforone ofits agents was inpossession ofthe note at the time the action was commenced. Id. In the present case, the defendant argued in her motion for summary judgment that because the note at issue in the present action was the subject ofa prior foreclosure action broughtbythe same plaintiffagainst
same the defendant, the present foreclosure action therefore was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court, Aurigemma, J., disagreed and denied the defendant’s motion. Thereafter, the defendant filed an answer in which she conceded that she ‘‘did not make certain of the payments contemplated by the Note

. . . .’’ She also pleaded five special defenses. The first and second special defenses invoked the doctrines of resjudicata and collateral estoppel.4
On January 23, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for summaryjudgmentastoliability, aswellasasupporting memorandum oflaw, on the grounds that there was an ‘‘absence of a legally sufficient defense, or material issue of fact,’’ and because it had established a prima facie case for foreclosure. In support of its motion, the plaintiff submitted copies of the note, the allonge endorsed in blank, the mortgage deed, the assignment ofmortgage, and the notice ofdefault sentto the defendant. The plaintiff also submitted an affidavit from Attorney Martha Croog, the managing member of the plaintiff’s attorney and bailee, Martha Croog, LLC (law firm), and an affidavit of debt from Gerhard Heckermann, an assistant secretary ofthe plaintiff’s attorneyin-fact and servicer, Homeward Residential, Inc. (Homeward).
The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motion for summaryjudgment in which she reasserted her contention that the action was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. She also claimed that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for foreclosure. The defendant did not file any affidavits or exhibits in support of her opposition, and instead relied on ‘‘all papers and proceedings

. . . that were filed

. . . in connection with the prior action’’ between the parties. The court, Domnarski, J., heard oral argument on the motion for summary judgment as to liability on March 11, 2013. The court subsequentlygrantedtheplaintiff’smotiononMarch 15, 2013. Thereafter, the court, Aurigemma, J ., rendered judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff
onApril 15, 2013. This appealfollowed. Additionalfacts will be set forth as necessary. I
The defendant first claims that the present foreclosure action is barred by the doctrines of res judicataand collateral estoppel. The issue of whether the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to the facts of this case presents a question of law. Our review, therefore, is plenary. Bruno v. Geller, 136 Conn. App. 707, 720, 46 A.3d 974, cert. denied, 306 Conn. 905, 52 A.3d 732 (2012). ‘‘Claimpreclusion (resjudicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) have been described as related ideas on a continuum. [C]laim preclusion prevents a litigant from reasserting a claim that has already been decided on the merits.

. . . [I]ssue preclusion

. . . prevents apartyfrom relitigating an issue that has been determined in a prior suit.

. . . The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel protect the finality of judicial determinations, conserve the time ofthe court, and prevent wasteful relitigation.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 720–21. In its order granting the plaintiff’s motion for summaryjudgment, the court found that although the plaintiff did not satisfy its burden of establishing that it was the holder of the note at the time the prior action was commenced, neitherresjudicatanorcollateral estoppel precluded the plaintifffrom commencing a new action and demonstrating its holder status at the time that the present action was commenced. We agree with the court. A
We first discuss the defendant’s res judicata claim. The defendant argues that ‘‘there can be no credible dispute that the dismissal ofthe prior action for lack of subject matterjurisdictionwas rendered on the merits’’ and therefore has a preclusive effect on the present action. We disagree. ‘‘[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, [provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim.

. . . The doctrine ofresjudicata applies ifthe following elements are satisfied: the identity of the parties to the actions are the same; the
same claim, demand or cause of action is at issue; the judgment inthe first actionwas rendered onthe merits; and the parties had an opportunity to litigate the issues fully.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotationmarks omitted.) Farmington Valley Recreational Park, Inc. v. Farmington Show Grounds, LLC, 146 Conn. App. 580, 588, 79 A.3d 95 (2013). ‘‘Judgments based onthe following reasons are not rendered on the merits: want of jurisdiction; pre-maturity; failure to prosecute; unavailable or inappropriate relief or remedy; lack of standing.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bruno v. Geller, supra, 136 Conn. App. 725. Relying on this principle, this court has held that the dismissal ofanearlieractionforlackofstandingisnota judgment onthe merits and does nothave aresjudicata effect. See, e.g., Cayer v. Komertz, 91 Conn. App. 202,203–204, 881 A.2d 368 (2005); Cayer Enterprises, Inc.

v. DiMasi, 84 Conn. App. 190, 194, 852 A.2d 758 (2004).
In her main and reply briefs before this court, the defendant acknowledges that the court’s judgment in the prior action implicated the subject matterjurisdiction ofthe court andwas adecision regardingthe plaintiff’s standing. ‘‘ ‘[S]tanding to enforce [a] promissory note is [established] by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code

. . . . [See] General Statutes § 42a1-101 et seq. Under [the Uniform Commercial Code], only a ‘‘holder’’ of an instrument or someone who has the rights of a holder is entitled to enforce the instrument. General Statutes § 42a-3-301. The ‘‘holder’’ is the person or entity in possession of the instrument if the instrument is payable to bearer. General Statutes § 42a1-201 (b) (21) (A).5 When an instrument is endorsed in blank, it ‘‘becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer ofpossession alone

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 42a-3-205 (b).’ ’’6 (Footnote omitted.) Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 310 Conn. 119, 126, 74A.3d 1225 (2013).
As noted previously, the allonge was endorsed in blank. In the prior action, the court noted that ‘‘the plaintiff’s witness could not [un]equivocally state that [theplaintiff] possessedthenote atthetimetheforeclosure commenced.’’ U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Foote, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-11-6004322. It therefore concluded that the ‘‘plaintiffdid notprove by apreponderance of the evidence that it was the holder of the note at the time the action was commenced,’’ and, accordingly, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. That judgment, pertaining to whether the plaintiff
was in possession of the note and therefore was the holder, was adismissalforlackofstanding. Thatplainly is not a judgment on the merits7 and the doctrine of
res judicata, therefore, does not apply.
B
We now turn to the defendant’s claim that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the plaintiff from relitigating the issue of whether it is the holder of the notethatwasthe subjectofthepriorforeclosure action. ‘‘Collateral estoppel

. . . is that aspect of res judicata which prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determinedinaprioractionbetweenthe samepartiesupona different claim.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Farmington ValleyRecreationalPark, Inc. v. Farmington Show Grounds, LLC, supra, 146 Conn. App. 588. ‘‘Collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and finaljudgment, that issue cannot again be relitigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.

. . . Issue preclusion arises when an issue is actually litigated and determined by avalid andfinal judgment, and that determination is essential to thejudgment.

. . . Collateral estoppel may be invoked against aparty to aprior adverse proceeding or against thoseinprivitywiththatparty.’’ (Citationomitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Byars v. Berg, 116 Conn. App. 843, 846, 977 A.2d 734 (2009).
In rejecting the defendant’s claim that collateral estoppel bars the present action, the court concluded: ‘‘[The finding] that the plaintiffhad not established that it was the owner of the note at the time the [prior] action was commenced

. . . is not binding upon this court under

. . . collateral estoppel because the dates of commencement of the [prior] action, January 11, 2011, and this action, May 29, 2012, are not the same.’’ We agree with the court. We must determine whether the issues raised by the plaintiff in the present case were in substance already litigatedand determinedinthe earlieraction. Initsbrief to this court, the defendant asserts that the issue of whether the plaintiff was the holder of the note was actuallylitigated, essentialtothejudgmentofdismissal, and determined in a prior action. The defendant, however, does not provide any support or argument as to whether the issues decided in the two actions were, in fact, the same, such that the same issue was being relitigated. The defendant appears to broadlyframe the issue simply as whether the plaintiff was the holder of the note that was the subject ofthe original foreclosure action. We, however, take a more narrow view that is appropriately guided by the pleadings.
In deciding the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court confronted the issue of whether the ‘‘plaintiff demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence at the [evidentiary] hearing that it was the holder of the note at the time this action commenced.’’ (Emphasis added.) U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Foote, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-11-6004322. That is, the court determined whether the evidence demonstrated that the plaintiffwas the holder ofthe note onJanuary 11, 2011. In the present case, however, the only issue before the court was whether the plaintiff was the holder of the note at the time thepresent action was commenced on May 29, 2012. Consequently, collateral estoppel has no application in the absence of an identical issue to be decided by the court. II
We next address the defendant’s claim thatthe plaintiffwas not entitled to summaryjudgment as to liability because it failed to establish a prima facie case for foreclosure. The defendant contends that the plaintiff did not demonstrate aprimafacie case because itfailed to satisfy its burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was the holder of the note at the time the present action wascommenced. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, we set forth our standard ofreview and other legal principles relevant to evaluating a court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment. ‘‘On appeal, [w]e must decide whether the trial court erred in determining that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

. . . Becausethetrialcourtrenderedjudgmentforthe [plaintiff] as a matter of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether [the trial court’s] conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.

. . . ‘‘Practice Book [§ 17-49] providesthatsummaryjudgmentshallberenderedforthwithifthepleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matter oflaw.

. . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

. . . ‘‘A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the outcome ofthe case.

. . . Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.

. . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact

. . . are insufficient to establish the existence ofa material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45].

. . . The movant has the burden of showing the nonexistence of such issues but the evidence thus presented, ifotherwise sufficient, is not rebutted bythe bald statement that an issue of fact does exist.

. . . To oppose a motion for summaryjudgment successfully, the nonmovant must recite specific facts

. . . which contradict those stated in the movant’s affidavits and documents.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Fidelity Bank v. Krenisky, 72 Conn. App. 700, 704–705, 807 A.2d 968, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 915, 811 A.2d 1291 (2002).
In herobjectionto theplaintiff’s motionforsummary judgment, the defendant argued that the plaintifffailed to establishaprimafacie case forforeclosure. ‘‘In order to establishaprimafacie caseinamortgageforeclosure action, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is the owner of the note and mortgage, that the defendant mortgagor has defaulted on the note and that any conditions precedent to foreclosure, as established by the note and mortgage, have been satisfied.

. . . Thus, a court may properly grant summaryjudgment asto liabilityin aforeclosure action if the complaint and supporting affidavits establish anundisputed prima facie case and the defendant fails to assertanylegallysufficientspecial defense.’’8 (Citations omitted.) GMACMortgage, LLCv. Ford, 144 Conn. App. 165, 176, 73 A.3d 742 (2013). ‘‘Amortgageethatseeks summaryjudgmentinaforeclosure action has the evidentiary burden of showing that there is no genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to any of the prima facie elements, including that it is the
owner of the debt. Appellate courts in this state have held that that burden is satisfied when the mortgagee includesinitssubmissionstothe courtaswornaffidavit averring thatthe mortgagee is the holder ofthe promissory note in question at the time it commenced the action.

. . . The evidentiary burden of showing the existence of a disputed material fact then shifts to the defendant. It is for the maker of the note to rebut the presumption that a holder ofthe note is also the owner ofit.’’ (Citations omitted; internalquotationmarks omitted.) Id., 177. ‘‘[T]he party moving for summary judgment

. . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 310 Conn. 304, 324 n.12, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). Likewise, ‘‘[t]he existence of the genuine issue ofmaterialfactmustbe demonstratedbycounteraffidavits and concrete evidence.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Littlev. Yale University, 92 Conn. App. 232, 235, 884A.2d427 (2005), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 936, 891 A.2d 1 (2006). Furthermore, ‘‘[t]he possession by the bearer of a note indorsed in blank imports prima facie that [it] acquired the note in good faith for value and in the
course ofbusiness, before maturity and without notice of any circumstances impeaching its validity. The production of the note establishes [its] case prima facie against the makers and [it] may rest there.

. . . It [is] for the defendant to set up and prove the facts which limitorchangetheplaintiff’srights.’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.) RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, 303 Conn. 224, 232, 32 A.3d 307 (2011). A mortgagee is not obligated to produce the original note in orderto meetthe mortgagee’s burden at summaryjudgment; ‘‘that burden is satisfied when the mortgagee includesinitssubmissionstothe courtaswornaffidavit averring thatthe mortgagee is the holder ofthe promissory note in question at the time it commenced the action.’’ GMACMortgage, LLCv.Ford, supra, 144 Conn. App. 177.
We begin our analysis by noting that the defendant does not challenge two of the three elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. Specifically, the defendant does not contest that she has defaulted on the note or that conditionsprecedentto foreclosure, as established by the note and mortgage, have been satisfied. The defendant instead challenges only the first element ofthe plaintiff’s prima facie case, that is, that it was the holder of the note at the time the action was commenced.
In the present case, the plaintiff had submitted to the trial court a memorandum of law accompanied by copies of the adjustable rate note, allonge endorsed in blank,9 and mortgage deed. As the note was endorsed in blank, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the holder—that is, in possession10—of the note in order to import aprima facie case for foreclosure and satisfy its burden at summaryjudgment. The defendant argues thatthedocumentation, includingtheaffidavits, submitted by the plaintiff do not establish that the plaintiff
was inpossession ofthe note at the time it commenced the action. We disagree.
The plaintiff pleaded that it is the holder of the note upon which the defendant defaulted as well as the
owner of the underlying debt. Further, the plaintiff offered the sworn affidavit of Attorney Croog, who averred that the law firm ofwhich she is the managing member is the bailee and attorney for the plaintiff. She further attested that the law firm ‘‘receives originally executedmortgageloandocumentsfrommortgageloan servicers and mortgage lenders,’’ and that upon receipt of those documents, the law firm ‘‘acknowledges receipts of those documents in a bailee letter that accompanies the original documents so received by [the law firm], as bailee.’’ The affiant stated that she received the original note, allonge endorsed in blank, and mortgage deed, and acknowledged receipt ofthose documents in abailee letter, which the affiant attached to her affidavit as an exhibit. Finally, she averred that the law firm, as bailee, continuously ‘‘has retained the original note, executed by [the defendant], together with the allonge endorsed in blank, and mortgage, executed by [the defendant], in its custody since

. . . February 22, 2011.’’ (Emphasis added.)
In his affidavit of debt Heckermann averred that he
was an assistant secretary of the plaintiff’s servicer and attorney-in-fact, Homeward. He further stated that ‘‘Homeward maintains records for the subject loan on behalfofthe [plaintiff]’’ andthattheplaintiff‘‘is entitled to enforce the Note.’’ He also calculated the total due to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s default.
The defendant argues that the affidavits do not demonstrate that the law firm ‘‘possessed the note for the plaintiff.’’Wearenotpersuaded.AttorneyCroogspecifically averred, as managing member ofthe lawfirm, that it, in its capacity as the plaintiff’s bailee, received and continuously retained the original note, allonge endorsed in blank, and mortgage, that had been executed by the defendant. She averred that these documents had been in its possession since February 22, 2011, some three months prior to the date the present actionwascommenced.Aspreviouslynoted, amortgag-ee’s burden at summary judgment ‘‘is satisfied when the mortgagee includes in its submissions to the court
a sworn affidavit averring that the mortgagee is the holder of the promissory note in question at the time it commenced the action.’’ GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, supra, 144 Conn. App. 177. By way of the Croog affidavit, which averred that the law firm, on behalf of the plaintiff, retained the note, the plaintiff satisfied its burden at summary judgment of establishing a prima facie case for foreclosure. Accordingly, the plaintiff, ‘‘by way of its possession of an instrument payable to [the] bearer, is a valid holder of the instrument and, therefore, is entitled to enforce it.’’ Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere, 119 Conn. App. 570, 577, 989 A.2d 606, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 922, 991 A.2d 564 (2010).
The defendant offered no evidence to counter the plaintiff’s sworn statement that it, through its bailee,
was in possession of the note at the time it served the complaint. In sum, the plaintiff submitted numerous documentsthat establishits status as holderofthe note and an absence of any genuine issue of material fact. It was then incumbent on the defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s presumption of ownership. Having failed to submit any evidence in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, that presumption prevails. Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly determined that there was no genuine issue ofmaterial fact and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as to liability.
III
The defendant next claims that the existence of the prior judgment of dismissal, at the very least, created
a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to whetherthe plaintiff was the holder of the note at the time the present action was commenced. In light ofthis purported issue of fact, the defendant argues that the court erred by granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. We disagree. ‘‘[T]o establish the existence of a material fact, it is not enough for the party opposing summaryjudgment to assert the existence of a disputed issue.

. . . Such assertions are insufficient regardless of whether they
are containedinacomplaintorabrief.’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.) Tuccio Development, Inc. v. Neumann, 111 Conn. App. 588, 594, 960 A.2d 1071 (2008). The defendant has provided us with no authority, nor are we aware of any, that supports his suggestion that theprioraction, resultingindismissal, createsagenuine issue of material fact.
The court in the prior action found that the plaintiff failed to prove by apreponderance ofthe evidence that it was the holder of the note at the time that action commenced, because the plaintiff’s sole witness ‘‘couldnot [un]equivocally state that [the plaintiff] possessed the note at the time the foreclosure commenced.’’ U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Foote, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-11-6004322. In the present case, the court determined, onthe basis ofthe documentation and affidavits before it, that the plaintiffwas in possession ofand the holder of the note at the time the present action was commenced. The defendant provided no authority for the proposition that the mere existence ofa priorjudgment of dismissal rendered against a plaintiff creates
a genuine issue of fact, for the purposes of a motion for summary judgment, as to an issue in subsequent litigation. The courtfound, on the basis ofthe affidavits and documents before it, no genuine issue of material fact. The fact that a court in a prior action rendered a judgment adverse to the plaintiff on a different issue,
on the basis of a witness’s testimony in that case, does not inevitably or inherently create a genuine issue of material fact in a future action.
In sum, on the basis of our plenary review of the pleadings and documentary submissions, we conclude that the court properly determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the plaintiff
was entitledtojudgmentastoliabilityonitsforeclosure complaint. Moreover, because we conclude that the court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability, we further must reject the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly rendered judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 An allonge is ‘‘[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with indorsements.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).

2 ‘‘As one court has explained, MERS does not originate, lend, service, or investinhomemortgageloans. Instead, MERS actsasthenominalmortgagee for the loans owned by its members. The MERS system is designed to allow its members, which include originators, lenders, servicers, and investors, to assign home mortgage loans without having to record each transfer in the local land recording offices where the real estate securing the mortgage is located.

. . . ‘‘The benefit ofnaming MERS as the nominal mortgagee ofrecord is that when the member transfers an interest in a mortgage loan to another MERS member, MERSprivatelytrackstheassignmentwithinitssystembutremains the mortgagee of record. According to MERS, this system saves lenders time andmoney, and reducespaperwork, by eliminating the needto prepare and record assignments when trading loans.

. . . ‘‘If, onthe otherhand, aMERS membertransfers an interestin amortgage loan to a non-MERS member, MERS no longer acts as the mortgagee of record and an assignment of the security instrument to the non-MERS member is drafted, executed, and typically recorded in the local land recording office.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.) ChaseHomeFinance, LLC v. Fequiere, 119 Conn. App. 570, 572 n.2, 989 A.2d 606, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 922, 991 A.2d 564 (2010).

3 The plaintiff sought reformation to exclude certain specified real property from the mortgage in order to conform to the intentions ofthe parties.

4 The three additional special defenses pleaded by the plaintiff were: (1) denial ofthe ‘‘authenticity of, and the authority to make, each signature on,
or any paper affixed to, the original Note’’; (2) the action was ‘‘precludedby Connecticut statutes and the express terms of the Mortgage’’; and (3) the action was barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. These special defenses are not relevant to this appeal.

5 ‘‘General Statutes § 42a-1-201 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘(21) ‘‘Holder’’ means: ‘(A) The person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession

. . . .’ ’’ Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 310 Conn. 119, 126 n.4, 74 A.3d 1225 (2013).

6 ‘‘General Statutes § 42a-3-205provides inrelevantpart: ‘(b) Ifan endorsementismadebytheholderofaninstrumentandisnotaspecialendorsement, it is a ‘blank endorsement’. When endorsed in blank, an instrumentbecomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially endorsed.

. . .’ ’’ Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 310 Conn. 119, 126 n.5, 74 A.3d 1225 (2013).

7 We note that in support of her position that the action is barred by res judicata, the defendant principally relies on this court’s decision in Rosenfield v. Cymbala, 43 Conn. App. 83, 681 A.2d 999 (1996). The defendant’s reliance on that case, however, is misguided. In Rosenfield, this court affirmed the trial court’s decision to render the summary judgment sought by the defendant against the plaintiffs on the basis that the foreclosure action was barred by resjudicata. The priorjudgment in that case, however, dismissed the plaintiff’s action because the plaintiff had failed to make out

a prima facie case for foreclosure. Id., 84–85. It was not dismissed merely because the plaintiff failed to satisfy its evidentiary burden that it was in possession of the note at the time the action commenced, as in the present case. InRosenfield, this court observed that in the prior action, ‘‘the trial court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that consideration for the note and mortgage deed was given by the plaintiff’s assignor

. . . to the defendant. The trial court also determined that the plaintifffailed to produce any evidence as to an appraisal ofthe mortgaged property or its current market value. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not present evidence of any default of payment

. . . nor the amount of any alleged debt presently due and owing from the plaintiffto anyone who had an interest in [the] underlying note.

. . . Moreover

. . . the trial court characterized the extent ofthe proceedings as
a trial of the issues. The plaintiff had an opportunity to present his case as thoughthetrialwouldgoto conclusion.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.) Id., 92. In the present action, the priorjudgment was decided solely on the ground of standing, and, specifically, the issue of whether the plaintiff had established its possession ofthe note at the relevant time. Therefore, it was not a final judgment on the merits.
8 We concluded in part I ofthis opinion that the special defenses asserted by the plaintiff—the doctrines ofresjudicata and collateral estoppel—were legally insufficient and did not bar the present action.
9 The allonge contains a special endorsement that states ‘‘PAY TO THE ORDER OF: American Brokers Conduit WITHOUT RECOURSE,’’ and is signed by a senior vice president of AmTrust. A second endorsement also appears on the allonge in which American Brokers Conduit, through its assistant secretary, endorsed the note in blank and without recourse. 10 ‘‘A holder is the entity, or person, in possession ofthe instrument ifthe instrument is payable to the bearer.’’ RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, supra, 303 Conn. 231.