Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Norris, 2018 IL App (3d) 170436

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

JOHN V. NORRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-17-0436

Filed December 31, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 17-DT-10; the 

Hon. Rick A. Mason, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

John V. Norris, of Joliet, appellant pro se.

James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino, David 

J. Robinson, and Jasmine D. Morton, of State’s Attorneys Appellate 

Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Holdridge and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, John V. Norris, appeals following the denial of his petition to rescind his 

statutory summary suspension. He raises five arguments on appeal, which we address in turn. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 The State charged defendant with driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 

ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2016)) via complaint dated January 3, 2017. Based on defendant’s 

refusal to complete postarrest testing, his driver’s license was subject to a 12-month statutory 

summary suspension. Defendant, who represented himself throughout the entirety of the 

proceedings below, subsequently filed a petition to rescind the suspension on the grounds that 

(1) the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was under 

the influence of alcohol and (2) he had not been warned that refusal to submit to testing would 

result in the suspension of his driver’s license.

¶ 4 Following a number of agreed continuances, defendant’s petition to rescind was stricken 

for want of prosecution on March 15, 2017, when he failed to appear in court. On April 4, 

2017, defendant filed a motion to reinstate his petition, averring that he had been sick on the 

previous court date and that officials at Will County Adult Detention Facility had failed to 

inform the court of that fact. On April 13, 2017, the court reinstated defendant’s petition, 

commenting: “We’ll show the motion is reinstated, and the new 30 days starts to run from 

today.” The court scheduled the hearing for May 1.

¶ 5 Defendant subsequently filed a “Motion to Suppress Statements (Miranda Warning).” In 

the motion, defendant asserted that statements he made in the course of his traffic stop should 

be suppressed on the grounds that the arresting officer never read a Miranda warning. In the 

motion, defendant did not identify with any specificity the statements he sought to have 

suppressed. 

¶ 6 On April 26, the State filed a motion to continue the hearing on defendant’s petition 

because the arresting officer would be unavailable on May 1. The court granted the State’s 

motion over defendant’s objection and rescheduled the hearing on the petition to rescind for 

May 15. 

¶ 7 A combined hearing on defendant’s petition to rescind and his motion to suppress 

commenced on May 15, 2017. Defendant’s first witness was the arresting officer, Robert Mau, 

of the Joliet Police Department. After a series of preliminary questions, an attempt was made to 

play the video recording of the traffic stop from Mau’s squad car. The record reflects, however, 

that apparent technical issues prevented the video from being played at that time. Defendant 

agreed to suspend his questioning of Mau and instead question Officer Kristoff Petro of the 

Joliet Police Department while the technical problems were being fixed, in an effort to 

accommodate Petro’s schedule.

¶ 8 Petro testified that she was investigating a hit-and-run accident on the night in question. In 

the course of her investigation, she brought the victims of the traffic accident to the area where 

Mau was performing the traffic stop of defendant, in order to determine if the victim could 

identify defendant. Petro testified that she could not recall whether defendant was emitting the 

odor of an alcoholic beverage or stumbling because she was focused on the traffic 
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investigation rather than on defendant’s physical state at the time. The video from Mau’s squad 

car was then played in court. 

¶ 9 The video shows defendant’s vehicle as it drives past Mau’s squad car. Mau begins pursuit, 

catching up to defendant’s vehicle at a red traffic signal, where defendant’s vehicle is stopped. 

Defendant proceeds through the intersection before the signal changes to green. Mau activates 

his overhead lights, at which point defendant turns onto the next available side street. 

¶ 10 After Mau asks defendant to step out of his vehicle, defendant admits that he drank one 

beer earlier that evening, later clarifying that he drank it approximately an hour earlier. Mau 

asks defendant to recite the alphabet, beginning with the letter C and ending with the letter P. 

On his first attempt, defendant recites the alphabet through the letter S before stopping. On his 

second attempt, he performs the test correctly. Next, Mau asks defendant to count backwards 

from 83 to 67, which defendant does without mistake. Mau then asks defendant to count from 

one to four and back, while touching each of his fingers to his thumb. Defendant performs the 

counting correctly and appears to complete the finger-touching portion successfully. 

¶ 11 Mau then performs the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. Defendant grows impatient 

with the test and accuses Mau of performing it incorrectly. After a lengthy discussion, Mau 

completes the HGN test. Defendant then declines to perform the walk-and-turn test, citing 

ongoing knee problems. Similarly, he states that he cannot perform the one-leg stand test, 

because of chronic ear infections. Mau places defendant under arrest. 

¶ 12 After the video was played, defendant resumed his questioning of Petro. Petro testified that 

the victims of the car accident she was investigating positively identified defendant and his 

vehicle. Defendant then expressed to the court his desire to lay a foundation for the booking 

room video. He explained that the video would show Petro in close proximity to him at 

multiple times, which would be relevant to her testimony concerning whether defendant was 

emitting the odor of an alcoholic beverage. The court found that defendant could question 

Petro regarding observations in the booking room but ruled that the playing of the video was 

not necessary at that time. When the issue of the booking room video was raised again while 

Petro was testifying, the court again denied defendant’s request, adding: “I am not going to 

stop you from playing the video later because those issues may be important to warnings, I 

presume.”

¶ 13 On cross-examination, Petro testified that she informed Mau that defendant had been 

positively identified in the hit-and-run accident. She did not participate in Mau’s DUI 

investigation and did not focus on any odor defendant was emitting nor did she check 

defendant’s eyes.

¶ 14 Mau returned to the witness stand following Petro’s testimony. Defendant asked Mau if he 

read to defendant the warning to motorist at 8:11 p.m. that night while in the booking room of 

the Joliet Police Department. Mau replied that he read the warning verbatim. Defendant’s 

direct examination grew contentious as it proceeded. Shortly after Mau testified that he read 

the warning verbatim, the following exchange took place: 

“[DEFENDANT]: Officer Mau, at some point [did] you walk over with a piece of 

paper in your hand? 

 [MAU]: Yes. 

 [DEFENDANT]: And you—is it okay to demonstrate, Judge? I am not going to do 

anything crazy. 
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 THE COURT: Well, you have a document—

 [DEFENDANT]: Yes. No, I am just going to act out. 

 [PROSECUTOR]: Judge—

 [MAU]: Step back. 

 THE COURT: Yeah, you are too close to the witness, so I am going to ask you to 

step back. Now, if you need to approach a witness with a document—

[MAU]: I’m going to get closer to you when we get you in Federal Court.[1]

 THE COURT: All right. All Right. 

 [PROSECUTOR]: Judge, again—

 THE COURT: I am going to allow that. Sit down, Officer. Thank you. You cannot 

say things like that, Mr. Norris. You can’t threaten the witness. I am asking you to be 

civil. We have had this discussion and do I need to stop questioning at this point or can 

you do it respectfully? 

[DEFENDANT]: That would be a very good idea because right now I’m ready to 

do something really stupid. 

THE COURT: Well, and I don’t think that’s a good idea. Okay.

[DEFENDANT]: I’m not really impressed with you.

 THE COURT: Okay, no more comments or further interrupting the proceedings at 

this point. 

 ***

 THE COURT: Well, I am allowing [defendant] to be cuffed because he suggested 

he needed it for protection of all people. And because [defendant] says he cannot at this 

time ask any more questions, I am going to stop the questions from [defendant], but I 

am going to allow the State, however, the State to cross examine.”

¶ 15 On cross-examination, Mau testified that he clocked defendant driving 55 miles per hour in 

a 30-mile-per-hour zone. He pulled defendant over after defendant proceeded through a red 

traffic signal. He observed that defendant had glassy eyes and was emitting the odor of an 

alcoholic beverage from his breath. Defendant told Mau that he had consumed one beer that 

night. Mau observed a 24-ounce can of beer, which he later learned to be unopened, on the 

driver’s side floorboard. Mau testified that he eventually learned that defendant had been 

positively identified as the driver in a hit-and-run accident earlier that evening. Mau testified 

that defendant failed the “finger test” by failing to place his index finger to his thumb, adding: 

“It wasn’t egregious, but he still missed it.” A number of cues on the HGN test indicated to 

Mau that defendant had consumed alcohol. 

¶ 16 Mau reiterated on cross-examination that he read the warning to motorist verbatim after 

defendant had been transported to the Joliet Police Department. He testified that his memory 

was exhausted as to the precise time at which he read the warning. The court, over defendant’s 

objection, allowed the State to refresh Mau’s memory with a copy of the warning to motorist 

 

1Throughout the proceedings, defendant frequently referenced his efforts to sue Mau in federal 

court. Based on that fact, and the court’s admonishment that defendant not threaten the witness, this 

particular line of transcript appears to have been misattributed in the record to Mau. 
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form from the court file. Mau affirmed that he read the warning at 8:11 p.m. He testified that 

defendant refused to take a Breathalyzer test. 

¶ 17 In the middle of the State’s cross-examination, defendant indicated that he had further 

questions for Mau. He stated: “I didn’t get a chance to ask any of my questions.” The court 

responded: 

“THE COURT: You actually—you did ask questions and then you said you can’t 

continue. 

[DEFENDANT]: I didn’t say I didn’t want to continue. I just said I needed a break 

for a minute. 

 THE COURT: You said you were going to do something bad and obviously you 

forfeited your right to continue at that moment.”

When the State completed its cross-examination, the court allowed defendant to proceed with 

his questions but made clear that it was a redirect examination. When defendant indicated that 

he had 13 more pages of questions for Mau, the court suspended proceedings and scheduled a 

continuance date. 

¶ 18 Defendant resumed his redirect examination of Mau on May 18, 2017, but the court 

eventually stopped those proceedings “until such time as [defendant] can properly behave.” 

The redirect examination resumed again on June 21. Defendant again disputed the 

characterization of his questions as redirect, insisting that he had never finished his direct 

examination of Mau. 

¶ 19 After a series of questions to Mau, defendant requested the playing of the booking room 

video. As a proffer, defendant suggested that the video would show that Mau did not, in fact, 

read the warning to motorist while at the Joliet Police Department. Defendant did note, 

however, that he did not actually have a copy of the video with him at the time. The State 

objected on the grounds that it had not referenced the booking room video on 

cross-examination. In objecting, the State also noted that the hearing was entering its eighth 

hour of testimony. As a proffer, defendant asserted that the video would rebut Mau’s testimony 

that he read the warning to motorist to defendant. The court denied leave to play the video but 

allowed defendant to proceed via questioning. 

¶ 20 During his own testimony, defendant denied speeding or being in a hit-and-run accident on 

the night in question. He testified that he had a cold, the symptoms of which included itchy, 

watery eyes, a fever, and a runny nose. He denied “fumbl[ing] the finger test.” He testified that 

Mau did not warn him that his refusal to submit to testing would result in the suspension of his 

driver’s license. Defendant also denied refusing testing, noting that he offered to go to the 

hospital for a blood draw. 

¶ 21 The circuit court ultimately denied defendant’s petition to rescind the statutory summary 

suspension. The court commented that it was allowing in defendant’s admission to Mau that he 

had been drinking alcohol on the night in question. The court then found Mau had reasonable 

grounds to believe that defendant was under the influence of alcohol, Mau had read the 

warning to motorist, and defendant refused the Breathalyzer test. 

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 23 On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments: (1) the circuit court erred in denying 

defendant’s petition to rescind his statutory summary suspension, (2) the State failed to hold 
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the hearing on defendant’s petition within the required 30-day time limit, (3) the circuit court 

erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress statements, (4) the circuit court erred when it 

did not allow defendant to introduce the booking room video, and (5) the State committed a 

discovery violation in that it did not tender to defendant a copy of Mau’s police report. 

¶ 24 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

¶ 25 Section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(a) (West 

2016)) dictates that any person driving on public highways in Illinois is deemed to have given 

consent to chemical testing of blood, breath, or other bodily substance for the purpose of 

determining the content of alcohol in their blood. That section also provides that the refusal to 

submit to such a test, where a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person 

is under the influence of alcohol, will result in the statutory summary suspension of that 

person’s driver’s license. Id. § 11-501.1(c). Section 2-118.1 of the Code, in turn, provides that 

a person whose driver’s license has been subject to the statutory summary suspension may 

request the rescission of the suspension. Id. § 2-118.1(b). 

¶ 26 The scope of a hearing on a petition to rescind statutory summary suspension is limited to 

certain issues, of which only the following are relevant in the present case: 

“1. Whether the person was placed under arrest for an offense as defined in Section 

11-501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, as evidenced by the issuance of a 

Uniform Traffic Ticket ***; and 

 2. Whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was 

driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway while under the 

influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination of both; and 

 3. Whether the person, after being advised by the officer that the privilege to 

operate a motor vehicle would be suspended or revoked if the person refused to submit 

to and complete the test or tests, did refuse to submit to or complete the test or tests to 

determine the person’s blood alcohol or drug concentration[.]” Id. § 2-118.1(b)(1)-(3). 

¶ 27 In reviewing the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s petition to rescind his statutory 

summary suspension, we apply a two-part standard of review. People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d 545, 

561 (2008). We give great deference to the circuit court’s factual findings, including any 

inferences drawn therefrom, reversing those findings only where they are contrary to the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Id. However, we review de novo the circuit court’s ultimate 

decision to deny the petition. Id. at 562. 

¶ 28 In the present case, there is no dispute that defendant was placed under lawful arrest. Two 

of the remaining issues, whether defendant refused testing and whether Mau read the warning 

to motorist, are purely factual. The circuit court found Mau more credible on those issues than 

defendant and found explicitly that defendant had refused testing and that Mau had read the 

warning to motorist. We defer to these findings, as they are not contrary to the manifest weight 

of the evidence. Further, defendant argues again that he offered to go to the hospital to submit 

to a blood draw. However, he cites no law that allows an arrestee dictate which manner of 

testing under section 11-501.1(a). 

¶ 29 We next consider whether Mau had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was 

under the influence of alcohol. “In determining whether there has been ‘reasonable grounds’ 

under subsection (b)(2) of the statute, this court has utilized the probable cause analysis 
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deriving from the fourth amendment.” Id. at 560. “Probable cause to arrest exists when the 

facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious 

person to believe that the arrestee has committed a crime.” Id. at 563. “ ‘ “The standard for 

determining whether probable cause is present is probability of criminal activity, rather than 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” ’ ” Id. at 564 (quoting People v. Garvin, 219 Ill. 

2d 104, 115 (2006), quoting People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 485 (2005)). “[P]robable cause does 

not even demand a showing that the belief that the suspect has committed a crime be more 

likely true than false.” Id.

¶ 30 Defendant successfully completed the backwards-counting test and at least appeared on the 

video to successfully complete the finger-touch test. While he initially failed the alphabet test, 

he was able to successfully complete it on the second attempt. However, defendant admitted to 

Mau that he had consumed alcohol that evening, and Mau was able to confirm that through the 

HGN test.2Further, Mau testified that he observed defendant’s eyes were glassy and the odor 

of an alcoholic beverage was emanating from defendant’s breath. Moreover, Mau observed 

defendant driving 25 miles per hour above the posted speed limit and running a red traffic 

light. He had also learned prior to making the arrest that defendant had been positively 

identified as the suspect in a hit-and-run accident earlier that evening. These facts would lead a 

reasonably cautious person to believe that defendant had consumed an amount of alcohol that 

had impaired his driving. See People v. Rozela, 345 Ill. App. 3d 217, 226 (2003) (rejecting 

argument that reasonable suspicion based upon the odor of alcohol, glassy eyes, and admission 

to drinking is necessarily dispelled by successful completion of field sobriety tests). 

¶ 31 We thus find that Mau had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was driving 

while under the influence of alcohol. We defer to the circuit court’s factual findings that 

defendant refused testing and that Mau read the required warning to motorist. Accordingly, we 

find that the circuit court properly granted defendant’s petition to rescind his statutory 

summary suspension. 

¶ 32 B. 30-Day Limit 

¶ 33 Section 2-118.1 of the Code mandates that a hearing on petition to rescind a statutory 

summary suspension shall be held “[w]ithin 30 days after receipt of the written request.” 625 

ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2016). It is well-settled that unless any delay is occasioned by the 

defendant, the failure to hold the required hearing within 30 days of the request is a violation of 

the right to due process, the remedy for which is the rescission of the statutory summary 

suspension. People v. Puckett, 221 Ill. App. 3d 594, 596-97 (1991). “[T]he time provision set 

forth in section 2-118.1(b) of the *** Code is satisfied when the hearing begins within 30 days 

after receipt of defendant’s written request ***.” People v. Cosenza, 215 Ill. 2d 308, 315 

(2005). 

¶ 34 Section 1.11 of the Statute on Statutes contains detailed instructions on how time should be 

computed. It provides in whole: 

 

2Defendant argues at length on appeal that Mau did not conduct the HGN test properly. By Mau’s 

own testimony, however, the HGN test results merely indicated the consumption of alcohol, rather than 

amount or impairment. As Mau already knew defendant had consumed alcohol because of defendant’s 

admission, any alleged error in the administration of the HGN test would have been harmless. 
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“The time within which any act provided by law is to be done shall be computed by 

excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is Saturday or Sunday 

or is a holiday as defined or fixed in any statute now or hereafter in force in this State, 

and then it shall also be excluded. If the day succeeding such Saturday, Sunday or 

holiday is also a holiday or a Saturday or Sunday then such succeeding day shall also be 

excluded.” 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2016). 

In People v. Ribar, 336 Ill. App. 3d 462, 463 (2003), the court found that section 1.11 of the 

Statute on Statutes is applicable to statutory summary suspension hearings because that it is a 

“general time-computation statute that applies to ‘any act provided by law.’ ” (quoting 5 ILCS 

70/1.11 (West 2000)). 

¶ 35 In the present case, defendant’s petition to rescind was reinstated on April 13, 2017. The 

first day of the 30-day window, per the Statute on Statutes, was April 14, 2017. The thirtieth 

day, then, was May 13, 2017. May 13, however, was a Saturday.3

 Thus, according to the 

Statute on Statutes, the thirtieth day was Monday, May 15, 2017. Defendant’s rescission 

hearing commenced on that day. 

¶ 36 As defendant’s hearing commenced within the prescribed 30-day time window, we reject 

defendant’s argument that the State failed to comply with section 2-118.1 of the Code. We also 

reject defendant’s related argument that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in 

moving for a continuance. Defendant has cited no case that holds the State that cannot move to 

continue a hearing to a date within the 30-day period. 

¶ 37 C. Miranda

¶ 38 Defendant next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

statements based upon Mau’s failure to read Miranda warnings. In making this argument, 

defendant maintains that Mau’s questions at the scene of the traffic stop constituted a custodial 

interrogation. The State counters by arguing that a Miranda violation is not grounds for 

suppression of statements at a statutory summary suspension hearing. We begin by addressing 

that threshold question. 

¶ 39 A hearing on a petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension is a civil proceeding. 

Wear, 229 Ill. 2d at 559. Section 2-118.1(b) of the Code provides that “[t]he hearings shall 

proceed in the court in the same manner as in other civil proceedings.” 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) 

(West 2016). 

¶ 40 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be 

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const., amend. V. The 

Illinois Constitution contains the same language. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10. In Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that the privilege 

applied out of court as well, any time a person faces custodial interrogation, or “questioning 

initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” The Miranda Court held that the 

prosecution may not use statements made by a defendant in this context unless those 

statements were accompanied by certain procedural safeguards, or what have come to be 

known as the Miranda warnings. Id. As our own supreme court observed, “[t]he purpose of the 

 

3

“A reviewing court may take judicial notice of the days of the week as they correspond to dates of 

the month.” People v. Gill, 2018 IL App (3d) 150594, ¶ 104 n.8. 
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warnings is to ensure that the accused is aware of his substantive constitutional right not to 

incriminate himself and to provide him with the opportunity to exercise that right.” People v. 

Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 348 (1992). 

¶ 41 The Miranda rule came to be known as a prophylactic rule, a safeguard of a person’s fifth 

amendment right against self-incrimination broader than the right itself. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 

U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (“The Miranda exclusionary rule, however, serves the Fifth Amendment 

and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the 

absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.”). While the rule is prophylactic, the United States 

Supreme Court has made clear that a violation of Miranda is of no less constitutional 

magnitude than a direct violation of the fifth amendment. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 

428, 438-42 (2000). The enforcement mechanism behind the Miranda rule is the familiar 

exclusionary rule. E.g., Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d at 350. In the Miranda context, our supreme court 

has summarized the exclusionary rule as follows: “[A]ny statement taken from a suspect 

without the presence of an attorney is inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief unless the 

prosecution demonstrates that the defendant was given Miranda warnings and made a 

knowing and intelligent waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination.” Id.

¶ 42 In Wear, our supreme court wrote: “This court has never specifically ruled whether the 

exclusionary rule should apply to implied-consent proceedings, and does not do so here.” 

Wear, 229 Ill. 2d at 561 n.1. The court did note that at least one appellate court district had 

found the rule applicable in statutory summary suspension hearings, citing People v. Krueger, 

208 Ill. App. 3d 897 (1991). Wear, 229 Ill. 2d at 561 n.1. In Krueger, the Second District held 

that the arrest requirement imposed by section 2-118.1 of the Code necessarily meant a valid 

and lawful arrest. Krueger, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 904. The Krueger court, however, was careful to 

point out that its ruling was not an endorsement of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings. 

Id. at 904-05. Rather than excluding anything from the proceedings, a finding that an arrest 

was unlawful would negate one of the requirements of section 2-118.1, resulting in rescission 

of the statutory summary suspension. Id. at 907 (“[W]e prefer to rest our holding here on the 

construction of the statute that we have put forth rather than on the application of the 

exclusionary rule as such.”). Indeed, the Wear court made a similar observation, commenting 

that “the use of the phrase ‘exclusionary rule’ is a misnomer in this context. A prevailing 

petitioner would not gain the exclusion of anything from a rescission hearing. Rather, if the 

court finds ‘no reasonable grounds’ for an arrest, then the suspension is simply rescinded.” 

Wear, 229 Ill. 2d at 561 n.1. 

¶ 43 The Wear and Krueger courts opined that where an arrest was unlawful, resorting to the 

exclusionary rule was unnecessary because the unlawful arrest alone would be grounds for 

rescission. In the Miranda context, however, numerous courts have refused to suppress 

statements at a statutory summary suspension hearing. In Village of Algonquin v. Tilden, 335 

Ill. App. 3d 332, 335 (2002), the circuit court did not allow the arresting officer to testify at a 

statutory summary suspension hearing regarding questions he asked of the defendant, on the 

grounds that he had not read defendant the Miranda warnings. The Second District rejected 

that reasoning, stating: 

“We need not decide [whether the defendant was in custody] because we conclude that 

any noncompliance with Miranda would not require excluding defendant’s statements 

in this case. We follow the Fourth and Fifth Districts of the Illinois Appellate Court, 

which have held that statements made in violation of Miranda, which would be 
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otherwise inadmissible in a criminal proceeding, may be considered in a proceeding to 

rescind a statutory summary suspension of driving privileges. People v. Pelc, 177 Ill. 

App. 3d 737, 741 (1988); People v. Furness, 172 Ill. App. 3d 845, 849-50 (1988).” Id.

at 336. 

The Tilden court, like those in Pelc and Furness, found that because a statutory summary 

suspension is a civil matter intended to protect drivers on the state’s highways, rather than 

punish the defendant, Miranda could not serve as grounds to suppress statements. Id. at 337; 

People v. Pelc, 177 Ill. App. 3d 737, 741 (1988) (“[S]tatements made in violation of Miranda, 

which would be inadmissible in criminal proceedings, can properly be considered to establish 

probable cause for the arrest in a summary suspension proceeding.”); People v. Furness, 172 

Ill. App. 3d 845, 849 (1988). 

¶ 44 The holdings of the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Districts comport with the United States 

Supreme Court’s decisions regarding Miranda and the exclusionary rule in the civil or 

noncriminal context. In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315 (1976), the Court observed: 

“The Court has never held, and we decline to do so now, that the requirements of [Miranda] 

must be met to render pretrial statements admissible in other than criminal cases.” In that case, 

the Court rejected the notion that non-Mirandized statements should be excluded from prison 

disciplinary hearings because they might be used in later criminal proceedings. Id. Indeed, the 

Supreme Court has refused to extend the exclusionary rule beyond criminal prosecutions in 

numerous cases. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 

1032, 1050 (1984) (deportation proceedings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-95 (1976) 

(federal habeas corpus proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976) 

(federal tax assessment proceeding); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974) 

(grand jury proceedings). Illinois courts have also declined to extend the rule to contexts 

beyond criminal trials. See People v. Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (1975) (probation revocation 

proceedings); Grames v. Illinois State Police, 254 Ill. App. 3d 191, 200-02 (1993) (police 

department administrative discharge proceedings); People v. Grubb, 143 Ill. App. 3d 822, 824 

(1986) (court supervision revocation proceedings). 

¶ 45 The United States Supreme Court has never held that there is a firm bar on the application 

of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings. In Janis, the Court observed: “In the complex and 

turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil 

proceeding, federal or state.” Janis, 428 U.S. at 447. The Janis Court went on to adopt a 

balancing test, under which the exclusionary rule may be applied where the societal benefits of 

exclusion outweigh the costs. Id. at 454. Regarding those societal benefits, the Court observed 

that “the ‘prime purpose’ of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future 

unlawful police conduct.’ ” Id. at 446 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347). The Janis Court 

concluded that because the evidence in question had been excluded from the state criminal trial 

and would be excluded from any federal criminal trial, its exclusion in a tax assessment 

proceeding provided no additional deterrent effect. Id. at 447-48. 

¶ 46 The same is true in the statutory summary suspension context. Any statements taken in 

violation of Miranda would be excluded from a defendant’s criminal DUI trial. This exclusion 

deters police officers from not complying with the safeguards set forth in Miranda. Further 

exclusion of those statements in statutory summary suspension hearings would provide no 

additional deterrence, while imposing the cost of making “concededly relevant and reliable 

evidence *** unavailable” in a proceeding intended to protect the public from unsafe drivers. 
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See id. at 447. More fundamentally, where the exclusionary rule has been found inapplicable in 

contexts with great liberty interests at stake, such as deportation or the revocation of probation, 

it seems to follow a fortiori that the rule should not be applied where the temporary suspension 

of a driver’s license is the ultimate cost. Accordingly, we join the Second, Fourth, and Fifth 

Districts in concluding that the exclusionary rule, at least in the context of an alleged Miranda 

violation, is inapplicable in statutory summary suspension hearings. It follows that the circuit 

court in the present case did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress. See People 

v. Ringland, 2015 IL App (3d) 130523, ¶ 33 (reviewing court may affirm on any grounds in the 

record). 

¶ 47 D. Booking Video 

¶ 48 Defendant next argues that the circuit court erred in not allowing the booking room video 

to be played in court. The State counters that the court was within its discretion to bar the 

introduction of the video on redirect examination. 

¶ 49 “Redirect examination is generally limited to an inquiry into new material elicited during 

cross-examination, and ordinarily it should not cover matters which could have been brought 

out during the [direct] examination.” Myers v. Arnold, 83 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (1980). The scope of 

redirect examination is a matter of the circuit court’s discretion. People v. Davis, 92 Ill. App. 

3d 426, 428 (1981). The circuit court abuses its discretion where its decision is arbitrary, 

fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the 

court. People v. Anderson, 367 Ill. App. 3d 653, 664 (2006). 

¶ 50 On direct examination of Mau, defendant asked Mau if he had read defendant the warning 

to motorist while in the booking room of the Joliet Police Department. On cross-examination, 

the State asked Mau the same question. By the time of defendant’s redirect examination, 

Mau’s reading of the warning to motorist in the booking room was not a new issue. The video 

of the booking room could have been introduced in direct examination, and the State did not 

elicit on cross-examination any new information or new issues related thereto. We cannot say 

that the circuit court was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable for denying defendant leave to 

play the booking room video. 

¶ 51 E. Discovery Violation 

¶ 52 Finally, defendant contends that the State “introduced a document that Defendant did not 

get in Discovery.” He contends that this caused “unfair surprise and prejudicing [sic] 

Defendant.” Though defendant has not identified with any specificity the document to which 

he is referring, we assume that it is the warning to motorist form from the court file with which 

the State used to refresh Mau’s memory. See supra ¶ 16.

¶ 53 That form was not introduced into evidence as defendant claims; it was merely used to 

refresh Mau’s memory. Defendant has not cited any particular rule that he claims the State 

violated by purportedly withholding the document. See Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 

682 (1993) (“Bare contentions in the absence of argument or citation of authority do not merit 

consideration on appeal and are deemed waived.”). Defendant is unable to show any sort of 

unfair surprise or prejudice. After having his memory refreshed, Mau testified that he read 

defendant the warning to motorist at 8:11 p.m. Defendant, having already asked Mau 

repeatedly if he had read the warning at 8:11 p.m., could not have been surprised by that 
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testimony. 

¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 55 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. 

¶ 56 Affirmed.