MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2018 ME 100 Docket: Wal

- 17

- 516 Argued : June	12,	2018 Decided: July	17,	2018 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. MIRANDA	G.	HOPKINS

ALEXANDER ,	J. [¶1] Miranda	 G.	 Hopkins appeal s from	 a	 judgment of	 conviction	 of manslaughter	 (Class	 A), 17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	 203(1)(A)	 (2017) ,	 entere d	in	 the	 trial

court (Waldo	County, R. Murray,	J. )	following	a jury	trial. Hopkins contends	that the court	erred	in (1) denying her	motion	to	suppress	statements	she	made	to law	enforcement	officers	during five	different interviews and	(2) giving the	jury an	 allegedly	 confus ing instruction on	 concurrent	 causation

. Hopkins	 also challenges	 the	 sufficiency	 of	 the	 evidence	 supporting	 the	 jury’s conclusion , beyond	a	reasonable	doubt , that	Hopkins	caused	 the	death	of	her	infant	son. We	affirm	the	judgment

.2 I. FACTS	AND PRETRIAL HISTORY [¶2 ] This	statement	of	the	facts	and	pretrial	history includes reference

to five	different	statements	that	Hopkins	made	to	law	enforcement	officers	at various	times.		Those	statements	were	subject	to	a	motion to	suppress	and	are
at	issue	in this	appeal. Viewing	the	evidence	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the State,	the	jury ,	at	the	trial,	and	the	court,	at	the	motion	hearing, rationally	could have	found	the	following	facts	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt. See State	v.	Nobles , 2018	ME	26,	¶	2,	17 9	A.3d	910 ; State	v.	Gerry ,	2016	ME	163,	¶	2,	150	A.3d	810

. [¶3 ] On the	morning	of January	11,	2017,	Miranda	Hopkins	sen t two	of her	 three	 children

— her eight

- y ear - old son and	 six

- year - old son — to	 school. Hopkins,	with her	seven

- week

- old	son , then joined	a friend	and	the	friend’s son for	coffee	and	some	shopping.		Hopkins,	her	friend,	and	their	children returned to	Hopkins’s	home that	afternoon	 to	wait	 for	Hopkins’s	 older	 so ns	 to	 return home	from	school. [¶4 ] While	waiting	f or	the	older	boys ,	Hopkins	and her	friend drank shots of	 Fireball	 whiskey	 and	 smoked	 marijuana.	 	 The older boys	 a rrived	 home around	3:30	p.m.		After	the	boys	arrived	home , Hopkins	and her	friend each	had a	couple	more	shots	of	Fireball	whiskey.		Arou nd	5:30	p.m.,	Hopkins’s	cousin3 and	her cousin’s daughter	arrived	a t	Hopkins’s	home	for dinner.		About twenty

or thirty minutes	later, Hopkins’s	friend an d	her	son	left	Hopkins’s	home. [¶5 ] Hopkins	had	“a	few	more	shots”	of	Fireball whiskey with her	cousin

. Hopkins	“wasn’t	counting” but	estimated	that between	2:30	p.m.	and	7:30	p.m. she	consumed	roughly	seven	shots	of	Fireball	whiskey,	smoked	m arijuana,	and took	a	Benadryl. [¶6 ] Around	8:00	p.m., Hopkins’s	cousin and	her cousin’s daughter	left , and	Hopkins	began	her	nighttime	routine	by	getting her	older	boys ready	for bed.		While	she	was	helping	the	older	boys,	she	put the	baby in	a	bouncy	seat	in the	living	 room.		Hopkins	got	 the	boys	into	 their	bed	and	began	 feeling	 very “spinny”	and	“not	fee ling	well	at	all.”		Hopkins	la y down	at	the	foot	of	the	older boy s ’ bed	and	“fell	asleep	big	time.”		She awoke much	later	that	night	due	to	a “gall	bladder	attack.”		Hopkins	got	an	ice	pack	and	then	la y down	in	her	own bed. She	“wasn’t	paying	attention	 to anything”	as	she	walked	 from	 the	older boys’	room,	into	the	kitch en,	and	then	into	her	bedroom. [¶7 ] Hopkins	dozed	off	and	then	woke	up	again.		Upon	waking	up,	she reached	over	and felt the	baby’s “ice	cold”	hand.		She	testified	that the	baby was4 in	his “boppy” 1 in	an	unnatural	position	and	 that	his	head	was	“wrong.”		She immediately	jumped	out	of	bed,	turned	on	the	lights,	and	grabbed	her	phone	to dial	9

- 1

- 1. 2 [¶8 ] A t	 a round	 1:47	 a

. m . ,	 Hopkins	 called	 9

- 1

- 1	 and	 reported	 that the baby was	not	breathing, was cold	to	the	touch,	and	had	a	big	bruise	on	him.		She told	the	9

- 1

- 1	dispatcher	that	one	of	her	older	boys	must	have	jumped	on the baby in	the	night,	but	that	she	had	not	heard	him	cry	or	any	other	noises.		The dispatcher	 instructed Hopkins	 to	 perform	 cardiopulmonary	 resuscitation (CPR). [¶9 ] A t	 around	 2:06	 a.m. , a Waldo	 County	 Sheriff’s	 d eputy	 arrived	 at Hopkins’s	home.		She	found	Hopkins	performing	CPR	on the	baby on	the	floor in	her	bedroom. The	d eputy	 took	 over	CPR	and	noticed that	 the	baby had	 a “significant	amount	of	bruising”	on	his	forehead	and	chest,	had	scratches	on	his face	 and	 neck,	 and	 was	 stiff	 and	 cold.	 	 While	 performing	 CPR, the	 d eputy contacted	 her	 dispatch	 center	 and	 requested that	 a detective	 come to investigate.

1 During	the	trial,	a	“boppy”	was	described	as	“one	of	those	U

- shaped	pillows	similar	to	the	type of	pillow	that	you	will	see	airline	passengers	use	during	their	travels.”

2 This	version	of	events	was	the	version	Hopkins	told	 for	the	 first	time	at	trial. Hopkins	gave several	different	accounts	of	what	happened	on	the	night	of	January	11,	2017,	and	the	early	morning of	January	12,	2017,	to	law	enforcement	officers	durin g	several	different	interviews

.5 [¶1 0 ] Around	2:16	a.m. , emergency	medical	technicians	(EMTs)	arrived at	 the	 home	 and	 took	 over	 CPR	 from the	 deputy .	 	 The	 EMTs	 brought	 in	 an automatic	 external	 defibrillator	 (AED),	 which	 is	 able	 to	 sense	 any	 cardiac rhythm that	is	shockable , and	attached	the	paddles	to the	baby .		T here	was	no shockable	rhythm,	and the	EMTs	pronounced the	baby dead. [¶1 1 ] While	 the	 EMTs	were	working	 on the	 baby , the	 deputy left	 the bedroom	and	went	into	 the	living	 room	 to	 speak	with	Hopk ins. The	 deputy advised Hopkins	that her	baby was	dead.		Hopkins	said	that	she	knew	he	was gone,	mentioned	the	bruising,	and	said	that	she	didn’t	know	how	the	baby	got the	bruises,	but	believed	that	one	of	the	older	boys	had	been	responsible.		She pointed	out her eight

- year - old son ,	sleeping	on	the	c ouch,	to the	deputy ,	then took	the	deputy	down	the	hall	to	see her	six

- year - old	son ,	who was	still	sleeping in	his	bed. [¶1 2 ] The	deputy explained	to	Hopkin s	that,	in	all	child	death	cases, it was	 standard	 procedure	 to	 call	 a	 detective	 and	 that	 a	 detec tive	 would	 be arriving	shortly.		Hopkins	then	told the	deputy about	her	day,	which	ended	with her	 and the	 baby going	 to	 bed	 around	 9:00	 p.m.	 	 As	 they	 spoke, the	 deputy smelled	 alcohol	 on	 Hopkins’s	 breath. The	 deputy asked	 Hopkins	 if	 she	 had

a nything	 to	 dr ink	 that	 night. Hopkins	 told	 her	 that	 she	 woke	 up	 around6 11:30 p.m.	with	gall	bladder	pain	and	had	a	“couple	of	shots” of	Fireball	whiskey to	help with	the	pain.		Hopkins said that she then	went	back	to	bed. S he	said that she woke up a	few	hours	later ,	reached	over	to the	baby , and	found	him cold,	stiff,	and	unresponsive,	at	which	point	she	called	9

- 1

- 1.		Hopkins	told the deputy that	she	thought that her oldest	son must	have	killed the	baby , but she admitted	that	she had	not	heard the	baby cry	out or	f elt the	bed	moving. [¶1 3 ] Around	3:00	a.m., a Maine	State	Police detective sergeant arrived at	Hopkins’s	home.		Upon the	detective	serge a nt’s arrival, the	deputy met	him outside	 to	 brief	 him	 on	 the	 situation.	 	 Upon	 entering	 Hopkins’s	 home, the detective sergeant exchanged	 introductory	 remarks	 with	 Hopkins	 and	 then gave	her Miranda warnings

. 3 Hopkins signed	a Miranda waiver	and	agreed	to participate	in	a	recorded	interview. [¶1 4 ] Hopkins	told the detective that	she	went	to	bed	around	9:00	p.m ., then	got	up	around	10:30	p.m.	to	do	the	“mommy	thing”	and	check	all	the	doors to	make	sure	they were secure , and	then	went	back	to	sleep.		She	said that she woke	 up	 later	 and	 found the	 baby cold,	 bruised,	 and	 not	 breathing.	 	 She described	herself	to the detective as	a	“light	sleeper,”	but	said	that the	baby had not	cried,	she	did	not	hear	either	of	the	older	boys,	and	neither	of	the	older	boys

3 See Miranda	v.	Arizona ,	384	U.S.	43 6,	478

- 79 (1966)

.7

was in	her	bed	when	she	woke	up.		She	guessed	that one	of	her	older	boys must have	climbed	into	bed	beside	her	a nd	killed the	baby

. [¶1 5 ] Hopkins	said that she	had	never	seen either	of	the	older	boys be aggressive	with	 the	 baby.	 	 She	 said	 that the	 baby had	 been	 sleeping	 “be side [her]	like	always”	in	his	boppy and	that	she did	not	hear either	of	the	older boys come	 into	 the	 room.	 	 She	 also	 said	 that	 she “always”	 had	 her	 three

- foot

- tall safety gate	secured	in	her	bedroom	doorway,	and	t hat	it	had	been	in	place that night

. She	further	indicated that	neither	of	the	older	boys	understood	how	to work	the	ga te. [¶1 6 ] The	deputy then	retu r ned	inside at	the	request	of	Hopkins,	and the detective went	outside. The detective left	his	recording	device	on	the	kitchen table ; the	 device continued	 to	 record	 Hopkins	 and the	 deputy as	 they conversed. Hopkins	again	told the	deputy that her	oldest	son must	have	killed the	baby .		She	stated	that	she	was	curled	up	in	a	ball	asleep	on	her	bed	and	she didn’t	feel	the	bed	move,	but	she	guessed	that one	of the	boys	“climbed	over	the top	of	[ the	baby ],	like	jud ging	by	[ the	baby ’s]	head.		Maybe	that’s	why	he	didn’t make	 a	 sound.” But she also said	 the	safety	gate	was	 always secured in	her bedroom	door	and neither of	the	older	boys had	ever	crawled	over the	baby in the	bed	before	beca use	they	knew	it	was	his	spot

.8 [¶1 7 ] After the	baby’ s	body	was	removed	from	the	home,	Hopkins	agreed to	participate	in	a	video taped walk

- through	to	explain	where	she	and the	baby had	been	positioned	in	her	bed. A d e tective from the	Maine	State	Police and a sergeant	 from the Evidence	 Response	 Team participated	 in	 the	 video taped walk

- through	 interview	 with	 Hopkins. During	 this	 walk

- t hrough , Hopkins pointed	out	the	boppy, described the	blankets	she	used	to	cover	the	baby up, described	her	position	on	h er	bed,	pointed	out	the	sa fety gate, and	explained that	the	safety gate	had	been	in	its	position	that	night. [¶1 8 ] Later	 that	 morning	 at	 around	 7:30	 a.m.,	 Hopkins	 agreed	 to	 be further	 interviewed	 by the	 detective	 who participated	 in	 the	 video taped walk

- through

. She	met	with the	detective in	his police c ruiser because friends and	 family	were arriving	at her home. The	detective reminded	Hopkins	 that she	had	been	provided Miranda warnings during	her earlier recorded	interview with	the	detective sergeant ,	informed	her	that	those rights	were	still	in	effect, and	offered to	go	over	the	rights	with	her .		Hopkins	declined the	offer	to	review her Miranda rights

. [¶1 9 ] Hopkins told the	 detective that	 she	 had	 two	 shots	 of	 Fireball whiskey	around	5:00 p.m.,	while	her	cousin	was	visiting ,	to	“clear	her	sinuses.” She	explained	that	after	dinner	she	got	the	older	boys	into	bed	around	8:00	p.m.9 and	then	put the	baby to	sleep	in	his	boppy on	her	bed	around	9:00	p.m.		She said	that	she	took	two	hits	from	a marijuana	joint	after	the	older	boys	had	gone to	sleep and	before	she	got	the	baby ready	for	bed	because	it	“slows [her] brain down	long	enough	that	[she]	can	fall	asleep.”		Hopkins	stated	that	she	la y down and	fell	asleep	around	9:00	p.m.	and	woke	up	abou t	an	hour	later	because	her gall	bladder	was	bothering	her.		At	th at time,	she	checked	on the	baby and	saw that	he	was	fine	and	still	sleeping. [ ¶20 ] Hopkins	 said that she	 put	 a	 “healthy	 bruise

- free	 one	 hundred percent	healthy,	happy	baby	to	bed

.	.	. . ”		She	did	not	know	what	happened	to the	baby , and	she	agreed	with the	detective that	the	injuries	were	inflicted	by someone	but	denied	that	she	was	responsible.		She	stated	that	she	was	“really praying”	that her	oldest	son would	talk	to the	detective and provide	him	with the	 answers	 he	 was	 looking	 for	 because one	 of	 her	 older	 boys was likely responsible,	but	she	acknowledged	that	she	had	never	seen	either	of	them	be violent	with	the	baby. [¶ 2 1] The	medical	e xaminer	who	conducted	the autopsy found abra sions and	bruises	all	over	the baby ’s	body ; skull	fractures	on	both	sides	of	his	head and	on	the	back	of	his	head ; multiple	rib	fractures ; upper	right	arm	fractures ; swelling	 and	 bleeding	 inside	 the	 scalp ; retinal	 and	 optic	 nerve	 sheath10 hemorrhage ; and	ble eding	into	the	cervical	spinal	cord.		The	medical	examiner opined	 that	 these	injuries	were	indicative	of	“whiplash”	 forces	applied	 to	 the body	and	that	the	rib	fractures	were	likely	a	result	of a “squeezing	of	the	chest” type	of	force.		The	medical	examine r	determined	that	the	baby’s	cause	of	death was	blunt	force	trauma	with	craniocerebral	injuries. 4 [¶22 ] On	January	17,	2017,	Hopk ins	was	charged	by	complaint	with one count	 of	 knowing	 or	 depraved	 indifference	 murder	 (Class A), 17

- A	 M.R.S. § 201(1)(A)

- (B) (2017)

. Thereafter,	Hopkins	was	indicted	 for	 manslaughter (Class	A),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	203(1)(A). After	the	grand	jury	indictment, the	State dismissed	th e original	murder	charge	in the	complaint

. [¶23 ] On	April	24,	2017,	Hopkins	filed	a	mot ion	to	suppress	statements she	made	to	law	enforcement	officers	during	the	course	of	several	interviews. A	hearing	on	the	motion	was	held	on	August	31,	2017.		At	the	hearing , Hopkins argued	 that	 (1)	 her	 initial	 interview	 with the	 responding	 deputy was	 in violation	of	her Miranda right s	and was	involuntary;	(2) her interview	with the detective sergeant at	her	kitchen	table was	undertaken	without	a	valid	waiver

4 At	trial,	Hopkins	introduced	the	expert	witness	testimony	of	a	pathologist	who	reviewed	the medical	examiner’s	autopsy	report	and	agreed	with	the	medical	examiner’s	autopsy	results	and	her testimony	regarding	the	baby’s	injuries.		He	further	opi ned	that	the	injuries	were	most	likely	caused by	multiple,	rapid	assaults	on	various	different	parts	of	the	baby’s	body	and	were	not	the	result	of	a fall	or	“co

- sleeping.”11 of	her Miranda rights	and	was	involuntary; and	that (3)	her	second	interview with the	 deputy , (4) her	intervie w	 during	 the	 video taped walk

- through, and (5) her	 interview	 with the detective	 in	 his cruiser were each undertaken without	a reading	of	her Miranda rights	and	were involuntary. At	the	hearing, recordings	of	the	interviews	were	admitted	in	evidence	and	the	State	offered the	testimony	of the	law	enforcement	officers	involved	in	the	interviews

. II.		RULING	ON	MOTION	TO	SUPPRESS [¶24 ] On	 October	 17,	 2017,	 the	 court	 entered	 a	 wri tten	 order	 on	 the motion	 to	 suppress,	 granting	 the	 motion	 in	 part	 and	 denying	 the	 motion	 in part. 5 The c ourt	made	specific	findings	of	fact	as	to	each	challenged	interview. [¶25 ] Regarding Hopkins’s	initial	interview	with the	deputy ,	 the	court found	that	although	no Miranda warnings	were	given ,	they	were	not	required because	the	interview	“was	not	a ‘ custodial ’ interrogation”	and the	deputy was responding	to	a	9

- 1

- 1	call	initiated	by	Hopkins.		The	court	found	that	although Hopkins	wa s	crying	at	points during	the	interview,	for	the most	part	she “ was coherent	and	understandable”	and	she	did	not	“indicate	she	wanted	to	leave	or

5 Addressing	 the	 five interviews	 Hopkins	 challenges	 on	 appeal,	 the	 court found th at	 the statements	made	by	Hopkins	during	these	interviews did	not	require suppression.		In	her	motion	to suppres s,	 Hopkins	 also	 challenged statements	 made	 during three other	 interviews	 with	 law enforcement	officers,	and	the	court,	in	its	order,	made	specif ic	findings ,	some	favorable	to	Hopkins, as	to	those three interviews. Hopkins	is	not	challenging	those	rulings.12 that	she	did	not	want	to	answer	questions.” Based	on	these	findings , the	court concluded ,	beyond	a	reasonable doubt, that	Hopkins’s	statements	made	to the deputy during	the	initial interview	were	voluntary. [¶26 ] Addressing	Hopkins’s interview with the detective sergeant at	her kitchen	table ,	the	court	found	that the detective sergeant informed	Hopkins	“of her Miranda rights , and also	provided	her	with a	written Miranda consent	form which	she	signed.”		The	court	also	found	that	the	interview	was	conducted	in	a “conversational	and	calm	tone.” Although	Hopkins	was	crying	at	times and she was	denied	 the	immediate	opportunity	 to	smoke a	cigarette,	 the	court	 found that	her	waiver	of	her Miranda rights	was	valid	and found,	beyond	a	reasonable doubt,	that her	statements	were	voluntarily	made. [¶27 ] The	court	found	that the	deputy’s	second	in terview	with	Hopkins occurred “almost	immediately	after	the	conclusion	of [the detective s ergeant’s ]
interview

. ”		Although the	deputy did	not	provide	Hopkins	with	new Miranda warning s ,	Hopkins	“was	allowed	to	smoke”	and	“went	about	various	domesti c duties”	while	they	conversed. The	court	found that	no	new Miranda warning s

were required	 for	 this	 interview ,	 and that the	 statements	 m ade	 by	 Hopkins were	voluntary.13 [¶28 ] The	 court	 also	 made	 specific	 fi ndings	 regarding	 the	 video taped walk

- through	 int erview.	 	 The	 court	 found	 that	 this	 interview	 occurred “approximately	 three	 hours	 after [ the detective sergeant ] had	 formally provided	 the	 defendant	 with	 her Miranda warnings”	 and	 new Miranda warnings	 were	 not	 given. The	 court	 found	 that	 Hopkins	 consented to participating	in	the	video taped walk

- through	and concluded	that although the interview	was	conducted	by different law	enforcement	officer s, new Miranda warnings	were	not	required	and	the	statements	made	by	Hopkins , “which	were in	 response	 to	 the	 officer ’s	 calm	 and	 nonconfrontational	 inquiries,	 were voluntary.” [¶29 ] Addressing	Hopkins ’s interview	with the detective in	 his	 police cruiser,	the	court	found	that	no	new Miranda warnings	were	given	but that the detective “did	 address Miranda ”	 with	 Hopkins	 by	 “telling	 her	 that	 all	 the
Miranda rights	 which	 had	 previously	 been	 explained	 to	 her	 still	 apply,	 and specifically	asking	her	if	she	needed	the	officer	to	go	over	those	again	with	her.” Hopkins	said	she	did	not	need to	go	over Miranda aga in. The	court	found	that this interview	 “lasted	 approximately	 three	 hours”	 and	 had	 a	 “conversational low

- key	 tone	 throughout.”		Hopkins	was	provided	with	at	least	 one	smok ing break,	was	specifically	told	she	was	not	under	arrest,	and	at	the	conclusion	of14 the	interview	she	was	not	placed	under	arrest. The	court concluded that , based on	 these	 circumstances,	 no	 new Miranda warnings	 were	 required	 and	 the statements	provided	by	Hopkins	during	this	interview	were	voluntary.
III.		TRIAL [¶30 ] A	 five

- day trial	 was	 held	 on	 October	 31,	 2017 , through November 7, 2017.		At	trial,	Hopkins	testified	on	her	own	behalf.		She	admitted that	much	of	what	she	had	told	law	enforcement	officers during	the	interviews that	occurred in	the	aftermath	of her baby ’s death	was	a	lie.		Hopk ins	testified that	she	lied	to	the	officers during these	i nterviews	because	she	was	afraid	that her	older	sons would	be	taken	from	her	if	she	admitted	that	the	death	occurred while	she	was	passed	out	from	drinking. [¶ 3 1] At	 the	 c oncl usion	 of	 the	 trial, Hopkins	 requested	 a specific
concurrent	causation	instruction , 17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	33	 (2017) , that informed	 the jurors	 that,	 in	 order	 to	 convict her ,	 the	 State	 would	 have	 to	 prove	 three elements	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt, 6 including a	thi rd	element that	read : “The

6 See Maine	Jury	Instruction	Manual ,	§	6

- 50 at	6

- 91 (2017

- 18	ed .): When	 the	 defendant’s	 conduct	 may	 have	 operated	 concurrently	 with	 other acti ons,	events	or	conditions	to	cause	a	particular	result,	then,	to	find	the	defendant guilty	of	the	result,	the	State	must	prove	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	that	(1)	the	result would	 not	 have	 occurred	 but	 for	 the	 defendant’s	 conduct,	 and	 (2)	 the	 concurrent cau se	was	not	alone	clearly	sufficient	to	produce	the	result	and	(3)	the	defendant’s conduct	was	not	clearly	insufficient	to	produce	the	result.15 Defendant’s	conduct	was	clearly	sufficient	to	produce	the	result	of	the	death	of [ her	baby ] .”		The	court	granted	Hopkins’s	request	 for	a	concurrent	causation instruction	but	declined	 to	adopt	 the	specific	language	proposed	by	Hopkins. Instead,	the	court gave	a	concurrent	causation	instru ction	with	a	third	element that	read :	“Miranda	Hopkins’s	c onduct	was	not	clearly	insufficient	to	produce the	resulting	death	of [her baby ] .” Hopkins objected to	the	court’s	instruction, and the	court responded by stating that	it	“look[ed]	at	the	language	contained in	the	statute	itself	on	the	issue	of	concurrent causation	as	it	appears	in	Title
17

- A,	section	33.		And	 there	.	.	. ,	 the	language	chosen	by	 the	L egislature	also uses	the	term	clearly	insufficient	in	addressing	the	conduct	of	the	defendant	as something	that,	again,	must	be	proven	by	the	State.” [¶32 ] During	its deliberations ,	the	jury sent	the	court	a	note	requesting clarification	 on	 “causation.” After	 consultation	 with	 the	 parties,	 t he	 court responded	 by	 giving	 further	instructions on	 concurrent	 causation stating , in part , “t o	the	extent	you	may find	that	the	conduct	of	one	or	more	of	the	older boy s	was	involved	in	the	cause	of	[ the	baby’s ] death,	the	State	must	also	prove beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	that,	number	one,	t he	boy	or	boys’	actions	were	not alone	clearly	sufficient	to	produce	the	resultin g	death	of [the	baby] and,	number
two,	t hat	Miranda	Hopkins’s	conduct	alone	was	clearly	sufficient	to	produce	the16 resulting	death	of [ her baby] .” The	concluding	sentence	of	this	instruction	was

s imila r	to	the	concluding	sentence	of the	instruction	that	Hopkins	had	originally requested. Both	 parties	 were	 satisfied	 with	 the	 court’s	 response , and	 there were	no	objections. [¶33 ] On	November	7,	2017,	the	jury returned	a	verdict	finding Hopkins guilty	of	manslaughter.		Hopkins	filed a	motion	for	judgment	of	acquittal,	which was	 denied	 on	 November	 28,	 2017.	 	 Hopkins	 filed	 a	 notice	 of	 appeal	 on November	 27,	 2017. 7 On	 December	 13,	 2017,	 Hopkins was	 sentenced	 to eighteen	years	in	prison, with	all	but	thirteen years suspended ,	and four	ye ars of	probation

. IV

. LEGAL	ANALYSIS
A. Motion	to	Suppress [¶34 ] Hopkins	 argues	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 in	 denying	 her	 motion	 to
suppress the statements that she	made	to	law	enforcement	officers	during the five interviews because (1) Hopkins’s	 initial interview	 with	 the	 deputy constituted a custodial	interrogation requiring the	deputy	to	inform	Hopkins	of her Miranda rights ; (2) Hopki ns’s	interview	with	 the	 detective	 sergeant was

7 Because	a	sentence	had	not	yet	been	entered at	the	time	the	appeal	was	filed ,	the	appeal	was interlocutory , and we allowed	the	trial	court to	enter	a	final	judgment and	deemed the appeal	to	be from	the	final	judgment.17 undertaken	without	a	valid	waiver	of	her Miranda rights;	(3) Hopkins’s Miranda rights	were	required	to	be	re read	during her second	interview	with	the	deputy, the	video taped walk

- through	interview,	and	the	interview	with	the	detective	in his	cruiser;	and	(4) Hopkins’s	statements made	during	all	five	interviews were not	volunta ry because of	her emotional	distress when	she	made	the	statements

. [¶35 ] When	 addressing	 a	 challenge	 to	 a	 court’s	 denial	 of	 a	motion	 to suppress,	“we	review	the	factual	findings	underlying	the	trial	court’s	ruling	for clear	error	and	the	court’s	legal	conclusions	de	novo.” State	v.	Cote ,	2015	ME 78, ¶	9,	118	A.3d	805

. We	will affirm	a	court’s	denial	of	a	motion	to	suppress	if	any reasonable	view	of	the	evidence	supports	the	court’s	decision. State	v.	Marquis , 2018	ME	39,	¶ 15,	181 A.3d 684

. 1. Whether	 Hopkins’ s	 Statements i n h er	 Initial	 Interview	 With t he D eputy	Were	Made During a Custodial	Interrogation [¶36 ] “When	a	person	has	been	subjected	to	an	in

- custody	interrogation but	 has	 not	 been	 advised	 of	 his Miranda rights,	 the	 State	 may	 not	 offer	 the statements	 made	 during	 that	 interrogation	 aga inst	 that	 person	 in	 its

case - in

- chief.” State	v.	Perry ,	2017	ME	74,	¶	15,	159	A.3d	840 ; see Miranda	v.
Arizona ,	384	U.S.	436,	473

- 74	(1966)

. A	defendant	is	c onsidered	“in	custody” when subject	to	either	a	formal	arrest	or	a	restraint	on	freedom	of	movement

to the	degree	associated	with	formal	arrest. See State	v.	Michaud ,	1998	ME	251,18 ¶	 4,	 724	 A.2d	 1222

. “To	 determine	 if	 a	 person	 was	 in	 custody for Miranda purposes,	 a	 court	 must	 objectively	 review	 the	 pertinent	 circumstances	 to decide	whether	a	reasonable	per son	in	the	defendant’s	position	would	have	felt free	 to	 terminate	 the	 interaction	 with	 law	 enforcement	 or	 if	 there	 was	 a restraint	on	freedom	of	movement	of	the	degree	associated	with	formal	arrest.” Perry ,	2017	ME	74,	¶	15,	159	A.3d	840. [¶37 ] In making	 this determination, we consider	 a	 number	 of factors, viewing	them	in	their	totality, including: (1) the	locale	where	the	defendant	made	the	statements; (2) the	party	who	initiated	the	contact; (3) the	existence	or	non existence	of	probable	cause	to	arrest	(to the	extent	communicated	to	the	defendant); (4) subjective	views,	beliefs,	or	intent	that	the	police	manifested to	 the	 defendant,	 to	 the	 extent	 they	 would	 affect	 how	 a reasonable	 person	 in	 the	 defendant’s	 position	 wou ld perceive	his	or	her	freedom	to	leave; (5) subjective	views	or	belief s that	the	defendant	manifested	to the	police,	 to	 the	extent	 the	 officer’s	 response	would	affect how	a	reasonable	person	in	the	defendant’s	position	would perceive	his	or	her	freedom	to	le ave; (6) the	focus	of	the	investigation	(as	a	reasonable	person	in	the defendant’s	position	would	perceive	it); (7) whether	 the	 suspect	 was	 questioned	 in	 familiar surroundings;19
(8) the	number	of	law	enforcement	officers	present; (9) the	degree	of	physical	restraint	p laced	upon	the	suspect;	and (10) the	duration	and	character	of	the	interrogation

. Michaud ,	1998	ME	251,	¶	4,	724	A.2d	1222. [¶38 ] Review of	 these	 factors	 establishes that	 Hopkins	 was	 not	 in custody at	 any	 point	 during her initial	 interview with	 the	 deputy .	 	 Hopkins initiated this	 interview	 seeking	 help	 following	 the	 9

- 1

- 1	 call concerning	 her baby.	 	 Hopkins	 was	 coherent	 and	 understandable	 during	 the	 interview, the interview	 occurred	 in	 her home, the	 deputy	 was	 the	 only	 officer	 involved during	 this	 interview ,	 and	 the	 conversation	 maintained	 a	 “calm	 tone” throughout

. T here	 was	 no	 point	 at	which	 a	 reasonable person in	Hopkins’s
pos ition	would	have	 felt	 that she	was	not	 free	 to	 termin ate	 the	interrogation and	leave. S ee State v.	Bragg ,	2012	ME	102,	¶	8,	48 A.3d	769 .		T he	court	did	not err	in	concluding	that	Hopkins	was	not	in	custody	for	purposes	of Miranda

. 2. Whether	Hopkins	Validly	Waived	her Miranda Rights	During	her Interview	W ith	the	Detective	Sergeant [¶39 ] If	an	individual	is	determined	to	be	“in custody , ”	the	State	then	has the	 burden	 of	 proving	 that	 the	 statements were obtained after a	 knowing, intelligent,	and	voluntary	waiver	of Miranda rights. State	v.	Coombs ,	1998	ME 1,20 ¶	 15 ,	 704 A.2d 387

. To	 constitute	 a	 valid	 waiver	 of Miranda rights,	 a defendant’s	 conduct	 must	 amount	 to	 an	 “intentional	 relinquishment	 or abandonment	of a known	right	or	privilege.” State	v.	Gordon ,	387	A.2d	611,	612 (Me.	 1978) .	 	 “Whether	 a	 defendant	 has	 validly	 waived	 her Miranda rights depends	 on	 the	 factual	 circumstances	 of	 the	 interrogation.” Coombs , 1998 ME 1,	¶	13,	704 A.2d 387. [¶40 ] Hopkins	 was	 given Miranda warnings at	 the	 beginning	 of her second	interview

— the interview	with	the detective sergeant	in	her	kitchen

— and	vali dly	waived Miranda .		After introductory	remarks,	the detective sergeant informed	 Hopkins	 of	 her Miranda rights	 and	 provided	 her	 with	 a	 written Miranda consent	 form , which	 she	 signed.	 	 Although	 Hopkins	 was	 crying	 at times,	she	was	coherent	and	understandable	for the	majority	of	the	interview.
T he	court	did	not	err	in	concluding , b ased	on	the	totality	of	the	circumstances , that	 Hopkins’s	 waiver	 of her Miranda rights	 w as	 knowing,	 voluntary,	 and intentional.
3. Whether Miranda Warnings	Needed	to	be Reread Before	Hopkins’s Second	Interview With	the	Deputy,	the	Video taped Walk

- Through Interview,	or	the	Interview	With	the	Detective	in	his	Police	Cruiser [¶ 4 1] When the	interrogation	process	is	resumed	after	an	interruption, Miranda warnings	 may	 need	 to	 be	 reread	 for	 statements	 to	 be	 admissible.21 State v.	 Birmingham ,	 527	 A.2d	 759,	 761

- 762	 (Me.	 1987)

. Several objective factors	are	examined to	determine	whether	an	accused	must	be	re

- informed	of her constitutional	rights: (1) the	 time	lapse	 between	 the	last Miranda warnings	 and	 the accused’s	statements; (2) interruptions	in	the	continuity	of	the	interrogation; (3) whether	 there	was	 a	 change	 of	locati on	 between	 the	 place where	 the	last Miranda warnings	were	given	and	 the	place where	the	accused’s	statements	were	made; (4) whether	 the	 same	 officer	 who	 gave	 the	 warnings	 also conducted	 the	 interrogation	 resulting	 in	 the	 accused’s statement;	and (5) whether	 the	 statement	 elicited	 during	 the	 complained	 of interrogation	 differed	 significantly	 from	 other	 statements which	had	been	preceded	by Miranda warnings. State	v.	Myers ,	345	A.2d	500,	502	(Me.	1975) ; see	State	v.	Drake ,	1999	ME	91, ¶ 4,	731	A.2d	85 8

. [¶42 ] Hopkins’ s	 contention that Miranda warnings	 should	 have	 been

re read	 during	 the	 second	 interview	 with	 the	 deputy,	 the videotaped walk

- though interview with	 the	detective ,	and	 the	interview	conducted with the	detective in his police	cruiser ,	is unavailing. T hese three interviews took place shortly after	 Hopkins	 received Miranda warnin gs and	 v alidly waived them , they occurred consecutively	and reasonably close	in	time	to	one	another ,22 and they occurred	either	in	Hopkins’s	home	or	right	outside her	home

. Further, Hopkins	was	reminded	of	her Miranda rights when	she	was	interviewed	by	the detective	in	his	police cruiser ,	the	last	of	the	interviews	at	issue, but declined the detective’s offer	 to	 review her Miranda rights

. T he	 court	 did	 not	 err	 in determining	that Miranda warnings	did	not	need	to	be	repeated before	these
interviews

. 4

. Whethe r	Hopkins’s	Statements	Were Voluntar y [¶43 ] When	a	voluntariness	issue	is	raised,	the	State	has	the	burden	to prove	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt	 that	 a	 statement	 was	 voluntary. State	 v. Kittredge ,	2014	ME	90,	¶	24,	97	A.3d	106

. We	review	the	court’s	factual	findings regarding	 voluntariness	 for	 clear error	 and	 its	 ultimate	 determination regarding	 voluntariness	 de	 novo. State	 v.	 Hunt ,	 2016	 ME	 172,	 ¶ ¶ 16

- 19 , 151 A.3d	911 ; State	v. Bryant ,	2014	ME	94,	¶	15,	97	A.3d	595

. [¶44 ] To	determine	whether	a	statement	was	voluntary , we consider	the totality	 of	 the	circumstances and	co nsider	 factors “such	as:	 t he details	 of	 the interrogation; duration	 of	 the	 interrogation; location	 of	 the	 interrogation; whether the	interrogation	was	custodial; the	recitation	of Miranda warnings; the	numb er	of	officers	involved; the	persistence	of	the	off icers;	police	trickery; threats, promises	or	induc ements	made	to	the	def endant;	and	the	defendant’s23 age,	 physical	 and	 mental	 health, emotional	 stability , and	 conduct. ” State	 v. Sawyer ,	2001	ME	88,	¶	9, 772	A.2d	1173

. [¶45 ] Here,	the	totality	of	the	circumstanc es support s the	conclusion	that Hopkins’s statements to	law	 enforcement	 officers	 during	 the	 five	 challenged
interviews were	voluntary. The questioning	that	occurred throughout	the	five
interviews was	 non confrontational	 and	 most	 of	 the	interviews	 took	 place	in Hopkins’s	 home,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 interview	 with	 the	 detective that occurred in	his	police	cruiser	in	 front	 of	Hopkins’s	home.		Although	Hopkins was	 crying	 at	 times	 during	 the	 interviews,	 Hopkins	 was	 coherent	 and understandable	during	the	interviews.		There	was	no	evidence	that	any	of	the law	 enforcement	 officers	 coerced	 or	 tric ke d	Hopkins	 to	 get	 her	 to	 talk. The court	 did	 not	 err in	 finding,	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt, that	 Hopkins’s

statements during	all	five	interviews were	voluntary.
B

. Jury	Instruction	on	Concurrent	Causation [¶46 ] Hopkins argues	 that	 the	 court erred	 by giving	 a	 concurrent
causation	instruction that	confused	the	jurors. We	review	j ury	instructions	as a	whole for	prejudicial	error to	ensure	that	they	accurately	and	fairly	informed the	jury	of	the	law	and	to	determine	the	potential	for	a	juror	misunderstan ding as	a	result	of	the	instructions. See State	v.	Okie ,	2010	ME	6,	¶	8,	987	A.2d	495

.24 We will	 not	 vacate	 a	 judgment	 based	 on the	 denial	 of	 a	 proposed jury instruction	 unless	 the	 appealing	 party	 can	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 instruction

“ (1) stated	 the	law correctly;	 (2)	was	 generated	 by	 the	 evidence	in	 the	 case; ( 3) was	not	misleading	or	confusing;	and	(4)	was	not	sufficiently	covered	in	the instructions	the	court	gave. ” State	v.	Hanaman ,	2012	ME	40,	¶	16,	38	A.3d	1278

. “A	trial	court	has	wide	discretion in	formulating	its	instructions	to	the	jury	so long	as	it	accurately	and	coherently	reflects	the	applicable	law.” State	v.	Martin , 2007	ME	23,	¶	6,	916	A.2d	961 .		“ When	jury	instructions	closely	parallel	 the provisions	of	the	Maine	Criminal	Code,	they	are adequate	to	provide	the	jury with	 the	 necessary	 information. ” State	 v. Mann ,	 2005	 ME	 25,	 ¶	 13,
868 A.2d 183

. [¶47 ] Title	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	33	provides	that	“[u]nless	otherwise	provided, when	causing	a	result	is	an	element	of	a	crime,	causation	may	be	found where the	 r esult	 would	 not	 have	 occurred	 but for	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	 defendant operating	 either	 alone	 or	 concurrently	 with	 another	 cause,	 unless	 the concurrent	cause	was	clearly	sufficient	to	produce	the	result	and	the	conduct of	the	defendant	was	clearly insufficient.” [¶48 ] R eviewing	the	instructions	as	a	whole,	the	court	informed	the	jury correctly	 and	 fairly	 of	 all	 necessary elements of	 the	 governing	 law on25 concurrent	causation

. Although	Hopkins’s requested	instruction stated	the	law correctly ,	was	generated	by	the	evidence,	and	was	not	misleading	or	confusing, the	trial	court’s slightly	different instruction mirrors the “clearly	insufficient” statutory	 language , and	 was	 a dequate	 to	 provide	 the	 jury the	 necessary information about	the	elements of	concurrent	causation

. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	33 ; Mann , 2005 ME	25,	¶ 13,	868	A.2d	183. [¶49 ] Additionally,	 upon	 receiving	 a	 note	 from	 the	 jury	 asking	 for clarification	 on	 “causation , ”	 the	 court	 responded	 by	 giving a	 clarifying instruction	that used langua ge similar	to	the	language	that Hopkins	originally requested

. T he	 court	 did	 not	 err	 in instructing	 the	 jury	 on	 concurrent
causation.
C. Sufficiency	of	the	Evidence [¶50 ] Hopkins argues	 that	 there	was	 not	 sufficient	 evidence	 to	 prove beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	that	she	“[r]ecklessly,	or	with	criminal	negligence, cause[d]	the	death” of	her	baby

. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	203(1)(A). [¶ 5 1] On	 a	 challenge	 to the	 sufficiency	 of	 the	 evidence to	 support a conviction, we	 view the	evidence	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	State	and determine whether	 a	 trier	 of	 fact	 rationally	 could	 find beyond	 a	 reasonable doubt	each element	of	 the	offense	charged. State	v.	McBreairty ,	2016	ME	61,26 ¶ 14,	137	A.3d	 1012

. The	jury	may	 draw	all reasonable	inferences	 from	 the evidence	presented	at	trial	and	decide	issues	of	the	weight	an d	credibility	of	the evidence. Id. [¶ 52 ] Direct	 evidence	 of	 a defendant’s exact	 actions	 in	 committing	 a
crime is	not	required ; t he	fact

- finder “ may	properly	find beyond	a	reasonable doubt	 that	 a	 defendant	 acted	 recklessly	 or	 with	 criminal	 negligence	 based sol ely	 on	 circumstantial	 evidence.” See State	 v.	 Brown ,	 2017	 ME	 59,	 ¶	 9 , 158 A.3d	501

. A	conviction	based	on	circumstantial	evidence	may	be	affi rmed even	if the	inferences	drawn from	circumstantial	evidence	are	contradicted	by parts	 of	 the	 direct	 evidence

. State	 v.	 Cummings , 2017 ME	 143,	 ¶	 12,
16 6 A.3d 996 ; State	v.	Medeiros ,	2010	ME	47,	¶ 17,	997	A.2d	95

. [¶53 ] To	convic t	Hopkins of	manslaughter, 17

- A M.R.S.	§ 203(1)(A),	the State	 was	 required to prove	 beyond	 a	 rea sonable	 doubt	 that	 she acted recklessly or	with	criminal	negligence	and	ca used	the	death	of	her	baby

. See
17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 35 (3), (4)(A)	(2017)

. In	addition,	the	State	was	required	to	prove beyond	 a reasonable	 doubt	 that	 the	 death wou ld	 not	 have	 occurred	 but	 for Hopkins’ s conduct operating	either	alone	or	concurrently	with	another	cause, unless	the	concurrent	cause	w as	clearly	sufficient	to	produce the	result	and	the conduct	of	the	defendant	was	clearly	insufficient. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	33.27 [¶54 ] Assessing	the	evidence	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	State, the jury,	 based	 on	 the	 evidence	 presented,	 could	 have	 found	 that the	 baby was home	with	Hopkins	and	Hopkins’s	two	older	sons	at	the	time	of	his	death, the baby’s cause	of	death	was	consistent	with severe inflicted	t rauma	rather	than an	act	of	a	sleeping	person or	falling,	and	the	evidence	was	not	consistent	with the	alternative cause	of	death	asserted	by	Hopkins

— that	her	older	boys	were responsible	 for the	 baby’s death. See State	 v. Allen ,	 2006 ME	 20,	 ¶¶	 25

- 27,
892 A.2d	 447 (holding	 that	 there	 was	 sufficient	 evidence	 supporting	 the defendant’s	manslaughter	conviction	where	the State	presented	evidence	that the	 toddler	was	 alone	with	 the	 defendant	 at	 the	 time	 of	injury,	 the	 cause	 of death	was	consistent	with	inflicted	trauma	rather	than	an	accidental	fall	as	the defendant	 claimed,	 and	 the	 evidence	 was	 not	 consistent	 with	 an	 alter native cause	 of	 death advanced	 by	 the	 defendant). The	 evidence	 wa s	 sufficient	 to support	Hopkins’s	conviction	of	manslaughter. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.28 Laura	P.	Shaw,	Esq. (orally) ,	Camden	Law	LLP,	Camden,	for	appellant	Miranda G.	Hopkins Janet	 T.	 Mills,	 Attorney	 General,	 and	 Donald	 W.	 Macomber,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen

. (orally) ,	Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Waldo	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 2017

- 47 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY