### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DINA SOLIMAN,M.D., Plaintiff,



### v. GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, 

### etal., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 

### Civil Action No. 08-1137 (RJL)

# MEMORAN~RDER (August

# L,2010) [# 54] Theplaintiff, Dr. Dina Soliman ("plaintiff' or "Soliman"), was employed as a doctor and faculty member ofthe George Washington University medical school. Solimanultimately resigned and broughtthis lawsuit against a number ofdefendants, including George Washington University ("GWU"), DistrictHospital Partners, L.P, United Health Services ofDC, Inc., and Richard B. Becker, M.D. ("the Hospital defendants"), and abevy ofher former colleagues, Dr. Michael Berrigan ("Berrigan"), Dr. Paul Dangerfield ("Dangerfield"), Dr. Jason Sankar ("Sankar"), and Dr. Ronald Guritzky ("Guritzky") (collectively, "the MFAphysician defendants"). The MFA physician defendants now move for complete dismissal ofthe complaint against them. After careful consideration ofthe pleadings, the relevant law, and the entire record herein, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion.

### BACKGROUND The events leading up to this suit are recounted at length in my earlier opinion in this case, and thus only warrantthe following summary statements. See Soliman v. George Washington University, 658 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D.D.C. 2009). Soliman's claims arise from her employment as a cardiothoracic anesthesiologist at George Washington University Hospital, where the MFAphysician defendants were Soliman's colleagues.] Specifically, with respect to the MFAphysician defendants, Soliman complains that while her application to rejoin the "HeartTeam" was pending, Sankar and Dangerfield spread rumors about herpersonal life (Am. Compi. ,-r 22) and about herprofessional perfonnance (ld. ,-r29), and publicly reprimanded herto discreditherin front ofhospital staff(Id. ,-r34). In addition, she complains that they, along with Guritzky, regularly assigned her to work alone, denying her the opportunity to work with residents, which

was a more prestigious assignment. Id. ,-r,-r24-25; 54-55. Soliman claims that Berrigan, who was the chair ofthe department at the time, failed to respond to Soliman's reports of discrimination and abusive behavior. See, e.g., id. ,-r,-r 27,32,38,39,45,46,50,51,57, 60-64. According to Soliman, Berrigan and Dangerfield also "falsely criticized" her perfonnance to at least one otherhospital where Soliman had applied for aposition. Id.

,-r,-r 75, 95.

I Berrigan is a professor ofanesthesiology and is chainnan ofthe department of anesthesiology and critical care medicine. Am. Compi. ,-rIO. Dangerfield is an assistant professor ofanesthesiology and the director ofclinical anesthesia. Id. ,-rll. Sankar is an assistant professor ofanesthesiology and the director ofcardiac anesthesia education. Id. ,-rI2. Guritzky is an assistant professor ofanesthesiology and the director ofstudent clerkship. Id. ,-r13. 2Soliman also alleges that Berrigan and Guritzky falsely blamed Soliman for the death ofa patient, an accusation which led to the summary suspension ofher hospital privileges in violation ofthe procedures prescribed by the hospital's bylaws. Id.**~~77-78;** 80-81. She claims that Berrigan, Dangerfield, and Guritzky, along with the other defendants, failed to provide Soliman "with a formal, recorded hearing, the right to legal representation, the right to testify on her own behalf, and the right to presentwitnesses and rely on documentary evidence at the hearing." Id.**~81.** Instead, Soliman was subject to an ad hoc review committee meeting, in which Berriganparticipated as a witness. Id.**~84.** The ad hoc committee reinstated Soliman'sprivileges but subjected herto a sixweekpeerreview, which exceededthe committee's authority underthe bylaws. Id.**~86,** 88. Over Soliman's objection, Guritzky performedthe peerreview. Id.**~~93-94.** In total, Soliman alleged four counts in her Complaint. This Courtpreviously dismissed Counts II and III, which alleged gender discrimination and retaliation in violation ofTitle VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964,42U.S.C. §§ 2000 

### etseq., and the D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 

### etseq. Soliman, 658 F. Supp. 2d. at 103. Because I concluded that aiding and abetting claims could not survive when the underlying claims had been dismissed, I also dismissed Count IV as to all defendants but the MFA physician defendants, who had not moved to do so at that time. Id. In addition, many ofthe claims underlying Count I, which alleged tortious interference with business relations, were also dismissed. Id. at 103-4. The sole remaining claim under CountI alleges the defendants failed to comply with their bylaws. Id. 3ANALYSIS A court may dismiss all orpart ofa complaint that "fail[s] to state a claim upon which reliefcan be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss made pursuantto Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must "plead[] factual contentthat allows the courtto draw the reasonable inference thatthe defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court construes the complaint "infavor ofthe plaintiff, who mustbe granted the benefit ofall inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, the Court "need not accept inferences drawn by plaintif:Q] ifsuch inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Normust the court accept legal conclusions cast in the form offactual allegations." Kowal v. MCI Commc 'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, "aplaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds ofhis entitlement to reliefrequires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation ofthe elements ofa cause ofaction will not do." BellAtlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Factual allegations, even though assumed to be true, must still "be enough to raise a right to reliefabove the speculative level." ld. As discussed above, all but one ofthe original Count I allegations oftortious interference with business relations have been dismissed as to the Hospital defendants. Those claims were dismissed because Soliman failed to plead enough to establish the 4plausibility ofshowing the necessary intent. Soliman, 658 F. Supp. 2d. at 103-04. For those same reasons, the Courthereby dismisses those Count I claims against the MFA physician defendants. The remaining claim-defendants' misuse oftheir bylaws-was notpreviously dismissed against the Hospital defendants due to the very low pleading requirement necessary to sustain such a claim. 

### ld. at 104 (citing Canady v. ProvidenceHasp., 942 F. Supp. 11, 18 (D.D.C. 1996)). The MFAphysician defendants now argue, however, that the misuse ofbylaws claim should be dismissed against them because this claim, on its face, is not actually asserted against them. Indeed, they claim that they are not alleged to have issued or adopted any bylaws, orto be responsible for implementing or adhering to the bylaws. Def.'s Mot. 12. To the contrary, the MFAphysician defendants are alleged

to have participated inthe expeditedhearing and peerreview that Soliman claims occurred in violation ofthe rights afforded to herby the hospital's bylaws. Thus, the MFA physician defendants argue that the sole basis for plaintiff's claim against them arises instead from her conclusory allegations that theirparticipation inher hearing circumvented the process establishedby the bylaws, which is insufficientto survive a motion to dismiss. I agree. While the plaintiffhas successfully alleged that the Hospital defendants failed to afford herthe protections due to her underthe bylaws, she has not alleged that the MFAphysician defendants, merely bytaking part in the process as a witness and peerreviewer, have done the same. Accordingly, Soliman's claim against the MFA physician defendants for misuse oftheir bylaws is dismissed. 

### 5Finally, my reasons for dismissing Count IV against the Hospital defendants apply equally to the MFAphysician defendants. Accordingly, Count IV as applied to the MFA physician defendants must also be dismissed. CONCLUSION Thus, for these reasons, the MFAphysician defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Itis hereby ORDERED thatthe Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the MFA physician defendants are dismissed from this action. 

### SO ORDERED.

United States DistrictJudge

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