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22–809 PDF 2005

CONTROLLING RESTRICTED AIRSPACE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION OF OUR NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 21, 2005

Serial No. 109–50

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on July 21, 2005 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

D’Agostino, Davi M., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,

Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Brian Lepore, Assistant Director Defense Capabilities and Management, Government

Accountability Office ..................................................................................... 21

McHale, Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,

Department of Defense; Major General Marvin S. Mayes, Commander,

1st Air Force and Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense

Command Region, Department of Defense; and Robert A. Sturgell,

Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration .......................... 76

McHale, Paul ............................................................................................. 76

Mayes, Major General Marvin S. ............................................................. 89

Sturgell, Robert A. ..................................................................................... 97

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................ 18

D’Agostino, Davi M., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,

Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of ....................... 25

Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Virginia:

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 4

Prepared statement of Mr. Kasprisin ...................................................... 68

Mayes, Major General Marvin S., Commander, 1st Air Force and Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command Region,

Department of Defense, prepared statement of ......................................... 91

McHale, Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,

Department of Defense, prepared statement of ......................................... 79

Sturgell, Robert A., Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 99

Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 11

(1)

CONTROLLING RESTRICTED AIRSPACE: AN

EXAMINATION OF THE MANAGEMENT AND

COORDINATION OF OUR NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE

THURSDAY, JULY 21, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room

2154 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (acting chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Davis of Virginia, Shays, Mica, Duncan,

Miller, Issa, Porter, Foxx, Waxman, Cummings, Kucinich, Clay,

Watson, Van Hollen, Ruppersberger, Higgins, and Norton.

Staff present: Melissa Wojciak, staff director; David Marin, deputy staff director/communications director; Keith Ausbrook, chief

counsel; Jennifer Safavian, chief counsel for oversight and investigations; Anne Marie Turner, counsel; Rob White, press secretary;

Drew Crockett, deputy director of communications; Grace

Washbourne, professional staff member; Teresa Austin, chief clerk;

Sarah D’Orsie, deputy clerk, Leneal Scott, computer systems manager; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; Earley

Green, minority chief clerk; Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. Good morning and welcome to the Committee on

Government Reform’s hearing on the United States’ restricted airspace and how the Federal Government coordinates the protection

of that space.

While we are all aware that restricted airspace exists across the

national capital region, restricted airspace is also scattered

throughout the United States. It includes such obvious places as

Camp David and Crawford, TX to military bases.

There can be temporary flight restrictions put in place during

certain sporting events and of course, depending on the President’s

location. It is incumbent on pilots to be aware of these areas and

they learn of them through the FAA Notices to Airmen.

To give you a sense of what we are talking about, we have two

maps on display. One map shows all the restricted spaces and prohibited areas in the United States, including military bases.

If you look at the coastal areas of the United States, you can see

there is a contiguous air defense identification zone [ADIZ] which

encompasses the entire U.S. water border. There is also an ADIZ

surrounding Alaska and Hawaii. These zones are in place for defense purposes and they establish requirements for incoming interVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:21 Nov 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22809.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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national flights, including providing an established flight plan before entering the ADIZ.

The other map shows the restricted airspace over the national

capital region. In total, the D.C. prohibited airspace is approximately 20,000 square miles. The map shows two rings around the

region. The inside ring is the flight restricted zone [FRZ]. The FRZ

is the 15 miles around Ronald Reagan National Airport, or DCA.

Included within the FRZ is prohibited airspace over the White

House, the National Mall, the U.S. Capitol, the Naval Observatory

and Mount Vernon, VA.

The outside ring is the ADIZ. The D.C. ADIZ is a 30-mile radius

around DCA which spans out to Dulles, BWI, and the Andrews Air

Force Base. At the top left of the map you can see the bottom of

a circle. This is the 3-mile prohibited airspace for Camp David in

Thurmont, MD, which would be expanded when the President is at

Camp David.

These maps of restricted airspace look daunting. It may seem

even more daunting when we take into account the many departments and agencies responsible for watching this airspace. That is

why we are here today, to better understand how these entities are

working to manage and coordinate their efforts to protect and defend the United States restricted airspace.

One of the best steps taken in this effort was the creation of the

National Capital Regional Coordination Center [NCRCC]. Housed

in Herndon, VA, the NCRCC is an interagency group that monitors

D.C.’s prohibited airspace 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

The Washington, DC, area is the only area of the country with

such a center. The Department of Defense, FAA, the Secret Service,

Customs, and Border Protection and the U.S. Capitol Police, along

with the TSA, which acts as the executive agency, are represented

at NCRCC full-time. During major events or search operations, the

Federal Bureau of Investigations, the U.S. Park Police, the Coast

Guard and local law enforcement, including D.C. Police, are also

NCRCC participants.

Each agency or department at NCRCC is responsible for its own

mission and jurisdiction as it relates to airspace security. However,

the participants work together in identifying airspace that are violated or may violate prohibited airspace. While the response to

each possible aircraft violation is decided by each government entity independently of the others, the information is immediately

shared by all participants at the NCRCC. That, at least, is our understanding of how it works.

I know the Government Accountability Office [GAO], has some

concerns about how well the coordination and information sharing

actually functions. According to NCRCC statistics, updated as of

July 17, 2005, there has been 3,495 airspace incursions in the National Capital Region since January 17, 2003. These statistics are

on the overhead. Airspace incursion can include a variety of incidents, including as you see on the overheard, FRZ violations, Camp

David TFR violations, and penetrations of prohibited airspace; 655

out of the 3,495 incursions resulted in the decision to launch or divert Government assets to intercept an aircraft.

As many of you know, occasionally these airspace violations lead

the Capitol Police or the Secret Service to evacuate the Capitol

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complex and the White House. While none of us are particularly

fond of the evacuations, to say the least, I think it is important to

note that only 3 times out of the 3,495 incursions has that happened.

Despite the work of the NCRCC, there are still questions to be

asked regarding coordination of the U.S. airspace. Today, GAO is

releasing an unclassified version of their report on the interagency

management of restricted airspace.

GAO asks some important questions: How is air defense working

without a single Government agency taking the lead? How do we

adequately determine a threat to the prohibited airspace when

agencies and departments have different definitions of what constitutes a threat?

How will DOD, FAA, and DHS continue to work to improve information sharing? I believe these are all valid questions that merit

discussion and these agencies will have a chance to respond to

GAO’s concerns.

In the Washington area we have three commercial airports,

countless general aviation airports. We are pleased to welcome general aviation back to Reagan National—all of this aviation combined with the flight restriction we see on the maps clearly show

that protecting America’s airspace, particularly around the Nation’s

Capital, is a challenge.

As the committee responsible for oversight of the Federal Government and the District of Columbia, it is our obligation to ensure

these agencies are working seamlessly together. A fast, coordinated

response is absolutely vital if we are ever again faced with an aircraft with hostile intent.

Thank you for your patience in listening to the statement. This

is the chairman’s statement.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I now yield to the ranking member, Mr. Waxman, for

any statement he would like to make.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all the

witnesses who are going to be appearing before the committee.

Almost 4 years after the horrific attacks on our country of September 11, 2001, we are still trying to shore up vulnerabilities to

our Nation’s air defense. I know it is a formidable effort. Yet we

know that despite our best efforts thousands of violations of restricted airspace have occurred, some of them dangerously close to

high risk targets and large populations.

The way our current system is working, agencies have only minutes to react when a plane enters a restricted area. Clear coordination, command and control structures and plans are essential in responding quickly to a situation.

Most of these violations, however, are accidental. Pilots can better avoid restricted airspaces, but they need updated information

on no-fly zones and temporary restricted areas.

In some cases the administration’s zeal to keep information secret from the public has undermined national security rather than

enhanced it. This is also true for air security.

This week the Congressional Quarterly Weekly reported that the

Federal Aviation Administration placed restricted airspace around

the Nation’s nuclear power plants, but would not tell pilots where

the power plants were located. The locations, they said, were considered sensitive security information.

How are pilots supposed to stay away from high risk targets if

they are not told where those targets are? Eventually, FAA softened its order and now allows the Pilots Association to post maps

indicating the general areas pilots are supposed to avoid.

However, new FAA advisory notices remain vague instructing pilots to avoid the airspace near all power plants, refineries, industrial complexes, military facilities and other similar facilities.

So, Mr. Chairman, not only do we need to reexamine our aviation

security policies so that there are improvements in Federal planning and cooperation, but we can also better communicate the

growing number of restricted airspaces to the public and aviation

community.

By doing so we can focus our attention on those who intend to

harm us and avoid as many of these false alarms as possible.

I want to thank the chairman again for calling this hearing. I

understand it is the first time that any congressional committee

has examined the progress of Federal agencies in controlling restricted airspace since September 11th. I believe our discussion

today will improve our national air defense.

I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentlemen for his statement. At this time

the Chair will recognize Mr. Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I don’t have

a formal opening statement. You have covered the topic more than

adequately. I would just simply say that, you know, we have over

700 million passengers flying commercially in this country and millions more flying in general aviation. The bulk of those are in the

eastern half of the United States.

So, we have a very crowded airspace, especially in this region.

This is a very difficult problem. I am pleased that you are looking

into this in the way that you are and I look forward to hearing

from the witnesses. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentlemen. At this time the Chair would

recognize Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Of course, I

have a special interest in this hearing and regret that because of

other hearings I won’t be able to be here the entire time.

But because this is the Nation’s Capital and because these incidents have begun to happen with just a little regularity, this is an

important hearing for getting to the bottom of it. Since we are all

amateurs at this, we have never had to deal with a situation like

September 11th, we need to systematically look at what needs to

be done, kind of the zero budgeting way. If you started from

scratch, what would you do?

I am concerned about the coordination of airspace. The only people who seem to know what to do are the people in the jets who

get up pretty fast, ready to shoot somebody down, the last thing we

want to have happen, of course.

I am pleased that somehow, and I don’t know if this is an accident or not, the planes that have penetrated the space have been

small planes. I would be very interested to know whether or not

there is some way, something in our system that we keep with

planes we really feel, the September 11th planes, from doing the

same thing or if we have just been lucky.

Mr. Chairman, I must say that coordination has a purpose and

the purpose is to save lives on the ground. What strikes me as particularly amateur is the evacuations. The evacuations have been

wholesalely from the Capitol, and from these buildings when we

have had very small planes.

Now, you don’t have to be a native Washingtonian to know that

among the most secure buildings in D.C. are the sub-basements of

the Capitol and of some of our office buildings because they are old,

you know, when buildings really used to be very solidly built, and

to wonder whether or not the best place, if there is a penetration

of airspace, is to be out there in the open saying is it coming down,

or to follow the advice that now the security officials are giving everyone in the case of an event, if you hear of any event, stay in

place and listen.

Of course, we have evacuated because the Capitol Police have

told us to evacuate. But I must say, it runs against my—forgive the

use of the non-technical word—common sense, to be out in the open

when we are dealing with what appears to be a small plane. Or

did we not know it was a small plane and why didn’t we know it

before we said evacuate?

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If we said evacuate, was that the right thing to do whenever

there is something overhead or only when there are certain kinds

of things overhead? Again, the coordination in the air is for a purpose. It is to preserve lives on the ground. I am not convinced that

the evacuations of the Capitol have been designed to or would have

had the effect of preserving lives on the ground.

I am not sure whether the President was evacuated or the White

House was evacuated to the outside or whether they were taken to

a basement. But I do think that is all part and parcel of coordination.

Finally, let me say the historic District Building or the historic

city hall of the District of Columbia is within a stone’s throw of the

White House. When these evacuations occurred, they are supposed

to occur around that endangered area. I would think that they

would involve not only the White House and the Capitol, but other

parts of the city that are in close proximity.

These are some of the questions I would want the panel to answer. I thank you very much.

Chairman TOM DAVIS [presiding]. Thank you. Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also for conducting this hearing. First of all, I appreciate, as chairman of the

House Aviation Subcommittee, Government Reform taking a look

at this. You do have broad jurisdiction over all of the agencies and

I think it is important that this type of review take place.

We did, after the so-called Ernie Fletcher flight last year, conduct a hearing. We looked at some of the problems that had occurred in sort of a disjointed effort in detecting planes and then

alerting folks and the different agencies that were involved.

I think you outlined here in your briefing paper the corrective actions that have been taken by the various agencies. I think it is important that we still look at problems that we continue to have.

I know that there are proposals being drafted and we are trying

to work with folks to look at possibly adjusting some of the penalties. The information I have is that in 2003 there were 998 violations and in 2004, 600 violations into the National Capital airspace.

Only a very few folks received penalties. We may need to look

at that. I don’t favor exorbitant fines. We were trying, before September 11, on the Aviation Subcommittee, to actually open up some

more of the airspace because we have more airplanes in the air and

we have limited corridors in which to fly.

Again, I don’t favor exorbitant fines. I think we have to look at

intent and disregard for rules and law. In that case I’m in favor

of throwing the book at offenders.

We are going to take up legislation maybe as early as September,

but in the fall, to consider increasing the fines. They are currently,

I guess, $1,100 and it is discretionary within FAA. That is for an

incursion in 30 to 45 miles in the ADIZ zone, air defense zone.

A possible 90-day suspension is the current penalty. That may

have to in fact be toughened up. The flight restricted zone which

again comes in a lot closer, 15 miles, there are proposals to increase fines. Some of them that we are looking at may be as much

as $100,000 to 5 years and without any discretion of imposing the

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fine. So, those are some of the things that we are looking at that

would certainly get people’s attention.

Again, there can be unintentional violations of airspace. There

may be a need in weather and other conditions to get into airspace.

There are still concerns. We have had actually two tests of the system.

The Fletcher flight was one of the faster ones. It was a small jet.

It was going around 240 miles an hour. Even at that speed, you

can reach the Capitol within 20 minutes from outside the zone.

Smaller aircrafts, again we can track. We have some warning

time. However, we haven’t been tested by a large aircraft traveling

at 500 miles an hour. That will give us a very short window of opportunity.

I know that they are looking at these planes that either get off

course or are off course even further out than the 50-mile zone. I

think that is something that we have to consider.

The thing that concerns me is the approach. First of all a terrorist is not going to abide by our rules of flying at certain levels and

speeds. They are going to come in at treetop level. We haven’t had

that experience, except we did have one where a small aircraft did

hit the White House under the Clinton administration, or a tree in

front of the White House, to be more specific. So, we still have that

threat.

Then we have the threat of a large aircraft coming in at 500

miles an hour with a very limited warning time. Finally, we have

a disconnect still. We have FAA, DOD, TSA, DHS and Secret Service who have much better coordinated their efforts. I’m not sure

how you solve this, how different folks go on alert like the Capitol

and that needs to be addressed.

The Capitol Police did order the last evacuation, but others did

not. The District of Columbia, again we have a disconnect there in

notifying police. Others are at risk, the District police and District

officials.

Also, again the most important one is DOD becoming engaged to

take down an aircraft. We haven’t had that experience yet. That

may be in the future. But we do face a number of challenges. I appreciate your letting me mention some that we are looking at from

our subcommittee standpoint.

I yield back.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. The gentlemen

from Maryland.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. In light of

the fact that we have been going at it a while, I will be very brief.

I am very pleased, Mr. Chairman, that you have scheduled this

hearing. September 11th illustrated the deadly intent and capability of terrorists who seek to destroy us.

In the post-September 11th world our Nation must be fully prepared to protect the homeland by effectively and efficiently managing our national air defense. Intelligence reports indicate that terrorist elements continue to consider another September 11th style

attack against U.S. targets where aircraft are used as missiles.

In light of this kind of threat, flight and airspace restrictions are

essential to help in the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration who

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primarily share the charge to prevent or rapidly respond to an aircraft that has violated restricted airspace. Unfortunately, the 3,400

violations of restricted airspace since September 11th clearly demonstrate deficiencies in our national air defense.

More specifically, the violations point to a need to standardize

Federal agencies roles more clearly and to improve communications. For example, on May 11, 2005 a student pilot violated a restricted airspace, necessitating a red threat level designation and

a frightful evacuation of the U.S. Capitol. Disturbingly, although

the risk and gravity of the airspace violation were designated severe according to the homeland security advisory system, the President and the Mayor of Washington, DC, were not informed of the

incident until the episode ended.

In evaluating the management and coordination of our national

air defense, the GAO reported commendable improvements since

September 11th, but identified information sharing and coordination problems that must be resolved. For example, the GAO found

that there is no standardized definition of an airspace violation

among agencies and that the FAA, the North American Airspace

Defense Command utilize distinct data bases to track airspace violations.

It seems a step in the right direction would be to address these

challenges with common sense solutions that would improve our

monitoring capabilities and management of a Federal response to

an aviation threat. It seems just as sensible that Congress seriously consider GAO’s recommendation that one agency be given the

responsibility of responding to restricted airspace violations.

Mr. Chairman, while we need not be an expert to understand the

disastrous impact another September 11th style attack would have

on our society and our economy. The American people expect more

from us than understanding. They expect for us to get it right

when it comes to securing our national air defense and protecting

their communities and families from those who seek to do us harm.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the gravity of

the statements made by yourself, by the ranking member and other

members on this committee.

I would like to take a slightly different tack in my remarks and

that is I would like to ask the witnesses to also recognize that

America has a tradition of being a leader in aviation that includes

a strong tradition of non-commercial pilots, sport, aerobatic, commuter, and the $100 hamburger pilots of which I am one. For those

of you who aren’t private pilots, that is a $2 hamburger and $98

worth of fuel and maintenance to get to the hamburger stand.

Complying with Homeland Security’s desire to minimize aircraft

in or around our cities while still allowing the freedom that has

given us self-trained pilots in every war of the previous century is

a balancing act. I believe we need to modernize communication requirements for aircraft without unreasonably restricting the right

of Americans to fly anywhere, anytime, whether it is for a business

meeting or to fly friends and family to a hamburger stand on the

other side of the mountain, just for the joy of seeing this great land

from the air.

I would certainly hope that as we are looking at the security

needs of our Capitol and other areas we would recognize that incrementally, as your map shows, we have first taken airspace and

said that it would be under control. Then we made it restricted.

Today, we are moving toward saying that if you live in a city,

essentially you are going to have to drive for an hour or two to get

to your airplane so that you can travel. It doesn’t make a whole lot

of sense. There’s no question that the technology exists today to

provide better alerts of restricted airspace even to the training

pilot.

My background in technology shows me that although they are

not presently on board our aircraft, there is no question that you

can have an alert beacon similar to our collision avoidance that

would come on when you enter restricted airspace, requiring no

radio contact and so on.

Now, I recognize that many sport pilots choose to have the minimum aviation assets on board and they may not do that. But for

those who fly modern aircraft and would like to comply with the

rules, but at the same time, have a difficult time.

Camp Pendleton and San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant are both

in my district. Ten years ago, if there were no operations at Camp

Pendleton, overflights were routinely granted. Today that is never

granted.

As a result, every small aircraft must either fly significantly inland along high meetings or fly over the ocean. There is a very narrow band for any pilot flying at low altitude between being outside

of San Onofre and Camp Pendleton’s restricted space and being too

far away from land to safely land if they were to have an engine

failure.

So, on behalf of the vast majority of flights taken, and the vast

majority are taken by single engine fixed aircraft, I would hope

that now and in the Q and A session that we can look at how to

balance that while maintaining the safety in and around our major

cities.

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With that, I yield back.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Are there any other members

who wish to make opening statements?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, not an opening statement.

I have one, but this is an extremely relevant issue. One of the main

reasons with respect to our air in the Capitol region is unfortunately the Capitol is a target for terrorists.

It seems to me that the teamwork approach, whether it is

NORAD which is in charge of controlling the security of the airspace, whether it is TSA or FAA, all these organizations coming together, we need to focus on what needs to be done to protect.

Now, we have had incidents in the past where we have had violations, where we have had over 10,000 people running into the

streets. I think it is very important when we analyze and come up

with a plan that we look at what we have done when in fact there

was a possible attack. Did we pull the trigger too quickly? Do we

need 24/7 jets in the sky, at least during these difficult periods?

I mean these are issues that I would hope we can address in this

hearing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Do any other Members wish to make opening statements?

If not, we will move to our first panel. Thank you for being with

us. We have Ms. Davi D’Agostino, Director of Defense Capabilities

and Management at the U.S. Government Accountability Office accompanied by Mr. Brian Lepore who is the Assistant Director.

Thank you both for being with us. I want to thank both of you

for taking the time, working so hard to declassify your report so

that we could have this hearing today.

I also want to point out that because the classified report will not

be released until September 2005, our second panel of witnesses

have graciously allowed GAO to testify first so we understand the

limits of what we can talk about today.

I am going to remind the Members that if the witnesses can’t

fully answer some of your questions because they might be classified, the committee will take all questions for the record.

It is our policy that we swear in all people before they testify.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You may be seated. Ms. D’Agostino, take

whatever time you need and then we’ll open it up for questions.

STATEMENT OF DAVI M. D’AGOSTINO, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY BRIAN LEPORE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT,

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you very much. Good morning, Mr.

Chairman and members of the committee. We are pleased to be

here today before you to discuss the results of GAO’s work on the

interagency response to violations of U.S. restricted airspace.

While much progress clearly has been made since September 11,

2001, we believe there are still opportunities to enhance our Nation’s airspace security.

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My remarks today are from the unclassified portions, as you

mentioned, of our classified report, which we will be issuing shortly.

As you know, intelligence agencies believe that terrorists remain

highly interested in U.S. aviation, both commercial and general

aviation, to attack airports or to use aircraft to attack targets, including critical infrastructure.

As you noted in your opening remarks, since September 11th several Federal agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration

[FAA], the North American Aerospace Defense Command or

NORAD, and the Transportation Security Administration [TSA]

have made noteworthy advances to protect our Nation’s airspace.

I believe the next panel will elaborate further on their progress.

I would also add that we were impressed that the FAA and

NORAD took actions to correct certain problems we identified during the course of our review.

Today I will focus on first, how restricted airspace is protected;

second, key gaps we identified in the interagency process to respond to violations; and third, the agency’s comments on selected

recommendations on our draft report and our response.

Let us start with how restricted airspace is protected. FAA reported that between September 12, 2001 and December 31, 2004

there were about 3,400 restricted airspace violations, most of

which, about 88 percent of which were committed by general aviation pilots.

Our diagram, if you will look at our diagram, and we provided

copies to the Members, shows the concept of restricted airspace

where the larger circle is restricted airspace and the center is the

protected asset or potential target. If a violation is imminent or underway responding agencies have very limited time to decide what

actions to take. However, they need enough time to determine the

pilot’s intent. In addition, NORAD and Homeland Security need

time to order, scramble and launch aircraft, if necessary, to intercept the violator.

Our diagram shows an aircraft deviating from its originally

planned flight path. As you can see, in one example the aircraft is

making an incursion that in the end is non-threatening. They go

in and out of the restricted area. In the other example the aircraft

is making a threatening incursion by heading directly at the protected asset.

Agencies take specific actions depending on the nature of the violation. For example, FAA can report a restricted airspace violation

based on its radar tracking. If the offending aircraft deviated from

its planned flight path but was not heading directly toward the

protected asset, they may simply monitor the aircraft and try to

contact the pilot.

On the other hand, if NORAD or FAA perceives the aircraft to

be a threat, NORAD or Homeland Security can alert their aircraft

and attempt to interdict the violator. At the same time, FAA would

continue to try to contact the pilot and monitor to assure safety of

the airspace. If the violating pilot does not divert and continues to

operate in a threatening manner, the NORAD pilot can be ordered

to engage the violating aircraft.

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Clearly, the process for responding to a violation can include

many agencies. There are seven principal agencies, each simultaneously responding according to their own procedures.

The agencies have made great strides to enhance air security, including setting up, as you mentioned, an interagency coordination

center known as the National Capital Region Coordinating Center

[NCRCC] and an interagency teleconferencing system for real time

communication, coordination and sharing of information for responding to violations known as the Domestic Events Network

[DEN].

While these interagency tools are functioning, we identified some

gaps that need to be addressed. Before we turn to some of the gaps

we identified, we need to recognize up front that it is not possible

to prevent all protected airspace violations.

Airspace security measures could be challenged purposely. In addition, some pilots simply do not check to see if they will be flying

in or near restricted airspace. Such challenges highlight the need

for clear policies and procedures and optimal interagency coordination.

Our review identified these key gaps in the interagency process:

First, there is no leadership over and no organization in charge of

the end-to-end interagency process of responding to violations. We

noted also the lack of an over-arching concept of operations plan or

other relevant document to guide the interagency process of responding to violation in all U.S. airspace.

Third, the lack of key interagency policies and procedures for either the NCRCC or the DEN. Fourth, no formal agency information-sharing protocols and procedures. For example, sharing segments of data on violations and aggregated information on FAA’s

enforcement actions would be beneficial. Fifth, the lack of common

definitions for use in this time-critical interagency operation.

Now I will discuss the agency’s comments on selected recommendations we made in our classified draft report. Homeland

Security and Defense disagreed with our draft report recommendation to appoint one agency to be in charge, largely because of concerns about command and control over their resources. Nevertheless, the aim of our recommendations is to ensure that someone is

available and accountable to resolve the interagency issues and

problems in a timely and effective manner.

Next, Transportation, Defense and Homeland Security agreed

with the general recommendation to establish information-sharing

protocols. DOD disagreed with a specific recommendation to discuss with FAA sharing segments, not all, of FAA’s pilot deviation

data base with NORAD.

DOD cited concerns over the appearance that it would be collecting information on U.S. citizens. We appreciate DOD’s concerns

and certainly did not recommend information sharing that would

run afoul of existing laws and policies.

We believe segments of FAA’s data base could be shared within

the law and that DOD and FAA should explore that possibility.

Our work showed that this is particularly important in light of the

fact that NORAD’s air defense mission, which includes tracking

aircraft in U.S. airspace, could benefit from segments of the inforVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:21 Nov 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22809.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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mation as additional input into deciding how to allocate their limited resources around the country.

In conclusion, while much progress has been made, we have

found that the interagency effort to secure U.S. airspace could be

enhanced by proactive leadership with accountability, an over-arching strategy and plan, clear interagency policies and procedures,

formal agency information sharing protocols, and common definitions.

Today, nearly 4 years after the September 11th attacks, we believe it is time to treat airspace security as a national program

with an eye toward balancing commercial and security needs and

applying risk management principles.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my oral summary. At this time we

would be happy to address any questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. D’Agostino follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Let me start. Most

of us have read in the newspapers different accounts of the interagency process that was used in recent incursions of the National

Capital Region. As GAO conducted this study, did you look at any

of these incidents and can you comment on what you saw?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Chairman, our work did not focus on a specific incident. We did look into the Kentucky Governor incident.

But actually we had completed our review by the time the May 11

incident had occurred and we had begun writing our report. So, we

did not dig deeper into those specific cases.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Does TSA need to do more to identify security vulnerabilities on general aviation aircraft?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. I think our statement points out areas where

TSA could do more. There are 19,000 general aviation airports. It

is a rather huge population. They are trying to do a risk-based approach to their effort and they have developed a risk-assessment

tool and they have deployed some to general aviation airports, so

I think they deserve some credit for that. There may be more that

they could do.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. What responsibilities do you think the

TSA should have as the executive agent for the National Capital

Region’s Coordination Center and do you think the TSA if fulfilling

its responsibilities? Can you give them a grade?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Well, I think as the executive agent TSA describes its own role as one of deconflicting. It is not seeing itself

as in charge and it is not clear that they see themselves in a leadership role or in a proactive leadership role.

One of the questions we have is if there were to be an air security strategy or plan put together, who would do the first draft, Mr.

Chairman. We would wonder who would do the first draft and then

broker the coordination of that draft with a timetable.

That’s where we would like to understand whose leadership——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So, what do you think the National Capital Regional Coordination Center needs? What improvements do

they need?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. I think we pointed out some communication

problems. They need a concept of operations plan. Although they

have one, it does not go into the kinds of specificity much beyond

roles and responsibilities of the individual agencies. So, we think

that could be pushed a little further.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You did identify gaps in the management

of the interagency response to airspace violations. What is lacking

in the management of the Federal responses? What is lacking? Is

it somebody in charge at the end?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Right, somebody in charge, an over-arching

strategy and plan, information sharing protocols as among the

agencies, some clear concepts of operations, how things will be communicated. Our team actually observed the DEN and they observed

there’s a lot of shouting. When there are multiple incidents it gets

very confusing. You can’t tell who is talking.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You ought to see it from this angle. I was

meeting with six presidents of nations in Central America. We had

a meeting and it just got started. They came in and just literally

carried them out, put them in cars and left.

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This building was emptied, office buildings around here, not just

the legislative branch and Library of Congress, but others. I mean

thousands of hours of productivity lost. Of course, at the end of the

day it was just somebody who got lost flying over the area.

But you can tell from some of the Members’ opening statements,

there has to be a better way to do this. There have to be penalties

for the violations. I don’t know if that starts with education or as

people are leaving, to understand it. But it is getting very, very disruptive in terms of both the private sector and the Government sector.

Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the

panelists.

I was listening very intently, Ms. D’Agostino, to your testimony

and your recommendations. Do you believe that we ought to create—would that be one of your recommendations—that we create

a new agency to coordinate all of this? Because it doesn’t appear

that we are talking to each other, the various agencies involved,

and that we are coordinating.

I understand with one incident there were two different agencies

that were trying to intercept. Do you think there’s a need for a new

agency or department?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. We do not think there’s a need for a new agency or department. There are enough agencies and departments now

participating in this response. What we do think is that one agency

needs to agree to step up to lead the response and be the leader

and coordinate the response and smooth out the rough edges.

They are coordinating fairly effectively. Again, it is very striking

how far they have come from September 11th in the coordination

process. The problem is there are seams there still between and

among the agencies and nobody has the job of ironing out those

seams and working out those differences and rough edges, as I’m

calling it.

Ms. WATSON. Who should do that? Who should make that decision that we need to destroy those seams and have more merging

and flowing? Who should do that?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. I actually think all the agencies believe that

they need to work on the seams, but they need to agree on who

should lead that effort. The NCRCC, the executive agency is TSA.

Both DOD and DHS, in their comments on our classified draft report mentioned a working group, which TSA is also the lead in.

There have been other working groups that DOD has participated in trying to work on some of these problems and get a strategy, get a plan. But their plans, and I know there have been draft

plans, have not made it to the final stage.

Ms. WATSON. Well, you mentioned that TSA doesn’t realize they

have this responsibility or authority. I am trying to gleam from

your testimony and your report where do we start this? Who is in

charge of it? What language is where that clearly can direct these

activities and take into consideration your recommendations? Can

you respond?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. I think it is up to the executive branch to determine who is the right party to be in the lead. I think they would

need all the agencies to agree to it and accede to it to make it

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work. You know, one candidate is TSA. But we did not recommend

a specific organization.

We suggested that the three departments discuss amongst themselves whether it makes sense to have somebody in charge or take

the lead, as we finally adjusted our recommendation to say.

Ms. WATSON. I feel a sense of frustration because the last time

we had an evacuation we found that there was a plane that some

way, accidentally, got into the restricted zone.

We as the policymakers hear nothing about followup. We have to

depend on you coming in and reporting to us. So, I would hope that

one of the recommendations that would come out of GAO is that

whatever this group is, a study group, TSA or the executive

branch, inform members so we, too, will know whether we need to

put into the process legislation or should the executive branch just

start to designate where they would like to see this occur.

Some way, and this goes to the Chair as well, we need to be informed. It should not be a confidential meeting. I am not talking

about sharing confidential information with us. But at least followup so we can be alerted and aware and propose corrective legislation.

Thank you very much, Ms. D’Agostino.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, when I look at

the map for the Washington, DC, region particularly, you know,

I’m struck by the fact that your restricted airspace versus your protection, it all looks very simplistic.

But when we go over it and we actually look at the sectional,

what we discover is that there are—to use a word I shouldn’t use—

a plethora of small airports, some of which were dramatically impacted by September 11th, aircraft stuck on the ground, unable to

fly for a long period of time.

From a practical matter, and I’ll try to make this a question, a

Cessna 150, 152, 172, these small light aircraft, for that matter,

any aircraft under 12,000 pounds, single or twin, that operate out

of those airports, basically, at the moment that they take off they

are in a sense in your zone.

Some of these historically didn’t need radios. They all now have

radio communication. They will be squawking 1,200 or something.

From a practical standpoint, aren’t we over-controlling to assume

that there won’t be a number of mistakes when somebody takes off

and does left traffic versus right traffic or coming in to an approach

isn’t aligned, talking about a VFR pilot particularly, isn’t aligned

exactly where they should be on one of these many runways that

are in this relatively small area.

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. I don’t think that we actually could come to a

conclusion that we are over-controlling or not. Again, I think we

are very supportive of a risk management approach to controlling

the airspace as we are with a lot of other programs that the Federal Government runs. But I don’t think we are in a position to

make that judgment about whether they are over-controlling or

not.

Mr. ISSA. Well, I will bring up something you mentioned earlier.

I was not yet a Member of Congress when during the Clinton administration a small Cessna landed at the White House. What it

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struck had very little to do with the fact that it was attempting to

do what it did, which was land at the White House.

The response at the time was to close Pennsylvania Avenue.

Now, I always wondered if that was to make it easier. But it apparently was not.

We have had a long history here in Washington of having reactions that don’t seem to line up with the problem. From a practical

standpoint these small light aircraft do not represent a large

enough risk to have the kinds of evacuations from here, the Capitol, that we have had.

Would that be fair to say that a Cessna 172 cannot have a degree

of impact? And we will assume that it doesn’t have a thermonuclear weapon that it somehow snuck in. Because you can have

that in a pickup truck. You can have that in a car. You wouldn’t

need an aircraft.

The mass of the aircraft, its carrying capacity in any reasonable,

conventional way simply can’t do much damage to these buildings

as Representative Norton said. Isn’t that correct?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. I would say that it depends on your perspective.

No. 1, as you say, a very small aircraft can be loaded with some

fairly dangerous material or horribly hazardous material and you

don’t know whether it does or it doesn’t when you are an FAA controller and you are looking at a blip on the screen or when they

file their flight plan and get authorization.

The other problem is, about assuming a small aircraft is not a

threat, is the Secret Service made it very clear to us in our exit

conversations that a small aircraft targeting the President or the

Vice President or the White House leadership is still a big threat

from their perspective. So, I think we have to think about it from

all the different angles and try to pull it apart.

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate that. I appreciate that the Secret Service

will not let people go to the restroom when the President is in a

room. They cannot walk away from the President under Secret

Service control. So, I am very aware of their view and I appreciate

it and I think protecting the President is extremely important.

A final question for now: The way we deal with large aircrafts,

the upgrading of communication of all fast movers, of all aircrafts,

let us say, over 12,000 pounds, can we in fact have an initiative

to upgrade the communication with those devices to prevent the

Ernie Fletcher type of situation?

I realize you may have some of this already thought out. Can we

upgrade that so that we can bifurcate, if you will, outside of the

White House, the normal threat of a small light aircraft, let us say,

flying over a military base or something versus aircraft capable of

inflicting huge damage on large targets?

Mr. LEPORE. Well, it is certainly possible to mandate something

like that. I guess one of the challenges that you might all encounter and that you may hear is who would actually pay for that? Who

would pay for the cost and how much it might cost to do that?

In the study that we conducted for the committee we didn’t actually look at that particular question. That was really outside the

scope of the work. But I suspect one of the key issues would be the

cost and who would pay for it.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you very much.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have read through some

of the report. You do raise a series of issues that need to be resolved, developing a common concept, really, of even violations, and

then sort of who is in charge.

The DOD versus Homeland Security is a tough one. DOD, they

have the real enforcement power. They will shoot the plane. Homeland Security really doesn’t have that capability. The true enforcement is taking the plane out and getting up there and eyeballing

what you have.

We do have a problem with definitions of violations. That also becomes an FAA issue because it applies to all aircrafts. We are not

just talking about restricted airspace in our Nation’s Capital.

That’s another question. Do you favor a different standard for

the Nation’s Capital or maybe some designated potential targets,

nuclear plants? I don’t know if New York City is a whole target.

How would you separate this out?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. I think that the executive branch sort of separates them out already as a practical matter. The TSA has made

clear that the National Capital region is unique space in all of U.S.

airspace because of the Capitol and the White House.

Mr. MICA. Again, for violations you want a separate standard.

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Yes.

Mr. MICA. They are coming to me right now. I have heard every- thing from, you know, a $1 million fine on down. We are going to

have incursions. I think you and I both have cited—fortunately I

think we have had less in the closer area as people become more

aware and we have more incidents.

But I have to address the issue of fine and fairness. I raised the

issue of intent and also purposely penetrating. Have you given any

thought to levels of fines or penalties?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. We did not look at enforcement actions at all

in the scope of our work. We looked only at the interagency operation of dealing with violations.

Mr. MICA. Do you think TSA or Homeland Security should have

a say in the level of fine for a violation? Again, you have to have

a definition of a violation. You have to have a penalty for the violation.

You know, the guy that just flew across the edge there, what is

that worth? Is FAA going to impose the fine? Is Homeland Security? What do you recommend?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. I don’t think it would hurt for the agencies to

consult with each other and come up with a proposal that is acceptable to them. You do have to balance this. As I said in my concluding remarks, you need to balance the commercial interests and the

freedom of flight, as Mr. Issa pointed out, with the valid and genuine security concerns since September 11th.

Again, we aren’t proposing to have the right answer on the right

line level for the type of violation or the intent of that. It wasn’t

in the scope of our review. But it would make sense for people to

consult with each other from their different perspectives and weigh

the penalties.

Mr. MICA. Did you also find the information I found correct, that

there are very few fines imposed?

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Ms. D’AGOSTINO. We didn’t look at it. But we do know that the

people who are actually monitoring the airspace and dealing with

the deviations of restricted airspace are interested in knowing what

happened to the pilot who were doing the violations?

Mr. MICA. I also use Officer Thompson as an example. If you go

out to First and C Street over by the Capital Hill Club, there is

a guy by the name of Officer Thompson.

Officer Thompson enforces the letter of the law. If you don’t have

both hands on your bicycle he will give you a ticket. If you jaywalk

and it is not green, he will give you a ticket. Everyone looks twice

before they cross that street because he is a tough enforcer.

First, we don’t know the definition of the violation and second we

don’t have a tough enforcement policy and we have different people, as you say, going in different directions. Hopefully, we can get

it together a little bit better.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. We will excuse this

panel. We will take a 2-minute break and move to the second

panel.

Ms. WATSON. Before you do that, Mr. Chairman, may I just make

a comment?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I will let the panel go, but you are welcome to make a comment.

Ms. WATSON. I think all of us are asking the same questions. I

notice, Ms. D’Agostino, that you took notes. But this question goes

to our committee. We are having kind of this oversight hearing and

we really want to know.

Would it be in order, Mr. Chairman, for this committee to put

in legislation based on what we have heard today and their report

so we can clarify definitions, get definitions and suggest that we do

have, whoever responsible for following up on these recommendations, for enforcement and for some way for pilots to understand.

One of the questions I would have asked is when you have violation of airspace simultaneously like what happened on September

11th, what do you do? Who is in charge? Is it DEN and are they

effective?

So, my question really goes to the chair. This panel doesn’t have

to respond. Mr. Chairman, what do you think?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, let us hear from the second panel.

I think that’s a good question to ask the second panel as well. We

could certainly put that in.

Thank you all very much. We will take a 2-minute break and

then proceed with the next panel.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We will now move to our second panel. I

want to thank them for taking the time to appear today. I welcome

the Honorable Paul McHale, a former colleague of ours, who is now

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense at the

Department of Defense.

We have Major General Marvin Mayes who is the Commander

of the 1st Air Force and Continental U.S. North American Aerospace from the Defense Command Region, Department of Defense.

Then we have the Honorable Robert Sturgell, who is the Deputy

Administrator from the Federal Aviation Administration.

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We are also going to hear from Dr. Kenneth Kasprisin who is the

Acting Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security at the Department of Homeland Security.

Because of the situation unfolding in London this morning, Mr.

Kasprisin won’t be able to attend, so I am going to ask that his

statement be included in the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kasprisin follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. It is our policy that we swear witnesses

before they testify.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Your entire statements are in the record and the questions are

based on the entire statement.

Paul, we will start with you. Welcome back.

STATEMENTS OF PAUL MCHALE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MAJOR GENERAL MARVIN S. MAYES, COMMANDER,

1ST AIR FORCE AND CONTINENTAL U.S. NORTH AMERICAN

AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND REGION, DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE; AND ROBERT A. STURGELL, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

STATEMENT OF PAUL MCHALE

Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, it is good to be back. I thank you

and the distinguished members of the committee for the opportunity to appear once again in front of you.

As you indicated, my formal statement has been submitted for

the record, so in the interest of preserving the maximum amount

of time for questions, I will present a brief summary with your consent at this point.

Not too long ago we knew who our enemies were and where they

lived. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Madrid train

bombing of March 2003 and most recently the tragic bombings in

London have introduced us to the new enemies of the 21st century.

In the 21st century, facing a new threat in a more ambiguous and

dangerous world, we are in a war with an asymmetric enemy without armies, navies or air forces.

Today a complex network of ideologically driven extremists seek

to terrorize our population, undermine our international partnerships and erode our global influence. The threat of catastrophic violence dictates a new strategic imperative we must actively confront,

when possible, early and keep at a safe distance those who directly

threaten us, employing all instruments of our national power.

Using the total force concept, active, Reserve and Guard, the Department of Defense is postured to deter, defend against and defeat

threats to the United States in the air, maritime and land domains.

Focusing specifically on the subject of today’s hearing, the Bi-National U.S.-Canada North American Aerospace Defense Command,

NORAD, represented here today by Major General Mayes who is

seated to my left, is responsible for protecting North America from

air threats.

Over the last 4 years we have achieved dramatic improvements

in our understanding of that air threat. Our military command and

control systems have been overhauled. Response assets are deployed for rapid and decisive threat interdiction and our collaboration and coordination with interagency partners have increased significantly.

Prior to September 11th NORAD’s surveillance efforts were directed outward from North America, primarily focusing on our

country’s borders in anticipation of a Soviet air threat.

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Today surveillance efforts include airspace over the interior portions of North America, recognizing that threats can now manifest

themselves within our own borders.

Carefully defined rules of engagement and a clear chain of command have been established to defeat terrorist air threats. The

President has delegated to the Secretary of Defense the authority

to take immediate effective action in response to a terrorist air

threat.

We have developed a classified conference capability with specific

protocols for DOD decisionmaking in the event of a domestic air

threat. These classified conferences are routinely monitored by U.S.

Government air security organizations. We exercise our command

and control systems to ensure that our senior civilian and military

leaders are well trained and prepared to exercise their authority.

Since September 11, 2001, under Operation Noble Eagle, the

men and women of the U.S. Air Force, the Air Force Reserve and

the Air National Guard have secured the skies over major metropolitan areas and our Nation’s critical infrastructure on a daily

basis. The rotating nature of this coverage, changed daily, denies

terrorists the opportunity to pre-plan attacks based on routine

schedules. We have conducted more than 41,000 sorties and have

scrambled fighters or diverted air patrols toward suspected air

threats on more than 1,900 occasions.

The Air National Guard provides more than 90 percent of the

daily fighter alert and irregular air patrol requirements of Operation Noble Eagle. Under the control of three NORAD regional

commands, we now have air defense alert fighters positioned

throughout the United States and Canada that are capable of

reaching major population centers and high value infrastructure

within minutes. The Department of Defense cannot conduct the air

defense mission without critical support from our interagency partners. Our support is fundamental to their success as well.

In the last 4 years we have taken tremendous strides in this

arena, reinforcing relationships with existing agencies, specifically

and most especially, the Federal Aviation Administration, and forging ties with new ones, especially the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration. Key areas

include shared situational awareness and exchange of liaison personnel at headquarters and operation centers and the development

of operational responses that reflect a common understanding of air

domain threats.

The establishment of robust liaison relationships facilitate daily

operations and have significantly improved our ability to address

potential air threats. Full-time FAA liaison personnel are located

at NORAD Headquarters at Cheyenne Mountain and at the operations complex in Colorado Springs.

DOD and FAA liaisons are also stationed at the TSA-hosted National Capital Region Coordination Center. Operational responses

now reflect a common understanding of the full range of threats in

our domestic airspace.

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Let me just briefly come to

a conclusion. DOD conducts military missions in the air defense of

the NCR as you heard during an earlier portion of this hearing. We

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conduct irregular air patrols. We have a dedicated 24/7 alert fighter response based at Andrews Air Force Base.

We have a dedicated ground missile defense system. We have implemented a visual warning system to provide a laser warning to

pilots who stray off course. DOD liaison officers serve at the

NCRCC. As previously mentioned DOD has developed a classified

conference capability with protocols for DOD’s decisionmaking.

Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense has implemented substantial improvements in the defense of the U.S. airspace. Our ability to detect, interdict and ultimately defeat air

threats is good, but it can get better.

With our interagency partners we continue to improve our air defense capabilities and in that context we welcome the GAO’s thorough, credible and constructive report.

I welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McHale follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

General Mayes.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL MARVIN S. MAYES

General MAYES. Chairman Davis and other members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here on behalf of Admiral Timothy J. Keating, commander of NORAD,

NORTHCOM.

It is an honor to appear before you and represent the exceptional

men and women of that command. Our professionals are ready to

act on a moment’s notice to protect and defend our Nation’s airspace.

Since 1958, the United States and Canada have defended the

skies over North America through NORAD. It is a bi-national command. Using data from satellites as well as airborne and groundbased radar, NORAD monitors, validates and warns of attack

against the United States and Canadian homelands by our aircraft,

missiles and space vehicles, as well as the emerging asymmetric

threat.

The plan ensures United States and Canadian air sovereignty

through a network of alert fighters, tankers and airborne early

warning aircraft and ground-based air defense assets cued by military and interagency surveillance radars such as those of the FAA

and its Canadian equivalent, NAV CANADA.

NORAD forces, as part of Operation Noble Eagle, maintain a

steady state quick response posture to counter these potential

threats to North America. We conduct irregular air patrols above

major metropolitan areas, critical infrastructure facilities, in addition to maintaining an alert force of fighter, tanker and control aircraft.

Our response posture is based on a tiered system and as threat

levels intensify, the number of aircrafts and other resources we put

on alert increase. Since September 11th we have flown over 41,000

fighter and support aircraft sorties and directed more than 1,900

fighter intercepts in response to potential threats.

Because the U.S. National Capital Region is a symbolic target

and contains many elements of our Nation’s critical infrastructure

it is protected around the clock by multi-layered joint and interagency integrated air defense system. The surveillance, warning

and air defense systems of the National Capital Region consists of

Army Sentinel radars, the ground-based visual warning system as

described by Secretary McHale, Department of Homeland Security

helicopters, fixed wing aircraft on alert at Reagan National, Air

Force fighters on alert at Andrews Air Force Base and the Army

ground-based air defense system which includes medium range

Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile systems and shortrange Stinger and Avenger missiles. These systems augment our

fighter defenses by providing assets in place in a quick reaction

posture to protect the seat of Government.

The NCRCC, we believe, enhances interagency coordination by

providing a venue for all the representatives of the many organizations, all the stakeholders, if you will, in defense of the National

Capital Region to sit and watch together. Through the NCRCC,

these various agencies have improved their individual situational

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awareness by knowing the actions of their defense partners. It is

a coordination center, I would point out, and no command and control of forces occurs at the center. You know who the participants

are.

We have established a rapid conference call capability to facilitate information sharing among the White House, Department of

Defense, FAA, Customs and Border Patrol, AMO, which is the Air

Marine Operations Division of Customs and Patrol, and other law

enforcement in the event of an airspace violator or a track of interest. These voice networks bring together different levels of decisionmakers from many organizations and increase the situational

awareness for all.

Secretary McHale addressed the rules of engagement. I will assure you that they are very precise and very directive and held at

the highest level.

Our partnership with the Federal Aviation Administration to improve our surveillance, command and control capabilities has made

significant progress. We have full-time FAA representation in most

of our command and control centers.

Their Domestic Events Network [DEN], provides us real time situational awareness. It brings together our senior leadership into

the decisionmaking cycle at a very early point in any crisis. We

have incorporated over 300 new radios in the FAA centers and 39

radars that we did not have prior to September 11th.

On October 1, 2004, the Department of Defense and Homeland

Security assumed shared financial responsibility from the FAA for

our Nation’s long-range radars under a 75–25 cost share formula.

In fiscal year 2006 the radars will be funded under a 50–50 cost

share formula and we would like to urge Congress to fully fund the

operations and maintenance of both departments to preserve our

critical air surveillance network. Without it, we are operating

blind.

We continue to make air travel safer through increased airport

and aircraft security measures. The action taken on the ground

prevents us from having to expend resources in the air.

We support national security events which take a great deal of

our resources and have been numerous in number of late, including

both political conventions, the inaugural, President Reagan’s funeral, and the State of the Union address.

In conclusion, since September 11th we have strengthened our

ability to detect and assess and warn and defend of air threats

against North America. We will continue to look for ways to refine

that process and maximize our ability to detect airspace violators

while we minimize the inconvenience to the aviation public.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Mayes follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Sturgell.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT STURGELL

Mr. STURGELL. Good morning, Chairman Davis, members of the

committee. I am pleased to represent the FAA before you this

morning to discuss the many issues that arise from violations of restricted airspace and how the FAA is working to help pilots understand the complexities of flying in and around such airspace in

order to reduce the number of pilot deviations, a few of which have

resulted in the evacuation of this building.

Working with my colleagues in the Department of Defense and

the Department of Homeland Security, the FAA has a lead on implementing flight restrictions wherever and whenever it is necessary.

Flight restrictions around the National Capital Region have been

in place for several years, but other restrictions are put in place

around the country as needed by the military or to provide additional security above high profile events. Pilots are required to

check to determine if there are restrictions in place that they must

comply with as part of their pre-flight planning.

The area around Washington, DC, is highly regulated and pilots

must follow a flight plan, be in contact with FAA and Air Traffic

Control and continually squawk a discrete transponder code in

order for FAA and the other participants of the NCRCC to know

exactly who is in the airspace. Since virtually all of the pilot deviations that have occurred in this area have been inadvertent, the

FAA is working with the users of the system to help heighten

awareness of restrictions and what can happen if they are not complied with.

Even though we have seen a declining trend in the number of

violations over the past 2 years, we have increased our educational

efforts with the general aviation community. Since June of last

year, highly experienced air traffic control specialists have conducted 175 formal outreach programs. These include visits to flight

schools, local flying clubs, local law enforcement aviation units and

military base units.

Our goal is to educate the pilots to use the system in this area

and help them understand how to avoid getting into what could be

a very difficult situation. These outreach efforts have been very

well received and very well attended. I should mention that our colleagues represented here today are also part of that effort.

We believe the trend is showing a decrease in the number of

ADIZ violations is attributable in part to this effort. So, we want

to do more. We think training is the key to further reducing violations.

With extremely few exceptions, the pilots who have been properly

flown into the restricted airspace around this city have not intended to do so. Some were lost. Some were avoiding weather. All

of them would have preferred to avoid the sanctions, the publicity

and the other consequences that can result from their mistakes.

So FAA wants to go farther than our current outreach program.

By using our existing authority, we want to require training that

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will begin with pilots who fly visual flight rules within 100 miles

of Washington, DC.

The FAA intends to issue a special Federal Aviation Regulation

that gives the pilots in this area 30 days to have accomplished

training on the requirements and procedures to operate in the

flight restricted zone, the air defense identification zone and other

restricted airspace. The training can be accomplished via an FAA

safety seminar or through an online course such as those offered

by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association [AOPA]. The pilot

must successfully complete the course and conclude the test in

order to be issued a certificate of completion.

The FAA will then require that this certificate be carried by the

pilot on any flight within 100 miles of Washington, DC. We think

pilot awareness will be further improved by this requirement and

over time we will expand that mandatory training on flying in and

around restricted airspace to pilots throughout the Nation.

Another part of our effort will include revisiting our sanction

guidance on pilot deviations in the District’s restricted airspace.

Currently our general policy is to propose a certificate suspension

for any pilot who penetrates the ADIZ. For a first-time offense, this

is generally 30 to 90 days. Now, this can vary depending on the circumstances surrounding the violation as was the case for the pilot

who caused the Capitol and the White House to be evacuated on

May 11th. His certificate was revoked.

The use of increased sanctions, especially for repeat violators and

those who fly into the flight restricted zone may serve to keep this

airspace safer and will send a clear message of the need to be

aware and comply with the ADIZ rules.

Chairman Mica mentioned some of the things that he is looking

at earlier. We expect to be discussing this further with him

through the summer.

I think by and large pilots want to comply with the FAA regulations and restricted airspace procedures. We have worked closely

with our community, especially in the D.C. area, to make our airspace safe, secure and efficient.

I would like to commend aviation user groups like AOPA who are

working hard to help educate their members. Last year, AOPA sent

over 4 million e-mails to their members about airspace restrictions.

This, in addition to cooperative education efforts with FAA and

TSA and a continuing web-based campaign demonstrates the commitment of the general aviation community to proactively address

our Nation’s security concerns.

I appreciate the congressional interest in how the FAA and the

many other Government agencies coordinate their efforts in a time

of heightened security. We are all striving to improve what we do

and how we keep each other informed.

I appreciate the consistent review, scrutiny, and reevaluation as

appropriate. I welcome the opportunity to continue to work with

the Congress, GAO, other Government agencies here and the users

of the system to keep the airspace safe, secure and efficient.

That concludes my statement. I would be happy to take questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sturgell follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Let me just start. Secretary

McHale, DOD’s new strategy for homeland security and civilian

support is critical of FAA radars. It states, ‘‘the current radars

maintained by the FAA to track air traffic within the U.S. are

aging with high maintenance costs, poor reliability and reduced capability to track emerging threats.’’

Do you have any comments on that statement? Is it true?

Mr. MCHALE. The Department of Defense continues to rely on

the FAA radars because the radar picture that is derived from the

deployment of those radar collection capabilities feeds directly into

the command and control centers throughout NORAD.

So, our eyes and ears throughout the airspace of the United

States, our ability to perceive what is happening in the airspace,

let me put it that way, is a direct result of the FAA quality radar

system. That is an old system. For the most part it is a remnant

of the cold war. There are issues with regard to the very substantial expenses that are associated with the upkeep of the FAA radars.

FAA has taken the position that there are better ways for them

to execute their civilian administrative deconfliction requirement

within the airspace and they have argued that the FAA radars continue to have importance primarily for reasons of national security.

Reflecting that analysis, as concerned by General Mayes, the Office

of Management and Budget has now assigned the responsibility to

the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense to pay for the upkeep of those radars.

Clearly at some point we are going to have to move beyond the

FAA radars to maintain comprehensive surveillance in the airspace. In the interim, we seek appropriate funding both for DHS

and DOD to maintain what are still the essential surveillance capabilities found uniquely within the FAA radars. We still need

them.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Sturgell, can you comment on FAA’s

attempts to update its radars and tell us about the development of

the Global Communications Navigation Surveillance System

[GCNCSS], the list providing a common air surveillance picture at

the National Capital Region’s Coordination Center as a requirement?

Mr. STURGELL. Chairman Davis, we have a number of different

radar systems within the National Airspace System. There are terminal radars basically and long-range radars which provide surveillance capability.

We have just recently approved a service life extension program

for our ASR–9 radars which are largely in the terminal areas. We

are acquiring newer digital ASR–11 radars as well. As the General

mentioned, we have incorporated some of these radar capabilities

into their networks as well.

With respect to the long-range radars which largely border the

Nation, they are an aging system. We identified that in the years

before September 11th. We operate in the FAA a cooperative aviation system, if you will, depending primarily on the secondary returns from aircraft through the use of transponders.

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So, we recognized that we no longer had a need for primary skin

paint returns, if you will, of the aircraft themselves which is largely used as a surveillance function.

As the witnesses here have mentioned, that function we maintained until after September 11th. Now it has been transferred to

the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense and they are

working for funding again, I believe, for a service life extension of

their capabilities.

I think within the National Capital Region the radar coverage is

extremely good. There are a number of other systems that enhance

that capability as well.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, DOD’s enhanced airspace security

system, their EAS and your GCNSS seem to perform some of the

same functions, namely air surveillance for the National Capital

Region. Are these two systems compatible and do you need two departments with the same capability?

Does anyone want to take a shot at that?

Mr. STURGELL. I would say that it is my belief that they do provide different types of capabilities, some of which Defense is particularly interested in. I will let them speak to that.

As far as our radars, again, you know, we recognize that D.C. is

unique and there is a need for enhanced surveillance here. Our system in general largely is a cooperative system with the airlines

through the use of the transponders.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I am just trying to get the compatibility

and overlap. Secretary McHale, do you have any comment on that?

Mr. MCHALE. I think General Mayes may have some comments

on this point operationally, but the most fundamental distinction is

this: the FAA uses radar to maintain awareness of what aircrafts

are in the airspace and to administratively deconflict aircrafts that

presumably are flying without any kind of terrorist intent.

We use the same radar and some other radar systems for a different purpose and that is once we determine that an airplane may

be under the control of someone with a malevolent intent, a terrorist, we use that radar not only to track the aircraft and maintain

awareness of its constantly changing location, but we also use that

radar to support some of our air interdiction capabilities.

In a closed session we could talk about that in a little more detail. But we use radar not merely to deconflict the airspace, which

is an FAA responsibility, but to track and if necessary shoot down

an aircraft that has come under the control of terrorists.

Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This question goes to

General Mayes. The GAO noted a discrepancy in data collection of

restricted airspace violations between the air defense sectors and

NORAD Headquarters. Headquarters knew only 10 percent of the

violations monitored by the regional sectors.

Can you respond to this? What caused the miscommunication

and how has NORAD addressed this problem?

Also, in its final report the 9/11 Commission recommended that

the Department of Defense and its oversight committee should regularly assess the adequacy of the Northern Command strategies

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and planning to defend the United States against military threats

to the homeland.

So, in relation to air defense, General Mayes, how are NORAD

and Northern Command complying with the 9/11 Commission recommendation?

General MAYES. Thank you for your questions, Ms. Watson. As

it pertains to the difference in clicker count, if I might use that

term, of the number of events recorded at NORAD versus the

Northeast Air Defense Sector, I will tell you that it has to do with

upchannel reporting requirements.

The Northeast Air Defense Sector will bump their clicker up on

any given target of interest, regardless of tactical action requirements, whereas NORAD only requires upchannel reporting of those

TOIs upon which we executed tactical action.

I will give you an example. Let us say a target pops up in the

National Capital Region and it is initially unknown, unidentified.

It quickly is resolved. We find out who it is and no tactical action

is required.

The Northeast Air Defense Sector will record that as an event.

NORAD, on the other hand, since there was no tactical action required, it does not require upchannel reporting. So, therefore

NEDS would necessarily have many more events recorded than

NORAD would.

In regard to your second question, is that is an answer that you

were looking for the first one, in regards to the second question

about reviewing our strategy, I will tell you that our strategy is in

constant review at many levels.

My staff at Tyndall Air Force Base, as the Joint Force Air Component Commander, is specifically responsible for reviewing that

air strategy daily and recommending changes to Admiral Keating,

who is the commander of NORAD NORTHCOM.

Our recommended changes that have been staffed by me initially

are then staffed by his joint staff in Colorado Springs. Any disconnects there are agreed upon.

I will also tell you that on an interagency basis we have an interagency airspace protection working group upon which representatives from all the stakeholders sit. We continually review our protection strategy specifically for the National Capital Region as well

as the rest of the Nation.

We review the measures that we are taking. We look at those

measures in regards to how they affect the general aviation public.

We take input from outside agencies like the AOPA and we evaluate modifications to our current defense strategy in terms of a risk

analysis and where possible we will change those procedures to

better accommodate the public.

Ms. WATSON. Mr. McHale, and I know you have to leave quickly,

but as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense are

you satisfied that the various different headquarters and defense

sectors are talking to each other with the same language, are reporting so it is clear and there are definitions?

I just heard General Mayes give us how NORAD looks at an incident and how another sector might look at an incident. I certainly

would be confused. I think that is what the 9/11 Commission was

getting to when they talked about putting this under one head.

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How would you respond?

Mr. MCHALE. The current system ensures, as was not the case

before September 11, that we throughout the interagency, meaning

the various departments of the Government, are now talking effectively to each other.

But the ability to speak effectively to one another is only the first

step toward achieving an effective air defense. Regrettably, before

September 11 that communication as an element of a larger requirement was not met. The 9/11 Commission recognized that, so

one of the first things that we had to do was ensure that the various departments, to include our own, the Department of Defense,

had the opportunity and the responsibility to communicate effectively daily, continuously to make sure that our activities were coordinated. We are doing that now.

Without going into great detail, there are representatives of my

staff who work full-time over at DHS. There are representatives

from NORAD who work full-time at the TSA-led, hosted, NCRCC.

So there is extensive communication.

But there are gaps and seams remaining in terms of interagency

coordination. When I was subject to confirmation in the Senate, I

said that I would never use the word satisfied. I am not satisfied.

There are improvements that can be made.

I think the GAO has done a commendable job in pointing out

where some of those improvements might be found.

We had some disagreement, I think modest disagreement, but

some disagreement with GAO in terms of how they originally

phrased some of their recommendations. I will give you one specific

example. The phrase was used ‘‘in charge of’’ and we pushed back

on that because the military chain of command is clear under the

Constitution and by statute. It goes from the President of the

United States to the Secretary of Defense to a Combatant Commander. There is no other civilian in that chain of command.

We don’t want to turn the decisions of the Secretary of Defense

into an interagency dialog. But we can, consistent with preserving

the chain of command, insist upon a proactive leadership role in

the interagency to make sure that as DOD exercises its military responsibilities, those responsibilities are fully coordinated with, not

commanded by, but coordinated with interagency partners.

I think there are still some unmet requirements with regard to

that coordination. As noted in the GAO report, I think one of those

areas involves leadership of the interagency process outside the

NCR. That was one of the main conclusions reached in the GAO

report and I think it is a valid conclusion demanding an answer.

Ms. WATSON. Well, I don’t think the GAO needs to be looked at

as someone that should be defining and clarifying the language in

which we talk to each other through the interagency.

They raised the issue. What I am trying to get from you is where

is the responsibility for the interagency coordination? Where should

it be housed? Are you saying the executive branch?

Mr. MCHALE. Yes. The position that I would preliminarily

present, and I think we are still in the process, not only in DOD

but throughout the interagency in reviewing this issue, is who

should have the role nationwide that has been assigned to the

NCRCC, TSA’s executive agency at the National Capital Region

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Coordination Center? Who should have that responsibility outside

the National Capital Region throughout the rest of the country?

Now, I believe, consistent with the GAO report, that TSA ought

not to be passive in that executive agency, that there is a leadership responsibility associated with that executive agency; not a

command responsibility, but a leadership responsibility, that is

what we envisioned within the National Capital Region when we

signed the memorandum of agreement.

The question then becomes: Who has that duty nationwide? I believe that we ought to be open to the prospect of expanding that

duty from the NCR throughout the Nation under the primary

interagency leadership of TSA.

Ms. WATSON. I think you ought to do it.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary McHale, you have been doing a great job. All of you

have done a fine job. I happen to know this gentlemen and I appreciate the work he has done.

I would like to ask you, how will the downsizing of the Air National Guard under BRAC and the reduction of the Air Guard assets affect DOD’s ability to protect the homeland in the near and

long term?

General MAYES. Sir, the BRAC recommendations were reviewed

before they came out on a public basis by Admiral Keating’s joint

staff in Colorado Springs, at headquarters of NORAD

NORTHCOM.

As a combatant commander, his interests are in combat capability, not in platforms or units. In reviewing those recommendations

alongside the force providers, Admiral Keating has determined that

the BRAC recommendations will not affect the ability of NORAD

NORTHCOM to complete its mission.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you also answer it, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. MCHALE. One of the factors to be considered in the BRAC

process is the potential impact of any individual closure upon

homeland defense capabilities. So, it is not only something that one

would think is the right thing to consider; by law we are obligated

to consider homeland defense implications in making BRAC decisions.

I can assure you from conversations that I had prior to the BRAC

recommendations coming out of DOD, we had that kind of dialog.

There was a review of the homeland defense implications associated with the proposed closures. Although that process continues,

I can tell you with confidence that homeland defense was properly

considered in coming up with the list that was recommended by the

Secretary to the BRAC commission.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. General, it is our understanding that the

1st Air Force operates 24 alert facilities across the United States.

I would like you to describe these facilities.

Let me give you all the questions, OK? Describe the facilities.

What do they do? Does the alert facility have the right fighter jet

assets to perform the air defense mission quickly and effectively?

Two more questions: Which air asset is best suited to the domestic air defense mission and how many of those planes does the Air

National Guard have?

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If you have forgotten one or two, I will come back to them, but

if you could kind of group it together, that would be helpful.

General MAYES. Sir, our alert facilities vary in number depending on our alert posture based on the given threat level. A lot of

the aspects of your question, regrettably, are classified, so I can’t

get into the details of all of them.

But I will tell you that typically at any given alert site there are

at steady state, there are two aircrafts on alert with a spare. The

facilities required to do that are generally an enclosed secured

area, alert barn, as it is referred to. That is manned by the appropriate aircraft crew chiefs, weapons personnel, and of course the

pilot force.

The facilities require extensive CON activity to the command and

control system so that those aircraft can be ordered into the air

with the appropriate rapidity. Their role would be, obviously, to get

airborne as rapidly as possible, close on a target of interest, execute

diversion signals, first off.

We have several ways of doing that. The international civil aviation organization has agreed upon a certain set of signals that will

indicate to an aircraft that he must alter his course of action, perhaps follow the intercepting aircraft to landing.

If the passenger signals do not work, then those aircrafts have

flares on board to ensure that we can get the visual attention of

a potential violator. Most of our alert airplanes are equipped with

both UHF and VHF radios. We attempt at all times to hail those

aircrafts, the potential violators, on the appropriate frequencies.

With all of that failing, then our command and control system is

such that we can access the highest available engagement authority and provide the situational awareness, a description of the current state of affairs to that engagement authority and then he can

make the decision about the final course of action.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, General. I am all set.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. Porter, do you have any questions?

Mr. PORTER. Yes. I know we just have a few moments left. But

tell me what triggers your security interest in an aircraft. I know

there are some specific things you look at, but what specifically

would trigger your interest in an aircraft?

General MAYES. Typically, what would cause an aircraft to be a

target of interest would be the fact that it is—well, a couple of different things.

First of all, on the unknown side it would be either not squawking the appropriate code, not flying on its filed flight plan, being

in a restricted area where it was not supposed to be, non-compliant

with instructions. If it was talking to us and then it didn’t comply

with instructions it would become a target of interest.

Another way that an aircraft can become a target of interest is

if we get through the intelligence fusion from the various agencies

including both civilian and military, if we got information that

there was a person on the no-fly list or the selectee list, and that

comes out of the Terrorist Screen Center, if a person of that nature

was on an aircraft, it would be determined to be a target of interest

and would merit further scrutiny as it progressed through the naVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:21 Nov 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22809.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tional airspace, or it could be refused entry into the national airspace if it was coming from a different country.

Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Porter, in addition to what the General just

mentioned in terms of the physical activity of the aircraft, where

it is flying, the altitude, the other indicators of potential threat activity in addition to the information that we receive routinely regarding passengers attempting to board or perhaps on board an

aircraft may raise issues of concern.

We also, consistent with the strategy that was quoted by the

chairman a few moments ago, see air defense as defense in depth.

That is, we want our air defense to begin overseas. So, we have established robust intel sharing relationships with friendly nation

states and other sources overseas.

Some of our most significant air defense activity has been triggered by information that we have received concerning specific

flights at specific times and specific threat conditions associated

with those flights so that we could bring to bear upon those flights

a very focused sense of concern.

You may recall a year ago this past Christmas, over a period of

2 or 3 weeks we had that kind of information and it dramatically

affected how we deployed and implemented our air defense capabilities, reviewing and in fact intercepting certain flights, well beyond the airspace of the United States of America.

General MAYES. Sir, I might add just one more factor. I will tell

you that the FAA, our partners in the FAA, are quite often the first

ones to bring to our attention the fact that an aircraft is not compliant with his plan or is squawking the wrong code. So the partnership there is working well.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, thank you all very much. We have

votes on so I will dismiss this panel. We will move ahead and adjourn this hearing but I appreciate everybody being here today to

answer our questions. We will keep working together.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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