United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on the 

Legislative Branch, Committee on 

Appropriations, U.S. Senate 

CAPITOL VISITOR 

CENTER 

Update on Schedule and 

Cost 

Statement of Bernard L. Ungar, Director 

Terrell Dorn, Assistant Director 

Physical Infrastructure Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 11:00 a.m. EST 

Wednesday, November 16, 2005

 

GAO-06-251T 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to assist the Subcommittee in monitoring 

progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. Our remarks will 

focus on (1) the status of the project schedule since the Subcommittee’s 

October 18, 2005, hearing1 on the project, (2) the project’s costs and 

funding, and (3) worker safety issues. We will discuss the progress made 

and problems encountered in completing scheduled construction work 

and in continuing to develop the project schedule, as we indicated during 

the Subcommittee’s October 18 hearing; however, we will not be able to 

estimate specific completion dates until the project schedule is stable and 

AOC and its construction management contractor—Gilbane Building 

Company—have completed their assessments of the schedule and we have

had an opportunity to evaluate them. Also, we will update the information 

we previously provided on the project’s costs and funding, using readily 

available data, but we will wait until the project schedule is stable and has

been fully reviewed before we comprehensively update our November 

2004 estimate of the cost to complete the project and update the provision

in our estimate for risks and uncertainties facing the project.

Our remarks today are based on our review of schedules, financial reports, 

and worker safety information for the CVC project and related records and 

reports developed or maintained by AOC and its construction management 

contractor; our review of AOC’s consultant’s—McDonough Bolyard Peck

(MBP)—November 1, 2005, report updating its October 2004 estimate of 

the cost to complete the project; our observations on the progress of work 

at the CVC construction site; and our discussions with CVC project staff 

(including AOC and its major CVC contractors), AOC’s Chief Fire Marshal, 

U.S. Capitol Police representatives, and officials responsible for managing 

the Capitol Power Plant (CPP). We did not perform an audit; rather, we 

performed our work to assist Congress in conducting its oversight 

activities. 

In summary, construction work in several areas has moved forward since 

the Subcommittee’s October 18 CVC hearing, but additional delays have 

occurred, and AOC’s construction management contractor has identified 

 1

See GAO, Capitol Visitor Center: Status of Schedule, Fire Protection, Cost, and Related

Issues, GAO-06-180T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 18, 2005). 

Page 1 GAO-06-251T 
several concerns with the schedule that raise questions about its proposed 

mid-December 2006 opening of the base CVC project to the public.2

• Construction work has continued on all interior CVC levels, various 

sections of the House and Senate expansion spaces, the plaza, and the 

House connector and utility tunnels. Overall, however, the work, 

especially stonework, has taken longer than scheduled. For example, the 

installation of interior wall stone fell behind about 2 weeks because of 

delays in receiving needed stone. Work on the utility tunnel was delayed 

by a similar amount of time for a variety of reasons. 

• Efforts by the sequence 2 contractor to resequence activities involved in

testing, balancing, and commissioning the heating, ventilation, and airconditioning (HVAC) system had the net effect of moving the base 

project’s completion date forward 3 days. AOC’s construction 

management contractor has accepted this resequencing. However, other 

scheduling issues could delay completion. For example, AOC’s Fire 

Marshal Division has raised several concerns about the schedule for 

testing and inspecting the CVC’s fire protection system, and the 

construction management contractor has identified a number of critical 

activities whose completion dates slipped from the September to the 

October schedule. Delays in completing these critical activities affect the 

progress of the project because other work cannot continue until they are 

completed. Critical stonework activities pose particular concerns, given 

the problems with labor and supplies that the project has experienced. For 

example, in October, the sequence 2 contractor received less than 20 

percent of the stone expected. 

• AOC’s construction management contractor’s evaluation of the duration of 

selected activities, completed last week, points to a later completion date

than is currently scheduled unless additional actions are taken. This 

evaluation identified unrealistic durations for the selected activities 

(especially stonework), concerns about the schedule’s logic, and 

 2

AOC set September 15, 2006, as the contractual date for completing the base project’s

construction and for opening the CVC facility to the public. The House and Senate 

expansion spaces were scheduled to be completed after that date. AOC set the September 

contract completion date in November 2004, when it reached agreement with the

contractor on a new date for starting sequence 2 that reflected the delays experienced on 

sequence 1. On September 6, 2005, AOC informed Capitol Preservation Commission 

representatives that it still expected the base project’s construction to be substantially 

complete on September 15, 2006, but was postponing the date for opening the facility to the 

public to December 15, 2006, so that it could complete system tests, minor punch-list work, 

and preparations for operations.

Page 2 GAO-06-251T 
inaccuracies in reflecting the impact of delays and sequence 2 contract 

changes to date. The construction management contractor made a number 

of recommendations based on its findings. The contractor’s evaluation has 

reinforced our view that the base project would be difficult to complete in

2006 and is more likely to be completed in early to mid-2007 unless AOC 

and its contractors take extraordinary action or change the project’s 

scope, which could increase the government’s costs. Our belief is based on 

the project’s history of delays; the views of project personnel that several

activities (such as the installation of interior wall stone) are likely to take 

longer than scheduled; the large number of critical activities in the current 

project schedule; and the risks and uncertainties that continue to face the

project. 

AOC and its construction management contractor expect to resolve 

outstanding scheduling concerns and issues by the end of this year. When 

AOC and its construction management contractor have prepared what 

they consider to be a reasonably stable project schedule, we will 

reevaluate the schedule and inform the Subcommittee of our results. In the 

interim, to help ensure that Congress has better information for making 

CVC-related decisions, we are recommending that AOC (1) implement the 

recommendations for obtaining a more reliable project schedule contained 

in its construction management contractor’s November 2005 report, which 

are consistent with our previous recommendations on schedule 

management, and (2) reassess its proposed December 2006 date for 

opening the CVC to the public when it has a more reliable construction 

schedule. 

Our preliminary work indicates that the entire CVC project is likely, at a 

minimum, to cost $542.9 million. This preliminary estimate falls about 

midway between our September 15, 2005, interim estimate of $525.6 

million, which did not provide for risks and uncertainties, and our 

November 2004 estimate of about $559 million, which did provide for risks 

and uncertainties. Specifically, this current $542.9 preliminary estimate is 

about $17.3 million more than the September 15 interim estimate and 

about $16.1 million less than the November 2004 estimate. The current 

$542.9 million preliminary estimate does not provide for risks and 

uncertainties or for additional payments to contractors to cover the costs

of certain delays and other contingencies. Even without providing for risks 

and uncertainties, though, we have increased our cost estimate since 

September 15 because additional and more expensive changes to the 

project have been identified; we have increased our allowance for 

contingencies; and we have added funding for AOC and contractor staff 

that we believe are likely to be working on the project through the spring 

Page 3 GAO-06-251T 
of 2007. Our preliminary estimate substantially exceeds MBP’s November 

2005 updated estimate of $481.9 million, largely because MBP’s estimate 

does not cover a number of project components and does not, in our view,

provide adequately for contingencies. In total, the funds specifically 

provided for project construction to date—about $528.4 million—are $14.5

million less than our preliminary $542.9 million cost estimate. In addition, 

another $7.7 million has been provided to cover either CVC construction 

or operations, although at this time AOC does not plan to use any of these 

funds for construction. Congress has limited the amount of federal funds

that can be used for the construction of the tunnel connecting the CVC 

with the Library of Congress to $10 million.3

 As of October 31, 2005, AOC 

estimated that the tunnel would cost about $8.8 million to construct; 

however, AOC had not yet awarded the contract for certain modifications 

to the tunnel project. Nevertheless, AOC believes that it will be able to 

keep the tunnel’s construction cost below the congressional limitation, 

and both we and AOC plan to monitor the tunnel’s construction cost 

closely. 

According to our analysis of CVC data, worker safety rates have improved

substantially this year, although the lost-time rate remains above industry 

norms. The injury and illness rate for the first 10 months of 2005 declined

52 percent from the rate for 2004, putting the CVC site’s rate 3 percent 

below the average for comparable construction sites. The lost-time rate 

decreased 62 percent during the same period, but the CVC site’s rate is still 

29 percent higher than the average rate for comparable construction sites. 

AOC and its contractors have taken a number of actions during 2005 to 

improve safety performance on the project, such as conducting training to

elevate safety awareness and placing safety posters around the worksite. 

In addition, senior managers are meeting periodically to develop strategies

to improve safety. Poor housekeeping, however, has been an ongoing issue 

at the site, and the sequence 2 contractor has recently taken actions to 

address this issue. 

 3

Public Law 108-83, 117 Stat. 1007, 1026 (Sept. 30, 2003). 

Page 4 GAO-06-251T 
Work in several areas has moved forward since the Subcommittee’s 

October 18 CVC hearing, but additional delays have occurred, and AOC’s 

construction management contractor has identified several concerns 

about the project schedule. AOC has been addressing previously identified 

schedule-related problems. 

According to the October 2005 schedule prepared by AOC’s sequence 2

construction management contractor, the base CVC project can open to 

the public in December 2006, and the House and Senate expansion spaces 

will be finished by the end of February 2007. The contractor’s October 

schedule indicates that, with some exceptions, construction work on the 

base CVC project will be essentially complete by September 15, 2006, and 

the remaining work will be completed by December 8, 2006. This 

remaining work includes testing, balancing, and commissioning the HVAC 

system; testing and inspecting the fire protection system; completing 

punch-list items; and preparing for operations. For the East Front, the 

October schedule shows construction work, such as the roof restoration, 

finish work, and elevator/escalator installation, completed after September 

15, 2006. The October schedule also shows other construction work, such 

as the installation of ceiling panels in the orientation lobby and painting in

the atria, extending after September 15, 2006. AOC expects all this 

construction work to be done and the base CVC project to be ready for 

operations between September 15, 2006, and mid-December 2006, enabling 

the facility to open to the public in mid-December. Additionally, under the 

October project schedule, the House and Senate expansion spaces will be

completed in December 2006, and the testing, balancing, and 

commissioning of the HVAC system and the testing of the fire protection 

system will be finished by February 26, 2007. According to AOC’s sequence 

2 and construction management contractors, it is not yet clear whether the

expansion space construction work will have progressed far enough to 

omit the temporary fire safety measures once considered necessary to 

open the CVC to the public. They said they are still analyzing the work 

associated with the areas where the base project and the expansion spaces 

come together to determine whether and how the need for temporary fire 

safety measures can be minimized or eliminated.

Since the Subcommittee’s October 18 CVC hearing, construction work has 

continued on the CVC, the East Front, the plaza, the House and Senate 

expansion spaces, and the House connector and utility tunnels. For 

example, the installation of wall stone has continued in the auditorium, the 

Work and Revisions to 

the Project Schedule 

Continue, but Delays 

Hamper Progress 

AOC Continues to Project 

a Mid-December 2006 

Opening for the Base CVC 

Project 

Construction Work 

Continued, but Problems 

with Stonework and Other 

Issues Caused Delays 

Page 5 GAO-06-251T 
orientation theaters, and the upper west lobby. Mechanical, electrical, and

plumbing work has also been proceeding in the CVC. 

Overall, however, construction work, especially stonework, has taken 

longer than scheduled. Between the Subcommittee’s October 18 hearing 

and November 10, the sequence 2 contractor completed 8 of the 16

activities that we and AOC have been tracking for the Subcommittee, but 

only 3 of these activities were completed by the target dates shown in the 

contractor’s September 2005 schedule. (See app. I.) Delays have also 

occurred in interior stonework and in work on the East Front, the utility 

tunnel, and the penthouse’s mechanical systems. For example, according 

to AOC’s construction management contractor, similar to what happened 

in September, the sequence 2 contractor lost about 10 out of 21 possible 

workdays, both on critical interior stonework and on the utility tunnel. 

According to the construction management contractor, the stonework was 

delayed by the slow and late delivery of stone, a lack of critical pieces of 

stone, the need to address problems arising from sequence 1 work, and a 

shortage of stone masons. During October, the installation of wall stone in 

the great hall and exhibit gallery was especially impeded because the 

stone supplier failed to meet scheduled delivery dates and the sequence 2 

contractor received less than 20 percent of the stone the supplier had 

agreed to provide. Moreover, according to the sequence 2 contractor, 

during several preceding months, deliveries of stone were only about half

as large as expected. Additionally, the contractor said, the delivered stone

was not in the appropriate sequence and did not cover complete areas. To 

help mitigate these problems, during October, the sequence 2 contractor 

transferred stone masons from areas such as the exhibit gallery, for which 

no wall stone was available, to the auditorium, for which wall stone was 

available. 

AOC’s construction management contractor cited other delays in October, 

especially in the utility tunnel and in the exhibit gallery. For instance, 

work on First Street for the utility tunnel was delayed by unforeseen site 

conditions, rain, and the need to do unanticipated work. However, the 

construction management contractor said that steps have been taken to 

mitigate the impact of the delays, including the sequence 2 contractor’s 

hiring of another subcontractor and the installation of piping in the tunnel.

In the view of the construction management contractor and the sequence 2 

contractor, these steps will enable the CVC’s air-handling units to start up 

in February 2006 rather than in March 2006, as indicated in the October 

schedule. In the exhibit gallery, besides the delay in wall stone installation, 

the construction management contractor identified several problems, 

including delays in drawings for marble and finishes and concerns about 

Page 6 GAO-06-251T 
the acceptability of the gallery’s fire suppression system, that could further 

delay work in the exhibit gallery. 

The sequence 2 contractor resequenced activities involved in testing, 

balancing, and commissioning the HVAC system and made other schedule 

changes that had the net effect of moving the base project’s completion 

date forward 3 days. While the resequencing will result in a loss of 10 

workdays for the HVAC activities, according to the contractor’s revised 

schedule, the other changes have advanced the base project’s scheduled 

completion date to December 8, 2006, rather than December 11, 2006, as 

indicated in the September schedule. AOC’s construction management 

contractor reports that it, the sequence 2 contractor, and AOC’s 

commissioning contractor have generally agreed on the revised schedule 

for testing, balancing, and commissioning the HVAC system. However, 

AOC’s Fire Marshal Division has not yet agreed on the schedule for those 

activities that relate to the CVC’s fire protection system, such as testing 

and inspecting the smoke control system, the fire alarm system, and stair 

pressurization. On October 31, the division provided its comments on the 

revised schedule for the fire protection system. The division’s Deputy Fire 

Marshal expressed several significant concerns about the schedule. AOC 

and its construction management contractor expect to complete their 

reviews of this part of the schedule and resolve the Fire Marshal Division’s 

concerns by December 31, 2005. 

The construction management contractor has identified 14 critical activity 

paths in the October schedule that will extend the base project’s 

completion date beyond AOC’s September 15, 2006, target date if expected

lost time cannot be recovered or further delays cannot be prevented. 

Eleven of the 14 critical activity paths in the October schedule were also 

identified in the September schedule. For 4 of these 11 paths, such as the 

auditorium wall stone installation and the orientation theater millwork, 

the completion dates showed improvement compared with the September

schedule, but for the other 7 paths, such as the utility tunnel and the 

exhibit gallery stonework, the completion dates slipped. The 3 paths newly 

identified in October are elevator installation, exhibit gallery steel framing,

and 10- and 12-inch water line installation,4

 each of which could delay the 

project if expected lost time cannot be recovered. In addition, our analysis 

Schedule Revisions Saved 

Some Time, but Many 

Activities Are Highly 

Vulnerable to Delay 

 4

The construction management contractor identified the water lines as an issue in 

September but did not list them as critical until October. 

Page 7 GAO-06-251T 
of productivity data for interior wall stone installation, coupled with the 

sequence 2 contractor’s analysis of stone deliveries, indicates that AOC is 

not likely to meet its September 15, 2006, target date for completing the 

base project’s construction without significant increases in the pace of 

wall stone deliveries and installation. That is, without more stone masons 

and/or more work hours, more stone delivered more quickly, and faster 

stone installation, AOC is unlikely to meet its target schedule. The 

sequence 2 contractor believes that stone masons will be able to install 

more wall stone per day in some areas, such as the exhibit gallery, because 

the work is not as difficult as in the great hall or orientation theaters. 

However, the pace of this installation remains uncertain, in our view. 

Furthermore, given the project’s experiences to date with the number of 

stone masons, the quantity of stone deliveries, and the pace of installation, 

AOC’s construction management contractor notes that the completion of 

wall stone installation could extend up to several months beyond the July 

2006 date shown in the project schedule without more work hours, higher 

productivity, and sufficient stone. The pace of wall stone installation is 

especially important because it affects the timing of other critical work 

necessary for the project’s completion, such as the ceiling’s installation 

and the HVAC system’s testing, balancing, and commissioning. The stone 

supply problem is the subject of litigation between the sequence 2 

contractor and its subcontractors, and the sequence 2 contractor has been

working to resolve the problem. However, at this time, it is not clear how

or when this issue will be resolved. 

Most of the activities we have been discussing, such as the wall stone 

installation, fire safety inspections, and House connector tunnel 

construction, are among the activities that we previously identified as 

likely having optimistic durations, suggesting that those activities could 

take longer to complete than shown in the project schedule. These 

activities served as the basis for our September 15 recommendation that 

AOC rigorously evaluate the durations for the activities shown in the 

project schedule. Last week, AOC’s construction management contractor 

finished evaluating these durations and the logic for what it considered the

most critical activities, such as wall stone installation, and discussed the 

impact of delays and sequence 2 contract changes on the project schedule.

In its November 9 report to AOC, the construction management contractor 

said that (1) it was generally difficult to identify any activities that were 

completed within the planned duration; (2) none of the activities 

underway, primarily stonework, can be projected to be completed within 

the planned duration unless additional resources are applied; (3) the 

durations for a number of activities exceed 40 days compared with the 

Construction Management 

Contractor’s Evaluation 

and Our Analysis Point to a 

Later Completion Date 

Page 8 GAO-06-251T 
contractual limit of 20 days; and (4) the sequence 2 contractor’s 

resequencing of work to mitigate the impact of delays will result in a 

“stacking of trades,”5

 which will require more manpower. Moreover, 

although the sequence 2 contractor has said that the project schedule 

reflects the impact of contract modifications executed to date and delays, 

the construction management contractor noted that the schedule does not 

accurately reflect the impact of contract changes and of delays due to the 

schedule’s logic and raised concern about whether the schedule fully 

reflected the impact of changes and delays given their magnitude. 

The construction management contractor made several recommendations 

to AOC based on its findings. For example, the construction management 

contractor recommended the development of a revised schedule that 

reflects (1) enhanced logic and sequencing of work, (2) activity durations 

more in line with the contract’s 20-day maximum requirement, and (3) the 

impact of all delays and contract changes encountered to date and the use 

of available resources. The construction management contractor also 

recommended the development of a recovery schedule for each 

recognized delay, an analysis of the impact of the recovery activities on 

required resources, and an examination of the amount of time required to 

prepare for operations between completing construction and opening to

the public. The construction management contractor’s findings and 

recommendations concerning the project schedule are generally 

consistent with ours.6

Although the sequence 2 contractor has taken, plans to take, and is 

considering various actions to recover lost time and prevent or mitigate 

further delays, we continue to believe that the contractor will have 

difficulty completing construction before early to mid-2007. Among our 

reasons for concern are the uncertainty associated with the fire protection 

system schedule, including the concerns expressed by AOC’s Fire Marshal 

Division and our earlier work that raised questions about the amount of 

time being provided for system testing and inspections; the schedule 

slippages to date; the optimistic durations for a number of activities based 

 5

This situation can occur when workers from different trades, such as stone masons, 

electricians, plumbers, or plasterers, have to work in the same area at the same time to 

meet a schedule, sometimes making it difficult to ensure sufficient space and resources for 

concurrent work. 

6

On November 14, 2005, AOC provided us with MBP’s draft report on MBP’s assessment of 

the schedule durations for 19 activities. We did not, however, have sufficient time to 

evaluate the report for discussion in this statement. 

Page 9 GAO-06-251T 
on the views of CVC team members and the results of the construction 

management contractor’s recently completed review; the large number of 

activity paths that are critical; and the risks and uncertainties that 

continue to face the project. In addition, the continued schedule slippages 

indicate that more and more work will have to be done in a diminishing 

amount of time, and we are concerned—as is the construction 

management contractor—that the project schedule may not reflect the

impact of changes to sequence 2 work resulting from contract 

modifications. Many changes, some substantial, have been made to the 

sequence 2 contract since it was initially awarded in April 2003. Yet,

according to the construction management contractor, none of the 

modifications that have added work to the sequence 2 contract or changed

the facility’s design have been reflected in the project schedule. Moreover, 

as AOC’s construction management contractor has noted, several 

problems have developed with activities associated with the exhibit 

gallery, and delays in completing CVC ceiling work necessary for the 

HVAC and fire protection systems could be problematic, although the CVC 

team is considering ways to mitigate these risks. We also note that the

Chief Fire Marshal has not yet approved the construction drawings for the 

fire protection system or the schedule for the system’s commissioning and 

testing. 

AOC and its construction management contractor have been working to 

implement recommendations we have made to improve AOC’s schedule 

management and to address other schedule-related issues we have 

identified. 

AOC Has Been Addressing 

Previously Identified 

Schedule-Related Issues 

• We have recommended for some time that AOC improve its schedule 

management and analyze and document delays and the reasons and 

responsibilities for them on an ongoing basis—at least monthly. In an 

October 20, 2005, letter, AOC asked its construction management 

contractor to implement this recommendation. The construction 

management contractor has begun to establish a process for doing so and

plans to have it operational by December 31. 

• We have also recommended that the project schedule show the resources 

to be applied to meet the schedule dates. While the sequence 2 contractor

has shown proposed resource levels for many activities, it has not done so

for many of the new activities added to the project schedule. The lack of 

such information can complicate the analysis of delays, including their 

causes and costs. AOC’s construction management contractor has 

expressed particular concern about the resources for the stone and 

Page 10 GAO-06-251T 
finishing work and has requested additional resource information from the 

sequence 2 contractor for these activities. 

• We have further recommended that AOC develop plans to mitigate risks 

and uncertainties facing the project. In July 2005, AOC asked one of its 

consultants—MBP—to assist it in identifying risks and developing plans to 

address those risks. As of November 1, AOC had identified 55 risks facing 

the project and had begun to develop and implement plans for managing 

these risks. As of November 1, AOC said that it had developed mitigation 

plans in varying levels of detail for about 30 risks and has been discussing 

or plans to discuss the remaining risks at a weekly meeting. AOC also said 

that it plans to add new risks to its list and develop mitigation plans for 

other risks as appropriate. 

• In our October 18 testimony, we noted several problems associated with

the CPP that could adversely affect the CVC, as well as other 

congressional buildings, if they are not corrected or addressed. For 

example, potential delays in completing the West Refrigeration Plant 

Expansion project and storm damage to electrical equipment that has 

precluded the use of an East Refrigeration Plant chiller could limit the 

ability of the CPP to provide enough steam and chilled water for the CVC’s 

air handlers to begin operating in March 2006, as shown in the October 

2005 schedule. Staffing and training issues associated with operating the 

new equipment and a vacant CPP director position also pose management 

concerns. Work on the West Refrigeration Plant Expansion project could 

be delayed because AOC has directed the contractor to proceed with two 

significant contract modifications since the Subcommittee’s October 18 

CVC hearing. Specifically, the contractor is authorized to (1) reconfigure 

piping so that the existing West Refrigeration Plant can be operated 

independently of the West Refrigeration Plant Expansion to enhance the 

CPP’s chilled water production capability and (2) change the design of the 

control system that will serve both the West Refrigeration Plant and new 

West Refrigeration Plant Expansion. These changes could affect the March

2006 completion date for the expansion project; however, AOC believes it

will have sufficient chilled water capacity for the CVC even if the 

expansion project’s completion is delayed. Furthermore, AOC plans to 

restore power to the chiller in the East Plant by realigning existing 

equipment and is still determining why the electrical equipment (e.g., aging 

equipment, inadequate maintenance) was vulnerable to storm damage. 

Finally, the period for applying for the plant’s vacant director’s position 

closed on November 4. According to AOC, it received 26 applications and 

expects to fill the position in December. As part of a separate review for 

this Subcommittee, we are continuing to assess certain CPP issues, such 

as the staffing and training for, and the estimated cost to complete, the 

Page 11 GAO-06-251T 
West Refrigeration Plant Expansion project. 

• In our October testimony, we identified problems with coordination 

between the CVC project team and AOC’s Fire Marshal Division. To 

address these problems, AOC and its construction management contractor 

have established a process for the team and the division to arrange for and 

document CVC inspections. 

To help ensure that Congress receives a more reliable estimate of the 

project’s completion date in order to plan for the CVC’s opening to the 

public and make more informed decisions about AOC’s funding needs for

CVC construction and operations, we recommend that the Architect of the 

Capitol (1) implement the recommendations (which are consistent with 

our prior recommendations on schedule management) made by its 

construction management contractor in its November 9 report on its 

schedule evaluation; and (2) reassess its proposal to open the CVC in midDecember 2006 when it is confident that it has a project schedule that 

reflects realistic durations, enhanced logic, the resolution of concerns 

expressed by the Fire Marshal Division, and the impact of delays and 

contract changes. 

Mr. Chairman, our preliminary work shows the cost to complete the entire 

CVC project at around $542.9 million without provision for risks and 

uncertainties. This preliminary estimate falls between our September 15, 

2005, interim estimate of $525.6 million without provision for risks and 

uncertainties, and our November 2004 estimate of about $559 million with 

provision for risks and uncertainties. Our current estimate is substantially 

higher than MBP’s updated estimate, and it exceeds the funding provided 

for the project to date. As we said at the Subcommittee’s October 18 

hearing, we are waiting for the project schedule to stabilize before we 

comprehensively update our November 2004 estimate of the cost to 

complete the project, including any costs to the government for delays. We 

plan to provide this updated estimate with and without allowances for 

risks and uncertainties and with adjustments for specific expected project

completion dates. 

We would now like to discuss the basis for our estimate and why we 

expect the project’s costs to increase, why our estimate differs from 

MBP’s, how much funding is currently available for CVC construction and

how much more may be needed, and how much the Library of Congress 

tunnel’s construction is likely to cost. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Project’s Estimated 

Cost to Complete 

Expected to Increase, 

but Our 

Comprehensive 

Assessment Awaits 

Schedule Stabilization 

Page 12 GAO-06-251T 
Our preliminary estimate of the cost to complete the entire CVC project, 

which we will discuss today,7

 is based on information provided by AOC 

and its construction management contractor. It reflects our review of 

MBP’s November 1, 2005, final report, which updates MBP’s October 2004 

estimate and includes supporting data; our review of CVC contract 

modifications and changes proposed between August 1, 2005, and October 

31, 2005;

8

 the knowledge and experience we have gained from monitoring 

this and other major construction projects; and our view that the base CVC 

project in not likely to be completed before the spring of 2007. We have 

discussed our preliminary estimate with AOC; however, we have not

completed other work needed for a comprehensive update of our cost-tocomplete estimate. For example, we have not updated our previous 

discussions of the project’s expected costs, risks, and uncertainties with 

other CVC project team members and fully assessed the schedule’s impact 

on costs, because the schedule has not been stabilized. Furthermore, we 

have not incorporated any costs for delays over and above the amount 

included in our November 2004 estimate. Delays have occurred since then, 

but as of October 31, 2005, CVC construction contractors had not filed any 

requests for adjustments or claims with AOC for delays occurring after 

November 2004. AOC nevertheless expects to receive additional requests

for adjustments, and AOC’s construction management contractor believes 

that AOC may incur more costs than budgeted for delays. At this time, it is 

unclear who will bear responsibility for the various delays that have 

occurred at the CVC site, and it is therefore difficult to estimate their 

possible costs to the government. 

Assuming that the base project and the House and Senate expansion 

spaces are completed in the spring of 2007 and considering the 

qualifications just discussed, our preliminary estimate of the cost to 

complete the entire project is about $542.9 million without provision for 

risks and uncertainties. This estimate is about $17.3 million greater than 

Estimate Is Preliminary 

CVC Costs Are Likely to 

Increase, Largely Because 

of Actual and Anticipated 

Changes and Delays 

 7

We previously updated our November 2004 estimate ($515.3 million) of the cost to 

complete the project without provision for risks and uncertainties for the Subcommittee’s 

September 15, 2005, CVC hearing. See Capitol Visitor Center: Schedule Delays Continue;

Reassessment Underway, GAO-05-1037T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2005). 

8

MBP’s estimate was based on contract modifications and proposed changes as of July 31, 

2005, except that for sequence 2, MBP included updated information from AOC on contract 

modifications executed through October 14, 2005. Also, MBP initially issued its report on

October 11, but issued a revision on November 1, 2005, based on comments it had received 

from AOC. 

Page 13 GAO-06-251T 
our September updated estimate of $525.6 million without provision for 

risks and uncertainties and about $16.1 million less than our November 

2004 estimate of about $559 million with provision for risks and 

uncertainties. The $17.3 million increase is due largely to the following: 

1. Actual and anticipated changes in the project’s work scope. Most of 

these changes were associated with sequence 2 work, but some also 

occurred or are expected in other project components, such as 

preconstruction. Significant sequence 2 changes include the

modifications to the CVC fire protection system that we discussed at 

the Subcommittee’s October 18 CVC hearing, changes to the building’s 

automated control system, and additional work to address gaps in the 

scopes of sequence 1 and sequence 2 work, such as additional 

waterproofing. Changes in the preconstruction component include 

moving security screening trailers and doing additional materials 

testing. 

2. Additional contingency funds. We believe that AOC will need 

significantly more contingency funds for the remainder of the project 

for three major reasons: First, the actual or estimated costs for 

changes in sequence 2, the East Front interface, and the 

preconstruction project components either exceed or account for the 

majority of the funds budgeted for unanticipated work, and available 

information indicates that additional changes in these areas are likely 

as the project progresses. For example, the actual and proposed 

sequence 2 changes to date are more numerous and more costly 

(without any provision for risks and uncertainties) than we, AOC, and 

MBP anticipated in late 2004, and the actual and estimated value of the 

already identified changes greatly exceeds the budgeted contingency

funding. Moreover, according to AOC’s construction management 

contractor, only about half the value of sequence 2 work is complete. 

Given that about half the work remains and changes to the project 

have been frequent thus far, we believe that more changes are likely to 

require funding in the future. Second, a number of issues that were not 

included in MBP’s analysis, such as the need for temporary 

dehumidification, have arisen. Proposed change orders for work to 

address these issues were not completed in time for the work to be 

included in MBP’s report. Third, as MBP pointed out, the costs of many 

pending (proposed, but not yet approved) changes that were included 

in its report may be understated because they are based on AOC’s and 

its construction management contractor’s estimates rather than on the 

contractor’s price. According to MBP, historically, AOC’s construction 

management contractor has significantly understated the costs of 

pending changes. Thus, additional funds are likely to be needed to 

Page 14 GAO-06-251T 
cover the difference between the estimated and actual costs of the 

approved changes. 

3. Delay-related project management costs. The schedule analysis 

underlying our November 2004 cost-to-complete estimate suggested 

that the CVC base project would most likely be completed in 

December 2006, and our November 2004 and September 2005 cost 

estimates therefore included funding for AOC’s CVC staff and 

architectural and construction management contractors through that 

time. Although the specific expected completion date for the base 

project is still uncertain because AOC and its contractors have not yet 

finished their schedule reassessment, our work indicates that the base 

project is unlikely to be done before early 2007. Thus, our preliminary 

estimated cost to complete includes the estimated costs for extending 

AOC’s CVC staff and architectural and construction management 

contractors for the base project to March 2007.9

Our preliminary $542.9 million estimate of the cost to complete the CVC 

project is significantly higher than MBP’s November 1, 2005, $481.9 million 

estimate for several reasons. 

• Our estimate includes the costs for the CVC’s air filtration system; MBP’s

does not. 

Our Estimate Differs from 

MBP’s Estimate Largely 

Because We Included More 

Items in the Project Scope 

and More Funds for 

Contingencies • MBP assumed the base project would be completed in December 2006; we 

considered the spring of 2007 more likely. 

• MBP did not include the costs of all CVC construction-related work, such 

as the fabrication and installation of wayfinding signs or the fit-out of the 

gift shops. Our estimate includes these costs. 

• MBP provided less contingency funding than we did for a number of 

project components (sequence 2, the House connector tunnel, the East 

Front interface with the CVC, and the House and Senate expansion 

spaces). We believe that our larger allowance is warranted, given the 

complexity of the work, the CVC project’s experience with changes, and 

our experience in monitoring other Capitol Hill construction projects. 

 9

This time extension estimate is largely based on information provided by AOC and MBP.

Page 15 GAO-06-251T 
About $528.4 million has been provided for CVC construction, and an 

additional $7.7 million has been provided for CVC construction or 

operations.10 The $528.4 million consists of 

Available Funding Is 

Unlikely to Be Sufficient 

• the 527.9 million we discussed during the Subcommittee’s October 18 CVC 

hearing and

• $500,000 that the Department of Defense (DOD) originally provided to 

AOC for security enhancements for the East Front of the Capitol and that 

AOC now intends, with DOD’s approval, to use for security enhancements

related to the CVC’s air filtration system. 

According to AOC, it does not currently plan to use any of the $7.7 million 

for CVC construction. Thus, our preliminary $542.9 million cost-tocomplete-estimate indicates that AOC would need about $14.5 million 

more to complete the project, assuming it is completed in March 2007. As 

noted, this estimate is preliminary and does not provide for contractor 

delay costs beyond the amount included in our November 2004 cost 

estimate. 

AOC does not believe that future changes will require as much funding as

we do. We recognize that the total amount of funds that will be needed for 

contingencies, as well as for adjustments to contracts to offset the costs of 

delays, is unclear at this time and is subject to differing views. 

Nevertheless, the costs for these items will be a major factor in 

determining whether AOC will need additional appropriated funds. We 

plan to address both issues when we do our comprehensive cost-tocomplete update early next year. 

 10AOC had planned to use $100,000 of its fiscal year 2006 appropriation for CVC 

construction to move a fire alarm control panel in the Capitol building to the CVC. If the 

control panel is to be moved, AOC will then decide what appropriation account will be 

used to pay for this move. If other than CVC funds are used, the $100,000 would be 

available for other CVC construction purposes subject to the approval of the House and 

Senate Committees on Appropriations. As we reported in September, AOC had also used

about $805,000 in CVC operations funds for certain construction work that had been

funded by the fiscal year 2006 construction appropriation. These funds also could be used

for other CVC work subject to the Committees’ approval. AOC previously had about $7.8

million remaining available for CVC operations or construction, but about $100,000 has 

been rescinded.

Page 16 GAO-06-251T 
Public Law 108-83 limits to $10 million the amount of federal funds that 

can be obligated or expended for the construction of the tunnel 

connecting the CVC with the Library of Congress. As of October 31, 2005, 

AOC estimated that the tunnel’s construction would cost about $8.8 

million, and AOC had obligated about $4.7 million for it. The remaining 

estimated costs are for modifications to the Jefferson building to 

accommodate the tunnel and for contingencies. AOC expects to receive 

the bids for the Jefferson building work by November 22. Given that the

work associated with the Jefferson building has not started and involves 

risks and uncertainties (since it will create an opening in the building’s 

foundation and change an existing structure), we believe that AOC could 

receive higher-than-expected bids and is likely to encounter unforeseen 

conditions that could increase costs significantly. Both we and AOC plan 

to monitor the tunnel’s construction closely to ensure that the statutory 

limit is not exceeded. 

Worker safety will remain an important issue at the CVC site as new 

hazards arise with changes in the site’s physical structure and increases in 

the number of employees and subcontractors in the months ahead. Since 

we testified in May 2005 on worker safety, AOC and its contractors have 

achieved improvements in key worker safety measures and actions. For 

example, the CVC injury and illness rate declined, from 9.1 in 2003 and 

12.2 in 2004, to 5.9 for the first 10 months of 2005—below the 2003

industry average of 6.1. Furthermore, the CVC lost-time rate declined, from 

8.1 in 2003 and 10.4 in 2004, to 4.0 for the same 10-month period—

approaching the 2003 industry average of 3.1. The quality of the 

construction management contractor’s monthly CVC progress reports has 

also improved. Whereas the reports for 2003 and 2004 contained 

inaccurate data for key worker safety measures, as we testified in May 

2005, the reports since June 2005 have contained accurate worker safety 

data. (In one instance, however, the draft report we received from the 

construction management contractor contained inaccurate worker safety 

data, which were corrected after we pointed them out to the construction 

management contractor.) Finally, AOC’s reporting of lost-time rates is now 

consistent with an updated definition issued by the Bureau of Labor 

Statistics in 2003. 

AOC and its contractors have taken a number of actions during 2005 to 

improve worker safety at the CVC site. For example, they have

Estimated Construction 

Costs for Library of 

Congress Tunnel under 

Limit, but Could Increase 

Worker Safety Has 

Improved 

Page 17 GAO-06-251T 
• held periodic safety meetings with senior managers to elevate safety issues 

(and will schedule additional meetings as needed); 

• held a project safety day to increase CVC project employees’ safety 

awareness; 

• provided and scheduled training on fall protection and electrical safety, for 

example, to elevate safety awareness and avoid accidents; 

• posted safety-related signs and banners around the CVC site to reinforce 

safety messages; and 

• added a second safety professional at the CVC project. 

In addition, since this past summer, AOC’s Central Safety Office has been

involved in CVC worker safety. Specifically, the responsible official has (1) 

clarified his role on the project with the CVC Project Executive, (2) visited

the CVC project site to obtain an understanding of general site conditions, 

(3) attended periodic CVC safety meetings and (4) reviewed safety-related

data, reports, and meeting minutes. Drawing upon these efforts, the 

official has made suggestions to CVC management on ways to improve 

worker safety. 

Poor housekeeping has been an ongoing issue at the site, and the sequence 

2 contractor has recently taken actions to address this issue. Piles of 

construction debris and trash, improperly stored equipment and materials, 

and poorly maintained employee break areas have been identified in the 

construction management contractor’s past safety audits. Although no 

injuries have been attributed to housekeeping issues, the construction 

management contractor and the sequence 2 contractor have recognized 

that these issues present an ongoing problem. To address these issues, the 

sequence 2 contractor is daily (1) cleaning up construction material debris 

and other items, (2) cleaning up the site’s three assigned eating areas, and 

(3) removing five to seven truckloads of trash. In addition, the sequence 2 

contractor has placed more bait traps around the site to control rodents. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We would be pleased to 

answer any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

Page 18 GAO-06-251T 
For further information about this testimony, please contact Bernard 

Ungar at (202) 512-4232 or Terrell Dorn at (202) 512-6923. Other key 

contributors to this testimony include Shirley Abel, Michael Armes, John

Craig, George Depaoli, Maria Edelstein, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Brett 

Fallavollita, Jeanette Franzel, Jackie Hamilton, Bradley James, Scott 

Riback, and Kris Trueblood. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

Page 19 GAO-06-251T 
Page 20 GAO-06-251T 

Appendix I: Capitol Visitor Center Critical 

Construction Milestones October 19-

November 17, 2005 

Source: AOC’s September 2005 CVC sequence 2 construction schedule for the scheduled completion dates and AOC and its 

construction management contractor for the actual completion dates.

Note: Actual completion information was obtained on November 10, 2005. 

Activity Location

September 2005 

scheduled finish

date

Actual finish 

date

Orientation Lobby Perimeter CMU walls 10/13/05 

Upper Level

Assembly Room 

Topping slab 10/20/05 10/20/05

East Front 

Subbasement 

Interior CMU walls 10/27/05 

Exhibit Gallery Wall stone Area 2 base 10/31/05 

Congressional 

Auditorium 

Wall Stone Area 1 11/3/05 10/26/05

Upper Level

Assembly Room 

Wall stone area 1 layout 11/9/05 10/24/05

Exhibit Gallery Wall stone Area 3 base 11/10/05 

Orientation Lobby Interior CMU walls 11/15/05 

Exhibit Gallery Wall stone Area 1 11/16/05 

Congressional 

Auditorium 

Wall Stone Area 2 11/17/05 

Utility Tunnel Excavate/shore Station Sta. 

0.00-1.00

10/6/05 10/24/05

Utility Tunnel Concrete Working Slab Sta. 

0.00-1.00

10/11/05 10/26/05

Utility Tunnel Waterproof Working Slab

Sta. 0.00-1.00

10/14/05 10/31/05

Utility Tunnel Install Mat Slab Sta. 

 0.00-1.00 

10/20/05 11/10/05

Utility Tunnel Install Mat Slab Sta. 

1.00-2.00

10/24/05 11/07/05

Utility Tunnel Install Walls Sta. 1.00-2.00 11/4/05 

(543155) 
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