United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

D.C. CHARTER 

SCHOOLS 

Strengthening 

Monitoring and 

Process When Schools 

Close Could Improve 

Accountability and 

Ease Student 

Transitions 

November 2005 

 

GAO-06-73 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2005

D.C. CHARTER SCHOOLS 

Strengthening Monitoring and Process 

When Schools Close Could Improve 

Accountability and Ease Student 

Transitions 

Highlights of GAO-06-73, a report to 

congressional committees 

D.C. has a larger percentage of

students in charter schools than 

any state. To help oversee D.C.

charter schools, Congress

established two authorizers—the 

Board of Education (BOE), which

has an Office of Charter Schools 

responsible for oversight, and the

independent Public Charter School 

Board (PCSB). Congress required 

the GAO to conduct a study of the 

authorizers. 

This report–which completes 

GAO’s May 2005 study–examines 

the (1) authorizers’ resources, (2) 

oversight practices, and (3) actions 

taken once charter schools close. 

GAO examined BOE and PCSB 

monitoring reports, revenue and

expenditure documents, and

closure procedures. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the BOE 

Office of Charter Schools 

implement a risk-based oversight 

system to target monitoring to new 

and at risk charter schools. GAO 

recommends that the BOE create a

routine process to review data 

collected by its Office of Charter 

Schools. GAO also recommends

that the BOE, the PCSB, and D.C. 

Public Schools jointly establish a 

process to guide their actions after

schools close, including a system 

for the secure transfer and 

maintenance of student records. 

BOE officials noted that they were

taking actions that would address 

GAO’s recommendations. PCSB 

comments supported GAO’s third

recommendation. 

The two D.C. charter school authorizers differed in revenue, number of staff 

overseeing schools, and use of D.C. services, but both spent their funds to 

support oversight activities. The BOE Office of Charter Schools had less revenue 

and fewer staff overseeing fewer schools than PCSB. It fulfilled its oversight 

responsibilities by using some D.C. Public School services and also occasionally

calling upon D.C. agencies for financial operations reviews. The PCSB had a

larger staff that oversaw more schools and had revenue more than two times 

larger than that of the BOE Office of Charter Schools. The PCSB did not use any 

D.C. Public Schools services, but did refer one school to a D.C. agency for 

further examination. Despite these differences, both authorizers used most of

their fiscal year 2004 expenses for in-house board operations, such as personnel,

and also hired consultants to help monitor charter schools. 

D.C. Charter School Authorizer Responsibilities

Both D.C. authorizers provided technical assistance to schools and had similar

oversight practices, such as tracking school academics and finances, but took

different approaches. The BOE Office of Charter Schools, with only 3 staff, 

provided the same level of oversight to all of its 16 schools and thereby limited 

its ability to target additional resources to schools requiring more assistance. 

Moreover, when the BOE Office of Charter Schools gave its Board monitoring 

information on its charter schools, the Board—also responsible for the city’s 167 

traditional schools—did not regularly review that information. In contrast, the 

PCSB targeted additional oversight on new charter schools and those where 

problems had been identified. The PCSB also granted more flexibility to wellmanaged schools. Although problems persisted at some schools, the PCSB’s 

targeted system enabled it to focus more attention on these schools.

Once D.C. charter schools closed, both authorizers took a number of actions to 

safeguard student records and public assets and inform parents of their 

children’s educational options; however, issues arose that both authorizers 

found difficult to adequately address, particularly when the closed school was 

insolvent. Managing and safeguarding student records was the most expensive 

and challenging aspect of closing schools, authorizers reported. Moreover, the

authorizers’ closure processes were different each of the 9 times charter schools 

closed, which limited opportunities to build on past experiences.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-73.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Marnie Shaul at 

(202) 512-7215 or shaulm@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

D.C. Authorizing Boards Differed in Revenue and Their Use of D.C. 

Government Services, but Spent Their Financial Resources on 

Similar Oversight Activities 13

Both Authorizers Provided Technical Assistance and Collected

Academic, Financial, and Other School Data, but Extent and 

Level of Oversight Differed 20

Authorizers Undertook a Wide Range of Activities When Schools 

Closed, but the Process Was Not Well Defined 26

Conclusions 29

Recommendations for Executive Action 30

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 32 

Appendix II Comments from the D.C. Board of Education 36 

Appendix III Comments from the PCSB 39 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 40 

Related GAO Products 41 

Tables 

Table 1: Characteristics of D.C. Charter Schools, School Year 2005-

2006 10

Table 2: Authorizer Revenue, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2003 15

Table 3: Authorizers’ Expenses, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2003 19

Page i GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Figures 

Figure 1: D.C. Offices with Responsibilities to Charter Schools 7

Figure 2: Overview of D.C. Authorizers’ Monitoring Process 8

Figure 3: Authorizer Staffing Levels and Schools Overseen, School 

Year 2004-2005 16

Figure 4: BOE Office of Charter Schools and PCSB Expenses, 

Fiscal Year 2004 18

Abbreviations 

BOE Board of Education 

PCSB Public Charter School Board 

IDEA Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 

FY fiscal year 

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Page ii GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

November 17, 2005 

The Honorable Sam Brownback 

Chairman 

The Honorable Mary L. Landrieu 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on the District of Columbia 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Sam Brownback 

Chairman 

The Honorable Mary L. Landrieu 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on the District of Columbia 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joe Knollenberg 

Chairman 

The Honorable John W. Olver 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban 

 Development, the Judiciary, District of Columbia, and Independent 

 Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Joe Knollenberg 

Chairman 

The Honorable John W. Olver 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban 

 Development, the Judiciary, District of Columbia, and Independent 

 Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

When the school doors opened for the 2004-2005 school year in the 

District of Columbia, over a fifth of all students were attending charter 

schools. The District of Columbia has a larger percentage of students 

enrolled in such schools than any state. Six new charter schools opened in 

the 2004-2005 school year alone. To help fund the growing number of 

charter schools, Congress designated $13 million specifically for D.C. 

charter schools in the 2005 D.C. Appropriations Act. 

When the school doors opened for the 2004-2005 school year in the 

District of Columbia, over a fifth of all students were attending charter 

schools. The District of Columbia has a larger percentage of students 

enrolled in such schools than any state. Six new charter schools opened in 

the 2004-2005 school year alone. To help fund the growing number of 

charter schools, Congress designated $13 million specifically for D.C. 

charter schools in the 2005 D.C. Appropriations Act. 

Charter schools are public schools that are exempt from certain state and 

local regulations in exchange for increased accountability for improving 

student achievement. Charter school authorizers—the entities that 

approve and oversee charter schools—are responsible for ensuring that 

charter schools achieve expected outcomes and comply with applicable 

laws. The District of Columbia School Reform Act, as amended, (D.C. 

School Reform Act) established two entities, the D.C. Board of Education 

(BOE) and the D.C. Public Charter School Board (PCSB), as charter 

school authorizers. The law requires that the authorizers approve and 

oversee charter school implementation. Although the law gives both 

authorizers similar responsibilities, each has some latitude in how it 

implements these responsibilities. As an independent agency, the PCSB 

devotes all of its resources to charter schools, while the BOE, which also 

Charter schools are public schools that are exempt from certain state and 

local regulations in exchange for increased accountability for improving 

student achievement. Charter school authorizers—the entities that 

approve and oversee charter schools—are responsible for ensuring that 

charter schools achieve expected outcomes and comply with applicable 

laws. The District of Columbia School Reform Act, as amended, (D.C. 

School Reform Act) established two entities, the D.C. Board of Education 

(BOE) and the D.C. Public Charter School Board (PCSB), as charter 

school authorizers. The law requires that the authorizers approve and 

oversee charter school implementation. Although the law gives both 

authorizers similar responsibilities, each has some latitude in how it 

implements these responsibilities. As an independent agency, the PCSB 

devotes all of its resources to charter schools, while the BOE, which also 

Page 1 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
has responsibility for D.C.’s traditional public schools, has established an 

Office of Charter Schools to monitor its charter schools. As interest in 

charter schools grows among parents, questions have been raised about 

how the District oversees its charter schools. 

As required by the 2005 D.C. Appropriations Act, we examined the 

performance of D.C. charter school authorizers in their oversight roles. In

May 2005, we published the interim findings of our study in Charter 

Schools: Oversight Practices in the District of Columbia (GAO-05-490), 

which outlined the legal responsibilities of the D.C. authorizers. To 

complete our study, we are addressing the following questions in this 

report: (1) what resources (financial and otherwise) do the D.C. 

authorizers have and how have they used these resources; (2) how have 

the D.C. authorizers provided oversight and technical assistance to charter 

schools after they have opened; and (3) what actions did the authorizers 

take once charter schools closed to help students transition to new 

schools, protect student records, and safeguard public assets. 

To analyze the authorizers’ resources and to learn how they have used 

them, we examined their budgets, revenues, and expenses for fiscal years

2003 and 2004. Our budget analysis is based on the amount of funds each

authorizer received per school rather than per student, because the 

authorizers provided services that generally benefited schools as a whole, 

not individual students. We also examined the authorizers’ use of their 

staff. To analyze the authorizers’ provision of oversight, we examined 

monitoring reports, audits, and related documentation from 8 of the 

42 D.C. charter schools—4 from each authorizer. These eight schools were 

selected to include variety in school performance, demographics, number 

of years in operation, and the schools’ history of sanctions. Additionally, 

we convened two focus groups of charter school administrators (one 

focus group per authorizer) to substantiate and augment information the 

authorizers provided. Appendix I provides our methodology and additional 

information on the schools selected for our document reviews and focus 

groups. To analyze the procedures in place once charter schools close, we 

examined the actions the authorizers took to address issues arising from 

the closure of the nine charter schools that have lost their charters as of 

September 2005. In these cases, we examined monitoring reports and 

other documents related to the closures and interviewed authorizer staff 

and board members. Finally, we examined the authorizers’ use of services 

available to them by interviewing officials of District agencies, including 

D.C. Public Schools, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the Office of 

the D.C. Auditor, and the D.C. Office of Inspector General. 

Page 2 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
We conducted our work between January and November 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

The D.C. authorizers differed in the amount of funding, staff, and their use 

of available D.C. government services, but spent their financial resources 

on similar activities. The BOE Office of Charter Schools received less in 

local funds, collected less in administrative fees from the schools it 

oversaw, and had fewer staff per school. To help fulfill its oversight 

responsibilities, the BOE Office of Charter Schools used test score 

analysis provided by D.C. Public Schools and referred four schools to 

other D.C. agencies for further examination. The PCSB’s total revenue

($1,349,916 in fiscal year 2004) was more than twice that of the BOE Office 

of Charter Schools. It received more in local funds and collected more in

fees from schools than its counterpart. It oversaw, however, more charter 

schools and employed a larger staff. Unlike the BOE Office of Charter 

Schools, the PCSB has not used D.C. Public School services, but has 

referred one school to a D.C. agency for further examination. Despite 

these differences, both D.C. authorizers spent their financial resources to 

support oversight activities, with the majority of funds being spent on 

in-house personnel and operational expenses. Both authorizers also hired 

consultants to assist with school monitoring, as well as application review 

and school closures. 

Results in Brief 

Both D.C. authorizers provided technical assistance and oversaw charter 

schools by tracking schools’ academic achievement and financial 

condition, but their approaches to oversight differed. With respect to 

technical assistance, both authorizers provided some aid to charter 

schools, including helping schools improve their academic programs and 

meet No Child Left Behind Act requirements. While the BOE and PCSB 

had similar oversight practices—both D.C. authorizers visited schools at 

least once annually, monitored schools’ test scores, and reviewed and 

approved school budgets and expenses—the BOE Office of Charter 

Schools provided the same level of oversight to all of its 16 schools 

regardless of risk. This approach sometimes limited its ability to address 

the problems that its oversight revealed. In addition, BOE Board members 

told us that they did not regularly review information collected by the BOE 

Office of Charter Schools. By contrast, the PCSB targeted additional 

oversight to new charter schools and those where problems had been

identified. For example, the PCSB conducted pre-opening visits only for 

new schools or schools in a new location, as opposed to visiting all 

schools each fall. Additionally, the PCSB targeted extra financial oversight 

to new schools or schools with problems. Although some PCSB schools 

Page 3 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
have had problems, the PCSB’s targeted monitoring approach has allowed 

it to more readily identify problems and direct monitoring activities to 

those schools. 

Once charter schools closed, both D.C. authorizers undertook a wide 

range of activities to safeguard student records and public assets and 

inform parents of their children’s school options; however, issues arose 

during closings that both found difficult to adequately address, particularly 

when the closed school was financially insolvent. The D.C. authorizers 

used their staff and financial resources to oversee school closings as well 

as handle closing logistics, such as inventorying assets and communicating 

with parents. Both D.C. authorizers reported managing and safeguarding 

student records was the most expensive and challenging aspect of closing

schools. The D.C. authorizers reviewed student records for completeness, 

collected records from closing schools, distributed records to new 

schools, and, in instances where students were no longer continuing their

education, stored student records. Although D.C. law requires that student

records become the property of D.C. Public Schools when a charter school 

closes, D.C. Public Schools officials were unaware of this responsibility. 

While both D.C. authorizers provided various types of assistance when 

schools closed, the procedures following a charter school closure varied in 

all nine instances. Neither D.C. authorizer has followed the same closure 

process, and both have closed each school differently. 

To improve D.C. charter schools oversight, we recommend that the BOE 

Office of Charter Schools implement a risk-based oversight system that 

targets monitoring resources to new charter schools and those identified

at risk. Additionally, we recommend that the BOE create a routine and 

timely process to review the monitoring information collected by its Office

of Charter Schools. We also recommend that the BOE Office of Charter 

Schools, the PCSB, and D.C. Public Schools establish a routine process to 

use once schools are closed, including, among other things, a system for 

the secure transfer and maintenance of student records. 

In comments on a draft of this report, the BOE Office of Charter Schools 

Executive Director noted that the BOE was taking actions that would 

address the recommendations in this report. The PCSB Executive Director 

also provided comments on a draft of this report. These comments 

supported our recommendation that the BOE Office of Charter Schools, 

the PCSB, and D.C. Public Schools establish a routine process for the 

secure transfer and maintenance of records when schools close. 

Page 4 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Charter schools are public schools established under contracts that grant 

them greater levels of autonomy from certain state and local laws and 

regulations in exchange for agreeing to meet certain student performance 

goals. Charter schools are often exempt from certain state and school 

district education laws and in some states may receive waivers or 

exemptions from other laws; however, charter schools must comply with 

select laws, including those pertaining to special education, civil rights, 

and health and safety conditions. While charter schools are free from 

many educational regulations, they are accountable for their educational 

and financial performance, including the testing requirements under the 

No Child Left Behind Act.

Background 

A wide range of individuals or groups, including parents, educators, 

nonprofit organizations and universities, may apply to create a charter 

school. Charter schools are typically nonprofit organizations and, like 

other nonprofits, are governed by a board of trustees. The board of 

trustees, which is initially selected by the school founders, oversees legal 

compliance, financial management, contracts with external parties, and 

other school policies. School trustees are also responsible for identifying 

existing and potential risks facing the charter school and taking steps to 

reduce or eliminate these risks. 

Charters to operate a school are authorized by various bodies, depending 

on the state’s laws, but may include local school districts, municipal 

governments, or special chartering boards. According to a GAO survey, 

about half of the charter school states and the District of Columbia 

allowed more than one authorizer, providing charter school founders an 

opportunity to find support for a wider range of instructional approaches 

or educational philosophies than might be possible with a single 

authorizer.1

 Many charter school authorizing bodies have formal 

procedures to monitor charter school performance in areas such as 

student performance, compliance with regulations, financial record 

keeping, and the provision of special education services. If charter schools 

do not meet expected performance measures, authorizers may revoke a 

school’s charter or decide not to renew the charter when it expires, 

resulting in the charter school’s closure. Since the first charter school 

 1

See Charter Schools: To Enhance Education’s Monitoring and Research, More Charter 

School-Level Data Are Needed, GAO-05-5 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 2005). This report

presented the results of a survey that asked states to report the number and type of

authorizers allowed in school year 2002-2003, among other information. 

Page 5 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
opened in Minnesota in 1992, about 350 charter schools—of the 

approximately 3,700 that opened—have closed as of April 2005. 

The D.C. School Reform Act, a federal law that applies only to D.C., 

designated two charter school authorizers—the D.C. Board of Education 

(BOE) and the D.C. Public Charter School Board (PCSB). Both authorizers 

have similar responsibilities, but are structured differently. While the 

PCSB was created as an independent board with the sole purpose of 

approving and overseeing charter schools, the BOE oversees both the 

167 traditional public schools that enrolled about 59,000 students in the 

2004-2005 school year and charter schools. To effectively manage its 

oversight responsibilities for both traditional public schools and charter 

schools, the BOE created an internal Office of Charter Schools to manage 

its functions as an authorizer. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the BOE 

generally determined how much local funding to allocate to each of the 

Board’s functions, including charter schools, while Congress determined 

the level of PCSB’s local funds through its D.C. Appropriations Act. In 

addition to the two authorizers, several D.C. offices have responsibilities 

related to the District’s charter schools, including the D.C. Inspector 

General, the D.C. Auditor, the D.C. Chief Financial Officer, the Mayor’s 

State Education Office, and the State Education Agency, which is part of 

the D.C. Public School system (see fig. 1). 

Page 6 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Figure 1: D.C. Offices with Responsibilities to Charter Schools 

The D.C. School Reform Act allows the BOE and the PCSB to grant up to 

10 charters each per year. Each charter authorizes a school for 15 years, at 

which point the charter may be renewed if the authorizer approves. To 

date, no school has reached the end of its 15-year term. After granting 

charters to schools, each authorizer is responsible for monitoring those 

schools. Under the D.C. School Reform Act, the BOE and PCSB are 

required to monitor charter schools’ academic achievement, operations, 

and compliance with applicable laws. Both authorizers conduct preopening visits to new schools and subsequently conduct annual 

monitoring visits and data reviews to meet this requirement (see fig. 2). All 

schools granted a charter in D.C. must create an accountability plan that 

outlines the school’s 5-year academic goals. Accountability plans become 

part of each school’s charter and are used as guides for the authorizers to 

monitor academic progress. Additionally, under the D.C. School Reform 

Act, the D.C. authorizers must conduct more comprehensive reviews of 

charter schools every 5 years to determine if the schools should be 

allowed to continue operating. Charter schools that are not meeting 

academic performance goals may be closed following a 5-year review. 

Charter schools may be closed for other reasons, such as financial 

mismanagement or legal noncompliance, at any time. 

Page 7 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Figure 2: Overview of D.C. Authorizers’ Monitoring Process 

As we noted in our May 2005 report, the BOE first began chartering 

schools in 1996, and the PCSB chartered its first schools in 1997.2

 As of the 

2004-05 school year, 23 BOE and 27 PCSB charter schools had opened.3

However, between 1998 and September 2005, nine charter schools closed. 

The BOE has revoked seven charters, and two PCSB charter schools 

closed; one voluntarily released its charter, and the other had its charter 

revoked at the end of the 2004-2005 school year. Financial reasons 

contributed to the closing of most of the schools that had their charters 

revoked. During the 2004-05 school year, 16 BOE schools and 26 PCSB 

were in operation. As of January 2005, BOE charter schools enrolled 

3,945 students, and PCSB charter schools enrolled 11,555 students. 

The two D.C. authorizers monitored a diverse set of schools (see table 1). 

These schools enrolled students at all grade levels, from pre-kindergarten 

to high school and offered varied instructional and academic models. For 

example some schools had a particular curricular emphasis, such as math 

and science, art, or foreign language, while other charter schools focused 

on specific populations, such as students with learning disabilities, 

students who have dropped out or are at risk of doing so, youth who have 

 2

For more information on GAO work concerning charter schools and D.C. public schools,

please see related GAO products at the end of this report. 

3

Eleven additional charter schools opened during the 2005-2006 school year. 

Page 8 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
been involved in the criminal justice system, and adults. Additionally, the 

charter schools pursued a variety of school-specific goals that were 

aligned with their missions or the student populations they served. The 

D.C. School Reform Act requires the authorizers to monitor schools’ 

annual and 5-year progress toward these goals. Some examples of goals 

included in school charters are improved attendance rates and increased 

parental satisfaction. Other goals varied widely. For example, Maya 

Angelou, a high school serving at-risk youth, included among its 5-year 

goals both an 85 percent graduation rate, as well as a significant reduction

in violent behavior by students. JOS-ARZ, a high school serving students 

with emotional and behavioral problems, included as a goal that at least 

half of its students would acquire skills that would allow them to function 

independently and would earn a high school diploma or the equivalent. 

Page 9 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Table 1: Characteristics of D.C. Charter Schools, School Year 2005-2006 

School Year opened Grade levelbEnrollment

c

School mission, curriculum,a 

or target population 

BOE schools

Barbara Jordan 2002 5-8 204 Critical thinking, character, and leadership 

education 

Booker T. Washington 1999 9-12 and adult 229 Career-focused school with emphasis on 

building trades

City Lights 2005 9-12 65dStudents with special needs 

Children’s Studio 1997 preschool-6 111 Arts focus 

Community Academy 1998 preschool-8 944 Community-centered learning model 

Elsie Whitlow Stokes Community 

Freedom 

1998 K-6 Bilingual education 

Hyde Leadership Academy 1999 K-12 735 College preparatory, character education, 

and service learning 

Integrated Design & Electronics 

Academy 

1998 7-12 367 Career-focused school; junior ROTC

program 

Ideal Academy 1999 preschool-8 260 Math, science, and technology focused 

program 

JOS-ARZ Therapeutic 2000 9-12 49 Residential school for students with 

emotional or behavioral disorders 

Kamit Institute for Magnificent

Achievers 

2001 9-12 144 Cultural-based education with an emphasis 

on Africa 

Latin American Montessori Bilingual 2003 preschool -

preK

59 Bilingual education 

Mary McLeod Bethune 2004 preK-4 92 Features foreign languages and the arts 

Next Step 1998 ungraded;

age 16 and 

older

75 Dropout prevention or remediation 

Options 1996 5-8 215 Alternative learning environment for 

underachieving students using project-based 

approach 

Roots 1999 preK-8 109 Instructional emphasis on African heritage

and culture 

Washington Academy 2005 K-6 340dFocuses on academics and technology 

Young America Works 2004 9-10 102 Vocational/technical career-based school 

PCSB schools

Academia Bilingue de la Comunidad 2005 6-7 150dBilingual education 

Academy for Learning Through the 

Arts 

2005 K-6 100dArts focus

Appletree Early Learning 2005 preschoolpreK36dFocus on literacy skills 

Page 10 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
School Year opened Grade levelb

Enrollment

c

School mission, curriculum,a 

or target population 

BOE schools

Arts and Technology Academy 1999 preK-6 617 Arts and humanities education, technology 

education 

Bridges 2005 preschoolpreK72dIndividualized education for children with and 

without special needs 

Capital City 2000 preK-8 236 Project-based curriculum 

Carlos Rosario International 1998 10-adult 1059 Adult education 

Cesar Chavez PCHS for Public Policy 1998 6-12 469 Public policy focus 

D.C. Bilingual 2004 preschool-1 115 Bilingual education 

D.C. Preparatory Academy 2003 4-7 153 College preparatory 

Eagle Academy 2003 preschoolpreK130 Individual focus, active learning model 

Early Childhood Academy 2005 preschoolpreK116dLiteracy, numeracy, and cognitive and social 

skills emphasized 

E. L. Haynes 2004 preschool-3 138 Math and science focus 

Friendship 1998 preK-12 3071eCurriculum that emphasizes basic learning 

using technology 

Hope Community 2005 preK-5 150dBroad-based cultural knowledge and 

character education 

Howard Road Academy 2001 preK-7 571 Arts and humanities education

Howard University Middle School of 

Mathematics & Science 

2005 6 120dMath and science focus 

KIPP D.C. 2001 5-8 317fCollege preparatory with extended day and 

year 

Marriott Hospitality 1999 9-12 146 College-preparatory school with emphasis 

on hospitality industry 

Maya Angelou 1998 9-12 176 Adjudicated and at-risk youth

Meridian 1999 preK-8 583 Features frequent testing and student 

portfolios 

Paul 2000 6-9 573 Converted public school focused on general 

academic skills and character education 

Potomac Lighthouse 2005 preK-3 168dArts focus 

New School for Enterprise & 

Development 

2000 9-12 437 Career-focused school featuring business 

information, technology and the arts 

Sasha Bruce 2001 7-11 278 Project-based curriculum 

School for Arts in Learning 1998 K-9 118 Arts focus for students with learning 

disabilities 

School for Educational Evolution and 

Development 

1998 7-12 320 Boarding school 

Thurgood Marshall Academy 2001 9-12 224 Law-related focus 

Page 11 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
School Year opened Grade levelb

Enrollment

c

School mission, curriculum,a 

or target population 

BOE schools

Tree of Life Community 2000 preK-8 222 Emphasizes literacy skills for students 

performing below grade level

Tri-Community 2002 preK-5 216 Focus on literacy skills 

Two Rivers 2004 preK-4 151 Project-based curriculum 

Washington Mathematics, Science & 

Technology 

1998 9-12 342 Math and science focus; ROTC program 

William E. Doar, Jr. 2004 preK-6 153 Performing arts focus 

YouthBuild 2005 ages 16-24 55dCareer-focused school emphasizing 

vocational training, employability skillbuilding, and community service 

Source: GAO analysis of D.C. charter school documents. 

a

An individual school’s curriculum may combine elements from various sources; for the schools 

shown, the table highlights one or more aspects of the curriculum. 

b

Reflects grade levels that were actually being served in September 2005. Individual schools’ charters 

may allow schools to gradually add grades over time. 

c

Reflects actual enrollment as of January 2005. Individual schools’ charters may allow schools to

increase enrollment over time up to a specific limit or ceiling. 

d

Figure represents projected enrollment. School opened in September 2005. 

e

Figure does not include the Friendship Southeast Campus, which opened under the same charter in 

fall 2005 with a projected enrollment of about 350. 

f

Figure does not reflect school expansion in fall 2005, which was projected to add 80 new students to 

the number already enrolled. 

D.C. charter schools receive funding from a wide range of sources. Charter 

schools in D.C. receive funding on a per-pupil basis using the same 

allocation formula for operating expenses that is applied to traditional 

D.C. public schools. In the 2004-2005 school year, charter and traditional 

public schools in D.C. received $6,904 to $8,077 for a regular education

student depending on grade level. D.C. charter schools received an 

additional allotment—equal to $2,380 per non-residential student and 

$6,426 per residential student—to help cover the cost of school facilities.

4

In addition to the per-pupil allotments, charter schools in D.C., like all 

public schools that meet federal criteria, are eligible for other federal 

 4

Unlike traditional public schools, charter schools are responsible for identifying and

securing appropriate spaces in which to operate. D.C. charter schools are responsible for

maintaining their facilities. However, upon mutual agreement, D.C. Public Schools may 

provide some facilities maintenance services to charter schools and bear some of the costs 

of such services. 

Page 12 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
funds, such as funding under the No Child Left Behind Act and the 

Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act.5

 A few charter 

schools also receive additional funding from foundation grants and other 

fundraising efforts. 

The two D.C. authorizers’ revenue, staff, and use of available D.C. services

differed, but the authorizers spent their funds on similar activities. The 

BOE Office of Charter Schools had less revenue and fewer schools and 

staff to oversee them than the PCSB. To help fulfill its oversight 

responsibilities, the BOE Office of Charter Schools occasionally called 

upon D.C. agencies for financial operations reviews and used some D.C. 

Public School services. The PCSB, which had more staff and oversaw 

more schools, had total revenue that was more than twice that of the BOE 

Office of Charter Schools’ and employed a larger staff. The PCSB also 

received more revenue per school than the BOE Office of Charter Schools. 

Unlike the BOE Office of Charter Schools, the PCSB did not use D.C. 

Public Schools services, which were available to it, but did use D.C. 

government services on one occasion. Despite these differences, both 

authorizers used their financial resources similarly. Both spent most of 

their fiscal year 2004 funds on board operations, including personnel 

costs, and their remaining funds on consultants to help with monitoring, 

application review and school closures. 

The BOE Office of Charter Schools received less funding from its two 

main sources of revenue—the local funds allocated to it by the BOE and 

the administrative fees it was permitted to charge the schools it oversaw—

than the corresponding amounts received by the PCSB (see table 2). The 

BOE Office of Charter Schools received $307,340 from the BOE in fiscal 

year 2004, less than half the amount of local funds the PCSB received in 

accordance with congressional directives, and collected $251,623 in fees 

from the schools it oversaw. The BOE Office of Charter Schools collected 

less in fees from schools than the PCSB, because these fees are based on 

the number of students per school, and the PCSB oversaw more schools 

D.C. Authorizing 

Boards Differed in 

Revenue and Their 

Use of D.C. 

Government Services, 

but Spent Their 

Financial Resources 

on Similar Oversight 

Activities 

BOE Office of Charter 

Schools Received Less 

Funding and Had Fewer 

Staff to Oversee Fewer 

Schools Than PCSB, but 

Used More Available 

Government Services 

 5

The nation’s primary special education law, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 

(IDEA), was reauthorized in 2004 under this new name. 

Page 13 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
with more students. In total revenue, the BOE Office of Charter Schools 

received approximately $38,000 per school in fiscal year 2004.6

In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the BOE Office of Charter Schools had three 

staff, including its Executive Director, to oversee its schools, which was 

less than a third the staff of the PCSB’s. In October 2005, the new budget 

for the BOE made possible the hiring of three new staff for its Office of 

Charter Schools. The BOE Office of Charter Schools supplemented its 

staff by using consultants to help oversee charter schools. In fiscal year 

2004, the Office of Charter Schools spent $121,502 on consultants in areas

such as reviewing applications, conducting annual monitoring visits, and 

assisting with school closings. Consultants with issue area expertise also 

provided specialized assistance associated with monitoring schools’ 

financial condition and special education compliance. The BOE Office of 

Charter Schools spent $28,589 per school on both in-house personnel and 

consultants in fiscal year 2004, which was 16 percent less than the PCSB 

spent. 

 6

We focused our analysis on per school revenue because the authorizers’ services were not

targeted to individual students and instead generally benefited entire schools. For example, 

the authorizers monitored schools’ financial condition, academic programs, compliance

with laws, and governance structures, which were generally school—and not student—

based. However, some aspects of monitoring, such as student record review, may have

been affected by the number of students enrolled, and the PCSB did have a higher total and 

median school enrollment. 

Page 14 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Table 2: Authorizer Revenue, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2003 

BOE Office of Charter Schools

(unaudited)a

PCSB (audited)b

FY 2004 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2003

Carryover from

prior year 11,773 0 106,408 275,661

Revenue

Local funds $307,340 $300,000 $660,000 $589,000

Fees from 

schools 251,623 127,800 527,403 382,819

Grantsc0 0 43,961d30,680

Miscellaneouse0 0 12,144 9,333

Total $570,736 $427,800 $1,349,916 $1,287,493

Source: GAO analysis of data submitted by BOE Office of Charter Schools and PCSB. 

a

The D.C. School Reform Act does not require the BOE Office of Charter Schools to obtain an annual 

financial statement audit. 

b

The D.C. School Reform Act requires the PCSB to obtain an annual financial statement audit. 

c

Grants reflects revenue received from foundations and other sources. 

d

This figure does not include $147,405, which the PCSB received as the initial installment of a $1.7 

million federal grant to support both the PCSB’s and the BOE Office of Charter Schools’ efforts to 

oversee their charter schools’ compliance with the No Child Left Behind Act. We did not include this 

amount because, by mutual agreement, the PCSB has managed the grant, which will benefit both 

authorizers and their schools. 

e

Miscellaneous includes revenue from areas such as reimbursed parking fees and interest income. 

In addition to using consultants, the BOE Office of Charter Schools 

augmented its financial and staff resources by leveraging services 

provided by other D.C. government agencies.7

 On four occasions, the BOE 

Office of Charter Schools referred schools to the D.C. Auditor or the Office 

of the Chief Financial Officer for financial operations reviews. For 

example, in 2002, the BOE Office of Charter Schools asked the Office of 

the Chief Financial Officer to review the internal controls of one school. 

Additionally, the BOE Office of Charter Schools referred one school to a 

special interagency team that included the D.C. Department of Mental 

Health and the D.C. Child and Family Services Agency, to review the level 

of services provided to children. For the past 2 years, D.C. Public Schools 

has provided the BOE Office of Charter Schools with some test score 

 7

No cost estimate has been computed for the services that the BOE Office of Charter 

Schools received from outside entities, because the Office does not assign a value to these 

services. 

Page 15 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
analysis and school performance data, which the office used to determine 

if its charter schools were in compliance with No Child Left Behind Act 

requirements. 

Figure 3: Authorizer Staffing Levels and Schools Overseen, School Year 2004-2005 

Note: This figure represents data as of January 2005, which corresponds to fiscal year 2005. Our 

budget analysis was based on fiscal year 2004 data, as these were the most recent data available. 

During fiscal year 2004, the BOE Office of Charter Schools had 3 staff, 15 schools, and a total 

enrollment of 3,646, while the PCSB had 9 staff, 22 schools, and a total enrollment of 10,097. 

Page 16 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the PCSB received more revenue, had a 

larger staff and oversaw more schools than the BOE Office of Charter 

Schools. As an agency independent from the D.C. Board of Education, the 

PCSB received $660,000 in local funds in fiscal year 2004, as required by

Congress. Additionally, the PCSB collected over $500,000 in fees from 

schools that year and in total received $61,360 per school. The PCSB used 

its revenue, which was more than double that of the BOE Office of Charter 

Schools, in part to employ nine people to oversee 22 charter schools in 

fiscal year 2004. The PCSB also had other revenue sources that the BOE 

Office of Charter Schools did not, such as grants and interest income. Like

the BOE Office of Charter Schools, the PCSB supplemented its staff by 

using consultants. In fiscal year 2004, the PCSB spent $134,756 on 

consultants to help with charter school oversight, such as reviewing 

applications, conducting annual monitoring visits, and assisting with 

school closings. PCSB consultants also reviewed schools’ financial 

conditions and special education compliance. The PCSB spent more than 

its counterpart—$33,897 per school—on both in-house personnel and 

consultants. 

The PCSB used fewer services available to the authorizers from D.C. 

government agencies than the BOE Office of Charter Schools. Unlike the 

BOE Office of Charter Schools, the PCSB did not use D.C. Public Schools 

test score analysis to determine if its schools were meeting No Child Left 

Behind Act standards. However, in April 2005, upon the recommendation 

of its financial consultants, the PCSB referred one school to the D.C. 

Inspector General for investigation of certain questionable financial 

practices.8

 Although the PCSB could refer more cases to D.C. agencies, a 

PCSB official stated that the PCSB instead tries to resolve all school issues 

by itself in order to help maintain the organization’s independence as an 

authorizing board. 

Although the two authorizers differed in terms of revenue available to 

them, they both used their financial resources to support oversight 

activities. Both authorizers used their staff and consultants to perform 

functions such as reviewing applications, monitoring schools, and 

overseeing school closures, although the costs associated with in-house 

staff were not separately tracked by the authorizers. For both authorizers, 

PCSB Received More 

Funding and Had More 

Staff to Oversee Schools, 

and Used Fewer Available 

Government Services 

Both Authorizers Spent 

Their Financial Resources 

to Support Oversight 

Activities

 8

We were unable to determine the value of this referral, because information from fiscal 

year 2005 had not been calculated when we were conducting our audit work for this report. 

Page 17 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
the majority of their expenses were used to support salaries and benefits 

for authorizer personnel involved in these activities, and other operational 

costs, such as conferences and technology. In fiscal year 2004, about threequarters of the BOE Office of Charter Schools’ expenses, and 88 percent of 

the PCSB’s expenses were used in this way (see fig. 4). However, a smaller 

percentage of the PCSB’s expenses were used on personnel and a larger 

percentage on other operational costs, such as technology, conferences, 

and books. The PCSB also had to pay for office space, an expense that the 

BOE Office of Charter Schools did not have to incur as its offices were 

provided by the BOE. 

Figure 4: BOE Office of Charter Schools and PCSB Expenses, Fiscal Year 2004 

Application

 review

School closings

24%

67%

Monitoring

Personnela

Source: GAO analysis of BOE Office of Charter Schools and PCSB expenses documents.

Other operational

costs

BOE Office of Charter Schools PCSB

7%

Consultant expenses

In-house expenses

10%

27%

54%

7%

Facilities 2% 1%

1% 1%

a

Both authorizers stated that personnel spent most of their time on activities related to application 

review, monitoring, and school closings; however, the authorizers were unable to provide personnel 

expense information for these activities because staff time was not recorded in this manner. 

The BOE Office of Charter Schools used a larger percentage of its total 

expenses for consultants than the PCSB. Consultant fees represented onequarter of the BOE Office of Charter Schools’ total expenses and onePage 18 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
eighth of the PCSB’s in fiscal year 2004. Both used consultants primarily to 

monitor schools, but both also hired consultants to review applications 

and help with school closings. For example, both the BOE and PCSB hired 

consultants to conduct site visits and review schools’ academic programs. 

Expenses for both authorizers in fiscal year 2003 were similar to 2004 

expenses, as both authorizers used most of their expenses for personnel 

and other operational costs. See table 3 for detailed expense information 

for both authorizers. 

Table 3: Authorizers’ Expenses, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2003 

BOE Office of Charter 

Schools (unaudited)a

PCSB (audited)b

FY 2004 FY 2003 FY 2004cFY 2003

In-house expenses 

Personnel $307,337 $294,859 $610,981 $472,426

Facilities 0 0 78,416 74,160

Other operational 

costsd

30,857 22,845 309,441 192,010

Subtotal 338,194 317,704 998,838 738,596

Consultant expenses 

Applications 4,000 11,700 15,312 8,248

Monitoring 109,318 78,400 111,839 152,017

School closings 8,184 3,083 7,605 8,755

Subtotal 121,502 93,183 134,756 169,020

Total $459,696 $410,887 $1,133,594 $907,616

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the BOE Office of Charter Schools and PCSB. 

a

The D.C. School Reform Act does not require the BOE Office of Charter Schools to obtain an annual 

financial statement audit. 

b

The D.C. School Reform Act requires the PCSB to obtain an annual financial statement audit. 

c

PCSB FY 2004 expenses do not include $142,045, which the PCSB spent as part of a $1.7 million 

federal grant to support both the PCSB’s and the BOE Office of Charter Schools’ efforts to oversee 

their charter schools’ compliance with the No Child Left Behind Act. We did not include this amount 

because, by mutual agreement, the PCSB has managed the grant, which will benefit both authorizers 

and their schools. 

d

Other operational costs includes expenses for items such as technology, books, and conferences. 

Page 19 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Both D.C. authorizers provided schools technical assistance and oversight

of charter schools by tracking schools’ academic achievement and 

financial condition. Both authorizers provided charter schools with 

assistance and had similar oversight practices, such as visiting each school 

at least once annually to assess performance and school operations. 

However, their approaches to oversight differed. The BOE Office of 

Charter Schools, staffed with only three employees, provided the same 

level of oversight to all of its 16 schools and in doing so limited its ability 

to provide additional assistance to those schools needing more help. 

Moreover, the BOE, which was also responsible for 167 traditional public 

schools, did not regularly review information collected by its Office of 

Charter Schools. BOE board members we interviewed acknowledged that 

problems were sometimes allowed to go unresolved for too long. By 

contrast, the PCSB targeted additional oversight on new charter schools 

and those where problems had been identified. 

Both authorizers provided charter schools technical assistance in several

areas. They often integrated technical assistance and monitoring to help 

schools improve academic and financial programs, identify potential 

facilities, and apply for facility funding. For example, the BOE Office of 

Charter Schools helped a school improve its financial condition after its 

2003 audit raised questions about the school’s financial viability. 

Specifically, its staff helped the school end a disadvantageous relationship 

with a school management company and negotiate a lower rent and 

security deposit for new school facilities. In another case, the BOE Office 

of Charter Schools obtained a financial operations review from the D.C. 

Chief Financial Officer in 2003 and a multi-agency school review in 2004 to

help a school that was identified as having enrollment and funding 

problems. The PCSB also integrated technical assistance and monitoring. 

For example, the PCSB referred a school to several local organizations for 

help, after the PCSB’s 2005 review concluded that the school needed to 

improve teacher professional development. PCSB has also established a 

governance project to develop pools of candidates for schools’ boards of 

trustees, created a financial policy manual for charter schools, and 

provided guidance to help schools address transitional issues as the 

schools increase enrollment and add grade levels. To help schools address 

academic deficiencies identified through monitoring, both authorizers 

have helped schools develop their academic accountability plans. 

Both Authorizers 

Provided Technical 

Assistance and 

Collected Academic, 

Financial, and Other 

School Data, but 

Extent and Level of 

Oversight Differed 

Both Authorizers Provided 

Schools with Technical 

Assistance 

The BOE Office of Charter Schools and PCSB also helped schools develop

school improvement plans to meet No Child Left Behind Act requirements. 

For example, BOE Office of Charter Schools officials told us that they 

Page 20 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
worked with one school to help it create an academic improvement plan 

and get relevant training for school leadership after the school did not 

make Adequate Yearly Progress in reading and math under the No Child 

Left Behind Act in 2005. They also said that they worked with the seven

schools identified as needing improvement as a result of not achieving 

Adequate Yearly Progress in the 2004-2005 school year by identifying 

actions each school must take to comply with the law, such as developing

school improvement plans outlining corrective strategies and offering 

services such as tutoring. The BOE Office of Charter Schools plans to use 

its annual monitoring visits to track these schools’ progress. For the 

13 PCSB schools identified in 2004-2005 as needing improvement as a 

result of not making Adequate Yearly Progress, the PCSB closed one and 

has made plans to track schools’ improvement efforts through its annual 

monitoring visits. For example, it has incorporated key questions into its 

visit protocols in order to measure schools’ progress. 

BOE Collected Data 

Uniformly from Schools, 

but Did Not Always Use 

Information to Address 

Problems 

The BOE Office of Charter Schools provided oversight to charter schools 

by using a uniform process to collect academic and financial data from all 

its schools, as well as other information about schools’ governance 

structure and compliance with laws. Specifically, it required each school 

to submit the same information, such as monthly financial statements, 

annual student test scores, and teacher information. It also visited each 

school at least twice a year—once before the school year began to check 

the school’s facilities and operational systems and again during the school 

year to monitor school performance. At the beginning of the school year, 

the BOE Office of Charter Schools focused on compliance and governance 

issues, by checking areas such as school board membership, student 

record storage, and adequacy of school facilities. In subsequent visits 

during the school year, the BOE Office of Charter Schools monitored 

mainly performance information, such as tracking schools’ progress in 

achieving their own academic goals and reviewing school budgets and 

annual audits.

9

 9

As a result of a joint effort by the D.C. Chief Financial Officer, the BOE Office of Charter 

Schools, and the PCSB, D.C. charter schools were required to select an auditor from an

approved list of best-qualified auditors beginning in fiscal year 2005. Until recently, no such

requirements existed, and according to BOE Office of Charter Schools and PCSB officials,

some schools have on occasion selected auditors who did not prepare audits that met 

professional audit standards.

Page 21 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Although the BOE Office of Charter Schools’ monitoring approach has 

enabled it to compile comprehensive data on every school, this approach 

has limited its ability to focus attention on those schools most in need of

the monitoring: new schools and schools considered to be at risk. Because 

the office has collected the same data from all schools regardless of their 

years of operation or performance history, the small staff has had to spend 

considerable time sifting through considerable amounts of data on all 

schools, while problems at some schools go unaddressed. For example, by 

visiting all schools at the beginning of every school year—rather than only 

visiting new schools or schools in new locations—the BOE Office of 

Charter Schools has dedicated staff resources that could have been 

focused on higher risk schools. Moreover, according to a BOE Office of 

Charter Schools official, in the past collecting and reviewing monthly 

financial statements from all of its schools had been nearly a full-time 

responsibility. Furthermore, while the BOE Office of Charter Schools has 

relied on the schools’ annual financial statement audits for key 

information related to financial oversight, it has not developed a system to 

assign priority to schools whose audits documented ongoing problems. 

For example, one school’s 2002 audit identified weaknesses that made the 

school vulnerable to an embezzlement.10 Although this particular weakness 

was corrected, the 2003 audit showed additional evidence of weak internal 

controls. When we asked BOE Office of Charter Schools officials whether 

it was possible to focus oversight on schools like this one, they told us that 

their practice was to review all schools during the annual monitoring visit 

to determine whether the issues have been resolved and require a 

corrective action plan if they have not. Additionally, the BOE Office of 

Charter Schools generally has not reviewed schools’ annual financial 

statement audits when they were submitted to the office, and instead 

waited until after the authorizers’ financial monitors completed their 

reviews of the schools. This approach may not allow the BOE Office of 

Charter Schools to respond in a timely manner to schools with immediate 

problems and may have contributed to the number of BOE charter schools 

that closed for financial reasons. 

 10The school’s fiscal year 2002 audit found insufficient documentation of expenses and 

inadequate internal controls related to check writing policies. The following year, the BOE 

Office of Charter Schools’ financial monitor identified additional weak internal controls,

such as improper authorization of cash transfers between bank accounts and untimely 

reconciliation of bank statements, and reported an embezzlement of $53,000. BOE Charter 

School officials told us that the employee involved was fired and prosecuted. 

Page 22 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Even after BOE Office of Charter Schools staff identified problems, 

resolution was sometimes prolonged. For example, two Board members 

we interviewed said that timely action was not taken with regard to the 

Village Learning Center that eventually closed in 2004. According to the 

BOE Office of Charter Schools’ own monitoring reports, this school 

experienced numerous problems over a period of years, including 

noncompliance with special education requirements, and failure to pay 

federal taxes and submit required federal grant performance reports. This 

school was open for 6 years and was granted three probationary periods 

totaling 180 days. Of the seven BOE schools whose charters were revoked,

four with long-standing problems were allowed to remain open 4 years or

more. In two of these cases, the BOE allowed the schools to stay open to 

give them time to correct their deficiencies.11 According to two BOE Board 

members we interviewed, the Board did not regularly review information 

collected by the BOE Office of Charter Schools and has not always acted 

upon information it received. They also stated that the BOE has not 

provided adequate oversight of its charter schools; as one Board member 

explained, it is easy to think of charter school oversight as a secondary 

concern to overseeing the public school system as a whole. Furthermore, 

during our review of the BOE Office of Charter Schools, the BOE had not 

held regular meetings devoted to charter schools and did not have a 

committee dedicated to charter school oversight. In October 2005, the 

BOE approved the creation of a charter school committee. Additionally, 

our review of BOE minutes showed that charter schools were infrequently 

discussed at BOE’s meetings.12 According to the BOE Office of Charter 

Schools Director, BOE Board members devoted some working sessions to 

charter school oversight issues; however, no minutes were taken of these 

meetings. 

PCSB Used Data to Target 

Additional Monitoring 

Efforts to Schools Most in 

Need 

The PCSB also monitored schools’ financial condition and academic 

performance but targeted additional monitoring on schools that needed 

more oversight. To monitor schools’ financial performance, the PCSB 

collected and reviewed school budgets, monthly financial statements, and 

 11The remaining two schools filed lawsuits to appeal the revocation, and the BOE Office of 

Charter Schools Director believed that these lawsuits probably accounted for the

additional time the schools were allowed to remain open. 

12We reviewed Board minutes from meetings held between January 2003 and April 2005 and 

identified only 12 references to the four BOE charter schools we had selected for review.

These 12 references involved only two of those four schools. 

Page 23 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
annual financial statement audits. To monitor academics, the PCSB visited 

schools annually and collected and analyzed test scores and other data to 

track schools’ outcomes as measured against their own academic goals 

and D.C. performance standards. Additionally, the PCSB created an annual 

compliance review process to track compliance with the No Child Left 

Behind Act, special education requirements, provisions of the D.C. School 

Reform Act and other laws. When schools have been identified as being 

out of compliance, the PCSB has used this process to identify specific 

actions each school must take to comply with the law, such as developing

school improvement plans, offering services such as tutoring, and 

notifying parents. The PCSB has also monitored issues related to the 

schools’ governance, such as the composition and operation of school 

boards of trustees, through its annual review of schools’ compliance with 

applicable laws and regulations. 

To ensure that new schools or schools identified as at risk receive 

sufficient oversight, the PCSB has targeted monitoring to ensure that 

higher-risk schools receive more attention, while lower-risk entities that 

were operating smoothly received less scrutiny. For example, at the 

beginning of the school year, the PCSB conducted pre-opening 

assessments of only new schools and schools opening in new facilities, 

thereby freeing up staff resources for higher risk schools. The PCSB also 

provided additional oversight to new schools by conducting a special 

financial management review of the internal controls of schools in their 

first year of operation.13 According to the PCSB, the purpose of this early 

review was both to assess school compliance and help the schools address 

issues early in their implementation. Additionally, the PCSB required 

schools in their first year to prepare a self-study, providing another 

opportunity for the school to identify challenges that require attention. 

The PCSB also applied targeted monitoring to its financial reviews. 

Schools with demonstrated financial performance have been allowed by 

the PCSB to submit their financial statements on a quarterly—rather than 

monthly—basis. The PCSB required schools to return to monthly 

submissions of financial statements when financial concerns emerged. For 

example, in October 2004, the PCSB required one school to resume 

monthly reporting after it failed to submit a financial statement audit that

 13Financial management reviews were not completed for new schools in fiscal year 2005

because the PCSB was reviewing its first year monitoring procedures, according to a PCSB

official. 

Page 24 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
was due in November 2003. Additionally, the PCSB has conducted interim 

financial reviews of schools where financial problems have been detected 

through regular monitoring. After identifying a potential budgetary 

shortfall at one school, the PCSB conducted an interim financial review of 

the school to assess its financial condition. According to a PCSB official,

this review provided the PCSB with the opportunity to make 

recommendations to the school to reduce its expenses, which helped 

restore the school’s financial condition. 

The PCSB also modified its annual and 5-year review processes to 

highlight or prioritize schools considered at risk. For example, PCSB’s 

annual program review, which has focused on academic performance, 

labeled some trouble areas as “mission-critical problems,” signaling to the 

school that inadequate improvement in these areas could threaten the 

school’s viability. In one case, the PCSB highlighted a school leader’s 

extended absences as a mission-critical problem that needed to be 

addressed. Following the PCSB’s monitoring report, the school leader 

resigned, and the school hired a new principal. Furthermore, the PCSB has 

applied criteria to schools during their 5th year of operation to determine 

whether each school has met the majority of its academic and

nonacademic goals.14 Any school that has not met both its academic and 

nonacademic goals can be placed on PCSB’s “Priority Review List.” In May 

2004, the PCSB placed one such school on this list—the SouthEast 

Academy for Academic Excellence—and subsequently revoked its charter. 

One PCSB official stated that the rationale for using a targeted monitoring 

approach is to free up more resources for technical assistance. 

Although some of its schools have experienced problems, the PCSB’s 

targeted monitoring approach allowed it to identify and provide technical 

assistance to schools in need of attention, which helped PCSB schools 

focus on their deficiencies. For example, the PCSB’s monitoring reports 

highlighted one school’s need for retaining qualified special education staff 

as a “mission-critical” problem for 3 consecutive years. In response, the 

PCSB targeted additional monitoring on this school and worked with the 

school to develop plans for hiring and training teachers to mitigate the 

school’s special education skills shortfall. The PCSB’s targeted monitoring 

approach also highlighted problems at both of the PCSB’s schools that 

later closed. For example, PCSB monitoring reports show that the 

 14Nonacademic goals include area such as student attendance, faculty professional 

development, and parental satisfaction. 

Page 25 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
authorizer identified problems, such as noncompliance with special 

education requirements, noncompliance with its charter, and late financial 

statement audits, at Associates for Renewal in Education Public Charter 

School, in the school’s second year of operation. The PCSB also identified

problems at SouthEast Academy, including the school’s inability to 

implement its own academic improvement plans. In both cases, the PCSB 

responded by intensifying monitoring and placing the schools on 

probation, and in the case of SouthEast Academy, revoked the school’s 

charter after it failed to correct identified deficiencies. 

When charter schools have closed, both authorizers undertook a wide 

range of activities to ensure student records and public assets were 

safeguarded, parents informed of their children’s school options, and 

closing schools received the assistance they needed; however, issues arose 

during closings that both found difficult to readily address. Officials from 

both authorizers stated that closing charter schools was costly, 

particularly when the closed schools were financially insolvent, and 

managing student records was the most challenging aspect of school 

closures. The authorizers’ processes for closing all nine schools varied in 

every instance. 

Authorizers used their staff and financial resources to oversee school 

closings as well as handle closing logistics, such as distributing student 

records, inventorying assets, and communicating with parents. Authorizer

staff inventoried school property, returned assets bought with federal 

dollars to the U.S. government, and disbursed remaining assets to other 

non-profit organizations, including existing charter schools. For example, 

when BOE Office of Charter Schools closed one of its schools, D.C. Public 

School staff helped the office inventory and dispose of its property. In a 

case when the closing school was financially insolvent, BOE Office of 

Charter Schools staff referred its creditors to appropriate parties for 

repayment. When one of PCSB’s schools closed, it hired a contractor to 

inventory the school’s records. Additionally, both authorizers 

communicated closing procedures to parents and students. BOE Office of 

Charter Schools officials stated that when charter schools closed, they 

sent letters to students and spoke with parents about the closure process. 

When the PCSB closed SouthEast Academy in 2005, GAO staff observed a 

town hall meeting where PCSB discussed the closure and students’ 

options for moving to another school. However, parents at the meeting 

still expressed confusion about the closure process and their questions 

Authorizers 

Undertook a Wide 

Range of Activities 

When Schools Closed, 

but the Process Was 

Not Well Defined 

When Schools Closed, 

Authorizers Took Actions 

to Manage Student 

Records, Safeguard Public 

Assets, and Inform Parents 

Page 26 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
about whether the closed school would reopen under new management 

could not be definitively answered at that time. 

Both the BOE and PCSB incurred costs when closing charter schools, 

particularly for the five schools that were financially insolvent. For 

example, a PCSB official stated that when PCSB closed the Associates for 

Renewal in Education Public Charter School, the PCSB spent over 

$15,000 from its budget. The authorizers often had to hire additional 

temporary staff to help with closing logistics. For example, in some 

instances, the authorizers hired administrators from the closed schools to 

help transfer records and dispose of inventory, such as textbooks, 

computers, and desks. BOE Office of Charter School and PCSB staff stated 

that hiring these school administrators helped make the closing process 

more efficient because the administrators were knowledgeable of the 

schools’ financial and student record keeping systems, as well as the 

school staff, parents and students. Four of the nine schools that were 

closed were financially solvent. In these cases, the authorizers used school 

resources to help defray the cost of closing. For example, the PCSB used 

the remaining assets from one closed school to hire a records management 

company to help collect, transfer, and store student records. Both 

authorizers also devoted staff resources to school closings. Staff spent 

time inventorying and dispersing assets, speaking with parents, and 

dealing with creditors when schools closed. 

Overseeing School Closures 

Was Sometimes Costly for 

Authorizers 

Both authorizers reported managing and safeguarding student records was 

the most challenging aspect of closing schools. Authorizers have assumed 

responsibility for reviewing student records for completeness, collecting 

records from closing schools, and distributing records to new schools. 

BOE Office of Charter Schools officials stated that this process can be 

delayed when student records were missing or were not complete. In some 

instances, student records may be on teachers’ desks or in classrooms 

rather than in central files, according to BOE Office of Charter Schools 

officials. Authorizer staff must then find and collect missing records. 

Student records can also be missing information or contain incorrect data. 

For example, BOE Office of Charter Schools officials told us that some 

student records have not included information about the most recent 

school quarter, while other records contained grade or class information 

that the students have stated is not correct. BOE Office of Charter Schools 

officials stated that updating and correcting these records can be difficult

as the administrators or teachers with the pertinent information may no 

longer be available to provide assistance. PCSB officials also cited 

problems with managing student records. For example, PCSB officials 

stated that transferring records to new schools has been complicated 

Managing Student Records Was 

the Most Challenging Aspect of 

School Closings 

Page 27 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
when parents and students were unsure which school they would attend in

the fall. 

In instances where students were no longer continuing their education, 

both authorizers had to find a place to store student records. Although 

D.C. law requires that student records become the property of D.C. Public 

Schools when a charter school closes, D.C. Public Schools officials stated 

that they thought responsibility for charter school records belonged to the 

authorizers. D.C. Public Schools officials nevertheless told the PCSB in 

September 2005 that they would be able to transfer these records to the 

D.C. Public Schools central administrative office once this office was 

ready to receive them. According to PCSB officials, as of November 2005, 

D.C. Public School officials have not notified them that they are ready to

receive these records and therefore the records remain at the PCSB office. 

Similarly, BOE Office of Charter Schools staff told us that they also kept 

the records of students who did not continue their education in their 

office. 

Authorizer staff expressed concerns that parents and students could have 

difficulty locating these records, which they would need if they wished to 

continue their education or join the military. For example, students—who 

may have only had contact with school administrators, rather than 

authorizer staff—might not know which authorizer was responsible for 

their charter school or how to contact the authorizer when they need to 

obtain records from a closed charter school. 

Process for Closing 

Schools Often Varied with 

Each Closure 

In all nine instances where schools had been closed, neither authorizer has 

followed a consistent closure process, and each has dealt with issues as 

they arose on a case-by- case basis. For example, the PCSB recently had to

deal with a new closure problem, when for the first time, a charter school 

was closed that owned rather than leased its facility. PCSB officials 

expressed concerns that the facility might not remain available to D.C. 

charter schools, a particular concern as new charter schools have often 

had difficulty finding adequate space and existing ones have had difficulty 

acquiring space to expand. In this case, the PCSB established guidance

outlining a process by which a closed school could receive petitions from 

existing charter schools to utilize its facility, and subsequently approved 

the arrangement reached between schools. BOE Office of Charter Schools 

and PCSB officials stated that they varied their school closing process 

based partly on the size and type of school and its financial condition at 

the time of closing, but such a varied process and the reasons for it may 

not be evident to parents as they try to think through what they need to do

Page 28 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
to transition their children to other schools. For example, when the BOE 

has closed schools, its Office of Charter Schools notified parents of the 

closure through letters and phone calls, while PCSB officials also held a 

town hall meeting when it revoked a charter. The handling of student 

records has varied across school closings and could be confusing for 

parents. When PCSB closed Associates for Renewal in Education Public 

Charter School, the PCSB hand delivered student records or sent them by 

certified mail to the new schools. In a few instances, students also 

collected their records from the PCSB office. However, when SouthEast 

Academy had its charter revoked, the PCSB hired a record management 

company to collect and transfer all records using the funds from the 

closed school. PCSB staff and board members stated that they are hoping

to use the SouthEast Academy closure procedures as a model for future 

school closings. While both authorizers have gained considerable 

experience with respect to what is required when schools close, neither 

has put in place a plan that would better guide school closing that would 

make it more efficient and clear to parents. 

With over a fifth of its students in charter schools, the District of Columbia 

has made a significant investment in charter schools. To protect this 

investment, the authorizers have a responsibility to provide timely 

oversight that ensures that students’ interests are served. However, the 

two authorizers conducted their monitoring differently, with the PCSB 

targeting its resources and the BOE Office of Charter Schools generally 

providing the same level of oversight to all its schools regardless of risk. 

While both approaches comply with the law’s requirements for 

authorizers, BOE can more effectively focus its resources where possible 

to oversee charter schools, particularly given its limited staff. Without 

such targeting, this authorizer may not be well positioned to ensure that its 

schools receive the assistance they need when they are most at risk. 

Conclusions 

Additionally, the Board of Education did not have a routine structure or 

process to ensure that its members regularly reviewed monitoring data for 

the charter schools under its purview. As a result, the Board has not 

always reviewed the information before it in time to react effectively and

in a timely manner. Although the Board has begun to address this issue by 

taking steps to create a charter school committee, it is not yet clear that 

this action will be sufficient to ensure that charter schools receive 

appropriate attention. 

Finally, when charter schools close, it is critical that a transparent process 

exist to ensure that schools, parents, and students understand their 

Page 29 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
options. While each authorizer undertook a wide range of activities when 

schools closed, no process existed to guide the authorizers, schools, and 

students through the closing. Lacking such a process, school 

administrators and parents may not understand what is required and 

expected of them to ensure a smooth educational transition for students. 

Additionally, the absence of such a process may result in student records 

being misplaced or difficult for students to locate in the future, 

particularly if they do not know which entity authorized their school. 

Additionally, closing charter schools without a systematic approach may 

not allow the authorizers to build on previous experience or learn from 

each other. As a result, an opportunity may be lost to develop a uniform, 

transparent, and efficient process that protects the interests of all parties.

To ensure that D.C. charter schools authorized by the BOE receive 

appropriate oversight, we recommend that the BOE Office of Charter 

Schools implement a risk-based oversight system that targets additional

monitoring resources to new charter schools and those identified at risk. 

Additionally, we recommend that the BOE create a routine and timely 

process to review the monitoring information, including audit reports, 

collected by its Office of Charter Schools. To help alleviate confusion 

among parents, students and school administrators following the closure 

of a charter school and to help the D.C. authorizers close schools 

efficiently, we recommend that the BOE Office of Charter Schools, the 

PCSB and D.C. Public Schools establish a routine process when schools 

close, including, among other things, a system for the secure transfer and 

maintenance of student records. 

We provided a draft of this report to the BOE Office of Charter Schools. In 

her response, the Executive Director of the BOE Office of Charter Schools 

noted that the BOE was taking actions that would address the 

recommendations in this report. For example, in response to the first 

recommendation, the Executive Director stated that the hiring of three 

new staff members will help focus greater oversight on schools in need. 

Similarly, in response to the second recommendation, the Executive 

Director stated that the BOE’s newly established committee on charter 

schools has begun reviewing monitoring data. BOE Board members also 

provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate in

this report. In response to Board member comments, we did not change 

enrollment or school data, because the audited enrollment count and D.C. 

Public Schools confirmed our initial information was accurate. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 30 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
We also provided a draft of this report to the PCSB. The comments of the 

PCSB Executive Director supported our recommendation that the BOE 

Office of Charter Schools, the PCSB and D.C. Public Schools establish a 

routine process for the secure transfer and maintenance of records when 

schools close. PCSB officials also provided technical clarifications, which 

we incorporated as appropriate in this report. 

We are sending copies of this report to relevant District of Columbia 

officials, relevant congressional committees, the Secretary of the 

Department of Education, and other interested parties. We will also make 

copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please 

contact me at (202) 512-7215 if you or your staffs have any questions about 

this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and 

Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other major 

contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Marnie S. Shaul 

Director, Education, Workforce 

 and Income Security Issues 

Page 31 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Appendix I: 

Methodology 

Objectives, Scope, and 

Page 32 GAO-06-73

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

As required by the D.C. Appropriations Act of 2005, we conducted a review 

of D.C.’s two charter school authorizers, the Board of Education (BOE) 

and the Public Charter School Board (PCSB). In conducting our analysis,

we reviewed the D.C. School Reform Act, as amended, and other 

applicable federal and District laws and regulations to determine the 

authorizers’ legal responsibilities. To determine how the authorizers used 

their resources (financial and otherwise), we analyzed the authorizers’ 

budgets and expenses for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. We also examined 

the authorizers’ use of staff resources and D.C. government services. 

Specifically, we identified the types of services available to the authorizers 

by D.C. agencies and learned if and how the authorizers used these 

services. To analyze the authorizers’ provision of oversight, we examined 

monitoring reports, audits and related documentation from 8 of the 42 DC 

charter schools operating in school year 2004-2005. We selected these 

schools using nonprobability procedures. In nonprobability sampling, staff 

selected a sample based on their knowledge of the population’s 

characteristics. We selected schools to ensure that our report was able to 

address a variety of the issues that the oversight boards faced in their 

monitoring efforts. Results from this nonprobability sample cannot be 

generalized to the entire population of schools. GAO also convened two 

focus groups of charter school administrators (one focus group per 

authorizer) to substantiate and augment information provided by the 

authorizers. Finally, we examined the actions the authorizers took to 

address issues arising from the closure of the nine charter schools that 

have lost their charters to date. (See below for more information about our 

budget, monitoring, and closure document analysis and use of focus 

groups.) We interviewed authorizer staff and board members and officials

of District agencies, including D.C. Public Schools, the Office of the Chief 

Financial Officer, the Office of the D.C. Auditor, and the D.C. Office of the 

Inspector General. We also interviewed representatives from the D.C. 

Public Charter School Association and Friends of Choice in Urban 

Schools, a D.C. charter school advocacy group. 

We conducted our work between January and November 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Analysis of Financial 

Documents 

To analyze the authorizers’ resources and to learn how they have used 

them, we examined the PCSB’s and BOE Office of Charter Schools’s 

income and expense statements for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. We 

analyzed the income statements to determine the proportion of income 

each board derived from various sources. Additionally, through interviews

with authorizer staff, we identified income that was carried over from the 

D.C. Charter Schools
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

previous fiscal year, which was not specifically labeled as such. We 

analyzed expenses and categorized these expenses into similar groupings 

for comparability purposes. We compared these data with projected 

budgets for corresponding fiscal years to identify differences. Finally, we 

reviewed the PCSB’s financial statement audits for these fiscal years. 

While the D.C. School Reform Act explicitly requires the PCSB to obtain

an annual financial statement audit, the Act contains no such requirement 

for the BOE Office of Charter Schools. As a result, we used unaudited 

financial information from the BOE Office of Charter Schools. 

Analysis of Monitoring 

Documents 

To obtain information about the processes both authorizers used to 

monitor charter schools after they had opened, we examined monitoring 

documentation for eight charter schools—four from each authorizer. 

These eight schools were selected for variation in the date the schools 

opened, grades served, and the schools’ history of probation or sanctions. 

Additionally, in selecting the 8 schools, we considered whether or not the 

charter school had gone through the 5-year review process, targeted a 

special needs population, and had achieved Adequate Yearly Progress in 

math or reading as required by the No Child Left Behind Act, and chose 

schools for variation in these areas. While our nonprobability selection of 

8 of the 42 D.C. charter schools does not allow GAO to generalize results 

to all 42 charter schools, our sampling procedures helped ensure that GAO 

was able to address the full assortment of issues that the oversight boards 

faced in their monitoring efforts. Once the schools were selected, we 

requested the authorizers provide us with all monitoring documents, 

including documentation of pre-opening visits, annual monitoring site 

visits, annual audited financial statements, and documentation of any 

sanctions placed on the school.1

 We examined these documents to learn 

how the BOE and PCSB monitored academics, finances, school 

governance and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. For 

each of these areas, we examined the types of deficiencies the authorizers 

identified at the schools and how the authorizers ensured deficiencies 

were corrected. We analyzed this information on a year-by-year basis to 

identify trends in how the BOE and PCSB monitored schools and 

addressed problems. We also reviewed Board minutes from monthly 

meetings held between January 2003 and April 2005 to learn information 

 1

In a limited number of instances, some school documentation was not provided. In these 

instances, we followed up by phone and e-mail with the authorizers, who confirmed for us

that they no longer had all monitoring documentation for every school. 

Page 33 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

about how the BOE and PCSB address charter school problems at board 

meetings. We also used this information to learn more about specific 

issues at D.C.’s charter schools. 

We also used focus groups to obtain the opinions and insights of D.C. 

charter school principals and other school officials regarding PCSB and 

BOE oversight efforts. Focus groups are a form of qualitative research in 

which a specially trained leader, the moderator, meets with a small group 

of people who have similar characteristics and are knowledgeable about 

the specific issue. The results from the discussion groups are descriptive, 

showing the range of opinions and ideas among participants. However, the 

results cannot serve as a basis for statistical inference because discussion 

groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the extent of a problem or to 

generalize results to a larger population, (2) develop a consensus for an 

agreed-upon plan of action, or (3) provide statistically representative 

samples with reliable quantitative estimates. The opinions of many group 

participants showed a great deal of consensus, and the recurring themes 

provide some amount of validation. 

We conducted two focus groups—one with school leaders from schools 

overseen by PCSB and one with school leaders from schools overseen by 

BOE. We invited all of the eight schools whose monitoring documents had 

been assessed by GAO to attend their respective focus groups. In addition, 

we invited representatives from a random selection of the remaining 

charter schools (those whose monitoring documents were not assessed by 

GAO) to gather information from additional schools. Attendance on the 

part of invited participants was voluntary. We had three participants from 

three different schools at each of our two focus groups for a total of six 

schools participating. A trained focus group moderator led the 

discussions. We developed a discussion group guide to assist the 

moderator in leading the discussions. A transcription service recorded and 

then transcribed the conversations. 

To determine the actions the authorizers have taken when D.C. charter 

schools closed, we examined documentation from the seven charter 

schools closed by the BOE and the two closed PCSB charter schools—one 

voluntarily and one through charter revocation. In each instance, we 

reviewed the monitoring documentation for each of the closed schools to

determine how the authorizers had identified and reacted to problems at 

the schools. We reviewed Board minutes to determine if and when 

sanctions were placed on the schools and how the schools responded to

Focus Groups 

Analysis of Documentation 

from Closed Charter 

Schools 

Page 34 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

these disciplinary actions. We reviewed revocation documentation, 

including school and authorizer correspondence, school appeals, and 

minutes from Board meetings when revocations were discussed. 

Additionally, we analyzed the authorizers’ budget documents to determine 

how the authorizers used their financial resources to close schools. We 

reviewed D.C. Public School policies for closing schools and compared 

these policies with the authorizers’ school closure procedures. We 

attended a town hall meeting organized by the PCSB for parents of a 

charter school that was being closed to observe how the authorizer’s staff 

and school administrators communicated closure information to students 

and parents. Finally, we interviewed one school administrator from a 

school that had its charter revoked to learn about the closure process 

from the school’s perspective. 

Page 35 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Appendix II: Comments from the D.C. Board of Education Appendix II: Comments from the D.C. Board 

of Education 

Page 36 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Appendix II: Comments from the D.C. Board of Education 

Page 37 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Appendix II: Comments from the D.C. Board of Education 

Page 38 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Appendix III: Comments from the PCSB Appendix III: Comments from the PCSB 

Page 39 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 40 GAO-06-73

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact Marnie Shaul (202)512-7215, shaulm@gao.gov

Sherri Doughty, Assistant Director, and Tamara Fucile, Analyst in Charge, 

managed this assignment and made significant contributions to all aspects 

of this report. Christopher Morehouse also made significant contributions, 

and Carlos Hazera, Walter Vance, and Shannon VanCleave aided in this 

assignment. In addition, Richard Burkard and Shelia McCoy assisted in the 

legal analysis, Julie Phillips assisted with the financial analysis, and 

Tovah Rom and Rachael Chamberlin assisted in the message and report 

development. 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

D.C. Charter Schools
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Charter Schools: Oversight Practices in the District of Columbia. 

GAO-05-490. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2005. 

Charter Schools: To Enhance Education’s Monitoring and Research, 

More Charter School-Level Data Are Needed. GAO-05-5. Washington, D.C.: 

January 12, 2005. 

No Child Left Behind Act: Education Needs to Provide Additional 

Technical Assistance and Conduct Implementation Studies for School 

Choice Provision. GAO-05-7. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2004. 

District of Columbia’s Performance Accountability Report. GAO-04-940R. 

Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2004. 

Charter Schools: New Charter Schools across the Country and in the 

District of Columbia Face Similar Start-Up Challenges. GAO-03-899. 

Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2003. 

Public Schools: Insufficient Research to Determine Effectiveness of 

Selected Private Education Companies. GAO-03-11. Washington, D.C.: 

October 29, 2002. 

DCPS: Attorneys’ Fees for Access to Special Education Opportunities. 

GAO-02-559R. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2002. 

District of Columbia: Performance Report Reflects Progress and 

Opportunities for Improvement. GAO-02-588. Washington, D.C.: April 15,

2002. 

Title I Funding: Poor Children Benefit though Funding per Poor Child 

Differs. GAO-02-242. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2002. 

District of Columbia: Comments on Fiscal Year 2000 Performance 

Report. GAO-01-804. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2001. 

Charter Schools: Limited Access to Facility Financing. 

GAO/HEHS-00-163. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2000. 

Charter Schools: Federal Funding Available but Barriers Exist. 

GAO/HEHS-98-84. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 1998. 

Charter Schools: Issues Affecting Access to Federal Funds. 

GAO/T-HEHS-97-216. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 1997. 

(130479) Page 41 GAO-06-73 D.C. Charter Schools
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