S. Hrg. 109–185

OIL FOR INFLUENCE: HOW SADDAM USED OIL

TO REWARD POLITICIANS UNDER THE UNITED

NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 17, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs

(

OIL FOR INFLUENCE: HOW SADDAM USED OIL TO REWARD POLITICIANS

UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

21–438 PDF 2005

S. Hrg. 109–185

OIL FOR INFLUENCE: HOW SADDAM USED OIL

TO REWARD POLITICIANS UNDER THE UNITED

NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 17, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA D. TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

RAYMOND V. SHEPHERD, III, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LELAND B. ERICKSON, Counsel 

MARK L. GREENBLATT, Counsel 

STEVEN A. GROVES, Counsel 

ELISE J. BEAN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

DAN M. BERKOVITZ, Minority Counsel 

LAURA E. STUBER, Minority Counsel 

ZACHARY I. SCHRAM, Minority Professional Staff Member 

MARY D. ROBERTSON, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 1

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 4

Senator Bennett ................................................................................................ 11

Senator Dayton ................................................................................................. 12

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, MAY 17, 2005

Mark L. Greenblatt, Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate ... 14

Steven A. Groves, Counsel, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate .......... 18

Dan M. Berkovitz, Counsel to the Minority, Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate ................................................................................................. 24

George Galloway, Member of Parliament for Bethnal Green and Bow, Great 

Britain ................................................................................................................... 42

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Berkovitz, Dan M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 24

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 77

Galloway, George: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 42

Greenblatt, Mark L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 14

Additional testimony ........................................................................................ 21

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 59

Additional prepared statement ........................................................................ 71

Groves, Steven A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 18

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 68

APPENDIX 

Chart entitled ‘‘Illicit Iraqi Income 1991–2003,’’ submitted by Senator Levin ... 55

Chart entitled ‘‘Illegal Surcharges on Iraqi Oil: Amounts Paid, by Final Destination 2000–2002,’’ submitted by Senator Levin ............................................ 57

Chart entitled ‘‘Oil Exports From Khor al–Amaya,’’ submitted by Senator 

Levin ..................................................................................................................... 58

‘‘Report on Oil Allocations Granted to Charles Pasqua & George Galloway,’’ 

prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ................................................................................ 84

‘‘Report on Oil Allocations Granted to Vladimir Zhirinovsky,’’ prepared by 

the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ................................................................................................................ 180

‘‘Report on Oil Allocations Granted to the Russian Presidential Council,’’ 

prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ................................................................................ 459

‘‘Report on Illegal Surcharges on Oil-For-Food Contracts and Illegal Oil Shipments From Khor Al-Amaya,’’ prepared by the Minority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ................................................................ 836

Page

IV

EXHIBITS 

1. Iraqi Memo Estimating Zhirinovsky Profit as $8.6 Million .......................... 1447

2. Zhirinovsky Request For Oil-for-Food Contracts; Zhirinovsky’s Request 

Granted .............................................................................................................. 1450

3. Bayoil agrees to pay Zhirinovsky; Bayoil Instructs NAFTA .......................... 1455

4. Zhirinovsky-Bayoil Surcharge Payments in Phase X ..................................... 1459

5. Zhirinovsky’s Offer of Moscow Building .......................................................... 1468

6. Zhirinovsky’s Phase VI Transaction ................................................................ 1471

7. Zhirinovsky Paid $4.7 Million In Illegal Surcharges .................................... 1475

8a.–8d. Documents concerning oil allocations granted to Charles 

Pasqua ........................................................................................................... 1479–1489

9. Ministry of Oil Letter Re: Galloway Allocation in Phase IX .......................... 1490

10. Crude Oil Allocations during Phase (9) of the Memorandum of Understanding ............................................................................................................. 1493

11. Surcharge Chart for Aredio .............................................................................. 1496

12. Ministry of Oil Letter Re: Galloway Allocation in Phase XI .......................... 1498

13. Surcharge Chart for Middle East Advanced Semi Conductor ....................... 1501

14. Ministry of Oil Letter Re: Galloway Allocation in Phase XII (PSI Staff 

Rpt–VZ–FN 96) ................................................................................................. 1503

15. Ministry of Oil Letter Re: Galloway Allocation in Phase XII (PSI Staff 

Rpt–VZ–FN 97) ................................................................................................. 1506

16. Ministry of Oil Letter Re: Galloway Allocation in Phase XIII (PSI Staff 

Rpt–PG–FN 101) ............................................................................................... 1509

17. Letter from George Galloway, ‘‘To Whom It May Concern’’ ........................... 1512

18. Table 1: Oil Allocations to the Russian Presidential Council by Phase, 

chart prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ............ 1513

19. Oil Allocations to Russian Recipients for Phase 8 .......................................... 1514

20. Letter from Haverhill Trading Ltd. to Bayoil dated June 10, 2000 .............. 1515

21. Letter from the Executive Director of SOMO to the Minister of Oil dated 

July 5, 2000 ....................................................................................................... 1516

22. Table 3: Estimated Division of Bayoil’s Payments Between Haverhill/

Rusnaftaimpex and the Russian Presidential Council in Connection with 

Contract M/08/85. Chart prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations .................................................................................................... 1517

23. Letter to the Executive Director of SOMO dated March 24, 2001 ................. 1518

24. Fax from Rosnefteimpex to Bayoil dated April 17, 2001 ................................ 1519

25. Fax from Rosnefteimpex to Bayoil dated April 20, 2001 ................................ 1520

26. Table 9: Estimated Division of Bayoil’s Payments Between Iraq, 

Rusnaftaimpex, and the Russian Presidential Council in Connection with 

Contract M/10/15. Chart prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations .................................................................................................... 1521

27. Memorandum from SOMO to the Minister of Oil dated September 26, 

2002 .................................................................................................................... 1522

28. Letter from Impexoil to Bayoil dated October 2, 2002 .................................... 1523

29. Internal SOMO Memorandum dated December 25, 2002 .............................. 1524

30. Memorandum from SOMO to Impexoil dated January 2, 2003 .................... 1525

31. Table 13: Estimated Division of Bayoil’s Payments Between Iraq, the 

Designated Purchasing Agents, and the Russian Presidential Council in 

Connection With Contract M/08/85, M/09/25, M/10/15, M/12/109, and 

M/13/33. Chart prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ................................................................................................................... 1526

32. Cash Portion of Illicit Iraqi Earnings During Sanctions 1991–2003. Chart 

prepared by the Majority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ............................................................................................................. 1527

33. Cash Portion of Illicit Iraqi Earnings During Sanctions, 1991–2003. Chart 

prepared by the Majority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ............................................................................................................. 1528

34–37. Documents relating to Illegal Surcharges.......................................... 1529–1631

Page

V

38–40. Documents relating to Bayoil participation in Israel boycott........... 1632–1636

41–42. Documents relating to Khor al-Amaya oil shipments....................... 1637–1687

43. Bayoil Indictment ............................................................................................. 1688

44. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations’ letters to the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State (U.S. Mission to the 

U.N.) .................................................................................................................. 1712

45. Iraqi Chart Showing Allocations to Galloway and Zhirinovsky in Phase 

IX ........................................................................................................................ 1723

46. George Galloway MP, Extracts from Hansard 1990–1998 (Verbatim Parliamentary Record), material provided to the Permanent Subcommittee 

on Investigations by George Galloway at the Subcommittee hearing on 

May 17, 2005 ..................................................................................................... 1727

47. Prepared statement of Thomas A. Schweich, Chief of Staff of the U. 

S. Mission to the United Nations, U.S. Department of State ....................... 1731

48. Prepared statement of Peter Reddaway, Professor Emeritus of Political 

Science and International Affairs, George Washington University .............. 1736

49. Transcript of Jeremy Paxman (BBC Newsnight) Interview of George Galloway on April 23, 2003 .................................................................................... 1741

(1)

OIL FOR INFLUENCE: HOW SADDAM USED 

OIL TO REWARD POLITICIANS UNDER THE 

UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM 

TUESDAY, MAY 17, 2005

U.S. SENATE,

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in room 

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Norm Coleman, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Coleman, Bennett, Levin, and Dayton. 

Staff Present: Raymond V. Shepherd, III, Staff Director and 

Chief Counsel; Mary D. Robertson, Chief Clerk; Leland Erickson, 

Counsel; Mark L. Greenblatt, Counsel; Steven A. Groves, Counsel; 

Mark D. Nelson, Counsel; Brian M. White, Professional Staff Member; Katherine Russell, Detailee (FBI); Phillip Thomas, Detailee 

(GAO); Gregory Coats, Detailee (IRS); Jeffrey James, Detailee 

(IRS); Richard Fahy, Detailee (ICE); Mike Williams, Intern; Erin 

Brannigan, Intern; Laila Sabara, Translator; Elise J. Bean, Staff 

Director/Chief Counsel to the Minority; Bob Roach, Counsel and 

Chief Investigator to the Minority; Dan M. Berkovitz, Counsel to 

the Minority; Laura E. Stuber, Counsel to the Minority; Zackary I. 

Schram, Professional Staff to the Minority; and Merril Springer, 

Intern. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. This hearing of the Permanent Subcommittee 

on Investigations is called to order. Good morning. Today, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations will present evidence delineating how Saddam Hussein exploited the Oil-For-Food Program 

for his own political purposes. 

Saddam Hussein utilized the same methodology time after time. 

Over the past week, the Subcommittee has released a number of 

bi-partisan reports detailing how the Hussein regime quickly manipulated the use of oil allocations to garner political influence 

around the globe. As one Hussein official described the scheme, 

Saddam Hussein used oil to his geopolitical and strategic advantage. 

The plan was simple. Rather than granting allocations to traditional oil purchases, Iraq gave priority to foreign officials, journalists, and even terrorist entities. The central purpose of this tactic, 

2

according to senior officials under the Hussein regime interviewed 

by the Subcommittee, was to engender international support for 

the Hussein regime and against the U.N. sanctions. 

By allocating the oil to favored people or entities, the regime 

forced oil purchases to obtain allocations from those favored few. 

Those allocation holders essentially became the gatekeepers to 

Iraqi oil. As gatekeepers, they demanded or earned a commission, 

which typically ranged from 3 to 30 cents a barrel. In light of the 

fact that most allocations consisted of millions of barrels of oil, such 

commissions were quite lucrative, reaching hundreds of thousands 

of dollars per allocation. 

In an interview with the U.S. Treasury Iraqi Financial Asset 

Team, a Hussein official described how Saddam Hussein devised 

this plan in simple terms. The source stated that Saddam Hussein 

began to utilize the memorandum of understanding, the Oil-ForFood Program, to sell oil to people who supported him. The source 

explained that this was done in order to enhance the power of Saddam Hussein. Hussein instructed that the price of oil should be 

made as low as possible and made beneficial to his supporters. Inside the SOMO system, the Iraqi marketing oil system, this was 

nicknamed the ‘‘Saddam bribery system.’’

Other senior members of the Hussein regime confirmed that the 

Saddam bribery system used oil allocations in an effort to buy political influence around the world. For instance, the Vice President 

of the Hussein regime, Taha Yasin Ramadan, confirmed to the Subcommittee that the allocations were, indeed, ‘‘compensation for support.’’ The vice president also confirmed that, ‘‘I know these people,’’ meaning allocation grantees, ‘‘yet a benefit.’’ Another senior 

Hussein official was concerned that the allocation scheme was, 

‘‘buying influence.’’ When asked whether allocation recipients 

would make a profit from the oil transactions, that official declared, 

‘‘That is the whole point.’’

The Hussein regime used these lucrative allocations in its primary political struggle, ending the U.N. sanctions. To that end, it 

primarily favored those individuals, entities, and countries on the 

U.N. Security Council. Senior Hussein regime officials and numerous Ministry of Oil documents confirmed that the regime steered 

a massive portion of its allocation toward U.N. Security Council 

members believed by the Hussein regime to support Iraq in its effort to lift sanctions, namely Russia, France, and China. 

For example, several Oil Ministry charts expressly separate the 

allocation recipients by country and specify whether the country is 

a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Russia, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, was consistently the 

largest recipient of oil allocations, and according to one Hussein regime official, this affinity for Russia resulted from Saddam’s desire 

to show ‘‘gratitude’’ to the Russians for their support at the U.N. 

Security Council. 

The recipients of the allocations were determined by a committee 

of Saddam Hussein’s closest advisors, including Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, and the Minister of Oil, Amir Mohammed Rashid. 

The committee was led by the Vice President of Iraq, Taha Yasin 

Ramadan. Every 6 months, the committee would meet to review 

the allocations and make decisions concerning allocations in the 

3

upcoming phase. The committee would evaluate, ‘‘special requests’’ 

made by individuals around the world who were soliciting allocations. 

The principal criterion for granting the special requests or granting an allocation was the individual’s support for Iraq. Once the 

committee determined the allocations for the upcoming phase, the 

vice president would generally discuss the allocations with Saddam 

Hussein himself. This modus operandi was followed by the Hussein 

regime again and again. 

The bipartisan reports issued last week present evidence establishing that members of Russian Presidential Council, including 

the former Chief of Staff of the Russian President Vladimir Putin, 

Alexander Voloshin, Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky, numerous political entities within Russia, Charles Pasqua, the former 

French Minister of the Interior, and George Galloway, a newlyelected member of the British Parliament, were all granted substantial oil allocations from the Hussein regime under the Oil-ForFood Program. 

In particular, the evidence obtained by the Subcommittee shows 

that the Hussein regime granted Russian Presidential Council allocations for 90 million barrels of oil. The allocations were given to 

Mr. Voloshin and his close confidant, Sergei Issakov. The Iraqi 

Ministry of Oil estimated the council’s allocations granted for 1999 

to 2003 were worth in excess of $16 million. Vice President Ramadan recognized Mr. Voloshin as the head of Russia’s presidential 

administration and stated that the oil allocations that were awarded to him had been approved by Saddam Hussein. 

The Hussein regime granted Russian official Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his political party, the LDPR, allocations for 75.8 million 

barrels of oil, enough to supply the entire United States for 4 days. 

The Iraqi Ministry of Oil estimated that Zhirinovsky’s allocations 

were worth $8,679,000. 

Saddam Hussein’s Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan, confirmed to the Subcommittee that Zhirinovsky did receive oil allocations from the Hussein regime. Another senior official of the regime 

that was interviewed by the Subcommittee confirmed not only that 

Zhirinovsky received oil allocations, but that he profited from the 

transaction, saying, ‘‘Of course, Zhirinovsky would make a profit. 

That is the whole point.’’

Among the evidence are six letters signed by Zhirinovsky himself 

that openly discuss the allocations and more than 30 documents of 

the Iraqi Ministry of Oil that expressly identify Zhirinovsky and 

his political party, the LDPR, in connection with oil allocations. 

The evidence shows that the Hussein regime granted Charles 

Pasqua allocations for 11 million barrels of oil, and George Galloway was allotted 20 million barrels. Saddam Hussein’s Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan, verified that Pasqua received allocations and that Galloway was granted allocations, ‘‘because of his 

opinions about Iraq,’’ and because he, again, ‘‘wanted to lift the embargo against Iraq.’’

Among the evidence are documents of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil 

that expressly identify Pasqua and Galloway in connection with oil 

allocations. One document shows that Saddam Hussein personally 

approved an allocation to Pasqua and also indicates that Pasqua 

4

refused to write a letter to the Iraqis about the allocation because 

he feared political scandals. 

The process of monetizing the Pasqua and Galloway allocations 

appears to have followed the same pattern as the Zhirinovsky and 

RPC allocations. The allocation recipient would nominate a purchasing agent to sign contracts for the allocation. That company 

would sell the oil to an oil company, and the oil company would pay 

a hefty commission, typically amounting to hundreds of thousands 

of dollars, to the nominal purchasing agent for the benefit of the 

allocation holder. 

In one of Mr. Galloway’s transactions, surcharges of more than $300,000 were paid to the Hussein regime. Senior Hussein regime 

officials informed the Subcommittee that the allocation holders, in 

this case, Galloway, were ultimately responsible for the surcharge 

payment and, therefore, would have known of the illegal under-thetable payment. 

The Subcommittee is not a court of law. The Subcommittee has 

a long history of bipartisan, thorough, and factual, substantive investigations. The reports released over the past week contain 99 

pages of text and 452 footnotes that detail compelling evidence describing how Saddam abused the Oil-For-Food Program to garner 

political influence around the globe. 

I want to thank my friend and Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, Senator Levin, for his participating in and supporting 

this investigation. Senator Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. As you pointed out, 

the Subcommittee has now had three hearings examining issues related to the Oil-For-Food Program and sanctions on Iraq. 

Because this hearing will focus on the problems associated with 

the program, it is easy to forget that U.N. sanctions on Iraq 

achieved their primary objective of preventing Iraq from rearming. 

Former Secretary of State Colin Powell characterized the U.N. 

sanctions program as ‘‘successful,’’ because Saddam Hussein was 

not able to ‘‘rebuild his army . . . and has fewer tanks in his inventory today than he had 10 years ago.’’ And going on, Secretary 

Powell said, ‘‘We have not seen that capacity for weapons of mass 

destruction emerge to present a full-fledged threat to us,’’ and concluded that ‘‘credit has to be given . . . for putting in place a sanctions regime that has kept him pretty much in check.’’

Now, the U.N. Oil-For-Food Program was intended to alleviate 

the humanitarian calamity which resulted from the U.N. trade embargo against Iraq. It was essential to find a way to get Iraq to 

agree to sell its oil and deposit the proceeds in a U.N.-controlled 

account from which humanitarian supplies like food and medicine 

could be purchased. And, in fact, over $65 billion was eventually 

deposited into the U.N. accounts for that purpose—humanitarian 

supplies for the people of Iraq, such as food and medicine. 

But Saddam Hussein would agree to the Oil-For-Food Program 

only if he could determine to whom the oil was sold and from 

whom the supplies would be purchased. U.N. member countries, including the United States, reluctantly agreed to give Saddam Hussein that control. It is unsurprising that Saddam Hussein later deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:03 Jan 04, 2006 Jkt 021438 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\21438.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
5

1The chart entitled ‘‘Illegal Surcharges on Iraqi Oil: Amounts Paid, by Final Destination 

2000–2002,’’ appears in the Appendix on page 57. 

vised multiple ways to abuse this authority, including the awarding 

of oil allocations to political figures and others to reward their support or to curry their favor for efforts to undermine or eliminate 

the U.N. sanctions against Iraq. 

It is also unsurprising that when a corrupt Saddam Hussein saw 

how profitable the oil allocations were, he schemed again to take 

a cut of the revenue. From September 2000 to September 2002, 

Iraq demanded that oil allocation holders awarded an Oil-For-Food 

contract pay a secret per-barrel surcharge that ranged from 10 to 

30 cents per barrel. In 2 short years, through these surcharge payments provided $228 million to Iraq. 

U.S. import statistics show that about half of the oil on which 

those surcharges were paid ended up in the United States. Using 

Iraqi internal records reviewed by our staffs, we estimate that 

more than half of all the surcharges paid to Iraq, about $118 million was paid on oil sold to U.S. companies. The remaining $110 

million in surcharges was paid on oil sent to other countries, in Europe, Asia, and Africa, and there is a chart that shows that division 

up here to my right.1

A U.S. company called Bayoil (USA), headquartered in Houston, 

Texas, was smack in the middle of it all. When other oil companies 

around the world were cutting back on business with Iraq due to 

Saddam Hussein’s surcharge demands, Bayoil increased its business. During the 2-year period in which surcharges were mandatory to get Iraqi oil, Bayoil became the largest single buyer of Iraqi 

oil for the U.S. market. 

Altogether, Bayoil brought in over 200 million barrels to the 

United States. My staff was able to trace 102 of the U.S. cargoes 

Bayoil brought here, and found that the surcharges paid on those 

cargoes, according to internal Iraqi records, totaled $37 million. 

Bayoil sold the oil to U.S. oil companies and refineries, which, in 

turn, sold refined petroleum products, like gasoline and heating oil, 

to American consumers. Last month, Bayoil was indicted for ‘‘violating U.S. sanctions on Iraq and for committing fraud, including 

by paying or arranging the payment of millions of dollars in secret 

illegal surcharges to the Government of Iraq,’’ and that is a quote 

from the indictment. 

That indictment comes 2 years after the end of the Oil-For-Food 

Program. But while the program was going on, no one in the U.S. 

Government appears to have paid much attention to Bayoil despite 

plenty of red flags. As soon as Iraq began demanding surcharges, 

oil companies around the world began complaining. Debate erupted 

at the United Nations about how to stop the surcharges. Opinions 

split, with the United States and United Kingdom on one side, trying to keep Iraqi oil prices at fair market value to make surcharges 

uneconomical, and Russia and China on the other side, supporting 

lower oil prices. 

It took 2 years for the U.S. and U.K. representatives to find a 

way, using retroactive pricing, to prevent Iraq from imposing these 

surcharges. By the end of 2002, Iraq had given up imposing surVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:03 Jan 04, 2006 Jkt 021438 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\21438.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
6

1The chart entitled ‘‘Illegal Iraqi Income 1991–2003,’’ appears in the Appendix on page 55. 

charges because the resulting price was so high no one could buy 

the oil, pay a surcharge, and still make a profit. 

But at the same time the United States joined in efforts to find 

a way to end such surcharges, joined in that effort by the U.K. at 

the United Nations, there was little or no U.S. effort here at home, 

to enforce our own laws against U.S. companies paying illegal oil 

surcharges or to help the United Nations find a way to stop a U.S. 

company, Bayoil, from contributing to the surcharge problem. A 

few general warnings against paying illegal surcharges were sent 

out, but U.S. Government agencies, including the government’s primary sanctions enforcer, the Office of Foreign Assets Control 

(OFAC), never took on the issue, never researched U.S. company 

involvement in the payment of oil surcharges, never took a hard 

look at Bayoil, despite evidence inviting closer scrutiny. 

While OFAC did investigate other issues, such as preventing the 

sale to Iraq of prohibited military equipment or dual-use items, the 

surcharge issue that commanded such attention at the United Nations received virtually no attention here in Washington. Bayoil 

slipped right by, for 2 years. 

When asked why OFAC failed to do more, OFAC told the Subcommittee that it considered the Oil-For-Food Program to be a 

U.N. responsibility and that it was up to the United Nations, not 

the United States, to police compliance with sanctions. The problem with this position, however, is that the United Nations has no 

law enforcement authority. It can’t police the nationals of any country. It can’t even force a company to answer questions. The United 

Nations is dependent upon its member states for enforcement, and 

it didn’t get much help from the United States on this matter. 

Bayoil illustrates the point, and the chart summarizes what happened with Bayoil.1 In 2001, the United Nations became suspicious 

that Bayoil and a few other companies were using various tactics 

to make room for surcharge payments. The U.N.’s oil experts asked 

Bayoil for specific cargo information, but Bayoil refused to provide 

it. In August 2001, the United Nations appealed to the U.S. Department of State for help and the State Department asked OFAC 

to obtain the information. After hearing nothing for months, the 

United Nations sent another request for help in January 2002. 

Eight months after the initial inquiry, in April 2002, OFAC finally wrote a letter to Bayoil, asking for information about its licensed activity in Iraq, without requesting the information wanted 

by the United Nations and without directing Bayoil to answer 

U.N.’s questions. Despite its booming Iraqi oil import business, 

Bayoil told OFAC that it no longer conducted licensed activities in 

Iraq. OFAC made no follow-up inquiry and never even bothered to 

send Bayoil’s response to the State Department or the United Nations. 

In the end, the United Nations never obtained the information 

it needed from the U.S. State Department, OFAC, or Bayoil. Worse, 

the U.N.’s inquiries about Bayoil never triggered any OFAC review 

into whether Bayoil was actually paying illegal surcharges. This 

lack of interest persisted even though, during the surcharge period, 

Bayoil suddenly expanded its imports to become one of the largest 

7

1The chart entitled ‘‘Illicit Iraqi Income 1991–2003,’’ appears in the Appendix on page 55. 

2The chart entitled ‘‘Oil Exports From Khor al-Amaya,’’ appears in the Appendix on page 58. 

U.S. importers of Iraqi oil. It performed precisely the intermediary 

role that experts flagged as likely to pay surcharges. And all the 

while Bayoil was constantly bombarding U.S., U.N., and Iraqi officials with letters and faxes urging them to set lower prices for Iraqi 

oil—prices which would allow more room for the payment of surcharges. 

OFAC’s failure to investigate Bayoil reflects a major oversight 

failure and a fundamental misconception on the part of OFAC 

about its responsibility to police U.S. nationals to ensure compliance with sanctions on Iraq. OFAC’s actions represented an abdication of its responsibility to monitor Bayoil’s behavior and an inappropriate attempt to shift OFAC’s own obligation to enforce U.S. 

sanctions on Iraq to the United Nations. 

Saddam Hussein’s corrupt control of oil allocations and illegal 

surcharges is a serious concern, even though the Hussein regime 

obtained far greater illicit income through other schemes, some 

with the knowledge and tacit approval of the United States and 

other members of the U.N. Security Council. The illegal surcharges 

from Saddam Hussein’s control of oil allocations netted Iraq about 

$228 million. 

But as this chart shows,1 Iraq’s direct oil sales to neighboring 

countries, Jordan, Turkey, and Syria, generated 40 times as much 

illicit income, over $8 billion. Those direct oil sales were in violation of U.N. sanctions and the Oil-For-Food Program that we 

helped draft at the United Nations, and yet the United States and 

others looked the other way, simply taking note of them. On occasion, the United States was not only aware of illegal Iraqi oil sales 

to its neighbors, the United States actually facilitated those sales, 

as happened in the Khor al-Amaya incident of 2003. 

This incident involved the largest single illicit sale of oil transported by ship out of Iraq during the sanctions period. Over several 

weeks in February and March 2003, Iraq loaded 7.7 million barrels 

of oil into seven seagoing oil tankers at the port of Khor al-Amaya 

in Southern Iraq.2 Khor al-Amaya was not authorized as a place 

for ships to load oil under the Oil-For-Food Program. The oil loaded 

onto the seven ships was sold to the Government of Jordan, which 

paid Iraq $53 million, which was wired to bank accounts under the 

control of the Hussein regime. 

The seven massive oil tankers that carried this oil docked at 

Khor al-Amaya in plain view of the Maritime Interdiction Force 

(MIF), which was then under U.S. command. Internal ship communications show that the seven ship captains were directed to contact the U.S. Naval officer at the MIF before loading any oil and 

to give him this message, ‘‘We are loading crude oil from the terminal at Khor al-Amaya for the Jordanian company acting for Jordan, called Millenium. Do you have any objection?’’ After obtaining 

a response of, ‘‘no objection,’’ the ships were directed to go to the 

port, fill up with oil, and leave with their cargo. They then traveled 

the length of the Persian Gulf with the MIF’s full knowledge and 

acquiescence. 

8

When word of the first Khor al-Amaya oil shipment hit the press 

and an outcry arose about this apparent blatant violation of U.N. 

sanctions, a U.S. company involved with chartering the ships for 

the Jordanian government called U.S. authorities to make sure 

that it was not violating U.S. or U.N. sanctions or hurting U.S. foreign policy. The company even offered to turn over the oil in the 

ships’ possession to the MIF, if asked. A State Department official 

responded that the United States ‘‘was aware of the shipments and 

has determined not to take action.’’ The U.S. company was then reassured. 

Those shipments from Khor al-Amaya sent $53 million into the 

pockets of Saddam Hussein on the eve of the U.S. invasion. The 

Department of Defense knew about the shipments, the State Department knew about the shipments, and we looked the other way. 

And, by the way, we can’t get answers from either of those Departments to inquiries, questions which the Chairman and I sent to 

them. 

There is a pattern here of erratic and inconsistent U.S. enforcement of sanctions on Iraq. On the one hand, the United States was 

at the United Nations trying to stop Iraq from imposing illegal surcharges on Oil-For-Food contracts. On the other hand, the United 

States ignored red flags that some U.S. companies might be paying 

those same illegal surcharges. 

The United States also looked the other way while Iraq sold 40 

times as much oil to its neighbors, Jordan, Turkey, and Syria, totaling $8 billion, 40 times as much as the illegal surcharges. As 

part of that $8 billion, we even permitted Jordanian-chartered 

ships to load oil illegally and gave them safe passage through the 

Persian Gulf, past the Maritime Interdiction Force that we were 

commanding to stop illegal oil ships. 

While imperfect, sanctions can be a useful tool. They can stop a 

country from acquiring armaments, as sanctions did in Iraq. But 

sanctions can also be undermined by schemes that attempt to corrupt or end-run the program, as Saddam Hussein’s scheme. They 

can spawn illicit income, and damage public confidence in international cooperation and in the United Nations itself. 

To safeguard against such schemes in the future, sanctions programs need to build-in stronger anti-corruption measures, including assigning clear responsibilities for detecting and preventing 

corruption, and for putting greater public pressure on member 

countries to take appropriate enforcement actions. U.N. member 

countries, including the United States, will have to stop turning a 

blind eye to violations. Here at home, OFAC must carry out its enforcement responsibilities under our laws, which include ensuring 

compliance with U.N. sanctions, with stronger anti-corruption oversight and active enforcement. 

Mr. Chairman, I know, like you, I commend our staffs for their 

hard work which went into their reports, and I look forward to the 

testimony today. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MICH) 

This is the Subcommittee’s third hearing examining issues related to the U.N. Oilfor-Food program and sanctions on Iraq. 

9

Because this hearing will focus on the problems associated with the program, it 

is easy to forget that U.N. sanctions on Iraq achieved their primary objective of preventing Iraq from rearming. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell characterized 

the sanctions as ‘‘successful,’’ because Saddam Hussein was not able to ‘‘rebuild his 

army . . . [and] has fewer tanks in his inventory today than he had 10 years ago. 

. . .[W]e have not seen that capacity [for weapons of mass destruction] emerge to 

present a full-fledged threat to us.’’ He concluded: ‘‘credit has to be given . . . for 

putting in place a [sanctions] regime that has kept him pretty much in check.’’

The U.N. Oil-for-Food was intended to alleviate the humanitarian calamity resulting from the U.N. trade embargo against Iraq. It was essential to find a way to get 

Iraq to agree to sell its oil and deposit the proceeds in a U.N.-controlled account 

from which humanitarian supplies like food and medicine could be purchased. In 

fact, over $65 billion was eventually deposited into the U.N. account for that purpose. Saddam would agree to the Oil for Food program only if he could determine 

to whom the oil was sold and from whom the supplies would be purchased. U.N. 

member countries, including the United States, reluctantly agreed to give Saddam 

Hussein that control. It is unsurprising that Saddam Hussein later devised multiple 

ways to abuse this authority, including awarding of oil allocations to political figures 

and others to reward their support or curry their favor for efforts to undermine or 

eliminate U.N. sanctions against Iraq. 

It is also unsurprising that when a corrupt Saddam Hussein saw how profitable 

the oil allocations were, he schemed again to take a cut of the profits. From September 2000 to September 2002, Iraq demanded that oil allocation holders awarded 

an Oil for Food contract pay a secret, per-barrel surcharge that ranged from 10 to 

30 cents per barrel. In two short years, through these surcharge payments, Iraq 

amassed $228 million. 

U.S. import statistics show that about half of the oil on which those surcharges 

were paid ended up in the United States. Using Iraqi internal records reviewed by 

our staffs, we estimate that more than half of all of the surcharges paid to Iraq, 

about $118 million, was paid on oil sold to U.S. companies. The remaining $110 million in surcharges was paid on oil sent to other countries, including in Europe, Asia 

and Africa. [See chart.] 

A U.S. company called Bayoil (USA), headquartered in Houston, Texas, was 

smack in the middle of it all. When other oil companies around the world were cutting back on business with Iraq due to Saddam’s surcharge demands, Bayoil increased its business. During the 2-year period in which surcharges were mandatory 

to get Iraqi oil, Bayoil became the largest single buyer of Iraqi oil for the U.S. market. Altogether, Bayoil brought in over 200 million barrels to the United States. My 

staff was able to trace 102 of the U.S. cargoes Bayoil brought here, and found that 

the surcharges paid on those cargoes, according to internal Iraqi records, totaled $37 

million. 

Bayoil sold the oil to U.S. oil companies and refineries which, in turn, sold refined 

petroleum products, like gasoline and heating oil, to American consumers. 

Last month Bayoil was indicted for violating U.S. sanctions on Iraq and for committing fraud, including by paying or arranging the payment of ‘‘millions of dollars 

in secret illegal surcharges to the Government of Iraq.’’ That indictment comes two 

years after the end of the Oil for Food program. But, while the program was going 

on, no one in the U.S. government appears to have paid much attention to Bayoil. 

As soon as Iraq began demanding surcharges, oil companies around the world 

began complaining. Debate erupted at the United Nations about how to stop the 

surcharges. Opinion split, with the United States and United Kingdom on one side, 

trying to increase Iraqi oil prices to make surcharges uneconomical, and Russia and 

China on the other side, supporting lower oil prices. It took two years for U.S. and 

U.K. representatives to find a way, using retroactive pricing, to prevent Iraq from 

imposing surcharges. By the end of 2002, Iraq had given up imposing surcharges, 

because the resulting price was so high, no one could buy the oil, pay a surcharge, 

and still make a profit. 

But at the same time the U.S. joined in efforts to find a way to end such surcharges at the United Nations, there was little or no U.S. effort here at home to 

enforce our own laws against U.S. companies paying illegal surcharges or to help 

the U.N. investigate a U.S. company, Bayoil, that was suspected of contributing to 

the surcharge problem. A few general warnings against paying illegal surcharges 

were sent out, but the government’s primary sanctions enforcer, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), never took on the issue, never researched U.S. company involvement in the payment of surcharges, and never took a hard look at 

Bayoil, despite evidence inviting closer scrutiny. While OFAC did investigate other 

issues, such as preventing the sale to Iraq of prohibited military equipment or dual 

10

use items, the surcharge issue that commanded such attention in the U.N. received 

virtually no attention here at home. Bayoil slipped right by, for two years. 

When asked why OFAC failed to do more, OFAC told the Subcommittee that it 

considered the Oil for Food program to be a U.N. responsibility, and that it was up 

to the U.N., not the U.S., to police compliance with sanctions. The problem with this 

position, however, is that the United Nations has no law enforcement authority. It 

can’t police the nationals of any country. It can’t even force a company to answer 

questions. The U.N. is dependent upon its member states for enforcement, and it 

didn’t get much help from the United States on this matter. 

Bayoil illustrates the point. This chart summarizes what happened with Bayoil. 

In 2001, the U.N. became suspicious that Bayoil and a few other companies were 

using various tactics to make room for surcharge payments. The U.N.’s oil experts 

asked Bayoil for specific cargo information, but Bayoil refused to provide it. In August 2001, the U.N. appealed to the U.S. State Department for help, and the State 

Department asked OFAC to obtain the information. After hearing nothing for four 

months, the U.N. sent another request for help in January 2002. Eight months after 

the initial inquiry, in April 2002, OFAC finally wrote a letter to Bayoil asking for 

information about its licensed activity in Iraq, without requesting the information 

wanted by the U.N. and without directing Bayoil to answer U.N. questions. Despite 

its booming Iraqi oil import business, Bayoil told OFAC that it no longer conducted 

licensed activity in Iraq. OFAC made no followup inquiry and never even bothered 

to send Bayoil’s response to the State Department or the United Nations. 

In the end, the U.N. never obtained the information it needed from the U.S. State 

Department, OFAC, or Bayoil. Worse, the U.N.’s inquires about Bayoil never triggered any OFAC review into whether Bayoil was paying illegal surcharges. This 

lack of interest persisted even though, during the surcharge period, Bayoil suddenly 

expanded its imports to become one of the largest U.S. importers of Iraqi oil. It performed precisely the intermediary role that experts flagged as likely to pay surcharges. And all the while, Bayoil was constantly bombarding U.S., U.N., and Iraqi 

officials with letters and faxes urging them to set lower prices for Iraqi oil—prices 

which would allow more room for the payment of surcharges. 

OFAC’s failure to investigate Bayoil reflects a major oversight failure and a fundamental misconception on the part of OFAC about its responsibility to police U.S. 

nationals to ensure compliance with sanctions on Iraq. OFAC’s actions represented 

an abdication of its responsibility to monitor Bayoil’s behavior and an inappropriate 

attempt to shift OFAC’s own obligation to enforce U.S. sanctions on Iraq to the 

United Nations. Saddam Hussein’s corrupt control of oil allocations and illegal surcharges is a serious concern, even though the Hussein regime obtained far greater 

illicit income through other schemes, some with the knowledge and tacit approval 

of the United States and other members of the U.N. Security Council. The illegal 

surcharges from Saddam Hussein’s control of oil allocations netted Iraq about $228 

million; Iraq’s direct oil sales to its neighboring countries, Jordan, Turkey and Syria, 

generated 40 times as much illicit income—over $8 billion. [See bar chart.] These 

direct oil sales were in violation of U.N. sanctions and the Oil for Food program we 

helped draft at the United Nations, yet the United States and others looked the 

other way, simply taking note of them. 

On occasion, the United States was not only aware of illegal Iraqi oil sales to its 

neighbors, the United State actually facilitated them as happened in the Khor alAmaya incident of 2003. This incident involves the largest single illicit sale of oil 

transported by ship out of Iraq during the sanctions period. 

Over several weeks in February and March 2003, Iraq loaded 7.7 million barrels 

of oil onto 7 seagoing oil tankers at the port of Khor al-Amaya in southern Iraq. 

Khor al-Amaya was not authorized as a place for ships to load oil under the Oil 

for Food program. The oil loaded onto the 7 ships was sold to the Government of 

Jordan, which paid Iraq $53 million, wired to bank accounts under the control of 

the Hussein regime. 

The 7 massive oil tankers that carried this oil docked at Khor al-Amaya in plain 

view of the Maritime Interdiction Force (MIF), which was then under U.S. command. Internal ship communications show that the 7 ship captains were directed 

to contact the U.S. naval officer at MIF before loading any oil and give him this 

message: ‘‘We are loading crude oil from the terminal at Khawr Amaya for 

Millenium [the Jordanian company acting for Jordan], do you have any objection?’’ 

After obtaining a response of ‘‘no objection,’’ the ships were directed to go to the 

port, fill up with oil, and leave with their cargo. They then traveled the length of 

the Persian Gulf, with the MIF’s full knowledge and acquiescence. 

When word of the first of the Khor al-Amaya oil shipment hit the press and an 

outcry arose about this apparent blatant violation of U.N. sanctions, a U.S. company 

involved with chartering the ships for the Jordanian government called U.S. auVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:03 Jan 04, 2006 Jkt 021438 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\21438.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11

thorities to make sure it was not violating U.S. or U.N. sanctions or hurting U.S. 

foreign policy. The company even offered to turn over the oil in the ships’ possession 

to the MIF, if asked. A State Department official responded that the United States 

‘‘was aware of the shipments and has determined not to take action.’’ The U.S. company was reassured. 

The Khor al-Amaya shipments sent $53 million dollars into the pockets of Saddam Hussein on the eve of the U.S. invasion. DOD knew about the shipments, the 

State Department knew, and we looked the other way. 

There is a pattern here of erratic and inconsistent U.S. enforcement of sanctions 

on Iraq. On the one hand, the United States was at the U.N. trying to stop Iraq 

from imposing illegal surcharges on Oil for Food contracts. On the other hand, the 

U.S. ignored red flags that some U.S. companies might be paying those same illegal 

surcharges. The U.S. also looked the other way while Iraq sold 40 times as much 

oil to its neighbors, Jordan, Turkey and Syria, totaling $8 billion. As part of that 

$8 billion, we even permitted Jordanian-chartered ships to load oil illegally and gave 

them safe passage through the Persian Gulf past the Maritime Interdiction Force 

we were commanding to stop illegal oil shipments. 

While imperfect, sanctions can be a useful tool. They can stop a country from acquiring armaments as sanctions did in Iraq. But sanctions can also be undermined 

by schemes that attempt to corrupt or end-run the program. They can spawn illicit 

income, and damage public confidence in international cooperation and in the 

United Nations itself. 

To safeguard against such schemes in the future, sanctions programs need to 

build-in stronger anti-corruption measures, including assigning clear responsibilities 

for detecting and preventing corruption, and for putting greater public pressure on 

member countries to take appropriate enforcement actions. U.N. member countries—including the United States—will have to stop turning a blind eye to violations. Here at home, OFAC must carry out its enforcement responsibilities under 

our own laws, which include ensuring compliance with U.N. sanctions, with stronger 

anti-corruption oversight and active enforcement. 

I commend our staffs for their hard work which went into their reports, and I look 

forward to the testimony today.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Bennett. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BENNETT 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have 

been unable to attend as many of these hearings as I would like 

and I will have to slip out of this one to go to another committee 

assignment that I have. 

I simply want to recall for the Subcommittee a personal experience which I hope will add a certain perspective to the work of the 

Subcommittee and the activities surrounding this issue. I was in 

the Middle East in a country—I will not identify it because it is 

known as being friendly to the United States, although there are 

those who might suggest that it is not—and as happens to a traveling Senator, I was exposed to a press conference. 

In the course of the press conference, the subject immediately 

came up about the sanctions in Iraq and the question was posed 

to me, Senator, how can you justify America’s position that is denying food to children, medicines to the ill, putting tremendous humanitarian pressure on the poor, starving people of Iraq? Your support for sanctions is causing undue hardship in Iraq, and how can 

America justify these hardships? 

The State Department official who was sitting at my elbow immediately whispered in my ear, as a Senator, you don’t have to answer that question. You can defer that to the State Department 

and you don’t have to respond. That is an inappropriate question 

for him to ask you when you are here on another purpose and you 

can deflect it. 

12

I chose to ignore the State Department admonition and said to 

the press, if the people in Iraq are suffering because of the sanctions, the blame belongs to Saddam Hussein and not to the United 

States. If the people in Iraq are being deprived of food or medicines, it is because Saddam Hussein himself chooses to use his 

money to build palaces and take care of his own needs rather than 

to take care of them, and I do not apologize under any circumstances for the position of the Western world that this man deserves to be sanctioned. 

There was no story that appeared as a result of that because 

they did not want to put that particular response in the press in 

that country. 

I think as we go through the details of the scandal relating to 

Oil-For-Food, we should pursue them with the kind of diligence 

that you and the Minority Staff have exhibited here. But I also 

think we should put it in greater context. 

There was a propaganda campaign mounted and maintained over 

a period of years that said that those people who were opposed to 

Saddam Hussein and his regime, who used sanctions in an effort 

to try to bring that regime into some level of civilized behavior, 

were the bad guys and that Saddam Hussein and those who ‘‘represented the Iraqi people,’’ were the good guys. 

One of the things we have learned as a result of the administration’s actions in response to a 15-to-0 vote in the Security Council 

of the United Nations in Iraq has been once again the lesson that 

tyrants do not change their spots. Brutal rulers do not change their 

attitudes. There must be pressure, and it must be effective pressure, from those who are truly on the side of the poor and the 

starving. And the information you are developing in this hearing 

and in other hearings demonstrates the truth of that once again 

and I hope the rest of the world will watch what you are doing here 

and recognize that the efforts on behalf of the United States to help 

the people of Iraq have been well placed and should be applauded 

rather than attacked in the way that they have been. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your diligence in what you are 

doing. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Senator Bennett. Senator Dayton. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAYTON 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend 

you and the Ranking Member for your diligence and persistence in 

this endeavor. 

I was State Auditor for Minnesota, and every time I got involved 

in any kind of audit or investigation, I was accused of having some 

motive. And I said, well, everyone has a motive, but ultimately, the 

audit or the investigation will be judged on the facts. If we have 

access to the facts, then they will stand whole on their own. 

I also learned, while it is not determinative, that the behavior of 

those under investigation was quite instructive as to the validity 

of some of the initial accusations. I found that those with nothing 

to hide usually tried to hide nothing, in fact, were most forthcoming. The more the individuals or institutions tried to hide or 

withhold what was being requested, the more suspicious I became, 

13

and more often than not, those suspicions were validated by the 

findings. 

I must say, the recent difficulties you have mentioned, Senator 

Levin, regarding the executive agencies responding to requests, the 

almost unprecedented steps taken last week to go to a Federal 

court for a temporary injunction to prevent a former FBI agent 

from releasing materials in his possession that would be relevant 

to this investigation says to me that certain individuals or institutions have a great deal to hide, and it makes your determination 

and your persistence in pursuit of the truth and all these facts and 

the money involved all the more commendable, both of you. Thank 

you. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Senator Dayton. 

I would like to call the first panel. I would like to call Mark 

Greenblatt and Steven Groves, Counsels for the Majority Staff, and 

Dan Berkovitz, Counsel to the Minority Staff of the Permanent 

Subcommittee on Investigations. 

I appreciate all the staff’s hard work on this investigation, both 

the Majority and Minority Staff. As I mentioned in my opening 

statement, today, we will present evidence that has been gathered 

on how Saddam Hussein manipulated the Oil-For-Food Program to 

peddle influence and reward friends in order to undermine sanctions. In particular, this hearing will present evidence detailing 

how Saddam rewarded foreign officials with lucrative oil allocations 

that could be converted into cash. 

Mr. Greenblatt will present his findings on allocations granted to 

a prominent Russian politician named Vladimir Zhirinovsky to reward him for his outspoken support for Iraq. In addition, Mr. 

Greenblatt will present evidence that the former French Minister 

of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, and George Galloway, the newly 

reelected member of the British Parliament, were granted substantial oil allocations by the Hussein regime. 

Mr. Groves will testify about how Saddam Hussein regime’s attempt to influence the Russian Government by granting allocation 

to the Russian Presidential Council. Specifically, oil allocations 

were given to the head of the Presidential Council, Alexander 

Voloshin. 

Finally, Mr. Berkovitz will be testifying about issues related to 

illegal surcharges paid on oil contracts under the OFF program, including an American company, Bayoil, as well as illegal oil shipments made from the Iraqi port of Khor al-Amaya. 

Before we begin, pursuant to Rule 6, all witnesses who testify before this Subcommittee are required to be sworn. 

Do you swear the testimony before the Subcommittee will be the 

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, 

God? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. I do. 

Mr. GROVES. I do. 

Mr. BERKOVITZ. I do. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, gentlemen. As you are well aware, 

your written testimony will be presented in its entirety. You will 

be each allocated 10 minutes for your presentation. Mr. Greenblatt, 

I understand that you will testify first, followed by Mr. Groves. Mr. 

14

1The prepared statement of Mr. Greenblatt appears in the Appendix on page 59. 

2See Report on Oil Allocations Granted to Charles Pasqua and George Galloway and Report 

on Oil Allocations Granted to Vladimir Zhirinovsky, prepared by the Majority and Minority 

Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which appear in the Appendix on 

pages 84 and 180 respectively. 3See Exhibit No. 1, which appears in the Appendix on page 1447. 

Greenblatt will then testify again, within the same time parameters, and we will finish up with Mr. Berkovitz. 

Mr. Greenblatt, you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF MARK L. GREENBLATT,1 COUNSEL, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE 

ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

U.S. SENATE 

Mr. GREENBLATT. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Levin, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify 

before you today concerning the Subcommittee’s investigation into 

the Oil-For-Food Program. 

My testimony today will present evidence demonstrating how the 

Hussein regime rewarded its political allies under the Oil-For-Food 

Program.2 In particular, I will introduce evidence establishing that 

the Hussein regime granted lucrative oil allocations to Vladimir 

Zhirinovsky, a prominent Russian official. 

In short, the evidence reveals that Zhirinovsky was granted allocations of 75 million barrels of oil. The Iraqi Ministry of Oil estimated that profits of $8.6 million were made in connection with 

Zhirinovsky’s allocations, as reflected in Exhibit 1.3 In fact, for 

some of those allocations, the evidence shows that an American oil 

trader named Bayoil may have paid Zhirinovsky millions of dollars 

in connection with those transactions. Finally, I will present evidence that Zhirinovsky and Bayoil paid illegal, under-the-table surcharges to the Hussein regime totaling $4.7 million. 

Senator Coleman, as you described in your opening statement, 

Hussein regime officials that were interviewed in Iraq by this Subcommittee told us that the Iraqis gave preferential treatment to 

specific foreign officials in the allocation of oil because of their support for the Hussein regime and their opposition to U.N. sanctions 

on Iraq. Vladimir Zhirinovsky was one of those officials. 

Zhirinovsky has been a long-time member of the Russian Duma 

and the leader of the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of 

Russia, commonly called the LDPR. He was popular enough to run 

for President of Russia three different times. He was a tireless and 

outspoken supporter of the Hussein regime, taking roughly 16 trips 

to Iraq during the 7 years of the Oil-For-Food Program, and frequently denouncing U.N. sanctions against Iraq. In addition, 

Zhirinovsky signed an agreement on, ‘‘interparty ties’’ between his 

party, the LDPR, and Saddam Hussein’s Baath party. He dispatched a group of supporters called, ‘‘the falcons of Zhirinovsky’’ 

to Iraq to support the Hussein regime during the First Gulf War. 

Zhirinovsky, who wrote a book entitled ‘‘I Spit on the West,’’ was 

unquestionably a strong supporter of the Hussein regime. 

The regime, in turn, rewarded Zhirinovsky with lucrative oil allocations. In total, Zhirinovsky received at least 12 different allocations totaling more than 75 million barrels of oil. The Iraqi MinVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:03 Jan 04, 2006 Jkt 021438 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\21438.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
15

1See Exhibit No. 2, which appears in the Appendix on page 1450. 

istry of Oil estimated that the profits arising from Zhirinovsky’s allocations amounted to $8.6 million. 

The Subcommittee staff has prepared a thorough and comprehensive report detailing the chronology of events surrounding 

Zhirinovsky’s allocations. Among the voluminous evidence are six 

letters signed by Zhirinovsky himself and 31 documents from the 

Ministry of Oil that specifically identify Zhirinovsky or his radical 

political party. 

The report also introduces testimony of four senior members of 

the Hussein regime, including Tariq Aziz and Saddam’s former 

Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan, each of which independently 

confirm that Zhirinovsky received oil allocations. In fact, one regime official confirmed to this Subcommittee not only that 

Zhirinovsky received oil allocations, but that Zhirinovsky also 

earned money from the deals. He said, ‘‘Of course, Zhirinovsky 

would make a profit. That is the whole point.’’ I will present a brief 

sampling of that evidence today. 

The first document is a letter that appears in Exhibit 2.1 That 

exhibit is a letter from Zhirinovsky to the Iraqi Ambassador to 

Russia at the very beginning of the Oil-For-Food Program. In short, 

this is Zhirinovsky’s pitch for oil contracts. He begins the letter by 

describing his longtime support for the Hussein regime. He states 

that he and his political party ‘‘stood firmly against the enforcement of United Nations sanctions against Iraq,’’ and that his political party used its ‘‘influence on the Duma to adopt resolutions that 

will facilitate economic cooperation between Russia and Iraq.’’ He 

also stated, ‘‘a special resolution to lift the economic sanctions on 

Iraq was adopted in particular and by virtue of our party’s efforts.’’ 

After brandishing his pro-Hussein credentials, Zhirinovsky states 

that his party has ‘‘commercial institutions’’ that would like to receive oil contracts under the Oil-For-Food Program. 

After Zhirinovsky’s letter, there were a series of meetings between his representatives and members of the Hussein regime, including meetings between Zhirinovsky himself and Saddam Hussein and Saddam’s right-hand man, Tariq Aziz. The Subcommittee 

staff report details all those meetings, which ultimately culminated 

in an oil allocation to Zhirinovsky in Phase II of the program. 

The Hussein regime continued to grant oil allocations through 

the next two phases. Then, in Phase V, a new player enters the picture. That new player is the American oil trader named Bayoil. In 

early phases of the Oil-For-Food Program, Bayoil was buying up as 

much Iraqi oil as possible. They aggressively pursued oil allocations and prided themselves on being one of the largest purchasers 

of Iraqi oil under the program. 

In late 1998, Bayoil struck a deal with Zhirinovsky. Zhirinovsky 

would assign his allocation to Bayoil in exchange for a hefty commission. The evidence suggests that the commission was 17 cents 

a barrel, which would amount to $850,000 for a medium-sized allocation, such as five million barrels. 

When Zhirinovsky informed the Iraqis that his allocation would 

be assigned to Bayoil, the Iraqis rejected the plan, saying, ‘‘Iraq 

cannot do business with American companies.’’ As a result, Bayoil 

16

1See Exhibit No. 3, which appears in the Appendix on page 1455. 

was forced to engage a Russian company to act as the nominal purchasing agent. Bayoil eventually did so, engaging a Russian company called Nafta Moscow to interface with the Iraqis. 

Bayoil then confirmed the deal with Zhirinovsky in a letter presented on the left-hand side of Exhibit 3.1 In that letter, Bayoil 

tells Zhirinovsky that it has engaged Nafta Moscow to act as the 

purchasing agent and requested that Zhirinovsky confirm the 

agreement with a letter on LDPR letterhead. Bayoil even drafted 

the letter for Zhirinovsky, saying, ‘‘We LDPR confirm that our Iraqi 

oil allocation of 7 million barrels is assigned to Bayoil. We will confirm to SOMO to contract this allocation with company designated 

by Bayoil. Upon receiving from you the agreed premium prior to 

. . .,’’ and it inserts a certain date. Signed, Mr. Vladimir V. 

Zhirinovsky. Bayoil then concludes the letter indicating that it 

hopes to pay Zhirinovsky’s premium earlier than the contractual 

deadline. 

Soon after Bayoil’s letter to Zhirinovsky, Bayoil explained the 

deal to Nafta, its nominal purchasing agent. That letter appears on 

the right-hand side of Exhibit 3. In that letter, Bayoil gives Nafta 

instructions on how to negotiate with the Iraqis, such as reminding 

the Iraqis that the allocation was, ‘‘being contracted for and on behalf of Mr. Vladimir Volfovich, the LDPR.’’ It is reasonable to conclude that the name ‘‘Vladimir Volfovich, the LDPR’’ is a reference 

to Zhirinovsky because Zhirinovsky’s full name is Vladimir 

Volfovich Zhirinovsky and the LDPR is his political party. Nafta 

was also supposed to remind the Iraqis that Zhirinovsky is, ‘‘one 

of the greatest supporter of the Iraqi cause in the world.’’ Bayoil 

also offered suggestions, ‘‘on maximizing the economic result for 

the LDPR,’’ Zhirinovsky’s radical political party. 

All of this correspondence eventually culminated in six different 

oil transactions, starting in Phase V and continuing through Phase 

X. In connection with those transactions, Bayoil will pay a large 

commission payment to a seemingly unrelated entity. For instance, 

in the Phase VI deal, Bayoil paid 17 cents to a mysterious entity 

called ‘‘Plasco Shipping.’’ In total, Bayoil paid Plasco more than 

$1.3 million. Similarly, in Phase VII, Bayoil paid a massive commission of 31 cents per barrel to another mysterious entity called 

‘‘Bayvan Consulting.’’ In one document, a Bayoil employee called 

those payments, ‘‘Russian commission.’’ Those Russian commissions 

to Bayvan appear to total more than $1.5 million. 

The Subcommittee could not identify any services provided by 

these companies, Plasco Shipping or Bayvan Consulting, in connection with the oil deals. Our exhaustive search of Bayoil’s files concerning these deals included a thorough vetting of thousands of 

pages detailing each and every aspect of the transactions. Nevertheless, the Subcommittee could not identify one piece of correspondence with Plasco or Bayvan. There was no contact with either of them, no invoices, no indication of any services provided 

whatsoever. Moreover, the Subcommittee attempted to locate each 

of those companies and was unable to do so. Therefore, in light of 

the fact that Bayoil agreed to pay a premium to Zhirinovsky and 

Bayoil made these massive payments to dubious companies, it is 

17

1See Exhibit No. 7, which appears in the Appendix on page 1475. 

2See Exhibit No. 4, which appears in the Appendix on page 1459. 

reasonable to conclude that those payments were, in fact, commissions to Vladimir Zhirinovsky. 

Not only did Zhirinovsky profit from this scheme, but Saddam 

Hussein profited, as well. In Phase VIII of the program, which occurred towards the end of 2000, the Hussein regime started demanding under-the-table payments in connection with oil purchases. These payments were in direction violation of U.N. sanctions and the rules of the Oil-For-Food Program. According to senior members of the Hussein regime, every single recipient of an oil 

allocation was obligated to make those payments, commonly called 

surcharges. Surcharges were imposed over a 2-year period, from 

September 2000 to mid-2002, and during that period, Zhirinovsky 

received four distinct allocations. As reflected in the documents 

presented in Exhibit 7,1 for those four allocations, the Hussein regime received under-the-table payments totaling approximately 

$4.7 million. 

Let us review one such surcharge payment. In Phase X, 

Zhirinovsky received an allocation of four million barrels. Bayoil 

once again purchased that allocation and engaged Russian oil giant 

Lukoil to be its agent. Lukoil contracted for the oil on behalf of 

Bayoil and the contract was numbered M/10/67. In connection with 

Contract M/10/67, Bayoil made payments totaling $1,122,548.70 to 

Plasco Shipping, the same mysterious entity that we visited previously. Those payments are captured on the left-hand side of Exhibit 4,2 which presents Bayoil’s internal accounting statements reflecting the payments to Plasco Shipping. 

It is crucial that we remember the sum paid to Plasco Shipping, 

$1,122,548.70, because that precise figure appears on a document 

created by the Ministry of Oil. That document, which is a chart 

that appears on the right-hand side of Exhibit 4, is a summary of 

all surcharges paid to the Hussein regime under the Oil-For-Food 

Program. The entry for Contract M/10/67, the Lukoil contract we 

discussed earlier, indicates that the surcharge owed was precisely 

$1,122,548.70, the exact amount to the penny that Bayoil paid 

Plasco Shipping. Finally, the chart indicates that the surcharge 

was paid in full. Therefore, given this evidence, it is reasonable to 

conclude that Bayoil’s payments to Plasco Shipping were, in fact, 

illegal under-the-table payments to the Hussein regime. 

As displayed in Exhibit 7, $4.7 million was paid in surcharges in 

connection with Zhirinovsky’s allocations. While Zhirinovsky and 

his agents paid $4.7 million to the Hussein regime in cash, 

Zhirinovsky also compensated the regime by literally giving the 

Iraqis a building in Moscow. In Phase VIII, Zhirinovsky was apparently having difficulty paying off all the surcharge debt. The Vice 

President of Iraq, Taha Yasin Ramadan, told the Subcommittee 

that he met with Zhirinovsky face-to-face and actually threatened 

him, saying, ‘‘Pay or get nothing.’’

In lieu of paying off the surcharge with cash, Zhirinovsky offered 

to give the Iraqis a building he owned in Moscow. Senior regime 

officials informed the Subcommittee that the building was worth 

more than $800,000. In our staff report, we present a letter from 

18

1The prepared statement of Mr. Groves appears in the Appendix on page 68. 

2See Report on Oil Allocations Granted to The Russian Presidential Council, prepared by the 

Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which appears 

in the Appendix on page 459. 

Zhirinovsky in which he discusses his proposal. The Iraqis eventually agreed to Zhirinovsky’s offer and the deed was transferred to 

the Iraqis at their embassy in Moscow. One senior official told the 

regime—I am sorry, told the Subcommittee that he observed the 

transaction, saying, ‘‘I was there personally.’’ We have learned that 

the building is being used as an Arabic school. 

In conclusion, our staff report establishes that Zhirinovsky received numerous lucrative oil allocations, that Bayoil paid the Russians millions of dollars in exchange for some of those allocations, 

and that Zhirinovsky, with Bayoil’s financing, paid the Hussein regime millions in under-the-table surcharges. 

With that, I will close my presentation. I would be happy to answer your questions. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Greenblatt. Mr. Groves. 

TESTIMONY OF STEVEN A. GROVES,1 COUNSEL, PERMANENT 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. 

SENATE 

Mr. GROVES. Good morning, Chairman Coleman, Senator Levin, 

and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today regarding the Subcommittee’s latest findings relating to our ongoing investigation into the Oil-For-Food Program. 

My testimony today presents evidence gathered by the Subcommittee establishing that the former regime of Saddam Hussein 

attempted to exert influence at the highest levels of Russian government by awarding lucrative allocations of oil to politically influential officials.2 In particular, the Hussein regime assigned the 

rights to massive quantities of oil to the Russian Presidential 

Council, which was then headed by a powerful Kremlin insider 

named Alexander Voloshin. 

In April, we traveled to Iraq and interviewed senior officials of 

the former Hussein regime. The officials told us that oil allocations 

were awarded to foreign politicians and political parties in order to 

engender international support for their regime. Documents reviewed by the Subcommittee from the Iraqi Ministry of Oil confirmed that massive allocations of oil were awarded to U.N. Security Council members that were sympathetic towards Iraq in its efforts to lift sanctions. Among those members was the Russian Federation. Saddam Hussein personally approved the lists of allocation 

recipients along with a committee of his closest advisors, including 

Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and Vice President Taha Yasin 

Ramadan, both of whom were interviewed by the Subcommittee. 

The Hussein regime gave allocations to Russian individuals, political parties, government ministries, and major oil companies due 

to their good relationship with Iraq and due to their support for the 

lifting of sanctions. A total of 30 percent of all of the oil allocated 

during the entire course of the program went to Russia. The stateowned oil company Zarubezhneft was allocated almost 180 million 

barrels of oil. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the equivaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:03 Jan 04, 2006 Jkt 021438 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\21438.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
19

1See Exhibit No. 19, which appears in the Appendix on page 1514. 

lent of our State Department, was allocated 155 million barrels. Individual politicians, such as Mr. Zhirinovsky, and political parties 

were also given allocations, including 73 million barrels to the Unified Russia Party, now known as the Unity Party, a pro-Kremlin 

organization associated with Russian President Vladimir Putin. 

Tariq Aziz stated that the Unity Party received such a large number of allocations because Russia was taking positions at the U.N. 

Security Council favorable to Iraq. Vice President Ramadan stated 

that the Unity Party was given massive allocations because it was 

the governing party and the party of the president. 

The Russian Presidential Council received nine oil allocations totaling 90 million barrels. The Presidential Council consisted of advisors appointed by the president, was responsible for devising 

presidential policy, drafting presidential decrees, and coordinating 

policy among government agencies. The head of the Presidential 

Council was Alexander Stalevich Voloshin, who was widely known 

to be the power behind the throne at the Kremlin. Mr. Voloshin assisted in President Putin’s rise to power, managed his first election 

campaign, and helped to create the Unity Party. He was once referred to as ‘‘de facto, after President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s most 

powerful man.’’

Former regime officials interviewed by the Subcommittee confirmed the allocations given to Mr. Voloshin were a show of support 

for him, and were granted to him because of his relationships with 

‘‘very important characters.’’ Vice President Ramadan told the Subcommittee that he knew that Mr. Voloshin was the head of Russia’s 

Presidential administration and stated that the oil allocations 

awarded to him had been approved by Saddam Hussein. 

Many of the allocations to the Russian Presidential Council, like 

the allocations to Mr. Zhirinovsky, were ultimately purchased and 

shipped by Houston-based Bayoil. The Presidential Council and 

Bayoil used a variety of middle-men oil trading companies to execute the actual contracts with Iraq. 

The transactions involved in the allocations granted to the Russian Presidential Council followed the same general pattern. It 

would start at the beginning of each phase with an oil allocation 

to the Russian Presidential Council. If you would turn your attention to Exhibit 19,1 it is an example of a Ministry of Oil allocation 

list. The chart indicates that the Russian Presidential Council was 

allocated 14 million barrels of oil in Phase VIII and that a Mr. 

Issakov was named as the designated contact person. Mr. Issakov 

is Sergei Issakov, who is associated with Mr. Voloshin, as noted in 

our report. As you can see by the hand-written note at the corner 

of the document, the allocations had been approved at the highest 

level by the ‘‘the President Leader.’’

Once the oil is allocated, the contact person would choose a Russian company to act as the nominal purchaser, the middleman, in 

exchange for a small commission. A representative of the middleman, often Mr. Issakov himself, then traveled to Baghdad and 

signed a contract with SOMO that could be forwarded to the 

United Nations for approval. Once the contract was signed, SOMO 

would forward that contract to the Minister of Oil for approval. If 

20

1See Exhibit No. 27, which appears in the Appendix on page 1522. 

2See Exhibit No. 29, which appears in the Appendix on page 1524. 

3See Exhibit No. 20, which appears in the Appendix on page 1515. 

4See Exhibit No. 23, which appears in the Appendix on page 1518. 

you could turn your attention to Exhibit 27,1 which is an example 

of one such an approval for an allocation given to Mr. Voloshin in 

Phase XII. As you can see, the terms of the official contract with 

the Russia middleman company, called Impexoil, were approved by 

the Minister of Oil, and you can see that the ministry kept track 

of exactly who the allocation holder was, Mr. Voloshin, the head of 

the Russian Presidential Council. 

Other Ministry of Oil documents also kept track of who was the 

ultimate beneficiary of the oil allocation. For example, Exhibit 29 2

is a letter from the Crude Oil Marketing Department to the Financial Department outlining the terms of a contract signed during 

Phase XIII with Impexoil. Again, the letter makes clear who is benefitting from the allocation. It states, ‘‘Party Benefiting from Allocation: Head of the Russian Presidential Council.’’

Once the allocation and the contracts had been approved, the 

middleman company entered into a separate contract with an oil 

company, in many instances Bayoil, to actually ship the oil. After 

the oil was lifted, Bayoil wired payments, usually hundreds of 

thousands of dollars each, into certain bank accounts in Cyprus or 

Switzerland, countries not exactly known for their transparency in 

banking practices. The evidence indicates that the money wired to 

those accounts by Bayoil was ultimately split between the allocation holder and the middleman. 

The Russian middlemen used to facilitate these allocations were 

paid a commission, usually amounting to two cents per barrel. For 

example, you can see here in Exhibit 20 3 that in June 2000, Bayoil 

agreed to pay one of these middlemen, a company called Rosnefteimpex, two cents a barrel for a contract in Phase VIII. As you can 

see, the Russian Presidential Council does not appear in this document. Instead, a company called Haverhill Trading suddenly appears and is somehow engaged in these transactions. This is because even the middlemen in these transactions had middlemen. 

As detailed in our report, Cyprus-based Haverhill served as a passthrough for the money that Bayoil paid to the middlemen, to the 

Russian Presidential Council, and in some instances, back to the 

Hussein regime in the form of surcharges. 

We conclude that the allocation holders and the middlemen profited from these transactions, and Saddam profited, as well. Millions 

of dollars wired by Bayoil into Cypriot bank accounts during Phase 

IX and X were routed back to the Hussein regime. The letter displayed in Exhibit 23 4 to the Executive Director of SOMO relates 

to a Phase IX allocation to the Russian Presidential Council and 

indicates that the middleman on the transaction, a company called 

Rosnefteimpex, had paid surcharges due to the regime. As you can 

see, the document notes that Rosnefteimpex delivered the surcharge payments directly to the Iraqi embassy in Moscow. This was 

a common practice for the Russian companies who paid surcharges 

under these oil transactions. 

For all of the transactions where Bayoil was involved, Bayoil wired over $9.2 million into different bank accounts in Cyprus, 

21

1See Exhibit No. 31, which appears in the Appendix on page 1526. 

2The additional prepared statement of Mr. Greenblatt appears in the Appendix on page 71. 

3See Exhibit No. 8a., which appears in the Appendix on page 1479. 

4See Exhibit No. 8b., which appears in the Appendix on page 1481. 

Greece, and Switzerland between July 2000 and January 2003. As 

indicated in Exhibit 31,1 we estimate that approximately $609,000 

went to the middleman companies, such as Rosnefteimpex and 

Impexoil. The contracts connected to the Russian Presidential 

Council in Phases IX and X resulted in surcharge payments back 

to the Hussein regime, payments that we estimate to be in excess 

of $5.6 million. Once the payments to the middlemen and the surcharges to the Hussein regime are deducted from the total payments made by Bayoil, there is a remainder of almost $3 million. 

That is the amount we conclude went to the allocation holders, specifically Mr. Voloshin and Mr. Issakov under the auspices of the 

Russian Presidential Council. 

Thank you again for allowing me to summarize our findings and 

I look forward to any questions you have on this matter. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Groves. 

Mr. Greenblatt, are you going to pick it up from here, and then 

we will go to Mr. Berkovitz? 

ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY OF MARK L. GREENBLATT 2

Mr. GREENBLATT. Thank you again for the opportunity to present 

additional evidence. This presentation will introduce evidence that 

the Subcommittee obtained establishing that the Hussein regime 

granted oil allocations to former French Minister of the Interior 

Charles Pasqua and recently reelected member of the British Parliament George Galloway. The evidence establishes that Pasqua refused to sign a letter for the Iraqis concerning the allocations because he ‘‘fear[ed] political scandals.’’ The evidence also indicates 

that Galloway appears to have used a children’s cancer foundation 

in at least one transaction. 

I will start with a sampling of evidence concerning the allocations granted to Charles Pasqua. The first exhibit, Exhibit 8(a),3 is 

a handwritten note written by the Executive Director of SOMO, the 

State Oil Marketing Organization, that he sent to the Minister of 

Oil. The subject line of the note is, ‘‘The French Personality 

(Charles Pasqua).’’ In the first line of the letter, SOMO indicates 

that Saddam Hussein personally approved the allocation to Charles 

Pasqua, stating, ‘‘The President leader . . . has approved the allocation of 3 million barrels to the French personality (Charles 

Pasqua).’’ The note goes on to say that the Iraqis requested that 

Pasqua sign a letter concerning one aspect of the transaction and 

that he refused to do so. According to the note, Pasqua refused to 

sign the letter because he ‘‘fear[ed] political scandals.’’

The next exhibit, which is displayed on Exhibit 8(b),4 is a letter 

written by Tariq Aziz’s chief assistant. In that letter, he informs 

SOMO that the identity of Pasqua’s agent and indicates that the 

agent, ‘‘represents Mr. Pasqua in receiving the oil allocations allotted to the latter.’’ I should note that Pasqua’s agent, Bernard 

Guillet, was detained 2 weeks ago for charges relating to Oil-ForFood transactions. 

22

1See Exhibit No. 8d., which appears in the Appendix on page 1486. 

2See Exhibit No. 9, which appears in the Appendix on page 1490. 

The last exhibit appears on 8(d).1 That exhibit is another letter 

from the Executive Director of SOMO, in which he informs the Oil 

Minister that everyone who received an allocation in Phase VI of 

the program requested an increase in their allotment. At the bottom of the letter is a handwritten note indicating that Tariq Aziz, 

‘‘endorsed’’ an increase of 1 million barrels to Pasqua’s allocation. 

Attached to the letter, which appears on the right side of the exhibit, is a chart created by SOMO reflecting the requests for additional barrels of oil. Under the headings ‘‘France’’ and ‘‘Special Requests,’’ the chart states ‘‘Charles Pasqua’’ and indicates that his 

purchasing agent had contracted for 3 million barrels of oil. It also 

indicates that Pasqua requested an additional allotment of ‘‘unspecified’’ volume. 

These documents are a mere sampling of evidence accumulated 

by the Subcommittee that establishes that Charles Pasqua was 

granted oil allocations under the program. 

Turning to the evidence concerning Mr. Galloway, the evidence 

indicates that Galloway received allocations in six phases of the 

Oil-For-Food Program, amounting to a total of 20 million barrels of 

oil. Saddam Hussein’s chief lieutenant, Vice President Taha Yassin 

Ramadan, confirmed in an interview with the Subcommittee that 

Galloway received allocations. In addition, as reflected in the poster presented now, Ramadan confirmed that Galloway was granted 

allocations, ‘‘because of his opinions about Iraq. [He] wants to lift 

embargo against Iraq.’’ Other Hussein regime officials confirmed 

that Galloway received allocations under the Oil-For-Food Program. 

In fact, just yesterday, the Subcommittee re-interviewed a senior 

member of the Hussein regime to confirm whether Galloway received allocations. The Subcommittee asked the following question: 

‘‘Did the Iraqis grant any oil allocations to George Galloway, the 

member of the British Parliament?’’ His answer, ‘‘Yes.’’

The first series of exhibits reveal that Galloway received an allocation of 3 million barrels of oil in Phase IX of the program. In the 

first exhibit, which is reflected in Exhibit 9,2 we see a letter from 

SOMO to the Minister of Oil requesting approval of Contract M/09/

23. In identifying the contact, SOMO indicates that the contract 

was with a French oil company called Aredio Petroleum Company, 

and next to that name, the letter states: ‘‘(Fawaz Zuraiqat—

Mariam’s Appeal).’’

Yesterday, the Subcommittee verified with that senior member of 

the Hussein regime that this document was authentic and that the 

Oil Minister’s signature was genuine. Regime officials interviewed 

by the Subcommittee also confirmed that, in these letters to the Oil 

Minister, the allocation recipient was identified in parentheses next 

to the purchaser’s name. Accordingly, this document indicates that 

the recipient of this oil allocation was ‘‘Mariam Appeal.’’ The 

Mariam Appeal was a foundation established by George Galloway, 

ostensibly to help a 4-year-old Iraqi girl named Mariam who was 

suffering from leukemia. Therefore, it appears that George GalloVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:03 Jan 04, 2006 Jkt 021438 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\21438.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
23

1See Exhibit No. 10, which appears in the Appendix on page 1493. 

2See Exhibit No. 12, which appears in the Appendix on page 1498. 

3See Exhibit No. 15, which appears in the Appendix on page 1506. 

4See Exhibit No. 14, which appears in the Appendix on page 1503. 

way used a children’s cancer foundation to conceal his oil allocation 

deal. 

A different Ministry of Oil document further confirms that Galloway received this allocation. That document, which appears as Exhibit 10,1 is a chart created by SOMO after the fall of the Hussein 

regime that lists all oil allocations granted in Phase IX of the program. Entry number 23 of that chart indicates that the oil for Contract M/09/23, the Aredio contract that we discussed a moment ago, 

had been allocated to George Galloway and his agent, Fawaz 

Zureikat. A senior Hussein regime official that was interviewed 

yesterday confirmed that Zureikat facilitated Galloway’s oil transactions, ‘‘It’s my understanding that Fawaz Zuraiqat is oil lifter for 

Galloway.’’

The next exhibit, Exhibit 12,2 is another of the SOMO letters requesting approval of a contract from the Oil Minister. The contract 

is identified as Contract M/11/04, with Middle East Advanced 

Semiconductor, and next to the company’s name appears ‘‘(Mr. 

George Galloway).’’ Once again, these forms were authenticated by 

senior Hussein regime officials. According to those officials, the 

name in parentheses next to the name of the purchasing company 

indicates the allocation recipient. 

For instance, the Subcommittee asked one senior regime official 

the following question concerning this very document: Q: ‘‘Does the 

phrase, ‘(Mr. George Galloway)’ mean that the allocation for this oil 

was granted to George Galloway?’’ His answer: ‘‘Yes.’’

The letter also indicates that an individual named ‘‘Fawaz 

Zureikat’’ was involved in the transaction. Once again, a senior 

Hussein regime official informed the Subcommittee that ‘‘Zureikat 

was the oil lifter for the benefit of George.’’ 

In the next exhibit, Exhibit 15,3 we see the same form yet again, 

a letter from SOMO to the Oil Minister requesting approval of an 

oil contract. In this form, SOMO indicates that Contract M/12/14 

was signed once again with Middle East Semiconductors, ‘‘(on behalf of Mr. George Galloway),’’ and requests the Oil Minister’s approval. Once again, we reconfirmed with a senior Iraqi official from 

the Hussein regime that this letter was, indeed, genuine and that 

the Oil Minister’s signature at the bottom was authentic. In addition, we confirmed that the form indicated that the oil had been allocated to Galloway. That official was asked, ‘‘Does the phrase, ‘on 

behalf of Mr. George Galloway’ mean that the allocation for this oil 

was granted to George Galloway?’’ His answer: ‘‘Yes.’’

The Subcommittee obtained additional evidence that the oil for 

this contract had been allocated to Galloway. That evidence is captured in Exhibit 14,4 a SOMO letter informing the ‘‘Financial Department’’ of pending oil contracts. For Contract M/12/14, SOMO 

notified the Financial Department of the contract, identifying the 

contract as ‘‘Contract M/12/14 with Middle East ASI, (Mr. Galloway).’’ Middle East ASI was Fawaz Zureikat’s company, and according to this document, it bought the oil that had been allocated 

to Mr. Galloway. This corresponds with the testimony of the senior 

24

1The prepared statement of Mr. Berkovitz appears in the Appendix on page 77. 

2See Report on Illegal Surcharges on Oil-for-Food Contracts And Illegal Oil Shipments From 

Khor Al-Amaya, prepared by the Minority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which appears in the Appendix on page 836. 

Hussein regime official, who confirmed to the Subcommittee for a 

second time that ‘‘Fawaz Zureikat is oil lifter for Galloway.’’

The Subcommittee obtained another example of this SOMO form 

for the last contract involving Galloway. That letter, which is Exhibit 14, is SOMO’s notification to the Financial Department for 

Contract M/13/48. 

Senator LEVIN. What exhibit is that? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is Exhibit 14. Once again, this document 

indicates that Galloway received the allocation and that Fawaz 

Zureikat’s company signed the contract to lift that oil. 

All told, the Subcommittee obtained evidence related to four of 

Galloway’s allocations. That evidence matches parallel evidence 

presented in the Subcommittee’s reports on Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 

the Russian Presidential Council, and Charles Pasqua. In addition, 

the Subcommittee authenticated the Galloway evidence with senior 

Hussein regime officials involved in the allocation of oil. 

With that, I will close my presentation and I would be happy to 

answer your questions. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Greenblatt. Mr. Berkovitz. 

TESTIMONY OF DAN M. BERKOVITZ,1 COUNSEL TO THE MINORITY, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE 

Mr. BERKOVITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin. 

My name is Dan Berkovitz. I am Minority Staff Counsel to the 

Subcommittee. 

The Minority Staff report complements the other Subcommittee 

reports discussed today.2 Whereas those reports focus on allocation 

holders and purchasers of Iraqi oil, the Minority Staff report examines what eventually happened to that oil, how so much of that oil 

got into the United States, and what the United States did to attempt to put an end to the illegal surcharge payments. Additionally, the Minority Staff report examines the largest single incident 

of oil being exported from Iraq by ship in violation of the U.N. 

sanctions, what is sometimes referred to as ‘‘the Khor al-Amaya 

shipments,’’ in reference to the Iraqi port where these shipments 

originated. 

From September 2000 until late 2002, the Iraqi government demanded that purchasers of Iraqi oil under the Oil-For-Food Program pay a per-barrel surcharge to the Iraqi regime. These surcharges were above the official sales price for Iraqi oil approved by 

the United Nations, and were to be paid into accounts outside the 

control of the United Nations. These payments violated the U.N. 

sanctions on Iraq. The surcharge amount varied, from a low of 10 

cents per barrel to a high of 30 cents per barrel. Detailed internal 

records kept by the Iraqi Oil Ministry’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), show that, during this period, Iraq collected 

about $228 million in illegal surcharges. 

25

1See an attachment to the prepared statement of Dan M. Berkovitz, Counsel to the Minority, 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which appears in the Appendix on page 82. 

During this surcharge period, the United States was one of the 

largest customers of Iraqi crude oil, importing an average of about 

660,000 barrels of oil per day. The United States imported a total 

of about 525 million barrels of Iraqi oil over this period. 

U.S. companies did not buy this oil directly from Iraq, but rather 

from oil traders, allocation holders, and various other ‘‘middlemen’’ 

that were unique to the Iraqi oil trade. Using SOMO records on 

surcharge amounts assessed and collected and U.S. Energy Information Administration data on U.S. oil imports, the Minority Staff 

estimates that about $118 million in illegal surcharges were paid 

on Iraqi barrels of oil sent to the United States. 

This means that oil imported into the United States financed 

about 52 percent of the illegal surcharges paid to the Hussein regime. Oil destined for other countries accounted for about $110 million in illegal surcharges, or about 48 percent of the total illegal 

surcharges paid. This information is depicted in the chart.1 These 

percentages roughly correspond to the percentages of Iraqi oil sent 

to the United States and elsewhere during this period. 

With one notable exception, the Subcommittee Minority Staff has 

not seen evidence showing that U.S. companies knowingly purchased oil on which a surcharge had been paid. U.S. companies 

buying Iraqi oil from traders typically included a clause in their 

contracts requiring the seller to warrant that no surcharge had 

been paid. However, other than this one notable exception, the 

Subcommittee Minority Staff did not investigate whether any U.S. 

companies knowingly purchased oil on which a surcharge had been 

paid. 

The notable exception involves a U.S. company called Bayoil. 

Bayoil is a privately-held company headquartered in Houston, 

Texas, with affiliates in the Bahamas, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. During the surcharge period, Bayoil was the largest provider of Iraqi oil for the United States. Bayoil provided about 200 

million barrels to U.S. oil companies, or almost 40 percent of American imports of Iraqi oil during this period. 

Our examination of Bayoil’s activities has found extensive evidence that Bayoil paid or financed illegal surcharges on Iraqi oil. 

Using Bayoil, Iraqi, and other documents, we were able to trace the 

history of 102 cargoes of Iraqi oil that Bayoil purchased and imported into the United States. We found that, together, the illegal 

surcharges paid on those cargoes totaled at least $37 million. 

Documents obtained by the Subcommittee also indicate Bayoil 

knowingly participated in a trade boycott in violation of U.S. law. 

One of the Bayoil officers signed a note and notarized a statement 

attesting, ‘‘We herewith confirm never to have sold directly or indirectly to Israel and further confirm that this policy will remain permanently in force during the entire validity of our contract.’’ That 

statement was signed and notarized by the chairman of Bayoil 

Supply and Trading, Limited. 

In interviews with Subcommittee staff, senior Hussein regime officials currently in detention, including former Vice President Taha 

Yasin Ramadan and former Presidential Secretary Abid Hamid 

26

Mahmoud, who was also Saddam Hussein’s chief body guard, confirmed that Iraq prohibited the purchasers of Iraqi oil from subsequently selling it to Israel. 

We also found evidence that Bayoil persistently and openly lobbied U.S. and U.N. officials to influence the pricing of Iraqi oil and 

oppose U.S. efforts to address the surcharge problem by raising the 

official sales price. Bayoil also helped Iraq and Russia devise objections to U.S. and U.K. pricing proposals to stop the surcharges, and 

even on occasion drafted documents for Russian companies to send 

to U.N. officials protesting pricing policies that set Iraqi oil prices 

very close to world market rates. 

We also found a significant contrast in the efforts of U.S. officials 

to stop the illegal surcharges. At the United Nations, U.S. and U.K. 

officials worked aggressively and creatively to develop pricing policies for Iraqi oil to prevent Saddam from imposing surcharges. 

After 2 years of effort, the United States and the United Kingdom 

moved the United Nations to a so-called ‘‘retrospective pricing system,’’ which delayed setting a price on Iraqi crude until after the 

oil had been loaded onto the ships. This delay allowed the United 

Nations to set prices which closely reflected actual market prices 

and made it uneconomical for Iraq to also demand payment of a 

per-barrel surcharge. By September 2002, the system finally 

‘‘squeezed out’’ the surcharges. 

In contrast, at the same time the United States was making it 

harder for Saddam to impose illegal surcharges, the United States 

took only minimal steps to ensure that U.S. companies were not 

paying surcharges. In late 2000 and early 2001, the State Department and the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, the office with primary responsibility for enforcing 

U.S. sanctions, informed U.S. oil companies that it would be illegal 

to pay any surcharges. Despite the knowledge that Saddam was 

continuing to impose surcharges on Iraqi oil and that the United 

States was importing very large amounts of Iraqi oil, the State Department and OFAC took no additional steps to ensure that no 

American companies were paying surcharges, or even to inquire 

about the nature of the trade in Iraqi oil. 

U.S. authorities also failed to respond to requests by United Nations officials for assistance in obtaining information about potential sanctions violations by Bayoil. In early 2001, the U.N.’s Oil 

Overseers obtained information that Bayoil may have diverted to 

Europe shipments of Iraqi oil that the United Nations had approved for sale to North America. Shortening the final destination 

in this manner, called transshipment, would have violated the 

sanctions and Bayoil’s U.S. license. It also would have earned 

Bayoil additional profits, which was of particularly concern at that 

time, in early 2001, because such profits could have been used as 

a source of funds to pay illegal surcharges. 

In early June 2001, the U.N. Oil Overseers formally asked Bayoil 

to provide details about these shipments. Bayoil refused. The 

United Nations then requested the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to require Bayoil to provide the information, since Bayoil was 

a U.S. company. In mid-August 2001, the State Department formally asked OFAC to obtain the information from Bayoil. 

27

1See an attachment to the prepared statement of Dan M. Berkovitz, Counsel to the Minority, 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which appears in the Appendix on page 83. 

Meanwhile, the U.N. Overseers continued to demand that Bayoil 

provide them with a complete accounting of the shipments in question. Twice, the Overseers threatened to inform the U.N. Security 

Council of Bayoil’s lack of cooperation. Each time, Bayoil claimed 

the U.N. Overseers were prejudiced against them and refused to 

provide the information. 

The United Nations again complained to the U.S. Mission to the 

United Nations. In early 2002, the State Department again asked 

OFAC, informally, it appears, to get the information from Bayoil. 

In late April 2002, 8 months after the State Department’s initial 

request, OFAC asked Bayoil to report on its licensed activities. In 

May 2002, Bayoil responded by stating it had not engaged in any 

licensed activities since 1997. OFAC then telephoned Bayoil to ask 

permission to release Bayoil’s response to the State Department 

and the U.S. Mission to the U.N. In July 2002, 11 months after the 

initial request, Bayoil agreed on the condition that the response not 

be disclosed to anyone else, which presumably included the United 

Nations. 

In the end, OFAC never provided Bayoil’s letter—which was nonresponsive to the U.N.’s concerns in any event—to either the State 

Department or the United Nations. The U.S. Government failed to 

provide the United Nations with any meaningful assistance, and 

the United Nations never obtained the requested information. Neither OFAC nor the State Department conducted any further inquiry into Bayoil’s role in the Iraqi oil trade. Last month, the Justice Department indicted Bayoil and its three principal officers for 

various crimes resulting from the payment of illegal surcharges to 

Iraq. 

The Minority Staff report also examines the Khor al-Amaya shipments. Over several weeks in February and March 2003, Iraq loaded seven large oil tankers with a total of over 7.7 million barrels 

of oil at the port of Khor al-Amaya in Southern Iraq, at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. These were the first loadings at Khor 

al-Amaya since the port had been damaged during the Iraq-Iran 

war in 1980. Iraqi oil exports from Khor al-Amaya were not authorized under the Oil-For-Food Program and did not have U.N. approval. They constituted the largest single instances of illicit oil 

shipments out of Iraq by ship during the sanctions period. 

The oil tankers had been chartered by a Jordanian company acting on behalf of the Jordanian government. In exchange for the 7.7 

million barrels of oil, the government of Jordan wired over $53 million in hard currency to the government of Iraq. Subcommittee 

interviews with high-ranking Iraqis currently in detention, again 

including former Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan, confirmed 

that these shipments were authorized at the highest levels of the 

Iraqi government and the oil proceeds went to bank accounts under 

control of the Hussein regime. 

Each of the large tankers docked at the Khor al-Amaya terminal, 

filled its tanks with Iraqi crude oil, and then sailed for the port of 

Fujairah, in the United Arab Emirates, as shown on the second 

chart.1 Other shipping interests in the Persian Gulf who saw the 

28

oil tankers characterized the shipments as blatant violations of 

U.N. sanctions. Press reports asked questions about how the ships 

were able to travel the Persian Gulf with impunity. 

U.N. inspectors and oil overseers interviewed by the Subcommittee stated they were surprised by the presence of the oil 

tankers. One U.N. oil overseer directly contacted the captain of the 

first ship to dock at Khor al-Amaya and told the ship it was carrying oil in violation of U.N. sanctions. 

In contrast, shipping communications obtained by the Subcommittee indicate that U.S. personnel appear to have had advance 

warning of the shipments and allowed them to continue. These 

communications involve a ship’s captain, some ship owners, the 

Jordanian company that chartered the seven ships, and an American shipbroker which was also involved in some of the charters. 

These communications indicate the ships traveled with the full 

knowledge and acquiesence of the Maritime Interdiction Force 

(MIF), the naval force patrolling the Persian Gulf to prevent smuggling of oil out of Iraq. The MIF was then under the command of 

a U.S. Naval officer. The message indicates, for example, that the 

Jordanians instructed their ship captains to contact Commander 

Harry French, the U.S. Naval officer then assigned to the MIF, 

with the following message. ‘‘We are loading crude oil from the terminal at Khor al-Amaya for Millennium,’’ which is the name of the 

Jordanian company. ‘‘Do you have any objection?’’

Shipping records obtained by the Subcommittee and contemporaneous reports indicate the MIF officers never objected to any of 

these shipments. Instead, the MIF allowed the ships to pick up 

their cargoes and leave unfettered. 

When objections were raised publicly to the Khor al-Amaya loadings, the U.S. company involved in chartering the ships for Jordan 

became concerned about the legality of the Khor al-Amaya shipments and decided to check with U.S. authorities to ensure that 

the company was not party to a transaction that violated U.S. law, 

U.N. sanctions, or U.S. foreign policy. The General Counsel for the 

company called the U.S. Commerce Department to discuss the 

shipments. The general counsel of the company who made the call 

was eventually put in touch with an official from the State Department. The general counsel explained to her the circumstances of 

the shipments. Two hours later, the official, Amy Schedlebauer, 

called back and said, according to a contemporaneous E-mail from 

the general counsel describing the conversation, that her office was, 

‘‘aware of the shipments and has determined not to take action.’’ 

The general counsel told her there was another shipment on the 

way, and the State Department officer, in the general counsel’s 

words, ‘‘repeated the quoted response and would say no more.’’

It is not clear who instructed the State Department official to 

convey this information to the U.S. company, or who within the Department of Defense instructed Commander Harry French not to 

object to the Khor al-Amaya shipments. Despite written requests 

by the Subcommittee Chairman and Ranking Member, and repeated verbal and E-mail requests from both Majority and Minority 

Staffs for unclassified briefings, neither the State Department nor 

the Defense Department, has provided any information on why the 

29

1See Exhibit No. 13, which appears in the Appendix on page 1501. 

2See Exhibit No. 10, which appears in the Appendix on page 1493. 

3See Exhibit No. 9, which appears in the Appendix on page 1490. 

4See Exhibit No. 11, which appears in the Appendix on page 1496. 

5See Footnote Exhibit No. 94 attached to the Report on Oil Allocations Granted to Charles 

Pasqua & George Galloway, prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent 

Subcommittee on Investigations, which appears in the Appendix on page 167. 

United States permitted these apparent violations of the Iraqi 

sanctions. 

Thank you. I would be happy to answer questions. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Berkovitz. 

We will do 7-minute rounds for this panel. 

Mr. Greenblatt, I wonder if we can get Exhibit 13.1 In Exhibit 

13, at the very bottom, you have Middle East Advanced Semi Conductor, and this Exhibit 13 relates to, and I think it is Exhibit 12. 

This is the Contract M/09/23, I think in Exhibit 10.2 I think that 

is Fawaz Zureikat, George Galloway, Aredio Petroleum Company, 

and I believe that is in Exhibit 9.3 This would be the one for 

Mariam’s Appeal. So this is a chart, then, that lays out the surcharge for the allocation to Mariam’s Appeal, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. I think you might be referring to Exhibit 11,4

is the surcharge chart for that particular transaction. 

Senator COLEMAN. Exhibit 13, then, is——

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is for the Phase XI transaction, 11/04 is 

the contract. 

Senator COLEMAN. And that one was to Fawaz Zureikat and 

George Galloway——

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is exactly correct. 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Again, Aredio Petroleum? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That was actually Middle East Semiconductor. 

They used two different companies. The first one, in Phase IX, was 

Aredio. The Phase XI contract was with Middle East Semiconductors. 

Senator COLEMAN. And I don’t think we can see it in that chart, 

but I believe in footnotes, because of where you have Middle East 

Advanced Semiconductor blown up over there, that actually covers—and I have the original here—it would be footnote 94 in the 

staff report.5 That also includes a listing from Machino Import allocations, and could you explain who Machino Import—how that fits 

into that hearing? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. The Machino Import entry on these refer to the 

contracts lifted by Machino Import that relate to the Zhirinovsky 

allocations. 

Senator COLEMAN. So what we have here—this chart was prepared after the fall of the Hussein regime, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is exactly right. 

Senator COLEMAN. What you have on this chart, Zhirinovsky allocations, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator COLEMAN. And also Galloway allocations? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator COLEMAN. So if one was just targeting somebody here, 

it would be highly unusual that you would be getting a multitude 

of companies. But we have checked Zhirinovsky going back and 

30

1See Exhibit No. 9, which appears in the Appendix on page 1490. 

2See Exhibit No. 12, which appears in the Appendix on page 1498. 

3See Exhibit No. 6, which appears in the Appendix on page 1471. 

there is absolutely no question in your mind as to the validity of 

the numbers of which, in this chart, relate to Zhirinovsky? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right, and other numbers on there 

match documents from other sources. The amount of oil lifted corresponds, contract numbers, contract entities, they match with 

other documents that we have elsewhere that we have obtained 

from other sources. 

Senator COLEMAN. What I am trying to do here is going through 

the exhibits, and what we see is a pattern, whether it is 

Zhirinovsky or Voloshin or Galloway or Pasqua, the listing on the 

surcharge charts, the same information, and the validity of those 

being validated. I believe if I look at Exhibit 9,1 this is a Mariam’s 

Appeal letter——

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. And this is with the stamp of the 

Ministry of Oil, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator COLEMAN. And then you would have the same for Exhibit 12. Then at Exhibit 12,2 again, same form, same letter, same 

stamp——

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. The name in parentheses being 

(George Galloway)——

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. And Iraqi officials have identified 

the name in parentheses uniformly as the person who received the 

allocation, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right, and they specifically identified 

this particular document—they authenticated this particular document, as well. 

Senator COLEMAN. And then would you have similar documents, 

then, for Voloshin and Zhirinovsky, again, documents from the 

Ministry of Oil, same stamp, same parentheses? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. The identical form with virtually identical information, depending on the specific terms of the contract, yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. Can you talk to me a little more, then, about 

how these patterns fit together? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. Sure. The one thing that emerges from the 

Zhirinovsky allocation report, from the Russian Presidential Council report, is that very pattern of documentation as you described 

it, which includes these SOMO requests for approval from the Oil 

Minister. If I were to sit here and list the number of these letters 

that we have, these forms that we have, we would be here all 

night. For each contract, SOMO would send a request for approval 

from the Minister of Oil, and in each one of those letters, they 

would indicate the name of the purchasing company and then indicate, in parentheses, the name of the allocation recipient. 

Senator COLEMAN. And how do we know that these documents 

are genuine? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. They corroborate with other documents related 

to the contracts that we see. For example, if you put up Exhibit 6,3

31

Exhibit 6 is two letters. One, on the left-hand side, is a letter from 

Vladimir Zhirinovsky informing SOMO that Nafta Moscow is the 

company that is going to sign the contract. That is the purchasing 

agent we discussed in my testimony. He is informing SOMO that 

Nafta Moscow is going to sign the contract. 

On the right-hand side, we have that very SOMO approval letter 

that they are requesting from the Minister of Oil in which they discuss the contract, and that is the culmination of Zhirinovsky’s letter on the left-hand side. 

Senator COLEMAN. And reference specifically to the Galloway 

documents that we verified the signature of the Minister of Oil on 

these Ministry of Oil letters? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is exactly right. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Groves, in dealing with the Russian companies, we appear to have a number of sham companies that are 

simply set up for the purpose of facilitating the payment of the surcharge, is that correct? 

Mr. GROVES. That is correct. 

Senator COLEMAN. Can you give me a better understanding? I 

know that we have looked into some of these companies. I think 

it was Impexoil, the Russian engineering company, a company in 

Cyprus that doesn’t appear to exist other than on paper. How were 

these companies allowed to participate in these transactions? 

Mr. GROVES. Well, once the contract was signed between the 

nominal purchaser and SOMO, that was the public face of the dealing. That is the contract that would be sent to the United Nations 

for review and approval. But the rest of the deal happened completely under the radar. We have access to the key deal documents 

because of our access to Bayoil documents. It is through those that 

we found a lot about the guts of these transactions and how they 

used these pass-through companies in order to effect the surcharges. 

For the Russian companies, they didn’t want to do a lot of wire 

transactions—this is based on our interviews—and they ultimately 

would want those surcharges to be paid in cash to the Iraqi embassy in Moscow. That was their preferred method of payment. 

Senator COLEMAN. But with the Russian transactions, because 

with Bayoil, an American company, we were able to get those documents, is that correct? 

Mr. GROVES. Correct. 

Senator COLEMAN. And as a result of getting those documents, 

we know exactly how much was paid. 

Mr. GROVES. That is also correct. 

Senator COLEMAN. And then we were able to break it down to 

divide what was paid to whom and what was left over, the amount 

left over for the allocation holder. 

Mr. GROVES. Yes, sir. 

Senator COLEMAN. Which is consistent with the testimony of the 

regime officials that the allocation holder got value from passing on 

those allocations to others. 

Mr. GROVES. The regime official said that is the whole point. The 

point of the allocation is to create the profit margin that would be 

split between the allocation holder and the nominal contractor. 

32

1See Exhibit No. 45, which appears in the Appendix on page 1723. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Greenblatt, the letters, the charts, the 

summaries, all that we see in the Galloway case completely consists of what we see in the Zhirinovsky case, the Voloshin case, and 

the other case, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. Absolutely. If you look at Exhibit 45,1 you will 

see another example. This is the chart that we saw earlier, where 

it has Galloway listed at Contract M/09/23, and then later in the 

chart, we see an entry for Zhirinovsky under Contract 10—I am 

sorry, 9/119, and Zhirinovsky is listed in the same exact manner 

as Galloway is listed in his Contract M/09/23. 

Senator COLEMAN. One last question, Mr. Greenblatt, for this 

round. Several officials identified as allocation recipients have 

issued categorical denials. I think they said that they, ‘‘have never 

bought a barrel of oil, never sold a barrel of oil.’’ It is correct to 

say that the allocation holders, in fact, never did buy a barrel of 

oil or sell a barrel of oil, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. They are walking a line where 

they are saying they never bought a barrel of oil, but that is not 

the question. The question is whether they traded in the allocations of the oil, the option to buy the oil. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Senator Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. I would like you to track for us again 

the relationship between Bayoil and the allocation holders. I think 

you indicated that Bayoil aggressively sought these allocations. Is 

that, first of all, correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator LEVIN. Then give us the process. Use Zhirinovsky, for instance. 

Mr. GREENBLATT. Sure. 

Senator LEVIN. How would they contact Zhirinovsky or viceversa? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. We do not actually have the actual initial contact between Bayoil and Zhirinovsky. We do have subsequent correspondence between them. What we do have is Bayoil courting the 

nominal purchaser, in that case, Nafta. We have other situations 

where they were courting companies, Russian companies named 

Sidanco, and that is documented in our report and I would be 

happy to show you where they are in the footnotes, if you like. But 

we have a series of letters. They wrote three letters to one company 

on one day, hounding them about getting a contract. That same 

day, they wrote to Nafta Moscow, hounding them to sign up a contract. So they were quite proud of what they were doing. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, we know that the allocation holders were 

committed to pay surcharges, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. According to the testimony of the senior Hussein regime officials, yes. 

Senator LEVIN. In addition to the testimony, we have the documents themselves, do we not, which say surcharge? For instance, 

I don’t know what the new number of this one is, but it is old number 152. That is the Zhirinovsky Report, footnote 152. 

33

1See Exhibit No. 9, which appears in the Appendix on page 1490. 

2See Exhibit No. 12, which appears in the Appendix on page 1498. 

Take Exhibit 9.1 It is the same thing. This is a Galloway allocation. I think the pattern here is the same, you tell me. 

Mr. GREENBLATT. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. Take a look at—this is a new number, Exhibit 9, it is footnote 84. First of all, it reads, to the Oil Minister, 

approval of exported crude oil contracts. Based on the approval of 

Your Excellency, please find below the details of the contract 

signed with, and they say Fawaz Zureikat and Mariam’s Appeal in 

parentheses. Then read number 11 down there. 

Mr. GREENBLATT. Surcharge, payable within one month of the 

date of loading each shipment. 

Senator LEVIN. So this was explicit in this allocation, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator LEVIN. And the other allocations, the Zhirinovsky allocations——

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is standard language. 

Senator LEVIN. Standard language. It explicitly states when the 

surcharge is going to be payable. 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, on one of the exhibits, I believe that when 

the surcharge was not paid—let me see if I can find this Exhibit 

12——

Mr. GREENBLATT. Exhibit 12. 

Senator LEVIN. It is Exhibit 12.2 This is another Galloway—a letter that refers to Mr. Galloway and Mr. Fawaz Zureikat. And then 

if you read the line relative to surcharge, what does it say there? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. It says, ‘‘Surcharge: As per the instructions of 

your Excellency,’’ meaning the Minister of Oil, ‘‘over the phone on 

12/11/2001, of not accepting the company’s proposals unless they 

pay the debt incurred since phase 8.’’

Senator LEVIN. In other words, this company, whatever that company was that was assigned the allocation, had not paid the surcharge in an earlier time period, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is exactly correct. 

Senator LEVIN. And so explicitly, unless that surcharge which is 

owing, the kickback—we might as well use plain English—which is 

owing is paid, then it says here that we don’t accept the proposal 

of the company in this time period, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, these efforts which you described to obtain 

surcharges, first off, that would go to the Iraqi regime, were a violation of the Oil-For-Food Program, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. Absolutely. 

Senator LEVIN. They were an assault, an attack on a U.N. program, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. They were an effort to undermine another U.N. 

program, which was the sanctions program, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. All of these manipulations, the surcharges and 

the allocations were designed to do that, yes. 

34

1See Exhibit No. 44, which appears in the Appendix on page 1712. 

Senator LEVIN. To undermine a U.N. effort? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. So we see in the testimony here, actually, an effort made to undermine, attack, assault something that the international community had devised in the sanctions program and in 

the Oil-For-Food Program, is that a fair statement? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Berkovitz, going back to the Khor al-Amaya 

incident, we wrote, I believe—we here being the Chairman and myself—wrote to the Department of Defense on February 8, 2002, a 

letter requesting certain information and an unclassified answer, is 

that correct? Exhibit 44?1

Mr. BERKOVITZ. That is correct. 

Senator LEVIN. And has the Defense Department offered to give 

us any unclassified response to this letter? 

Mr. BERKOVITZ. No, Senator. 

Senator LEVIN. All they have offered is a classified briefing, is 

that correct? 

Mr. BERKOVITZ. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, how public were the events that are described in the Chairman’s and my letter to the Department of Defense? 

Mr. BERKOVITZ. The events were reported almost contemporaneously in the oil trade press. There was a Wall Street Journal article about it that shortly followed. There have been renewed press 

articles about it this year, and the State Department spokesman 

has addressed this in a State Department press conference. So it 

is out in the public domain. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. And finally, in Exhibit 45—well, I guess 

it is still part of Exhibit 44, we also, the Chairman and myself, 

wrote to the U.S. Representative for U.N. Management and Reform, Mr. Kennedy, on March 9, thanking him, first of all, for his 

testimony in February, but then seeking certain unclassified information from the Department of State, is that correct? 

Mr. BERKOVITZ. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. And have they answered that letter at all? 

Mr. BERKOVITZ. No. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Bennett. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much to all three of you for 

the diligence with which you have pursued this. 

I want to see from your examination of all of this if there is a 

pattern of purpose that can be identified here. Ruling out Bayoil, 

because I am assuming that Saddam Hussein or his ministers did 

not understand that Bayoil would be involved in this, why were the 

particular people whom you have identified as recipients of Saddam Hussein’s largess chosen to be the recipients of Saddam Hussein’s largess? I have listed three possibilities here from my own 

perspective, but I am not into it nearly as deeply as you are. 

One would be political influence. They would go after people who 

would be helpful to them in either the French, the British, or the 

35

Russian governments. We have nationals of those three countries 

before us. 

One would be, we will deal with anybody as long as he is willing 

to give us a kickback. We don’t care whether he has influence or 

not as long as he will give us money back, and it may be coincidence that the people we are talking about happened to be those 

who held governmental positions in the three countries. 

Or it may have been friendship. Mr. Zhirinovsky made a number 

of trips to Iraq, was very outspoken in his support of Iraq. As we 

will hear from, I believe it is Mr. Reddaway in the next panel, looking at his testimony, he says the Iraqis may not, in Zhirinovsky’s 

case, made a particularly good investment. He never had that 

much influence in the Russian government and his trips to Iraq 

were not popular with the Russian people as a whole. 

Can you add to these three possibilities? They are not exhaustive 

by any means. I just jotted them down as I listened to you. Give 

us a sense of what Saddam Hussein, in his mind, thought he was 

accomplishing by favoring these particular individuals with the opportunity to participate in this illegal activity. 

Mr. GREENBLATT. Your first and third ideas are quite closer to 

the mark. Our interviews with Hussein regime officials confirmed 

repeatedly that this allocation system was designed to reward 

friends throughout the world and to undermine U.N. sanctions 

against Iraq. That was the ultimate goal. They gave allocations, or 

they gave priority to those individuals and political parties 

throughout the world who supported them in that goal, regardless 

of where they were, with one slight exception. 

By and large, the regime had a general rule of not dealing with 

American companies and not dealing with British companies. We 

have documents to that effect in our reports, where they expressly 

say Iraq cannot deal with American companies. It doesn’t necessarily mean that American individuals weren’t granted allocations, but they were much more limited than those given out to 

Russians and French. 

Senator BENNETT. We have in this hearing, a French former Interior Minister. Was he a friend, or did they think he would help 

undermine U.N. sanctions, or both? Zhirinovsky, we have talked 

about, various Russian political leaders, and Mr. Galloway, a member of Parliament. Was the assumption that Mr. Galloway or Mr. 

Pasqua would be able to influence their governments, or was that 

primarily friendship on those two? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. I think it is both, six of one, half-a-dozen of the 

other in the sense that their friends were the ones who supported 

them, and I think there was no direct quid pro quo in terms of you 

get an allocation if you do this action right now. 

Senator BENNETT. I see. 

Mr. GREENBLATT. But there was a general sense of support. 

Senator BENNETT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BERKOVITZ. Senator, you asked from the perspective of the 

Iraqis, what was in Saddam Hussein’s head. We did not interview 

Saddam HUssein, but almost uniformly, all the other ministers 

that were interviewed viewed this as that they weren’t doing something wrong—or violating the U.N. resolutions in these allocations. 

They were viewing the process as using trade or using what limited 

36

1See Exhibit No. 12, which appears in the Appendix on page 1498. 

2See Exhibit No. 11, which appears in the Appendix on page 1496. 

3See Exhibit No. 13, which appears in the Appendix on page 1501. 

contractual ability they had to give it to the people who they wanted to strengthen their political ties. It wasn’t just these Oil-ForFood contracts, either. They were also giving large contracts for the 

development of the Iraqi oil fields to Russian companies and 

French companies to encourage Russia and France to end sanctions 

so that the oil fields could be developed by those companies in 

those countries. 

So in the Iraqis’ mind, this was an extension of using trade for 

political benefit, strengthening the ties between the two. That is 

sort of what I think was in their mind. 

Senator BENNETT. But I am assuming that they went to lengths 

to prevent public disclosure of what they were doing. You are saying, in their mind, this was an open trade kind of activity, but they 

were at least smart enough to realize that they had to keep anybody from knowing about it. 

Mr. BERKOVITZ. Yes. They were not—definitely. 

Senator BENNETT. OK. We have Mr. Reddaway’s comment that 

in Zhirinovsky, they didn’t get a very good investment. Off the top 

of your heads, do you have any sense as to whether or not Charles 

Pasqua or George Galloway was able to have any influence on the 

positions of their respective governments? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. I think it is difficult to say whether there was 

any specific action taken and how much one individual influenced 

national policy. I think that was clearly the intent of the Hussein 

regime, but it is hard to quantify what the—but they were certainly outspoken supporters of Iraq throughout—and opponents of 

the sanctions regime throughout the entire Oil-For-Food Program. 

Senator BENNETT. Well, just one last observation. They may have 

done it for political influence and for friendship to reward those 

that were on their side, but they always made sure they got their 

kickback or friendship would disappear. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thanks, Senator. 

I am going to do one more 5-minute follow-up round. I have just 

a couple more questions that I would like to address. 

If we can put Exhibit 121 up again, this is the Ministry of Oil 

document regarding the Galloway Middle East ASI company allocations. Senator Levin noted, as per the instructions of Your Excellency over the phone on 12/11/2001 of not accepting the company’s 

proposal unless they paid the debt incurred since Phase VIII. If we 

then, in Exhibit 13, that shows that the surcharge was, in fact, 

paid, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. What it would show is in Exhibit 11.2 That will 

show that the surcharges paid by the previous allocations had been 

paid. What is interesting is in Exhibit 13,3 it actually shows that 

Middle East Semiconductor was delinquent in paying that surcharge, but up until then, it did lift the oil, which indicates that 

it had paid off the previous surcharges, which amounted to 

$304,000. 

Senator COLEMAN. Senator Bennett raised the question, and I 

think, Mr. Berkovitz, you responded, that, in fact, the Iraqi former 

37

regime officials said that there was purpose and reason to these 

surcharges, that, in fact, Iraq needed cash and they felt they 

were—they felt it was certainly justifiable that these surcharges 

were paid. Is that correct, Mr. Berkovitz? 

Mr. BERKOVITZ. Saddam Huseein felt that the middlemen were 

making excessive profits off of Iraqi oil and that it was really 

money that belonged to the Iraqi people, so he wanted to get some 

of it back. That seems to be what the ministers said was in his 

mind, yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. I really want to get back to the tone of the 

interviews with the former officials. They were not, when they were 

questioned, pointing fingers and looking for leniency by naming 

names. In fact, when they discussed the allocations to a Galloway 

or to a Voloshin or to a Zhirinovsky, they felt there was nothing 

wrong. They thought these folks were doing exactly the right thing. 

There was nothing improper about it, that they had a perfect right 

to provide these allocations to folks that were friendly to the regime or that opposed sanctions, is that correct? 

Mr. BERKOVITZ. That is correct. 

Mr. GROVES. They were actually proud of what they were doing 

with the system, and they felt that they were being quite creative 

in many instances of how to evade the fools. 

Senator COLEMAN. But there wasn’t any sense that they were 

looking for leniency by naming names. Rather, they were clearly affirming, this is the way we did business. We thought there was a 

justifiable reason for doing business and there wasn’t anything improper about this. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. BERKOVITZ. That is correct. 

Senator COLEMAN. The question Senator Bennett asked of whether there was evidence of specific actions regarding the allocations, 

I do believe as I review the record that in regard to the Russians 

in particular, the issue of—the whole issue of retroactive pricing, 

without getting into all the complexities, the U.S. and Britain 

pushed for a retroactive pricing mechanism which would make it 

difficult for there to be enough extra cash to pay the surcharge. Is 

there evidence in the record that, in fact, allocations had an impact 

on that specific issue? 

Mr. GROVES. The evidence in the record and from the interviews 

indicates a broad pattern and a broad strategy to influence all 

countries on the U.N. Security Council, or several countries on the 

U.N. Security Council, including Russia. Their opposition to retroactive pricing, the effort that the U.S. and the U.K. was trying to 

stop the surcharges, stop the excessive profits, was thwarted by the 

Russian members and others. 

The closest we have to an event where something that a member 

state did that resulted in a reward came in the sprint of 2001, 

where there was going to be a resolution floated to institute smart 

sanctions, where they were going to tighten up the sanctions, restrict border trade. The Russian Federation made it known that if 

any such resolution was introduced, they would veto it. The word 

got back to the Hussein regime and they specifically gave rewards 

to the Federation, both in oil allocations and on the humanitarian 

contracts because of that action, and I think one of the witnesses 

38

1See Report on Oil Allocations Granted to The Russian Presidential Council, prepared by the 

Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which appears 

in the Appendix on page 707. 

on the third panel will be able to address that matter in more detail. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Groves. 

I just want to make a statement, actually to the benefit of Senator Levin. Mr. Berkovitz, I think it is important to look at American companies that were involved and whether they paid the surcharges. Your analysis notes that Bayoil was affiliated with several 

transactions involving $37 million in surcharges. I want to say I 

think it is important that we continue to follow that and continue 

to look at that. 

And then the other statement I want to make is I know we have 

sent two Chairman’s letters to the State Department and the Department of Defense trying to get additional information on the 

Khor al-Amaya incident and I have not been satisfied with the response. I want to state to the Ranking Member that I intend to 

pursue this and that we need to follow up on both of those issues 

again. 

Senator Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you for both of those statements, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like you to look at some documents which don’t have exhibit numbers. They are part of the staff report, but they weren’t 

given exhibit numbers, so it may be hard for me to do this, but I 

am going to give it a try. It is PSI Staff Report, it is Footnote 117.1

Mr. GREENBLATT. Which report? 

Senator LEVIN. Which report? Oh, on the Russian Presidential 

Council. Is that something you can get at real quickly? 

Mr. GROVES. Yes, Senator. I am here. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. And I am going to ask you to do the same 

thing on three other documents. 

This says we have entered into a contract with Rosnefteimpex 

Company, a long Russian name, Mr. Issakov. Now, is he part of the 

Presidential Council? Is that Mr. Issakov? 

Mr. GROVES. No. Our information is that he is a close confidant 

of the head of the Russian Presidential Council. 

Senator LEVIN. I understand. 

Mr. GROVES. He was the point man on many of these contracts. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. I would like to make this document and a 

number of similar documents part of this record, although they are 

part of the staff report already. 

Senator COLEMAN. They will be entered into the record, without 

objection. 

Senator LEVIN. It shows a pattern here. I mean, this is the same 

type of document that we have referred to before. It shows we have 

entered into a contract with a company, and then after the company is a parenthesis that says ‘‘(Mr. Issakov).’’

Mr. GROVES. That is correct. 

Senator LEVIN. He contracts with the company, as it must be 

under the Oil-For-Food Program rules, I see, is that right? 

39

1See Report on Oil Allocations Granted to Vladimir Zhirinovsky, prepared by the Majority and 

Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which appear in the Appendix on pages 415, 439 and 456 respectively. 

Mr. GROVES. That is correct. These documents and all the documents in this category fall into what in a courtroom would be 

called documents kept in the ordinary course of business. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. So it is a pattern. They name a company, 

which could be a phony company, could be real, either one. It could 

be a real company, is that correct? 

Mr. GROVES. That is correct. 

Senator LEVIN. But it is an entity other than an individual. But 

then it says down here on all these documents, destination of crude 

oil, and it says Europe and/or America. So that meant that the Oil 

Minister knew in the internal documents that this could go to 

America, but they couldn’t deal directly to sell to America under 

their policy, right? 

Mr. GROVES. That is correct. They knew that much of their crude 

was destined for North American markets. 

Senator LEVIN. But they go through the appearance in their own 

public statements, or their own documents that are filed, that they 

don’t deal with an American company directly, but they know that 

the oil could end up in America. 

Mr. GROVES. Yes. So it is an open secret. 

Senator LEVIN. It is just a charade that they were putting on 

publicly, is that correct? 

Mr. GROVES. That is correct. 

Senator LEVIN. But even their own documents don’t even try to 

maintain that charade. 

Mr. GROVES. They do not. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, the same thing is true, is it not, 

with three other documents which I will give you. These are the 

documents in the same report. First of all, it is Footnote 152.1

These are all Zhirinovsky documents, 152, 170, and 181. It is kind 

of hard to ask you to look at three documents at the same time, 

but this is what these documents show me. 

These are all Zhirinovsky documents, in parentheses, after the 

name of a company, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator LEVIN. And there are three different companies used 

here, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator LEVIN. MachinoImport is one, Lukoil is another—I take 

it back. The third one is the same as the first, MachinoImport. So 

there are two different companies. 

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. But Zhirinovsky’s name appears in parentheses in all of them——

Mr. GREENBLATT. That is right. 

Senator LEVIN [continuing]. And all of them show that the destination is Europe and/or America, is that correct? 

Mr. GREENBLATT. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. This panel will be excused. 

40

1See Exhibit No. 13, which appears in the Appendix on page 1501. 

Let us call the second panel, George Galloway, Member of Parliament for Bethnal Green and Bow, Great Britain. 

Mr. Galloway, I am pleased to have you before the Subcommittee 

today. What I am going to do is briefly summarize the evidence before I give you a chance to give your sworn testimony. 

The Oil-For-Food Program was used to support those who were 

favorable to Iraq. Former Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz 

and Iraqi Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan confirmed this. I 

would think that you would admit that your efforts to oppose the 

sanction were well received by the regime. 

I know it has been quoted to you many times, but your, I would 

say, infamous statement to Saddam Hussein on January 21, 1994, 

where you said to Saddam, ‘‘Your Excellency, Mr. President, I greet 

you in the name of many thousands of people in Britain who stood 

against the tide and opposed the war on aggression against Iraq 

and continue to oppose the war by economic means which is aimed 

to strangle the life out of the great people of Iraq.’’ You then went 

on to say you greet him in the name of the Palestinian people. You 

went on to note that I thought the President would appreciate 

knowing that even today, 3 years after the war, I still meet with 

families who are calling their newborn sons Saddam. You went on, 

ultimately at the very end, to say, ‘‘Sir, I salute your courage, your 

strength, your indefatiguability, and I want you to know that we 

are with you,’’ and I believe it was in Arabic, which means until 

victory, until victory in Jerusalem. 

And I also would note that you say that you deeply regret those 

comments and that the comments were not aimed directly at Saddam Hussein, but they were aimed at the Iraqi people. 

In the fall of 1999, you headed a 2-month London-to-Baghdad 

bus trip to gain support for lifting the sanctions on Iraq. 

We have your name on Iraqi documents, some prepared before 

the fall of Saddam Hussein, some after, that identify you as one of 

the allocation holders, that your allocations were then used by 

Fawaz Zureikat, operating under the name of Aredio Petroleum 

and Middle East Advanced Semiconductor to actually lift the oil. 

We know, too, based on the statements of former Iraqi officials, 

and in the cases of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Alexander Voloshin, 

correspondence and documents, that allocation holders knew that 

surcharges on oil allocations were paid to Saddam Hussein and 

that allocation holders were aware of this and responsible for the 

payments. 

We have also heard testimony regarding several documents retrieved from the Iraqi Ministry of Oil that demonstrate how Iraq 

allocated oil to its friends and allies. Exhibit 13,1 which you have 

seen, displayed a SOMO chart that demonstrated Vladimir 

Zhirinovsky’s dealing with MachinoImport in Phase XI. That chart 

also lists Contract M/11/04 with Middle East Advanced Semiconductor. 

41

1See Report on Oil Allocations Granted to Charles Pasqua and George Galloway, prepared by 

the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which appears in the Appendix on page 333. 2See Exhibit No. 12, which appears in the Appendix on page 1498. 

3See Exhibit No. 45, which appears in the Appendix on page 1723. 

4See Exhibit No. 9, which appears in the Appendix on page 1490. 

Footnote 93,1 is a commercial invoice that shows Middle East 

Semiconductor loaded 2,360,860 barrels of Iraqi crude oil pursuant 

to SOMO crude oil sales Contact M/11/04. 

In Exhibit 12,2 we heard testimony regarding correspondence 

from the Executive Director of SOMO to the Iraqi Oil Minister providing details of Contract M/11/04 and listing your name in parentheses next to Middle East Advanced Semiconductor and Fawaz 

Zureikat, who we know lifted the oil against statements of detainees, including former Vice President Ramadan, confirmed that the 

name in parentheses, your name, is the allocation holder. 

We heard testimony regarding Contract M/11/04, which was 

signed on December 12, 2001, between SOMO and Fawaz Zureikat, 

President of Middle East Advanced Semiconductor. 

We heard testimony regarding SOMO commercial invoice B–13–

201 that shows Aredio Petroleum lifted 1,014,403 barrels of Iraqi 

oil pursuant to SOMO crude oil sales Contract M/09/23. 

Exhibit 45,3 heard testimony regarding a SOMO chart showing 

allocations during Phase IX of the Memorandum of Understanding. 

It indicates Contract M/09/23 was executed between SOMO and 

Mr. Fawaz Zureikat/George Galloway/Aredio Petroleum. 

Exhibit 9,4 we also heard testimony regarding a memo from the 

Executive Director of SOMO to the Oil Minister requesting approval of Contract M/09/23. The document includes an official Ministry of Oil stamp dated 1/15/2001 and provides details of Contract 

M/09/23, signed with Aredio Petroleum Company, (Fawaz 

Zureikat—Mariam’s Appeal), indicating that the allocation recipient for Contract M/09/23 was Fawaz Zureikat-Mariam’s Appeal. 

Mr. Galloway, as I indicated in my opening statement, this is not 

a court of law. This Committee has simply made available information obtained during the investigation from interviews of former 

Iraqi officials as well as Iraqi documents that lay out how the OilFor-Food Program worked, how allocations were given to favored 

friends, allocation holders made substantial commissions on those 

allocations to oil companies, what Ramadan called compensation 

for support, what another official in talking about another allocation said, ‘‘Of course, they made a profit. That is the whole point.’’ 

Surcharges on oil contracts were given back to the Saddam Hussein regime and were the responsibility of the allocation holder. 

The evidence clearly identifies you as an allocation beneficiary 

who transferred the allocations to Fawaz Zureikat, who became 

chairman of your organization, Mariam’s Appeal. Senior Iraqi officials have confirmed that you, in fact, received oil allocations and 

that the documents that identify you as an allocation recipient are 

valid. 

If you can help provide any evidence that challenges the voracity 

of these documents or of the statements of former Iraqi officials, we 

would welcome that input. 

Mr. Galloway, you are appearing before the Subcommittee without asserting any privilege or immunity. Indeed, your appearance 

42

before the Subcommittee is entirely voluntary and on your own accord. No subpoena was issued to secure your appearance. You are 

appearing before the Subcommittee concerning matters that do not 

arise out of the performance of any of your official duties as a member of the British Parliament, but instead concern actions taken by 

you in your capacity as a private citizen. 

Before we begin, pursuant to Rule 6, all witnesses who testify before this Subcommittee are required to be sworn. At this time, I 

would ask you to rise and please raise your right hand. 

Do you swear the testimony you are about to give before this 

Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I do. 

Senator COLEMAN. We will be using a timing system today, Mr. 

Galloway. You have 10 minutes for an opening statement. If you 

need more time, we will certainly accommodate that, and you may 

proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE GALLOWAY, MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FOR BETHNAL GREEN AND BOW, GREAT BRITAIN 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Senator, I am not now, nor have I ever been, an 

oil trader, and neither has anyone on my behalf. I have never seen 

a barrel of oil, owned one, bought one, sold one, and neither has 

anybody on my behalf. 

Now, I know that standards have slipped over the last few years 

in Washington, but for a lawyer, you are remarkably cavalier with 

any idea of justice. I am here today, but last week, you already 

found me guilty. You introduced my name around the world without ever having asked me a single question, without ever having 

contacted me, without ever having written to me or telephoned me, 

without any contact with me whatsoever, and you call that justice. 

Now, I want to deal with the pages that relate to me in this dossier and I want to point out areas where there are, let us be charitable and say errors. And then I want to put this in the context 

that I believe it ought to be. 

On the very first page of your document about me, you assert 

that I have had many meetings with Saddam Hussein. This is 

false. I have had two meetings with Saddam Hussein, once in 1994 

and once in August 2002. By no stretch of the English language 

can that be described as many meetings with Saddam Hussein. 

As a matter of fact, I have met Saddam Hussein exactly the 

same number of times as Donald Rumsfeld met him. The difference 

is, Donald Rumsfeld met him to sell him guns and to give him 

maps, the better to target those guns. I met him to try and bring 

about an end to sanctions, suffering, and war, and on the second 

of the two occasions, I met him to try and persuade him to allow 

Dr. Hans Blix and the United Nations weapons inspectors back 

into the country, a rather better use of two meetings with Saddam 

Hussein than your own Secretary of State for Defense made of his. 

In the same opening paragraph, you assert that I was an outspoken supporter of the Hussein regime. This is false. I have 

brought along here a dossier, a dossier for all the Members of your 

Subcommittee, of statements by me as early as the 15th of March 

1990 in which I condemn the Saddam Hussein dictatorship in the 

43

1See Exhibit No. 46, which appears in the Appendix on page 1727. 

most withering terms;1 a stance I have taken since around about 

the time you were an anti-Vietnam War demonstrator. I was an opponent of Saddam Hussein when British and American governments and businessmen were selling him guns and gas. I used to 

demonstrate outside the Iraqi Embassy when British and American 

officials were going in and out doing commerce. You will see from 

the official Parliamentary record from the 15th of March 1990 onwards, voluminous evidence that I have a rather better record of 

opposition to Saddam Hussein than you do and than any member 

of the British or American governments do. 

Now you say in this document—you have the gall to quote a 

source, without ever having asked me if the allegation from the 

source was true—that I am ‘‘the owner of a company which has 

made substantial profits from trading in Iraqi oil.’’

Senator I do not own any companies beyond a small company 

whose entire purpose, whose sole purpose is to receive the income 

from my journalistic earnings from my employer, Associated Newspapers, in London. I do not own a company that has been trading 

in Iraqi oil. And you had no business to carry a quotation, utterly 

unsubstantiated and false, implying otherwise. 

Now you have nothing on me, Senator, except my name on lists 

of names from Iraq, many of which have been drawn up after the 

installation of your puppet government in Baghdad. If you had any 

of the letters against me that you had against Zhirinovsky and 

even Pasqua, they would have been up there in your slide show for 

the Members of your Subcommittee today. You have my name on 

lists provided to you by the Duelfer inquiry, provided to him by the 

convicted bank robber and fraudster and con man, Ahmad Chalabi, 

who many people, to their credit, in your country now realize 

played a decisive role in leading your country into the disaster in 

Iraq. 

There were 270 names on that list originally. That has somehow 

been filleted down to the names you chose to deal with in this Subcommittee. Some of the names on that list included the former secretary to His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, the former head of the 

African National Congress presidential office, and many others who 

had one defining characteristic in common: They all stood against 

the policy of sanctions and war which you vociferously prosecuted 

and which has led us to this disaster. 

You quote Taha Yasin Ramadan. Well, you have something on 

me. I have never met Taha Yasin Ramadan. Your Subcommittee 

apparently has. But I do know that he is your prisoner. I believe 

he is in Abu Ghraib prison. I believe he is facing war crimes 

charges punishable by death. In these circumstances, knowing 

what the world knows about how you treat prisoners in Abu 

Ghraib prison, in Bagram Air Base, in Guantanamo Bay, including 

I may say, British citizens being held in those places, I am not sure 

how much credibility anyone would put on anything you managed 

to get from a prisoner in those circumstances. 

But you quote 13 words from Taha Yasin Ramadan, whom I have 

never met. If he said what he said, then he is wrong. And if you 

had any evidence that I had ever engaged in any actual oil transVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:03 Jan 04, 2006 Jkt 021438 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\21438.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
44

action, if you had any evidence that anybody ever gave me any 

money, it would be before the public and before this Subcommittee 

today. Because I agreed with your Mr. Greenblatt. Your Mr. 

Greenblatt was absolutely correct. What counts is not the names 

on the paper. What counts is where is the money, Senator? Who 

paid me hundreds of thousands of money? The answer to that is 

nobody. And if you had anybody who ever paid me a penny, you 

would have produced them here today. 

Now you refer at length to a company named in these documents 

as Aredio Petroleum. I say to you under oath here today, I have 

never heard of this company. I have never met anyone from this 

company. This company has never paid a penny to me. And I will 

tell you something else, I can assure you that Aredio Petroleum 

has never paid a single penny to the Mariam Appeal campaign. Not 

a thin dime. I do not know who Aredio Petroleum are, but I dare 

say if you were to ask them, they would confirm that they have 

never met me or ever paid me a penny. 

Whilst I am on that subject, who is this senior former regime official that you spoke to yesterday? Don’t you think I have a right 

to know? Don’t you think the Subcommittee and the public have a 

right to know who this senior former regime official you were 

quoting against me, interviewed yesterday, actually is? 

Now one of the most serious of the mistakes that you have made 

in this set of documents is, to be frank, such a schoolboy howler 

as to make a fool of the efforts that you have made. You assert on 

page 19, not once but twice, that the documents that you are referring to cover a different period in time from the documents covered 

by the Daily Telegraph which were the subject of a libel action won 

by me in the High Court in England late last year. You state that 

the Daily Telegraph article cited documents from 1992 and 1993 

whilst you are dealing with documents dating from 2001. 

Senator the Daily Telegraph’s documents date identically to the 

documents that you are dealing with in your report here. None of 

the Daily Telegraph’s documents dealt with a period of 1992–1993. 

I had never set foot in Iraq until late in 1993; never in my life. 

There could possibly be no documents relating to Oil-for-Food matters in 1992–1993 for the Oil-for-Food scheme did not exist at that 

time. Yet, you have allocated a full section of this document to 

claiming that your documents are from a different era to the Daily 

Telegraph documents when the opposite is true. Your documents 

and the Daily Telegraph documents deal with exactly the same period. 

But perhaps you were confusing the Daily Telegraph action with 

the Christian Science Monitor. The Christian Science Monitor did 

indeed publish on its front pages a set of allegations against me 

very similar to the ones that your Subcommittee have made. They 

did indeed rely on documents which started in 1992–1993. These 

documents were unmasked by the Christian Science Monitor themselves as forgeries. 

Now the neo-con web sites and newspapers in which you are 

such a hero, Senator, were all absolutely cockahoot at the publication of the Christian Science Monitor documents. They were all absolutely convinced of their authenticity. They were all absolutely 

45

convinced that these documents showed me receiving $10 million 

from the Saddam Hussein regime. And they were all lies. 

In the same week as the Daily Telegraph published their documents against me, the Christian Science Monitor published theirs, 

which turned out to be forgeries, and the British newspaper Mail 

on Sunday purchased a third set of documents which also on forensic examination turned out to be forgeries. So there is nothing fanciful about this. Not at all fanciful about it. The existence of forged 

documents implicating me in commercial activities with the Iraqi 

regime is a proven fact. It is a proven fact that these forged documents existed and were being circulated amongst right wing newspapers in Baghdad and around the world in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Iraqi regime. 

Now, Senator, I gave my heart and soul to oppose the policy that 

you promoted. I gave my political life’s blood to try to stop the mass 

killing of Iraqis by the sanctions on Iraq, which killed a million 

Iraqis, most of them children. Most of them died before they even 

knew that they were Iraqis, but they died for no other reason other 

than that they were Iraqis with the misfortune to be born at that 

time. I gave my heart and soul to stop you committing the disaster 

that you did commit in invading Iraq. 

And I told the world that your case for the war was a pack of 

lies. I told the world that Iraq, contrary to your claims, did not 

have weapons of mass destruction. I told the world, contrary to 

your claims, that Iraq had no connection to al Qaeda. I told the 

world, contrary to your claims, that Iraq had no connection to the 

atrocity on 9/11/2001. I told the world, contrary to your claims, that 

the Iraqi people would resist a British and American invasion of 

their country and that the fall of Baghdad would not be the beginning of the end, but merely the end of the beginning. 

Senator, in everything I said about Iraq, I turned out to be right 

and you turned out to be wrong, and 100,000 people have paid with 

their lives, 1,600 of them American soldiers sent to their deaths on 

a pack of lives, 15,000 of them wounded, many of them disabled 

forever on a pack of lives. If the world had listened to Kofi Annan, 

whose dismissal you demanded, if the world had listened to President Chirac, who you want to paint as some kind of corrupt traitor, 

if the world had listened to me and the anti-war movement in Britain, we would not be in the disaster that we are in today. 

Senator, this is the mother of all smoke screens. You are trying 

to divert attention from the crimes that you supported, from the 

theft of billions of dollars of Iraq’s wealth. Have a look at the real 

Oil-for-Food scandal. Have a look at the 14 months you were in 

charge of Baghdad, the first 14 months, when $8.8 billion of Iraq’s 

wealth went missing on your watch. Have a look at Halliburton 

and the other American corporations that stole not only Iraq’s 

money but the money of the American taxpayer. Have a look at the 

oil that you did not even meter, that you were shipping out of the 

country and selling, the proceeds of which went who knows where. 

Have a look at the $800 million you gave to American military 

commanders to hand out around the country without even counting 

it or weighing it. 

Have a look at the real scandal breaking in the newspapers 

today, revealed in the earlier testimony in this Subcommittee, that 

46

1See Exhibit No. 9, which appears in the Appendix on page 1490. 

the biggest sanctions busters were not me or Russian politicians or 

French politicians. The real sanctions busters were your own companies with the connivance of your own government. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Galloway. 

Mr. Galloway, can we start by talking about Fawaz Zureikat? Do 

you know the individual? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I know him very well. 

Senator COLEMAN. In fact you were best man at his wedding? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I was. 

Senator COLEMAN. And at some point in time he became chair 

of Mariam’s Appeal; is that correct? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. He did. 

Senator COLEMAN. Can you tell me when that occurred? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I think in late 2000 or early 2001. 

Senator COLEMAN. Before Mr. Zureikat was chair of Mariam’s 

Appeal, who had that position? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I was the founding chairman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Was there somebody in between you and——

Mr. GALLOWAY. Mr. Halford. 

Senator COLEMAN. Do you recall when he had that position? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I do not. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Zureikat was a significant contributor to 

Mariam’s Appeal; is that correct? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. He was the second biggest contributor. The main 

contributor was Sheikh Zayed, the ruler of the United Arab Emirates, which you have glossed over in your report because it is 

slightly embarrassing to you. And the third major contributor was 

the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, which you have equally glossed 

over because it is embarrassing to you, because both of those individuals are your friends. 

Senator COLEMAN. How much did Mr. Zureikat contribute to 

Mariam’s Appeal? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Roughly 375,000 English pounds. 

Senator COLEMAN. Is that about $600,000 American? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I do not know the conversion but it is 375,000 

Sterling. 

Senator COLEMAN. By the way, Mr. Zureikat was your designated representative for the activity of Mariam’s Appeal; is that 

correct? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. For the activities of the Mariam Appeal, yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. When did he get that position? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I think late 2000. 

Senator COLEMAN. Looking at Exhibit 9 1—I think you have the 

books in front of you. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. That appears to be a document from the Ministry of Oil. Testimony has indicated that the signature is an accurate signature. Do you have any reason to believe that document 

is false? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I have told you that I have never heard of Aredio 

Petroleum, and I have told you that the Mariam Appeal never reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:03 Jan 04, 2006 Jkt 021438 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\21438.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
47

1See Exhibit No. 12, which appears in the Appendix on page 1498. 

ceived a single penny from Aredio Petroleum. So the information 

at the top of the page, if you have translated it accurately, is false. 

Senator COLEMAN. Have you heard of Middle East ASI Company? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Yes, that is Mr. Zureikat’s company. 

Senator COLEMAN. Turn to Exhibit 12.1

Mr. GALLOWAY. Yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. That purports to be, again, a stamp, the seal 

of the Ministry of Oil, People of Iraq, and this purports to show the 

details of a contract signed with Middle East ASI Company, George 

Galloway and Fawaz Zureikat. So Middle East ASI is Mr. 

Zureikat’s company? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Middle East ASI is Mr. Zureikat’s company. He 

may well have signed an oil contract. It had nothing to do with me. 

Senator COLEMAN. He was chair of Mariam’s Appeal in 2000, so 

I take it you knew him well. Did he ever talk to you about his dealings in oil with Iraq? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. He did better than that. He talked to everybody. 

He talked to every English journalist that came through Baghdad 

who he helped, our request, to get the interviews and get the places 

that they wanted and needed to go. He was introduced to everyone 

as a major benefactor of the Mariam Appeal and as a businessman 

doing extensive business in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. 

Senator COLEMAN. I am asking you specifically, in 2001 were you 

aware that he was doing oil deals with Iraq? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I was aware that he was doing extensive business with Iraq. I did not know the details of it. It was not my business. 

Senator COLEMAN. So this is somebody who is the chairman of 

your Subcommittee, that you know well, and you are not able to 

say that he was——

Mr. GALLOWAY. Well, there are a lot of contributors, I have just 

been checking, to your political——

Senator COLEMAN. There are not many at that level, Mr. Galloway. For the record——

Mr. GALLOWAY. Let me assure you, I have checked your web site. 

There are lots of contributors to your political campaign funds. I 

don’t suppose you ask any of them how they made the money they 

give you. 

Senator COLEMAN. Certainly not at $600,000 American. But let 

me again ask the question, just so the record is clear. I need to be 

clear on the record, that you are not contesting then the validity 

of Exhibit 12.1 You are indicating that Mr. Zureikat could have had 

dealings with Iraq. But you are saying that at that point in time 

you were not aware that he had oil dealings with Iraq? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. First of all, I have only seen this document 

today, and I am telling you that insofar as my name is in a parentheses, the information in it is false. I have no reason to believe 

Mr. Zureikat’s company did not do that particular oil deal. But this 

is your problem in this whole affair. There is nobody arguing that 

Mr. Zureikat’s company did not do oil transactions, and many 

other, much bigger, frankly, business contracts with Iraq. There is 

48

1See Exhibit No. 49, which appears in the Appendix on page 1741. 

2See Exhibit No. 14, which appears in the Appendix on page 1503. 

nobody contesting that Mr. Zureikat made substantial donations to 

our campaign against sanctions and war. 

My point is, you have accused me personally of enriching myself, 

of taking money from Iraq, and that is false and unjust. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Galloway, do you recall an interview you 

had with Jeremy Paxman on April 23, 2003? Do we have a copy 

of the transcript? I would like to refresh your memory.1

You were asked the question, talking about business dealings 

with Mr. Zureikat in Iraq, and at least the transcript that I have, 

and I would like you to know if it is incorrect, your quote is—have 

you asked him about business in Iraq. ‘‘I am trying to reach him’’—

this is in 2003. ‘‘I am trying to reach him to ask him if he has ever 

been involved in oil deals because I do not know the answer to 

that.’’

So in 2003, you are saying you do not know the answer to whether he was involved in oil deals? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I told you in my previous two answers, I knew 

that Mr. Zureikat was heavily involved in business in Iraq and 

elsewhere but that it was none of my business what particular 

transactions or business he was involved in, any more than you ask 

the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee when they donate 

money to you, or pay for your trips to Israel, where they got the 

money from. 

Senator COLEMAN. So, Mr. Galloway, you would have this Subcommittee believe that your designated representative for Mariam’s 

Appeal, becomes the chair of the Mariam’s Appeal, was listed in 

Iraqi documents as obviously doing business, oil deals with Iraq, 

that you never had a conversation with him in 2001 of whether he 

was ever doing oil business with Iraq? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. No, I am doing better than that. I am telling you 

that I knew that he was doing a vast amount of business with Iraq; 

much bigger, as I said a couple of answers ago, than any oil business he did. In the airport, he was the representative of some of 

the world’s biggest companies in Iraq. He was an extremely 

wealthy businessman doing very extensive business in Iraq. Not 

only did I know that, but I told everyone about it. I emblazoned 

it in our literature, on our web site, precisely so that people like 

you could not later credibly question my bona fides in that regard. 

So I did better than that. 

I never asked him if he was trading in oil. I knew he was a big 

trader with Iraq and I told everybody about it. 

Senator COLEMAN. So in 2003, when you said you did not know 

whether he was doing oil deals, were you telling the truth at that 

time? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Yes, I was. I have never known until the Daily 

Telegraph story appeared that he was alleged to be doing oil deals. 

But his oil deals are about one-tenth of the business that he did 

in Iraq, so I did better than telling people about his oil deals. I told 

them he was doing much, much more than that. 

Senator COLEMAN. So Exhibit 14,2 which purports to be a contract with Middle East Semiconductor, contract M/12/14—Middle 

49

1See Report on Oil Allocations Granted to Charles Pasqua and George Galloway, prepared by 

the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which appears in the Appendix on page 331. 

East semiconductor, again, is Mr. Zureikat’s company; is that correct? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Yes, it is. 

Senator COLEMAN. So do you have any reason to believe that this 

document is false? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. If the parentheses implies, as you have been arguing all morning what it implies, that this was being signed for 

by Middle East Advanced Semiconductors in order to pass the 

money on to me, is false. Mr. Zureikat and Middle East Semiconductors, or any other company, have never given me any money. 

And if they had, you would have it up here on a board and in front 

of the Subcommittee here. 

Senator COLEMAN. I take it, Mr. Galloway, that in regard to any 

surcharges paid to Saddam Hussein in, I think it is Footnote 89 1

which refers to the surcharge for the contract focused on Mariam’s 

Appeal, you are saying that document—first of all, any contract between Iraq and Mariam’s Appeal, is false? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Senator, I had gotten used to the allegation that 

I was taking money from Saddam Hussein. It is actually surreal 

to hear in this room this morning that I am being accused of giving 

money to Saddam Hussein. This is utterly preposterous—utterly 

preposterous—that I gave $300,000 to Saddam Hussein. This is beyond the realm of the ridiculous. 

Now the Mariam Appeal’s finances have been investigated by the 

Charity Commission on the order of Lord Goldsmith. You will recall him, Senator, he is the attorney general, practically the only 

lawman in the world that thought your war with Iraq was legal, 

thought Britain joining your war with Iraq was legal. He ordered 

the Charity Commission to investigate the Mariam Appeal. Using 

their statutory powers, they recovered all money in and all money 

out, ever received or spent by the Mariam Appeal. They found no 

impropriety. 

I can assure you, they found no money from an oil contract from 

Aredio Petroleum; none whatsoever. 

Senator COLEMAN. The commission did not look at these documents relating to this contract with Iraq——

Mr. GALLOWAY. No, but they looked better than that, Senator. 

Senator COLEMAN. I am not asking you that. I am asking the 

question whether they looked at these documents. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Senator, you are not listening to what I am saying. They did better than that. They looked at every penny in and 

every penny out, and they did not find, I can assure you, any trace 

of a donation from a company called Aredio Petroleum, or frankly, 

a donation from any company other than Mr. Zureikat’s company. 

That is a fact. 

Senator COLEMAN. If I can get back to Mr. Zureikat one more 

time. Do you recall a time when you had a conversation with him 

about oil dealings in Iraq? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I have already answered that question. I can assure you, Mr. Zureikat never gave me a penny from an oil deal, 

from a cake deal, from a bread deal, or from any deal. He donated 

50

1See Exhibit No. 12, which appears in the Appendix on page 1498. 

money to our campaign, which we publicly brandished on all of our 

literature, along with the other donors to the campaign. 

Senator COLEMAN. Again, Mr. Galloway, a simple question. I am 

looking for either a yes or no. Did you ever have a conversation 

with Mr. Zureikat where he informed you that he had oil dealings 

with Iraq, yes or no? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Not before this Daily Telegraph report, no. 

Senator COLEMAN. Senator Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Galloway. 

Mr. Galloway, could you take a look at Exhibit 12? 1

Mr. GALLOWAY. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Where your name is in parentheses after Mr. 

Zureikat’s——

Mr. GALLOWAY. Before Mr. Zureikat, if I am looking at the right 

exhibit. 

Senator LEVIN. I was going to finish my question though. My 

question was, where your name is in parentheses after Mr. 

Zureikat’s company. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I apologize, Senator. 

Senator LEVIN. That is all right. 

Now that document, assuming it is an accurate translation of the 

document underneath it, you are not alleging here today that the 

document is a forgery, I gather. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I have no idea, Senator, if it is a forgery or not. 

Senator LEVIN. But you are not alleging——

Mr. GALLOWAY. I am saying that the information insofar as it relates to me is fake. 

Senator LEVIN. Is wrong. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. It is wrong. 

Senator LEVIN. But you are not alleging that the document——

Mr. GALLOWAY. I have no way of knowing, Senator. 

Senator LEVIN. That is fine, so you are not alleging that. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. No, I have no way of knowing. This is the first 

time——

Senator LEVIN. Is it fair to say since you do not know, you are 

not alleging——

Mr. GALLOWAY. It would have been nice to have seen it before 

today. 

Senator LEVIN. Is it fair to say though that either because you 

have not seen it before or because otherwise you do not know, you 

are not alleging the document is a fake; is that fair to say? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I have not had it in my possession long enough 

to form a view about that. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you let the Subcommittee know after you 

have had it in your possession long enough whether you consider 

the document a fake? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Yes, although there is an academic quality about 

all this, Senator Levin, because you have already found me guilty 

before you actually allowed me to come here and speak for myself. 

Senator LEVIN. In order to attempt to clear your name, would 

you——

Mr. GALLOWAY. Let us be clear about something, Senator——

51

Senator LEVIN. Let me finish my question. Let me be clear about 

that, first of all. 

Would you submit to the Subcommittee, after you have had a 

chance to review this document, whether or not in your judgment 

it is a forgery? Will you do that? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. If you give me the original. This is not—presumably you wrote this English translation. 

Senator LEVIN. Yes, and there is a copy underneath it of the——

Mr. GALLOWAY. Yes, there is a copy of a gray blur. 

Senator LEVIN. A copy of the original. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. If you give me the original in a decipherable way 

then, of course, I will. 

Senator LEVIN. That would be fine. We would appreciate that. 

Now at the bottom of this document, assuming it is not a forgery 

for a moment, it says surcharge. Are we together? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. ‘‘As per the instructions of your excellency over 

the phone on 12/11/01 of not accepting the company’s proposals unless they pay the debt incurred since phase eight.’’ If in fact Mr. 

Zureikat’s company paid a surcharge or a kickback to the Iraqi government in order to obtain an allocation of oil, would that trouble 

you? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. It turns out from your own testimony that practically everyone in the world, and especially the United States, was 

paying kickbacks. 

Senator LEVIN. It troubles me a great deal. As you have heard 

from my statement today, I am very much troubled that we have 

an oil company that was involved in this and we are going to go 

after that oil company. 

Now let me ask you. I have expressed my view about Bayoil so 

now let me ask you about Mr. Zureikat’s company. If in fact Mr. 

Zureikat’s company paid a kickback to the Iraqi government in 

order to obtain this allocation, would you be troubled? That is my 

question. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. That is a good question and will you allow me 

to answer it seriously. 

Senator LEVIN. I would be happy to. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Not in a yes or no fashion, because I could give 

you a glib——

Senator LEVIN. Providing you give us an answer, I would be delighted to hear it. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Here is my answer and I hope it does delight 

you. I opposed the Oil-for-Food program with all my heart. Not for 

the reasons that you are troubled by it, but because it was a program which saw the death—I am talking about the death now, I 

am talking about the mass grave of a million people, most of them 

children, in Iraq. The Oil-for-Food program gave 30 cents per day 

per Iraqi for the period of the Oil-for-Food program. Thirty cents 

for all food, all medicine, all clothes, all schools, all hospitals, and 

all public services. I believe that the United Nations had no right 

to starve Iraq’s people because it had fallen out with Iraq’s dictator. 

David Bonior, your former colleague, Senator, whom I admire 

very much, a former chief whip here on the Hill, described the 

52

sanctions policy as infanticide masquerading as politics. Senator 

Coleman thinks that is funny. But I think it is the most profound 

description of that era that I have ever read: Infanticide 

masquerading as politics. So I opposed this program with all my 

heart. Not because Saddam was getting kickbacks from it—and I 

do not know when it is alleged these kickbacks started. Not because some individuals were getting rich doing business with Iraq 

under it, but because it was a murderous policy of killing huge 

numbers of Iraqis. That is what troubles me. 

Now if you are asking me, is Mr. Zureikat in some difficulty, like 

all the other companies that it would appear paid kickbacks to the 

Iraqi regime, no doubt he is, although it would appear he is quite 

small beer compared to the American companies who were involved 

in the same thing. 

Senator LEVIN. Now my question. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I told you what troubles me. 

Senator LEVIN. I am asking you——

Mr. GALLOWAY. And I have told you——

Senator LEVIN. My question, now that you have given us again 

your statement about your feeling about the Oil-for-Food program, 

my question is, would you be troubled if you knew that Mr. 

Zureikat paid a kickback in order to get an allocation of an oil contract? That is a very simple question. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. It is Mr. Zureikat’s problem, not mine. 

Senator LEVIN. It would not trouble you. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. It is Mr. Zureikat’s problem, not mine. 

Senator LEVIN. So that if a kickback which was illegal under 

international—now you may not agree with the United Nations, 

but that is the international community that you are attacking, 

which is fine. You are entitled to do that. You are entitled and I 

will defend your right to do it. But you are attacking a U.N. program, which is your right to do, which was aimed at providing humanitarian assistance to try to alleviate the problems that the 

sanctions provided, which is your right to do. 

But my question, which you are so far evading is, would you be 

troubled if that U.N. Oil-for-Food Program was being circumvented 

by the kind of kickbacks which were taking place and being given 

to Saddam Hussein in order to obtain allocations under that program, if Mr. Zureikat participated in that kickback scheme which 

violated the U.N. sanctions? You may not have agreed with it, but 

it violated the program. Would it trouble you if he violated that 

U.N. program in that way? That is my question. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Senator, there are many things that——

Senator LEVIN. I know other things trouble you, but can you just 

give us a straightforward answer? You have given us a long explanation of other things that trouble you, which is your right. Now 

I am asking you whether that troubles you. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. It troubles me that it might put him in difficulty. 

It troubles me that it might now lead to a prosecution of him. It 

troubles me that this will be further smoke in the smoke screen. 

But I opposed this Oil-for-Food Program. 

Senator LEVIN. I understand. There are a lot of things you oppose but you do not believe should be circumvented in illegal ways, 

is that not——

53

Mr. GALLOWAY. Please, Senator, you supported the illegal attack 

on Iraq. Do not talk to me about illegalities. 

Senator LEVIN. Sorry about that, I did not. But that is beside the 

point. You are wrong on your facts——

Mr. GALLOWAY. I am collectively talking about the Senate, not 

you personally. 

Senator LEVIN. That is all right. Let me go back to my question. 

I do not want to get involved in——

Mr. GALLOWAY. Why not? You want to talk about illegality? 

Senator LEVIN. No. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. You launched an illegal war which has killed 

100,000 people. You want me to be troubled about——

Senator LEVIN. No, I want you to answer questions which are 

fairly put and directly put to you. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. All right. 

Senator LEVIN. Now I will ask you two last questions. If Mr. 

Zureikat’s contributions to Mariam’s Appeal came from the sale of 

oil, or his share of a sale of oil, which he was able to obtain because 

he paid a kickback in violation of the U.N. program, would that 

contribution trouble you? That is my question. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Well, Senator——

Senator LEVIN. If you cannot give a short answer, just——

Mr. GALLOWAY. I will give as short as I can and I appreciate your 

fairness in this. Fund-raising for political purposes is seldom pretty, as any American politician could testify. I took the view—I 

could be criticized for it, have been criticized for it—that I would 

fund-raise from the kings of Arabia, whose political systems I have 

opposed all my life, in order to raise funds for what I thought was 

an emergency facing a disaster. I did not ask Mr. Zureikat which 

part of his profits from his entire business he was making donations to our charity. 

Senator LEVIN. That was not my question. My question is, would 

it trouble you if you found that out? 

It is OK, you are not going to answer it, it is clear to me. I want 

to go to my next question. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. All right. 

Senator LEVIN. You are just simply not going to answer it. I will 

say, American politicians who find the source of money after it is 

given to them is troubling, they find out something they did not 

know afterwards, frequently will, and hopefully I think always, but 

at least frequently will return that money, will say they disagree 

with the source of the money. Hopefully all of us will do that. But 

whether or not we all live up to that standard, you clearly do not 

adopt that as a standard for contributions to Mariam’s Appeal. You 

are not going to look at the source of the money. You are just simply going to accept the money, and you have made that clear. 

I want to just ask you about Tariq Aziz. You have indicated who 

you did not talk to and who you did talk to. Did you have conversations with Tariq Aziz about the award of oil allocations? That is my 

question. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. No. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. I am done. Thank you. 

Senator COLEMAN. Just one follow-up on the Tariq Aziz question. 

Describe your relationship with Tariq Aziz. 

54

1See Exhibit Nos. 47 and 48, prepared statements of Thomas A. Schweich and Peter 

Reddaway, which appear in the Appendix on pages 1731 and 1736 respectively. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Friendly. 

Senator COLEMAN. How often did you meet him? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Many times. 

Senator COLEMAN. Can you give an estimate of that? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. No. Many times. 

Senator COLEMAN. More than five? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. More than 10? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. Is it around 15? 

Mr. GALLOWAY. We are getting nearer, but I have not ever counted. But many times. I am saying to you many times, and I am saying to you I was friendly with him. 

Senator COLEMAN. You described him as a very dear friend. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. I think you have quoted me as saying a dear, 

dear friend. I do not often use the double adjective. 

Senator COLEMAN. I was looking into your heart on that. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. But friend I have no problem with. 

Senator just before I go on, I do hope you will avail yourself of 

this dossier that I have produced. I am really speaking through you 

to Senator Levin. This is what I have said about Saddam Hussein. 

Senator COLEMAN. We will enter that into the record without objection. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Thanks. 

Senator COLEMAN. I have no further questions for the witness. 

You are excused, Mr. Galloway. 

Mr. GALLOWAY. Thank you very much. 

Senator COLEMAN. We have a vote. The hearing will be recessed 

for 20 minutes. 

[Recess.] 

Senator COLEMAN. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations is back in session. 

As I have indicated to the next panel, because of the fact that 

both Senator Levin and I have to be at our conference lunches 

today because of some very important issues that are being discussed, and we want to give this panel time, we felt the best thing 

to do was to adjourn the hearing at this point. We will have another day—we will set another time. There are some other matters 

and other reports that we wanted to follow up on. This will be the 

first panel of that next hearing.1 So we will set a date and we will 

set a time. 

I want to apologize to the panel for the inconvenience but there 

are some pressing matters that we have to attend to. So with that, 

this hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(55)

A P P E N D I X 


21438.001
56


21438.002
57


21438.003
58


21438.004
59


21438.005
60


21438.006
61


21438.007
62


21438.008
63


21438.009
64


21438.010
65


21438.011
66


21438.012
67


21438.013
68


21438.014
69


21438.015
70


21438.016
71


21438.017
72


21438.018
73


21438.019
74


21438.020
75


21438.021
76


21438.022
77


21438.023
78


21438.024
79


21438.025
80


21438.026
81


21438.027
82


21438.003
83


21438.004
84


21438.028
85


21438.029
86


21438.030
87


21438.031
88


21438.032
89


21438.033
90


21438.034
91


21438.035
92


21438.036
93


21438.037
94


21438.038
95


21438.039
96


21438.040
97


21438.041
98


21438.042
99


21438.043
100


21438.044
101


21438.045
102


21438.046
103


21438.047
104


21438.048
105


21438.049
106


21438.050
107


21438.051
108


21438.052
109


21438.053
110


21438.054
111


21438.055
112


21438.056
113


21438.057
114


21438.058
115


21438.059
116


21438.060
117


21438.061
118


21438.062
119


21438.063
120


21438.064
121


21438.065
122


21438.066
123


21438.067
124


21438.068
125


21438.069
126


21438.070
127


21438.071
128


21438.072
129


21438.073
130


21438.074
131


21438.075
132


21438.076
133


21438.077
134


21438.078
135


21438.079
136


21438.080
137


21438.081
138


21438.082
139


21438.083
140


21438.084
141


21438.085
142


21438.086
143


21438.087
144


21438.088
145


21438.089
146


21438.090
147


21438.091
148


21438.092
149


21438.093
150


21438.094
151


21438.095
152


21438.096
153


21438.097
154


21438.098
155


21438.099
156


21438.100
157


21438.101
158


21438.102
159


21438.103
160


21438.104
161


21438.105
162


21438.106
163


21438.107
164


21438.108
165


21438.109
166


21438.110
167


21438.111
168


21438.112
169


21438.113
170


21438.114
171


21438.115
172


21438.116
173


21438.117
174


21438.118
175


21438.119
176


21438.120
177


21438.121
178


21438.122
179


21438.123
180


21438.124
181


21438.125
182


21438.126
183


21438.127
184


21438.128
185


21438.129
186


21438.130
187


21438.131
188


21438.132
189


21438.133
190


21438.134
191


21438.135
192


21438.136
193


21438.137
194


21438.138
195


21438.139
196


21438.140
197


21438.141
198


21438.142
199


21438.143
200


21438.144
201


21438.145
202


21438.146
203


21438.147
204


21438.148
205


21438.149
206


21438.150
207


21438.151
208


21438.152
209


21438.153
210


21438.154
211


21438.155
212


21438.156
213


21438.157
214


21438.158
215


21438.159
216


21438.160
217


21438.161
218


21438.162
219


21438.163
220


21438.164
221


21438.165
222


21438.166
223


21438.167
224


21438.168
225


21438.169
226


21438.170
227


21438.171
228


21438.172
229


21438.173
230


21438.174
231


21438.175
232


21438.176
233


21438.177
234


21438.178
235


21438.179
236


21438.180
237


21438.181
238


21438.182
239


21438.183
240


21438.184
241


21438.185
242


21438.186
243


21438.187
244


21438.188
245


21438.189
246


21438.190
247


21438.191
248


21438.192
249


21438.193
250


21438.194
251


21438.195
252


21438.196
253


21438.197
254


21438.198
255


21438.199
256


21438.200
257


21438.201
258


21438.202
259


21438.203
260


21438.204
261


21438.205
262


21438.206
263


21438.207
264


21438.208
265


21438.209
266


21438.210
267


21438.211
268


21438.212
269


21438.213
270


21438.214
271


21438.215
272


21438.216
273


21438.217
274


21438.218
275


21438.219
276


21438.220
277


21438.221
278


21438.222
279


21438.223
280


21438.224
281


21438.225
282


21438.226
283


21438.227
284


21438.228
285


21438.229
286


21438.230
287


21438.231
288


21438.232
289


21438.233
290


21438.234
291


21438.235
292


21438.236
293


21438.237
294


21438.238
295


21438.239
296


21438.240
297


21438.241
298


21438.242
299


21438.243
300


21438.244
301


21438.245
302


21438.246
303


21438.247
304


21438.248
305


21438.249
306


21438.250
307


21438.251
308


21438.252
309


21438.253
310


21438.254
311


21438.255
312


21438.256
313


21438.257
314


21438.258
315


21438.259
316


21438.260
317


21438.261
318


21438.262
319


21438.263
320


21438.264
321


21438.265
322


21438.266
323


21438.267
324


21438.268
325


21438.269
326


21438.270
327


21438.271
328


21438.272
329


21438.273
330


21438.274
331


21438.275
332


21438.276
333


21438.277
334


21438.278
335


21438.279
336


21438.280
337


21438.281
338


21438.282
339


21438.283
340


21438.284
341


21438.285
342


21438.286
343


21438.287
344


21438.288
345


21438.289
346


21438.290
347


21438.291
348


21438.292
349


21438.293
350


21438.294
351


21438.295
352


21438.296
353


21438.297
354


21438.298
355


21438.299
356


21438.300
357


21438.301
358


21438.302
359


21438.303
360


21438.304
361


21438.305
362


21438.306
363


21438.307
364


21438.308
365


21438.309
366


21438.310
367


21438.311
368


21438.312
369


21438.313
370


21438.314
371


21438.315
372


21438.316
373


21438.317
374


21438.318
375


21438.319
376


21438.320
377


21438.321
378


21438.322
379


21438.323
380


21438.324
381


21438.325
382


21438.326
383


21438.327
384


21438.328
385


21438.329
386


21438.330
387


21438.331
388


21438.332
389


21438.333
390


21438.334
391


21438.335
392


21438.336
393


21438.337
394


21438.338
395


21438.339
396


21438.340
397


21438.341
398


21438.342
399


21438.343
400


21438.344
401


21438.345
402


21438.346
403


21438.347
404


21438.348
405


21438.349
406


21438.350
407


21438.351
408


21438.352
409


21438.353
410


21438.354
411


21438.355
412


21438.356
413


21438.357
414


21438.358
415


21438.359
416


21438.360
417


21438.361
418


21438.362
419


21438.363
420


21438.364
421


21438.365
422


21438.366
423


21438.367
424


21438.368
425


21438.369
426


21438.370
427


21438.371
428


21438.372
429


21438.373
430


21438.374
431


21438.375
432


21438.376
433


21438.377
434


21438.378
435


21438.379
436


21438.380
437


21438.381
438


21438.382
439


21438.383
440


21438.384
441


21438.385
442


21438.386
443


21438.387
444


21438.388
445


21438.389
446


21438.390
447


21438.391
448


21438.392
449


21438.393
450


21438.394
451


21438.395
452


21438.396
453


21438.397
454


21438.398
455


21438.399
456


21438.400
457


21438.401
458


21438.402
459


21438.403
460


21438.404
461


21438.405
462


21438.406
463


21438.407
464


21438.408
465


21438.409
466


21438.410
467


21438.411
468


21438.412
469


21438.413
470


21438.414
471


21438.415
472


21438.416
473


21438.417
474


21438.418
475


21438.419
476


21438.420
477


21438.421
478


21438.422
479


21438.423
480


21438.424
481


21438.425
482


21438.426
483


21438.427
484


21438.428
485


21438.429
486


21438.430
487


21438.431
488


21438.432
489


21438.433
490


21438.434
491


21438.435
492


21438.436
493


21438.437
494


21438.438
495


21438.439
496


21438.440
497


21438.441
498


21438.442
499


21438.443
500


21438.444
501


21438.445
502


21438.446
503


21438.447
504


21438.448
505


21438.449
506


21438.450
507


21438.451
508


21438.452
509


21438.453
510


21438.454
511


21438.455
512


21438.456
513


21438.457
514


21438.458
515


21438.459
516


21438.460
517


21438.461
518


21438.462
519


21438.463
520


21438.464
521


21438.465
522


21438.466
523


21438.467
524


21438.468
525


21438.469
526


21438.470
527


21438.471
528


21438.472
529


21438.473
530


21438.474
531


21438.475
532


21438.476
533


21438.477
534


21438.478
535


21438.479
536


21438.480
537


21438.481
538


21438.482
539


21438.483
540


21438.484
541


21438.485
542


21438.486
543


21438.487
544


21438.488
545


21438.489
546


21438.490
547


21438.491
548


21438.492
549


21438.493
550


21438.494
551


21438.495
552


21438.496
553


21438.497
554


21438.498
555


21438.499
556


21438.500
557


21438.501
558


21438.502
559


21438.503
560


21438.504
561


21438.505
562


21438.506
563


21438.507
564


21438.508
565


21438.509
566


21438.510
567


21438.511
568


21438.512
569


21438.513
570


21438.514
571


21438.515
572


21438.516
573


21438.517
574


21438.518
575


21438.519
576


21438.520
577


21438.521
578


21438.522
579


21438.523
580


21438.524
581


21438.525
582


21438.526
583


21438.527
584


21438.528
585


21438.529
586


21438.530
587


21438.531
588


21438.532
589


21438.533
590


21438.534
591


21438.535
592


21438.536
593


21438.537
594


21438.538
595


21438.539
596


21438.540
597


21438.541
598


21438.542
599


21438.543
600


21438.544
601


21438.545
602


21438.546
603


21438.547
604


21438.548
605


21438.549
606


21438.550
607


21438.551
608


21438.552
609


21438.553
610


21438.554
611


21438.555
612


21438.556
613


21438.557
614


21438.558
615


21438.559
616


21438.560
617


21438.561
618


21438.562
619


21438.563
620


21438.564
621


21438.565
622


21438.566
623


21438.567
624


21438.568
625


21438.569
626


21438.570
627


21438.571
628


21438.572
629


21438.573
630


21438.574
631


21438.575
632


21438.576
633


21438.577
634


21438.578
635


21438.579
636


21438.580
637


21438.581
638


21438.582
639


21438.583
640


21438.584
641


21438.585
642


21438.586
643


21438.587
644


21438.588
645


21438.589
646


21438.590
647


21438.591
648


21438.592
649


21438.593
650


21438.594
651


21438.595
652


21438.596
653


21438.597
654


21438.598
655


21438.599
656


21438.600
657


21438.601
658


21438.602
659


21438.603
660


21438.604
661


21438.605
662


21438.606
663


21438.607
664


21438.608
665


21438.609
666


21438.610
667


21438.611
668


21438.612
669


21438.613
670


21438.614
671


21438.615
672


21438.616
673


21438.617
674


21438.618
675


21438.619
676


21438.620
677


21438.621
678


21438.622
679


21438.623
680


21438.624
681


21438.625
682


21438.626
683


21438.627
684


21438.628
685


21438.629
686


21438.630
687


21438.631
688


21438.632
689


21438.634
690


21438.635
691


21438.636
692


21438.637
693


21438.638
694


21438.639
695


21438.640
696


21438.641
697


21438.642
698


21438.643
699


21438.644
700


21438.645
701


21438.646
702


21438.647
703


21438.648
704


21438.649
705


21438.650
706


21438.651
707


21438.652
708


21438.653
709


21438.654
710


21438.655
711


21438.656
712


21438.657
713


21438.658
714


21438.659
715


21438.660
716


21438.661
717


21438.662
718


21438.663
719


21438.664
720


21438.665
721


21438.666
722


21438.667
723


21438.668
724


21438.669
725


21438.670
726


21438.671
727


21438.672
728


21438.673
729


21438.674
730


21438.675
731


21438.676
732


21438.677
733


21438.678
734


21438.679
735


21438.680
736


21438.681
737


21438.682
738


21438.683
739


21438.684
740


21438.685
741


21438.686
742


21438.687
743


21438.688
744


21438.689
745


21438.690
746


21438.691
747


21438.692
748


21438.693
749


21438.694
750


21438.695
751


21438.696
752


21438.697
753


21438.698
754


21438.699
755


21438.700
756


21438.701
757


21438.702
758


21438.703
759


21438.704
760


21438.705
761


21438.706
762


21438.707
763


21438.708
764


21438.709
765


21438.710
766


21438.711
767


21438.712
768


21438.713
769


21438.714
770


21438.715
771


21438.716
772


21438.717
773


21438.718
774


21438.719
775


21438.720
776


21438.721
777


21438.722
778


21438.723
779


21438.724
780


21438.725
781


21438.726
782


21438.727
783


21438.728
784


21438.729
785


21438.730
786


21438.731
787


21438.732
788


21438.733
789


21438.734
790


21438.735
791


21438.736
792


21438.737
793


21438.738
794


21438.739
795


21438.740
796


21438.741
797


21438.742
798


21438.743
799


21438.744
800


21438.745
801


21438.746
802


21438.747
803


21438.748
804


21438.749
805


21438.750
806


21438.751
807


21438.752
808


21438.753
809


21438.754
810


21438.755
811


21438.756
812


21438.757
813


21438.758
814


21438.759
815


21438.760
816


21438.761
817


21438.762
818


21438.763
819


21438.764
820


21438.765
821


21438.766
822


21438.767
823


21438.768
824


21438.769
825


21438.770
826


21438.771
827


21438.772
828


21438.773
829


21438.774
830


21438.775
831


21438.776
832


21438.777
833


21438.778
834


21438.779
835


21438.780
836


21438.781
837


21438.782
838


21438.783
839


21438.784
840


21438.785
841


21438.786
842


21438.787
843


21438.788
844


21438.789
845


21438.790
846


21438.791
847


21438.792
848


21438.793
849


21438.794
850


21438.795
851


21438.796
852


21438.797
853


21438.798
854


21438.799
855


21438.800
856


21438.801
857


21438.802
858


21438.803
859


21438.804
860


21438.805
861


21438.806
862


21438.807
863


21438.808
864


21438.809
865


21438.810
866


21438.811
867


21438.812
868


21438.813
869


21438.814
870


21438.815
871


21438.816
872


21438.817
873


21438.818
874


21438.819
875


21438.820
876


21438.821
877


21438.822
878


21438.823
879


21438.824
880


21438.825
881


21438.826
882


21438.827
883


21438.828
884


21438.829
885


21438.830
886


21438.831
887


21438.832
888


21438.833
889


21438.834
890


21438.835
891


21438.836
892


21438.837
893


21438.838
894


21438.839
895


21438.840
896


21438.841
897


21438.842
898


21438.843
899


21438.844
900


21438.845
901


21438.846
902


21438.847
903


21438.848
904


21438.849
905


21438.850
906


21438.851
907


21438.852
908


21438.853
909


21438.854
910


21438.855
911


21438.856
912


21438.857
913


21438.858
914


21438.859
915


21438.860
916


21438.861
917


21438.862
918


21438.863
919


21438.864
920


21438.865
921


21438.866
922


21438.867
923


21438.868
924


21438.869
925


21438.870
926


21438.871
927


21438.872
928


21438.873
929


21438.874
930


21438.875
931


21438.876
932


21438.877
933


21438.878
934


21438.879
935


21438.880
936


21438.881
937


21438.882
938


214381.690
939


21438.883
940


21438.884
941


21438.885
942


21438.886
943


21438.887
944


21438.888
945


21438.889
946


21438.890
947


21438.891
948


21438.892
949


21438.893
950


21438.894
951


21438.895
952


21438.896
953


21438.897
954


21438.898
955


21438.899
956


21438.900
957


21438.901
958


21438.902
959


21438.903
960


21438.904
961


21438.905
962


21438.906
963


21438.907
964


21438.908
965


21438.909
966


21438.910
967


21438.911
968


21438.912
969


21438.913
970


21438.914
971


21438.915
972


21438.916
973


21438.917
974


21438.918
975


21438.919
976


21438.920
977


21438.921
978


21438.922
979


21438.923
980


21438.924
981


21438.925
982


21438.926
983


21438.927
984


21438.928
985


21438.929
986


21438.930
987


21438.931
988


21438.932
989


21438.933
990


21438.934
991


21438.935
992


21438.936
993


21438.937
994


21438.938
995


21438.939
996


21438.940
997


21438.941
998


21438.942
999


21438.943
1000


21438.944
1001


21438.945
1002


21438.946
1003


21438.947
1004


21438.948
1005


21438.949
1006


21438.950
1007


21438.951
1008


21438.952
1009


21438.953
1010


21438.954
1011


21438.955
1012


21438.956
1013


21438.957
1014


21438.958
1015


21438.959
1016


21438.960
1017


21438.961
1018


21438.962
1019


21438.963
1020


21438.964
1021


21438.965
1022


21438.966
1023


21438.967
1024


21438.968
1025


21438.969
1026


21438.970
1027


21438.971
1028


21438.972
1029


21438.973
1030


21438.974
1031


21438.975
1032


21438.976
1033


21438.977
1034


21438.978
1035


21438.979
1036


21438.980
1037


21438.981
1038


21438.982
1039


21438.983
1040


21438.984
1041


21438.985
1042


21438.986
1043


21438.987
1044


21438.988
1045


21438.989
1046


21438.990
1047


21438.991
1048


21438.992
1049


21438.993
1050


21438.994
1051


21438.995
1052


21438.996
1053


21438.997
1054


21438.998
1055


21438.999
1056


214381.000
1057


214381.001
1058


214381.002
1059


214381.003
1060


214381.004
1061


214381.005
1062


214381.006
1063


214381.007
1064


214381.008
1065


214381.009
1066


214381.010
1067


214381.011
1068


214381.012
1069


214381.013
1070


214381.014
1071


214381.015
1072


214381.016
1073


214381.017
1074


214381.018
1075


214381.019
1076


214381.020
1077


214381.021
1078


214381.022
1079


214381.023
1080


214381.024
1081


214381.025
1082


214381.026
1083


214381.027
1084


214381.028
1085


214381.029
1086


214381.030
1087


214381.031
1088


214381.032
1089


214381.033
1090


214381.034
1091


214381.035
1092


214381.036
1093


214381.037
1094


214381.038
1095


214381.039
1096


214381.040
1097


214381.041
1098


214381.042
1099


214381.043
1100


214381.044
1101


214381.045
1102


214381.046
1103


214381.047
1104


214381.048
1105


214381.049
1106


214381.050
1107


214381.051
1108


214381.052
1109


214381.053
1110


214381.054
1111


214381.055
1112


214381.056
1113


214381.057
1114


214381.058
1115


214381.059
1116


214381.060
1117


214381.061
1118


214381.062
1119


214381.063
1120


214381.064
1121


214381.065
1122


214381.066
1123


214381.067
1124


214381.068
1125


214381.069
1126


214381.070
1127


214381.071
1128


214381.072
1129


214381.073
1130


214381.074
1131


214381.075
1132


214381.076
1133


214381.077
1134


214381.078
1135


214381.079
1136


214381.080
1137


214381.081
1138


214381.082
1139


214381.083
1140


214381.084
1141


214381.085
1142


214381.086
1143


214381.087
1144


214381.088
1145


214381.089
1146


214381.090
1147


214381.091
1148


214381.092
1149


214381.093
1150


214381.094
1151


214381.095
1152


214381.096
1153


214381.097
1154


214381.098
1155


214381.099
1156


214381.100
1157


214381.101
1158


214381.102
1159


214381.103
1160


214381.104
1161


214381.105
1162


214381.106
1163


214381.107
1164


214381.108
1165


214381.109
1166


214381.110
1167


214381.111
1168


214381.112
1169


214381.113
1170


214381.114
1171


214381.115
1172


214381.116
1173


214381.117
1174


214381.118
1175


214381.119
1176


214381.120
1177


214381.121
1178


214381.122
1179


214381.123
1180


214381.124
1181


214381.125
1182


214381.126
1183


214381.127
1184


214381.128
1185


214381.129
1186


214381.130
1187


214381.131
1188


214381.132
1189


214381.133
1190


214381.134
1191


214381.135
1192


214381.136
1193


214381.137
1194


214381.138
1195


214381.139
1196


214381.140
1197


214381.141
1198


214381.142
1199


214381.143
1200


214381.144
1201


214381.145
1202


214381.146
1203


214381.147
1204


214381.148
1205


214381.149
1206


214381.150
1207


214381.151
1208


214381.152
1209


214381.153
1210


214381.154
1211


214381.155
1212


214381.156
1213


214381.157
1214


214381.158
1215


214381.159
1216


214381.160
1217


214381.161
1218


214381.162
1219


214381.163
1220


214381.164
1221


214381.165
1222


214381.166
1223


214381.167
1224


214381.168
1225


214381.169
1226


214381.170
1227


214381.171
1228


214381.172
1229


214381.173
1230


214381.174
1231


214381.175
1232


214381.176
1233


214381.177
1234


214381.178
1235


214381.179
1236


214381.180
1237


214381.181
1238


214381.182
1239


214381.183
1240


214381.184
1241


214381.185
1242


214381.186
1243


214381.187
1244


214381.188
1245


214381.189
1246


214381.190
1247


214381.191
1248


214381.192
1249


214381.193
1250


214381.194
1251


214381.195
1252


214381.196
1253


214381.197
1254


214381.198
1255


214381.199
1256


214381.200
1257


214381.201
1258


214381.202
1259


214381.203
1260


214381.204
1261


214381.205
1262


214381.206
1263


214381.207
1264


214381.208
1265


214381.209
1266


214381.210
1267


214381.211
1268


214381.212
1269


214381.213
1270


214381.214
1271


214381.215
1272


214381.216
1273


214381.217
1274


214381.218
1275


214381.219
1276


214381.220
1277


214381.221
1278


214381.222
1279


214381.223
1280


214381.224
1281


214381.225
1282


214381.226
1283


214381.227
1284


214381.228
1285


214381.229
1286


214381.230
1287


214381.231
1288


214381.232
1289


214381.233
1290


214381.234
1291


214381.235
1292


214381.236
1293


214381.237
1294


214381.238
1295


214381.239
1296


214381.240
1297


214381.241
1298


214381.242
1299


214381.243
1300


214381.244
1301


214381.245
1302


214381.246
1303


214381.247
1304


214381.248
1305


214381.249
1306


214381.250
1307


214381.251
1308


214381.252
1309


214381.253
1310


214381.254
1311


214381.255
1312


214381.256
1313


214381.257
1314


214381.258
1315


214381.259
1316


214381.260
1317


214381.261
1318


214381.262
1319


214381.263
1320


214381.264
1321


214381.265
1322


214381.266
1323


214381.267
1324


214381.268
1325


214381.269
1326


214381.270
1327


214381.271
1328


214381.272
1329


214381.273
1330


214381.274
1331


214381.275
1332


214381.276
1333


214381.277
1334


214381.278
1335


214381.279
1336


214381.280
1337


214381.281
1338


214381.282
1339


214381.283
1340


214381.284
1341


214381.285
1342


214381.286
1343


214381.287
1344


214381.288
1345


214381.289
1346


214381.290
1347


214381.291
1348


214381.292
1349


214381.293
1350


214381.294
1351


214381.295
1352


214381.296
1353


214381.297
1354


214381.298
1355


214381.299
1356


214381.300
1357


214381.301
1358


214381.302
1359


214381.303
1360


214381.304
1361


214381.305
1362


214381.306
1363


214381.307
1364


214381.308
1365


214381.309
1366


214381.310
1367


214381.311
1368


214381.312
1369


214381.313
1370


214381.314
1371


214381.315
1372


214381.316
1373


214381.317
1374


214381.318
1375


214381.319
1376


214381.320
1377


214381.321
1378


214381.322
1379


214381.323
1380


214381.324
1381


214381.325
1382


214381.326
1383


214381.327
1384


214381.328
1385


214381.329
1386


214381.330
1387


214381.331
1388


214381.332
1389


214381.333
1390


214381.334
1391


214381.335
1392


214381.336
1393


214381.337
1394


214381.338
1395


214381.339
1396


214381.340
1397


214381.341
1398


214381.342
1399


214381.343
1400


214381.344
1401


214381.345
1402


214381.346
1403


214381.347
1404


214381.348
1405


214381.349
1406


214381.350
1407


214381.351
1408


214381.352
1409


214381.353
1410


214381.354
1411


214381.355
1412


214381.356
1413


214381.357
1414


214381.358
1415


214381.359
1416


214381.360
1417


214381.361
1418


214381.362
1419


214381.363
1420


214381.364
1421


214381.365
1422


214381.366
1423


214381.367
1424


214381.368
1425


214381.369
1426


214381.370
1427


214381.371
1428


214381.372
1429


214381.373
1430


214381.374
1431


214381.375
1432


214381.376
1433


214381.377
1434


214381.378
1435


214381.379
1436


214381.380
1437


214381.381
1438


214381.382
1439


214381.383
1440


214381.384
1441


214381.385
1442


214381.386
1443


214381.387
1444


214381.388
1445


214381.389
1446


214381.390
1447


214381.391
1448


214381.392
1449


214381.393
1450


214381.394
1451


214381.395
1452


214381.396
1453


214381.397
1454


214381.398
1455


214381.399
1456


214381.400
1457


214381.401
1458


214381.402
1459


214381.403
1460


214381.404
1461


214381.405
1462


214381.406
1463


214381.407
1464


214381.408
1465


214381.409
1466


214381.410
1467


214381.411
1468


214381.412
1469


214381.413
1470


214381.414
1471


214381.415
1472


214381.416
1473


214381.417
1474


214381.418
1475


214381.419
1476


214381.420
1477


214381.421
1478


214381.422
1479


214381.423
1480


214381.424
1481


214381.425
1482


214381.426
1483


214381.427
1484


214381.428
1485


214381.429
1486


214381.430
1487


214381.431
1488


214381.432
1489


214381.433
1490


214381.434
1491


214381.435
1492


214381.436
1493


214381.437
1494


214381.438
1495


214381.439
1496


214381.440
1497


214381.441
1498


214381.442
1499


214381.443
1500


214381.444
1501


214381.445
1502


214381.446
1503


214381.447
1504


214381.448
1505


214381.449
1506


214381.450
1507


214381.451
1508


214381.452
1509


214381.453
1510


214381.454
1511


214381.455
1512


214381.456
1513


214381.457
1514


214381.458
1515


214381.459
1516


214381.460
1517


214381.461
1518


214381.462
1519


214381.463
1520


214381.464
1521


214381.465
1522


214381.466
1523


214381.467
1524


214381.468
1525


214381.469
1526


214381.470
1527


214381.471
1528


214381.472
1529


214381.473
1530


214381.474
1531


214381.475
1532


214381.476
1533


214381.477
1534


214381.478
1535


214381.479
1536


214381.480
1537


214381.481
1538


214381.482
1539


214381.483
1540


214381.484
1541


214381.485
1542


214381.486
1543


214381.487
1544


214381.488
1545


214381.489
1546


214381.490
1547


214381.491
1548


214381.492
1549


214381.493
1550


214381.494
1551


214381.495
1552


214381.496
1553


214381.497
1554


214381.498
1555


214381.499
1556


214381.500
1557


214381.501
1558


214381.502
1559


214381.503
1560


214381.504
1561


214381.505
1562


214381.506
1563


214381.507
1564


214381.508
1565


214381.509
1566


214381.510
1567


214381.511
1568


214381.512
1569


214381.513
1570


214381.514
1571


214381.515
1572


214381.516
1573


214381.517
1574


214381.518
1575


214381.519
1576


214381.520
1577


214381.521
1578


214381.522
1579


214381.523
1580


214381.524
1581


214381.525
1582


214381.526
1583


214381.527
1584


214381.528
1585


214381.529
1586


214381.530
1587


214381.531
1588


214381.532
1589


214381.533
1590


214381.534
1591


214381.535
1592


214381.536
1593


214381.537
1594


214381.538
1595


214381.539
1596


214381.540
1597


214381.541
1598


214381.542
1599


214381.543
1600


214381.544
1601


214381.545
1602


214381.546
1603


214381.547
1604


214381.548
1605


214381.549
1606


214381.550
1607


214381.551
1608


214381.552
1609


214381.553
1610


214381.554
1611


214381.555
1612


214381.556
1613


214381.557
1614


214381.558
1615


214381.559
1616


214381.560
1617


214381.561
1618


214381.562
1619


214381.563
1620


214381.564
1621


214381.565
1622


214381.566
1623


214381.567
1624


214381.568
1625


214381.569
1626


214381.570
1627


214381.571
1628


214381.572
1629


214381.573
1630


214381.574
1631


214381.575
1632


214381.576
1633


214381.577
1634


214381.578
1635


214381.579
1636


214381.580
1637


214381.581
1638


214381.582
1639


214381.583
1640


214381.584
1641


214381.585
1642


214381.586
1643


214381.587
1644


214381.588
1645


214381.589
1646


214381.590
1647


214381.591
1648


214381.592
1649


214381.593
1650


214381.594
1651


214381.595
1652


214381.596
1653


214381.597
1654


214381.598
1655


214381.599
1656


214381.600
1657


214381.601
1658


214381.602
1659


214381.603
1660


214381.604
1661


214381.605
1662


214381.606
1663


214381.607
1664


214381.608
1665


214381.609
1666


214381.610
1667


214381.611
1668


214381.612
1669


214381.613
1670


214381.614
1671


214381.615
1672


214381.616
1673


214381.617
1674


214381.618
1675


214381.619
1676


214381.620
1677


214381.621
1678


214381.622
1679


214381.623
1680


214381.624
1681


214381.625
1682


214381.626
1683


214381.627
1684


214381.628
1685


214381.629
1686


214381.630
1687


214381.631
1688


214381.632
1689


214381.633
1690


214381.634
1691


214381.635
1692


214381.636
1693


214381.637
1694


214381.638
1695


214381.639
1696


214381.640
1697


214381.641
1698


214381.642
1699


214381.643
1700


214381.644
1701


214381.645
1702


214381.646
1703


214381.647
1704


214381.648
1705


214381.649
1706


214381.650
1707


214381.651
1708


214381.652
1709


214381.653
1710


214381.654
1711


214381.655
1712


214381.656
1713


214381.657
1714


214381.658
1715


214381.659
1716


214381.660
1717


214381.661
1718


214381.662
1719


214381.663
1720


214381.664
1721


214381.665
1722


214381.666
1723


214381.667
1724


214381.668
1725


214381.669
1726


214381.670
1727


214381.671
1728


214381.672
1729


214381.673
1730


214381.674
1731


214381.675
1732


214381.676
1733


214381.677
1734


214381.678
1735


214381.679
1736


214381.680
1737


214381.681
1738


214381.682
1739


214381.683
1740


214381.684
1741


214381.685
1742


214381.686
1743


214381.687
1744


214381.688
1745

Æ


214381.689