[Cite as State v. Young, 2022-Ohio-3132.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant, :

No. 110973

v. :

KIARAN YOUNG, :

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 8, 2022

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-17-624427-B

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, Kerry A. Sowul, Gregory Ochocki, and Ryan 

Bokoch, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and 

Aaron T. Baker, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:

Appellant Kiaran Young (“appellant”) appeals his convictions and 

sentencing by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. After a thorough 
review of the applicable law and facts, we affirm appellant’s convictions but remand 

the case to the trial court to recalculate appellant’s jail-time credit.

I. Factual and Procedural History

This appeal arises from a series of crimes committed by appellant and 

four codefendants in October and November 2016. 

The first incident occurred on October 12, 2016, and involved the theft 

of a motor vehicle. Orokya Ouedrago was stopped for gas at a Shell gas station on 

the corner of Lee and Harvard Roads. She went inside the station to pay and left her 

keys inside her 2014 black Ford Focus. When she returned to the vehicle, she saw a 

light-skinned black male with dreadlocks enter and drive away in her vehicle.

Ms. Ouedrago reported the car as stolen to Cleveland police and later 

identified appellant from a photo lineup. Her vehicle was recovered, and clothing 

in the vehicle contained appellant’s DNA. 

The next incident involved a carjacking, which occurred on October 31, 

2016. Shavanna Wesley was driving to the Walmart at the Steelyard Commons and 

was traveling down Miles Road. At the time, she was driving a 2016 silver Ford 

Escape, which was a rental car. As she was driving, a car, which she described as 

smaller, “like a Ford or something,” which may have been black, bumped her vehicle 

from behind. She got out to observe the damage, leaving the keys in the vehicle and 

the Ford Escape running. 
Wesley testified that appellant was the driver of the vehicle that hit her,

and a second, darker skinned man got out and put a gun to her face and said, “I need 

that.” The man then got into her Ford Escape, and both vehicles drove away. 

She walked to a nearby convenience store and called the police from her 

cell phone. Ms. Wesley’s vehicle was recovered a week later. The license plates from 

the rental company had been replaced with plates registered to appellant’s 

grandmother. 

Ms. Wesley was unable to identify appellant from photo arrays 

provided to her by detectives. However, during her testimony, she was asked if she 

saw the driver of the vehicle that hit her in the courtroom. She stated that she did 

and described what he was wearing — a black shirt, blue mask, and dreads. When 

questioned on cross-examination about her inability to initially identify appellant in 

the photo array, Ms. Wesley stated that she was shaken up in the days following the 

incident, but the event has replayed in her head in the five years since. 

The next incident also occurred on October 31, 2016, in the afternoon, 

and involved a shooting. Deandre Veal, Kyara Graves, their two young children, 

D.V. and K.V., and Kyara’s cousin, Javon Graves, were driving on Harvard Road 

when they passed a black Ford Focus that was stopped in the street. The Focus 

began following them slowly. Mr. Veal drove to the Shell gas station at the 

intersection of Lee and Harvard Roads and parked to see if he was being followed. 

The black Focus pulled in behind them.
Mr. Graves exited the vehicle and went into the store of the gas station. 

Mr. Veal observed a man, with long dreadlocks and a tattoo on his cheek, exit the 

Focus’s passenger side and cross the street. The individual then retrieved a handgun 

from the bus stop across the street and returned to the Focus.

Mr. Veal got Mr. Graves back into the car and tried to leave the gas 

station parking lot and lose the Focus in traffic. Both cars came to a stop light, and 

the occupants of the Focus brandished guns and told Mr. Veal to pull over to a side

street. The occupants of the vehicle included the driver, the man with dreadlocks 

that Mr. Veal saw retrieving the firearm, and a man in a clown mask sitting in the 

back seat.

Ms. Graves told them that they would not pull over and that there were 

kids in the car. Mr. Veal heard someone say something about “purging,” which he 

understood to be a reference to the movie.1 As Mr. Veal began to speed away, the 

driver began shooting at his car. Five shots rang out before the Focus turned onto a 

side street. Mr. Graves and K.V., who was only 19 months old, had both been shot. 

K.V. had been shot in the shoulder, and Mr. Graves was shot in the chest.

Mr. Veal met with police at the hospital and later met with detectives, 

who administered a photo array. Mr. Veal identified appellant with 75 percent

certainty as the man with dreadlocks who retrieved the firearm. Ms. Graves 

identified appellant with 90 percent certainty.

1 The Purge is a 2013 horror movie where all crime, including murder, is 

temporarily legal during the night of the annual Purge.
The next incident occurred on November 2, 2016. Garfield Heights 

Police Officer Patrick Monnolly observed a silver Ford Escape (later identified as the 

vehicle stolen from Ms. Wesley) with a Maryland license plate. He ran the plate, 

which came up as stolen; he then notified dispatch. Later that day, he again 

observed the silver Escape and began to follow it. The silver Escape was driving 

together with a black Ford Focus (later identified as the one stolen from Ms. 

Ouedrago). Ofc. Monnolly activated his lights and siren and began to pursue the 

Escape.

The Focus and the Escape both attempted to evade Ofc. Monnolly. 

After a short pursuit, the Focus crashed into another vehicle. Ofc. Monnolly saw the 

driver of the Focus, a black male with dreadlocks, get into the Escape and flee the 

scene. 

The Focus was towed from the scene, and police retrieved evidence 

from the vehicle, including two cell phones, two handgun magazines, a box of 

shotgun shells, and clothing. DNA on the clothing matched that of appellant.

The next incident occurred on November 2, 2016, and involved 

another carjacking. Curtis Davis left his house to play the lottery. His daughter, 

Ciara Ware, heard tires screeching in the parking lot adjacent to her father’s house. 

Davis then came to the house and told her that he had been robbed. Mr. Davis’s 

black Ford Escape had been stolen from him.
The two called the police. Detectives later administered a photo array,

and Davis identified the robber as appellant’s codefendant, William Cannon, with 

45-50 percent certainty.

On November 8, 2016, B.S., who was a minor at the time of the 

incident, was walking to pick up his paycheck when he saw a black SUV (later 

identified as Mr. Davis’s black Ford Escape) circle him suspiciously in the street. 

There were three people in the SUV. The Escape then stopped in a driveway ahead 

of B.S., causing him to walk around the vehicle. When he did, a man with a gun 

came around from the other side of the Escape and pointed the gun in B.S.’s face. 

This man was later identified as codefendant Brico Allen (“Allen”). Allen told B.S. 

to get into the Escape and pushed him in by his shoulder. The SUV was driven by a 

light-skinned black man with dreadlocks.

Allen told B.S. to give him everything he had and that he did not want 

to hurt him. B.S. heard someone in the front of the vehicle suggest taking B.S. to 

their trap house to murder him. As the SUV drove, the driver turned around and 

struck B.S. with the handgun he was holding. The men robbed B.S. of his shoes, 

phone, and hoodie, and then ejected him at gunpoint onto the sidewalk. 

B.S. called his mother and police from a friend’s house. When he 

spoke with police, he stated that he recognized Allen from social media and a news 

story involving Allen recently stealing a police car. He did not recognize the driver 

or front passenger. 
B.S. met with detectives several days later and was presented with a 

photo array. He identified Allen with 75 percent certainty and identified appellant 

with 50 percent certainty as the light-skinned man with dreadlocks who drove the 

vehicle. B.S. testified that he was less certain about appellant’s identification 

because he only saw him when appellant turned around to pistol whip him.

The next incident occurred on November 9, 2016, where Frederick 

Sims heard gunfire directed toward his vehicle. It was later determined that the 

shots came from the black Ford Escape, the vehicle stolen from Mr. Davis.

That same day, officers located the black Ford Escape at a shopping 

plaza at Lee and Harvard Roads. Officers attempted to pull the vehicle over, driving 

behind it with lights and sirens activated, but ultimately lost sight of the vehicle. The 

officers identified the driver of the vehicle as a light-skinned black male with dreads.

The following day, the black Ford Escape was recovered, and 

appellant’s cell phone was found inside the vehicle.

Another incident occurred on November 10, 2016. J.F., who was 15 

years old at the time of the incident, testified as to events that he reported to police. 

He had difficulty remembering the incident and was questioned about not wanting 

to “snitch.” He was permitted to utilize the statement he had made to police on the 

day of the incident. 

On the day in question, J.F. was walking to school when a silver truck 

pulled up and a dark-skinned male outside the truck had a gun and told him to get 
into the truck. The man took his phone and told him to take off his belt and shoes. 

He was then dropped off on a different street.

J.F. stated that the driver was a light-skinned black male with dreads 

and a cross tattoo under his eye. He identified appellant from a photo array with 50

percent certainty.

In the next incident, Deborah Papp heard a loud pounding on her 

front door on the morning of November 14, 2016. She did not answer and then 

heard a similar pounding at her side door. She ran to her back bedroom to look out 

the window and see the individual doing the pounding. She then heard the door

being kicked in and yelled that she had called the police and that they were on their 

way. She next heard tires screeching. She saw the individual she had observed 

leaving in a car and saw others in the car with him. She described the individual as 

young, medium to light-skinned black man with dreadlocks. The police came and 

she was presented with a photo array; she identified appellant with 100% certainty 

as the individual who kicked in her door. 

Jazmine Strozier was across the street visiting her grandmother at the 

time that Ms. Papp’s door was kicked in. She saw two people attempting to break 

into the house, one with dreadlocks. She further observed the individuals get into a 

silver vehicle and drive away.

The following day, on November 15, 2016, Garfield Heights Police 

Lieutenant David Bailey responded to reports of two males fleeing from a stolen 

vehicle. One of the individuals was thought to be appellant. Lt. Bailey arrived in his 
vehicle at the Garfield Park Reservation and observed appellant and his codefendant 

William Cannon run out of the park and split up. Lt. Bailey recognized appellant 

from a photograph posted at the Garfield Heights Police Department. He observed 

appellant reaching for his waistband and yelled for him to stop. Appellant withdrew 

a handgun from his waistband and ran into the woods.

Cleveland Metroparks Patrolman Michael Kort responded to a 

reported foot chase. He caught up to Lt. Bailey and another officer, who warned him 

that appellant had run into the woods and had a handgun. Kort, Bailey, and the 

other officer split up to pursue appellant. Kort spotted appellant who had fallen into 

a pool of muddy water. Kort shouted at appellant to show his hands, which were 

beneath the water. 

Appellant eventually complied and officers pulled him out of the mud 

and took him into custody. At the time of his arrest, appellant was wearing the belt 

taken from J.F. 

Appellant was interviewed by Detective Phillip Herron at the Garfield 

Heights police station. Appellant admitted to driving the silver SUV during the 

robbery of J.F., acknowledged spending time and committing crimes with Allen, 

Cannon, and an individual named Mike, and admitted to driving the Ford Focus 

during the police chase on November 2, 2016, and then getting into the silver Ford 

Escape.

Appellant and his codefendants were indicted on a total of 113 counts. 

Appellant was charged in 54 of the 113 counts on charges of engaging in a pattern of 
corrupt activity, attempted aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, 

discharge of a firearm on prohibited premises, felonious assault, conspiracy, 

burglary, robbery, failure to comply, having weapons while under disability, 

receiving stolen property, and grand theft of a motor vehicle, along with 

accompanying firearm specifications.

Five counts of having weapons while under disability were tried to the 

court and the rest of the charges were tried to a jury. The state presented the 

testimony of 42 witnesses and offered evidence including, inter alia, text messages 

between appellant and his codefendants, Facebook records, photographs, photo 

arrays, and DNA evidence. At the close of the state’s case, appellant moved for a 

Crim.R. 29 acquittal, which the court denied. Appellant renewed his motion after 

all evidence had been presented, which was again denied.

In response to the defense’s Crim.R. 29 motion, the state dismissed 12 

of the counts. The jury found appellant not guilty of one felonious assault charge 

and guilty of the remaining counts, including a number of firearm specifications. On 

the having weapons while under disability charges, the court found appellant not 

guilty of three charges and guilty of two. 

The court imposed an aggregate prison sentence of 36 years. At the 

sentencing hearing, appellant was also sentenced on two other cases, Cuyahoga C.P. 

Nos. CR-16-605516 and CR-16-606749. The court ordered the sentence in this 

matter to run concurrent with the sentences imposed in the other two cases, as well 

as with the prison sentence that appellant was already serving for another unrelated 
case, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-16-611642. The court granted appellant 1,794 days of 

jail-time credit based upon the time he had already served on CR-16-611642.

Appellant appealed, raising nine assignments of error for our review:

1. The trial court erred by failing to grant a judgment of acquittal 

pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A) on various charges in the indictment, and 

thereafter entering a judgment of conviction of those offenses which 

were not supported by sufficient evidence, in derogation of appellant’s 

right to due process of law, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution, as well as section 16 of the Ohio 

Constitution.

2. The trial court erred by entering judgments of conviction as to the 

various counts of the indictment that were against the manifest weight 

of the evidence, in derogation of Mr. Young’s right to due process of 

law, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution.

3. The trial court abused its discretion and/or committed plain error, 

in violation of Mr. Young’s due process right to a fair trial, when it ruled 

admissible the in-court identification of Mr. Young by Shavanna 

Wesley when she showed no prior ability to identify Mr. Young in an 

out-of-court photo lineup a few days after the incident in question.

4. The trial court abused its discretion and/or committed plain error, 

in violation of Mr. Young’s due process right to a fair trial and the 

confrontation clause, when it admitted the Facebook records, 

contained in various exhibits numbered 225 through 256, which were 

both hearsay and not authentic.

5. Trial counsel for Mr. Young provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel, as guaranteed by both the United States Constitution, and the 

Ohio Constitution, when he failed to challenge via suppression the 

various out-of-court identifications of Mr. Young as impermissibly 

suggestive, failed to object to the in-court identification of Mr. Young 

by Shavanna Wesley, and failed to object to the Facebook records 

contained in various exhibits numbered 225 through 256.

6. The trial court erred, in violation of Mr. Young’s due process right to 

a fair trial, when it abused its discretion in admitting irrelevant 

testimony by Kyara Graves, indicating that she had been intimidated 

by an unknown individual in the courthouse.
7. The trial court abused its discretion, in violation of Mr. Young’s due 

process right to a fair trial, by admitting out of court statements by J.F., 

in violation of the hearsay rule.

8. The trial court erred and/or committed plain error, in violation of 

Mr. Young’s due process right to a fair trial, when it refused to grant the 

motion to withdraw and the motion to dismiss counsel, thus forcing 

trial counsel to defend Mr. Young when Mr. Young had an ethical 

grievance pending against trial counsel.

9. The cumulative effect of multiple errors at trial, even if singularly 

not sufficient to warrant reversal, together deprived appellant of a fair 

trial and a denial of due process.

The state cross-appealed, assigning one error for our review:

1. The trial court erred when it granted defendant-appellant jail-time 

credit for the time he was serving a prison sentence on an unrelated 

offense.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Appellant’s Appeal

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that his convictions 

were not supported by sufficient evidence. Where a party challenges the sufficiency 

of the evidence supporting a conviction, a determination of whether the state has 

met its burden of production at trial is conducted. State v. Hunter, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 86048, 2006-Ohio-20, ¶ 41, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 

380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). An appellate court reviewing sufficiency of the 

evidence must determine “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Leonard, 104 
Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 

Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. With a 

sufficiency inquiry, an appellate court does not review whether the state’s evidence 

is to be believed but whether, if believed, the evidence admitted at trial supported 

the conviction. State v. Starks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91682, 2009-Ohio-3375, 

¶ 25, citing Thompkins at 387. A sufficiency of the evidence argument is not a factual 

determination, but a question of law. Id.

Appellant does not dispute that any of the crimes in question 

occurred, but he argues that there was insufficient evidence of his identity. He 

argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his identity as the 

person who actually committed the crimes in question. Specifically, appellant raises

the following identification issues:

** Ms. Ouedrago — made an out-of-court identification of appellant but 

did not testify that the person identified in the photo lineup was the 

same person on trial in the courtroom. 

** Ms. Wesley — was unable to identify appellant in a photo lineup but 

was able to identify an individual in the courtroom as the driver she 

believed to be involved. The record does not reflect that she identified 

appellant.

** Mr. Veal — testified that he saw a chubby man that was 5′8′′ or 5′9′′

with a face tattoo and made an out-of-court photo identification of 

Kiaran Young with 75% certainty. He did not make an in-court 

identification.

** Ms. Graves — made an out-of-court identification of Kiaran Young 

with 90% certainty. She was unable to make an in-court identification. 

** Mr. Graves — never identified appellant.
** Appellant was never identified as the driver of the Ford Focus.

** B.S. — was only 50% certain of his out-of-court identification of 

Kiaran Young; further there was no testimony that the Kiaran Young in 

the lineup was appellant.

** Officer Farren — testified that Kiaran Young was driving the black 

Escape. He also identified that an individual in the courtroom was the 

driver, but the record does not reflect that the individual he identified 

was appellant.

** J.F. — was only 50% certain of his out-of-court photo identification 

of Kiaran Young. No one identified appellant in the courtroom as being 

the person in the photo lineup or involved in the incident with J.F.

** Debbie Papp — identified Kiaran Young from a photo lineup with 

100% certainty, but made no in-court identification.

** Some of the individuals depicted in the photo arrays did not match 

the description of the perpetrator. 

Appellant contends that while in-court identifications were made of 

an individual in the courtroom, the record does not reflect that the individual was 

appellant. In addition, where an out-of-court photo identification was made, the 

witnesses did not state that the individual in the photo was appellant in the 

courtroom. Moreover, appellant was wearing a mask over his face during the 

courtroom proceedings pursuant to the court’s administrative order regarding the 

COVID-19 pandemic and was never asked to remove his mask.

The state argues that appellant admitted that he was driving the stolen 

Ford Focus when he fled from police and crashed the car and escaped in the stolen 

Ford Escape. In addition, appellant admitted that the iPhone recovered from the 
black Ford Escape was his and admitted that he drove and aided in the robbery of 

J.F. 

Appellant was identified by Ms. Ouedrago, Ms. Wesley, Ms. Graves, 

J.F., B.S., and Ms. Papp. While the state did not ask for the record to reflect that 

appellant had been identified by the witnesses, the jury was present in the 

courtroom and was able to see the individual that the witnesses had described. In 

addition, the photo arrays were admitted into evidence. 

Moreover, photos from appellant’s phone and Facebook account show 

that he was in the stolen Ford Focus with his codefendants, brandishing firearms. 

There was additional evidence where appellant was seen and identified as driving 

the black Ford Focus, and some of his property, including his underwear that

contained his DNA, was recovered from the Focus.

When analyzing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing 

court is neither permitted to assess the credibility of witnesses nor otherwise weigh 

the evidence. In re A.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103269, 2016-Ohio-7297, ¶ 33.

“The resolution of conflicting testimony and the credibility of the witnesses remains 

within the province of the trier of fact.” Id., citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 

230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

We find that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s 

convictions, and appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
2. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his 

convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

A reviewing court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts 

in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage 

of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. 

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). A reversal on the 

basis that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence is granted “only in 

the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” 

Id.

Although appellant raises separate assignments of error challenging 

the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence, appellant does not develop an 

argument in support of his manifest weight challenge with citations to the record 

and supporting authorities, as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). Rather, appellant 

merely references the arguments raised in his first assignment of error. See 

Cleveland v. Hall, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101820, 2015-Ohio-2698, ¶ 14, citing 

App.R. 16(A)(7) (overruling appellant’s assignment of error relating to a sufficiency 

challenge pursuant to App.R. 16(A)(7) because the appellant did not make a specific 

argument regarding why the convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence, 

and only addressed the issues relating to the manifest weight challenge). 
“Sufficiency” and “manifest weight” challenges present two distinct legal concepts. 

Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 23.

App.R. 16(A) requires a party to separately argue each assignment of 

error. Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2), an appellate court may disregard any 

assignment of error, or portion thereof, if the appellant fails to make a separate 

argument. State v. Wells, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98388, 2013-Ohio-3722, ¶ 55. 

Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.

3. In-Court Identification by Shavanna Wesley

In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion or plainly erred by allowing the in-court identification of 

appellant by Ms. Wesley when she was unable to identify him in an out-of-court 

photo lineup several days after the incident in question.

A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence. State 

v. Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254, 2014-Ohio-4751, 23 N.E.3d 1096, ¶ 111. An 

admissibility ruling will not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion 

and the defendant has thereby suffered material prejudice. Id.

“An identification derived from unnecessarily suggestive procedures, 

which have a likelihood of leading to a misidentification, violates a defendant’s right 

to due process.” State v. Fields, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99750, 2014-Ohio-301, ¶ 10, 

citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). Generally, 

an in-court identification will be upheld “where the totality of the circumstances 

demonstrates that the in-court identification was reliable.” State v. Gales, 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 102809, 2016-Ohio-588, ¶ 30, citing State v. Monford, 190 Ohio 

App.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4732, 940 N.E.2d 634, ¶ 58 (10th Dist.).

This court has held that even if a pretrial identification procedure, 

such as a photo array or a lineup, was impermissibly suggestive, an in-court 

identification is permissible if the state establishes by clear and convincing evidence 

that the witness had a reliable, independent basis for the identification based on 

prior independent observations made at the scene of the crime. State v. Thomas, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88548, 2007-Ohio-3522, ¶ 20; State v. Jackson, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 88345, 2007-Ohio-2925, ¶ 43; State v. Tate, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

81577, 2003-Ohio-1835, ¶ 24; In re Henderson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79716, 2002 

Ohio App. LEXIS 452 (Feb. 7, 2002). In State v. Jackson, 26 Ohio St.2d 74, 269 

N.E.2d 118 (1971), the Supreme Court of Ohio explained that in determining the 

admissibility of an in-court identification, trial courts should consider whether the 

in-court identification was a product of an improper pretrial identification 

procedure or whether the in-court identification “came from some independent 

recollection and observation of the accused by the witness.” Id. at 77.

In analyzing the potential for misidentification, courts consider:

“the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the 

crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’

prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by 

the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the 

crime and the confrontation.”
State v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109060, 2021-Ohio-856, ¶ 2, quoting

Biggers at 199-200. The court must review these factors under the totality of the 

circumstances. Id.

Here, Ms. Wesley’s in-court identification was based on her own 

observations and memory. She testified under oath and was subject to crossexamination about her identification of appellant. She stated that she originally saw 

him as the driver of the vehicle behind her. She further testified that after the vehicle

behind her bumped her silver Escape, she got out to see if there was damage and 

again observed appellant as the driver. 

When questioned about her confident in-court identification in light 

of her prior inability to identify appellant in the days following the incident, Ms. 

Wesley stated that she was shaken up in the days after the incident, but the event 

has replayed in her head in the five years since. On cross-examination, appellant’s 

trial counsel asked Ms. Wesley whether it was possible she was “ID-ing [appellant] 

because he’s sitting at the table here today?” She responded, “No.” She further 

denied that anyone she knew had put appellant’s name in her head.

The foregoing evidence, when viewed under the totality of the 

circumstances, does not indicate that the identification procedure was unduly 

suggestive or unreliable. Any issues regarding Ms. Wesley’s inability to identify 

appellant days after the incident and make a certain identification five years later 

while appellant was wearing a mask in the courtroom was an issue of credibility for 

the jury to determine, and it is apparent that the jury did indeed believe her. See 
State v. Dennis, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1290, 2006-Ohio-5777, ¶ 13 

(witnesses’ trial identifications of defendant, despite prior failures to identify 

defendant in photo arrays entered into evidence, presented credibility 

determinations for the jury); State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 

(1964) (It is the province of the jury to “believe or disbelieve any witness or accept 

part of what a witness says and reject the rest.”).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the admission 

of Ms. Wesley’s in-court identification of appellant, and the third assignment of 

error is overruled.

4. Admission of Facebook Records

In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion or plainly erred by admitting Facebook records that were not 

authentic and constituted hearsay.

Appellant asserts that Cleveland Police Detective Shane Bauhof

testified as to certain Facebook records that the state asserted were from an account 

connected to appellant. The documents showed photographs of appellant and his 

associates brandishing firearms, riding in vehicles that fit the descriptions of the 

ones they were accused of stealing, and holding themselves out to be a gang.

Appellant contends that there was no testimony as to the authenticity 

of the records, and Det. Bauhof simply stated that they were pages from a “search 

warrant result.” Appellant maintains that the documents were labeled “business 

records,” but there was no testimony to support this. Additionally, appellant asserts 
that the documents implicated the Confrontation Clause because they constituted 

testimonial statements. 

Appellant acknowledges that his trial counsel did object several times 

during the testimony in question but concedes that the objections were not based 

upon his arguments regarding hearsay and the Confrontation Clause. Where a party 

fails to object to alleged hearsay testimony, we review for plain error. State v. 

Obermiller, 147 Ohio St.3d 175, 2016-Ohio-1594, 63 N.E.3d 93, ¶ 72. Under Crim.R. 

52(B), “plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although 

they were not brought to the attention of the court.” However, “‘[n]otice of plain 

error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional 

circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State v. 

Mallory, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106052, 2018-Ohio-1846, ¶ 17, quoting State v. 

Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 93, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

The “extremely high burden” of demonstrating plain error is on the defendant. State 

v. Chapman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107375, 2019-Ohio-1452, ¶ 20.

Pursuant to Evid.R. 901(A), the “requirement of authentication or 

identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence 

sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 

claims.” Ohio courts have also held that the determination of admissibility and 

authentication of social media evidence is “based on whether there was sufficient 

evidence of authenticity for a reasonable jury to conclude that the evidence was 
authentic.” State v. Gibson, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-13-1222 and L-13-1223, 2015-

Ohio-1679, ¶ 41. 

The hurdle the proponent of the document must overcome in order to 

properly authenticate a document is not great. * * * Thus, the purpose 

behind authentication is to connect the particular piece of evidence 

sought to be introduced to the facts in the case by giving some 

indication the evidence is relevant and reliable. The ultimate decision 

on the weight to be given to that piece of evidence is left to the trier of 

fact.

State v. Brown, 151 Ohio App.3d 36, 2002-Ohio-5207, 783 N.E.2d 539, ¶ 33-35 (7th 

Dist.).

In State v. Inkton, 2016-Ohio-693, 60 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 72 (8th Dist.), the 

court admitted appellant’s Facebook page into evidence, holding that “[t]here has 

been testimony sufficient to support, if believed, that it is what it purports to be.” In 

Inkton, a detective and a codefendant testified that “there were ‘numerous’ pictures 

on appellant’s Facebook page and that [they] were able to determine that appellant 

was in fact that person in the pictures,” thus properly authenticating them. Id. at 

¶ 78. Compare State v. Gordon, 2018-Ohio-2292 114 N.E.3d 345, ¶ 71 (8th Dist.)

(holding that the state failed to identify a photograph allegedly from “a Facebook 

page using the name Yonko Boolin” when there was no evidence linking the 

photograph or the social media account to the defendant, no evidence of who 

retrieved the photo from Facebook, and no evidence that defendant was one of the 

people in the photograph).

In the case at hand, Det. Bauhof testified that he had monitored 

Facebook accounts related to appellant and his associates. In particular, he 
monitored an account in the name of “Bossman Pablo”; he determined that this 

account was operated by appellant. Det. Bauhof testified that they were being 

monitored in real time, checking them multiple times per day. Even though they 

were monitoring the Facebook accounts, the police still obtained a warrant for the 

actual records from Facebook. Det. Bauhof testified that Detective Lisette Gonzalez 

obtained the warrant and that he assisted her in reviewing some of the records.

Upon review, we find that Det. Bauhof testified as to the authenticity 

of the photograph taken from appellant’s Facebook page. There was no evidence 

that the Facebook page was created by anyone other than appellant, nor was there 

evidence that the page was fabricated or tampered with. We find that this evidence 

satisfies the relatively low burden of authentication. 

Appellant further argues that the Facebook records constituted 

inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.

Evid.R. 801(C) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made 

by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 

the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R. 801(D)(2), admission by a partyopponent, provides that a statement is not hearsay if “the statement is offered 

against a party and is (a) the party’s own statement, in either an individual or a 

representative capacity * * * .”

In the instant matter, the Facebook records in question were 

admissible as a statement by a party-opponent. As outlined above, the evidence 

supports that the account on which the photos were posted belonged to appellant. 
Furthermore, the evidence supports that the photos posted on appellant’s Facebook 

page matched photos that were extracted from his cell phone. Thus, we find that the 

Facebook records did not constitute inadmissible hearsay.

Finally, appellant’s argument regarding the Confrontation Clause is 

also without merit. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * 

to be confronted with the witnesses against him * * *.” The Confrontation Clause 

generally precludes the introduction of testimonial statements at trial. Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Although 

the Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes a “testimonial” statement, it has 

been held to apply to “‘prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, 

or at a former trial, and responses to police interrogations.’” State v. Dixon, 2016-

Ohio-1491, 63 N.E.3d 591, ¶ 45 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Mills, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 21146, 2006-Ohio-2128, ¶ 17. In Crawford, the United States 

Supreme Court held that “testimonial” hearsay statements may be admitted only 

where the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness regarding the subject matter of the statements.

Appellant has not demonstrated how the Facebook records 

constituted testimonial statements. Accordingly, there was no violation of the 

Confrontation Clause, and appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
5. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his fifth assignment of error, appellant argues that his counsel was 

ineffective by failing to challenge the out-of-court identifications of appellant, failing 

to object to the in-court identification of appellant by Ms. Wesley, and failing to 

object to the admission of the Facebook records. 

Appellant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel 

over a strong presumption that a properly licensed trial counsel rendered adequate 

assistance. State v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985). In order 

to demonstrate ineffective counsel, a defendant must show, not only that his 

counsel’s representation was deficient, but also that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). 

Counsel’s performance may be found to be deficient if counsel “made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant 

by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland at 687. To establish prejudice, “the defendant 

must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s 

errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” Bradley at paragraph two 

of the syllabus; see also Strickland at id.

We find no merit to this assignment of error. We determined in our 

analysis of appellant’s third and fourth assignments of error that the trial court did 

not err in admitting the Facebook records or allowing Ms. Wesley’s in-court 

identification. A defense counsel’s failure to object is not ineffective assistance of 
counsel if the evidence is admissible. State v. Jackson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

86105, 2006-Ohio-174, ¶ 87. As stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio, “counsel is 

not deficient for failing to raise a meritless issue.” State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio 

St.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-6087, 817 N.E.2d 845, ¶ 117, citing State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 

15, 31, 676 N.E.2d 82 (1997). Accordingly, we do not find appellant’s counsel 

deficient in his performance, and appellant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

6. Admission of Irrelevant Testimony

In his sixth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion in admitting the irrelevant testimony of Ms. Graves, where she 

stated that she had been intimidated by an unknown individual in the courthouse. 

Ms. Graves testified that while she was at the courthouse, certain individuals looked 

at her, sat behind her, and made her uncomfortable. She did not identify the 

individuals. Appellant asserts that this implication that appellant or individuals 

associated with him were engaging in witness tampering was highly prejudicial. 

The state argues that the line of questioning was appropriate to 

determine any effect that the individuals’ behavior had had on Ms. Graves’s

testimony. We agree. “A trial court has broad discretion concerning the admission 

of evidence.” State v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102855, 2016-Ohio-391, ¶ 14, 

citing State v. Pawlak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99555, 2014-Ohio-2175.

“The decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is subject to review 

under an abuse of discretion standard, and absent a clear showing that 

a trial court abused its discretion in a manner that materially prejudices 

a party, an appellate court will not disturb an evidentiary ruling. An 

abuse of discretion connotes more than an error in law or judgment, 

but instead demonstrates perversity of will, passion, prejudice, 
partiality, or moral delinquency. When applying the abuse of 

discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment 

for that of the trial court.”

Id., quoting Pappas v. Ippolito, 177 Ohio App.3d 625, 2008-Ohio-3976, 895 N.E.2d 

610, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.).

Testimony that a witness fears reprisal for testifying is admissible 

because it is relevant to the witness’s credibility. State v. Payne, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 107825, 2019-Ohio-4158, ¶ 52. “This rule applies equally to third-party 

intimidation that renders a witness reluctant to testify[.]” State v. Gibson, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 103958, 2016-Ohio-7778, ¶ 14, citing People v. Mendoza, 52 Cal.4th 

1056, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 808, 263 P.3d 1 (2011) (“Evidence that a witness is afraid to 

testify or fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to the credibility of that witness 

and is therefore admissible.”). Even though Ms. Graves ultimately stated that the 

actions of the individuals did not have any effect on her testimony, evidence 

regarding the circumstances under which she was testifying was relevant, and the 

trial court did not err.

Appellant’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.

7. Hearsay Statements

In his seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion by admitting out-of-court statements by J.F., which 

constituted hearsay.

Appellant contends that counsel for the state questioned J.F. about 

events that occurred on November 15, 2016, of which J.F. stated that he had no 
recollection. The state then sought to have J.F. read his prior written statement to 

police into the record. Defense counsel objected, but the trial court allowed the 

testimony, finding that this constituted the past recollection recorded exception to 

hearsay. Appellant contends that there was no foundation for refreshing his 

recollection of the events of November 10, 2016, when he had instead been asked 

about November 15, 2016. 

Pursuant to Evid.R. 803(5), the following does not constitute hearsay: 

A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness 

once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him 

to testify fully and accurately, shown by the testimony of the witness to 

have been made or adopted when the matter was fresh in his memory 

and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum 

or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an 

exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.

According to this rule, foundational requirements for the use of a past 

recollection recorded include a showing that

(1) the witness has insufficient memory to accurately testify to crucial 

information; (2) that the witness can show through his or her testimony 

that the past recollection recorded was made or adopted when the 

matter was fresh in the witness’s memory; and (3) that the past 

recollection recorded correctly reflects the knowledge the witness had 

at the time it was recorded.

State v. Bailey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81498, 2003-Ohio-1834, ¶ 32, citing State 

v. Baston, 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 709 N.E.2d 128 (1999). The staff notes relating to 

Evid.R. 803(5) specify:

The rule makes explicit the requirement that the foundation for the 

introduction of the statement under this exception must be made by 

testimony of the witness himself. The assessment of trustworthiness is 
thereby focused upon the author and not upon some other person 

incident to the event.

In the instant matter, all of the foundational requirements for Evid.R. 

803(5) were met. J.F. testified that he did not recall any of the events that had 

occurred when he was walking to school and was approached by individuals and 

pulled into a vehicle and robbed. He further stated that he did not remember going 

to the Garfield Heights Police Department with his mother and making a robbery 

report. We note that appellant is correct that J.F. was asked about the wrong date; 

however, it does not appear from the record that J.F.’s lack of memory stemmed 

simply from counsel for the state’s use of the incorrect date.

When J.F. stated that he did not remember being approached, pulled 

into a car and robbed, or going downtown to the police station and making a report, 

it showed that he had insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully. J.F. was 

able to recognize his name and writing on the top of the written statement he gave 

to police and admitted that it was written right after he was robbed.

Therefore, because all of the foundational requirements of Evid.R. 

803(5) were met, we find the court did not err in allowing the admission of J.F.’s 

written statement to police. Appellant’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.
8. Motion to Dismiss Counsel/Motion to Withdraw

In his eighth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court 

erred by refusing to dismiss his counsel and/or grant his counsel’s motion to 

withdraw when appellant had an ethical grievance pending against trial counsel.

One month before trial was set to commence, appellant filed a motion 

to dismiss counsel, asserting that his trial counsel had not spoken with him for 

months, pushed continuances that he had not consented to, had not shown 

appellant the discovery received from the state, and had not been working in his best 

defense. 

Trial counsel also filed a motion to withdraw, based partly upon 

appellant’s motion to dismiss counsel, and also asserting that appellant had stated 

to counsel that he had filed a grievance against him. Trial counsel maintained that 

he was ethically prohibited from continuing to represent appellant. 

Trial counsel stated that he did not feel comfortable representing 

appellant while a grievance was pending against him but iterated that if he were kept 

on the case he would “show up and fight for” appellant. 

The trial court held a hearing on the motions where trial counsel 

stated his belief, based upon conversations with disciplinary counsel, that he could 

not represent appellant while an ethical grievance was pending. The court asked 

appellant about the grievance, who confirmed that he had filed one with the bar 

association based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the hearing, the 

trial court denied both motions without analysis.
Appellant argues that because a grievance was pending, he and his 

trial counsel were at odds in an ethical matter, and thus he demonstrated good cause 

to receive different appointed counsel.

The state, who did not object to the motions and deferred to the court’s 

ruling, asserts that appellant did not demonstrate a breakdown of the attorneyclient relationship and that no grievance was ever put on the record. The state 

further notes that the issue of a bar complaint was never asserted again, despite the 

fact that the matter was not tried until three months after the court’s denial of the 

motions.

As noted by this court:

It is well established that an indigent defendant is not entitled to the 

counsel of his choosing, but rather, only the right to competent, 

effective representation. See [State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 523, 

747 N.E.2d 765 (2001)]. Further, the right to counsel does not 

guarantee the defendant a meaningful relationship with counsel. See 

Morris v. Slappy (1983), 461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 

610; State v. Pruitt (1984), 18 Ohio App.3d 50, 57, 480 N.E.2d 499. In 

order for a criminal defendant to discharge a court-appointed attorney, 

the defendant must show a breakdown in the attorney-client 

relationship of such magnitude as to jeopardize the defendant’s right to 

the effective assistance of counsel. See State v. Coleman (1988), 37 

Ohio St.3d 286, 525 N.E.2d 792, paragraph four of the syllabus. Thus, 

an indigent defendant is entitled to new counsel “only upon a showing 

of good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in 

communication, or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an 

apparently unjust result.” State v. Edsall (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 337, 

339, 680 N.E.2d 1256; see, also, State v. Blankenship (1995), 102 Ohio 

App.3d 534, 558, 657 N.E.2d 559.

State v. Stewart, 2018-Ohio-684, 101 N.E.3d 688, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. 

Hawkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91930, 2009-Ohio-4368, ¶ 63.
This court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw as 

counsel for an abuse of discretion. State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 135. Similarly, we review a trial court’s decision regarding a 

defendant’s request for substitute counsel (or in this case a motion to dismiss 

counsel) for an abuse of discretion. Hawkins at id., citing Murphy at id.

In State v. Deal, 17 Ohio St.2d 17, 244 N.E.2d 742 (1969), the Supreme 

Court of Ohio held that when an indigent defendant questions the effectiveness and 

adequacy of assigned counsel and requests new counsel, the trial court has a duty to 

inquire into the defendant’s complaint and request and to make the inquiry a part 

of the record. Id. at syllabus. Subsequently, in State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210, 

2006-Ohio-6404, 858 N.E.2d 1144, the court explained that “‘the limited judicial 

duty [to inquire into a defendant’s complaint about adequacy or effectiveness of 

counsel] arises only if the allegations are sufficiently specific; vague or general 

objections do not trigger the duty to investigate further.’” Id. at ¶ 68, quoting State 

v. Carter, 128 Ohio App.3d 419, 423, 715 N.E.2d 223 (4th Dist.1998).

In this case, the trial court did, in fact, conduct an inquiry regarding 

appellant’s concerns during a hearing held on the motions. Specifically, the trial 

court inquired about the conflicts between appellant and counsel, the

communication issues, and appellant’s grievance that he said he filed with the bar 

association. 

After reviewing the record, we find no basis to conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying counsel’s motions to withdraw or appellant’s 
motion to dismiss counsel. The record does not reflect a complete breakdown in 

communications or irreconcilable conflict between appellant and counsel that 

jeopardized appellant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel. Indeed, trial 

counsel stated that if he were to remain on the case, he would “show up and fight 

for” appellant. 

We further note that over two months after the motions were filed, 

trial was set but did not go forward that day due to a conflict with the court’s

calendar. However, on this day, the parties appeared in court and appellant’s trial 

counsel stated that he had met with appellant in the jail the weekend prior and 

appellant was “adamant” that he wanted to go forward with trial. There was no 

further mention of any grievance or breakdown between appellant and his counsel. 

Trial in this matter did not occur until nearly two months later, and in this time, 

there was no further mention of any issue with appellant’s counsel.

Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record that the differences, 

conflict, or communication issues between the two prevented counsel from 

rendering effective assistance. While appellant’s appeal does raise issues of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, these were found to be without merit and did not 

relate to the issues raised by appellant in his motion to dismiss. 

Appellant’s eighth assignment of error is overruled.

9. Cumulative Error

In his ninth assignment of error, appellant contends that while he 

maintains that each of his assignments of error warrant reversal, if this court were 
to disagree, the cumulative effect of all of the errors deprived him of his right to a 

fair trial.

As we have determined that there were no errors committed in the

trial of this matter, appellant’s final assignment of error is overruled.

B. State’s Cross-Appeal – Jail-Time Credit

In its sole cross-assignment of error, the state argues that the trial 

court erred by granting appellant jail-time credit for the time he was serving in 

prison on an unrelated offense.

At the time of appellant’s trial in this matter, he was serving a fiveyear prison sentence in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-16-611462-A. Accordingly, the state 

contends that he was not entitled to jail-time credit for the period of time he was 

serving that sentence, to wit: September 19, 2017, to October 15, 2021 (the date he 

was sentenced in the case at hand). 

In the court’s sentencing entry, it states, “This sentence is ordered to 

be served concurrently to the defendant’s sentences in Case Nos. 605516, 606749

and 611462.” Appellant was credited with 1,794 days, which reflected jail-time credit 

for November 17, 2016, through October 15, 2021.

“An error in the computation of jail-time credit is subject to review 

under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).” State v. Hearn, 6th Dist. Erie Nos. E-19-067, E-19-076, 

E-19-077, and E-19-078, 2021-Ohio-86, ¶ 6. See also State v. Williams, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 104155, 2016-Ohio-8049, ¶ 10. “An appellate court may increase, 

decrease, modify, or vacate and remand a disputed trial court sentence if it clearly 
and convincingly is demonstrated that either the record of evidence does not 

support applicable statutory findings or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” 

Hearn at ¶ id., citing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

R.C. 2967.191 provides as follows:

The department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the prison 

term of a prisoner, as described in division (B) of this section, by the 

total number of days that the prisoner was confined for any reason 

arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and 

sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial, 

confinement for examination to determine the prisoner’s competence 

to stand trial or sanity, confinement while awaiting transportation to 

the place where the prisoner is to serve the prisoner’s prison term, as 

determined by the sentencing court * * *.

“Although the principle of crediting time served seems fairly simple 

on its face, in practice, it can be complicated when, inter alia, the defendant is 

charged with multiple crimes committed at different times, or when the defendant 

is incarcerated due to a probation violation.” State v. Chafin, 10th Dist. Franklin 

No. 06AP-1108, 2007-Ohio-1840, ¶ 9.

Here, while awaiting disposition on the instant matter, appellant was 

serving his sentence in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-16-611462-A. Appellant argues that, 

because he was sentenced to a concurrent rather than a consecutive term in the 

instant case and 611462, he should be entitled to jail-time credit. He argues that,

without jail-time credit, he will serve a longer period of incarceration because the 

sentence would be consecutive rather than concurrent as the trial court intended.

Pursuant to the provision in R.C. 2967.191, a defendant is entitled to 

jail-time credit for confinement “for any reason arising out of the offense for which 
the prisoner was convicted and sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail 

while awaiting trial * * *.” R.C. 2967.191. Under the statute, when a defendant is 

held in jail awaiting trial and disposition of a case (for any reasons arising out of the 

case, including confinement in lieu of bail), the court is to credit the time the 

defendant is held in jail toward the sentence the defendant receives in the case.

When a defendant is being confined due to multiple cases, this court 

has interpreted R.C. 2967.191 to preclude a claim of jail-time credit “for any period 

of incarceration that arose from facts which are separate and apart from those on 

which his current sentence is based.” State v. Maddox, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

99120, 2013-Ohio-3140, ¶ 41, citing State v. DeMarco, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

96605, 2011-Ohio-5187, ¶ 10. There is no jail-time credit pursuant to R.C. 2967.191 

when a defendant is imprisoned as a result of another unrelated offense. Id. There 

is no jail-time credit for time served on unrelated offenses, even if that time served 

runs concurrently during the pretrial phase of another matter. Id. See also State 

v. Holley, 2017-Ohio-1559, 88 N.E.3d 1290, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.); Williams, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 104155, 2016-Ohio-8049, at ¶ 15; and State v. Smiley, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 99486, 2013-Ohio-4495, ¶ 13.

Consequently, appellant is not entitled to jail-time credit for the 

period of pretrial detention in this matter because he was serving a sentence in an 

unrelated case — even though the trial court made the sentence in the instant case 

concurrent to the other case.
Accordingly, the state’s sole assignment of error is sustained, and this 

matter is remanded for recalculation of appellant’s jail-time credit without inclusion 

of time served on unrelated offenses.

III. Conclusion

All of appellant’s assignments of error are overruled, and the decision 

of the trial court is affirmed. Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient 

evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, the court did 

not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence, did not err in denying 

appellant’s motion to dismiss counsel and his trial counsel’s motion to withdraw, 

and appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

In addition, the state’s cross-assignment of error in its cross-appeal 

is sustained. This matter is remanded for recalculation of appellant’s jail-time credit 

without inclusion of time served on unrelated offenses. 

Convictions affirmed; cause remanded to the lower court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case 

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence and recalculation of jail-time 

credit.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and

CORNELIUS J. O’SULLIVAN, JR., J., CONCUR
KEYWORDS

#110973 - State v. Young

Crim.R. 29; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; App.R. 

16(A); in-court identification; reliable, independent basis; totality of the 

circumstances; admission of evidence; Facebook records; authenticity; plain error; 

failure to object; Evid.R. 901(A); sufficient evidence of authenticity; hearsay; 

Evid.R. 801; admission by party opponent; Confrontation Clause; ineffective 

assistance of counsel; irrelevant testimony; abuse of discretion; third-party 

intimidation of witness; admissible; credibility; Evid.R. 803(5); past recollection 

recorded; motion to withdraw as counsel; motion to dismiss counsel; pending 

ethical grievance; jail-time credit; time served on unrelated offense; R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2967.191. 

Appellant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Further, the court did not abuse its discretion in 

the admission of evidence, did not err in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss 

counsel and his trial counsel’s motion to withdraw, and appellant did not receive 

ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, the state’s assignment of error in its 

cross-appeal is sustained. This matter is remanded for recalculation of appellant’s 

jail-time credit without inclusion of time served on unrelated offenses.