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QUESTION: WHAT IS MORE SCRAMBLED THAN AN

EGG? ANSWER: THE FEDERAL FOOD INSPECTION SYSTEM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE

AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 17, 2005

Serial No. 109–47

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION

JON C. PORTER, Nevada, Chairman

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

——— ———

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

EX OFFICIO

HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA

RON MARTINSON, Staff Director

CHRIS BARKLEY, Professional Staff Member

REID VOSS, Clerk

MARK STEPHENSON, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on May 17, 2005 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Robinson, Robert A., Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Robert E. Brackett,

Ph.D., Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food

and Drug Administration; Merle Pierson, Ph.D., Acting Undersecretary

for Food Safety, U.S. Department of Agriculture; Jim Jones, Director

of Pesticide Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; and

Richard V. Cano, Acting Director, Seafood Inspection Program, National Marine Fisheries Service ................................................................... 3

Brackett, Robert E. ................................................................................... 36

Cano, Richard V. ....................................................................................... 87

Jones, Jim .................................................................................................. 79

Pierson, Merle ............................................................................................ 63

Robinson, Robert A. ................................................................................... 3

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Brackett, Robert E., Ph.D., Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied

Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration, prepared statement of .......... 39

Cano, Richard V., Acting Director, Seafood Inspection Program, National

Marine Fisheries Service, prepared statement of ...................................... 89

DeLauro, Hon. Rosa L., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 58

Jones, Jim, Director of Pesticide Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, prepared statement of ............................................................. 81

Pierson, Merle, Ph.D., Acting Undersecretary for Food Safety, U.S. Department of Agriculture, prepared statement of ........................................ 65

Robinson, Robert A., Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of .... 7

(1)

QUESTION: WHAT IS MORE SCRAMBLED

THAN AN EGG? ANSWER: THE FEDERAL

FOOD INSPECTION SYSTEM

TUESDAY, MAY 17, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE AND AGENCY

ORGANIZATION,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jon C. Porter (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Porter, Norton, Cummings, and Van

Hollen.

Staff present: Ron Martinson, staff director; B. Chad Bungard,

deputy staff director/chief counsel; Chris Barkley and Shannon

Meade, professional staff members; Reid Voss, legislative assistant/

clerk; Patrick Jennings, detail from OPM serving as senior counsel;

Mark Stephenson and Tania Shand, minority professional staff

members; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Teresa Coufal,

minority assistant clerk.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, everyone, for being here. I appreciate

your being with us this afternoon.

We are actually going to start the meeting until we get a

quorum, and then we will recess and get into the markup, which

really should be shortly. But for the element of time and for those

that are here, for the balance of the meeting, I’m going to start the

issue regarding Federal food inspection, and then we will recess as

soon as we have the quorum and go into the markup.

So with that, again, thank you for being here and good afternoon.

We’re going to start by answering the question, what is more

scrambled than an egg? The answer is the Federal Food Inspection

System.

I’d like to let everyone know again, for the record, that we will

move into the markup, but this hearing is just about the basic commonsense in finding ways to achieve efficiency and economy for

taxpayers.

As chairman of the subcommittee, I will continue to look for

ways to organize the government in a more effective manner and

to do so in an expedited fashion, such as reconstituting Fast Track

Authority for agency reorganization proposals.

We have chosen to examine the food inspection process today

only because of the seemingly nonsensical organizational structure

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of the inspection process itself. For example, if Congress were to set

up an organizational structure today, I hardly believe that we

would have the USDA inspect manufacturers of spaghetti with

meat sauce, pepperoni pizza, open face meat and poultry sandwiches, corn dogs and beef broth daily and require the FDA to inspect manufacturers of spaghetti without meet sauce, cheese pizzas, close faced, which are traditional meat and poultry sandwiches, bagel dogs and chicken broth once every 5 years.

We also would not require school lunches to be inspected twice,

once by the USDA and once by the FDA. It is almost too hard to

believe, but that’s the organizational structure that we have today

in the current food inspection system. I’m sure there was a method

to this madness at one point in time, but we have to be more efficient and find a more effective way to organize the inspection process.

At the hearing this subcommittee held last March, it looked into

why the food inspection process has become what may seem like an

organizational nightmare. It was uncovered that 10 agencies are

now responsible for executing more than 30 laws directing how the

Federal Government inspects food. Moreover, the inspection process has become an intricate web of governmental agencies with responsibilities that often overlap one another, as I just cited a few

moments ago. So the question then becomes, who is to blame for

this? Well, actually, the blame for this organizational problem does

not lie primarily with the past organizations, Republicans or Democrats, or with the food industry that has to live with this system.

And as a matter of fact, many folks in the food industry would prefer we leave it the way it is. The blame lies primarily with Congress, which has haphazardly passed the laws making the system

what it is today throughout the years. It has been a Band-Aided

system.

Though the organizational problems with the system are deepseated. It does not let off the hook the agencies charged with inspecting food for improving upon the job that they’re doing. I am

deeply concerned with the findings uncovered by the Government

Accountability Office, which are contained in the report I will release today, entitled, Federal Agencies Should Pursue Opportunities to Reduce Overlap and Better Leverage of Resources.

The report focuses on the problem of overlap and duplications between the various food inspection agencies. GAO concentrated its

investigation on the four agencies with the most food inspection responsibilities, the USDA, the FDA, EPA and National Marine Fisheries Service. As a result of the hearing, GAO has made a number

of recommendations for the agency to better operate within the current operation structure. The subcommittee will be examining

those recommendations today.

One of the more troubling findings in the report, though, reveals

that simply between the four agencies represented here today there

are 71—yes, 71 memorandum of understanding to keep the agencies coordinating with one another. Of these 71 agreements, GAO

recovered that only in seven cases did all signatory agencies know

that they were a party to the agreement. This means that in 64

of 71 agreements, one or more agencies were completely unaware

that it was responsible for coordinating with another agency on a

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certain matter. This kind of example does not speak to safety of

food. I want to make that clear. We’re not here to talk about safety

of food, although in the long run, it does have an impact. But we

understood that we have one of the best and safest food systems

in the world, we are just trying to make it more efficient. Rather,

it highlights the need that the Federal Government is using the tax

dollars taken from the American people as wisely and efficiently as

possible. Anything less than a lean and well organized food inspection process is unacceptable.

Regardless of the organizational ideas offered today, I would emphasize at the outset that everyone in this room is in agreement

that we want our food supply to be safe, so that’s not the issue.

I thank our witnesses for being here, and I look forward to the

discussion. Again, we are waiting for a quorum, so what I would

like to do is ask all those on the panel to please stand, and I’ll

swear them in at this time.

On the first panel today, we’re going to hear from Robert Robinson. Mr. Robinson is the Managing Director of Natural Resources

and Environment, Government Accountability Office. And we’re

going to hear from Dr. Robert Brackett, Director of the Center for

Food Safety and Applied Nutrition at the Food and Drug Administration.

Welcome.

Then we’ll hear from Dr. Merle Pierson, Acting Undersecretary

for Food Safety at the U.S. Department Of Agriculture. And then

we will be hearing from Mr. Jim Jones, Director of Pesticide Programs at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. And finally,

we will hear from Richard Cano, Acting Director of the Seafood Inspection Program at the National Marine Fisheries Service.

OK. What I’d like to do is let the record reflect the following.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. PORTER. Thank you very much. Would you please be seated.

Mr. Robinson, welcome. Thank you for joining us today, you will

be recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENTS OF ROBERT A. ROBINSON, MANAGING DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; ROBERT E. BRACKETT,

PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED

NUTRITION, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION; MERLE

PIERSON, PH.D., ACTING UNDERSECRETARY FOR FOOD

SAFETY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; JIM JONES,

DIRECTOR OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY; AND RICHARD V. CANO, ACTING DIRECTOR, SEAFOOD INSPECTION PROGRAM, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. ROBINSON

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for holding this hearing and giving us the opportunity

to express our views about the Federal food safety’s food inspection

structure.

As you can see in our appendix to our statement, we have been

weighing on this and related topics for quite some time. We first

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called for fundamental restructuring of the system in 1992 when

my hair color was decidedly different than it is today. In the more

than a decade since then, some important progress has been made

in making our food safety system more science based.

Of particular note, the agencies have begun requiring companies

to adopt the HACCP system to try to prevent contamination before

it occurs, rather than simply dealing with it after it has been detected. HACCP shifted a significant share of responsibility for ensuring safe food from government to industry, and there are clear

signs the industry has responded. However, the same structural

problems and inefficiencies present in 1992 remain today. And in

the intervening years, a number of trends have emerged that make

the case for restructuring even more compelling today.

First, as the Comptroller General pointed out in his 2003 testimony before this subcommittee, our Nation is facing increasingly

serious long-term fiscal challenges. We are on an unsustainable fiscal path that, without a change in course, could have future revenues unable to cover much more than interest on the debt just a

few decades from now. If we ever could, we probably have reached

a point where we can no longer afford a government weighed down

by duplicative and overlapping missions and functions.

Second, the chorus of voices calling for change is growing. While

a number of industry associations we contacted in assembling our

report continue to believe that the structural problems are not significant, many other stakeholders are coming to realize that the

current structure doesn’t meet the commonsense test. In fact, a

number of food companies subjected to dual regulation by USDA

and FDA told us that the overlaps can be burdensome as they deal

with two sets of HACCP requirements and two sets of inspection

approaches. In some cases, they even told us of conflicting direction

being provided by different inspectors from different agencies.

Likewise, the Institute of Medicine, the Consumer Federation of

America and the National Commission on the Public Service have

now also supported a move to a more consolidated structure.

Third, several other countries have moved to a single food safety

agency to increase efficiency, to eliminate conflicts of interest and

improve the safety of their food supply. As we reported in February, officials in each of the seven developed countries we reviewed believe the overall effect of consolidation has been or is expected to be positive. For example, as the first exhibit to your left

shows, the government of Denmark consolidated major food safety

functions that were performed by three separate entities, numerous

municipalities into a single agency, the Danish Veterinary and

Food Administration. As the second exhibit shows, Canada also

consolidated food inspection functions from food agencies into a single Canadian food inspection agency, while placing public health

policy and standard setting with Health Canada.

Finally, as we pointed out in the report you’re releasing today,

the overlap and duplication consequences of our current organizational structure are becoming more apparent. Because the key

agencies still have jurisdiction over different segments of the food

supply, USDA and FDA both conduct overlapping and even duplicative inspections at more than 1,450 domestic food processing facilities that produce multi-ingredient foods or different types of

5

food. In our view, this represents an inefficient use of increasingly

scarce government resources. For example, as shown in the third

exhibit, a facility that the GAO team visited that produces both

meat and seafood products and therefore comes under the jurisdiction of both USDA and FDA, the USDA inspector is there on a

daily basis. And because of the physical plant layout, the inspector

must walk through an area containing FDA-regulated seafood.

However, because FDA regulates seafood, the USDA inspector does

not monitor or inspect that section of the plant.

As the final exhibit shows, most Federal food safety expenditures

involve inspection or enforcement activities. Oddly enough, though,

USDA spends about 75 percent of these inspection dollars, even

though it is responsible for regulating about 20 percent of the food

supply. Conversely, FDA regulates about 80 percent of the food

supply, but spends only about 25 percent of these dollars.

FDA and the seafood inspection program run by the National

Marine Fisheries Service also conduct somewhat overlapping inspections at about 275 domestic seafood facilities. The NMFS program is a volunteer fee-for-service that is not mandated by legislation. However, FDA does not take full account whether NMFS has

already inspected a facility when devising its inspection plans.

USDA and FDA also both inspect imported foods at U.S. ports

of entry, and the agencies also visit foreign countries to perform

equivalence exams, but they do so under significantly different authorities. Thus, in 2004, USDA conducted equivalence reviews in

34 countries that supply meat and poultry products to the United

States. FDA also sent separate teams to conduct inspections in 6

of these same 34 countries.

Finally, USDA and FDA spend millions of dollars each year developing and delivering food inspection training that could easily be

unified.

Testifying to the cumbersome structure in an effort to reduce duplication of effort, among other objectives, Federal agencies have

developed at least 71 interagency agreements. Unfortunately, the

agencies are having difficulty trying to make these agreements

work because they don’t have adequate mechanisms for tracking

them; in many cases, couldn’t identify that they existed. In other

cases, they simply have not been able to implement them effectively on a day-to-day basis.

Mr. Chairman, at the end of the day, we continue to hold the

view that we first expressed more than a decade ago, the Federal

Food Safety Inspection System is fragmented and based on outdated laws that reduce its effectiveness and efficiency.

The millions of foodborne illnesses and thousands of hospitalizations in foodborne disease-related deaths tell us we can be more effective. The duplicative inspections, overlapping training and uneven information-sharing among agencies tell us we can be more

efficient. The experiences of seven developed countries that moved

forward and consolidated their previously fragmented operations

tell us that better operations are possible.

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And finally, the Nation’s growing fiscal imbalance tells us that

there is growing urgency to address inefficiencies whenever we find

them. With that, let me pause, and I would be anxious to answer

questions when the time comes.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]

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Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

I would like to take this time now to recess our hearing on the

food inspection system and open our hearing regarding the markup

on H.R. 994, H.R. 1283 and H.R. 1765.

[Recess.]

Mr. PORTER. We will go back to the other hearing, and bring it

back into session, and that’s the Federal Food Inspection System.

Thank you, Mr. Robinson, again for your testimony.

And I would now like to ask Robert Brackett, again, Director of

Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. BRACKETT, PH.D.

Mr. BRACKETT. Thank you. And good afternoon, Chairman Porter

and members of the subcommittee.

I am Robert E. Brackett, Ph.D, Director of the Center for Food

Safety and Applied Nutrition at the FDA, which is part of the Department of Health and Human Services.

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the role that the HHS

plays in the Federal Food Safety System. As has been stated, ensuring the safety of the food supply continues to be a top priority

for HHS and the administration, and so I am pleased to be here

today with my colleagues from USDA, EPA and the National Marine Fisheries Service.

Your letter of invitation mentioned that this hearing will examine the need for reorganizing Federal food safety activities. The

current system of interagency coordination is helping to improve

the safety of the food supply and will continue to look for new ways

to further this coordination. The American food supply continues to

be among the safest in the world, and the current Federal Food

Safety System is working well.

Just last month, the Centers for Disease Control Prevention, in

collaboration with FDA and USDA, released a report with preliminary surveillance data that showed important declines in 2004 in

foodborne infections due to common pathogens. This report shows

that we are achieving significant public health outcomes in the effort to reduce the incidence of foodborne illness to the lowest level

possible.

FDA is the Federal agency that regulates everything we eat except for meat, poultry and egg products, which are regulated by our

partners at USDA. FDA’s responsibility also extends to life-food

animals and animal feed.

You asked about our role in the food inspection system. In fact,

FDA has many roles. For example, FDA conducts investigations

into foodborne illness outbreaks, along with CDC and our Federal

and State partners. And FDA conducts inspections of food manufacturing facilities. We utilize a risk-based approach and expect highrisk facilities with greater frequency than low-risk facilities. We

have many contract and partnership agreements with States to assist us with the domestic inspection activities. In addition, FDA

works closely with States and local officials on inspections at the

retail level.

For foreign producers, FDA conducts a limited number of compliance inspections of high-risk food facilities, such as firms that manVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:25 Oct 11, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22707.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ufacture low-acid can foods or infant formula. FDA also works

through the international organization such as Codex Alimentarius

to establish international standards. Through this mechanism, we

extend science-based inspection of standards worldwide.

To manage the ever-increasing volume of imported food shipments, we also utilize risk-management strategies. Through the

use of an electronic screening system, FDA is able to concentrate

its inspection resources on high-risk shipments while allowing the

low-risk shipments to proceed into commerce. FDA personnel conduct examinations and collect and analyze samples as necessary to

determine compliance with FDA’s food safety requirements.

You asked FDA to respond to a recent report by GAO about the

use of Federal food safety resources. And we certainly share GAO’s

interest in finding ways to make FDA more efficient. However, we

do not believe the report provides an accurate assessment of how

to achieve this. We do not agree with GAO’s characterization of

what constitutes overlap. In processing establishments, there are

no food products that both FDA and USDA regulate. Each agency

inspects those products over which it has jurisdiction. The FDA

and USDA inspectors have different educational backgrounds, have

received different training and have responsibility for different food

products and industries.

GAO’s report cites the inspection of dual jurisdiction establishments, so-called DJEs, as a primary example of overlapping and efficiency. DJEs are facilities that are regulated by both FDA and

USDA because the establishment produces food products that fall

under each agency’s jurisdiction. We do not agree with GAO’s emphasis on inspection of these facilities as a way to save resources

and achieve efficiencies. DJEs comprise less than 2 percent of the

total food processing or manufacturing facilities in the United

States, and further, the report did not seem to take into account

the fact that more than half of the 1,451 dual jurisdiction facilities

are low-risk facilities, such as warehouses, that do not require a

high inspection frequency. Thus, the opportunity for achieving efficiencies through leveraging of inspection resources for these facilities is quite small.

As noted in the report, FDA and USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service have signed a memorandum of understanding to facilitate the sharing of information about DJEs. This MOU has been

successful in enhancing collaborative activities to improve public

health protection. To further strengthen this MOU, we have agreed

to conduct some additional joint training. We are also following up

on GAO’s report recommendations to inventory all active interagency agreements and to evaluate and update them as necessary.

I would like now to provide some other examples of successful

collaborations with our food safety partners. HHS, USDA, EPA and

other agencies are working with the Department of Homeland Security to achieve the objectives of homeland security Presidential

Directive No.’s 7, 8, and 9, which identify critical infrastructures,

improve response planning, and establish a national policy to defend the agriculture and food systems against terrorist attacks,

major disasters and other emergencies.

DHS serves as the coordinator of the food and agriculture sector,

with the FDA and HHS as the lead for the food sector, and the

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Homeland Security Office and USDA as the lead for the agricultural sector. Today, FDA and FSIS are also announcing a joint proposal to establish a set of general principles for evaluating existing

and proposed food standards. General food standards are used to

ensure that products sold under particular names have the characteristics expected by consumers. Adherence to the proposed principles will result in more modern standards that will better promote honesty and fair dealing, and will allow for technological advances for food processing. Such technological advances mean enhanced manufacturing efficiency and reduced costs, which could

benefit consumers through lower prices and increased product diversity in the marketplace.

In conclusion, FDA is working closely with its Federal food safety

partners and others to protect the food supply from deliberate and

accidental contamination. And as a result of this effective collaboration, the Federal Food Safety System is stronger than ever before.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to respond to any

questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brackett follows:]

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Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Brackett. Before we move on, I

would like to ask unanimous consent to submit testimony from

Congresswoman Rosa L. DeLauro. Any objections? Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Rosa L. DeLauro follows:]

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Mr. PORTER. Next, Dr. Pierson, welcome, Acting Undersecretary

for Food Safety, U.S. Department of Agriculture, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MERLE PIERSON, PH.D.

Mr. PIERSON. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of

the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to speak about the

important issue of protecting the Nation’s food supply.

I’m Dr. Merle Pierson, Acting Undersecretary for Food Safety at

the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

The mission of the agency under the Food Safety Inspection

Service is to ensure that meat, poultry and egg products prepared

for use assembling food are safe, secure, wholesome and accurately

labeled. FSIS is charged with administering and enforcing the Federal Meat, Poultry and Egg Products Inspection Acts.

Ensuring the safety of meat, poultry and egg products requires

a strong infrastructure. FSIS has a work force of over 7,600 inspection personnel in approximately 6,000 federally inspected meat,

poultry and egg product plants, import establishments every day.

These public health inspection personnel verify each year that 43.6

billion pounds of red meat, 49.2 billion pounds of poultry, and 33.7

billion pounds of liquid egg products, as well as 4.2 billion pounds

of imported products comply with the agency’s regulatory requirements.

Our efforts are paying off, as seen by the decline in foodborne illness over the last 7 years. Last month, the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention reported continued reductions in foodborne

illnesses in 2004 from E. Coli 157:H7, Listeria monocytogenes,

Camplyobacter, Yersinia, and Salmonella.

The CDC contributes the changes in the incidents of these infections in part to the control measures implemented by government

and industry leaders, enhanced food safety education efforts and

increased attention by consumer groups and the media. Through

close cooperation, communication and coordination, Federal agencies and others do work effectively together to ensure a safe and

secure food supply. As a partner in the U.S. food safety effort, Food

Safety Inspection Service strives to maintain a strong working relationship with its sister public health agencies.

We appreciate the GAO’s efforts in producing their March 2005

report on what they call overlaps in the Federal Food Safety System. However, I am concerned with any assessment that oversimplifies the food safety regulatory functions of FSIS and FDA, as

well as others. And it is not clear on the inherent complexities and

differences in our work. It is important to recognize that while

FSIS and FDA inspection activities may seem similar in some

cases, there are essential differences due to their authorities and

responsibilities.

I want to point out that considering what GAO describes as jurisdictional overlap between FSIS and FDA, particularly with regard

to dual jurisdiction establishments, the amount of food products

and number of establishments that fall within these dual jurisdiction establishments is small compared to what the two agencies

regulate independently.

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Another topic the GAO report dealt with, the joint training: Both

FSIS and FDA HAPCC and sanitation is important aspects of the

regulations, and there are certain similarities in hazards and their

controls. However, in the broader context, specific food safety hazards and sanitary approaches differ greatly by product, thus necessitating differences in provisions in how the rules are applied.

FSIS’s HACCP regulations apply to all meat and poultry products. FDA has two of its inspected commodities, seafood and juices,

under mandatory HACCP.

FSIS has experienced considerable change over the past few

years with the adoption of a HACCP-based regulatory system, an

implementation of policies that have worked to provide a significant reduction in foodborne illness. It is essential that the agency’s

resources be effectively directed toward those areas of greatest risk

and not be diverted to efforts that have little potential for improving public health.

We look forward to working with Congress, GAO and our food

safety partners to continue the best we can to make our Nation’s

food supply the safest in the world. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pierson follows:]

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Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Doctor, I appreciate it.

Thank you, Doctor.

Now we will hear from Jim Jones, Director of Pesticide Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. You are recognized

for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF JIM JONES

Mr. JONES. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of the

committee. My name is Jim Jones, and I serve as the Director of

the Office of Pesticide Programs at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss EPA’s role in

food safety and how we coordinate with other Federal agencies on

this important topic.

EPA’s main food safety responsibility is to regulate pesticides, including setting health-based standards for pesticides use in food

production, and ensuring our decisions promote the protection of

public health and the environment. The EPA protects public health

through the registration or licensing of pesticides prior to their

marketing and use in the United States under the authority of the

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, as well as setting and reevaluating tolerances or legal maximum residue levels

under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. This requires use

of a scientifically sound risk assessment process to consider the potential risks of pesticide use not only to human health, but to the

environment as well.

Registration tolerances will be granted only if EPA determines

that there is a reasonable certainty of no harm from exposure to

the pesticide residues in food and the use of the pesticide will not

pose an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment.

In addition to pesticides, EPA also works closely with FDA on

the development and publication of National Fish Advisories for

fish and shellfish. While EPA is responsible for establishing pesticide tolerances during the registration process, FDA and USDA’s

Food Safety Inspection Service enforce these tolerances. If pesticide

residues on food or feed exceed the tolerance, or if no tolerance exists for such pesticide residues, the food or feed would be subject

to regulatory action.

EPA actively cooperates and collaborates with FDA and FSIS regarding tolerance levels for pesticide residues on both domestically

produced and imported foods. Some of the data EPA uses when establishing tolerances are generated through interagency agreements with USDA, FDA and the Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention. These agreements provide valuable information related

to food consumption patterns, pesticide use and expected levels of

pesticide residues once food products actually reach the consumer.

The Agency is also partner to a number of agreements in areas

such as training for agricultural workers, providing alternatives to

the use of pesticides and coordinating work on pesticide residues.

As mentioned by Dr. Brackett, EPA is collaborating with other

food safety agencies, including FDA and USDA and the Department of Homeland Security on a number of initiatives to protect

the Nation’s food supply from natural, unintended or malicious

threats.

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In closing, EPA is committed to continuing to work with our Federal partners, including FDA, USDA and others, to ensure that the

United States maintains its well-earned reputation for protecting

the safety of our Nation’s food supply.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Jones. We appreciate that.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

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Mr. PORTER. Next we have Richard Cano, Acting Director of Seafood Inspection Program, National Marine Fisheries Services. You

are recognized for 5 minutes. Thank you for being here.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD V. CANO

Mr. CANO. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank

you for inviting me to speak on the GAO report, Oversight of Food

Safety Activities. I am Richard Cano, Acting Director of the Seafood Inspection Program of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA]. My testimony today will provide a

brief description of the Seafood Inspection Program and comment

on the GAO report.

NOAA oversees the fishery management in the United States.

Through the delegated authority of both the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 and the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, NOAA provides voluntary seafood inspection programs on a fee-for-service

basis.

The NOAA Seafood Inspection Program offers a variety of professional inspection services, including vessel and plant sanitation,

product inspection, laboratory analysis, training and consultation.

These activities ensure that products from firms participating in

the NOAA Seafood Inspection Program comply with all applicable

Federal regulations.

Our inspections, both in the United States and in other countries, examine facility conditions, personnel practices and safety

and effectiveness of protocols. To ensure safe and properly labeled

products, our evaluation considers both the risks associated with

the product and the manufacturing process. We inspect products

directly at the facility and by taking random samples from warehouses.

NOAA also certifies products by periodically monitoring written

industry control systems to ensure facilities are meeting their responsibilities. For example, we use Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point [HACCP], techniques that focus on hazard identification,

problem prevention and corrective actions taken by industry to

produce complying products.

By identifying and monitoring control points in the process, our

HACCP-based program helps ensure that requirements such as

proper labeling and quality attributes are met, in addition to safety.

In 1974, NOAA signed a memorandum of understanding with the

Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Health and

Human Services recognizing our agencies’ related responsibilities.

This agreement is designed to outline a working relationship in the

public interest to enable each agency to discharge as effectively as

possible its responsibilities related to the inspection and standardization activities for fishery products. In general, this agreement

outlines requirements regarding adulterated and misbranded products, how best to maximize resources, and the need for effective

communication between the agencies.

The most notable accomplishment under this agreement has

been in the area of training. NOAA’s inspection staff has benefited

from FDA’s willingness to provide access to their online training

modules. Since January 2003, NOAA personnel have completed apVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:25 Oct 11, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22707.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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proximately 9,100, a combined employee total, of the FDA online

courses.

In addition, most NOAA workshops on sensory evaluation of fishery products are jointly instructed by both NOAA and FDA personnel, and NOAA provides an instructor to assist FDA in retail training courses. However, both the FDA and NOAA believe this agreement, which is now more than 30 years old, needs to be assessed

in the light of changing roles and responsibilities, and we have

been in discussions with FDA on this. Both industry and other

agencies use the NOAA Seafood Inspection Program to ensure that

fishery products procured and distributed comply with regulatory

requirements, purchasing specifications and consumer expectations.

As the GAO report outlined, several agencies are involved in food

safety oversight. In general, we believe the report does a fair and

thorough job of describing the major food safety activities at NOAA. As the GAO report outlines, in fiscal year 2003, of the $1.7 billion spent on food safety-related activities, NOAA spent just under

$22 million, only approximately 1 percent of the total expenditure.

The GAO report made several recommendations, and I will focus

on those directly relevant to NOAA. As I mentioned earlier, the

FDA and NOAA have an interagency agreement. We agree with

the GAO recommendation for FDA and NOAA to ensure the implementation of this agreement, and we will continue to work with the

appropriate components of FDA in order to do this.

In addition, the report recommends that the leaders of each of

the agencies discussed in the report identify and inventory all active interagency food safety-related agreements, evaluate the need

for these agreements and, where necessary, update the agreements

to reflect recent legislative changes, technological advances and

current needs. We agree with this recommendation and will establish an inventory of active, interagency, food-related agreements on

which NOAA is a signatory.

In addition, NOAA will contact the applicable agencies associated

with food safety-related agreements whenever NOAA believes an

agreement should be revised.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting

me here to speak about our Seafood Inspection Program and the

recommendations in the GAO report. I will be happy to answer any

questions you may have.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Cano. I appreciate that.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cano follows:]

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Mr. PORTER. I would like to start by asking a question to all of

you and would like a response.

In the GAO’s report, they identified over 71 memoranda of understanding, MOUs, between the four agencies present today. Unbelievably, in only seven cases do all agencies party to an agreement identify that they were a part of such an MOU. This means

in 64 of 71 cases, one or more agencies had no idea they were part

of an agreement.

How would you explain this?

We will start with Mr. Brackett.

Mr. BRACKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Many of these MOUs actually were written for specific issues at

the time. Many of them were also written at the local level. These

were meant to be operational, and in some cases where the issue

in the past may no longer be applicable, but they were never taken

off the books, consequently, what FDA is doing is actually doing

the inventory as was suggested by GAO, looking through our

MOUs, revising them if necessary, sunsetting those that don’t

apply, and perhaps leaving those alone that are working well.

Mr. PIERSON. We also look at the MOUs in a similar fashion to

which Dr. Brackett has just commented on.

These have evolved over the years. If you notice, some of these

go back into the 1970’s and 1980’s and the like. We certainly agree

that they do deserve review. FSIS certainly is willing to take a look

at those MOUs that apply to them and see whether or not we

should revise them or sunset them or whatever is appropriate for

the MOUs.

MOUs have served a very, very important purpose for us in

many cases, and I just think of one now, for instance, with the

Public Health Service. We have an MOU with them relative to

members of the Public Health Service to become part of our Food

Safety Inspection Service, and we have a number of physicians and

veterinarians who are uniformed and work for us. For example, our

administrator of our Office of Public Health Science is a physician

from the Public Health Service, and he is over there in part because of this MOU that was created.

So they do serve a very useful purpose, but, yes, historically the

ones that are there need to be reviewed, and we will be doing that.

Thank you.

Mr. JONES. I would agree with my colleagues on some of the reasons why these MOUs have not been tracked as aggressively as

they should have been. Many of them at the Agency, the EPA, are

over 30 years old. We have now identified a tracking system to

make sure we have in front of us all the existing MOUs, and we

will be going back to look at them for their relevance. Some of them

may be sunsetted and some of them, updated.

Mr. CANO. As I mentioned, we are intending to establish an inventory and to followup on any of the MOUs that NOAA is a signatory to and that appear to need revision.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Chairman, could I just make a quick summary comment?

Based on my 32 years of experience doing this kind of work, any

system that requires, at least—and I emphasize, at least—71 interagency agreements to function is a system built for problems. PeoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:25 Oct 11, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22707.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ple retire. Agreements that are made on the ground are based on

human relations. Those things change over time. Pretty soon, as we

discovered in this particular case, folks drift away and agreements

are forgotten or not aggressively implemented.

The whole system that begs for this volume of interagency agreement is a system that is severely handicapped, in our opinion.

Mr. PORTER. It seems to me that these MOUs were the basis for

cooperation, supposed cooperation.

I know, Mr. Brackett, you mentioned they were for local operational purposes. Can you expand upon that a little more?

Mr. BRACKETT. Sure, Mr. Chairman.

Many of these had very specific purposes. In one that we have,

for instance, with the Food Safety and Inspection Service, it was

specifically designed for information sharing, particularly at the

district level. That one actually called for a reassessment after 1

year, which was done. It was not reassessed after that because the

MOU didn’t request that. But that particular operational MOU has

continued on, and it has been one of the more successful operational MOUs we have had, as sort of evidenced by many of the

joint enforcement actions it has prompted.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you.

Mr. Marchant, do you have any questions?

Mr. MARCHANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The administration has put forth a proposal for results commissions which would examine sectors of the government in need of reform and issued recommendations for reorganization. Under the

proposal, Congress would vote the recommendation up or down

without amendment.

What is each of your opinions on promoting such a fast track reorganization legislation to solve these problems we are talking

about today?

Mr. BRACKETT. Thank you, Mr. Marchant.

I am not in a position really to state with any authority what reorganization proposals the administration would contemplate, referring to commissions for consideration, but I am certain the administration is not currently contemplating a commission that

would consider reorganization of the food safety agencies at this

point.

Mr. MARCHANT. Mr. Pierson.

Mr. PIERSON. Yes. Certainly we are supportive of any effort

where we can better address public health. That is our baseline, is

effectively addressing public health. However, without knowing all

the details, etc., of what is proposed and what will finally transpire, it is very, very difficult to comment specifically on that.

But I might say that the White House has established a Policy

Coordinating Committee, led by the Domestic Policy Council and

the National Economic Council, to look into the issue of a single

food safety agency. I believe this was in 2002. The Policy Coordinating Committee did conclude that the goals of the administration

are better advanced through enhanced interagency coordination,

rather than through the development of legislation to create a single food safety agency; and that is the current position of this administration.

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We feel that we have worked very effectively together, and I

think the outcomes, as seen, for example, by CDC, speak very loudly to the success of effectively addressing food safety and assuring

public health.

Mr. MARCHANT. Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Yes. Similar to my colleagues, I don’t feel like I am

in a position to speak directly to the question related to the results

commission.

Mr. CANO. Similarly, I am not prepared to comment on that.

Mr. MARCHANT. You have recommended that all agencies coordinate better when evaluating the food inspection system in foreign

countries. How do you think that this can be done in the most effective and useful way for all the agencies?

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, Mr. Marchant, I think we come back to

where we have been for quite some time, that a consolidated enterprise is the best way to proceed. A single food safety agency that

is independent, free of inherent conflicts of interest, able to move

resources about, to ensure two delegations from two different agencies are in the same country in the same year, evaluating essentially the same kinds of things, is the way to go.

Again, systems built on trying to make interagency agreements

function are suboptimal by their definition, in our opinion.

Mr. MARCHANT. Can you tell me, are the agencies self-funded?

Do the companies that you inspect the food of pay the fees that

fund the agencies?

Mr. ROBINSON. I will let the administration witnesses speak for

their own agencies, but in general, this is about—at least in the

last year we had complete data, about $1.7 billion in appropriated

funds were applied here. NIMS essentially operates their enterprise on a fee-for-service basis, so they don’t receive a great deal

of appropriated funds to conduct their activities. They are done on

a fee-for-service basis.

The rest of the agencies operate with appropriated funds, with

the exception of FSIS line inspectors; when they go into overtime

mode, the companies pay for the overtime. But the regular tours

of duty are paid for out of appropriated funds.

Mr. MARCHANT. Thank you.

Mr. PORTER. Actually, I have a question for Dr. Pierson and Dr.

Brackett regarding the cheese pizzas. You think it makes the most

economically and efficient sense to require the USDA to inspect

pepperoni pizzas and require the FDA to inspect cheese pizzas?

Actually, both of you.

Mr. PIERSON. Certainly. This example has been used time and

time again as something where there appear to be very serious,

very large problems, discrepancies, etc.

Let me point out, like Dr. Brackett pointed out, first of all, that

these dual-jurisdiction establishments amount to a very, very low

percentage of volume and numbers of establishments that we are

dealing with. The vast bulk of our inspection system deals strictly

with meat, poultry and egg products, not dual-jurisdiction establishments.

Our inspectors are required to be present daily by statute. They

are in these operations daily, where you would find meat and poultry-topped products. We do have—through our MOU, we feel the

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flexibility that if FSIS sees or perceives something that is out of

line, we can contact our colleagues at FDA and inform them of a

situation that is out of line or not appropriate or meeting what we

feel would be, potentially, regulatory requirements.

Certainly this type of thing should be given consideration. For

example, the meat and poultry that goes on the pizzas has already

been federally inspected and passed, and we feel that these sorts

of products are, to us, low-risk products.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you.

Mr. BRACKETT. Mr. Chairman, as Dr. Pierson said, many of these

sorts of confusing products are very small in comparison to the rest

of the food that we regulate, but nevertheless, they have evolved

over the years for numerous reasons, and sometimes they may confuse some people.

We have discussed with our partners at FSIS, and will continue

to discuss, ways that we can clarify the jurisdiction; and at some

point in the future we would hope that we could also provide this

to the public for input also to see if we can clarify better.

Mr. PORTER. It seems to me this has been a problem for a decade

or more.

I guess, to followup on your answer, or partial answer, to my

question, I have outlined five or six, maybe seven different areas

of duplication. Why haven’t you done something about that? Why

haven’t you taken the initiative to correct and create a more efficient program and more economical program for the American people? Is it something not important, so you allow it to continue, or

am I missing something here?

Mr. PIERSON. First of all, we are very concerned about the resources and how we effectively apply those resources. We feel that

we do a pretty good job of that in, again, effectively applying one

to better provide protection, public health protection.

There are management issues that we do in fact continually address. There are just a number of issues that we do constantly sort

out of how we can better coordinate, cooperate in terms of our

effectivenesses and efficiencies.

I disagree with GAO’s previous reports that there is this matrix

that has been evolving. And certainly we do not have the instantaneous solution, but we are giving these, I think, due consideration.

Mr. BRACKETT. Well, Mr. Chairman, the first thing I would like

to point out is, again, there are no foods that are inspected

duplicatively by both FSIS and USDA. We inspect those ingredients or those foods for which we have statutory authority, and that

is the reason that is set up that way.

But, nevertheless, there are a number of foods, such as those

that you have mentioned, where the jurisdiction may not be as

clear to the outside. But, nevertheless, one or the other of us is inspecting those, is making sure that they are safe; and of course, in

our minds, what is of foremost importance is public health.

Mr. PORTER. I appreciate that everyone in this room believes everything is for the health of the American people. I think that it

is important to state it again, and I appreciate hearing it. But,

again, for over a decade we have been seeing some distinctions between the two different agencies, but yet you have not taken steps

to correct some of these areas.

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With the state of the budget—and I would expect, I think I heard

it today, some of you need additional funds for operations; and if

I haven’t heard it today, I hear it most every day from different

Federal agencies, that they are underfunded.

Yet, FDA does closed-face meat sandwiches, USDA does openface meat sandwiches. FDA does the frozen pizza, and USDA does

the pepperoni. FDA does hot dogs on a roll and the USDA does hot

dogs on a pastry dough. FDA does beef soup and USDA does chicken soup. FDA does chicken broth, but USDA does beef broth.

It is very difficult for me to tell my constituents that we are running these agencies in an efficient manner.

I appreciate you have done things this way and—for whatever

reason, but the reason we are here today is you haven’t taken steps

to correct some of these problems.

I guess, Dr. Brackett, I want to ask you one more question and

then move on. Do you think there is room for improvement in the

organizational structure?

Mr. BRACKETT. Well, in each agency, I think we continually look

at the organizational structure to find out the best and most efficient way to use our resources that we have. So I think there is

always room for improvement, and I think we are always looking

for ways to improve what we do.

Mr. PORTER. What would you suggest for organizational reforms

as we move into the future? You are the expert. We are Members

of Congress and, of course, trying to take all the information we

can and come up with some possible solutions.

What would you suggest needs to be done to help improve the

efficiency and performance of your agency?

Mr. BRACKETT. Well, I think the main thing is that the two agencies, regardless of the structure, are built upon what we consider

to be very strong food safety systems. That is the reason for our

being, and anything that would change the structure would have

to be looked at to see if it affected that. That would include such

things as maybe a Farm to Table approach. The organization has

to address that. It has to address the proper amount of outreach

to the consumers, as well as to the regulated industry and the

amount of research needed to back up science-based decisions,

which are based on risk assessments.

It would also include the proper funding, surveillance and reporting back, so that we knew that what we were doing is efficient.

Any kind of organizational change would have to be looked at with

that in mind, and also so that we would still be in harmony with

our legislative directives.

Mr. PORTER. Dr. Pierson.

Mr. PIERSON. Yes, we can, and we have created organizational

charts of new vintages and looked at them and said, oh, we will

do better under this structure and that structure. I know when I

first came in the under secretary’s office, one of the first thing we

did was to do some reorganization at FSIS.

One can do that. But I think the fundamental, important concept

here is, regardless of whether or not you are in FSIS, FDA, EPA

or combinations thereof, you have to have cooperation and communication and coordination, and, to me, that is the key to moving forward.

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One of the examples that I think is very appropriate is the cooperation, coordination and communication that occurred in addressing the BSE situation here in the United States. Through cooperative efforts of a number of agencies, we were able to provide

consumers with immediate assurance of the safety of our beef supply and to coordinate very, very tireless efforts to reopen markets.

We are very hopeful that is going to happen. But it required a tremendous amount of coordination between agencies within USDA,

with FDA and many others—the State Department, USTR, etc.

So it is that coordination, I think, that is just so key and so essential. If we act as stovepipes regardless of our structure, we are

not going to get ahead. We have to work together.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Chairman, may I weigh in?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, but I want to comment first.

I appreciate your comments, but unfortunately, I don’t think you

answered the question. I would agree that we need more cooperation, and there is no question we need more coordination. But what

specific organizational reforms do you think are needed? Again,

yes, we need more coordination and more cooperation.

But beyond those good political terms, what do you suggest specifically be done, Doctor?

Mr. PIERSON. Well, I think at this point for me to sit here and

provide some type of structure without working with my colleagues

and others at USDA and the like, you know, without having that

coordinated effort to give you a distinct answer in terms of representing USDA, I think that would be inappropriate for me.

Mr. PORTER. Isn’t that your job? I am sorry, isn’t this your responsibility?

Mr. PIERSON. Yes. Well, I am Acting Under Secretary for Food

Safety in USDA, correct.

Mr. PORTER. So your answer today is cooperation and coordination?

Mr. PIERSON. I think that is done very effectively. If we talk

about any type of restructuring, I think it has to be through a collaborative effort to come out with a plan; and for me, right now,

to lay out a plan, I think I would have a lot of people that I would

be having to have further discussions with. I think it is quite appropriate for me to work with others in moving forward, if we were

to discuss such things.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. Robinson.

Mr. ROBINSON. I was going to weigh in relative to the BSE issue.

We have done work on BSE, and I think it speaks to this exact

point you are raising here, that we pointed out situations in our

work where FDA, who had identified potentially contaminated feed

and didn’t inform USDA of those events and potentially—fortunately, it didn’t turn out—potentially put the system at risk. FDA’s

own acting counsel, I think, has referred to the structure between

FDA and USDA as hampering Federal abilities to deal with this

issue.

I also want to come back to your opening statement that the

problems here are unfortunately rooted in statute. The various systems are directed largely by statute, and the statutes direct that

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cass, carcass by carcass by carcass. Those resources can’t be shifted

to other higher priority areas.

We now know that the food safety threats are seafood first, fruits

and vegetables second, eggs third, and meat and poultry fourth.

The resources by statute are heavily directed toward the fourth priority and not priorities one through three. That is not something

that the agencies can do a heck of a lot about. They are directed

by statutes to do certain things the way they are doing them now.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Robinson, I partially agree, but partially disagree. Yes, it is directed by statute, but I would hope that the

agencies wouldn’t expect all the statutes to come out of this body.

I would expect that in their role and responsibilities, they would

bring forward ideas and suggestions, because if they don’t, then we

are going to pass legislation that may well be another Band-Aid.

I guess I agree with you, but we should take it a step further.

These are the experts, and we would hope in the future that they

would bring forward their own, and possibly they have before my

tenure. But I think your point is well taken.

Mr. ROBINSON. We recommended they do just that. Obviously, I

think you are hearing today there is no likelihood of that occurring

any time soon.

Mr. PORTER. I won’t repeat that, but I will concur. I think that

is part of the problem.

What I would like to do is say thank you to the panel for being

here, for your testimony. There may well be followup questions.

I also ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative

days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing

record, and that any answers provided by the witnesses also be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents and

the materials referred to by the Members and witnesses may be included in the hearing record and that all Members be permitted to

revise and extend their remarks. Without objection, so ordered.

Again, I want to say, thank you all. I appreciate that we have

one of the best systems in the world. We are here today just trying

to make it a little bit better.

Thank you all for being here, and the meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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