J-S76035-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PATRICK DUGAN

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 768 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 24, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-26-CR-0000817-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 24, 2018

Patrick Dugan (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after the trial court convicted him of two counts of attempted 

homicide,1 16 counts each of aggravated assault and recklessly endangering 

another person (REAP),2 and one count of discharging a firearm into an 

occupied structure.

3

 Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.4 

Upon review, we affirm.

At approximately 5:00 p.m. on January 26, 2016, Roy Friend called Zach 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2501(a).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2705.

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2707.1(a).

4 The Commonwealth has not filed a brief.
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Helisek to buy approximately $1,000 worth of marijuana. N.T. Trial, 2/1/18, 

at 115-116 (testimony of Helisek). Helisek did not have the marijuana, but 

called Appellant, who did. Id. at 116-117. Helisek drove his car, a blue fourdoor sedan, picked up Christian Cicconi, and together they picked up Appellant 

from his house in Uniontown. Id. at 118-119. Helisek acknowledged at trial 

that earlier that day, he drank alcohol and smoked marijuana. Id. at 141. 

The trial court summarized:

Mr. Helisek drove Mr. Cicconi and [Appellant] to an alley . . . in 

Smock, Pennsylvania to meet Mr. Friend for the transaction. Mr. 

Helisek got out of the car with the [marijuana] and Mr. Friend 

asked if he could smell it. Mr. Friend then took the [marijuana] 

without paying, got in his car, and sped away.

Enraged, the other three men wanted to either retrieve the 

[marijuana] or receive proper payment. Mr. Helisek knew where 

Mr. Friend lived and drove to the house. [At approximately 8:00 

p.m., a]s Mr. Helisek was driving by slowly, [Appellant] began 

shooting from out the back seat window [toward Friend’s house]. 

Mr. Helisek sped away.

Police were summoned to the residence and began an 

investigation of the crime scene.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/18, at 2.

Meanwhile, 16 people, including 7 children, were present at Friend’s 

house for Friend’s 26th birthday party. Two women, Samantha Hall and Abigail 

Hoffman, were on the porch.

At that time, Ms. Hall saw a four-door sedan driving slowly down 

the street[.] She saw the rear window on the driver’s side was 

down. The next thing she noticed was muzzle fire—red flames—

coming from the rear window on the driver’s side.

As gunshots started ringing out, Ms. Hall fell to the ground. 
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Ms. Hoffman stood motionless, so Ms. Hall grabbed her and pulled 

her to the ground as well. They huddled there until the gunshots 

ended.

Ms. Hall also testified [at trial] that the car was about 30 yards 

away, and that the porchlight was on. . . . Three rounds of bullets 

hit the porch. They were three-to-four inches above where Ms. 

Hall and Ms. Hoffman were standing. Ms. Hall testified that she if 

she hadn’t pulled Ms. Hoffman down, Ms. Hoffman would have 

been killed, as the rounds that entered the porch were right at the 

chest and head level of where they had been standing.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/18, at 9-10, citing N.T., 2/1/18, at 39-43. 

Additionally, Friend’s mother, who was inside the house, “testified that lights 

were on in the house, that people were going in and out,” the gunshots 

shattered the windows, and one bullet “struck the kitchen freezer, which 

partygoers had been using just moments before the shooting began.” Id. at 

11, citing N.T., 2/1/18, at 22. Friend’s mother “had to be pulled down by 

another son when the shooting started.” Id., citing N.T., 2/1/18, at 19. 

After the shooting, Helisek exchanged telephone calls with someone —

Helisek could not recall who — who stated that they would return the 

marijuana if Helisek returned. N.T., 2/1/18, at 127.

The three men returned later that night to [Friend’s] house—this 

time in [Appellant’s] car—with the hopes of retrieving the 

[marijuana]. Upon arrival near the residence, the three got out 

of the car but were shot at by a rifle. They quickly got back in 

[Appellant’s] car and sped away. Eventually, [Appellant] got his 

vehicle stuck in a snow bank, and was later found by police and 

arrested that night.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/18, at 2. At the time of his arrest, Appellant had 

gunshot residue on his hands. Id. at 8, citing N.T., 4/1/18, at 337. The police 
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recovered two handguns, including a Glock 23, clips, and a box of shells in the 

area where Appellant’s car had stopped. Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/18, at 8, 

citing N.T., 4/1/18, at 235-238. An “eTrace weapons search” revealed that 

Appellant had purchased the Glock 23 gun and that casings recovered from 

the scene were fired from the Glock 23. Id., citing N.T., 4/1/18, at 236, 329.

Appellant was charged with 16 counts each of attempted homicide, 

aggravated assault, and REAP, and one count of discharging a firearm into an 

occupied structure. The case proceeded to a two-day bench trial on April 2, 

2018. Helisek testified that when he drove to Friend’s house, Appellant sat 

behind him, and Cicconi was in the front passenger seat. N.T., 2/1/18, at 

122-123. They planned to go inside the house, but as Helisek passed the 

front of Friend’s house, Helisek heard gunshots fired from behind him, in the 

direction of the house. Id. at 123-124. Helisek also testified that he entered 

into a plea deal with regard to his own charges. Id. at 132. Helisek pled 

guilty to REAP and received a sentence of two years of probation, and in 

exchange, agreed to testify at Appellant’s trial. Id. at 132. Appellant did not 

testify or present any evidence.

The trial court found Appellant guilty of two counts of attempted 

homicide with respect to Hall and Hoffman; 16 counts of aggravated assault 

and REAP, for all 16 occupants at Friend’s house; and one count of discharging

a firearm into an occupied structure. On April 24, 2018, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 5 to 10 years in prison, comprised of: 
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(1) two concurrent terms of 5 to 10 years for the two attempted homicide 

convictions; and (2) a concurrent term of 3 to 6 years for discharging a 

firearm. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.

On May 22, 2018, Appellant’s privately-retained counsel filed a motion 

to withdraw from representation, along with a notice of appeal, the latter of 

which was signed by Appellant only. On May 25th, the trial court granted 

counsel’s motion to withdraw, appointed the Fayette County Public Defender’s 

Office to represent Appellant, and directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement. Thereafter, Appellant’s current counsel filed a statement, 

raising a single issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.

On July 12, 2018, this Court issued a per curiam order, noting that 

Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed pro se and directing the trial court to 

conduct a Grazier hearing to determine whether Appellant intended to 

proceed pro se. See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). 

The trial court responded that it had allowed Appellant’s trial counsel to 

withdraw and had appointed the public defender to represent Appellant. On 

July 27th, this Court entered an order noting that Appellant had counsel. As 

noted above, the trial court filed an opinion on July 31, 2018.

On appeal, Appellant presents one issue for our review:

WAS THE EVIDENCE LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY INSUFFICIENT TO 

SHOW THAT [APPELLANT] COMMITTED THE CRIMES?

Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant summarily argues:

The case came down to one witness, Zach Helisek. An individual 
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who testified based on his own self-preservation. He would say 

anything to stay out of jail. He admitted to smoking marijuana 

and [consuming] a large quantity of alcohol before going to make 

a drug deal. He admitted he was not forthcoming to the police. 

It was not until the Commonwealth drop[ped] all charges but one 

[that] he testif[ied] as he did.

Id. at 13-14.

At the outset, we consider Appellant’s court-ordered Rule 1925(b) 

statement, which reads, in entirety: “Was the evidence insufficient to find the

Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the criminal charges?” 

Appellant’s Concise Issue, 6/5/18. The trial court has suggested that this 

statement so lacked any specificity that Appellant has waived his issue on 

appeal. Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/18, at 3-5. We agree. The trial court 

correctly noted that a Rule 1925 statement must concisely identify each ruling 

or error with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the trial court, 

and that this Court has found waiver where a Rule 1925(b) statement read:

“The evidence presented by the Commonwealth was insufficient to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] was guilty of Robbery.” See Trial 

Court Opinion, 7/31/18, at 3, citing Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4); Commonwealth 

v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011). As noted above, Appellant 

was convicted of two counts of attempted homicide, sixteen counts each of 

aggravated assault and REAP, and one count of discharging a firearm, all of 

which are comprised of discrete elements. The Rule 1925(b) statement in 

Hansley only specified the offense of robbery, and not any of its elements;

here, Appellant has not even identified his four convictions. Accordingly, and 
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consistent with the applicable legal authority, we conclude that Appellant’s 

issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4); Hansley, 24 A.3d at 415.

Moreover, even if Appellant had presented an adequate Rule 1925(b) 

statement, we would conclude that his issue was waived for a similarly 

deficient brief. This Court has stated:

The Rules of Appellate Procedure require that appellants 

adequately develop each issue raised with discussion of pertinent 

facts and pertinent authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119. It is not this 

Court’s responsibility to comb through the record seeking the 

factual underpinnings of an appellant’s claim. Further, this Court 

will not become counsel for an appellant and develop arguments 

on an appellant’s behalf. It [is an appellant’s] responsibility to 

provide an adequately developed argument by identifying the 

factual bases of his claim and providing citation to and discussion 

of relevant authority in relation to those facts. [If he] has failed 

to do so, [his] issue waived.

. . . In order to develop a claim challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence properly, an appellant must specifically discuss the 

elements of the crime and identify those which he alleges the 

Commonwealth failed to prove. [If he] has failed to do so . . . he 

has waived this claim for lack of development.

Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations omitted). A claim that the Commonwealth’s evidence was incredible 

goes to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. Id.

Despite the trial court’s admonishment regarding the lack of specificity 

in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant has presented this Court with a brief

which fails to identify his four convictions and their statutory elements. The 

sole allusion to the convictions appears in the statement of the case, where 

Appellant mistakenly recounts that he “was charged with Involuntary [sic] 
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Criminal Attempt to Commit Homici[de], et al.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. 

Appellant’s brief makes no mention of aggravated assault, REAP, or 

discharging a firearm into an occupied structure, fails to set forth the statutory 

elements of his crimes, and does not identify which particular elements were 

allegedly unproven. Further, Appellant does not include, contrary to the 

requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4), “[a] closely condensed chronological 

statement . . . of all the facts which are necessary to be known in order to 

determine the points in controversy[.]” See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4). Thus, we 

would further conclude that Appellant has waived his issue “for lack of 

development.” Samuel, 102 A.3d at 1005.

In any event, our review reveals that no relief would be due. Appellant 

generally asserts that Helisek “testified based on his own self-preservation” 

and would have said “anything to stay out of jail.” See Appellant’s Brief at

13. He also points out, without further discussion, that Helisek drank alcohol 

and smoked marijuana on the day of the shootings. This challenge to the 

veracity of Helisek’s testimony goes to the weight of the Commonwealth’s 

evidence, not its sufficiency. See Samuel, 102 A.3d at 1005. We would find 

this claim waived for Appellant’s failure to raise it before the trial court. See 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3) (claim that the verdict was against the weight of 

the evidence shall be raised before or after sentencing).

Also, even if a weight claim were properly before us, we note that

Helisek acknowledged at trial that he had pled guilty to REAP and received a 
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sentence of 2 years of probation in exchange for his testimony. See N.T., 

2/1/18, at 132. The trial court, who was the finder of fact, opined that it 

accepted Helisek’s testimony identifying Appellant as the person who sat 

behind him in the car and fired a gun toward Friend’s house. Trial Court 

Opinion, 7/31/18, at 7. The court was free to believe Helisek’s testimony and 

weigh it accordingly. See Hansley, 24 A.3d at 416 (“[T]he [trier] of fact 

while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence 

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.”). The court 

reasoned that the evidence at trial established that Appellant committed 

attempted homicide, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2501(a), where the requisite 

specific intent to kill could be inferred from Appellant’s use of a deadly weapon 

upon a vital part of the bodies of Hall and Hoffman, who were the two women 

on the porch. Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/18, at 6, 9-10, citing Commonwealth 

v. Geathers, 847 A.2d 730, 734 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“For a defendant to be 

found guilty of attempted murder, the Commonwealth must establish specific 

intent to kill.”); Commonwealth v. Hobson, 604 A.2d 717 (Pa. Super. 1992) 

(“A jury may properly infer an intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon 

on a vital part of the victim’s body.”). The court further reasoned that the 

Commonwealth’s evidence that Appellant fired a gun into a home with 16 

people inside established discharge of a firearm into an occupied structure, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2707.1(a) (knowingly, intentionally or recklessly discharging a 

firearm from any location into an occupied structure) and 16 counts each of 
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aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) (attempting to cause serious 

bodily injury to another), and REAP, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705 (recklessly engaging

in conduct which places another person in danger of death or serious bodily 

injury).

For these reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/24/2018