Testimony 

Before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, October 20, 2005 RESERVE FORCES 

Army National Guard's 

Role, Organization, and 

Equipment Need to be 

Reexamined 

Statement of David M. Walker 

Comptroller General of the United States 

GAO-06-170T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-170T. 

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Highlights of GAO-06-170T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives 

October 20, 2005

RESERVE FORCES

Army National Guard's Role, 

Organization, and Equipment Need to Be 

Reexamined 

The heavy reliance on National Guard forces for overseas and homeland 

missions since September 2001 has resulted in readiness problems which 

suggest that the current business model for the Army National Guard is not 

sustainable over time. Therefore, the business model should be reexamined 

in light of the current and expected national security environment, homeland 

security needs, and fiscal challenges the nation faces in the 21st century. 

Under post-Cold War planning assumptions, the Army National Guard was 

organized as a strategic reserve to be used primarily in the later stages of a 

conflict after receiving additional personnel, equipment and training. 

Therefore, in peacetime Army National Guard units did not have all the 

equipment and personnel they would need to perform their wartime 

missions. However, over 70,000 Guard personnel are now deployed for 

federal missions, with thousands more activated to respond to recent natural 

disasters. To provide ready forces, the Guard transferred large numbers of 

personnel and equipment among units, thereby exacerbating existing 

personnel and equipment shortages of non-deployed units. As a result, the 

preparedness of non-deployed units for future missions is declining. 

The need to reexamine the business model for the Army National Guard is 

illustrated by growing equipment shortages. As of July 2005, the Army 

National Guard had transferred over 101,000 equipment items to units 

deploying overseas, exhausting its inventory of some critical items, such as 

radios and generators, in non-deployed units. Nondeployed Guard units now 

face significant equipment shortfalls because: (1) prior to 2001, most Army 

National Guard units were equipped with 65 to 79 percent of their required 

war-time items and (2) Guard units returning from overseas operations have 

left equipment, such as radios and trucks for follow-on forces. The Army 

National Guard estimates that its units left over 64,000 items valued at over 

$1.2 billion overseas. However, the Army cannot account for over half of 

these items and does not have a plan to replace them, as DOD policy 

requires. Nondeployed Guard units now have only about one-third of the 

equipment they need for their overseas missions, which hampers their ability 

to prepare for future missions and conduct domestic operations. Without a 

plan and funding strategy that addresses the Guard’s equipment needs for all 

its missions, DOD and Congress do not have assurance that the Army has an 

affordable plan to improve the Guard’s equipment readiness. 

DOD is taking some steps to adapt to the new security environment and 

balance the Army National Guard’s overseas and homeland missions. For 

example, the Army has embarked on reorganization to a modular, rotational 

force. Also, DOD issued a strategy for homeland defense and civil support in 

June 2005. However, until DOD develops an equipping plan and funding 

strategy to implement its initiatives, Congress and DOD will not have 

assurance that these changes will create a new business model that can 

sustain the Army National Guard affordably and effectively for the full range 

of its future missions. 

Since September 2001, the National 

Guard has experienced the largest 

activation of its members since 

World War II. Currently, over 30 

percent of the Army forces now in 

Iraq are Army National Guard 

members, and Guard forces have 

also carried out various homeland 

security and large-scale disaster 

response roles. However, 

continued heavy use of the Guard 

forces has raised concerns about 

whether it can successfully 

perform and sustain both missions 

over time. In the short term, the 

National Guard is seeking 

additional funding for emergency 

equipment. GAO was asked to 

comment on (1) the changing role 

of the Army National Guard, (2) 

whether the Army National Guard 

has the equipment it needs to 

sustain federal and state missions, 

and (3) the extent to which DOD 

has strategies and plans to improve 

the Army National Guard’s 

business model for the future. 

What GAO Recommends

For this statement, GAO drew on 

previous work, primarily on a 

report titled: Reserve Forces: 

Plans Needed to Improve Army 

Guard Equipment Readiness and 

Better Integrate Guard into Army 

Transformation Initiatives (GAO06-111). In this report, GAO makes 

recommendations intended to 

improve the structure and 

readiness of the Army National 

Guard for overseas and homeland 

operations. DOD agreed with the 

recommendations. 
Page 1 GAO-06-170T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the critical role of the National 

Guard in conducting missions at home and overseas as well as equipment 

issues affecting the Army National Guard. Recent and ongoing military 

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and new homeland missions have led to 

higher demands on the reserve component, particularly the Army National 

Guard. As we described in our previous report and testimony on the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) use of the National Guard, the launch of 

the Global War on Terrorism has resulted in the largest activation of 

National Guard forces for overseas missions since World War II. In 

addition, Guard members have been called upon to perform new 

homeland security missions as well as state missions ranging from fighting 

forest fires to providing hurricane relief. As of July 2005, more than 30 

percent of the Army forces deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom are 

National Guard members and as of September 2005 over 50,000 National 

Guard personnel from over 48 states, 2 U.S. territories and the District of 

Columbia supported the hurricane disaster response in the Gulf Coast. 

Before I address the primary subject of this hearing, I would like to bring 

an important matter to the attention of this committee relating to the 

Guard and Reserves. This past Saturday evening, I had the privilege and 

pleasure to attend the Annual Freedom Awards Banquet sponsored by the 

National Committee of Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve here 

in Washington. This year’s banquet honored 15 employers, including 

Enterprise Rent-a-Car and Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. who 

demonstrated their above and beyond commitment to their employees 

who are members of the Guard or Reserves. During the evening it became 

clear to me that the U.S. Government is not leading by example or 

practicing what it preaches in connection with employer support for the 

Guard and Reserves. GAO would like to be able to do what many of the 

awardees have already done but we are limited in doing so under current 

law. Namely, we believe federal agencies should be able to make up any 

salary differential that activated Guard and Reserve members might 

otherwise lose out of our annual appropriation. We would also like to be 

able to be sure that applicable employees and their family members 

continue to receive their employer provided benefits. We and other federal 

employers need your help to make this a reality. 

The Army National Guard’s heavy involvement in recent operations and 

growing equipment problems are a reflection of the significant changes in 

the security environment—changes that are occurring at a time when our 

nation is threatened by growing fiscal imbalances stemming, in large part, 
Page 2 GAO-06-170T 

from an aging population and rising health care costs. If left unchecked, 

these fiscal imbalances will ultimately impede economic growth, which 

could impact our ability to address key national and homeland security 

needs. To assist the Congress in reviewing and reconsidering federal 

programs in light of changing security threats and fiscal challenges, we 

have identified a number of fundamental questions that we believe 

policymakers will need to address in the coming years to ensure that 

federal programs and organizations are focused on the nation’s highest 

priority challenges and are affordable in light of fiscal projections. To 

facilitate a process of reexamining the base of federal government, we 

issued a report in February 2005 that identifies a number of 21st century 

challenges and includes 12 reexamination areas.1

 One of these areas is the 

need to reassess defense programs and practices that stem from the Cold 

War era. Within defense, a specific issue we believe bears review is the 

need to reexamine the current business model for the reserve component. 

The current business model is unsustainable, especially in light of recent 

changes in how the DOD uses its reserve units. In essence, we believe that 

policymakers need to focus on helping to assure that DOD has an 

appropriate model for the National Guard that adequately balances the 

demand for forces with appropriate human capital policies, readiness 

standards, and equipping policies for all of the National Guard’s missions. 

My statement today focuses on (1) challenges facing the Army National 

Guard as a result of its changing role and high pace of operations, (2) 

whether the Army National Guard has the equipment needed to maintain 

readiness for future missions, and (3) the extent to which DOD is 

transforming the Army National Guard to enhance its equipment posture 

and preparedness for the future. In conjunction with this testimony, we 

have also prepared a report2

 at the committee’s request, on Army National 

Guard equipment issues and the Army’s plans to convert the Army 

National Guard to a modular force that equips units to support continuous 

overseas operations. 

 1

 GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government, 

GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb., 2005). 

2

 GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment 

Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Transformation Initiatives, 

GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2005). 
Page 3 GAO-06-170T 

To address these objectives, we drew from previous reports on the 

National Guard’s use for overseas and homeland security missions3

 and 

collected and analyzed data to assess the status of Army National Guard 

equipment. To determine the status of equipment, we analyzed 

information on the types and quantities of Army National Guard 

equipment that have been used in overseas operations; determined the 

equipment status of nondeployed units; assessed the extent to which Army 

National Guard equipment has been retained overseas to support ongoing 

operations; and identified some of the equipment issues associated with 

responding to homeland security missions and natural disasters, such as 

Hurricane Katrina. To assess DOD’s transformation plans, we evaluated 

the Army’s plans to convert Guard units to modular brigades and develop 

a rotational deployment model to equip units to support continuous 

overseas operations. We interviewed officials in the DOD, the Department 

of the Army, the National Guard Bureau, and the Army National Guard and 

supplemented this information with visits to Army commands and two 

units—the 30th Brigade Combat Team in North Carolina, which deployed 

in February 2004, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, which 

deployed in May 2005. We selected these units because they enabled us to 

evaluate how the process used to prepare units has changed with 

subsequent rotations to Operation Iraqi Freedom. We also discussed the 

National Guard’s response to Hurricane Katrina with senior leaders of the 

National Guard and visited National Guard officials in Louisiana and 

Mississippi to gain their perspectives. We conducted our review of the 

National Guard’s equipment status from December 2004 to October 2005 

and determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our 

objectives. 

The significant use of Army National Guard forces for overseas and 

homeland missions since September 11, 2001 has resulted in declining 

readiness, weakening the Army National Guard’s preparedness for future 

missions and indicating that DOD’s business model for the Army National 

Guard is unsustainable and needs to be reassessed. The current heavy 

reliance on the Army National Guard for overseas operations represents a 

fundamental change from the Guard’s planned role as a strategic reserve 

force whose principal role was to deploy in the later stages of a major 

 3

GAO, Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and 

Homeland Missions, GAO-04-670T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2204.) and Reserve Forces: 

Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic 

Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004). 

Summary 
Page 4 GAO-06-170T 

conflict if needed. Under this model, which still governs how resources are 

provided to the Guard, the majority of Army National Guard combat forces 

are only provided with 65 to 74 percent of the people and 65 to79 percent 

of the equipment needed to conduct their assigned wartime missions. 

Units are generally expected to receive additional personnel, training, and 

equipment during a mobilization period before deploying to support 

military operations. However, for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

combatant commanders have required the Army National Guard to 

provide large numbers fully manned and equipped units to conduct 

stability operations on an ongoing basis. To meet these demands, the Army 

National Guard has transferred thousands of personnel and equipment 

from nondeployed units to support deploying units. As a result, the 

preparedness of nondeployed units for future missions is declining, and 

DOD’s strategy of transferring large numbers of equipment and personnel 

among units is showing signs of increased stress. The declining readiness 

of nondeployed units could also make it more difficult for the Guard to 

respond to homeland security and disaster response missions. 

Importantly, DOD has not developed a system for measuring the Guard’s 

preparedness for such missions. 

Worsening equipment shortfalls affecting the Army National Guard 

illustrate the need for DOD to reexamine its strategy and plans for the 

Army National Guard. As we noted in our report, National Guard Bureau 

officials estimate that the Guard’s nondeployed units had only about 34 

percent of their essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005, after 

subtracting equipment that has been left overseas, substitute items that 

may be incompatible with the active component’s equipment, or items that 

are undergoing maintenance after being overseas. As of July 2005, the 

National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment 

from nondeploying units to fully equip deploying units. This practice has 

depleted the Army National Guard’s inventories of more than 220 critical 

items, such as armored humvees, and reduced the Guard’s remaining 

inventory of other mission-essential items. In addition to planned 

equipment shortfalls, another key reason why the equipment condition of 

nondeployed units has worsened in recent months is that the Army has 

required units returning from deployment to leave significant quantities of 

equipment overseas for use by follow-on forces. As of June 2005, Army 

National Guard units had left more than 64,000 pieces of equipment, 

valued at more than $1.2 billion, overseas to support continuing 

operations. Moreover, the Army cannot account for over half the 

equipment Army National Guard units have left overseas and has not 

developed replacement plans for the equipment as, DOD policy requires. 

Further, extensive use of the Guard’s equipment overseas has significantly 
Page 5 GAO-06-170T 

reduced the amount of equipment available to state governors for 

domestic needs. National Guard officials believe that the National Guard’s 

response to Hurricane Katrina was more complicated because significant 

quantities of critical equipment, such as satellite communications 

equipment, radios, trucks, helicopters, and night vision goggles, were 

deployed to Iraq. In the absence of a plan and funding strategy that 

addresses the Guard’s equipment needs for all its missions, DOD and the 

Congress currently do not have assurance that the Army National Guard 

will be well prepared for future missions at home or abroad, particularly 

those that arise on short notice. 

DOD is undertaking some initiatives to improve the Guard’s equipment 

readiness and to balance its multiple roles in overseas and domestic 

operations. However, it is not clear whether these initiatives will be 

effective in enhancing the Army National Guard’s equipment posture 

because DOD has not yet developed detailed plans and included funding 

for all the initiatives in its budget. The Army has begun reorganizing Army 

National Guard units into modular brigades and is planning to implement a 

rotational deployment model in which it expects Guard units would 

deploy overseas no more than about once every 6 years. However, the 

Army has not yet worked out many details of these initiatives, such as 

what readiness standards units will be required to maintain after returning 

from deployments, what specific types of equipment Guard modular 

brigades will receive and how their equipping levels will differ from the 

active component, and how quickly Guard units will be provided new 

equipment needed for modular formations after converting to the new 

modular structure. In addition, DOD has not yet fully assessed the Guard’s 

role and requirements for homeland defense and civil support missions. In 

June 2005, DOD published a strategy for homeland defense and civil 

support missions that recognizes the Army National Guard’s federal and 

state roles and sets out the department’s overall approach to securing the 

nation from attack. However, the department has not determined how it 

will implement the strategy, nor has it clarified the responsibilities of the 

National Guard or established specific personnel and equipment 

requirements for these missions, as we recommended in our 2004 report. 

Until these initiatives are more fully developed and key implementation 

decisions are made, the Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh 

the affordability and effectiveness of DOD’s strategy for positioning the 

Army National Guard to remain a relevant and sufficiently equipped force 

for the future. 

In the report we are publishing with this testimony, we are recommending 

that DOD develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy that 
Page 6 GAO-06-170T 

addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard and a plan for 

the effective integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational 

force model and modular force initiatives. DOD agreed with our 

recommendations and said that it is taking actions to posture Army 

National Guard forces for prolonged operations by building a rotational 

force and developing resource plans for all Army units. It further noted 

that the Army is taking steps to implement stricter accountability over 

Guard equipment currently left in theater and is working to develop 

replacement plans for these items. 

As we have previously testified,4

 legislative proposals involving substantial 

long-term costs and commitments should be considered in the context of 

the serious fiscal challenges facing this country. The federal government’s 

liabilities and commitments have grown from $20.4 trillion to $43.3 trillion 

from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2004. This amount continues to 

increase due to continuing deficits, known demographic trends, and 

compounding interest costs. Furthermore, our long-range budget 

simulations show that this nation faces a large and growing structural 

deficit. Given the size of our projected deficit, we will not be able to 

eliminate the deficit through economic growth alone. The long-term fiscal 

pressures created by the impending retirement of the baby boom 

generation, rising health care costs, and increased homeland security and 

defense commitments intensify the need to weigh existing federal 

budgetary resources against emerging new priorities. In our 21st Century 

Challenges report,5

 we noted that it is time for a baseline review of all 

major federal programs and policies, including the military’s reserve 

components. 6

 We have previously reported on a number of military force 

management issues in the active and reserve components, including roles 

 4

 See GAO, Long-Term Fiscal Issues: The Need for Social Security Reform, GAO-05-318T

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2005); Budget Process: Long-term Focus Is Critical, 

GAO-04-585T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004); Long-term Budget Issues: Moving from 

Balancing the Budget to Balancing Fiscal Risk, GAO-01-385T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 

2001). 

5

 See GAO-05-325SP. 

6

 The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army National Guard of the 

United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air 

National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. 

The Selected Reserve consists of military members assigned to organized reserve units and 

reservists who participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods each year and 

serve on active duty for training of not less than 14 days during each year.

Background 
Page 7 GAO-06-170T 

and missions of the Army and Air National Guard 7and the Army Reserve8

and the process for assessing the numbers of active duty military forces.9

We have also reported on a number of military personnel issues, including 

military compensation, health care, and recruiting and retention. In each 

of these areas, questions have arisen as to whether DOD has the right 

strategies to cost effectively sustain the total force in the future. In the 

case of the National Guard, how this is accomplished is of particular 

importance in light of its dual missions of supporting overseas operations 

as well as its considerable responsibilities in its state and homeland 

security roles. 

The National Guard of the United States consists of two branches: the 

Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. The National Guard 

Bureau is the federal entity responsible for the administration of both the 

Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. The Army National 

Guard, which is authorized 350,000 soldiers, makes up more than one-half 

of the Army’s ground combat forces and one-third of its support forces 

(e.g., military police and transportation units). Army National Guard units 

are located at more than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50 states and 4 

U.S. territories. Traditionally, the majority of Guard members are 

employed on a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend per month and 

2 weeks per year. The Guard also employs some full-time personnel who 

assist unit commanders in administrative, training, and maintenance tasks. 

In the past 2 years, the Army National Guard has faced increasing 

challenges in recruiting new soldiers to fill authorized positions. 

Army National Guard personnel may be ordered to duty under three 

general statutory frameworks – Titles 10 or 32 of the United States Code or 

pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. In a Title 10 status, Army 

National Guard personnel are federally funded and under federal 

command and control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being 

ordered to active duty, either voluntarily or involuntarily (i.e., 

mobilization) under appropriate circumstances. When Army National 

 7

 See GAO-05-21. 

8

 See GAO, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve 

Personnel and Equipment Shortages, GAO-05-660 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 2005). 

9

 See GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven Analysis of Active 

Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the Defense Strategy, GAO-05-200

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2005). 
Page 8 GAO-06-170T 

Guard forces are activated10 under Title 10, the National Guard is subject 

to the Posse Comitatus Act,11 which prohibits it from law enforcement 

activities unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or law. 

Personnel in Title 32 status are federally funded but under state control. 

Title 32 is the status in which National Guard personnel typically perform 

training for their federal mission. In addition, the federal government 

reimburses states for Guard units’ activities in response to federallydesignated disasters, such as hurricane response. Personnel performing 

state missions are state funded and under state command and control. 

Under state law, a governor may order National Guard personnel to 

respond to emergencies, civil disturbances, or perform other duties 

authorized by state law. While the Army National Guard performs both 

federal and state missions, the Guard is organized, trained, and equipped 

for its federal missions, and these take priority over state missions. 

The Guard can also be tasked with homeland security missions under the 

state governors or, when activated, by DOD under command of the 

President. DOD refers to its contributions to the overall homeland security 

effort as “homeland defense.” Homeland defense activities include military 

missions within the United States, such as flying armed patrols over U.S. 

cities and guarding military installations. DOD also supports civilian 

authorities to provide quick response or capabilities that other agencies do 

not have. The U.S. Northern Command provides command and control for 

DOD’s homeland defense missions, including land, air, aerospace, and 

maritime defense operations, and coordinates DOD’s support to civil 

authorities for homeland security missions. 

 10 Activation refers to the ordering of units and individual members of the reserve 

component, which includes the Army National Guard, to active duty under the statutory 

authority granted to the President, the Congress, or the secretaries of the military 

departments. 

11 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The Army and Air Force are prohibited by the Act and the Navy and 

Marine Corps are prohibited by Defense Directive 5525.5.E.4.1.3. 
Page 9 GAO-06-170T 

As we previously reported, the high number of Army National Guard 

forces used to support overseas and homeland missions since September 

11, 2001, has resulted in decreased preparedness of nondeployed Guard 

forces12 which suggests the need to reassess DOD’s business model for the 

Army National Guard. We have previously reported that high-performing 

organizations must reexamine their business models to ensure that their 

structures and investment strategies enable them to meet external changes 

in their operational environments efficiently and effectively.13 To meet the 

demand for forces since September 11, especially for forces with special 

skills that reside heavily in the Army National Guard, such as military 

police, over 50 percent of Army National Guard members have been called 

upon to deploy. At the same time, the Army National Guard’s involvement 

in operations at home has taken on higher priority since 2001. The change 

in the roles and missions of the Army National Guard has not been 

matched with a change in its equipping strategy that reflects its new high 

pace of operations, and as a result the Army National Guard’s ability to 

continue to support ongoing operations is declining. 

In keeping with post-Cold War planning assumptions, most Army National 

Guard units were not expected to deploy in the early days of a conflict, but 

to augment active duty units in the event of an extended conflict. 

Therefore, the Army accepted some operational risk by providing the 

Army National Guard fewer soldiers than it would need to fully equip its 

units and less equipment than it would need to deploy, on the assumption 

that there would be time to provide additional personnel, equipment, and 

training during the mobilization process before units would deploy. For 

example, as of 2004, the Army National Guard’s force structure called for 

about 375,000 soldiers, but it was authorized about 350,000 soldiers. In 

addition, Army National Guard combat units are only provided from 65 to 

74 percent of the personnel and from 65 to 79 percent of the equipment 

they would need to deploy, depending on the priority assigned to their 

warfighting missions. 

However, after September 11, 2001, the President authorized reservists to 

be activated for up to 2 years, and approximately 280,000 Army National 

Guard personnel have been activated to support recent operations. As of 

July 2005, about 35,500 Army National Guard members were deployed to 

 12 See GAO-05-21. 

13 See GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002). 

Declining 

Preparedness from 

High Pace of 

Operations Signifies A 

Need to Reexamine 

the Army National 

Guard’s Business 

Model 
Page 10 GAO-06-170T 

Iraq—nearly one-third of the 113,000 U.S. forces in theater. Army National 

Guard personnel deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq are expected to serve 1 

year in these countries and to spend up to several additional months 

mobilizing and demobilizing. As figure 1 shows, the number of activated 

Army National Guard personnel for federal missions has declined since its 

peak in December 2004 and January 2005. However, the Army National 

Guard continues to provide a substantial number of personnel to support 

current operations. 

Figure 1: Army National Guard Activity under Federal Command and Control from September 2001 through July 2005 

The Army National Guard has begun adapting its forces to meet the 

warfighting requirements of current operations, but some measures taken 

to meet immediate needs have made sustaining future operations more 

challenging. Because its units did not have all the resources they needed to 

deploy at the outset of current operations, the Army National Guard has 

had to transfer personnel and equipment from nondeploying units to 

prepare deploying units. We reported in November 2004 that as of May 

2004, the Army National Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel 

transfers and shifted over 35,000 pieces of equipment to deploying units. 

These initial transfers worsened personnel and equipment shortages in 
Page 11 GAO-06-170T 

units that were then alerted for deployment and had to be staffed and 

equipped through more transfers. The cumulative effect of these personnel 

and equipment transfers has been a decline in the readiness of Army 

National Guard forces for future missions, both at overseas and at home. 

Even as significant numbers of personnel and equipment are supporting 

overseas operations, since September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard’s 

role in homeland security and civil support has taken on greater priority, 

as demonstrated by the Guard’s recent involvement in responding to 

Hurricane Katrina. Since September 11, 2001, the Guard has performed 

other operational duties such as providing airport security and supporting 

events such as the 2004 Democratic and Republican national conventions. 

In the pre-September 11 security environment, it was assumed that the 

National Guard could perform its domestic roles with the personnel and 

equipment it was supplied for its warfighting missions. While the Army 

National Guard is implementing pilot programs to strengthen capabilities 

to respond to homeland security needs, such as improving critical 

infrastructure protection, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the 

full spectrum of the Guard’s roles and requirements for homeland security, 

as we recommended.14 Until such an analysis is completed, congressional 

policymakers may not be in the best position to assess whether the Army 

National Guard’s current structure and equipment can enable it to sustain 

increased homeland security responsibilities in addition to its overseas 

missions. 

 14 See GAO-05-21. 
Page 12 GAO-06-170T 

Increasing equipment shortages among nondeployed Army National Guard 

units illustrate the need for DOD to reexamine its equipping strategy and 

business model for the Army National Guard. The amount of essential 

warfighting equipment nondeployed National Guard units have on hand 

has continued to decrease since we last reported on the Army National 

Guard in 2004. Compounding the equipment shortages that have 

developed because most Army National Guard units are still structured 

with lesser amounts of equipment than they need to deploy, Army National 

Guard units have left more than 64,000 equipment items valued at over 

$1.2 billion in Iraq for use by follow-on forces; however, the Army has not 

developed replacement plans for this equipment as required by DOD 

policy. In addition, DOD has not determined the Army National Guard’s 

equipment requirements for homeland security missions, and some states 

are concerned about the Guard’s preparedness for future missions. 

While most Army National Guard combat units are typically provided from 

65 to 79 percent of the equipment they would need for their wartime 

missions, for recent operations, combatant commanders have required 

units to deploy with 90 to100 percent of the equipment they are expected 

to need and with equipment that is compatible with active Army units. 

While the Army can supply deploying Army National Guard forces with 

additional equipment after they are mobilized, nondeployed Guard units 

will be challenged to maintain readiness for future missions because they 

transferred equipment to deploying units and have less equipment to train 

with or to use for other contingencies. 

The Army National Guard began transferring people and equipment to 

ready units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan in the early days of the 

Global War on Terrorism and the number of transfers has grown as 

overseas operations have continued. In June 2004 the Army National 

Guard had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of equipment to ready units 

for overseas operations.15 By July 2005, the number of equipment items 

transferred among Army National Guard units had grown to more than 

101,000 items. As a result of these transfers, the proportion of 

nondeployed units that reported having the minimum amount of 

equipment they would need to deploy16 dropped from 87 percent in 

 15 See GAO-05-21. 

16 To meet minimum deployment criteria, a unit must generally have at least 80 percent of 

its mission-essential equipment items on hand. 

Critical Equipment 

Shortages Have 

Degraded the 

Readiness of 

Nondeployed Army 

National Guard Units 

for Future Overseas 

and Domestic 

Missions 

Equipment Status of 

Nondeployed Units Has 

Worsened in Recent 

Months due to Challenges 

in Supporting Overseas 

Operations with Current 

Inventory Levels 
Page 13 GAO-06-170T 

October 2002 to 59 percent in May 2005. However, Army National Guard 

officials estimated that when substitute items which may be incompatible 

with active forces, equipment undergoing maintenance, and equipment left 

overseas for follow-on forces are subtracted, nondeployed units had only 

about 34 percent of their essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005. 

Further, as of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that it had less 

than 5 percent of the required amount or a quantity of fewer than 5 each of 

more than 220 critical items. Among these 220 high-demand items were 

generators, trucks, and radios, which could also be useful for domestic 

missions. 

To address equipment requirements for current overseas operations, the 

Army now requires units, in both the active and reserve components, to 

leave certain essential items that are in short supply in Iraq for follow-on 

units to use,17 but it has not developed plans to replace Army National 

Guard equipment as DOD policy requires. 18 The Army’s requirement for 

leaving equipment overseas is intended to reduce the amount of 

equipment that has to be transported from the United States to theater, to 

better enable units to meet their deployment dates, and to maintain stocks 

of essential equipment in theater where it is most needed. While this 

equipping approach has helped meet current operational needs, it has 

continued the cycle of reducing the pool of equipment available to 

nondeployed forces for responding to contingencies and for training. 

The Army National Guard estimates that since 2003, it has left more than 

64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas to support 

continuing operations, but the Army lacks visibility and cannot account for 

all this equipment and has not developed plans to replace it. According to 

Army officials, even though DOD policy requires the Army to replace 

equipment transferred to it from the reserve component for more than 90 

days,19 the Army neither created a mechanism in the early phases of the 

 17 The Army has directed that equipment purchased specifically for Operation Iraqi 

Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, or other key items currently in short supply 

such as armored vehicles, improvised explosive device jammers, long-range surveillance 

systems, and generator sets, remain in theater for the duration of operations. 

18 DOD Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, April 7, 2005. 

19 Replacement plans for removed equipment and supplies are not required for transfers in 

support of force restructuring adopted as result of the planning, programming, budgeting, 

and execution process decisions approved by the Secretary of Defense. 

Retaining Army National 

Guard Equipment 

Overseas without Plans for 

Replacement Hinders the 

Guard’s Ability to Prepare 

and Train Units 
Page 14 GAO-06-170T 

war to track Guard equipment left in theater nor prepared replacement 

plans for this equipment because the practice of leaving equipment behind 

was intended to be a short-term measure. As operations continued, in June 

2004, the Army tasked the Army Materiel Command with overseeing 

equipment retained in theater. However, according to Army and National 

Guard officials, the Army Materiel Command developed plans to track 

only certain high-demand equipment items that are in short supply, such 

as armored humvees and other items designated to remain in theater for 

the duration of the conflict. As of July 2005, the National Guard Bureau 

estimates that the Army Material Command was only tracking about 45 

percent of the over 64,000 equipment items the Army National Guard units 

have left in theater. The tracking effort does not include over half of the 

equipment items, such as cargo trucks, rough terrain forklifts, and 

palletized load trucks Guard units have left behind that were only 

documented at the unit level through unit property records, even though 

these items may remain in theater for up to 3 years. As a result, the Guard 

does not know when or whether its equipment will be returned, which 

challenges its ability to prepare and train for future missions. 

As operations have continued, the amount of Guard equipment retained in 

theater has increased and has hampered the ability of returning Guard 

units to maintain a high level of readiness and train new personnel. For 

example, according to Army National Guard officials, three Illinois Army 

National Guard military police units were required to leave almost all of 

their humvees, about 130, in Iraq when they returned home from 

deployment, so they could not conduct training to maintain the proficiency 

they acquired while overseas or train new recruits. In all, the National 

Guard reported that 14 military police companies left over 600 humvees 

and other armored trucks overseas, and these items are expected to 

remain in theater for the duration of operations. 

In May 2005, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

expressed concerns about the significant amount of equipment Army 

National Guard units have left overseas and directed the Army to develop 

replacement plans as required by DOD policy.20 The Army expects to 

complete its plans to replace stay behind equipment by October 2005. 

While Army officials have stated that the equipment tracked by individual 

 20 The Comptroller General plans to initiate additional work on accountability for 

equipment left overseas this fall. That work will further explore strategies to manage this 

equipment and address the ramifications of plans for the disposition of this equipment. 
Page 15 GAO-06-170T 

units may eventually be returned to the Guard, both Army and Army 

National Guard officials said that even if this equipment is eventually 

returned, its condition is likely to be poor given its heavy use and some of 

it will likely need to be replaced. Until the Army develops plans to replace 

the equipment, including identifying timetables and funding sources, the 

National Guard will continue to face critical equipment shortages that 

reduce its readiness for future missions and it will be challenged to train 

and prepare for future missions. In the report we are publishing 

concurrently with the testimony,21 we recommended that DOD develop 

and submit to the Congress a plan and funding strategy that address the 

equipment needs of the Army National Guard for the Global War on 

Terrorism and how the Army will transition from short-term equipping 

measures to long-term equipping solutions. DOD agreed with this 

recommendation, stating in its written comments that the Army needs to 

determine how Army National Guard forces will be equipped to meet state 

disaster response and potential homeland defense requirements and 

include these requirements in its resource priorities. We believe that such 

a plan should address the measures the Army will take to ensure it 

complies with existing DOD directives to safeguard reserve component 

equipment readiness. 

While Army National Guard forces have supported a range of homeland 

security missions since September 11, 2001, states are concerned about 

the Guard’s ability to perform future domestic missions given its declining 

equipment status. For example, New Jersey officials told us that Army 

National Guard units lacked some essential equipment, such as chemical 

protective suits and nerve agent antidotes; they needed to respond to a 

terrorist threat in December 2003. More recently, Louisiana Army National 

Guard units lacked some key items they needed to conduct large-scale 

disaster response. According to National Guard officials, at the time 

Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf coast, much of the Guard’s most modern 

equipment was deployed to Iraq while less capable equipment remained in 

the United States. We are currently examining the federal response to 

Hurricane Katrina, including the roles of DOD’s active duty and reserve 

forces. At the time of the hurricane over 8,200 personnel and two brigade 

sets of equipment from the 155th Armored Brigade of Mississippi and the 

256th Infantry Brigade of Louisiana were deployed in support of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom and were not available to perform their domestic missions. 

 21 See GAO-06-111. 

States Are Concerned 

about Preparedness for 

Future Domestic Missions 

in Light of Growing Army 

National Guard Equipment 

Shortages 
Page 16 GAO-06-170T 

Furthermore, the Adjutant General of Louisiana reported to the Army 

National Guard in August 2005 that based on their analysis of the state 

Guard’s equipment for state missions, even after the 256th Infantry 

Brigade returned home from deployment, the brigade would lack about 

350 essential equipment items needed for hurricane response including 

trucks, humvees, wreckers, and water trailers because it was required to 

leave a majority of its equipment items in Iraq. When we visited the area in 

October 2005, Louisiana National Guard officials particularly noted that 

more radios would have enabled them to communicate with other forces 

and more vehicles that could be used in high water would have been very 

helpful. 

Louisiana and Mississippi, like many other states, have entered into mutual 

assistance agreements with other states to provide additional National 

Guard forces in times of need, typically to facilitate natural disaster 

response.22 Under such agreements, in August and September 2005, over 

50,000 National Guard personnel from 48 states, 2 U.S. territories and the 

District of Columbia responded to the devastation caused by Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita in the Gulf Coast region. According to Louisiana officials, 

state partners were proactive in identifying troops to send to the area 

when the magnitude of the storm was anticipated. These forces brought 

with them additional equipment such as key command and control 

equipment and aviation assets. 

 22 While the mutual support arrangements, called Emergency Management Assistance 

Compacts, have been useful in responding to natural disasters, it is not clear whether these 

arrangements will always meet the states’ needs for forces or capabilities for homeland 

security missions because states can withhold forces if they are needed in their home state. 
Page 17 GAO-06-170T 

DOD, and the Army have recognized the need to transform the Army 

National Guard to meet the new threats of the 21st century and support 

civil authorities, and are undertaking some initiatives to improve the 

Guard’s organization and readiness for these missions. However, it is too 

early to determine whether these initiatives together comprise a 

sustainable equipping and funding model for the future because 

implementation plans are not complete and funding strategies have not 

been fully identified. For example, the Army has not decided how to 

manage equipment to ready forces as they move through the proposed 

rotational force model. In addition, while DOD has produced a strategy for 

homeland defense and civil support in June 2005, it has not yet completed 

a plan to implement that strategy, including clarifying the Army National 

Guard’s role and assessing what capabilities the Guard will require for 

domestic missions, as we previously recommended. Until these initiatives 

are more fully developed and key implementation decisions are made, 

DOD and the Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh their 

affordability and effectiveness, and the Army National Guard will be 

challenged to train and prepare for all its future missions. 

In 2004, the Army developed a plan to restructure Army forces, including 

the Army National Guard, to become more flexible and capable of 

achieving a wide range of missions, but it has not yet completed detailed 

implementation plans or cost estimates for its transformation. Rather than 

being organized around divisions, the Army will transform to an 

organization based on standardized, modular brigades that can be tailored 

to meet the specific needs of the combatant commander. Two primary 

goals of this new structure are to standardize designs and equipment 

requirements for both active and reserve units and maintain reserve units 

at a higher level of readiness than in the past. While the Army plans to 

convert most Army National Guard units to the modular organizational 

structure by 2008, Guard forces will not be fully equipped for the new 

design until 2011 at the earliest. The Army had originally planned to 

convert Guard units on a slower schedule by 2010, but at the request of the 

Army National Guard, accelerated the conversions so that Guard units 

would share the new standardized organizational designs with the active 

component at least 2 years earlier, which is expected to help avoid training 

soldiers for the previous skill mix and better facilitate recruiting and 

retention efforts. However, our work indicates that accelerated modular 

conversions will exacerbate near-term equipment shortfalls for three key 

reasons. First, according to current plans, units will be expected to 

convert to the new modular designs with the equipment they have on 

hand. However, because of existing shortages and the large number of 

DOD and Army Have 

Some Initiatives to 

Improve Future 

Readiness of Army 

National Guard 

Forces but Has Not 

Developed Detailed 

Implementation and 

Funding Plans 

Army Converting Guard to 

Modular Designs, but 

Plans and Cost Estimates 

for Equipping Units Are 

Incomplete 
Page 18 GAO-06-170T 

equipment items that deployed units have left in Iraq or that need repair or 

replacement due to heavy use, units will not have the equipment needed 

for their new unit designs. For example, converted Guard units expect 

initially to be without some key equipment items that provide improved 

capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, single channel ground and 

airborne radio systems, and Javelin antitank missiles. Second, the Army 

has not planned funding to provide equipment based on the new 

conversion schedule. Instead, the Army plans to proceed with the original 

equipping schedule, which will not equip the Guard’s modular force until 

at least 2011. Army resourcing policy gives higher priority to units engaged 

in operations or preparing to deploy than those undergoing modular 

conversions. As a result, the requirements of ongoing operations will 

continue to deplete the Army National Guard’s equipment resources and 

will affect the pace at which equipment will be available for nondeployed 

units to transform to the modular design. In the meantime, modular Guard 

units are expected to continue using equipment that may be older than 

their active counterparts’ and will initially lack some key enablers, such as 

communications systems, which are the basis for the improved 

effectiveness of modular units. 

In addition to the equipment shortfalls and lack of comparability that are 

projected for near-term Guard conversions, the Army’s initial estimate of 

$15.6 billion through 2011 for converting Guard units to modular designs is 

incomplete and likely to grow for several reasons. First, the Army’s cost 

estimate was based on a less modern equipping plan than the design the 

Army tested for the new brigades. Second, the estimate does not include 

costs for 10 of the Guard’s support units, nor does it include nearly $1.4 

billion that the Guard currently estimates is needed for military 

construction costs associated with the modular conversion of the Guard’s 

40 support units. Third, current cost estimates assume that Guard 

equipment inventories will be at prewar levels and available for modular 

conversions. This, however, may not be a reasonable assumption because 

as discussed previously, Army National Guard units have left large 

amounts of equipment overseas, some of which will be retained 

indefinitely, and the Army has not provided plans for its replacement. The 

lack of complete equipping requirements and cost estimates for converting 

the Army National Guard to the new modular structure raises concerns 

about the affordability and effectiveness of this multibillion dollar 

restructuring effort. Furthermore, without more detailed data, the 

Congress may not have sufficient information to fully evaluate the 

adequacy of the Army’s funding requests for its modular force initiative. 
Page 19 GAO-06-170T 

While the Army plans to transform into a rotational force, it has not yet 

finalized plans for how Army National Guard units will be equipped under 

its new model. The rotational force model is intended to provide units with 

a predictable cycle of increasing readiness for potential mobilization once 

every 6 years. As such, it involves a major change in the way the Army 

planned to use its reserve forces and has implications for the amount and 

types of equipment that Army National Guard units will need for training 

to improve their readiness as they progress through the cycle. Under the 

rotational force concept, rather than maintain units at less than full 

readiness, the Army would cycle Army National Guard units through 

phases of increasing readiness and provide increasing amounts of 

equipment to units as they move through three training phases and near 

readiness with the goal of predictable availability for potential deployment 

once in a 6-year period. 

While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip units according 

to the readiness requirements of each phase of the rotational force model, 

it has not yet detailed the types and quantities of items required in each 

phase. Under this proposal, the Army National Guard would have three 

types of equipment sets: baseline sets, training sets, and deployment sets. 

The baseline set would vary by unit type and assigned mission and the 

equipment it includes could be significantly reduced from the amount 

called for in the unit design, but plans call for it to provide at least the 

equipment Guard units would need for domestic missions, although this 

standard has not been defined. Training sets would include more of the 

equipment units will need to be ready for deployment, but units would 

share equipment that would be located at training sites throughout the 

country. The deployment set would include all equipment needed for 

deployment, including theater-specific equipment, items provided through 

operational needs statements, and equipment from Army prepositioned 

stocks. At the time of our report, the Army was still developing the 

proposals for what would be included in the three equipment sets and 

planned to publish the final requirements in December 2005. 

At present, it is not clear how the equipment requirements associated with 

supporting deployment under the new rotational readiness cycle will 

affect the types and quantities of items available for converting the Army 

National Guard to a modular force. Until the near-term requirements for 

the rotational model and long-term requirements for a modular force are 

fully defined and integrated, the cost of equipment needed to most 

efficiently implement the two initiatives will not be clear. Without firm 

decisions as to requirements for both the new modular structure and 

rotational deployment model and a plan that integrates requirements, the 

Army Plans for Managing 

Equipment under Its 

Rotational Force Model 

Are Not Complete 
Page 20 GAO-06-170T 

Army and Army National Guard are not in a position to develop complete 

cost estimates or to determine whether the modular and rotation 

initiatives will maintain the Guard’s readiness for all its missions, including 

warfighting, homeland security, and traditional state missions such as 

disaster response. In our report,23 we recommend that DOD develop and 

submit to the Congress a plan for the effective integration of the Army 

National Guard into the Army’s rotational force model and modular 

initiatives. We recommended that this plan include the equipment 

requirements, costs, timelines and funding strategy for converting Army 

National Guard units to the modular force and the extent to which the 

Army National Guard will have the types of equipment and equipment 

levels comparable to the active modular units. We further recommended 

that the plan include an analysis of the equipment the Army National 

Guard’s units will need for their missions in each phase of the rotational 

cycle and how the Army will manage implementation risks to modular 

forces if full funding is not provided on expected timelines. DOD agreed 

with our recommendation. 

In June 2005, DOD published its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 

Support, which recognizes the National Guard’s critical role in these 

missions in both its federal and state capacities. However, the strategy 

does not detail what the Army National Guard’s role or requirements will 

be in implementing the strategy. DOD has not yet completed a review of 

the full range of the Army National Guard’s missions and the assets it will 

need to successfully execute them. In the absence of such requirements, 

National Guard units will continue to be structured and funded largely for 

their warfighting roles, and with the exception of certain specialized units, 

such as weapons of mass destruction civil support teams, Army National 

Guard forces are generally expected to perform civil support missions 

with either the resources supplied for their warfighting missions or 

equipment supplied by states. 

In its homeland defense and civil support strategy,24 DOD sets goals of 

(1) maximizing threat awareness; (2) deterring or defeating threats away 

from the U.S. homeland; (3) achieving mission assurance in performance 

 23 See GAO-06-111. 

24 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington, 

D.C.: Jun. 2005). 

DOD Has Developed a 

Strategy for Homeland 

Defense and Civil Support, 

but Identification of 

Requirements and 

Readiness Measures Are 

Not Complete 
Page 21 GAO-06-170T 

of assigned duties under attack or after disruption; (4) supporting civil 

authorities in minimizing the damage and recovering from domestic 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive mass 

casualty attacks; and (5) improving national and international capabilities 

for homeland defense and homeland security. The strategy recognizes the 

need to manage risks in the homeland defense and civil support mission 

areas given resource challenges the department faces in performing all its 

missions. Therefore, the strategy puts first priority on homeland defense 

missions that the department will lead, with second priority on ensuring 

the department’s ability to support civil authorities in the event of multiple 

mass casualties from chemical, biological, radiation, or nuclear incidents 

within the United States. 

To accomplish these goals, DOD has noted that it will have to integrate 

strategy, planning, and operational capabilities for homeland defense and 

civil support more fully into its processes. It plans to implement its 

strategy with dual-purpose forces that are simultaneously trained and 

equipped for warfighting and homeland missions. The strategy recognizes 

that National Guard forces not on federal active duty can respond quickly 

to perform homeland defense and homeland security within U.S. territory 

and are particularly well suited for civil support missions because of their 

locations across the nation and experience in supporting neighboring 

communities in times of crisis. Based on this strategy, U.S. Northern 

Command has been tasked to develop detailed contingency plans to 

identify the full range of forces and resources needed for the homeland 

missions DOD may lead or the civil support missions in which active or 

reserve forces should be prepared to assist federal or state authorities. 

However, it is not clear when this effort will be completed. 

DOD has taken some steps to develop additional information on the 

National Guard’s readiness for some of its domestic missions. In August 

2005, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) directed 

the National Guard to include readiness assessments for both its Title 10 

(federal missions) and Title 32 (state missions conducted with federal 

funding) in the department’s new readiness reporting system, the Defense 

Readiness Reporting System, which is scheduled for implementation in 

2007. The new system is expected provide officials better visibility into 

unit readiness by reporting standardized metrics rather than general 

categories of readiness. The National Guard Bureau is also preparing a 

report for the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) on 

concepts for reporting the Guard’s readiness for domestic missions and 

plans to prepare a detailed implementation plan by mid-January 2006. 

Until detailed concepts and implementation for these plans for domestic 
Page 22 GAO-06-170T 

readiness reporting are developed and approved, it is not clear whether 

they will fully meet the recommendation in our prior report that DOD 

establish readiness standards and measures for the full range of the 

Guard’s homeland missions so that readiness for these missions can be 

systematically measured and accurately reported. 

As we reported in 2004, some states expressed concerns about the Army 

National Guard’s preparedness to undertake state missions, including 

supporting homeland security missions and disaster relief, given the 

increase in overseas deployments and the shortages of personnel and 

equipment among the remaining Guard units. Moreover, to meet new 

threats, some homeland security missions could require training and 

equipment, such as decontamination training and equipment that differ 

from that needed to support warfighting missions. Some Guard officials 

noted that states have limited budgets and that homeland security 

requirements compete with other needs, although the states have funded 

some homeland security activities, such as guarding critical infrastructure, 

and have purchased some equipment for homeland security purposes. 

To address some potential homeland security needs, DOD began 

establishing weapons of mass destruction civil support teams within the 

Army National Guard, as authorized by Presidential Directive and the 

Congress in fiscal year 1999. These teams, which are comprised of 22 fulltime personnel, are maintained at high readiness levels and can respond 

rapidly to assist local officials in determining the nature of an attack, 

provide medical and technical advice, and help identify follow-on federal 

and state assets that might be needed. These teams are unique because 

they are federally funded and trained, but perform their missions under 

the command and control of the state governor. In the wake of Hurricane 

Katrina, the Louisiana civil support team provided command and control 

technology that was valuable in responding to this natural disaster. 

While strategies such as transferring large numbers of Army National 

Guard personnel and equipment from non-deploying units to deploying 

units and leaving Guard equipment overseas have met DOD’s immediate 

needs to support overseas operations, these strategies are not sustainable 

in the long term, especially as increasing numbers of Army National Guard 

personnel have already been deployed for as long as 2 years, recruiting 

challenges have arisen, and equipment challenges have increased. The 

current status of the Army’s equipment inventory is one symptom of the 

much larger problem of an outdated business model. Critical shortages of 

deployable equipment and the Army’s lack of accountability over the Army 

Conclusions 
Page 23 GAO-06-170T 

National Guard’s equipment retained overseas have created considerable 

uncertainty about what equipment the Guard will have available for 

training and domestic missions, and DOD has not developed detailed plans 

that include timeframes and identify resources for replacing equipment 

that has been heavily used or left overseas in the short term. Without 

replacement plans for equipment its units left overseas, Army National 

Guard units are unable to plan for training and equipping forces for future 

missions. Moreover, without a broader rethinking of the basis for Army 

National Guard equipment requirements that considers both overseas and 

homeland security requirements, preparedness will continue to decline 

and the Guard may not be well positioned to respond to future overseas or 

homeland missions or contingencies. As a result, we are recommending 

that DOD develop an equipping strategy that addresses how the Army 

National Guard will transition from short-term equipping measures to 

long-term solutions. 

DOD and the Army are implementing some initiatives to transform the 

Army National Guard so that it can better support a broader range of 

missions in light of the new security environment characterized by new 

threats, including global terrorism. These initiatives include establishing 

modular brigades; establishing a rotational model that seeks to target 

equipment to a unit’s expected mission; and clarifying the Guard’s role, 

training, and equipment needs for homeland security missions. However, 

supporting ongoing operations will continue to strain Army National 

Guard equipment inventories, and, under current plans, equipping Guard 

units for new modular designs will take several years. Further, it is not 

clear that these initiatives will result in a comprehensive and integrated 

strategy for ensuring that the Army National Guard is well prepared for 

overseas missions, homeland security needs, and state missions such as 

responding to natural disasters. We are therefore making 

recommendations to better integrate its initiatives. In this regard, we 

believe that the Congress and senior DOD leadership must be ready to play 

a key role in pressing the Army to provide more detailed plans for these 

initiatives and outlining the specific funding required to implement them in 

the most efficient manner. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond 

to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have. 
Page 24 GAO-06-170T 

For more information regarding this testimony, please contact Janet St. 

Laurent, Director, at (202) 512-4402. Individuals making key contributions 

to this testimony include Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director; Frank 

Cristinzio; Alissa Czyz; Curtis Groves; Nicole Harms; Tina Morgan 

Kirschbaum; Kim Mayo; Kenneth Patton; Jay Smale; and Suzanne Wren. 

GAO Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

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