United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate

UNITED NATIONS 

Preliminary Observations 

on Internal Oversight and 

Procurement Practices 

Statement of Thomas Melito, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST 

Monday, October 31, 2005

 

GAO-06-226T 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss internal oversight and 

procurement in the United Nations (UN). The findings of the Independent

Inquiry Committee into the UN’s Oil for Food Program have rekindled 

long-standing concerns about internal oversight and procurement at the 

United Nations. In addition, the UN’s 2005 World Summit called for a host 

of reforms, from human rights, terrorism, and peace-building to economic 

development and management reform. 

Today, I will share with you our preliminary observations on the UN’s 

budgeting processes as it relates to the ability of the UN’s Office of 

Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to perform independent and effective 

oversight.1

 I will also discuss some of the UN’s efforts to address problems 

affecting the openness and professionalism of its procurement system. I 

would like to emphasize that my comments today reflect the preliminary 

results of two ongoing GAO engagements examining the UN’s internal 

oversight and procurement services. We will issue reports covering a wide 

range of issues in both areas early next year.2

To conduct our work to date, we met with senior Department of State 

officials in Washington, D.C., and senior officials with the U.S. Missions to 

the UN in New York, Vienna, and Geneva. At these locations, we also met 

with the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services management officials 

and staff; UN Procurement Service officials and staff; representatives of 

several UN funds, programs, and specialized agencies; and the UN external 

auditors—the Board of Auditors (in New York) and the Joint Inspection 

Unit (in Geneva). We reviewed relevant OIOS program documents, 

manuals, and reports. To assess the reliability of OIOS’s funding and 

staffing data, we reviewed the office’s budget reports and discussed the 

 1

In our previous report on this topic (United Nations: Status of Internal Oversight 

Services, GAO/NSIAD-98-9, Washington, D.C., Nov. 19, 1997), we recommended that the

Secretary of State encourage the Under Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services 

to do more to help maintain OIOS’s independence and establish the office as the 

authoritative internal oversight mechanism the General Assembly intended it to be. 

2

Our report on OIOS, which will be issued in spring 2006, will examine, among other issues, 

the Office’s management structures and accountability frameworks, including risk

assessment and recommendations tracking. Our report on the UN Procurement Service 

that will be issued in spring 2006 will, among other issues, examine the internal controls in 

place to ensure compliance with procurement regulations. The Secretariat is currently

reviewing these controls in the wake of recent events concerning the UN’s Procurement 

Service, which is currently under interim leadership. 

Page 1 GAO-06-226T 
data with cognizant officials. We determined the data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report. To conduct our work on UN 

procurement, we reviewed past GAO, UN audit, and expert reports on UN 

procurement practices. We also reviewed the UN’s procurement manual, 

training materials, ethics rules, and financial rules and regulations. In 

addition, we interviewed UN and U.S. government officials. We made the 

Department of State and UN officials aware of the contents of our 

testimony. We performed our work between April 2005 and October 2005 

in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

OIOS’s ability to carry out independent, effective oversight over UN 

organizations is hindered by the UN’s budgeting processes for its regular 

and extrabudgetary resources. In establishing OIOS in 1994, the General 

Assembly passed a resolution stating that OIOS should exercise 

operational independence in carrying out its oversight responsibilities and 

that the Secretary-General should take into account the independence of

the office in preparing its budget. The Secretariat’s budget office—over 

which OIOS has oversight authority—exercises control over OIOS’s 

regular budget, which may result in conflicts of interest and infringe on 

OIOS’s independence. In addition, UN budgeting processes make it 

difficult for OIOS to reallocate its regular budget resources among OIOS 

locations worldwide or among its three oversight divisions—internal audit; 

investigations; and monitoring, evaluation, and consulting services—to 

meet changing priorities. OIOS officials provided us with several examples 

of work funded through the regular budget that they were unable to 

undertake due to resource constraints. In addition, OIOS does not have a 

mechanism in place to identify or justify OIOS-wide staffing needs, except

for peacekeeping oversight services. OIOS also lacks control over its 

extrabudgetary resources, which comprise 62 percent of its overall budget

in fiscal biennium 2004-2005. The UN funds and programs that OIOS 

oversees maintain control over some of these resources since OIOS 

negotiates its terms of work and payment for services with the managers 

of the programs it intends to examine. If the entity does not agree to an 

OIOS examination or does not provide sufficient funding for OIOS to carry 

out its work, OIOS cannot adequately perform its oversight 

responsibilities. 

Summary 

The United Nations has made progress in improving the clarity of its 

procurement manual but has yet to fully address previously identified 

concerns affecting the lack of openness and professionalism of its 

procurement system. Specifically, concerns remain relating to an 

Page 2 GAO-06-226T 
independent bid protest system, staff training and professional 

certification, and ethics regulations. In 2002, the United Nations revised its 

procurement manual, which now provides staff with clearer guidance on 

UN procurement regulations and policies, including more detailed step-bystep instructions of the procurement process than it had when we 

reported in 1999. However, the Secretariat has yet to enhance the 

openness of the procurement system by heeding a 1994 recommendation 

by outside experts that it establish an independent bid protest process. At 

present, vendors cannot file complaints with an independent official or 

office if they believe that the UN Procurement Service has not handled 

their bids appropriately. As a result, senior UN officials may not be made 

aware of problems in the procurement process. In addition, the United 

Nations has not fully addressed longstanding concerns affecting the 

professional qualifications of its procurement workforce. The 

Procurement Service is developing a new training curriculum and a 

professional certification program. It has trained some procurement staff 

as instructors but has yet to complete training curricula. In addition, the 

United Nations still needs to develop the individual training profiles 

necessary to determine the extent of its training requirements. A June 2005 

report by an independent contractor indicated that most headquarters 

procurement officers and procurement assistants do not possess 

professional procurement certifications. According to the contractor, the

level of certification was low in comparison to other organizations. 

Further, the United Nations has yet to adopt several internal proposals to 

clarify UN ethics regulations for procurement staff and vendors, such as a 

code of conduct. 

Established in 1994 to serve as the UN’s main oversight body, OIOS 

operated with a budget of $63.9 million in fiscal biennium 2004-2005 and 

employs a workforce of 256 staff in 20 locations around the world. OIOS 

was established to assist the Secretary-General in fulfilling internal 

oversight responsibilities over UN resources and staff. The stated mission 

of OIOS is “to provide internal oversight for the United Nations that adds 

value to the organization through independent, professional, and timely 

internal audit, monitoring, inspection, evaluation, management consulting,

and investigation activities and to be an agent of change that promotes 

responsible administration of resources, a culture of accountability and 

transparency, and improved program performance.”3

 The office is headed

Background 

 3

In December 2004, the General Assembly passed a resolution making all OIOS’s audit 

reports available to any member state upon request. 

Page 3 GAO-06-226T 
by an Under Secretary-General who is appointed by the Secretary-General

for a 5-year fixed term with no possibility of renewal.4

 The Under 

Secretary-General may be removed by the Secretary-General only for 

cause and with General Assembly approval. OIOS’s authority spans all UN 

activities under the Secretary-General, namely the UN Secretariat in New 

York, Geneva, Nairobi, and Vienna; the five regional commissions for 

Africa, Asia and the Pacific, West Asia, Europe, and Latin America and the 

Caribbean; peacekeeping missions and humanitarian operations in various 

parts of the world; and numerous UN funds and programs, such as the 

United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), United Nations Human 

Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT), and the Office of the United Nations 

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).5

The UN Procurement Service is located within the UN Secretariat’s 

Department of Management, at the UN headquarters in New York City. As 

of August 2005, the Procurement Service had a staff of 71 personnel that 

included 21 procurement officers, 5 associate procurement officers, and 24 

procurement assistants. The Procurement Service manages procurement 

for the UN Secretariat headquarters and procures air services and items 

costing more than $200,000 for the Secretariat’s peacekeeping and other 

field missions. While it also provides procurement guidance and support to 

UN personnel who procure goods and services in the Secretariat’s 

peacekeeping and other field missions, it does not directly supervise 

them.6

 Overall Secretariat procurement spending tripled between 1994 and 

2004 as the number of UN peacekeepers in the field increased.

7

Past reviews of the UN’s procurement system have identified problems in 

each of the six commonly identified characteristics that define an effective 

 

4

A new Under Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services was appointed in July

2005. 

5

OIOS’s authority does not extend to UN specialized agencies such as the Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labor Organization (ILO), and World Health

Organization (WHO). 

6

For example, the 135 procurement staff who work in the Secretariat’s peacekeeping field

missions report to the Secretariat’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations rather than to

the Procurement Service in the Secretariat’s Department of Management. 

7

In 1997, the Secretariat spent about $430 million on procurement and fielded an average of

about 21,000 peacekeepers per month. According to UN figures, in 2004 the Secretariat 

spent more than $1.3 billion on procurement and fielded an average of 57,300 peacekeepers 

per month. Most (85 percent) of the $1.3 billion spent by the Secretariat on procurement in 

2004 was for peacekeeping. 

Page 4 GAO-06-226T 
procurement system.8

 In 1999, we found that the United Nations had yet to 

fully address these problems. The United Nations has retained a consulting 

firm to assess the Procurement Service’s financial and internal controls, 

following the decision of a former procurement official to plead guilty to 

federal charges involving his receipt of funds from firms seeking UN 

contracts. The Procurement Service is currently under interim 

management. 

The ability of OIOS to carry out independent, effective oversight is 

impeded by the UN’s budgeting processes for the regular budget and funds 

from the assessed peacekeeping budget and voluntary contributions from 

funds and programs subject to OIOS’s oversight, which are known as 

extrabudgetary resources. The Secretariat’s budget office—over which 

OIOS has oversight authority—exercises control over OIOS’s regular 

budget, which may result in potential conflicts of interest. UN budgeting 

processes make it difficult for OIOS to shift resources among OIOS 

locations or divisions to meet changing priorities. In addition, OIOS lacks 

control over extrabudgetary resources from UN funds and programs. OIOS 

negotiates its terms of work and payment for services with the manager of

the program it intends to examine. However, if the entity does not agree to

an OIOS examination or does not provide requested funding for OIOS to 

perform its work, OIOS cannot adequately perform its oversight 

responsibilities. These regular budget and extrabudgetary processes have 

impeded OIOS in its ability to complete some of its identified oversight 

priorities and raise serious questions about OIOS’s independence. 

UN Budgeting 

Processes Limit 

OIOS’s Effectiveness 

 8

In our previous report on this topic (United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms, 

GAO/NSIAD-99-71, Washington, D.C., Apr. 15, 1999), we noted that openness and a

professional workforce are two of six commonly identified characteristics of effective 

procurement systems. An open procurement system is characterized in part by a clear and

formal bid protest process, a procurement manual, standard operating procedures, and 

policies and procedures that are understood by all participants. A professional workforce is

characterized by competent and knowledgeable staff who have undergone professional 

training programs. Other commonly identified characteristics of effective procurement

systems are integrity, competitiveness, accountability, and value. These characteristics 

were discussed by a high level group of procurement experts who reviewed the UN

procurement system in 1994. 

Page 5 GAO-06-226T 
OIOS’s ability to carry out independent, effective oversight is hindered by 

the UN’s budgeting processes for its regular budget. A General Assembly 

resolution in the creation of OIOS stated that the new internal oversight 

body shall exercise operational independence9

 and that the SecretaryGeneral, when preparing the budget proposal for OIOS, should take into 

account the independence of the office.10 OIOS receives its funding from 

two sources, the UN’s regular budget and funds from the assessed 

peacekeeping budget and voluntary contributions from funds and 

programs subject to OIOS’s oversight—known as extrabudgetary 

resources.11 UN rules and regulations preclude the movement of funds 

between the regular budget and extrabudgetary resources. From 1996-1997

through 2004-2005, the number of staff funded by the regular budget has 

been relatively flat while the number funded by extrabudgetary resources 

has increased steadily. During that same period, OIOS’s regular budget 

increased from about $15 million to about $24 million; its extrabudgetary 

resources grew from about $7 million to about $40 million. OIOS officials 

stated that the increase in extrabudgetary resources has been largely due 

to growth in oversight for UN peacekeeping (see fig. 1). 

OIOS’s Oversight Capacity 

Is Hindered by the UN’s 

Budgeting Processes for 

the Regular Budget 

 9

The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) International Standards for the Professional 

Practice of Internal Auditing defines independence as freedom from conditions that 

threaten objectivity or the appearance of objectivity. The Standards state that the chief 

audit executive should report to a level within the organization that allows the internal 

audit activity to fulfill its responsibilities. The Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing 

Precepts adopted by the International Organization of Supreme Auditing Institutions 

defines independence in terms of the independence of supreme audit institutions, the 

independence of their members and officials, and financial independence.

10Earlier this year, the General Assembly directed the Secretary-General to report on how

to achieve full operational independence for OIOS, in accordance with its original mandate. 

The Secretary-General plans to issue the report before the end of 2005.

11OIOS’s regular budget resources are funds from assessed contributions from member

states and cover normal, recurring activities such as the core UN functions of the

Secretariat. OIOS extrabudgetary resources are voluntary or assessed contributions made 

by member states to support a specific program or activity, including, for example, 

peacekeeping, war crime tribunals, and the UN’s various, separately administered funds 

and programs. 

Page 6 GAO-06-226T 
Figure 1: OIOS’s Regular Budget and Extrabudgetary Resources, Fiscal Biennium 1996-1997 to 2004-2005 

0

30

60

90

120

150

180

Source: GAO analysis of UN data.

Regular Extrabudgetary

Budget

Staffing

1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005

1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005

$21.6

Total (in millions)

Staff

30%

70%

$28

36%

64%

$32.4

42%

58%

$40.1

48%

52%

$63.9

62%

38%

Note: Regular budget data are the appropriated amounts for the biennium. Extrabudgetary resources 

are estimates of the amounts allotted to OIOS that it expects to receive from UN entities not funded 

from the UN’s regular budget. 

The Secretariat’s budget office—over which OIOS has oversight 

authority—exercises control over OIOS’s regular budget, which infringes 

on the office’s independence. In developing the biennium budget, the 

Under Secretary-General of OIOS sends its biennial budget request to the 

Secretariat’s budget office for review. While OIOS can negotiate with the 

budget office on suggested changes to its budget proposal, it has limited 

recourse regarding the budget office’s decisions. This process limits 

OIOS’s ability to independently request from the General Assembly the 

resources it has determined it needs to provide effective oversight and 

also poses a conflict of interest. 

UN budgeting processes make it difficult for OIOS to reallocate its regular

budget resources among OIOS locations worldwide or among its three 

Page 7 GAO-06-226T 
divisions—internal audit; investigations; and monitoring, evaluation, and

consulting services—to meet changing priorities. For example, OIOS 

officials requested a reallocation of 11 investigative posts from New York

to Vienna to save travel funds and be closer to the entities that they 

investigate. This change was approved only after repeated requests by 

OIOS over a number of years. In addition, although OIOS officials stated 

that they routinely identify high-risk and high-priority audits and 

investigations after the biennial budget has been determined, it is difficult

to mobilize the resources required to carry out the work. 

OIOS officials have stated that the office is under resourced, but they do 

not have a mechanism in place to determine appropriate staffing levels or 

to justify budget requests, except for peacekeeping oversight services. 

Officials provided us with several examples of work funded through the 

regular budget that they were unable to undertake due to resource 

constraints. For example, although the Board of Auditors recommended 

on several occasions that OIOS develop the capacity to perform more 

information technology audits, OIOS officials said that they lack the 

financial and human resources to do so. We found that OIOS does not 

have a mechanism in place to determine its overall staffing requirements, 

which would help justify requests for additional resources. On the other 

hand, for peacekeeping audit services, OIOS has a metric—endorsed by 

the General Assembly—that provides one professional auditor per $100

million annual peacekeeping budget. Although OIOS has succeeded in

justifying increases for peacekeeping oversight services consistent with 

the large increase in the peacekeeping budget since 1994, it has been 

difficult to support staff increases in oversight areas that lack a 

comparable metric. 

OIOS Lacks Control Over 

Extrabudgetary Resources 

OIOS lacks control over the extrabudgetary resources funded by UN funds 

and programs. OIOS’s reliance on extrabudgetary resources has been 

steadily increasing over the years—from 30 percent in fiscal biennium 

1996-1997 to 62 percent in the last fiscal biennium, 2004-2005 (see fig. 1).

According to OIOS officials, the growth in the office’s budget is primarily 

due to extrabudgetary resources for audits and investigations of 

peacekeeping. OIOS is dependent on UN funds and programs and other 

UN entities for resources, access, and reimbursement for the services it 

provides. Heads of these entities have the right to approve or deny funding

for oversight work proposed by OIOS. By denying OIOS funding, UN 

entities could avoid OIOS audits, and high-risk areas could potentially be

excluded from adequate examination. For example, we have previously 

Page 8 GAO-06-226T 
testified that the UN Office of the Iraq Program refused to fund an OIOS 

risk assessment of its program management division.12

UN funds and programs limit OIOS’s ability to independently set its work 

priorities in that they exercise the power to decide and negotiate whether 

to fund OIOS oversight activities and at what level. OIOS officials stated 

that because of OIOS’s budgetary structure, some high-priority work has 

not been undertaken. For example, according to a senior OIOS official, the 

office has not been able to adequately oversee the extrabudgetary 

activities of many entities, particularly those based in Geneva. In addition, 

the office also has not been able to oversee the UN Framework 

Convention on Climate Change or the UN Convention to Combat 

Desertification. OIOS reports that if funding is not forthcoming, OIOS may 

have no choice but to discontinue auditing certain extrabudgetary 

activities as of January 2006. In addition, in some cases, the fund and 

program managers have disputed the fees OIOS charges for its services. 

For example, 40 percent of the $2 million billed by OIOS after it completed 

its work are currently in dispute, and since 2001, less than half of the 

entities have paid OIOS in full for investigative services it has provided. If 

the funds and programs fail to pay or pay late, this also adversely affects 

OIOS’s resources. 

The United Nations has improved the clarity of its procurement manual, 

which now provides procurement staff with clearer guidance on UN 

procurement regulations and policies. However, the United Nations has 

yet to fully address several problems affecting the openness and 

professionalism of its procurement system. Specifically, concerns remain 

relating to an independent bid protest system, staff training and 

professional certification, and ethics regulations.

The United Nations 

Has Made Progress 

but Has Yet to Fully 

Address Previously 

Identified 

Procurement 

Concerns 

 12GAO, United Nations: Oil for Food Program Audits, GAO-05-346T (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 15, 2005). 

Page 9 GAO-06-226T 
The UN Procurement Service has improved the clarity of its procurement 

manual. The manual guides UN staff in their conduct of procurement 

actions worldwide. The Procurement Service is responsible for ensuring 

that the manual reflects financial rules and regulations and relevant 

Secretary-General bulletins and administrative instructions. An open and

effective procurement system requires the establishment of processes that 

are available to and understood by vendors and procurement officers 

alike. 

In 1999, we reported that the manual did not provide detailed discussions 

of procedures and policies.13 The United Nations has addressed these 

concerns in the current manual, which was endorsed by a group of outside 

experts. The manual now has detailed step-by-step instructions of the 

procurement process for both field and headquarters staff, including 

illustrative flow charts. It also includes more guidance that addresses 

headquarters and field procurement concerns, such as delegations of 

procurement authority, more specific descriptions of short- and long-term 

acquisition planning, and the evaluation of requests for proposals valued at 

more than $200,000. However, the United Nations has yet to add a section 

addressing renovation construction to the manual. 

The UN Procurement 

Service Has Improved the 

Clarity of its Procurement 

Manual 

The United Nations Has 

Not Established an 

Independent Bid Protest 

Process 

The United Nations has not heeded a 1994 recommendation by a group of 

independent experts to establish an independent vendor bid protest 

process as soon as possible.14 As a result, UN vendors cannot protest the 

Procurement Service’s handling of their bids to an independent official or

office. We reported in 1999 that such a process is an important aspect of 

an open procurement system.15 A process that allows complaints to be 

adjudicated by an independent office could promote the openness and 

integrity of the process and help alert senior UN officials to the failure of 

procurement staff to comply with stated procedures. 

The current UN bid protest process is not independent of the Procurement 

Service. Vendors are directed to file protests through a complaints ladder 

 13GAO, United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms, GAO/NSIAD-99-71

(Washington, D.C., Apr. 15, 1999). 

14United Nations, High Level Expert Group Procurement Study Report (New York, N.Y.,

Dec. 1994). 

15GAO, United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms, GAO/NSIAD-99-71

(Washington, D.C., Apr. 15, 1999). 

Page 10 GAO-06-226T 
process that begins with the acting Chief of the Procurement Service and 

moves through his immediate supervisor, currently the Secretariat 

Controller. The Chief of the Procurement Service at the time of our audit

stated that there is no vendor demand for an independent process. 

In contrast to the UN’s approach to bid protest, the U.S. government 

provides vendors with an agency-level bid protest process. In addition, it 

also provides vendors with two independent bid protest forums. Vendors 

dissatisfied by a U.S. agency’s handling of their bids may protest to the 

U.S. Court of Federal Claims or to the GAO. The GAO receives more than 

1,100 such protests annually. Several other countries provide vendors with 

independent bid protest processes. Moreover, the United Nations has 

endorsed the use of similar independent bid protest mechanisms by other 

member nations. In 1994, the General Assembly approved a model 

procurement law that incorporates independent bid protest. In its 

comments on the law it drafted for the General Assembly, the UN 

Commission on International Trade Law stressed that a bid protest review 

body should be independent of the procuring entity.16

The United Nations Has 

Not Fully Addressed 

Concerns Regarding 

Certification and Training 

of Its Staff 

The United Nations has not fully addressed longstanding concerns 

regarding the qualifications of its procurement staff. Although the 

Procurement Service is developing new training curricula and has initiated 

a certification program, most Procurement Service staff at headquarters 

have not been professionally certified. In addition, it has yet to determine 

the extent to which its training budget may need to increase to pay for 

these new programs. 

A June 2005 report by a UN contractor indicated that most UN 

headquarters Procurement Service officers and assistants have not been 

certified as to the level of their procurement experience and education.17

The report indicated that only 3 of the 20 procurement officers and 21 

procurement assistants responding to a survey had been certified by a 

recognized procurement certification body.18 The contractor informed us 

 16UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Procurement of

Goods, Construction and Services. 

17National Institute of Governmental Purchasing, Assessment of UNPS Procurement 

Processes, June 2005. 

18The experts reported that about 90 percent of the personnel in these categories were 

represented in the survey. As of August 2005, the Procurement Service staff included 21

procurement officers and 24 procurement assistants. 

Page 11 GAO-06-226T 
that the UN’s level of certification was low compared with the level at 

other organizations. Their report concluded that it was imperative that 

more UN procurement staff be certified. Although the experts did not 

address the qualifications of field procurement staff, UN headquarters 

officials informed us that field procurement staff are also in need of more 

training. 

Concerns regarding the qualifications of UN procurement staff are 

longstanding. Since 1994, international procurement experts reported that 

UN procurement staff were largely ill-trained or inexperienced and very 

few had any recognized procurement qualifications. In 1998, OIOS 

reported that the majority of the 20 professional headquarters 

procurement staff had procurement-related experience and were qualified.

However, OIOS also stated that field procurement staff had limited 

procurement-related experience. In addition, OIOS reported that field-level 

procurement practices were at high risk due to continuing problems in 

training peacekeeping procurement staff in the field.19 In 1999, we reported 

that the UN Secretariat procurement training program did not constitute a 

comprehensive curriculum to provide a continuum of basic to advanced 

skills for the development of procurement officers.20

The UN Procurement Service has acknowledged that more needs to be 

done to train and certify procurement staff. It has developed basic and 

advanced training curricula and provided training to staff at headquarters 

and in the field during 2004 and 2005. However, although the training 

curriculum covers several key topics in procurement, it does not provide 

in-depth or comprehensive coverage of some topics. For example, the 

training material does not include in-depth information on procurement 

negotiation, which is of particular importance in light of UN plans to 

renovate its headquarters complex. UN data indicates that 1-week basic 

procurement training courses are being provided to some field staff and 

that advanced procurement training courses are being provided to some 

headquarters and field staff. However, it is not clear whether all 

procurement staff have received training in both the basic and advanced 

curricula. 

 19These reports are summarized in United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms, 

GAO/NSIAD-99-71 (Washington, D.C., Apr. 15, 1999). 

20GAO/NSIAD-99-71. 

Page 12 GAO-06-226T 
The Procurement Service has also begun developing a mandatory 

certification program. Procurement officials stated that their goal is to 

secure certification of all staff within 5 years. As part of this certification 

program, UN officials will train procurement staff to serve as trainers. 

According to UN officials, the curriculum for the trainers has been 

finalized and the UN has trained some staff as trainers. However, these

staff have yet to receive the certification they need before they can train 

UN procurement staff. Other uncertainties relating to the certification 

program exist, including the number of staff who will require certification 

training and the type of certification they will receive. 

Current budget levels for procurement training may not be adequate to 

support the new training efforts. A June 2005 report by the National 

Institute of Governmental Purchasing, advised the Procurement Service 

that its training budget was not sufficient to maintain the levels of training

needed to ensure fair, open, and ethical procurement operations.21 It 

recommended that the Procurement Service seek a larger budget. 

However, the budget’s adequacy cannot be assessed because the 

Procurement Service has not yet developed training profiles for each staff

member. Without assessments of individual training needs, the 

Procurement Service cannot accurately determine the funds it requires to 

address those needs. 

The United Nations Has 

Yet to Finalize 

Procurement Ethics 

Regulations 

The United Nations has not yet acted on several proposals forwarded by 

the UN Procurement Service to clarify ethics regulations for procurement 

staff. Although the United Nations has established general ethics rules and 

regulations for all UN staff, the Secretary-General has directed that 

additional rules be developed for procurement officers concerning their 

status, rights, and obligations. The General Assembly also has asked the 

Secretary-General to issue ethics guidelines for procurement staff without 

delay. Several draft rules and regulations specifically addressing 

procurement ethics are waiting internal review or approval; no firm dates 

have been set for their promulgation. 

If approved, the documents would emphasize that all procurement 

activities in the Secretariat are conducted in the sole interest of the United

Nations. They include a declaration of ethics responsibilities for 

 21The National Institute of Governmental Purchasing, Assessment of UNPS Procurement 

Processes, June 2005. 

Page 13 GAO-06-226T 
procurement staff, a code of conduct for vendors, and an outline of the 

policies in current rules and regulations as they relate to procurement 

staff. The proposed policies would also address ethics standards on 

conflict of interest and acceptance of gifts for procurement staff, and 

outline UN rules, regulations, and procedures for suppliers of goods and 

services to the United Nations. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I will be happy to 

address any questions you may have.

For further information, please contact Thomas Melito at (202) 512-9601. 

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Assistant 

Director Phyllis Anderson, Jaime Allentuck, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Richard 

Boudreau, Lynn Cothern, Timothy DiNapoli, Etana Finkler, Jackson 

Hufnagle, Kristy Kennedy, Clarette Kim, John Krump, Joy Labez, Jim 

Michels, Valérie Nowak, Barbara Shields, and Pierre Toureille. 

Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

Page 14 GAO-06-226T 
Page 15 GAO-06-226T 

Related GAO Products 

United Nations: Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to Achieve 

Lasting Results, GAO-05-392T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2005). 

United Nations: Oil for Food Program Audits, GAO-05-346T (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 15, 2005). 

United Nations: Reforms Progressing, but Comprehensive Assessments

Needed to Measure Impact, GAO-04-339 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004). 

United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms, GAO/NSIAD-99-71

(Washington, D.C., Apr. 15, 1999). 

(320394) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER