ZAIRE

Predicament and Prospects

A Report to the Minority Rights Group (USA)

by J. C. Willame et al.

UNITED STATES

INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Summary v

Preface by Minority Rights Group (USA) ix

Maps xii

Abbreviations xiv

Part I: Understanding the Unending Crisis in Zaire 1

Jean-Claude Willame

1 The Structure of Society 2

2 Economic Structures and Prospects 8

3 Political Structures and Prospects 14

4 Urgent Issues 19

Notes 21

CONTENTS
iv

Part II: Frameworks for Preventive Diplomacy 23

5 A Framework for Action to Arrest 

Further Violence in Zaire 24

Jean-Claude Willame

6 How Best to Provide International 

Economic Aid in Zaire 27

Hugues Leclercq

7 Violence in Zaire 31

Peter Rosenblum

Appendix: Rwandan Refugees in Kivu, Zaire 37

Catharine Newbury

Notes to Appendix 41

Chronology, 1960–96 42

About the Authors 49

About the Institute 51
For more than five years, the people of Zaire

have struggled to survive in a state on the brink

of utter collapse. Amid growing economic disarray and infrastructural breakdown, standards of living have plummeted, moral and ethical standards

have withered, and violence has risen. Political authority is almost hopelessly fragmented and discredited.

The massive inflow and outflow of Hutu refugees from

Rwanda has exacerbated Zaire’s multifaceted predicament—a predicament that, for political and economic

as well as humanitarian reasons, the international

community cannot ignore.

But what practical steps can and should be taken

by the international community, and which actors (individual governments, multilateral organizations, or

NGOs) should take them? In the search for answers to

these questions, and for an accurate portrait of the extent and nature of Zaire’s malaise, Minority Rights

Group (USA)—supported by the United States Institute of Peace and the Carnegie Corporation—initiated

a project in 1995 that brought together academics,

government officials, and NGO experts to consider

the case of Zaire and the prospects for effective preventive diplomacy there. This two-part report presents

the results of this project: part I offers a broad-ranging

examination of Zaire’s predicament; part II presents

three suggestions for preventive action to ameliorate

Zaire’s problems.

UNDERSTANDING THE UNENDING

CRISIS IN ZAIRE

Jean-Claude Willame

To the astonishment of many observers, Zaire continues to exist. Despite the implosion of key social, political, and economic structures since the beginning of

the 1990s, Zairians have developed a set of informal

arrangements that enables them to survive and prevents the societal explosion one would have expected.

Belgian colonial rule created a society, but not a

strong centralized state, out of a network of mobile

and autonomous households. In the postcolonial

period, attempts to establish the total unification of

Zairian society through the cult of the Supreme Chief

and acceptance of a party-state ran up against ethnic

and mostly regional loyalties. In regions such as

Shaba, Kasai, Kivu, and Kongo, these loyalties are still

strong. Even so, ethnicity in Zaire has little to do with

old-fashioned tribal realities; rather, it is essentially a

modern political phenomenon that revolves around

the allocation of scarce resources of power. Moreover,

urbanization has attenuated the divisive impact of ethnicity (and has done so without creating as pronounced a polarization between the cities and the

countryside as is sometimes claimed).

One social cleavage that is both significant and

growing is the distinction between the spheres of the

elite and the non-elite. The problem of inequality is

not simply one of rich versus poor but of Zaire’s increasing inability to redistribute wealth through the

channels of patrimonial relationships. Popular resentment at this could explode into violence.

The reactions of ordinary Zairians to such societal

stress have, however, been relatively peaceful to date,

though they have changed over time. In a first phase,

popular discontent with the Mobutu regime expressed itself through participation in “money games”;

the second phase consisted of a series of revolts and

looting in the early 1990s; next came a tide of messianic hope in the ability of charismatic leaders to

solve Zaire’s problems, followed shortly by great confusion as political parties proliferated amid a supposed “transition” to democracy. There is today

widespread popular disillusion with political

transition.

The most conspicuous feature of the economy of

Zaire is the dichotomy between the modern or formal

economy, which has completely collapsed, and the informal economy, which has created its own momenv

SUMMARY
tum. After more than a decade of economic growth,

the economy was badly shocked in the mid-1970s by

a confluence of national and international events. Stabilization programs foundered, and in the early 1990s

the economy crashed: public servants went unpaid,

the currency was reduced to nothing. As early as 1980

large regions had escaped government control and

were organizing illegal exports on a large scale. Today

the informal economy is a prominent feature of

Zairian life—and one that, by helping Zairians survive,

has inhibited widespread violence. Meanwhile, any

hopes of restarting the modern economy and achieving macroeconomic rehabilitation depend not least

on unorthodox approaches to tackling the huge national debt.

The political situation in Zaire is more complex

than is indicated in Western press reports, which present Mobutu as a powerful dictator fully responsible

for Zaire’s political chaos. The beginning of the political transition in 1990 unleashed a general drive for

power among a new generation who had previously

been contained by the old guard of the MPR or had

found no place in the political system. For many, political liberalization meant democracy, but above all a

form of democracy that could entail a greater share of

the national wealth. Hundreds of opposition parties

arose, but their opposition was limited to a single

objective: toppling Mobutu. The past five years have

seen many alignments and realignments among members of the old and the new political classes, but no

real change has occurred. So far the president’s power

has not been weakened by the transition in terms of

his ability to play off one faction against another.

Among the elite, the first nexus of power is made

up of President Mobutu and his immediate entourage. To date, Mobutu has succeeded in compelling his opponents to recognize his prominence in

foreign and defense affairs. A second nexus of power

is the current, and clearly unconstitutional, government of Prime Minister Kengo wa Dongo. The Kengo

government, conscious of its lack of domestic support, has been trying to gain external credibility by appearing to play a managerial role in the governing of

Zaire. Between these two centers of power are various

quarrelsome factions and a number of charismatic figures with ethnic or regional constituencies.

Three conclusions emerge from a survey of Zairian

politics. First, large-scale violence will probably not

erupt because factionalism prevents the consolidation of power. Second, nationalist feelings are strong

and pervasive among the political class. Third, those

institutions promoted by foreign governments—

democracy, the holding of free elections, and so

forth—do not seem very relevant to the circumstances

of Zairian political life.

Since the beginning of the transition, the Troika—

the United States, Belgium, and France—have

attempted to press for democracy and good governance. Their activities have not, however, achieved

significant or positive diplomatic results, partly due to

differences in their appraisal of Zaire’s political evolution. The only common denominator among the

three has been the affirmation of the necessity of

democracy through a fully legitimate National Conference.

Large-scale civil strife in Zaire seems unlikely in

part because Zairians have learned over the years to

live beyond the reach of the state’s authority and

structures. Interventions by both the Kengo government and President Mobutu have also helped to quell

some volatile situations.

Even so, the problem of generalized public insecurity remains critical throughout the country. Timely

payment of soldiers and civil servants might well reduce the extent of bribery and physical harassment.

Some local garrisons, it may be noted, have been paid

by local businessmen, and a temporary reprieve in

tensions has been the result. But such local expedients cannot overcome national macroeconomic and

financial woes. Zaire has the resources to support

only a fraction of its existing armed forces and civil

service. Another urgent issue concerns the creation of

a more favorable environment for the maintenance of

education and health, demand for which is very

strong among both urban and rural populations.

Given their strong sense of national dignity, Zairians regard outside intervention with suspicion.

Thus, foreign mediators, analysts, and practitioners

must appreciate and respect Zairian political culture.

Mediating local and regional conflicts, which have often degenerated into “national” ones, is one of the

most urgent issues in Zaire, especially in light of the

continued postponement of parliamentary elections.

Assisting intergroup mediation must precede any attempt at “educating” people about democracy and

codes of conduct. Additionally, typical state-to-state

relations between Zaire and outside governments will

yield few results if they focus on the management of

resources at the expense of addressing human and

social concerns.

vi
FRAMEWORKS FOR PREVENTIVE

DIPLOMACY

A Framework for Action to Arrest Further

Violence in Zaire

Jean-Claude Willame

A framework for immediate action would focus on

regional conflict prevention. Following an on-site

expert assessment mission, an independent and informal forum should be developed—preferably under

UN auspices—to identify areas where local political

mediation is most urgently needed. Pilot centers

should be set up to implement the recommendations

of the forum and strengthen local resources.

How Best to Provide International Economic

Aid in Zaire

Hugues Leclercq

The severe malfunctioning and corruption of the

monetary system not only inhibit the recovery of the

economy but also would negate the benefits of largescale aid programs, especially those working through

the government. The system of parallel currencies

must be regularized and a climate of public security

guaranteed for any real reform to occur. Aid agencies

and governments can still effectively contribute to

Zaire by extending credit and aid in proportion to the

economy’s capacity to absorb it, targeting small

infusions especially to those small, vibrant microindustries thriving away from the center of Zaire.

Violence in Zaire

Peter Rosenblum

The pervasive state-sponsored—and now increasingly “privatized”—violence in Zaire is a primary

impediment to real political transition, social and

ethnic stability, and economic development. The reform of the army and other security forces will depend on establishing a regular and sufficient pay

schedule, as well as successfully delinking militarized

groups and gangs from political manipulations by

various elites. Much of the privatized violence is unarmed, but given the arms flowing through the country, conditions could dramatically worsen. Indeed,

the takeover of Kivu by a “rebel” army in the fall of

1996 has challenged the fragile order maintained by

the armed forces of the state.

APPENDIX

Rwandan Refugees in Kivu, Zaire

Catharine Newbury

In an appendix written in early 1996, Catharine Newbury examines the Rwandan refugee crisis in the Kivu

region of Zaire. Although most of the refugees have

since returned home, Newbury’s analysis remains

valuable for the issues it identifies and the solutions it

proposes to problems typical of many African refugee

crises. Priority should be placed on a multipronged

approach: halting the delivery of weapons to rebel

forces; concrete efforts by the home government to

encourage refugees to return and ensure their security; programs to enhance communication between

the refugee camps and the villages and communes

from which the refugees fled; mechanisms to resolve

land conflicts as refugees return home; and donor assistance to fund the costs of repatriation.

CHRONOLOGY, 1960–96

Key events in Zaire’s postcolonial history are chronicled, especially the political turmoil of recent years. 

vii
ix

This report on Zaire is the first published result of the program on preventive diplomacy

undertaken by Minority Rights Group (USA),

with the support of the United States Institute of

Peace and the Carnegie Corporation.

The notion of preventive diplomacy has been in

the air for many years and has collected both defenders and detractors, but all would agree that it received

a fresh impetus from the Secretary-General of the

United Nations in his An Agenda for Peace. Mr.

Boutros-Ghali, an experienced diplomat, is well aware

that much good diplomacy has always been preventive, on the principle that prevention is better than a

cure. An Agenda for Peace, however, calls for preventive diplomacy specifically through the United Nations. That implies action by and for the international

community, a careful and constructive interpretation

of the UN Charter, and the evolution of new methodologies. The charter provides a variety of ways in

which diplomacy in general can be brought to bear on

a problem. UN preventive diplomacy may be thought

to call in particular for soundings, investigations, UNbrokered negotiations, proposals by the SecretaryGeneral, and other discrete actions by the Secretariat

and agencies. This is a delicate matter for which there

are few well-established procedures. How are dangerous issues to be defused while respecting national

sovereignty?

MRG (USA) does not presume to supply a blueprint; however, supported by a distinguished Advisory Board, it does believe that as an experienced

non-governmental organization (NGO) it can make a

worthwhile contribution to the techniques and practice of preventive diplomacy. It seeks to help in the

realm of information, analysis, and preparation for

those who may be called upon to respond to matters

of concern to the international community.

The first case MRG (USA) considered in this light

is the predicament in which Zaire finds itself. This can

be investigated at several levels. There is the fallout

from the enormous and unexpected influx of

refugees, mainly from Rwanda, to the province of

Kivu; the crisis has produced severe strains within

Zaire and in relations with Rwanda, to say nothing of

a horrendous humanitarian problem. There is the collapse of central government. There is the “transition

process” toward more democratic political arrangements in which the United Nations and others are by

agreement playing a role. There is a serious breakdown of infrastructure and there are signs of a rising

level of violence. Underlying all is a profound deterioration in the standard of living for most people. In

such circumstances, Zaire is open to a sudden shock

calling for the deployment of massive and expensive

resources by the international community.

The more one investigates the roots of the predicament, the clearer it becomes that a still larger crisis

than at present exists could be very ugly—yet the more

evident it is that such a crisis could be prevented. If

preventive diplomacy through the United Nations is

to become a reality, Zaire presents a singular challenge that cannot be ignored. And if the existing crisis

in Zaire should escalate, the international community

may yet be grateful for action to forestall and control

its development.

It is the particular merit of Professor Jean-Claude

Willame’s paper “Understanding the Unending Crisis

in Zaire” to illuminate the nature of Zairian life. He

shows us that if Zaire has “failed” in some senses, the

Zairian people are nevertheless surviving and grassroots community action is growing. This insight reveals possibilities for healing the Zairian ills that are

not necessarily apparent through normal diplomatic

exchanges, and it is precisely this sort of understanding that MRG (USA) seeks to elicit. Professor Willame

and his colleagues on the team assembled by MRG

(USA) explain the local, social, political, and economic forces that transcend the daily dysfunction of

PREFACE
the Zairian state and in so doing indicate possible remedial actions of an unusual kind. The possibility is

growing of salvation burgeoning from the grassroots

rather than being handed down from the top of the

political pyramid. That could prove to be a vital insight.

The experimental methodology employed in this

project—research leading to a series of workshops—

worked well. Professor Willame’s report provided the

original working paper for the workshops held during autumn 1995. These workshops involved a small

number of important scholars and analysts of Zaire

(and the Great Lakes region) together with policy

practitioners. This bringing together of academic,

NGO, and governmental experts proved mutually

beneficial and led to a more effective and coordinated

approach to certain Zairian problems. 

The ensuing discussions produced a high degree

of consensus on how to answer the question, “What

precisely are the elements in the Zairian predicament

that should concern the international community and

could be ameliorated in a practical way by international action?” At the final session of the workshop a

range of options was debated in response to the question, “Given our consensus on the situations that

should concern the international community, what

practical steps can and should be taken, by whom,

and at what cost?” 

The broad answers—plural, because it was recognized that no single key can unlock all the problems

considered—are set forth in three short papers in part

II of this report (and in a fourth in the appendix),

each the work of a single author, written while debate

was under way and revised after the final workshop.

These recommendations were intended as a “framework” that could be amplified and adjusted in the

light of ongoing developments.

The upsurge of fighting in Kivu, the dramatic largescale movement of refugees, the strained relations

with Rwanda, the prolonged illness of President

Mobutu, the failure to launch the electoral process,

and half a dozen other unwelcome developments of

the autumn of 1996 confirm that the so-called “crisis

waiting to happen” in Zaire has stopped waiting.

What will happen and exactly when cannot be safely

predicted, but it is evident that the old processes are

tired and have not worked. Something new is required if a still greater crisis is to be prevented.

Action through the Troika alone (the governments

of Belgium, France, and the United States) may not be

effective, and the involvement of the wider international community may be required. If this is the case,

one possible course of promising action might be to

create a working group in New York to be chaired by

the UN Secretariat and to appoint in the Great Lakes

region a special representative of the SecretaryGeneral. The working group, whose core members

could be joined by others according to the agenda of

individual meetings, would coordinate the activities

of agencies and, to the extent appropriate, of NGOs,

and would have an overview of the relations between

the international community and the governments of

the region. The special representative would be the

main source of recommendations and the principal

implementer of practical policies. The special representative, in this scheme, would have three principal

objectives: (1) to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of Zaire and the other states in the region; (2)

to negotiate the best achievable settlement of the

refugee problem, including bringing to justice the perpetrators of genocide; and (3) to encourage the

growth of civil society and democratic institutions in

Zaire. The achievement of objective (1) depends crucially but not wholly on success with (2) and (3).

However, it would be a mistake to regard those latter two objectives as inseparable problems that can

only be tackled jointly and simultaneously. As Professor Willame notes in his paper in part I, the disasters

in Rwanda and the crisis in Zaire are not necessarily

part and parcel of each other. We believe that the

Rwandan (and Burundi) refugee situation demands

instant action that does not depend upon the resolution of the crisis in Zaire. And vice versa. This is just as

well, because the scale of the crisis in Zaire means that

it has to be tackled piecemeal by a patient, sustained

effort over several years.

Elections will not themselves resolve the crisis. On

the contrary, there is a danger that the international

community will consider that assistance with elections—an obviously worthy and expensive project—

absolves it from other, longer-running and more

constructive efforts. The political elites in Zaire have

so conspicuously failed to make the necessary provisions for elections (for instance, the establishment of

electoral rolls) that the international community

should desist from giving priority to national parliamentary elections and should, as a first step, aim to

assist with local elections as and where appropriate

conditions exist. It would, for example, be impractical

to hold any elections in Kivu province at present.

x
This illustrates the point that if we insist on dealing

with Zairian problems only when all parts of that vast

and varied country are equally ready, we may wait forever. This is certainly not how to conduct preventive

diplomacy.

The top priority for the special representative of

the Secretary-General should be the encouragement

of civil society at the grassroots as and where it is possible to build on the spontaneous action taking place

in several regions of the country. It will be up to the

special representative to take appropriate soundings

and to form his own views. He will, however, be wise

to take seriously the proposals and the timetable suggested by Professor Willame (see part II). A program

along these lines would swiftly get to grips with the

basic problems and would be relatively cheap: a

small, high-quality staff would suffice, and most of the

early disbursements would be measured in thousands, rather than hundreds of thousands, of dollars.

The special representative would not be alone in

assisting Zaire. We envisage activity by several UN

agencies and also by NGOs. We place particular importance on the role of the World Bank and we stress

the need for action along the lines of the suggestions

by Professor Hugues Leclercq (see part II).

Apart from the development of the crises already

described, the greatest threat to the national unity of

Zaire is the growth in violence. Action to avoid and

curb this is a sine qua non of success, and in this context we commend the observations put forward by

Peter Rosenblum (in part II).

In tackling the refugee problem, the special representative would have at least two key objectives: to

arrange for human rights observers, including NGOs,

to monitor the situation of returned refugees in

Rwanda and Burundi and report through him or her

to the Secretary-General and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; and to encourage the

Zairian authorities to hand over the suspected perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda to international authorities and to resettle far from the border with Rwanda

those refugees genuinely unwilling to return home.

Pursuing these goals will call for great perseverance

on the part of the special representative. It will also

call for remarkable flexibility and inventiveness, given

the very fluid and unpredictable nature of the refugee

crisis. Even so, certain issues will be of enduring

concern and certain approaches of continuing worth.

In an appendix to this report penned in early 1996,

Catharine Newbury pinpoints several of these issues

and approaches. Although the character of the

refugee crisis in Kivu has dramatically changed since

her paper was written, Dr. Newbury’s analysis

remains valuable for its identification of problems—

and of potential solutions to those problems—typical

of many African refugee crises.

Of course, MRG (USA) hopes that the international community, the communities within Zaire, and

the Zairian authorities will adopt these and other recommendations set out in this report. But irrespective

of this, MRG (USA) believes that all the actors and potential actors in the Zairian predicament, together

with many others, notably in academia and the media,

will benefit from the analysis and wisdom contained

in the contributions from Professor Willame and his

colleagues.

MRG (USA) thanks Professor M. Crawford Young,

Professor Michael Schatzberg, and Professor Tom

Callaghy for their important comments—both supportive and critical—on the report. Professor Herbert

Weiss in particular gave invaluable time and advice

on the report and the overall project, for which we are

very much obliged. Pascal Kambale Kalume of

AZADHO and currently a fellow with the International Human Rights Law Group kindly updated the

chronology. The generous support of the Carnegie

Corporation and the United States Institute of Peace

was indispensable, and we are grateful for the practical and sympathetic encouragement of their officers.

Most importantly, the kind support and encouragement of Mr. Kouyaté and his able staff at the United

Nations Department of Political Affairs made this

project possible in the first place. The last word in

thanks and acknowledgment must go to the “team”:

Professor Willame, Professor Hugues Leclercq, 

Dr. Catharine Newbury, and Mr. Peter Rosenblum.

Their excellent analysis and judgment were more

than matched by their unflagging commitment to 

the future prospects of Zaire.

ELIZABETH CABOT AND JOHN THOMSON

MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP (USA)

xi
xii

ZAIRE AND ITS AFRICAN NEIGHBORS

MAPS
xiii

ZAIRE: MAJOR CITIES AND PROVINCES
xiv

AZADHO Association zairoise des droits de l’homme 

CEDAF Centre d’études et de documentation africaine

CNDDH Comité national pour la défense des droits de l’homme

CNONGD Conseil national des organisations non gouvernmentales de développement

COMINGEM Combinat industriel de Gemena 

DSP Division spéciale présidentielle

FAZ Forces armées zairoises

FLNC Front de libération national congolais

FPC Force politique du conclave

GDN Gendarmerie nationale

HCR Haut conseil de la république

JUFERI Jeunesse de l’union des fédéralistes républicains

LIZADHO Ligue zairoise des droits de l’homme

MPR Mouvement populaire de la révolution

OAU Organization of African Unity 

PALU Parti Lumumbiste unifie

PDSC Parti démocratique social chrétien

PRP Parti révolutionnaire du peuple

SARM Service d’action et de renseignement militaire

SNIP Service national d’intelligence et de protection 

SOSIDER Société d’exploration siderurgique

SOZIR Société Zaire-italienne de raffinage

UDPS Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social

UFERI Union des fédéralistes indépendants

UNAMIR United Nations Advance Mission in Rwanda

UNHCR United Nations High Commission on Refugees

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USORAL Union sacrée de l’opposition radicale et alliés

VSV Voix des sans voix

ABBREVIATIONS
“Zaire: is there a state?” . . . “the unending crisis” . . .

“the rise and fall of the Zairian state” . . . “the nonexistent state.” For more than five years such phrases have

been used to describe Zaire, as though the country

were unable to avoid congenital chaos during its first

decades of independence.

Some twenty years after independence, Zairian sociologist Ilunga Kabongo wrote that were one to put

all the relevant data on Zaire in a computer, one could

conclude such a country did not exist.1 But clearly

Zaire does exist, to the astonishment of many observers, even though certain meaningful social, economic, and political structures have imploded over

the past five years; and even though—probably a more

worrisome point—few ethical and moral values have

prevailed in political and civil society.

This report does not attempt to recount the long

and painful historical processes that led to that implosion. Instead, it tries to explain the way society at

large, as well as some of its economic, social, and political arrangements, hold together in a somewhat

bizarre and mostly paradoxical “order” preventing the

explosion that one would have expected. 

1

PART I

UNDERSTANDING THE

UNENDING CRISIS IN

ZAIRE

Jean-Claude Willame
Afirst point to consider is whether a single

Zairian society exists within a specific

Zairian territory. During colonial times the

existence of such a society was firmly denied. Belgium

viewed its African possession as a mosaic of several

hundred autonomous tribal groupings and clanic aggregates, which often maintained “traditionally” hostile relations with their neighbors. In order to govern

a territory eighty times larger than Belgium—and one

which had to be “dominated in order to serve,” as former Governor Ryckmans used to put it—the colonial

administration searched frantically for local chiefs

and intermediaries responsible for well-circumscribed territorial entities, usually identified by rigid

ethnic and tribal divisions.

To be sure, there was a paradox in the colonial

Promethean ideology. While Belgium aimed to civilisé, christianisé, et modernisé the Congo, it could not

help assuming that the colonized and (sometimes) affectionate “children” of the Belgian king were doomed

to live in a state of tribal nature from which they

would only slowly emerge. This perception outlasted

the colonial period and explains the current and protracted frustration that exists between large segments

of the Congolese, and now Zairian elites, and the Belgians.

From the early postcolonial period onward, historians and anthropologists have questioned the congruence between tribe and territory. Among others,

Jan Vansina has suggested that Congolese societies

were the result of a network of ethnic and tribal

clusters characterized by territorial mobility. This

condition was determined by the pressures of the prevailing mode of production, such as extensive agriculture or hunting and gathering.2 In contrast to other

societies in Africa, in Zaire household migrations continuously fluctuated according to the basic requirements of subsistence—for example, food security,

natural frontiers, relationships with neighbors, and

density. Vansina also suggested that political centralization was never completely realized in the so-called

kingdoms of central Africa: the prevailing sentiments

for local autonomy among households prevented

consolidation into strong chiefdoms.3

Colonial rule succeeded however, consciously or

not, in creating a society, if not a strong centralized

state, out of these multiple households. The central

figures of the Belgian colonial triad—colonial administrator, missionary, and company—served to unify this

society despite occasional resistance by local populations to performing their roles of “good taxpayer,”

“good Christian,” and “good company worker.”

The colonial authoritarian experiment was consolidated under a Zairian “monarch,” President Mobutu

Sese Seko, who imposed himself as the founding father of a Zairian nation after a “time of troubles”

(1960–65). The unification of society by the elite was

conducted and pursued in different ways, however:

frequent political turnover at the top and middle levels of provincial, regional, and local administrations

replaced the rigid pattern of colonial governance. 

The good MPR militant was loyal and obedient to the

“Chief,” just as he or she used to be to the colonial

administrator.

Further consolidation of the Zairian nation arose

through newly fashioned cultural artifacts in such

realms as dance, music, and song. The slogan of authenticity helped create feelings of national pride and

unity, even in distant parts of the country. Education,

urbanization, and the development of small trade and

business dramatically increased after independence

and also contributed to the acceleration of social exchanges.

THE QUESTION OF TRIBAL LOYALTIES

However, total unification of Zairian society in the

postcolonial period, through the cult of the Supreme

Chief and obedience to a new political religion

embodied in a party-state (the MPR), remained

1

THE STRUCTURE

OF SOCIETY

Consolidating the

Postcolonial Authority

2
incomplete. Ethnic and mostly regional loyalties

flourished at elite, sub-elite, and popular levels despite the president’s ability to constantly remove political entrepreneurs from their territorial or ethnic

power bases.

Shaba Region

Popular and elite allegiances to the former Katanga

(now Shaba) persisted even after the first secession

attempt ended in January 1963. Over the following

decade Shabans viewed Zaire as comprising only

those from Kinshasa, not themselves. Shaba once provided 60 percent to 80 percent of Zaire’s hard currency through Gécamines, the main producer of

copper and cobalt, and the Shabans’ consciousness of

being a main source of economic prosperity was widespread and strengthened latent feelings of regional

autonomy.

It was very well known that President Mobutu,

even at the peak of his strength in the late 1960s and

early 1970s, continued to worry about a new secession in Shaba. The enormous Inga-Shaba power-line

project was built partly to address that threat: in the

event of a Katangese insurgency, Kinshasa could

“press the button” and cut the supply of electricity for

the mining industry.4 In 1977 and 1978, the two

Shaba wars, as they came to be known, posed a direct

threat of separatism and seriously endangered the viability of the political regime. The ensuing French and

Belgian military intervention went beyond mere protection and evacuation of foreign expatriates.

No wonder then that the collapse of the Zairian

state after 1991 revived the myths and symbols of the

old Katangese secession. In 1992 most of the inhabitants who were not regarded as true Katangese citizens (largely those of Luba origin) were expelled

from the mining towns where they had formed the

major part of the administrative, industrial, and technical personnel since their arrival in the colonial

period. The revival of Katangese secession was nevertheless unrealistic. Gécamines had virtually collapsed

by 1991, and no foreign company had any real interest in its copper or cobalt ventures.

Kasai Region

Kasai, mostly Luba, ethnic “particularism” was perceived as one of the major threats to the political cohesion of Zairian society. Like Katanga, Kasai seceded

from the central government in 1960–62. Since then,

Luba administrative, social, and commercial elites

have spread all over the Congo country to form an

ethnic diaspora that has been viewed with suspicion

by the rest of the political class. Meanwhile, in their

stronghold of South Kasai, the Luba have taken over

the second source of economic prosperity in Zaire:

the diamond trade, a business whose profits they

have been compelled to share with other regional

barons.

As early as the 1960s, the Baluba regarded themselves as the “Jews of the Congo,” and some of their

most notorious leaders (for example, J. Ngalula) were

called “Moise.” They felt persecuted by most of the

other ethnic constituencies, who disliked the privileges the Baluba allegedly garnered under the white

administration. During the Second Republic they remained highly visible in politics: President Mobutu’s

strategy was to consistently absorb the Luba elite into

the highest levels of the political hierarchy in order to

better control it. Since 1978 one of the harshest opponents of the regime among the Luba elite has been

Etienne Tshisekedi, later named the “Zairian Moise,”

who, together with ten fellow Kasaians, led a protracted struggle against Mobutu.

With the implosion of the copper and cobalt sectors and an economy that relies nowadays mostly on

the legal and illegal export of diamonds, Kasaians—

and thus the Baluba—are regarded with suspicion as

their region has become the center of the “real” economy of the country. The fact that they are a leading

force behind the main radical opposition party, the

UDPS, as well as having members involved in many

other smaller political groups, has antagonized most

of the other ethnic and regional elites.

In almost all the regions and provinces, the Luba

diaspora is implicitly accused of wanting power only

for its own people. Like the Shabans, the Luba are

threatened with expulsion by the “native sons.” The

grievances of the “Jews of Zaire” once again resonate.

Kivu Region

Somewhat milder regional loyalties in North and

South Kivu have been another noteworthy political

force in Zaire. Unlike the Baluba of Kasai or the

Katangese, the natives of Kivu have never been especially vocal in national politics—their elite preferring

to withdraw quietly from the political theater. Equally,

Kivu’s representatives in Kinshasa were never very active or well known, and some were even distrusted.

As the economic recession deepened, the Kivu

economy, especially that of North Kivu, became

increasingly oriented eastward. Local business and

3
trade based on the illegal export of gold and coffee

have always been relatively independent of the

Zairian kleptocracy. The most important part of it was

taken over by an entrepreneurial ethnic group, the

Banande, whose sphere of expansion once reached

the Kisangani area5 and who used to trade with distant regions in East Africa and the Middle East

(Dubai).

Another entrepreneurial group is the Banyarwanda, many of whom came from Rwanda in the

1930s or after the political turmoil of 1959, 1963, and

1973. They acquired vast areas of grazing land in Masisi and Rutshuru and even expanded farther west

into the territory of Walikale. Not considered “true”

Zairians by the native population, they came into collision in the 1980s with the native agriculturists of

North Kivu (the Bahunde, Batembo, and Nyanga),

who now tend to associate “democracy” with the recapture of what they deem to be their own land and

property and the expulsion of those they regard as

foreigners.

Kongo Region

“Kongo nationalism,” once an important political reference in the 1960s, has not been a substantial driving ethnic force in the Second Republic. Shortly after

independence, Kongo elites loudly proclaimed their

rights as the first occupants of the capital city, but

have since quietly renounced the struggle for political

autonomy. Entering into good relations with the

Mobutu regime, they were allowed to concentrate

freely in big business and trade, a position enhanced

by the region’s strategic location near the sea, and

benefiting until recently from a relatively good road

and railway system. In short, this region, which was a

granary for the capital, softened its demand for purely

political rewards and benefits.

More recently, however, grievances against “nonnatives” who are heading certain public and state enterprises have been heard. As in Kasai, Kivu, and

“Katanga,” calls for autonomy are gaining strength

and momentum, although the Congolese realize perfectly well that their future cannot be disassociated

from Kinshasa, which remains the immediate hinterland.

---

In sum, ethnicity in Zaire should not be regarded as—

nor associated with—“backward” struggles related to

old-fashioned ethnographic tribal concepts and

realities. Ethnicity is essentially a modern political

phenomenon that revolves around the allocation of

the scarce resources of power. It expresses itself

through local and regional allegiances that are more

geopolitically than historically circumscribed.

Moreover, urbanization has been instrumental in

attenuating the divisive impact of ethnicity. The

Zairian essayist Lye Mboka has pointed out the ambivalence of ethnic urban identities in his humorous

“Letter to a Village Uncle”: 

Believe me, here [in Kinshasa] tribal origins sometimes lose their importance. Look at me, for example, with my unidentifiable name, I continuously

change my regional affiliation according to the demands of cooperation.6 I am a native of Tshikapa,

of Isiro, or of Kahemba whenever I have to talk

about precious stones and business. I am a native

of Equateur whenever I have to impress women. 

I am from Bas-Zaire, to be acknowledged and welcomed by the religious sects. But I am from Kinshasa, that is to say, sexless and with no biases

whenever I have to talk about politics, giving myself the false alibi of being neutral.7

THE RELIGIOUS CLEAVAGES

Institutionalized religion is not at the root of social

and political distinctions and affiliations in Zaire.

President Mobutu has always taken great care to

maintain a subtle equilibrium between the three main

official churches: Catholic, Protestant, and Kimbanguist. Major quarrels with the Catholic Church in the

1970s led Mobutu to counter its profound influence

in society and its powerful array of social services 

in the education and health sectors by granting

4

1958 1970 1984 1993

Kinshasa 398,472 1,142,761 2,664,309 4,402,633

Lubumbashi 182,872 318,000 564,830 817,153

Mbujimayi 42,864 204,923 486,235 766,684

Kisangani 121,726 216,526 317,581 406,249

Kananga 116,940 203,398 298,693 392,389

Kolwezi 56,434 76,182 220,706 391,979

Likasi 74,833 133,696 213,862 289,249

Bukavu 52,896 130,094 167,950 197,924

Kikwit 15,198 113,017 149,296 178,549

Mbandaka 61,675 101,925 137,291 166,266

Goma 33,426 56,495 94,984 130,582

Source: Jean Flouriot, “Introduction à la géographique physique et

humaine du Zaire” (Lyon, February 5, 1994, mimeographed).

Table 1. Population Growth in Zaire’s Largest Cities

(1958–93).
protection to both the Protestant and especially to the

“native” Kimbanguist Church, so deeply rooted

among the Bakongo people.

However, allegiance to only one cult has always

been tenuous in Zaire, and in the present crisis is

likely to become more so. People are turning both to

traditional institutional religions (mostly to the

Catholic Church) and to the numerous sects that

have always been active in the country and are believed to provide spiritual rewards and security.8

Since the onset of political transition, numerous

prayer groups, exorcists, messianic and prophetic

“churches,” and evangelists—some of whom are foreign-born—have proliferated, especially in Kinshasa.

Active in the official media (radio and television), they

have received a lot of publicity in the press. These

movements and individuals are popular not just

among the poor: they recruit intensively among members of the presidential entourage, former clientele of

MPR dignitaries, army officers, and even security

agents.9

One fact remains, however: the Catholic Church is

too influential an institution to be really threatened.

The magnitude of its economic and social role

throughout the country is demonstrated by the fact

that, even after the collapse of state structures and institutions, the church remains one of the main pillars

of the informal economy, as well as the primary

provider of health care and education.

URBANIZATION

The spectacular growth of urbanization, especially in

Kinshasa, seems to indicate a growing polarization

between urban centers and the countryside. According to Joseph Boute and Léon de Saint-Moulin, the

rate of urbanization rose from 8 percent in 1959 to 

19 percent in 1970 and to about 28–32 percent in

1984.10 Today, 8.9 million Zairians live in cities of

100,000 or more inhabitants. Estimates are that in

2000 half of the population will live in cities, with

over five million people in Kinshasa.11

As table 1 indicates, urban growth is not limited to

the capital city. The population of other urban clusters such as Lubumbashi, or the main center of diamond production and export, Mbujimayi, has risen

more than sevenfold from the late 1950s to the early

1990s. Thus the emphasis sometimes placed on the

existence of a radical dichotomy between urban

Kinshasa and the rest of the country does not seem

entirely accurate.

Moreover, the French demographer Jean-Claude

Bruneau argues that Zaire has actually experienced a

decrease in urban growth over the last twenty years

due to the severity of the economic and social crisis.12

This trend has mostly affected the big cities, while

medium-sized or small towns (especially in Shaba

and Kasai) continue to grow.

A second point is that the development of urbanization must be seen in the context of a large hinterland within which cities interact commercially and

otherwise. Kinshasa could not survive without neighboring Bandundu and Bas-Zaire feeding the capital

city during the rainy season, and without territories

farther north (Equateur) supplying staple foods during the dry season. The vitality of trade in Zaire—despite the severe constraints—has constantly put cities

and countryside in close contact and enhanced the

circulation of goods and people.

Third, it would be a mistake to regard Zairian cities

as the beneficiaries of specific revenues at the expense

of the rural countryside. A familiar image, partly supplied by World Bank analyses, of an urban milieu

sucking its surplus from an impoverished rural sector

is not quite accurate. Before the collapse of the modern economy in 1991, the value added to agriculture,

most notably cassava, which is the main staple food in

Zaire, had reached 30 percent of the total economic

activity, whereas that of typically urban activities

(manufacturing, transport, and services) lagged well

behind (see figure 1).

5

Figure 1. Value Added to the Main Economic Sectors

in 1987.
Finally, Kinshasa and other large cities are home

primarily to a population that has largely retained its

rural mentality. The top elites maintain local loyalties

that are the dominant frame of reference, but the big

cities otherwise are conglomerates of rural-minded

inhabitants lacking fully integrated urban habits. This

is still the case today, despite a high incidence of

intermarriage and proximity with “alien” ethnic constituencies that have given rise to the feeling of being

“Kinois” (that is, an inhabitant of Kinshasa).

Since the episodes of massive looting in September

1991 and January 1993, many people are seeking

help and refuge in their neighborhoods. René

Devisch, for example, speaks of the “villagization” 

of towns where urban citizens seek to renew values of

solidarity through land cultivation or other activities

related to agriculture.13

ELITE AND NON-ELITE AFFILIATION

Beyond tribal allegiances often tempered by regional

ties, beyond religious affiliations (which are not necessarily conducive to political divisions), and beyond

the question of rural-versus-urban identities (which,

in fact, are often blurred), there is one dominant

cleavage that has continued to grow with the consolidation of the Mobutu regime and that even precedes

tribe, religion, and urbanity. That is the distinction between the spheres of the elite and the non-elite.

One of the main features—and a consequence—of

the deterioration of the political regime in Zaire is the

enlargement of the gap between the classes. This

breach was initially created by a decolonization

process that moved too quickly. The growing inequalities were summarized in pat images, such as a country ruled by a powerful dictator (“one of the richest

men in Africa”), promulgated by part of the Belgian

and international press and relayed by the “free” opposition press. Such images have contributed to an

oversimplified understanding of political and social

conditions in Zaire.

Although the classical measure of revenue inequalities (the Gini coefficient) is more moderate in Zaire

than in Western European countries, the relatively

egalitarian distribution of revenue in the agricultural

and urban sectors conceals the reality of a tiny, extremely rich ruling class that absorbs more than 45

percent of the national wealth (see table 2). Thanks to

Mobutu’s political acumen, members of this class

have basically overcome ethnic and tribal divisions,

having lost touch in many instances with their constituencies.

However, it might be argued that the problem of

inequality in Zaire (as well as in other sub-Saharan

countries) cannot simply be defined as rich versus

poor. Rather, as François-Régis Mahieu points out, a

proper understanding of elite versus non-elite is related not to the acquisition of wealth but to its redistribution. In other words, what is at stake is not the

immense and arrogant wealth of a tiny fraction of the

population but its growing inability to redistribute

wealth through the vertical and horizontal channels

of patrimonial relationships.

The problem many African countries, both rich

and poor, face nowadays—and particularly since the

beginning of the attrition of external assistance—is the

“growing pressure upon a diminishing constituency

of political donors (be they external or internal),” as

Mahieu puts it.

Hence, a growing confrontation between the

“haves,” who no longer redistribute, and the “havenots”; hence also a growing number of people, especially urban youngsters, who no longer respect

their traditional obligations toward the community from which they have progressively come to

feel excluded. At this stage, not only the poor but

also the relatively protected middle class have developed a real sickness. . . . According to a classical

syndrome, they have too many problems and have

lost the prestige and consideration they once enjoyed from their constituency and from which they

now fear reprisal.14

It is precisely at this juncture that a popular explosion might take place, and one that could be exacerbated not only by the loss of income but also by the

loss of status and sense of citizenry. Complicating the

situation is the tremendous diminution of purchasing

power, the disappearance of social services, and the

threats to personal security posed by crime and police

“extraction.”

SOCIAL RESPONSES TO CRISIS

This leads us to the reactions of ordinary people facing a situation of societal stress in Zaire, especially in

the urban environment. These reactions, which have

been relatively peaceful, have changed over time.

In a first phase, popular discontent and disaffection with the Mobutu regime expressed themselves

by the huge participation in money games—the socalled Bindo Promotion, the Pannier de la Ménagère,

and so on—developed in Kinshasa and elsewhere

from the beginning of the “transition” process.15

6
Launched by mid-level urban businessmen and

traders, these games consisted of making deposits of

money in exchange for “gifts” (first in kind, next in

interest), the value of which was two to three times

higher than the original deposit. In a couple of

months, these games became immensely popular.

Among ordinary people who did not immediately

realize that the “gifts” just equaled the rate of inflation,

this unexpected wealth was said to originate from

Mobutu himself, who was finally redistributing to the

people from his own treasury chest. Eventually, the

pouring of money into schemes came to exceed the

capacity of those who had promoted the games to reimburse players: thousands received neither their

gifts nor their initial deposits.

The second phase consisted of a series of revolts

and looting, in Kinshasa in December 1990, in Mbujimayi in May 1991, in Kinshasa again in June 1991,

then in almost all the Zairian cities between September and October 1991. At this stage, the impoverished

sections of the army became directly involved; in

most instances soldiers opened the way to the great

pillages and acts of destruction of September and

October 1991. In many cases, however, systematic

looting developed in a festive atmosphere and in a

sort of “organized chaos.”16

Next, in the aftermath of the military and popular

uprising, urban populations turned to a messianic

hope induced by a charismatic type of political hero.

They looked to a few personalities who had long been

out of politics and were perceived as potential successors to Mobutu, who was thought to be losing his

magical grip on the political system. This was the period of the much acclaimed return of leaders such as

Tshisekedi and Gizenga and of the beginning of the

National Conference in early 1992.

A period of extraordinary confusion followed, as

more than three hundred parties registered and 

more than two thousand delegates participated in 

the National Conference. Subsequently, the quick

succession of prime ministers designated by Mobutu

or by the National Conference, the suspension and

reopening of the National Conference, and the protracted debates on responsibility for the bankruptcy 

of Zaire added to the rampant political insecurity and

social banditry in Kinshasa and led to the collapse of

the monetary and economic system—resulting in widespread popular disillusion with political transition.

The transition did not result in a large and organized movement of civil disturbance, except for the

1991 looting. Clearly, however, political violence and

abuses by ruling elites—ranging from large-scale corruption to arbitrary arrests of opponents or rivals—

have spread throughout large segments of the civil

society.

From life stories collected from among ordinary

people in Kisangani and elsewhere, Benoit Verhaegen

and Bugumil Jewsiewicki have both observed the spiral of violence, despotism, and autocracy in Zairian

civil society.17 As Jewsiewicki writes:

[Social] cohesion is mostly ensured by the fear of

others. Stories present a world where violence, often so insidious that the discourse of “tradition”

translates into matters of witchcraft, constitutes

the principal if not the only relationship between

individuals. Life is the art of avoiding the worst in

order to survive, in the hope of being able one day

to abuse another man, or better yet, another

woman. The violence that results is an end unto

itself and the ambiguities that emerge confer 

upon state violence more than the appearance of

legitimacy.18

To the extent that Zaire can still be regarded as a

nation and as a single society, it is a society that is experiencing a deep “social sickness,” a sickness aggravated and exacerbated by the political evolution of the

country. It will take time for Zaire to heal.

7

Percentage Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of

of Agricultural Nonagricultural Revenue in Revenue in

Quintiles Revenue Revenue Zaire Kinshasa

1 7.78 6.50 7.19 7.5

2 11.54 11.13 10.89 11.5

3 15.68 15.29 15.02 16.0

4 21.93 21.19 21.37 23.0

5 43.07 45.90 45.53 42.0

Gini coefficient 0.338 0.378 0.364 0.385

Source: J. Maton, “Structure et développement de l’économie zairoise: Une analyse macroéconomique” (working paper, Ghent, November 1993).

Table 2. Revenue Distribution by Quintiles.
The confused economy of Zaire today presents

two conditions.19 On the one hand, the modern economy—the formal, registered activities acknowledged in the national accounts—has

completely collapsed, in part because of its dependency on large predatory state structures and in part

because of the dramatic decrease in the purchasing

power of the urban population. On the other hand,

the informal, secondary, or popular economy—the

middle-scale or petty activities that are not registered

in any official statistics—now has its own momentum.

Nevertheless, the dichotomy between formal and 

informal sectors does not fully capture the current

situation. 

In order to understand the economic conditions in

Zaire, one must have a sense of the trends over the

past twenty-five years. One might divide this era into

three periods, the first of which may be labeled the

“Zairian miracle,” extending from 1962 to 1974 (see

figure 2).

ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1962–74

Despite the traumatic accession to independence and

the 1963–64 rebellions, Zaire’s economic potential

was not really damaged. After a radical devaluation of

the currency in 1967, economic performance soon approached that of developing countries such as the

Ivory Coast and Mexico. Although agriculture lagged,

with only a 2–3 percent annual growth, overall economic growth rose to 6 percent annually, mostly due

to strong copper and diamond prices and the performance of the manufacturing and mining industries.

This period was also characterized by a tremendous

expansion of the public sector, as well as by some

grandiose industrial and infrastructure projects—for

example, Ingadam, the Inga-Shaba power-line,

SOSIDER, SOZIR, AND COMINGEM.

ECONOMIC SHOCKS, 1975–91

The first postindependence economic shock occurred

in 1975, when a confluence of national and international events began to undermine Zaire’s position.

First, the totally unplanned nationalization in the

agro-industrial and trading sectors severely disrupted

the economy. Second, copper prices suddenly—but

expectedly—collapsed after the 1974 oil crisis. Third,

the Benguella railway in Angola, traditionally one of

the major export routes for Zaire’s mining industries,

was closed. The recession was abrupt in character

(see figure 2), and Zaire never really recovered. Between 1975 and 1993, gross domestic product per

capita (in 1993 dollars) plummeted, from $330 to

less than $140.

Initially, the shock did not appear catastrophic.

Economic growth remained high, at 6.4 percent a

year. Except for the disastrous large industrial and infrastructure projects, the manufacturing sector, still

supported by bilateral donors, maintained relatively

good performances, though falling to only 30–40 percent of productive capacity.

The textile industry was badly hurt by the explosion of illegal exports, but other industries overcame

the crisis by exporting their output, which was largely

enhanced by external public aid. The transport sector

suffered but succeeded in stabilizing itself from 1978

to 1984. State receipts remained high until 1980, although public expenditures tended increasingly to

exceed public revenues.

The first three years (1983–86) of the stabilization

program imposed by the International Monetary

Fund and the World Bank appeared promising. A

new and quite severe devaluation allowed Zaire to

again be competitive—at least in theory. The country

also appeared to regain some credibility by starting to

repay part of the interest on the huge national debt.

But hopes placed in the stabilization program were

quickly dashed. Between 1984 and 1989—“the Kengo

years,” as the period was once known—Zaire entered

2ECONOMIC

STRUCTURES AND

PROSPECTS

8
9

into a phase of generalized “predation” and extortion

perpetrated by those close to the presidency and

above all by a large circle of barons and plutocrats. It

is estimated that roughly $1 billion was drained from

the state treasury during that period.

At the same time, even as state expenditures were

maintained at the highest levels, the state budget was

collapsing under the high interest rates on the external debt, which Zaire could no longer service—and

part of which could not be rescheduled. What is surprising is the amount of external aid conceded to

Zaire: $555 million in 1983–89 (compared to $508

million in 1975–82). In 1990 official development aid

to Zaire reached a peak of more than $800 million.

ECONOMIC CRASH, 1991

In September 1991 the collapse of one of the richest

copper mines of Gécamines (Kamoto) triggered a major economic and financial crash. When the revenue

stream from the core mining industry dried up, Zaire

virtually ceased to exist as a state. 

The currency, a symbol of national sovereignty,

was reduced to nothing, while 500,000 to 600,000

public servants went unpaid. A World Bank document from 1994 reveals the withering of the state and

the social impact of a crumbled economy:

The overall size of the economy has shrunk to

the level of 1958 albeit with a population of 2.9

times larger. . . . Public finances are in disarray. . . .

The State is insolvent; most state-owned enterprises and financial institutions are de facto bankrupt. . . . The economy has been demonetized and

exchange markets have contracted and serve

mostly speculatory purposes. . . . Power and water

utilities and the Road Authority are still operational, but Gécamines, Petro-Zaire, and ONPTZ

[the postal and telecommunications company] are

barely functioning; SNCZ [the railway holding]

and most other public enterprises have de facto

ceased operating and have in some cases lost or

sold their fixed assets.

Enrollment in primary education declined from

95 percent in 1972–73 to 77 percent in 1986–87

and was projected at 50 percent by year 2000, barring massive remedial actions. When open at all,

the schools operate in deplorable conditions, without textbooks and teaching materials and with the

students often forced to sit on the floor as desks

Figure 2. Gross Domestic Product of Zaire (at 1968 prices).
10

have been looted. . . . Higher education institutions . . . [have seen] their infrastructure crumble:

facilities and teaching materials vanish, teachers

[are] increasingly underpaid (or not paid at all)

and demotivated, and students [are] unable to survive on meager scholarships.

Health standards deteriorated due to inadequate and declining financing. In 1986, the government was financing only 5 percent of the

recurrent costs in the health sector, compared to

50 percent or more in most sub-Saharan African

countries. . . . The economic and financial crisis

has since severely constrained the ability of the

population and enterprises to provide basic care,

while externally financed health programs have de

facto ceased.20

Nonetheless, although fully representative data is

lacking, it appears that at the microeconomic level of

the economy some sectors did not follow the catastrophic trends just outlined.

For one thing, production of staple foods (mostly

cassava and other tubers) continued to rise faster

than the rate of population growth. However, as

shown in table 3, the growth in the production of staple foods has not matched the growth of the urban

population. This means that urban households,

whose revenues have been drastically reduced by the

recession, must devote a larger part of their income to

buy food.

Three factors have played a large part in the performance of the agricultural sector: the collapse of the

road infrastructure, the increase in oil prices, and the

monetary manipulations of the government. If these

problems can be remedied, the agricultural situation

in Zaire can probably rapidly recover.

THE PRIMACY OF POPULAR

ECONOMIES

To be sure, urban “popular” economic activities have

a long history in Zaire, stretching back long before

the 1984–90 recession. Some economic indicators

suggest that between 1974 and 1978 what were labeled “underground activities” climbed from 9 percent to 19 percent of total productive activities.21

By 1980 large regions had escaped government

control and were successfully organizing illegal coffee

exports on a large scale through new commercial centers that were not even on the map. Some of these,

Table 3. Agricultural Production and Marketing.

Food Crops as Food as Percentage

Food Production Cash Crops Percentage of Urban Population of Urban

Year (billions of zaires) (billions of zaires) Sold Production (millions) Consumption

1968 76.3 26.4 41.5 2.43 12.0

1969 79.1 23.7 43.0 2.61 13.1

1970 81.4 24.6 43.0 2.81 14.6

1971 86.3 25.7 43.0 2.98 13.8

1972 95.3 23.5 44.1 3.15 14.9

1973 96.7 21.3 45.3 3.33 13.0

1974 108.9 20.5 45.2 3.53 15.7

1975 104.0 16.1 43.7 3.74 17.3

1976 108.9 19.1 44.6 3.94 18.8

1977 110.6 14.3 42.5 4.16 19.5

1978 111.6 14.4 40.9 4.39 20.6

1979 114.8 11.3 41.9 4.63 23.2

1980 118.3 13.4 41.4 4.89 19.8

1981 120.9 12.7 41.7 5.06 19.9

1982 124.9 11.8 41.4 5.24 19.7

1983 128.5 12.2 40.8 5.42 18.8

1984 133.5 13.4 40.6 5.60 18.6

1985 137.6 12.6 40.8 5.80 18.7

1986 141.3 18.0 41.5 6.00 19.1

1987 145.0 13.8 41.0 6.20 18.9

1988 149.2 10.0 42.6 6.42 30.3

1989 153.0 15.3 40.9 6.64 29.2

1990 157.6 13.8 41.3 6.86 29.6

Source: J. Maton, “Structure et développement de l'économie zairoise: Une analyse macro-économique” (working paper, Ghent, November

1993).
11

called “Base,” became the gathering point for Zairian,

Chadian, Ugandan, and Malian traders who peacefully exchanged luxury goods (cars, radios, spare

parts) for coffee, tea, or gold.22

Today, the urban popular economy—whether formal or informal (that is, registered or not)—is a prominent feature of Zairian life. Its economic strength is

sometimes reinforced by the support of the powerful

network of Catholic missionary posts, historically

representing the prime social and economic mediator

between civil society and the local authorities. In both

the city and the countryside, local churches are often

the only place in which trade and bank activities can

take place at a popular level. It can also be argued that

the proliferation of the popular economy is a major

factor inhibiting large-scale violence.

According to Hugues Leclercq, the informal sector

occupies three major territorial spaces in Zaire.23

- The urban petty or middle-range economy of Kinshasa and its hinterland, formed by two main regions (Bas-Zaire and Bandundu), has easy

communication links with the capital through a

relatively fair road infrastructure and river system. To these two trade axes one might add the

intense traditional trading activities between Kinshasa and Bas-Zaire, on the one hand, and neighboring Congo-Brazzaville, on the other.

According to Eric Tollens, a typically Zairian retail

economy has replaced the larger Greek and Portuguese enterprises, which have almost completely withdrawn from that sector.24

- The mining area of the Kasai region, particularly

around Tshikapa and Mbujimayi, has an economy that relies essentially on nonindustrial exploitation and marketing of diamonds up to

Angola on the Kasai River. In Haut-Zaire and

Equateur new diamond deposits have been exploited over the past several years by the local

population. Nowadays, diamonds—half of which

are illegally exported—are the only available resource for the state (as well as for many Zairian

barons); hence the rather ambiguous nature of

that popular economy, which is by no means limited to the ordinary diamond craftsmen of the

Kasai region.

- The economy of the area encompassing North

and South Kivu provinces and part of the former

Ituri district relies on the nonindustrial and informal exploitation of gold, the unofficial export of

coffee, and the trade of staple foods. For the last

three years, this area, involving several regional

and local barons, has been linked to the far distant lands of the Middle East, including Dubai,

through imports of oil products and manufactured goods.

To these unstructured forms of the Zairian economy, which have become part of the “real” economy,

one could add a nonmarket economy organized

along the necessities of sheer survival. This equivalent

of a social security system provides the poorest segment of the population access to minimal health services and education.

Activities in the nonmarket economy are often seasonal and occasional, yet provide many households

various opportunities arising from the erosion of the

modern economy. Usually such benefits are not reinvested in productive activities but spent instead on

social or “status” exchanges.25 Thus, the popular

economy should not be seen as a panacea for the lack

of a modern economy.

René Devisch has reported on the predatory—

though nonviolent—aspect of the informal sector, particularly among young city dwellers. He identifies the

popular illusion sustained by the celebrated ability to

scrape by (débrouillardise) within the informal sector:

The imaginary universe of numerous slumdwellers continues to be haunted, through television and “downtown” scenes, by the lives of ease

and extravagance centered around fine clothing,

expensive cars, and luxury goods. This mirroring

process simply reinforces social disparities and

stigmatizes any individual or social space deprived

of these goods.26

Despite the visible dynamism of the popular economy in most instances, a large segment of the modern

technocratic elite claims that this type of economy

cannot produce the needed development. They argue

that it represents an individual way to adapt to recession, not a significant means to fight the economic

crisis.27

In some cases, the validity of that argument might

be contested on empirical grounds. Illegal or not,

small-scale or large-scale, the informal economy evidently means (at least in some notorious cases) a

“real” economy not only for groups of individuals but

also for large collectivities.
Such is, for instance, the case of the Banande of

North Kivu, whose impressive entrepreneurial

achievements have been studied by Janet MacGaffey

(see figure 3). According to MacGaffey, the Banande

trading ventures, both legal and illegal, illustrate how

the crisis of the last decade has undoubtedly created

problems for aspiring entrepreneurs but has also

stimulated “potential opportunities for those with initiative, enterprise, and a measure of good fortune.”28

CRISIS AND THE GROWTH OF LOCAL

INITIATIVES

Since the early 1990s the crisis in Zaire has stimulated

embryonic forms of local “good governance” in some

areas. In Kivu and Bas-Zaire, certain regional spontaneous agreements have been reached between local

army officials, administrative chiefs, NGOs, and

traders to ensure a minimum of order, especially in

times of extreme tension and uncertainty. In particular, local entrepreneurs, who control most of the economic activities, have paid the salaries of the garrisons in order to avoid being looted by them.

From Kasai come reports of local authorities and

businessmen indirectly helping the integration and

resettlement of a substantial number of refugees from

Shaba, absorbing them either into the informal economy or into the agricultural and transport sectors.

This process was obviously facilitated by the relative

prosperity of a region controlling the production of

diamonds—the main financial resource of the country.

Because the “native” population has invested heavily

in that sector and thus pulled out of investments in

rural development, there are employment opportunities for newcomers. Thus, it was observed by a UN

mission in December 1994 that out of 16,000 displaced persons living in a camp eight kilometers from

Mbujimayi, 3,400 were able to reintegrate and settle

spontaneously on plots of land at the outskirts of the

camp.29

12

vehicles

spares

appliances

manufactured goods*

coffee*

tea*

gold

ivory

tea

coffee

gold

ivory

coffee

empties

Sudan

Bunia

Isiro

Beni

East

Africa

Butembo

Goma

Kinshasa

Kisangani

tea

ivory

palm oil*

white beans

empties

fish

coffee

beef on the hoof

coffee

palm oil

industrial products

cement

palm oil

fuel

beer

coffee

vegetables

beans

empties

fuel

cement

industrial products

coffee = legal trade

coffee= illegal trade

* = legal and illegal trade

coffee

beans

vegetables

beef

fish

empties

manufactured goods*

fish*

salt*

fuel*

gold

ivory

beer

sugar

salt

tea

fish

Figure 3. Flowchart of Commodities Trades in Northeast Zaire.
It remains obvious, however, that if some parts of

the country can function reasonably well when others

are in a state of unrest and even anarchy, economic

and social development is not the first priority of

Zaire. To be sure, the popular or informal economy is

still suffering from the general economic deterioration. In this respect it would be tempting, but wrong,

to rely exclusively on the capacity of resistance and

the imaginative solutions of ordinary citizens to accommodate themselves as best they can. 

While the players in the popular economy may

have skillfully adapted to the monetary landslide, one

thing is clear: economic chaos in the modern sector

has paralyzed the national economy, most notably in

terms of the circulation of goods, as well as the provision of sanitary and educational services.

Equally clear is that the economic rehabilitation of

Zaire will not progress from the top down, that is,

through master plans originating from state or international macroeconomic structures—some of which

are pretexts for promoting specific foreign or national

interests and as such have no relevance for economic

development.

The fundamental obstacle to any macroeconomic

rehabilitation remains the huge national debt, which

is a greater problem for the international financial

markets than it is for the country. Without any new,

unorthodox proposals, very little can be achieved in

13
POLITICAL

STRUCTURES AND

PROSPECTS

Afamiliar image emerges from international,

especially Belgian, press accounts of the political theater in Zaire. It is that of a country

led by a powerful “dictator,” Mobutu, who skillfully

manipulates the puppets orbiting his presidency and

who, of course, is fully responsible for the political

chaos in the country. The rather simplistic premises

of such press analyses ignore the complexity of political evolution in Zaire and thereby misinform and mislead foreign policy establishments in their appraisal

of realities in that country.

KEY INTERNAL ACTORS

At the beginning of the political transition in April

1990, Zaire’s political class consisted of roughly three

groups. One group was composed of those linking

their political careers to the former party-state, the

MPR, thereby professing faith in the continuation of

Mobutuism with new clothes. The second group was

formed by moderate political leaders who had maintained a distance from the Mobutu regime for several

years but had kept their dissatisfaction a private matter. The third was made up of radical opponents,

many of whom had been in exile for years or had been

punished for their refusal to formally rejoin the partystate. 

When Mobutu proclaimed the end of the one-party

system, he thought he could maintain dominance by

advocating three Zairian parties, one for each of the

groups. However, within eight months of the proclamation, there were upwards of three hundred political parties and caucuses, each of which aimed to

occupy a seat at the National Conference and, more

generally, to participate in the new political redistribution game.

Even the parties that received financial support

from Mobutu (partis alimentaire—literally, parties

“fed” by the regime) were not mere puppets of the

president. In fact, the transition unleashed a general

drive for power among a new generation that previously had either been contained by the old guard of

the MPR or that could not find a place in the political

system during a period of economic recession. For

many, political liberalization meant democracy, but

above all a form of democracy that could entail a

greater share of the national wealth. As a Zairian press

analyst aptly commented: “Power [in Zaire] is just like

alcohol: it gives thirst to whoever drinks of it. When

one has tasted it, one always wants to drink more of it.

tackling the macroeconomic matters conducive to

real “development.” 3

14
Moreover, unlike the lands of old democracies, where

primarily the rich seek power, in the third world,

power is sought to become rich. It is therefore not

convictions that often dictate political behavior, but

appetites.”30

To be sure, opposition parties arose, but their opposition was limited to a single objective: toppling

Mobutu, whose political life appeared terminal. Beyond his demonization and eventual replacement

there were no social or political projects.

One outcome of the many alignments and realignments among members of the old and new political

classes during the unending transition is a dividing

line between those who succeeded—that is, who were

co-opted into the various transitional governments

and thus had access to the diminishing benefits of the

state structures—and those who were excluded from

power and its immediate dividends and returns.

The strength of the president’s power, while

clearly in decline, is geared more toward factional arbitration than maintaining some form of dictatorship.

But it is precisely this capacity to skillfully play off the

many discontents in a large group of incumbents that

prevents the permanent polarization of members of

the political class, many of whom have lost contact

with their local constituencies.

Beyond the division of haves from have-nots, there

are several cleavages between political factions and

clans. Paradoxically, the way these groups have interrelated during the most recent government does not

significantly differ from their dealings in the period

before political transition.

Nexus around President Mobutu

Among the haves, the first nexus of power is made up

of the president and his immediate entourage, represented not so much by regional barons as by the functional instruments of power, for example, the security

services, the Civil Guard, and the Special Presidential

Division (DSP). 

Clustered around this prime circle are some young

technocrats and older opponents, including formerly

radical ones. Also included are certain people with no

particular regional constituency, especially those previously considered “citizens of dubious nationality”

(for example, the mulatto Seti Eyale, head of the security services, and businessman Bemba Saolona). This

second cluster is more dispensable: it can be disbanded at will and at any moment by the chief of state

as required by political exigencies. 

So far, the president’s power has not been weakened by the transition. On the contrary, President

Mobutu and his entourage (a group who engage in

fluctuating allegiances) have consistently pursued a

twofold strategy similar to that employed during the

First Republic. The first and foremost strategy is to

prevent the collapse of the security and armed forces

by maintaining control over certain trusted and disciplined units. The second is to keep—and even reinforce—international credibility in the closed circle of

African heads of state, while attempting to restore

credibility in the eyes of foreign governments, by performing the usual mediating role in regional African

conflicts (for example, in Rwanda).

So far, Mobutu has succeeded in compelling his

opponents to recognize his prominence in foreign

and defense affairs and in attracting a loose coalition

of former supporters of the MPR and former opponents of the government.

Nexus around Kengo wa Dongo

A second meaningful nexus of power is the current

government, led by Prime Minister Kengo wa Dongo,

which is dominated by the technocratic and political

elite of the Kengo years of the mid-1980s (see table 4).

The Kengo government, however, is clearly unconstitutional. Contrary to the agreement of the entire

political class in the Constitutional Act of the Transition—namely, that any government had to result from

a political consensus—Kengo was elected by fewer

than half (332 out of 738) of the members of the

Transitional Parliament.

A further weakness is the absence of meaningful

political and, importantly, regional constituencies

among members of the Kengo government. Their

15

Table 4. Sociopolitical Profile of the Kengo Government

(June 1994–August 1995).

Profile Number of Ministers

Old Generation New Generation

Political* 9 9

Management 10 –

Diplomacy 2 –

Business 5 –

Professional – 3

Military 2 –

University 2 1

Others 2 –

Note: Ministers can belong to several profiles.

* Includes former member of the Legislative Council and regional

assemblies, former ministers, and members of the HCR.
only support comes from a tiny faction of generally

younger intellectuals, high-level technocrats, and

some individual members of civil society who,

through informal or occasional political platforms,

hope to gain rewards in return for their support. However, these political groups do not yet form a meaningful clientele.

Aware of its weaknesses, the Kengo government

has been pursuing a strategy aimed at gaining external credibility—most notably in international financial

and business circles—by appearing to play a managerial role in the governing of Zaire. Good governance

imperatives such as those defined by the World Bank

and USAID have conditioned the political behavior of

the Kengo team, although there is no significant proof

that the government has the means to implement

them. Noteworthy measures taken by the Kengo government include the following:

- the spectacular expulsion of several dozen

Lebanese businessmen, some of whom were associated with the printing of allegedly counterfeit

bills under the preceding government;

- the seizure of thirty tons of banknotes that had

not been registered at the Central Bank;

- the designation of new managers at the Central

Bank and the removal of some high officials from

such strategic posts as Customs and Hôtel des

Monnaies;

- the decision to clean up the civil service by getting rid of 200,000 fictitious and real public servants out of a total of between 500,000 and

600,000;

- the willingness to launch a large privatization

program in the mining sector, a program inspired

by some officials at the World Bank, the African

Bank of Development, and various foreign financial advisers;

- the numerous declarations of war against those

contributing to the “criminalization” of the

Zairian economy, including members of the radical opposition; and

- the decision to start expelling Rwandan refugees

from the camps near Bukavu and Goma, a decision taken with President Mobutu’s support.

The impact of these measures is not yet clear. Kengo’s government still has no leverage in either the diamond sector—the only sector where resources can still

be mobilized—or the popular economy, which is beyond the reach of any kind of public authority.

Opposition Factions

Besides these two centers of power, Zairian politics is

also determined by the very complex play of factions

that are now allowed to act in the open but prevent

any real political stability from emerging. Whereas 

the landscape used to be divided between the mouvance présidentielle (FPC) and the radical opposition

(USORAL), factional politics have invaded practically

all political parties, movements, caucuses, and loose

coalitions.

Thus, within the mouvance présidentielle, a war of

succession followed the death of its moderate leader,

former Ambassador Lengema Dulia. A member of the

old guard, Mandungu Bula Nyati, is vying with a representative of the new political generation, Kitenge

Yesu, while both pretend to be close to the Mobutu

entourage.

The main issue behind that struggle, positing

Mobutu once again as arbitrator, is that the new generation is ready to support Kengo, while the old guard

refuses to entrust the executive power of the country

to a prime minister who is considered the paramount

example of an “inauthentic citizen” and is judged beholden to “foreign actors.”

Similar factional quarrels have appeared within the

radical opposition. The UDPS leadership imploded

into two camps. The first embodies truly radical opposition to Mobutu, while the second, allegedly

backed by followers of Etienne Tshisekedi, agreed to

open negotiations with the president in order to unseat the prime minister. The PDSC is also split into

two factions: one led by supporters of a former PDSC

leader who has accepted Kengo; and the second, the

party’s old guard, ready to compromise with Mobutu. 

In the UFERI, which is supposed to represent

Katangese aspirations to autonomy or independence,

major splits have occurred between the national president and the regional branch of young radicals led by

the local governor, who was held responsible for the

“ethnic purification” in Shaba.

In short, party politics are being strongly eroded

by one and only one issue: who is going to grab

power, and where and when. Matters such as the rehabilitation of political legitimacy, of a viable state sys16
tem, or of an acceptable modern economy do not

seem to greatly preoccupy political actors.

Regional and Ethnic Constituencies

A fourth category of political actors includes those

who appear to have retained the support of regional

or ethnic constituencies. Many are formerly prestigious leaders and employ political symbols that are

still invested with charisma. Tshisekedi belongs to

this category: his messianic type of leadership gives

vent to feelings widespread among the Luba diaspora.

Another politician of this sort is Antoine Gizenga,

who emerged as a leading “nationalist” figure of the

1963–64 rebellion in Kwilu and eastern Zaire. A third

example is the current governor of Shaba, Kyungu wa

Mwanza, who entertains the futile dream of

Katangese independence.

But charismatic figures are not the only relevant

actors in regional politics. Other local leaders (governors, district commissioners, and so forth) might

emerge in the context of democratization and the collapse of central state structures. One might thus anticipate that political regionalism will be the lasting

reality, consolidated in the future through elections

and the backing of Mobutu, who by remaining in his

native constituency (Gbadolite), appears to support

regional patrons.

Mediators

A final category of political actors could be labeled

“mediators.” This category includes a number of

independent individuals who once belonged to the

moderate old guard of Mobutuism (for example, Nendaka, Bomboko) and who, at one point or another,

have tried to moderate factional politics by discretely

performing the role of go-between. Most have no political future and prefer to remain on the sidelines.

---

Three major conclusions emerge from this survey of

the complex and constantly shifting political landscape. The first is rather comforting: Even though

factionalism is the prime mover of politics in Zaire,

large-scale political violence has not—and probably

will not—erupt, precisely because every attempt at

consolidating power is usually dashed by the eruption of a new counterforce.

Mobutu may claim the central mediating role in

factional politics, but since figures such as Monsengwo have emerged at the National Conference, he is

not the sole arbitrator. Moreover, Mobutu was forced

to reopen the political monopoly; as president of the

Republic he can no longer exercise despotic rule and

is compelled to concede to new arrangements that

suggest a more democratic face.

A second conclusion concerns the prevailing and

pervading strength of nationalist feelings within the

political class. Nationalism is expressed not only

through the revival of ethnic identity and ethnic politics, possibly reinforced by regional and local political

bosses, but also through the widespread use of the

symbols of “Zairian authenticity,” which have

reemerged since a “non-Zairian,” Kengo wa Dongo,

took over the government. These nationalist themes

are also supported by the major “godfathers” of Zaire.

Third, one must question the relevance of the political institutions and practices promoted by foreign

governments. Democracy, the holding of free elections—yet again postponed—and even good governance do not seem to be the order of the day.

Factional politics are omnipresent in Zaire, and 

one may conclude that the ruling class, among them

the natural incumbents of the Third Republic, are not

quite ready to tackle the problem of state effectiveness

and legitimacy.

KEY EXTERNAL ACTORS: THE TROIKA

Since the beginning of the transition, the governments of Belgium, France, and the United States—the

“Troika”—have attempted to press for democracy and

good governance in Zaire. The most important pressure has come from the U.S. State Department, which,

together with World Bank officials, has insisted on

consistent and fundamental political reform so that

Zaire can implement the measures (chief among

them, tackling the huge national debt) recommended

by international financial institutions.

Initially, Belgium did not play an active part with

the United States and France in exerting diplomatic

pressure on the Mobutu regime: Belgian cooperation

with Zaire had virtually ceased following a diplomatic

crisis between the two in early 1989. Eventually,

however, a process of international consultation

developed between Belgium, the United States, and

France, which have long-established political and economic ties to Zaire. An informal group of ambassadors from these countries has displayed some

degree of unity in delivering its message to the Zairian

17
authorities—first and foremost to President Mobutu—

about the necessity of democracy.

Belgium

Within the Belgian government, whose foreign affairs

policy passed into socialist hands in 1992, a strong

anti-Mobutu feeling—traditional in the Flemish socialist party—has prevailed. As was bluntly stated in an official document issued by Minister of Foreign Affairs

W. Claes, for discussion in the Belgian House of Representatives, Mobutu has no future at all and must be

“isolated” from the international scene. 

In spring 1992 this position was endorsed by a majority of the Belgian political parties, which made it

clear that political dialogue was unlikely as long as

Mobutu remained head of state. However, this antiMobutu position conflicted with decisions adopted at

the National Conference, which repeatedly asked

Mobutu not to leave the presidency, but to learn to

share his absolute power.

Later, the Belgian foreign policy establishment was

caught by its open support for the Tshisekedi government when it became obvious that (1) no political

compromise was possible at the National Conference,

(2) Mobutu was clearly regaining his political influence, and (3) the United States and France had rather

mixed feelings, to say the least, with respect to the

Tshisekedi cabinet.

The United States

The position of the United States has rested on two

ideas: Zaire is no longer a strategic spot in Africa and

Mobutu has been a friendly ally of the West. Moreover, during the first phase of the political transition,

President Bush and part of the U.S. Congress felt that

Mobutu had an inevitable role to play in the democratizing process that they thought was unfolding.

The Clinton administration came to develop a

rather different attitude toward Mobutu, with some

U.S. diplomats seeing him as a possible obstacle to

democratization. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration took no initiatives that would have indicated a

willingness to break with Mobutu. Personal relationships between Mobutu and the U.S. presidency, highranking officials in the State Department, and leaders

in Congress remained intact.

In fact, both the Bush and Clinton administrations

were partly paralyzed in their search for new credible

political actors in Zaire, being highly suspicious of the

radical opposition. Eventually, the Clinton administration came to accept the traditional argument that

“Zaire without Mobutu could entail a Zaire engulfed

in chaos.”31 In the end, the designation of Kengo wa

Dongo as prime minister was considered the only

politically valid initiative to stabilize Zaire.

France

Despite the verbal support of the French diplomatic

establishment for democratization in Africa, embodied primarily in the celebrated speech of President

Mitterand at the Franco-African summit at La Baule,

France’s attitude toward Zaire has remained consistently ambivalent and even contradictory. 

Before transition, the French establishment had at

times considered Mobutu a not quite reliable African

“chief.”32 Since 1990, the French position has become

less coherent, largely due to the dilution of the decision-making process in the realm of foreign affairs

among several centers of influence. Thus, for example, Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Bernard Kouchner publicly showed his contempt for Mobutu even

as close advisors to Mitterand and Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua, a conservative politician, discretely maintained cordial relations with Mobutu’s

family and entourage. France, like Belgium and the

United States, did not regard the Zairian radical

opposition as a credible political solution—although

limited circles within the socialist party disagreed.

---

So far, the Troika’s activities have not achieved significant or positive diplomatic results, partly due to

differences in their appraisal of Zaire’s political evolution. The only common denominator has been the

affirmation of the necessity of democracy through a

fully legitimate National Conference.

OTHER ACTORS

Other state and nonstate actors and international financial pressures have also been at work during various phases of Zaire’s transition. First in chronological

order was the little-known visit in early November

1991 by the Nigerian representative of the president

of the OAU, an attempt to start a conciliatory process

between several major opponents and the FPC.

18
Another OAU attempt to mediate the political conflict, in May 1993, was cut short by the radical opposition’s request for a joint UN-OAU mediation. In July

the matter was settled by the designation of Algerian

Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi as special emissary of

the United Nations. After negotiating an agreement

for a new round of talks between the contending parties in August and September 1993, Brahimi left Zaire

bitterly noting “the versatility, the inconsistency, and

the lack of maturity of the Zairian political class.”33 He

briefly returned in October to discover that his efforts

had been to no avail.

Although these mediation attempts failed, they

were not perhaps entirely useless. It can be argued

that these efforts helped diminish the level of tension

and prevented further political violence.

19

4

That short-lived effort was followed immediately by another bilateral African mediation, that

of President Abou Diouf of Senegal. Led by his

emissary, Abdoulaye Wade, it was a little more

successful in that a “Common Declaration”

signed by the major political leaders was issued.

The statement asserted inter alia that (1) the principle of nonviolence would be “scrupulously respected” (this declaration was issued almost

immediately after the looting of September and

October 1991); (2) the National Conference,

abruptly canceled by the looting, would be reopened; and (3) the head of the new “transitional”

government would belong to the opposition. 

The first two parts of the agreement were respected, but political feuds reemerged when

Nguz Karl-i-Bond, who claimed to be a long-time

opponent of the Mobutu regime, was designated

the head of the transitional government by the

president.
URGENT ISSUES The quiet implosion of the Zairian state (in

contrast to the explosions in Somalia, Liberia,

Angola, and Rwanda) suggests that largescale civil strife—with all that implies for mass migration and large-scale humanitarian intervention—is not

likely to occur, at least in the near future. One reason

Zaire has not exploded is that Zairians have learned

over the years to live beyond the reach of the state’s

authority and structures, as evidenced by the development of the popular economy. A further example: the

expulsion of the Luba and other non-Katangese from

Shaba did not result in the establishment of huge permanent refugee camps in Kasai and elsewhere. Some

of those taking refuge near Mbujimayi have tried, successfully on occasion, to leave the camps and insert

themselves in local agricultural activities or the diamond business.

Certain state interventions have also contributed

to a decrease in tensions. Both the Kengo government

and President Mobutu have gone to Shaba to try to

persuade the governor—who had been accused of ethnic cleansing, and who was then suspended and later

20
called back to Kinshasa for three months—to stop his

appeals to civil strife and his threats to secede.

The one highly dangerous spot where chaotic conditions have required large-scale humanitarian intervention is the area around Bukavu and Goma, where

more than 1.7 million Rwandan refugees have been

situated. Their presence threatened to provoke a

major ecological disaster while exacerbating general

insecurity.

But the crisis in Zaire is not at the root of the Rwandan hecatomb. Local populations are the victim of the

chaotic situation prevailing in that part of Zaire where

resentment has been growing against the refugees,

whose lot has been considered better than that of ordinary Kivu citizens on account of the huge external

assistance organized on the refugees’ behalf. Although Zairian authorities cannot solve the problem

alone, the expulsion of several thousand Rwandan

refugees, initiated by the Kengo government and tacitly backed by Mobutu, came as a major rebuke to the

United Nations, which was accused of inflexibility

and ignoring the Zairian side of the problem.

For the time being, local elites, newspapers, and

NGOs do not place much trust in the effectiveness of

any large international humanitarian intervention,

and they worry that such an effort could further destabilize the region. In places such as North Kivu, populations have armed in order to resist the threat of a

permanent settlement of Rwandan refugees, while

several military incidents have taken place between

Zairian soldiers and unidentified militias (Interahamwe or other) from Rwanda.

Beyond this geopolitical tension concentrated in

one part of Zaire, the problem of generalized public

insecurity remains critical throughout the country.

Apart from the DSP and some paramilitary units, irregular or no pay is the common lot of most of the

Zairian army, as it is for the civil service. The bribes

and physical harassment that result have directly undermined the observance of human rights by both

military personnel and the civil service throughout

Zaire. This remains true despite the fact that the population avoids contact with the state as far as possible,

and has learned how to retaliate against local extortion (for example, in Kinshasa or Kivu) during the

transition.

Timely payment of soldiers and civil servants

might well improve the situation. As mentioned earlier, the payment of some local garrisons by local businessmen bought a temporary reprieve in tensions.

But such local expedients cannot overcome national

macroeconomic and financial woes. Zaire simply

does not have sufficient resources to support more

than 50,000 to 60,000 civil servants and 10,000 to

12,000 army troops.

Not paying much of the civil service for close to a

year and no longer paying the largest part of the garrisons in the interior has brought home to Zairian

authorities the harsh realities of austerity. In response

to this pressing issue, the government will have to

match, in a coherent rather than random manner, the

remaining national resources with the reasonable

needs of governance.

Another urgent issue concerns the creation of a

more favorable environment for the maintenance and

development of two basic services: education (including higher education) and health. Demand for these

services is very strong among both urban and rural

populations.

According to a number of observers, Zairians are

willing to invest their savings and assets in certain sectors provided that they can control the quality of the

services offered. In the case of institutions of higher

learning, for instance, some former state and new private educational structures function thanks to the

tuition paid by the students’ families.

Obviously, the pressing national issues in Zaire

will need to be approached very carefully. Within the

elite (both the radical opposition and the mouvance

présidentielle), the NGOs, and the population at

large, national dignity is not an empty concept.

Whether benevolent or not, outside intervention has

always been and is still regarded with strong suspicion. It is thus essential that foreign observers, analysts, and practitioners appreciate and respect the

concrete contingencies and constraints of Zairian political culture.

Mediating local and regional conflicts, which have

so often degenerated into “national” ones, is one of

the most urgent issues in Zaire—all the more so given

that presidential and parliamentary elections have

been postponed until the summer of 1997. The National Electoral Commission is in disarray, however,

21

NOTES
and there are questions as to whether this schedule

can be met. 

In my view, assisting the learning process of intergroup mediation and conflict management must precede any attempt at “educating” people about

democracy, electoral procedures, and codes of conduct. Additionally, state-to-state relations between

Zaire and other countries will have trivial results if

they focus on the management of resources (foreign

debt, rehabilitation of infrastructure, control over

public expenses, and so forth) at the expense of addressing human and social concerns.

22
23

PART II

FRAMEWORKS

FOR PREVENTIVE

DIPLOMACY
At the initial sessions of the MRG (USA) workshop,

four principal points emerged.

1. State and political structures as such have no relevance in Zaire for the time being. The government

lacks any meaningful control over basic state

functions (defense, finance) and over the country

at large. According to Hugues Leclercq’s estimates, the government’s claim that it has achieved

“better mastery” over public finances is not well

founded. In short, the content of state power and

influence is nonexistent. The political institutions

born out of the transition, specifically the new political parties and the Transition Parliament (the

HCR-PT), have not succeeded in offering a viable

alternative. They have all split in endless feuds

and factions, unable to maintain a minimum of institutional coherence and political responsibility.

2. Normal state-to-state relations have little meaning

at this point. As such, members of the Troika (the

United States, Belgium, and France)—which remain to some extent limited by their previous approaches (for example, the demonization and

isolation of Mobutu) and by their domestic public

opinion—seem unwilling to take any initiative

other than provide indirect public aid to Zaire. A

clear signal of the departure from state-to-state relations was given by the European Union in 1995,

when it decided to channel an aid package of

$100 million for local infrastructure, health, and

education through the civil society in particular

regions (Kasai, Kivu, and around Kinshasa).

3. For the time being, holding elections, be they at

the regional, local, or national level, might present

a dangerous illusion. In 1994 the World Bank estimated that elections would cost at least $100 million. Recently, the minister of the interior of Zaire

said that his department was prepared for elections but estimated the cost at $300 million. A

European consulting firm has assessed the cost 

at between $250 million and $270 million. 

Obviously Zaire does not have sufficient resources to engage in that process. There are serious doubts that the international community—in

this case, the Troika—would be ready to mobilize

even a quarter of that amount. Besides, elections

might exacerbate, rather than reduce, ethnic and

regional tensions, and the violence could be far

more dangerous than the sort now encountered.

In certain parts of the country, elections would be

impossible to conduct.

4. Large-scale political violence is unlikely. The more

probable scenario is the continuous spread of

day-to-day social violence, especially among the

younger age groups, which constitute about half

the population and have nothing to lose. In Shaba

and North Kivu, especially, they form gangs that

have been mobilized by unscrupulous and unorganized members of the political class, as well as

by citizens who wish to defend themselves.

A PROPOSAL FOR REGIONAL

CONFLICT PREVENTION

The current state of affairs does not mean that nothing

significant can be achieved prior to the conduct of legitimate democratic elections. There is justification for

believing that opportunities exist, given the appearance of a workable agreement between President

Mobutu and Prime Minster Kengo, although neither

man has decisive leverage in political and economic

developments.

I suggest undertaking an initiative that focuses on

regional conflict prevention and that seeks to ameliorate tensions before the beginning of the election

process. The institutions of the political transition

were asked to tackle this latter task, but they have

been unable to implement a serious plan. The national

5

24

A FRAMEWORK FOR

ACTION TO

ARREST FURTHER

VIOLENCE IN ZAIRE

Jean-Claude Willame
authorities would be more likely to find a preventive

approach acceptable if the external parties involved in

the initiative refuse to take sides in the political feuds

between caucuses and factions.

Such an initiative could be inaugurated with an informal, independent forum attended by

- national and regional church leaders, who have

recently created their own system of coordination;

- regional entrepreneurs, particularly those maintaining their independence vis-à-vis the political

class;

- some military provisional commanders acceptable to all sides;

- political bosses and elders who retain regional

backing and are still able to perform the role of

go-between;

- representatives of NGO coalitions (CNONGD)

and established NGOs (for example, Oxfam and

Médecins Sans Frontières);

- representatives of major human rights associations (VSV, Toges Noires, AZADHO, LIZADHO,

CNDDH); and 

- members of the intellectual and educational communities, especially those working in the new private universities.

This forum, which should be independent of both

the executive power and the political class as such,

could be placed in the context of the mission to be fulfilled by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human

Rights, whose mandate has been accepted by Zaire.

The identification of the relevant actors to be associated with the forum could be partly undertaken by

independent outside experts with a good knowledge

of Zaire and its human resources. This phase would

be critical, requiring considerable attention; the assistance of the UN agencies still operating in Zaire and

of the embassies of the Troika would be extremely

valuable.

Once the forum is convened and it recognizes the

need to abandon the stalemate at the macroinstitutional level, it should define as precisely as possible

the critical sectoral and geographical areas where

local political mediation is most urgently needed. Additionally, the forum should determine the specific

means and ways to be used to decrease the level of local and regional conflicts.

It is critical that the participants understand that

Zaire is at a crossroads. Language used during the forum should be straightforward; there should be no

misunderstandings about the role of external mediation and the responsibilities that the elite must collectively assume. Participants should be invited to adopt

a positive, concrete, and realistic attitude and to eschew explicit or implicit recriminations about past

events.

For symbolic reasons and subject to logistical feasibility, it would be more appropriate to hold the forum

in a place other than Kinshasa.

After the forum adjourns, its members would oversee the establishment of pilot centers for the prevention of conflict at those locations chosen at the

forum’s first session. The forum participants would

also continue to meet informally to assemble the local

and regional grievances (in the form of letters, tracts,

and other documents) that circulate widely in Zaire,

to report on them, and to start implementing a procedure of conciliation.

Needless to say, the operation of the pilot centers

would be entrusted to independent local structures

responsible to the forum, while maintaining regular

and even day-to-day contact with the regional authorities. At this stage, the active participation of local security agents and army officers would be required.

As the following timetable indicates, implementation of this process of regional conciliation could be

achieved in less than a year: 

- three to four months for preliminary investigation by independent experts

- two to three months to organize the forum

- one to two weeks for the forum, if everything

goes as planned

- three to four months to operationalize two to

three pilot centers.

UN-EUROPEAN PEACE CORPS

A complementary, longer-term action that could 

be undertaken concerns the proposal made by 

some members of the European Parliament for a 

25
“UN-European Peace Corps” that would promote

conditions conducive to dialogue between contending parties at a grassroots level. This proposal is an attempt to implement the “Bourlanges-Martin” report

adopted by the European Parliament on May 17,

1995, recommending the establishment of “a European Civil Peace Corps with the training of monitors,

mediators, and specialists in conflict resolution.”

The premise of the civil peace corps initiative is

that military peacekeeping and large humanitarian

mobilizations have yielded few substantial results so

far. Although they might have succeeded in diminishing the gravity of conflicts and the level of violence,

most military peacekeeping and peacemaking operations have been overrun by macropolitical and geopolitical factors over which they had no control.

Moreover, large-scale humanitarian missions have

sometimes upset the precarious socioeconomic equilibrium within local communities. At times, too, local

resentment against refugees has grown as international aid has poured in to address the needs of those

in the refugee camps, but not those among the established population. This was the case in Kivu, where

the use of dollars, rather than the Zairian currency,

greatly increased after the arrival of the humanitarian

organizations.

According to its proponents, a purely civilian peace

corps would have the advantage, at least in theory, of

being independent of any institutional machinery,

and its culture would be more informal, more egalitarian, and individually oriented. It would not therefore

seriously threaten national sovereignty, pride in

which remains supremely important to government

agencies, local military commanders, militia chiefs,

and ambitious political leaders in Zaire.

---

In sum, mediation would be a relevant initiative in

Zaire to the extent that it is conducted from beginning

to end by native political brokers. Thus the prime role

of a civilian peace corps or any other presence is to

search for and encourage the emergence of such brokers. In 1994 the political and land conflicts that

erupted in North Kivu were entirely managed by the

contending ethnic groups under the aegis of local

military commanders, regional authorities, and local

NGOs. Although the quarrel is not yet extinguished—

indeed, it has been reactivated by social and

economic “bandits” attracted by the presence of

Rwandan refugees in the area—such a purely endogenous mediation has undoubtedly contributed to easing local tensions.

26
The severe malfunctioning of Zaire’s monetary

system has negative consequences for recovery in both the modern economy and the informal popular economy. It also affects the operations

conducted by central governments, monetary authorities, and, more broadly, the central political institutions. Among other things, it is for now impossible to

establish a budget that is really operational, still less

to administer and audit it properly, and no monetary

policy can be effectively implemented. Moreover, the

current situation allows officials to manipulate funds

and waste resources, especially foreign exchange, despite the acute shortages.

There are profound implications for aid policy. Indeed, until radical changes in the monetary system

are taken (that is, with the establishment of a currency

board), it will remain extremely difficult, even counterproductive, to channel funds directly or indirectly.

Tensions among the central political institutions will

rise and reinforce the clientalist behavior of officials.

To prevent the misallocation of funds, aid agencies

should make arrangements with the central government to channel aid for predetermined purposes to

existing NGOs or para-NGOs (associations composed of not only representatives of civil society but

also local officials and military authorities).

An essential precondition for economic survival is

the maintenance of civil peace and national solidarity.

Civil peace, intertribal “good neighborliness,” and

good regional relationships must be preserved at all

costs. Absent a climate of public security, no economic recovery is possible. The security function in

Zaire can be enforced not only by the usual instruments of the formal police and army but also by other

kinds of supplementary security provided by local

communities. A major problem is to sustain, on a

pragmatic basis, the links between security functions

performed by the formal central government and

those performed by local communities.

ZAIRE’S MONETARY SYSTEM

The current monetary system makes it very difficult

to channel aid funds to the neediest sectors of society.

The current system has five components.

“Useful” banknotes denominated in NZ (nouveaux

zaires). The “useful” banknotes are the only Zairian

money accepted in the country. The ultimate holders

of these notes are the poor: women, men, and children who animate the informal economy and need

the notes for undertaking their micro-activities. For

most workers in the informal popular economy, holding cash balances in banknotes is the essential counterpart to their modest working capital, and it allows

them to generate income and employment.

About 85 percent of the cash balances in Zaire is

the hands of the informal popular economy. The remainder is held by the upper-income set (big traders

in diamonds and gold), by those in the private modern sectors who need the banknotes for transactions

(with workers or local suppliers) in the informal

economy, and by the elite who have family links with

the informal economy. Most of the cash holdings in

banknotes are located in Kinshasa and its suburban

hinterlands (home to over twelve million people).

The real value of the cash holdings in banknotes

denominated in NZ is $80 million. The real purchase

values of the different banknotes range from six cents

to around $1.25, which is the largest banknote that

can be used in the informal economy.

The responsibility for issuing currency notes rests

with the Central Bank. Because issuing banknotes is

the only means of financing public expenditures, the

printing of banknotes exceeds the needs of the informal economy, and the value of the currency circulation of banknotes degenerates rapidly.

Due to the hyperinflation provoked by excessive

public financing, the circulation of notes has had to

be totally renewed every year. Monetary authorities

are constrained to annually print between 650 and

27

6

HOW BEST TO

PROVIDE

INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC AID

IN ZAIRE

Hugues Leclercq
900 million banknotes. Thus the cost of maintaining

an average of $80 million in real cash holdings

amounts to $50 million a year.

Old one-million-zaire banknotes that were to have

been retired on December 10, 1993. At the time of the

monetary reform in September 1993, only 65 percent

of the banknotes in circulation were exchanged

against the NZ. Most of the currency that was not exchanged consisted of one-million-zaire notes. These

notes were progressively sucked into the two regions

of Kasai, where they are now used for transactions in

the informal popular economy. There are probably

between 400 and 410 million banknotes with a real

purchase value of around $25 million. In fact, the onemillion-zaire notes issued in September 1991 are now

appreciating versus the NZ. (At the end of September

1995, a one-million-zaire banknote could buy 385

NZ.) This currency will probably continue to circulate

until it is worn out.

Notes denominated in U.S. dollars. The dollar currency circulation, already important before 1994, was

boosted by an injection of dollars through the relief

aid from humanitarian agencies and NGOs coping

with the Rwandan refugees in Kivu. Dollar notes of

almost all denominations are in use. A very rough

estimate of the dollar notes in circulation in Zaire is

around $40 million. 

This currency is mainly used in the informal popular economy of the two Kasai and the two Kivu regions. Dollar notes are used for transactions in the

upper-income bracket of the informal economy outside of Kinshasa. A substantial amount are also held

by the elite and the private sector for payments in local transactions.

The foreign-exchange accounts deposited in local

banks in Zaire are used mainly by exporters. This

foreign-exchange deposit is estimated at $50 million,

the majority of which belongs to a dozen big diamond

traders. Fed mainly by the repatriation of export proceeds, these foreign-exchange deposits are formally

under the control of central monetary authorities, but

in fact they are freely used by their holders. (Indeed,

when central authorities periodically try to take hold

of these funds, they have little success.) Foreignexchange deposits are used for both foreign commercial transactions and local payments, either by

acquiring NZ banknotes to settle payments with 

local businesses holding these types of deposits or 

by cashing dollar notes.

“Zairian Belgian francs,” which appeared in Kinshasa in 1994. The difficulties of running a business

with banknotes denominated in zaires has encouraged some in the middle class to engage in certain

financial arrangements with large local religious associations. These middle-class traders, mainly operating

in Kinshasa and in Bas-Zaire, bring the proceeds of

their sales in zaires to the association, which then

opens in its books a deposit account denominated in

Belgian francs.

The transfer to this deposit account is executed at

the current rate of exchange between the NZ and the

Belgian franc. These Belgian deposits are used mainly

to protect the real value of cash holdings. Sometimes

they serve to settle local transactions with colleagues

who also have accounts in the association. Finally,

part of these deposits are used to pay for goods and

services bought in Belgium. The entire process is

computerized and seems to work fairly well on a

small-scale basis.

Degenerated money deposit accounts denominated

in NZ. The deposit accounts in NZ cannot be used

either for current normal transactions or to retire

banknotes. They only retain their value because they

permit the settling of fiscal obligations. Such accounts

are sometimes the only way to receive a payment by

the Treasury, and there is always a hope that banknotes will be retired by some arrangement.

These accounts are a virus in the monetary system.

Their proportion varies between 8 percent and 30

percent of the total monetary circulation. Recently,

the authorities officially legalized the rate of conversion between zaires held in deposit accounts with

banknotes denominated in zaires. In late February

1994 the legal rate applied for deposit accounts that

could serve to settle transactions was 14,000 NZ per

$1 (compared to 3,500 NZ per $1 for banknotes).

From February onward, the rate of conversion was

fixed by “the market”—that is, by arrangements between customs, revenue administration, and local

businesses. This floating rate of exchange only adds

to the confusion in the monetary system and in public

finance. It has also put the Central Bank in an embarrassing situation: according to the books of the Central Bank, deposits of zaires do not perfectly equal

zaires in banknotes. It will be extremely difficult now

to have an accurate idea of the real accounting situation of the Central Bank, the government, or the local

banks.

28
---

The current monetary system, with its multiple currencies and annual renewal of banknotes, invites malpractice and mismanagement. Opportunities include

manipulating the exchange rate by issuing more or

fewer banknotes; acquiring foreign exchange by issuing banknotes; speculating on the variable rates between the currency rates and the deposit rates; and

arbitrarily selecting the beneficiaries of public funds

and settling their payments either in banknotes, in

deposit accounts, or in foreign exchange.

Given these conditions, it will remain extremely

difficult, and may be counterproductive, to inject aid

through those channels ruled by the central government and monetary authorities. The best remedy is to

establish some sort of currency board (as was done,

for example, in Estonia in 1992) adapted to the conditions of the Zairian economy. Establishing such a

board would require not only that financial, technical,

and economic decisions are made but also that the

current political institutions reach a consensus that

the issuing of money should be strictly linked to a corresponding foreign-exchange deposit at a fixed intangible rate and that public expenditures cannot be

financed simply by issuing banknotes.

THE WAY AHEAD

The fundamentals of the Zairian economy are still

promising and could rapidly generate a high growth

rate if proper political and monetary conditions were

restored.

Potential resources and environment. As is well

known, Zaire has a significant natural resources potential, notably in the mining and the hydraulic sectors: this could be exploited in the medium term.

Zaire has maintained a relatively well-protected natural environment compared with other countries in

sub-Saharan Africa, although the influx of Rwandan

refugees has threatened the environmental situation.

It should also be noted that the social environment is

still relatively sheltered from chronic and general violence, as yet uncontaminated by ferocious tribal war,

urban guerrillas, or modern and international forms

of crime.

The dynamism of the informal popular economy.

The informal economy is very dynamic, working on a

highly free and competitive market-oriented basis.

Participants have a sense of opportunities and flexibility, and are making the best of the available local

resources. The informal popular economy generates a

deep sense of solidarity, founded not so much in sentiment as in the necessity for survival: people need

one another to undertake profitable activities. Finally,

the participants are conscious of the public goods that

need to be provided, because the success of their

humble activities depends on their understanding of

their local market. The highest priorities expressed by

those in the informal sector are (1) security, that is,

freedom from personal violence and aggression toward property; (2) access to health care and education; (3) freedom and facilities to move easily, one

priority being the maintenance of roads; and (4) free

access to information and communications.

The endurance of the modern sector of the economy. Despite the collapse of the public sector and its

infrastructure, and despite the outbreaks of looting in

1991 and 1993, the private modern sector, notably

the manufacturing industry, has survived. Indeed,

under the pressure of circumstances, the modern

economy has made several far-reaching and sound

economic adjustments:

- Local experts have replaced redundant expatriates. Between 1989 and 1994, around 60 percent

of the total expatriate labor force left industry and

services in the private sector.

- The unqualified labor force has been reduced (at

a tolerable social cost) by almost 45 percent since

1989. 

- The manufacturing sector is able to sell products

in a very competitive environment while employing cheap labor. Goods and services are provided

by the informal economy most efficiently and at

lowest cost.

- Intensive labor and equipment have been favored

over sophisticated machinery in capital expenditures.

- There has been a growing awareness that a social

environment must be created, in collaboration

with the local NGOs and authorities, that addresses the economic and social problems of the

local people. In some regions, health, education,

29
road maintenance, and electricity distribution

have been partly financed by coalitions, with

manufacturing industries and private mining enterprises being particularly responsive.

The informal economy, the private modern sector,

and the large local NGOs thus represent quite a large

segment of Zairian society that is trying to work together. Operating mainly without foreign aid, and relying instead on their own resources (both local and

external), these economic actors have developed a

kind of consensus to supply and finance certain priority public goods. They are sensitive to financial constraints and careful to spend scarce resources on the

highest local priorities.

CONCLUSIONS

Until the monetary system is changed it will be difficult to channel a substantial amount of aid to the central government. There is, however, a strong case for

targeting aid on the local level.

Providing support to regional and local communities does not require a complex infrastructure either

in Zaire or outside. The first step is to encourage those

local initiatives already under way to make themselves known to international agencies. Designing

arrangements to allow international organizations to

dispense foreign aid without channeling it directly or

indirectly through the central government calls for

creativity and an understanding of local and national

realities. Working from the local groups’ proposals, a

high-powered representative of international organizations could help conclude practical arrangements

with central government authorities.

To begin with, the amount of financial aid that can

be efficiently absorbed by local communities under

this approach will be small. However, as the program

achieves greater success, so the capacity to absorb

much more substantial aid will enlarge. In this manner, the program will directly address Zaire’s most

pressing problem, which lies not so much with the absence of large-scale aid as with the country’s limited

capacity to absorb aid, particularly for the economic

development of the poor. The most important role

that international organizations can play in the transition is to help enlarge Zaire’s capacity to absorb aid

through formulas developed by local communities

and to foster appropriate arrangements with the central official authorities.

30
The primary impediment to political transition

in Zaire throughout most of the 1990s, and

the continuing threat to local and regional

development comes from violence perpetrated, tolerated, or provoked by the state. While still circumscribed, “privatized” violence in the form of ethnic or

regional strife, has also become a fact of life, principally in the regions of Shaba and Kivu, and represents

an increasing threat, because of the trend toward acquiring weapons and the perception that economic

and political benefits can be had with little risk.

Without reform of the army, containment of the security forces, and reining in of the military and civilian investigative security apparatus, political change

will be ephemeral and development unsustainable.

The recent past demonstrates that while a fragile equilibrium is possible between civil society and armed

forces, it cannot last in the face of political intrigue,

ethnic and regional division, or simply the appearance of new profit-making opportunities.

STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES

The armed forces of Zaire—army and security apparatus—are composed of overlapping and competitive

units dominated by individuals close to Mobutu; 

they come primarily from his own ethnic group, the

Ngbandi, and neighboring groups in the region of

Equateur, primarily the Ngbaka. Mobutu has been the

undisputed head, a position he maintains in part by

ensuring that few lines of authority converge below

him.

The number of men under arms is notoriously difficult to assert. However, UN Special Rapporteur for

Human Rights Roberto Garréton gave these estimates:

- a regular army (FAZ) of about 60,000, half of

whom belong to the Gendarmerie nationale

(GDN);

- an air force and navy totaling about 5,000;

- a Civil Guard (Garde civile) of about 12,000; and

- the Special Presidential Division (DSP) of between 6,000 and 10,000.

Most army officers with significant professional

training were purged in the 1970s or early 1980s. Officers lacking ethnic and regional links to the president were, with very few exceptions, executed,

dismissed, or moved to inconsequential positions.

Even within a single “corps” like the FAZ, loyalties

vary according to relationships with the president: 

A regional commander may not—probably will not—

have control over troops belonging to a particular

elite regiment whose commander has a direct relationship to the president or one of his “barons.”

The elite units and security forces are linked to

barons of the regime, who are known to have used

them to build economic empires. Three key figures

are Kpama Baramoto of the Civil Guard, General

Bolozi of the Gendarmerie, and Nzimbi Nbale Kongo

of the DSP. In addition, a number of Mobutu’s closest

advisors, the most prominent of whom currently is

Ngbanda Nzambo-ko-Atumba, are associated with the

intelligence forces, which had their own strike force in

the past.

THE TRANSITION PERIOD

Although official banditry was endemic before 1990,

it has reached new peaks in recent years. Two rounds

of army-led pillaging, in 1991 and 1993, hit almost

every urban center (Bukavu being one of the few

exceptions). Although it is true that the first round of

pillaging was joined by a gleeful population pleased

to assault big businesses, the second targeted the

population itself with a vengeance not previously

experienced.

31

7VIOLENCE IN ZAIRE

Peter Rosenblum
While the army pillaging was overtly motivated by

economic needs (few if any soldiers actually receive a

regular, living wage), there has been a significant element of political manipulation behind the timing and

targets. The 1993 assaults in Kinshasa, for example,

were particularly aggressive against institutions of the

Catholic Church at a time when the Catholic bishops

and many individual priests were playing a leading

role in the democracy movement. The strategic deployment or restraint of the reliable elite forces

demonstrated the extent of the president’s will to

control the army rampage, as did his immediate

announcement of an amnesty after the first round 

of pillaging.

The military and security forces have been used

frequently in the 1990s to block specific transition initiatives, most significantly in connection with the National Conference. In addition, with the independent

press that has thrived in Zaire since 1990, journalists,

newspapers, and opposition politicians have been periodically targeted for attacks. Although most of the

identified crime of this type is carried out by soldiers

in uniform, the regime sometimes relies on secret

strike forces or zealous party youth.

MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES

There have been signs during the transition of

breaches of Mobutuist orthodoxy, and these have favored a democratic transition within the military and

the security forces. Under Mobutuist “moderates,” the

civilian and military intelligence forces (SNIP and

SARM, respectively) were essentially removed from

the work of active political repression early in the

transition. During the National Conference, a number

of important military figures—including General

Singa Boyenge, head of territorial security until 1990,

and General Dona Mahele, army chief of staff and former head of SARM—indicated a willingness to support the transition process.

Signs of splintering have been seen within the rank

and file as well. A bungled government effort, in early

1992, to implicate soldiers in a coup d’état monté redounded to the overwhelming benefit of the opposition, turning human rights lawyers into heroes in 

the eyes of the soldiers. Later, under the Tshisekedi

government, the defense minister—himself from 

the Ngbaka ethnic group—reassured many soldiers.

Although perhaps overconfident, the opposition

government and the minister, in particular, were

extremely optimistic about the possibilities of working with the army.

This process came to end, however, in early 1993,

when Mobutu intervened to stop the transition

process initiated by the National Conference; he removed the “moderates” from positions of authority

and replaced them with hard-liners. One immediate

result was the resumption of repressive political activities by the SNIP.

Despite these developments, soldiers up to the

very highest levels are free agents, and seek out the

best economic opportunities for themselves. For

years before the transition, the perpetrators of repressive activity were rewarded with the possessions of

the victim. The practice continues. When the Rwandan army fled to Kivu in August 1994, any political

support for the fleeing Hutus was clearly secondary to

the search for spoils. According to officials in South

Kivu, in response to calls for help, generals from Kinshasa arrived, only to collect their share of vehicles

and weaponry and then depart. Zairian soldiers have

sold weapons to Hutus and non-Hutus alike, and

have joined on each side of the battle in North Kivu.

During periods of insecurity in Kinshasa, even members of the DSP rent their services to European and

Zairian businessmen.

Where communities have succeeded in paying the

soldiers, as in Bukavu, the worst economic disasters

have been avoided. But the equilibrium is very delicate and can be upset by a new group of soldiers, a

new set of demands, or a political incentive to disturb

the balance.

ETHNIC AND REGIONAL VIOLENCE

Since 1990 traditional enmities have erupted into violence in two regions of the country—the copper- and

cobalt-rich region of Shaba and the fertile, densely

populated region of North Kivu. Neither eruption of

violence was without precedent. However, the particular circumstances and timing of the violence were

more a function of recent politics than of age-old

feuds. The case for the direct government manipulation and control of the conflict is strongest in Shaba.

There, a popular opposition politician, Kyungu wa

Kumwanza, allied himself with one of the most notorious politicians of the Second Republic, Nguz Karl-iBond. When Nguz broke ranks with the opposition to

become prime minister in 1991, Kyungu became governor of Shaba. Taking a direct, populist approach,

Kyungu went to the people with the message that

32
Shabans must take back what is theirs—in other

words, drive out the people of the neighboring region

of Kasai, who, admittedly, occupied most of the prestigious positions in the major regional enterprises.

Kyungu justified his alliance with Mobutu as one

of pure convenience. One of the expressions of the

party was “Better a dying dictator than a permanent

dictatorship of Kasaians”—a reference to Tshisekedi,

who is a Luba from Kasai. The administration

adopted an explicit policy of regional cleansing. Following the model used by Mobutu during the Second

Republic, Kyungu’s party—the UFERI—established a

militant and partly militarized youth wing, the

JUFERI. The JUFERI increasingly took up policing

functions at state institutions. Although not paid for

their services, members of the JUFERI expected to receive the jobs of departing Kasaians.

The first outbreaks of violence occurred in late

1991, soon after Kyungu became governor. But immediately after Etienne Tshisekedi became prime minister in August 1992, the violence took on an entirely

different scale and direction. Massive gangs of youth

attacked Kasaians and forced them out of their

homes. These gangs, whose attacks were systematic

and well organized, appeared as if out of nowhere, accompanied by drugs and fetishes. In Likasi, where the

worst violence occurred, soldiers made what appears

to have been a sincere effort to suppress the gangs,

but they lacked the means and the logistical support.

Those troops that did have the capabilities to act effectively—the DSP and the Civil Guard—never arrived. 

By March 1993 most of the Kasaians living in

Shaba had left their homes for displaced persons’

camps or moved to the capital of Lubumbashi. In

Lubumbashi, tensions flared, but the Kasaian community was probably too large and powerful to displace.

Throughout this period Governor Kyungu continued to expand his administrative control over local

television, newspapers, and radio. Like other Zairian

politicians, Kyungu also used his control of local resources to enrich himself. The youth gangs apparently disappeared with the departure of the Kasaians.

But the populist base, including the JUFERI, continued to grow and play an increasingly public role.

In the process, Kyungu created a power base unlike any other in modern Zaire. Although allied to

President Mobutu, it was clearly separate. As a result,

few were surprised when Mobutu allowed Prime Minister Kengo to remove Kyungu in 1995. Unexpectedly, the initial response of the population was calm,

perhaps because of Kyungu’s willingness to play by

the rules of the Second Republic. Subsequently, however, political tension has increased in Shaba. The

SNIP, with the support of the Civil Guard, has used an

iron fist to keep order while purging Kyungu’s supporters from positions of power. Many members of

the UFERI have been arrested, detained, and abused.

The violence in Shaba has been almost entirely unarmed, despite the large number of weapons passing

through Shaba destined for Angola and for other

parts of the country, including Kivu. Apparently, however, administrative control or popular sentiment is

sufficient to prevent weapons from flowing into the

community. While impressive, this situation must be

viewed as fragile and analyzed in light of what would

happen if armed violence increases in neighboring

South Kivu or if the struggle for power in the region

intensifies.

The circumstances in North Kivu are somewhat

different. No charismatic political leader motivated

the population to rise up. Rather, a long-term controversy over citizenship took on new importance as

populations jockeyed for control in eventual elections. The ethnic Rwandan population of North Kivu,

known as Banyarwanda, composed of waves of immigrants over a period of more than a hundred years,

had grown in some areas to outnumber other inhabitants, primarily the Hunde and Nyanga, known, inappropriately, as the “autochthonous” people. In the

area of Masisi, for example, the Banyarwanda account

for as much as 80 percent of the population.

Successive laws in 1971 and 1981 first acknowledged the Zairian citizenship of the Banyarwanda and

then withdrew that citizenship (requiring proof of

presence since 1885), but no administrative action

was taken to enforce the latter measure. Although the

Banyarwanda had become the most powerful economic force in the regions of Masisi and Walikali, and

occupied important positions there in, for example,

the Catholic Church, they did not own the land they

cultivated and on which they herded. Rather, according to traditional land rights, the land belonged to the

“autochthonous” leaders.

What sparked the outbreak of violence in March

1993 is unclear. There were reports of visits to Kinshasa by local politicians, on the one hand, and of

secret meetings of Banyarwanda elders, on the other.

Whatever the cause, in March 1993 a group of Hunde

and Nyanga attacked the Banyarwanda at Ntoto

market, east of Masisi. The violence that erupted in

Masisi, Walikali, and Rutshuru quickly took on a

33
character far more deadly than the gang attacks in

Shaba. Within a period of weeks several thousand

people were killed, villages were destroyed, and hundreds of thousands of people were displaced.

During the ensuing calm, President Mobutu dispatched a contingent of the DSP, headed by a rare

non-Ngbandi officer. The DSP took up a peacekeeping role (one of the rare instances in which it has

played such a part), to the general satisfaction of

many in the region. In the meantime, local groups in

Goma, with little external support, tried to mediate

and organized community meetings. There, many

people acknowledged that, while the grievances were

real, they had been manipulated into violence that

was unwelcome. By the time Rwandan refugees began

flowing into Kivu in 1994, a delicate balance had been

struck. Although the underlying political issues had

not been addressed, many villagers—not, however, the

traditional leaders of the “autochthonous” peoples—

had returned to their villages, and NGOs and local

collectivities were functioning.

This delicate balance was destroyed by the arrival

of the refugees, but not, as many believe, because of

the infiltration by Interhamwe and ex-FAR (Rwandan

and Hutu soldiers). Rather, new acts of provocation

were bolstered by the flow of arms to both sides in the

conflict. Youth militias formed on all sides, primarily

Hutu and Hunde. The Zairian soldiers now stationed

in the region are no longer paid, and even the remaining DSP troops have joined in preying on all sides.

In South Kivu a similar ethnic balance exists.

There, as well, people of Rwandan origin—primarily

Tutsi and known as Banyamulenge—have lived

among other ethnic groups for generations, predating

even the arrival of the Banyarwanda in North Kivu. A

resolution of the transition parliament in Kinshasa,

however, claims that large numbers of refugees have

joined them and links their fate to that of the Rwandan refugees, who were to be expelled by the end of

December 1995. One of the leaders of the Mobutu faction in the HCR-PT, Anzaluni Bambe, is from the region and has reportedly been active in inciting

aggression toward the Banyamulenge.

According to Banyamulenge residents of the area,

the local administration has begun to inventory the

belongings of the Banyamulenge for repossession after the residents’ expulsion. The Banyamulenge report a heavy flow of arms, primarily from Shaba, and

add that every family is encouraged to buy a Kalashnikov, which can be had for the equivalent of about

$60.

CONCLUSIONS

On the surface, there exists an eerie stability to the relations between society and the armed forces in Zaire.

Violence is constant—used to pursue either political

or economic ends—but held within limits. There is no

popular armed movement against the government

and no “private” violence beyond the control of the

government.

Viewed from another angle, however, what has occurred is a dangerous dissipation of authority over

armed power in the state. While armed forces remain

loyal to Mobutu, the motivation is little more than opportunism. Their actual source of income is banditry

and pillaging, encouraged by their near-complete impunity for crimes.

Even if there were the necessary will, it is questionable whether, for example, elite forces could maintain

order over the 60,000 remaining troops of the armed

forces for any prolonged period. On the other hand,

the armed forces as now constituted pose an insurmountable threat to Zaire’s economic and political

development.

Both the incitement and the relative containment

of ethnically or regionally based violence are significant. Although hundreds of thousands of people have

been displaced, the violence has been far less deadly

and widespread than many predicted. This is in part

due to the absence of armed violence and armed opposition to Mobutu, and in part due to restraint

within society. But these conditions may not hold:

weapons are flowing into areas such as South and

North Kivu, and youth gangs are becoming accustomed to power brought by weaponry.

This analysis leads to these recommendations:

- Intensive research should be conducted to detect

points of ethnic, regional, and political division

susceptible to violent provocation and also to

identify the means by which tensions can be reduced or avoided.

- An effort should be made to develop a strategy for

military containment and restructuring in preparation for elections and long-term development.

- Specific confidence-building measures should be

developed that take into account ethnic and regional sensibilities. For example, some Mobutu

insiders might be replaced with officers who,

while close to Mobutu, are more acceptable to the

population.

34
ADDENDUM

The takeover of the Kivu provinces by a “rebel” army

in the fall of 1996 set the conflict in Zaire on a new

course, challenging the fragile order maintained by

the armed forces of the state and raising the specter of

Zaire’s hastened disintegration. For the first time

since 1978, a well-armed, foreign-backed military

movement challenged the state. As in previous military confrontations, the Zairian troops were easily

routed. The main resistance to the rebels appeared, in

fact, to come from the former Rwandan troops (exFAR) based on Zairian territory. As they beat a retreat,

Zairian troops ransacked towns and wreaked havoc.

The city of Bukavu, the only major city to escape the

pillaging of 1991 and 1993, was plundered by Zairian

soldiers before they fled in late October.

The mainstay of the forces that took over Kivu is

Rwandaphone, reportedly Banyamulenge from the

southernmost region of South Kivu, near Uvira. They

are almost exclusively Tutsis, and have roots in Zaire

that extend nearly two hundred years, further than

most ethnic Rwandans living in Zaire. In September

1996 a provincial official announced that the Banyamulenge would be expelled from Zaire. This threat of

expulsion followed upon the actions of Hutu extremists in the refugee camps in Zaire, who began spreading anti-Tutsi propaganda, and of Hutu guerrillas,

who drove most Zairian Tutsis out of the Masisi and

Rutshruru regions. After Zairian soldiers started attacking Banyamulenga Tutsi in South Kivu in September and October, the well-armed rebels attacked

Zairian army posts and Rwandan refugee camps, first

around Uvira and Bukavu, and then in and around

the northern camps surrounding Goma. The attacks

on the camps routed the Hutu militias, who fled further west into Zaire. With the tight control of the militias over their fellow refugees broken, vast numbers of

Hutu refugees started returning to their homes in

Rwanda.

Although the Banyamulenge are a major component of the rebel forces, the real composition of the

troops is not clear, particularly the level of involvement of Rwandan soldiers. The Rwandan authorities

have denied the involvement of regular Rwandan

troops, though they admit providing substantial assistance to the rebels. In North Kivu, which is entirely

foreign to the Banyamulenge, the rebels have reportedly been joined by Hunde militias and others that

were fighting against the Banyarwanda (now

“cleansed” of Tutsis) and ex-FAR in Masisi, north of

Goma. The rebel leaders, who have played bit parts in

earlier rebellions and lack any known base of support

in the country, are calling for an overthrow of Mobutu

and pointedly avoid calling for the secession of Kivu.

In the short term, the takeover in the east is causing a dramatic realignment of political forces in the

country. The Zairian public unified against what is

perceived as a foreign invader employing local proxies. The opposition, civil society, and followers of

President Mobutu have come together for the first

time, rallying to the side of President Mobutu, applauding France for its willingness to intervene, and

decrying the United States both for its hesitation at

sending troops and for its uncritical support for

Rwanda. In Kivu itself it is hard to gauge the reaction

of the population. Local leaders of civil society have

either fled or sought to remain out of the public eye.

None is yet collaborating openly with the institutions

established by the rebels.

The unity created by the rebel takeover will likely

be short-lived. Even now, opposition leader Etienne

Tshisekedi is calling for negotiation rather than military confrontation. If the spell of nonviolence has

been broken in the country, as some believe, other

disaffected populations in the country may be more

willing to use the arms that are so easily available in

the region. Although suspicion of the rebels and their

leaders makes the current assault an unlikely vehicle

for a direct takeover of the state, it could be the catalyst for the spreading of violence that Zaire has thus

far succeeded in avoiding.

35
I

n the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda in

1994 and the accession to power in Kigali of a

government dominated by the Rwandan Patriotic

Front, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans fled to

Tanzania, Zaire, and other neighboring countries. As

of this writing (early 1996), some two million “new

caseload” Rwandan refugees are living outside the

country. Most of these recent refugees are Hutu, and

most are in refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire. 

Despite sometimes aggressive efforts by the

UNHCR to persuade the refugees to return home,

only a small proportion of them have done so. By

contrast, since 1994 an estimated 750,000 “old caseload” refugees have come to Rwanda from Uganda,

Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, and other countries. Most

of these are Tutsi who themselves, or whose parents,

had fled the country two to three decades earlier.1

The largest proportion of new caseload refugees

from Rwanda, some 1.5 million people, are living in

Zaire’s Kivu province. The presence of such a huge

conglomeration of refugees in this area is problematic

in a number of respects. First and foremost, it is a

significant human tragedy for so many people to be

living in what are, for most of them, miserable conditions. 

Second, the presence of these refugees in the

densely populated lacustrine areas of Kivu constitutes

a grave burden for local communities, heightening

social tensions. Although some Kivu residents have

benefited from the refugee influx, for most ordinary

citizens such benefits are far outweighed by the negative political, economic, and social effects, including

serious destruction of the environment and, in North

Kivu, an exacerbation of ethnic tensions. 

Third, for the current government in Rwanda, the

refugees in Kivu represent both an embarrassment

and, because there are among them soldiers from the

former Rwandan army (FAR) and members of the

militias, a significant security threat.

Finally, providing material support as well as

medical and social services to such a large refugee

population is expensive; the costs are stretching the

resources and generosity of international organizations and humanitarian agencies.

In August 1995 the decision by the government of

Zaire to expel Rwandan refugees by force attracted

world attention, underscoring the importance and

volatility of this simmering crisis. Zaire’s subsequent

ultimatum, naming December 31, 1995, as the deadline for repatriation of the refugees, dramatized the

urgency of these concerns. 

Because the refugee crisis in Kivu is constantly

evolving, any analysis runs the risk of being overtaken

by events. One thing is clear, however: Resolving the

refugee crisis will require that a number of measures

are taken on several different fronts at the same time.

The problem is a regional one and the refugee crisis

cannot be isolated from the problems of Zaire. Careful assessment is needed of Zaire’s position on the

refugee crisis and of how the Zairian leadership could

be persuaded to facilitate efforts to promote orderly

repatriation. 

IMPERATIVES AND DILEMMAS OF

REPATRIATION

Under what conditions are the refugees in Kivu (and

in Tanzania and Burundi) likely to go home, and what

can be done to establish those conditions? How can

international organizations such as the United

Nations work with governments in the Great Lakes

region, humanitarian agencies, and donor countries

to address the crisis and establish the basis for voluntary, peaceful repatriation? 

In general, it may seem reasonable to assume that

encouraging repatriation can help to defuse the crisis.

Yet the situation is more complicated. How one goes

about encouraging repatriation will determine

whether it helps to ameliorate or serves to aggravate

the situation. And any efforts in this regard must take

37

APPENDIX

RWANDAN REFUGEES

IN KIVU, ZAIRE

Catharine Newbury
account of the dynamics of fear among the refugees,

among leaders of the current government in Kigali,

and among ordinary citizens in Rwanda, both Tutsi

and Hutu. 

A number of studies have pointed out that many of

the refugees want very much to return to Rwanda but

are afraid to do so.2 Hutu refugees fear that if they return, they may be arrested, accused of participation in

the genocide, and thrown into prison. They also fear

that they may be mistreated or harassed by the army,

by civil authorities, or by people seeking vengeance

for the genocide. Linked to such fears are concerns

over property rights. If refugees return home to find

their homes occupied by others, how can they attempt to reclaim property without running the risk of

imprisonment? There have been enough cases of arbitrary arrest to make such fears credible.

In particular, the conduct of the Rwandan Patriotic

Army (RPA) is hardly reassuring to refugees contemplating return. After taking power in 1994 the RPA engaged in massacres of Hutu in some regions.3 In 1995

dramatic cases of army brutality sent shock waves of

fear through the camps. During the Kibeho massacre

in April, at least 2,000 and perhaps as many as 8,000

persons were killed when the RPA moved to close a

displaced persons’ camp in southwestern Rwanda; 

in September more than 100 villagers and their mayor

were massacred at Kanama in northwestern Rwanda.4

Attacks by the RPA on a refugee camp at Birava in

Kivu in April 1995 and against suspected guerrillas

on the island of Iwawa in Lake Kivu in November

1995 have added to refugees’ fears.

The death or disappearance of what Human Rights

Watch calls “a substantial number of Rwandans” has

served as a further deterrent to the return of refugees

from Kivu. Among the more prominent people killed

were the prefect of Butare Prefecture, in March; a

deputy prefect of Gitarama Prefecture (killed with his

wife, two children, and a cook), in July; a deputy prefect of Gikongoro Prefecture, in early August; a judge

in Butare, in late August; and a local government official in Gisenyi, in late September.5

Reports on conditions in the refugee camps have

noted that extremists in the camps, partisans of the

former government, exaggerate the frequency and nature of abuses in Rwanda, so as to frighten refugees

and convince them not to return. Moreover, some

leaders in the camps and former militia have used

pressure and coercion to prevent refugees from

returning to Rwanda. Nonetheless, some 27,000

refugees in a camp near Bukavu said they wish to

return to their homes in southwestern Rwanda. As of

October 1995, however, local authorities in Rwanda

(Cyangugu Prefecture) were hindering rather than facilitating their return.6

It is important to recognize that there are groups of

refugees (women’s organizations prominent among

them) who have attempted to marginalize or circumvent the extremists in the camps. But the comportment of the RPA and some local government officials

in Rwanda has tended to confirm refugees’ fears;

abuses by soldiers, arbitrary arrests, and the everincreasing prison population (58,000 in November

1995) are grim reminders that there are risks to returning. Compounding the problem are calls for

vengeance on the part of some government leaders in

Kigali, and a stalled justice system.7 Because of such

uncertainties, refugees have asked for more information about conditions in Rwanda, and for escorts

from UNHCR or other international agencies back to

their home communes. 

At the end of August 1995 a cabinet reshuffle in the

Kigali government heightened fears among the

refugees, because those who left the government were

moderates who had opposed indiscipline in the army,

criticized human rights abuses, and called for measures to combat insecurity. The prime minister and

interior minister resigned, and three other ministers,

including the justice minister, were dismissed.8

Misinformation and lack of communication between the camps and Rwanda are not necessarily the

most important constraints. Just as important has

been the pervasive climate of insecurity in Rwanda

and an apparent lack of political will on the part of the

government to promote confidence-building measures. The political conditions inside Rwanda have

convinced numbers of refugees that their fears are

well founded.

Meanwhile, the RPA and elements in the government in Kigali fear the threat of military attack by remnants of the FAR (the army of the former Rwandan

government, loyalists to Habyarimana). They have

heard reports of arms being sent to the refugees and

of military training among them. Some observers believe that the extent of the military threat posed by the

refugees has been exaggerated. At most, such critics

say, the former FAR and militias could carry out small

attacks but would be unable to mount an all-out war. 

Whatever the realities on the ground, the fear of attack from outside has been used to justify a military

buildup within Rwanda. Some estimates suggest the

RPA grew to some 50,000 soldiers during 1995. Yet

38
these soldiers often go unpaid, which creates a further

security threat, as soldiers turn to assaults and thefts

while foraging among the population. Moreover,

since the arms embargo on Rwanda was lifted by the

United Nations in August 1995, the RPA has been

seeking to increase its arsenals. 

Thus, for many reasons, every effort should be

made to halt the flow of arms into Kivu and to prevent

the efforts of the former FAR and militias to re-arm. At

the same time, strong pressure should be brought to

bear on the government in Kigali to secure a halt to

armed forays into Kivu. 

Just as threats from the FAR spread fear within

Rwanda, certain policies and actions of the current

government in Kigali seem to foster the very situation

that the incumbent leaders fear. That is, the more that

refugees in the camps in Zaire (or in Tanzania) become convinced that they cannot safely return to

Rwanda, the more receptive they will be to appeals

from hard-liners in the camps who wish to recommence the war and attempt a return to Rwanda by

force. The RPF leaders, having themselves chosen to

use force in 1990 to win the right to return to

Rwanda, are surely aware of the potentially explosive

consequences of having large refugee populations on

their borders. Conversely, they cannot fail to understand that concrete gestures of reconciliation and

confidence-building are needed if indeed they are

serious about promoting repatriation of new caseload

refugees.

In such a polarized situation, the willingness of the

Zairian government to extend the deadline for repatriation beyond December 31, 1995, was a positive step.

The International Tribunal in Arusha has handed

down the first indictments of those to be tried for

genocide. Although only eight indictments have been

issued so far, this judicial activity has tremendous

symbolic significance. 

In November 1995, during a meeting of regional

leaders in Cairo (organized by the Carter Center), the

Kigali government reiterated its commitment to repatriation of refugees—a positive message. Within

Rwanda, there appeared to be progress at the end of

1995 toward beginning trials for some of the prisoners accused of genocide. And there were signs that the

Kigali government might be softening its previous refusal to engage in dialogue with representatives of the

refugees in the camps.

It appears that the 12,000 refugees forcibly expelled by Zaire at the end of August 1995 have been

successfully reintegrated to their home communes.

The efforts by the Rwandan government to accommodate the returnees were encouraging. Less encouraging was the fact that the prison population continued

to grow during the last quarter of 1995 at the rate of

about 1,000 per week.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. UN agencies, donor governments, and organizations providing development aid should encourage the government in Kigali to take

concrete measures to allay the fears of refugees. 

Refugees need to believe that they are welcome in Rwanda and that they can return safely.

In this regard, local administrations in Rwanda

require close attention. Each of Rwanda’s eleven

prefectures has several deputy prefects, who assist the prefect and carry out specified functions

in finance, legal affairs, and so on. At the end of

1995 about 85 percent of these subprefects were

Tutsi. The prefectures are divided into communes; there are 143 communes, each headed by

a bourgmestre. Estimates indicate that more than

60 percent of the bourgmestres are Tutsi. One

measure that could help to reassure refugees

would be to replace those bourgmestres who are

relatively new to the country, having returned to

Rwanda only recently (after the genocide), with

individuals who are known locally and respected

by the inhabitants of the commune they are to administer.

The Kigali government should be encouraged

to move ahead as rapidly as possible in reestablishing a functional justice system. Funding has

been provided, and expatriate jurists are prepared to provide assistance. Manifestation of political will on this issue would be an important

confidence-building measure.

2. Obtain agreement from the Rwandan government to prolong the presence of a UN peacekeeping force.

As of December 1995 the United Nations had

negotiated an agreement with the government 

of Rwanda to maintain a UNAMIR presence in

the country until March 1996. Still under discussion was the question of whether UN political

observers would remain. Though neither the

United Nations nor the Rwandan government

seem inclined to maintain UNAMIR in Rwanda

beyond March 1996, the withdrawal of UNAMIR

39
40

is likely to retard rather than encourage refugee

repatriation. The continued presence of UNAMIR

would seem to be an important confidence-building measure, to provide reassurance to returning

refugees and to UN and NGO personnel involved

in repatriation and relief operations. 

3. Promote mechanisms to facilitate communication and dialogue between refugee camps, their

home communes in Rwanda, and the Rwandan

government. 

The Rwandan government claims that conditions have improved and refugees should not be

afraid to return. If this is true, better communication with the camps is needed so that refugees

can obtain a realistic picture of the conditions

back home.

4. Conduct follow-up monitoring in communes to

which refugees have been repatriated. 

There are a variety of ways in which follow-up

monitoring could be done: it would probably be

best to use several different approaches, for example, more human rights monitors (at least two

per commune), as well as monitoring by NGOs

involved in humanitarian relief and by UNHCR

personnel. Coordination of efforts between

NGOs operating in particular communes within

the camps and NGOs in counterpart communes

in Rwanda should be encouraged. Churches

could also be called upon to assist in facilitating

follow-up and communication.

5. Promote a massive effort to provide resources

to defray the costs of repatriation. 

Coordination among the United Nations Development Programme, UNICEF, other UN agencies, and humanitarian organizations will be

needed to assure adequate material support for

returning refugees when they arrive in their home

communes. This effort will require substantial

funding.

Such support should take the form of hoes,

seed, and food supplies to carry people through

until the next harvest. December/January and

August/September are propitious periods for

repatriation, since rural cultivators are more

likely to want to return home at a time when they

can begin to cultivate and envisage a harvest. One

problem that became evident in Rwanda during

the January/February 1995 planting season is

that relief organizations tended to serve mainly

those areas near the principal roads; more remote

communes were neglected. Mechanisms must be

developed to ensure transport of supplies to

remote areas. 

Some agencies have raised the possibility of

providing cash payments (rather than food and

seed) to returning refugees. This is inadvisable,

for once the money is spent, the refugees are left

with nothing. Moreover, distributing hoes, seed,

and food increases the likelihood that the supplies will be used for family needs. To avoid

tensions, some resources should also be made

available to local residents, many of whom are

desperately poor. The expense of this additional

aid seems less costly than risking resentment and

violence against the returnees.

6. Devote specific attention to the land issue and

to ensuring women’s rights to land and other

property. 

Plots of land in resettlement areas must be

made available to old caseload refugees, so they

will cease occupying the land of newly returning

caseload refugees. Tracts of land, mostly in the

east, have already been identified in government

plans for resettlement, but additional land will be

needed in communes in many different parts of

the country. As a report from Refugees International has emphasized, it is important that the

Rwandan government “issue a clear land and

property decree to clear up confusion and designate a local dispute resolution mechanism.”

Moreover, material assistance is needed for both

new caseload refugees and the old caseload

returnees.9

7. Programs to provide employment and training

should be developed.

The Rwandan government has been told by

the World Bank that it must sharply limit government employment. How, then, can returning new

caseload refugees with training and skills hope to

find employment? Many existing jobs have already been filled with old caseload refugees. This

situation requires study and attention. Rural em-
ployment is also needed to accommodate those

who have too little land to ensure family survival.

41

NOTES TO APPENDIX
tion of Rwandans: Findings and Recommendations” (report issued October 30, 1995).

3. See Human Rights Watch/Africa, Rwanda: A New

Catastrophe? (New York: Human Rights Watch,

December 1994).

4. Human Rights Watch has reported that survivors

of the massacre were often treated harshly when

they returned to their home communes after the

Kibeho camp was closed. Many were “attacked by

gangs of civilians who beat them and pillaged their

belongings. Hundreds of the displaced were arrested as they arrived in their home communes and

were crammed into lockups that were already full

to bursting.” See Human Rights Watch, “Human

Rights in Rwanda: 1995,” in Human Rights Watch

World Report 1996 (New York: Human Rights

Watch, 1995), 43.

5. See ibid., 5.

6. See United Nations, Department of Humanitarian

Affairs, Observations while Traveling through

Rwanda, Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania, mission

report (New York: United Nations, 1995).

7. Human Rights Watch reported that “although real

shortages of human and material resources slowed

the operation of the judicial system, this did not

account for the failure to try even one of the more

than two hundred cases that were ready as early as

April 1995. The authorities who ended the genocide appeared unwilling to prosecute its perpetrators, either because they lacked confidence in

judges named by the previous government or because they saw some political interest in detaining

large numbers of persons indefinitely.” Human

Rights Watch, “Human Rights in Rwanda: 1995,”

41.

8. See ibid., 44.

9. Refugees International, “Repatriation of Rwandans,” 3.

1. Sources on the genocide in Rwanda are numerous. For background on political conflicts in

Rwanda and the roots to the genocide, see André Guichaoua, ed., Les crises politiques au

Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994), 2d ed.

(Paris: Karthala, 1995); David Newbury, ed.,

“Rwanda: Genocide and After,” special issue of

Issue: A Journal of Opinion 23, no. 2 (1995);

Filip Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en

crise: Rwanda, Burundi, 1988–1994 (Paris:

Karthala, 1994); and Claudine Vidal and Marc

Le Pape, “Les politiques de la haine: Rwanda,

Burundi, 1994–1995,” special issue of Les

Temps Modernes, no. 538 (July–August 1995).

2. See, for example, Jeff Drumtra, “Rwandan

Refugees: Updated Findings and Recommendations” (site visit notes, U.S. Committee for

Refugees, October 25, 1995); Jean-Pierre Godding, “Rwanda: Désastre, mensonge, et espérance,” Dialogue, no. 178 (October 1994):

49–54; and Refugees International, “Repatria42
CHRONOLOGY

1960–96

1960

Zaire (Congo) achieves independence from Belgium.

After an unexpected military coup against the first

elected government in July, the United Nations sends

a Chapter VII operation. Katanga, supported by Belgian forces, secedes. After a political clash between

President Joseph Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister

Patrice Lumumba, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, who commands the Congo army, temporarily seizes power and

Lumumba is jailed near Kinshasa.

1961

Lumumba is transferred to Elizabethville (now

Lubumbashi) and is almost assassinated. While

Katanga is still in the process of seceding, Mobutu relinquishes power. Parliament reconvenes in Kinshasa

and a new prime minister, Cyrille Adoula, is nominated by the congress.

1962

Parliament votes for the creation of twenty-two new

provinces. The Congo becomes a quasi-federal state.

1963–64

End of the secession in Katanga; its president, Moise

Tshombe, is forced to leave the Congo. Beginning of

popular rebellions in the Congo against an ineffective

administration in Leopoldville, which ostracizes the

“nationalist opposition” claiming Lumumba’s heritage. A foreign-led military operation is launched

against the “rebel army.” Tshombe returns to the

Congo and is immediately designated as the new

prime minister.

1965

Amid renewed political turmoil, induced by the approaching presidential election, Mobutu takes power

in a coup d’état. A new era of nationalism (“Zairianization”) begins, but accompanied by pacification in the

country.

1973–75

Economic disarray results from government policies

to seize foreign-owned commercial and industrial assets and distribute them to patrimonial clients. The

precipitous fall of world copper prices in 1974 exacerbates the economic crisis.

43
1976

First in series of stabilization programs under the IMF

and the World Bank, which last until 1987. After initially disappointing results, the World Bank and the

IMF send their own people to key posts in the Bank 

of Zaire, the Customs Office, and the Ministries of

Finance and Planning. 

1977–78

After the FLNC invasion of Shaba (Shaba I), Mobutu

allows multiple candidates for legislative seats,

although all belong to the MPR. The National

Legislative Council demonstrates some political

independence by rejecting a presidential budget, due

to excessive presidential spending, and after the elections it becomes more assertive in questioning ministers. Mobutu’s “democratic reforms” terminate with

the second invasion of Shaba in 1978 (Shaba II).

1979

“The Thirteen” arise as an opposition voice within the

legislature, defying the government and holding the

army responsible for massacres of diamond miners in

Kasai-Oriental. Erwin Blumenthal, the World Bank’s

appointed manager of the Central Bank in Zaire,

resigns in frustration. 

1980

The Thirteen write an open letter to Mobutu critiquing the government. They are arrested and

stripped of their seats. 

1982

The Thirteen create the UDPS, which claims to be an

opposition party—an explicit violation of Zaire’s

constitution and laws permitting only one party.

Although most founding members are from Kasai, 

the party succeeds in obtaining a diverse ethnic and

regional base.

1987

The UDPS agrees to dissolve and become a “tendency” within the MPR. A number of prominent

members accept positions with government or state

enterprises. Etienne Tshisekedi and Faustin Birindwa,

among others, are soon detained and subject to internal exile and house arrest. Elections for the National

Assembly are held (the last ones to date).

1988

Consolidation of the UDPS as an underground opposition movement. Periodic demonstrations and student protests are repressed violently by special forces.

Tshisekedi remains under house arrest.

1990

The beginning of the political transition.

January. Mobutu attempts to fend off pressure for democratization by proposing “Popular Consultations.”

Instead, Zairians seize the opportunity to debate the

affairs of the state for the first time in more than

twenty years.

April 24. Mobutu announces a limited return to

democracy. Tshisekedi and other political detainees

are released. Zairians greet the announcement with

jubilation. 

May. Students in Lubumbashi are attacked in what

Africa Watch determines is a routine disciplinary measure “slightly gone awry.” Special Rapporteur Wako

reports that there was organized official involvement.

November. The Troika’s support for Mobutu, which

has already been diminishing, dwindles further when

the United States follows France and Belgium and

cancels remaining economic aid.

According to Africa Watch: “Most long-term political detention has disappeared, an active free press has

come into existence, and a number of significant human rights monitoring organizations have arisen.

Nevertheless, the state keeps a stranglehold on the official media and periodically intervenes to intimidate

journalists, opposition political leaders, and human

rights activists.”

1991

April. Mobutu agrees to a National Conference as demanded by the opposing parties, but no immediate

action is taken.

July. The main opposition parties (UDPS, UFERI,

PDSC) form the Union sacrée and immediately attract

other opposition voices. Mobutu is unable to split this

bloc, despite his strategy of appointing several “transitional governments” in rapid succession.

The opposition continues to call for a National

Conference. Public pressure pushes Mobutu to agree

44
45

to the conference, but he begins to invest heavily in

the creation of new parties and groups loyal to him.

Over two hundred political parties, some with no apparent base of support, appear. At the same time, hyperinflation increases at an almost unprecedented

rate.

August. The National Conference opens but is unable

to complete any substantive work due to constant

shutdowns, interruptions, and delays caused by the

military and squabbles among the participants.

September. The 31st Brigade, followed by the population of Kinshasa, goes on a looting spree in the capital. Looting spreads to other cities (except Bukavu)

and destroys much of what remained of the modern

sector of the economy. The brigade’s actions are in response to the devaluation of the currency and meager

wages in comparison with per diem allotments for

delegates to the National Conference. Further clashes

between security forces and the Union sacrée lead to

the suspension of conference activities between September and November 1991. The violence and political turmoil prompt the withdrawal of almost all aid

from foreign governments.

October. After intense negotiations, Mobutu accepts

the Union sacrée opposition leader, Tshisekedi, as

prime minister while retaining four ministries, including defense. Tshisekedi is soon removed because, according to Mobutu, he did not properly execute the

oath of office; the opposition attributes the dismissal

to Tshisekedi’s effort to block Mobutu’s control of the

currency.

November. After the intervention of Senegal’s president, Mobutu agrees to name a prime minister from

the opposition, assumed by all to be Tshisekedi. Nguz

Karl-i-Bond, a long-time Mobutu stalwart now leading

the UFERI, breaks ranks with the Union sacrée and

accepts the appointment. His ally, Kyungu wa

Kumwanza, becomes governor of Shaba. 

December. Mobutu’s term of office expires on December 4. The National Conference reopens with some

2,000 participants representing political parties, public institutions, and civil society. Laurent Monsengwo

Pesinya, the archbishop of Kisangani, and a moderate,

is elected president—demonstrating the strength of

opposition to Mobutu. When the conference

launches itself on a path of genuine transition, Karl-iBond suspends it, fueling great public support for the

opposition.

1992

Renewed conflicts result in 750,000 displaced persons in Zaire, according to the UN Human Rights

Commission. The main areas of turbulence are Shaba

and North Kivu. The government abandons the IMF’s

economic recovery plan; inflation averages 33 percent

per month.

January. Soldiers take over the radio station, raising

the specter of a coup. The defense minister mounts a

televised trial, promising to prove that the soldiers

were linked to the opposition. Instead, defense

lawyers provided by human rights groups turn the

trial against the government, winning those groups

widespread popularity among rank-and-file soldiers.

February. One million people march in Kinshasa in

support of the National Conference. The March of

Hope, as it is called and which is organized by the lay

Christian community, is suppressed by soldiers.

March. With pressure from the Troika after the March

of Hope, the National Conference reconvenes.

May. Foreign oil companies are regulated by the

regime, ostensibly to prevent a rise in oil prices.

(Tshisekedi rescinds these regulations in October

when he becomes prime minister.) The copper and

cobalt industries operate at less than 50 percent

capacity. 

August–November. The Sovereign National Conference names Tshisekedi prime minister and adopts a

program for the transition that attempts to end the

political impasse by redefining the duties and powers

of the president, the prime minister, and the courts.

Mobutu eventually accepts Tshisekedi but not the redefinition of powers. The first full-scale “ethnic cleansing” officially backed by the local authorities occurs in

Likasi (Shaba). The Katangese are further aggrieved

by the protection given by international organizations

to fleeing Kasaians. 

December. Tshisekedi struggles for control over the

Central Bank and the currency, precipitating a new

crisis. The National Conference adjourns with a declaration that its work will be continued by a transitional

legislature, the 453 members of the HCR. The conference also proposes a timetable for elections in August

1994. The HCR continues to support Tshisekedi, but

in the coming months the armed forces intervene and

seek to stop the work of the HCR.
1993

The Troika engage in intensive negotiations, and

three measures are discussed: the denial of visas to

Mobutu supporters, a boycott of weapons shipments,

and a freeze of Mobutu’s assets. Only the first two are

adopted. Vital jobs formerly held by foreigners remained unfilled: unemployment is estimated at 80

percent and monthly inflation averages almost 38

percent. 

January. Looting by army units recurs in Kinshasa.

Part of their motive is that salaries are paid with new

five-million-zaire notes, imposed by Mobutu over the

objections of Tshisekedi. The notes are refused

throughout the country except in Shaba and parts of

Equateur, leading to trafficking in banknotes and different exchange rates for various domestic currencies.

The population does not participate in the pillaging, and instead is targeted by the soldiers. In an attack on the French embassy, the French ambassador

is killed.

February–April. The transition process appears to

come to an end. Ethnic violence in Kivu and Shaba increases. The U.S. State Department estimates that at

least 1.8 million Zairians (5.2 percent of the population) are suffering from acute malnutrition. Reportedly, children are being abandoned by their

families—rare in an extended family system. 

Belgium seizes 14.5 million tons of five-millionzaire notes after Tshisekedi informs the Belgian authorities of aircraft landing at Ostend.

The Troika tries to establish a coherent response

that will compel Mobutu to respect the transitional

process. Mobutu plays for time and fires Tshisekedi. 

A month later, one of the UDPS copresidents resigns

and the opposition is shaken, with many criticizing

Tshisekedi for intransigence and an inability to

compromise.

Mobutu convenes a conclave and issues a new

transitional institutional framework. In a legally questionable move, Birindwa is appointed prime minister.

Soldiers obstruct the HCR from performing its

work. Two separate and parallel governments develop: Birindwa occupies the ministerial offices, while

Tshisekedi has no office but remains the legitimate

executor of the decisions of the National Conference.

The existence of two prime ministers, two constitutions, and two cabinets leads to the complete paralysis of the state machinery. 

July. Lakhdar Brahimi is sent as the UN SecretaryGeneral’s special envoy to Zaire after Tshisekedi asks

for, but is refused, a UN peacekeeping force. This mission fails, as had an earlier one by the OAU and another by the president of Namibia. The opposition is

divided between moderates and hard-liners; Frederic

Kibassa Maliba heads the Union sacrée.

October. Mobutu, Karl-i-Bond, and the opposition finally come to an agreement under the “Protocol of

Agreement,” which is designed to merge the two governments. Negotiations resume on a single constitution, a single parliament (the HCR is to be replaced by

a Transition Parliament, the HCR-PT), and elections.

All agreements eventually break down.

Hoping to stop hyperinflation, Birindwa launches

a reform of the currency by introducing a new banknote. But the note loses 75 percent of its value within

three weeks; the effect is cataclysmic on the rural poor

and does nothing to quell inflation.

November. The World Bank suspends all projects in

Zaire; the United States closes the USAID mission.

December. After another currency devaluation and

scattered rioting, Shaba Governor Kyungu wa

Kumwanza declares “total autonomy.”

1994

The average monthly inflation rate rises to almost 47

percent.

January. Mobutu dissolves the HCR and dismisses

both governments, announcing that a new joint

parliament will choose a new prime minister.

Tshisekedi refuses to go along. France indicates that 

it would support a third route, in effect bypassing

Tshisekedi.

February. A U.S. State Department report concludes

that violations of human rights in Zaire are at the

worst level since the early 1960s. 

Mobutu’s willingness to negotiate gains him increasing legitimacy with the West, which perceives

the opposition as intransigent and divided. The HCR

reconvenes but succumbs to procedural wrangling.

March. The USAID mission reports on increasing decentralization in Zaire. Médecins Sans Frontières

finds one in ten children malnourished and one in

forty starving. The government provides virtually no

public services and has less than $250,000 in the

Treasury.

46
47

April. The HCR accepts the Transitional Constitution,

which provides for the election of a new prime minister. Mobutu signs the accord.

June. After a deadlock over the naming of a prime

minister (who must come from the opposition),

Kengo wa Dondo is elected, although without the required consensus. Kengo is considered to have the

backing of Western diplomats.

July. Prime Minister Kengo opens the media to the opposition, freezes all Bank of Zaire withdrawals, releases political prisoners (although new arrests

continue), curtails embassies abroad, and suspends

the governor of the Bank of Zaire. His proposals include granting autonomy to the Bank of Zaire, revisions of the tax system, stronger customs controls,

and measures to curtail tax evasion.

Other decisions are to restore relations with the

World Bank and the IMF and to pay arrears. His ambitious program meets with enthusiasm but some skepticism; the regime’s abuses appear to continue.

August. Kengo visits Shaba on a goodwill mission.

Mobutu remains in office, cooperating with Kengo

over the Rwandan refugee crisis. In gratitude, France

expresses a readiness to resume aid to Zaire. Belgium,

too, is tentatively willing to resume cooperative relationships.

September. A World Bank team begins an audit of

Zairian projects.

November. The UN Secretary-General recommends

dispatching 5,000 UN peacekeepers to help cope

with the influx of refugees into Zaire from Rwanda.

The Security Council rejects the proposal.

December. A National Electoral Commission is

accepted.

1995

March. Lebanese businessmen are expelled by Kengo.

The UN Center for Human Rights announces that it

will open an office in Zaire.

July. Elections are scheduled but never held. In midJuly Kengo announces that he will consult the “political class” to bolster his government against the radical

opposition. However, Kengo merely reshuffles his

cabinet, and his “new government” includes no new

members from the opposition. 

At the end of July, the army kills between ten and

forty demonstrators at a march organized by the

PALU, a party associated with the radical opposition

and that is pressing for Kengo’s resignation. 

August. A rally organized by the Union sacrée attracts

fewer people than expected. At the end of the month,

Zaire expels 10,000 to 20,000 Burundian and Rwandan refugees from camps in Kivu. This decision follows the decision of the Security Council to lift the

arms embargo on the new Rwandan government.

September. Zaire’s minister of foreign affairs insists

that all Rwandan and Burundian refugees must leave

Zaire by December 31. Mobutu meets with Jimmy

Carter in Faro, Portugal. According to the Carter Center, Mobutu agrees that force will no longer be used to
Jean-Claude Willame is a professor at the Catholic

University of Louvain (Leuven), where he teaches political anthropology and African politics, and a director of the Institut Africaine—CEDAF in Brussels. After

receiving his doctorate in political science from the

University of California—Berkeley in 1971, Willame

served as a professor at the National University of

Zaire in Lubumbashi and director of its Center for

Sociopolitical Studies of Central Africa (CEPAC).

Since then, he has taught in Boston, Antwerp, Brussels, and Louvain. Willame is widely acknowledged

for his expertise on the economies, societies, and politics of Central Africa, and he has participated in many

international study groups and missions. He has published extensively, with dozens of articles and several

books to his name. Recent books include L’épopée

d’Inga: Chronique d’une prédation industrielle

(Paris: Editions l’Harmattan, 1986); Patrice Lumumba: La crise congolaise revisitée (Paris:

Karthala, 1990); and L’automne d’un despotisme:

Pouvoir, obéissance, et argent dans le Zaire des années 80 (Paris: Karthala, 1992).

Hugues Leclercq is a specialist on monetary and fiscal policy of sub-Saharan countries. He was a professor at the University of Lovanium—National

University of Zaire from 1958 to 1975 and at the

Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve from 1976 to

1994 (he was made professor emeritus in 1995).

Throughout the 1960s he was director of the Institute

of Economic and Social Research of the University of

Zaire, and from 1963 to 1968 was appointed to the

Bank of Zaire as an IMF consultant. Between 1977

and 1981 he was adviser to the Bureau of the President of the Republic of Zaire. He has served on several occasions as a consultant for the Belgian Aid

Agency and the European Commission. He is coauthor (with Christian Comeliau) of Nonmarket Economy and Development (Paris: Editions Mouton); his

latest publication is “Macroeconomic Aspect of the

Informal Economy in Kinshasa,” which appeared in

the April 1994 issue of Les Cahiers du CEDAF.

Peter Rosenblum is project director of the Harvard

Human Rights Program of Harvard Law School. Until

recently, he was program director for the International Human Rights Law Group, based in Washington, D.C., where he initiated and oversaw projects in

the fields of law reform, judicial assistance, and human rights development. Educated in political science and law at Columbia University, Northwestern

University, and the University of Paris, Rosenblum

has taught at Fordham University, has served as staff

attorney for the Lawyers Committee for Human

Rights, and has acted as a consultant to NGO projects

on Romania, Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo.

His publications include articles on Zaire for Africa

Watch and a report—Ethiopia in Transition (1994)—

for the International Human Rights Law Group.

Catharine Newbury is an associate professor in the

Department of Political Science at the University of

North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Educated at Willamette University and the University of Wisconsin—

Madison, where she earned her doctorate, Newbury

has researched and taught at a variety of institutions

in Africa and North America. She has also conducted

extensive fieldwork in Zaire, Tanzania, and especially

Rwanda. Active as a speaker and a writer, Newbury

has contributed articles to many journals and edited

volumes. Her book The Cohesion of Oppression:

Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda (Columbia University Press, 1988) was a finalist for the 1989 African

Studies Association Herskovits Award.

49

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
51

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

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Other titles in the Peaceworks series:

Turkey’s Role in the Middle East: A Conference Report by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No. 1)

Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity by Nancy Lubin (Peaceworks No. 2)

From the Managing Chaos conference:

Keynote Addresses by Les Aspin and Ted Koppel (Peaceworks No. 3)

Sources of Conflict: G.M. Tamás and Samuel Huntington on “Identity and Conflict,” 

and Robert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews on “‘The Coming Anarchy’ and 

the Nation-State under Siege” (Peaceworks No. 4)

NGOs and Conflict Management by Pamela R. Aall (Peaceworks No. 5)

Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa by David R. Smock (Peaceworks No. 6)

Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession by Patricia Carley

(Peaceworks No. 7)

Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis by Vesna Pesic (Peaceworks No. 8)

Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism by Denis McLean 

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State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile

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Many other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address issues of direct

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and preventive diplomacy. Recent publications include:

Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, by John L.

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Somalia: The Missed Opportunities, by Mohamed Sahnoun (1994)

Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord, by Peter Gastrow (1995)

Ending Mozambique’s War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices, by Cameron Hume (1994)

State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa: Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, by

Pierre du Toit (1995)

Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa, by David R. Smock (1996)

Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa, edited by David R. Smock (1993)

Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, by Michael S. Lund (1996)

Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, edited by I. William Zartman and 

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Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail, by Fen Osler Hampson (1996)

Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, (3 vols.), edited by 

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Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, by Ted Robert Gurr (1993)

Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, by Timothy D. Sisk (1996)

NGOs and Conflict Management, by Pamela R. Aall (1996)