### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 10, 200 3 STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JOHN LEM ONT PIER CE, a.k .a. JAM ES

OW ENS, a .k .a. J OHN LAMO NTE PI ERCE
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2001-C- 1336 Cheryl Blackbu rn, Judge

No. M2002- 02979-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jun e 16, 2004

T h e d ef en d an t , J o h n L em o n tP i er ce , i n d i ct ed fo r t wo co u n t s o f e s p e ci al l y aggr av at ed k i d n ap p i n g, three counts of ag g ravated assault, and simple a ssault, enter ed a gu i l t y plea to one c ount of ag g ravated assault. The trial court imposed a fiftee n-y ear

sentenc e to be se rved c onsecutively to a prior six -y ear

sentenc e. In this appea l, the defendant contends that the t rial court err ed by ordering a maximum sentenc e of 15 y ear s and requiring consec utive service

. The judgme nt of the trial court is affirme d. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed
G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and D AVI D G. H AYES , J J ., joined. Dwig ht E. Scott, Nashville, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, J ohn L emont Pierce

. Paul G. Sum me rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . B le ds oe , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and B ret T. Gunn, A ssistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
. OP IN ION
A transc ript of the g uiltyplea he aring is not included in the rec ord. The pre sentenc e re port provides that on Marc h 7, 2001, the def endant e ntere d the re sidence of the victim, Verisa Gooch, and str uc k h e r i n th e fo re he a d wi th a c los e d fi st. He the n g ra bb e d a bo ard , w hic h h a d p ro trud ing na ils , and struck he r seve ral times, causing a 1 1⁄2 inch l ace ration t o her head, two larg e bumps on her he ad, a ndtw o b ump s o n h e r rig ht a rm . T he vic tim ' s u pp e r ri g ht thi g h wa s sw oll e n. She wa s in se ve re pa in and had dif

ficul t y wa l king. T he def

endant transported the victim to a house on A rthur Stree t and the n a n u nkno wn loc a tio n w he re a n u nid e nti fi e d f e ma le pr ov ide d th e vic tim wi th m e dic a l tr e a tme nt. When the defe ndant enter ed the house, the victim’s g randmother , seventy -six -y ear -old Mary Thomas, had attempted to esca pe to call police. The defendant g rabbe d her, placed his arms around her w aist, and threw her to the c ouch. Ms. Thomas suff ere d pain to the hip and buttock ar ea.T h es e f ac t or s we r e r en u mber ed by t h e G en er al As s embl y ef fec t i v e Ju l y 1, 2002. Se e T en n
. Code An n
. § 40- 1 3 5

- 1 1 4 (Sup p
. 20 0 2 ). -2- At the sentenc ing he aring , Detec tive Chris Pol k, a member of the Na shville Pol ice Depa rtment’s domestic violence division, m et wit h the victim shortly afte r the a ssault. He photogr aphed the victim’s injuries, describing the lace ration on the vi ctim’s scalp a s an inch to an inch and one -half in leng th. The dete ctive rec alled that the initial wa rra nts inc luded a kidnapping c ha rg e be c aus e the vic tim

ha d b e e n r e mov e d f

ro m he r r e sid e nc e a g a ins t he r w ill

. Cordelia F oster, who had known t he defenda nt for approxi mately nine y ear s, confirme d that he had a stable work history , s ometimes holding more than one job at a time. The def

endant ha d helped Ms. F oster with her g randc hildren and pr ovided her with financia l assistance.
The de fendant, who had date d the victim for appr ox imately ten y ear s, was the f

ather of two of he r c hil dr e n. A thir d h a d d ie d o f dru g abu se
. He de sc ri be d th e vic tim a s a pr os titute wh o, de sp ite his protests, “insisted on prostituti ng and doing drug s.” The de fendant expl ain ed that he had assaulted the vic tim because she “had been out with someone else.” He de scribed the offe nse, for wh ic h h e c la ime d to be truly re mor se fu l, a s f

oll ow s: [Th e vic tim ] we nt ou t a ll nig ht a nd stay e d g e tti ng hig h, a ndthe n s he c omeho me to me
. . . . [S ]h e li e d to me ab o u t i t, a n d I ju s t w e n t o f

f

. I h it h e r inth e h e a d with a lit tle sti c k. I t w a s a

lit tle sti c k a

bo ut that li ttl e (i nd ic a tin g ). I t wa sn ’t no thi ng to j us t rea lly kill her. She didn’t have to be hospi talized or any thing of that nature

. . . . She didn’t even r ece ive no stitches or a ny thing . . . .
T h e d ef en d an t , wh o wo rk ed t wo j o b s , h ad o b t ai n ed h i s GE D a n d co m p l et ed o n e s em es t ero f c o l l ege while in jail. The d ef

en d an t as ked for

treatment for a dr

ug addiction and a lso requeste d ang er manag ement cla sses. At the time o f t he off enses, the de fendant was on probation for a 1999 ag g ravated assault convic tion involvi ng the victim.
The victim testified that the de fendant had assaulted he r throug hout th ei r en t i re ten-y ear relationship. S he stated that the defe ndant walked into the r esidenc e as thoug h he we re he ading for the re str oo m, “ c a me ba c k, pic ke d u p th e te le ph on e , je rk e d it ou t of the wa ll, a ndthat’ s w he n h e hit me in m y fa c e wi th h is f

ist .” She te sti fi e d th a t he str uc k h e r w iththe sti c k e ig ht o r n ine tim e s.
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

app lie d the fol lo wi ng e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s: ( 1) that th e de fe nd a nt h a s a pr e vio us his tory

of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns or

c ri min a l be ha vior

in a dd iti on to tho se ne c e ssa ry to e sta bli sh the app rop ri ate ran g e ; ( 8) that th e de fe nd a nt h a s a pr e vio us his tory

of un wi lli ng ne ss t o comply with the conditions of a sentenc e involving rele ase in the community ; (11) that the f elony resulted in death or bodily injury and the defe ndant had previously been convicted of a felony that resulted in death or bodily injury ; and (13) that the offense was committed while the def endant wa s on probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114(1), ( 8), (11) , (13) ( 1997). No mitigating fac tors 1
wer e found to be applicable . The trial court order ed a fiftee n-y ear Rang e I I I sentenc e to be se rved-3-

consec utively

to the six -y ear

sentenc e for

which the de fendant was on prob at i o n at t h e ti me of offe nse.
I nitially , the def

endant c omplains that the t rial court err ed by ordering a maxi mum sentence of fifte en y ear s. When there is a challeng e to the l eng th, rang e, or manner of service of a sente nce, it is the duty of this c ourt to c onduct a de novo revie w with a pre sumption t hat the dete rminations ma de by the tr ia l c ou rt are corr ect

. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ). Th is p re su mpt ionis “conditioned upon the a ffirmative showing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt cons idere d the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 19 91 ); se e State v. Jone s, 88 3 S.W.2 d 597 , 600 (T e nn . 199 4) . “ f the tr ia l c ou rt app lie s in app ro pria te fac tors or otherw ise fails to follow the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct, the presumption of corr ectne ss falls.” State v. She l ton, 854 S.W .2d 116, 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) . The Sentenc ing Commission Comments provi d e t h at t h e burden is on the defe ndant to show the impropriety of the sente nce. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 , Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts

. Our re view re quires an analy sis of (1) the e vidence , if any , rec eived at the trial and se ntencing hearing; ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port; (3) the pri n ci p l es o f sentencing and the a rg uments of counse l relative to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and char acte ristics of t he off ense; (5) any

mitigating or enhancing fac tors; (6) any statements made by

the def endant in his own beha lf; and (7) the defe ndant' s potential for re habilitation or t re at ment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-102, -103, - 210; State v. Smit h, 735 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

. The de fendant does n o t challengethe enhanceme nt fac tors applied by the trial court, but instead conte nds that the trial court erre d by failing to apply

mitigating fac tors (2) that he ac ted under strong provo c a ti o n ; ( 3 ) th a t s u b s tan ti a l g r o u n d s e xis t t e n d in g to e xc u s e o r ju s ti f y h is c r im in al conduct, thoug h fa iling to establish a de fense ; (11) that the of fense was c ommitt ed under such unusual circ umstances that it is unlikely that a sus t ai n ed i n t en t to violate the law motivated the conduct; and ( 13) he ha s a g ood work history and performed g ood works for others. See T enn. Code A n n
. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 3 ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , ( 1 1 ) , ( 1 3 )

. T h e s tate ar g u e s th a t th e r e c o r d s u p p o r ts th e tria l c ourt’s reje ction of those fa ctors.
I n support of his claim of mitigating f actor s, the defe ndant ar g ues that “[t] o have the mother of y our child be out a ll night wit h another man, t aking drug s, is strong pr ovocation.” A side from the defe ndant’s stateme nts, however , there is no corr oborative proof of his a lleg ations. I f, in fac t, the victim had a leng thy , ong oing history of drug use and prostitution, any such behavior which pre cede d the assault should not have been unusual, shocking, or particula rly provocative. Finally , the re cord de mon str a te s th a t th e de fe nd a nt has b e e n p hy sic a lly abu siv e tow ard s th e vic tim thr ou g ho ut the ir re la tio ns hip a nd , infa c t, h a s a prior c on vic tio n in c on ne c tio n the re wi th. Un de r tho se c ir c ums ta nc e s, it is our view that the trial court properly declined to a

pply mitigating fac tors (2), ( 3), and ( 11).
Wit h reg ard to mitigating fac tor (13), the catc hall provision, the prese ntence report indicates that th e de fe nd a nt c la ime d to ha ve wo rk e d a t “ B a nd R De ve lop me nt Compa ny fo r f ive y e ars a s a ho us e re no vator .” Th e of fi c e r that pr e pa

red t he re po rt , h ow e ve r, wa s u na ble to v e ri fy

the c la im.-4-

Whil e th e defe nd ant ma y ha ve be e n a

g oo d f ri e ndto M s. Cor de lia

F os te r, wh o c omp lim e nte d h is work re cord, this mitigating fac tor, even if applicable , would not serve to lesse n the sentenc e in light of the seve ral e nhance ment fac tors.
I ntentional ag g ravated assault is define d by our code as a Class C felony . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102( d)(1) . I n calc ulating the sentenc e for a Class B, C , D, o r E felony conviction, the pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e is the min imu m in therang e if the reareno e nh a nc e me nt o r m iti g a tin g fa c tor s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(c ). I f there are enhanc ement but no mitigating fac tors, the trial court may set t h e s en t en ce above the minimum , but stil l within the rang e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(d). A sentenc e involving both e nhance ment and mitigating f actor s require s an assig nment of relative weig ht for the e nhance ment fac tors as a means of incre asing the sentenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( e). The sentenc e should then be r educe d within the rang e by any weig ht assigne d to the mitigating fac tors prese nt. I d. A Rang e I I I

sentenc e for

a Class C felony

offe nse is ten to fiftee n y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112( c). In summary , there are four a pplicable e nhance ment fac tors in this case: (1) that the de fe nd a nt h a s a

pr e vio us his tory

of c ri min a l c on vi cti on s or c ri min a l be ha vio r i n a dd iti on to tho se nece ssary t o establish the appr opriate r ang e; (8) that the defe ndant has a previous history

of unwillingness to comply with the conditions of a sente nce involving rele ase in the c ommunity ; (11) that the felony resulted in de ath or bodily injury and the defe ndant has pre viouslybeen c onvicted of a fe lony that resulted in death or bodily injury ; and (13) that the offe nse wa s committed while the de fe nd a nt w a s o n p ro batio n. Se e Te nn . Code An n. § 40- 35 -1 14 (1 ), (8 ), (1 1) , (13 ) (1 99 7) . The re is arg uably one mitigating f

actor . The trial c ourt did not specify the weig ht to be ac corde d the various enhanc ement fa ctors. In our view, how ever , fac tor (1) is e ntitled to g reat weig ht. The pre sentenc e report indicates that the forty -seve n-y ear -old defe ndant has at least forty -seve n prior convic tions for offe nses (incl u d i ng attempted armed robbe ry , robbery , ag g ravated assault, assault, attempted kidnappi n g, automobile larc eny , petit larce ny , theft, criminal impersonation, shoplifting, criminal tr e sp a ss, po sse ssi on of

c ocai ne wi th i nte nt t o r e se ll, po sse ssi on of dr ug pa ra ph e rn a lia , d iso rd e rl y conduct, e v a d in g arr e s t, a n d r e s is ti n g s to p a n d f r is k )

. I t i s o u r

v ie w th a t th e p r e v io u s h is to r y of criminal convi ct ions and beha vior would, in and of itself, merit the max imum sentence of fiftee n y e ars
. The defe ndant also contends that the trial court erre d by ordering that his sentence be serve d c on se c uti ve ly

to h is p re vio us six- y e ar s e nte nc e fo r the a g g ra vate d a ssa ult of the vic tim

. Th e state disag ree s. Prior to the enac tment of the Crimi n al S en t en cing Reform Act of 1989, the limited classifications for the i mpositi on of consecutive sente nces w ere set out in Gray v. State, 538 S.W .2d 39 1, 39 3 ( Te nn . 1 976). I n th a t c a se ou r s up re me c ou rt ru le d th a t a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s mu st be pre sent befor e placement in any one of the classifications. L ater , in State v. Tay lor, 739 S.W .2d 227 (Tenn. 1987), the court established an additional cate g ory for those de fendants convicted of two or more statutory offe nses involving sexual abuse of minors. Ther e we re, how ever , additional words of c auti on :T he f i rs t fo ur cr i t eri a are fo und in G ray
. A fi f t h c at ego ry in G ray , ba sed o n a s p eci f i c num b er of

pri o r f el o ny 2

con v i ct i on s , ma y e n h an ce t h e s en t en ce r an g e bu t i s n o l on g er a l i s t ed cr i t er i on
. Se e T en n
. Code An n
. § 40- 35

- 1 1 5, S en t en cing C o m m i ssi o n C o m m en t s. -5- [C]ons e c uti ve se nte nc e s sh ou ld n ot r ou tin e ly be imp os e d

. . . a nd

. . . th e a g g re g a te maxi mum of consec utive terms must be rea sonably related to the severity of t he offe nses involved. Tay lor, 739 S.W .2d at 230. The Sente ncing Commi ssion Com ments adopt ed the cautionary lang uag e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 4 0 -35-115. The 1989 Act is, in essenc e, the c odification of the holdings in G ray and Tay lor; consec utive sentenc es may be imposed in the discretion o f t h e t ri al c ou rt on ly up on a de te rm inatio n th a t on e or mor e of the fo llo wi ng c ri te ri a e xist: 2 (1 ) T he de fe nd a nt is a pr of e ssi on a l c ri min a l wh o h a s kno wi ng ly de vo te d h ims e lf

to criminal ac ts as a major sour ce of livelihood; (2) The defe ndant is an off ender whose re cord of

criminal ac tivityis ex tensive; ( 3 ) T h e d e f

e n d a n ti s a

d a n g e r o u s m e n t a l l y ab n o r m a l p e r s o n s o d e c l ar e d b y a c omp e te nt p sy c hiatr ist

wh o c on c lud e s a s a

re su lt o f an in ve sti g a tio n p ri or to sentenc ing that the defe ndant' s criminal conduct has been char acte rized by a pattern of re pe tit ive or

c omp uls ive be ha vio r w ithhe e dle ss i nd if fe re nc e to c on se qu e nc e s; (4) The defe ndant is a dang erous of fende r whose be havior indica t es l i t t l e or no re g ardfo r h uman lif

e , a ndno he sit a tio n a

bo ut c ommitt ing a

c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk to h uman li fe is h ig h; (5) The defe ndant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory

offe nses involving se x ual abuse of a minor with consider ation of the a g g ravating c ircumstances arising from the re lationship b et we en t he def endant and victim or victims, the tim e span of defe ndant' s undetec ted sexual activity , the nature and scope of the sexual acts a nd the e xten t of the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim or vic tim s; (6) The defe ndant is sentence d for a n offe nse committed while on probation; (7 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s se nte nc e d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(b)

. The leng th of the sentenc e, whe n consec utive in nature, must be “ justlydeserved in re lation to the se r io u s n e s s o f

th e o f f e n s e , ” T e n n
. Co d e A n n
. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 2 ( 1 ) , a n d “ n o g r e a te r th a n th at deserved” unde r t he circumstance s, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103( 2); State v. L ane, 3 S.W.3d 456 (Tenn. 1999)

. I n Gray , our su p r e me c o u r t r u le d th at beforeconsec utive sentenc ing c ould be imposed up on the dan ger ou s o ff

e nd e r, c on sid e re d th e mos t su bje c tiv e of the c la ssi fi c a tio ns a ndthe mos t difficult to apply , other c onditi o n s must be present: (a ) that the c rimes involved ag g ravating circ umstances; (b) that consec utive sentenc es are a nece ssary means to pr otect the public from the defe ndant; and (c ) that the term rea sonably relates to t h e severity

of the off

enses. In State v.-6-

Wil kerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995), our hig h court re aff irmed those princ iples, holding that c on se c uti v es e n t e nc e s c a nn ot b e re qu ir e d o f the da ng e ro us of fe nd e r “ un le ss the te rm s r e a so na bly re la te [] to th e se ve ri ty

of the of fe ns e s c omm it ted a ndarene c e ssa ry in o rd e r t o p ro te c t th e pu bli c (s o ci ety ) fr om further

criminal ac ts by

those persons who r esort to ag g ravated criminal conduct.” T h e W i lkerson dec ision, which modified somewhat the stric t fac tual g uidelines for c onsecutive sentenc ing a dopted in State v. Woods, 814 S .W

. 2 d 3 7 8 , 3 80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) , described s en t en ci n g as a “human proc ess that neither can nor should be reduc ed to a se t of fixed and mecha nical rule s.” Wilkerson, 905 S.W .2d at 938.
I n o rd e ri ng a n in c arc e rativ e se nte nc e , th e tr ia l c ou rt ma de the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s: Wit h reg ard to c onsecutive or concur rent sentenc es, I ’m g oing to f ind that he is both a dang erous offe nder [with] littl e or no r eg ard f or human life, and he has no hesitation abo u t co m mitti ng a crime in which the risk to human life is hig h. . . . [A] lso the ag g reg ate term rea sonably relates to the s everity of the off enses, and it’s ne c e ssa ry in o rd e r t o p ro te c t th e pu bli c fr om fu rthe r se ri ou s con du c t by the de fe nd a nt. He is one of

these individuals who[m] . . . they describe as ha [vi ng ] knocked the top out of the ra ng e. I

mean, his behavior i s so offe nsive clea rly nothing is g oing to stop him . . . . Not onlythat, he wa s on probation [at the time of the offe nse].
I n our v i ew , the re cord supports the finding that the defe ndant qualified f or conse cutive sentenc ing f

or two re asons: beca

use he w as on probation for ag g ravated assault at t he ti me that he committed the offe nse and be cause he qualifie s as a da ng erous of fende r.
Acc ording ly , the judg ment is affirme d.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE