The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District 1

Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

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No. 96-1664

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United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff/Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Craig Walker, *

*

Defendant/Appellant. *

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Submitted: September 12, 1996

Filed: October 3, 1996

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Before FAGG, BEAM, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

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MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Craig Walker was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit mail

fraud, mail fraud, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and subornation of

perjury. The district court sentenced him to thirty-three months in

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prison and he appeals from the judgment. We affirm.

The convictions stem from Walker's participation in a scheme designed

to ensure the reelection of Vivrus Jones, the Comptroller of the City of

St. Louis. Jones, who is African-American, was opposed by James

Shrewsbury, who is white. Based on past elections, it was expected that

Jones would receive the vast majority of the votes of African-Americans,

and Shrewsbury would
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receive most of the votes of whites. In order to ensure his reelection,

Jones and others devised a scheme in which a second white candidate, Penny

Alcott, would enter the race in order to draw votes from Shrewsbury.

Alcott's campaign focused on wards in the south side of St. Louis, where

the population was predominantly white. Walker was a personal friend of

Jones who had represented St. Louis in bond deals. Part of the scheme

involved his providing funds for Alcott's campaign. The true source of the

funds was hidden by having a friend of his in Chicago, John Runyan, make

a contribution and a loan to the Alcott campaign with money Walker had

provided. The basis for his mail fraud conviction was a false campaign

finance disclosure report that was sent through the mail. 

Walker contends that the district court improperly instructed the

jury regarding the conspiracy to commit mail fraud and the mail fraud

charges, denying him the right to a unanimous jury verdict. See Andres v.

United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748, 68 S.Ct. 880, 884, 92 L.Ed. 1055 (1948).

The indictment stated that the objects of the mail fraud and the conspiracy

were to deprive the people of the State of Missouri and the City of St.

Louis of both the Comptroller's salary and the intangible right to honest

services. The court instructed the jury that in order to convict Walker

of either conspiracy to commit mail fraud or mail fraud, at least one of

the objects of the fraud had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Walker argues the instructions were defective because they did not require

the jury to agree unanimously on the same object.

The court instructed the jury that "in order to return a verdict of

guilty, you must unanimously agree upon which of the objects or purposes

was the subject of the conspiracy." She also provided the jury with a

special verdict form that contained independent questions on each of the

objects of the fraud. The first question asked whether Walker knowingly

participated in a scheme to defraud the people of the honest services of

Jones and Alcott. The second asked whether Walker knowingly participated

in
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a scheme to defraud the people of the Comptroller's salary and other

benefits of a fair election. The jury answered yes to each of these

questions. The jury was adequately instructed on the unanimity

requirement, and the instructions were not constitutionally defective. 

Walker asserts that the district court erred by not instructing the

jury that the testimony of a perjurer should be treated with caution.

According to Walker, John Runyan was the government's key witness against

him and had pleaded guilty to perjury. Walker cites United States v.

Partin, 493 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974), in support of his position that a

special instruction was needed on the credibility of a perjurer. 

The court instructed the jury on the testimony of someone who has

testified falsely:

 If a person is shown to have knowingly testified falsely

 concerning any important or material matter, you 

 obviously have a right to distrust the testimony of such

 an individual concerning other matters. You may reject

 all of the testimony of that witness or give it such

 weight or credibility as you may think it deserves.

Jury Instruction 6A. This was sufficient guidance, and a separate

instruction on perjury was not required. The particular wording contained

in the instruction does not matter so long as it adequately covers "the

substance of the requested instruction." United States v. Rankin, 902 F.2d

1344, 1347 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ridinger, 805 F.2d 818, 821

(8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Reda, 765 F.2d 715, 719 (8th Cir. 1985).

Here the district court gave an instruction dealing with false testimony

which was not the case in Partin.

Walker also complains that the government's cross-examination of him

about income not reported on his tax returns was
 These claims are that the district court erred by (1) 2

limiting testimony relating to Penny Alcott's decision to enter

the race; (2) maintaining bond conditions on him that affected

his ability to represent himself; (3) excluding expert testimony

on past election schemes in St. Louis; (4) not granting judgment

in his favor; (5) rejecting his claim of selective prosecution;

(6) not dismissing the indictment; and (7) imposing a sentencing

enhancement for an offense involving a public official.

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inflammatory and prejudicial. Walker had claimed on direct examination

that he had cash flow problems and therefore could not have been the source

of the funds Runyan contributed to Alcott's campaign. The government later

asked Walker whether he had income not mentioned on his tax return. The

cross-examination was not improper because it related to his testimony on

direct examination about his available funds. The testimony was relevant

and probative, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in

permitting it. 

Walker also raises a number of other claims which we have reviewed

and find without merit.2

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A true copy.

 Attest:

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.