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24–661 PDF 2005

S. HRG. 109–184

AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

AMENDMENT ON MARRIAGE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 

CIVIL RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 20, 2005

Serial No. J–109–45

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

DAVID BROG, Staff Director 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Chief Counsel 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

AJIT PAI, Majority Chief Counsel 

ROBERT F. SCHIFF, Democratic Chief Counsel 

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C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Page

Brownback, Hon. Sam, a U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas ....................... 1

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin ............. 3

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 66

WITNESSES 

FitzGibbon, Scott, Professor of Law, Boston College, Boston, Massachusetts .... 14

Harris, Christopher E., M.D., Assistant Professor of Pediatrics, Vanderbilt 

University School of Medicine, Nashville, Tennessee ....................................... 7

Seidman, Louis Michael, John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown 

University Law Center, Washington, D.C. ........................................................ 12

Wilkins, Richard G., Professor of Law and Managing Director, The World 

Family Policy Center, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah ..................... 9

Wolfe, Christopher, Professor of Political Science, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin ............................................................................................... 5

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Richard G. Wilkins to questions submitted by Senator Feingold . 31

Responses of Scott FitzGibbon to questions submitted by Senator Feingold ..... 39

Responses of Christopher Wolfe to questions submitted by Senator Feingold ... 42

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Dowd, Nancy E., Chesterfield Smith Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center 

for Children and Families, University of Florida Levin College of Law, 

Gainesville, Florida, prepared statement ........................................................... 43

FitzGibbon, Scott, Professor of Law, Boston College, Boston, Massachusetts, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 51

Harris, Christopher E., M.D., Assistant Professor of Pediatrics, Vanderbilt 

University School of Medicine, Nashville, Tennessee, prepared statement .... 63

Pro-Family Pediatricians, letter ............................................................................. 68

Seidman, Louis Michael, John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown 

University Law Center, Washington, D.C., prepared statement ..................... 69

Wilkins, Richard G., Professor of Law and Managing Director, The World 

Family Policy Center, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 73

Wolfe, Christopher, Professor of Political Science, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, prepared statement ............................................................ 96

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AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 

AMENDMENT ON MARRIAGE 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2005

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS AND

PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Brownback, Sessions, and Feingold. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF KANSAS 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Good afternoon. I call the hearing to 

order. Thank you all for joining us today. Thank you to the panelists for being here to testify. I have an opening statement, Senator 

Feingold will, and then we will go to the panelists. 

Just a year ago, the issue of marriage was center stage in the 

national political debate. Poll after poll showed strong opposition to 

same-sex marriage and that a majority of Americans supported a 

Marriage Protection Amendment to the Constitution. When the 

people spoke last November, they approved every one of the 11 

State amendments protecting traditional marriage in those States 

by decisive majorities. Many commentators acknowledged that 

President Bush’s victory was, in part, attributable to this call for 

Congress to, quote, ‘‘promptly pass and send to the States for ratification a Marriage Protection Amendment,’’ and that is the topic of 

this hearing today. 

In the past year, we have seen the enactment of two more State 

marriage amendments. Polls continue to show widespread support 

for amending the Constitution to protect the traditional definition 

of marriage, particularly after last April’s ruling by a single Federal district judge overturning Nebraska’s marriage amendment. 

That amendment was passed by the people of Nebraska with 70 

percent support in 2001. 

As we have heard in previous hearings, the popular consensus to 

protect the traditional institution of marriage is widespread and it 

is strengthening. I have got a chart to show and refer to that and 

I will go through some of these numbers because it is a pretty busy 

chart. Eighteen States now have constitutional amendments protecting marriage as solely between a man and a woman. Twentyseven other States have statutes to protect traditional marriage. 

Six States have no statutory or constitutional protection for tradiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:11 Nov 29, 2005 Jkt 024661 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\24661.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
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tional marriage. Of the States with no current constitutional provisions on marriage, five States are sending constitutional amendments to voters this year or next and another 13 States are considering doing so. 

We have also heard testimony in previous hearings that the prospects of Federal or State courts contravening the will of the people 

on this vital issue by overturning State or federally enacted protections of marriage is a very real concern. In the opinion of many 

legal scholars, it is just a matter of time before this phenomena becomes the norm. Eight States face lawsuits challenging traditional 

marriage. In California, New York, and Washington, State trial 

courts have already followed Massachusetts and found a right to 

same-sex marriage in State Constitutions. All of those cases are on 

appeal. 

As I have already noted, last April, a Federal district court in 

Nebraska found unconstitutional a State constitutional amendment 

protecting marriage that had won 70 percent of the vote. The U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit may hand down a decision 

on whether to uphold this Federal court ruling at any time. 

In June 2005, a Federal district court in California uphold 

DOMA, Defense of Marriage Act’s definition of marriage for purposes of law, but this decision is soon expected to be appealed to 

the Ninth Circuit, which long has been one of the most activist 

courts in the nation. 

Another case in Washington State challenges DOMA’s constitutionality. It is now pending in the Federal district court. 

Make no mistake, the threat to redefining marriage by the courts 

is imminent. The time for us to act is now. 

We are here today to discuss the merits of the constitutional 

amendment protecting marriage as it has always been defined, the 

union of a man and a woman. We have reached a crossroads in 

American legal history. The will of the American people is today in 

danger of being thwarted by the will of an activist judiciary. In 

order to protect this vital institution so central to the health and 

stability of families and society at large, we will have to define 

marriage. The only question is who will do the defining, the people 

or the judges? 

We have a clear choice before us. Do we allow Federal judges to 

redefine marriage for all of us or do we allow the American people 

to decide what marriage is? This is especially important because 

the redefinition of marriage will result in consequences many proponents perhaps have not considered. 

I believe that we must act now to protect traditional marriage. 

I hope this hearing will illuminate some of the reasons why that 

protection is best achieved through a constitutional amendment. I 

also hope that the panelists will discuss the specific concerns and 

review that they have of the draft of the constitutional amendment 

and give us feedback and thought on the particular drafting of the 

amendment. 

Today, we will hear some arguments for and against a constitutional amendment as the right solution to the attempt of the courts 

to bypass the will of the people on the issue of marriage. I hope 

to explore some of the questions related to the wording of the 

3

amendment. We also will explore some of the social consequences 

of same-sex marriage. 

We have a distinguished panel here today to discuss this topic 

and I look forward to their presentation, but before I introduce the 

panel, I will turn to my colleague and the Ranking Member, Senator Feingold, for his opening statement. Senator Feingold? 

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate once 

again the collegial manner in which you have handled this hearing, 

including the advance notice of it that you gave us and the threeto-two ratio for witnesses. 

Mr. Chairman, despite all the attention the proposed constitutional amendment has received in the Senate, four hearings in the 

last Congress and a vote on the floor last year and two out of the 

total of four hearings we have held in this Subcommittee all of this 

year, the issue of same-sex marriage does not seem to be something 

that the public itself is all that concerned about. The issues that 

my constituents want to usually talk to me about and want Congress to take action on include the war in Iraq and health care and 

spiraling gas prices. They don’t seem as interested in passing judgment on the private lives of their neighbors. They don’t feel that 

marriages or families are particularly threatened by same-sex marriages in Massachusetts or civil unions in Vermont or Connecticut. 

One of the main problems with the constitutional amendment 

that we will discuss today, S.J. Res. 1, is that we still don’t really 

know what effect it will have if it becomes part of the Constitution, 

and that became clear when its proponents brought it to the floor 

last year without allowing a markup in the Judiciary Committee. 

Uncertainty still remains, for example, as to whether the language 

of the amendment would permit States to offer domestic partner 

benefits or the option of civil unions to same-sex couples. I hope our 

witnesses, who I do welcome, can shed some light on these important questions today. 

As time has passed since the Massachusetts court ruling, I think 

it has become clear that passing a constitutional amendment would 

be an extreme and unnecessary reaction. For more than two centuries, family law has been the province of the States and that is 

how it should be. Voters in several States passed marriage initiatives in the last election. The legislature in Connecticut recently 

passed a civil union bill and the Governor signed it. In California, 

a bill to permit same-sex marriages was vetoed, but new protections for domestic partners were signed into law. 

These developments tell me that the States are capable of addressing this issue and they will do so in different ways, which is 

how our Federal system generally works and should work. Federal 

intervention here would not be a good idea. 

I was struck by reports of what happened in the Massachusetts 

legislature last month. The legislature narrowly passed a constitutional amendment last year to prohibit same-sex marriage, but 

when the issue returned this year, as the Massachusetts Constitution requires in order to put the issue on the ballot, the legislature 

actually rejected it by a vote of 157 to 39. 

4

So I believe we should think long and hard about preempting 

State legislatures or State initiative processes through a Federal 

constitutional amendment. There is certainly no crisis warranting 

a Federal constitutional amendment on this issue, nor is there evidence that the courts are poised to strike down marriage laws. 

Mr. Chairman, our Constitution is an historic guarantee of individual freedom that every day stands as an example to the world. 

Except for the 18th Amendment on prohibition, which was later repealed, it has never been amended to limit basic rights or discriminate against one group of our citizens. 

I look forward to the testimony today from which I hope we will 

learn more about what this amendment will actually do, but I continue to strongly oppose this amendment because I think it is unfair, unwise, and unnecessary. 

Mr. Chairman, I do again thank you for your courtesy. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Thank you, and I hope today we can get 

from the witnesses some thoughts on the specific language, because 

we have held a number of hearings on a constitutional amendment 

and we really need to get down to the wording of this in discussion 

as we move that on forward. 

Our first witness is Professor Christopher Wolfe. Professor Wolfe 

teaches political science at Marquette University. He is founder 

and President of the American Public Philosophy Institute. 

Our second witness is Professor Christopher Harris, Assistant 

Professor of Pediatrics at Vanderbilt University. He serves as Director of the Pediatrics Pulmonary Function Laboratory and Associate Director of the Cystic Fibrosis Center. Dr. Harris is also a 

former President of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association. 

Our third witness will be Richard Wilkins of Brigham Young 

University. Professor Wilkins is the founder and Managing Director of the World Family Policy Center and currently teaches constitutional law and international law. 

The fourth witness we have today is Louis Michael Seidman, a 

law professor at Georgetown University. Professor Seidman is the 

2004 recipient of the Ally of Justice Award from the Human Rights 

Campaign. 

And finally, we have Professor Scot FitzGibbon of Boston College. 

Professor FitzGibbon teaches on the subject of marriage law and 

theory. He has published numerous law review articles on the issue 

of marriage and is a member of the International Society of Family 

Law. 

Gentlemen, we will run the clock at 5 minutes. That is a guide—

actually, let us give you a little more time. Let us run it at six. We 

want to have plenty of time for questions. Your full statements will 

be put into the record as if presented, so if you want to summarize, 

that is certainly your choice. 

But I do want to have sufficient time for us to be able to question 

particularly on—at least from my perspective, Senator Feingold 

may feel differently—but on the specific wording of the amendment 

and thoughts, cautions, support, concerns that you have on the 

legal wording, because we have held a number of hearings on the 

social implications. We have held hearings on what has happened 

5

in other places around the world. We really now need to get down 

to the wording itself of the proposed constitutional amendment. I 

hope all of you have it, have had a chance to look through it, have 

had a chance to really think and contemplate about it. 

So with that, Professor Wolfe, we are delighted to have you here. 

Thanks for coming and joining us. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN 

Mr. WOLFE. It is good to be here. As has been said, I am a political scientist. I teach constitutional law and American politics at 

Marquette University and I have edited several books and written 

several law review articles on homosexuality and American public 

life. 

The marriage tradition amendment which you are considering 

today would fix in the U.S. Constitution the principle that marriage in the United States means marriage between one man and 

one woman. Its text reads, ‘‘Marriage in the United States shall 

consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the Constitution of any State, shall be construed to 

require that marriage or the legal incidence thereof be conferred 

upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.’’ 

Now, one objection that might be made to the amendment is that 

it is unnecessary since U.S. law, specifically in the form of the Defense of Marriage Act, already defines marriage and prevents one 

State from imposing a different meaning of marriage on other 

States. But it is simply a fact of our political and judicial life that 

courts sometimes go out of their way to give highly controversial 

constructions to the Constitution, and it is certainly within the 

realm of possibility that Federal judges might strike down the Defense of Marriage Act as judges have struck down marriage defense 

laws in various States. 

The decisions of the Supreme Court in Romer v. Colorado and 

Lawrence v. Texas, despite the glaring weaknesses of their reasoning, will inevitably be invoked that virtually any legal distinction between heterosexuals and homosexuals is unconstitutional. 

While it is conceivable that judges might reject such arguments, it 

is equally conceivable that they may accept them. In fact, I think 

it would be intellectually dishonest of anyone to deny that there is 

at least a very real possibility that some judges, including even the 

Supreme Court, might strike down the Defense of Marriage Act. 

Given that fact and given the existence of a well-organized and 

financed effort to legalize same-sex marriage in this country, 

backed by extensive ideological scholarship in the academy and in 

the legal community, it is only prudent to remove even the possibility that judges will intervene to strike down the Defense of Marriage Act and the State laws it was intended to protect. 

Some constitutional commentators criticize this amendment on 

the grounds that it would grant Federal judges excessive power 

over domestic relations. It is worth noting that most of these commentators are opposed to the amendment on substantive grounds 

and that they have generally been rather enthusiastic about expanding the power of judges when it advances their own political 

6

views. I have been delighted to see the converts to federalism when 

it comes to this particular issue. 

This amendment, as its backers have made clear, does not give 

Federal judges general power over domestic relations. In fact, it 

clearly authorizes State legislatures to regulate civil unions as long 

as they are not the legal equivalent of marriage. The purpose of the 

amendment, therefore, is to deny power to Federal and State 

judges, a very specific power, that is the power to the interpret, 

that is to reinterpret or to read into or alter the meaning of, Federal or State Constitutions in order to impose same-sex marriage 

on this Nation. 

Another major objection to the Marriage Protection Amendment 

comes from those who would argue that even if an amendment is 

necessary, it ought to take a different form. It would be better, they 

say, for the amendment simply to guarantee the right of the States 

to deal with the issue of marriage free of Federal, including judicial, interference. This would preserve the Defense of Marriage Act, 

but make explicit the already existing power of States to define 

marriage as something other than a union of one man and one 

woman. But this does not really resolve the fundamental underlying issue, and it deliberately intends not to do so. It would rule 

out certain ways of introducing and expanding same-sex marriage, 

but it would fall short of defending traditional marriage by erecting 

effective barriers to the legitimization of same-sex and polygamous 

marriages. 

Those who advocate a federalism amendment on the gay marriage issue, which simply returns the issue to the States, seeing it 

as a permanent solution to the dispute apparently do not think 

that gay marriage is a fundamental issue. But the crux of the case 

for the Marriage Protection Amendment is that same-sex marriage, 

like polygamy, is precisely such a fundamental issue. The ready acceptance of a checkerboard pattern of State policy either does not 

understand or simply doesn’t agree that defending certain essential 

features of marriage, such as gender complementarity, is essential 

for social and individual well-being. 

Marriage is an institution that has certain intrinsic features and 

those requirements must be honored. For example, even if three or 

four people sincerely loved each other, our law would not permit 

them to marry. Why? Because we believe there is something about 

the very nature of marriage that precludes this. Most Americans 

today also reject same-sex marriage because they believe that gender complementarity is also essential or integral to the meaning of 

the institution of marriage. 

The discussion of the Marriage Protection Amendment is a key 

moment in the public debate about marriage stability. That goal 

will not be achieved if marriage is considered to be a malleable institution, revisable by society and unfettered by deep natural requirements, such as monogamy and gender differentiation, a view 

that is at the heart of the movement for same-sex marriage. Only 

by an amendment that directly addresses the core issue, the nature 

of marriage, can we achieve the goal of preserving marriage as a 

key social institution. 

The American people clearly want marriage to be protected. A 

large majority of States have laws or constitutional provisions that 

7

define marriage in the way that DOMA and the Marriage Protection Amendment define it. Many of those legal provisions have 

been passed in recent years with full, free, and open public debate. 

It is most unfortunate that those who wish to establish same-sex 

marriage in defiance of popular will are willing to have recourse to 

the manipulation of law by judicial and legal elites. Under such circumstances, a Marriage Protection Amendment is the only reliable 

way to preserve the definition of marriage the American people 

have long recognized and are intent on defending. Thank you. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Thank you, Professor. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfe appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Dr. Harris, thank you for coming here 

today. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER E. HARRIS, M.D., ASSISTANT 

PROFESSOR OF PEDIATRICS, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY 

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you. Good afternoon. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to this Subcommittee as it considers a proposed 

amendment to the Constitution that would deprive gay and lesbian 

couples and their children of important protections that they now 

enjoy. 

I appear before you today as a pediatrician, a father, and a gay 

African American. I also appear before you as a former president 

of the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association, an organization of 

health care providers devoted to equitable health and health care 

for lesbian, gay, and bisexual people. 

By way of introduction, I am a graduate of the University of Wisconsin, both the School of Pharmacy and the Medical School. During my time in medical school, I started my life’s devotion to the 

care of children. This continued with my pediatric residency at 

Vanderbilt and my fellowship in pediatric pulmonary medicine at 

the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I subsequently 

spent 5 years at Children’s Hospital in Cincinnati, involved in basic 

science research of children’s lung disease. 

However, throughout all of this, I felt compelled to work toward 

having my own child. As an openly gay man, I realized that this 

would be a difficult process, but instilled with the values of my parents and previous generations, I was undeterred. The two-and-ahalf-year process culminated 3 years ago when I was matched with 

a birth mother and became the father of a darling daughter. Because of this, these discussions today are more than mere political 

rhetoric. They affect my family and they affect me deeply, most importantly my daughter, who I am now raising to be a loving, caring 

member of our society. 

I feel compelled to testify before you today not only because I am 

a gay African American single father, but also as a pediatrician. I 

hope that my testimony will provide some clarity to the flurry of 

misinformation regarding the effect of parental sexual orientation 

on children. 

Some supporters of this amendment claim that the welfare of 

children will be advanced by a constitutional amendment denying 

the legal protections of marriage to gay and lesbian couples and 

8

their families. I disagree. Willfully injuring children through the 

denial of legal rights to their parents serves no legitimate social 

purpose. Regardless of one’s individual feelings regarding same-sex 

relationships, I think that everyone agrees that all children need 

the care and concern of a loving family and the legal protections 

that this structure can provide. 

The value of a loving family cuts across sexual orientation. In 

fact, the American Academy of Pediatrics states clearly that civil 

marriage is the legal mechanism by which societal recognition and 

support is given to couples and families. It provides a context for 

legal, financial, and psycho-social well-being, an endorsement of 

inter-dependent care, and a form of public respect for personal 

bonds. 

As a pediatrician, I deal with children and families firsthand. I 

have treated children for nearly 20 years and I can tell you what 

children need most, and that is love and affection. They need parents who care about them and can protect them. I can tell you, 

whether those parents are gay or straight, kids need the same 

things, and whether those parents are gay or straight has no bearing on whether they can be good parents to their children. 

This has been my personal observation while working directly 

with children and their parents. Although my anecdotal evidence 

is grounded in years of clinical experience, I will not ask you to 

solely rely on my experience to determine what is best for children. 

In my capacity as a professor of pediatrics, I regularly analyze 

peer-reviewed medical studies. In preparation for this testimony, I 

reviewed the scientific evidence regarding the welfare of children in 

gay-lesbian families. 

Judith Stacey’s and Timothy Biblarz’s article in the American Sociological Review entitled, ‘‘How Does the Sexual Orientation of 

Parents Matter?’’ is one of the most comprehensive reviews of the 

scientifically reputable literature on the subject of same-sex parenting. This review confirms that successful child rearing is unaffected by a parent’s sexual orientation. For instance, there is simply no significant difference between children of lesbian mothers 

and heterosexual mothers in such factors as anxiety level, depression, or self-esteem. This difference holds true through studies that 

test children directly, their parents, and their teachers. 

In fact, every relevant study of the effects of parental sexual orientation on children shows no measurable effect on the quality of 

the parent-child relationship or the child’s mental health and successful socialization. I, therefore, concur with previous testimony 

before this Subcommittee that children raised by lesbian mothers 

or gay fathers are as healthy and well-adjusted as other children. 

Given this body of scientific evidence, it is not surprising that the 

American Academy of Pediatrics supports both joint and secondparent adoptions by gay and lesbian parents. Thus, these professionals, my colleagues who provide care and have detailed knowledge of the parenting skills of gay and lesbian parents, approve of 

these parents’ ability to raise healthy, socially well-adjusted children. This finding affirms the importance of ensuring the legal 

rights of children extends to both parents. 

This is why I have signed a letter to Congress by the Pro-Family 

Pediatricians opposing any Federal marriage amendment to the 

9

Constitution. This letter, signed by over 750 of my fellow pediatricians, expresses our strong opposition for a constitutional amendment we know as caretakers would hurt children and their families. 

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as an African American, 

I cannot express how strongly I feel about the prospect of adopting 

a discriminatory amendment into the Constitution of the U.S. 

Much like the first article of the Constitution relegating African 

Americans to sub-human status, the Marriage Protection Amendment seeks to reduce the rights of some American citizens to a 

fraction of those enjoyed by others. I urge the members of this Subcommittee to learn from the mistakes of our past and not again 

condemn another class of Americans to second-class citizenship for 

future generations to witness. Though repealed, Section 2 of Article 

I will never disappear. Every time an African-American citizen 

reads the Constitution, they are reminded of the less-than-human 

status that my people once held in this country. The Constitution 

does not have an eraser. It retains all of our mistakes and missteps 

from now until nigh the end of time. 

I commend this Subcommittee for its focus on the welfare of families and, thus, of children. Though this issue is an emotional one, 

each of us must ask if the proposed constitutional amendment prohibiting the marriage of gay and lesbian parents would support the 

welfare of all families and all American children, including those 

millions of children whose parents are gay and lesbian. With all 

due respect, for me as a pediatrician and a scientist, the answer 

is clear. The Marriage Protection Amendment will only hurt the 

well-being of children in this country. 

Thank you for your time and the opportunity to speak here 

today. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Thank you, Dr. Harris. We appreciate 

that. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Harris appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Professor Wilkins? 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD G. WILKINS, PROFESSOR OF LAW 

AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE WORLD FAMILY POLICY 

CENTER, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, PROVO, UTAH 

Mr. WILKINS. Thank you, Senator Brownback. I am delighted to 

be here. I would like to talk about the importance of the interaction 

of the U.S. Supreme Court and the decisionmaking powers of the 

American people. 

In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that States could 

not criminalize homosexual sodomy. That case raises a serious 

question about the future of marriage. Can it be defined as the 

union of a man and a woman? But there is another question, as 

well. Does America even have a written Constitution anymore? 

Lawrence relies upon an unwritten right that was first established by the Supreme Court in its 1967 decision in Griswold. There, the Court struck down what was undoubtedly an anachronistic or an ancient, outdated law regulating—or involving Connecticut’s regulation of condom usage. But rather than wait for 

democratic debate to reject this silly law, the Court invalidated this 

10

law by saying that marriage was a, quote, ‘‘sacred’’ union between 

a man and a woman that is supported by a right of privacy found 

nowhere in the Constitution. It was found in the penumbras, or 

shadows. These shadows have now brought the sacred relationship 

relied upon by Griswold into very constitutional doubt. It has also 

put at risk what Chief Justice John Marshall called, quote, ‘‘the 

greatest improvement on political institutions’’ ever achieved in 

America, ‘‘a written Constitution.’’ 

Federal courts have departed from the text of the Constitution 

before. As was noted by the prior witness, Dred Scott v. Sanford, prior to the Civil War, the Supreme Court departed from the text 

of the Constitution to hold that slaves were property and could not 

be made people and individuals by their owners bringing them into 

the State of Missouri and thereby freed pursuant to an Act of Congress. The Supreme Court held the Due Process Clause prevented 

that result. It is that very type of reasoning that is at issue here 

today. 

Dred Scott v. Sanford is of a piece of Griswold v. Connecticut and 

Lawrence v. Texas. In 1936, these decisions in the economic area 

forced President Roosevelt to go on the offensive and threaten to 

pack the Court unless the Court returned to constitutional text. 

Within three months of receiving the President’s credible threat, it 

was as if the text of the Constitution had suddenly appeared to the 

Justices and they departed from their prior practice of enforcing 

their own views of wise social policy and instead enforced the text 

of the Constitution. 

We must remind the Court that, as Chief Justice John Marshall 

wrote in Marbury, quote, ‘‘the Framers of the Constitution contemplated this instrument as a rule for the government of courts 

as well as of the legislature.’’ The modern court is seemingly unaware of this fact. 

In Lawrence, the Court even announced it wouldn’t even follow 

Griswold anymore. Forget about all that sacred union talk. Privacy 

has nothing at all to do with marriage, procreation, or bearing of 

children. Instead, privacy, the Court says, vests sexual partners 

with an entitlement to determine, quote, ‘‘their own concept of existence of meaning of the universe and of the mystery of human 

life,’’ and under this new Concept of Existence Clause, government, 

the Court said, may not demean consenting adult sexual behavior. 

If Lawrence is to be taken at its word, governments may no longer 

be able to distinguish between a marital union of a man and a 

woman, a sexual partnership between two men, a relationship between two women, a relationship between three men and four 

women, or any other conceivable sexual relationship. 

If Griswold’s marital relationship is sacred, will Lawrence permit 

States to demean other sexual relationships by suggesting they are 

not? Can States even require sexual fidelity if that contravenes the 

meaning of individuals’ own universes? Thus, more than marriage 

is threatened. The very meaning of a written Constitution may be 

at stake. 

Lawrence and cases preceding it have eroded democratic control 

of debatable and unquestionably difficult issues of public concern. 

But by substituting a concept of existence test for the actual words 

of the Constitution, the Court has removed a broad range of imporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:11 Nov 29, 2005 Jkt 024661 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\24661.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
11

tant questions of social concern from the reach of the American 

people. No one knows whether marriage will survive, but all relevant decisions to date following Lawrence suggest the answer is 

no. 

Ordinary citizens, law professors, doctors, judges, we all disagree 

regarding the meaning of marriage, but the existence of this disagreement demands that the people be allowed to determine the 

meaning of marriage. Marriage does have a meaning. It is an essential and longstanding social institution. As described in the proposed amendment, it consists of the union of a man and a woman. 

Union in this sense means sexual union as it has always meant in 

the law of marriage. It merely provides that States, courts, and 

Federal courts should stop construing, meaning stop doing what 

you did in Griswold, stop looking at shadows. Look at the words. 

Apply the text. And it says that no legal incidence on other unions 

on other sexual relationships will be conferred. 

That does not, however, prohibit States from defining protected 

relationships based on characteristics other than sexual status. 

There are aged widows living together in dependent, caring relationships, not involved in a sexual relationship, who deserve social 

protection, as well. 

The marriage debate must not be resolved by the courts because 

the courts are unable to balance all of the difficult issues involved. 

It should, indeed, be left to the people. 

As Abraham Lincoln warned in his first inaugural address, if the 

policy of government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is irrevocably fixed by the Supreme Court the instant they are 

made in ordinary litigation, people will have ceased to be their own 

Governors. 

Let me also, in due deference to the good doctor, let me point out 

that the study he cited for no difference by Stacey and Biblarz, in 

fact, concludes that the contention that there is no difference is 

false. On page 176 of their study discussing differences of social 

concern, the authors say evidence in these studies that focus on 

these variables does not support the ‘‘no differences’’ claim. They 

conclude, quote, ‘‘the evidence suggests that parental gender and 

sexual identities interact to create distinctive family processes 

whose consequences for children have yet to be studied.’’ 

We do not know what the impact of changing the definition of 

marriage will have, but we should not allow the courts to make it. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Thank you. Is that the end of your statement, Professor? 

Mr. WILKINS. That is fine. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Good. Thank you, because I want to try 

to keep this to a tight timeframe. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilkins appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman BROWNBACK. We have got a vote that has been called. 

Senator Feingold has gone to vote, and when he comes back, he 

will just continue the hearing, and so we will continue to run this, 

if we could. 

Professor Seidman, thank you for joining us today. 

12

STATEMENT OF LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, JOHN CARROLL 

RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF LAW, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

LAW CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. SEIDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for affording me the opportunity to testify. As I think you know better 

than I do, the moral, ethical, and public policy questions posed by 

the amendment generate strong emotions on all sides. Like most 

Americans, I have views about those questions, but I don’t pretend 

to have any expertise about them. Therefore, I would like to accept 

your invitation and confine my testimony to something I do know 

something about, which is the way the courts are likely to interpret 

the language that has been drafted. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Thank you. 

Mr. SEIDMAN. With regard to that matter, I am sorry to say that 

the amendment reflects remarkably poor lawyering. If adopted, 

ironically enough, the amendment will grant unelected Federal 

judges untrammeled discretion that could be checked neither by 

Congress nor by the State legislatures regarding domestic relations 

law. 

Despite its title, the amendment would also have the perverse effect of weakening the institution of marriage. 

Because I can’t believe that the drafters of the amendment intended those results, I strongly urge you to reject the amendment 

being considered at this hearing and other similar amendments 

pending in this Congress. 

The proposed amendment creates a number of interpretative ambiguities. First, Federal courts will be required to decide what the 

word ‘‘marriage’’ means. Then they will have to decide what the 

legal incidence thereof means, those words, and what the word 

‘‘construed’’ means. It is important to emphasize that the answers 

to those questions will become matters of Federal constitutional 

law. It would not be revisable either by the Congress or by the individual States. 

Now, why do these words pose interpretative problems? Suppose 

we start by focusing on the word ‘‘marriage’’ in the first sentence 

of the amendment. Clearly, the framers of the amendment meant 

to distinguish between marriage itself and its legal incidence. Apparently, the framers had in mind a distinction between core legal 

attributes which make up marriage, on the one hand, and an unspecified list of peripheral attributes which make up the legal incidence on the other. 

But because the marriage is entirely silent about what is core 

and what is periphery, it gives the Federal judges unchecked power 

to place various aspects of marriage in one category or another, 

and short of a constitutional marriage, neither the States nor Congress could do anything to reverse those decisions. 

Suppose, for example, that a State passed a statute that unambiguously created civil unions under which gay Americans could 

enjoy most, but not quite all, of the benefits of marriage. Is that 

a marriage or does it confer only the legal incidence of marriage? 

As members of this Subcommittee know, this is hardly a farfetched hypothetical. A number of States have created or are considering various forms of civil union. Yet the drafters of the amendment themselves have testified that they are unsure of the effect 

13

that the amendment would have on these statutes. How can a 

judge possibly determine whether or not a particular form of civil 

union, including some but not all benefits of marriage, is a marriage or not when the drafters of the amendment themselves don’t 

know the answer to that question? 

Reasonable people might disagree about whether civil unions are 

wise. It is simply irresponsible, however, to turn that question over 

to Federal judges for them to decide for all time and for the entire 

country without any guidance from elected officials. 

A similar problem is posed by the second sentence of the amendment, which provides that the Constitution shall not be construed 

to require either marriage, whatever courts decide that is, or the 

legal incidence thereof, or whatever they are, to be conferred on 

anyone other than different sex couples. Suppose that a State court 

interprets a vaguely worded statute to allow grandparents visitation rights. Again, this is hardly a far-fetched hypothetical. State 

courts throughout the country are considering this very question 

and some courts have afforded grandparents these rights. But if 

visitation is an incidence of marriage and if this amendment is enacted, then the granting of these rights violates the Federal Constitution. That is so because grandparents are not part of the union 

of a man and a woman and, therefore, are not entitled to enjoy the 

incidence of marriage. Do the members of this Subcommittee really 

intend that result? Do they really wish to give Federal judges the 

discretion to impose this outcome or not as they choose? 

The word ‘‘construed’’ is also ambiguous. The most sensible reading of the amendment is that gay men and lesbians should not 

enjoy core marriage rights, whatever they are, but that States can 

create peripheral incidents of marriage for them so long as no construal of a Constitution is necessary to create them. This provision 

requires Federal judges to develop a jurisprudence that distinguishes between the construal of a State constitutional provision 

and its mere enforcement. 

But how are judges supposed to do that? Perhaps, for example, 

the wording of a statute is somewhat vague, but its legislative history leaves no doubt about the intent of the framers. How is a Federal court to decide whether a State court’s engagement with that 

particular provision constitutes a forbidden construal or a mere enforcement? 

In conclusion, some years ago, I had the honor of serving as a 

reporter for the bipartisan blue ribbon Committee convened by the 

Constitution Project under the chairmanship of two distinguished 

Members of Congress, former members, Hon. Abner Mikva and 

Hon. Mickey Edwards. Our assigned task was to develop guidelines 

for the amendment of the Constitution. We did so in a document 

entitled, ‘‘Great and Extraordinary Occasions: Developing Guidelines for Constitutional Change.’’ 

Although members of the commission disagreed among themselves about specific amendments, they were united in their commitment to some minimal standards before our fundamental document could be changed. Central among those standards was the requirement that proponents of proposed amendments, quote, ‘‘attempt to think through and articulate the consequences of their 

14

proposal, including the ways in which the amendment would interact with other constitutional provisions and principles.’’ 

I am sorry to conclude that the proponents of this amendment 

have not met that minimal standard. If enacted, their handiwork 

is bound to produce outcomes that no one could have wanted or intended and an unprecedented transfer of power over domestic relations law to Federal judges. Although Americans disagree about 

gay marriage, surely they can agree that more care ought to be 

taken before the Constitution is sullied in that fashion. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Seidman appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Professor FitzGibbon, and as I mentioned, I am anticipating that my colleague is going to be coming 

back and we will continue the hearing, but if he doesn’t come back 

here in a couple of minutes, I am afraid we will cut you off in midstream and come back after a brief recess, but thank you for joining us, Professor. 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT FITZGIBBON, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 

BOSTON COLLEGE, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. FITZGIBBON. Thank you very much for inviting me, Senator 

Brownback, and thanks to my research assistant, Colbe 

Mazzarella, who gave me a lot of help on this. 

From time to time, skeptics about initiatives to protect and defend the institution of marriage advance the view that same-sex 

marriage and its recognition is really something of no great importance except to same-sex couples and need not attract any great 

concern as regards the wider social order. But as a resident of Massachusetts, the only American State to have embraced the practice, 

as it did under the mandate of the Supreme Judicial Court in 

Goodridge, I come before this Subcommittee to testify that the 

adoption of same-sex marriage leads on to social changes of the 

most profound character and that these developments are an appropriate subject of national concern and attention. 

The practice has been in place in Massachusetts for only 17 

months now. Plainly, we can only begin to surmise the full consequences of a development whose effects are sure to unfold across 

the generations. But I would like to mention three lines of developments that are already visible. 

First, as to the education of our children, the Superintendent of 

the Boston Public Schools has issued a memorandum which states 

that, quote, ‘‘this is a historic moment in our Commonwealth and 

in our country’’ and that legal same-sex marriage ‘‘has had, and 

continues to have, a profound effect on our civil life and discourse,’’ 

and that its impact will ‘‘filter through our society and our schools,’’ 

and what he predicts, he imposes, because he then grimly warns 

that he has, quote, ‘‘received some reports of inappropriate speech’’ 

and goes on to articulate a ‘‘zero-tolerance policy’’ for those who not 

only exhibit bias as to sexual orientation, but even those who 

‘‘cause’’ bias in others or who contribute to a climate of intolerance. 

Today in Boston, a teacher would take her career into her hands 

by conducting a discussion about both sides of the same-sex marVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:11 Nov 29, 2005 Jkt 024661 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\24661.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
15

riage question or even about both sides of the question of same-sex 

cohabitation. So the first aspect of the social situation I wish to 

bring to the attention of this Subcommittee is an icy chilling of discourse. 

Now, my second concern involves not what is chilled, but what 

is presented. ‘‘After all,’’ says an eighth grade teacher in a school 

not far from Boston, ‘‘this is legal now so teaching about homosexuality is important,’’ and the way she does it, she lays out as 

quoted fully in my written testimony. Suffice it to say here, she 

gets very explicit. 

The effect of the Goodridge decision has been to encourage the 

indoctrination of public school students in the merits of same-sex 

marriage and in many related topics. Today in Massachusetts, a 

parent would be met with resistance and possibly even legal struggles if he tried too hard to protect his children from presentations 

of this sort, as illustrated by the case of David Parker, arrested by 

the Lexington, Massachusetts police on April 24 as described at 

length in my written submission. 

My third concern relates to the social understanding of marriage 

projected by the same-sex decisions, which is that marriage is not 

primarily a matter of tradition, custom, or basic moral ordering, 

but is a creature of the government. The Goodridge judges arrogantly announced that marriage is what they say it is. Quote, ‘‘The 

government creates civil marriage,’’ they stated. ‘‘The government 

creates civil marriage and it had better not do so moralistically or 

with too great a regard for tradition or the beliefs of the community 

or what some courts have referred to as the prejudices of the people—’’ 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Professor, I am going to have to stop you 

here. We are right at the end of the vote, so I have to run over and 

vote. I thought my colleague would be back. I am going to put the 

hearing into recess until Senator Feingold gets back, at which time 

he will reconvene and you can finish your statement, and then he 

will proceed to questions and I will come back for that. So we will 

be in recess until Senator Feingold appears. Sorry. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. [Presiding.] We will reconvene the session. 

Senator Brownback asked me to start things up again. I understand Professor FitzGibbon had some time left on his statement, so 

why don’t you proceed, Professor. 

Mr. FITZGIBBON. Well, thank you very much. I kind of lost my 

pace here, but I will do my best. 

I was saying how the Goodridge court announces that the government creates civil marriage and it strikes down the definition, 

whatever it might have been in the common law, and then doesn’t 

give one itself. It says marriage is, quote, ‘‘an evolving paradigm,’’ 

leaving us in a void, not just legally, but as a matter of social attitudes. 

As legal and social policymakers lose their grasp on any coherent 

understanding of marriage, the barrier between marriage and cohabitation breaks down. The institution of marriage forfeits its definitive status in general opinion and social practice, as well. It becomes harder and harder to present and defend any solid marital 

morality or any morality as to family life in the public schools. And 

16

Denmark, which has traveled this road some decade ahead of us, 

now reports very high rates of cohabitation and a social normative 

acceptance of non-marital cohabitation even as a mode for raising 

children. 

Well, I leave in the hands of other witnesses the discussion of 

federalism and the nature of the relations between State and Federal law, but I do extend my comments that way to the point of 

observing that these social developments now underway in Massachusetts are proceeding with accelerating velocity and will in no 

way remain cabined or contained within the borders of any one jurisdiction. When a State gets off the same page as the rest of the 

country as regards fundamental marital and sexual morality and 

develops a jurisprudence of marital relationships which is unstable, 

divergent from tradition, and fundamentally deleterious to the raising of the next generation of Americans, it is appropriate to bring 

the matter forward for national discussion and common resolution. 

Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Professor. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. FitzGibbon appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. My understanding is the Chairman would 

like me to begin my round at this point, 7-minute rounds. 

First, let me ask unanimous consent that Senator Leahy, the 

Ranking Member, that his statement be placed in the record, without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. Before I begin my questioning, I would also 

request the written testimony of Joe Salmonese, the President of 

the Human Rights Campaign, and Professor Nancy Dowd of the 

University of Florida, Levin College of Law, be entered in the 

record, without objection. 

I would also ask that a letter in opposition to the Federal marriage amendment signed by over 700 pediatricians be entered into 

the record, without objection. 

Let me start by asking Professor Seidman, and I do apologize for 

missing your testimony, whether you have any response to Professor FitzGibbon’s testimony that you would like to make. 

Mr. SEIDMAN. Thank you, Senator. Professor FitzGibbon is my 

law school classmate and I have a tremendous respect for him. I 

think, though, that we do have to understand the situation we are 

in in early 21st century America is one where there is just deep 

disagreement and emotional disagreement about this issue. That is 

not something that was created by Goodridge and it is not something that is going to go away with the marriage amendment. So 

given that fact that we can’t change, we have to find some way to 

live with each other and understand each other. 

So I am prepared to concede that maybe the Boston Superintendent of Schools went too far, although I can’t help noting Professor FitzGibbon quotes him as not tolerating harassment, discrimination, bias, or intimidation of any member of the community. 

I wonder what part of that Professor FitzGibbon disagrees with. 

But maybe the Superintendent went too far. 

17

But at the same time, we have to recognize that in our society, 

people like Dr. Harris have kids that they are trying to raise and 

we have to accommodate both of those situations. The way conservatives have done that in the past has been largely by letting people 

decide these matters for themselves and keeping government out of 

it. I think it is a shame conservatives have lost track of that core 

conservative commitment which seems to me to be at stake here. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Dr. Harris, first let me say what 

a wonderful panel this is and for it to begin with two distinguished 

people with Wisconsin roots is particularly appreciated. 

Dr. Harris, do you have anything you would like to comment on 

based on what you have heard thus far? 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you, Senator Feingold. With regard to the 

statement by Professor Wilkins from the Stacey article, there are 

several spots where Dr. Stacey says that lesbian, gay, bisexual parents and their children in these studies display no differences from 

heterosexual counterparts in psychological well-being or cognitive 

functioning. In another spot, she says that the results demonstrate 

no differences on any measures between the heterosexual and the 

homosexual parents regarding parenting styles, emotional adjustment, and sexual orientation of their children. 

She does suggest actually in several spots around the article that 

actually children of lesbian and gay parents may actually do somewhat better, so perhaps that is what Professor Wilkins was referring to. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Back to Professor Seidman, you 

mentioned something in your statement that I wanted you to elaborate on, and that is the situation this amendment creates with how 

it treats State Constitutions as opposed to statutes. Could you say 

something about that? 

Mr. SEIDMAN. I would be happy to. This is one of the most bizarre aspects of the amendment as it is currently formulated. If a 

State Constitution by ambiguous language is construed to create 

civil unions, that would be unconstitutional under this amendment. 

The State legislature, having seen that, could pass a statute with 

the exact ambiguous language and then it would be constitutional 

for a court to construe that to recognize civil unions. 

So you have this, so far as I know, unprecedented situation 

where State Constitutions are treated with less respect than State 

statutes. I can’t imagine a reason for doing that. I can’t believe the 

framers of this provision meant to do it. It is just more sloppiness 

in how this was put together. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Dr. Harris, in your testimony, you mentioned 

the American Academy of Pediatrics’ support of gay and lesbian 

parenting. This is an organization of 60,000 pediatricians that is 

dedicated to the health and well-being of all children, that strongly 

believes in the value of civil marriage for fostering healthy families 

and children, and feels that same-sex marriage harms no one and 

is, like any marriage, good for children. 

What other organizations in the broader medical community are 

you aware of that have taken a similar position? In particular, 

could you tell me how members of the psychiatric field have 

weighed in on this issue? 

18

Dr. HARRIS. Certainly. The American Psychiatric Association, 

their membership and board has issued a statement in favor of 

civil marriage for lesbian and gay people. There are other organizations, the American Association of Family Practice has come out in 

favor of support for children of lesbian and gay people. The same 

is true of the American Psychological Association and the National 

Social Work Association. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Doctor. 

Professor Seidman, Professor Wilkins’ testimony focuses largely 

on a line of decisions regarding the constitutional right to privacy, 

a line of cases that he basically argues is illegitimate. He blames 

an out-of-control judiciary for cases with which he disagrees. Could 

you comment on how this proposed amendment would affect the judiciary’s power to make decisions regarding marriage and legal arrangements and benefits related to it? 

Mr. SEIDMAN. Two points, Senator. First, as I testified, ironically, 

the amendment would have the effect of greatly expanding judicial 

power with no guidance from—and no ability of the popular 

branches of government to check it. I went through the reasons for 

that in my testimony. 

The other point is this. Professor Wilkins testified at some length 

about his disagreement with Lawrence v. Texas. I am more favorably disposed toward Lawrence than he is, but we don’t have to 

argue about that now. The fact of the matter is, this amendment 

does nothing at all to change Lawrence v. Texas. It leaves Lawrence

untouched. And given that fact, it produces a really strange result, 

because the holding of Lawrence permits—creates a constitutional 

right to engage in even casual sex with a total stranger. 

So we are now in—if this amendment were to pass, we would be 

in the bizarre situation where there was an absolute constitutional 

right to engage in casual sex with strangers, but an absolute constitutional prohibition on legally recognized, long-term relationships. Again, it seems to me that is a result that nobody could 

want and nobody could intend. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, we have finished the testimony. I have finished my round and now you see how long it takes 

to get back and forth. [Laughter.] 

Chairman BROWNBACK. [Presiding.] Thank you very much. 

I want to look at the text of the draft of the amendment and really focus in on that, if I could. Professor Wilkins, you have heard 

some of the criticism here and I know a lot of people have spent 

a lot of time trying to draft this properly and get at the issue of 

defining marriage in the United States as the union of a man and 

a woman, that there is a pretty simple intent and clear intent with 

this. And yet I want to treat with great respect Professor 

Seidman’s raising these issues and concerns and situations. I will 

think about it and say, well, OK, now that one makes sense to me. 

What do you think of the direct wording of this constitutional 

amendment as it is put forward now and its intended purpose? Do 

those two match? 

Mr. WILKINS. Yes. Thank you, Senator. With due respect to Professor Seidman, this amendment does reflect very careful thinking, 

careful lawyering, and careful wording. It defines marriage as the 

union of a man and a woman. 

19

Within the context of marriage law throughout ages, throughout, 

actually, thousands of years—we can go back to Mesopotamian 

texts on this—marriage has always been defined as the sexual 

union, and the word ‘‘union’’ means sexual union. In fact, the traditional, the established definition of marriage in all of the States involves sexual complementarity, a man and a woman, a sexual 

union. Without the union, a sexual union, you can get an annulment. A pledge of lifelong fidelity, support, that is, of course, eroding. That is one of the problems we need to do. We need to shore 

up marriage. And then the assumption of a host of rules related 

to the bearing and rearing of children and the legal responsibilities 

therefore. 

Now, once you understand that fact, most of the ambiguities that 

the Professor talks about disappear. We know what the union of a 

man and a woman is. We know what the meaning of marriage is. 

It is not, as he has asserted, a simple collection of incidents. We 

have known what the meaning is. It is clear. It is widely understood. 

The incidents of marriage are those things that legislatures of 

various kinds, both State and national, have added to or provided 

to the institution of marriage because of the perception that this 

institution has social benefit. They have provided economic grants 

or social subsidies, et cetera. It is very easy to identify what they 

are. You just go—it is not hard. It is not ambiguous. You go 

through the statute books. If this benefit is contingent upon a person being married, it is an incident of marriage. 

Now, will this create a problem of, wow, courts will construe 

things now? Well, no. Right now, courts are already trying to determine what marriage is. This is not going to expand Federal power. 

This is going to limit Federal power of courts and of State courts 

because it is going to return them to the core meaning of marriage 

as the union of a man and a woman. The fact that they are going 

to have to construe things, courts construe language all the time. 

That objection just hardly makes sense. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Let me ask you—I want to get on a finer 

point on this. The Professor raises the issue that you are taking an 

area of State law jurisdiction and Federalizing it in an unlimited 

way, if I am correctly interpreting. What do you think of that? 

Mr. WILKINS. The response to that, Senator, is very easy. It has 

already been Federalized. This is the only way. The Federal marriage amendment or the Marriage Protection Amendment, the current name, is the only way to preserve any ability of States and 

the people within the States to have any say on the meaning of 

marriage. Right now, the Federal courts are deciding the meaning 

of marriage. They are deciding what the incidents of marriage are. 

And the debate comes down to, do you want the judges to Federalize it or do you want this to be left to the people. 

Mr. SEIDMAN. Senator— 

Mr. WILKINS. This language merely preserves the longstanding 

union of a man and a woman. It does not stop States, nor will it 

expand the power of Federal courts because so long as State legislatures or other bodies confer incidents or benefits based on some 

other ground than sexual union, then it is not an incident of marriage. It is an incident of this other defined relationship. 

20

It will promote fairness. Consider this hypothetical. A man—two 

women—or two brothers living together, one of them dying of prostate cancer. The one has health insurance. But because they are 

not sexual partners, they cannot—the insured brother cannot extend his health care benefits. Two similar gay men, if we have gay 

marriage, would be able to do so. The only distinction is the sexual 

conduct, which Lawrence says is private and the State has no business in regulating, one way or the other. 

Therefore, the legislatures should be left free, and this Act will 

leave the legislatures free, to recognize any dependent caring relationship, confer any incident it chooses on that relationship, and so 

long as it is not defined sexually, it will not be an incident of marriage and it will not reduce or increase inequality. It will produce 

more equality, more justice, and preserve the core meaning of a 

very important social institution. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Let me ask you, if I could, family law 

has traditionally always been done in the States. Do you think this 

takes family law away from the States? And there, I am talking 

about the functionality of granting a marriage license, divorce, 

child custody, those sorts of issues. 

Mr. WILKINS. No. It simply—right now, if we do nothing, we are 

merely waiting for the day when the Federal courts will Federalize 

the institution of marriage and take it completely away from the 

States— 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Under the definition of what marriage— 

Mr. WILKINS. Under the definition of what a marriage is, and 

then it will be completely out of the hands of the States and the 

State legislatures. This Act defines marriage and tells courts they 

may not construe, meaning you may not twist or contort the language of your own Constitutions or of the Federal Constitution to 

require that other sexual unions be given the same status as marriage. But it will not prevent State legislatures from providing for 

protections for families like Dr. Harris and other situations so long 

as those protections are not defined on the basis of private sexual 

conduct that Lawrence says States no longer have any regulatory 

interest in. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Senator Feingold? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Back to Professor Seidman. Last year, the voters in Michigan approved a constitutional amendment and part of that amendment 

states, quote, ‘‘this State and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, quality, significance, or effect of marriage.’’ 

During our last hearing on the proposed Federal amendment, Dr. 

Kathleen Moltz testified that supporters of the amendment insisted 

during the campaign that the amendment had nothing to do with 

health benefits for domestic partners. But shortly after Michigan 

adopted the amendment, the Attorney General issued an opinion 

prohibiting State and local governments from providing domestic 

partner benefits to their employees. State employees challenged the 

Attorney General’s opinion in a Michigan court. In a decision 

issued at the end of last month, the court held that the constituVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:11 Nov 29, 2005 Jkt 024661 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\24661.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
21

tional amendment was intended to protect the benefits of marriage 

and health care was a benefit of employment, not of marriage. 

You discussed this proposed Federal constitutional amendment’s 

ambiguity at some length in your testimony, but let us talk about 

the specific situation. In your view, would this amendment permit 

State employers to give health care benefits to domestic partners? 

Mr. SEIDMAN. Senator, I would love to give you an answer to that 

question but the honest answer is, I don’t have a clue. The amendment is so open-ended and so vague, I could imagine judges coming 

up with any number of different conclusions about that. 

With regard to that point, Senator, and with regard to what Professor Wilkins just said, I would like to bring to your attention the 

testimony just last April of Professor Gerard Bradley before this 

Committee, who was a drafter, or at least he identified himself as 

a drafter of this amendment. Here is what he said about the point 

you are raising and the point Professor Wilkins was just talking 

about, and I am quoting here from the transcript. 

The amendment leaves it wide open for legislatures to extend 

some, many, most, perhaps all but one, I suppose, benefit of marriage to unmarried people, but I would say if it is a marriage in 

all but name, that is ruled out by the definition of marriage in the 

first sentence. 

Now, two points about that. First, it is really interesting that 

what Professor Bradley says is quite different from what Professor 

Wilkins just said. These are two people involved in the drafting of 

this amendment who disagree between themselves as to what it 

means. Second, I would challenge anybody reading Professor Bradley’s, what Professor Bradley has to say about this, to give an answer to your question. I don’t think he knows the answer, and if 

he doesn’t know the answer, then how is a Federal judge supposed 

to figure out what the answer is? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, let me give Professors FitzGibbon and 

Wilkins a chance to answer it again with regard to the proposed 

Federal constitutional amendment and concern about ambiguity. In 

your view, would this amendment, Professor FitzGibbon, permit 

State employers to give health care benefits to domestic partners? 

Mr. FITZGIBBON. You know, I am a little reluctant to testify 

about what it means because unlike others here, I haven’t had the 

pleasure of helping draft this thing. So to see my name appear in 

the legislative record as opining on what it means, I am a little reluctant about that. 

I am just going to say that the degree of ambiguity which troubles my former classmate so much isn’t necessarily a terrible thing. 

This isn’t a part of the tax code. It is proposedly a part of the 

United States Constitution and constitutional provisions rightly 

leave some scope for later determinations. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I guess I would just say that that may be 

true, but people whose health care benefits may depend on this 

may be eager to know what its likely implication is before we vote 

on it. I respect your desire not to comment on this thing, as you 

described it, this amendment, but let me ask Professor Wilkins to 

do it. 

Mr. WILKINS. Well again, Senator, thank you. The language does 

reflect careful lawyering, careful drafting. It uses terminology that 

22

has been used for hundreds of years in marriage law and marital 

law and defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman. In 

that context, union of a man and a woman is a sexual union. Without sexual union, a marriage is annulled. It is nonexistent. 

The second paragraph, which then restricts the granting of any 

legal incidents to any other union according to standard principles 

of constitutional construction, all words in the same text must be 

given the same meaning. It is sexual union. It is clear. It is not unambiguous. And so long as a State law provided benefits to a civil 

partnership that was not defined on the basis of sexual union, yes, 

those benefits could be provided. Is that just? Is that fair? Yes, because there are many, many, many caring, dependent, and interdependent long-term relationships in America. 

Senator FEINGOLD. So your answer is, no, that this amendment 

would not permit State employers to give health care benefits to 

domestic partners, correct? 

Mr. WILKINS. So long as those unions were not defined on the 

grounds of sexual union. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Seidman, would you like to respond to 

that? 

Mr. SEIDMAN. Well, just very briefly. Again, it is quite remarkable, the problems here. Professor Wilkins just said that the constitutional provision defines marriage only in terms of a sexual 

union. There are hundreds of thousands, millions of marriages in 

this country that don’t involve sexual union. I am quite proud of 

the fact, next month, my 86-year-old father-in-law is getting married to a 79-year-old woman. I would be delighted if that involved 

a sexual union, but I am not at all confident that it does and I 

would be very upset if that amendment prohibited that marriage. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Seidman— 

Mr. WILKINS. Again, we are not looking at the specific examples 

of 87-year-old people, and I am in my 50’s and it is not nearly as 

sexual a union as it was when I was in my 20’s, but the legal institution itself—[Laughter.] 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Wait a minute. What is going on here? 

I want order in this place. [Laughter.] The oral history hearing is 

next week. [Laughter.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. Professor Seidman, the proposed amendment 

seeks to prohibit both marriage and the legal incidents thereof 

from being extended to same-sex couples. Is it clear what the legal 

incidents of marriage are? How would a court decide whether a 

benefit was one of legal incidence of marriage? 

Mr. SEIDMAN. Senator, it is completely ambiguous. I mentioned 

in my testimony the problem of grandparent visitation rights, 

which might or might not be an incidence of marriage, but there 

were many other examples, things like the ability to visit somebody 

in a hospital, the ability to get health benefits, the ability to raise 

children, that may or may not be an incidence of marriage. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Thank you. 

I want to get Professor Wolfe involved in this on looking at the 

specific wording of the actual amendment itself. You have heard 

some of the criticism on this. I want to get you on the record of 

23

your direct thoughts of the writing of this and whether it hits the 

intended purpose of defining marriage in the United States as the 

union of a man and a woman. 

Mr. WOLFE. I would like to get involved in this, too. I have been 

sitting on the sideline hearing what I think are—and Professor 

Seidman talks about bizarre implications of the amendment. I 

think, frankly, there are bizarre implications of his bizarre reading 

of the amendment. 

For instance, let us take the phrase he cited from Professor 

Bradley which he seems to suggest is this incredibly open-ended, 

ambiguous thing whereas actually it is extremely clear. The 

amendment leaves it wide open for legislatures to adopt some, 

many, most, perhaps all but one, I suppose, benefits of marriage to 

unmarried people, but I would say if it is marriage in all but name, 

that it is ruled out by the definition of marriage in the first sentence. 

What he is basically saying is that if you created another status 

that had all the exact same aspects, features, incidents of marriage, then that would violate that first sentence. That is, if you established a civil union and then said, we define civil union as everything that marriage is except for the name, that would violate 

the first line. Anything short of that—if the State legislature wants 

to give lots of different incidents of marriage or some of them, or 

most of them, as long as it is not giving everything to them, then 

there is this distinction. States under this amendment—State legislatures have the right to give those legal incidents, not the whole 

bundle, but particular ones. 

So, for instance, grandmother visitation rights, no problem at all. 

Of course, grandmothers can have visitation rights. On Professor 

Seidman’s interpretation, anything that a married couple has by 

virtue of being married must now be specifically denied everybody 

else. That is a bizarre interpretation. No legislature could possibly 

have intended that. For instance, to say just because parents have 

children, nobody but parents can have children. You can’t have single parents, for example, adopting, whereas many of the States 

have it and there is no intention in this record to do away with 

things like that. 

So I think—and frankly, the attribution of ambiguity here is 

really—it comes from, I think, Professor Seidman attributing a 

meaning to the amendment that its framers currently don’t have, 

clearly don’t have, couldn’t possibly have. 

Mr. SEIDMAN. May I respond briefly to that? 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Let me get down here and then I want 

to come back to it. I have got another point I want to ask you 

about, as well. 

Professor FitzGibbon, would you care to comment on this debate 

about whether or not the amendment hits clearly the mark of what 

I think it seems pretty clear its drafters intended, which is to define marriage as the union of a man and a woman and to make 

clear that that is not going to be interpreted otherwise in the State 

courts? What is your thought? 

Mr. FITZGIBBON. I think as we develop a good legislative history 

here with the draftpersons speaking out about what it means, it 

gets near as clear as a constitutional provision is ever likely to get. 

24

Chairman BROWNBACK. Mr. Seidman, let me ask you this, and 

I would be happy to hear your response to some of these others. 

You have been a critic of this. You have looked at it. You have examined it. You have put forward a clear set of questions on it. I 

respect that. I appreciate that. 

If you were drafting this with the mindset of those who are drafting it, which I think is pretty clear what they are trying to get at 

here, is marriage is a union of a man and a woman and that is 

what we want recognized in the United States and that is what we 

are setting it at, how would you have drafted this amendment? 

Mr. SEIDMAN. Thank you, Senator. I would be delighted to answer that question. First, though, I do want to just comment very 

briefly on what Professor Wolfe said, and I have two very quick 

points. First, I want to note again that Professor Wolfe and Professor Wilkins are in sharp disagreement about what this language 

means. What Professor Wolfe said is not anything like what Professor Wilkins said. 

Second, Professor Wolfe associated himself with Professor Bradley’s statement, which is that something that gives all of the attributes of marriage except one to a couple would be permissible 

under this amendment. Well, OK. Here is an attribute or an incidence of marriage. Married people get to take the name of their 

spouse. So under Professor Wolfe’s reading of this, if you said gay 

people can have everything that married people have except taking 

the name of the spouse, that would be constitutionally permissible 

under the amendment. Now, that is fine with me, but it does seem 

to make the exercise rather pointless because then you are just 

dealing with a name and why amend the Constitution to outlaw a 

word? 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Now help me draft it. 

Mr. SEIDMAN. OK. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. How would you draft it? 

Mr. SEIDMAN. I have two responses to that. The first is, I don’t 

draft language on the back of a napkin, so it would take some effort and some thinking, but the second response is this. 

I think it is true with a lot of legal concepts that somebody has 

an idea of something they want to accomplish, but when you actually try to put it down on paper, it becomes difficult or impossible 

to do. Now, sometimes we are forced into a situation like that. 

What is really striking about this amendment is despite the parade 

of hypothetical horribles that have been advanced here, none of 

those things has happened. That is to say, the Defense of Marriage 

Act hasn’t been struck down. The courts have not required States 

to recognize marriages from other States. 

What I would say is it will be time enough to see if we can figure 

out how to do this if we actually have to, and I don’t think we actually have to right now. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. You have thought a lot about this, 

though. I mean, you have thought of a lot of critique on it, and I 

respect that. That is what we need and that is why we have got 

a panel here like we do. Have you thought previously how to draft 

this sort of constitutional amendment to hit the mark that—I think 

you pretty well understand where people want to go with this. 

Have you thought about that? 

25

Mr. SEIDMAN. Well, I am not sure I do understand, Senator. Part 

of the problem is I think the people behind the amendment themselves are not in agreement on how to go. So I think there are some 

Americans who are—many, many Americans, actually, who are offended by the use of the word ‘‘marriage’’ but want to extend to gay 

men and lesbians everything else. There are other people who are 

in favor of this amendment, I think Professor Wilkins may be one 

of them, who want to go further than that and want to prohibit the 

creation of things that look a lot like marriage, but they are a little 

vague in their mind as to how much like marriage it has to look. 

So with respect, Senator, I think you guys have to get straight 

what you want before you tell me how to go about drafting it. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Well, if you come up with any great 

thoughts on this, I will look forward to that. And I respect the criticism of it, but I do believe it is clear what people are trying to get 

at and it would be useful to be able to have that. 

Senator Feingold, do you have other questions? I would like to 

ask a few more, and then if you want to come back after that. 

Professor Wolfe and Wilkins in particular, you have heard additional criticism of it. I would appreciate a response, if you had, of 

what Professor Seidman—and I think this is a useful exchange and 

a particular one that is good to have in the record. Professor Wilkins? 

Mr. WILKINS. Professor Bradley and I are good friends. If you go 

look and you read his writings, he has written extensively on how 

marriage is a sexual union. He has written many articles on that 

fact. I don’t know how to explain a comment he made in response 

to a question off the cuff, but if you look at the writings of Professor Bradley, they are completely consistent with what I have explained is the drafting and intent behind the amendment. Professor 

Bradley’s scholarly and significant academic writings support that 

interpretation of the amendment. I can’t explain precisely why he 

would describe it with the language that, well, so long as you don’t 

give one thing, somehow, it would be OK. Sometimes in testimony—this is scary. I mean, I am from Utah. This is only the second time in my life I have done something like this. I am nervous. 

I could say something stupid. I probably have. [Laughter.] 

But I do know that Professor Bradley does not disagree and 

would interpret the meaning of the Marriage Protection Amendment consistently, that it is to protect the sexual union of a man 

and a woman. The legal incidents that attach to that are easy to 

find. You just look at the statutes. They are the ones that are contingent upon that union, and once that is understood, the ambiguities disappear. The difficulties disappear. It does not expand Federal judicial power. It reduces it. It does not decrease the power of 

the States, it increases it. It at least stabilizes it and prevents further erosion. 

Therefore, I think the language is well crafted, and Professor 

Bradley and I are not, in fact, in disagreement on this point. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Professor Wolfe, anything new to add? I 

don’t want to cause you to have to repeat things you have said, but 

if you have something new to bring in on the definition here. 

Mr. WOLFE. Professor Seidman asks a fair question. What if the 

authors of a State law, for example, conferred all the benefits of 

26

marriage on civil unions and then they simply kind of arbitrarily 

chose one, you know, some insignificant aspect they could find, and 

did not confer that simply in order to create a distinction. It seems 

to me that—and that is why Professor Bradley said, perhaps all 

but one, because you can imagine a situation where those chose 

one in a way that clearly was simply a way of evading the force 

of the constitutional provision. 

So if there is a reasonable case to show that they have made one 

difference simply in order to evade the effect of the amendment, 

then it is plausible that that kind of statute could be struck down, 

as well. That is going to be a very narrow range of things. Certainly, it would not include anything like health care benefits or 

visitation, anything of those sorts. 

I mean, it is really striking that Professor Seidman talks about 

this parade of horribles like all these different things, although he 

actually only mentions one thing, which is the Defense of Marriage 

Act being struck down. I have no doubt that Professor Seidman 

would do whatever he could to get the Defense of Marriage Act 

struck down, and under those circumstances, it seems to me rather 

disingenuous for him to argue, why do we have to worry about the 

Defense of Marriage Act? After all, it is out there and it is intact. 

Well, it is intact until he and his allies get a chance to strike it 

down, in which case then there is going to be a clear need for the 

Marriage Protection Amendment and I think it is plausible not to 

sit around waiting for that to happen. Cases like Romer and Lawrence show that judges are, on these kinds of issues, effectively of 

control, that they are simply willing to assert their own social 

views over the majority views in America. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Is there any range of timeframe before or 

when most people would project DOMA is overturned by the Federal court? Has anybody—I listed the number of cases that are 

pending on DOMA, the Federal court cases. I listed— 

Mr. WOLFE. It could happen any time. 

Chairman BROWNBACK.—Federal court cases on State constitutional— 

Mr. WOLFE. It could happen any time, but the one real limit is 

that it probably would take some time for lower court opinions to 

be appealed up to the Supreme Court. So in that sense, we may 

not get an absolutely final ruling on it for a couple of years. But, 

frankly, it could be any time, really, that a Federal judge somewhere strikes down DOMA. We have already had a Federal court 

judge strike down a State DOMA and so there is no reason to assume that you won’t get a Federal judge striking down the Federal 

DOMA. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. And that has gone to Eighth Circuit, and 

then it would take a couple years after it gets from Eighth Circuit 

to make it on up to the Supreme Court, so we could be talking in 

a three- to 5-year timeframe before we have a Supreme Court ruling on this issue? 

Mr. WOLFE. I would find it utterly plausible to think in terms of 

two years. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. To have a Supreme Court ruling— 

Mr. WOLFE. To have a Supreme Court ruling. 

27

Chairman BROWNBACK [continuing]. On a constitutionality. So 

really, if we want the people to speak before the courts do, the Supreme Court does, we are talking something in the two-to 5-year 

timeframe? 

Mr. WOLFE. Sure. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Between the nearest and the latest 

dates? 

Mr. WILKINS. I don’t think, Senator, that it will take longer than 

5 years. I think 2 years is a very realistic estimate. I would be surprised if it took as long as five. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Let me make one comment, if I could, to 

Dr. Harris, and I appreciate you being here and I appreciate your 

work and your comments. I have been very sensitive to the issue 

of this being categorized as a civil rights type of issue, and you presented that eloquently. I have had that conversation with many African-Americans and most do not see this in that same frame that 

you presented here, and you presented eloquently and very well. 

A Worthlin poll in 2003, 62 percent of African-Americans supporting marriage being defined as the union of a man and a 

woman, supporting a constitutional amendment to protect marriage. I certainly appreciate and respect the difficulty with which 

you have had to overcome obstacles. I would note that the majority 

of African-Americans actually support a constitutional amendment 

defining marriage as a union of a man and a woman, and I am 

sure you knew that, but I wanted to put that in the record. 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you, Senator, and I just wanted to respond 

also to what Professor Wolfe said about the will of the majority. 

Not being an attorney here, the only one not at the panel, I am 

kind of out of my league, but certainly the Framers were very clear 

about wanting to protect the rights of the minority and I am very 

concerned when I hear that the majority has to rule here because 

this Nation is not founded on solely the will of the majority moving 

forward. In spite of what polls say, in spite of what the majority 

says, the rights of minority Americans in all manners need to be 

protected. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Senator Sessions has joined us. Jeff, do 

you have any questions or comments for the panelists? 

Senator SESSIONS. I would be pleased if you continued, you or 

Senator Feingold. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. I am about ready to wrap it up, and Senator Feingold didn’t have further questions. If you had a couple 

of— 

Senator SESSIONS. I am sorry. The vote and all interrupted me. 

I was more interested in just hearing what you had to say. I will 

do my best to read your statements and I would just ask this question or share this thought. 

I am troubled by the Supreme Court. They have a lifetime appointment and they are unaccountable to the American people. The 

majority or minority or whatever view they express becomes the 

Constitution. I remember one Federal judge humorously saying one 

time in conversation that continuing convention known as the Supreme Court, and really, only five Justices can rewrite the Constitution and make it say what it does not say. If you complain, 

they say, you are against the Constitution. You are against civil 

28

rights. You are not part of the evolving standards of decency that 

we see. You are a backwoodsman, narrow minded, and those kinds 

of things. That is what they say, of course. So it is real troubling. 

That is why the confirmation of John Roberts was very important, and he articulated just beautifully the role of a judge and why 

that is a dangerous thing, and he said at one point—I don’t think 

anybody picked it up, Mr. Chairman, particularly, but he said one 

of the greatest, and perhaps the greatest threat to the Court would 

be that it overreached and lost its legitimacy with the people, and 

then 1 day when a real civil rights issue is up, they don’t have the 

credibility to carry out their order because they don’t have an army 

to call out to enforce it. 

So I am concerned about this. I see very little principled basis 

for any such interpretation that the Constitution, ratified by the 

American people, would ever have been contemplated by those people who entered into that contract with our government that it was 

going to allow five judges to redefine marriage when a marriage is 

not mentioned in the Constitution. Is it, Mr. Chairman? The word 

is not mentioned, and it has always been left to the States and 

they have always handled this in various, different ways. If some 

States want to allow various kinds of marriages, that is one thing. 

So we are concerned about it. 

The Supreme Court in paring back on recently State death penalty cases has said we need to keep up with the evolving standards 

of decency, and yet at the same time, they strike down a Texas law 

in the Lawrence case and they say a State cannot rely on established, long-held moral values to render. So elected representatives 

can’t base a statute on long-established moral principles as seen by 

the people, but the judges, five of them on the Supreme Court can 

use this ephemeral, unprincipled, unlimited view, evolving standards of decency, which means nothing. It means only what they say 

it means, of course. It is a standardless test. 

Mr. SEIDMAN. Senator, may I— 

Senator SESSIONS. Professor Seidman— 

Mr. SEIDMAN. May I comment very briefly? 

Senator SESSIONS. You have every right to maybe rebut my diatribe, but it represents a sincere concern. I think it is held by a majority of the American people. I think we need—and I think it 

would be my basic view, Mr. Chairman, is what a healthy thing it 

would be if the American people got to have the opportunity to express their view on this issue rather than leaving it to the 

unelected five. 

Mr. SEIDMAN. Senator, I think that is a very powerful position, 

very powerfully expressed. I am not going to try to refute it here, 

but I do just want to introduce some complexities. That is what law 

professors do for a living. [Laughter.] 

So if one had to pick the most important decision this century 

that was the most deviant from the attempt of the Framers, it 

would not be Roe v. Wade, it was Brown v. Board of Education. While the— 

Senator SESSIONS. Post the Fourteenth Amendment? 

Mr. SEIDMAN. While the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 

were debating it in the House and Senate, the galleries of the 

House and Senate were segregated by race by the order of the 

29

House and the Senate. There was no evidence that the Framers intended to abolish segregation. 

Justice Roberts in his testimony before this Committee— 

Senator SESSIONS. Can I interrupt you there? I think you make 

a valid point, and it is something we should consider, but it is a 

fair interpretation of the words that were adopted, ‘‘equal protection,’’ that that was not equal protection. Tell me what fair interpretations of the words can say you have got to have a redefinition 

of marriage? 

Mr. SEIDMAN. Well, first, let me say this. Justice Roberts, in his 

testimony before this Committee, on several occasions said that his 

judicial hero was Justice Robert Jackson. Well, we now have available to us the conference notes of what Justice Jackson said about 

Brown v. Board of Education at the time it was decided, and Senator, here is what he said. He said this is a decision that cannot 

be justified legally. It is not in the Constitution, either in the words 

or the intent of the Framers. I am voting for it anyway because it 

is a moral imperative. That is what Justice Roberts’s hero said in 

Brown v. Board of Education. Senator SESSIONS. I think you are raising a point here that is 

worth discussing. Professor Wilkins, do you want to comment? 

Mr. WILKINS. Senator, I would like you to read, if you would, my 

entire 23 pages, but Footnote 38 in particular. [Laughter.] 

The problem—the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sanford for 

the first time invoked the Due Process Clause to say a human 

being, a former slave, was still a slave and still property notwithstanding an Act of Congress that freed that slave upon his master’s 

moving the slave to Missouri, and Congress clearly had the power 

to do so. The Supreme Court struck it down under the Fifth 

Amendment Due Process Clause in Dred Scott, making— 

Senator SESSIONS. You would call that an activist decision— 

Mr. WILKINS. I certainly would, and that made the Civil War inevitable. We thereafter amended the Constitution three times, 

Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth Amendment, and for about 26 

years, the Supreme Court had the courage to apply that language 

as it was written. In fact, in a case that is never cited by anyone, 

but I cited in Footnote 38, in the case of Railroad Company v. 

Brown, 1873, it invalidated a railroad company’s attempt to provide separate but equal provisions and the Supreme Court in 1873 

said this is ingenious, but it is a disingenuous attempt to evade 

compliance with the obvious meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

It was only when 20 years, or a few years later, in 1896, the 

Court again departs from the language of the Constitution in 

Plessy v. Ferguson because it complies with the perceived political 

need to keep the Constitution alive, and in 1896, the political climate was, we really didn’t mean what we said in the Thirteenth 

and Fourteenth Amendment. Let us just depart. And so the Court 

departs in Plessy. Now, I don’t know why Justice Jackson said what he said that 

has just been quoted by Professor Seidman, but if you look at the 

Court’s decisions, all Brown did was bring its own actions back into 

compliance with the literal text of the Constitution. We get into 

trouble when courts start construing language to create shadows 

30

and concepts that are not in the Constitution. The documented history of judicial departure from applying constitutional text as construed in light of its history and interpretation by the American 

people is a sorry one, indeed. 

Brown is often cited as this great departure and as this great example of judicial bravery. I favor the Brown decision. I am glad the 

Supreme Court finally came around back to the language. But the 

point is, they should have stayed with the language as they did in 

Strouder and Railroad Company and other cases until they departed in 1896 in Plessy. 

Senator SESSIONS. And, Professor Seidman, I will just mention 

this. I know the Committee needs to go on. I think your point is 

better if you take the view of interpretation as solely an originalist, 

assuming all your facts are correct, which I really don’t know, but 

Justice Roberts didn’t say he was solely an originalist. Some of it 

is plain meaning of the words, what the words mean. I liked, I believe it was Miguel Estrada that said he believed in a fair interpretation of the Constitution. He didn’t like the labels. That may be 

a richer view of how to handle it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership. I don’t think this 

is a small matter. I think that the American people are concerned 

about it in a legitimate way. It represents a cultural shift if the 

definition of marriage is altered. I think the American people ought 

to be able to decide those things, if it is within their province and 

not in violation of the Constitution. I don’t see how it can be in violation of the Constitution. Thank you. 

Chairman BROWNBACK. Thank you, and thank you for joining us, 

Senator. It is no small matter, and that is why we have got a panel 

here of experts to talk about it and I invite them to put forward 

more information if anything here has stirred them to additional 

thoughts. 

This is a very important issue. It is one I am hopeful that we 

are going to be able to have a markup in the Judiciary Committee 

at some point in time on the constitutional amendment. Senator 

Feingold is right. Last year when it came up, it didn’t come 

through the Committee and I am hopeful this year we are going 

to be able to have sometime during this session of Congress, this 

year or next, that we will be able to have a markup and have a 

full discussion on it and we need all your thought. We need your 

prayers, too. This is a tough issue to figure out and to try to move 

the country forward together on, and yet I think there are ways to 

be able to move that forward and get it right for the betterment 

of the country and the betterment of our society. 

The record will remain open for 7 days for any questions Senators wish to submit. 

I thank the panelists and those in the audience for being here. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.] 

[Additional material is being retained in the Committee files.]

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24661.061
92


24661.062
93


24661.063
94


24661.064
95


24661.065
96


24661.066
97


24661.067
98


24661.068
99


24661.069
100


24661.070
101


24661.071
102


24661.072
103


24661.073
104


24661.074
105

Æ


24661.075