GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on National Security, Veterans Affairs, 

and International Relations, Committee 

on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

November 1999 DEFENSE 

INVENTORY

Improvements Needed 

to Prevent Excess 

Purchases by the Air 

Force

GAO/NSIAD-00-5

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-5 Defense Inventory

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 16

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 17

Related GAO Products 20

Tables Table 1: Rotor Blade Requirements 7

Table 2: Comparison of Termination Quantities for a Disc

Brake Assembly 9

Table 3: Comparison of Termination Quantities for a High-Pressure

Turbine Blade 10

Figure Figure 1: Levels of Inventory Requirements 7

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-00-5 Defense Inventory
Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-5 Defense Inventory

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280236 Leter

November 10, 1999

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 Veterans Affairs, and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This report is one in a series of reports on the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) management of secondary inventory−spare and repair parts and 

other items that support DOD’s operating forces on land, at sea, and in the 

air.1

 Over the past several years, we have testified and issued a number of 

reports that cite the management of defense inventory as a high-risk area.2 

The management of inventory involves significant Air Force expenditures. 

The Air Force annually purchases about $4.4 billion of secondary inventory 

and has a reported on-hand inventory valued at about $25.9 billion. As of 

September 30, 1997, Air Force inventory files showed that the Air Force 

had contracts for $1.5 billion of secondary inventory, $384 million of which 

exceeded current operating requirements−the inventory needed to prevent 

out-of-stock situations and to meet funded war reserves.

As requested, we focused this review on inventory the Air Force had on 

contract (that is, ordered but not yet delivered) that was excess to current 

operating requirements. Specifically, to determine whether the Air Force 

was canceling purchases that exceeded current operating requirements, we 

judgmentally selected and reviewed 160 items with inventory valued at 

$162.4 million on contract that exceeded current operating requirements as 

1

See Related GAO Products at the end of this report.

2

In 1990, we began a special effort to review and report on the federal program areas that we 

had identified as high risk because of vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and 

mismanagement. This effort, which was supported by the Senate Committee on 

Government Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform, brought a much 

needed focus on problems that were costing the government billions of dollars. We 

identified inventory management as high risk in our 1992, 1995, 1997, and 1999 high-risk 

reports because of the high levels of inventory in excess of current needs and the lack of 

adequate systems for determining inventory requirements.
B-280236

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of September 30, 1997. The scope and methodology of our work are 

described in appendix I.

Results in Brief The Air Force did not always cancel purchases that exceeded current 

operating requirements. The Air Force canceled contracts for $5.5 million 

of the $162.4 million excess inventory that we reviewed, but it could have 

canceled more. Contracts for unnecessary items are not being canceled 

primarily because the Air Force process for canceling contracts takes a 

long time, during which costs are incurred for which the government is 

liable. Specifically, it takes 60 to 90 days to provide managers with the 

requirement information needed to make cancellation decisions. Also, the 

Air Force model provides for over 63 months of supply—more time than 

needed to order and receive items. In addition, the model uses invalid 

requirements that reduce quantities to be canceled. Once a purchase is 

considered for cancellation, Air Force managers use a model to determine 

if the savings from canceling the contract would exceed the cost of 

reordering the items at a later date. In several cases that we reviewed, the 

model indicated that it was not cost beneficial to cancel contracts for 

unneeded inventory items because of potential reprocurement costs. 

However, the model is flawed because it does not consider parts recovered 

from retired weapon systems that are available to be reused. As a result, 

the model understates the amount of purchases that could be canceled. In 

other cases, inaccurate records increased manager workloads by causing 

items to be unnecessarily reviewed.

We are recommending that the Air Force strengthen management oversight 

procedures and internal controls over the processes for canceling 

purchases. For example, the Air Force needs to improve the timeliness and 

accuracy of data that managers use to make contract cancellation 

decisions.

Background DOD’s logistics principles state that inventories will be established at the 

minimum levels required to meet customer needs. Inventory management 

comprises several major functions, including determining what is needed; 

buying needed items; and storing, maintaining, distributing, and disposing 

of these items. Five Air Force Air Logistics Centers, along with other 

activities such as maintenance depots and disposal activities, perform 

these inventory management functions.
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In April 1999, we reported3 that as of September 30, 1997, $39.4 billion of 

DOD’s $65.8 billion secondary inventory exceeded current requirements. 

Our past work has shown that weaknesses in procedures used to cancel 

contracts for inventory that is no longer needed to satisfy current operating 

requirements have contributed to buying inventory that should not have 

been purchased. This report focuses on the Air Force process for canceling 

contracts for items that are in excess of current operating requirements.

Opportunities Exist to 

Cancel More Contracts

Our analysis of 160 judgmentally selected items with excess inventory on 

contract valued at $162.4 million showed that the Air Force canceled 

contracts for 14 of the items worth $5.5 million because they were no 

longer needed to meet current requirements. However, the Air Force could 

have canceled more contracts. Additional contracts were not canceled 

because (1) the Air Force process for canceling contracts takes a long time 

(for example, 60 to 90 days to provide managers with requirements 

information), during which contractors incur costs for which the 

government is liable, reducing savings opportunities from canceling 

contracts; (2) the Air Force model that estimates requirements provides for 

over 5 years of supply, a period greater than the normal period needed to 

replace the items; and (3) the model uses invalid requirements, thus 

reducing the quantities to be canceled. For contracts identified for 

cancellation, the Air Force termination model does not consider all 

reclamation assets (material recovered from weapon systems that are not 

part of the active fleet) when making cancellation decisions. In addition, in 

some cases, inaccurate inventory records inappropriately identified 

contracts for cancellation and unnecessarily increased managers’ 

workloads.

Requirements Model Does 

Not Provide Timely 

Information for Canceling 

Contracts 

DOD Materiel Management Regulation 4140.1-R states that termination 

decisions generally should be reached within 30 days of notification that 

contracts should be considered for termination. However, model runs 

analyzing requirements for the contract being considered for cancellation 

are not finalized and provided to managers until 60 to 90 days after the 

runs. Reviews to verify data can take an additional 2 to 3 weeks. As a result, 

it can take 3 months to finalize a requirement computation. Further, 

3

Defense Inventory: Status of Inventory and Purchases and Their Relationship to Current 

Needs (GAO/NSIAD-99-60, Apr. 16, 1999).
B-280236

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additional time is taken to request termination costs from the contracting 

office, which must request the cost information from the contractor.

One of the factors that determine whether a contract should be terminated 

is the cost that a contractor has incurred. The longer it takes to make a 

decision to terminate a contract, the higher the contractor costs will be and 

the less likely it will be for the termination to be economical. For example, 

a contracting official said that each day termination was delayed on a 

contract for torque landing gear collars the contractor incurred an 

additional $5,000 in costs that the government would have to pay to cancel 

the contract and not take delivery of the collars.

According to Air Force officials, it takes several weeks to assemble 

inventory data from many sources (contractors, retail locations, and 

inventory control points) for the model to make requirement computations. 

The officials plan to reduce the time it takes to provide managers with this 

data. The Air Force will use techniques such as data warehousing (storing 

all data in a central computer repository) to improve the accuracy and 

reduce the time it takes to assimilate the data required for the requirements 

model.

Providing for Several Years 

of Supply Limits 

Cancellations

The requirements model computes the quantity of an item that should be 

purchased for inventory purposes. The period for which inventory is 

purchased is referred to as the buy period. The buy period consists of an 

operating period (the current period for which the Air Force has an 

approved budget; for example, the last quarter of fiscal year 1998 and all of 

fiscal year 1999) and a lead time (the time needed to purchase and receive 

inventory, up to a maximum of 36 months). On June 30, September 30, 

December 31, and March 31, the operating periods are equal to 15, 12, 9, 

and 6 months, respectively. Therefore, the buy period may represent as 

many as 51 months of supply (operating period plus lead time). The model 

adds an additional 12 months to the buy period to determine what it calls 

the termination period. The model further computes what is called a 

worldwide termination level that, by using the greater of certain buy or 

termination period requirements, may reduce the amount of inventory to 

be considered for termination. Figure 1 summarizes these inventory 

requirements.
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Figure 1: Levels of Inventory Requirements

Source: Air Force data.

Because the Air Force requirements model provides for inventory to be 

used during the time needed to order and receive inventory and for a safety 

level to satisfy fluctuations in demand or lead time, orders can be placed so 

that they arrive before out-of-stock situations occur. However, because the 

operating and termination periods and the worldwide termination level 

may represent from 18 to 27 months of additional supply, item managers 

are prevented from considering large quantities of inventory for 

cancellation. For example, a September 1997 requirement computation for 

a rotor blade used on the T-33 aircraft engine protected over 49 months of 

supply. As shown in table 1, requirements for the item included 15,798 

blades to cover the safety level as well as the item’s 25-month lead time. 

The item’s 12-month operating period, the 12-month termination period, 

and the worldwide level prevented an additional 13,192 items from being 

considered for cancellation.

Table 1: Rotor Blade Requirements

Source: Air Force inventory records.

Type of requirement Quantity required Months of supply

Safety level + lead time 15,798 25+

Operating period 7,410 12

Termination period 5,757 12

Worldwide termination level 25 Not applicable

Total 28,990 49+
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Termination Period Limits 

Contract Cancellations

While the buy period may represent enough inventory to satisfy as many as 

51 months of needs, the requirements model adds 12 months of 

requirements to the buy period to compute an item’s termination period. 

Our analysis of 56 of the 160 sample items showed that the 12-month 

termination period added $158 million of inventory requirements to the buy 

period. For example, the 12-month termination period for a different rotor 

blade used on the TF-33 aircraft engine added 4,188 blades, valued at 

$435,000, to the buy period requirements. Although the buy period provides 

for enough inventory to satisfy requirements during the time needed to 

order and receive inventory (lead time) and an operating period that can 

provide from 6 to 15 months of supply, the termination period protects an 

additional 12 months of supply from consideration for termination.

Additional Termination Level 

Further Limits Contract 

Cancellations

Even though the buy and termination periods may represent as long as

63 months of needs, the Air Force computes a worldwide termination level 

that reduces the quantity of inventory considered for termination. For 10 of 

the 160 sample items reviewed, the worldwide level reduced contract 

quantities to be canceled by $1.1 million. For example, as of December 10, 

1997, the Air Force had 109 disc brake assemblies on contract for the C-17 

aircraft. As indicated in table 2, the requirements model showed that at 

both the buy and termination periods, 84 on-contract assemblies were not 

needed to meet current operating requirements. By using the greater of 

certain buy or termination period requirements the model computed a 

worldwide level of 77. Therefore, seven fewer assemblies were subject to 

termination and the value of the items considered for cancellation was 

reduced from $2,156,918 to $1,977,174, a difference of $179,744.
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Table 2: Comparison of Termination Quantities for a Disc Brake Assembly 

a

Base stock level and depot safety level requirements are used to permit continued operations in the 

event of minor interruptions of the normal replenishment process or a fluctuation in demand. The war 

reserve requirement is used to ensure fast mobilization in the event of war, and the repair cycle 

requirement represents stock to satisfy demands while items are being repaired.

Source: Air Force inventory records.

According to Air Force officials, the Air Force uses the larger of the 

individual requirement levels to determine the quantities to be terminated 

to increase mission support while recognizing that some on-order 

inventory may not be needed later. However, because the buy period 

already includes requirements for war reserves and safety levels, it is not 

clear how stockpiling items that are not needed to meet current operating 

requirements increases mission support.

Invalid Requirements Limit 

Cancellations

The Air Force requirements model includes prestocked requirements—

requirements for items used to augment war reserve readiness spares 

packages and peacetime operating stocks—in computing the amount of 

inventory that needs to be purchased. However, the Air Force does not 

authorize item managers to buy inventory to satisfy the prestocked 

requirements because these requirements are not considered important 

enough to be funded within the budget process. As a result, item managers 

reduce the amount of inventory to be purchased by the prestocked 

requirements. However, when the model identifies contract quantities for 

cancellation, the prestocked requirements are counted as valid 

requirements. Thus, the model decreases the quantity to be canceled by the 

amount of the prestocked requirements.

Requirementsa/assets Buy period Termination period Worldwide level

Base stock level 94 96 96

Depot safety level 8 1 8

War reserve 43 43 43

Repair cycle 22 27 27

Total requirements 167 167 174

On-hand assets 142 142 142

On-contract assets 109 109 109

Total assets 251 251 251

 Difference 84 84 77
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In our review of 160 sample items, we identified 9 items for which 

prestocked requirements of more than $4 million decreased the quantity of 

inventory to be canceled. For example, in September 1997, 186 slats (the 

leading edge of an aircraft wing) were on contract, costing $13,472 each, 

for the E-3 B/C aircraft. The requirements model computed a termination 

quantity of four slats. However, the termination quantity could have been 

increased to nine slats if the prestocked requirement of five had not been 

included in the computation. In another example, in September 1997, the 

Air Force had 18,869 high-pressure turbine blades on hand and another 

9,987 on contract. The blades cost $400 each and are used on the F-16 C/D 

aircraft. As shown in table 3, based on requirements for 26,371 blades, 

which included a prestocked requirement of 1,982 blades, 2,485 blades 

were subject to termination. By eliminating the prestocked requirement, 

the termination quantity would have increased to 4,467 blades.

Table 3: Comparison of Termination Quantities for a High-Pressure Turbine Blade 

Source: Air Force inventory records.

Although the Air Force has not funded prestocked requirements for a 

number of years, Air Force officials believe that those requirements 

represent reasonably valid requirements that allow for fluctuations in 

needs during times of conflict.

Reclamation Assets Are Not 

Always Considered in 

Cancellation Decisions

The Air Force did not always take into account the full impact of ongoing 

or planned asset reclamation projects in its termination model. 

Reclamation projects are specifically designed to increase on-hand assets 

through the recovery of spare parts from weapon systems that are not part 

Requirements/assets

Including

prestocked

requirement

Without

prestocked

requirement

Assets on hand 18,869 18,869

Assets on contract 9,987 9,987

Total assets 28,856 28,856

Prestocked requirements 1,982 0

Other requirements 24,389 24,389

Total requirements 26,371 24,389

Termination quantity 2,485 4,467
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of the active fleet. Because the influx of reclaimed assets is only considered 

for 2 years into the future, all potentially available reclamation assets are 

not considered when making termination decisions.

In our review of the 160 sample items, we identified 7 items for which 

reclamation assets affected reprocurement quantities and cancellation 

decisions. For example, in September 1997, the Air Force had the purchase 

of 64 turbine spacer assemblies on contract. The $1,200-spacer assemblies 

are used on the TF-33 aircraft engine. Because the requirement 

computation included reclaimed assets, the entire on-contract quantity 

became excess to requirements. However, the item manager used the 

termination model to determine that it was not economical to terminate at 

that time. The termination model only considered 2 years of reclaimed 

assets when computing the reprocurement quantity, even though the 

spacer assemblies will be reclaimed beyond the 2-year period. Considering 

all potential reclamation assets may have caused the termination to be 

economical.

Inaccurate Records 

Overstated Excess 

Inventory on Contract

Records for the 160 items in our sample showed that $162.4 million of 

inventory on contract was not needed to meet current operating 

requirements. However, inventory records for 32 items were inaccurate. 

For example,

• requirements were not recorded for eight items,

• on-contract quantities for five items had been delivered but showed up 

both as on-hand and due-in inventory,

• on-contract quantities for four items were for foreign military sales and 

should not have been considered as Air Force assets, and

• contracts for three items had been canceled, but due-in quantities 

remained on record.

As a result, the $162.4 million in inventory which was identified as not 

needed to meet current operating requirements was overstated by

$26.3 million and manager workloads were unnecessarily increased 

because items were mistakenly identified for cancellation review.

For example, a September 1997 requirement computation identified three 

data entry keyboards, costing $162,381 each, as on-contract inventory and 

subject to termination. The item manager attempted to cancel the contract 

but found that the three keyboards had been delivered to the Air Force in 
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Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-00-5 Defense Inventory

October 1996. Records had not been updated to show that the keyboards 

had been shipped.

In another case, Air Force records for September 30, 1997, showed 24 

thermal insulation tiles used on the B-2 aircraft on hand and an additional

7 on contract. By May 1998, the tiles had been replaced by another type of 

insulation tile, and when the item manager attempted to terminate the 

contract for the seven tiles, he was informed by a contracting official that 

the on-contract quantity was in error. The tiles, which cost $5,400 each, had 

been delivered a year earlier in May 1997.

According to Air Force officials, managers are responsible for insuring that 

all due-in and on-order assets used in computing requirements are accurate 

and for correcting those that are not accurate. Air Force officials recognize 

that data accuracy problems exist, and a requirements improvement team 

has been formed to address problems relating to the accuracy of on-hand 

and on-order inventory data.

Conclusions Ineffective and inefficient inventory management practices result in buying 

items where there is already sufficient inventory to support needs. 

Correcting these problems would make more funds available where needs 

are not being met. While we cannot precisely quantify the overall extent of 

the problems discussed in this report, canceling purchases that exceed 

requirements could free up resources for higher priority needs.

Because the Air Force requirements model does not provide managers 

timely information, the government incurs additional contractor costs that 

reduce savings from canceling contracts. Due to lengthy operating and 

terminating periods and the worldwide termination level, managers are 

prevented from considering large quantities of inventory for cancellation. 

The Air Force model already provides for a safety level and lead time 

inventory to minimize out-of-stock situations. Therefore, the lengthy 

periods and additional levels are not necessary and tie up scarce financial 

resources in inventory. Further, including invalid prestocked requirements 

in termination decisions understates the amount of inventory subject to 

cancellation.

By not including all potential reclamation assets in the termination model, 

the Air Force understates the amount of inventory on hand. This practice 

ties up resources in inventory that may never be used. In addition, 
B-280236

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-00-5 Defense Inventory

inaccurate records increase manager workloads and misdirect their efforts 

by causing items to be unnecessarily reviewed.

Recommendations To improve the process for canceling purchases that exceed current 

requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Secretary of the Air Force to (1) provide managers with the requirements 

information needed to cancel contracts in a timely manner, (2) examine the 

necessity for using lengthy operating and termination periods and 

additional levels of supply (worldwide termination levels) when identifying 

contracts for termination, and (3) eliminate prestocked war reserve 

requirements that are not authorized for purchase from all calculations that 

affect contract cancellation decisions. We further recommend that the 

Secretary (1) consider all potential reclamation assets when making 

cancellation decisions and (2) take measures to improve the accuracy of 

inventory management records, such as ensuring that requirements and

on-contract inventory are properly recorded.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report. DOD partially agreed with the 

report and our recommendations. (See app. II for DOD’s complete 

comments.) The Department agreed with our recommendations for

(1) providing information needed to cancel contracts in a timely manner, 

(2) examining the necessity for using lengthy operating and termination 

periods and worldwide termination levels when identifying contracts for 

termination, and (3) improving the accuracy of inventory management 

records. The Department stated that the Air Force will issue 

memorandums addressing these recommendations by the end of calendar 

year 1999. These memorandums will direct the Air Force Materiel 

Command to (1) modify the requirements system to help expedite 

decisions in canceling contracts, (2) examine operating and termination 

periods and the worldwide termination levels, and (3) take appropriate 

management actions to improve the accuracy of inventory management 

records.

DOD did not agree with our recommendation to eliminate prestocked 

requirements from all calculations that affect contract cancellation 

decisions. DOD stated that prestocked war reserve requirements allow for 

fluctuations in need during potential conflicts and should be considered in 

contract termination decisions. As our report points out, the Air Force 

requirements model specifically provides separate safety levels of 
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Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-00-5 Defense Inventory

inventory to accommodate fluctuations of demand. Including prestocked 

requirements simply increases the size of the safety levels. Further, the Air 

Force neither funds nor authorizes managers to purchase prestocked 

requirements. We believe that if the requirements are not sufficiently 

important to be purchased, they should not be considered in cancellation 

decisions. Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation has 

merit.

DOD also did not agree with our recommendation to consider all potential 

reclamation assets when making cancellation decisions. DOD stated that in 

view of the aging of aircraft, it is not prudent to increase reliance on 

potential reclamation assets. Our report points out that when computing 

reprocurement quantities, the Air Force termination model only considered 

assets to be reclaimed for a 2-year period, even though supporting 

documents indicated that parts will be reclaimed beyond that time. We 

recognize that some parts cannot be recovered from weapon systems that 

are not part of the active fleet. However, since on-contract inventory is 

considered for cancellation 1-1/2 years to 5 years into the future, there is 

sufficient opportunity to identify all usable reclamation assets. Regardless 

of the age of aircraft, these assets are a viable source of parts for keeping 

aircraft operational and should be considered when making cancellation 

decisions. Thus, we continue to believe that our recommendation has 

merit.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; to the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the 

Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; and the Honorable 

Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget.
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Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you have any questions. Key 

contributors to this report were Charles Patton, James Murphy, Louis 

Modliszewski, and David Keefer.

Sincerely yours,

David R. Warren, Director

Defense Management Issues
Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-5 Defense Inventory

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApendxIi

We analyzed September 30, 1997, inventory stratification reports, which 

match on-hand and due-in inventory to requirements, for overall data 

regarding Air Force secondary inventory purchases. We did not validate the 

Air Force’s automated inventory database; however, we did note database 

discrepancies during our review of documents and discussions with item 

managers. In collecting data on individual sample items, we used the same 

data the Air Force uses for inventory management, reporting, and 

budgeting purposes.

We used the data to identify Air Force inventory items that had inventory 

on contract or on purchase request that exceeded then-current 

requirements. We identified 1,560 items that had $384.1 million of inventory 

on contract that exceeded needs. We focused our efforts on items that were 

on contract because they represented the bulk of the inventory being 

purchased that exceeded requirements.

To determine the adequacy of the Air Force process for canceling 

purchases that exceed current operating requirements, we judgmentally 

selected 160 items with about $162.4 million of inventory on contract in 

excess of current operating requirements (80 items with $46.4 million on 

contract managed at the Air Force Air Logistics Center, Ogden, Utah;

70 items with $68.7 million on contract managed at the Air Force Air 

Logistics Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and 10 items with $47.3 million 

on contract managed at the Air Force Air Logistics Center, San Antonio, 

Texas). Of the 160 items, 95 were repairable items and 65 were consumable 

items. We selected items that had the highest values and quantities of 

inventory on order in excess of needs, as well as a cross section of the 

remaining items.

For the items, we analyzed data from the September 1997 inventory 

stratification reports and information and documents from item managers 

on requirement computations and efforts to cancel contracts that exceeded 

requirements. We used the information and documents as a basis for 

follow-up questions and discussions with item managers. We also met with 

other Air Force officials, as needed, to discuss various subjects and 

concepts relevant to overall Air Force inventory management. We valued 

inventory items at the latest acquisition cost.

We performed our review from May 1998 through September 1999 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-5 Defense Inventory

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxIi
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-5 Defense Inventory
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-5 Defense Inventory
Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-5 Defense Inventory

Related GAO Products

Defense Inventory: Management of Repair Parts Common to More Than 

One Military Service Can Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-00-21, Oct. 20, 1999).

Defense Inventory: Status of Inventory and Purchases and Their 

Relationship to Current Needs (GAO/NSIAD-99-60, Apr. 16, 1999).

Defense Inventory: DOD Could Improve Total Asset Visibility Initiative 

With Results Act Framework (GAO/NSIAD-99-40, Apr. 12, 1999).

Defense Inventory: Navy’s Procedures for Controlling In-Transit Items Are 

Not Being Followed (GAO/NSIAD-99-61, Mar. 31, 1999).

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense

(GAO/OCG-99-4, Jan. 1999).

High Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, Jan. 1999).

Inventory Management: More Information Needed to Assess DLA’s Best 

Practices Initiatives (GAO/NSIAD-98-218, Sept. 2, 1998).

Navy Inventory Management: Improvements Needed to Prevent Excess 

Purchases (GAO/NSIAD-98-86, Apr. 30, 1998).

Inventory Management: DOD Can Build on Progress by Using Best 

Practices for Reparable Parts (GAO/NSIAD-98-97, Feb. 27, 1998).

Defense Inventory: Inadequate Controls Over Air Force Suspended Stocks

(GAO/NSIAD-98-29, Dec. 22, 1997).

Defense Logistics: Much of the Inventory Exceeds Current Needs

(GAO/NSIAD-97-71, Feb. 28, 1997).

Defense Inventory: Spare and Repair Parts Inventory Costs Can Be 

Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-97-47, Jan. 17, 1997).

(709343) Letr
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