COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

BRENDA BOWER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2373-94-3 PER CURIAM 

 JUNE 27, 1995 

VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION 

AND 

ROANOKE COLLEGE 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 

THE CITY OF SALEM 

Roy B. Willett, Judge 

 (Burton L. Albert, on brief), for appellant. 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; 

Patricia H. Quillen, Assistant Attorney General; 

Lisa J. Rowley, Assistant Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee Virginia Employment 

Commission. 

 (W. Fain Rutherford; Elizabeth L. Niles; Woods, 

Rogers & Hazelgrove, on brief), for appellee 

Roanoke College. 

 The Virginia Employment Commission (VEC) found that Brenda 

Bower was terminated for misconduct and was not entitled to 

unemployment benefits. Bower appeals the judgment of the trial 

court affirming that decision and contends that the VEC erred 

when it determined that she was discharged for misconduct. Upon 

reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that 

this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm 

the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

 Under Code § 60.2-625(A), "the findings of the [VEC] as to 

the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, 

shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be 

confined to questions of law." See Shifflett v. Virginia 

Employment Comm'n, 14 Va. App. 96, 97, 414 S.E.2d 865, 865 

(1992). "The VEC's findings may be rejected only if, in 

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind would 

necessarily come to a different conclusion." Craft v. Virginia 

Employment Comm'n, 8 Va. App. 607, 609, 383 S.E.2d 271, 273 

(1989). "Whether an employee's behavior constitutes misconduct, 

however, is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable by this 

court on appeal." Israel v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 7 Va. 

App. 169, 172, 372 S.E.2d 207, 209 (1988). 

 The VEC found that Bower, the manager of the Roanoke College 

bookstore, received permission to purchase a used computer for 

the bookstore in June 1991. When the computer had operational 

problems in 1991, Bower took it to her son's place of business to 

have it repaired. Although Bower did not intend to steal the 

computer or to convert it to her personal use, the computer 

remained at her son's place of business for nearly a year and was 

used by employees at that business. 

 While completing an inventory in the spring of 1992, Bower 

listed the computer as faculty supply, despite the objection of 

her subordinate that the computer should be classified as a 

capital asset. The computer had been tagged as a capital asset. 
 3 

 College procedure placed the responsibility for conversion of 

assets at the cabinet level. 

 In January 1993, Bower was questioned by campus security 

concerning the missing computer. When Bower admitted that she 

had removed the computer, she was directed to return it. She 

returned the computer after her offer to purchase it was 

rejected. She was later terminated for removing property and 

falsifying records. 

 Under Code § 60.2-618(2), an employee who has been 

discharged for work-related misconduct is disqualified for 

unemployment benefits. 

 [A]n employee is guilty of "misconduct 

connected with his work" when he 

deliberately violates a company rule 

reasonably designed to protect the legitimate 

business interests of his employer, or when 

his acts or omissions are of such a nature or 

so recurrent as to manifest a willful

disregard of those interests and the duties 

and obligations he owes his employer. Absent 

circumstances in mitigation of such conduct, 

the employee is "disqualified for benefits," 

and the burden of proving mitigating 

circumstances rests upon the employee. 

Branch v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 219 Va. 609, 611, 249 

S.E.2d 180, 182 (1978). 

 Although the VEC found that the initial decision to remove 

the computer in order to seek repairs was a mistake in judgment, 

it found that Bower intentionally miscategorized the computer 

during the inventory and reported that the computer was 

physically present on campus when Bower knew it was not. As the 
 4 

bookstore manager for over twenty years, Bower had a 

responsibility to ensure inventories were correctly completed. 

Her actions violated her employer's rules concerning inventories 

and were contrary to her employer's legitimate business 

interests. 

 While Bower argues in mitigation that she classified the 

computer as faculty supply to ensure the computer was properly 

accounted for, the evidence proved that the computer was a 

capital asset and should have been so designated. Bower's 

subordinate testified that erroneously listing the computer as 

faculty supply indicated that an additional computer existed. 

Moreover, Bower told campus security that the computer had been 

taken to her son's place of business in November of 1992, not 

1991, creating the appearance that the computer had been on 

campus more recently than had been the case. 

 In light of the evidence presented before the VEC, we cannot 

say the record as a whole would lead a reasonable mind 

necessarily to a different conclusion than that reached by the 

VEC. Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.