Filed 10/11/22 In re K.C. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re K.C., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B318413

(Super. Ct. No. J072581)

(Ventura County)

VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES AGENCY, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.C.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

C.C. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s orders 

terminating parental rights to her two-year-old son, K.C. (Welf. 

& Inst. Code, § 366.26.)1 She contends the court and Ventura 

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise stated. 
2

County Human Services Agency (HSA) failed to comply with the

inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1901 et seq.; ICWA)

2 and California law. We agree the record 

does not establish that the expanded duty of initial inquiry set 

forth in section 224.2, subdivision (b) has been satisfied. 

Accordingly, we conditionally affirm the judgment and remand 

for further proceedings. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

K.C. was taken into protective custody after he tested 

positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine at birth. 

HSA’s section 300 petition alleged K.C. was at risk of harm 

because of his parents’ substance abuse issues and noted that two 

of his half-siblings were dependents of the juvenile court due to 

mother’s drug use during those pregnancies.3

Mother and father attended the detention hearing on June 

25, 2020. They presented their ICWA-020 Parental Notification 

of Indian Status forms in which they each stated: “I have no 

American Indian ancestry as far as I know.” No other ICWA 

information was offered to the juvenile court. Based on parents’ 

representations, the court found ICWA does not apply to K.C. 

2 Because ICWA uses the term “Indian,” we will do the 

same for consistency, even though we recognize that “other 

terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by 

many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

3 Mother has six children in addition to K.C. Two are 

adults; one is in the juvenile delinquency system; two are in 

parental custody and receiving family maintenance services; and 

one is receiving permanent placement services. K.C. is mother’s 

only child with C.F. (father), who is not a party to this appeal. 
3

Reunification services were unsuccessful. The juvenile 

court terminated services and set the matter for a section 366.26 

permanency placement hearing. At that hearing, the court 

admitted HSA’s reports into evidence and heard mother’s 

testimony. It found by clear and convincing evidence that K.C. is 

adoptable and that there is no relevant exception to termination 

of parental rights. 

DISCUSSION

“Regardless of a parent’s response concerning his or her 

possible Indian ancestry on the ICWA-020 Parental Notification 

of Indian Status form or when questioned by the court at the 

initial appearance, if, as here, a child has been detained and 

placed in the temporary custody of a child protective agency, 

section 224.2, subdivision (b), requires the agency to ask the 

child, the parents, extended family members and others who 

have an interest in the child whether the child is, or may be, an 

Indian child.” (In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309, 318, fn. 

omitted (Rylie S.).) Extended family members include 

grandparents, aunts and uncles, siblings, brothers-in-law and 

sisters-in-law, nieces and nephews, first and second cousins, and 

stepparents. (25 U.S.C.S. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).) 

If, based on this initial inquiry, HSA or the juvenile court 

has a reason to believe the minor is an Indian child, HSA must 

make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the 

child. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) This “duty to develop information 

concerning whether a child is an Indian child rests with the court 

and the [agency], not the parents or members of the parents’ 

families.” (In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 430 

(Antonio R.).)

HSA concedes “[t]he record does not reflect that either 

HSA or the court asked th[e] named family members about 
4

Indian ancestry, and this oversight may have been an error.” It

further acknowledges that “because the parents mentioned 

various relatives to the social worker and section 224.2, 

subdivision (b), imposes upon the county child welfare 

department an initial duty of inquiry to ask extended family

members whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child, there 

probably is not substantial evidence to support the court’s finding 

that ICWA did not apply to [K.C.] because HSA should have 

asked relatives about Indian ancestry.” 

Notwithstanding this error, HSA contends that “because 

mother . . . has not made any representation that any of the 

relatives if asked would actually claim Indian ancestry, any error 

was harmless.” 

“Courts of Appeal are divided as to whether a parent must 

make an affirmative showing of prejudice to support reversal 

where the [agency] failed fully to perform its initial duty of 

[ICWA] inquiry.”

4 (Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) 

After analyzing the conflicting views, a majority of this court 

concluded in In re J.K. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 498, 506-507, that 

(1) “[s]ection 224.2, subdivision (b) makes clear that [the 

agency’s] duty of initial inquiry require[s] it to ask [the child’s] 

extended family members about [the child’s] potential Indian 

status,” and (2) the juvenile court must “ensure that [the agency] 

. . . satisfied its initial inquiry duties and that the record so 

reflect.” The majority rejected the argument that the appealing 

parent must show prejudice. (Ibid.) We adopt that view here. 

As in In re J.K., the agency and the juvenile court did not 

satisfy their ICWA duties. (See In re J.K., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 

4 This issue is currently on review in In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 

Cal.App.5th 769, review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.
5

at pp. 506-507.) Indeed, HSA acknowledges it improperly limited 

the initial inquiry to K.C.’s parents.5 

We are not persuaded by HSA’s assertion that remanding 

the matter for satisfaction of these duties would be contrary to 

K.C.’s interests in permanency and stability. HSA “has 

contributed to the delay in the finality of these proceedings by 

opposing the appeal rather than stipulating to a remand. [K.C.’s] 

interests are best served by a full resolution of all ICWA-related 

issues, and ‘Indian tribes have interests protected by ICWA that 

are separate and distinct from the interests of parents of Indian 

children.’ [Citation.]” (In re J.K., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 510.) 

DISPOSITION6

The order terminating parental rights is conditionally 

affirmed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for the 

limited purpose of allowing HSA and the juvenile court to satisfy 

their statutorily-mandated inquiry and notice duties under 

section 224.2 by, among other things, soliciting information (or 

making reasonable efforts to do so, supported by a showing of 

reasonable and due diligence) from K.C.’s extended family 

members regarding the child's possible Indian status. All such 

5 The record reflects that a social worker asked “maternal 

aunt Nancy” and “maternal second cousin . . . Erica” whether 

they had “knowledge of being registered in an Indian tribe.” Both 

denied such registry. The proper inquiry, however, is not 

whether K.C. or his relatives are or were registered tribal 

members but whether K.C. has any Indian ancestry and “is, or 

may be, an Indian child.” (Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 318.) 

6 Our disposition is guided by our decision in In re J.K.,

supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 511-512. 
6

duties shall be promptly performed and completed with 

reasonable and due diligence.

After satisfying its initial inquiry duties in accordance with 

section 224.2, subdivision (b), HSA and the social worker shall 

file a report with the juvenile court (with any necessary 

attachments) setting forth the details and results of its inquiry, 

its reasonable and diligent efforts to contact the extended family 

members identified by the parents or any other individuals 

identified by the parents or extended family members who might 

be reasonably expected to have information about K.C.’s potential 

Indian status, and HSA’s findings and recommendations 

regarding whether ICWA applies or may apply.

If the report and its attachments demonstrate that HSA 

has satisfied its duty of initial inquiry, the juvenile court shall so 

find and then proceed to find whether this new information gives 

the social worker or the court a “reason to believe” K.C. is or may 

be an Indian child, or a “reason to know” K.C. is an Indian child. 

If the court concludes there is still no “reason to believe” that 

K.C. is or may be an Indian child, it shall enter a new order 

finding that ICWA does not apply and the judgment (order 

terminating parental rights) shall become final as of that date.

If the juvenile court finds that the new information gives 

rise to a “reason to believe” that K.C. is or may be an Indian 

child, the court shall find that ICWA may apply and further 

inquiry shall be conducted in accordance with section 224.2, 

subdivision (e). If such further inquiry dispels the reason to 

believe that K.C. is or may be an Indian child, the court shall 

enter a new order finding that ICWA does not apply and the 

judgment (order terminating parental rights) shall become final 

as of that date.
7

If the information obtained during the initial or further 

inquiry gives the court or the social worker a “reason to know” 

that K.C. is an Indian child, the court shall ensure that proper 

notice of the proceedings is sent in accordance with section 224.2, 

subdivision (f) and section 224.3. If the court subsequently finds 

in accordance with section 224.2, subdivision (i)(2) that ICWA 

does not apply, it shall enter an order to that effect and the 

judgment shall become final as of that date.

If on remand a tribe informs the court that K.C. is a 

member of the tribe or eligible for membership and that the tribe 

intends to intervene in the proceedings, the court shall find that 

ICWA applies and enter an order to that effect. If the court 

issues such an order, the judgment (order terminating parental 

rights) is reversed as of that date. If the judgment is so reversed, 

the court shall promptly hold a new section 366.26 hearing in 

compliance with ICWA and related California law.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.*

I concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second 

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
YEGAN, J., Dissenting: 

I respectfully dissent for the reasons stated in my 

dissenting opinion in In re J.K. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 498, 512-

514 (dis. opn. of Yegan, J.). 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.
Tari L. Cody, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Tiffany N. North, County Counsel, and Joseph J. Randazzo, 

Principal Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.