The Honor able Ge rald E. Rosen, Unit ed S t at es District Judge f or the Ea stern District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0751n.06 F iled: October 11, 2006 No. 05-5010 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. AN TO NI O D . JON ES, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) OnA p p e a l f

r o m t h e U n it e d St ates Di str ict Court

fo r t he Mid dle District of Tenne ssee

Be fore : BO GGS, Chief J udg e; COL E, Circuit J udg e; and ROSEN, District Judge. *

PER C URI AM. Followin g a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tenne ssee , d efendant-a ppellant Antonio J ones wa s convicted of : 1) possession with intent to dis tribute 50 or more g rams of c rac k and some amount of coca ine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) ; 2) possession of fire arms in furthe ranc e of a drug traff icking crime, in violation of 1 8 U.S.C. § 924(c); and 3) being a fe lon in possession of firea rms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g )(1) and 924. The district court sentenc ed him to concur rent life se ntence s on counts 1 and 3
and fi ve y e ars ’ imp ri so nme nt on co un t 2, to ru n co ns e c uti ve to co un ts 1 and 3. Jone s c ha lle ng e s h is convictions and sente nce on a variet y o f gro unds. For the rea sons below, we a ffirm Jones’s convictions and sente nce.No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 2 - I On J une 17, 2002, De tective John Doneg an of the Metro Nashville Police De partment Vic e Division swore an a ffidavit for a sea rch w arr ant t o s earch for controlled substanc es and r elated evidenc e at 3288 Nia g ara Court in Nashville. I n t h e af fidavit, Doneg an stated that a conf idential informant (“ C.I .”) ha d inf o rm ed h i m that the C.I . could purc hase c rac k or powde r coc aine f rom “Antonio.” The C. I
. s aid t hat Antonio would usually make de liveries nea

r a pa rticular loc ation ( S t e w art ’ s F e r

r y P i k e an d

I- 4 0 ) , w o u l d

m a k e s e v e r a l d e l i v e r i e s e a c h d ay, an d w o u l d a l w ays c ar

r y a g un. The C. I
. d es cr i bed vehic les that Antonio would drive duringthe dea ls. The C.I . stated that Antonio lived at 3288 Niag ara Court, and that the C
. I
. h ad g one with a r elative of Antonio to that addre ss for a dr

ug deal in the pa st, but that the C.I . could not g o to that addre ss for a deal without the relative. Doneg an fur

ther swor e that ele ctric utility rec ords s h o we d that Antonio J ones maintained
e l e c t r i c s e r

v i c e a t 3 2 8 8 N i a g ar a , t h a t p e r i o d i c s u r v e i l l an c e s h o w e d t h a t s e v e r a l o f t h e v e h i c l e s t h e C
. I. had desc ribed we re r eg istered to Jones and wer e pre sen t at 3 2 88 Niag ara , and that Jones had been convicted of

felony drug and we apon cha

rg es. At the instruction of Done g an, the C.I . made a controlled, observe d drug purcha se fr om J ones
a t a mark e t on J un e 5, 2002 . Jon e s d ro ve a g ra y Che vr ole t L

umi na that th e C.I . h a d p re vio us ly descr ibed as one of “A ntonio’s” deliver y car s. The police lost Jones’s trail after the dea l. The C.I . made a

second c ontrolled , o b serve d drug purcha se fr om J ones, at Stewa rt’s F err y Pike and I -40, on June 14, 2002. A surveillance office r informed Doneg an that J ones left fr om 3288 Niag ara befor e the de al, driving a blue F ord re g istered to Jones. After the deal with the C.I ., J onesNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 3 - was obser ved makingwhat appe are d to be another drug deal. Jones w as then followed to 655 Joseph Avenue , wh er e h e p arke d the For d next t o the L umina he had use d during the first controlled purcha se. J ones entered 655 J oseph and exit ed shortly there afte r with a male and a f emale a nd drove off in the blue F ord. L ater that day the blue F ord was parke d at 655 J oseph and the g ray Lumina was g one. Doneg an fur

ther stated in the aff

idavit that based on his training a nd experience (seve nteen y ear s as a police office r, thirteen a s a nar cotics investig ator), he had lea rned that drug deale rs often keep mone y , transac tion recor ds, and other materials related to their drug de aling in secure locations such as r esidenc es, and that they often ke ep we apons in such locations for protec tion. A Tenne ssee state court judg e issued the se arc h war rant for 3288 Niag ara

on J une 17, 2002. On J une 19, 2002, Done g an swore a sepa rate aff idavit for a se cond sea

rch w arr ant, this one to searc h 655 J oseph Ave nue. In that aff idavit he re iterate d the above acc ount f rom his June 17, 2002 aff idavit for the 6288 Nia g ara sear ch wa

rra nt. He adde d that rec ords s howed that Tameka J ohnson maintained ele ctric se rvice at 655 J oseph. He further added that on J une 17, 2002, the C.I . arr ang ed a third controlled, obse rved dr ug purcha se fr om J ones. On that occasion, surve illance showe d J ones and one of

his vehicles at 655 Joseph. J ones told the C.I . to meet him (at the same location as the second c ontrolled buy

) in thirty minutes. Shortly

afte r that conve rsation J ones and a nother male left 655 J oseph in the blue F ord. Jones drove to 3288 Niag ara , dropped of f the pa s s en g er, w ent inside for a brief time, then e x ited and drove to meet the C.I . for the buy . L ater that day the blue F ord wa s ob se rv e d at 65 5 Jose ph ; Jone s th e re a ft e r d ro ve of f i n it
.No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 4 - I n the s econd affidavit, Doneg an also stated t hat surveillanc e of 655 Joseph on J une 18, 2002 showed “ a lar g e amount of f oot traff ic g oing in and out in very short periods of time. At one point y our af fiant counte d 9 peopled [sic] ex iting the apartment in less than a ten minute period of time.” The foot tra ffic c ontinued until mi dnight. J ones ca me and we nt severa l times in bot h the blue F ord and the g ray

Chevrolet Lumina, and at one point was observe d with another ma le driving to a location to make what appea

red to be a drugdeal with a f emale. D uring the same pe riod of surv ei llance a
woman believed to be Tameka J ohnson was seen enter ing a nd exit ing the apar

tment, and was se en driving the blue F ord. The next day , J une 19, 2002, Doneg an che cked 655 Joseph and obser ved that both the blue For d and the g ray Lumina wer e par ked in front of

that location during the ea rly morning hours, “whe n it would be ex pecte d for Mr. J ones t o be asle ep.” T he sec ond aff idavit also contained t h e s a m e l an g u a g e r e g ar d i n g D o n e g an ’ s e x p e rt i s e an d t h e l i k e l i h o o d

o f dr u g d e a l e r s k e e p i n g m o n e y,
e tc ., in t he ir ho us e s a s d id t

he fi rs t a ff

ida vit
. A Tenne ssee state court judg e issued the se arc h war rant for 655 J oseph on June 19, 2002. Having obtained the sear ch warra nts for 3288 Niag ara

and 655 Joseph, the Nashville Police
arr ang ed another–the fourth–controlled, observed drug purchase by the C .I . from Jones on J une 19, 2002. J ones told the C.I . to me et him at a g as station. J ones left from 655 J oseph in the blue F ord, which wa s driven by

a fe male. Jones sat in the f ro n t p as s en ger seat; Jones and the fema le wer e
a c c omp anie d b y

ano the r m a le . Jon e s a

pp are ntl y e ng a g e d in

a dr ug tr ans a c tio n w ithan in div idu a l in the same loc a tio n im me diate ly be fo re makin g the de a l w iththe C.I . T he po lic e sto pp e d th e ve hic le about two or thre e miles from the sc ene of the deals. After the occupants g ot out of the vehic le, J ones
wa s a dv ise d o f h is r ig hts
.No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 5 - The police rec overe d $655 from Jones, including $250 in mar ked money

from the c ontrolled drug purcha se t hat had just taken place. The poli ce took a ll of the subjects–Tame ka Johnson was the fema le–bac k to 655 J oseph to ex ecute the sea rch w arr ant for that addre ss. There they found about 8.5 g rams of c ocaine , an ele ctronic sc ale, a nd two box es of sa

ndwich bag g ies. The police then took J ones and his compa nio n s t o 3 2 8 8 Niag ara , and executed the sear ch
war rant for that addre ss. The police found evidenc e that a child resided there
. At 3288 Niag ara , they
a lso fo un d o ve r s ixty

g ra ms o f c rack , abo ut ha lf

a kil og ra m of c oc a ine , ma

ri jua na , a pp ro xima te ly $11,000 in cash, a

Lug er 9-mm semiautomatic pistol, a L lama .380 semiautomatic pistol, a c hromeplat ed re v o lver, a

Ruge r .44-c aliber Ma g num revolver , an AK 47- ty pe rifle , a shotg un, box es of
a mmunit ion , a

ho lst e r, a bu lle t- pr oo f ve st, e le c tr on ic sc a le s, ba g g ie s, wh a t a pp e are d to D on e g an to be drugtransac ti o n l ed ger s , a bottle of Vitable nd, commonly used as a

cutting a g ent for c ocaine (ac cordingto Doneg an), photog raphs on display depicting J ones with other men a nd with Candace S h el t o n(s o m e o f wh i ch s h o w J o n es p o s s es s i n g fi re ar m s fo u n d d u ri n g t h e s ea rc h ), wo m en ’s cl o t h i n g, men’s clothing (some of w hich matche d clothing w orn by J ones i n the phot og raphs) , and pape rwork of Jone s. Th e c ra c k, Rug e r 9 -m m pi sto l, L lama . 38 0 p ist ol, Vi ta ble nd , d ru g tr ans a c tio n le dg e rs , elec tronic scales, and bagg ies wer e all found i n a dresser in the m aster bedroom; the chr ome-plate d
re vo lve r a nd bu lle t- pr oo f v e st w e re fo un d in a c los e t in the ma ste r b e dr oo m; the Rug e r . 44 Ma g num, wh ic h w a s lo a de d, wa s f

ound un de r a c ou c h c us hio n in the de n; t he sh otgun

wa s und e r a

ma ttr e ss i n the master be droom; the coc aine wa s in a safe along with cash, which was nea r the dre sser; the marijuana was in the dre sser, in the saf e, and in a

small refr ige rator in the ma ster bedr oom.No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 6 - Offic er J esse Bur chwe ll testified that he re ad Miranda ri g hts to Jone s, us inga pr int e d f or m, afte r they arr ived at 3288 Niag ara . That wa s the second time Jones had bee n g iven Miranda wa rn i n gs that d ay ; t h e fi rs t h ad occ urre d at his arr est. J ones wa ived his rig hts in writing on the f orm. After
wa ivi nghis Miranda ri g hts , Jon e s sa id t hat he woul d c oo pe rate wi th l aw e nf or c e me nt, we nt i nto considera ble d etail re g ardinghis coca ine supplier and the nature of his dealing s with that supplier, state d that he c oo ke d c oc a ine int o c ra c k to se ll, tol d th e po lic e the loc a tio n o f s e ve ra l of the fi re arm s seized, and said that he ha d the fire arms for protec tion. I n addition, he stated that he lived at 3288 Niag ara , and that Canda ce Shelton, his g irlfriend a nd the mother of one of hi s children, a lso lived at 3288 Niag ara . He sa id that the police had f ound all of his drug s and money
. At one point during the ex ecution of the s ear ch warra nt at 3288 Niaga

ra, D oneg an aske d J ones how much mo n e y w a s in th e s a f e , “ b e c a u s e th e r e w a s a p r e tt

y g o o d c h u n k th e r e , ” and J ones responde d that the amount was betwee n eleve n and twelve thousand dollars. Done g an re called at trial that the ac tual amount totaled $11,015. Doneg an also a sked Jones about a larg e bagof white powde r that did not smell l ike coc aine, whic h J ones stated c onsisted only of cut, not of c ocaine
. J ones wa s tried bef

ore a j u ry in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Te nn e sse e and

fo un d guil ty

on a ll three c ounts . Jon e s, thr ou g h a pp e llate c ouns e l, r a ise s th e six arguments addre ssed in S ec t i o n I I
. J ones ra ises six additional issues in a pro se br ief, whic h are
a d dr e s s e d i nS e c t i o nIII
. II

A. P robable cause for issu ance of the searc h w arrantsNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 7 - J ones ar g ued in a motion to suppress evide nce that the sear ch wa rra nts for 3288 Niag ara

Court and 655 Joseph Avenue we re unsuppor ted by p ro b able cause. A fter a hear ing, the district court de nie d th e mot ion . Jon e s r e ite rate s h is c ha lle ng e on a pp e a l. I nre v i ew i n g t h e d en i al o f a m o t i o nt o s u p p re s s , we re v i ew t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fa ct u al fi n d i n gs for c lear err or and its leg al conc lusions de novo. United States v. Carpenter , 360 F .3 d 591 , 5 94 (6 th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citation omitted). We view the e vidence “in a lig ht most l ikely to support the decision of the district c ourt.” United States v. Frazier , 423 F.3d 526, 531 ( 6th Cir. 2005). This court has state d that “[i] n deter mining whe ther a

n aff idavit establishes probable cause , ‘[t] he task of t he is suing mag istrate is simply to make a pr actica l, common-sense de cision whether , g iven all the cir cumstance s set forth in t h e af fi d av it before him, . . . there is a f air proba bility that contra band or e vidence of a c rime will be found in a par ticular plac e.’” Carpenter , 360 F.3d at 594 (q u o t i n g Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)) . “To justify a search,” we continued, “the circ umstances must indicate w hy evidenc e of illeg al ac tivity will be found ‘in a particular place .’ There must, in ot her w ords, be a ‘nexus between the place to be sea rche d and the e vidence soug ht.’” Carpenter , 3 6 0 F. 3 d

at 5 9 4 (q u o t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . V an Sh utt e rs , 163 F.3d 331, 336- 37 (6th Cir. 1998)). We fi nd that a subs tanti a l bas is exist e d for the Te nn e sse e state jud g e to co nc lud e that pr ob a ble
cause exis ted. See Carpente r , 360 F.3d at 594 (“the duty of a revie wing court is simply to ensure that the mag istrate had a substantial ba sis f or concluding that probable cause exis ted. ”)
. Do neg an’s aff idavits showed a ne x us betwee n the two addr esses a nd evidenc e of Jones’s drugtraff icking
.No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 8 - As repor ted in Doneg an’s a ffidavit re g arding3 2 8 8 Ni ag ara , a C.I . stated that a dr ug deale r named Antonio lived at 3288 Nia g ara and that the C.I . had purc hased dr ug s from Antonio at that locati o n . T he C.I . descr ibed vehicle s that Antonio used in his deals. The a ffidavit illustrated that the C.I .’s hea

rsay information was c orrobor ated to a c onsiderable degre e by subsequent police investigation. See Frazier , 423 F.3d at 532 (“ a court must c onsider the ver acity , reliability , and the basis of knowledge for [ hear say information from a

C.I .] as part of the totality of circ umstances f

or evaluating the impac t of that informatio n . ”)
. J ones maintained e lectric al servic e at 3288 Nia g ara , pe ri od ic surv e ill anc e sh ow e d th a t se ve ra l of the ve hic le s th e C.I . h a d d e sc ribed were re g ist e re d to J on es and were pr esent at 3288 Niag ara , and Jones had been c onvicted of f elony drug and we apon
c ha rg e s. F u rt h e r m o r e , an d m o r e i mp o rt an t l y, t h e a f

f i d a v i ti n c l u d e d

d e t a i l s o f t w o c o n t r o l l e d

dr u g b u ys betwee n the C .I
. and J ones t hat were arra ng ed by the police, be fore at least one of which ( on J une 14, 2002) the p o l i ce observed Jones leavingdirec tly from 3288 Niag ara , and duringboth of which the police noted that Jones drove a vehicle that was desc ribed by the C.I . and that they

had seen pa

rked
a t 32 88 Ni a g ara . T hat in fo rm a tio n, pa rt ic ula rl y in c omb inatio n w ithDo ne g an’ s state me nts that in his experience it is often the case that drug deale rs store c ontraba nd and other evidenc e in their re sidence s or in location s t h at t h ey control but that are titled in the name of other s, clea rly links J ones’s drug dealingto the 3288 Niag ara location, and cre ates more than a “fa ir probability ” that evidenc e of suc h drug dealingwould be found at 3288 Niag ara . Reg arding the war

rant for 655 J oseph, the aff idavit for that addr ess ave rre d that J ones trave led to 655 J oseph af

ter the se cond contr olled drug buy . Surveillance showed both of the r eleva nt car s atNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 9 - 655 J oseph at va

rious times. Be fore the t hird controlled dr ug purcha se, Jones left from 655 J oseph wi th a no the r m a le and

sto pp e d b ri e fl y

a t 32 88 Ni agar a

be fo re tr a ve lin g to t

he loc a tio n o f t

he de a l. L ater that day J ones was ag ain s een a

t 655 J oseph and dr ove aw ay from it in the blue For d. The da y
a ft e r t he thi rd ob se rv e d dru g de a l, sur ve ill anc e of 65 5 J os e ph sh ow e d “a larg e a mou nt o f f oo t tr a ff ic g oin g in a nd ou t in ve ry sh or

t per iod s of time .” Th e fo ot t ra ff ic c on tin ue d unti l mi dn ig ht. Jone s c a me and we nt severa l times in bot h the blue F ord and the g ray Chevrolet L

umina, and at one p o i n t was observe d with another ma le driving to a location to make w hat app ear ed to be a drug deal with a fema le. The ne x t day , both the blue For d and the g ray Lumina wer e par

ked in f ro nt of 655 J oseph during the ea

rly morning hours, “whe n it wo u l d b e ex p ec t ed for Mr. J ones to be a sleep.” The aff idavit for 655 Joseph also contained the la ng uag e re g ardingDoneg an’s e x pertis e a n d th e likelihood of drugdeale rs kee ping r eleva nt evidence in their res i dence s or in residenc es titled to others, but which the deale rs actua lly controlled. Ag ain, the information in the aff idavit f or 655 J o s ep h l inks J ones’s drugdealingto the location, and cre ates a fair pr obability that evidenc e of that drug dealing would be found the re. B. V olu nt ar ine ss o f Jon e s’ s st at e m e nt s I n his moti on to suppr ess, J ones also contende d that his state ments following his a rre st at 3288 Ni a g ara sh ou ld have be e n sup pr e sse d as the pr od uc ts of c oe rc ion , an d be c a us e he did no t vo lun tari ly waive his rig hts under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). I n assessing whether

a def endant’ s statements were coerc ed, the test is whether, consider ing the totality

of the c ircumstance s, “the c onduct of law enfor ceme nt officia ls is such as to over bear the
acc used’s will to resist.” Ledbetter v. Edwards , 35 F.3d 1062, 1067 ( 6th Cir. 199 4 ). At theNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 10 - suppression hea

ring , J ones stated that his statements at 3288 Niag ara wer e coe rce d beca use Off icer B ur c hw e ll s ma c ke d a

nd kic ke d h im. He a lso a sse rt e d th a t he wa s n ot r e a d h is Miranda rig hts, and that he was tr ic ke d in to s ig nin g the wa ive r o f h is Miranda rig hts, which he say s he sig ned the da y afte r his arr est and the se arc hes, bec ause O ffice r B urchw ell told him that he would not “be char g ed with what I was helping him do,” appar ently ref err ing to his subsequent cooper ation with the police in their investigation of hi s suppliers. Offic er Burc hwell flatly denied any phy sical abuse , and denie d te lli ngJone s th a t he wo uld no t be c ha

rged. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

fo un d th a t Jone s w a s n ot a c re dib le witness and rule d that his statements were voluntary
. We “g ive gre at defere nce to the district c ourt’s
cre dibilit y deter

minations as i t is in the best position t o observe witnesses.” United States v. J ohnson , 34 4 F .3 d 5 62 , 5 67 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) . O n the se fa c ts w e dis tur b n e ith e r t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c re dib ili ty deter mination nor its conclusion that J ones’s stateme nts were uncoer ced. The g overnme nt bear s the burden of proving , by

a pre p o n d erance of the e vidence , that the de fe nd ant’ s w a ive r o f h is Miranda rig hts was knowing an d voluntary . The test for knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rig hts is essentially the s am e as t h at for whether statements wer e
coer ced. Un ite d Sta te

s v . R e dd itt , 8 7 F. Ap p ’x 4 4 0 , 4 4 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Col orad o v . Co nn e lly , 47 9 U. S. 15 7, 16 8- 70 (1 98 6) ). Jone s ini tia le d and sig ne d a wa ive r o f h is Miranda rig hts dated June 19, 2002, the date of the arr est and sear ches, thus c ontradicting his acc ount that he sig ned it the day afte r his arr est. Off

icer Bur chwe ll testified at the suppression hear ing that he rea d the Miranda waiver to J ones at 3288 Nia g ara , that J ones under stood the rig hts and signe d the wa i v er , an d that he (B urchw ell) used neither phy sical nor psy cholog ical thre ats to coer ce Jones. The district cour t ruledNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 11 - that J ones’s stateme nts were made a fter a knowing and voluntary

waiver of his rig hts. There is no
re as o nt o re v er s e t h at ru l i n g.

C. Se nt e nc ing e nhanc e m e nt s forpr iorc onv ic ti ons 1. Statutory sente ncing enh ancem ent pursuan t to 21 U.S.C. § 841( b)(1)(A ) 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1)( A) provides that one who, int e r a lia , p os se sse s w ithint e nt t o d istri bu te 50 g rams or more of cr ack, “ afte r two or more p ri o r co n v i cti ons for a felony drug offe nse have become final, . . . shall be sentence d to a mandator y term of life imprisonment without release . . . .” Be fore trial, the g overnme nt filed an infor mation pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 alleg ing that J ones had previously

been c onvicted o f multiple felony drug offe nses in Tenne ssee state court, a nd fac ed a
mand a tor y lif e se nte nc e on c ount 1 (t

he c ha rg e of po sse ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o d istri bu te ov e r 5 0 g ra ms of c ra c k a nd so me a mou

nt o f c oc a ine ). Th e jur

y sp e c if ic a lly fo un d th a t Jone s h a d p os se sse d w ith intent to dist ribute 50 g rams or more of crack. J ones was sentenc ed to t he mandatory minimum of life imprisonment on count 1 pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (A). J ones ar g ued unsucce ssfully befor e the district cour

t, and asser

ts on appea l, that he did not have tw o p ri or

c on vic tio ns fo r a

fe lony dr ug of fe ns e be c a

us e his “ tw o p ri or

c on vic tio ns are a c tua lly the same c ourse of conduct and should only be treated as one conviction for se ntencingpurposes.” We assume, without deciding , that we r eview the district court’s de cision to count J ones’s prior convic tions as separate pre dicate of fense s for purposes of 21 U.S .C. § 841(b)(1) (A) unde r a de novo standard r ather

than for c lear

err or. See United States v. Thomas , 211 F.3d 316, 319 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (“ Since determining whether the conduct wa s a sing le occ asion or multiple occa sions” under the ana logous Ar m ed Care er Criminal Ac t, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) , “pre sents a leg al questionNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 12 - conce rning the interpre tation of a statute, we review the district court’s de cision de novo.”) ; United States v. Gray , 152 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 1998) (re solution of defenda nt’s argument that his prior felony drug convictions may

only be counte d as one unde r the 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)( 1)(A) requir es interpre tation of t he st atute and is thus reviewe d de novo); United States v. Pugh , No. 96-3954, 1998 WL 165143 at *5 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 1998) (re viewing de novo the mix ed question of law and fac t of
w h e th e r th e d e f

e n d an t’ s p r io r c o n v ic ti o n s w e r e “ f in a l” u n d e r 2 1 U
. S. C. § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A )). B ut see Un ite d S tat es v . P owe ll , 404 F.3d 678, 682 ( 2d Cir. 2005) (addr essing de novo the question of law of “ wh a t, a s a

ma tte r o f s ta tut or

y c on str uc tio n, con st itute s a

se pa rate c on vic tio n, ” un de r 2 1 U .S. C. § 841(b)( 1)(A) , and then, a pply ing the standard t o t h e d i s trict court’ s decision, re viewing for c lear
err or). Reg ardle ss of which sta n d ard of revie w we e mploy , the re sult of J ones’s c halleng e is the
same. This circuit has a dopted the “se parate cr iminal episo d es ” t es t for dete rmining w hether a defe ndant’s prio r fe l o n y drug convictions qualify as discre te pre dicate c onvictions to enhance the sentenc e pursua

nt to 21 U.S.C . § 841(b)( 1)(A) . Under that test, prior fe lony

drug convictions amount to separate pre dicate c onvictions for the purpose s o f s en tence enhanc ement whe n they arise f rom “sepa rate criminal episode[s]” that are “ distinct in t ime.” “An episode is a n incident that is part of
a se ri e s, bu t f

or ms a se pa rate un it wi thi n the wh ole . A lth ou g h r e la te d to the e nti re c ours e of e ve nts , an episode is a punctuated oc curr ence with a limited duration.” United States v. Hughe s , 924 F.2d 1354, 1361-62 (6th Cir. 1991). I n United States v. Goins , 53 F. App’ x 724, 729-30 (6th Cir. 2002), we he ld that two prior fe lony c on vic tio ns fo r d

ru g sa le s tha t took pla c e six w e e ks a pa rt , e ve n th ou g h th e y

inv olv e d th e sameNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

The judg ment in the T en nessee state cour t refe rs to J ones’s c onviction for the c rime of 1 “Poss of [il leg ible] .5g coc.” As the discussion at subsection I I I .E, inf ra , d em o n s t ra t es , t h at l an gu age wa s a lmo st c e rt a inl y

sh or tha nd fo r t he felon y of fe ns e of po sse ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o d e liv e r/ se ll l e ss than .5 g rams of c ocaine
. - 13 - g overnme nt informant and the defe ndant was convicted of both felonies on the same day , amounted to se parate episodes and could be used as two predic ate convictions for a mandatory l i fe s entenc e under 21 U .S.C. § 8 4 1 (b )( 1)(A) . This court has noted that the fac t that a def endant r ece ived
concur rent sente nces f

or prior f elony drug convictions “does not me an that the convictions we re pa rt of the same episode.” United States v. Ande rson , 76 F.3d 685, 691 ( 6th Cir. 1996). Other c ircuits applying the “sepa rate episodes” te st have he ld that prior convictions for three dr ugof fe ns e s c omm itt e d w ith in m in ut es of e a c h o the r w e re dis tin c t, a nd c ounta ble a s se pa

rate predic ate of

fense s for a

mandatory

life sentenc e under

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)( 1)(A) , when they involved sales to diffe rent individuals and ea ch wa s a complete transac tion in it self. See United States v. Gree n , 293 F.3d 886, 894- 95 (5th Cir. 2002). Simil arly , prior convic tions for two felony offe nses for dr ug sa le s to the same inf

or mant oc c ur

ri ng on e da

y a pa rt , of w hic h th e de fe nd ant w a s c on vic te d in the s ame trial and for which he rec eived concurr ent s entenc es, amounted to separ ate e pisodes. Gray , 152 F.3d at 821-22. I n this case, the g overnme nt g ave notice of three prior Tennessee state felony drug convictions (only two of which a

re ne eded) as pre dicate of fense s for a

mandatory

minim u m life sentenc e. Following a plea

deal, Jones was convic ted on October 22, 2000 of t he following drug crimes: selling 26 g ra ms o r mor e of c oc a ine , off e ns e date F e br

ua ry 15 , 200 0; pos se ssi on wi th int e nt t o d e liv e r/ se ll l ess t han .5 g rams of c ocaine , offe nse date Fe bruar y 19, 2000 ; and selling 26 g rams or more of

1No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 14 - coca ine, offe nse date Fe bruar y 24, 2000. The c onvictions for off enses c ommitt ed on F ebrua ry 15 and 24 , 200 0, a

pp e ar to ste m f

ro m c on tr oll e d, re c or de d tr ans a c tio ns inv olv ingon e c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant. The thre e convic tions arose fr om separate episodes, a nd thus eac h can be used as one of the two predic ate dr

ug felonies ne cessa

ry to enhanc e Jones’s sentence on h i s fede ral drugchar g e to a mandatory

life sentenc e. The prior

drug crimes oc curr ed on sepa rate dates–F ebrua

ry 15, 19, and 24, 2000. Although the time betwee n any two of those cr imes was not as g reat a s the six wee ks in Goins , J ones’s pre vious drug crimes a re muc h further

apar t in tim e than the tr ansac tions in Gree n (three sales to differ ent buy ers within minutes of ea ch ot h er) and Gray(t wo sa le s, on e da

y a pa rt , to the same informant). That judgme n t wa s en t er ed aga inst J ones on the same day by the same c ourt and,
a pp are ntl y , w ithc on c ur

re nt s e nte nc e s, do e s n ot t hereby make the thr e e c ri me s p art of the same episode. See A nderson , 76 F .3 d at 69 1; Gray , 152 F.3d at 820-22 (prior c onvictions for two fe lony offe nses f o r drug sa les of which the defe ndant was c onvicted in the same trial and for which he
rec eived concur

rent sentenc es amounted to se parate episodes). Eac h of the three previous state drug felonies ( and only

two are neede d) listed by the g overnme nt constitute a separ ate episode, a nd thus qualify as pre dicate of

fense s for the pur

poses of e nhancingJ ones’s sente nce for possession of ove r fi ft y g ra ms o f c ra c k to mand a tor

y lif e imp ri so nme nt. J ones ar g ues that whe ther the pr i o r felony drug convictions are distinct for the purpose s of d et er m i ning his statutory minimum sentenc e should be de cided on the ba sis of various Sentenc ing Gu i d el i n e p rovi sions reg ardingthe re latedness of crimes. B ut this i nquiry is not one based on the Guidelines; it is based on 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)( 1)(A) , and has its own set of pr ece dents. See , e.g ., Hughes , 9 24 F .2 d at 13 61 -6 2; United States v. W inston , 3 7 F .3 d 2 35 , 2 40 -4 2 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 4) ; UnitedNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 15 - S t a t es v. French , 9 74 F .2 d 6 87 , 6 97 -9 9 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 2) ; Pugh , 1998 WL 165143, at *5. S e e als o United States v. Cannon , 429 F.3d 1158, 1160 ( 7th Cir. 2005). 2. Se nt e nc ing e nhanc e m e nt s unde r th e G uide line s J ones also cha lleng es “be ing a car eer offe nder a

nd arme d car eer

offe nder,” presumably

under the Gu ide lin e s, on

the g ro un ds that his “p ri or c on vic tio ns we re the same c ours e of c on du c t and

sh ou ld be tre ated a s one conviction.” This argument is irrele vant, as J ones receive d a statutory mandatory minimum sentenc e of life imprisonment on count 1.

D. Eighth Ame ndme nt challenge to m andatory lif e im prisonme nt J ones ar g ues that his e nhance d mandatory minimum sentenc e of life imprisonment, pursuant to 21 U.S
. C
. § § 841(b)( 1)(A) and 851, violates the Eig hth Amendment’s prohibition on crue l and
unus ua l pu

nis hme nt. He c la ims that 21 U. S.C. § 8 41 (b )( 1) (A ) i s “ g ro ssl y dis pr op or

tio nate ” be c a

us e

“ i td o e s n o td i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e nd e f e n d an t s w h o h a v e f

e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n s f

o r dr u g p o s s e s s i o no n l y, and those de fenda

nts who have more serious drug traff icking felonies.” We note that in this case at least t wo of J ones’s prior Tenne ssee state court c onvictions were for se lling drug s–not for mere possession. The Supreme Court upheld ag ainst an Eig hth Amendment c h al leng e the mandatory sentenc ing, unde r Michig an statute, to life imprisonment of a first-time felon who was c onvicted for possessing 672 g rams of c ocaine
. Harmelin v. M ichigan , 501 U.S. 957, 961, 994, 1002 (1991). A plurality of the Ha rm e lin Court stated that “the Crue l and Unusual Punishments Cl ause e ncompasses
a n ar r o w p r o p o rt i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e ” t h a t a p p l i e s t o n o n c a

p i t a l s e n t e n c e s . 5 0 1 U
. S
. a t9 9 7 ( K e n n e dy,No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 16 - J., c on c ur ri ng ). I t he ld t

hat th e Ei g hth

Am e ndme nt “ fo rb ids on ly e xtre me se nte nc e s th a t are ‘g ro ssl y disproportionate’ to the c rime.” Id
. a t 1 001. The Har mel in Court added that “ [w] e have never inv a lid a te d a

pe na lty mand a te d b y

a le g isl a tur e ba se d o nly

on the le ng th of se nte nc e , a nd , e sp e c ia lly with a crime as seve re a s this one, we should do so only in the most ex treme c ircumstance s.” Id . at 1006-07. This court has f

ollowed the Ha rm e lin plurality ’s nar row propor

tionality p ri n ciple. United Sta te s v . H ill , 30 F.3d 48, 50-51 (6th Cir. 1994). I n Hi ll , we uphe ld ag ainst an Eig hth Amendment challeng e the imposition of a mandator y life s entenc e, pursua

nt to 21 U.S.C . § 841(b)( 1)(A) , on a thi rd -t ime fe lon

c onvic te d o f c on sp ir a c y to dis tr ibute 17 7. 8 g ra ms o f c ra c k. We h a ve su

bs e qu e ntl y interpre ted Hi ll

as “h[o] ld[ ing] that a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release u p o n a third felony

drug conviction did not violate the Eig hth Amendment’s prohib i tion ag ainst crue l and unusual p u n i s h m en t.” United States v. Flowal , 163 F.3d 956, 963- 64 (6th Cir. 1998). I n United States v. Goode , No. 97-2163, 1999 WL520553, at *4 (6th Cir. J uly 14, 1999), a c ase dire ctly on point, we found that, unde r Ha rm e lin and Hi ll , a manda tor

y lif e se nte nc e imp os e d o n a

thi rd -t ime dr ugfe lon c on vic te d o f c on sp ir ingto d istri bu te and po sse ssi on wi th int e nt to dis tr ibute ov e r 5 0 g ra ms of cr ack did not violate the E ighth Ame ndment. I n this case, Jones was convic ted of possession with intent t o d i s t ribute over 50 g rams of
cra ck. (Police a lso found about a half a kilogr am of c ocaine and some qua ntity of marijuana

at 3288 Ni agara.) U nder the above- cited pre cede nts, it i s clea r that Jones’s sentence does not violate the Ei g hth Am e ndme nt. E. Denial of dow nw ard departureNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

I n United States v. Mc

Bride , 434 F.3d 4 7 0 , 474-77 (6th Cir. 2006), this court stated that 2
“Pu c k e tt simply prec ludes o u r re v i ew of that nar row de termination of a de nial of a Chapte r 5 Guideline depa

rture w ithin the context of the Guideline calc ulation. I t does not preve nt our revie w of a def e nd ant’ s c la im that hi s se nte nc e is e xce ssi ve ba se d o n th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s un re a so na ble analy sis of the section 3553(a ) fa ctors.” - 17 - J ones ar g ues that the district court e rre d in denying his motion for downw ard de parture . J ones moved f or do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e un de r t

he Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s b e c a us e of a lle g e dly

ha rs h incar cer ation in the Robertson County J ail and bec ause, he asser ts, his “criminal history

calc ulation overstate s the seriousness of his criminal history .” At the se ntencinghear ing, the district court hea rd evidenc e re lated to the motion for downwa rd depa rture, inc luding testim ony from Jones reg arding his confinement at the county jail. The district court de nied the motion. W e h a v e h e l d

t h a t Un i t ed S t ates v. Book er , 5 43 U. S. 2 20 (2 00 5) , d id n ot a ff e c t ou r w e lle sta bli sh e d r ule that w e “ sh a ll n ot r e vie w d e c isi on s o f a dis tr ic t c ourt

no t to de pa

rt do wnwa

rd un le ss the re cord r efle cts that the district court was not a war e of or did not understand its discretion to make such a de parture .” Un ite d S tat es v . P uc k

e tt , 422 F.3d 340, 344-46 (6th Cir. 2005) (interna l quotation
mark s and

c itation omi tte d) . We a dd e d th a t “ the dis tr ic t c ourt ne e d n ot ‘ e xplic itl y

state that it

is
awa re of its discretionary

authority to depar t downwar d.’” 422 F .3d at 346 (c i t i n g United States v. Lucas , 357 F.3d 599, 609- 10 (6th Cir. 2004)). 2 No thi ngsu g g e sts that th e dis tr ic t c ourt wa s una wa re of or did no t un de rs tand

its dis c re tio n to make a downwar d depar

ture under the Guidelines. I ndeed, the fac t that it heard e vidence on, e.g ., the conditions of J ones’s imprisonment at the county jail sug g ests that it did understan d i t s d iscretion.No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

Section 5G1.1 dea ls ge neral l y wi t h sentenc ing on a single count of c onviction when the 3 statutory maxi mum is l ower than t he bott om of the Guidelines r ang e or w hen the statutory minimum is hi gh er tha

n the top of the Guide lines rang e; subsection (c ) states that “ [i ]n any other c ase, the sentenc e may

be imposed at a

ny point within t he applica ble g uideline ra

ng e, provided that the se ntenc e – ( 1) is n ot g re a te r t ha n th e statut or ily

a uth or ize d maximumse nte nc e , a nd (2 ) i s n ot l e ss than any statutorily

require d minimum sentenc e.” - 18 - Fur thermore , J ones re ceive d t h e s t at utory minimum sentenc e on counts 1 a nd 2. Under

18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), the district court may depar t below the statutory minimum if the g overnme nt files a motion reque sting it, but the g overnme nt did not file such a motion in this c ase. Acc ording ly , the motion for downwar d depar ture a pplies only

to count 3, and is not subject to revie w eve n then. F . Whether r em and i s required und er Booker J ones ar g ues that he i s en t itled to a rema nd for r esente ncing under Booke r beca use the SentencingGuidelines–he points in particula r to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c)( 2)–ar e advisory afte r Booke r . 3 We have he ld that when the de fenda nt has bee n s entenc ed to the statutory mandatory minimum , Booke r

is not im plicated. Un ite d Stat es v. S mi th , 419 F.3d 521, 531- 32 (6th Cir. 2005); Un ite d S tat es v . S mi th , N o. 05 -3 42 2, 20 06 WL11 33 57 4, a t *2 ( 6th Cir . Apr . 2 7, 20 06 ); United States v. Johnson , 129 F. App’x 966, 971-72 (6th Cir. 2005) (collecting case s from other c ircuits). Jones was sente nced on c ount 1 to mandatory life imprisonment, based on the c ombination of 1) the jury ’s finding that he h ad p o ssessed with intent to distribute more than 50 g rams of c rac k and 2) his two pr ior c on vic tio ns . As dis c us se d a bo ve , the dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y fo un d un de r thi s c ourt ’s se pa rate
e pis od e s te st that Jone s ha d a t le a st tw o pr e dic a te dr ugfe lon ie s. Jone s w a s se nte nc e d o n c ount 2 to five y ear s, also the statutory minimum
.No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 19 - That lea ves co u n t3 , t h e f

el o n -i n -p o s s es s i o n -o f- fi re ar m s co u n t
. T h e s t at u t o ri l y m an d at ed term for that c ount, after

taking into account Jones’s prior convic tions, wa s 15 y ear s to life. The district court sente nced Jones to a life ter m on that count, to run conc urr en t l y with count 1, possibly

afte r g ro up ingit w ithc ount 1 purs ua nt t o th e Gu ide lin e s. We have de clined to r emand for rese ntencingpursuant to Booke r an appe al from a

sentenc e imposed for one count when the defe ndant re ceive d a long er or equal statutory

mandatory

minimum term on anothe r count and the two r un concur rently
. Un ite d S

tat es v . Co rn e ll , 162 F. App’ x 404, 409- 10 and n.1 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Grundy , No. 03-6435, 2006 WL1133321, at *2 (6th Cir. Ap r. 27 , 2 00 6) ; United States v. Goliday , 145 F. App’ x 502, 507 (6th Cir. 2005). Be cause the life sente nce on c ount 1 was statutorily require d, we d o not remand f or
re se nte nc ingun de r a

n a dv iso ry

Gu ide lin e s sy ste m.

III A. Co nfro nt at ion Cl aus e Cha lle nge s I n h is p ro se su

pp le me nta l br ie f, Jone s argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt vio la te d h is Si xth Amendment Confrontation Clause rig hts w hen it a dmitted: 1) testimony by Det. Done g an re g arding i n f o r m a t i o nt h a tt h e C
. I. h a d

p r o v i d e d t o D o n e g a n ; an d

2 ) r e c o r d i n g s o f

t h e c o n t r o l l e d

dr u g b u ys betwee n J ones and the C.I . We addre ss eac h in turn.

1. Inf orm ation provid ed by the C.I. to Donegan Du ri n g d i re ct ex amination of Done gan b y t h e A s s i s t an tU. S
. At t o rn ey , t h e f o l l o wi n g ex ch an ge ensued: Q. Ho w d id you

c ome to b e ingint e re ste d in Mr . Jon e s?No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

T h e tr ia l p r e d a te d

th e Su p r e me Co u rt’ s o p in io nin C r a w f o r d v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 4 (2004). - 20 - A. I was contacted by

a conc erne d citizen here in Da vidson County

who stated that he had be en -- MR. COOPER

[J ones’s trial attorney ]: Your Honor, I ’m g oing to object to the h e ar s ay. T H E C O U R T : W e l l , i f i t ’ s n o t o f f e r e d f o r t h e t r u t h o f t h e m at t e r

a s s e rt e d
. In other wor ds, members of the jury , someone can r ece ive some information not knowing whether

it is true or not, c an later testify about re ceivingthat information, and y o u ’ r e n o t t o c o n s id e r th a t i n f o r mati o na s n e c e s s ar il y

b e in g tr u e o r u n tr u e, be c a us e it’ s n ot s wo rn

to, bu t he c an te sti fy

a s to wh a t he wa s tol d and wh a t he did upon rec eiving that information. Go ahe ad. B Y M R. K O SH Y [th e A U SA ]: Q. I f y o u w o u ld , ju s t k e e p it in a v e r y s u mm ar y f a s h io n w h a t th is p erson told y ou. For instance, did he tell y ou that Mr. J ones–that he c ould perha ps purcha se controlled su bs tanc e s f ro m Mr . Jon e s? A. Ye s, tha

t a pe rs on that he kn e w by To ny , and a lso kn e w h is f

ull name of

An ton io J ones, that he c ould purcha se coc aine f rom that person, g ave me the addre ss of 3288 Niag ara Court a s being his residenc e and two othe r locations where he would meet the informant, or the conce rned c itiz en at that tim e, to make the deliverie s of coc aine, one of those beingon Stewarts F err y near I -40 and the other one being closer dow ntown of f N or th 1 st. Th e qu e sti on ingthe n tu

rn e d to the ste ps Do ne g an to ok to i nv e sti g a te Jone s. J ones ar g ues that the a dmission of that evidence violates his Confr ontation Clause rig hts. He did no t r a ise a

Con fr on ta tio n Cl a

us e ob je c tion t o th e a dmi ssi on

of the e vid e nc e a t tr ia l. “ B e c a us e 4 De fe nd ant r a ise d o nly

a he ars ay ob je c tio n to the se state me nts a t tr ia l, a nd did no t c ha lle ng e the ir admissibili ty

on constitutional g rounds, our revie w is g overne d by the plain err or standar d.” United States v. Hadley , 431 F.3d 484, 498 ( 6th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to plain er

ror r eview, a

n appellate court may only corr ect an err or not raised at trial if there is (1) e rror , (2) that is plain, and ( 3) that af fec ts substantial rights.” United States v. Cromer ,No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 21 - 389 F.3d 662, 672 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “I f all three conditions are me t, an appellate cour t may then exercise its discre tion to noti ce a forf eited er ror, but only if (4) the err or seriously aff ect[s] the fairne ss, integ rity , or public reputati o n o f j u d i cial proce eding s.” Ibid. (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). I n Cra wfo rd , the Supreme Court he ld that “[w] here testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . the Sixth A me nd

ment de mand s w hat th e c omm on law r e qu ir e d: u

nava ila bil ity and a pr ior op po rt un ity for c ross-examination.” 541 U.S. at 68. The Court noted t hat t he C onfrontation C lause “does not bar the use of te stimoni al statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asser ted.” Id . at 59 n.9. I n Cromer , w e de c lare d th a t “ [t]he pr op e r inq uir y ” fo r w he the r a

state me nt i s te sti mon ia l is “whe ther the de clar ant intends to b ea r t es t i m o ny ag ainst the ac cused.” “That intent, in turn,” we continued, “ma

y be deter mined by query ing w hether

a re asonable person in the de clar ant’s position would anticipate his statement being used ag ainst the ac cused in investig ating and prose cuting the crime.” 38 9 F.3d at 672, 675. The Cromer court he ld that statements by a C.I . to police ar e testimonial. Id . at 675. I t commented: Ti ps pr ov ide d b y

c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ants are kno wi ng ly and purp os e ly

ma de to a uth or iti e s, a c c us e so me on e of a c ri me , a nd of te n are us e d a g a ins t th e a c c us e d at tr ia l. Th e ve ry fa c t th a t th e inf

or mant i s c on fiden ti a l– i.e ., that no t e ve n h is i de nti ty is dis c los e d to the de fe nd ant– he ig hte ns the da

ng e rs inv olv e d in a llo wi nga de c lara nt t o bear testimony

without confrontation. The allowanc e of a nony mous accusations of crime w ithout any

o p p o rtunity

for c ross-examination would make a moc kery of the Confrontation Clause. Ib id
.No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

Cromer wa s convicted by jury of possessing c ocaine with intent to dis tribute. Id . at 665. 5 - 22 - The Cromer

court then addre ssed whether i n that case parts of the lead police investigator’s trial testimony

that disclosed information provide d to her by a C
. I
. v iolated the def endant’ s Confront at i o n Clause rig hts. 389 F.3d at 675-79. The Cromer court divided the r eleva

nt parts of 5 the police of

fice r’s testimony

into three sec tions for purposes of its analy sis. Id . at 675-79. I n th e fi rs t se c tio n, the of fi c e r w a s a sk e d on dire c t e xami natio n w hat he r r ole wa s in investigating the defe ndant. She responde d that she had rec eived information about a p ar t i cu l ar addre ss, and that she be g an investig ating the addr ess in connec tion with drug a ctivity , as a r esult of which she c ame up with enoug h information for a s ea rc h wa rr ant. Cromer , 389 F.3d at 675. The Cromer c ourt no te d that that a sp e c t of the of fi c e r’ s te sti mony

did no t vi olate the Con fr on ta tio n Cl a us e beca use it arguably

did not put any

statements from the C.I . befor e the jury , and ev en i f i t d i d, the testi m o n y “wa s provided mer ely

by way of bac kg round.” The court stated that the Confrontation Clause does not bar assertions offe red not for the truth of t heir content but rather to expl ain why

the g overnme nt commence d the investig ation. By contra st, the Cromer court held that the second section of the office r’s testimony that
reve aled state ments by

the C.I . did amount to a Conf ro n t at ion Clause violation. Also on direct examination, the officer

was a sked the names of the pe ople the poli ce believed, pr ior to executing the
sear ch of the re s i d en ce i n question, to be associated with the illeg al ac tiviti es at that a ddress. She responde d by saying that one was “ a per son nicknamed N ut, which is Mr. Sean Cromer .” 389 F .3d at 676. The Cromer

c o u rts t a t e d

t h a t“ [ t ] h i s t e s t i m o n y w a s n o to f f e r e d m e r e l y t o e x p l a i nw h y aNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 23 - g ov e rnme nt i nv e sti g a tio n w a s und e rt a ke n o r t o d e mon str a te the e ff e c t of the ou t- of

-c ourt state me nts on the offic ers,” but that “the purpose of this testimony could only

have be en to help esta

blish that the per son nicknamed ‘ Nut’ . . . , which the prosec ution de monstrated elsewhe re in the tria l was Sean Cromer’s nic kname, ha d been involved w ith the i lleg al drug activity occur ring at t he . . . re sidence .” Id . at 676. The Cromer

court found the first and sec ond sections of the police office r’s testimony –based on statements by

the C.I .–distinguishable on the following g rounds: the sec ond implicated Cromer in a wa y that w e nt t o th e he art

of the pr os e c uti on ’s c a se ; the fi rs t only a llu de d in

the va g ue st p os sib le te rm s to the C.I .’ s sta te me nts and lin ke d thos e state me nts wi th a c tio ns take n b y the of fi c e r; the fi rs t br ie fl y e xpla ine d w hy

the g ov e rnme nt b e g an th e inv e sti g a tio n of the re sid e nc e and “ a t le a st a

rgua bly provided some a ss i s t ance in understandingthe bac kg round of the c ase.” The c ourt noted that the second section informed the jury that the C .I
. had im plicated “Nut” in illega l activities, and stated that
any a tte mpt to l ink tha t to su bs e qu e nt p oli c e a c tiv iti e s w a s a “ sh a m” ; th e c e ntr a l le g a l iss ue in the c a se
wa s n ot w he the r i lle g a l a c tiv ity too k p la c e a t th e re sid e nc e bu t r a the r w he the r C ro me r k no wi ng ly pa rt ic ipate d in

it. As such, the c ourt found that “e vidence that the g overnme nt f ocused its investig ation on Nut is helpful t o the j ury only insofar as it relates to the di fficult question whether Cromer was involved in t h e i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y , ” an d c o n c l u d e d t h a t “ t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s t e s t i m o n y w a s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e tr

uth of the matter asser

ted: to prove that Cromer was, indeed, involved in the illeg al ac tivity , as stated by the CI .” Id . at 676 -7 7. F or sim ila r re a so ns , the c ourt

fo un d th a t th e thi rd

c a te g or y of ob je c tio na bleNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 24 - testimony , the offic er’ s testimony on redire ct re g ardinga phy sical desc ription of Cromer provide d by the CI , also violated the Confrontation Cl ause. Id . at 678. The Cromer

court found that the err or was plain under Cra wfo rd , and that Cromer ’s substantial rig hts were v i o l ated be cause , in light of the c loseness of the f acts of that case , “the admission of statements direc tly ty ing Crome r to the cr ime likely impacted the outc ome of the tria l.” Acc ording ly , the cour

t reve rsed Cromer ’s conviction. Id . at 679. Cromer makes clear that statements m ade by a C .I
. to the pol ice can be “testimonial.” The question, in t h at ca s e as we ll as in this one, then becomes w hether the trial testimony

of the police office r that re fer s to statements made to the off icer by a non-te stify ing C.I . is o ff er ed to provide 1) ba c kg ro un d in fo rm a tio n r e g ard ing t he in ve sti g atio n a nd wh y the po lic e a c te d a s th e y

did , o r 2 ) t o pr ov e the tr

uth of the ma tte r as se rt e d. I n this c a se , D on e g an’ s te sti mony re g ard ingwh a t th e C.I . to ld him about J ones provided inf ormation to the jury

about why

Doneg an investig ated Jones, and that testimony was tied to subseque nt actions taken by the police. F urthermore, it could be a rg ued that the district court’s inter

vention and instruction mitigate d the ef fec t of the C.I .’s statements. On the other hand, Doneg an’s testimony repe ating the C.I .’s statements squar ely implicated J ones as r esiding at 3288 Niag ara , and tied J ones to dr ug activities based at that addre ss. Whil e ther e
are no expli cit indicati o n s that the prosec utor elicited the te stimony for the pur

pose of using the
e vid e nc e fo r t

he subst anc e of

the ma tte r a sse rt e d, the fo rm of the pr os e c uto r’ s q

ue sti on vir tua lly
ensure d that Doneg an’s r esponse would be inculpatory on one or all of the centr al leg al issues in the
case . Fur thermore , a re view of the trial transc ript shows no ar guments or conf usion over why

the police investig ated Jones. Under Cromer , it seems that t he admission of Done g an’s testimonyNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 25 - reg ardingtestimonial sta t ements made by the C.I . wer e in fa ct offe red f or the truth of the matter
asser ted, rather than to serve “the purpose of explaining how certain e vents came to pass or why the office rs took the ac tions they did,” 389 F.3d at 676, and that the district cour t committed plain error in admitting it. The e rror did not affe ct J ones’s substantial rig hts, h o we v er . “An e rror aff ects substantial ri gh t s when the error

was pre judicial, that is, when it ‘af fec ted the outcome of

the district court pro ce edings.’” United States v. Page , 2 3 2 F. 3 d 5 3 6 , 5 4 4 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Olano , 5 07 U. S. 7 25 , 734 (1 99 3) ). Th e g ov e rnme nt pr e se nte d pro of of fo ur c ontr oll e d d

ru g buy s; i n 65 5 J os e ph the po lic e fo un d dru g s and a sc a le ; in 32 88 Ni a g ara the y fo un d la rg e a mou nts of dr ug s, firea rms, photos of the def

endant with fire arms, photos of the de fenda nt wear ing c lothing found at that residenc e, and pa

perw ork of Jones’s; J ones admitted t o l i v i n g at 3288 Niag ara and g ave the police information reg ardinghis drug supplier and the l ocation of some of t he fire arms in the house, which he s ai d h e k ept for protection. Unde r these c ircumstance s, J ones ca nnot show that the admission of the one brie f part of Doneg an’s testimony in which Doneg an re peate d statements from the C.I . a ff

e c te d th e ou tc ome of

his tr ia l.

2. Rec ordings of

the contr olled drug b uys The g overnme nt sought to play at trial re cording s of the contr olled drug buy s betwee n J ones and the C.I . J ones objec ted on the basis of he arsa y and lac kof foundation. Following a dditional fo u n d at i o n testimony , the district court ove rruled the objection, althoug h the re cording s were not
a dmi tte d in to e vid e nc e un til la te r, wh e n Jon e s r e a sse rt e d h is l a c k- of -f ound atio n o bje c tio n a

nd a lsoNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 26 - objected unde r F eder al Rule of Evidenc e 404(b) , the rule g ener ally prohibiting evidenc e of prior ba d acts. The jury

asked to a

nd did list en to one of the rec ording s during deliberations, a ppare ntly to hear a sample of

J ones’s voice
. Jone s c ha lle ng e s the a dmi ssi on of the re c or din g s a s a vio la tio n of his Con fr on ta tio n Cl a us e rig hts. Ag ain, bec ause he did not raise that specific objection below, the c halleng e is revie wed f or plain err or. J ones’s challeng e is unava iling. In United States v. Se xton , 1 19 F . App ’x 73 5, 74 1- 43 (6 th Cir . 2 00 5) , w e he ld t

hat th e a dmi ssi on

of re c or din g s invo lvi nga

C.I . a nd a de fe nd ant d id n ot v iol a te the Confrontation Clause be cause the portions not involving the C.I
. wer e party admissions a nd the portions involving the C.I . wer e off ere d not for the truth of the matters asse rted but to “g ive meaning to the admissible r esponses of [t he defe ndants].” The Third Circuit ha s come to the same c onclusion via simil ar rea soning in United States v. He ndricks , 395 F.3d 173, 182-84 (3d Ci r. 2005) a dding that the portions of t h e re cording s containing the def endant’ s and co- conspirator ’s statements we re not testimonial and fell outside of Cra wfo rd for that r eason.) . The Third Circ uit held that “if a D efe ndant
or his or he r c oc on sp ir a tor

make s st a te me nts a s p art

of a re c ipr oc a l and

int e g ra te d c on ve rs a tio n w ith a g overnme nt informant who later become s unavailable for tria l, the Confrontation Clause does not bar the introduction of the informa nt’s portions of t he conversation as are rea sonably require d to place the def endant or coconspirator’s nontestimonial statements into context .” Ib id
. J ones’s stateme nts capture d on the re cording s are party admissions and nontestimonial and do not violate the Confrontation Clause. Although the prosec utor did not state exactly why he had moved for the admission of the rec ording s, nor did the district court state w hy it overruled Jones’sNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 27 - objections, it is clear that the portions of the re cording s capturingthe C.I
. ’s statements wer e not offe red for t he truth of t he matters asser ted but rathe r, as in Sexton and Hendrick s , to give meaning to J ones’s stateme nts by

placingthem in context. That is bolstered by the fa ct that the district cour t
overr uled J ones’s he arsa

y objection. Even if the por

tions of the rec ording s containing the C.I .’s statements we re of fer ed for the truth of what the C .I . said on them, howeve r, and the admission of them violated the Confrontation Clause, the admission did not substanti al l y af fec t J ones’s rights, for the re asons discussed a bove. That the jury asked to hear a sample of J ones’s voice from the tapes, and evidently did hear some part of the tape s (the re cord doe s not specify what they

hear d), does not alter

that conclusion. B. Pr osecutor ial m iscondu ct J ones allege s in his pro se supplemental br ief that the pr osecutor c ommitt ed misconduct by threatening Candac e Shelton. J ones asser ts that the prosec utor, in the courtroom while the jury was excused, told Shelton t hat she would rec eive a life sentenc e if she te stified on behalf of the de fense , and that the prosec utor had e arlier “instructed Ms. Shelton to rec ant her suppression hea

ring statements and in r eturn would g rant he r immunity .” Jones attached to his pro se supplemental brief
an a ff ida vit fr om S he lto n e sse nti a lly

c on ve y ingtho se and

sim ila r a lle g a tio ns . Neither J ones’s a lleg ation of prose cutorial misconduct nor the i nformation in Shelton’s aff idavit on which that alleg ation is based we re pr esente d to the district court. We will not consider J ones’s a lleg ations of prosec utorial misconduct, which we re not ra ised or rule d upon below and a re not sufficiently

develope d on appeal. Se e PA CCA R I nc . v . Te le Sc an Te c hs ., L.L. C. , 319 F.3d 243, 258 (6th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ); United States v. Cinnamon , 112 F. App’ x 415, 419 n.4 (6th Cir. 2004) (pe rNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

The indictment did not specify the drugtraff

icking crime unde rlying c ount 2. I t stated that 6 Jo n e s ’ s a ll e g e d

p o s s e s sion of

f ir e ar ms in f u rth e r an c e o f

th a t d r u g tr a f f ic k in g c r im e o c c u r

r e d “ [i ]n - 28 - c ur iam) . Jon e s h a s p re sent ed no c ir c ums tanc e s th a t w ou ld j us tif y our c on sid e ri ngthe a lle g a tio ns . See U nited States v. Lane , 909 F.2d 895, 900 ( 6th Cir. 1990) (interna l quotation marks omitted). C. Adm iss ion of e vid e nc e of t he pr iorc ont r oll e d dr ug s ale s byJo ne s t o t he C. I. I n his pro se supplemental br ief, Jones arg ues t h a t the district court er

red in a dmitti ng evidenc e of the c ontrolled drugsales betwe en Jones and the C.I
. that took place on J une 5, 14, and 17, 2002. He a sserts that the evide nce violate d Fe dera l Rule of Evi d en ce 404(b) a nd that the district court abused its discre tion in admitt ing the evidenc e. Rule 404(b) provide s in releva nt pa rt that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wr ong s, or ac ts is not
a d m i s s i b l e t o p r o v e t h e c h ar a c t e r o f a p e r s o n i n o r d e r t o s h o w a c t i o n i n c o n f o r m i t y t h e r e w i t h
. It m ay, howeve r, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of m otive, opportunity , intent, prepa ration, plan, knowledg e, identity , or abse nce of mistake or ac cident.” Although the drugsales betwe en Jones and the C.I . on J une 5, 14, and 17, 2002, w ere not char g ed as substantive c ounts in the indictment, the g overnme nt introduced e vidence of those drug sales at tria l, including testim ony by Doneg an and the recording s of the tra nsactions. J ones objec ted at t rial on m ultiple occasions on 404(b) g rounds to the admission of that evidenc e. The prosec utor stated that the evidenc e of the drug sales from J ones to the C.I
. prior to Jones’s arr est was introduce d
no t f or the re a so n p ro hib ite d b y

40 4( b) bu t a s e vid e nc e re la te d to c ount 2 , po sse ssi on of fi re arm s in further ance of a dr

ug traff icking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
. The prose cutor a sserted that J ones possessed the firea rms in further anc e o f t h e following drugtraff icking crimes : 1)

6No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

or ar ound J une 2002.” Th e pr os e c uto r a lso argue d th a t th e e vid e nc e wo ul d be us ed wi th r e sp e c t to c ount 1 to 7 establish the motive, opportunity , and intent to distribute the cra ck and c ocaine
. - 29 - possession with intent to distribute, a s char g ed in c ount 1; 2) conspirac y with his supplier, Fe rnando Go nza le s, to o bta in a

nd dis tr ibute c oc a ine ; and 3) ma int a ini ng32 88 Ni a g ara a s a dr ugho us e , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856. The prosecutor claimed t hat t he evidence of the drugsales on June 5, 14, and 17, 2002, wa s introduced to ser ve as e vidence of those pre dicate dr ug traff icking crimes. The district court admitted the e vidence on that g round. 7 I n discussing count 2 during his c losing a rg ument, the prosec utor stated that amongthe drug traff icking crimes Jones committed in furthera nce of which he possessed firearms we re posse ssion with intent to dis tribute cra ck and c ocaine on the day he wa s arr ested, maintaining a drug house, and
a drug -traf

ficking conspirac y with F erna ndo. I n the district c ourt’s instructions to the jury , the cour t stated: “Count 1 alleg es drugtraff icking on or about June 19, 2002. There has bee n testimony about dr ugtr a ff ic kin g pr ior

to Jun e 19
. Th a t evi de nc e wa s adm itt e d a s p e rt ine nt t o th e c ha rg e in C ount 2 of the Indictment that Ihave just explained to y ou.” The dist rict court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidenc e of the controlled drug tr ans a c tio n a s e vid e nc e of the g ov e rnme nt’ s ca se on c ount 2, an d in instr uc tin g the jur

y that it wa s to consider the evidenc e for

that purpose. See U

nited States v. Frede rick , 406 F.3d 754, 761 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ) ( f i n d i n g n o a

b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt ’ s a d m i s s i o n o f t e s t i m o n y b y a wi tne ss
re co unting pr ior drugdealingby the def endant whe re the defe ndant was c harg ed with, i n t e r a lia ,No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 30 - possession of marijuana

with intent to dis tribute and possession of a fire arm in fur thera nce of a drug traff icking crime, a

nd wher e the testimony

serve d as evide nce w ith respec t to the firea rm cha rg e). I n United States v. Dunn , 805 F.2d 1275, 1280 (6th Cir. 1986), this court stated that “[w]hen oth e r c ri me s a lle g e dly committ e d b y the de fe nd ant a

re int ro du c e d f or a purp os e oth e r t

ha n th os e expli citly listed in Rule 404(b), the evidenc e mus t nonetheless be subjected to Rule 404(b) inquiry in o rd e r t o e ns ur e that it

is n ot u se d to sh owthat, o n the oc c a sio n in qu e sti on , the a c c us e d ‘a c te d in confor mity there with,’ or to show the de fenda nt’s bad cha

rac ter or c riminal propensity .” The e vidence of the prior

drug sales fr om J ones t o the C .I
. passes thi s court’s tripa rtite test for deter mining admissi bility of prior acts evidence under 404( b). See U nited States v. Hay wood , 280 F .3 d 7 15 , 719 -2 0 (6t

h Cir. 20 02 ) (s e tti ng ou t the tr ipa rt ite te st) . F ir st, the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion in impl icitly decidingthat the evidenc e of the prior ac ts–the controlled drug transac tions–was sufficie nt to s h o w th a t those prior ac ts actually

occur red. Un ite d S

tat es v . M att he ws , 44 0 F. 3d 81 8, 82 8- 29 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; Haywood , 28 0 F .3 d a t 72 0. Se c on d, the dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y found, as d i s cu s s ed ab ove, that the e vidence of the other acts wa s probative of

an issue other

than char acte r. Third, the district cour t did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the probative value of the evidenc e wa s substantially outweig hed by its potential prejudicia l effe ct. See H aywood , 280 F.3d at 723 (dist rict court may implicitl y make that deter mination by admitting the evidenc e). W hile the
e vid e nc e of

Jone s’ s p ri or

dr ugde a lin g may

have ha d a

pr e jud ic ia l impa c t on

the jur y wi th r e sp e c t to count 1, there wa s co nsiderable other e vidence on the issue, and the district c ourt’s limiti ng instruction to the jury

mitigated a

ny such pre judice.No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 31 - F ina lly , e ve n if

the a dmi ssi on

of the e vid e nc e was erro neous u nd e r 4 04 (b ), it i s su

bje c t to harmless e rror

analy sis, and in this case any error wa s harmless in light of the other ove rwhe lming evidenc e of the defe ndant’s g uilt on the three counts. United St ates v. Mac k , 2 58 F .3 d 5 48 , 5 55 (6 th Cir. 2001). D. Claim s relate d to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1) I n his pro se suppleme ntal brief, Jones makes seve ral a rg uments relate d to 18 U.S.C. § 35 59 (c )( 1) . Jon e s w a s not pr os e c ute d und e r 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 9( c )( 1) , a nd that st a tut or

y pr ov isi on

is not otherwis e re l evant to thi s case . See, e .g. , Goins , 53 F. App’ x at 730 (re fusing to import the require ments of § 3559(c )(1) into § 841(b)(1)( A)). E. Cha r ac te r iz at ion of Jo ne s’ s pr e vio us s ta te c onv ic ti on fo r pos se ssi ng . 5 g r am s o r le ss of c oc ain e as a fe lon y J on es ar gues in his pro se supplementa l brief that his prior Te nnessee state convic tion for possessing le ss than .5 g rams of c ocaine did not count as a “felony ” for the purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) , and thus could not be used a s one of the pr edicate offe nses trig g eringhis mandatory life sentenc e under

§ 841(b)( 1)(A)
. Firs t , this challeng e is futile. As discussed su pra part I I , subsection C.1., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)( 1)(A) require s only two prior felony drug convictions to trigg er a mandatory

life sentenc e, and J ones’s other

two prior Te nnessee state felony drug convictions, both for selling 26 g rams or more of c oc a ine , amou nt to se pa rate e pis od e s and

thu s o n th e ir

ow n c an f

ulf il the pr e dic a te of

fe ns e
re qu ir e me nt.No. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 32 - Second, the arg ument is waived. At the s entenc ing he aring , J ones’s c ounsel ac knowledg ed t h a tt h e p r i o r

c o n v i c t i o no f

w h i c h J o n e s c o mp l a i n s h e r e w a s a f e l o n y. Third, the ar g ument is almost certainly incorre ct. 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) define s “fe lony drug offe nse” a s “an of

fense that is punishable by imprisonment f or more than one y ear

under a ny law of the United States or of a S tate . . . that prohibits or re stricts conduct re lating to na rcotic dr ug s . . . .” On Octobe r 19, 2000, Jones plea ded g uilty in Tennesse e state c ourt to (in his handwriting ) “poss. of less than 1/2 G of c ocaine ” in ca se number 2000 I 943. The Te nnessee state cour t judgment, dated October 22, 2000, noted that J ones wa s convicted of “Poss of [il leg ible] .5g coc” under Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417. T he judg ment stated that the c rime involved a sc hedule I Idrug and constituted a cla ss C felony . On that count Jones was sentenc ed to s ix y ear s in a workhouse and a $2,000 fine. Th e pr e -s e nte nc e inv e sti g a tio n re po rt in t his c a se de no te d th a t st a te c on vic tio n a s “ Pos se ssi on wi th I n te n t t o Se ll L e s s T h an. 5 G m o f Co c a in e . ” Se c ti o n3 9

- 1 7
- 4 1 7 p r o h ib it s , int e r a lia , p o s s es s i n g a controlled substanc e with i ntent to deliver or sell it; it does not prohibit simpl e possession. Section 39-17-417( a)( 4). Unde r Section 39-17- 417(c) (2)( A), possessing with intent to deliver/sell less than .5 g rams of c ocaine , a Schedule I Idrug , is a Class C felony . We see nothing in the Tenne ssee Code that indicates that a Class C felony is not punishable by

more than a

y ear of imprisonment, and Jones was in fa ct sentenc ed to six y ear s’ imprisonment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-101, 40- 35-111, 40-35-112. Thus it a pp e ars tha

t Jone s w a s a c tua lly

c on vic te d in

Te nn e sse e of

po sse ssi ngwi th i nte nt t o de liv e r/ se ll l e ss t

ha n . 5 g ra ms o f c oc a ine un de r S e c tio n 39- 17 -4 17 , an d tha t the re fe re nc e s in the state
c ourt do c ume nts to pos se ssi on of .5 g ra ms o r l e ss o f c oc a ine we re sh or tha nd . T he of

fe ns e is p ro pe rl yNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 33 - a fe lony drug offe nse. J ones’s prior conviction could be used as a pr edicate conviction for sentenc ing enhanc ement pursua

nt to 21 U.S.C . § 841(b)( 1)(A)
. F . Suf fi ciency of the evid ence regar din g count 2, possession of fi rear m s in f urtherance
o f a d ru g tr a f

f i ck i n g cr i me I n h is pr o se su

pp le me nta l br ie f, Jone s argue s that his c on vic tio n fo r po sse ssi nga fi re arm in further ance of a dr

ug traff icking crime w as not supported by sufficie nt evidence
. “We must uphold a jury

verdic t if viewing the eviden ce i n a li g ht most favorable to the prosec ution, anyrational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a
rea sonable doubt.” United States v. Blood , 435 F.3d 612, 618 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and c i t at i o n s omitt ed). A dditionally , it appear s that J ones did not move for judg ment of
a c qu i t t a l p u r s u an t t o F e d e r a l R u l e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d

u r e 2 9 d u r i n g t r i a l o r

n o l a t e r t h ans e v e nd ays afte r the ve rdict, and thus we revie w the cla im fo r m i scar riag e of justice, w hich exist s “only if the
rec ord is devoid of e vidence pointing to g uilt.” Un ite d S tat es v . F ra nk lin , 415 F.3d 537, 554 (6th Cir. 2005). Se e als o U

nit e d S tat es v . D av is , 430 F.3d 345, 359 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Su ff i ci en t evidenc e exists t hat J ones construc tively possessed the f

irea rms found at 3288 Niag ara and that ther e wa s a spec ific nex us betwee n the firearms and the drugtraff icking offe nse of possession with intent t o distribute the cra ck (a lthough the ne x us could also be maintaininga drug house or c onspiring w ith his suppl ier, F erna ndo). See F

rederick , 4 06 F .3 d at 76 3- 65 ; United States v. Mac key , 265 F.3d 457, 460- 63 (6th Cir. 2001). Suf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e su

pp or ts Jon e s’ s c on str

uc tiv e po sse ssi on

of the g un s. Jone s “ kn ow ing ly ha[d] both the power

and the intention at a

ny g iven time to exercise dominion and contr ol” over theNo. 05-5010

U.S. v. J ones

- 34 - firea rms. Frederic k , 406 F.3d at 765 (interna l quotation marks and c itation omit ted). The g uns and drug s were found in close proxi mity in the 3288 Niag ara residenc e; the g uns were located in plac es clea rly chosen to ma

ke them easily acc essible; J ones admitted he re sided at 3288 Niag ara and that the g uns were his. Severa l rec ent circ uit court dec isions have found that suff icient evidenc e esta

blished constructive posse ssion of g uns in furthera nce of a drugtraff

ickin g crime in analog ous fac tual circ umstances. See, e.g., Unit ed States v. M cLee , 436 F.3d 751, 757-58 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Brooks , 43 8 F .3 d 1 23 1, 12 34 , 1 23 7- 38 (1 0th Cir . 2 00 6) ; Un ite d S

tat es v . S mi th , No. 05-2379, 2006 WL 535756, at ** 1-5 (11th Cir. Mar . 6, 2006). T h e e v i d en ce i s cl ea r t h at t h e f i re ar m s b o re a s p ec i fi c n ex u s t o J o n es ’s p o s s es s i o no f t h e d ru gs wi th i nte nt t o d istri bu te the m. I n th e ma ste r b e dr oo m of

32 88 Ni a g ara , tw o p ist ols , th e c ra c k, c ut, transac tion ledge rs, sca les, and ba g g ies wer e all found in a dresse r; near t h e d re sser wa s a saf e containing cash a

nd coca ine; under the mattress was a shot g un. Fur ther afield, a loade d .44 mag num
wa s f ound unde r a

c ou c h c us hio n in

the de n. Jone s a dmi tte d to re sid inga t 32 88 Ni a g ara and to possessing the g uns, he pointed out the location of some of the g uns during the sear ch, he said that he had the g uns for prote ction, and he w ent into detail reg ardinghis drug operations and supplier. Th e c ha lle ng e is w ith ou t me ri t. IV For the fore g oing r easons, we AFF I RM J ones’s c onvictions and sentenc e.