FOURTH D I VI SI ON DI L LA RD, P. J. , B ROWN and PA DGETT, JJ.

N O T IC E : M o tions for r e c ons i de r a tion m us t be phy s ic a lly r

e ce iv ed i n our c le r k ’s offic e w ithin te n da y s of the da te of de c is ion to be de e m ed tim e ly file d.

https ://w w w
. ga a ppe a ls .us /r ule s

M ay 24, 2024



# In t he C ourt o f A ppe a ls o f G e o r g ia

A 24A 0 1 59

. SCRUD D ER, B A SS, Q U I LLI A N, H ORLOCK , LA ZA RUS & A D ELE, LLP v

. B A RK EN et al.

D I L L A R D , Presid ing J u d ge.

I n this disc retio nary ap p eal, Sc ru d d er, B as s, Qu illian, H o rlo c k , Laz aru s &

A d ele, L LP (“ t he Firm” ) c hallenges the trial co u rt’ s o rd er granting atto rney f ees and
litigatio n exp enses u nd er OCGA § 9- 1 5- 1 4 (b) t o Rho nd a B ark en, t he so le heir and

ad ministratrix o f the Estate o f D aniel James B ark e n. The Firm argu es the trial c o urt

erred by (1 ) ap p lying a negligenc e stand ard to s u a spo n te imp o se sanc tio ns u nd er

OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b); ( 2) p u nishing the Firm w hen there is a l a c k o f e v id enc e tosu p p o rt sanc tio ns; and (3) imp osing an exc essi v e p e n a l t y n o t t a i l o r e d t o the sanc tio ned

c o nd u c t

. 1 Fo r the f

o llo wing reaso ns, w e rev erse.

I n J anu ary 201 2, B a rk en’ s hu sband w as stru c k and killed b y ano ther v ehic le

w hile d r iv ing his mo to rc yc le in a rev ersible lane in A t lanta. B ark e n p ro c e e d ed to f ile

su it against the City o f A tlanta and tw o p u blic w o r k s e m p lo yees: A nn Green, a traf f ic

systems o p erato r d u ring the time in qu estio n, and Kev in Billu p s, a traf f ic s u p erv iso r. 2

B a rk en asserted t he d ef

end ants f ailed to insp ec t a n d m a i n tain a traf f ic signal go v erning

the f lo w o f traf

f ic in t he rev ersible lane, thu s c au sing o r c ontribu ting to the ac c id ent

that k illed he r h u s band

. The City’ s law d ep artment a nd an o u tsid e law f irm j o intly

rep resented all three d ef

end ants.

D u ring the ensu ing d isc o v ery p r o c ess, B ark en o btained three s erv ic e requ ests regard ing malf

u nc tio ning lane lights at the relev ant lo c atio n. Green o s tensibly c reated

1 Oral argu ment w as held in this c a se o n J a nu ary 9 , 2024, and is arc hiv ed o n the Co u rt’ s w ebsite. See Co u rt o f A p p eal s o f G e o rgia, Oral A rgu ment, Case N o
. A 24A 01 5 9 (J an. 9 , 2024), a v a ila b le a t http : //v imeo

. c om/9 01 6 739 7 4.

2 B ark en initially su ed the at- f au lt d riv er, the City, and f o u r plac eho ld er d ef

end ants. A f ter the at- f

au lt driv er w as d isc harged in b ank ru p tc y, B ark en dismissed the su it and filed

a renew al ac tio n against the City, 21 City emp lo yees, an d f iv e J o hn D o e d ef

end ants. Fo llo w ing the trial c o u rt’ s o rd er o n the parties’ j oint mo tio n to d ismiss, o nly the City, Green, and B illu p s remained

.
2t h e serv ic e requ ests on Sep t e mber 1 4, Sep tember 1 5 , and D ec e mber 2, 201 1

— o n l y

mo nths bef

o re t he f atal c o llisio n. A s a resu lt, G reen w a s later ask ed abo u t these

sp ec if ic serv ic e requ e sts—and serv ic e requ ests in general—in a 201 7 d ep o sitio n. 3

A c c o rd ing t o Green, a serv ic e requ est is an insp ec tio n no t a tio n o r a n initiatio n

o f serv ic e w hen a c o nstitu e nt calls the City w ith a c onc ern, at whic h p o int a t ec hnic ian

go es o u t to insp ec t the p ro blem. I f w ork is req uired ( e. g. , a signal bu lb need s to be

c hanged ), a w o r k o rd er is then c reated ; and w hen the w o rk is co mp lete, b o th the w o rk

o rd er and serv ic e requ est are c lo sed

.
A s p art o f her j ob d u ties at t he time, Gree n c r ea t ed serv ic e requ ests u sing

sp ec if ic c o mp u ter so f

tw are a nd then co ntac t ed the tec hnic ian assigned t o t he relev ant City qu a drant to no t if

y them o f the p ro blem (so they c o u ld insp ec t t he issu e). Green

w o u ld also no te in the system when the tec hnic ian w as c o ntac ted and t hen, sep arately,

w hen they arriv ed o n t he sc ene. I f the tec hnic ian rep o rted that t he rep o rted i ssu e

requ ired wo rk to f

ix it, G reen w o u ld t hen c reate a w o rk o rd er. A nd Green testif ied that

w hen a signal w as o u t o n a rev ersible lane, this w as c o nsid ered an emergenc y situ atio n

3 G reen d id no t do anything to p rep are f o r her 201 7 dep ositio n, inc lu d ing any rev iew

o f do c u ments. She a lso had no inv o lv ement in c o llec t ing d o c u ments p ro d u c ed f o r the c ase.

3and w as requ ired to be c o d ed that w ay. She was then s h o w n the s erv ic e requ ests

relev ant to this c ase.

The f irst serv ic e requ est—f

r o m Sep tember 1 4th—ref lec ted Green’ s name and

t h e u niqu e id entif

ic atio n nu mber she used w ithin t he serv ic e- requ est so f tw are s y s t e m
. She resp o nd ed to qu estio ns abo u t this requ est as f o llo w s: Q: D o e s this tell yo u that yo u inp u t inf o rmatio n into this serv ic e requ est?

A : I t tells me that my name was u tiliz ed to c reate that requ est, yes.

Q: A nd I k no w this w as six years a go and I a ssu m e yo u d o n’ t hav e any sp ec if ic ind ep end ent rec o llec tio n sitting d o w n to t he c omp uter on
.

. . Sep tember 14th and inp u tting any o f this inf o rmat io n here; is that

c o rrec t?

A : That is c o rrec t.

Q: So u nless so mebo d y else lo gged in w ith yo u r [id en t i f i c a tio n]

nu mber, yo u assu m e this is inf ormatio n that yo u p u t into this f o rm?

A : Yes, sir.

Q: T he requ est typ e is TC9 02. Do y o u k no w w hat that stand s f o r?

4A : TC9 0 2 rep resents a no n- emergenc y requ est.

Q: A nd then it says, j ust b e l o w t hat no n- emergenc y, [‘ ]signal
rep air[’ ]; c orrec t?

A : That is c o rrec t.

Q: W hy wo u ld TC9 02 no n- emergenc y s ignal r ep air be typ ed in at that sp o t?

A : I hav e no id ea.

Q: I s that so mething yo u w o u ld hav e mad e a determinatio n abo u t if yo u w ere c r eating this f

o rm?

A : A bso lu tely no t.

Q: W hy no t ? W hy d o yo u say that?

A : B e c au se this — ac c o rd ing to the lo c atio n here, it’ s a lane light
requ est.

Q: So tell me w hy tho se tw o things d o n’ t matc h u p if that’ s w hat
yo u ’ re saying?

5A : B e c au se ac c o r d ing to o u r w o r k p rac tic e s, lane lights, esp e c ially

w ith a bu lb X o r a c hec k mark o r the LED S that are at the lo c atio n c o u ld be imp ed ing traf

f ic and it requ ires immed iate attentio n.

Green also agreed the Sep t ember 1 4th serv ic e requ est ind ic ated in the c o mments that

the red X lane light w as o u t , ac c o mp anied by her initials, as f o llo w s : Q: D o yo u k no w w hy [the requ est] says A M G ?

A : I t has my initials.

Q: So is that ho w yo u typ ic ally w o u ld end a c o mment lik e that?

A : That’ s my trad emark , yes.

Q: L o o k ing at that and seeing A M G , a r e y o u at least reaso nably

c ertain that tho se c o mments w ere typ ed by yo u ?

A : I c anno t say, sir.

Q: Yo u d o n’ t k no w
. It w as either s o m e b o d y u sing yo u r [id entif ic atio n nu mber] a nd signing o f f w ith yo u r initials o r it w as y o u ? Tho s e are the tw o o p tio ns; right?

A : That is c o rrec t.

6Green w as then ask ed abo u t t h e Sep tember 1 5th serv ic e requ est, w hic h she

tho u ght might be a d up lic ate o f the p rev io u s d a y ’ s requ est. She testif ied abo u t that

requ est as f

o llo w s:

A : I w o u ld n’ t hav e rep e ated this w ork tw ic e. I wo u ld hav e d o ne it

o nc e and c reated a w o rk o rd er to task the f i r s t o rd er, [the Sep tember
1 4th] serv ic e requ est, no t the sec o nd o ne.

To me this sec o nd serv ic e re q u e s t is r ed u nd a nt. Yo u k no w , it’ s d u p lic atio n, s o the same issu e hasn’ t been reso lv ed

. So it wo u ld n’ t hav e been c r e a t ed

. I w ou ld n’ t hav e c reated a sec o nd serv ic e requ est f o r the same lo c atio n w ith the same issu e.

Q: B ut that d id hap p en; right?

A : A c c o rd ing to here, yes.

Q: A nd c an yo u tell u s w hy that hap p ened ?

A : N o , sir.

D esp ite Green’ s testimo ny abo u t the stand ard p r o c ed u res f or serv ic e requ ests

and the c reatio n o f wo rk o rd ers, there was no ind ic a tio n o f any w o rk o rd er ev er being

c reated f o r either o f the Sep tember serv ic e requ ests. T here also w as no wo rk o rd er

7c reated f

o r the D ec ember 2nd serv ic e requ est, tho u gh it w as a lso c o d ed as a no ne mergenc y. Green f

urther testif

ied t hat it w as imp o ssible to determine f ro m t h e

serv ic e requ ests w hen the inf o r matio n w as entered into t he serv ic e -requ est so f tw are

system (w h e th e r on the date o f the requ e st o r a t a later time)—tho u gh she later

equ iv oc a ted and said she w o u ld hav e to ask the I T d ep artment.

Fo llo w ing Green’ s dep ositio n, Bark en r eq u ested tw o years’ w o rth o f time

sheets f o r ap p ro ximately 1 6 City emp lo yees in the traf f ic d iv isio n. A nd o n J anu ary 3,

201 8, the City p ro d uc e d ro u ghly 4,500 p ages o f rec o rd s, in cl u d i n g G r e e n ’ s a t t e n d a n c e

rec o rd s, w hic h s ho w e d t h a t s he w as no t a t w ork on Sep tember 1 5 o r D ec ember 2,

201 1 —tw o o f the three serv ic e requ est d ates. On J anu a ry 29 , 201 8, abo u t three w eek s

af ter the attend a nc e rec o rd s w ere pro d u c ed , the o u tsid e law f irm that had been

rep resenting the d ef

end ants w as su bstitu ted w ith Sc ru d d er, B ass, Qu illian, H o rlo c k ,
Laz aru s & A d ele, LLP.

M o re t han f

ou r years a f

ter the Firm to o k o ver rep resentatio n of the def end ants,

the c ase w as c alled to t r ial o n M arc h 1 , 2022. Bu t j u st bef ore o p ening statements w ere

to b e gin o n M arc h 2, the Firm inf o rmed the trial c o u rt it had j u st bec o me aw are o f a

8c o nf

lic t that p rec lu d ed it fro m co ntinu ing to rep resent all three def end ants. 4 A nd o u t

o f co nc ern f

o r client co nf

id entiality, the Firm d id no t giv e many p artic u lars abo u t the

natu re o f the c o nf

lic t. B u t when ask ed to estimate “a p o int in time” w hen the c o nf lic t

aro se, the Firm resp o nd ed that “ the c o nf lic t, itself , altho u gh w e w ere u naw are o f it,

w o u ld hav e arisen mu l t i p l e years ago
. ” Bu t the Firm did no t believ e the c o nf lic t

p red a ted the filing o f the renew al ac tio n in 201 6 , and it said the inf ormatio n pro v id ed

to it that m o rning was “ brand new
. ” So , immed iately af ter learning o f t he c o nf

lic t, the

Firm inv estigated its legal and ethic al o bligatio ns.

The Firm then requ ested a c o ntinu anc e (so eac h c l i e n t c o uld ac qu ire

ap p ro p riate rep r esentatio n), exp la ining that it had d o ne its “ d u e d iligenc e and o nly

bec a m e aw are o f this c onf lic t, w hic h is v ery, v ery d if f e r ent, j ust to d a

y,” and w as

u naw are of “ w hat c o u ld hav e been d o ne p rev io usly to hav e f o u nd o u t t his inf

o rmatio n beyo nd w hat w e hav e d o ne alread y” bec au se the inf o rmatio n it rec e iv ed that mo rning

w a s e n t irely new
. N e v ertheless, the trial co u rt no ted that—in the absenc e o f an y

inf o rmatio n abo u t t he natu re o f the c o nf lic t—it w as u nable to d etermine w hether

4 T he atto rney ap p e a r i n g o n b e half of the City of A tlanta Law D ep artment also ind ic a ted that he no w had the same c o nf lic t, tho u gh he was u nsu re whe t h e r the c o nf lic t ap p lied to the entire D ep artment.

9w ithd r aw al w as requ ired u nd er the Geo r gia Ru les o f Pro fessio nal Co nd u c t

. The c o urt

then c o ntinu ed the case f or f iv e d ays a nd ad v i se d i t w o u ld “entertain a su bstitu tio n

o f c o u nsel in the interim p erio d,” tho u gh it did n o t intend to f u rther c o ntinu e the trial.

T w o d ays later, the Firm f iled an emergenc y mo tio n to w ithd raw , asserting—w itho ut any ad d itio nal d etails—that, o n t he mo rning o f M arc h 2, 2022, it

“ learned o f new inf

o r m a t i o n f

ro m [its] c lients” giv ing rise to a c o nf lic t w hic h

p rec lu ded its co ntinu ed rep resentatio n. A nd w hen the trial resu med , t he trial c o urt

held a hearing o n the emergenc y mo tio n, du ring whic h the Firm s aid o nly p reliminary

step s w ere tak en to s ec u re new c o u nsel f o r the d ef end ants. The Firm again ref u sed to

d isc lo se t he b a s i s f

o r the co nf

lic t of interest o n the gro u nd s o f client c o nf id entiality

and requ ested to be heard by the c o u rt in c amera to p ro v id e ad ditio nal inf ormatio n.

B ut the c o u rt ref

used this r equ e st, c laiming t hat it w o uld “ c reate[ ] the p o ssibility that

the [ c ]o u rt might need to be d isqu alif ied f ro m a c ase that has been o n my d o c k et sinc e

201 6 , and that is no t go ing to hap p en. ”

The trial c o u rt d ec lared a mistrial, bu t d e c id ed —o n its o w n mo tio n—to

“ pro c eed w ith hearing the issu e o f r ep ayment o f p laintif f ’ s e xp enses f

o r p rep aring f

o r

trial against c ou nsel” u nd er OCGA § 9

- 1 5

- 1 4 (b). The trial c o u rt then o p ened

10d isc ov ery so B ar k e n c o u l d inv estigate the c o nf lic t o f interest and f

ile any brief o r

af f id av its related to the c o u rt’ s mo tio n.

D u ring t h i s d isc o v ery p ro cess, B a rk en learned that—d u ring j u ry

selec tio n—Green rev iew ed her 201 7 d ep o sitio n and d ec id e d to lo g in to her emp lo yee

p o rtal to v iew her attend anc e rec o r d s f o r the dates in q u estio n bec au se she w as

c o nc e rned abo u t the inf

o rmatio n c o ntained in the relev ant serv ic e requ ests. 5 I n d o ing

so , Green realiz ed that s h e w a s no t at w o rk o n tw o o f the three d ates at issu e and

bro u ght this inf

o rmatio n to t he Firm’ s attentio n. I n d o ing so , Green relayed her belief

5 The p o r t al p ro v id e d the same inf o rmatio n c o ntained in t he attend a nc e rec o rd s t hat the City tu r ned o v er in J anu ary 201 8, bu t Green testif ied it d id no t o cc u r to her to c hec k her attend anc e rec o r ds—o r ev e n that it w as p o ssible to c hec k as far bac k as 201 1—u ntil M arc h 2, 2022. She f

u rther testif

ied that she c o u ld no t hav e c hec k ed her attend a nc e rec o rd s p rio r to her dep o sitio n in 201 7 bec au se p u blic

- w o rk s management at that time wo u ld no t p ermit it. W h en Green w a s ask ed w hether it w o u ld hav e been p o ssible f o r her to ac c e ss the inf o rmatio n that led her to bec ome s u sp ic io u s o f t he r elev ant serv ic e requ ests p rio r to M a r c h 2, 2022, she ind ic ated it wo u ld no t hav e b een p o ssible bec au se she believ es “ so me p ap erw o rk is being hid d en. ” A lo ng these lines, Green also ind ic ated that when she bec ame
c o nc erned a bo ut the serv ic e requ ests in 2022, she w ent f o r t he f irst time to lo o k f

o r d isp atc h lo g sheets that she w o u l d h a v e m aintained in her p o sitio n d u ring the time in qu estio n, bu t the lo gs f

o r Sep tember 201 1 thro u gh J anu ary 201 2 w e re no lo nger sto red in the c o ntro l c enter with all o t her d isp atc h lo gs—w hic h she c o u ld no t exp lain. A nd w hen she

w as ask ed w hy s he had no t prev io u sly lo o k ed f o r these d isp a tc h lo gs, Green exp lained t hat her f o c us at the t ime o f her 201 7 d ep o sitio n was o n her new emp lo yme n t p o s i tio n in a d if f erent City d ep artment, a nd it w as her assu m p tio n that City Law D ep artment atto rneys
w o u ld hav e lo o k ed f

o r the lo g sheets.

11that so meo ne else c reated the s erv ic e requ ests u sing h er id entif ic atio n nu m ber and

initials “ t o mak e it lo o k a s if I w as at w o rk on the d ays I was of f

. ” Ev en s o , she agreed

it w as p o ssible to b e absent o n the days in qu estio n and still hav e entered inf o rmatio n

into the system w hen she retu rned at a later d a te. B u t c o n t r a r y to so me o f her 201 7

testimo ny, Green sai d i n h er 2022 d e p o sitio n testimo ny t hat the serv ic e requ ests

ref lec t “ in real time” w hen they are initiated in the system a nd the initiatio n o r

c reatio n date c a nno t be altered later, tho u gh o ther d ates w ithin a serv ic e requ est ca n

be altered

.
Green ref u sed t o sp ec u late as to w hy so meo ne w o u ld p o ssibly f o r ge do c u ments

u sing her initials, bu t then s u ggested that it may hav e been a no ther emp lo yee w ho d id

no t lik e h e r
. B u t s h e ad mitted that, p rio r to M arc h 2, 2022, she had nev er been

c o nc e rned abo u t anyo ne f o rging d o c u m en t s u sing her inf o rmatio n. Ev e n so , Green

exp lained that a nyo ne in the d ep artment has t he ability to c reate a serv ic e requ est

u sing ano ther e m p l o y ee’ s u niqu e id entif ic atio n nu mber in t he s o f tw are system; bu t

she d id no t hav e any id ea as to who might hav e used her id entif ic a tio n nu mber o n the

o c c asio ns in qu estio n.

12The trial c o u rt c o nd u c ted a n e v i d entiary hearing in Oc to ber 2022, and

exp lained that the c ase w as resc hed u led f o r t rial the fo llo w ing Febru a ry, bu t that it

w o u ld still p ro c ee d w i t h co n s i d ering sanc t io ns u nd er OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 14 ( b ). A nd d u ring

the hearing, the Firm exp lained it interp reted Green’ s 201 7 d e p o sitio n testimo ny regard ing the serv ic e requ ests as h e r s a y i n g that it had been “ m any, many years; I

d o n’ t rec o llec t

. I ’ v e go t s o me qu estio ns; this lo o k s a little f u nny I’ m no t su re[,]” bu t

she “ nev er at any p o int .

. . said [‘ ]I d o n’ t believ e I d id this. I believ e so mebo d y else

d id it. [’ ]” A nd in su p po rt, the Firm p layed Green’ s 2022 v id eo d ep o sitio n, d u ring

w hic h she ind ic ated that she had no c o nc ern so meo ne w a s using her id entif ic atio n

nu mber to p lac e false inf

o rmatio n in serv ic e requ ests u ntil M arc h 2, 2022. A s a resu lt,

the Firm maintained it w as no t u ntil Green qu estio ned the au thentic ity o f the serv ic e

requ ests—the v alid ity o f w hic h the C i t y wo u ld rely u p o n in its d ef ense—that an

irrec o nc ilable c onf

lic t aro se. N ev erthel e s s , the trial c ou rt d ec id ed to sanc tio n the
Firm, and t hen heard testimo ny f ro m three o f B ark en’ s atto rneys as t o their f ees and
litigatio n exp enses.

The c ase w e nt o n to settle that s ame mo nth, af ter w hic h the trial c o u rt issu ed

its ru ling o n the OCGA § 9 -1 5- 1 4 (b) f ees. I n its o r d e r , the c o u rt co nc lu d ed that

13Green’ s 201 7 d e p ositio n “ sho w s t h a t it w as p lainly c o ntemp lated by M s. Green in

201 7 that she w as u nc e rtain as to the o rigin o f entries that a p p ear to hav e been c reated

u nd er her name,” and her testimo ny “ go e s beyo nd m ere u nc ertainty

. . . and c learly

raised a signif

ic a nt qu estio n a s o f Sep tember

. . . 201 7 , as to w hether M s
. Green

c reated t he tw o s erv ic e r equ ests. ” The c o u rt f urther no ted that the Firm p o ssessed

the f ac ts and do cu ments u nd erlying the c o nf lic t sinc e its entry into the c ase in 201 8,

and so the c o nf

lic t “ p lainly c o u ld and sho u ld hav e been d isc o vered p rio r to trial. ”

I n ru ling against the Firm, the trial co u rt exp lic itly no ted that the d isc lo su re o f

the c o nf lic t w as n o t w hat it f

ou nd imp r o p er, bu t w a s instead t h e “ ov erall c o nd u ct

su rro u nd ing the d isc lo su re. ” Sp ec if ic ally, the co u rt to o k issu e w ith the Firm’ s f ailu re

to timely d isc lo se a n ap p arent c o nf lic t to the p o int o f a mistrial bec au se the nec essary

d isc lo su re o c c u rred af

ter a j ury w as selec ted

. A nd the c ou rt u ltimately c o nc lu d ed that

the f ailu re to d isc lo se the c o nf lic t p rio r to trial “ c o nstitu t e d a f a ilu re t o ac t w ith a

minimu m lev el of d iligenc e,” amo u nting to i m p ro p er c o nd u c t that u nnec essarily

exp and e d the p r o c eed ings.

The trial c o u rt rej ec ted the Firm’ s argu ment that o p p o sing c o u nsel need ed to

p rep a re f o r trial regard less o f the mistrial, sp e cu lating that “ it is mo re lik e ly than no t

14that all, or su bstantially all, o f the trial p rep aratio ns d o ne in antic ip a tio n o f the M arc h

1 , 2022 trial, w o u ld need to be red o ne, o r at a minimu m, c aref ully rec o nsid ered and

ev alu ated , co nsid ering the year- lo ng d e lay,” and giv en t hat the d ef enses “ hav e been

su bstantially altered

. ” The c o u rt then aw ard ed B a rk en $584,082. 45, whic h c o v ered

all o f t he f

ees a nd c o sts asso ciat e d w i t h trial prep aratio n and the OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4

mo tio n. W e granted the Firm’ s ap p lic atio n f or d isc retio nary rev iew , and this ap p eal

f o llo w s.

1

. T he Firm argu e s the t rial c o u rt erred by ap p lying a negligenc e stand ard to s u a

s p o n te imp ose sanc tio ns u nd er OCGA § 9 -1 5- 1 4 (b). A nd in a sep arate enu meratio n

o f erro r, the Firm c ontend s there is insu f f ic ient ev id enc e to s u p p o r t the trial c o u rt’ s

aw ard

. W e agree the t rial c ou rt’ s f i n d i n g s o f f

ac t amo u nt to , at mo st, p o tential
negligenc e by the Firm and d o no t satisf y t he stand a rd u sed to aw ard sanc tio ns u nd er

OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b)—u nnec essarily exp and ing the p r o c e ed ings thro ugh imp ro p er

c o nd u c t

.
A s o u r Su preme Co urt has e xp lained , if a law yer has a c o nf lic t o f interest, he o r

she “mu st (at a mini m u m ) d isc lo s e it t o his c lient, and in so me instanc es, he mu st

15w ithd r aw f

ro m the rep resentatio n. ” 6 I nd e ed , u nd er Geo rgia’ s Ru les o f Pro fessio nal

Co nd u c t, a law yer s

ha ll n o t “ c o ntinu e to r ep resent a client if there is a signif ic ant risk

that the

. . . law yer’ s d u ties to a no ther c lient

. . . w ill m aterially and ad v ersel y a f f e c t

the rep resentatio n o f the c lient,” exc e p t if the c lient p ro vid es inf o rmed c onsent that

is c o nf irmed in w riting. 7 B ut these ru les f u rther p ro v id e that inf

ormed c o nsent is n o t

p ermissible if

, i n ter a li a , the rep resentatio n “ inc lu des the assertio n o f a c laim by o ne

c lient against ano ther c lient r ep resented by the law yer in the same o r su bstantially

related p ro c eed ing. ” 8

I n this c ase, t he Firm maintains t hat a c o nf li c t o f i n te rest aro se o n M arc h 2,

2022, f o r whic h inf

ormed c o n s e nt w as no t p ermissible; and bec au se c ontinu ed

rep resentati o n wo u l d v i o l a t e t h e R u les o f Pro f e s sio nal Co nd u c t, it immed iately so u ght

6 C ro y v
. W hi tfi eld C n ty

. , 301 Ga. 380, 385 (2) (801 SE2d 89 2) (201 7 ).

7 G a. R. o f Pro f ’ l Co nd u c t 1

. 7 (a); s e e Ga. R. o f Pro f’ l Co nd u c t 1

. 7 (b) (“ I f c lient inf o rmed co nsent is p ermissible a law yer m ay rep resent a c lient no tw ithstand ing a signif ic ant risk o f

material and ad verse ef

f ec t if eac h af

f ec t ed c lient o r f

o r mer c lient giv es inf o rmed c o nsent, c o nf

irmed in w riting, to the rep resentatio n af ter: (1 ) c o nsu ltatio n w ith the law yer, p u rsu a nt to Ru le 1

. 0 (c ); (2) hav ing rec eiv ed in w riting reaso nable and ad equ ate inf o rmatio n abo u t t he m a terial risk s o f a nd r easo nable av a ilable alternativ es t o t he rep resentatio n; and (3) hav ing b e en giv en the o p p o rtu nity to c onsu lt w i t h i n d ep end ent
c o u nsel. ” ).

8 Ga. R. o f

Pro f ’ l Co nd u c t 1

. 7 (c ) (2).

16to w ithd raw
. I mp o rtantly, there is no c o ntentio n the Firm w as no t requ ired to

immed iately w ithd r aw f

ro m rep re s en t a t io n o r that there w as a w aiv able co nf lic t o f

interest. 9 So , w ith the f

orego ing in m ind , w e tu rn no w t o OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b), u nd er

w hic h the trial c o u rt aw ard ed fees d u e to the ti mi n g o f th e Firm’ s d isc o v ery o f the

c o nf lic t and su bsequ ent w ithd raw al.

I n lo ok ing to the text of OCGA § 9

- 1 5

- 1 4 (b), w e nec essarily begin ou r analysis

w ith “ familiar and bind ing ca n o n s o f c o nstru c tio n. ” 1 0 A nd in c o nsid e ring the meaning

o f this statu te, o u r charge is to “ p resu me that the General A s s e mbly m eant w hat it

said and said w hat it meant. ” 1 1 To w ard that e nd , w e mu st af f o rd the statu to ry text its

p lain a nd o rd inary meaning, 1 2 c o nsid er the text c ontextu ally, 1 3 read t h e t e x t “ i n its

9 I t i s a l s o u nd isp u ted that a w ritten c o nf irmatio n o f inf

o r m ed c o nsent signed b y Green earlier in the p ro c eed ings w as no lo nger e f f e c t i v e o n c e the instant c o nf lic t w as d isc o v e red

.

10 Ho lco mb v
. Lo n

g , 329 Ga. A p p
. 51 5, 51 7 (1 ) (7 6 5 SE2d 687 ) (20 1 4 ) ; a cco rd In the In teres t o f L

. T. , 325 Ga. A p p
. 59 0, 59 1 (7 54 SE2d 380) (201 4).

11 Dea l v
. C

olema n , 29 4 G a. 1 7 0, 1 72 (1 ) () ( 7 51 SE2d 337 ) ( 2 0 1 3 ) (p u nc t u a tio n
o mitted ); a cco rd Ho lco mb , 329 Ga. A pp
. at 51 7 (1 ).

1 2 S ee Ho l co mb , 329 Ga. A p p
. at 51 7 (1 ); a cco rd D e al , 29 4 Ga. at 17 2 (1 ) (a) ; s e e a l s o Ti b b les v. Tea c

hers Reti remen t Sys

. o

f Ga

. , 29 7 Ga. 557 , 558 (1 ) (7 7 5 SE2d 527 ) (201 5) (“ A statu te draw s it meaning, o f c o u rse, f ro m its text. ” (p unc t uatio n and c ita ti o n o mitted )); C ha n v
. Elli s , 29 6 Ga. 838, 839 ( 7 70 SE2d 851 ) (201 5) (same); S ta te v
. Ab le , 321 Ga. A p p
. 6 3 2 , 6 36 (7 42 SE2d 1 49 ) (201 3) (“ A j u d ge is c harged w ith interp r eting t h e l a w i n

17mo st natu ral and reaso nable w ay, a s an o rd inary sp e ak er o f the English langu age

w o u ld ,” 1 4 and seek to “ av o id a c o nstru c t io n that mak es so me langu age m e r e

su rp lu sage. ” 1 5 In s u m , w hen the langu age o f a statu te is “ p lain a nd su s c ep tible o f o nly

o ne natu ral and reaso nable c o nstru c tio n, co u rts m u s t c o nstru e the statu t e

ac c ord ingly. ” 1 6

ac c o rd a nc e w ith the o riginal and /o r p lain meaning o f the text a t issu e (and a ll that the text f airly imp lies)

. . . . ” ); S i

n gleta ry v
. S ta te , 31 0 Ga. Ap p
. 57 0, 57 2 (7 1 3 SE2d 6 9 8) ( 201 1 ) (“ I n
c o nstru ing these s tatu tes, w e ap p ly the f u nd amental ru l e s o f statu t o ry c o nstru c tio n t hat requ ire u s t o co nstru e the statu tes ac c o rd ing to their terms, [and ] to giv e w ord s their p lain and o rd inary meaning .

. . . ” (p unc tu atio n o mitted ) ).

13 S e e Ari z o n a v
. In ter Tri

ba l C o u n ci l o f Ari z
. , In c. , 57 0 U. S. 1 , 1 0 (1 33 SCt 2247 , 1 86 LE2d 239 ) (201 3) (Sc alia, J ) (“ W o rd s that can hav e mo re t h a n o n e meaning are giv en
c o ntent, ho w ev er, by their su rro u nd ings. ” (p u nc tu atio n o mitted )); D ea l , 29 4 G a. at 1 7 2 (1 ) ( a ) ( “ [ W ] e mu st v iew the statu to ry text in the c o ntext in w hic h it ap p e ars[. ]” ); ac c o r d Hen d ry v
. Hen dry , 29 2 Ga. 1 , 3 (1 ) (7 34 SE2d 46 ) (201 2); Ho lco mb , 329 Ga. A p p
. at 51 7 (1 );

s ee a ls o Ti b b les , 29 7 Ga. at 558 (1 ) (“ The c o mmo n and c u sto mary u sages o f the w o rd s are imp o rtant, bu t so is their c ontext. ” (p u nc tu atio n and citatio n o m itted )); Cha n , 29 6 Ga. at 839 (1 ) (same).

14 D ea l , 29 4 Ga. at 1 7 2- 7 3 (1 ) (a); acco rd Ho lco mb , 329 Ga. A p p
. at 51 8 (1 ).

15 In the In teres t of

L. T. , 325 Ga. A p p
. at 59 2 (p u nc tu atio n o m itted ); a cco rd Ho lco mb , 329 Ga. A p p
. at 51 8 (1 )

.

16 Ho lco mb , 329 Ga. A p p
. at 51 8 (1 ) (p u nc tu atio n o mitted ); s e e a ls o D ea l , 29 4 Ga. at 1 7 3 (1 ) (a) (“ [I ]f the s tatu t o ry text is c lear and u nambigu ou s, w e a ttribu te to the statu te its p lain meaning, and o u r searc h f o r statu to ry m eaning is at an end

. ” (p u nc tu atio n o mitted )).

18OCGA § 9 -1 5

- 1 4 (b) au tho riz es an aw ard o f atto rney f ees w hen, amo ng o ther
things, a party “ u nnec e ssarily exp and ed t he p ro c eed ings t hro u gh i mpro per co n du ct o r

ac ted to cau se d elay. ” 1 7 A nd an aw ard o f d amages u nd er this c o d e sec tio n is “ intend ed

no t o nly to sanc tio n o r deter li ti ga ti o n a bu s es b u t also to rec o mp ense litigants w ho are

f o r c e d t o exp end their reso u rc es in c o ntend ing with a bu s i v e li ti ga ti on
. ” 1 8 So , w hen

c o nsid ering w hether t o a w ard f ees u nd er OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b), “ the c o nd u c t o f the

p arty against w ho m an aw ard is so u ght, and the c o nd u c t o f that p arty’ s c ou nsel, are

c o nsid ered alo ng w ith the imp a ct o f that c o nd u c t o n the a tto rney f ees inc u rred by the

o p p o sing p arty. ” 1 9 A nd w e rev iew a trial c o u rt’ s a w ard o f f ees u nd e r Sec tio n 9

- 1 5- 1 4

o nly f o r an abu se o f

d isc r etio n. 2 0

17 Mo ore v
. Hu lla n d

er , 345 Ga. A p p
. 56 8, 57 2 (2) (c ) (81 4 SE2d 423) (201 8) (emp hasis

su p p lied ).

18 C o n n o lly v
. S mo ck , 338 Ga. A p p
. 7 54, 7 57 (1 ) (7 9 1 SE2d 853) (201 6 ) (p u nc t u a tio n
o mitted ) (emp hasis s u p p lied ); acco rd Ri ddell v
. Ri ddell , 29 3 Ga. 249 , 250 (7 44 S E 2d 7 9 3) (201 3); Mo o n v
. Mo o n , 27 7 G a. 37 5, 37 9 ( 6 ) (589 SE2d 7 6 ) (2003); Jo e & Ja mes Pro ps

. , LLC

v
. Ci ty o f A tla n t a , 36 8 Ga. Ap p
. 302, 308 (3) (89 0 SE2d 21 ) (2023) , c e r t

. den i ed (D ec
. 1 9 , 2023).

19 W

i lli a ms v
. C o o p e r , 280 Ga. 1 45, 1 47 (1 ) (6 25 SE2d 7 54) (2006 ); a cco rd Ri cha rds o n
v
. Lo cklyn , 339 Ga. A p p
. 457 , 46 2 (7 9 3 SE2d 6 40) (201 6 ).

2 0 Mo o re , 345 Ga. A p p
. at 57 2 (2) (c )

.
19H ere, in aw ard ing OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 14 (b) fees against t he Firm, the trial c o urt

relied so lely o n Bi

rco ll v
. Ro s e n tha l 2 1 f o r the p ro p o sitio n that the “ failu re to inv estigate

and a f ailu re t o ac t ‘ with a minimu m amo u nt o f d iligenc e’ p re- su it” s u p po rts a n aw ard

o f atto rney f

ees as “ imp ro p er c o nd u c t. ” Bu t Bi rco l l is who lly inap po site bec au se the

p re- su it f ailu r e to inv estigate in that c ase led to the p laintif fs f il i n g su it when “ they

sho u ld hav e kno w n that their c laims had no su bstantial basis. ” 2 2 A nd imp o rtantly, the

aw ard o f OCGA § 9

- 1 5

- 1 4 ( b) f ees in Bi rco ll w as b ased o n the p o r tio n o f t h e statu t e

p ermitting su c h an a w ard when “ a n ac tio n, o r any p art thereo f , . . . lac k ed su bstantial
j u stif ic a tio n,” 2 3 no t o n a llegatio ns o f imp ro per co nd u c t. Ev e n so , the trial c o u rt in this

c ase c o nc lu d ed “ the [ Bi rco ll ] princ ip le re q u i r i n g a m inimu m amo u nt o f d iligenc e [w a s ] ap plic able” bec au s e t he Firm’ s c o nd uc t “w as imp ro p er and u nnec essarily

exp and e d the p ro c e e d i n gs. ” Sp ec if ic ally, the c o u rt f

o u nd t hat the Firm f

ailed “ to

d isc lo se a c o nf

lic t that they knew o r sho uld hav e k no w n” p rio r to the po int o f need ing

to d ec lare a mistrial w hen “ the f ac ts and d o c u ments that ap p ear t o u nd erlie the

2 1 26 7 Ga. A p p. 431 (6 00 SE2d 388) (2004).

2 2 Id. at 439 (2) (c ).

2 3 Id. at 431 (p unc tu atio n o mitted ), qu o ti n g OCGA § 9 -1 5

- 1 4 (b).

20c o nf

lic t p lainly c o uld and sho u ld hav e been d isc o v ered prio r to trial. ” I n d o ing so , the

trial c ou rt abu sed its disc retio n in aw ard ing a tto rney f ees und er OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b)

bec au se the f

ac ts are insu f

f ic ient to su p p o rt an aw a rd f o r unnec e ssarily exp a nd ing the

p ro c eed ings by imp ro p er c o nd uc t. 2 4

Onc e again, an a w a rd u nd er OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 ( b ) i s d irec ted at, i n ter a li a ,
ad d ressing a b u s i v e litigatio n o r, 2 5 as the s tatu te p lainly says, “ imp r op er c o nd u c t. ” 2 6

To that end , we hav e af

firmed aw ard s u nd er OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b) f o r u nnec essarily

exp and ing p ro c e e d i n g s thro u gh imp ro per c ond u c t w hen (1 ) a w itness disregard s

2 4 Fo r this same reaso n, w e are no t p ersu ad ed by B ark e n’ s argu m e nt that ou r Su p r eme Co u rt’ s dec isio n in S ta n ci l v
. Gwi n n e tt Co u n ty , 259 Ga. 507 (384 SE2d 66 6 ) (1 9 89 ) , su p po rts the trial c ou rt’ s aw ard

.

2 5 Ri ddell , 29 3 Ga. a t 250; Mo o n , 27 7 Ga. at 37 9 ( 6 )

. See gen era lly Ab u s iv e , Oxf ord English D ic tio nary (2nd ed

. 1 9 89 ) (“ 1

. W ro ngly used , p erv erted , misap p lied , i mpro per [. ]” (emp hasis su p p lied )), a v a i l a b le at http s: //w ww
. o ed

. c o m/o ed v 2/000009 78 (last ac c essed M a y 1 , 2024).

2 6 S ee gen era lly Impro

per , Oxf o rd English D ic t io nary (2nd ed

. 19 89 ) (“ 1

. No t tru ly o r stric tly b elo nging t o the thing u n d er c o nsid eratio n; no t in a c c o rd anc e w ith tru th, f ac t,
reaso n, o r ru le; a bno r mal, irregu lar; inc o rrec t , inac c u rate, erro neo u s, w ro ng.
. . . 3. N ot in

a cco r d a n c e w ith go od manners, m od esty, o r d e c o ru m; u nbec o ming, u nsee m l y ; i n d e co r o u s , ind e c ent. ” ), a v a i

la b le a t http s: //w w w
. o ed

. c o m /o ed v 2/001 1 349 0 ( last ac c essed M ay 1 , 2024).

2 1rep eated trial co u rt instru c t io ns to av o id mentio n o f a p artic u lar to pic in testimo ny; 2 7

(2) c o u nsel and a p arty p ro lo ng litigatio n so a s to d ep riv e ano ther p arty o f pro p erty in

t h e i n t e r i m ; 2 8 (3) a p arty tu rns “ simp le litigatio n into a co mp lex o ne” by, i n ter a li a ,
f iling rep eated mo tio ns to d ismiss, send ing o v erw helming d isc o v e ry requ ests, threatening c riminal pro sec u tio n, and t a k ing o ther ac tio ns that abu se the litigatio n

p ro c ess; 2 9 and (4) a pu blic of f ic ial o r go v ernm e n t entity f orc es a c itiz en into c o urt

2 7 S ee C o n n o lly , 338 Ga. A p p
. at 757 (1 ) (af f irming a trial c o urt’ s grant o f atto rney fees

u nd er OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b) w h e n , “ [i]n d etermining that A p p e llants’ c o nd u c t w as imp ro p er, the trial c o u r t f o u nd t hat p rio r to t he su bj ec t testimo ny, it had ad mo nished [ap p ellant’ s] c ou nsel that it w ou ld no t allo w irrelev ant c harac ter e v id enc e o f the p arties’ statements or ac tiv ities, and w ou ld no t p ermit the p arties to imp u gn eac h o ther’ s c harac ter in fro nt o f the j u ry” (p u nc tu atio n o mitted )); Co rey v
. C lea r C ha nn el Ou tdo o r, In c. , 29 9 Ga. A p p
. 487 , 49 5 (4) (6 83 SE2d 27 ) (2009 ) (p hysic al p rec ed ent o nly) (af f irming aw ard u nd er OCGA § 9- 15- 1 4 (b) w hen trial co u rt c o nc lu d ed a p arty e ngaged in imp r o p er c o nd u ct and

u nnec essarily exp and ed p r o c e e d i ngs by mentio ning a to p ic the c ou rt had rep eated ly instru c ted w as no t to be mentio ned in testimo ny).

2 8 S ee In re E

s t a te o f Zei gler , 29 5 Ga. A p p
. 1 5 6 , 16 0 (2) (d ) (6 7 1 SE2d 21 8) (2008) (ho ld ing trial c o urt d id no t abu s e its d isc retio n in aw a rd ing f ees u nd er OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b) f o r u nnec essarily exp and ing p ro c eed ing by imp ro p er co nd u c t when “ [t]he p ro bate c o u rt f o u nd that [exec u trix] and [her atto rney] had c o nd u c ted themselv e s in a manner to p ro lo ng ad ministratio n o f the estate so a s to giv e [exec u trix] the o p p o rtu nity t o sell t he ho u se, c iting

amo ng o ther co nd u c t [exec u trix’ s] requ est f o r a c o ntinu anc e o f t he hearing o n the p etitio n to remo v e her as e xec u trix and her sale o f the ho u s e d u ring the p erio d in w hic h the hearing

w as c o ntinu ed ” ).

2 9 See D a llo w v
. Da l

lo w , 29 9 Ga. 76 2, 77 7

– 7 8 (5) (7 9 1 SE2d 20) (201 6 ) (ho ld ing t hat

aw ard o f f e es u nd e r OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b) w as su p p o rted by find ings that ap pellant f iled f iv e

22u nnec essarily. 3 0 Co nv ersely, w e hav e e x p lained t here is no imp r o p er c o nd u ct

mo tio ns to d ismiss ap p e llee’ s c o m p laint f o r m o dif ic atio n; sent ap p ellee 5 1 7 requ ests to ad mit; requ ested a p p o intment o f a gu ard ian ad litem six w eek s bef o re the t r i a l w as
sc hed u l e d to start; threatened ap p ellee w ith p ro sec u tio n f o r c riminal interf

erenc e with

c u s t o d y a nd w ith arrest f ro m her j o b; and mad e threats in c o nnec tio n w ith a settlement p ro p o sal that w o u ld hav e requ ired ap p ellee to p ay ap p ellant’ s law yer $55,000); s ee a ls o S mi th v. Pea rce , 334 Ga. A p p
. 84, 93 (5) (a) (7 7 8 SE2d 248) (201 5) (ho ld ing t r ial c o u rt d id

no t abu s e its d isc r etio n by aw ard ing OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 14 (b) f e e s w hen ap pellant (1 ) insisted ap p ellee su bmit to a p aternity test d esp ite hav ing alread y d o ne o n e a nd ap p ellant’ s st i p u l a t i o n ap p ellee w as t he f ather; (2) ev a d ing serv ic e a nd f iling mu ltip le u nsu c c essf u l

mo tio ns to d ismiss based on lac k o f serv ic e; (3) hid ing the child f r o m ap p ellee f

o r 1 8 mo nths bef o re insisting o n su p erv ised v isitatio n; (4) seek ing a p syc ho lo gic al ev alu a tio n o f ap p ellee tw o w eek s b e f

o r e o riginal trial d ate; and ( 5) m ak ing d u bio u s a llegatio ns t hat ap p ellee

sexu ally mo lested the c h i l d and ref u sing to bac k d o wn af

ter ap p ellee w as c leared o f

su sp ic io n); Bi

en ert v
. D ickers o n , 27 6 Ga. A p p
. 6 21 , 6 26

– 27 (4) (b) (6 24 SE2d 245) (2005) (listing the nu mero u s p o ints o f ev id entiary su p p o r t f o r trial co u rt’ s aw ard o f f ees u nd er OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b) f

o r e ngaging in “ imp ro p er c o nd uc t w hic h u nnec essarily exp and ed the p ro c eed ing,” inc lu d ing f ailing to tu rn ov er k e y ev id enc e, engaging in ex p arte
c o mmu nic atio ns w ith a med iato r, f i l ing d isc o v ery requ ests af ter the clo s e o f d isc o v ery, f iling red und ant c o u nts and amend ments ev en af ter the c o urt ru led o n t h e m , and

su rrep titio u sly rec o rd ing co nv ersatio ns with o p p o sing c o u nsel w hic h resu lted in extensiv e
c o rresp o nd enc e and brief ing o f the issu e).

3 0 S ee Ro b i

n s o n v
. Gla s

s , 302 Ga. Ap p
. 7 42, 7 46 ( 6 91 SE2d 6 20) (201 0) (ho ld ing t hat

an aw ard u nd er OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 14 (b) w as au tho riz ed bec au s e “[a] p u blic o f f ic er that ref

u ses
o r neglec ts to o bey a p lain statu to ry mand ate f o r almo st six m o nths, thereby f o rc in g a
c itiz en t o go t o t he tro u ble and exp ense o f f i l i n g a m a n d amu s p etitio n in o rd e r to o btain

w hat he is entitled to by law , a nd f u r t h e r m o r e f

iles an a nsw er denying that the c itiz en is

e ntitled to r elief

, sho u ld no t b e able to esc ap e resp o nsibility fo r his or her inac tio n b y belated ly c o mp lying with the law a f ew d ays bef

o re a sc hed u led hearing” ) ; s ee a ls o McKemi e
v
. C i ty o f Gri ffi n , 27 2 Ga. 843, 844 (3) (537 SE2d 6 6) (2000) (ho ld ing that a n aw ard u nd er OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 ( b) might be au tho riz ed b ec au se t he c ity “ c o ntinu ed to p u rsu e the

c o nd emnatio n u ntil af

ter the sp ec ial master mad e its aw ard and af ter the c o nd emnees filed

23su f

fic ient to su p p o rt an aw ard u nd er OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b ) w hen (1 ) a pro s e litigant

o p erates mo re slo w ly than an atto rney w o u ld in litigating a case, 3 1 a n d (2) a p arty

maintains a d ef

ense fro m the o u tset, w hic h r esu lts in ap p ellate pro c eed ings by the

o ther p arty based o n the trial c o u r t’ s erro neo u s ru ling as to that d e fense. 3 2

I t is c lear, then, fro m bo th the p lain langu a g e o f OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 14 (b) and o u r

c aselaw that ev en if the Firm had d isc o v e red a c o nf lic t e xisted prio r to M arc h 2, 2022,

this is no t c o nd u c t r isi n g to the lev el o f w arranting f ees u nd er t he statu te f

o r

an ap p e al a s to v alu e and no n- v alu e issu e s” bu t t hen “elec ted to red esign the p ro j ec t and to dismiss its c ond emnatio n p ro c eed ing,” and “ [a]ltho u gh d ism i s sal w as f inanc ially benef ic ial to the City, it also resu lted in a f inanc ial d etriment t o the c o nd emnees, w ho w ere requ ired to in c u r atto rney f ees to enf

o rc e t heir c o nstitu tio nal right t o rec eiv e j u st and ad equ ate c omp ensatio n f

or their p ro p erty” ).

3 1 S ee Mo o re v. Mo o re-

McKi n n ey , 29 7 Ga. A pp
. 7 03, 7 1 1

- 1 2 (4) (6 7 8 SE2d 1 52) (2009 ) (“ A ltho u gh [ap p ellant], w ho w as ac ting p ro se, may hav e b een s lo w er than an atto rney, this is no t a f ind ing w hic h sho w s t hat he u nnec essarily exp a nd ed the p ro c e ed ing by o ther imp ro p er c o nd u c t as c o ntemp lated by OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b). ” (p u nc tu atio n o m itted )).

3 2 S ee McGa hee v. Ro

gers , 280 Ga. 7 5 0, 7 5 4 (2) (6 32 SE2d 6 57 ) (2006 ) (“ [T]here is simp ly no ev id enc e o f any ‘imp ro p er c ond u c t’ o n [ap p ellant’ s] part w hic h u nnec essarily exp and ed the p ro c eed ing. H e asserted the disc harge in bank ru p tc y d ef e nse fro m the o u tset. The f irst ap p e al w as bro u ght by [ap p e llee] bec au se the trial c o urt erro neo u sly held that it had no j u risd ic tio n to d etermine whether t he d ebts w ere d isc harged

. Ac c o rd ingly, [the f irst ap p eal] w as a nec e ssary exp ansio n o f the p ro c eed ings attribu t able to [ap p ellee], and no t an
u nnec essary e xp an sio n attribu table to [ap p ellant]. M oreo v er, atto rney’ s f ees inc u rred in

c o nnec t io n w ith ap p ellate p ro c eed ings are no t rec ov erable u nd er OCGA § 9 -1 5- 1 4. ” ).

24“ imp ro p er c o nd u c t. ” Ou r c o nc lu sio n might v ery w ell be d if f erent if there w ere

ev id enc e the Firm k new a co nf lic t existed bu t d eliberately w aited u ntil the d ay o f trial

to w ithd raw a s a means o f p ro lo nging litigat i o n , b u t t hat is no t w hat the ev id enc e

sho w s o r w hat the trial c o u rt f

ou nd o c c u r red

.
A dd itio na l l y , a nd imp o rtantly, the trial c o u rt rej ec ted the Firm’ s requ est to

hear ev id enc e in c a mera as to why the c o nf lic t o f interest c o u ld no t hav e been

d isc ov ered p rio r to M arc h 2, 2022. I n d o ing so , the trial co u rt erred in s u ggesting that

it c o u ld no t hear su c h ev id e nc e w itho u t r isk ing disqu alif ic atio n. 3 3 A s a resu lt, bec au se

the Firm d id no t engage in imp ro p er c o nd u c t as c o ntemp lated b y OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 1 4 (b),

the trial co u rt abu s ed its d isc retio n by aw ard ing f e es agains t i t o n t h i s basis, and w e

rev erse.

3 3 See Hi ll, K erts cher & W

ha rto n , L LP v
. M o o d

y , 308 Ga. 7 4, 81 (3) (839 SE2d 535) (2020) (exp laining t hat a trial c o u rt mu s t “ p ro tec t against d isc l o s u re o f the mental imp ressio ns, c o nc lu sio ns, o p inio ns, o r legal theo ries o f an atto rney o r other rep resentativ e
o f a p arty co nc erning the litigatio n, inc lu d ing, if nec essary, thro u gh in c amera rev iew ” (c itatio n & p u nc tu atio n o mitted )); Ho wa rd v
. S ta te , 27 9 Ga. 1 6 6 , 1 7 0 (6 1 1 SE2d 3) (2005) (no ting that “ af

ter an in- c amera insp ec tio n, the trial c o u rt d etermined t hat no c o nf id e ntial

c o mmu nic atio ns w ere imp lic ated ” thro ugh atto rney- c lient p riv ilege).

252. B ec au se w e c onc lu d e the t r ial c o u rt erred in aw ard ing f ees u nd e r OCGA §

9

- 1 5 -1 4 (b) in D iv isio n 1 , w e need no t ad d ress the Firm’ s remaining a rgu ments a s to

the amo u nt o f

f ees the c o u rt aw ard ed

.
Fo r all these reaso ns, w e rev erse the trial c o u rt’ s j u d gment as to the Firm. 3 4

Ju dgmen t rev ers ed. Bro wn a n d Pa dgett, JJ. , co n c u r
.

3 4 T he trial c ou rt aw ard ed fees to B ark e n u nd er OCGA § 9

- 1 5- 14 (b) against bo th the Firm a n d the City o f A tlanta; bu t the City is no t a p a rty to this a p p eal, d id no t f ile an ap p ellate brief

, and d id no t j oin the Firm’ s brief

. W e thank the Geo r gia M u nic ip al A sso c iatio n f or its tho u ghtf

u l amic u s brief

.
26