NUMBER 13-17-00119-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

LEONARDO VASQUEZ, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 138th District Court 

of Cameron County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Benavides 

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez

Appellant Leonardo Vasquez was charged with capital murder and aggravated 

kidnapping following the abduction and murder of Reyes Bocanegra. See TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. §§ 19.03(a)(2), 20.04(b) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Vasquez 

plea-bargained for a thirty-year prison sentence on the aggravated kidnapping charge on 

the condition that the State drop the capital murder charge. In accordance with this plea-
2

bargain agreement, Vasquez pleaded guilty to aggravated kidnapping, he was sentenced 

to thirty years in prison, and the State dismissed the capital murder charge. The trial court 

granted Vasquez permission to appeal. This appeal followed. 

Vasquez’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, Vasquez’s court-appointed appellate counsel has 

filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record 

yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id. 

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation 

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re 

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, 

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds 

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set 

out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1991). 

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel 

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), Vasquez’s 

counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error 

in the trial court’s judgment. Vasquez’s counsel has also informed this Court that he has 

(1) notified Vasquez that he has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) 

provided Vasquez with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed Vasquez of his rights to file 
3

a pro se response, to review the record preparatory to filing that response, and to seek 

discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals if this Court finds that the 

appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided Vasquez with a form motion for pro se access to the 

appellate record with instructions to file the motion in this Court. See Anders, 386 U.S. 

at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20, Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re 

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. Vasquez has filed a pro se brief, in which he raises 

two issues.1 

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the 

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 

75, 80 (1988). After reviewing the entire record, counsel’s Anders brief, and Vasquez’s 

pro se brief, we find nothing that would arguably support an appeal.2 See Bledsoe v. 

 1 After Vasquez filed his pro se brief, the State sought to include a copy of a presentence 

investigation (PSI) report in the appellate record. Over Vasquez’s objection, we granted the State’s motion. 

We are now of the opinion that the State’s motion was improvidently granted. Accordingly, our review of 

the appellate record does not encompass the PSI report. Because the PSI report is not part of the appellate 

record, Vasquez is not entitled to review a copy of it for purposes of preparing a pro se response. 

Accordingly, the Cameron County District Clerk is under no obligation to furnish Vasquez a copy of the PSI 

report for purposes of this direct appeal. 

2 We note that Vasquez’s pro se brief raised an issue regarding whether the trial court erred by 

failing to approve in writing his waiver of rights and consent to stipulate to evidence, as required by article 

1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 1.15 (West, Westlaw 

through 2017 1st C.S.) (providing that no defendant shall be convicted of a felony in a case not tried to a 

jury without sufficient evidence of guilt and that such evidence may take the form of a stipulation, consented 

to by the defendant and approved in writing by the trial judge). In McClain v. State, the Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals concluded that evidence stipulated to by a defendant could not be considered in 

determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction, as required by article 

1.15, where the defendant’s consent to stipulate was not signed by the trial judge. 730 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1987). In Ybarra v. State, we held that the trial judge’s failure to sign the appellant’s consent to 

stipulate was harmless where “appellant signed a judicial confession wherein he confessed to committing 

the crime as alleged in the indictment, and this confession was admitted into evidence at the plea hearing.” 

93 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). Here, the trial judge did not sign Vasquez’s 

consent to stipulate. However, as in Ybarra, this error was rendered harmless because Vasquez signed a 

judicial confession, which the trial court admitted into evidence at the plea hearing (as per the trial judge’s 

seventh post-abatement finding of fact, dated June 7, 2018). Thus, we conclude that Vasquez’s complaint 

under article 1.15 does not support an appeal. 
4

State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders 

briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and 

reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the 

requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. 

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, Vasquez’s attorney has asked this Court for 

permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re 

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must 

withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the 

appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the 

appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s 

motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered 

to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to Vasquez and to advise him of 

his right to file a petition for discretionary review.3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In 

re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006).

 3 No substitute counsel will be appointed. If Vasquez seeks further review of this case by the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file 

a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty 

days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc 

reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. A petition for discretionary 

review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3. Any petition for 

discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See 

id. R. 68.4.
5

/s/ Rogelio Valdez

ROGELIO VALDEZ

Chief Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed this

28th day of June, 2018.