NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 23a0494n.06

No. 22-3801

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v. 

TERRY LEE JACKSON, SR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE NORTHERN 

DISTRICT OF OHIO

OPINION

Before: WHITE, STRANCH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges. 

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Terry Lee Jackson, Sr.

appeals his convictions of one drug-distribution and three drug-possession charges, arguing that 

the district court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause when it admitted statements 

made by a confidential informant and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him. 

We AFFIRM. 

I.

Officers from the Elyria Police Department began investigating Jackson around February

2019, after two confidential informants (C.I.s) brought them information suggesting that Jackson 

was selling drugs in local hotels. Specifically, a C.I. referred to as C.I. 297 told police that Jackson 

was dealing drugs out of the Knights Inn in Elyria. 

Police arranged a controlled buy between C.I. 297 and Jackson on February 26, 2019. To 

set up the buy, the C.I. called Jackson and relayed a “coded message” that the C.I. was coming to 

the hotel to buy drugs. R.88, PID 507. Police took “pre-buy and post-buy precautions,” including

searching the C.I. to ensure the C.I. did not have money, drugs, or contraband; giving the C.I. a 
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“covert video device” that could also transmit audio; and photocopying the $40 used for the buy. 

Id. at PID 504–05. The C.I. went to the hotel room and met with Jackson. Throughout the 

transaction, the police surveilled the street and the hotel room door. The C.I. met with Jackson, 

“got drugs, came back to a predetermined location to meet [police],” and “turned over those drugs.” 

Id.

During this meeting, the C.I. carried the recording device that captured audio and video. 

The video—which is shaky and has an incorrect time stamp1—shows the C.I. in the car with 

detectives; the C.I. walking to the Knights Inn and entering Jackson’s room; the C.I. and Jackson 

exchanging a few words inside the room; the C.I. placing money on the table in front of Jackson;

and the C.I. leaving the room and returning to the police car, where an officer says, “Let me get 

that from you.” The officer testified that at that point, he was asking for the crack cocaine in the 

C.I.’s hand, which the C.I. then handed to the officers.

The officers searched the C.I. again for any drugs, money, or contraband, paid the C.I., and 

let the C.I. go. They then sought and received a search warrant for the hotel room, and executed

the warrant later that afternoon. When they did, officers found the same $40 they had given the 

C.I. to purchase the drugs on the table in front of Jackson. They also found and weighed three 

bags of drugs—17 grams of crack cocaine, 1.5 grams of methamphetamine, and 4 grams of a 

heroin/fentanyl mix—and recovered other drug paraphernalia. The government’s witnesses 

testified that this quantity of drugs is consistent with distribution, and that drug users typically 

carry less than a gram. 

1 According to the government, the time stamp was incorrect because the video device lost power and officers 

forgot to reset the clock before using it. The video shows a police vehicle’s clock with the correct time, and an officer 

announced the correct time on the recording.
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Before and at trial, Jackson objected to the admission of the audio portion of the controlledbuy recording, arguing that the C.I.’s statements on the recording were inadmissible hearsay. The 

government had prepared a transcript of the recording, and Jackson may have objected to its 

admission as well. The district court overruled Jackson’s objections and the government played 

the video for the jury. The district court also permitted the jury to see the government’s written 

transcription, with the caveat that the jury must decide for itself whether the transcription was 

accurate.

Jackson moved for judgment of acquittal after the close of the government’s case and 

renewed the motion at the close of evidence. The district court denied the motion both times, 

finding that the government had presented sufficient evidence for the jury to convict on each count. 

The jury convicted Jackson of one count of distribution of a controlled substance, and three counts 

of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).

II.

Jackson first argues that the admission of the C.I.’s recorded statements on the video of the 

controlled buy violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. The Confrontation Clause 

ensures that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 

with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Admitting out-of-court testimonial 

statements that are “offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted” violates this clause unless 

“(1) the declarant is unavailable and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine 

the declarant.” United States v. Boyd, 640 F.3d 657, 665 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004)). A declarant’s statement is testimonial if “a reasonable 

person in the declarant’s position would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in 
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investigating and prosecuting the crime.” United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 

2004).

We review a claim that a district court violated a defendant’s Confrontation Clause right 

de novo. Boyd, 640 F.3d at 665. However, such claims are subject to a harmless-error analysis

and we will not set aside convictions that are otherwise valid if we can “confidently say, on the 

whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States 

v. McGee, 529 F.3d 691, 697 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 

(1986)). 

The parties agree that the C.I.’s statements on the recording were testimonial. Even so, 

“the admission of recordings involving a C.I. and a defendant [does] not violate the Confrontation 

Clause” if “the portions not involving the C.I. were party admissions and the portions involving 

the C.I. were offered not for the truth of the matters asserted but to ‘give meaning to the admissible 

responses of [the defendant].’” United States v. Jones, 205 F. App’x 327, 342 (6th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting United States v. Sexton, 119 F. App’x 735, 741–43 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also United States 

v. Harrison, 54 F.4th 884, 887 (6th Cir. 2022). 

The relevant conversation between the C.I. and Jackson, as transcribed by the government,

is:

CI: What do I owe you?

[Jackson spoke with an unknown female on speakerphone.]

CI: Here, just because, you know (Unintelligible (UI))

TJ: (UI) spend that money with your n[****], man.

CI: Alright, that’s what I owe you, right? And then (UI) here you go. Now.

TJ: (UI) I got you.

CI: Alright, maybe. (UI) Rachel, uh (UI) she’s almost (UI) but she’s, uh, in the 

middle of something so (UI) back on that one. Oh, was that the bag, are 

those all the chips that you (UI) from the bag?
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TJ: Um-hmm

CI: You got a baggie? No? (UI)

TJ: (UI) 

CI: 56 . . . (UI) I’ll be back for the (UI)

TJ: Um-hmm . . . (UI)

CI: (UI) Be careful.

Jackson argues that the C.I.’s statements were offered for the truth of the matter asserted

“because the statements provided proof Mr. Jackson distributed cocaine base.” Appellant Br. 13–

14. “But ‘the matter asserted’ means the matter asserted by the statement, not the matter asserted 

by the government.” Harrison, 54 F.4th at 888. “[A]lmost any out-of-court statement the 

government offers in court is admitted to prove the government’s case in some way. Otherwise, 

there would be no reason to introduce the statement at all.” Id.

A review of the statements suggests some may have been admitted for their truth. For 

example, the CI tells Jackson “I’ll be back for” something, and the government elicited testimony 

at trial that the CI was telling Jackson that the CI would be back for more drugs. 

However, even if some statements are seen as factual assertions offered for their truth, any 

error was harmless. The video shows the C.I. place money on the table, leave, and return to a 

police vehicle where an officer asks for what he testified was crack cocaine. The audio—while 

giving some context—was not necessary for the jury to understand that the money was placed on 

the table in exchange for drugs. Looking at the government’s evidence “on the whole,” we are 

convinced that any error in admitting the few challenged statements “was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” McGee, 529 F.3d at 697 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681).

Accordingly, the district court’s admission of the C.I.’s statements on the video was not a 

reversible Confrontation Clause error.
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III.

Jackson’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims also fail. He argues that the government 

presented a “flawed case” and, accordingly, “no rational factfinder could find Mr. Jackson guilty.” 

He relies on the poor quality of the recording device, the fact that the officers could not fully search 

the C.I. before and after the controlled buy, and the prosecution’s failure to present the actual bills 

used for the purchase at trial.

A court assessing the sufficiency of the evidence considers “whether, after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Copeland, 321 

F.3d 582, 600 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We review

the claim de novo and draw “all reasonable inferences in support of the jury’s verdict.” United 

States v. Stewart, 729 F.3d 517, 526 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Wettstain, 618 F.3d 

577, 583 (6th Cir. 2010)). We “will reverse a judgment for insufficient evidence ‘only if the 

judgment is not supported by substantial and competent evidence upon the record as a whole.’” 

Id. (quoting Wettstain, 618 F.3d at 583). “[A] defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence 

bears a very heavy burden.” United States v. Jackson, 473 F.3d 660, 669 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 589 (6th Cir. 2006)).

To convict Jackson on Count One, the government had to prove Jackson distributed a 

controlled substance with the intent to do so. United States v. Villarce, 323 F.3d 435, 439 (6th Cir. 

2003); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The government’s evidence showed that the C.I. walked to 

Jackson’s hotel room with pre-photocopied bills. Officers searched the C.I. for drugs before and 

after, and the C.I. was surveilled and carrying a recording device the entire time. The C.I. placed 

the bills in front of Jackson and returned with cocaine. After seeing that evidence, a rational juror 
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could convict Jackson of distributing the cocaine to the C.I., and intending to do so. See, e.g., 

United States v. Hall, 20 F.4th 1085, 1106 (6th Cir. 2022) (finding evidence sufficient to convict

a defendant of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances based in part on testimony that “he 

sold $60 worth of narcotics to a CI” and that officers “recovered a ‘trafficker’s amount’ of drugs” 

from his vehicle).

A rational finder of fact could have found that the supposed “flaws” in the evidence

identified by Jackson did not undermine the government’s case in any significant way. The video 

was shaky and the time stamp was incorrect, but the jury could see the basic details of the entire 

encounter. One of the government’s witnesses testified that detectives searched the C.I. before 

and after the controlled buy for any other drugs, and the video and police surveillance confirms 

that the C.I. had little, if any, opportunity to obtain the cocaine any other way. Although the 

government did not produce the actual pre-photocopied bills at trial, officers testified they found 

the bills they had given the C.I. to use in the buy in Jackson’s room. In any event, we are required 

to draw all inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict, and thus cannot entertain Jackson’s suggestion 

that we infer an unsupported set of events.

Jackson does not offer argument on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict on Counts 

Two, Three, and Four, which charge possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, and 

we conclude a jury could rationally have found the evidence was sufficient to convict on those 

counts as well. The police found three separate bags of controlled substances in Jackson’s hotel 

room, along with two digital scales and small baggies. Jackson admitted he was the only person 

staying in the room, which supported an inference that he possessed the drugs found in it. And the 

quantity of drugs in each of the three bags was consistent with distribution. Taken together, that 
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evidence was sufficient to convict Jackson of possession with intent to distribute the drugs, even 

without considering the alleged hearsay. 

IV.

For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.