Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations, Committee 

on Energy and Commerce, House of 

Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Wednesday, September 28, 2005 HURRICANE KATRINA

Providing Oversight of the 

Nation’s Preparedness, 

Response, and Recovery 

Activities 

Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

GAO-05-1053T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-1053T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Norman J. 

Rabkin at (202) 512-8777 or 

rabkinn@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-1053T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, Committee on Energy 

and Commerce, House of Representatives 

September 28, 2005

HURRICANE KATRINA

Providing Oversight of the Nation's 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 

Activities 

GAO’s past work has noted a host of needed improvements in a variety of 

government programs related to Hurricane Katrina and other natural 

disasters. For example, GAO found that there have been a number of 

challenges in preparing health care providers for catastrophic events. In 

addition, GAO’s work on energy issues has noted the interconnectedness of 

our petroleum markets and revealed the vulnerability of these markets to 

disruptions, natural or otherwise. GAO’s environmental work has indicated 

that the loss of wetlands has increased the severity of damage from 

hurricanes, and that cleanup of contaminated sites takes a tremendous 

amount of coordination and funding. Finally, GAO’s work on 

telecommunications issues has found that interoperable emergency 

communications are challenged by insufficient collaboration among federal, 

state, and local governments. In these areas, among others, GAO has made a 

number of recommendations which are still open. 

While GAO has issued a number of relevant reports in the past, the 

accountability community has an active future agenda for evaluating the 

nation’s response to Hurricane Katrina. The DHS Office of Inspector 

General (OIG) has developed a plan to coordinate Katrina-related oversight 

activities with the OIGs of 12 other departments and agencies, focusing on 

waste, fraud, and abuse. GAO plans to provide the Congress with more 

strategic evaluations to assess the federal, state, local, and private sector 

preparedness, response and recovery efforts related to Hurricane Katrina. 

GAO also plans to be involved in reviewing the overall accounting of and use 

of Katrina-related funds by federal agencies. 

Rescue Workers Search a Home in Flooded New Orleans 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard. 

Hurricane Katrina will have an 

enormous impact on people and 

the economy of the United States. 

The hurricane affected over a half 

million people located in Louisiana, 

Mississippi, and Alabama and has 

resulted in one of the largest 

natural disaster relief and recovery 

operations in United States history. 

In terms of public health, standing 

water and high temperatures have 

created a breeding ground for 

disease, and public health 

advisories have warned about the 

spread of disease in the affected 

areas. Hurricane Katrina also 

resulted in environmental 

challenges, such as water and 

sediment contamination from toxic 

materials released into the 

floodwaters. In addition, our 

nation’s energy infrastructure was 

hard hit; it affected 21 refineries. In 

terms of telecommunications, 

Hurricane Katrina knocked out 

radio and television stations, more 

than 3 million customer phone 

lines, and more than a thousand 

cell phone sites. 

GAO prepared this testimony to 

highlight past work on government 

programs related to Hurricane 

Katrina and other natural disasters, 

and to provide information on 

plans and coordination among the 

accountability community—GAO, 

the Inspectors General, and other 

auditors at the state and local level. 
Page 1 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss oversight of the nation’s response 

to Hurricane Katrina. As Comptroller General Walker has stated, while the 

Inspectors General of the various departments plan to conduct detailed 

work on fraud, waste, and abuse in individual programs in federal 

agencies, GAO plans to provide support to Congress through analysis and 

evaluation of the various issues related to coordination among different 

federal agencies, and between these federal agencies and the state, local, 

and private sectors. The Comptroller General has also stated that GAO will 

be involved in reviewing the overall funding for and use of Katrina-related 

funding by various federal agencies. In addition, GAO has conducted 

several related reviews in the past—including reviews of federal actions 

following Hurricane Andrew in 1992—that will be helpful in evaluating the 

nation’s response to Hurricane Katrina. 

Before I begin my detailed comments, I want to say that, as you know, all 

of us at the U.S. Government Accountability Office, as all Americans, were 

saddened by the destruction that Hurricane Katrina caused throughout the 

Gulf Coast in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama on August 29, 2005, and 

the ensuing days. One of the many roles of government is to provide for its 

citizens at a time when they are most in need. Because of Hurricane 

Katrina, it is clear that strengthening the nation’s emergency response 

efforts is at the top of the national agenda. While this testimony is a 

dispassionate and analytical discussion of some of the challenges faced by 

the nation, we recognize the terrible costs of Hurricane Katrina in human 

terms and our hearts go out to the victims and their families. 

Hurricane Katrina will have an enormous impact on people and the 

economy of the Gulf Coast as well as the United States. The hurricane 

affected over a half million people located within approximately 90,000 

square miles spanning Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and has 

resulted in one of the largest natural disaster relief and recovery 

operations in United States history. Many of the sectors affected by the 

hurricane are within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Energy and 

Commerce. In terms of public health, standing water and high 

temperatures have created a breeding ground for disease, and public 

health advisories have warned about the spread of disease in the affected 

areas. The medical needs of evacuees will be an additional challenge; 

many evacuees are without medical records and at risk of losing their 

medical coverage. Hurricane Katrina also resulted in environmental 

challenges, such as water and sediment contamination from toxic 

materials released into the floodwaters. In addition, our nation’s energy 
Page 2 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

infrastructure was hard hit. The Department of Energy reported that 

21 refineries in affected states were either shut down or operating at 

reduced capacity in the aftermath of the hurricane. Damaged transmission 

lines left as many as 2.3 million customers without electricity. The 

hurricane also disrupted commerce. According to the Department of 

Commerce, the ports damaged by Hurricane Katrina accounted for 

4.5 percent of total exports of goods from the United States last year, and 

5.4 percent of total U.S. imports. Finally, in terms of telecommunications, 

the Federal Communications Commission reported that Hurricane Katrina 

knocked out radio and television stations, more than 3 million customer 

phone lines, and more than a thousand cell phone sites. 

In my statement today I will highlight some of GAO’s previous work on 

challenges faced by government preparedness, response, and recovery 

programs, many of which are directly related to this committee’s 

jurisdiction. For future work, GAO will continue to provide this committee 

and Congress with independent analysis and evaluations, and coordinate 

our efforts with the accountability community to ensure appropriate 

oversight of federal programs and spending. As provided for in our 

congressional protocols, we plan to conduct Katrina-related work under 

the Comptroller General’s statutory authority since it is an issue of interest 

to the entire Congress and numerous committees in both houses. 

My statement is based upon our extensive work spanning a wide variety of 

topics over a number of years. Much of this work was done relatively 

recently in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

and the subsequent creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 

March 2003. In all, we have published over 120 reports on disaster 

preparedness and response, and other issues raised by Katrina, which are 

useful in moving forward in addressing problems encountered with the 

nation’s response to the hurricane. At the end of this statement is a 

comprehensive list of our related products. 

Our past work has noted needed improvements in government programs 

related to preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural 

disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. Many of these challenges relate to 

programs under the jurisdiction of the Energy and Commerce Committee. 

For example, health care providers have not always been adequately 

prepared for catastrophic events. The health care community has been 

addressing some of these challenges, such as those involving coordination 

efforts and communications systems, more readily than others, such as 

infrastructure and workforce issues, which are more resource-intensive. 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

Our work on energy issues has described some of the consequences of 

hurricanes on petroleum markets—such as rapid gasoline price increases. 

Our environmental work has indicated that the loss of wetlands has 

increased the severity of damage from hurricanes, and that cleanup of 

contaminated sites takes a tremendous amount of coordination and 

funding. Finally, our work on telecommunications issues has found that 

first responders are challenged by a lack of interoperable emergency 

communications. In these areas, among others, we have made a number of 

recommendations, many of which are still pending completion. 

There are a host of challenges to government programs related to 

Hurricane Katrina and other natural disasters in terms of preparedness, 

response, and recovery. Our work on preparedness—programs to prevent 

disasters or prepare to respond in advance—has identified needed 

improvements in a number of areas, including balancing efforts to prepare 

for terrorism with efforts related to natural disasters and all hazards; 

planning preparedness efforts and setting goals and measures; providing 

training, exercises, evaluations, and lessons learned to first responders; 

providing flood control and protection; improving public health 

preparedness; and providing federal grants to state and local governments. 

Similarly, our work on response to disasters has identified a number of 

problems. These relate to federal, state and local roles in coordinating the 

response; the role of the military, to include the National Guard; and the 

medical and public health response capabilities. Furthermore, our work on 

recovery—programs to help communities and victims get back to 

normal—has also identified challenges related to federal assistance to 

recovery areas, private nongovernment assistance efforts, and lessons 

from overseas recovery programs. In many of these areas we have made a 

number of recommendations, some of which have still not been 

implemented. Below are some examples of our previous and planned work 

related to the jurisdiction of this committee regarding preparedness, 

response, and recovery issues related to health care, energy, the 

environment, and telecommunications. 

Hurricane Katrina raised a number of health care concerns, and the 

preparedness of health care providers, their response capabilities, and 

health care agency and hospital capacity are all important in a major 

disaster. The National Strategy for Homeland Security had a specific 

Past GAO Work Has 

Highlighted Needed 

Improvements in 

Many Programs 

Related to 

Preparedness, 

Response, and 

Recovery 

Health Care Issues 
Page 4 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

initiative to prepare health care providers for catastrophic events, such as 

major terrorist attacks.1

 However, in April 2003, we reported that many 

local areas and their supporting agencies may not have been adequately 

prepared to respond to such an event.2 Specifically, while many state and 

local officials reported varying levels of preparedness to respond to a 

bioterrorist attack, they reported that challenges existed because of 

deficiencies in capacity, communication, and coordination elements 

essential to preparedness and response. These included workforce 

shortages, inadequacies in disease surveillance and laboratory systems, 

and a lack of regional coordination and compatible communications 

systems. Some of these challenges, such as those involving coordination 

efforts and communications systems, were being addressed more readily, 

whereas others, such as infrastructure and workforce issues, were more 

resource-intensive. Generally, we found that cities with more experience 

in dealing with public health emergencies were generally better prepared 

for a major disaster (such as a bioterrorist attack) than other cities, 

although challenges remain in every city. Almost a year later, in February 

2004, we reported that although states had further developed many 

important aspects of public health preparedness, no state was fully 

prepared to respond to a major public health threat.3

 Specifically, states 

had improved their disease surveillance systems, laboratory capacity, 

communications capacity, and workforce needed to respond to public 

health threats, but gaps in each remained. Moreover, regional planning 

among states was lacking, and many states lacked surge capacity—the 

capacity to evaluate, diagnose, and treat the large numbers of patients that 

would present during a public health emergency. 

In terms of health care agencies and hospital capacities, we also found 

major deficiencies. In May 2003 we testified that while the efforts of public 

health agencies and health care organizations to increase their 

preparedness for major public health threats have increased, significant 

challenges remained.4

 Specifically, we found most emergency departments 

 1

See the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the White House, July 2002. 

2

See GAO, Bioterrorism: Preparedness Varied Across State and Local Jurisdictions, 

GAO-03-373 (Washingon, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2003). 

3

See GAO, Public Health Preparedness: Response Capacity Improving, but Much 

Remains to Be Accomplished, GAO-04-458T, (Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004). 

4

See GAO, SARS Outbreak: Improvements to Public Health Capacity Are Needed for 

Responding to Bioterrorism and Emerging Infectious Diseases, GAO-03-769T

(Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2003). 
Page 5 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

across the country lacked the capacity to respond to large-scale infectious 

disease outbreaks. For example, although most hospitals across the 

country reported participating in basic planning activities for large-scale 

infectious disease outbreaks, few had acquired the medical equipment 

resources—such as ventilators—that would be required in such an event. 

Further, because most emergency departments already routinely 

experienced some degree of overcrowding, they may not be able to handle 

the sudden influx of patients that would occur during a large-scale 

infectious disease outbreak. Regarding hospital capacity, in August 2003 

we reported that the medical equipment available for response to certain 

incidents (e.g., as a biological terrorist incident) varied greatly among 

hospitals.5

 Additionally, many hospitals reported that they did not have the 

capacity to respond to the large increase in the number of patients that 

would be likely to result from incidents with mass casualties. 

In our April 2003 report on preparedness, we made a number of 

recommendations to help state and local jurisdictions better prepare for a 

bioterrorist attack and to develop a mechanism for sharing solutions 

between jurisdictions. In response to this report, the Departments of 

Health and Human Services and Homeland Security concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations. 

• We plan future work related to Hurricane Katrina regarding public 

health and health services, including mental health services issues. 

Specifically, we plan to conduct evaluations of evacuation plans for 

inpatient and long-term care health facilities; federal, state, and local 

preparedness plans for dealing with the health consequences of natural 

and man-made disasters; and provision of mental health services for 

evacuees and first responders. 

The wide-ranging effects of Hurricane Katrina on gasoline prices 

nationwide are a stark reminder of the interconnectedness of our 

petroleum markets and reveal the vulnerability of these markets to 

disruptions, natural or otherwise.6

 These markets have become stressed 

over time, in part because of a proliferation of special gasoline blends that 

have raised costs and affected operations at refineries, pipelines, and 

 5

See GAO, Hospital Preparedness: Most Urban Hospitals Have Emergency Plans but Lack 

Certain Capacities for Bioterrorism Response, GAO-03-924 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 

2003). 

6

For a primer on gasoline prices, see GAO, Motor Fuels: Understanding the Factors That 

Influence the Retail Price of Gasoline, GAO-05-525SP (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2005). 

Energy Issues 
Page 6 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

storage terminals.7 As we noted in our recent testimony on energy 

markets, Hurricane Katrina did tremendous damage to, among other 

things, electricity transmission lines, and oil producing, refining, and 

pipeline facilities.8

 Because the Gulf Coast refining region is a net exporter 

of petroleum products to all other regions of the country, retail gasoline 

prices in many parts of the nation rose dramatically. A variety of factors 

determine how gasoline prices vary across different locations and over 

time. For example, gasoline prices may be affected by unexpected refinery 

outages or accidents that significantly disrupt the delivery of gasoline 

supply. Future gasoline prices will reflect the world supply and demand 

balance and will continue to be an important factor affecting the American 

consumer for the foreseeable future. The impact of gasoline prices is felt 

in virtually every sector of the U.S. economy. Some of our more significant 

open recommendations are that (1) the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA), with the Department of Energy (DOE) and others, develop a plan 

to balance the environmental benefits of using special fuels with the 

impacts these fuels have on the gasoline supply infrastructure, and (2) if 

warranted, EPA work with other agencies to identify what statutory or 

other changes are required to implement this plan. EPA declined to 

comment on our recommendations and did not signify agreement or 

disagreement with them. 

• We plan future work on energy issues in order to better understand the 

vulnerability of the nation’s energy infrastructure to natural or 

manmade disasters. Specifically, we plan to conduct evaluations of 

determinants of gasoline prices in particular, and the petroleum 

industry more generally. Included will be evaluations of world oil 

reserves; security of maritime facilities for handling and transporting 

petroleum, natural gas, and petroleum products; viability of the 

Strategic Petroleum Reserve to respond to disruptions such as 

Hurricane Katrina; and impacts of the potential disruption of 

Venezuelan oil imports. 

Hurricane Katrina resulted in significant impacts on Gulf Coast 

environmental resources. The condition of environmental resources has 

an important role in both the prevention and of recovery from natural 

 7

See GAO, Gasoline Markets: Special Gasoline Blends Reduce Emissions and Improve 

Air Quality, but Complicate Supply and Contribute to Higher Prices, GAO-05-421

(Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2005). 

8

See GAO, Energy Markets: Gasoline Price Trends, GAO-05-1047T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

21, 2005). 

Environmental Issues 
Page 7 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

disasters. In the area of prevention, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has 

responsibility for constructing hurricane prevention and flood control 

projects throughout the country. The Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity 

Hurricane Protection Project was one such project that was authorized by 

Congress in 1965 to provide hurricane protection to New Orleans from a 

fast-moving Category 3 hurricane.9 Similarly, wetlands, once regarded as 

unimportant areas to be filled or drained for agricultural or development 

activities, are now recognized for the variety of important functions that 

they perform, including providing flood control by slowing down and 

absorbing excess water during storms; maintaining water quality by 

filtering out pollutants before they enter streams, lakes, and oceans; and 

protecting coastal and upland areas from erosion.10 Moreover, it has been 

suggested that wetlands act as a speed bump, slowing down storms almost 

as dry land does. The Fish and Wildlife Service reports that more than half 

of the 221 million acres of wetlands that existed during colonial times in 

what is now the contiguous United States have been lost. There is no 

reliable set of wetland acreage estimates to be used to evaluate the 

progress made in achieving the goal of “no net loss” of the remaining 

wetlands. In the area of recovery, Hurricane Katrina poses an enormous 

challenge in terms of the cleanup of hazardous materials in the area. 

Industrial discharges, sewage, gas and oil from gas stations, household 

hazardous materials, pesticides, and chemicals contaminated the 

floodwaters. The long-term effects of these hazardous materials, the level 

of effort and coordination needed and the cost of decontamination and 

cleanup will take some time to determine. 

In situations where such contamination exits, EPA serves as the lead 

agency for the cleanup of hazardous materials, including oil and gasoline. 

EPA emergency response personnel are working in partnership with 

FEMA and state and local agencies to help assess the damage, test health 

and environmental conditions, and coordinate cleanup from Hurricane 

Katrina. They are conducting water, air, and sediment testing, assessing 

drinking water and wastewater facilities, examining superfund and other 

hazardous waste sites affected by the storms, issuing environmental 

waivers, and providing public advisories regarding drinking water and the 

potential for hazardous debris in homes and buildings. 

 9

 See GAO, Army Corps of Engineers: Lake Ponchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane 

Protection Project, GAO-05-1050T, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2005). 

10 See GAO, Wetlands Overview: Problems With Acreage Data Persist, 

GAO/RCED-98-150, (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 1998). 
Page 8 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

• We plan future work on environmental issues, such as evaluations of 

how EPA and other federal, state, and local agencies conduct water, 

soil, and air quality testing to determine when it will be safe for 

residents to return to New Orleans. We also plan to evaluate efforts to 

treat hazardous materials during the cleanup efforts and restore 

drinking water and wastewater facilities. We also plan to review the 

Army Corps of Engineers efforts to repair the integrity of the hurricane 

protection structures in the New Orleans area and assess issues 

relating to wetland losses. 

Hurricane Katrina knocked out a wide variety of communications 

infrastructure and communication among emergency personnel is 

important in any disaster. The National Strategy for Homeland Security

called for seamless communications among all first responders and public 

health entities. However, in our August and November 2003 reports, we 

noted that insufficient collaboration among federal, state, and local 

governments had created a challenge for sharing public health information 

and developing interoperable communications for first responders.11 For 

example, states and cities had implemented many initiatives to improve 

information sharing, but these initiatives had not been well coordinated 

and risked creating partnerships that limited access to information and 

created duplicative efforts. Another challenge involved the lack of 

effective, collaborative, interdisciplinary, and intergovernmental planning 

for interoperable communications. For instance, the federal and state 

governments lacked a coordinated grant review process to ensure that 

funds were used for communications projects that complemented one 

another and added to overall statewide and national interoperability 

capacity.12 Moreover, we testified in April 2004 that the Wireless Public 

Safety Interoperable Communications Program, or SAFECOM, had made 

very limited progress in achieving communications interoperability among 

all entities at all levels of government and had not achieved the level of 

collaboration necessary.13 Finally, in our October 2003 report on public 

 11See GAO, Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be 

Strengthened, GAO-03-760, (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 27, 2003); and Homeland Security: 

Challenges in Achieving Interoperable Communications for First Responders, 

GAO-04-231T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2003). 

12See GAO, Homeland Security Federal leadership and Intergovernmental Cooperation 

Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable Communications, GAO-04-740

(Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004). 

13See GAO, Project SAFECOM: Key Cross-Agency Emergency Communications Effort 

Requires Stronger Collaboration, GAO-04-494 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.16, 2004). 

Telecommunications 

Issues 
Page 9 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

health preparedness, we reported that challenges existed in ensuring 

communication among responders and with the public.14 For example, 

during the anthrax incidents of 2001, local officials identified 

communication among responders and with the public as a challenge, both 

in terms of having the necessary communication channels and in terms of 

making the necessary information available for distribution. 

We made a number of recommendations that DHS, in conjunction with 

other federal agencies, complete a database on communication 

frequencies, determine the status of wireless public safety 

communications nationwide, tie grant funding to statewide 

interoperability plans, and review the interoperability functions of 

SAFECOM. DHS has agreed to take some, but not all, of the corrective 

actions we recommended. 

We have issued a number of reports relevant to evaluating Hurricane 

Katrina. In addition, the accountability community—including the IGs and 

GAO—has an active future agenda for evaluating the nation’s response to 

the hurricane. Congress has recently passed legislation that provided $15 

million for the DHS IG to audit and investigate Hurricane Katrina response 

and recovery activities.15 The DHS IG has developed a plan for oversight of 

the funds being spent directly by DHS components and the IGs of the 12 

other departments and agencies that account for almost all of the 

remainder of the funds appropriated thus far. The primary objective of the 

IG plan is to ensure accountability, primarily through ongoing audit and 

investigative efforts designed to identify and address waste, fraud, and 

abuse. Each IG will be issuing an individual report to ensure that the 

affected people, organizations, and governments receive the full benefit of 

the funds being spent and to be spent on disaster response and recovery 

programs. The DHS IG will coordinate the work of the respective IGs 

through regular meetings, and the overall account of funds will be 

coordinated with us through regular meetings with our senior officials. 

As the IGs focus on fraud, waste, and abuse, GAO can provide Congress 

with more strategic evaluations on such issues as coordination among 

 14See GAO, Bioterrorism: Public Health Response to Anthrax Incidents of 2001, 

GAO-04-152 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2003). 

15 Second Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs Arising 

from the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. 109-62, 119 Stat. 190, 191 (2005). 

Concluding 

Observations 
Page 10 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

various agencies and state and local government and the private sector. 

Some of our past strategic work included reports in the wake of Hurricane 

Andrew in 199216 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.17 Other 

strategic-level reports have covered such topics as barriers to interagency 

coordination,18 issues related to continuity of operations planning for 

essential government services,19 and DHS’ efforts to enhance first 

responders’ all-hazards capabilities.20 Many of our past reports, which 

provide a firm foundation for doing Katrina-related work, contain 

recommendations to improve top-level coordination. While several 

changes have occurred in terms of the government’s structure and process 

for emergency preparedness and response, the extent to which many of 

our earlier recommendations have been fully implemented remains 

unclear. 

In closing, we will continue to work with the accountability community 

and have already reached out to the relevant congressional committees, 

federal IGs, and state and local auditors in the affected states to 

coordinate our efforts, avoid unnecessary duplication, and most 

effectively utilize our resources. Comptroller General Walker has been 

personally and extensively involved in this effort and he plans to continue 

to be heavily involved. 

- - - - - 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond 

to any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have 

at this time. 

 16See GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation’s Response to Catastrophic 

Disasters, GAO/RCED-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1993). 

17See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, 

GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001). 

18See GAO, Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination, 

GAO/GGD-00-106 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2000). 

19See GAO, Continuity of Operations: Improved Planning Needed to Ensure Delivery of 

Essential Government Services, GAO-04-160 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2004). 

20See GAO, Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All-Hazards 

Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2005). 
Page 11 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. For further 

information about this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin at 

(202) 512-8777 or at rabkinn@gao.gov, or William O. Jenkins, Jr., at 

(202) 512-8757 or at jenkinswo@gao.gov. This statement was prepared 

under the direction of Stephen L. Caldwell. Key contributors were 

Nancy Briggs, Christine Davis, David Lysy, Stephanie Sand, and 

Ashanta Williams. 

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Page 12 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable 

Organization’ Contributions to Disasters, GAO-03-259, December 19, 

2002. 

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater 

Assets and Acquisition Challenges, GAO-05-651T, June 21, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport 

Exercises Needs Further Attention, GAO-05-170, June 14, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater 

Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, GAO-05-307T, 

April 20, 2005. 

Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information 

Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, 

GAO-05-394, April 15, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 

Budget Request, GAO-05-364T, March 17, 2005. 

Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New 

Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security, GAO-04-838, June 

30, 2004. 

Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed, 

GAO-04-695, June 14, 2004. 

Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 

2005 and Beyond, GAO-04-636T, April 7, 2004. 

Gasoline Markets: Special Gasoline Blends Reduce Emissions and 

Improve Air Quality, but Complicate Supply and Contribute to Higher 

Prices, GAO-05-421, June 17, 2005. 

Energy Markets: Understanding Current Gasoline Prices and Potential 

Future Trends, GAO-05-675T, May 9, 2005. 

Motor Fuels: Understanding the Factors That Influence the Retail Price 

of Gasoline, GAO-05-525SP, May 2005. 

Related GAO Products 

Charities 

Coast Guard and 

Seaports 

Energy Supply 
Page 13 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

Meeting Energy Demand in the 21 st Century: Many Challenges and Key 

Questions, GAO-05-414T, March 16, 2005. 

Energy Markets: Mergers and Many Other Factors Affect U.S. Gasoline 

Markets, GAO-04-951T, July 7, 2004. 

Propane: Causes of Price Volatility, Potential Consumer Options, and 

Opportunities to Improve Consumer Information and Federal Oversight, 

GAO-03-762 , June 27, 2003. 

Energy Security: Evaluating U.S. Vulnerability to Oil Supply 

Disruptions and Options for Mitigating Their Effects, GAO/ RCED-97-6, 

December 12, 1996. 

Agricultural Conservation: USDA Needs to Better Ensure Protection of 

Highly Erodible Cropland and Wetlands, GAO-03-418, April 21, 2003. 

Wetlands Overview: Problems With Acreage Data Persist, GAO/RCED-98-

150, July 1, 1998. 

Coastal Barriers: Development Occurring Despite Prohibition Against 

Federal Assistance, RCED-92-115, July 17, 1992. 

Emergency Disaster Farm Loans: Government's Financial Risk Could 

Be Reduced, RCED-96-80, March 29, 1996. 

Flood Map Modernization: Program Strategy Shows Promise, but 

Challenges Remain, GAO-04-417, March 31, 2004. 

Federal Flood Control Funding for Rural Areas, GAO/RCED-97-25R, 

December 23, 1996. 

Midwest Flood: Information on the Performance, Effects and Control of 

Levees, GAO/RCED-95-125, August 7, 1995. 

Improved Planning Needed By the Corps of Engineers to Resolve 

Environmental, Technical, and Financial Issues on the Lake 

Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection Project, GAO/MASAD-82-39, August 

17, 1982. 

Environment and 

Natural Resources 

Flood Control 
Page 14 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

Improvements Being Made in Flood Fighting Capabilities in the 

Jackson, Mississippi, Area, GAO/CED-80-36, December 18, 1979. 

Cost, Schedule and Performance Problems of the Lake Pontchartrain and 

Vicinity, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project, PSAD-76-161, August

31, 1976. 

Protection of Chemical and Water Infrastructure: Federal Requirements, 

Actions of Selected Facilities, and Remaining Challenges, GAO-05-327, 

March 28, 2005. 

Hazardous Waste Sites: Improved Effectiveness of Controls at Sites 

Could Better Protect the Public, GAO-05-163, January 28, 2005. 

Federal-Aid Highways: FHWA Needs a Comprehensive Approach to 

Improving Project Oversight, GAO-05-173, January 31, 2005. 

Water Infrastructure: Comprehensive Asset Management Has Potential 

to Help Utilities Better Identify Needs and Plan Future Investments, 

GAO-04-461, March 19, 2004. 

Electricity Restructuring: 2003 Blackout Identifies Crisis and 

Opportunity for the Electricity Sector, GAO-04-204, November 18, 2003. 

Drinking Water: Experts' Views on How Future Federal Funding Can 

Best Be Spent to Improve Security, GAO-04-29, October 31, 2003. 

Highway Infrastructure: Stakeholders' Views on Time to Conduct 

Environmental Reviews of Highway Projects, GAO-03-534, May 23, 2003. 

Highway Infrastructure: Perceptions of Stakeholders on Approaches to 

Reduce Highway Project Completion Time, GAO-03-398, April 9, 2003. 

Environmental Protection: MTBE from Underground Tanks, GAO-02-

753T, May 21, 2002. 

Drinking Water: Information on the Quality of Water Found at 

Community Water Systems and Private Wells, RCED-97-123, June 12, 

1997. 

Infrastructure 
Page 15 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

National Flood Insurance Program: Oversight of Policy Issuance and 

Claims, GAO-05-532T, April 14, 2005. 

Catastrophe Risk: U.S. and European Approaches to Insure Natural 

Catastrophe and Terrorism Risks, GAO-05-199, February 28, 2005. 

National Flood Insurance Program: Actions to Address Repetitive Loss 

Properties, GAO-04-401T, March 25, 2004. 

Catastrophe Insurance Risks: The Role of Risk-Linked Securities and 

Factors Affecting Their Use, GAO-02-941, September 24, 2002. 

Budget Issues: Budgeting for Federal Insurance Programs, GAO/AIMD97-16, September 30, 1997. 

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for 

Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21, November 10, 2004. 

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas 

and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges, GAO-04-670T, April 29, 

2004. 

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for 

Domestic Military Missions, GAO-03-670, July 11, 2003. 

Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown 

but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention, GAO-01-9, January 26, 2001.

Military Operations: DOD's Disaster Relief Assistance in Response to 

Hurricane Mitch, GAO/NSIAD-99-122R, March 29, 1999. 

Disaster Assistance: DOD's Support for Hurricane Andrew and Iniki 

and Typhoon Omar, GAO/NSIAD-93-180, June 18, 1993. 

Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' AllHazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652, July 11, 2005. 

Strategic Budgeting: Risk Management Principles Can Help DHS 

Allocate Resources to Highest Priorities, GAO-05-824T, June 29, 2005. 

Insurance 

Military’s Role, 

Including National 

Guard and Reserves 

Preparedness 
Page 16 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better 

Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies, GAO-05-

619T, April 28, 2005. 

Homeland Security Management of First Responder Grant Programs 

and Efforts to Improve Accountability Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-530T, 

April 12, 2005. 

Results-Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS's Planning Process 

Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability, GAO-05-300, March 31,

2005. 

Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Create 

an Effective Acquisition Organization, GAO-05-179, March 29, 2005. 

Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and Sustained 

Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration, GAO-05-139, 

March 16, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs 

Has Improved, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-121, February 2, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges 

Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-05-33, 

January 14, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Further Action Needed to Promote Successful Use of 

Special DHS Acquisition Authority, GAO-05-136, December 14, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance 

Emergency Preparedness, GAO-04-1009, September 15, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental 

Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable 

Communications, GAO-04-740, July 20, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed to 

Better Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region, 

GAO-04-904T, June 24, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the 

National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and 

Performance Goals, GAO-04-433, May 28, 2004. 
Page 17 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

Status of FEMA's FY03 Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program, GAO-04-727R, 

April 28, 2004. 

Project Safecom: Key Cross-Agency Emergency Communications Effort 

Requires Stronger Collaboration, GAO-04-494, April 16, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Reforming Federal Grants to Better Meet 

Outstanding Needs, GAO-03-1146T, September 3, 2003. 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Homeland Security, GAO-03-102, January 2003. 

Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues, 

GAO-02-957T, July 17, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Responsibility And Accountability For Achieving 

National Goals, GAO-02-627T, April 11, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach, 

GAO-02-150T, October 12, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 

Recommendations Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-01-822, 

September 20, 2001. 

Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing 

States for Emergencies, GAO-01-850, August 13, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in 

Coordinating Preparedness and Response, GAO-01-15, March 20, 2001. 

Budgeting for Emergencies: State Practices and Federal Implications, 

AIMD-99-250, September 30, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Issues to be Resolved to Improve 

Counterterrorism Operations, GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999. 

September 11: Monitoring of World Trade Center Health Effects Has 

Progressed, but Not for Federal Responders, GAO-05-1020T, September 10, 

2005. 

Public Health 
Page 18 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

Influenza Pandemic: Challenges in Preparedness and Response, GAO-05-

863T, June 30, 2005. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Crisis Counseling Grants 

Awarded to the State of New York after the September 11 Terrorist 

Attacks, GAO-05-514, May 31, 2005. 

Veteran's Health Care: VA's Medical Support Role in Emergency 

Preparedness, GAO-05-387R, March 23, 2005. 

Flu Vaccine: Recent Supply Shortages Underscore Ongoing Challenges, 

GAO-05-177T, November 18, 2004. 

Emerging Infectious Diseases: Review of State and Federal Disease 

Surveillance Efforts, GAO-04-877, September 30, 2004. 

Infectious Disease Preparedness: Federal Challenges in Responding to 

Influenza Outbreaks, GAO-04-1100T, September 28, 2004. 

September 11: Health Effects in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center 

Attack, GAO-04-1068T, September 8, 2004. 

Public Health Preparedness: Response Capacity Improving but Much 

Remains to Be Accomplished, GAO-04-458T, February 12, 2004. 

HHS Bioterrorism Preparedness Programs: States Reported Progress but 

Fell Short of Program Goals for 2002, GAO-04-360R, February 10, 2004. 

Hospital Preparedness: Most Urban Hospitals Have Emergency Plans 

but Lack Certain Capacities for Bioterrorism Response, GAO-03-924,

August 6, 2003. 

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Established Infectious Disease 

Control Measures Helped Contain Spread, But a Large-Scale Resurgence 

May Pose Challenges, GAO-03-1058T, July 30, 2003. 

SARS Outbreak: Improvements to Public Health Capacity Are Needed for 

Responding to Bioterrorism and Emerging Infectious Diseases, 

GAO-03-769T, May 7, 2003. 

Infectious Disease Outbreaks: Bioterrorism Preparedness Efforts Have 

Improved Public Health Response Capacity, but Gaps Remain, 

GAO-03-654T, April 9, 2003. 
Page 19 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

Public Health: Maintaining an Adequate Blood Supply is Key to 

Emergency Preparedness, GAO-02-1095T, September 10, 2002. 

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but 

Transferring Control of Certain Public Health Programs Raises 

Concerns, GAO-02-954T, July 16, 2002. 

Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Role in 

Public Health Protection, GAO-02-235T, November 15, 2001. 

Influenza Pandemic: Plan Needed for Federal and State Response, 

GAO-01-4, October 27, 2000. 

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness, 

GAO/HEHS-00-180, September 11, 2000. 

West Nile Virus: Preliminary Information on Lessons Learned, 

GAO/HEHS-00-142R, June 23, 2000. 

Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' AllHazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652, July 11, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Federal and Industry Efforts Are Addressing 

Security Issues at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Action Is Needed, 

GAO-05-631T, April 27, 2005. 

Continuity of Operations: Improved Planning Needed to Ensure 

Delivery of Essential Services, GAO-04-638T, April 22, 2004. 

Human Capital: Opportunities to Improve Federal Continuity Planning 

Guidance, GAO-04-384, April 20, 2004. 

Continuity of Operations: Improved Planning Needed to Ensure 

Delivery of Essential Government Services, GAO-04-160, February 27, 

2004. 

Homeland Security: Challenges in Achieving Interoperable 

Communications for First Responders, GAO-04-231T, November 6, 2003. 

Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security 

of Sealed Radioactive Sources, GAO-03-804, August 6, 2003. 

Response 
Page 20 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to 

Success, GAO-02-1013T, August 23, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships 

Will Be Critical to Success, GAO-02-900T, July 2, 2002. 

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but 

May Complicate Priority Setting, GAO-02-893T, June 28, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National 

Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-547T, March 

22, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied 

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination, GAO-01-

14, November 30, 2000. 

Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination, GGD-00-

106, March 29, 2000. 

Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to Catastrophic 

Disasters, GAO/RCED-93-186, July 23, 1993. 

Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to 

Improve the Nation's Response Strategy, GAO/T-RCED-93-46, January 27, 

1993. 

Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders to 

Support Military Operations, GAO-05-201, April 29, 2005. 

Small Business Administration: SBA Followed Appropriate Policies and

Procedures for September 11 Disaster Loan Application, GAO-04-885, 

August 31, 2004. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and 

Management Challenges, GAO-04-605, May 27, 2004. 

Purchase Cards: Increased Management Oversight and Control Could 

Save Hundreds of Millions of Dollars, GAO-04-717T, April 28, 2004. 

September 11: Overview of Federal Disaster Assistance to the New York 

City Area, GAO-04-72, October 31, 2003. 

Recovery 
Page 21 GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina 

Foreign Assistance: USAID's Earthquake Recovery Program in El 

Salvador Has Made Progress, but Key Activities Are Behind Schedule, 

GAO-03-656, May 15, 2003. 

Small Business Administration: Response to September 11 Victims and 

Performance Measures for Disaster Lending, GAO-03-385, January 29,

2003. 

Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program Addressed Intended 

Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Capability, 

GAO-02-787, July 24, 2002. 

Guidelines for Rescuing Large Failing Firms and Municipalities, GGD84-34, March 29, 1984. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Lack of Controls and Key 

Information for Property Leave Assets Vulnerable to Loss or 

Misappropriation, GAO-04-819R, July 14, 2004. 

FEMA Cerro Grande Claims: Payments Properly Processed, but 

Reporting Could Be Improved, GAO-04-129, December 24, 2003. 

Freight Transportation: Strategies Needed to Address Planning and 

Financing Limitations, GAO-04-165, December 19, 2003. 

September 11: Overview of Federal Disaster Assistance to the New York 

City Area, GAO-04-72, October 31, 2003. 

Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669, July 2, 2003. 

Potential Terrorist Attacks: Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare 

Critical Financial Market Participants, GAO-03-251, February 12, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership, 

GAO-03-260, December 20, 2002. 

September 11: Small Business Assistance Provided in Lower Manhattan 

In Response to the Terrorist Attacks, GAO-03-88, November 1, 2002. 

(440456) 
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