United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 

Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of 

Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

DOD PERSONNEL 

CLEARANCES 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 3:00 p.m.

Wednesday, November 9, 2005

Government Plan 

Addresses Some Longstanding Problems with 

DOD’s Program, But 

Concerns Remain 

Statement of Derek B. Stewart, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

GAO-06-233T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 9, 2005

DOD PERSONNEL CLEARANCES

Government Plan Addresses Some Longstanding Problems with DOD's Program, 

But Concerns Remain 

Highlights of GAO-06-233T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

We are encouraged by the level of commitment demonstrated by OMB in 

overseeing the preparation of the government plan for addressing problems in 

the personnel security clearance process. The plan represents an important step

toward addressing some long-standing concerns GAO has raised in this area. It 

includes some elements that a comprehensive strategic plan should contain,

such as metrics that will be used to monitor the timeliness of the security

clearance process governmentwide. However, the plan provides few details on

other features that GAO looks for in a comprehensive strategic plan. For

example, in some cases, the plan does not provide details on discrete actions the 

government would take or their projected completion dates. In addition, the 

plan does not always include details on the resources required to accomplish the 

plan’s objectives. Finally, the plan does not describe potential risks or mitigation 

plans to address potential risks. 

Although the government plan establishes metrics to address the timeliness of 

the security clearance process, they focus on some phases of the process more 

than others. Specifically, the plan identifies a wide variety of metrics for

monitoring the timeliness of security clearance investigations, but it does little to 

address timeliness in the adjudication phase of the process. The government 

plan also provides quarterly goals for different types of investigations. However, 

the plan does not identify baseline measures or interim goals for average 

adjudication processing time. 

Although it explicitly acknowledges that agencies have concerns about the

quality of investigations and adjudications, the government plan devotes little

attention to monitoring and improving the quality of the personnel security

clearance process. The plan’s primary metric for measuring the quality of 

investigations—the percentage of investigations returned by requesting agencies

due to incomplete case files—is not, by itself, a valid indicator of the quality of 

investigative work. Other or additional statistics, such as the number of

counterintelligence leads generated from security clearance investigations, may 

be needed. The government plan did not identify a metric for assessing the 

quality of adjudications, although GAO and other agencies have identified

actions that would facilitate monitoring and improvement of the quality of this 

portion of the personnel security clearance process. 

DOD must correct previously identified problems before its personnel security

clearance program can be removed from the high-risk list. Before removing

DOD’s personnel security clearance program from the high-risk list, GAO will 

examine whether OMB, OPM, and DOD have satisfied certain criteria, including

the establishment of leadership support, sufficient resources to resolve the risk, 

and a corrective action plan. GAO’s criteria also include the presence of a 

program to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and 

sustainability of any corrective actions and the agency’s ability to demonstrate 

the implementation of corrective measures. 

Unauthorized disclosure of classified 

information can cause up to 

exceptionally grave damage to

national security. The Department of 

Defense (DOD) is responsible for 

about 2 million personnel with 

clearances that allow them access to

classified information. While most of 

these clearances are for 

servicemembers and DOD’s 

employees and contractors, DOD is 

also responsible for contractors’ 

clearances for more than 20 other 

agencies, as well as for congressional

staff. Due to long-standing problems 

with DOD’s clearance program, GAO 

designated it a high-risk area in

January 2005. In February 2005, when

DOD transferred its personnel

security investigative functions to the 

Office of Personnel Management 

(OPM), the average wait for a top 

secret clearance governmentwide

was over 1 year. In June 2005, 

Executive Order 13381 gave the

Office of Management and Budget

(OMB) authority to retain or assign to 

any executive agency any process 

relating to determinations of 

eligibility for access to classified

information. OPM is assisting OMB 

with the development of the plan. 

GAO was asked to assess the 

government plan. This testimony will 

provide GAO’s preliminary review of

how well the government plan (1) 

adheres to the standards of

comprehensive strategic planning

and (2) addresses the timeliness and 

quality of the security clearance 

process. Finally, GAO will discuss the

actions required to remove DOD’s 

program from GAO’s high-risk list. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-233T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Derek B. 

Stewart at (202) 512-5559 or 

stewartd@gao.gov. 
 

Chairman Voinovich and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the government plan for addressing problems in 

the Department of Defense’s (DOD) personnel security clearance program. Clearances 

granted through such programs allow personnel access to classified information. 

Unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause exceptionally grave damage 

to national security. As you know, Mr. Chairman, in January of this year, we added 

DOD’s personnel security clearance program to our list of government high-risk

operations.1

 Our high-risk list focuses on those major programs and operations that need 

urgent attention and transformation in order to ensure that our national government 

functions in the most economical, efficient, and effective manner possible. Also, some 

federal programs and operations are designated high risk because of their greater 

vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. 

We declared DOD’s personnel security clearance program a high-risk area in January 

2005, in part because of long-standing delays in completing requests for security 

clearances. We have reported backlogs and impediments to timeliness and quality 

throughout DOD’s personnel security clearance process. DOD has faced challenges in 

the past in setting and projecting the requirements for clearances, submitting requests 

for investigations, conducting timely investigations, and adjudicating, or determining, 

whether someone is eligible for a clearance. We also found that DOD had been unable to 

accurately estimate the size of its clearance backlog. 

Problems with timeliness and quality in the personnel security clearance process can 

affect our national security. For example, delays in renewing security clearances for 

personnel who are already doing classified work can lead to a heightened risk of 

disclosure of classified information. Moreover, delays in providing initial security 

clearances for previously noncleared personnel can result in other negative 

consequences, such as additional costs and delays in completing national securityrelated contracts, lost-opportunity costs, and problems retaining the best-qualified 

personnel. Given the vast scope of DOD’s personnel security clearance program, these 

negative effects resound across government. Within DOD, the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is responsible for the clearances issued to 

approximately 2 million personnel and for coordinating and implementing DOD-wide 

policies related to accessing classified information. While most of the clearances DOD 

handles are for servicemembers and DOD’s federal employees and contractor personnel, 

the Office of the Under Secretary for Intelligence is also responsible for the clearances of 

contractors for more than 20 other federal agencies, as well as the clearances of staff in 

the federal government’s legislative branch. 

My testimony today will focus on the government plan and its relevance to improving 

DOD’s personnel security clearance process and how well it addresses our past 

concerns. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) took the lead in developing the 

government plan, and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which is now 

responsible for 90 percent of the clearance investigations in the federal government, 

 1

 See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

Page 1 GAO-06-233T
 

assisted OMB in developing this plan. Because we have had a limited time to review the 

government plan, we have been unable to conduct a thorough assessment. Therefore, my 

preliminary observations will focus on four key areas. First, I will describe how well the 

government plan adheres to the standards of comprehensive strategic planning. Next, I 

will provide our evaluation of how well the plan addresses concerns about the timeliness 

and the quality of personnel security clearances. Finally, I will discuss the actions 

required to remove the program from our high-risk list. I would like to note that, at your 

request, we have recently begun a review focusing on the quality of top secret security 

clearance investigations and adjudications for contractor personnel. As of February 

2005, these personnel waited, on average, over 1 year for DOD to determine clearance 

eligibility. As part of that review, we will examine the government plan more fully and 

provide an assessment in our report to the Subcommittee. 

My statement is based on our preliminary review of the government plan and previous 

GAO reports and analyses. Our work was performed from October 2005 through 

November 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In our preliminary review, we considered what was presented in the government plan in 

light of elements from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 as 

well as relevant prior reports from GAO and DOD’s Inspector General. 

Summary 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the government plan represents an important step toward 

addressing some of the long-standing concerns we have raised about the personnel 

security clearance process. We are encouraged by the high level of commitment that 

OMB has demonstrated in preparing this plan. The government plan provides many 

metrics that will be used to monitor the timeliness of the clearance process 

governmentwide, but it provides few details on other elements that a comprehensive 

strategic plan might contain. For example, in some cases, the plan does not provide 

details on discrete actions the government would take or projected completion dates for 

actions the plan identifies. In addition, the plan does not always include details on the 

resources required to accomplish the plan’s objectives. Finally, the plan does not 

describe potential risks or mitigation plans to address potential risks. 

The government plan identifies a wide variety of metrics for monitoring the timeliness of

security clearances. Passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004 addressed many of our past concerns about metrics and monitoring the program. 

For example, the act requires that, during the period between December 17, 2006, and 

December 17, 2009, each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a determination on 

at least 80 percent of all applications for personnel security clearances within an average 

of 120 days of receiving the security clearance request. However, the government plan is 

inconsistent in its treatment of some timeliness issues. Specifically, the plan provides 

quarterly goals for different types of investigations, but it does not identify interim goals 

for average adjudication processing time. In addition to metrics, the government plan 

describes the use of information technology to positively affect the timeliness of

clearances. 

Page 2 GAO-06-233T
 

The government plan devotes little attention to monitoring and improving the quality of 

the personnel security clearance process, although it explicitly acknowledges that 

agencies have concerns about the quality of investigations and adjudications. The 

primary metric found in the government plan for measuring the quality of investigations 

is the percentage of investigations returned by requesting agencies because of 

incomplete case files. Because the number of investigations returned for rework is not—

by itself—a valid indicator of the quality of investigative work, use of other or additional 

statistics such as the number of counterintelligence leads generated from investigations 

may be needed. The government plan did not identify a metric for assessing the quality of 

adjudications, although we and other agencies have identified actions that would 

facilitate monitoring and improvement of the quality of this portion of the security 

clearance process. However, the government plan contains provisions for an investigator 

training and quality assurance program. 

Before removing the security clearance process from our high-risk list, we will examine 

whether OMB, OPM, and DOD have satisfied the criteria we have established for 

removing a high-risk designation. As we established in November 2000, these criteria 

include leadership support, sufficient resources to resolve the risk, and a corrective 

action plan. Our criteria also include the presence of a program to monitor and 

independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of any corrective actions and 

the ability to demonstrate the implementation of corrective measures. DOD must 

undertake many corrective actions to implement our recommendations and to correct 

previously identified problems before its personnel security clearance program can be 

removed from its high-risk list. 

Background 

On June 28, 2005, I testified before this subcommittee on DOD’s personnel security 

clearance program.2

 I noted that while DOD has taken steps to address some of the 

problems that led us to designate its personnel security clearance program a high-risk 

area, we found continuing challenges in each stage of DOD’s clearance process. I also 

noted that, despite partially concurring with our May 2004 recommendation,3

 DOD had 

not developed and implemented an integrated, comprehensive management plan to 

eliminate the backlog, reduce the delays in conducting investigations and determining 

eligibility for security clearances, and overcome the impediments that could allow such 

problems to recur. 

On the day before your June hearing, the President signed Executive Order 13381, which 

is to expire on July 1, 2006, and has the stated purpose of strengthening processes for 

 2

 GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the 

Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk Designation, GAO-05-842T (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005).

3

 GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce Backlogs and Delays in 

Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel, GAO-04-632 (Washington, D.C.: May 

26, 2004). 

Page 3 GAO-06-233T
 

determining eligibility for access to classified national security information.4 The order 

stated that the Director of OMB may assign, in whole or in part, to the head of any 

agency, either solely or jointly, any process relating to determinations of eligibility for 

access to classified national security information. 

At the request of the OMB Deputy Director, OMB and GAO officials met on July 12, 2005, 

to discuss OMB’s general strategy for addressing the problems that had led to our highrisk designation for DOD’s personnel security clearance program. Among other things, 

the Deputy Director indicated that (1) OMB staff would work with DOD and OPM to 

develop preliminary milestones and metrics for correcting problems associated with the 

program and (2) GAO would be asked to comment on that information in August or 

September. We indicated that GAO would need to remain independent, but could provide 

general comments to OMB about milestones, timeframes, criteria, and other materials 

developed by OMB and other executive branch agencies. The timeframe of August or 

September for the next meeting with OMB corresponded roughly with the up to 90 days 

after selection that was specified in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004 for the head of the identified lead agency to develop, in consultation with the 

appropriate committees of Congress and each authorized adjudicative agency, a plan to 

reduce the length of the personnel security clearance process.5

Plan Identifies Metrics but Lacks Details on Other Critical Elements of a 

Strategic Plan 

The government plan provides many metrics that will be used to monitor the timeliness 

of the clearance process governmentwide, but the plan detailed few of the other 

elements that a comprehensive strategic plan might contain. The Government 

Performance and Results Act of 19936

 identified some of the elements that might be 

found in a comprehensive strategic plan. Those elements include a comprehensive 

mission statement, general goals and objectives, a description of how the goals and 

objectives are to be achieved, key external factors that could significantly affect the 

achievement of the goals and objectives, and a description and schedule of the program 

evaluations used in establishing and revising general goals and objectives. GAO has also 

published an evaluator’s guide to use in evaluating strategic plans. This guide discusses 

key performance indicators and the means to verify and validate the measured values.7

The government plan provides numerous metrics to monitor the timeliness of the 

clearance process. For example, the plan requires more accurate projections of the 

numbers of clearances needed, statistics on how long it takes to process a request for the 

 4

 The White House, Executive Order 13381, Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility 

for Access to Classified National Security Information (June 27, 2005). 

5 50 U.S.C. § 435b(g). 

6

 Pub. L. No. 103-62. 

7

 GAO, The Results Act: An Evaluator’s Guide to Assessing Agency Annual Performance Plans, 

GAO/GGD-10.1.20 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 1998). 

Page 4 GAO-06-233T
 

investigation once the request has been made, information on the time required to 

perform various types of investigations, and the amount of time needed to determine 

clearance eligibility. Many of the metrics will be monitored on a quarterly or yearly basis 

according to the example tables contained in the plan. Another positive feature of the 

plan is that the same metrics will be used in many governmental agencies, making it 

possible to roll the data up and obtain a larger federal government perspective.

Many portions of the government plan fail to include important elements of strategic 

planning that could influence how effectively and efficiently the plan is carried out. I will 

illustrate our concerns using two example sections from the plan. In the first case, the 

plan includes a section on how the government intends to address reciprocity.8

 For those 

who are unfamiliar with that term, reciprocity is the extent to which departments, 

agencies, or military services accept clearances and access granted by other 

departments, agencies, or military services. The government plan does not include 

discrete actions with projected completion dates that could be used to monitor interim 

progress toward the goal of greater reciprocity. The plan overlooks such actions and 

related timeframes even though a June 17, 2005, memorandum written by the Deputy 

Director of OMB indicates that the plan for each of the 25 areas on GAO’s high-risk list 

should set goals and milestones that, if implemented will reduce the risk of waste, fraud, 

abuse, and mismanagement. A second example of the security clearance plan’s failure to 

follow principles of strategic planning can be found in the plan’s section on requirements 

for access to national, state, and local record systems. Nothing in this section of the plan 

mentions actions and milestones for actions, or how OMB or the federal government 

could affect access to state and local records. The plan also fails to consider whether 

additional monetary or human capital resources would be needed for that effort, what 

external risks could adversely affect the government plan, or what steps the government 

could use to mitigate those risks. 

Plan Emphasizes Timeliness of the Clearance Process 

The government plan identifies a wide variety of metrics that can be used to track the 

timeliness of clearances, and it describes generally some initiatives for speeding the 

processing of clearances. In February 2004, we expressed continuing concerns about the 

size of DOD’s backlog and its accurate measurement.9

 At that time, we recommended 

that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develop timeliness definitions and 

measures, and monitor the security clearance backlog at each stage of the personnel 

security clearance process. 

 8

 50 U.S.C. § 435b(d)(1) provides that “all security clearance background investigations and determinations 

completed by an authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency shall be accepted by all

agencies.” Exceptions to reciprocity are, however, permitted on a case-by-case basis under the conditions 

specified in the U.S. Code. 

9

 GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and 

Determining Its Size, GAO-04-344 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004). 

Page 5 GAO-06-233T
 

Passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 addressed our 

concerns about metrics and monitoring within the larger context of the total federal 

government, specifying timeframes for the completion of both investigations and 

adjudications and requiring an annual report to Congress detailing the timeliness of the 

clearance process. Specifically, the act requires that not later than December 17, 2006, 

and ending December 17, 2009, each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a 

determination on at least 80 percent of all applicants for personnel security clearances 

within an average of 120 days—90 days to complete the investigation and 30 days to 

complete the adjudication—of receiving the security clearance application.10 Also, not 

later than February 15, 2006, and annually thereafter through 2011, OMB must provide a 

report to appropriate congressional committees on the progress made during the 

preceding year toward meeting these goals.11

The government plan identifies numerous management reports and metrics that can be 

used to monitor all stages of the personnel security clearance process. To monitor the 

submission of requests for investigations, the plan indicates that the government will 

require that submissions be processed within an average of 14 calendar days of the 

subject completing the security clearance questionnaire. For the investigation stage, the 

plan shows baseline measures for how long it took to complete the average investigation 

and the investigative workload. This type of information is shown for multiple quarters in 

fiscal year 2005. The plan also provides quarterly goals—expressed as average days 

taken to complete an investigation—for different types of investigations. The 

adjudication-timeliness goals mandated by the National Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 are noted in the plan, but it does not identify baseline 

measures or interim goals for average adjudication processing time.

In addition to metrics, the government plan describes the use of information technology 

to positively affect the timeliness of clearances. For example, OPM has deployed the 

electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) system for a subgroup of 

users and indicates that all agencies will be required to submit their requests for 

investigations with e-QIP by March 2006. OPM is also involved in an effort to streamline 

clearance processing by digitally sending completed investigation files to adjudicative 

agencies for review, approval, and submission to the investigation provider. However, 

the plan provides few details that would allow us to assess the maturity of either 

initiative. 

Plan Needs to Build More Quality into the Clearance Process 

The government plan devotes little attention to monitoring and improving the quality of 

the personnel security clearance process. At the same time, the government plan 

 10 50 U.S.C. § 435b(g)(3). Section (g)(2) also provides that the timeframe for completing clearances will 

reduce further once 5 years have elapsed from the enactment of the section. At that time, the section 

indicates that to the extent practical, the plan shall require each authorized adjudicative agency to make a 

determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a personnel security clearance within an

average of 60 days—40 days to complete the investigation and 20 days to complete the adjudication. 

11 50 U.S.C. § 435b(h).

Page 6 GAO-06-233T
 

explicitly acknowledges that agencies have concerns about the quality of investigations 

and adjudications. Specifically, the plan says that “a lack of reciprocity often arises due 

to reluctance of the gaining activity to inherit accountability for what may be an 

unacceptable risk due to poor quality investigations and/or adjudications.” These 

concerns exist despite the fact that since 1997, all federal agencies have been subject to a 

common set of general personnel security investigative standards and adjudicative 

guidelines for determining whether service members, government employees,

government contractors, and others are eligible to receive security clearances.12

 

The primary metric found in the government plan for measuring quality of investigations 

is the percentage of investigations returned by requesting agencies due to incomplete 

case files, but use of that metric is problematic. In 1999, we reported that the number of 

investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid indicator of the quality of 

investigative work, because adjudication officials said they were reluctant to return 

incomplete investigations in anticipation of further delays.13 Regardless of whether this 

metric remains a part of the plan, developers of the plan may want to consider adding 

other indicators of the quality of investigations, such as the number of 

counterintelligence leads generated from security clearance investigations and 

forwarded to relevant units. Our 1999 review of a random sample of investigations is 

another example of a method that can be used to evaluate quality. This type of periodic 

review could be performed by an office of the inspector general or some other unit that 

is not affiliated with OPM’s investigations facility in order to insure the independence of 

the findings. 

The government plan indicates that OPM has developed an investigator training and 

quality assurance program. This is a positive step. Our prior work has shown that 

investigation quality can be negatively affected when investigators are insufficiently 

trained. However, the plan does not discuss implementation of the training program or 

the metrics associated with the quality assurance program. 

The government plan does not identify a metric for assessing the quality of adjudications. 

As the Defense Personnel Security Research Center has noted, it is difficult to measure 

the degree to which adjudicative standards are met.14 Nevertheless, GAO and other 

agencies have identified actions that would facilitate monitoring and improvement of the 

quality of this portion of the security clearance process. For example, a 2001 GAO report 

recommended that DOD require adjudicators to use common explanatory guidance and 

 12 The White House, “Implementation of Executive Order 12968,” Memorandum (Washington, D. C.: Mar.

24, 1997). This memorandum approves the adjudication guidelines, temporary eligibility standards, and 

investigative standards required by Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information (Aug. 2,

1995). 

13 GAO, DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks, 

GAO/NSIAD-00-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999). 

14 Ralph M. Carney, Joanne Marshall-Mies, Daniel G. Youpa, and Whitney B. Helton-Fauth, Quality 

Assurance in Defense Adjudication: An Adjudicator Workshop for Defining and Assessing Quality, 

PERSEREC TR 02-04 (Monterey, Calif.: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, March 2003). 

Page 7 GAO-06-233T
 

document adjudication determinations.15 In addition, a 1998 DOD Inspector General 

report suggested implementation of a peer review program among DOD adjudication 

facilities.16

The government plan does not contain initiatives for improving adjudication quality. We 

have, however, previously reported recommendations for improving DOD’s adjudication

quality.17 In our 2001 report, we recommended that DOD make four major improvements 

to its adjudicative process. First, DOD should establish detailed documentation 

requirements to support adjudication decisions. Second, the department should require 

that all DOD adjudicators use common explanatory guidance. Third, it should establish 

common adjudicator training requirements and develop appropriate continuing 

education opportunities for all DOD adjudicators. Finally, DOD should establish a 

common quality assurance program to be implemented by officials in all DOD 

adjudication facilities and monitor compliance through annual reporting. DOD has 

indicated progress on some of these initiatives such as professional adjudicator 

certification and continuing education opportunities. The government plan may be able 

to broaden the DOD initiatives to governmentwide actions for improving adjudication 

quality. 

Actions Required to Remove DOD’s Clearance Program from the High-Risk List

DOD must undertake many corrective actions to implement our recommendations and to 

correct previously identified problems before we will remove DOD’s personnel security 

clearance program from our high-risk list. Many of the issues about timeliness and 

quality are being addressed in actions that OMB and OPM will monitor as part of the 

government plan. Those actions need to address the criteria that we use in determining 

whether or not to remove a high-risk designation. These criteria, which we defined in 

November 2000, are shown in Figure 1.18

 

 15 GAO, DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for Top Secret Security 

Clearances, GAO-01-465 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2001). 

16 DOD Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report: Department of Defense Adjudication Program, 

DoDIG 98-124 (Washington, D.C.: 1998). 

17 GAO-01-465. 18 GAO-01-159SP. 

Page 8 GAO-06-233T
 

Figure 1: Criteria Agencies Must Meet Before High-Risk Designations Can Be Removed 

• A demonstrated strong commitment and top leadership support to address the risk(s) 

• The capacity (that is, the people and other resources) to resolve the risk(s) 

• A corrective action plan(s) that 

• defines the root causes,

• identifies effective solutions, and 

• provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term, including but 

not limited to steps necessary to implement solutions we recommend 

• A program instituted to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and 

sustainability of corrective actions 

• The ability to demonstrate progress in having implemented corrective measures 

Source: GAO.

Since our high-risk list began in 1990, the government has taken high-risk problems 

seriously and has made long-needed progress toward correcting them. During the past 15 

years, those efforts have resulted in 16 high-risk areas being removed from the list. For 

example, in January 2005, sufficient progress had been made to warrant the removal of a 

high-risk designation from three areas: student financial aid programs, Federal Aviation 

Administration financial management, and Forest Service financial management. 

We will remove a high-risk designation when agency actions, including those in response 

to our recommendations, result in significant progress toward resolving a high-risk 

problem. 

- - - - - 

Concluding Observations 

Mr. Chairman, we are encouraged that OMB has undertaken the development of a 

governmentwide plan for improving the personnel security clearance process. Still, much 

remains to be done to develop a more comprehensive plan for improving the timeliness 

and quality of the security clearance process. Developing specific steps to address the 

general concerns that I identified today should move OMB and the executive branch 

agencies closer to that goal. As we stated in our high-risk report, perseverance by OMB 

and the agencies to implement our prior recommendations and continued oversight, 

such as that shown by you and this committee, are both essential to bringing lasting 

solutions to this high-risk area. In short, this is a good first step in the right direction. We 

will continue to monitor the security clearance program, as we do for all of the programs 

on our high-risk list. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. 

I would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this time. 

Page 9 GAO-06-233T
 

Staff Contact and Acknowledgments 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at 202-512-5559 or 

stewartd@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Jack 

E. Edwards, Assistant Director; Kurt A. Burgeson; Susan C. Ditto; Sara Hackley; Kenneth 

E. Patton; William J. Rigazio; and Jennifer L. Young.

Page 10 GAO-06-233T
 

Related GAO Products 

Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection Issues Associated 

with Manufacturing Presidential Helicopters. GAO-06-71SU. Washington, D.C.: 

November 2005. 

DOD’s High-Risk Areas: High-Level Commitment and Oversight Needed for DOD Supply 

Chain Plan to Succeed. GAO-06-113T. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2005. 

Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program. 

GAO-05-988R. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to 

Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk Designation. GAO-05-842T.

Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005. 

Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD Business 

Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005. 

Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security 

Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 

15, 2005. 

DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires Sound 

Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T. Washington, D.C.: April 

13, 2005. 

GAO 2005 High-Risk Update. GAO-05-350T. Washington, D.C.: February 17, 2005. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 2005. 

Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 Commission’s 

Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2004. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce Backlogs and 

Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel. GAO-04-

632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs and Delays 

in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004. 

Security Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and Local Law 

Enforcement Officials. GAO-04-596. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004. 

Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its Oversight 

Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332. Washington, D.C.: March 

3, 2004. 

Page 11 GAO-06-233T
 

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating 

Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its 

Expanded Mission and Workforce but Additional Actions Needed. GAO-04-242. 

Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003. 

DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for Top Secret 

Security Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2001. 

DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance 

Reinvestigation Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security Clearance 

Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are Being Addressed. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security 

Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2000. 

DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security 

Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 1999. 

Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to Relinquish Its 

Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999. 

Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History Screening. 

GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999. 

Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access to and 

Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245. Washington, D.C.: 

September 30, 1998. 

Privatization of OPM’s Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R. Washington, D.C.: 

August 22, 1996. 

Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R. Washington, D.C.: 

July 5, 1996. 

Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive Office of the 

President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 1995. 

Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM’s Role in Background 

Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 1995. 

Page 12 GAO-06-233T
 

Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations and 

Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995. 

Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the Clearance Process. 

GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995. 

Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 

1994. 

Nuclear Security: DOE’s Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance Work Load. 

GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993. 

Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative Background 

Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 1993. 

DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not Provided When Access 

Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993. 

Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security Clearances and 

Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993. 

Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by Defense, Energy, and 

State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 1992. 

Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security Clearance Actions. 

GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1990. 

(350778) 

Page 13 GAO-06-233T
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