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23–280 PDF 2005

S. HRG. 109–129

THE ROLE OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED

RETIREMENT PLANS IN INCREASING NATIONAL

SAVINGS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

WASHINGTON, DC

APRIL 12, 2005

Serial No. 109–5

Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Aging

(

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon, Chairman 

RICHARD SHELBY, Alabama 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho 

RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BLANCHE L. LINCOLN, Arkansas 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

CATHERINE FINLEY, Staff Director 

JULIE COHEN, Ranking Member Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Opening Statement of Senator Gordon Smith ....................................................... 1

Opening Statement of Senator Herb Kohl ............................................................. 3

Opening Statement of Senator James DeMint ...................................................... 8

Opening Statement of Senator Thomas Carper .................................................... 9

PANEL I 

Mark J. Warshawsky, assistant secretary for Economic Policy, Department 

of the Treasury, Washington, DC ....................................................................... 4

J. Mark Iwry, nonresident senior fellow, Economic Studies, The Brookings 

Institution, Washington, DC ............................................................................... 25

Eugene Steuerle, senior fellow, The Urban Institute, Washington, DC ............. 80

James A. Klein, president, American Benefits Council, Washington, DC .......... 98

John M. Kimpel, senior vice president and deputy general counsel, Fidelity 

Investments, Boston, MA .................................................................................... 139

APPENDIX 

Testimony submitted by Patricia Cox, chief operating officer, Schwab Retirement Plan Services, Inc. ...................................................................................... 159

Statement of The Principal Financial Group ........................................................ 168

Information submitted by The Retirement Security Project ................................ 174

A Report on Corporate Defined Contribution Plans submitted by Fidelity 

Investments .......................................................................................................... 214

(III) 

(1)

THE ROLE OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED RETIREMENT PLANS IN INCREASING NATIONAL SAVINGS 

TUESDAY, APRIL 12, 2005 

U.S. SENATE, 

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room 

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon H. Smith 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Smith, DeMint, Kohl, and Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GORDON H. SMITH, 

CHAIRMAN 

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, if we can come to order, 

we will commence this hearing of the Senate Special Committee on 

Aging. 

Today’s hearing will focus on a very important topic: the role of 

employer-sponsored retirement plans in increasing national savings. We are going to hear from two distinguished panels of witnesses who will provide us with their insights on whether the current employer-sponsored retirement plan system effectively increases national savings and how we can improve that system. 

The average life expectancy of Americans has steadily increased. 

For example, the average life expectancy of Americans born in 1960 

was about 70 years. Yet in 2003, life expectancy was about 77 

years. Although Americans are living longer than ever before, most 

Americans continue to retire before age 65. 

At the same time, the personal savings rate in the United States 

has declined dramatically over the last two decades, reaching about 

one percent of personal income in 2004. The decline in our savings 

rate is a disturbing trend because, as the length of retirement 

grows, Americans must save more, not less, to ensure a financially 

secure retirement. 

The need to increase our savings was also emphasized by 

Chairman Alan Greenspan of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System during his testimony before this committee 

last month on the economics of retirement. Many refer to retirement income as a three-legged stool: Social Security, employersponsored retirement plans, and personal savings. Although there 

has been a tremendous amount of focus on Social Security lately, 

we all know that it takes all three legs of the stool to keep the 

whole thing balanced. 

2

Therefore, as pensions are the second largest sources of income 

among the elderly, the goal of this hearing is to focus on ways to 

increase savings in employer-sponsored retirement plans and thus 

improve the stability of America’s retirement system. 

Currently, savings and participation rates in employer-sponsored 

retirement plans are low. In 2001, only about 58 percent of households with an employed head of the household under the age of 64 

included at least one worker who participated in an employer-sponsored plan. In addition, about 37 percent, or 28 million, of such 

households did not own a retirement savings account of any kind. 

With respect to the amount of retirement savings Americans have 

accumulated among the 47.8 million households that owned a retirement savings account of any kind in 2001, the median value of 

such accounts was only $27,000. 

Besides low savings and participation rates, another important 

trend with respect to employer-sponsored retirement plans is the 

shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans, including 401(k) plans. Over the last several years, the number of defined benefit plans has dropped dramatically, while at the same 

time the number of defined contribution plans has increased. In the 

context of savings, this shift is significant because coverage under 

a defined contribution plan generally requires employers to take a 

more active role in preparing for retirement. 

For example, in general, employees must decide whether to participate in the retirement plan, how much to contribute to the plan, 

and how their contributions should be invested. 

In response to these trends, I plan to introduce legislation shortly 

that is aimed at increasing savings and participation rates in 

employer-sponsored retirement plans. For example, the bill will 

include a provision intended to encourage sponsors of 401(k) plans 

to adopt automatic enrollment in which a percentage of each 

employee’s salary is placed in an individual account without requiring the employee to take any action. Therefore, instead of requiring 

employees to actively enroll in a 401(k) plan in order to participate, 

under automatic enrollment employees will be automatically enrolled unless they elect to opt out, as is generally done under defined benefit plans. Automatic enrollment has been shown to increase participation rates in 401(k) plans significantly, especially 

among low- and middle-income individuals. 

In addition, with increased life expectancies, it is also important 

for individuals to preserve their income throughout their retirement years and not outlive their savings. Therefore, my bill also 

will provide incentives to ensure income preservation throughout 

one’s retirement by encouraging employers to offer and employees 

to select distributions from defined contribution plans and IRAs in 

the form of lifetime annuities. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming today, and I look 

forward to hearing your testimony. I would note that there is a 

3:30 vote scheduled. Perhaps we can hear from everyone and get 

all the questions asked in that amount of time. 

I now turn to my colleague, Senator Kohl, for his comments.

3

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HERB H. KOHL 

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, we have all seen the statistics and the studies on 

the amount of money Americans are saving for retirement, and it 

is striking that so few are prepared for their nonworking years. 

Retirement income has often been compared to a three-legged 

stool—as you pointed out—which includes Social Security, 

employer-sponsored pensions, and personal savings. Increasingly, a 

fourth leg will be wages, as many older Americans work past traditional retirement age. 

Financial planners recommend a retirement income that replaces 

70 percent of pre-retirement earnings. With Social Security’s overall replacement rate of about 45 percent, clearly other sources of 

retirement income are critical. 

As we continue the Social Security debate, we cannot ignore the 

other legs of the stool. Clearly, the pension system needs improvement. Most workers are not covered by a plan, and only about half 

participate in a pension at all. Participation rates are poor for 

lower-income workers and small businesses. Contributions are also 

low across the board, and too many workers withdraw money before retirement. The typical balance for a 401(k) for workers near 

retirement is only $43,000, and for workers earning less than 

$25,000 a year, the typical balance is only $2,200. 

So it is clear that more needs to be done to encourage saving, but 

we need to do it right. As we will hear today, the government now 

spends more on tax incentives for retirement saving than Americans actually save. Almost all of these incentives are worth the 

most to higher-income workers, who probably would have saved 

even without the extra inducement from the government. Some 

proposals by the administration, such as Retirement Savings Accounts and Lifetime Savings Accounts, instead of reversing this 

backwards incentive structure, would go even further in the wrong 

direction. 

Obviously, we need to reorient government policy to encourage 

saving and improve retirement security among the population that 

most needs to save; our lowest-income workers. Several policies 

have the potential to do just that: encouraging automatic enrollment in 401(k)s; extending and expanding the saver’s credit, which 

is a matching tax credit for contributions targeted toward lower-income workers; improving financial education and investment 

choice; and allowing taxpayers to split off a portion of their tax refund and put it directly into a savings account. 

These are promising ideas with the potential to receive bipartisan support. The time to act is now; the retirement security of 

millions of Americans depends on it. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and we welcome you all to the panel. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kohl. 

Our only witness on our first panel is Mark J. Warshawsky, and, 

Mr. Secretary, we welcome you. He is the assistant secretary for 

Economic Policy, Department of the Treasury, and the microphone 

is yours. 

4

STATEMENT OF MARK J. WARSHAWSKY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF THE 

TREASURY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, 

Ranking Member Kohl, and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the administration’s proposal to reform and strengthen the single-employer defined benefit pension 

system against the backdrop of the larger issue of promoting national saving. 

As far back as 1776, Adam Smith identified capital accumulation 

as the key force in promoting growth in the wealth of nations. 

Smith also identified the key force in capital accumulation: increasing national savings. Since Smith’s time, almost all economists 

have come to understand the vital nature of national saving, and 

increasing saving has become a standard policy prescription for enhancing economic growth and raising living standards. 

We know the U.S. faces a challenge as the economy works 

through the implications of the retirement of the baby-boom generation. With the growth in the workforce set to slow and the average age of the population rising, maintaining steady growth in the 

standard of living will become more difficult. The Smith prescription shows the way out. Increase our savings, which will increase 

our accumulated capital, which will give each worker more and better tools to work with, which will raise productivity and secure a 

growing standard of living. 

Despite the fact that this prescription is well known, the evidence suggests it is exceptionally hard to follow. Net private saving—which we define as gross private saving less depreciation on 

plant, equipment, and housing stock—as a share of national income 

averaged about 11 percent from 1955 through 1985, but since then 

has trended steadily down. Over the past 10 years, it has averaged 

about 5.5 percent of GDP, or about 5 percentage points below 

where it was during the decades of the 1950’s, 1960’s, 1970’s, and 

most of the 1980’s. 

One reason the saving prescription is difficult to follow is that incentives work against it. Our tax system, for example, has for a 

long time encouraged Americans to spend first and save second. To 

reverse this, the Administration has worked hard to set in place 

the incentives that encourage saving. EGTRRA cut the top tax 

rates which raised the after-tax rate of return on capital income—

encouraging savings. The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 cut taxes specifically on capital income. 

But even with these positive changes, the Federal income tax 

code still discourages saving. To combat this, the President has 

proposed retirement savings accounts, which would replace the 

complex array of retirement saving incentives currently in the tax 

code, such as IRAs, Roth IRAs, and similar saving vehicles. The 

President has also proposed employer retirement savings accounts, 

ERSAs, to simplify the saving opportunities individuals have 

through their employers. The President’s lifetime savings accounts 

would, for the first time, allow individuals to save on a tax-preferred basis for any purpose. This can be especially important to 

low-income individuals and families who need to save but cannot 

afford to lock up funds for retirement that may be needed for an 

5

emergency in the near term. The President has also proposed individual development accounts which would give extra financial incentive to certain low-income families to set aside funds for major 

purchases, such as a first home. 

Pensions, of course, play a critical role in savings as well. Accumulating financial assets for future retirement is indeed one of the 

main reasons households save any way. If individuals and households believe they will receive a pension in retirement, that clearly 

influences their saving and asset accumulation behavior. But if, in 

fact, those promised benefits are not available because of pension 

underfunding, then the household’s savings and, when you add up 

households, the aggregate national savings is less than it otherwise 

would have been had their pension been adequately funded. 

Unfortunately, the single-employer pension system’s current serious financial trouble is likely to lead to just such undersaving and 

participant benefit losses. Many plans are badly underfunded, jeopardizing the pensions of millions of American workers, and the insurance system which protects those workers in the event that 

their own plans fail has a substantial deficit. 

The primary goal of any pension reform effort should be to ensure that retirees and workers receive the pension benefits they 

have earned. Clearly, the current funding rules have failed to meet 

this goal. As part of its reform proposal, the administration has designed a new set of funding rules that we think will ensure that 

participants receive the benefits they have earned from their pension plans. 

Today I will briefly discuss a few critical issues pertaining to the 

funding elements of the proposal and their likely effects on the 

economy and national savings. My written testimony provides a 

more comprehensive discussion of the entirety of the proposal. 

For any set of funding rules to function well, assets and liabilities must be measured accurately. The system of smoothing embodied in current law serves only to mask the true financial condition of pension plans. Under our proposal, assets will be marked 

to market. Liabilities will be measured using a current spot yield 

curve that takes into account the timing of future benefit payments 

summed across all plan participants. Discounting future benefit 

cash-flows using the rates from the spot yield curve is the most accurate way to measure a plan’s liability. Liabilities computed using 

the yield curve match the timing of obligations with discount rates 

of appropriate maturities. Proper matching of discount rates and 

obligations is, in fact, the most accurate way to measure today’s 

cost of meeting pension obligations. 

The Administration recognizes that the current minimum funding rules have added to contribution volatility. Particular problem 

areas are the so-called deficit reduction contribution mechanism 

and the limits on tax deductibility of contributions. Our proposal 

is designed to remedy those issues by giving plans the tools needed 

to smooth contributions over the business cycle. These tools include 

increasing the deductible contribution limit, and this will give plan 

contributions an additional ability to fund up during good times. 

We also increase the amortization period for funding deficits to 7 

years compared to a period as short as 4 years under current law. 

Finally, there is the continued freedom that plan sponsors already 

6

have to choose prudent pension fund investments. Using all these 

tools, plan sponsors can limit volatility and maintain a conservative funding level so that financial market changes will not result 

in large increases in minimum contributions. 

We believe these are the appropriate methods for dealing with 

risk. We believe it is inappropriate to limit contribution volatility 

by permitting plan underfunding that transfers risk to plan participants and the PBGC. 

Under our proposal, plan funding targets for healthy plan sponsors will be established at a level that reflects the full value of benefits earned to date under the assumption that plan participant behavior remains largely consistent with the past history of an ongoing concern. 

Plans sponsored by firms with below investment grade credit will 

be required to fund to a higher standard that reflects the increased 

risk that these plans will terminate. Pension plans sponsored by 

firms with poor credit ratings pose the greatest risk of default. It 

is only natural that pension plans with sponsors that fall into this 

readily observable, high-risk category should have more stringent 

funding standards. Credit ratings are used throughout the economy 

and, in fact, in many Government regulations to measure the risk 

that a firm will default on its financial obligations. A prudent system of pension regulation in insurance would be lacking if we did 

not use this information. 

Credit balances under current law are created when a plan 

makes a contribution that is greater than the required minimum. 

Under current law, this credit balance plus an assumed rate of return can be used to offset future contributions. We see two significant problems with this system. First, the assets that underlie the 

credit balances may lose rather than gain value. Second, and far 

more important, credit balances allow plans that are seriously underfunded to take funding holidays. In our view, every underfunded 

plan should make minimum annual contributions. 

So under our proposal, credit balances, as defined under current 

law, will be eliminated. Contributions in excess of the minimum, 

however, still reduce future minimum contributions. The value of 

these contributions is added to the plan’s assets and, all other 

things equal, reduces the amount of time that the sponsor must 

make minimum contributions to the plan. In combination with the 

other elements of our proposal, there is more than adequate incentive for plan sponsors to fund above the minimum. In fact, we believe there are four other reasons that employers might choose to 

contribute more than the minimum: (1) there is the increased deductibility provisions that allow sponsors to accumulate on a taxfree basis; (2) disclosure of funded status to workers will encourage 

better funding; (3) a better funded status results in lower PBGC 

premiums under our proposal; and, (4) a better funded status 

makes benefit restrictions less likely. 

Now, as I have described, the current rules often fail to ensure 

adequate plan funding, and recent history has made this very obvious. Formally, and speaking as an economist, we might say that 

the current set of rules has created a partially pay-as-you-go private pension system by allowing some accrued liabilities to be unfunded. That is, in general, when plans are not funded fully, the 

7

system basically operates by transferring contributions associated 

with younger workers to current retired workers. 

The funding rules proposed by the administration, whereby sponsors that fall below the accurately measured minimum funding levels are required to fund up toward their contribution in a timely 

manner, and this moved the system in the direction of being fully 

funded. In a fully funded system, the contributions associated with 

each generation of workers are invested and fund their own retirements. A basic result in macroeconomics is that a pay-as-you-go 

system results in less savings, a slower rate of capital accumulation, and a lower steady state capital stock. Therefore, the Administration’s proposal, through the move toward more fully funded 

private defined benefit pensions, is consistent and in support of the 

administration goal of increases saving and greater capital accumulation. 

Now, let me comment that some analysts recently have expressed concern that the administration’s proposal could have negative macroeconomic effects. They suggest these effects will come 

through depressed business investment by underfunded plan sponsors, some of whom will, in fact, face higher contributions under 

the administration’s proposal. 

In my opinion, sound economic analysis strong suggests that 

there are no short- or long-term macroeconomic risks associated 

with reforming pension funding rules. Quite the contrary, the proposal’s long-term economic effects will be positive and in the direction that we have just described. 

Well-functioning capital markets allow companies to finance attractive investments even if they face short-term demands on their 

current cash-flows. For that reason, many economists believe that 

there is little link between a company’s cash-flows—including its 

pension funding requirements—and its investment decisions. This 

suggests that as a general matter, pension contributions are unlikely to cause a reduction in the plan sponsor’s investment pattern. 

But even more importantly, it is critical to recognize that pension 

contributions finance investment throughout the economy. They do 

not just disappear. The monies directed into pension accounts are 

invested in stocks and bonds, thereby deploying these resources 

throughout the economy. Failure to recognize this may have led 

some analysts to mistakenly attribute negative macroeconomic effects to the Administration’s proposal. 

In conclusion, let me say that defined benefit plans are a vital 

source of retirement income for millions of Americans. The Administration is committed to ensuring that these plans remain a viable 

retirement option for those firms that wish to offer them to their 

employees. The long-run viability of the system, however, depends 

on ensuring that it is financially sound. The Administration’s proposal is designed to put the system on secure financial footing in 

order to safeguard the benefits that plan participants have earned 

and will earn in the future. We are committed to working with the 

Members of Congress to ensure that effective defined benefit pension reforms that protect workers’ pensions are enacted into law. 

It has been my pleasure to discuss the proposal, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

8

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We have been joined by two colleagues, Senator DeMint of South 

Carolina and Senator Carper of Delaware. If either of you have an 

opening statement, we would be happy to take those now. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES DEMINT 

Senator DEMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just make a 

couple of comments and maybe ask a question, if we could just get 

that started. 

Thank you very much for your testimony today. It is a subject 

near and dear to my heart. As an employer for many years, trying 

to get folks to save was a real challenge. I have found over the 

years even matching or putting savings into some form of pension 

is very difficult for a small employer with unpredictable profits. 

The regulations that require consistent contributions make it very 

difficult for a small employer to participate since year to year we 

are not sure if we can make a contribution. 

The other frustrating aspect of it was we may have actually contributed 100 percent of some form of pension or savings, and only 

to find that an employee might pull it out with a large penalty to 

spend on immediate need. 

I think what it comes down to pragmatically is the average-income American is going to find it very difficult to find any additional discretionary money to save. That is why I appreciate the 

President’s recognition that when you take over 12.5 percent of 

what the average American makes, it is going to be very difficult 

for them to find additional money to save. That is why I believe 

it is so important that we as a Government figure out how we can 

start saving part of that 12.5 percent that people are already putting into their Social Security plan. The average American family now contributes over $5,000 a year 

in Social Security taxes, if you include the employer’s side of that. 

That makes it very difficult for an employee to add to. So as we 

look at total savings, we do see that is a key problem in America 

because, as you know, when there is not savings from a large percent of the population, the wealth gap continues to grow. We have 

half of Americans who own something and the other half who don’t, 

half who benefit from the growth in the economy and nearly another half that don’t. 

So I appreciate the President’s proposal. I would be very supportive of expanding particularly the idea of IDAs, which at least 

somewhat control how the money could be spent, expanding those 

in some ways. But I think I would just like your comments on realistically can we expect the Americans who need to save the most 

to actually come up with additional funds as well as the employers 

who have the most difficult time of creating these plans coming up 

with plans under new regulations that might make it more difficult 

for them to be consistent with them, if you could just make a few 

comments, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. One reason to particularly focus on defined 

benefit plans is that under current law the rules have become extraordinarily complex. I am sure that is a strong disincentive, particularly for small employers, for sponsoring defined benefit plans. 

Defined benefit plans do have certain advantages for employees 

9

and employers, and in particular they are, if you will, a forced saving vehicle. Everyone participates and the money is put in by the 

employer, and sometimes by employees as well. 

Under our proposal, we basically have a significant simplification 

of the rules; this is hard to appreciate without knowing how complicated the current rules are. But I think it is fair to say that we 

have a much simpler system, and that perhaps could have the impact down the road of encouraging smaller plan sponsors to enter 

the system. 

Another aspect of our proposal is that by allowing companies to 

fund during good times, that enables them to manage their cashflow better than under current law, which is very restrictive of additional contributions because of the full funding limitations. 

Senator DEMint. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMAS CARPER 

Senator CARPER. I have got a couple of questions I want to ask 

our witness. I am going to wait until just a little bit later. But this 

is certainly a timely hearing and a timely issue, and we appreciate 

your input, and I look forward to asking a couple of questions. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Did I detect in your statement an expression that 

defined contribution or defined benefit plans do more to add to national saving, one versus the other? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. Not necessarily. I think the import of my 

statement is that underfunded defined benefit plans do detract 

from national savings because employees think they are going to 

get the benefits that are promised to them and, therefore, they 

save less. But in point of fact, the realization may be other than 

what they are promised because the plan is poorly funded. So, 

therefore, one way of increasing national savings in the context of 

defined benefit pensions is to be sure that these plans are adequately funded. That is really what I was getting at in my testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Many defined contribution plans occurs essentially through a payroll deduction, and then it is there and they 

own it and they watch it grow, they participate, their knowledge 

increases, I assume, in what they have. 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. I think that is an aspect of a defined contribution plan. That is right. 

The CHAIRMAN. How much simpler are 401(k) plans versus defined benefit plans in terms of—you spoke to Senator DeMint about 

the complexity being a significant deterrent to small companies offering defined benefit plans. How much simpler are defined contribution? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. There have been studies in the past that actually try to quantify the administrative costs of defined benefit 

versus defined contribution plans, and depending on the size of the 

plan sponsor, because there are economies of scale, defined contribution plans are easier and less costly to administer. Therefore, 

because defined benefit plans have had layer upon layer upon layer 

of regulation and rules that have been established for them, parVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:03 Sep 26, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\23280.TXT SAGING1 PsN: JOYCE
10

ticularly in the funding area, one point of our proposal is to simplify that system. 

The CHAIRMAN. How about the administrative cost? Is one more 

costly to administer versus another? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. I believe for many employers, defined benefit 

plans are more costly to administer. 

The CHAIRMAN. How often is it that there is malfeasance on the 

part of the corporation or the pension fund manager where workers 

are utterly cheated out of their retirement? I ask that because of 

a terrible case that occurred in my State whereby not only were 

some pensions underfunded, but then they were appropriated to 

the extent of over $100 million. You have people who have worked 

all of their lives now with no recourse and only a few people in jail. 

How common is that? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. My impression is that it is fortunately not 

very common. That is something that is subject to Department of 

Labor and Internal Revenue Service oversight. Perhaps I could 

share my own research on this point. 

In a prior position, many years ago, I used to work at the Internal Revenue Service in the Employee Plans area. We conducted an 

examination of about 400 large underfunded defined benefit plans. 

We were looking to see whether there was compliance with the current law of funding requirements, to see whether that was a reason 

for why the plans were underfunded. 

While we discovered some small problems, by and large plan 

sponsors followed the rules. The reason why they were underfunded was not because they were not following the rules. They 

were following the rules. The problem was the rules themselves. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kohl. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Warshawsky, in their submitted statements three of the next 

panel’s witnesses advocate not only extending the saver’s credit, 

but also expanding it. One study estimated that about 75 percent 

of the benefits of all the 2001 pension provisions go to the top 20 

percent of taxpayers. In contrast, over 45 percent of the benefits of 

the saver’s credit go to taxpayers with income below $30,000, who 

most need to save. 

While the administration proposes to extend a variety of pension 

provisions, the saver’s credit is on the chopping block. A New York 

Times article reports that the Treasury Department’s explanation 

is that the administration is waiting for the recommendations of its 

tax reform panel. 

Why must the saver’s credit wait, but not the other pension provisions? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. Senator, it is my understanding that one significant problem is that provisions in the code are designed for particular groups, and they therefore become very difficult for financial companies to market, because generally marketing campaigns 

have to be done on a mass basis. They are also very confusing because people do not know whether they are eligible or whether they 

are not eligible, whether they are phased out, and it introduces an 

enormous amount of complexity in the system and precisely for individuals, lower-income individuals, who are ill-equipped to deal 

with tax code complexity. Therefore, the administration, for examVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:03 Sep 26, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\23280.TXT SAGING1 PsN: JOYCE
11

ple, has put forward the LSA proposal, the lifetime savings account 

proposal, which is intended to be particularly appealing to low-income folks because of the removal of various special requirements 

and so on and so forth, and also to enable them to be effectively 

marketed. 

Senator KOHL. So you are saying the saver’s credit is too complicated? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. Well, I am saying that I think we need to be 

very mindful of the complexity in the code, and, therefore, that 

sometimes works at cross-purposes with the intent of very specifically, carefully targeted incentives. 

Senator KOHL. Here is a tax incentive which, as I pointed out, 

provides benefits that lower-income families generally take advantage of; 45 percent of the saver’s credit goes to taxpayers with incomes below $30,000. So it would seem that it would be something 

that would deserve all kinds of attention because it does exactly 

what we want. Yet the administration has apparently decided that 

it should expire completely. While 75 percent of the benefits of all 

the 2001 provisions go to the top 20 percent of taxpayers, 45 percent of the benefits of this credit go to people with incomes less 

than $30,000. So why wouldn’t you say, maybe we have to simplify 

it or make it a little bit easier to understand, but we should really 

promote it because it does what we want it to do? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. Senator, I am sure that it will be something 

that will be carefully studied by the tax panel, among many of the 

other features of the tax code in the saving incentive area. 

Senator KOHL. Well, I hope so. 

The administration has proposed split tax refunds in its last two 

budgets. A recent letter from the IRS Commissioner to Members of 

Congress said that split refunds cannot be implemented until 2007 

because a committee needs time to do things like program computers and add a new schedule to the tax forms. It is unclear why 

it should take two years to resolve such minor administrative 

issues. 

Can you assure us that everything that can be done is being 

done with maximum speed? Would congressional action such as 

providing more funding help speed things up? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. Senator, I regret to say I am not familiar with 

that issue. It is more a matter of tax administration. But we would 

be glad to get back to you on that question. 

Senator KOHL. OK. Finally, I was struck by the fact that you 

have devoted the bulk of your testimony to the administration’s 

proposed PBGC funding reforms. You make almost no mention of 

whether current tax incentives for retirement saving actually increase private and national saving. As I mentioned in my statement, the government now spends more on these incentives than 

Americans save. So how can you explain this? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. We feel it is very important that the benefits 

that are promised to workers be assured that they get them. It is 

really a matter of simple fairness and equity, Senator. 

Senator KOHL. Alright. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kohl. 

Senator Carper, your questions. 

Senator CARPER. Do you pronounce your name ‘‘Warshawsky’’? 

12

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. That is correct. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Secretary Warshawsky, just for my purposes would you—I came in about halfway through your testimony. 

Just distill for me just into a couple of small nuggets the problem 

we are trying to address here. 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. The main problem we have, Senator, in the 

defined benefit system is that many plans—in fact, currently most 

plans—are significantly underfunded. Therefore, this poses a risk 

both to the Government through the Pension Benefit Guaranty 

Corporation and even more importantly to the plan participants of 

not getting the benefits that they are promised. 

That is the problem in a nutshell from the perspective of individuals and the Government, but there is also a macroeconomic problem, and that is, underfunded pension plans tend to decrease national savings, which is one of the points that we were talking here 

about as well. So it is actually a broader issue as well. 

Senator CARPER. If we go back a decade or so, did we face the 

same problem? Were we facing the same problem in the 1990’s 

with underfunding of these pension funds? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. Yes. In fact, as I described my own job at the 

Internal Revenue Service, I was hired actually to lead a research 

program on underfunded defined benefit plans because there were 

so many and the underfunding was so significant. In fact, it seems 

as if each business cycle we have a cycle of underfunding and then 

adequate funding, and then each cycle it seems to get worse and 

worse. So back then in the early 1990’s, there were significant 

problems with underfunded plans as well. 

Senator CARPER. I seem to recall in the 1990’s there was a time 

when a number of employees thought their funds were overfunded, 

and they sought to take money out of their fund. 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. In the late 1990’s, as interest rates went up 

and stock prices went up, there was an apparent overfunding. But, 

of course, that was also related to how the liabilities were defined. 

If liabilities are correctly measured, we seem to find more underfunding than current law measurement of pension liabilities. 

Senator CARPER. So what you are saying is this is a recurring 

problem. 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. Correct. 

Senator CARPER. As we go through each business cycle, a cycle 

of the stock market going up and down, the problem gets worse 

over time. 

Again, just lay out for me again just briefly the cure, as prescribed by the administration. 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. The cure is several-fold. One aspect, which I 

emphasized in my testimony, is a simple but stronger set of funding rules whereby, No. 1, assets and liabilities are marked to market, measured accurately, and the difference between assets and liabilities, if the plan is underfunded, has to be made up within 

seven years. 

Senator CARPER. Say that last part again? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. In other words, if the plan is underfunded, if 

liabilities exceed assets, that difference has to be made up within 

seven years, which we feel is prudent—in other words, not too fast, 

13

not too slow, it is key that it be done off of an accurate measurement of the liability. 

In addition, we also propose a new method of calculating PBGC 

premiums for that insurance program that will also reflect the risk 

that plans represent, so that if plans are underfunded but are 

sponsored by poor credit risks, they will have to pay a higher premium, and also they have to pay more in funding for the plan because they represent a larger risk to the PBGC as well as to the 

plan participants. 

We also have a proposal to increase disclosure. We feel it is very 

important that plan participants know how well funded their plans 

are, those are the main elements of the proposal. 

Senator CARPER. What would you have us do? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. We have the proposal, and as I understand it, 

it is being considered by the various committees—the Finance 

Committee, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the other 

relevant committees. We feel very strongly that this proposal 

would, in fact, cure the ills of the defined benefit system. 

Senator CARPER. Are hearings taking place in the House and the 

Senate for the legislative committees? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. We had hearings at the beginning of March, 

yes. 

Senator CARPER. What is the prognosis? 

Mr. WARSHAWSKY. I believe there is a good recognition of the 

problem, and I think there is an appreciation that the administration has come forward with a comprehensive package, and I think 

there is great interest in it. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks very much. 

Senator KOHL [presiding.] Thank you very much, Senator Carper, and, Mr. Warshawsky, we appreciate your being here today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Warshawsky follows:]

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Senator KOHL. On the second panel, if you would like to step up, 

we have J. Mark Iwry, who is a nonresident senior fellow of economic studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC; Eugene Steuerle, senior fellow, the Urban Institute, here in DC; 

James Klein, president, American Benefits Council, Washington, 

DC; and John Kimpel, Fidelity Investments, senior vice president 

and deputy general counsel, here in Washington, DC. 

So maybe we will start on my left with Mr. Iwry and give you 

each brief opportunity to make your opening statements so we will 

have some time to ask a question or two. Mr. Iwry. 

STATEMENT OF J. MARK IWRY, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, ECONOMIC STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. IWRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am Mark Iwry. I am 

happy to be here with you. I commend you for holding this hearing. 

I would like to start out by noting that our private pension system 

has put together what is probably the largest pool of investment 

capital in the world, over $5 trillion in defined benefit, defined contribution plans, and IRAs, most of it rolled over from employer 

plans. It covers about two-thirds of the workforce at some point in 

people’s lives, and at any given moment about half the workforce 

is in an employer plan of one kind or another. It has done a great 

job of delivering meaningful benefits to millions of working families. 

At the same time, we can do much more to make the system ef- fective in encouraging saving. We spend about $175 billion—that is 

Treasury’s estimate—on tax incentives for employer plans and 

IRAs. Much of it is skewed, as, Senator Kohl, you said, toward the 

people at the top, more skewed than it ought to be. One reason is 

that the tax preference is based on tax deductions. In other words, 

its value is proportional to your tax bracket. If you are in the 35-

percent bracket and you have $1 that you contribute to a tax-preferred plan, you get 35 cents’ worth of tax savings. So the dollar 

costs you a dollar minus 35, or 65 cents to save. If you are in the 

10-percent bracket, you get a dime’s worth of tax savings so that 

it costs you 90 cents to save. This is essentially an upside down 

system. We are giving the most incentive to the people who need 

it the least, who have the most wherewithal already. We are giving 

the least incentive to the people who need it the most for whom retirement savings actually would represent security and not just increased affluence. 

It follows that we need to target our efforts more toward the 

three out of four Americans who are in the 15-percent bracket, the 

10-percent bracket, or, in fact, the 0-percent income tax bracket, 

people who pay their payroll taxes but do not owe any income tax, 

and to level the playing field. As you said, Senator Kohl, the saver’s credit does that. It is the most significant and probably the 

only major Federal legislation that is directly targeted toward promoting retirement saving for the majority of the working population. 

Contrary to what Mr. Warshawsky said, who I very much respect 

personally, it is not complex. It could hardly be simpler. You contribute to a 401(k) or an IRA and you get a 50-percent tax credit, 

26

or a tax credit at a lower percentage. Instead of the amount you 

get for saving being dependent on how well off you are, it is dependent on how much you save. It makes a lot more sense than 

the deduction-based tax incentives. Even though many people have 

not heard of the saver’s credit, 5.3 million people took advantage 

of it in its first year, 2002, and again in 2003. 

Mr. Warshawsky, I respectfully suggest, is dead wrong when he 

says it is hard to market. It is not even a product. People do not 

market the saver’s credit by itself. You market 401(k)s. You market 

IRAs. You market savings. The saver’s credit is one of the tools 

that helps you market those because it is an additional benefit that 

people get when they do contribute to a 401(k) or another employer 

plan or an IRA, and something that H&R Block can attest is actually very easy to get. They helped a million people last year get a 

saver’s credit in connection with their contributions. It costs less 

than 1 percent of the entire tax incentive package that we give employer plans and IRAs. Less than one percent of that tax expenditure is the cost of the saver’s credit, but, unfortunately, it is about 

to expire at the end of next year. It is not refundable so over 50 

million people intended to get it do not get it. It does not reach 

high enough into the lower-middle-income and middle-middle-income groups. We need to make those three changes to further improve it. 

The other thing I would like to talk about very briefly is something that, Mr. Chairman, you described at the beginning of your 

remarks—automatic enrollment. The impact and the power of telling people that they are in a 401(k) unless they want to opt out, 

giving them advance notice and giving them a chance to opt out at 

any time, is huge. One study showed that in a particular company 

the 401(k) participation by low-income people was 13 percent when 

they had the traditional method of enrollment, you have to sign up. 

They switched to automatic enrollment, so you are automatically in 

unless you sign out of the plan. It went from 13 to 80 percent. 

These are people earning less than $20,000 a year. Similarly, for 

Hispanic Americans, a similarly dramatic increase in participation, 

from less than half to way more than half. 

The other things I would suggest that you consider, Mr. Chairman and the other members of the committee, in thinking about 

promoting automatic enrollment are the related escalation of contributions, making it easier for employers to say, you know, we will 

not only put everybody in the plan at three percent of pay at the 

beginning or four percent of pay, whatever the employer is comfortable with, but over time we will make it easier for you to step 

up. Maybe next year it will be five percent, and a couple years later 

it will be six percent. But you can always step off the escalator. 

Anyone can opt out or say, ‘‘I want to stay at three percent. That 

is all I want to do.’’ 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding.] Can you speak to Senator DeMint’s 

comment earlier that low-income people do not really have a lot of 

discretionary money, but where it is automatic and they do not opt 

out, is there any study in terms of satisfaction level with such a 

thing? 

Mr. IWRY. There are studies that suggest that lower-income people, contrary to what we might think, actually want to save and 

27

do respond to saving incentives. When you give them a chance to 

save, especially if you give them a match, offer them a matching 

contribution, whether it is a tax credit or money deposited in an 

account, they do tend to step up and save. 

I was at a focus group a few days ago, apropos of your question, 

Senator, where we had nine moderate- to lower-income people 

around the table who are eligible for a (k) plan and none of them 

were in it. They were asked why. You know, what is keeping you 

out? Why aren’t you saving? Then they were introduced to this 

automatic enrollment concept and asked: What do you think of 

this? Does this bother you? Is it a good thing? 

One woman there, about 39 years old, says, ‘‘I have been working 

since I was 16. I haven’t saved a penny.’’ Once she understood 

what automatic enrollment was about, she said, ‘‘You know, my 

company has a 401(k). I didn’t even know it existed. I found out 

about it by accident the other day after several years of being with 

the company. If I had been put in automatic enrollment back when 

I was 16, it would have been’’—in her words—‘‘a beautiful thing. 

I would have just gone ahead, I would have seen the money accumulate, and I would have a real nest egg now.’’ 

My suggestion is that these techniques that are focused on lowerincome people not only work in the sense that people really respond—I mean, 5.3 million people are doing this right now, and 

they are all folks—most of them are—they are all below $50,000 

in income, and it is something people have barely even heard of. 

My suggestion would be also that when you do focus on lowerincome people with savings incentives, it increases saving. That, 

after all, is the topic, the focus of your hearing today. What is the 

impact on saving? Give savings incentives to people of moderate income, they tend to actually save more. Give savings incentives to 

people who are very affluent, it is a mixed bag. There is a lot of 

shifting. A lot of us will take money that has been in a different 

account that is not tax-favored, and we will just move it over to the 

tax-favored account. No net increase in personal saving, no net increase in national saving. Net decrease in national saving because 

we just spent some tax expenditure, the Government just gave a 

tax break to an individual who did not actually increase his or her 

saving, but just shifted it around. So I think it makes eminent good 

sense to focus on the moderate- and lower-income. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Iwry follows:]

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Just for your notice, we 

probably have a vote coming up fairly soon. 

We do not have timing lights apparently operating in this room 

right now, so one of our assistants is going to notify you as to a 

reasonable amount of time so we can make sure we hear all of you. 

I am sorry. Pronounce your name for me. 

Mr. STEUERLE. ‘‘Steuerle.’’ 

The CHAIRMAN. Steuerle, OK. 

STATEMENT OF EUGENE STEUERLE, SENIOR FELLOW, THE 

URBAN INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. STEUERLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Kohl. As 

I mentioned to Senator Smith before the formal hearing began it 

is a privilege to testify before this committee, in part because I 

think it is one of the true bipartisan committees on either side of 

the Congress. I always enjoy working with the committee because 

it really does try to seek answers to questions. 

As Mark has mentioned, on the positive side the United States 

is in a select group of developed countries with a very significant 

share of assets in pension and retirement accounts, and they are 

largely employer-sponsored. I would like to add that the involvement of employers appears to be very crucial in increasing retirement assets, whether the employer directly funds these accounts or 

merely makes them available to employees. 

Nonetheless, the evidence that retirement and pension incentives 

have done much recently for national saving is very weak. As you 

mentioned, Senator Kohl, citing some statistics, I believe, that a 

colleague and I came out with a few weeks ago, total personal saving in the United States is now below just the revenue spent on 

supporting retirement and pension plans. That does not even count 

the revenue spent on other so-called saving incentives that Congress has adopted. Even that comparison further does not count 

other accounts in areas like health that have a saving component. 

Even if net saving were not an issue, the distribution of retirement saving is very highly skewed, and the current system fails to 

provide much in the way of retirement saving—but not just for lowincome taxpayers, whom we have been talking about, but for 

middle-income taxpayers, as well. Most middle-income taxpayers, 

not just low-income taxpayers, go into retirement with very little 

in the way of saving. I make that comment very strongly because 

among the issues we discussed, such as automatic enrollment, it is 

not just an issue for low-income people. It is even for the middleincome people who are not saving. 

I will give you one quick statistic. For two-thirds of the population in the United States, the value of their Social Security and 

Medicare benefits alone is in excess of all their saving from every 

other source—their own homes, their retirement assets, their savings accounts, every other source. So two-thirds of the population 

have more in Government benefits coming to them than from their 

entire saving when they go into retirement. So it is far more than 

a low-income issue. 

Now, one major reason is that all of these Government subsidies 

that we have are not for saving. They are for deposits. There is a 

big difference. A taxpayer can borrow, for instance, and put money 

81

in a saving account or a subsidized saving account, and he would 

be taking interest deductions on the other side without saving a 

dime. 

A second reason—and it has been mentioned by Secretary 

Warshawsky—is that the extraordinary complexity of the laws discourages saving. It discourages saving both by employees and it 

discourages the offering of saving accounts or pension plans by employers. 

I would like to also add that some pension designs and laws also 

present an assortment of problems that probably discourage saving, 

such as easy withdrawals of deposits before old age and design of 

traditional defined benefit plans that often discriminate against 

older-age employees. In fact, I can show you a number of cases 

where older employees accrue negative pension benefits by working 

longer. 

Yet another negative influence on saving is that most people retire in middle age. We have a system of retirement now, both public and private, that basically has people retiring for about onethird of their adult lives. That is, they are retiring in years when 

traditionally they have been savers. It would be as if about 50 or 

60 years ago we had people retiring in their early 50’s and then 

not saving for years beyond that early retirement age. 

Finally, the incentives, as has been mentioned several times, for 

low- and moderate-income, even middle-income taxpayers, are often 

small and sometimes nonexistent. Let me quickly mention some 

ways of dealing with these issues. 

One is to limit the tax breaks for those who are arbitraging the 

tax system by applying limitations on their interest deductions 

when, on the one hand, they are getting preferences for so-called 

savings but really deposits and, on the other hand, taking deductions—it might be mortgage interest deductions, it might be investment interest deductions—without actually saving at all. They are 

not counting their interest receipts when taking these interest deductions. Tightening up on withdrawals from retirement plans before old age could enhance saving. Yet another approach is to simplify, even though one has to admit simplification means that some 

people somewhere in the system are going to lose. Mind you that 

simplification is not just offering of a new simple plan. It is reducing the extraordinary array of plans that people have to choose 

from. If you look in the back of my testimony, I show a scheme for 

the plans that Congress now offers that makes the Clinton health 

plan, if you may remember the design of that, look simple by comparison. The pension laws are extraordinary complex and expensive. 

Strong consideration also needs to be given to providing safe harbors for employers in designing new retirement plans for older 

workers so these older workers can save, at the same time making 

it easier for them to have bridge jobs, while removing the threat 

of suits that employers face from tax laws, labor laws, and old-age 

discrimination laws. 

Another promising approach is to provide defaults for deposits 

which employers can opt out rather than opt in, as we have talked 

about. Another strong possibility is to increase the subsidy for 

lower- and moderate-income taxpayers. 

82

Both of you, Senators Smith and Kohl, have asked about the saver’s credit. I would like to offer my support for expanding the saver’s credit, but also to mention three major limitations. It does not 

apply to most low- and moderate-income taxpayers. It does not 

cover employer deposits. The subsidy itself does not go directly into 

retirement accounts. So I think we need to work with the saver’s 

credit, not merely just continue or increase it. 

Another promising approach is to provide a clearinghouse to handle rollovers out of employer plans and a simplified saving system, 

especially when small amounts are involved. Finally, mandates 

that employees save for retirement, including in employer-sponsored plans, should be considered as one leg of a broader retirement stool. That issue of mandates for employee deposits is on the 

table right now, but very indirectly, as part of the Social Security 

debate. I think it needs to be brought into the broader private retirement system debate as well. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Steuerle follows:]

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Senator KOHL [presiding.] Thank you very much, Mr. Steuerle. 

Mr. Klein. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES A. KLEIN, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN 

BENEFITS COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Senator Kohl. I appreciate the opportunity to be here. I am the president of the American Benefits 

Council. Our organization represents companies that either directly 

sponsor or provide services to retirement and health plans that 

cover more than 100 million Americans. 

My written testimony, which is being submitted for the record, 

provides a lot of data and statistics as well as a number of specific 

recommendations for improvements to the private employer-sponsored retirement system, and I would be delighted to chat about 

that if there is a question-and-answer period. But I thought that 

I would use my few moments during the oral remarks to just make 

some observations that are not fully developed in the written statement. 

To start out, I would like to just call your attention to three 

charts that I have brought with me. The first chart here shows the 

growth in private pension fund assets from 1945 until 2004, and 

that is both defined benefit and defined contribution assets. As you 

can see—or it may be a little bit hard to see from where you are 

sitting—the growth in the assets really took off in the late 1970’s, 

early 1980’s, corresponding roughly with the advent of the 401(k) 

plan that provided opportunities for both employers as well as individuals to make additional retirement savings. 

We have talked a lot about the abysmally low savings rate in 

this country, and it is absolutely appropriate to do so. You pointed 

out, in fact, in your introductory remarks that the actual average 

amount in individuals’ accounts is nowhere near what is needed. 

I would point out, though, that at least retirement savings is the 

one bright light in an otherwise very dismal picture on overall savings rates, and we have commissioned research in the past that 

showed that but for retirement savings, we would have had net 

negative savings in this country. So it at least contributes to the 

fact that we have some modest savings. 

The other notable thing I think about this chart is the substantial dip that you see in the line from the year 2000 to 2002, and 

obviously that corresponds with the downturn in the economy. But 

I think that that really underscores a separate point that relates 

back to Secretary Warshawsky’s earlier testimony, and that it underscores, in our view, the importance of preserving the defined 

benefit system, because unlike defined contribution plans, in the 

defined benefit system, of course, the employer bears the risk of ensuring that a payment will be made. So notwithstanding the downturn in the assets, defined benefit plans help provide some very important protections there. 

The next chart shows employer contributions to plans, and as 

you can see, those have steadily risen. I think what is significant 

about this chart is that it does not show the same dip that the 

prior one did. Notwithstanding periods of market downturn, employers continue to make contributions to plans, and, in fact, notably, with respect to defined benefit plans, the employer is on the 

99

hook to make up additional contributions to those plans during periods of time when the plan becomes less well funded. 

If the first two charts were in large part the good news, then this 

final chart is the bad news because this is a chart showing the decline of defined benefit plans insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The height of defined benefit plan existence, if 

you will, was in 1985 when there were about 112,000 plans. Following the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there started a 

decline in the number of those plans, in large part, not entirely but 

in large part due to a number of changes that were made in that 

law. Very substantially, and I think what should be very worrisome 

to all of us, is that in the last decade alone, from 1994 to 2004, we 

lost half—half—of the defined benefit pension plans in this country, from about 57,000 plans down to about 29,000 plans. 

So while it is good news that through defined contribution plans 

we are absolutely increasing a tremendous amount of wealth accumulation—and I am sure Mr. Kimpel will discuss that in greater 

detail—there are challenges here, both with respect to defined contribution plans and certainly on the defined benefit side. 

The sum total, I think, of these charts says, to me at least, two 

messages. First, that is really imperative for Congress to deal this 

year with the issue of funding reforms. While we at the American 

Benefits Council embrace a lot of the goals that the administration 

has laid out, we have tremendous concerns that the specifics of 

many of the proposals that they have put forward will, in fact, very 

much unintentionally, undermine the defined benefit system and 

will cause a lot of companies to exit the system. At the end of the 

day, what should probably keep us awake at night is not the notion 

that a few more seriously underfunded plans will terminate and 

impose those liabilities on the PBGC. That is a concern that we 

have, and, in fact, we have a very extensive report which enumerates many proposals that we have for how to shore up the pension 

system. Obviously, as premium payers, the sponsors of well-funded 

plans are very much concerned when poorly funded plans dump 

their liabilities on the PBGC. But really the bigger issue and the 

bigger backdrop against which all of this needs to be considered is 

not that a handful of underfunded plans will terminate, but that 

tens of thousands of very well-funded plans are exiting the system 

and their exit from the system may be exacerbated if we—that is, 

Congress—make the wrong decisions with respect to funding reforms. 

The second related issue to defined benefit plans concerns the 

one bright light in the defined benefit system, and that is the creation over the past several years of so-called hybrid plans, cash balance plans, and other types of varieties. The legal status of these 

plans is very much in doubt, both in Congress and certainly in the 

courts, and we urge the Congress to act sooner rather than later, 

very quickly to try to establish that these are legal, legitimate 

plans. Arriving at that conclusion is inextricably linked with the 

fiscal health of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation because 

there are roughly 1,200 so-called cash balance or hybrid pension 

plans in this country. They cover over 7 million Americans, and 

they are predominantly very well-funded plans, by the way, and 

they represent fully 20 percent of the premium revenue that goes 

100

to the PBGC. So not dealing with the issue of the legal status of 

hybrid plans can have a very deleterious impact on the health of 

the overall defined benefit system and the health of the PBGC. 

In conclusion, I just want to hit four very quick points for your 

attention, and then if I may, either at the end or as part of the 

question-and-answer period, address this whole question about 

whether or not we are getting adequate value for the tax expenditure, which has come up a number of times. 

The first point that I would make is that clearly this is not a 

hearing about Social Security, but I think that there can be and 

should be bipartisan agreement that the private retirement system 

needs to be strong, and that to the extent that it is not, the financial pressure on Social Security to do more will be made even larger. So we would very strongly urge two things: first of all, as Congress proceeds in whatever it chooses to proceed on the issue of Social Security reform, that it take into account the implications for 

employer-sponsored plans; and, second, that Congress should really 

not consider Social Security reform without also addressing a variety of things that need to be done to help improve the defined benefit and defined contribution private system. 

The second very quick point is that one of the greatest threats 

to retirement security in this country is what is happening on 

health care costs, and it is very important not to lose sight of the 

fact that health care costs are absorbing the available resources 

that would otherwise be put into what we think of as more retirement income plans. These two issues must be considered together. 

The third point is that the retirement system not only is obviously crucial for providing retirement income security, but also is 

the source of most of the investment capital in this country, and 

I see you perhaps want to——

Senator KOHL. The time for the vote is just about out, and Senator Smith will be back in just a minute and will resume the hearing. But I need to recess so I can get over. 

Mr. KLEIN. Absolutely. 

Senator KOHL. So he will be back in just a minute. I thank you. 

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you. 

Senator KOHL. We will be in a short recess. [Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding.] We will reconvene this hearing. Regrettably, the Majority Leader does not run the Senate schedule 

around the Aging Committee’s schedule. We mean no disrespect, 

and we truly appreciate your participation. 

Mr. Klein, I believe you are finishing, and please proceed. 

Mr. KLEIN. Gosh, I was hoping I would be able to start from the 

top again. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Anything you want to recapitulate for me, I 

would appreciate it. 

Mr. KLEIN. Well, I would be delighted to, either now or in part 

of the question-and-answer period. 

I guess the two last points that I would make is that we need 

to think both short term, which is what I have addressed thus far, 

as well as long term. In that regard—and I will not take the time 

now as part of these oral remarks, but in that regard, we have developed a very extensive report called ‘‘Safe and Sound,’’ which is 

a long-term strategic plan about what both the health and the reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:03 Sep 26, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\23280.TXT SAGING1 PsN: JOYCE
101

tirement system might look like 10 years from now. In that report, 

we establish three retirement policy goals. They are very specific, 

measurable goals relating to financial literacy, increasing coverage 

in employer-sponsored plans, and also boosting overall retirement 

savings. Then, not surprisingly, we followed up with a substantial 

number of very specific initial policy recommendations to help us 

achieve those goals, and with your permission, I would like to submit that report as part of the formal hearing record. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will include that. 

[The report follows:]

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Mr. KLEIN. The last point I would like to just pick up on is something I was not necessarily planning on discussing, but in light of 

the fact that it has been discussed so extensively already, I just 

want to comment on it. That is the issue about whether or not we 

are really getting our money’s worth with respect to the tax expenditure for employer-sponsored retirement, which is one of the 

largest tax expenditures in the budget. I agree with some of what 

has been said, but also would point out the following: 

First of all, in terms of whether or not an adequate portion of the 

tax expenditure is going to lower-income individuals, as my testimony indicates, we very strongly support both extension and, 

frankly, the expansion of the low-income saver’s credit. We think 

that it is extremely important to do more to help low-wage workers 

save more effectively. So I am in complete agreement on that point. 

But there is a very comprehensive, many would say extraordinarily onerous set of nondiscrimination rules that govern the employer-sponsored retirement system that are designed to ensure 

that a disproportionate amount of the value of the tax expenditure 

not go just to the very highly paid. So it is not like Congress has 

somehow ignored this issue and not tried to design the system in 

order to ensure that workers across the income spectrum are benefiting from this system. 

Moreover, there are at least two reasons for what would appear 

to be a disconnect between the amount of the tax expenditure and 

also the amount of taxes that are being paid out on the benefits. 

That, of course, relates to simply the present value that workers 

now today are getting as an exclusion for money that is being put 

into a plan. In the case of their 401(k) plans, companies get a deduction, individuals get an exclusion for the amount that they put 

in, as well as the amount that their company puts in on their behalf. But, of course, those benefits will then be paid out later on 

when those individuals retire, including, of course, those high-income people for whom these large deductions and exclusions presumably are taking place. So I think that one has to keep in mind, 

uppermost in mind, the timing issue. 

The other point, of course, is that we are dealing right now demographically with a situation whereby there is a larger group of 

baby boomers who are in the working population for whom these 

deductions and exclusions are being taken and being made and a 

comparatively smaller group of retirees. But once we baby boomers 

retire, we are going to be in the population that will be paying 

taxes on the benefits that are paying out. 

So I think that these are very crucial points to keep in mind in 

answer to Senator Kohl’s earlier questions around this point. 

With that, I would conclude and be delighted to answer questions 

later. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klein follows:]

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Kimpel. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN M. KIMPEL, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

AND DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, FIDELITY INVESTMENTS, 

BOSTON, MA 

Mr. KIMPEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Fidelity is the largest mutual fund manager in the country. In 

addition to that, we are the largest provider of employer-sponsored 

plan services. The main part of that business is in providing investment management and recordkeeping services to defined contribution plans. All of you have received a copy of a report that we have 

done now for 5 years drawing on the data that we have as the largest defined contribution recordkeeper. We currently record-keep 

over 10,000 plans covering over 8 million employees with assets approaching $500 billion. The report is all based on data at the end 

of 2003. We are in the process of gathering the data and putting 

together a report for 2004. 

With that, I just want to focus on three or four points. 

The first, in looking through this and trying to get a capsule of 

who is the average defined contribution or 401(k) participant, who 

is it, and what we see from our database is it is a person 44 years 

old, who earns about $53,000; who is contributing 7 percent of his 

or her compensation a year, that works out to slightly more than 

$3,500 a year; and who has an average account balance—and I am 

jumping ahead because I just received the numbers for the end of 

2004—of a little over $61,000 in that account balance. 

Now, the good news there is that average participant still has 

approximately 20 years to grow that number into a significant retirement nest egg. 

As the presentation I provided and the report also shows, all of 

the important things we care about—participation rates, deferral 

rates, and account balances—increase as the participant’s income 

goes up, as the participant ages, and, importantly, as the participant’s job tenure with the employer increases. 

Now, the opposite of that is also true, as we have all talked 

about as well, that a lower-paid, short-tenured, low-compensation 

participation will have less. But if you make some reasonable assumptions about where that person will ultimately be, you can see 

that those account balances will grow, participation rates will grow, 

and deferral rates will grow. 

So the issue that I would like to focus on in particular is trying 

to put these numbers in the appropriate context, and what I would 

like to do is focus on the importance that the employer plays in all 

of this. In addition, as you know, Fidelity is a very large IRA provider. We have some experience in that market as well. But what 

is significant to us—and if you look at one of the pages in the presentation, if you look at participation rates comparing employersponsored DC plan to IRA, if you look at deferral rates or contribution rates, and if you look at account balances, what you see is significantly, wildly larger numbers under the employer-sponsored 

plan. The most important of those is the participation rate. Sixtysix percent of people who are offered the opportunity to participate 

in a 401(k) plan do so. We sometimes complain that is not high 

140

enough, that it should be higher, that it should be 100 percent, and 

God knows we all wish it were 100 percent. But the figure for employees who do not participate in an employer-provided plan, the 

contribution rate or the participation rate for them in IRAs—and 

all of them have the ability to participate in an IRA—is only 5.5 

percent. So the power of the workforce, the power of the employer 

providing a plan is very significant. 

The CHAIRMAN. Sixty percent versus 5? 

Mr. KIMPEL. It is 5.5 for IRAs. 

Now, then we get to the question of what to do. People have 

talked about automatic enrollment. We think automatic enrollment 

is terrific. We are doing it with a lot of plans. Treasury regulations 

allow it today. Anything to encourage greater use of automatic enrollment is terrific. To make it unanimous, we, like the other panelists, are in favor of the continuation and possible expansion of the 

saver’s credit. 

But there is one other thing I would like to bring up that nobody 

else has talked about, and that is, when you have automatic enrollment, where does the money go? How is it invested? Another thing 

that we think is important to put on the legislation table is having 

the default fund be a life cycle fund or some kind of a balanced 

fund, because what everybody does now is the money goes into a 

money market fund. Again, looking at our data base, fewer than 5 

percent of the participants are defaulted into a life cycle fund. A 

life cycle fund is one that invests in different asset classes, that 

change as the participant ages, so it is appropriate for that age, so 

it is a higher—it would be a higher investment in equities, and 

then as the participant ages, it will go increasingly away from equities into money market. 

The CHAIRMAN. So is that something that exists or something 

you want us to create? 

Mr. KIMPEL. It exists, Senator. The problem is the fiduciary rules 

under ERISA and Section 44(c) in particular. They do not provide 

any relief from liability to an employer who identifies the life cycle 

fund as the default fund because participants are not deemed to exercise control over the default fund. So what employers all do, 

therefore, is default to a money market fund. That, coupled with 

automatic enrollment, would be a huge benefit under the current 

system. 

The CHAIRMAN. What percent of, say, their 7 percent, their personal and their employer contributions, what percent would it take 

to do the default fund? 

Mr. KIMPEL. Well, I am not sure——

The CHAIRMAN. Is this something separate that you created? 

Mr. KIMPEL. No, no. 

The CHAIRMAN. An extra percent or something? 

Mr. KIMPEL. No. The question is what happens to a participant 

who does not identify where his or her account should—what investment should be allocated to. So when you think of automatic 

enrollment——

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I understand now. OK. You are not talking 

about somebody whose investments tank. 

Mr. KIMPEL. No, no. No, I am just talking about someone who 

was automatically enrolled into a plan——

141

The CHAIRMAN. But they do not designate where——

Mr. KIMPEL. They do not designate an investment fund. 

The CHAIRMAN. Of those who enroll with Fidelity, what kind of 

a program do you offer them? High risk? Medium risk? Low risk? 

What does the average participant do? Do they spread it? 

Mr. KIMPEL. The average participant—well, let’s go back to the 

default issue. Approximately, I believe, 20 percent of participants 

end up being in one fund, and typically that one fund will be the 

default fund, which is why that issue is so important. Beyond that, 

what we——

The CHAIRMAN. What does a default fund earn? 

Mr. KIMPEL. Money market rates. 

The CHAIRMAN. Just the same money market rate. 

Mr. KIMPEL. Yes, typically. If the money market fund is the default fund. If you look at this across different age spectrums, what 

we see is that there is some level of appropriate—of reasonably appropriate—at least on average, of appropriate allocation among 

participants, among equity, fixed income, and money market. In 

other words, you see significantly higher concentrations of equity 

funds in participants’ accounts when they are younger, and that 

percentage declines over age. 

I think the typical holding, number of funds held, it will again 

depend on the particular plan because it is the plan sponsor who 

designs the plan, decides what investment options to provide and 

how many of them. So you will get variations depending on how 

many plan options are available. 

The CHAIRMAN. The 20 percent who go into the default fund, why 

don’t they choose? What is their excuse? They are not educated? 

They are not told? They are not given an option? 

Mr. KIMPEL. Well, the why, I am not sure we know the answer 

to. 

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, you know, they have to sign up for it. 

Mr. KIMPEL. Correct. They have signed up. I think it is because 

they simply—I think, and this is just opinion, I think they don’t 

have confidence in terms of what it should be, what they should 

be doing. 

Now, going back to the life cycle funds, we do see more and more 

employers offering them as an option, and we see more and more 

people going into them of their own volition. But we also have not 

been able—and this is one of the things we are trying to do in the 

data point, is track what people do. In other words, if they go into 

a default fund, do they stay there? We think most of them, unfortunately, do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Does Fidelity handle any defined benefit plans? 

Mr. KIMPEL. Yes, we administer defined benefit plans as well, 

and we also manage defined benefit plan assets. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you share with me the pros and cons? I am 

looking for an answer why is—beyond the complexity of defined 

benefit plans and the cost—why is one declining and the other 

going up? 

Mr. KIMPEL. Well, I think the simple reason that defined benefit 

plans are declining is not so much the cost but the uncertainty of 

the cost. If you are a corporation, what you do know with defined 

contribution plans, if you are contributing 5 percent or 7 percent, 

142

or whatever that number is, no matter what happens fiscally to 

your company, that is the rate you will have to contribute each 

year. But in a defined benefit plan, you don’t know from year to 

year what that contribution is going to be because it will be in part 

determined by your workforce and your compensation, which you 

have some control over, but it is also going to be determined by 

how well your investments do. That uncertainty, in our experience, 

drives corporate treasurers crazy. 

The CHAIRMAN. The mobility of our society today, I assume a lot 

of employees, as they become educated with respect to in 401(k) 

plans, they are asking for that instead of defined benefit plans. 

Mr. KIMPEL. I think that is true, too. 

The CHAIRMAN. Because it goes with them. There is no red tape. 

It is theirs, they own it, they grow it, they manage it. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kimpel follows:]

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Mr. STEUERLE. Senator, could I speak to that? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, please. 

Mr. STEUERLE. We have done some studies at the Urban Institute speaking exactly to your point. The traditional defined benefit 

plan over time only favored a small segment of the employee population, mainly——

The CHAIRMAN. It is usually the high-income. 

Mr. STEUERLE. The higher-income, but also those who are longterm employees with the same firm, not the more mobile population. If you look at the distribution of benefits by age and time 

with the firm, it is a hill-shaped. The very young get almost nothing because if they leave the plan at age 30 or 40, the plan is not 

indexed for inflation. The benefits are often almost worthless. The 

middle-aged people on the other hand start getting a huge buildup 

of assets, but that works badly for retaining employees. If you are 

an employer, all of a sudden you have some middle-aged employees 

say in a firm in Detroit who become very expensive. It is sometimes cheaper to close down the plant and move to Kentucky. 

Whereas, if you are on the other side of the hill, if you are on the 

down side, as I mentioned earlier in my testimony, sometimes the 

benefits go negative for older employees. 

Are employers looking for older employees? I think they are a 

major demand in the future as these people who are now retiring 

55 to 75 and are the largest underutilized pool of human resources 

in our economy. The traditional defined benefit plan has not adjusted to figuring out how to provide them with a modicum of benefits. 

One thing all four of us have spoken to at one level or the other 

is how important it is to provide employers with some simple default options that they can use for a variety of pension reform 

issues so they are not threatened with suits under the labor laws, 

the tax laws, and the age discrimination laws. They know they can 

set it up. In many cases they don’t want broad fiduciary responsibilities. They don’t mind making deposits on behalf of employees, 

but they generally don’t want long-term fiduciary responsibilities 

that threaten them with lawsuits. I think we spoke of this challenge for cash balance plans, automatic enrollment and automatic 

escalation plans and allowing life cycle plans. The notion that in 

the law or at least in the regulations there are safe harbors that 

reduces the threat of lawsuits, I think, is a very important advance, which I think all four of us would support. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can I ask you a question? I don’t know the answer to it. I am looking for education for myself. Where you have 

a company like United Airlines who—I believe one of their problems is the whole defined benefit plan liability. A new airline is set 

up called Ted. What does Ted offer to their employees? Is it a 

401(k) or is it a defined benefit plan? 

Mr. KLEIN. Well, I don’t specifically know what is offered to that 

airline——

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, there are lots of examples like that. 

Mr. KLEIN. I assume that they do not provide the same level of 

benefits, retirement or otherwise, but it is clear that in that industry they are facing pressure. Some of the companies, the legacy carriers, are facing pressure not only from those who have terminated 

155

their plans, like the Uniteds and U.S. Airways, but also some of 

the newer low-fare air carriers that clearly do not have a defined 

benefit pension. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would JetBlue have a 401(k)? 

Mr. KLEIN. I would think they do. 

Mr. IWRY. Mr. Chairman, I agree——

Mr. KLEIN. I also—go ahead, Mark. 

Mr. IWRY. I am sorry. I was just going to add to what Jim Klein 

is saying, that the newer carriers and in general the newer industries in our country have gone much more toward the 401(k) model, 

and this answers both of your questions in part, in addition to the 

factors my colleagues have mentioned. The defined benefit has 

been associated traditionally with manufacturing and with unionized industries particularly. As the share of the workforce represented by unions has declined and as the share of the workforce 

in this country involved in manufacturing has declined in favor of 

service industries, we have seen that mix of——

The CHAIRMAN. That accounts for part of the decline of one and 

the rise of the other. But are there any union pension funds that 

are or were defined benefit, are any of them transferring to 401(k)? 

Mr. IWRY. Yes, or they have added 401(k)s. 

The CHAIRMAN. They have added it. 

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, if I might also further embellish upon 

the answer to your question about the reasons for the decline, 

which are many, and kind of refer back to the chart that I showed 

during my comments. You know, at its peak in 1985, we had 

112,000 of these defined benefit plans insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. In 1986, the Tax Reform Act was enacted. Now, admittedly it did, through some of its changes, get rid 

of a number of very, very small defined benefit plans that maybe 

were only covering one or two people in a professional organization. 

But once you clear those out of there I want to debunk the notion 

that employers do not really necessarily want a defined benefit 

plan. I think that a lot of the provisions and the regulations that 

have followed on top of the provisions from the Tax Reform Act of 

1986 and its progeny have made it very difficult for companies to 

have defined benefit plans. 

I completely agree with John Kimpel’s comment that it is not so 

much the actual cost as it is the uncertainty about the cost. I hear 

that time and again from our Fortune 500 company members who 

are saying they find it very, very difficult to make the case to their 

boards of directors and their shareholders that it is worthwhile 

having a defined benefit plan given the unpredictability. That is 

why we are so tremendously concerned about certain features of 

the administration’s proposals on funding. 

The last point is the notion that people have obviously experienced, notwithstanding the dip during the market downturn, an 

enormous amount of wealth accumulation in 401(k) and other types 

of defined contribution plans. So from an employee relations point 

of view, there is a tremendous amount of interest in those kinds 

of plans, which brings us back to the beauty, I think, of the cash 

balance and other kinds of hybrid plans that combine the best features of both. It is a defined benefit plan. Its benefits are guaranteed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The employer 

156

funds it, but it is more transparent and individuals have a better 

sense of the value that they have. 

I will just leave you with one fascinating anecdote. A member 

company of ours did a survey of its workers about the extent to 

which those workers value different kinds of benefits, and they 

found that they placed a far superior value on the company-run 

gymnasium than they did on the defined benefit pension plan, notwithstanding that the company was obviously spending vastly more 

resources on the defined benefit plan. That speaks to the issue of 

communications and why it is important to engage people in the 

value of their defined benefit plan since it is not as evident to them 

as the defined contribution plan. 

But I think also that survey was done prior to the market downturn, and I think a lot of people began to realize the value of that 

security of the defined benefit plan. Most large companies obviously 

sponsor both or try to sponsor both. 

The CHAIRMAN. I have to apologize. There is another vote. We 

have only a few minutes left. 

Do any of you have any concluding comments that you can say 

briefly that would add to our record? Yes, Mr. Iwry. 

Mr. IWRY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reinforce and expand 

upon something that Mr. Kimpel called attention to. 401(k)s can be 

made easier and more effective in a number of different ways, really in all three phases: contributing to the plan, accumulating 

through sound investment, and then paying out. 

Mr. Kimpel is absolutely right that the accumulation phase 

needs some legislative comfort, and Gene Steuerle said this as well. 

We can use some more fiduciary reassurance for employers that if 

they default people into a life cycle fund instead of a money market 

fund or into a managed account where there is a professionally 

managed individual account for employees, if they want to let a 

professional manage it the way we run our defined benefit plans, 

with professional management, we will have made a great step forward and moved the system away from the excessive dependence 

now on self-direction. Every employee having to become their own 

investment expert, their own investment manager, it is too great 

a demand on people. 

Again, if I can refer to these focus groups that the Retirement 

Security Project has arranged, we saw people essentially begging 

for help with the investments. They do not know exactly how they 

ought to be investing their money. They want some professional 

help. 

You can have the right to opt out and have the right to continue 

to choose your own investments, the way we do today in 401(k)s, 

but let the employer have a default that represents a diversified 

and balanced fund or managed account. 

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, my only final comment would be to 

echo what is in our written statement commending you for the efforts that you articulated earlier with respect to automatic enrollment and associate myself with the comments of the others on the 

panel. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Yes? 

157

Mr. STEUERLE. Senator, the one comment I would add is that for 

some of the options we have been talking about at the end—the 

automatic enrollment, the clear statements as to fiduciary responsibilities and the removal of possibilities of a lawsuit—I think there 

is fairly uniform agreement. I really do hope that Congress moves 

ahead in those areas. But in some ways, those are the easier decisions. Especially at this time of budget stringency, we have to 

admit that some aspects of our current system are not working 

well, and I do not want to leave you with the notion that some 

harder decisions do not have to be made. 

I would mentioned one, for instance. We have a system now 

where people can borrow on the one side, take interest deductions, 

put money into accounts that get interest receipts, not save a dime, 

not make a dollar of interest income on net, and yet get substantial 

amounts of tax savings—tax savings, by the way, that can be as 

great or greater than these given to the people that actually do 

save. I have given other instances in my testimony. 

Consider early withdrawal options that are so easy for employees 

that sometimes they take money out of saving that the Government has subsidized, and leave nothing by the time of retirement 

age. The people then are more likely to turn to the Government for 

help in old age. Maybe it is nursing home help. Maybe it is retirement help. 

There are some tough decisions to be made here to encourage 

more people to keep money in a retirement solution. If the Government is going to be subsidizing people, and especially subsidizing 

additions to the saver’s credit, which most of us favor, we have to 

take a hard look in making sure that this money is adding to net 

saving and actually does stay in a retirement solution. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you all so very much. I know 

you have given me some ideas of things to add to my bill, and I 

invite and encourage and ask for your continued engagement with 

my office and other Senators, because we have got to start working 

on this soon because we have got a real economic or retirement tsunami ahead of us if we do not get ahead of this. 

So thank you all so much. It has been a very enlightening hearing, and you have added to the public record in a measurable way. 

With that, we thank you and we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:16 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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Æ


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