2024 IL App (1st) 231686-U

No. 1-23-1686 

Order filed May 17, 2024 

Sixth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

DOROTHY GOOLSBY,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ELEXIUS THOMPSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 23 M1 705913

Honorable 

Sondra Nicole Denmark, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices C.A. Walker and Tailor concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We dismiss as moot the appeal from the portion of the jury’s verdict granting 

 possession of the apartment to appellee. We are without a sufficient record

 to review appellant’s other claim of error and so affirm the award of damages. 

¶ 2 A jury awarded possession of an apartment located and $5,120 in damages to Dorothy 

Goolsby. Defendant Elexius Thompson appeals pro se, contending that she was prevented from 

presenting evidence and jury instructions and was not properly served with documents during 
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discovery. We dismiss as moot the jury’s award of possession of the apartment and, based on the 

inadequate record on appeal, affirm the jury’s award. 

¶ 3 Background 

¶ 4 The following facts are gleaned from the record, which comprises only the common law 

record. 

¶ 5 The parties entered into a month-to-month lease for an apartment, which began on March 

11, 2022, at $850 per month. About a year later, Goolsby filed a complaint for eviction against 

Thompson and all unknown occupants, seeking possession of the apartment, unpaid rent, and court 

costs. Attached were copies of the lease, a 60-day notice to vacate, and a lease extension. 

Thompson appeared pro se and requested a jury trial. Thompson filed pro se affirmative defenses, 

alleging a breach of the warranty of habitability, failure to maintain the building, and retaliation. 

Thompson sought the dismissal of the case, a rent offset, and fees and costs.

¶ 6 The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Thompson appeared pro se, and Goolsby appeared 

with counsel. Following trial, the jury awarded Goolsby possession of the apartment and damages. 

The trial court entered posttrial orders that Thompson immediately vacate the apartment and that 

the Cook County Sheriff’s Department proceed with removing Thompson from the apartment. 

¶ 7 Analysis 

¶ 8 After Thompson filed a pro se notice of appeal, she filed a pro se motion seeking an 

additional week to vacate the apartment. Then, Thompson filed pro se motions to vacate and set 

aside the judgment and for a new trial and to stay the eviction pending appeal. The trial court 

denied the motion, ordered the eviction to proceed, and denied Thompson’s remaining motions, 

ordering the Cook County Sheriff’s Office to remove Thompson from the apartment. The record 
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contains an “Eviction Unit Affidavit” from the Cook County Sheriff’s Department with a 

“disposition date” of October 4, 2023, which states that officers entered the apartment, spoke to 

Thompson, and removed her without incident. 

¶ 9 While Thompson’s pro se notice of appeal was filed before her pro se motion to vacate 

and set aside the judgment and for a new trial, that does not necessarily deprive this court of 

jurisdiction. Where, as here, a timely postjudgment motion has been filed after the filing of a notice 

of appeal, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) states that the notice of appeal becomes effective 

when the trial court enters an order disposing of the timely postjudgment motion. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 

303(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017). Accordingly, when the trial court denied Thompson’s motion, the 

notice of appeal became effective, and we have jurisdiction over this appeal

¶ 10 On March 1, 2024, this court entered an order on its own motion, taking the case for 

consideration on the record and Thompson’s brief. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis 

Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (reviewing court may decide case on appellant's 

brief alone “if the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that the court can easily decide 

them without the aid of an appellee’s brief”).

¶ 11 Thompson contends that the jury’s verdict should be vacated as the trial court stated that 

her evidence was not “relevant in eviction court” and did not permit her to present the evidence or 

jury instructions. Thompson also contends that she was improperly barred from cross-examining 

a witness and was not properly served with documents during discovery.

¶ 12 Initially, Thompson’s failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 

1, 2020) hinders our review. While Thompson’s brief, submitted using the Supreme Court’s 

approved preprinted appellant brief form, contains a narration from her point of view, it lacks 
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cohesive legal arguments and reasoned bases for those arguments in violation of Rule 341(h)(7). 

“Arguments that do not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) do not merit consideration on appeal and may 

be rejected by this court for that reason alone.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015 IL App 

(1st) 141272, ¶ 43. To the extent that Thompson’s brief fails to comply with Rule 341(h)(7), her 

arguments are forfeited. 

¶ 13 Although considering the content of Thompson’s brief, it would be within our discretion 

to dismiss this appeal, we decline to do so. See Epstein v. Galuska, 362 Ill. App. 3d 36, 42 (2005)

(“[P]arty's failure to comply with basic rules is grounds for disregarding his or her arguments on 

appeal”). Instead, we choose to consider the discernible merits of the appeal as it is apparent that 

Thompson challenges the jury’s award. 

¶ 14 Issue of Possession

¶ 15 First, we consider whether the issue of possession is moot, given that the record 

demonstrates Thompson has been evicted. “An appeal is moot if no actual controversy exists or 

when events have occurred that make it impossible for the reviewing court to render effectual 

relief.” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 10. “The 

existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction, and courts of 

review will generally not decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions.” In re Marriage of 

Nienhouse, 355 Ill. App. 3d 146, 149 (2004). Whether a case is moot presents an issue we review 

de novo. Benz v. Department of Children & Family Services, 2015 IL App (1st) 130414, ¶ 31.

¶ 16 The purpose of an eviction claim is to determine “which party is entitled to immediate 

possession and whether a defense which is germane to the distinctive purpose of the action defeats 

plaintiff’s asserted right to possession.” First Illinois Bank & Trust v. Galuska, 255 Ill. App. 3d 

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86, 90 (1993). When a defendant no longer lives at the property, the issue of possession is moot. 

See Circle Management, LLC v. Olivier, 378 Ill. App. 3d 601, 607-08 (2007) (appeal of forcible 

entry and detainer action moot where circuit court entered possession order and appellant vacated

premises but applying public interest exception to mootness doctrine to address whether 

possession may be awarded as sanction for tenant’s failure to comply with use and occupancy

order); see also 6103-07 Claremont, LLC v. Hunter, 2024 IL App (1st) 231287-U, ¶¶ 26-27 (citing 

Circle Management and finding issue of possession moot where sheriff enforced eviction order 

and removed defendant from property and plaintiff acquired possession); 2242 Archer Court, LLC 

v. Roberts, 2023 IL App (1st) 221655-U, ¶¶ 14-15 (same). 

¶ 17 Here, the jury’s verdict granted possession of the apartment to Goolsby, and the trial court’s 

posttrial order required Thompson to vacate the apartment instanter. The record further reveals 

that on October 4, 2023, the Cook County Sheriff’s Department eviction unit removed Thompson 

from the apartment. Additionally, Thompson’s filings before this court bear a different address

than the apartment. Thus, Thompson's appeal from that part of the jury’s verdict, which granted 

possession to Goolsby, is dismissed as moot.

¶ 18 Issue of Damages

¶ 19 The jury also awarded Goolsby $5120 in damages, which was not rendered moot by 

Thompson vacating the apartment. But, the record on appeal does not contain a report of 

proceedings from the trial or an acceptable substitute, such as a bystander’s report or agreed 

statement of facts under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a), (c), (d) (eff. 

July 1, 2017). Thompson has the burden of providing a complete record for review in the appellate 

court to support her claims of error. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391 (1984). Without a 
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record, “it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law 

and had a sufficient factual basis.” Id. at 392. This is because, to determine whether there was an 

error, a reviewing court must have a record before it to review. Id. (absent “transcript of the hearing 

*** there is no basis for holding” that court erred).

¶ 20 Without a trial transcript or an acceptable substitute, we cannot determine the evidence 

presented at trial or the parties’ arguments. Under these circumstances, we must presume that the 

jury acted in conformity with the law and properly awarded damages to Goolsby based on the 

evidence before it. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 156-57 (2005) (“Without an 

adequate record preserving the claimed error, the reviewing court must presume the circuit court 

had a sufficient factual basis for its holding and that its order conforms with the law”). In the 

absence of a report of proceedings or other record of the trial, we have no basis for disturbing the 

jury’s award. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. 

¶ 21 Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.