[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Flak v. Betras, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8109.]

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-8109 

THE STATE EX REL. FLAK ET AL. v. BETRAS ET AL.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8109.] 

Mandamus—Writs of mandamus sought to compel county board of elections to 

place proposed city-charter amendments on election ballot—Proposed 

amendments exceed constitutional authority of a municipality’s authority to 

enact—Writs denied. 

(No. 2017-1239—Submitted September 29, 2017—Decided October 6, 2017.) 

IN MANDAMUS. 

________________ 

 Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} This expedited election matter concerns two efforts to place 

proposed amendments to the Youngstown City Charter on the November 2017 

ballot: the People’s Bill of Rights for Fair Elections and Access to Local 

Government (“the Elections Amendment”),1

 and the “Youngstown Drinking Water 

 

1

 Relators Lynn Anderson, Susan L. Beiersdorfer, Kathleen K. Berry, Marguerite Linda Felice, and 

Dario David Hunter comprise the Committee of Petitioners for the Elections Amendment. 
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2 

Protection Bill of Rights” (“the Water Amendment”).2 Relators seek writs of 

mandamus to compel respondents, the Mahoning County Board of Elections and 

its individual members,3 to certify relators’ petitions to place the proposed 

amendments on the ballot. We deny the writs. 

Background 

The Elections Amendment (Section 69.1) 

{¶ 2} The Elections Amendment would add a new Section 69.1 to the city 

charter declaring that the people of Youngstown have a right to fair elections and 

access to local government. The Elections Amendment would, among other things, 

prohibit campaign contributions to local candidates or issues from anyone other 

than registered Youngstown voters, cap any such contributions at $100 per 

contributor per candidate or issue, adopt a “top-two” primary election for mayor 

and for ward representative, and mandate the use of paper ballots to verify 

electronic election results. 

{¶ 3} Section (d) of the Elections Amendment, captioned “Right to 

Enforcement,” affirms the right of the people of Youngstown to enforce the rights 

set forth in the amendment: 

If the City of Youngstown fails to enforce or defend this 

Amendment, or, a court fails to uphold this Amendment, any natural 

person may enforce this Amendment through nonviolent direct 

action or via a suit at law or in equity as a private attorney general 

plaintiff, for damages and costs of litigation, including, without 

limitation, expert and attorney fees. If any appointed or elected 

 

2

 Relators Christine Agnes Flak, Mary C. Khumprakob, Raymond Nakley Jr., Young Tensley, and 

Hattie Wilkins comprise the Committee of Petitioners for the Water Amendment. 

3

 The members of the Mahoning County Board of Elections are David J. Betras, Mark E. Munroe, 

Robert J. Wasko, and Tracey S. Winbush. 
January Term, 2017 

3 

official infringes upon the people of Youngstown’s adoption of this 

Amendment through their right of democratic initiative power, any 

natural person may enforce these rights through nonviolent direct 

action. 

Section (d) provides that “City of Youngstown law enforcement, and cooperating 

agencies acting within the jurisdiction of the City of Youngstown, shall have no 

lawful authority to surveil, detain, arrest, or otherwise impede natural persons 

enforcing these rights.” 

The Water Amendment (Section 133) 

{¶ 4} The second proposed charter amendment, the Water Amendment, 

would add a new Section 133 to the city charter. It declares that the people of 

Youngstown, “along with ecosystems and natural communities within the city, 

possess the right to clean water, air, and soil, and to be free from activities that 

would violate this right and expose citizens to the harmful effects of contaminants 

in their water supply, including, but not limited to, the drilling of new wells or 

extraction of oil and gas.” Section (b) of the Water Amendment contains the same 

language as Section (d) of the Elections Amendment, authorizing private citizens 

to enforce their rights through nonviolent direct action or by filing suit as a private 

attorney general. And the Water Amendment also contains the provision barring 

“City of Youngstown law enforcement, and cooperating agencies acting within the 

jurisdiction of the City of Youngstown” from “surveil[ing], detain[ing], arrest[ing], 

or otherwise imped[ing] natural persons enforcing these rights.” 

Mahoning County Board of Elections proceedings 

{¶ 5} On July 24, 2017, the Water Amendment committee submitted its 

part-petitions to the Youngstown City Clerk. The Mahoning County Board of 

Elections (“BOE”) certified a sufficient number of valid signatures for the Water 
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4 

Amendment to qualify for the ballot.4 On August 23, the Youngstown City Council 

unanimously passed an ordinance instructing the BOE to place the Water 

Amendment on the November 2017 ballot. 

{¶ 6} The Elections Amendment committee delivered its part-petitions to 

the city clerk on August 7, 2017. After the BOE validated the signatures, the city 

council unanimously passed a resolution instructing the BOE to place the Elections 

Amendment on the November ballot. The BOE received the two proposed 

amendments on August 25, 2017. 

{¶ 7} On September 6, 2017, the BOE met to consider placement of the 

two proposed amendments on the ballot. BOE Chairman Mark Munroe expressed 

concern that both amendments “contain provisions that are beyond the scope of 

cities to enact via initiative.” BOE member David Betras agreed that the proposed 

amendments contained provisions that exceeded the authority of the city to adopt. 

The BOE then voted four to zero not to certify the amendments to appear on the 

ballot, on the grounds that they exceeded the city’s initiative power. 

{¶ 8} The next day, September 7, relators filed the present expedited 

election complaint against the BOE and its individual members. The parties have 

filed briefs and evidence in accordance with the calendar for expedited election 

cases set forth in S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08. 

Legal Analysis 

{¶ 9} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish, by 

clear and convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a 

clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an 

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth,

131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6, 13. When reviewing a 

 

4

 The complaint identifies the numbers of signatures validated on both petitions, without expressly 

noting that the numbers were sufficient for the proposed amendments to qualify for the ballot. 

However, the sufficiency of the signatures does not appear to be in dispute. 
January Term, 2017 

5 

decision of a county board of elections, the standard is whether the board engaged 

in fraud or corruption, abused its discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable 

legal provisions. State ex rel. Jacquemin v. Union Cty. Bd. of Elections, 147 Ohio 

St.3d 467, 2016-Ohio-5880, 67 N.E.3d 759, ¶ 9. 

{¶ 10} Under the Ohio Constitution, municipalities have “authority to 

exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their 

limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict 

with general laws.” Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3. The Constitution 

extends that same authority to the people acting in their sovereign capacity: “The 

initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of each 

municipality on all questions which such municipalities may now or hereafter be 

authorized by law to control by legislative action * * *.”5

 Ohio Constitution, Article 

II, Section 1f. These clauses impose limitations on the permissible subject matter 

of a municipal initiative or referendum petition. See, e.g., Buckeye Community 

Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls, 82 Ohio St.3d 539, 545, 697 N.E.2d 181 (1998) 

(holding that the phrase “by legislative action” in Article II, Section 1f means that 

a municipal ordinance is not subject to referendum if it constitutes an 

administrative, rather than a legislative, action). 

{¶ 11} R.C. 3501.11(K)(1) provides that a county board of elections must 

“[r]eview, examine, and certify the sufficiency and validity of petitions.” We have 

held that the statute gives the county boards of election authority “to determine 

whether a ballot measure falls within the scope of the constitutional power of 

referendum or initiative.” State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of 

Elections, 144 Ohio St.3d 239, 2015-Ohio-3761, 41 N.E.3d 1229, ¶ 9. 

 

5 “An initiative is a proposal which allows the people to directly enact a law if they accept the 

proposal in an election and a referendum is a proposal which allows the people to directly repeal a 

law which has already been enacted by the legislature.” State ex rel. Todd v. Felger, 7th Dist. 

Columbiana No. 06 CO 38, 2007-Ohio-731, ¶ 3.
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6 

{¶ 12} Our jurisprudence has distinguished between an elections board’s 

determining that a proposed initiative may be unconstitutional and an elections 

board’s determining that a proposed initiative falls outside the scope of the 

permissible subject matter of a municipal initiative. Thus, in Youngstown, we held 

that a county board of elections cannot refuse to certify a ballot measure based on 

its assessment that the measure, in substance, would be unconstitutional if enacted. 

Id. at ¶ 4-5, 12 (requiring a county board of elections to place a proposed citycharter amendment on the ballot despite its concern that the measure would be 

unenforceable because it conflicted with the Ohio Constitution). This court “ ‘will 

not consider, in an action to strike an issue from the ballot, a claim that the proposed 

amendment would be unconstitutional if approved, such claim being premature.’ ” 

State ex rel. Walker v. Husted, 144 Ohio St.3d 361, 2015-Ohio-3749, 43 N.E.3d 

419, ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. Cramer v. Brown, 7 Ohio St.3d 5, 6, 454 N.E.2d 

1321 (1983). 

{¶ 13} Just last year, however, this court held that a county board of 

elections may properly refuse to certify a proposed municipal ordinance to the 

ballot when the ordinance encompasses a matter beyond the scope of the 

municipality’s authority to enact. State ex rel. Sensible Norwood v. Hamilton Cty. 

Bd. of Elections, 148 Ohio St.3d 176, 2016-Ohio-5919, 69 N.E.3d 696, ¶ 22. In 

Sensible Norwood, the county board of elections refused to certify to the ballot a 

proposed municipal ordinance, the effect of which would have been to change the 

city’s marijuana ordinances. We noted that a municipality has authority to define 

misdemeanor offenses but that the power to define felonies is committed to the 

General Assembly. Id. at ¶ 10. And because the power to designate felonies is not 

a matter that municipalities are “authorized by law to control by legislative action” 

(in the language of Article II, Section 1f of the Ohio Constitution), the supporters 

of the proposed ordinance had no legal right to place the measure on the ballot. Id. 

at ¶ 12. 
January Term, 2017 

7 

{¶ 14} It is fair to say that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a 

provision that a municipality is not authorized to adopt by legislative action 

(something an elections board may determine per Sensible Norwood) and one that 

is simply unconstitutional (something an elections board may not determine, per 

Youngstown, 144 Ohio St.3d 239, 2015-Ohio-3761, 41 N.E.3d 1229, at ¶ 12). But 

that is the line our caselaw has drawn. 

{¶ 15} Sensible Norwood is directly on point here. Here, the BOE rejected 

the petitions, in part because the proposed amendments purport to create a private 

cause of action. Just as a municipality may not create a felony, a municipality is 

not authorized to create new causes of action. See Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, 

Section 3; see also Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 150 (“state law * * * determines what injuries are 

recognized and what remedies are available”). 

{¶ 16} The dispositive question in this mandamus action is whether the 

BOE violated a clear legal duty by refusing to certify relators’ petitions to place the 

proposed amendments on the ballot. In refusing to certify the petitions, the BOE 

acted consistently with our most recent pronouncement on the matter—Sensible 

Norwood. We cannot conclude that in doing so it violated a clear legal duty. Thus, 

we deny the extraordinary writs. 

{¶ 17} The dissenting opinion not only concludes that the BOE violated a 

clear legal duty but also would declare the recently enacted 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 463 

(“H.B. 463”), effective April 6, 2017, unconstitutional. But we do not reach 

constitutional issues unless it is necessary to do so. State ex rel. BSW Development 

Group v. Dayton, 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 345, 699 N.E.2d 1271 (1998). Adherence to 

this principle seems particularly appropriate in this expedited election matter, with 

its short time frame for consideration, limited briefing, and lack of participation by 

the state, see R.C. 2721.12(A). Because the matter may be properly resolved under 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8 

our pre-H.B. 463 caselaw, we leave consideration of the constitutionality of the 

new enactment for another day. 

{¶ 18} Relators have failed to establish a clear legal duty on the BOE’s part 

to certify their petitions to place the proposed amendments on the November ballot, 

and we therefore deny the requested writs of mandamus. 

Writs denied. 

O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 

FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’CONNOR, C.J., and 

O’NEILL, J. 

__________________ 

FISCHER, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 19} Recently, in State ex rel. McGinn v. Walker, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 

2017-Ohio-7714, __ N.E.3d ___, this court denied requests for writs of mandamus 

to compel county boards of elections to certify initiative petitions to place county 

charters on the November ballot. In that case, we did not address the 

constitutionality of R.C. 3501.11(K)(2). See id. at ¶ 24 (plurality opinion). 

However, although today’s majority does not reach the issue, the constitutionality 

of that statute is now squarely before us. I conclude that to the limited extent that 

it incorporates R.C. 3501.38(M), R.C. 3501.11(K)(2) violates the separation-ofpowers doctrine by granting the power of judicial review to county boards of 

elections, an arm of the executive branch; therefore, I must respectfully dissent. I 

would hold that R.C. 3501.11(K)(2) is unconstitutional to that limited extent, and I 

would grant the writs of mandamus requested in this case. 

I. ANALYSIS 

{¶ 20} Respondent Mahoning County Board of Elections (“the BOE”) 

makes two primary arguments in opposition to the requested writs of mandamus. 

First, it contends that mandamus cannot issue because relators, the committees of 

petitioners for the two proposed city-charter amendments (and their individual 
January Term, 2017 

9 

members), have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Second, the 

BOE argues that the proposed amendments are not proper initiative measures and 

that a county board of elections has the authority to make that determination. 

A. Adequate remedy at law 

{¶ 21} The relator in an expedited election case almost always lacks an 

adequate remedy at law because the relevant election was imminent at the time the 

county board of elections took whatever action the relator is complaining of. See, 

e.g., State ex rel. Stewart v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 124 Ohio St.3d 584, 2010-

Ohio-1176, 925 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 17. As was true in previous cases, “given the 

proximity of the election, an injunction would arguably not constitute an adequate 

remedy because any ‘appellate process would last well past the election.’ ” State 

ex rel. Thurn v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 72 Ohio St.3d 289, 292, 649 N.E.2d 

1205 (1995), quoting State ex rel. Smart v. McKinley, 64 Ohio St.2d 5, 6, 412 

N.E.2d 393 (1980); State ex rel. Finkbeiner v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 122 Ohio 

St.3d 462, 2009-Ohio-3657, 912 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 18. 

{¶ 22} R.C. 3511.04(B) requires county boards of elections to have 

absentee ballots under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act 

of 1986 (“UOCAVA”), 42 U.S.C. 1973ff, ready for distribution no later than 45 

days before each election; the deadline for having the absentee ballots ready for this 

year’s general election was Monday, September 25, see R.C. 1.14. This court has 

held that a party seeking ballot access has no adequate remedy in the ordinary 

course of the law when the deadline for UOCAVA ballots is imminent. State ex 

rel. Ebersole v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 140 Ohio St.3d 487, 2014-Ohio4077, 20 N.E.3d 678, ¶ 22-24 (holding that the relators had no adequate remedy at 

law when they filed suit 18 days before the UOCAVA deadline). 

{¶ 23} Here, the BOE does not allege that relators could have used a special 

statutory procedure to challenge the BOE’s decision. By contrast, in McGinn, there 

was at least an argument that the relators had two available remedies: they could 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

have filed a protest pursuant to R.C. 307.95, or they could have sought an 

adjudication of the petitions’ validity from the common pleas court, under R.C. 

307.94. ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2017-Ohio-7714, __ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 28 (DeWine, J., 

concurring in judgment only). 

{¶ 24} Those statutory remedies are not available to relators in this case. 

R.C. 307.94 addresses initiative petitions to adopt county charters. The statute 

authorizes a petition committee to file either a protest or an action in the common 

pleas court if the county board of elections invalidates a county-charter petition. It 

does not authorize those remedies for municipal-charter petitions, which are 

governed by different sections of the Revised Code. 

{¶ 25} The General Assembly recently enacted 2016 H.B. No. 463 (“H.B. 

463”), which purported to expand the duties of the county boards of elections. Prior 

to the passage of H.B. 463, there does not appear to have been a statutory 

mechanism for appealing an elections board’s decision concerning a municipalcharter petition. Even under the amended statute, the committee for a municipalcharter petition has no statutory cause of action in the common pleas court. But 

along with expanding the review authority of county elections boards, H.B. 463 did 

add one avenue of appeal: “The finding of the board shall be subject to challenge 

by a protest filed pursuant to division (B) of section 307.95 of the Revised Code.” 

R.C. 3501.38(M)(1)(b). 

{¶ 26} The first requirement of R.C. 307.95 is that a protest under that 

section must be filed no later than 4:00 p.m. “of the ninety-seventh day before the 

election.” R.C. 307.95(B). The 97th day before the November 7, 2017 election 

was Wednesday, August 2, 2017, more than one month before the BOE even 

invalidated the petitions in this case. A statutory protest that one is time-barred 

from pursuing before one’s cause of action even arises cannot constitute an 

adequate alternative remedy. 
January Term, 2017 

11 

{¶ 27} Nor is the BOE correct that relators had an adequate remedy in the 

form of a declaratory-judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of H.B. 

463, coupled with a request for a prohibitory injunction to block the BOE from 

applying the terms of the new statute. The BOE faults relators for “many months 

of inaction” during which they could have challenged the new statutory enactments 

in a nonexpedited fashion. 

{¶ 28} There are at least two significant flaws in the BOE’s argument. 

First, relators had no viable claim that would have allowed them to challenge the 

statute until the BOE acted under its authority to their detriment. Therefore, if 

relators had brought an earlier declaratory-judgment action, any court “would have 

recognized the complaint as a quintessential request for an advisory opinion and 

dismissed it for failure to state a claim,” State ex rel. Jones v. Husted, 149 Ohio 

St.3d 110, 2016-Ohio-5752, 73 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 23 (plurality opinion). Notably, the 

BOE’s argument that this case is barred by laches, because relators could have filed 

an action for declaratory judgment when H.B. 463 was passed, should fail for the 

same reason. 

{¶ 29} Second, the BOE’s assertion that a declaratory judgment and a 

prohibitory injunction would have been a complete remedy is not correct. An 

injunction barring the BOE from using the H.B. 463 statutory amendments to 

invalidate the petitions would not be a complete remedy, because it would not have 

required the BOE to place the proposed amendments on the ballot. Only a 

declaratory judgment coupled with a mandatory injunction could have prevented 

the BOE from invalidating the petitions on some other basis. See State ex rel. Ohio 

Liberty Council v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, 

¶ 28 (holding that “a prohibitory injunction would not provide relators with the 

relief they request: an order to compel the ballot board * * * to certify its approval 

of their proposed constitutional amendment as written” [emphasis sic]). And a 

mandatory injunction is an extraordinary remedy that does not preclude a writ of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

mandamus. State ex rel. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs., 128 Ohio St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-625, 943 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 25; State ex rel. 

Gen. Assembly v. Brunner, 114 Ohio St.3d 386, 2007-Ohio-3780, 872 N.E.2d 912, 

¶ 25. 

{¶ 30} Despite the absence of an available remedy, it could be argued that 

mandamus should not issue in this case because “ ‘constitutional challenges to 

legislation are generally resolved in an action in a common pleas court rather than 

in an extraordinary writ action,’ ” State ex rel. Brooks v. O’Malley, 117 Ohio St.3d 

385, 2008-Ohio-1118, 884 N.E.2d 42, ¶ 11, quoting Rammage v. Saros, 97 Ohio 

St.3d 430, 2002-Ohio-6669, 780 N.E.2d 278, ¶ 11. But this rule is simply a 

corollary to the principle that a party must avail itself of alternative legal remedies, 

if available. See Rammage at ¶ 11. The rule does not apply in expedited election 

cases, in which there is no sufficiently speedy alternative remedy. State ex rel. 

Watson v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 88 Ohio St.3d 239, 258, 725 N.E.2d 255 

(2000) (“It is appropriate to consider the merits of [the relator’s] constitutional 

claim in this mandamus action because an action for a declaratory judgment and 

prohibitory injunction would not be sufficiently speedy in this expedited election 

case”). 

{¶ 31} I would accordingly conclude, consistently with our prior 

jurisprudence in the expedited-election-case context, that relators lacked an 

adequate remedy at law. 

B. Clear legal right and clear legal duty 

{¶ 32} We review a decision of a county board of elections to determine 

whether the board engaged in fraud or corruption, abused its discretion, or acted in 

clear disregard of applicable legal provisions. State ex rel. Jacquemin v. Union Cty. 

Bd. of Elections, 147 Ohio St.3d 467, 2016-Ohio-5880, 67 N.E.3d 759, ¶ 9. 

{¶ 33} Municipalities have “authority to exercise all powers of local selfgovernment and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary 
January Term, 2017 

13 

and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” Ohio 

Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3. This authority is also extended to the people 

acting in their sovereign capacity: “The initiative and referendum powers are 

hereby reserved to the people of each municipality on all questions which such 

municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative 

action * * *.” Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 1f. The permissible subject 

matter of a municipal initiative or referendum petition is limited by these clauses. 

See, e.g., Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls, 82 Ohio St.3d 539, 

545, 697 N.E.2d 181 (1998). 

{¶ 34} We have held that if a proposed measure does not conform to the 

constitutional prerequisites for a ballot measure, the county boards of elections 

“have not only discretion but an affirmative duty to keep such items off the ballot.” 

State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 144 Ohio St.3d 239, 

2015-Ohio-3761, 41 N.E.3d 1229, ¶ 9.

{¶ 35} However, we have also held that elections boards cannot determine 

whether a measure, in substance, would be unconstitutional if enacted. Id. at ¶ 4-

5, 12 (elections board must place measure on the ballot despite its concern that the 

measure would be unenforceable because it conflicted with the Ohio Constitution). 

Nor can a county board of elections invalidate a proposed ordinance on the grounds 

that the measure is unlawful or unconstitutional in the manner of its passage. State 

ex rel. Hazel v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 80 Ohio St.3d 165, 169, 685 N.E.2d 

224 (1997). 

{¶ 36} The majority concludes that the BOE did not violate a clear legal 

duty in rejecting relators’ petitions because the proposed amendments purport to 

create a private cause of action. The majority reasons that this case is controlled by 

State ex rel. Sensible Norwood v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 148 Ohio St.3d 

176, 2016-Ohio-5919, 69 N.E.3d 696. I disagree. First, we have not previously 

considered the issue of who can create a private cause of action. The majority 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

decides this issue in a conclusory manner without significant analysis. See majority 

opinion at ¶ 15. However, regardless of the answer to the question of who can 

create a private cause of action, we should reach the constitutional issue because 

Sensible Norwood does not apply to this case. 

{¶ 37} The reliance on Sensible Norwood by the BOE and the majority is 

misplaced, and not “sensible.” In that case, this court offered two reasons for 

invalidating a proposed municipal marijuana ordinance. In addition to holding that 

municipalities have no power to define felonies, the court also held that the 

ordinance was administrative because it would have changed the manner in which 

local police and courts could enforce specific existing laws. Sensible Norwood at 

¶ 14-18. 

{¶ 38} In Sensible Norwood, the proposed ordinances purported to create 

felony offenses, and in doing so they clearly exceeded the power of a municipality 

to make the violation of any of its ordinances a misdemeanor. The issue here—

whether a municipality has the authority to create a private cause of action—has 

not previously been ruled upon by this court. Whether a municipality can act in 

this way required a legal determination—one that went beyond the more 

straightforward determination made in Sensible Norwood. 

{¶ 39} Ultimately, the constitutionality of the proposed amendments at 

issue in this case would need to be determined by a court if they ever became 

effective. We have made clear that an unconstitutional proposal may be a proper 

item for referendum or initiative and that such a proposal becomes void and 

unenforceable only when declared unconstitutional by a court of competent 

jurisdiction. Youngstown, 144 Ohio St.3d 239, 2015-Ohio-3761, 41 N.E.3d 1229, 

at ¶ 11. I would accordingly reserve a ruling on the constitutionality of the proposed 

amendments in the event that they become law and are subsequently challenged in 

court. 
January Term, 2017 

15 

{¶ 40} Thus, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this case can be 

resolved on the basis of this court’s pre-H.B. 463 caselaw, particularly Sensible 

Norwood. I would address the constitutionality of R.C. 3501.11(K)(2). And I 

would conclude that a county board of elections does not have the authority to 

invalidate petitions on the basis that a municipality is not authorized to create 

private causes of action, pursuant to our line of decisions including Youngstown

and Hazel, 80 Ohio St.3d 165, 685 N.E.2d 224. 

{¶ 41} At issue in Youngstown was a ballot measure to adopt a 

“Community Bill of Rights” that would have, among other things, made it unlawful 

to extract oil and gas within the city through the process of hydrofracturing. 

Youngstown at ¶ 2. The county board of elections refused to certify the measure 

because a plurality of this court had concluded in State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck 

Energy Corp., 143 Ohio St.3d 271, 2015-Ohio-485, 37 N.E.3d 128, ¶ 34, that local 

ordinances that impede or obstruct oil-and-gas-production operations are 

unconstitutional and void. Youngstown at ¶ 4. This court granted a writ of 

mandamus compelling the elections board to certify the measure, because 

[t]he boards of elections * * * do not have authority to sit as arbiters 

of the legality or constitutionality of a ballot measure’s substantive 

terms. An unconstitutional amendment may be a proper item for 

referendum or initiative. Such an amendment becomes void and 

unenforceable only when declared unconstitutional by a court of 

competent jurisdiction. 

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 11. 

{¶ 42} Our holding in Youngstown is consistent with the principle that the 

authority to make legal rulings is reserved for the judiciary alone. See Norwood v. 

Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 116. I would 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

accordingly hold that the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance creating a 

private cause of action is a matter to be decided in postenactment litigation, not a 

subject within the authority of a county board of elections to determine. See Hazel

at 169; Thurn, 72 Ohio St.3d at 293, 649 N.E.2d 1205 (“any claim alleging the 

unconstitutionality or illegality of the substance of the proposed ordinances prior to 

their approval by the electorate is premature”).

1. The constitutionality of H.B. 463 

{¶ 43} The statutory amendments made by H.B. 463 do not change this 

analysis. Newly enacted R.C. 3501.11(K)(2) provides that the county boards of 

elections must 

[e]xamine each initiative petition, or a petition filed under section 

307.94 or 307.95 of the Revised Code, received by the board to 

determine whether the petition falls within the scope of authority to 

enact via initiative and whether the petition satisfies the statutory 

prerequisites to place the issue on the ballot, as described in division 

(M) of section 3501.38 of the Revised Code. The petition shall be 

invalid if any portion of the petition is not within the initiative 

power. 

R.C. 3501.38(M)(1) provides that the elections boards shall examine petitions to 

determine 

(a) [w]hether the petition falls within the scope of a 

municipal political subdivision’s authority to enact via initiative, 

including, if applicable, the limitations placed by Sections 3 and 7 

of Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution on the authority of 

municipal corporations to adopt local police, sanitary, and other 
January Term, 2017 

17 

similar regulations as are not in conflict with general laws, and 

whether the petition satisfies the statutory prerequisites to place the 

issue on the ballot. The petition shall be invalid if any portion of the 

petition is not within the initiative power; or 

(b) [w]hether the petition falls within the scope of a county’s 

authority to enact via initiative, including whether the petition 

conforms to the requirements set forth in Section 3 of Article X of 

the Ohio Constitution, including the exercise of only those powers 

that have vested in, and the performance of all duties imposed upon 

counties and county officers by law, and whether the petition 

satisfies the statutory prerequisites to place the issue on the ballot. 

{¶ 44} The separation-of-powers doctrine is “implicitly embedded in the 

entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the 

substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government.” 

S. Euclid v. Jemison, 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 159, 503 N.E.2d 136 (1986). This court’s 

jurisprudence limiting the authority of county boards of elections to review the 

constitutionality of proposed ballot measures rested squarely on separation-ofpowers considerations. Youngstown, 144 Ohio St.3d 239, 2015-Ohio-3761, 41 

N.E.3d 1229, at ¶ 11 (holding that questions of constitutional interpretation are 

resolved by the courts, not the elections boards); State ex rel. Ebersole v. Powell, 

141 Ohio St.3d 17, 2014-Ohio-4283, 21 N.E.3d 274, ¶ 6 (“Nor can the city council 

assess the constitutionality of a proposal, because that role is reserved for the 

courts”). It follows that the General Assembly’s grant of judicial-review power to 

the elections boards violates the Constitution, because “[t]he administration of 

justice by the judicial branch of the government cannot be impeded by the other 

branches of the government in the exercise of their respective powers,” State ex rel. 

Johnston v. Taulbee, 66 Ohio St.2d 417, 423 N.E.2d 80 (1981), paragraph one of 
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18 

the syllabus. For these reasons, I would hold that R.C. 3501.11(K)(2) is 

unconstitutional to the limited extent that it requires elections boards to make 

constitutional and legal conclusions pursuant to R.C. 3501.38(M). See Hazel, 80 

Ohio St.3d at 169, 685 N.E.2d 224; Thurn, 72 Ohio St.3d at 293, 649 N.E.2d 1205. 

2. Legislative vs. administrative provisions 

{¶ 45} The BOE has presented an alternative theory under which it argues 

that relators’ petitions are invalid: it contends that the proposed charter amendments 

contain administrative provisions. For example, the BOE points to the provisions 

restricting the authority of Youngstown law-enforcement officials and cooperating 

agencies to surveil, detain, arrest, or otherwise impede citizens enforcing the rights 

conveyed by the proposed amendments. 

{¶ 46} Article II, Section 1f of the Ohio Constitution limits the initiative 

and referendum powers to questions municipalities are authorized by law to control 

by legislative action. “Because citizens of a municipality cannot exercise 

referendum powers greater than what the Constitution affords, an administrative 

action [by the municipal legislature] is beyond the scope of the referendum power.” 

Ebersole, 140 Ohio St.3d 487, 2014-Ohio-4077, 20 N.E.3d 678, at ¶ 29; see also 

Buckeye Community Hope Found., 82 Ohio St.3d at 545, 697 N.E.2d 181 (holding 

that municipal ordinances and resolutions that qualify as administrative are not 

subject to referendum). In State ex rel. Upper Arlington v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 

Elections, 119 Ohio St.3d 478, 2008-Ohio-5093, 895 N.E.2d 177, this court 

extended the legislative-administrative dichotomy to municipal initiatives. In 

Upper Arlington, we held that a county board of elections abused its discretion by 

denying a protest and placing an administrative initiative on the ballot, and we 

issued a writ of prohibition. Id. at ¶ 25-27. 

{¶ 47} The test for determining whether an action is legislative or 

administrative is “ ‘whether the action taken is one enacting a law, ordinance, or 

regulation, or executing a law, ordinance, or regulation already in existence.’ ” 
January Term, 2017 

19 

Ebersole at ¶ 30, quoting Donnelly v. Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 

500 (1968), paragraph two of the syllabus. To qualify as an administrative measure, 

an ordinance must execute or administer “preexisting” laws. State ex rel. N. Main 

St. Coalition v. Webb, 106 Ohio St.3d 437, 2005-Ohio-5009, 835 N.E.2d 1222, 

¶ 35. If an ordinance or initiative enacts new law (as relators’ two proposed 

amendments would do if passed), it is legislative, even if it contains directions as 

to how to implement the law. Id. (holding that a proposed ordinance approving a 

railroad grade-separation project did not become administrative by virtue of the fact 

that it specified the location of the project and the amount of the village’s financial 

contribution to the project); State ex rel. Citizen Action for a Livable Montgomery 

v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 437, 2007-Ohio-5379, 875 

N.E.2d 902, ¶ 38-39 (proposed ordinance directing city to acquire land for use as 

parkland was legislative even though it prescribed how the city was to acquire the 

land). 

{¶ 48} In contrast to Sensible Norwood, where this court also held that the 

ordinance was administrative because it would have changed the manner in which 

local police and courts could enforce specific existing laws, 148 Ohio St.3d 176, 

2016-Ohio-5919, 69 N.E.3d 696, at ¶ 14-18, the BOE has identified no existing 

statutes that would be altered or enforced differently under the proposed charter 

amendments. The Sensible Norwood problem in this case, if such a problem exists, 

is not that the proposed amendments are administrative but that they arguably bar 

state officials from enforcing state law within the confines of the city. Sensible 

Norwood established that an ordinance preventing the enforcement of state law 

exceeds the legislative authority of a municipality. Id. at ¶ 18. If one interprets the 

“surveil, detain, arrest, or otherwise impede” clauses in the proposed amendments 

as barring federal or state officials from enforcing their laws within the jurisdiction, 

then the amendments would be improper. 
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20 

{¶ 49} However, the proposed charter language, in context, does not 

purport to nullify federal and state law. The complete provision reads: “City of 

Youngstown law enforcement, and cooperating agencies acting within the 

jurisdiction of the City of Youngstown, shall have no lawful authority to surveil, 

detain, arrest, or otherwise impede natural persons enforcing these rights.” The 

parties give no attention to the meaning of the phrase “cooperating agencies.” 

{¶ 50} The phrase “cooperating agencies” appears to refer to local lawenforcement entities that enter into mutual-aid agreements. Owensby v. Cincinnati, 

385 F.Supp.2d 626, 639 (S.D.Ohio 2004). Local law enforcement may enter into 

these agreements with other local jurisdictions (municipal corporations, townships, 

township police districts, joint police districts, or county sheriffs) for the use of 

police services or equipment. R.C. 737.04. It seems unremarkable to require 

cooperating law-enforcement officers to abide by local city ordinances while they 

are operating within the city, pursuant to agreement. Unfortunately, if such an 

agreement exists in this case, it is not in the record. 

{¶ 51} Given the ambiguous scope of the “surveil, arrest, detain, or 

otherwise impede” clauses, we should rule on the side of ballot access and let the 

matter be resolved, if necessary, through fact-finding during postenactment 

litigation. See Youngstown, 144 Ohio St.3d 239, 2015-Ohio-3761, 41 N.E.3d 1229, 

at ¶ 11.

{¶ 52} Finally, the BOE objects to language in the proposed amendments 

purporting to limit the ability to challenge the amendments; the BOE calls these 

“administrative” provisions. The relevant words in the two amendments differ 

from each other. The Youngstown Drinking Water Protection Bill of Rights 

(“Water Amendment”) provides: 

Any corporation, or other business entity, that violates the 

rights in this Amendment shall not be deemed a “person” to the 
January Term, 2017 

21 

extent that such treatment would interfere with the rights 

enumerated by this Amendment, nor shall it possess any other legal 

rights, powers, privileges, immunities, or duties that would interfere 

with the rights, including the power to assert state, federal or 

international preemptive laws in an attempt to overturn this 

Amendment, or the power to assert that the people of the City of 

Youngstown lack the authority to adopt this Amendment. 

While this provision may appear problematic under Sensible Norwood because it 

seems to be aimed at divesting the courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges brought 

by corporations, it is distinguishable from the proposed marijuana ordinances at 

issue in that case, as I have discussed above. In Sensible Norwood, the proposed 

ordinances purported to create felony offenses, and in doing so they clearly 

exceeded the power of a municipality to make the violation of any of its ordinances 

a misdemeanor. The above-quoted provision of the Water Amendment is 

ambiguous, and its constitutionality would need to be determined by a court if that 

provision ever became effective. We have made clear that an unconstitutional 

proposal may be a proper item for referendum or initiative and that such a proposal 

becomes void and unenforceable only when declared unconstitutional by a court of 

competent jurisdiction. Youngstown at ¶ 11. I would accordingly reserve a ruling 

on the constitutionality of this provision in the event that the provision becomes 

law and is subsequently challenged in court. 

{¶ 53} The other provision objected to by the BOE is found in the portion 

of the People’s Bill of Rights for Fair Elections and Access to Local Government 

(“Elections Amendment”) providing: 

The people of Youngstown possess the right to make law 

through local initiative processes. That right shall include but not 
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22 

be limited to the right to be free from interference with the exercise 

of the initiative power, that there shall be no attempt to stop the 

placement of an initiative proposal on the ballot based on 

substantive challenges, claimed illegality or unconstitutionality, or 

review of the content, intent, or surmised effect of the measure prior 

to being presented to the voters and before it is enacted into law. 

This right shall require that all issues duly petitioned in accordance 

with law shall appear on the ballot in the same manner as is 

customary for other issues, that they be presented with unbiased 

summary language on the ballot and that the complete legislative 

proposal be posted at each polling location. 

This paragraph, and especially the second and third sentences, appears to be 

addressed to the BOE and designed to curtail its ability to conduct a substantive 

evaluation of proposed initiatives. Based on Youngstown and my conclusion that 

R.C. 3501.11(K)(2) is unconstitutional to the limited extent that it incorporates R.C. 

3501.38(M), I would hold that this language is merely a restatement of existing law, 

and does not disqualify the Elections Amendment from the ballot. See Citizen 

Action, 115 Ohio St.3d 437, 2007-Ohio-5379, 875 N.E.2d 902, at ¶ 39, quoting the 

relator’s brief (“a holding that an ordinance is administrative simply because it 

contains language directing that Ohio law should be followed would result in the 

extinction of ‘virtually all legislative actions’ ”). Alternatively, should the 

Elections Amendment ever pass, it would be the role of the courts to determine 

whether this language invalidates the provision. 

II. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 54} I would hold that pursuant to Youngstown, 144 Ohio St.3d 239, 

2015-Ohio-3761, 41 N.E.3d 1229, the BOE’s role in processing initiative petitions 

does not extend to evaluating the substantive ballot-worthiness of a proposal. Only 
January Term, 2017 

23 

to the limited extent that R.C. 3501.11(K)(2) incorporates R.C. 3501.38(M), I 

would declare it unconstitutional. In determining that the proposed charter 

amendments fall outside the scope of Youngstown’s power to enact through 

initiative, the BOE, pursuant to R.C. 3501.11(K)(2), made substantive 

constitutional and legal determinations that are reserved for the judiciary. In fact, 

when BOE member David Betras moved the BOE to deny certification, he 

expressly referenced Article XVIII, Sections 3 and 7 of the Ohio Constitution in 

asserting that the proposed amendments were unconstitutional. 

{¶ 55} Because relators have shown the existence of a clear legal right and 

of a clear legal duty on the part of the BOE as well as the lack of an adequate 

remedy at law, and because the BOE abused its discretion and erred as a matter of 

law when it refused to certify relators’ petitions, this court should grant the 

requested writs of mandamus. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’NEILL, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 

__________________ 

Terry J. Lodge, for relators. 

Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sharon K. 

Hackett, Linette M. Stratford, and Gina DeGenova Zawrotuk, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondents. 

Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., and L. Bradfield Hughes, in 

support of respondents, for amici curiae Affiliated Construction Trades Ohio 

Foundation, Ohio Chamber of Commerce, and American Petroleum Institute. 

Mangano Law Offices Co., L.P.A., and Joseph J. Guarino III and Ryan K. 

Hymore, in support of respondents, for amici curiae Western Reserve Building and 

Construction Trades Council, Youngstown Warren Regional Chamber, 

Youngstown Warren Black Caucus, Community Mobilization Coalition, and 

Mahoning Trumbull AFL-CIO. 

_________________________