a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

December 2005 PLUM ISLAND 

ANIMAL DISEASE 

CENTER

DHS and USDA Are 

Successfully 

Coordinating Current 

Work, but Long-Term 

Plans Are Being 

Assessed

GAO-06-132
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

December 2005

PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER

DHS and USDA Are Successfully 

Coordinating Current Work, but LongTerm Plans Are Being Assessed 

Highlights of GAO-06-132, a report to 

congressional committees 

The livestock industry, which 

contributes over $100 billion 

annually to the national economy,

is vulnerable to foreign animal

diseases that, if introduced in the 

United States, could cause severe

economic losses. To protect 

against such losses, critical

research and diagnostic activities 

are conducted at the Plum Island

Animal Disease Center in New 

York. The Department of

Agriculture (USDA) was 

responsible for Plum Island until 

June 2003, when provisions of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 

transferred the facility to the

Department of Homeland Security

(DHS). Under an interagency 

agreement, USDA continues to

work on foreign animal diseases at 

the island. GAO examined (1) DHS

and USDA coordination of research

and diagnostic activities, (2) 

changes in research and diagnostic 

priorities since the transfer, and (3) 

long-term objectives of joint 

activities at Plum Island. 

What GAO Recommends

To make more effective use of

limited space, GAO recommends 

that DHS, in consultation with 

USDA, pursue opportunities to 

shift work that does not require the 

unique features of Plum Island to 

other institutions. In commenting 

on a draft of this report, DHS and 

USDA generally agreed with the

recommendation, but DHS believes

it has already addressed it. We 

believe that more work is needed. 

DHS and USDA’s coordination at Plum Island Animal Disease Center has 

been largely successful because of the agencies’ early efforts to work 

together to bring structure to their interactions at the island. For example, 

prior to the transfer, officials from DHS and USDA worked in concert to 

develop a written interagency agreement—effective when the island was 

transferred to DHS—that coordinated management activities. Subsequently,

DHS and USDA created a detailed strategy to guide their joint work on 

foreign animal disease research and diagnostics. According to this joint 

strategy, DHS’s role is to augment the research and diagnostic work that 

USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and the Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service (APHIS) conduct at the island. 

Since the transfer, budget changes, in part, have modified overall priorities 

and the scope of work at the island. First, ARS narrowed its research 

priorities to focus its work primarily on a single foreign animal disease, footand-mouth disease (FMD). Traditionally one of the high-priority diseases 

studied at Plum Island, FMD has emerged as its top research priority 

because, according to officials, it poses the greatest threat of introduction 

because of its virulence, infectivity, and availability. Other research 

programs have been terminated or are proceeding at a slower pace. National 

experts we consulted confirmed the importance of studying FMD, but stated 

that it is also important to study a variety of other diseases to remain 

prepared. They suggested that, to free up limited space at the facility, some

of the work that does not require the unique features of Plum Island could be 

performed elsewhere: for example, work that does not involve the use of a

live virus, such as certain aspects of vaccine development. Second, while 

APHIS’s overall priorities have not changed, diagnostic work has been 

curtailed. Officials said that, after the transfer, because the agency did not 

receive an expected budget increase, their plans to expand development of 

diagnostic tools for high-priority diseases were curtailed. This work is vital 

to rapidly identifying diseases when outbreaks occur. APHIS officials told 

us that the funds to support work on diagnostic tools remain insufficient. 

Finally, DHS has assumed responsibility for operations and maintenance at 

Plum Island and has established an applied research science and agricultural 

forensics team. 

While DHS and USDA plan to continue to work together on FMD, agency

officials told us that it is not prudent to speculate on long-term objectives at 

Plum Island, in part, because DHS has plans to replace the Plum Island 

Animal Disease Center with a new, modernized facility that could be located 

at Plum Island or elsewhere. Pending congressional approval, DHS estimates 

that the new facility will be fully operational by 2012. www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-132.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Robert A. 

Robinson at (202) 512-3841 or 

robinsonr@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

DHS and USDA Have Successfully Coordinated Research and 

Diagnostic Programs at Plum Island 11

Budget Changes at Time of the Transfer in Part Modified Overall 

Priorities and the Scope of Work at Plum Island 17

DHS and USDA Are in the Process of Assessing Long-Term Plans for 

Joint Work at Plum Island 29

Conclusions 31

Recommendation for Executive Action 31

Agency Comments 32

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 34

Appendix II: List of Experts Interviewed 36

Appendix III: Animal Diseases That Affect Livestock 38

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 39

GAO Comments 41

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 43

GAO Comments 46

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 48

Tables Table 1: ARS Plum Island Funding, Fiscal Years 2002-2005 20

Table 2: APHIS Plum Island Funding, Fiscal Years 2002-2005 28

Table 3: List of Animal Diseases 38

Figures Figure 1: The DHS Homeland Security Biodefense Complex 9

Figure 2: Funding Allocations at Plum Island before and after the 

Transfer 11

Figure 3: A Laboratory Technician Evaluates Tissue Samples at 

Plum Island 14

Figure 4: Veterinarians Participate in Training on Foreign Animal 

Diseases at Plum Island 26
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Abbreviations

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

ARS Agricultural Research Service

DHS Department of Homeland Security

FMD foot-and-mouth disease

Joint Strategy Joint DHS and USDA Strategy for Foreign Animal 

Disease Research and Diagnostic Programs

OMB Office of Management and Budget

S&T Science and Technology Directorate

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

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Page 1 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

December 19, 2005 Letr

The Honorable Robert F. Bennett

Chairman

The Honorable Herb Kohl

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, 

and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate

The Honorable Henry Bonilla 

Chairman

The Honorable Rosa DeLauro 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, 

Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Over 40 contagious animal diseases identified in other countries—known 

as foreign animal diseases—threaten the United States’ agriculture 

economy, the largest and most integrated in the world. A key component of 

this economy is the livestock industry, which contributes over $100 billion 

annually to the gross domestic product. To protect the nation’s animal 

industries and exports from catastrophic economic losses that would result 

from the deliberate or accidental introduction of a foreign animal disease, 

scientists and veterinarians conduct critical research and diagnostic 

activities at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, located off the coast of 

New York.

Plum Island’s research and diagnostic activities stem from its mission to 

protect U.S. animal industries and exports from deliberate or accidental 

introductions of foreign animal diseases. The United States is normally free 

of such diseases, and highly contagious pathogens could cause disastrous 

losses in the agriculture sector if they were released outside the facility. 

Plum Island’s activities include conducting research to develop more 

sensitive and accurate methods of disease detection and identification; 

developing new strategies to control disease epidemics, including new 

vaccines and antiviral drugs; investigating suspected cases of foreign 

animal disease outbreaks in the United States; producing and maintaining 

materials used in diagnostic tests and vaccines; and training animal health 
Page 2 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

professionals to recognize and diagnose foreign animal diseases. Moreover, 

Plum Island is the only facility in the United States that is currently 

approved to study high-consequence foreign livestock diseases, such as 

foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), because its laboratory has been equipped 

with a specially designed biocontainment area that meets specific safety 

measures.1

 Plum Island’s work involves large mammalian animals. In fact, it 

is the only facility in the United States that has special safety features 

required to study certain high consequence foreign animal diseases in large 

animals. Research on other highly pathogenic animal diseases is being 

conducted at other facilities. For example, highly pathogenic avian 

influenza is being studied at the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) 

Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory in Athens, Georgia, and is being 

diagnosed at the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa. 

USDA was responsible for Plum Island until June 1, 2003, when provisions 

of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 were implemented.2

 The act 

transferred Plum Island, including all of its assets and liabilities, to the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This action shifted overall 

responsibility for Plum Island to DHS, including all of the costs associated 

with facility maintenance, operations, and security. The act specified that 

USDA would continue to have access to Plum Island to conduct diagnostic 

and research work on foreign animal diseases, and it authorized the 

President to transfer funds from USDA to DHS to operate Plum Island.3

Responding to concerns from the agriculture sector that the transfer of 

responsibilities at Plum Island could shift the focus away from agriculture 

to other DHS priorities, the members of a congressional conference 

committee inserted language in the conference report accompanying the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2005 requesting that we 

report on the coordination efforts between DHS and USDA and describe 

the long-term objectives of joint activities at Plum Island.4

 In this context, 

we examined (1) how DHS and USDA coordinate research and diagnostic 

activities at Plum Island; (2) what changes, if any, have taken place 

1

Live FMD virus may be used only at coastal islands such as Plum Island, unless the 

Secretary of Agriculture specifically authorizes the use of the virus on the U.S. mainland. 21 

U.S.C. § 113a.

2

Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 310, 116 Stat. 2135, 2174 (2002), codified at 6 U.S.C. § 190.

3

6 U.S.C. § 542(b)(3).

4

H.R. Rep. No. 108-792, p. 666 (2004).
Page 3 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

regarding research and diagnostic priorities at Plum Island since the 

transfer, and the reasons for and implications of such changes; and (3) the 

long-term objectives of joint DHS and USDA activities at Plum Island.

To address the first and second objectives, we analyzed DHS and USDA 

strategy documents and interviewed officials at various levels from each 

agency, including senior leadership officials in Washington, D.C. We also 

reviewed budget data and interviewed analysts and officials at DHS, USDA, 

and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); lead scientists based at 

Plum Island; and former USDA scientists who left Plum Island after its 

transfer to DHS. In addition, we reviewed agency budget documents and 

other budgetary information provided by the agencies to identify changes 

in funding levels since the transfer and to determine the funding allocations 

among the programs at Plum Island, before and after the transfer. 

We also interviewed selected animal disease experts to respond to the 

second objective. We selected our experts for their diverse perspectives 

and technical expertise on animal health and diseases based on the 

following criteria: (1) recommendations we received from others 

knowledgeable in the field of foreign animal diseases; (2) area of expertise 

and experience; and (3) the type of organization represented, including 

academic institutions and associated research centers. 

To address the third objective, we analyzed agency planning documents 

and interviewed senior leadership officials representing DHS and USDA. 

Additional details about our scope and methodology are presented in 

appendix I. We performed our work from March 2005 to December 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief Efforts to coordinate work at Plum Island have been largely successful. 

This success is attributable to DHS and USDA agreeing to work together 

early on to bring structure to their interactions at the island. For example, 

an official from USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) told us that 

prior to the transfer, staff from DHS and USDA worked together to develop 

a written interagency agreement—effective when the island was 

transferred—that coordinated management activities. Furthermore, DHS 

and USDA created a detailed strategy to guide their joint work on the 

island’s two critical functions—conducting research on foreign animal 

diseases and providing diagnostic services to identify such diseases. 

According to the strategy, DHS’s role is to augment the research and 

diagnostic work that USDA’s ARS and Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Page 4 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Service (APHIS) conduct at the island. For example, DHS’s scientists will 

expand on basic ARS research by advancing efficacy testing and 

development of vaccines to enhance the nation’s ability to respond to a 

bioterrorism attack. ARS’s role at Plum Island continues to involve 

fundamental research, such as studying the immune response of livestock 

infected with FMD. APHIS continues to diagnose diseases in livestock and 

train veterinarians to recognize and diagnose foreign animal diseases. In 

addition to the joint strategy, DHS and USDA established two other formal 

mechanisms to ensure that their respective missions are well integrated 

and to guide routine activities: a Board of Directors and an interagency 

working group, known as the Senior Leadership Group. The board is 

composed of top officials from DHS, ARS, and APHIS, and it is responsible 

for overall management and operations as well as the island’s research 

strategy. The Senior Leadership Group includes one representative from 

each of the three agencies and addresses immediate on-site management 

decisions, such as scheduling use of limited laboratory space and shared 

equipment. Finally, according to the staff we interviewed, frequent informal 

communication among scientists at the island has contributed to effective 

coordination. 

Program budget changes that occurred soon after the transfer—resulting in 

part from implementation of the Homeland Security Act of 2002—modified 

overall priorities and the scope of work at the island. 

• First, ARS narrowed its research priorities to focus its work primarily on 

a single foreign animal disease, FMD. Traditionally one of the highpriority diseases studied at Plum Island, FMD has emerged as the 

facility’s top research priority following the transfer to DHS since, 

according to officials, it poses the greatest threat of deliberate 

introduction because of its virulence, infectivity, and availability. Also, 

ARS responded to budget reductions by slowing research on another 

high-priority disease—classical swine fever—and by terminating other 

research programs, such as one for African swine fever. At the same 

time, ARS negotiated agreements with other organizations, including 

DHS, under which ARS was reimbursed to carry out mutually beneficial 

research. The amount of these reimbursements equaled about 80 

percent of the total reduction in the ARS program budget that occurred 

in 2003 after the transfer. Commenting on the new focus of research at 

Plum Island, most of the nationally recognized animal disease experts 

we interviewed agreed that it may be prudent to divert limited funds 

from diseases of lesser importance to the U.S. economy, such as African 

swine fever, to study FMD. However, all of the experts expressed 
Page 5 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

concerns that focusing research on a single disease makes livestock 

more vulnerable to diseases that are not being studied to the same 

extent or, in some cases, at all. Some of the experts also said that 

although Plum Island is the only domestic facility where scientists are 

currently authorized to study live, high-consequence foreign animal 

disease agents in large animals, some of the research being conducted at 

the island could be performed elsewhere. Specifically, work that does 

not involve the use of a live virus, such as certain aspects of vaccine 

development, does not require the strict biosafety features of Plum 

Island. 

• Second, APHIS’s disease diagnostic priorities have not changed, but 

plans to expand diagnostic services have been curtailed because, 

according to officials, the agency did not receive an expected budget 

increase after the transfer. APHIS officials told us that this slowed their 

plans to expand development of diagnostic tools for high-priority 

diseases—work that is vital to rapidly identifying diseases when 

outbreaks occur. However, in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, DHS paid 

APHIS to perform diagnostic work at Plum Island on DHS’s behalf. 

Despite APHIS not receiving the expected budget increase, the sum of 

the 2004 DHS reimbursement and the 2004 allocation to the APHIS 

laboratory at Plum Island are roughly equivalent to the APHIS program 

budget in the fiscal year before the transfer. APHIS and DHS officials 

agree that the reimbursements are not an appropriate way to support 

the agency’s diagnostic work. APHIS officials believe that funds to 

support work on diagnostic tools remain insufficient.

• Third, DHS is now responsible for all of the costs associated with 

operating and maintaining Plum Island. In addition, the agency 

continues to implement major infrastructure improvements and is 

developing its own applied research program. DHS has also used 

programmatic funds to establish a bioforensics laboratory at Plum 

Island and plans to use the bioforensics laboratory to validate forensic 

assays.

Finally, although DHS and USDA officials told us that they plan to continue 

to work together on FMD, they also said it is not prudent to speculate on 

the long-term objectives of future joint work at Plum Island, in part, 

because DHS has plans to replace the existing facility with a new, 

modernized one at Plum Island or elsewhere. DHS officials believe that this 

change is necessary because of the shortcomings of the current laboratory 

facilities at Plum Island, which include insufficient space and an outdated 
Page 6 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

infrastructure. DHS expects that the new facility will expand its 

capabilities to protect animal health against terrorist attacks. DHS 

estimates that, pending congressional approval, the new facility will be 

fully operational by 2012. DHS officials told us that they have not yet 

determined the scope of the work to be performed at this new facility, or 

the facility’s size or location—whether Plum Island or elsewhere. They also 

indicated that they do not yet know whether the new facility would address 

current research gaps, such as the lack of a higher biosecurity laboratory 

than Plum Island currently has. Such a laboratory would enable the study 

of other highly contagious viruses in large animals, such as Nipah virus, 

which affects swine and can also be fatal to humans. DHS officials 

emphasized that the dynamic nature of threat assessments makes it 

difficult to firmly commit to long-term priorities because information and 

research needs may change depending on the nature of the threat. DHS and 

USDA officials confirmed that as they explore future work on foreign 

animal diseases, whether at Plum Island or elsewhere, they will rely on the 

joint strategy and the mechanisms they have established to implement this 

strategy to coordinate the effort.

We are making a recommendation aimed at ensuring the effective use of 

limited space at Plum Island while longer term plans for a new facility are 

being developed. Specifically, we recommend that DHS, in consultation 

with USDA, pursue opportunities to shift work that does not require the 

unique features of Plum Island to other institutions and research centers. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS and USDA generally agreed 

with the report and its recommendation. DHS said that the report 

accurately reflects the current relationships and coordination between 

DHS and USDA at Plum Island. While DHS agreed with the 

recommendation, the agency also believes that it has largely addressed it. 

While we agree that important and valuable steps have been taken toward 

implementing the recommendation, we believe additional actions are 

necessary and have therefore left the recommendation in the report. In 

particular, we have not seen evidence that DHS is coordinating its 

assessment, which is still under way, of the laboratory and animal room 

requirements at Plum Island with USDA. 

Background Plum Island is a federally owned 840-acre island off the northeastern tip of 

Long Island, New York. Scientists working at the facility are responsible for 

protecting U.S. livestock against foreign animal diseases that could be 

accidentally or deliberately introduced into the United States. Animal 
Page 7 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

health officials define an exotic or foreign animal disease as an important 

transmissible livestock or poultry disease believed to be absent from the 

United States and its territories that has the potential to create a significant 

health or economic impact.

Plum Island’s scientists identify the pathogens that cause foreign animal 

diseases and work to develop vaccines to protect U.S. livestock.5

 The 

primary research and diagnostic focus at Plum Island is foreign or exotic 

diseases that could affect livestock, including cattle, swine, and sheep. In 

addition to FMD and classical swine fever, other types of livestock diseases 

that have been studied at Plum Island include African swine fever, 

rinderpest, and various pox viruses, such as sheep and goat pox. Appendix 

III provides more extensive information on animal diseases of concern 

mentioned in this report. 

Some of the pathogens maintained at Plum Island are highly contagious; 

therefore, research on these pathogens is conducted in a biocontainment 

area that has special safety features designed to contain the pathogens. If 

accidentally released, these pathogens could cause catastrophic economic 

losses in the agricultural sector. The biocontainment area includes 40 

rooms for livestock and is the only place in the United States that is 

equipped to permit the study of certain contagious foreign animal diseases 

in large mammalian animals. USDA uses this biocontainment area for basic 

research, diagnostic work, and for clinical training of veterinarians in the 

recognition of foreign animal diseases. These veterinarians would serve as 

animal health first responders in the event of an emergency. The North 

American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank is also located on Plum 

Island.6

5

USDA conducts research on high-priority diseases affecting animals besides livestock, such 

as poultry, at other locations. For example, diseases like Newcastle disease and avian 

influenza, which affect poultry, are studied at USDA’s Southeast Poultry Research 

Laboratory in Athens, Georgia. USDA’s National Animal Disease Center in Ames, Iowa, 

studies indigenous diseases of livestock and poultry, including brucellosis. USDA performs 

diagnostics on these diseases at the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, 

Iowa.

6

There is no universal FMD vaccine that is effective for all of the subtypes of FMD. The 

United States stockpiles some FMD vaccines at the North American Foot-and-Mouth 

Disease Vaccine Bank on Plum Island. However, these vaccines are not stored in a “ready-touse” state. That is, they are stored as a vaccine antigen concentrate that requires finishing in 

order to be used. 
Page 8 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

USDA had owned and operated Plum Island for nearly 50 years when, in 

June 2003, the island and its assets and liabilities were transferred to DHS. 

Plum Island is now part of a broader joint strategy developed by DHS and 

USDA to protect against the intentional or accidental introduction of 

foreign animal diseases. Under the direction of the DHS’s Science and 

Technology Directorate (S&T), the strategy for protecting livestock also 

includes work at two of DHS’s Centers of Excellence, known as the 

National Center for Food Protection and Defense and the National Center 

for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense, as well as other centers 

within the DHS homeland security biodefense complex. These include the 

National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center and the 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The strategy calls for building on 

the strengths of each agency’s assets to develop comprehensive 

preparedness and response capabilities. (See fig. 1.) 
Page 9 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Figure 1: The DHS Homeland Security Biodefense Complex

Conn.

N.Y.

N.J. Long Island

Plum Island

DHS operates and maintains the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. DHS partners with USDA at 

this facility to address foreign animal diseases.

Plum Island Animal Disease Center Orient Point, New York

USDA/APHIS

• Confirmatory diagnostics

• Vaccine bank

DHS/S&T

• Targeted advanced 

development

• Establish bioforensics lab

USDA/ARS

• Basic research • Early discovery of

countermeasures

DHS/S&T Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

S&T

• Leverage DHS S&T biodefense

assets and programs

• National bioforensics capability

Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory

Livermore, California

National Center for Foreign Animal 

and Zoonotic Disease Defense

Texas A&M University

College Station, Texas

National Center for

Food Protection and Defense

University of Minnesota

Minneapolis

National Biodefense Analysis and 

Countermeasures Center

Frederick, Maryland

Source: GAO analysis of A Joint DHS and USDA Strategy for Foreign Animal Disease Research and Diagnostic Programs.
Page 10 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

According to the strategy, DHS and USDA now work together to address 

national biodefense issues and carry out the mission of the Plum Island 

Animal Disease Center as follows: 

• DHS is responsible for coordinating the overall national effort to 

enhance the protection of agriculture, which the President has defined 

as a critical infrastructure sector. At Plum Island, DHS’s Science and 

Technology Directorate is working to advance the development of 

vaccines and disease prophylactics based on ARS’s basic research. Also, 

DHS has established a bioforensics laboratory at Plum Island and is 

working to conduct forensic analysis of evidence from suspected 

biocrimes and terrorism involving a foreign animal disease attack.

• USDA/ARS scientists at Plum Island are responsible for basic research 

on foreign livestock diseases and for early discovery of 

countermeasures, such as evaluating countermeasures for rapid 

induction of immunity in livestock. 

• USDA/APHIS scientists are responsible for diagnosing livestock 

diseases. Also, APHIS conducts diagnostic training sessions several 

times a year to give veterinary health professionals the opportunity to 

study the clinical signs of animal diseases found in other countries, such 

as FMD. 

Currently, in addition to visiting scientists and fellows, there are 

approximately 70 federal research scientists, veterinarians, 

microbiologists, laboratory technicians, and support staff working at Plum 

Island. DHS and USDA’s combined annual operating funds at Plum Island, 

based on fiscal year 2005 allocations and other funds, is about $60 

million—USDA’s funding is about $8 million, and DHS’s is about $51 million 

(see fig. 2). Prior to the transfer of Plum Island to DHS, ARS and APHIS 

shared responsibility for operating costs, although ARS had primary 

responsibility for the facility. According to agency officials, both agencies 

received appropriations to execute their research and diagnostic missions, 

out of which operations and maintenance costs had to be funded. Neither 

ARS nor APHIS received a specific appropriation for operations and 

maintenance activities. Now, DHS is responsible for operations and 

maintenance costs as well as programmatic costs that DHS incurs directly. 

ARS and APHIS continue to receive funding from USDA to support their 

own programmatic activities at the island.
Page 11 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Figure 2: Funding Allocations at Plum Island before and after the Transfer

Notes: Research funds do not include those allocated to the research consortium for animal vaccines. 

Congress requires ARS to provide funds directly to participating universities. 

The funding amounts listed for ARS and APHIS include funds received from other agencies and 

entities (including DHS) through reimbursable agreements.

DHS and USDA Have 

Successfully 

Coordinated Research 

and Diagnostic 

Programs at Plum 

Island

DHS’s and USDA’s efforts to coordinate research and diagnostic programs 

at Plum Island have been largely successful because of the agencies’ early 

efforts to work together to bring structure to their interaction at the island. 

For example, the agencies developed a joint strategy that outlines how they 

will pursue their shared mission at Plum Island. They also developed 

formal mechanisms for coordination, and they rely on frequent informal 

communication among scientists at Plum Island. The scientists also 

attribute effective coordination and resolution of transition difficulties to 

skilled management at Plum Island.

Source: GAO analysis of APHIS, ARS, and DHS data.

Agency

Dollars in millions Dollars in millions

Fiscal year 2002 Fiscal year 2005

$34.6

$7.3

$3.0

$5.6

$51.3

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Facility improvements

Operations and maintenance

Program

APHIS ARS APHIS ARS DHS 
Page 12 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Joint DHS and USDA 

Strategy Serves as Basis to 

Prioritize and Coordinate 

Work 

Our review shows a largely positive experience thus far in the coordination 

of DHS and USDA activities at Plum Island. The success of the agencies 

resulted from their early efforts to work together to bring structure to their 

interactions at the island. The agencies developed a framework for 

coordination in several stages. 

• First, in accordance with provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 

2002, DHS, ARS, and APHIS worked together before the transfer to 

establish an interagency agreement. The purpose of the agreement is to 

establish written guidelines that identify each agency’s role and to 

coordinate immediate operations and maintenance needs, such as fiscal 

responsibilities and the use of shared equipment. Effective on the day of 

the transfer, this agreement remained in place while the agencies 

completed a more detailed strategic plan.7

• Second, a working group, composed of DHS, ARS, and APHIS officials, 

as well as representatives from nongovernmental producer groups, 

convened about one month after the transfer to review the island’s 

mission and priorities and to develop a strategy for coordination. 

According to a USDA official, DHS recognized that, as a newly 

established agency, it needed to seek technical expertise through this 

interagency group. The group began by discussing foreign animal 

diseases from a broad perspective to inform the new DHS staff about 

key issues. Subsequent meetings became more focused as stakeholders 

evaluated the capabilities of the island and its programs, and identified 

shortfalls and a common priority for the agencies—FMD. The group 

finalized a joint strategy to address this priority in August 2004. 

The Joint DHS and USDA Strategy for Foreign Animal Disease Research 

and Diagnostic Programs (Joint Strategy) serves as the basis for the 

agencies to prioritize and coordinate work on Plum Island’s two critical 

functions—conducting research on foreign animal diseases and providing 

diagnostic services to identify such diseases. The Joint Strategy describes 

the role of each agency at Plum Island; identifies the agencies’ common 

goal to address the threat of foreign animal disease introduction; and 

outlines the activities that DHS, ARS, and APHIS are to perform to fulfill 

that goal. In particular, the Joint Strategy identifies gaps in the federal 

7

The interagency agreement is entitled: Interagency Agreement Between the United States 

Department of Agriculture and the Department of Homeland Security for the Plum Island 

Animal Disease Center. The agencies review this agreement at least annually. 
Page 13 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

government’s effort to address foreign animal diseases and specifies how 

DHS programs will fill those gaps. For example, DHS will use its resources 

and expertise to support efficacy testing and advanced development—an 

identified gap—of improved vaccines for FMD that showed promising 

results in the early research stages—i.e., basic research—performed by 

ARS scientists. 

Under the terms of the Joint Strategy, ARS and DHS will conduct research 

to develop products, such as vaccines, antivirals, and diagnostic tools, that 

could be used by APHIS, sold on the market, or both. ARS will continue to 

focus on the early stages of the work and conduct basic research, which 

explores generally untested ideas. Examples of recent ARS basic research 

include obtaining new knowledge about diseases and their causative agents 

and studying the immune responses of livestock infected with FMD. DHS 

will augment the ARS work by performing targeted applied research, which 

is intended to lead to the practical use of the most promising basic research 

results. Among other things, DHS scientists will work with the results from 

ARS experiments toward developing those concepts into tangible products 

that will enhance the nation’s ability to respond to a bioterrorism attack. 

For example, ARS scientists could prove a vaccine concept in laboratory 

experiments, while DHS could conduct the efficacy testing of this vaccine, 

which would lead to securing licenses required for full-scale manufacture 

of a vaccine product. 
Page 14 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Figure 3: A Laboratory Technician Evaluates Tissue Samples at Plum Island

Finally, the Joint Strategy confirms the role of APHIS to conduct 

confirmatory diagnostic work, develop and validate diagnostic test 

methods, support the federal and state network of laboratories intended to 

quickly respond to disease outbreaks, and train veterinarians to recognize 

and diagnose foreign animal diseases. The Joint Strategy also identifies 

ways that DHS will augment the diagnostic role of APHIS. DHS will not 

initiate diagnostic services at the island, but will contribute to APHIS work 

by supporting validation and deployment of rapid diagnostic technologies 

and enhancing training capabilities. For example, DHS has modernized 

educational equipment used by APHIS to teach students and veterinarians 

about diagnosing foreign animal diseases. DHS has also established its 

bioforensic laboratory at Plum Island, and DHS scientists will use this 

laboratory to validate the forensic assays used for FMD.8

8

Diagnostic assays refer to tools used to detect and confirm the presence of disease, 

whereas forensic assays include those which could be used as evidence in a prosecution. 

Bioforensics is conducted according to certain protocols such that there is no question 

about contamination and the analysis can serve as proof in court.

Source: USDA.
Page 15 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

DHS and USDA Rely on 

Formal and Informal 

Communication to 

Coordinate Activities

In addition to the Joint Strategy, the agencies established two other formal 

mechanisms to ensure that their respective missions are well integrated 

and to guide routine activities: a Board of Directors and an interagency 

working group known as the Senior Leadership Group. The agencies also 

rely on frequent informal communication among scientists and the 

leadership at Plum Island to further enhance coordination. 

Composed of top officials from DHS, ARS, and APHIS, the Board of 

Directors focuses on overall strategic issues and meets on a quarterly basis. 

The board includes the DHS Director of the Office of Research and 

Development, Science and Technology Directorate, and the administrators 

of both ARS and APHIS. The Director of Plum Island, a DHS employee, 

participates as the Executive Secretary, but is not a member of the board. 

The board maintains responsibility for coordination and oversight of all 

matters relating to the management, administration, research strategy, and 

operations at Plum Island. The board also ensures that the operation of the 

facility at Plum Island fulfills the agriculture security mission of the Science 

and Technology Directorate, ARS, and APHIS. 

On the other hand, the Senior Leadership Group provides local 

management and focuses on immediate on-site management decisions, 

such as scheduling use of limited laboratory space. The Plum Island-based 

leaders from each agency make up the Senior Leadership Group, and they 

meet on at least a monthly basis. The group’s responsibilities include (1) 

establishing operational procedures and practices and conducting strategic 

planning for future needs, (2) ensuring that individuals who use the facility 

adhere to its operational procedures and practices, (3) scheduling use of 

the facility and shared equipment, (4) establishing policies for workers to 

access the facility, (5) reviewing the compatibility of the work performed at 

the facility with the island’s mission and operations, (6) identifying and 

coordinating program management for joint projects, and (7) coordinating 

continuity of operations procedures.9

The staff we interviewed at Plum Island also said that frequent informal 

communication among scientists has contributed to effective coordination. 

According to the Director of Plum Island, scientists discuss their work with 

one another on an almost daily basis. One scientist noted that the informal 

9

DHS commented that in the case of limited space, the Senior Leadership Group would, as 

part of its review of the proposed projects, evaluate whether the work could be done at 

another location.
Page 16 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

dialogue creates a collaborative environment, thereby strengthening their 

work. The ease of informal communication appears to have resulted in part 

from existing relationships among the scientists in the three agencies—

some of the scientists that now work for DHS at Plum Island previously 

worked for ARS and APHIS at the island. 

In addition, the lead scientists we spoke with attributed the effective 

integration of DHS at the facility in part to the skilled leadership of the 

Plum Island Director. For example, several scientists believe that the 

leader’s successful efforts in facilitating open communication among staff 

have fostered a collaborative environment. Moreover, several noted that 

the leaders currently based on the island value the comments and ideas 

expressed by the scientists. One lead scientist concluded that the Director’s 

ability to establish positive relationships with staff has brought greater 

focus to the research and diagnostic programs. USDA officials also noted 

that the leadership of the Director and the entire Senior Leadership Group, 

working as a team, have contributed to effective cooperation at Plum 

Island.

Finally, while there is now good coordination among the agencies at Plum 

Island, scientists acknowledged that they experienced some administrative 

difficulties during the transition period. The scientists we spoke with 

generally viewed challenges such as these as inevitable given the 

complexity of transferring responsibility for operations to a new agency 

and incorporating new programs in the existing facility. For example, one 

scientist said that the lack of procurement officers initially posed a burden 

to scientists. He had to perform the duties of a procurement officer—

searching for the products, obtaining cost estimates, and completing 

extensive paperwork—when he needed new supplies and equipment. As a 

result, this scientist had to forgo some of his limited time in the laboratory 

and delay his research while he learned how to process procurement 

orders. This scientist noted, however, that he expected this to be a 

temporary problem because the agency has since hired administrative 

staff. DHS officials noted that two procurement officers currently are 

working at Plum Island, which should alleviate this type of problem in the 

future. 
Page 17 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Budget Changes at 

Time of the Transfer in 

Part Modified Overall 

Priorities and the 

Scope of Work at Plum 

Island 

Program budget changes that occurred soon after the transfer—resulting in 

part from implementation of the Homeland Security Act of 2002—modified 

overall priorities and the scope of USDA’s work at Plum Island. 

Traditionally one of the high priorities at Plum Island, FMD has emerged as 

the facility’s top research priority. According to ARS officials, the agency 

slowed or terminated other research activities in response to the budget 

reductions that occurred soon after the transfer of the facility to DHS. 

Many of the experts we spoke with raised concerns about focusing Plum 

Island’s research resources on one disease. They also noted that some of 

the aspects of the research being conducted at the island could be 

performed elsewhere. With regard to the diagnostic component of Plum 

Island, APHIS’s priorities have not changed, but APHIS officials told us that 

budget changes at the time of the transfer curtailed the planned expansion 

of diagnostic services. DHS is now responsible for all of the costs 

associated with operating and maintaining Plum Island. In addition, DHS 

continues to implement major infrastructure improvements and is 

developing its applied research science and agricultural forensics program.

ARS Is Focusing Its 

Research on FMD, While 

Other Programs Were 

Terminated or Slowed 

Down Because of Budget 

Reductions

After the transfer, ARS designated FMD—traditionally one of the highpriority diseases at Plum Island—as its top research priority because it 

poses the greatest threat to the agriculture economy. Also, ARS responded 

to budget reductions by slowing research on other high-priority diseases, 

such as classical swine fever, and by terminating research on other 

diseases, including African swine fever. According to ARS officials, the 

agency determined the current research priorities—FMD and, to a lesser 

extent, classical swine fever—using its research plan, which was developed 

under the agency’s formal planning process, known as the National 

Program review.10

In addition to the priorities established by the National Program review, an 

ARS official told us that the agency also considered other assessments, 

including those of the White House Office of Science and Technology 

Policy Blue Ribbon Panel on the Threat of Biological Terrorism Directed 

10ARS conducts the National Program review every 5 years to solicit feedback from 

agriculture stakeholders to identify and establish the research objectives for the ARS 

program. The review process involves a survey and a series of stakeholder meetings to 

discuss research objectives. The stakeholders represent knowledgeable officials in 

academia, industry, and the government. At the time of this report writing—fall of 2005—

ARS was preparing to host the 2005 National Program review.
Page 18 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Against Livestock. These assessments consistently ranked African swine 

fever as a lower threat to the United States than FMD and classical swine 

fever, and ranked FMD as the top threat to the agriculture economy from a 

deliberate introduction because of its virulence, infectivity, and availability. 

African swine fever has been perceived as a less imminent threat to the 

United States because, according to USDA, outbreaks require a vector, 

such as a tick, to spread the disease.

As a result of these assessments, as well as a budget reduction soon after 

the transfer, ARS officials told us that the agency had to slow the pace of 

some research projects and terminate others. Specifically, ARS terminated 

the African swine fever research program, which included genomic 

sequencing of large DNA viruses, and slowed the pace of work on classical 

swine fever.11 While these officials acknowledged the need to make FMD a 

research priority at Plum Island, they raised concerns about the effect of 

budget reductions on other diseases of concern. For example, research on 

classical swine fever, which included development of a marker vaccine, is 

proceeding at a slower pace than it did before the budget reductions. 12 An 

ARS official estimated that the reduced funds for classical swine fever 

research will extend the project timeline about 5 to 10 years.13 Such delays 

postpone the development of products that would improve the nation’s 

ability to respond to and manage an outbreak of disease. 

Since ARS is no longer responsible for operations and maintenance costs at 

Plum Island, funds to meet these expenses were transferred to DHS in 

fiscal year 2003. However, a reduction of ARS’s programmatic funds for 

research conducted at Plum Island also occurred. ARS budget data show 

that the agency’s programmatic funds decreased by 45 percent between 

fiscal years 2003 and 2004. These changes are the result of OMB’s actions to 

11ARS retained the capacity to sequence viruses in the highest-priority programs, i.e., FMD 

and classical swine fever. Sequencing enables scientists to better understand the genetic 

code of viruses and helps to identify and trace the source of diseases. DHS officials noted 

that the sequencing equipment is used by both agencies.

12Once administered to livestock, a marker vaccine elicits a protective immunity that can be 

distinguished from the immune response elicited by natural infection of the virus. Marker 

vaccines enable veterinarians to clearly differentiate between animals infected with a 

disease and those that have been vaccinated. This important distinction would have a 

significant impact on trade. 

13USDA has commented that while ARS has had to reduce efforts on classical swine fever 

due to budget reductions, it has still made significant advances toward the development of a 

marker vaccine for classical swine fever.
Page 19 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

create the first DHS budget for Plum Island in fiscal year 2004. According to 

an OMB budget examiner, all of the funding for facility operations was 

transferred to DHS. OMB also divided Plum Island program funds equally 

between DHS and USDA in fiscal year 2004. 

ARS negotiated agreements with other government agencies (including 

DHS) and a nongovernmental entity under which ARS was reimbursed to 

carry out mutually beneficial research.14 The amount of these 

reimbursements equaled about 80 percent of the reduction in the ARS 

program budget in 2003 after the transfer. For example, in fiscal years 2004 

and 2005, ARS received reimbursements from DHS for research ARS 

performed in support of DHS’s mission. Reimbursements from these 

agreements, which an ARS official told us are not guaranteed to continue in 

fiscal year 2006 or beyond, decreased from fiscal year 2004 through 2005. 

One ARS management analyst noted that the agency cannot factor these 

reimbursements into program planning because of their inherent 

uncertainty—such agreements are negotiated as reimbursements on a 

case-by-case basis after the agency has completed the work. 

DHS officials stated that it may appear that ARS’s research budget was 

reduced posttransfer more than it actually was because it is not clear from 

ARS’s fiscal year 2002 and 2003 budgets how much of those budgets 

included indirect costs (i.e., research overhead costs) and operations and 

maintenance costs. ARS’s budget data for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, 

however, do not distinguish between indirect costs and operations and 

maintenance costs. According to an ARS official, DHS now pays for some 

of the indirect research costs at Plum Island, and the agencies continue to 

negotiate how to share indirect support costs on a case-by-case basis.

Table 1 summarizes the net effect of the budget reductions and subsequent 

funding on ARS’s research resources, exclusive of building and facility 

funds, at Plum Island for fiscal years 2002 through 2005. 

14ARS negotiated such agreements with other agencies before the transfer, but total 

reimbursements under these agreements increased in fiscal year 2004.
Page 20 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Table 1: ARS Plum Island Funding, Fiscal Years 2002-2005

Source: GAO analysis of ARS data.

a

Includes funding for programmatic activities as well as for operations and maintenance. ARS was not 

responsible for maintenance and operations costs at the facility after the transfer to DHS. In addition, 

ARS has spent these funds, which are received from annual appropriations and must be obligated by 

the end of each fiscal year. 

b

Amount that ARS planned, at the start of fiscal year 2003, to allocate to Plum Island. Some of this 

allocation was then transferred to DHS later that year under the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

c

The operations and maintenance costs for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 include indirect research costs, 

which cover support staff and ARS overhead at Plum Island, because the ARS budget did not 

distinguish between indirect costs and operations and maintenance costs prior to fiscal year 2004. 

d

The House Appropriations Committee directs ARS to provide these funds directly to universities 

participating in a research consortium. 

e

The direct transfer of funds occurred only in fiscal year 2003. The funds transferred from ARS to DHS 

in fiscal year 2003 included those used for other facility costs, such as utility and fuel costs, and did not 

include research dollars.

f

Refers to reimbursements ARS received through agreements with other governmental and 

nongovernmental entities. In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, these reimbursements include research 

funds obtained from DHS through Economy Act agreements. Because these funds are from multiyear 

appropriations, ARS has not completely spent the payments received in fiscal year 2005. 

Finally, a senior ARS official expressed concern that because of current 

funding constraints, research at Plum Island does not address other 

emerging livestock diseases. This official stated that researching other 

diseases would mitigate some of the uncertainty and better prepare animal 

health responders, such as veterinarians, to respond to the unknown. In 

particular, this official emphasized the importance of developing expertise 

in other foreign animal diseases. 

Dollars in millions

2002 2003 2004 2005

Total allocated fundsa $12.9 $12.7b $4.3 $4.8

Operations and maintenancec 7.1c 4.4c 0 0

Indirect costs c c c 0.560 0.235

Program funds 5.8 8.3 3.7 4.6

Funds allocated to research 

consortiumd (1.7) (1.8) (1.1) (1.3)

Funds transferred to DHS e (3.2) e e 

Reimbursable interagency 

agreements and other sourcesf 0.691 0.629 3.7 2.3

Sum of net program funds and 

reimbursements received $4.8 $3.9 $6.3 $5.6
Page 21 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Experts Regard FMD as the 

Most Significant Threat but 

Raised Concerns about 

Focusing Limited Resources 

on a Single Disease

Nationally recognized animal disease experts we interviewed agreed that 

FMD constitutes the greatest threat to American livestock, and, as such, 

warrants increased attention. Therefore, most of the experts agreed that it 

is prudent to marshal resources to study FMD at Plum Island. Most of the 

experts also found it reasonable to terminate research on diseases of lesser 

importance to the U.S. economy, such as African swine fever. However, all 

of the experts questioned the wisdom of focusing limited resources almost 

exclusively on a single disease. Several experts also expressed concern 

that the focus on a single disease will constrain the development of 

expertise in other critical diseases, exacerbating the current shortage of 

talent in this area. For example, one expert told us that there is a shortage 

of people with an interest in developing expertise in high-priority foreign 

animal diseases. 

In fact, nearly all of the experts we interviewed believed that the current 

work at Plum Island does not adequately address the potential threats 

posed by deliberate and accidental introductions of foreign animal diseases 

other than FMD. Specifically, all but one of the experts we consulted said 

that focusing research on a single disease makes livestock more vulnerable 

to the diseases that are not being studied to the same extent, or in some 

cases, at all, such as Nipah virus. Many of these experts emphasized that 

because it is difficult to predict foreign animal disease outbreaks, it is 

important to maintain ongoing research on a range of diseases to be better 

prepared. As a related example, one scientist pointed out that because little 

was known about West Nile virus, officials were unprepared when the first 

outbreak occurred in the United States in 1999. West Nile is a disease that 

can be fatal to humans, horses, and birds. The first case of West Nile virus 

in the United States was detected in New York, and the disease spread to an 

additional 48 states by 2003. An ARS official acknowledged the limitations 

of focusing research on a single disease and commented that ARS would 

like to do more research on emerging diseases to be better prepared for the 

unknown. DHS and ARS officials caution that resource and facility 

constraints would make it difficult to expand the current research portfolio 

at Plum Island. Also, such a portfolio would require significantly more 

stringent biosecurity than is currently in place at the island if research were 

performed on diseases that could affect both animals and humans. 
Page 22 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Some diseases of concern that are not currently being studied at Plum 

Island include Nipah virus and Rift Valley fever.15 Members of a blue-ribbon 

threat assessment panel pinpoint these diseases, which affect both humans 

and livestock, as warranting greater attention because an outbreak could 

result in economic disruption or interfere with trade. Some of the experts 

we interviewed also said that Rift Valley fever research is needed. Research 

conducted outside of Plum Island on Nipah virus and Rift Valley fever is 

very limited. At the DHS-funded Center of Excellence at Texas A&M 

University there are plans to develop a vaccine for Rift Valley fever, but 

there is limited laboratory space to conduct this type of work on large 

animals and, therefore, researchers at the center cannot test the vaccine on 

large animals.16 The Texas A&M Center of Excellence anticipates that it will 

rely on institutions overseas, such as the Onderstepoort laboratories in 

South Africa, to conduct such tests. 

DHS and USDA officials told us that in order to study Rift Valley fever on 

large animals at Plum Island, individuals involved with the research would 

require a vaccination. Alternatively, Plum Island would need to enhance its 

biosafety procedures to comply with the stricter biosafety level 4 

standards.17 A DHS official noted that at the time of the transfer of Plum 

Island, the Homeland Security Secretary pledged to the nearby 

communities that DHS would not seek a more stringent biosafety 

designation for the facility. 

15Nipah virus affects pigs, horses, cats, and dogs, and spreads readily from pigs to humans 

with serious effects. Nipah virus causes serious, and sometimes fatal, encephalitis in 

humans, and respiratory and central nervous system disease in swine and other animals. 

Rift Valley fever affects primarily livestock, but also causes illness in humans. Exposure to 

the Rift Valley fever virus may result in no symptoms or mild illness, such as fever, or more 

serious illnesses such as hemorrhagic fever, encephalitis, and vision problems.

16DHS officials told us that funds are being allocated to the development of a vaccine for Rift 

Valley fever in fiscal year 2006. According to DHS, Plum Island staff will direct the work, but 

it will not be conducted at Plum Island. 

17Laboratories adhere to specific biosafety guidelines according to their designated 

biosafety level, which can range from 1 to 4. Biosafety level 1 is acceptable for low-risk 

organisms that may be found, for example, in high school laboratories. Biosafety level 4 is 

reserved for a number of exotic and highly lethal pathogens, such as Ebola virus. There are 

only five facilities in the United States with biosafety level 4 laboratories, including the 

Department of the Defense’s U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases 

and the Department of Health and Human Services’ National Institutes of Health. Plum 

Island operates a biosafety level 3 agriculture laboratory with some additional special 

agricultural safety features to prevent the release of animal disease pathogens into the 

environment.
Page 23 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Other experts commented on other factors that limit research on foreign 

animal diseases. For example, one expert commented that while Plum 

Island plays a critical role in the national effort to address foreign animal 

diseases, researchers at this facility cannot study every foreign animal 

disease of concern, especially given the resource constraints and that the 

staff do not have expertise in other diseases, such as vector-borne diseases. 

This expert believes that collaborations between Plum Island and other 

research institutions would benefit the United States by enhancing the 

nation’s knowledge in areas that researchers would otherwise not be able 

to address at Plum Island. Several experts suggested that DHS and USDA 

might use the Plum Island facility more effectively by limiting its research 

agenda to live infectious agents that can be studied only there and allowing 

other institutions to perform the work that does not require the stringent 

safety features of Plum Island. For example, researchers in other 

institutions could develop vaccines without using a live form of infectious 

agents or model disease outbreaks. One expert told us that researchers 

could answer questions through modeling and risk assessment that would 

be based on the data generated from tests using animals at Plum Island. 

Another way to maximize space resources at Plum Island may be to shift 

work on domestic animal diseases off the island. An expert we consulted 

said that doing this work at Plum Island decreases the island’s already 

limited resources available to study foreign animal diseases. For example, 

this expert regards vesicular stomatitis—a disease often mistaken for 

FMD—as inappropriate for Plum Island because it is a domestic disease 

and is not highly contagious. Other experts highlighted the value of 

studying this disease—in part to provide researchers or responders with 

experience in distinguishing this domestic disease from FMD—but some 

noted that it might be more appropriate to study it in other laboratories in 

the mainland United States. USDA commented that it is necessary for the 

agency to conduct its research on vesicular stomatitis at Plum Island 

because scientists are working with samples that may be contaminated 

with FMD. In addition, USDA commented that another benefit from 

maintaining research on vesicular stomatitis at Plum Island is that such 

work enables the agency to retain staff trained to work with diseases that 

affect humans and animals. DHS officials stated that, in their opinion, this 

type of work constitutes a minimal percentage of Plum Island's workload; a 

senior ARS official concurred and estimated that this work accounts for 

roughly 5 percent of the ARS research funds at Plum Island. 

According to DHS, the agency is exploring opportunities to involve other 

research institutions. For example, the DHS officials noted that recently 
Page 24 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Plum Island officials have begun to assess what work could be moved off 

the island to other research facilities while taking into consideration what 

parts of the combined research tasks can be possibly conducted off of the 

island.18 A DHS official told us that the agency has tapped Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory to coordinate closely with Plum Island 

researchers and develop diagnostic and detection tools for FMD, and 

demonstrate the performance of such tools in the field. Also, a researcher 

at the DHS Center of Excellence at Texas A&M stated that the center is 

investigating genetic methods for preventing FMD, deferring portions of 

the research requiring use of the live virus to Plum Island; there, a smaller 

team can handle the virus in a laboratory setting that meets the stringent 

safety standards. Finally, USDA commented that ARS has established 

collaborative relationships with eight universities and two other 

institutions to accomplish its research mission. 

APHIS’s Priorities Remain 

the Same, but Budget 

Changes Curtailed the 

Planned Expansion of 

Diagnostic Services 

According to APHIS officials, before the transfer of Plum Island to DHS, 

they expected to receive a $2.3 million increase in funding, which Congress 

had approved in February 2003 as part of the agency’s appropriations. 

APHIS was expecting this increased funding to meet rising demand for 

diagnostic services. Specifically, the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United 

Kingdom and the emphasis on bioterrorism prompted a shift from passive 

foreign animal disease surveillance to a more active approach. These 

events underscored the need for additional staff. In addition, APHIS had 

assumed responsibility for establishing the validity of rapid diagnostic tools 

to be used by scientists in a national network of state veterinary 

laboratories.19

18DHS officials told us that discussions regarding coordination of research and 

maximization of space resources have occurred at the Board of Directors meetings. 

According to ARS, however, program officials have held such discussions, but not at the 

level of the Board of Directors. 

19DHS officials recently noted that while APHIS will validate rapid diagnostic tools for 

foreign animal diseases, DHS is coordinating the field validation of multiplexed diagnostic 

assays that include domestic diseases that can be confused with FMD. 
Page 25 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

However, APHIS officials told us that as a result of the transfer, the $2.3 

million increase that APHIS officials were expecting to receive was not 

fully realized.20 According to budget documents, APHIS had expected to 

allocate a total of $4.3 million in fiscal year 2004 to diagnostic work at Plum 

Island, which included the $2.3 million. Instead, half of this amount—$2.1 

million—was allocated to the DHS budget for Plum Island that year. OMB 

decided to use the APHIS fiscal year 2003 budget allocation—which 

included the $2.3 million—as a base to determine how much money APHIS 

and DHS should receive in fiscal year 2004.21 Additionally, OMB transferred 

a portion of APHIS’s fiscal year 2003 programmatic funds (about $332,000) 

to cover DHS’s new responsibility for operations and maintenance at Plum 

Island. This change in fiscal year 2003 funding for APHIS occurred because 

the Homeland Security Act authorized the President to establish initial 

funding for DHS by transferring funds from other agencies.22 Although 

APHIS officials understood that APHIS’s budget for Plum Island would 

decrease when operations and maintenance funds were allocated to DHS, 

they did not expect this further reduction in programmatic funds. 

APHIS officials noted that although they remain committed to the same 

diagnostic priorities at Plum Island, the transfer to DHS has strained their 

diagnostic capabilities at Plum Island. They said their plans to hire more 

scientists and train more veterinarians to recognize foreign animal diseases 

were seriously curtailed because they did not receive the anticipated 

increase. The officials told us that anticipated enhancements to the 

diagnostic tools at Plum Island would have facilitated a faster response to 

an outbreak. In fact, an APHIS official told us that, at current funding 

levels, APHIS staff are able to focus only on validating tests for the highestpriority diseases, such as FMD, and that APHIS lacks the staff and 

resources to develop tests for other high-priority diseases, such as Rift 

Valley fever and other emerging diseases. APHIS officials concluded that 

Plum Island, which is the only place in the United States where hands-on 

training on high-priority foreign animal diseases affecting livestock can be 

provided, lacks the capacity to accommodate the increased demand for 

20Congress does not appropriate funds directly to the Plum Island facility, but appropriates a 

lump sum to APHIS. APHIS in turn allocates funds to its programs. An APHIS official told us 

they based the disbursement on the allocation guidelines recommended in congressional 

conference reports.

21Over and above funds for facility maintenance and operations, according to OMB officials, 

OMB divided program funds equally between DHS and APHIS. 

22Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1502, 116 Stat. 2135, 2308 (2002), codified at 6 U.S.C. § 542.
Page 26 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

such training. DHS officials noted that, since assuming responsibility for 

Plum Island, the agency has funded a pilot program to provide distance 

learning via audiovisual equipment. While the distance training does not 

provide students with the desirable hands-on experience of observing and 

diagnosing foreign animal diseases, DHS stated that this tool has 

augmented the capability of the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician 

Course by providing instruction to practitioners in locations beyond Plum 

Island. 

Figure 4: Veterinarians Participate in Training on Foreign Animal Diseases at Plum 

Island 

Source: USDA.
Page 27 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Though APHIS funding was reduced after the transfer, DHS has reimbursed 

APHIS to perform diagnostic work at Plum Island in fiscal years 2004 and 

2005.23 For example, in fiscal year 2004, DHS and APHIS negotiated an 

Economy Act agreement that enabled APHIS to retain eight new 

scientists—a key step in carrying out its planned expansion of diagnostic 

services. This agreement covered salary and benefits for eight new APHIS 

employees rather than ongoing APHIS program costs at Plum Island. The 

sum of the 2004 DHS reimbursement and the 2004 allocation to the APHIS 

laboratory at Plum Island are roughly equivalent to the APHIS program 

budget in the fiscal year before the transfer. However, APHIS officials do 

not view these reimbursements—referred to as Economy Act 

agreements—as an appropriate way to fund the agency’s diagnostic work. 

These officials said that the purpose of the agreements was “to avoid 

duplicating functions” performed by the agencies at Plum Island, such as 

caring for the animals, and noted that they do not expect to negotiate 

additional agreements directly related to the planned expansion. Because 

the reimbursements obtained through Economy Act agreements have 

decreased in 2005 and recent congressional appropriations have not been 

sufficient to support the additional eight scientists, APHIS officials 

expressed concern about the agency’s ability to retain these scientists. DHS 

officials concurred with APHIS’s view that Economy Act agreements are 

not an appropriate way to fund the agency’s diagnostic work at Plum 

Island.

Table 2 summarizes the net effect of the budget reductions and subsequent 

funding received through interagency agreements on APHIS’s overall 

resources at Plum Island for fiscal years 2002 through 2005. 

23DHS and USDA negotiated several reimbursements through Economy Act agreements in 

fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. 1535, as amended) 

authorizes federal agencies to order goods and services from other federal agencies when 

funds are available, it is in the best interest of the government, and the goods and services 

cannot be provided as conveniently and cheaply by private industry. The Economy Act 

generally requires reimbursement for goods and services provided to another agency.
Page 28 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Table 2: APHIS Plum Island Funding, Fiscal Years 2002-2005

Source: GAO analysis of APHIS data.

a

Includes funding for programmatic activities as well as for operations and maintenance. APHIS was 

not responsible for maintenance and operations costs at the facility after the transfer to DHS.

b

According to USDA, the fiscal year 2005 program funds increased only because the agency 

redirected funds from other facilities within the National Veterinary Services Laboratories to Plum 

Island. 

c

The fiscal year 2002 Department of Defense supplemental funding was directed to APHIS at Plum 

Island. Of the total ($2.45 million), $450,000 was used for classical swine fever testing in fiscal year 

2002. The remaining portion had to be used for the FMD vaccine bank ($1 million in fiscal year 2002 

and $1 million in fiscal year 2003; these funds were not available for fiscal years 2004 and 2005). 

d

The direct transfer of funds occurred only in fiscal year 2003.

e

Refers to the payments APHIS received from DHS through Economy Act agreements. 

f

USDA officials understood the payments received in fiscal year 2004 were a partial replacement for 

funds not received and were intended to cover salaries for APHIS staff at Plum Island. 

DHS Continues to Address 

Infrastructure Needs and 

Develop Programs 

Addressing Its Bioterrorism 

Priorities at Plum Island

As discussed elsewhere in this report, DHS has assumed responsibility for 

operations and maintenance at Plum Island and has developed its own 

applied research program. As part of the 2003 transfer authorized by the 

President, DHS received approximately $33 million for building and facility 

funds from ARS and APHIS. In addition to the routine operations and 

maintenance needs at the facility, the DHS budget at Plum Island includes 

funds that allow the agency to conduct major infrastructure improvements 

at the facility. External assessments of the Plum Island facility as well as 

the agency’s own evaluation revealed safety and security issues that the 

agency needed to resolve. DHS’s budget included $5.9 million in fiscal year 

2004 and $12.9 million in fiscal year 2005 to conduct these improvements at 

the facility, such as the installation of closed-circuit television surveillance 

to control and monitor access to the containment area in the laboratory. 

Dollars in millions

2002 2003 2004 2005

Total allocated fundsa $5.9 $7.1 $1.7 $2.5 

Operations and maintenance 4.7 4.9 0 0

Program funds 1.1 2.2 1.7 2.5b

Department of Defense supplemental 

funds c 1.45c 1.0c c c

Funds transferred to DHS d (0.332) d d

Reimbursable interagency agreements e e 1.7f 0.473

Sum of net program funds and 

reimbursements received $2.7 $2.9 $3.4 $3.0 
Page 29 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

DHS officials told us that the security and safety upgrades at Plum Island 

have increased the funding needs to operate the facility. 

The programmatic funds for DHS—which support the agency’s applied 

research science and agricultural forensics work—accounted for $8.3 

million of the $51 million total allocated to the agency for Plum Island in 

fiscal year 2005. As of August 2005, DHS’s applied research science team—

which focuses primarily on developing vaccines for FMD—included seven 

scientists and support staff. DHS has also used its programmatic funds to 

establish a bioforensics laboratory at Plum Island, which will, according to 

the agency, validate forensic assays for FMD as well as classical swine 

fever. 

DHS and USDA Are in 

the Process of 

Assessing Long-Term 

Plans for Joint Work at 

Plum Island 

DHS and USDA officials will continue to pursue their current agreed-upon 

joint activities, which focus on FMD, and they are assessing longer-term 

objectives for future joint work at Plum Island or elsewhere. Agency 

officials did not consider it prudent to speculate on long-term objectives of 

joint work, in part, because DHS plans to replace the existing Plum Island 

facility, and aspects of the new facility have not yet been determined. 

Although DHS and USDA officials told us they plan to continue to work 

together on FMD, they are currently assessing the longer-term objectives of 

future joint work at Plum Island or elsewhere. DHS and USDA have 

established FMD as the immediate top priority for Plum Island, but they 

have not yet identified which diseases, if any, they will address together 

after FMD. In fact, the Joint Strategy provides a blueprint for coordinating 

efforts to address FMD but does not currently address work on other 

diseases.24 DHS officials told us that the agency remains committed to 

studying the highest-priority livestock diseases at Plum Island and will 

decide which diseases to study based on a scientific assessment of the 

highest threats. DHS and USDA officials confirmed that if they decide to 

conduct joint activities on other diseases, they will rely on the Joint 

Strategy and the mechanisms they established to implement this strategy—

such as the Board of Directors—to coordinate the effort. 

DHS officials emphasized that the dynamic nature of threat assessments 

makes it difficult to firmly commit to long-term priorities because 

24DHS officials noted that the Joint Strategy is being modified.
Page 30 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

information and research needs may change frequently depending on the 

nature of the threat. In terms of USDA research priorities, ARS will 

establish its research objectives for the next 5 years at the 2005 National 

Program review and assessment. An ARS official told us that in the near 

term, the agency would like to conduct more work on classical swine fever, 

though not at the expense of FMD research. This official noted that no 

decisions have been made as to whether DHS will coordinate with ARS to 

address classical swine fever, and that the work on this disease has not yet 

advanced to a stage that would involve DHS and its applied research 

capabilities.

Several of the experts we interviewed agreed that, currently, the 

prioritization of foreign animal disease threats produces the same ranking 

of diseases whether the threat is based on an accidental or a deliberate 

introduction; therefore, the experts stated that the current focus on FMD 

addresses the disease posing the greatest threat through both accidental 

and intentional introduction. However, the rise of new threats may disrupt 

the alignment of the agencies’ priorities and, in turn, affect the possibility of 

joint activities. For example, one top ARS official told us that the agencies’ 

research and diagnostic priorities at Plum Island may not continue to be so 

closely aligned in the future because, in his view, the agencies have 

different missions. DHS officials noted that the agencies’ missions are, in 

fact, closely aligned because DHS is also responsible for protecting against 

the accidental introduction of foreign diseases. They also noted that the 

agency’s ranking of diseases would follow a formal risk analysis to 

prioritize foreign animal diseases based on threat. Based on our analysis of 

documents such as the Joint Strategy for Plum Island, we believe that 

DHS’s mission to protect agriculture is more oriented toward intentional 

attacks on agriculture, and, therefore, we expect the agency will continue 

to focus more on diseases that could be introduced deliberately than on 

diseases that could accidentally break out in the United States. 

Furthermore, officials told us it is premature to firmly commit to long-term 

objectives of joint work at Plum Island, in part, because DHS has plans to 

replace the existing facility with a new, modernized facility. Recognizing 

the shortcomings of the laboratory facilities at Plum Island—insufficient 

space and outdated infrastructure—a senior DHS official told us the agency 

will construct this facility, pending congressional approval, to expand its 

capabilities to defend the nation’s agricultural infrastructure against 

terrorist attacks. DHS officials told us, however, that they have not yet 

determined the scope of the work to be performed at this new facility, or 

the facility’s size or location—whether Plum Island or elsewhere—and do 
Page 31 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

not know the extent to which the new facility will carry out the current 

mission of Plum Island. For example, DHS officials told us the agency has 

not determined whether the new facility will address such research gaps as 

the lack of an approved laboratory to study highly contagious viruses like 

Nipah virus, which require higher biosecurity standards than those in place 

at Plum Island. 

Some DHS and USDA officials speculated that the existing ARS and APHIS 

programs at Plum Island would move with the DHS applied research 

program to the new facility, but regardless of the facility’s location, the 

agencies are considering their options. DHS has convened a scientific 

working group, including representatives from DHS, ARS, APHIS, and the 

Department of Health and Human Services, to discuss the options for a 

new facility. DHS estimates that, pending congressional approval, it will 

become fully operational by 2012. 

Conclusions Although quite successful in terms of interagency cooperation, the transfer 

of Plum Island from USDA to DHS highlights the challenges that the 

agencies face in meeting diagnostic and research needs with available 

resources. The limits on funding and on the availability of laboratory space 

at Plum Island underscore the importance of leveraging available resources 

and expertise elsewhere in the country. While Plum Island is the only 

facility in the United States where scientists are currently authorized to 

study diseases using certain highly contagious pathogens in large animals, 

other important work related to these diseases could be conducted in other 

institutions. As DHS evaluates the size and capabilities of the new foreign 

animal disease facility that the agency estimates will be completed by 2012, 

it will be important to explore the cost-effectiveness of shifting some 

current work, such as research that does not involve the use of live agents, 

to other laboratories and reserve the limited laboratory space at Plum 

Island for work that can only be performed in that facility. 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

To make more effective use of Plum Island’s limited laboratory space in the 

short term, we recommend that DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate, 

in consultation with USDA’s Agricultural Research Service and the Animal 

and Plant Health Inspection Service, pursue opportunities to shift work 

that does not require the unique features of Plum Island to other 

institutions and research centers. 
Page 32 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to DHS and USDA for their review and 

comment. 

DHS generally concurred with the report and said that it accurately reflects 

the current relationships and coordination between DHS and USDA at 

Plum Island. DHS also agreed with the recommendation and said the 

agencies have already addressed the issue. For example, DHS commented 

that the agency’s assessment—currently under way—of laboratory and 

animal room requirements at Plum Island includes addressing the agencies’ 

options for shifting work to institutions off of the island. While we view the 

steps DHS has taken toward implementing the recommendation as 

positive, the agency has not completed these tasks. We believe that DHS 

needs to consult with USDA and conduct more work to demonstrate 

consideration of opportunities to shift work elsewhere. DHS also provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. DHS’s written 

comments and our detailed response appear in appendix IV.

USDA generally agreed with the recommendation and found the report to 

be factual and generally positive in recognizing the coordination of 

activities between DHS and USDA. USDA commented that it would 

continue to evaluate the working relationship with DHS. USDA also 

provided some clarifying points. For example, USDA noted that while ARS 

had to reduce efforts on classical swine fever because of budget 

reductions, it has made significant advances toward the development of a 

marker vaccine for classical swine fever. USDA also elaborated on our 

discussion of vesicular stomatitis virus research, and clarified the benefits 

of conducting such work at Plum Island. Finally, USDA stated that while 

the recommendation is sound and supported by the agency, the 

recommendation could be misleading because little of the work can be 

performed elsewhere and it would be difficult to transfer such work. We 

have incorporated the clarifications, as appropriate. We also note that 

although work done at Plum Island that does not require containment may 

not be easily removed or relocated, it is an important step to take in order 

to use the facility’s limited resources effectively and to be prepared to 

respond to outbreaks of various foreign animal diseases. USDA also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. 

USDA’s written comments and our detailed response appear in appendix V.
Page 33 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture, and 

other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3841 or robinsonr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix VI. 

Robert A. Robinson

Managing Director, Natural Resources 

and Environment
Page 34 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To determine how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) coordinate research and diagnostic 

activities at Plum Island, we analyzed DHS and USDA joint strategy 

documents, including an interagency agreement between DHS and USDA 

for Plum Island, the Joint DHS and USDA Strategy for Foreign Animal 

Disease Research and Diagnostic Programs, and the Plum Island Animal 

Disease Center Charter. In addition, we reviewed Homeland Security 

Presidential Directives 9 and 10 to understand the roles for DHS and USDA 

in addressing the threat of agricultural terrorism. We interviewed officials 

at various levels from each agency, including senior leadership officials 

based in Washington, D.C., the facility’s on-site leadership, and, during a 

visit to Plum Island, all of the lead scientists. We also interviewed former 

USDA scientists who have left Plum Island since its transfer to DHS on 

June 1, 2003. 

To determine what changes, if any, have taken place regarding research and 

diagnostic priorities at Plum Island since the facility was transferred to 

DHS, and the reasons for and implications of such changes, we interviewed 

the current and two former Plum Island directors, spoke with current and 

former Plum Island scientists, and discussed research and diagnostic 

priorities with senior officials in the DHS Science and Technology 

Directorate and USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and Animal 

and Plant Health and Inspection Service (APHIS). To understand Plum 

Island’s budget, we also interviewed analysts and officials at the agencies 

and at the White House Office of Management and Budget, which 

developed and oversaw the DHS budget during the creation of the agency. 

In addition, we analyzed agency budget documents for fiscal years 2002 

through 2006 to identify changes in funding levels before and after the 

transfer of Plum Island and to determine the funding allocations among the 

programs at Plum Island. 

We also conducted structured interviews in person or via telephone with 

recognized nongovernment experts from academic and other research 

organizations that we chose for their diverse perspectives and technical 

expertise on animal health and diseases.1

 In particular, we sought to obtain 

their comments on research and diagnostic priorities at Plum Island. We 

based our initial selection of experts on a list of stakeholders invited to 

1

In addition, we spoke with a USDA APHIS attache as well as the chief executive officer of a 

science consulting company that specializes in threat reduction and disease surveillance 

and response systems.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

participate in the ARS’s National Program Review Workshop, which met on 

September 20-21, 2005, in Kansas City, Missouri, to provide feedback on 

ARS priorities and national research programs. From the list of workshop 

participants, we identified 13 stakeholders who do not work at Plum Island 

and who study foreign animal diseases or serve as members in 

organizations that address foreign animal diseases. This list included some 

recognized experts who have served on reputable committees assessing 

the threats of animal diseases, including the White House Office of Science 

and Technology Policy Blue Ribbon Panel on the Threat of Biological 

Terrorism Directed Against Livestock. We identified an additional two 

contacts through referrals from these stakeholders. From these 15 

contacts, we selected the final 11 experts on the basis of the following 

criteria: (1) recommendations we received from others knowledgeable in 

the field of foreign animal diseases; (2) area of expertise and experience; 

and (3) type of organization represented, including academic institutions 

and associated research centers.

To examine the long-term objectives of joint activities at Plum Island, we 

analyzed agency planning documents and interviewed senior leadership 

officials representing DHS and USDA. We also discussed with DHS and 

USDA officials the status and possible outcomes of a DHS feasibility study 

to upgrade the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.

We conducted our review from March 2005 to December 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 36 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Appendix II

List of Experts Interviewed ApendxiI

• Roger Breeze, Ph.D., M.R.C.V.S. Chief Executive Officer, Centaur 

Science Group, Washington, D.C. Former Director, Plum Island Animal 

Disease Center.1

• Corrie Brown, Ph.D., D.V.M. Professor and Coordinator of International 

Activities, Department of Veterinary Medicine, University of Georgia, 

Athens, Georgia.2

• Neville Clarke, Ph.D., D.V.M. Director, National Center for Foreign 

Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense, College Station, Texas.

• Peter Cowen, Ph.D., D.V.M., M.P.V.M. Associate Professor of 

Epidemiology and Public Health, Department of Population Health and 

Pathobiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, North Carolina State 

University, Raleigh, North Carolina.

• Linda L. Logan, Ph.D., D.V.M. USDA APHIS Attache serving North 

Africa, East Africa, the Middle East and the Near East, Cairo, Egypt.3

• Peter W. Mason, Ph.D. Professor of Pathology, Professor of 

Microbiology and Immunology; Senior Scientist, Sealy Center for 

Vaccine Development; member, Center for Biodefense and Emerging 

Infectious Diseases, University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, 

Texas.

• James A. Roth, Ph.D., D.V.M. Distinguished Professor of Immunology; 

Assistant Dean, International Programs and Public Policy; and Director, 

Center for Food Security and Public Health, College of Veterinary 

Medicine, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa.

1

M.R.C.V.S. is a member of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons. Ph.D. is a doctorate of 

philosophy degree.

2

D.V.M. is a doctorate of veterinary medicine degree.

3

Dr. Logan did not speak on behalf of USDA, but answered GAO’s questions based on her 

professional expertise.
Appendix II

List of Experts Interviewed

Page 37 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

• M.D. Salman, Ph.D., M.P.V.M., D.A.C.V.P.M., F.A.C.E. Professor and 

Director of Animal Population Health Institute, College of Veterinary 

Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State University, Fort 

Collins, Colorado.4

• Mark C. Thurmond, Ph.D., D.V.M. Professor, Department of Medicine 

and Epidemiology, University of California, Davis, California.

• Alfonso Torres, Ph.D., D.V.M. Executive Director, New York State 

Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratory, and Associate Dean for Veterinary 

Public Policy, College of Veterinary Medicine, Cornell University, Ithaca, 

New York.

• David H. Zeman, Ph.D., D.V.M. Department Head, Veterinary Science 

Department; Director, Animal Disease Research and Diagnostic 

Laboratory; and Director, Olson Biochemistry Laboratories, South 

Dakota State University, Brookings, South Dakota.

We also sought the perspective of agricultural producers:

• Gary Weber, Ph.D. Executive Director, Regulatory Affairs, National 

Cattlemen’s Beef Association, Washington, D.C.; and 

• National Pork Board.5

4

M.P.V.M. is a master of preventive veterinary medicine. D.A.C.V.P.M. is a diplomat, 

American College of Veterinary Preventive Medicine. F.A.C.E. is a fellow, American College 

of Epidemiology.

5

While we attempted to contact representatives at the National Pork Board several times, 

we did not receive responses to our questions.
Page 38 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Appendix III

Animal Diseases That Affect Livestock ApendxiI

The table below presents information about key aspects of animal diseases 

that can affect livestock mentioned in the report, including the animals 

affected, transmission route, and vaccine ability.

Table 3: List of Animal Diseases 

Source: GAO.

Diseases and agents Animals affected Route of transmission Distribution

Availability of 

vaccine

Can affect 

humans

African swine fever Domestic and wild pigs, 

wart hogs

Direct contact with body 

fluids, especially blood; 

fomites; tick vectors

Africa No No

Brucellosis Main threat to cattle, 

bison, and swine

Direct contact Worldwide Yes Yes

Classical swine fever Domestic pigs Ingestion (uncooked 

garbage); fomites; 

aerosol; direct contact

Africa, Asia, Europe, 

South America

Yes No

Foot-and-mouth disease All cloven hoofed 

animals, including 

cattle, sheep, goats, 

pigs

Aerosol; direct contact; 

ingestion; fomites

Africa, Asia, Middle East, 

South America

Yes Yes, but 

rarely 

infects 

humans

Nipah virus Pigs, horses, cats, 

dogs

Close direct contact with 

contaminated tissue or 

body fluids

Southeast Asia No Yes

Rift Valley fever Cattle, sheep, goats, 

dogs, cats, camels, 

monkeys

Insect vectors 

(mosquitoes); direct 

contact with blood or 

tissue

Africa Yes Yes

Rinderpest Cattle, sheep, goats Direct or close contact 

with body fluids

Indian subcontinent, 

Near East, sub-Sahara 

Yes No

Sheep and goat pox Sheep, goats Aerosol; direct contact, 

fomites, mechanically by 

arthropods 

Africa, Asia, Middle East Yes No

Vesicular stomatitis Horses, donkeys, 

mules, cattle, pigs

Insect vectors, direct 

contact, fomites, aerosol

North and Central 

America, Northern part 

of South America

Yes Yes

West Nile virus Birds, many mammals, 

reptiles

Mosquito vectors Africa, Asia, Europe, 

Middle East, North 

America

Yes (for 

prevention in 

horses)

Yes
Page 39 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security ApendxiIV

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

Page 40 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.
Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

Page 41 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Homeland 

Security’s letter dated November 22, 2005.

GAO Comments 1. Regarding DHS’s comment that the scope of its research program is not 

limited to FMD, our report notes that the DHS-funded Center of 

Excellence has plans to develop a vaccine for Rift Valley fever. In 

addition, we have modified the report to include a statement that DHS 

funds are being allocated to the development of a vaccine for Rift Valley 

fever in fiscal year 2006. 

2. Regarding DHS’s assertion that its mission includes enhancing 

protection against major disease outbreaks, our report states that 

DHS’s mission to protect agriculture includes responsibilities to 

address introductions of high consequence foreign animal diseases that 

could be either deliberately or accidentally introduced. However, we 

continue to believe that DHS’s mission to protect agriculture is more 

oriented toward intentional attacks on agriculture. First, the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 states that DHS’s primary mission is to prevent 

terrorist attacks within the United States.1

 Second, the information 

DHS provided about its role at Plum Island has emphasized deliberate 

introductions. For example, the Joint Strategy emphasizes the 

bioterrorism focus of DHS work at Plum Island in describing the 

agency’s mission “to conduct, stimulate, and enable research and 

development to prevent or mitigate the effects of catastrophic 

terrorism.” The Joint Strategy also states that DHS will “focus on 

identified research and development gaps specifically targeted to 

strengthen the nation’s ability to anticipate, prevent, respond to, and 

recover from the intentional introduction of a high consequence foreign 

animal disease.” 

3. Although DHS said that the Board of Directors meetings included a 

discussion of what work could be conducted off the island, USDA 

officials disagree with this statement. Furthermore, while we 

understand that the Board of Directors has met on several occasions, 

we do not have evidence to support that a discussion about maximizing 

space resources occurred at the meeting. We also have not seen an 

outcome of discussions regarding shifting work to other institutions.

1

Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101(b), 116 Stat. 2135, 2142 (2002), codified at 6 U.S.C. § 111(b).
Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

Page 42 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

4. Regarding DHS’s comment that the Senior Leadership Group has 

instituted a room reservation system that takes into consideration work 

that can be shifted elsewhere, our report states that the Senior 

Leadership Group has implemented a system to ensure efficient use of 

limited space at Plum Island. We have modified the report to note that 

in the case of limited space, the Senior Leadership Group would, as part 

of its review of the proposed projects, evaluate whether the work could 

be done at another location. However, as our report states, space is 

already limited at Plum Island, constraining research and diagnostic 

work that can be performed at the facility. We have not seen evidence 

that this group has formally evaluated the feasibility of shifting work 

from Plum Island to other research institutions in order to overcome 

resource constraints.

5. We are encouraged to hear that DHS is in the process of assessing the 

laboratory and animal room requirements for all three agencies at Plum 

Island for the next 6 years and, as part of this assessment, will address 

each agency’s options for performing activities off of the island through 

other facilities, contract research organizations, and the like. However, 

because the assessment has not been completed yet, and we have not 

seen evidence that DHS is conducting this review in conjunction with 

USDA, we continue to believe that the agencies have not identified 

opportunities to shift work that does not require the unique features of 

Plum Island to other institutions and research centers. 
Page 43 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture ApendxiV

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture

Page 44 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.
Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture

Page 45 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center
Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture

Page 46 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

The following are GAO’s comments on the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 

letter dated November 30, 2005.

GAO Comments 1. Regarding USDA’s comments about ARS’s continued focus on classical 

swine fever and its advances in developing a marker vaccine for this 

disease, our report notes that this disease is a high priority. We 

modified the report to include USDA’s view that while ARS has had to 

reduce efforts on classical swine fever due to budget reductions, it has 

made significant advances toward the development of a marker vaccine 

for classical swine fever. 

2. Regarding USDA’s comments about the value of working on vesicular 

stomatitis virus at Plum Island, our report summarizes the conflicting 

views of experts regarding the need for such work at Plum Island. We 

have modified the report to summarize why USDA believes it is 

important to maintain research on vesicular stomatitis virus at Plum 

Island. 

3. Regarding USDA’s comment on the transfer of programmatic funds 

from ARS and APHIS to DHS for a related but distinct area of work, our 

report states that after the transfer, there have been increased demands 

for the facility’s limited space and resources related to research and 

diagnostic activities. Our conclusions summarize the challenges the 

agencies face in meeting research and diagnostic needs with available 

resources, and form the basis of our recommendation that DHS’s 

Science and Technology Directorate work with USDA’s ARS and APHIS 

to pursue opportunities to make more effective use of Plum Island’s 

limited laboratory space.

4. Regarding USDA’s comments on the recommendation to pursue 

opportunities to shift work that does not require the unique features of 

Plum Island to other institutions and research centers, we recognize 

that not all such work may be relocated or easily removed. For 

example, as our report notes, any work involving a live FMD agent 

would have to be conducted at Plum Island. Furthermore, the report 

states that Plum Island is the only facility that has special safety 

features required to study certain high consequence foreign animal 

diseases in large animals. However, we continue to believe that there 

are opportunities to shift work to other institutions. For example, 

experts identified work that could be done outside of Plum Island, such 

as developing vaccines without using the live form of the agents. This 
Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture

Page 47 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

work is important in order to remain prepared to respond to outbreaks 

of various foreign animal diseases.

5. Regarding USDA’s comment on modeling, we modified our report to 

clarify that modeling activity does not occur in containment.
Page 48 GAO-06-132 Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Appendix VI

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contact Robert A. Robinson, (202) 512-3841 or robinsonr@gao.gov

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

In addition to the contact named above, Maria Cristina Gobin (Assistant 

Director), Kate Cardamone, Nancy Crothers, Mary Denigan-Macauley, Lynn 

Musser, Omari Norman, Joshua Smith, and Lisa Vojta made key 

contributions to this report. Sharon Caudle, Elizabeth Curda, Denise 

Fantone, Terry Horner, Katherine Raheb, Keith Rhodes, and Steve Rossman 

also made important contributions.

(360562)
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Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

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