Filed 11/29/22 In re C.R. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re C.R. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B317118

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

V.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

17CCJP02383

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Dismissed. 

Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, Peter A. Ferrera, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

V.R. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s October 2021 

orders

1 temporarily suspending her visitation with her two 

children, C.R. and A.R. In so doing, mother acknowledges the 

court reinstated her visits in February 2022, while this appeal 

was pending. Nevertheless, she contends the February 2022 

orders have not rendered this appeal moot because: (1) we can 

grant her effective relief by directing the juvenile court to order

make-up visits for the period in which her visits were suspended; 

and (2) if allowed to stand, the October 2021 orders will prejudice 

her by infecting subsequent proceedings in this case. 

As discussed below, we reject mother’s arguments and 

conclude this appeal is moot. Accordingly, we dismiss. 

BACKGROUND

Mother and F.V.2 (father) are the parents of C.R. and A.R.

Mother also has four adult children, who reside in Washington. 

When this case arose in December 2017, C.R. was seven years old 

and A.R. was four years old. They lived in a house with mother

and a few other adults, including their godmother. The parents 

had not been in contact for several years. Mother reported father 

was not involved in the children’s lives. 

1 Throughout the underlying case, the juvenile court entered 

separate minute orders setting forth its rulings for each child.

2 The juvenile court found F.V. to be the alleged father of 

both children. He is not a party to this appeal. 
3

In late January 2018, the juvenile court sustained an 

amended Welfare and Institutions Code3 section 300 petition filed

by the Department of Children and Family Services 

(Department). In so doing, it found true the allegations that the 

children were at risk of serious physical harm due to: (1) mother’s

history of criminal convictions and her failure to make an 

appropriate plan for their care while she was incarcerated; and 

(2) father’s unresolved criminal history. The juvenile court then

declared the children dependents of the court, removed them 

from both parents, and granted mother reunification services and 

monitored visitation. 

At the six-month review hearing held in October 2018, the 

juvenile court found mother in partial compliance with her case 

plan and continued her reunification services. At the twelvemonth review hearing held in February 2019, however, the court 

terminated her reunification services and set a permanency 

planning hearing for June 2019.

In March 2019, V.M., one of the children’s adult siblings, 

expressed interest in having the children placed in her care with 

a permanent plan of legal guardianship. Her home was approved 

for placement in May 2019. Mother agreed to the children’s 

placement with V.M. under a permanent plan of legal 

guardianship.

Consequently, at a hearing held in late June 2019, the 

juvenile court ordered the Department to transfer the children

from their foster home to V.M.’s home in Washington. The 

juvenile court also found legal guardianship to be the appropriate 

goal for the children and ordered it as their permanent plan. Per 

3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code. 
4

the Department’s request, the juvenile court continued the 

permanency planning hearing to December 2019.

In early October 2019, the children began residing with 

V.M. Later, mother relocated to Washington, where she stayed 

with one of her other adult children.

Due to various reasons, including issues with notice and 

concerns relating to the COVID-19 pandemic, the juvenile court 

continued the permanency planning review hearing several 

times.

A brief hearing was held on October 26, 2021. That 

morning, mother had filed a section 388 petition to modify the 

order terminating her reunification services. She sought an order 

placing the children in her care. Alternatively, she asked the 

juvenile court to place the children with A.G., one of her other 

adult children, and reinstate her reunification services with 

unmonitored or overnight visitation. In support of her petition, 

mother asserted circumstances had changed to justify her 

requested modifications because, among other things, V.M. was 

“refusing to allow mother any visitation with the children, and 

even attempted to obtain a frivolous restraining order against 

mother, which has since been dismissed.” Attached to mother’s 

section 388 petition was an October 21, 2021 order of the 

Superior Court of Washington for Yakima County, denying V.M.’s 

request for a full restraining order against mother and A.G., and 

lifting all temporary restraining orders previously entered.

At the outset of the October 26 hearing, the juvenile court 

noted the Department had requested to continue the permanency 

planning hearing based on information provided by the children’s 

counsel. The court did not state or otherwise clarify what 

information was given. Nonetheless, the court stated it would
5

continue the matter to December 21, 2021 to “address[ ] some of 

the things that are going on.” 

At that point, mother’s counsel noted he had filed a section 

388 petition for mother. The juvenile court had yet to read her 

petition at the time of the hearing. Then, apparently referencing 

the information provided by the children’s counsel, mother’s 

counsel stated: “What I understand, there was a restraining 

order that was attempted by the caregiver in Washington, 

supposedly barring [mother] from visiting the children. [¶] I don’t 

think it’s legally valid, since this court has jurisdiction over the 

children. [¶] I would ask if they do enforce the visitation order, 

my client is not being able to [sic] see her children.” The juvenile 

court responded: “Well based on what [the children’s counsel] is 

telling me, it appears there are some issues. [¶] So, at this point, 

the court is going to follow the lead of the criminal restraining 

order and . . . mother’s visits, at this time, are not going to take 

place until some different orders are made.” Mother’s counsel 

then stated: “There is not really concrete evidence before the 

court. [¶] [Mother] contests the representations made.” Over her 

objection, the court ordered mother to stay away from the 

children. 

Mother timely appealed from the October 26, 2021 orders. 

However, at a hearing held on February 4, 2022, while this 

appeal was pending, the juvenile court lifted its orders

suspending mother’s visits, finding “no detriment exists if mother 

visits with a monitor in place.”

DISCUSSION

“An appeal may become moot where subsequent events,

including orders by the juvenile court, render it impossible for the 

reviewing court to grant effective relief. [Citations.] ‘“An issue is 
6

not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent 

proceedings.”’” (In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436.) “The 

question of mootness in a dependency case should be decided on a 

case-by-case basis[.]” (In re Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 

404-405.) 

As noted above, mother contends the reinstatement of her

visits in February 2022 has not rendered this appeal moot for two

primary4 reasons. First, she asserts this appeal is not moot 

because we can provide her with effective relief by ordering the 

juvenile court to grant make-up visits for the three-month period 

in which they were suspended. Second, she argues that, if 

allowed to stand, the order suspending her visits will infect 

subsequent proceedings by making it “more difficult for her to 

succeed in her section 388 petition[ ]” and “ma[king] it impossible 

for [her] to establish the first prong of the beneficial relationship 

exception.” As discussed below, we are not persuaded by either 

contention.

4 Mother also asserts “[a] finding of mootness would 

undermine fundamental due process principles applicable to 

dependency proceedings.” She does not, however, clearly explain 

how those principles are implicated on the facts of this case. We 

therefore conclude her conclusory due process argument has been 

forfeited and decline to entertain it. (See Benach v. County of Los 

Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) In any event, we 

further conclude dismissal of this appeal does not give rise to any 

due process concerns because, as discussed below: (1) mother has 

not shown she cannot ask the juvenile court for the relief sought 

before this court (i.e., an order granting her make-up visits for 

the period in which they were suspended) following the dismissal 

of her appeal; and (2) mother has not shown she will be 

prejudiced by the October 2021 orders in subsequent proceedings. 
7

With respect to her first argument, the record reflects

mother has not, at any point, asked the juvenile court for an 

order directing the Department to provide her make-up visits for 

those she missed due to the October 2021 orders. Accordingly, we 

conclude she has forfeited her request for such relief on appeal 

and decline to consider it. (See In re Malick T. (2022) 73 

Cal.App.5th 1109, 1127 [“[F]orfeiture generally applies . . . when 

a party failed to ask in the juvenile court for relief being sought 

on appeal”].) In so doing, we note mother has not presented—and 

we cannot discern—any reason why she cannot ask the juvenile 

court to enter her desired order now or in the future. 

With respect to her second argument, we conclude mother 

has not shown the order temporarily suspending her visits will 

infect the outcome of subsequent proceedings in this case. 

To succeed on her section 388 petition, mother must show, 

by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) that there is new

evidence or a change of circumstances and (2) that the proposed 

modification would be in the best interests of the child[ren].” (In 

re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615, italics omitted.) 

Although she asserts the juvenile court’s suspension of her visits 

“rendered it more difficult for her to succeed in her [section] 388 

petition[,]” she does not explain how its orders have harmed or 

will harm her ability to satisfy the elements noted above. 

Mother’s contention the order suspending her visitation 

will “ma[k]e it impossible for [her] to establish the first prong of 

the beneficial relationship exception[ ]” is speculative. That 

exception, codified in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i),5 is an 

5 Per section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), a permanent 

plan other than adoption may be selected if “[t]he parents have 
8

“exception[ ] to the general rule that the [juvenile] court must 

choose adoption where possible[.]” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 45, 53, italics omitted.) Throughout the underlying 

proceedings, however, the Department has consistently 

recommended the permanent plan of legal guardianship, rather 

than adoption accompanied by termination of mother’s parental 

rights. In addition, the juvenile court previously found legal 

guardianship to be an appropriate goal for the children, and has 

ordered it as their permanent plan. Although the Department 

changed its recommendation from legal guardianship to adoption 

in November 2021, the record before us reflects the juvenile court 

has yet to adopt that recommendation. In addition, as noted 

above, mother has filed a section 388 petition seeking to have the 

children returned to her care or, alternatively, to have her 

reunification services reinstated. So far as we can tell, her 

petition is still pending. Therefore, whether mother will have to 

establish the beneficial relationship exception applies at all 

remains uncertain. 

In any event, mother’s contention is also incorrect. In 

evaluating the first prong of the three-part test governing the 

beneficial relationship exception, courts consider “whether 

‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent 

permitted by court orders.’” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 

632, italics added.) Thus, we are not convinced mother’s threemonth lapse in visitation resulting directly from a court order 

will foreclose her from establishing she “maintained regular 

visitation and contact with [her] child[ren]” as required to show 

the exception’s applicability. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) 

maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the 

child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
9

In sum, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude this 

appeal has become moot due to the juvenile court’s reinstatement 

of mother’s visitation. Accordingly, we need not address the 

merits of her challenge to the prior orders suspending her visits. 

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed as moot. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, J. 

We concur: 

MANELLA, P.J. 

WILLHITE, J.