[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13272

Non-Argument Calendar

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ANTONIO HALL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SAC WIRELESS, LLC, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-05241-JPB

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13272

Before WILSON, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

We vacate and withdraw our previous opinion dated July 

24, 2024, 2024 WL 3519298, (11th Cir. July 24, 2024), and substitute 

the following opinion.

Plaintiff-Appellant Antonio Hall appeals the district court’s 

order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee 

SAC Wireless, LLC, on Hall’s negligence claim. The district court 

found that SAC Wireless was Hall’s statutory employer under 

Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) and thus was immune from tort liability. After careful review, we affirm. 

I.

SAC Wireless, a subsidiary of Nokia, is often the general 

contractor who works on cellphone towers. In August 2020, SAC 

Wireless installed and removed antennas on a cell phone tower

benefiting a customer. But SAC Wireless does not own any cranes 

to help bring materials to the cell phone tower. SAC Wireless contracted with Maxim Crane Works, L.P., to provide the crane and 

employees to perform the necessary crane work for this project.

Maxim provided the use of a crane, a crane operator, a crane 

oiler, and individuals who help set up and break down the crane. 

Hall was one of those individuals who helped break down the 

crane. When Maxim provided the crane and its employees to SAC 

Wireless, they were under SAC Wireless’s “exclusive jurisdiction, 

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possession, supervision and control.” SAC Wireless told the crane 

operator where the equipment needed to be set up and then to lift 

and lower necessary equipment. SAC Wireless would not have 

been able to complete the job had it not been for the Maxim’s contract to provide the crane, crane operator, and crane oiler. 

After SAC Wireless completed moving the antennas off the 

cell phone tower, Hall had to disassemble the crane to prepare it 

for transport. During the disassembling process, Hall placed his left 

hand on the crane to balance himself just as the crane operator 

caused the crane to touch energized power lines. As a result, Hall 

was electrocuted and was significantly injured. Hall sought and received workers’ compensation benefits from Maxim. 

Hall sued SAC Wireless for negligence and punitive damages. SAC Wireless moved for summary judgment,1 arguing that 

it is entitled to tort immunity under the “statutory employer” doctrine, codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a), such that Hall’s exclusive 

remedy is under the WCA. The district court agreed. Hall timely 

appealed.

II.

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo, viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual 

inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks

1 Hall also moved for partial summary judgment, which the district court denied. 

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omitted). A grant of summary judgment is proper “if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). 

First, Hall argues that he was not an employee of a subcontractor under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a). Second, Hall argues that even 

if Maxim was a subcontractor of SAC Wireless, he was not engaged 

in the subject matter of the contract under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a). 

We find that both arguments fail and address each in turn. 

The WCA “is designed to provide for relief to injured employees, while also protecting employers from excessive recoveries 

of damages.” Savannah Hosp. Servs., LLC v. Scriven, 828 S.E.2d 423, 

425 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). The WCA has an exclusive remedy provision. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a). “Therefore, where the Act applies, it 

provides the employee’s exclusive remedy against his employer 

and precludes recovery on a tort claim by an injured employee 

against his employer.” Teasley v. Freeman, 699 S.E.2d 39, 41 (Ga. Ct. 

App. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).

The statutory employer provision of the WCA states: “A 

principal, intermediate, or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any of 

his subcontractors engaged upon the subject matter of the contract 

to the same extent as the immediate employer.” O.C.G.A. § 34-9-

8(a). This provision “applies only where the principal has contracted to perform certain work for another and has subcontracted 

some or all of that work.” Carr v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 

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733 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). “[T]he statutory employer doctrine permits liability for workers’ compensation benefits to attach 

vicariously against someone other than an injured employee’s employer. In return, the vicariously liable party is immune from tort 

liability for the injury suffered.” Manning v. Ga. Power Co., 314 

S.E.2d 432, 433 (Ga. 1984).

The contract between SAC Wireless and Maxim shows that 

SAC Wireless retained Maxim to provide a crane to assist with SAC 

Wireless’s work on the cell phone towers. Further, like the district 

court correctly noted, SAC Wireless could not have completed the 

work for its customer because it did not have its own cranes or 

those to operate the cranes.2 Thus, SAC Wireless subcontracted 

with Maxim to complete its contract with its customers. As a result, the district court properly found that SAC Wireless was the 

principal contractor and Maxim was the subcontractor with Hall 

being an employee of Maxim.

Next, Hall asserts that because he was disassembling the 

crane, he was not “engaged upon the subject matter of the contract,” O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a), insisting that the breaking down of the 

crane was not part of the contract. This is illogical. SAC Wireless 

did not have cranes that Hall was coming to solely remove; instead, 

Maxim brought the cranes to the job site, stayed and assisted in 

SAC Wireless’s job, and then had to remove the cranes. We agree 

2 Hall also argues that Maxim only provided tools. But that argument lacks 

merit because if SAC Wireless only need the crane, there would not be a contract for personnel to help use the crane. 

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with the district court that “erecting the crane, tending to the needs 

of the crane and disassembling the crane were as much a part of the 

contract as the hoisting activities.” Hall v. SAC Wireless, No. 1:21-

cv-05241-JPB, 2023 WL 5918920, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 11, 2023). 

Thus, Hall’s duties in breaking down the crane were part of the 

subject matter of the contract. 

Accordingly, the district court properly found that SAC 

Wireless was Hall’s statutory employer and entitled to immunity 

from suit. 

AFFIRMED. 

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