UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 03-4137

SHANNON DERRELL WILLIAMS, a/k/a

Doe,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

James R. Spencer, District Judge.

(CR-02-85)

Argued: December 4, 2003

Decided: January 16, 2004

Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, TRAXLER, Circuit Judge, and

Richard D. BENNETT, United States District Judge

for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Christopher Ford Cowan, COWAN & OWEN, P.C.,

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. David T. Maguire, Assistant

United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Michael J. Elston,

Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Shannon Derrell Williams ("Shannon") appeals from his convictions on various drug-related charges, including a conviction for a triple murder committed in connection with his drug activities. Finding

no reversible error, we affirm. 

I.

The record reveals the following facts. Shannon and four other

individuals were named in a multi-count indictment arising out of

their involvement in a loose-knit association of drug dealers that controlled an open-air drug market at the corner of Milton Street and

Maryland Avenue in Richmond, Virginia. The dealers involved in the

drug operation, sometimes referred to as the "M&M Boys" or "Highland Park Boys," had been selling drugs in the area from 1995 to

2001. 

Although the evidence demonstrated that the drug dealers, including Shannon, usually sold crack cocaine individually, they jointly

controlled the area to the exclusion of other drug dealers, chased and

assaulted those who attempted to encroach upon their turf or to steal

drugs from them, benefitted from paid "lookouts" who would yell "5-

O" to alert them to approaching police officers, and sought refuge

within the four primary drug houses on Milton Street — the Williams

house, the Hall house, the Coffey house, and, most frequently, the

Chavis house. In addition, there was testimony that Shannon occasionally supplied the other dealers with crack for sale and that Shannon regularly paid at least one person to transact drug sales on his

behalf when Shannon was approached by buyers that he did not

know.

On November 6, 1998, at approximately 2 a.m., Corey Roberts,

James Sargent, and Leslie Holloman drove to the Milton Street and

2 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
Maryland Avenue area to purchase crack cocaine. Roberts was driving, Sargent was in the front passenger seat, and Holloman was in the

rear seat. Derek Toms, one of the Milton and Maryland drug dealers,

was walking down the street at the time. Shannon was standing on the

porch of the Chavis house with several other dealers. When the car

stopped, Holloman got out of the back seat, approached Toms, and

asked Toms if he had any crack for sale. Toms, who had crack that

he had obtained from Shannon, was about to make the sale when

Shannon walked up behind Toms, pointed a 9mm firearm with a

directional beam over Toms’s shoulder at Holloman and demanded

that Holloman give him his money. Shannon had obtained the gun

earlier from Jemar Jordan, another Milton and Maryland drug dealer,

while the men were hanging out at the Chavis house. Apparently

believing that Shannon was playing around, Holloman brushed the

gun away from his face, at which point Shannon re-aimed the gun at

Holloman and shot him through the right eye. Roberts, who was still

in the driver’s seat, attempted to flee, but Shannon shot him in the

back of the head, causing Roberts to slump forward and collide with

another vehicle. Shannon then walked to the side of the vehicle and

shot Sargent. After shooting Roberts and Sargent, Shannon returned

to Holloman’s body and took money from the victim’s pants pocket.

He then fled the scene. Holloman, Roberts, and Sargent all died from

their gunshot wounds. 

Immediately after the murders, Shannon’s family concocted a false

alibi for him, telling Richmond police that Shannon had been babysitting for his sister at the time of the murders. Shannon’s sister personally confirmed the alibi to local law enforcement at the time. Two

years later, Shannon’s sister again provided this alibi to federal law

enforcement officers, who had by that time joined in the investigation.

But when presented with a federal grand jury subpoena, Shannon’s

sister recanted the false alibi and admitted that she had lied at her

family’s request.

On October 26, 2001, at approximately 2:20 a.m., Richmond police

officers Jean-Guy LeGouffe and Thomas McGovern were patrolling

in a marked police unit when they observed a 1983 Oldsmobile vehicle approaching them on Milton Street. The vehicle had an inoperable

running light in the front. The officers pulled in behind the vehicle

and activated their emergency lights. After turning onto another street

UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 3
and driving the length of three or four houses, the driver of the Oldsmobile finally pulled to the side of the road. Although repeatedly

instructed to remain in the vehicle, the driver exited the vehicle,

stopped, and momentarily looked at Officer LeGouffe while playing

with a black plastic bag in his hand. When Officer LeGouffe, who had

also exited his patrol car, began to approach the driver, the driver ran

from the scene. Both Officer LeGouffe and Officer McGovern gave

chase. Officer McGovern nearly caught the fleeing suspect, but fell

just as he reached forward to grab him. Almost simultaneously, Officer McGovern saw the driver throw the black plastic bag and,

although the officers were ultimately unable to apprehend the driver,

Officer McGovern was able to immediately retrieve the black plastic

bag from where it had been thrown. 

The black plastic bag was subsequently confirmed to contain

200.987 grams of cocaine base and a handheld digital scale. A search

of the vehicle revealed a number of documents bearing Shannon’s

name, and Officer McGovern identified Shannon as being the driver

of the vehicle from a mug shot obtained from police records. It was

determined that the Oldsmobile was registered in the name of Dorothy Williams, a family friend of Shannon. Ms. Williams later testified

that she had registered the vehicle in her name at Shannon’s request

and that the vehicle was driven primarily by Shannon. A set of keys

found in the ignition contained a key to the front door of the house

where Shannon lived at the time. Ms. Williams also testified that

Shannon’s mother called her at some point and told her that the car

had been stolen. Ms. Williams reported the vehicle stolen to the

police as a result, but Shannon later told her "that he had got stopped

about two [in the morning] and he ran because he was dirty." J.A.

300. Ms. Williams testified that she no longer believed the vehicle

was stolen after that, but she never contacted the police to retract her

theft report. 

In February 2002, after Officers LeGouffe and McGovern had

recovered the 200.987 grams of crack cocaine, ATF Special Agent

Brian Swann obtained a federal warrant for Shannon’s arrest for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Shannon was arrested

on February 21, 2002, at which time officers found 3.27 grams of

crack cocaine in his pants pocket. When questioned, Shannon admitted that, "You caught me red-handed with coke." J.A. 316. 

4 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
Following a bench trial, Shannon was convicted of one count of

conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base at the

Milton and Maryland open air drug market (Count I), see 21 U.S.C.A.

§ 846 (West 1999); one count of possession with intent to distribute

50 grams or more of cocaine base, arising from the crack cocaine

recovered during the October 2001 traffic stop (Count II), see 21

U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 1999); one count of possession with

intent to distribute cocaine base, arising out of the crack cocaine

recovered from Shannon’s pocket during the February 2002 arrest

(Count III), see 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1); three counts of murder while

engaged in a drug conspiracy involving more than 50 grams of

cocaine base (Counts VII through IX), see 21 U.S.C.A.

§ 848(e)(1)(A)(West 1999); and one count of use of a firearm during

and in relation to a drug conspiracy, resulting in death (Count X), see

18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) and (j) (West 2000). Shannon was sentenced to

life imprisonment on Counts I, II, VII, VIII, and IX, to run concurrently with each other, to 240 months imprisonment on Count III to

run concurrently with the former, and to life imprisonment on Count

X to run consecutively. Shannon appeals his conviction and sentence

on numerous grounds. For the reasons below, we find no reversible

error and affirm. 

II.

A.

Shannon first argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the October

2001 traffic stop and, in particular, the 200.987 grams of cocaine base

that was recovered from the black plastic bag. We review the district

court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de

novo. See United States v. Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666, 671 (4th Cir. 2003).

We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. See id.

The crux of Shannon’s claim is that the evidence from the traffic

stop was improperly admitted by the district court because the traffic

stop was not based on probable cause or a reasonable and articulable

suspicion of criminal activity. Because a traffic stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, such

UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 5
stops must be reasonable under the circumstances. See Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). "As a general matter, the

decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have

probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred," id., or

"a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal

activity may be afoot." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)

(internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating the existence of reasonable suspicion, we consider "the totality of the circumstances"

known to the officer at the time of the stop. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8

(internal quotation marks omitted). The subjective intentions or motivations of the officer for stopping the vehicle do not affect the validity

of the stop. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; United States v. Hassan El,

5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993). As long as the officer has a reasonable suspicion that even a minor traffic offense has occurred or is

occurring, the stop of the vehicle is constitutionally permissible. See

Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 730. 

In this case, the patrolling officers observed an inoperable running

light on the front of the Oldsmobile vehicle. Officer LeGouffe

believed that the light also functioned as the turn signal and hazard

light. After the stop and some additional inquiry, however, it was

determined that the inoperable light was a combination light designed

to operate as a parking lamp, turn signal, and hazard light. The light

had a single bulb, but the bulb had two filaments. One filament operated the parking lamp function and another filament operated the turn

signal and hazard light function. Accordingly, it turned out that Officer LeGouffe was factually mistaken in his belief that, because the

parking lamp was inoperable, the vehicle’s turn signal and hazard

lights were also inoperable. 

The district court ruled that, although the inoperable running light

alone did not violate Virginia law, Officers LeGouffe and McGovern

had a reasonable suspicion that Virginia law was being violated. We

agree. Having observed the inoperable parking light, the officers

had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the vehicle was being

operated in violation of Virginia’s law requiring that the vehicle possess operational turn signals in the front and rear. See Va. Code Ann.

§ 46.2-1038 (Michie 2002);1 Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-1003 (Michie

1At oral argument, Shannon contended for the first time that Virginia

law did not require the Oldsmobile to have operable electrical turn sig6 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
2002).2

 The fact that the officers were factually mistaken did not render the stop illegal. See United States v. Chantahsouxat, 342 F.3d

1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[A]n officer’s reasonable mistake of

fact may provide the objective grounds for reasonable suspicion or

probable cause required to justify a traffic stop, but an officer’s mistake of law may not."). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s

denial of Shannon’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the

wake of the traffic stop. 

B.

Prior to trial, Shannon moved to suppress Officer LeGouffe’s incourt identification of Shannon as the driver of the 1983 Oldsmobile

stopped in October 2001. Shannon argued that LeGouffe should not

be allowed to identify him at trial because LeGouffe’s pre-trial identification of Shannon was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise

to a substantial likelihood of misidentification at trial. 

When considering whether in-court identification testimony is

admissible, the court employs a two-step analysis. The court examines whether the pretrial procedure was impermissibly suggestive and,

nals. To the extent we would consider this eleventh-hour argument, we

reject it. Although Virginia statutes submitted to us after oral argument

appear at first blush to allow drivers to employ either hand signals or

electrical turn signals, as argued by counsel, the statutes go on to quite

clearly provide that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to drive on any

highway a motor vehicle registered in the Commonwealth and manufactured or assembled after January 1, 1955, unless such vehicle is

equipped with [electrical] turn signals on both front and rear," Va. Code

Ann. § 46.2-1038(B), and that "[n]o front turn signal . . . shall be

required on vehicles manufactured before January 1, 1943," Va. Code

Ann. § 46.2-1039. The Oldsmobile stopped by Officers LeGouffe and

McGovern was a 1983 model. 

2

See Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-1003 (Michie 2002) ("It shall be unlawful

for any person to use or have as equipment on a motor vehicle operated

on a highway any device or equipment mentioned in § 46.2-1002 which

is defective or in an unsafe condition."); Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-1002

(Michie 2002) (setting forth such equipment as including "any lighting

device, warning device, [or] signal device"). 

UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 7
if so, whether the identification was reliable in any event. See United

States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1996). In determining

the reliability of the identification evidence, the court considers a

number of factors, specifically 

(1) the witness’ opportunity to view the perpetrator at the

time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at the

time of the offense; (3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior

description of the perpetrator; (4) the witness’ level of certainty when identifying the defendant as the perpetrator at

the time of the confrontation; and (5) the length of time

between the crime and the confrontation. These factors are

weighed against the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. 

Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Manson

v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (rejecting per se exclusionary

rule for suggestive out-of-court identification processes and concluding "that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of

identification testimony").

Officer LeGouffe testified that immediately after pulling behind the

Oldsmobile, he stood face-to-face with the driver of the vehicle on a

well-lit street a half-car length away for several moments before the

driver began to run. In addition, Officer LeGouffe was no "casual or

passing observer, as is so often the case with eyewitness identification." Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. He "was a trained police officer on

duty," who "could be expected to pay scrupulous attention to detail."

Id. at 115. Shortly after the stop, Officer LeGouffe was presented with

a one-inch by one-inch, black-and-white mug shot of Shannon and

documents recovered from the vehicle bearing Shannon’s name. At

that time, LeGouffe identified Shannon as the driver from the small

photograph, but he admitted that the mug shot was too small to identify Shannon on that basis alone. At the pretrial proceeding in October

2002, however, LeGouffe testified that Shannon "appear[ed] to look

just like" the driver he encountered that night, although he "ha[d]

more facial hair than [he] remember[ed]." J.A. 88. And, at trial,

LeGouffe again testified that Shannon appeared to be the driver that

he observed that night. 

8 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
Much is made of the fact that Officer LeGouffe also completed an

incident report after the encounter describing the driver of the vehicle

as 5’9" to 5’10", 145 to 150 pounds, and dark-skinned, whereas police

records indicated that Shannon was 5’11" or 6’, 195 pounds, and

light-skinned. However, we view these discrepancies between Officer

LeGouffe’s initial description of the driver and the defendant’s actual

appearance as described by other police records to be minor ones

under the circumstances, particularly when weighed alongside the

other factors for consideration. Officer LeGouffe testified that he

looked at the driver’s face and hands in the moments before he ran

and, to the extent one would place emphasis upon the variations, they

were matters appropriately considered by the district court as factfinder in weighing the identification testimony, not in determining its

admissibility. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to allow Officer LeGouffe, a trained police officer who had clear occasion to observe the driver that night, to offer

the in-court identification of Shannon as the driver of the vehicle. 

C.

Shannon next challenges the district court’s refusal to grant his

motion to quash Counts II and III and to dismiss the indictment as a

whole. The district court has discretion to dismiss an indictment on

the basis of a defect in instituting the prosecution or a defect in the

indictment or information when the defendant shows that he has been

prejudiced by the irregularity. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3); United

States v. Brewer, 1 F.3d 1430, 1433 (4th Cir. 1993). 

After Officers LeGouffe and McGovern recovered the 200.987

grams of crack cocaine thrown by Shannon when he fled the traffic

stop in October 2001, ATF Special Agent Swann executed an affidavit and criminal complaint seeking Shannon’s arrest for possession

with intent to distribute crack cocaine. A warrant for his arrest was

then issued. Shannon was arrested pursuant to the warrant on February 21, 2002, at which time officers found 3.27 grams of crack

cocaine in his pants pocket. These two drug possessions led to Shannon’s indictment for Counts II and III, respectively. 

The criminal complaint executed by Agent Swann was dated February 20, 2002. However, Agent Swann’s accompanying affidavit

UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 9
possessed no specific date, bearing instead an unexecuted date line of

"___ day of April 2000." J.A. 155. On appeal, Shannon asserts that

the missing date on the affidavit renders the affidavit defective and

the criminal complaint a legal nullity because it was impossible, in

April 2000, for Agent Swann to attest to Shannon’s possession of

crack cocaine in October 2001. Accordingly, Shannon contends that

Counts II and III of the indictment are defective and should have been

dismissed. In addition, Shannon contends that, because the incarceration resulting from the unlawful arrest allowed law enforcement officers to persuade his family members and others to implicate him in

the drug conspiracy, homicide, and firearm counts (Counts I, VII-X),

they too are tainted by the date error, and the entire indictment should

have been dismissed. 

Shannon offers no direct challenge to the grand jury indictment

returned against him and suggests no error occurred during those proceedings. Rather, he challenges his arrest pursuant to the warrant

which preceded his indictment. Like the district court, we are wholly

unpersuaded by this argument, which counsel freely acknowledges

has no precedential support. 

The Criminal Complaint executed by Agent Swann, and sworn and

subscribed to in the presence of the United States Magistrate Judge,

is dated February 20, 2002, and refers to the October 26, 2001 traffic

stop. The Affidavit bearing the unexecuted date of "___ day of April,

2000" is entitled "Attachment ‘A’" and is a continuation of the narrative portion of the Complaint. J.A. 155-56. We are satisfied that the

incorrect and unexecuted date preceding the Magistrate Judge’s signature on this attachment to the Criminal Complaint was completely

innocent and more than likely resulted from the use of an old form

someone else had started filling out for another case. This error was

simply overlooked by the Magistrate Judge, who had already executed the properly dated first page. Furthermore, to the extent Shannon could make a case that this minor error in the attachment to the

criminal complaint somehow rendered his subsequent indictment

defective (which he has not), Shannon has failed to demonstrate how

he was prejudiced by the mistake. Accordingly, the district court did

not err in denying the motion. 

10 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
D.

Shannon next asserts that the district court abused its discretion in

denying his request for the appointment of new counsel. We review

a district court’s denial of a motion for substitution of counsel for an

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891, 895

(4th Cir. 1994). 

Shannon first asked the district court to appoint new counsel to represent him because his attorneys were not telling him what was

"going on with [his] case" and because his lead counsel had not

"show[n] much interest in [the] case." J.A. 72-73. On August 6, 2002,

the district court denied the motion, noting that counsel was experienced and competent and that Shannon’s complaint was not sufficient

to warrant new appointed counsel. Undeterred, Shannon claimed, by

letter dated August 19, 2002, that his attorneys were ineffective

because they had failed to notice that the indictment was not signed

by the grand jury foreperson. The district court denied this second

request for new counsel as well, noting that the indictment had, in

fact, been signed and finding that Shannon had failed to provide a

legally cognizable reason to remove counsel. 

A defendant does not have an absolute right to substitution of

counsel. See id. In determining whether the district court abused its

discretion in denying a defendant’s motion to substitute counsel, we

consider (1) the "timeliness of the motion," (2) the "adequacy of the

court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint," and (3) "whether the

attorney/client conflict was so great that it had resulted in total lack

of communication preventing an adequate defense." Id.

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of

Shannon’s requests for new counsel. After Shannon filed his first

motion, the district court conducted a hearing and gave Shannon the

opportunity to fully explain in person his reasons for dissatisfaction

with his counsel. After Shannon filed his second motion, the district

court issued an order explaining that the indictment was indeed signed

and directing the clerk to personally provide Shannon with a copy of

the original, signed indictment. Thus, the district court conducted an

adequate inquiry into Shannon’s complaints and responded appropriately. Having carefully reviewed the record we are satisfied that,

UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 11
although Shannon was generally dissatisfied as to the level of communication he was receiving from his counsel, he failed to demonstrate a conflict so great as to create a total lack of communication

between himself and counsel. 

E.

Shannon next asserts that the district court erred in admitting into

evidence the 200.987 grams of cocaine base because the chain of custody was fatally defective. We review the trial court’s determination

that an adequate chain of custody has been established for an abuse

of discretion. See United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 366

(4th Cir. 1982). 

Proving the chain of custody of evidence as a threshold requirement to its admissibility establishes that the evidence sought to be

introduced is what it purports to be. See id.; Fed. R. Evid. 901 ("The

requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a

finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.").

However, a missing link in the chain of custody "does not prevent the

admission of real evidence, so long as there is sufficient proof that the

evidence is what it purports to be and has not been altered in any

material aspect." Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d at 366. The ultimate question is "whether the authentication testimony was sufficiently complete so as to convince the court that it is improbable that the original

item had been exchanged with another or otherwise tampered with."

Id.

After the October 2001 traffic stop and ensuing chase, Officer

LeGouffe testified that he placed the suspected drugs in the Property

Section at the police department. He later submitted the drugs to the

State Lab for analysis and, after the lab completed the analysis,

returned the drugs to the Property Room. Shannon’s argument focuses

on Officer LeGouffe’s testimony that, based on a conversation he had

with Officer Michael Spinos, he believed Officer Spinos might also

have taken the drugs recovered to the lab at some later point for an

additional test. However, Officer Spinos, who testified later, did not

testify that he transported the 200.987 grams of crack cocaine to the

lab. Rather, he testified that he twice transported the 3.27 grams of

12 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
crack cocaine (recovered when Shannon was arrested in February

2002) to the state lab, which was confirmed by the forensic scientist’s

testimony that the 3.27 grams had indeed been submitted for analysis

on two occasions. 

Having carefully reviewed the record, we do not view Officer

LeGouffe’s testimony as establishing a "gap" in the chain of custody

for the 200.987 grams of crack cocaine. Even if it did, however, we

would affirm its admission. There is no evidence or indication that the

200.987 grams of crack cocaine recovered by Officer LeGouffe and

Officer McGovern was tampered with at any time, and Officer

LeGouffe testified that the evidence appeared to be the same as when

it was recovered by them. Accordingly, we hold that the district court

did not err in concluding that the government had sufficiently satisfied the requirements for establishing chain of custody and in admitting the crack cocaine into evidence. 

F.

Next, Shannon challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for Counts I, II, and VII-X. In determining the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, this court must

determine whether "there is substantial evidence, taking the view

most favorable to the Government, to support it." Glasser v. United

States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see also United States v. Perry, 335

F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 2003). "[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that

a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to

support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt." United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en

banc). 

With regard to Count I, we conclude that the evidence, set forth

above and viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, was

more than sufficient to support the finding that Shannon was a member of a drug conspiracy operation that distributed far in excess of 50

grams of crack cocaine. Like the other dealers operating at Milton and

Maryland, Shannon moved freely among the drug houses, sold drugs

directly to customers, and benefitted from the joint efforts to protect

the drug market, sometimes by violence, from law enforcement, rival

dealers, and thieves. In addition, there was testimony that Shannon in

UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 13
particular would, at times, supply drugs to the other dealers and personally used at least one intermediary to sell drugs to customers that

he did not know. 

With regard to Count II, there was more than sufficient evidence

upon which to find that Shannon was the person who drove the Oldsmobile and then threw away the 200.987 grams of crack cocaine

while being pursued by Officers LeGouffe and McGovern in October

2001. The Oldsmobile, registered in a family friend’s name at Shannon’s request, was usually driven by Shannon and, on the night in

question, contained numerous documents bearing his name and a set

of keys that included Shannon’s house key. In addition, several witnesses testified that Shannon told them he had been stopped or chased

by the police and had to "throw" his crack. 

With regard to the murder charges contained within Counts VII

through IX, and related firearm offense charged in Count X, we also

find sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions. Indeed, Shannon

does not contest on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence that he

murdered the three men. Rather, he argues that the evidence was

insufficient to establish that the murders were committed while

engaged in a violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A), as required by

21 U.S.C.A. § 848, and not the result of a routine armed robbery. 

Section 848(e)provides as follows: 

(1) In addition to the other penalties set forth in this section — 

(A) any person engaging in or working in furtherance of

a continuing criminal enterprise, or any person engaging in

an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A) . . . who

intentionally kills . . . an individual . . . shall be sentenced

to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be less than

20 years, and which may be up to life imprisonment, or may

be sentenced to death. . . ." 

21 U.S.C.A. § 848(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). A conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of

14 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
crack cocaine is "an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A)."

Id.; see 21 U.S.C.A. § 846.3 Accordingly, we reject Shannon’s contention that murder committed while a defendant is engaged in a conspiracy involving the distribution of in excess of 50 grams of crack

cocaine is not punishable under Section 848(e)(1)(A). 

We likewise reject Shannon’s contention that the evidence was

insufficient to support the finding that the murders were related to a

drug trafficking offense as opposed to a random act of violence occurring during an unrelated armed robbery. At the time of the murders,

the victims were seeking drugs. Indeed, Toms was in the process of

selling one victim crack cocaine that he had obtained from Shannon

while the other two victims waited in the vehicle. After the murders,

Shannon gave a number of different motives for killing the three men.

He told his girlfriend that he killed the men because he believed they

were undercover police officers. He told one of his co-conspirators

that he was "too drunk" at the time. He told another man that the victims "came around here trying to score or whatever, but they had a

little money and they was trying to play him." J.A. 626. And his

brother Andre, who also questioned Shannon about it, testified Shannon "didn’t have no exact reason of why he did it." J.A. 455. 

Based upon this evidence, a rational trier of fact reasonably could

have concluded that the murders were intertwined with the crack

cocaine trafficking taking place at Milton and Maryland during the

relevant time frame. For the same reasons, we also reject Shannon’s

argument that the related firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 924(c) and (j) cannot stand because the murders occurred during the

course of a random armed robbery and not a drug trafficking offense.

G.

Shannon’s final claim is that the district court committed reversible

error in its calculation of the drug quantities for which he was held

accountable for purposes of sentencing. We review the district court’s

3

"Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense

defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those

prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the

attempt or conspiracy." 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1999). 

UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 15
drug quantity determination for clear error. See United States v.

Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 55 (4th Cir. 1996). 

In this case, Shannon was convicted of participating in a crack distribution conspiracy that lasted at least six years. A number of witnesses testified as to discrete amounts of crack cocaine that they

personally observed Shannon selling, or that they sold on his behalf,

as well as to the frequency of these regular transactions. Having carefully reviewed this testimony, we conclude that the trial court did not

err in its calculations of drug quantity and, in fact, appears to have

been conservative in its calculation.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences

on all counts.

AFFIRMED.

16 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS