UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________________________

DAVID TYLER MONTALDI,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 15-cv-12452

DUNCAN MACLAREN, 

Respondent.

________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RELEASE ON BOND 

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the court are two motions filed by Petitioner David Tyler Montaldi, 

a motion for summary judgment and motion for release on bond. For the reasons 

explained below, the court will deny both motions. 

II. BACKGROUND

In 2015, Petitioner David Tyler Montaldi filed a petition for the writ of habeas 

corpus. (ECF No. 1.) In the petition, he challenges his state convictions for two counts 

of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b(1)(a), and one 

count of first-degree child abuse, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.136b(2). Petitioner raises

four claims in his petition: (1) there was insufficient evidence that he sexually penetrated 

the complainant; (2) expert witnesses improperly stated their medical opinions that the 

complainant had been physically abused, and trial counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective for failing to object; (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective legal assistance by 

failing to investigate and present a substantial defense; and (4) the prosecutor relied on 
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false testimony and made improper comments to the jury during opening statements 

and closing arguments. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3-4.)

About five weeks after Petitioner filed his habeas petition, he moved for a stay of 

the federal proceeding so that he could exhaust additional state remedies. (ECF No. 6.) 

On September 10, 2015, the court granted Petitioner's motion for a stay and closed this 

case for administrative purposes. (ECF No. 8.) 

In 2018, Petitioner filed a combined supplemental petition for the writ of habeas 

corpus and a motion to re-open this case. (ECF No. 12.) He presents the following 

arguments in his supplemental petition: (1) the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims 

which he raised on state collateral review are new claims that have never been 

adjudicated on their merits and, therefore, warrant de novo review; (2) trial counsel’s 

failure to interview any prosecution witnesses before trial constructively deprived him of 

his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; (3) trial counsel failed to adequately consult 

expert witnesses; (4) trial counsel failed to object to, or challenge, the admission of a 

voice recording that contradicted Petitioner’s initial explanation for the incident with the 

complainant; (5) the prosecutor violated Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to remain 

silent by stating to the jury that Petitioner was protecting himself in the courtroom and 

that Petitioner refused to inform anyone besides his father what happened to the 

complainant; and (6) his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to raise these 

issues on direct appeal. 

The court granted Petitioner’s motion to re-open this case (ECF No. 13), and on 

April 25, 2019, the State filed a responsive pleading. (ECF No. 17). Now before the 
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court are Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 23) and his motion for 

release on bond. (ECF No. 30). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Petitioner seeks summary judgment on his claims that trial counsel failed to (i) 

interview prosecution witnesses, (ii) adequately investigate a trial strategy, and (iii) 

object to the admission of an audio recording. Petitioner also seeks summary judgment 

on his claim that the prosecutor invited the jury to infer Petitioner’s guilt by stating that 

Petitioner was protecting himself in the courtroom. 

A motion for summary judgment “presumes the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009). The court 

must “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). The summary judgment standard applies to habeas proceedings:

The court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the non-moving party, and determine “whether the evidence 

presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or 

whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). The party 

bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the 

record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material 

facts. Mt. Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc.,

276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2002). Once that occurs, the party opposing 

the motion then may not “rely on the hope that the trier of fact will 

disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact” but must make an 

affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. 

Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989).

Alexander, 576 F.3d at 558. 
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Here, there are several factual disputes which preclude summary judgment. For 

example, factual disputes exist regarding whether Petitioner exhausted state remedies 

for all his claims or procedurally defaulted some claims. There are also factual disputes 

on Petitioner’s substantive grounds for relief, such as the extent and adequacy of trial 

counsel’s investigation, preparation for trial, and cross-examination of witnesses during 

the trial. Additionally, other factual disputes include whether Petitioner told his trial 

attorney not to investigate a “dog-did-it” defense, whether the audio recording was 

authenticated, and whether trial counsel’s reasons for not objecting to the admission of 

the audio recording was part of his trial strategy. Still another disputed fact is whether 

the prosecutor’s comment that Petitioner was protecting himself in the courtroom was a 

reference to Petitioner’s failure to testify and whether the remark was deliberate or 

merely a casual, offhand comment to the jury.

In his reply brief, Petitioner acknowledges that his version of the facts differs from 

that of the State. (ECF No. 26, PageID.4141-4143.) Summary judgment is not

appropriate in light of these factual disputes. Nor is summary judgment appropriate

because Petitioner fails to show that the evidence is so one-sided that he must prevail 

as a matter of law. The court will deny Petitioner’s motion.

B. Motion for Release on Bond

In his motion for release on bond, Petitioner alleges that his petition contains 

substantial constitutional claims and that he has a significant chance of succeeding on 

the merits of his claims. He also contends that his petition has been pending for a 

substantial amount of time and that the petition is likely to remain unresolved for an 

additional substantial amount of time. 
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While it is true that “28 U.S.C. § 2243 imposes a specific duty on the court to 

summarily hear and dispose of habeas corpus petitions,” McClellan v. Young, 421 F.2d 

690, 691 (6th Cir. 1970), Petitioner has been tried, convicted, and sentenced in state 

court. He now attacks his convictions in a collateral proceeding and, as such, “a greater 

showing of special reasons for admission to bail pending review [is] required.” Aronson 

v. May, 85 S. Ct. 3, 5 (1964). To justify release on bond under these circumstances, 

Petitioner must demonstrate “not only a substantial claim of law based on the facts 

surrounding the petition but also the existence of ‘some circumstance making [the 

motion for bail] exceptional and deserving of special treatment in the interests of 

justice.’” Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 77, 79 (6th Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) 

(quoting Aronson, 85 S. Ct. 3). This is a high bar that few petitioners can meet. Id.; see 

also Lee v. Jabe, 989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993). 

Here, even though Petitioner may have alleged substantial claims in his habeas 

petition, he “has not demonstrated any unusual circumstances warranting the relief 

requested.” Greenup v. Snyder, 57 F. App’x 620, 622 (6th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the 

court will deny his motion for bond. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is 

entitled to relief on either motion. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 23) 

and motion for release on bond (ECF No. 30) are DENIED.

s/Robert H. Cleland /

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 20, 2020
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record 

on this date, March 20, 2020, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. 

s/Lisa Wagner /

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(810) 292-6522

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