### COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED July 18, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Court of Appeals NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See W IS . S TAT . § 808.10 and R ULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP1234 Cir. Ct. No. 2020PR3 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT III

I N RE THE ESTATE OF M ARTIN Z OLONDICK :
M ARY T APS , A PPELLANT ,
V . T HE E STATE OF M ARTIN Z OLONDICK , R ESPONDENT , A LLY B ANK , C REDITOR - R ESPONDENT .

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Marinette County: JANE M. SEQUIN , Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause remanded with directions

.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.No. 2022AP1234

2 Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in W IS . S TAT . R ULE 809.23(3).
¶ 1 PER CURIAM. At the time of his dea th, Martin Zolondick 1 owned checking and savings accounts at Ally Bank (“Ally”) , along with a large number of certificate of deposit (“ CD ”) accounts

. Following Martin’s death, Ally transferred approximately $256,000 from those accounts to Mary Taps , consi stent with the beneficiary designations show n in Ally’s internal records. Martin’s estate (“the Estate”) subsequently challenged the distributions to Taps , and the circuit court concluded that the funds in question should be remitted to the Estate

. ¶ 2 Taps now appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred by concluding that the funds in question were not controlled by a “governing instrument,” as that term is defined in W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.01(2) (2021

- 22). 2 Taps further argues that the relevant governing instruments “effectively dispose[d] of” the funds in Martin’s
accounts because there is competent evidence showing that Martin intended that
money to be distributed to Taps upon his death. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.07(3). Accordingly, Taps asserts that Ally properly distributed the funds to her

. ¶ 3 We conclude that the circuit court erred with respect to Martin’s checking and savings accounts. Those accounts were subject to governing instruments, as there is competent evide nce that Martin intended to create payable on death (“POD”) accounts. Furthermore, the governing instruments effectively

1 For clarity and ease of reading, after our initial references to Martin Zolondick and his family members, we will refer to them by their first names.

2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021

- 22 version unless otherwise noted.No. 2022AP1234

3 disposed of the funds in the checking and savings accounts because there is competent evidence that Martin intended the money to be distributed to Taps following his death. We therefore reverse that portion of the court’s judgment requiring the funds from the checking and savings accounts to be remitted to the Estate. We remand for the court to determine the amount of money to which Taps is entitled from those accounts and to award Taps that amount

. ¶ 4 With respect to Martin’s CD accounts, we assume, without deciding, that the funds in those accounts were subject to governing instruments. We conclude, however, that the circuit court properly determined there was no competent evidence of Martin’s intent regarding the disposition of the funds in th e CD accounts. Consequently, the relevant governing instruments did not “effectively dispose of” the funds in the CD accounts. See id. We therefore affirm that portion of the court’s judgment requiring the funds from the CD accounts to be remitted to the Estate.

BACKGROUND
¶ 5 Martin died intestate on December 25, 2019. He was survived by his three ch ildren

— Adrienne Zolondick, Steven Zolondick, and Karen Granger

. Martin was also survived by Taps, who was his girlfriend and had lived with him for approximately thirty

- eight years

. ¶ 6 At the time of his death, Martin owned 333 CDs (each in the principal amount of $1,000), a checking account, and a savings account at Ally , an online bank

. It is undisputed that at the time of Martin’s death, Taps was listed in Ally’s inter n al records as the sole POD beneficiary for the checking account, th e savings account, and 228 of the CDs. It is further undisputed that Ally’s recordsNo. 2022AP1234

4 listed six POD beneficiaries for each of the remaining 105 CDs : Taps, Adrienne, Steven, Karen, and Martin’s grandchildren Tayla Zolondick 3 and Ari Zolondick

. ¶ 7 Following Martin’s death, Ally distributed $256,426. 77 from his accounts to Taps. Taps then invested th at money in four CDs at Ally. Ally distributed approximately $18,000 to each of the other five named benefi ciaries of Martin’s accounts.
¶ 8 The Estate subsequently challenge d Ally’s distribution s to Taps , filing a petition asking the circuit court to determine whether any person had “concealed, stolen, conveyed, or disposed of property of the estate

. ” 4 See W IS

. S TAT

. § 879.61. During the circuit court proceedings, the parties stipulated that Ally had distributed the funds from Martin’s accounts in a manner consistent with the POD beneficiary designations s hown in its internal records. The Estate argued , however, that the funds distributed to Taps were not controlled by any “governing instrument,” as that term is defined in W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.01(2), and were there fore subject to probate and should have be en paid to the Estate. The Estate further argued that there w as no “competent evidence” of Martin’s intent regarding the disposition of the funds in his various Ally accou nts.
¶ 9 Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court issued a written decision and order . The court made a number of factual findings, which are

3 Throughout t he appellate record, this individual’s first name is variously spelled “Tayla,” “Talya,” and “Talia.” The parties do not dispute that these spellings all refer to the same individual, who is one of Martin’s grandchildren. Following the circuit court’s le ad, we will refer to this individual as “Tayla,” which reflects the spelling that Martin provided to an Ally representative during a recorded Ja nu ary 12, 2019 phone call.

4 The Estate did not challenge Ally’s distributions to Martin’s children and grandch ildren.No. 2022AP1234

5 discussed in greater detail below. Based on those factual findings, the court concluded that the funds in Martin’s Ally accounts were “not subject to a governing instrument as defined by” W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.01(2 )

. The court also agreed with the Estate that there was no “competent evidence” regarding Martin’s intent as to the disposition of the funds in the Ally accounts

. The court t herefore ordered that the funds “shall be remitted to the Estate.”
¶ 10 The circuit court subsequently entered a judgment reiterating that the “[f]unds currently being held by [Ally,] which reflect assets of [Martin] transferred to [Taps] by POD Designation, shall be remitted to the Estate. ” However, the court stayed t he enforcement of its judgment pending the resolution of this appeal.
¶ 11 Additional facts are included below as relevant to our discussion of the parties’ arguments

.
DISCUSSION

I. Applicable legal principles
¶ 12 On appeal, we will uphold the circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly err oneous. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 805.17(2). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Phelps v. P hysicians Ins. Co. of Wis. , 2009 WI 74, ¶39, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615. Whether the facts fulfill a particular legal standard, however, is a question of law that we review independently. “ K ” Care, Inc. v. Town of Lac du Flambeau , 181 Wis. 2d 59, 65, 510 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1993)

. ¶ 13 In this appeal , the first question is whether the funds in Martin’s Ally
accounts were subject to governing instruments. It appears to be undisputed that, if the funds were not subject to governing instr uments, they should have beenNo. 2022AP1234

6 distributed to the Estate. The term “governing instrument” includes “ an instrument under [ W IS

. S TAT .] ch. 70 5.” W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.01(2) . An instrument under ch. 705 , in turn, includes a POD account. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 705.02(1)( b)

. ¶ 14 Thus, to determine whether the funds in Martin’s Ally accounts were subject to governing instruments, we must address whether Martin created valid POD accou nts under Wisconsin law. L anguage “in substantially the followi ng form ” is effective to create a POD account “ when conspicuously printed or typewritten immediately above or adjacent to the place for the signatures of the parties to the account :” “ THIS ACCOUNT/CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT IS O WNED BY THE PARTY NAMED HEREON. UPON THE DEATH OF SUCH PARTY, OWNERSHIP PASSES TO THE P.O.D. BENEFICIARY(IES) NAMED HEREON. ” W IS

. S TAT

. § 705.02(1)(b). Alternatively,

[a] ny deposit made to an acco unt created on or after July 1, 1975, and within the scop e of this subchapter, which account is not evidenced by an agreement containing language in substantial conformity with this section

... shall nonetheless be deemed to create

... [a] P.O.D. relationship

... in accordance with whatever competent evidence is avail able concerning the depo sitor’ s intent at the time the account was created.

Sec. 705.02(3).
¶ 15 If Martin did create valid POD accounts

— that is, if governing instruments did control the disposition of the funds in Martin’s accounts

— then the next question is whether those governing instruments effectively disposed of the money in Martin’s accounts

. “ If a governing instrument other than a will does not effectively dispose of an asset that is governed by the instrument, that asset shall be paid o r distributed to the transferor’ s probate estate. ” W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.07(3). The parties appear to agree that, in order to determine whether any governingNo. 2022AP1234

7 instruments in this case effectively disposed of the funds in Martin’s accounts, we
must decide whether there is competent evidence of Martin’s int ent regarding the beneficiary designations for his accounts

. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 705.02(3).

I I
. Martin’s checking and savings accounts
¶ 16 It is undisputed that Martin’s checking and saving s accounts at Ally

were not evidenced by any provision in substantial conformity with the language set forth in W IS

. S TAT

. § 705.02(1)(b). Nevertheless, a deposit made to those accounts on or after July 1, 1975, was sufficient to create a POD relationship “ in accordance with whatever competent evidence is available concerning [Martin’s] intent at the time the account was created .” See § 705.02(3).
¶ 17 The parties agree that Ally’s internal records show that Martin’s checking and savings accounts were POD accounts. During the evidentiary hearing, Ally submitted Exhibits 1, 2, and 25. Jacqueline Lemm a, a manager at Ally , testified that Exhibit 1 is the “full account history” for each of Martin’s Ally
accounts. Lemma testified that Exhibit 2 is a list of Martin’s Ally accounts at the time of his death, with the acco unt beneficiaries identified. Lemma explained that Exhibits 1 and 2 were created “ to accurately identify the accounts that were still active at [Martin’s] death and who the beneficiary was ” for each account.
¶ 18 Lemma further testified that Exhibit 25 is a “screenshot” from Ally’s internal system, which shows “the summary of the decedent’s account [s] at the time of his death

... as well as sho wing that all the accounts were listed as POD.” Exhibit 25 also lists the beneficiaries for each account, as reflecte d in Ally’s internal records.No. 2022AP1234

8 ¶ 19 Exhibit 1 shows that Martin’s checking account was opened on February 17, 2016 , and his savings account was opened on December 16, 2015

. Exhibit 25 shows the same opening dates for both accounts and lists the account type for each as “Single with POD Beneficiary

. ” Although Ally’s internal records do not specifically indicate that the checki ng and savings accounts were designated as POD accounts on the dates they were opened , t here is no evidence in the record to suggest that the checking and savings accounts were ever anything other than POD accounts.
¶ 20 More importantly , Ex hibit 1 shows that Taps was named the sole beneficiary of Martin’s checki ng account on March 19, 2018. Exhibit 1 also shows that Taps was named the sole beneficiary of Martin’s savings account on May 24, 2016

. Taps was subsequently removed as the benefic iary of Mar tin’s savings account on August 11, 2017, but she was renamed the sole beneficiary of that account the same day. Martin’s designation of Taps as the beneficiary for his checking and savings accounts provides competent evidence that he created P OD accounts as of the dates the beneficiary designations were made , even if the accounts were not POD accounts when they were initially opened.
¶ 21 Moreover, the record contains a partial recording and transcript of a phone call that Martin made to Ally on January 12, 2019. We discuss this call in greater detail below, as it relates to our analysis of Martin’s CD accounts. As relevant here , during the recorded portion of the Janua ry 12 call, Martin confirmed that Taps was to receive the fu nds from his checking and savings accounts fo llowing his death.
¶ 22 Taken together, the January 12 phone call and Ally’ s internal records provide competent evi dence that Martin intended his checking and savingsNo. 2022AP1234

9 accounts to be POD accounts. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 705.02(3). Even if the checking and savings accounts were not initially POD accounts at the time they were opened, there is competent evidence that they were created as POD accounts on March 19, 2018, and May 24, 2016 , respectively

— the dates when Martin named Taps as the beneficiary of the accounts. Accordingly, we conclude that the checking and savings accounts were subject to governing instruments , as that term is used in W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.01(2).
¶ 23 In arguing to the contrary, the Estate asserts that “Wisconsin law prefers written and signed governing instrument s[,] and there is none here.” We do not find this argument convincing. Although the law may favor governing instruments that are written and signed , W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.01(2) expressly states that a “governing instrument” includes “an instrument under [ W IS

. S TAT .] ch. 705. ” While W IS

. S TAT

. § 705.02 prefers a written governing instrument that contains the recommended wording, § 705.02(3) also pe rmits other evidence to support a conclusion that a POD account was created and intended. Section 705.02(3) does not require that evidence to be a written governing instrument.
¶ 24 The Estate also argues that Taps stipulated at trial that “Ally’s internal computer records are not compliant with Wisconsin law or enforceable for des ignation of POD beneficiaries.” According to the Estate, this stipulation “bars the argument that

... Ally’s record s are governing instruments.” This argument fails because t he Estate misstates the terms of the parties’ stipulation. The parties merely stipulated that Ally had distributed the funds from Martin’s accounts in accordance with the beneficiary designations shown in its internal records. The Estate’ s counsel clarified that the Estate was not stipulating that Ally’s internal records wer e complian t with Wisconsin law , but Taps never stipulate d that Ally’sNo. 2022AP1234

10 internal records were not compliant with Wisconsin law. Consequently , the stipulation does not ba r Taps from arguing that Martin’s checking and savings accounts were subject to governing instruments.
¶ 25 Having concluded that Martin’s checking and savings accounts were subject to governing instruments, we must next consider whether the governing instruments effectively disposed of the funds in those accounts. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.07(3). Taps argues that the governing instruments effectively disposed of the funds because there is competent evidence that Martin intended the funds to be distributed to Taps upon his death. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 705.02(3). We agree.
¶ 26 As discu s sed above, Ally’s records show that Taps was named the sole beneficiary of Martin’s checking and savings account s on March 19, 2018 , and May 24, 2016, respectively

. Although Taps was subsequently removed as the beneficiary of Mar tin’s savings account on August 11, 2017, she was renamed the sole beneficiary of that account the same day. Ally’s records do not reflect any subsequent changes to the benefic iary designations for Martin’s checking and savings accounts. Exhibits 2 and 25 show that Taps remained the sole POD beneficiary of those accounts at the time of Martin’s death.
¶ 27 Moreover, as noted above, Martin confirmed during the recorded portion of the January 12, 2019 phone call that he wanted the funds from his checking and savings accounts to go to Taps following his death. There is no evidence suggesting that Martin intended any other person to receive the fund s from thos e accounts or that Martin did not intend Taps to receive that money

. On this record, we agree with Taps that there is competent evidence Martin intended her to be the beneficiary of his checking and savings accounts. As such, the relevant governing instr uments effectively disposed of the funds in those accounts

.No. 2022AP1234

11 ¶ 28 The Estate argues that we cannot rely on Exhibits 1, 2, and 25 as competent evidence of Martin’s intent because those documents were created by Ally following Martin’ s death, n ot “ at the time the accounts were opened.” We reject this argument because W IS

. S TAT

. § 705.03(2) does not limit us to considering evidence that was in existence at the time an account was opened. Instead, we read that statute as allowing us to consider any competent evidence that bears on the owner ’ s intent at the time the account was created as a POD
account

— irrespective of when the evidence came into existence

. ¶ 29 Here , regardless of whether the checking and savings accounts were POD accounts at the time they were opened, Ally’s records show that Martin named Taps as the sole POD beneficiary of the checking account on March 19, 2018 , and of the savings account on May 24 , 2016

. Thus, even if the checking and savings accounts were not initially POD accounts, there is competent evidence that Martin created them as POD accounts as of those dates

. Furthermore, there is competent evidence that Martin intended Taps to be the sole beneficiary from those dates onward. The fact that this evidence was not in existence at the time the accounts were opened is immaterial.
¶ 30 The Estate also cites our supreme court’s decision in Bruckner v. Prairie Federal Savings & Loan Ass’ n , 81 Wis. 2 d 215, 260 N.W.2d 256 (1977) , in support of its claim that there is no competent evidence regarding Martin’s intent

. The issue in Bruckner was whether there was “ sufficient evidence to show that the decedent, John L. Bruckner, created a savi ngs account with the Prairie du Chien Federal Savings and Loan Association payable on his death to Lee J. Bruckner, a nephew. ” Id. at 216. John had opened the account on November 9, 1959, and had executed a signature card for the account on the sa me date. Id. At the time the account was opened, the bank’s records contained noNo. 2022AP1234

12 reference to the account being payable on death to Lee. Id. at 216

- 17. Following John’s death in 1974, the bank “r efused to turn over the assets [to John’s estate] , becaus e of an entry on the signature card which recited ‘ POD to Lee J. Bruckner. ’” Id. at 217. The same entry appeared on the second of three pages of the bank’s ledger card for John’s account. Id.
¶ 31 The evidence at trial showed that no bank employee had any recollection of when the POD entries were made on the signature and ledger cards

. Id. In addition, t here was “no evidence” that John had “ever requested or applied for a POD account.” Id. at 218. On this record, our supreme court concluded that the POD entries on the signature and ledger cards were not competent evidence of John’s intent. Id. at 222

- 23. The court reasoned that because there was no evidence that the entries were made at John’s req uest, there were no grounds to conclude that the entries were an expression of John’s intent “and not that of a third person.” Id. at 222.
¶ 32 T he Estate argues that, under Bruckner , a “bank

- generated record,” standing alone, is in sufficie nt to provide competent evidence that an account owner intended to create a POD account or designate a particular POD beneficiary. Here, however, we do not rely on Ally’s internal records alone as evidence that Martin intended his checking and savings acc ounts to be POD accounts with Taps as the sole beneficiary. We also rely on Martin’s own confirmation during the January 12, 2019 phone call that he wanted Taps to receive the funds from the checking and savings accounts following his death. Unlike the c ircumstances in Bruckner , t he January 12 phone call provides evidence to support a conclusion that the entries in Ally’s records were an expression of Martin’s intent “and not that of a third person.” See i d.No. 2022AP1234

13 ¶ 33 We therefore reverse that portion of the circuit court’ s judgment ordering that the funds from Martin’s checking and savings accounts be remitted to the Estate. We remand for the court to determine the amount of money to which Taps is entitled and to award that amount to Taps

.
II I
. Martin’s CD accounts
¶ 34 We next consider whether the circuit court properly determined that the funds from Martin’s CD accounts should be remitted to the Estate. In addressing this issue, w e ass ume, without deciding, that governing ins truments controlled the disposition of the funds in Martin’s CD accounts. W e nevertheless affirm the court’s decision with respect to the CD accounts because we agree that there is no competent evidence of Martin’s intent regarding the beneficiary designa tions for those accounts

. ¶ 35 As noted above, it is undisputed that Martin owned 333 CDs at Ally at the time of his death . It is further undisputed that , at the time of Martin’s death, Ally’s internal records listed Taps as the sole POD beneficiary for 228 of the CDs and listed Taps, Adrienne, Steven, Karen, Tayla, and Ari as co
- beneficiaries for the remaining 105 CDs

. Taps argues that these internal records provide competent evidence of Martin’s intent regarding the beneficiary designat ions for his various CD accounts. Like the circuit court , however, we conclude that other evidence raises questions regarding Martin’s intent.
¶ 36 During the evidentiary hearing, Taps introduced Ex hibit 26, which purports to be a series of notes made by Ally employees regarding telephone calls wi th Martin about his accounts. According to Exhibit 26, Martin called Ally on January 8, 2019, and asked to open 450 fourteen

- month CDs, each in the amount of $1,000. Martin asked Ally to provide a single welcome kit for all of theseNo. 2022AP1234

14 accounts and asked that “ beneficiaries [be] assigned to his profile as a whole and not the accounts individually ” in the following amounts: “ *Mary $240K* *Adrian $100K* [ 5 ] *Karen $100K* *Steven $30K*. ” Ally denied both of these requests, noting that Martin would receive individual welcome kits for each account and that beneficiaries “need to be assigned to each account.” Ally advised Martin that

“ someone will reach out to him by EOD to confirm whether w e can open that many accounts .”
¶ 37 Martin apparently called All y again on January 9 , 2019, asking to “remove Steven’s name from his list of requested beneficiaries, and replace it with two names, [Tayla] and Ari, each of who would receive 30k.” The agent noted,

“ Confirmed with customer that I would update request, but no promises were mad e.”
¶ 38 Exhibit 26 shows another call between Martin and Ally on January 10 , 2019

. The agent’s note states: “[C] ustom er wanted to finish opening the

... 450 select cd. [C] ustomer advise that previous agent that started with the 217 account [s] got sup approval to open all of them but call disconnect when phone died. ” Martin again requested to receive only one welcome kit for all of the accounts, and the agent told Martin that only one welcome kit would be sent. The January 10 note ends with the statement: “Pass call back to agent to com plete other account openings. ”
¶ 39 Exhibit 26 refle cts that another phone call occurred , apparently on either January 10 or 12 , 2019, du ring which Martin “started asking about welcome

5 This presumably referred to Martin’s daughter Adrienne.No. 2022AP1234

15 kits again” and then stated he wanted all of the CDs listed on one sheet of paper. T he agent advised that written approval would be required for that request, and Martin responded that he wanted to close all of his CDs if the request co uld not be approved. The agent then “suggested that we stop opening accounts until he gets that approva l or he could end up on the phone for a long while just to close accounts.” Exhibit 26 shows that, at the time of this phone call, 107 CDs had already been opened.
¶ 40 Exhibit 26 shows that at least three additional phone call s took place on January 12 , 2019

. The agent’s notes from the first of those call s state:

[O]pen 450 Select cds

- customer is requesting to close all his NPCD wants to open 450 x 1000 each 14m CD. He wants 230 x 1000 cd beneficiary Mary Tap there is 10 left for Mary, 100x 1000 for Karen, 100 x 1000 for Adrienne, 10x 1000 for [Tayla] , and 10 x 1000 for [Ari]

. [T] hat makes 450. [T] here 217 left to do.
¶ 41 Ally provided a recording of the first two hours of t his January 12 , 2019 phone call, and the record also contains a transcript of that recording

. Although Ally’s system recorded two hours of this call , it is undisputed that the call actually lasted longer than two hours

. The transcript shows that during the recorded portion of the call , Martin initially stated that he wanted to close his existing CD accounts and “take all [his] assets and put it into individual $1,000 CDs,” leaving $1 0,000 in his savings account. In response to that request,

a n Ally representative, “Kat,” cl osed Martin’s existing CD accounts and transferred the funds from those accounts into his checking account for the
purpo se of purchasing the new CDs.
¶ 42 Kat then informed Martin that he had $457,748.04 in his checking account, which would allow hi m to purchase 457 $1,000 CDs. Martin respondedNo. 2022AP1234

16 t hat Kat should “make it 460.” Kat told Martin that, in order to do that, she would need to transfer $2,251.96 from his savings account into his checking account , which would leave only $7,748.04 in his savings account. Martin indicated that he wanted to leave more than $7,748.04 in his savings account, and Kat then suggested opening only 450 $1,000 CDs , instead of 460. After further discussion, Martin agreed with that suggestion.
¶ 43 Kat then asked Martin about the beneficiaries for the new CDs. Martin initially stated that he wanted $240,000 to go to Taps, $100,000 to go to Adrienne, and $100,000 to go to Karen. Because those amounts added up to $440,000, Kat told Martin that he h ad $10,000 left in CDs for which he neede d to designate a beneficiary. Martin expressed confusion as to whether the amounts that he and Kat had been discussing included his checking and savings accounts, and Kat clarified that Martin had a total of $467,7 48.04 at Ally, including the funds in his checking and savings accounts. Martin responded:

Okay. Why don’t we make it 450

— let’s see, 460. I’m trying to break it up. I wanted to put, so 467, so 240

— why don’t we make it 230

— 230, 100, 100, so that’s 430, 530, 630, 630, and 15 and 15 for the last two. If I have 230, 100, 100, that’ s 430.
¶ 44 Kat informed Martin that this would leave $20,000 in CDs for which he needed to designate a beneficiary. Martin replied, “Okay. So make it 10 and 10 for [Ta y la] and Ari, 10 for [Ta y l a] and 10 for Ari.” Kat responded, “Okay. So, now, we’re going to do 450 at 1,000, and so Mary’s going to have 230 of it. Your two daughters are going to have 100,000 apiece, and then Ari and [Tayla are ] going to have 10,000.” Martin indica ted that was correct.
¶ 45 Kat subsequently put Martin on hold multiple times while she work ed to open the requested CDs. Near the end of the recorded portion of theNo. 2022AP1234

17 call, Kat told Martin that she had o pened eighteen $1,000 CDs and was working to complete the rest. As noted above, at least two additional phone calls occurred between Martin and Ally r epresentatives on January 12. The appellate record does not contain recordings of those calls.
¶ 46 The parties agree that , ultimately, only 338 CDs were opened in Martin’s name o n January 12, 2019, rather than 450. It is further undisputed that, according to Martin’s February 5 bank statement , 233 of the CDs were set up as POD accounts and 1 05 were “ in trust for ” (I TF ) beneficiary accounts

. As of February 5, Martin still had $129,319.25 in his Ally savings account. On February 12, Martin made four separate transfers of $25,000 from his Ally savings
account to Synchrony Bank

. On April 19, Martin called Ally and asked to change his 105 I TF CDs to POD CDs. Ally imple mented that request on May 2. In November 2019, Martin closed five of his Ally CDs that listed Taps as the sole beneficiary.
¶ 47 The circuit court s tated in its written decision that the “best competent evidence of [Martin’s] intent at the time the accounts were created would have been the transcript of the recording from the January 12, 2019 phone call ,” but “[u]nfortunately, the recordin g is not of the entire call.” The court noted that the transcript of the call did not “reflect, in [its] entirety, the accounts that were ultimately established as a result of the call. The recording does not reflect, in [its] entirety, the beneficiaries that were u ltimately named on the accounts established.” The court found that while there were some consistencies between Martin’s instructions during the January 12 call and the ultimate beneficiary designations shown in Ally’s internal records, the re were also inc onsistencies. The court also noted that the parties agreed that additional phone calls had taken place, but those phone calls were not recorded.No. 2022AP1234

18 ¶ 48 Next, the circuit court found that Martin “change[d] his mind multiple times as to what he want[ed] to do” during the recorded January 12 call. The court then reiterated that the beneficiaries ultimately listed in Ally’s records did not “coincide” with Martin’s instructions during the recorded portion of the January 12 call. The court explained:

The [call] reflects that [Martin’s] son, [Steven] , is not a beneficiary. In fact, he ultimately was named as a beneficiary. The [ call ] indicates that Mary Tap s would not be listed on 105 [ CD s ] created. In fact, she [ultimately] was named with the other 5 beneficiaries. The [ call ] indicates an intention that each of [Martin’s] two daughters would receive $100,000. This was not the end result. The [call] indicates an intention to have his 2 grandchildren receive $10,000 each. This was not th e end result

. Given these inconsistencies between the January 12 call and the beneficiary designations shown in Ally’s internal records, the court stated it was “impossible” for the court to find “that any competent evidence exists to determine [Martin’s] true intent at the time that the accounts were established as required under [ W IS

. S TAT

. §] 705.02(3).”
¶ 49 None of the circuit court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous , as they pertain to Martin’s CD accounts

. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 805.1 7(2). In particular, the court’s finding that the recorded portion of the January 12 call is inconsistent with the beneficiary designations for the CD accounts shown in Ally’s internal records is not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. See Phelps , 319 Wis. 2d 1, ¶39. The record also supports the court’s findi ng that Martin changed his mind multiple times during the January 12 call regarding the beneficiary designations for his CD accounts. Furthermore, the court correctly noted that the parties agreed there were additional phone calls between Martin and Ally on January 12 , which were not recorded. Those phone calls could have shedNo. 2022AP1234

19 light on Martin’ s intentions with respect to the beneficiary designations for the CD
accounts ; however, without knowing the contents of those calls, we have no way of knowing whether they support the beneficiary designations for the CD accounts that were shown in Ally’s internal records at the time of Martin’s death. On this record, we agree with the circuit court that there was no “competent evidence” of Martin’s intent regarding the beneficiary designations for the CD accounts

. ¶ 50 Taps argues that Ally’s Exhibits 1, 2 , and 25

— which were compiled from Ally’s internal records

— are competent evidence of Martin’s intent regarding the beneficiary designations for the CD accounts

. According to Taps, those exhibits “clearly show[] ” that Taps was the sole beneficiary of 228 CD accounts at the time of Martin’s death and was a co

- beneficiary of the remaining 105 CD
accounts. As discussed above, however, a bank’s internal records, without more, are insufficient to provide competent evidence regarding a depositor’s intent. See Bruckner , 81 Wis. 2d at 222

- 23. For Martin’s checking and savings accounts, there was additional evidence of Martin’s intent

— namely, Martin’s confirmation during the January 12 phone call that Taps was to receive the funds from the checking and savings accounts following his death. There is no similar corrob orating evidence of Martin’s intent regarding the beneficiaries for the CD accounts. To the contrary, as explained above, Martin’s expressed intentions during the January 12 phone are inconsistent with the ultimate beneficiary designations for the CD acco unts shown in Ally’s records.
¶ 51 Taps also argues that the parties’ stipulation that Ally distributed the funds from Martin’s accounts in accordance with its internal records “ is competent evidence that Martin intended for [Taps] to be beneficiary of his accounts.” We disagree. The fact that Ally distributed the funds in accordance with its internal records does not prove that Ally’s internal records accurately reflect ed Marti n’sNo. 2022AP1234

20 intent regarding the beneficiary designations for the CD accounts

. The Estate stipulated to the former proposition only ; it did not stipulate to the latter.
¶ 52 Taps next argues that the recorded portion of the January 12 phone call cl early shows that Martin “wanted [Taps] to be beneficiary of 230 CDs, the savings account and the checking account. ” Taps argues, “Although the transcript of the January 12 phone call does not match the internal records of [Ally] as it pertains to the chil dren’s and grandchildren’s distributions, it is nevertheless evidence of [Martin’s] intent to make [Taps] a beneficiary of his accounts .” We reject this argument because the inconsistencies between the January 12 call and Ally’s internal records are not l imited to the beneficiary status es of Martin’s children and grandchildren. The January 12 call and Ally’s internal records are also inconsistent with respect to Taps as a beneficiary of the CDs , as Ally’s internal records list Taps as a co

- beneficiary of 105 of Martin’s CDs , which is in consistent with Martin’s instructions during the January 12 call.
¶ 53 Finally, Taps argues that Martin’s actions after the January 12 call confirm that he wanted Taps to receive “at least $230,000 ” from the CD accounts. In particular, Taps asserts that after Martin received his February 5 , 2019 bank statement, he was clearly aware that he had a significant amount of money at Ally that had not been invested in CDs, given that he transferred $100,000 from Ally to Synchrony Bank on February 12. Taps also observes that, in April 2019, Martin asked to change 105 of his CDs

— which listed Taps and his children and grandchildren as co

- beneficiaries

— from ITF accounts to POD accounts . Taps
asserts: “Martin’s tra nsfer of $100,000 to Synchrony Bank and his request to change the ITF beneficiary accounts to POD beneficiary [accounts] show that Martin reviewed his bank statements and was aware that he had not set up 450 CD accounts as stated in the partial recording o f the January 12 phone call.”No. 2022AP1234

21 According to Taps, these actions show that “there must have been a subsequent discussion between Martin and [Ally] in which he changed his designations of beneficiaries, as reflected in [Ally ’s ] Exhibits 1, 2, and 25. ”
¶ 54 We agree with Taps that Martin’s transfer of $100,000 from Ally to Synchrony Bank shows that Martin knew he had not purchased 450 $1,000 CDs from Ally. We do not agree, however, that Martin’s transfer of that money or his request to change c ertain CDs from I TF accounts to POD accounts shows Martin’s intent regarding the beneficiary designations for his CD accounts

. Furthermore,

a ny speculation about what Martin may have said during his unrecorded conversations with Ally representatives does not provide competent evidence of his intent , as required by W IS

. S TAT

. § 705.02(3). Notably, Lemma was the only Ally employee to testif

y at the evidentiary hearing. No Ally employee who actually spoke to Mar tin on January 12

— or at any other time

— provided any testimony about Martin’s intent with respect to the beneficiary designations for the CD accounts

. ¶ 55 Ultimately , while Ally’s internal records reflect certain beneficiary designations for the CD accounts , those designations conflict with Martin’s
statements during the recorded portion of the January 12 phone call. Under these circumstances, we agree with the circuit court that there is no competent evidence of Martin’s intent regarding th e beneficiary designations for the CD accounts. Accordingly, t he court properly ordered that the disputed funds from the CD
accounts be remitted to the Estate. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 854.07(3).
¶ 56 No costs are awarded to any party

.No. 2022AP1234

22 By the Court.

— Judgment affirmed in part ; reversed in part and cause remanded with directions

.

This opinion will not be published. See W IS

. S TAT

. R ULE 809.23(1)(b)5.