1

Filed 4/12/22; Certified for Publication 5/11/22 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Siskiyou)

----

WE ADVOCATE THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL 

REVIEW et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CITY OF MOUNT SHASTA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

CRYSTAL GEYSER WATER COMPANY,

Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

C091012

(Super. Ct. No. 

SCCVPT20180531)

From 2001 to 2010, a water bottling company operated a plant in Siskiyou County 

(the County) that extracted groundwater and then used it to produce bottled water. A few 

years after the plant closed, Crystal Geyser Water Company (Crystal Geyser) bought the 

facility and sought to revive it. To that end, Crystal Geyser requested, among other 
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things, a permit from the County to build a caretaker’s residence for the bottling plant and 

a permit from the City of Mt. Shasta (the City) to allow the plant to discharge wastewater 

into the City’s sewer system. Both the County and the City ultimately granted Crystal 

Geyser the permits it sought.

This appeal concerns one of two lawsuits challenging these approvals, both of 

which are now on appeal and both of which concern the California Environmental 

Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). In one suit, Appellants We 

Advocate Thorough Environmental Review and Winnehem Wintu Tribe alleged that the 

County’s environmental review for the bottling facility was inadequate under CEQA. In 

another, they alleged that the City’s decision to issue the wastewater permit for the 

bottling plant, which relied on the County’s environmental review for the facility, was 

also improper under CEQA.

We focus here on Appellants’ challenge to the City’s approval of the wastewater 

permit. CEQA generally requires public agencies, like the County and the City, to 

consider the environmental consequences of discretionary projects they propose to 

approve. When multiple agencies propose to approve aspects of the same project, as 

here, one serves as the “lead agency” that conducts environmental review for the whole 

of the project and all others serve as “responsible agencies” that conduct a more limited 

review of the project. In this case, the County served as the lead agency and the City 

served as one of several responsible agencies for the proposed bottling facility. 

According to Appellants, the City failed to comply with its obligations as a responsible 

agency for three reasons. First, they assert that the City failed to make certain findings

that are required under CEQA before issuing the wastewater permit for the bottling 

facility. Second, they contend that the City should have adopted mitigation measures to 

address some of the bottling facility’s environmental impacts before approving the 

permit. And lastly, they argue that the City should have performed additional 

environmental review following a late revision to the permit.
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The trial court rejected all Appellants’ arguments. But we agree with Appellants 

on one point: The City should have made certain findings under CEQA before issuing 

the wastewater permit. Because the County, during its environmental review, found 

several potentially significant impacts associated with the City’s permitting of the project, 

the City needed to make certain findings before issuing its permit. In particular, it needed 

to make one or more of the following findings for each significant impact that the County 

identified: the impact has been mitigated or avoided; the measures necessary for 

mitigation are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency and 

have been, or can and should be, adopted by that other agency; or specifical economic, 

legal, or other considerations make mitigation infeasible. Apart from needing to make 

one or more of these findings for each significant impact, the City also needed to supply a 

brief explanation of the rationale for each finding.

The City, however, never complied with these requirements. It never 

acknowledged the significant impacts that the County identified. It never said whether 

these impacts would be mitigated, whether another agency would handle mitigation, or 

whether mitigation would be infeasible. And it never supplied any reasoning for the 

required findings. It instead, in a single sentence, said only this: The City has reviewed 

the County’s report on the project and “finds no unmitigated adverse environmental 

impacts relating to the alternate waste discharge disposal methods.” Because we find this 

brief statement inadequate to satisfy CEQA, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

CEQA serves “to ensure that public agencies will consider the environmental 

consequences of discretionary projects they propose to carry out or approve.” (Stockton 

Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 481, 488.) To fulfill 

this purpose, as relevant here, CEQA requires an agency proposing to approve or carry 

out a project to prepare a document called an Environmental Impact Report, or an EIR, if 
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the project “may have a significant effect on the environment.” (Pub. Resources Code, 

§§ 21100, subd. (a), 21151, subd. (a).)

The agency charged with preparing the EIR for a project is known as the “lead 

agency” and is “responsible for considering the effects, both individual and collective, of 

all activities involved in a project.” (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21002.1, subd. (d), 21067 

[defining “lead agency”].) Other agencies that also have a role in approving or carrying 

the project, but which are not the lead agency, are known as “responsible agencies” and 

generally consider only the effects of those parts of the project that they decide to carry 

out or approve. (Ibid.; Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 14, § 15096.)1

In this case, after Crystal Geyser sought various governmental approvals for a 

proposed bottling facility, the County served as the lead agency in evaluating the 

facility’s potential environmental impacts. In its draft EIR, the County explained that, in 

general, “[t]he Proposed Project entails renovations to a former bottling plant in 

unincorporated Siskiyou County . . . adjacent to the City of Mt. Shasta (City) for the 

production of sparkling water, flavored water, juice beverages, and teas.” It added that, 

to facilitate the project, Crystal Geyser would need to obtain permits from several public 

agencies, including a permit from the County for construction of a caretaker’s residence 

for the plant, a permit from the City for wastewater discharge from the plant, and several 

other permits. The County evaluated in its draft EIR the potential environmental impacts 

associated with all these governmental approvals.

The City, having a more limited role, served as one of several responsible agencies 

for the project. In this role, the City shared a draft of the wastewater permit it proposed 

for the project, which the County then included and discussed in its EIR. The City also,

1 California Code of Regulations, title 14, sections 15000-15387 are ordinarily referred 

to as the CEQA Guidelines. We will use that shorthand to refer to these regulations 

going forward.
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at various stages of the administrative proceedings, commented on the project and the 

County’s environmental review.

Sometime after the County certified the EIR, the City moved to finalize the terms 

of the wastewater permit for the bottling facility. The initial draft of the permit, which 

was part of the EIR, purported to authorize Crystal Geyser to “discharge process, nonprocess, and sanitary wastewater to the City of Mt. Shasta sewer system.” It added that 

“[t]his wastewater includes high-strength wastewater from spilled product and internal 

and external cleaning and sanitizing chemicals (e.g., sodium hydroxide and acids); flavor 

change rinse water; and final rinse water from product lines and tanks.” The final version 

of the permit kept all this language and further added that “[t]his wastewater” also 

includes “condensate, boiler blowdown water, [and] cooling tower blowdown water.”

The City council later approved the permit as revised. In its resolution approving 

the permit, the City council stated: “The City Council has considered the Environmental 

Impact Report prepared by the County of Siskiyou for the Crystal Geyser Bottling Plant 

and finds no unmitigated adverse environmental impacts relating to the alternate waste 

discharge disposal methods.”

Appellants afterward filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging that the City and 

its council violated CEQA. In their suit, they alleged that the City failed to make the 

findings required under Public Resources Code section 21081—a statute that requires 

public agencies to make certain findings before approving a project “for which an 

environmental impact report has been certified which identifies one or more significant 

effects on the environment.” Appellants also alleged that the City should have adopted 

“the mitigation measures set forth in the EIR for the portions of the Bottling Facility 

project under the City’s jurisdiction.” Lastly, as relevant here, they alleged that 

“[a]dditional environmental review was necessary as a result of the addition of three 

unanalyzed waste-streams in the final [wastewater permit].” Apart from raising these 

substantive claims, Appellants also asked the trial court to take judicial notice of two 
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letters that, according to Appellants’ counsel, should have been part of the record before

the trial court but “were inadvertently left out.”

The trial court rejected all Appellants’ arguments and requests. First, the court 

rejected Appellants’ request for judicial notice, finding that “[t]he documents proposed 

are not helpful to the court in determining the facts of this case and include confidential 

information. . . .” Second, the court concluded that the City had no need to make findings 

under Public Resources Code section 21081. It reasoned: “If the responsible agency 

determines that there is no unmitigated significant impact to the environment, then the 

responsible agency is not required to make written findings.” Third, the court found that, 

despite Appellants’ argument otherwise, the City did adopt mitigation measures. It stated

that the City’s permit “contains conditions requiring [Crystal Geyser] to comply with the 

project EIR which includes mitigation measures for that part of the project over which the 

City has authority.” Finally, the court declined to find that the City needed to perform 

additional environmental review for the revised permit. It reasoned that the City 

determined that the revision would not add new significant impacts and that Appellants 

failed to meet their “burden to show that there is an absence of substantial evidence 

supporting the City’s decision.”

Appellants appealed, raising the same four claims discussed above.

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DISCUSSION

We start with Appellants’ claim that the trial court improperly denied their request 

for judicial notice.

2 A few months before filing this action, Appellants also filed a related action 

challenging the adequacy of the County’s EIR. In that case too, the trial court rejected all 

Appellants’ claims. Appellants afterward appealed the court’s decision, which we 

consider in the separate case of We Advocate Thorough Environmental Review et al. v. 

County of Siskiyou et al. (Case No. C090840).
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Shortly after preparing the record for the trial court, Appellants noticed that two 

letters had inadvertently been left out. They then requested judicial notice of the letters, 

along with the “complete administrative record of proceedings lodged” in the related case 

titled We Advocate Thorough Environmental Review et al. v. County of Siskiyou et al. 

(Case No. C090840). They argued that these records should be judicially noticed under 

Evidence Code section 452 because they are county records. (See Evid. Code, § 452 

[judicial notice “may” be taken of certain types of records].) The trial court, however, 

denied the request, explaining that “[t]he documents proposed are not helpful to the court 

in determining the facts of this case and include confidential information. . . .”

In Appellants’ view, the trial court was wrong to deny the request on this ground. 

They reason that “[t]he law mandates that letters submitted to a public agency regarding 

its review of a project” must be included in the record before the trial court even if 

unhelpful. Appellants base their argument on Public Resources Code section 21167.6, 

which, relevant here, states that the record in CEQA cases “shall include,” among other 

things, “[a]ll written comments received in response to, or in connection with, 

environmental documents prepared for the project, including responses to the notice of 

preparation.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21167.6, subd. (e)(6).)

We find no reversible error. Even if, as Appellants argue, the two letters should 

have been part of the record before the trial court, that is not reason enough to require 

reversal. Reversal would be appropriate, instead, only if the exclusion of these letters 

caused prejudice. (See Madera Oversight Coalition, Inc. v. County of Madera (2011) 

199 Cal.App.4th 48, 75 [exclusion of a “letter from the administrative record d[id] not 

constitute reversible error because its exclusion resulted in no prejudice to plaintiffs”], 

disapproved of on another ground by Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line 

Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439, 457.) But because Appellants make no 

effort to show that the exclusion of these letters was prejudicial, declining even to dispute 

the City’s claim that these letters are irrelevant to the issues in this case, we decline to 
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find reversal appropriate here. (Ibid.; see also Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, 

Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6 [denying requests for judicial 

notice where “the requests present[ed] no issue for which judicial notice of these items 

[wa]s necessary, helpful, or relevant”].)

We consider next Appellants’ contention that the City failed to make the findings 

required under CEQA before approving the project.

Before turning to the substance of Appellants’ claim, we start with a little more 

background on the distinction between “lead” and “responsible” agencies. Under CEQA, 

the “ ‘[l]ead agency’ means the public agency which has the principal responsibility for 

carrying out or approving a project which may have a significant effect upon the 

environment.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21067.) A “responsible agency,” in turn, is “a 

public agency, other than the lead agency, which has responsibility for carrying out or 

approving a project.” (Id., § 21069.)

Both types of agencies play important roles under CEQA, though their roles are 

markedly different. A lead agency, notably, must consider all environmental impacts of 

the project before approving it. (Id., § 21002.1, subd. (d) [“The lead agency shall be 

responsible for considering the effects, both individual and collective, of all activities 

involved in a project.”].) But a responsible agency need only consider the direct or 

indirect environmental effects of those parts of the project that it decides to carry out or 

approve. (See ibid. [“A responsible agency shall be responsible for considering only the 

effects of those activities involved in a project which it is required by law to carry out or 

approve.”]; CEQA Guidelines, § 15096, subd. (g)(1) [“A responsible agency has 

responsibility for mitigating or avoiding only the direct or indirect environmental effects 

of those parts of the project which it decides to carry out, finance, or approve.”]; 

California Coastkeeper Alliance v. State Lands Com. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 36, 55.)

Although distinct in this regard, however, lead and responsible agencies are 

similar in an important respect: Each must, before “approv[ing] or carry[ing] out a 
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project for which an environmental impact report has been certified which identifies one 

or more significant effects on the environment that would occur if the project is approved 

or carried out,” “make[] one or more of the following findings with respect to each 

significant effect: [¶] (1) Changes or alterations have been required in, or incorporated 

into, the project which mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment. [¶] 

(2) Those changes or alterations are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another 

public agency and have been, or can and should be, adopted by that other agency. [¶] 

(3) Specific economic, legal, social, technological, or other considerations . . . make 

infeasible the mitigation measures or alternatives identified in the environmental impact 

report.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21081, subd. (a).) Each agency’s findings, moreover, 

must be “accompanied by a brief explanation of the rationale for each finding.” (CEQA 

Guidelines, § 15091, subd. (a); see also Resource Defense Fund v. Local Agency 

Formation Com. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 886, 896 [“the responsible agency must 

independently make its own findings and conclusions” and these “findings [must] be 

written and accompanied by a supporting statement of facts”], disapproved of on another 

ground by Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 

52 Cal.4th 499, 529.)

In this case, Appellants argue that the City never complied with these basic 

requirements of CEQA. We agree. The EIR identified several potentially significant 

impacts associated with Crystal Geyser’s proposed discharge of wastewater into the 

City’s sewer system. It said, for example, that wastewater from the project could exceed 

the capacity of the City’s wastewater treatment plant and thus result in a significant 

impact. It also, as another example, said that the project could require the installation of 

additional pipelines to discharge wastewater into the City’s sewer system, and that the 

installation of these pipelines could potentially result in significant impacts to fishery 

resources, several endangered species, and cultural resources. The EIR then went on to 

discuss several mitigation measures to address these impacts. But the City, for its part, 
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never discussed these significant impacts. It instead, in its resolution approving the 

permit, said only this: “The City Council has considered the Environmental Impact 

Report prepared by the County of Siskiyou for the Crystal Geyser Bottling Plant and 

finds no unmitigated adverse environmental impacts relating to the alternate waste 

discharge disposal methods.”

But a blanket finding that a project includes “no unmitigated adverse 

environmental impacts” does not satisfy CEQA’s findings requirement. Again, CEQA 

required the City, for “each significant effect” identified in the EIR associated with the 

City’s permit, to make one or more of the following findings: “the project’s significant 

environmental effects have been mitigated or avoided ([Pub. Resources Code], § 21081, 

subd. (a)(1)), . . . the measures necessary for mitigation ‘are within the responsibility and 

jurisdiction of another public agency and have been, or can and should be, adopted by 

that other agency’ (id., § subd. (a)(2)), and/or . . . ‘specific economic, legal, social, 

technological, or other considerations’ render mitigation ‘infeasible’ (id., § subd. (a)(3)).” 

(City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2006) 39 Cal.4th 

341, 350 (Marina).) But the City made none of these findings. Nor did it acknowledge 

that the EIR identified several potentially significant effects associated with the part of 

the project that it decided to approve. Nor, finally, did it provide the required “brief 

explanation of the rationale” for its nonexistent findings. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15091, 

subd. (a); see also Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of 

California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 404 [under CEQA, an agency’s conclusion as to 

whether a given impact is significant is not enough; “there must [also] be a disclosure of 

the ‘analytic route the . . . agency traveled from evidence to action’ ”].)

Because of these shortcomings, we find the City violated CEQA’s procedural 

requirements. We also find unpersuasive the trial court’s reasoning for holding

otherwise. The trial court stated: “If the responsible agency determines that there is no 

unmitigated significant impact to the environment, then the responsible agency is not 
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required to make written findings.” The court, in other words, concluded that an agency 

need only make findings under Public Resources Code section 21081 when the EIR 

identifies significant environmental impacts that will not be mitigated. The City echoes 

this sentiment on appeal. But if an EIR explains that a project would have significant 

effects, but that imposed mitigation measures would reduce each of these effects to an 

insignificant level, that is not a reason for declining to make written findings. That is 

instead a reason for finding that “[c]hanges or alterations have been required in, or 

incorporated into, the project which mitigate or avoid the significant effects.” (Pub. 

Resources Code, § 21081, subd. (a)(1).) Again, however, the City neither made this

finding for each significant effect identified in the EIR nor supplied any explanation in 

support of this finding.

We turn next to Appellants’ claim that the City should have “adopt[ed] the 

[mitigation] measures” identified in the EIR for the sewer improvements and “include[d]

them in a mitigation and monitoring plan.”

Appellants offer several points in support of their argument. They first assert that 

the City should have adopted these measures because the County, which is largely 

charged with monitoring the imposed mitigation measures, “does not have the clear 

ability to enforce most of the mitigation measures.” Appellants reason that the County 

lacks this “true ability to monitor or enforce mitigation measures” because “[t]he 

County’s enforcement authority is attached to [a permit] for [a] structure” (the caretaker’s 

residence) that is “unnecessary” and that Crystal Geyser “does not need.” Appellants, in 

other words, appear to argue that the County’s enforcement authority is contingent on the 

caretaker’s residence for the bottling facility being necessary; but because the residence is 

actually “unnecessary,” the County has no “true ability to monitor or enforce mitigation 

measures.” Appellants, however, neglect to provide any legal authority for this 

conclusion. Nor do they supply evidentiary support for their claim that the residence is 

“unnecessary.” Considering their cited evidence, they have at most shown that no single 
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Crystal Geyser employee may occupy the residence more than 40 hours per week. But 

that, in itself, does not show that the residence is somehow unnecessary. We thus reject 

this unsupported argument concerning the project’s mitigation measures.

Appellants further contend that the City should have either adopted these 

mitigation measures or “at least ma[d]e CEQA findings stating that the mitigation would 

be the responsibility of another agency.” We generally agree. CEQA requires “[e]ach 

public agency,” including each responsible agency, to “mitigate or avoid the significant 

effects on the environment of projects that it carries out or approves whenever it is 

feasible to do so.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (b); see CEQA Guidelines, 

§ 15096, subd. (g)(1) [discussing the mitigation obligations of responsible agencies].) 

But CEQA “does not require a public agency to undertake identified mitigation measures, 

even if those measures are necessary to address the project’s significant environmental 

effects, if the agency finds that the measures ‘are within the responsibility and 

jurisdiction of another public agency and have been, or can and should be, adopted by 

that other agency.’ (Pub. Resources Code, § 21081, subd. (a)(2).)” (Marina, supra, 

39 Cal.4th at p. 366.)

Considering these principles, should the City decide to approve the project once 

more following remand, it will need to consider these types of issues before approving 

the project. And when that time comes, considering the parties’ briefing in this case, we 

expect the City will assert that it need not adopt any of the mitigation measures for the 

sewer improvements because these measures are within the jurisdiction of another public 

agency and have been, or can and should be, adopted by that agency. And should the 

City in fact do so, we expect Appellants will dispute that finding. But we need not decide 

today whether the City could in fact disclaim responsibility for these measures on the 

ground that they are the responsibility of some other agency—an issue we find to be 

premature at this stage. We simply note, at this time, that the City may “disclaim[] the 

responsibility to mitigate environmental effects . . . only when the other agency said to 
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have responsibility has exclusive responsibility.” (Marina, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 366; 

see CEQA Guidelines, § 15091, subd. (c).)

Lastly, we consider Appellants’ contention that the City should have performed 

additional environmental review and allowed for further public review before it approved 

a revised version of the wastewater permit.

The City’s permit, again, authorizes Crystal Geyser to “discharge process, nonprocess, and sanitary wastewater to the City of Mt. Shasta sewer system.” In the initial 

draft of the permit, the version included in the EIR, the permit stated that “[t]his 

wastewater includes high-strength wastewater from spilled product and internal and 

external cleaning and sanitizing chemicals (e.g., sodium hydroxide and acids); flavor 

change rinse water; and final rinse water from product lines and tanks.” But in the final 

draft, the permit noted that “[t]his wastewater” also includes “condensate, boiler 

blowdown water, [and] cooling tower blowdown water.”

Of these three additions, Appellants express concern about the latter two: boiler 

blowdown water and cooling tower blowdown water. In Appellants’ telling, Crystal 

Geyser’s consultant explained that both these waste streams would contain anti-scaling 

chemicals, including Boilermate 1200S (which, according to its safety data sheet, should 

not be “discharge[d] into lakes, streams, ponds or public waters”) and Boilermate 3300C 

(which, according to its safety data sheet, can be acutely toxic). Appellants then argue 

that the City should have “disclose[d]” and “adequately reviewed” these changes before 

approving the permit. The City, for its part, counters that the Boilermate products are 

simply replacements for a product, Boilercare, that was identified in the EIR but that “is 

no longer manufactured.” The City adds that its consultant characterized Boilermate as 

an “equivalent product” and concluded that “no detrimental effects are anticipated at the 

[City’s wastewater treatment plant].”

Without needing to delve into the merits of the City’s response, we reject 

Appellants’ argument. To start, we reject their characterization of the facts. Appellants, 
14

again, citing an email from Crystal Geyer’s consultant, allege that “ ‘boiler blow down 

water’ and ‘cooling tower blowdown water’ ” would “contain anti-scaling chemicals.” 

But the consultant said only that boiler blowdown water would contain anti-scaling 

chemicals and emphasized that cooling tower blowdown water “would have no added 

chemicals.”

Apart from overstating the facts, Appellants also fail to identify any law that the 

City potentially violated. As legal authority for their argument, Appellants note that 

public agencies are required to make certain findings under Public Resources Code 

section 21081 before approving a project and that an EIR that omits essential information 

is subject to de novo review. But although Public Resources Code section 21081 is 

certainly relevant to Appellants’ argument concerning the lack of CEQA findings, which 

we discussed earlier, it carries no relevance to their current argument. And although true 

that an EIR that omits essential information is subject to de novo review (Banning Ranch 

Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach (2017) 2 Cal.5th 918, 935), we are not evaluating 

the merits of the EIR here. To the extent Appellants believe otherwise and think their 

suit against the City is an appropriate forum for challenging the County’s EIR, they are 

wrong. (Friends of Outlet Creek v. Mendocino County Air Quality Management 

Dist. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1235, 1243 [a plaintiff, in a CEQA challenge to one public 

agency’s approvals for a project, could not also challenge a separate public agency’s 

approvals for the same project]; 1 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. 

Environmental Quality Act (Cont. Ed. Bar 2021 update) § 3.23 [“A lawsuit brought 

against a responsible agency is limited to the actions that the responsible agency takes in 

approving the project, and does not extend to actions by the lead agency, or to the 

adequacy of the lead agency’s CEQA review of the project.”].)
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The trial court is instructed to enter, consistent with this 

opinion, a new judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate and specifying those 

actions the City must take to comply with CEQA. Appellants are entitled to recover their 

costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

 \s\ ,

BLEASE, P. J.

We concur:

 \s\ ,

ROBIE, J.

 \s\ ,

DUARTE, J.
1

Filed 5/11/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Siskiyou)

----

WE ADVOCATE THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL 

REVIEW et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CITY OF MOUNT SHASTA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

CRYSTAL GEYSER WATER COMPANY,

Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

C091012

(Super. Ct. No. 

SCCVPT20180531)

ORDER CERTIFYING 

OPINION FOR PUBLICATION

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on April 12, 2022, was not certified 

for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion 

should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
2

EDITORIAL LISTING

APPEAL from a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate of the Superior 

Court of Siskiyou County, Karen Dixon, Judge. Reversed in full.

Law Offices of Donald B. Mooney, Donald B. Mooney and Marsha A. Burch for 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, We Advocate Through Environmental Review, and Winnemem 

Wintu Tribe.

Kenny & Norine, a Law Corporation, John Sullivan Kenny for Defendants and 

Respondents, City of Mount Shasta and City Council of City of Mount Shasta.

White Brenner LLP, Barbara Anne Brenner and Kerry A. Fuller for Real Party in 

Interest and Respondent Crystal Geyser Water Company.

BY THE COURT:

 \s\ ,

BLEASE, P.J.

 \s\ ,

ROBIE, J.

 \s\ ,

DUARTE, J.