J-S39028-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIE C. COOPER, 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2548 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 5, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0808401-2002

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 28, 2020

Appellant, Willie C. Cooper, appeals pro se from the August 5, 2019 

order dismissing his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The record reveals that on October 1, 2003, a jury found Appellant guilty 

of first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary.

1

 At the conclusion of a penalty 

phase hearing on October 3, 2003, the jury returned a verdict sentencing

Appellant to death after the jury found that he committed the murder during 

the perpetration of a felony with no mitigating circumstances. On January 5, 

2004, the trial court imposed a sentence of death. The trial court also imposed 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 3701(a), and 3502(a), respectively.
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a consecutive sentence of nine to twenty years’ imprisonment for robbery and

a consecutive sentence of five to twenty years’ imprisonment for burglary.

On June 21, 2004, the trial court granted Appellant’s post-sentence 

motion, in part, and vacated the sentence of death.2 The trial court, in doing 

so, ordered a new penalty phase hearing. On July 1, 2004, Appellant filed a 

capital appeal with our Supreme Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9546(d), 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 910, and Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). On July 21, 2004, the 

Commonwealth filed a cross-appeal with our Supreme Court challenging the 

June 21, 2004 order vacating Appellant’s sentence of death. On December 

28, 2007, our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order that vacated

Appellant’s sentence of death and ordered a new penalty phase hearing. 

Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2007).

On April 30, 2009, upon the conclusion of the penalty phase hearing in 

which the jury returned a verdict sentencing Appellant to life imprisonment, 

the trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for murder. Appellant 

did not file a subsequent appeal.

On July 2, 2009, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition raising, inter alia, 

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, post-sentence and 

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2

In a June 30, 2004 order, the trial court clarified its June 21, 2004 order, 

indicating that only the sentence of death was vacated and that the two 

consecutive sentences imposed for Appellant’s robbery and burglary 

convictions remained in place.
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direct-appeal counsel, and counsel for his second penalty phase hearing. 

PCRA counsel was appointed to represent Appellant, and on February 22, 

2010, counsel filed a Turner/Finley3 no-merit letter and a motion to 

withdraw. On March 26, 2010, the PCRA court notified Appellant of its intent 

to dismiss the PCRA petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did not 

file a response. On April 23, 2010, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA 

petition. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal.

On July 19, 2017, Appellant filed pro se the instant PCRA petition, his 

second, requesting the reinstatement of his appeal rights nunc pro tunc on 

the grounds, inter alia, his PCRA counsel abandoned him in his first PCRA 

petition. On March 13, 2019, the PCRA court notified Appellant, pursuant to 

Rule 907, of its intent to dismiss his PCRA petition on the basis it was untimely 

and Appellant failed to invoke an exception to the jurisdictional time-bar. 

Appellant did not file a response. The PCRA court subsequently dismissed 

Appellant’s PCRA petition on August 5, 2019. This appeal followed.4

On appeal, Appellant raises twelve issues, including, inter alia, a claim 

of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel based upon PCRA counsel’s filing of 

a Turner/Finley no-merit letter and allegedly failing to notify Appellant that 

PCRA counsel did not perfect an appeal of the PCRA court’s dismissal of 

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3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

4 The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of matters 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court, 

however, filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 13, 2019.
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Appellant’s first PCRA petition. Appellant’s Brief at 1-2. We do not, however, 

set forth Appellant’s issues, herein, because those issues are not dispositive 

of this appeal.

Our Supreme Court instructed that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is 

jurisdictional. If a PCRA petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the 

petition. Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Pa. 2005); 

see also Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(holding courts do not have jurisdiction over an untimely PCRA petition). In 

order to be timely filed, a PCRA petition, including second and subsequent 

petitions, must be filed within one year of when an appellant’s judgment of 

sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “A judgment becomes 

final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 

or at the expiration of the time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(3). Our Supreme Court has held that the PCRA’s time restriction 

is constitutionally sound. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287, 292 (Pa. 

2004).

Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment on April 

30, 2009. Appellant did not file an appeal with this Court. Therefore, 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on June 1, 2009, 30 days after 
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the expiration of the time for seeking an appeal with this Court.5 See

Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (requiring a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after 

the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(3) (stating that a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of 

direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking the review). Therefore, 

Appellant’s instant PCRA petition filed on July 19, 2017, more than 8 years 

after his judgment of sentence became final, is patently untimely.

If a PCRA petition is untimely filed, the jurisdictional time-bar can only

be overcome if the petitioner alleges and proves one of the three statutory 

exceptions, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Commonwealth v. 

Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017). The three narrow statutory exceptions

to the one-year time-bar are as follows: “(1) interference by government

officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) 

an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51

A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).

A petition invoking an exception to the jurisdictional time-bar must be filed

within 60 days of the date that the claim could have been presented.6

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5 We note that the 30th day following April 30, 2009, was Saturday, May 30, 

2009. Consequently, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on 

Monday, June 1, 2009. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (stating that when the last 

day of any period of time referred to in a statute falls on a Saturday or Sunday, 

that day shall be omitted from the computation).

6 We note that effective December 24, 2018, the period of time in which to 

file a petition invoking one of the three exceptions was extended from 60 days 
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (prior version). If the petitioner fails to invoke a 

valid exception to the PCRA time-bar, courts are without jurisdiction to review 

the petition or provide relief. Spotz, 171 A.3d at 676.

A review of Appellant’s PCRA petition demonstrates that Appellant is 

attempting to assert the newly discovered facts exception to the jurisdictional 

time-bar. PCRA Petition, 7/19/17, at 1, 3. Our Supreme Court held that when 

considering a claim seeking to invoke the newly discovered facts exception, 

“the petitioner must establish only that (1) the facts upon which the claim was 

predicated were unknown and (2) they could not have been ascertained by 

the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227

(Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). “Due diligence does not require perfect 

vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the party [] put forth 

reasonable effort to obtain the information upon which a claim is based.” Id. 

at 230 (citation and original quotation marks omitted). The petitioner must 

offer “evidence that he exercised due diligence in obtaining facts upon which 

his claim was based.” Id. at 227, citing Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 

A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001). “[T]he presumption that information which is of public 

record cannot be deemed ‘unknown’ for purposes of subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) 

does not apply to pro se prisoner petitioners.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 

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to one year. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (current version). This amendment 

applies to claims arising one year prior to the effective date of the amendment, 

that is to say arising on December 24, 2017, or later. Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 

894, No. 146, § 3. Because Appellant filed his instant PCRA petition on July 

19, 2017, this amendment does not apply.
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158 A.3d 618, 638 (Pa. 2017) (emphasis omitted). Thus, “in determining 

whether a petitioner qualifies for the [newly discovered facts] exception to the 

PCRA's time requirements pursuant to subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii), the PCRA 

court must first determine whether ‘the facts upon which the claim is 

predicated were unknown to the petitioner.’” Id.

Here, Appellant argues that on May 8, 2017, he learned that there was 

no current appeal pending with this Court pertaining to his first PCRA petition. 

PCRA Petition, 7/19/17, at “Supplemental Page 3.” Appellant asserts that he 

understood that the court-appointed counsel in his first PCRA petition filed a 

Turner/Finley no-merit letter and a motion to withdraw and that the PCRA 

court subsequently granted counsel permission to withdraw from

representation of Appellant. Id. at 3. Appellant contends, however, that he 

was under the belief that his court-appointed counsel was securing another 

lawyer from her firm to file a notice of appeal on behalf of Appellant. Id. 

Appellant admits that he received a letter from his court-appointed counsel 

explaining that Appellant had 30 days in which to file a notice of appeal from

the PCRA court’s dismissal of his first PCRA petition. Id.

The PCRA court, in dismissing Appellant’s instant PCRA petition, stated,

This second or subsequent petition was untimely filed and does 

not plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. In an 

attempt to establish the newly-discovered fact exception, 

§ 9545(b)(1)(ii), [Appellant] claimed that in 2017[,] he 

discovered that his PCRA counsel abandoned him by failing to 

appeal the PCRA court’s 2010 order denying relief. [Appellant] 

acknowledged, however, that his attorney was permitted to 

withdraw after filing a Turner/Finley no-merit letter. [Appellant] 

also acknowledged that his attorney specifically advised him that 
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he had [30] days to appeal. Thus, [Appellant] failed to 

substantiate the purported newly-discovered fact that counsel 

abandoned him.

[FN3]

[FN3] Even if counsel was obligated to preserve [Appellant’s] 

appeal, [Appellant] failed to demonstrate that the status of 

his appeal previously was unascertainable with the exercise 

of due diligence. Additionally, [Appellant] failed to file his 

instant petition within [60] days of discovering the 

purported abandonment. Specifically, [Appellant] averred 

that he discovered the fact that an appeal [was not] 

perfected on May 8, 2017. [Appellant] filed the instant 

PCRA petition on July 19, 2017, outside the [60]-day 

window[.]

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/23/19, at 1 (record citations and footnote 2 omitted 

(footnote 1 does not appear in the opinion)).

A review of the record demonstrates that Appellant admitted receipt of

a letter from his court-appointed counsel informing him that he had 30 days 

to appeal the dismissal of his first PCRA petition.7 Appellant further admitted

he was aware that the PCRA court granted his court-appointed counsel 

permission to withdraw from representation.

8

 Although Appellant claimed he 

believed his court-appointed counsel was arranging for another attorney from 

her firm to represent Appellant on his appeal, Appellant failed to plead or 

prove his PCRA counsel informed him as such.

9

 Appellant simply did not file 

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7 A copy of the correspondence from Appellant’s court-appointed counsel is 

not part of the certified record.

8 A copy of the PCRA court’s order granting counsel’s petition to withdraw is 

not part of the certified record.

9 The letter of appointment appointing Appellant’s PCRA counsel specifically 

stated that the appointment was “not transferable”.
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an appeal, pro se or otherwise, of the dismissal of his first PCRA petition. 

Appellant failed to demonstrate that the newly discovered facts, namely that 

Appellant’s PCRA counsel no longer represented Appellant and that there was 

no pending appeal of the dismissal of his first PCRA petition, were not 

previously known by Appellant.10 Therefore, the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely and without exception.

Consequently, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review Appellant’s 

PCRA petition, and we may not review the petition on appeal.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/28/20

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10 Moreover, Appellant failed to plead and prove that the newly discovered 

facts could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

Much like Appellant was able to file the instant PCRA petition, Appellant could 

have exercised due diligence by contacting this Court in an attempt to 

ascertain the status of an appeal or by contacting his prior PCRA counsel.