SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1834-15T4

DENISE V. THOMAS,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MARIA BOBADILLA1,

Defendant,

and

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

Argued March 21, 2017 – Decided August 9, 2017

Before Judges Koblitz, Rothstadt and Sumners.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L1864-14.

Kenneth N. Lipstein argued the cause for 

appellant.

S. Robert Princiotto argued the cause for 

respondent (Marcus & Levy, attorneys; Mr. 

Princiotto, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

 

1 We have revised the caption to reflect defendant's name as 

spelled in the police report and other documents. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
2 A-1834-15T4

In this automobile negligence action, plaintiff Denise V. 

Thomas claimed she was injured in an accident as a result of 

defendant Maria Bobadilla's negligence. Thomas was insured by 

defendant All-State Insurance Company (All-State), through a 

policy she purchased in Florida. The trial court denied AllState's motion for summary judgment to dismiss Thomas' claim 

because it determined that All-State was obligated to provide her 

with uninsured motorist benefits under the Deemer Statute,

N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4, as Bobadilla was covered by a basic insurance 

policy without bodily insurance protection. For the reasons that 

follow, we reverse. 

In December 2011, Thomas separated from her husband and left 

Florida to relocate to New Jersey, where she has since remained. 

Seven months later, on July 7, 2012, Thomas was driving her 

automobile in New Jersey when she was involved in an auto accident 

with Bobadilla. Although her automobile had been with her since 

her arrival to our state, at the time of the accident it was still 

registered in Florida under her name and insured by All-State 

under a Florida policy in which she declined uninsured motorist 

coverage. At the time of the accident, Bobadilla had a basic 

insurance policy without bodily insurance coverage. 
3 A-1834-15T4

All-State moved for summary judgment contending that since 

Bobadilla, the tortfeasor, was insured without bodily injury 

coverage, Thomas could not seek recovery for bodily injury through 

her Florida All-State policy that did not have uninsured or 

underinsured protection. All-State argued the Deemer Statute did 

not afford uninsured or underinsured coverage to Thomas' out-ofstate All-State policy because her automobile was principally 

garaged in New Jersey for seven months prior to the accident and 

she should have obtained coverage under a New Jersey automobile 

insurance policy. 

The trial court denied the motion with written findings of 

facts and conclusions of law. The court found that when the 

accident occurred Thomas was not a New Jersey resident and did not 

have to acquire New Jersey insurance coverage. The court reasoned

"while there may be indicators that Thomas did in fact relocate 

back to New Jersey, seven months is not a sufficient amount of 

time to declare her an official New Jersey resident at the time 

of the accident." Further, the court determined that Bobadilla 

was an uninsured motorist under the Deemer Statute. Thus, the 

court reasoned that the Deemer Statute converted Thomas' Florida 

All-State policy to a New Jersey policy with the lawsuit limitation

option. N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.45; N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). 
4 A-1834-15T4

Several months later, the court entered a consent judgement 

in favor of Thomas against All-State in the amount of $15,000,

with All-State reserving the right to appeal the court's denial 

of its summary judgment motion. 

On appeal, All-State reiterates its argument that Thomas is 

not entitled to seek recovery for bodily injury because Bobadilla's 

insurance coverage did not have bodily injury coverage and the 

Florida All-State policy that covered Thomas' automobile did not 

provide uninsured or underinsured benefits. All-State contends 

that the Deemer Statute does not apply to afford Thomas the lawsuit 

limitation option to seek recovery for bodily injury because as a 

New Jersey resident with an automobile principally garaged in New 

Jersey, she should have had a New Jersey policy. All-State further

argues that since Thomas did not have a New Jersey policy with 

personal injury protection benefits, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) 

precludes her from seeking recovery for bodily injury. 

We review a motion seeking summary judgment using the same 

standard used by the trial court. Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 

38 (2014). We must determine, based on the competent evidential 

materials submitted by the parties, whether there are genuine 

issues of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is 

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Brill v. Guardian 

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); R. 4:46-2(c). 
5 A-1834-15T4

Here, based upon our review of the record, there were no material 

issues of fact in dispute, therefore All-State's motion for summary 

judgment should have been granted.

The Deemer Statute requires an out-of-state insurer 

authorized to transact business in New Jersey to include standard 

personal injury protection (PIP) coverage pursuant to N.J.S.A.

39:6A-4 "for any New Jersey resident who is not required to 

maintain [PIP] coverage pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 or N.J.S.A.

39:6A-3.1] and who is not otherwise eligible for such benefits, 

whenever the automobile . . . insured under the policy is used or 

operated in this State." N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 (emphasis added). 

The question in this case is whether the Deemer Statute is 

inapplicable because Thomas was required to maintain PIP coverage 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.

Every owner of an automobile registered or principally 

garaged in New Jersey is required to maintain minimum amounts of 

standard, basic, or special liability insurance coverage for 

bodily injury, death, and property damage caused by their 

automobiles. `N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). In addition, every insurance 

policy must provide a package of PIP benefits. Ibid. A person 

who fails to maintain such coverage "shall have no cause of action 

for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result 
6 A-1834-15T4

of an accident while operating an uninsured automobile." N.J.S.A.

39:6A-4.5(a).

The term "principally garaged" as used in N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 

is not defined in the statute and, thus, must be given its 

generally accepted meaning. N.J.S.A. 1:1-1. As we determined in 

Chalef v. Ryerson, 277 N.J. Super. 22, 27 (App. Div. 1994), the 

term "principally garaged" means "the physical location where an 

automobile is primarily or chiefly kept or where it is kept most 

of the time." In Chalef, the plaintiff had been living and working 

in New Jersey for four consecutive months before the accident. We 

deemed that span of time sufficient to find that the plaintiff's 

automobile was being principally garaged in New Jersey. Id. at 

28.

Here, Thomas was living in New Jersey and driving her Florida 

registered and insured automobile in New Jersey for seven 

consecutive months prior to the accident. Based upon the fourmonth time period we concluded was sufficient in Chalef, we 

disagree with the trial court that Thomas did not have a sufficient 

time to register and insure her automobile in New Jersey. 

Consequently, the Deemer Statute does not apply to the present 

circumstances, and Thomas' failure to insure her automobile under 

a New Jersey policy precludes her from seeking recovery for her 

bodily injury under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). 
7 A-1834-15T4

Lastly, Thomas' contention that not applying the Deemer 

Statute violates her constitutional equal protection rights is 

without sufficient legal basis to merit discussion in this opinion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Reversed and remanded for the entry of an order granting 

defendant summary judgment.