United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Honorable Peter A. 

DeFazio, House of Representatives 

AVIATION SECURITY

Federal Air Marshal 

Service Could Benefit 

from Improved 

Planning and Controls 

November 2005 

GAO-06-203 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2005

AVIATION SECURITY

Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit 

Highlights of GAO-06-203, a report to the from Improved Planning and Controls 

Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, House of 

Representatives 

The U.S. Federal Air Marshal 

Service (FAMS) has undergone a 

number of changes in recent years,

including a 2003 transfer from the

Transportation Security

Administration (TSA) to the U.S.

Immigration and Customs

Enforcement Bureau (ICE), and a 

2005 transfer from ICE back to 

TSA. A key aspect of federal air 

marshals’ operating procedures is 

the discreet movement through 

airports as they check in for their 

flight, transit screening 

checkpoints, and board the aircraft. 

This report discusses FAMS’s 

(1) transfer to ICE and key 

practices that could facilitate its 

return to TSA, and (2) management

of mission-related incidents that

affect air marshals’ ability to 

operate discreetly. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the

Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) adopt

key practices for successful

mergers and transformations, to 

include developing an overall

strategy with implementation goals 

and milestones and a 

communication strategy. GAO is 

also recommending that the 

Secretary direct FAMS to improve

management controls for

recording, tracking, and addressing

mission incidents and 

communicating the outcome of 

actions taken to address them. 

DHS reviewed a draft of this report

and agreed with GAO’s findings 

and recommendations. 

DHS made limited progress in achieving the intended objectives of its 

transfer of FAMS to ICE, which included (1) developing a “surge” capacity 

through cross-training ICE agents, and (2) enhancing federal air marshals’ 

career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge capacity 

by cross-training a number of ICE agents but suspended these efforts in 

October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the cross-training 

was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS indicated that it would 

continue to support the surge effort, but had not determined whether and 

when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative. Further, 

although DHS recognized that federal air marshals’ career opportunities 

were limited, it had not developed plans to expand them through 

investigative or other duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined how these 

transition objectives would be met because it had not developed an overall 

strategy to include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help 

target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections—a key 

practice for a successful transformation. DHS also had not developed a 

communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related 

progress on the transition to employees and other stakeholders—another 

key practice. With its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS’s prior experience in 

transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful information on key practices to

consider in effecting a successful transition. 

FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure that missionrelated incidents that affect air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly are 

recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, FAMS has not developed a 

written policy that establishes criteria for when and how federal air marshals 

are to complete mission reports on incidents they encounter during their 

missions. In addition, FAMS lacks adequate controls to ensure that the 

outcome of actions taken to address these incidents was communicated to 

the federal air marshals who originally reported them. Not providing such 

information may serve to discourage federal air marshals from submitting 

future reports. FAMS officials have acknowledged that FAMS lacks written 

policies to govern the use and management of mission reports and stated 

that FAMS plans to develop such policies in the near future. 

Federal Air Marshals Protect Passengers, Crew, and Aircraft 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-203.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick at (202) 512-8777 or

berrickc@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 6

DHS Made Limited Progress in Achieving its Stated Objectives in 

Transferring FAMS to ICE and Could Benefit from Key 

Transformation Practices in Returning FAMS to TSA 8 

FAMS Lacks Adequate Controls to Manage Incidents That Affect 

Federal Air Marshals’ Ability to Operate Discreetly 15 

Conclusions 18

Recommendations for Executive Action 19 

Agency Comments 19 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 22 

Appendix II Key Practices and Implementation Steps for 

Mergers and Organizational Transformations 25 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 26 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 28 

Related GAO Products 29 

Page i GAO-06-203 Aviation Security
Aviation Security

Abbreviations 

ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

BTS Border and Transportation Security Directorate 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOT Department of Transportation 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FAMS Federal Air Marshal Service 

GS General Schedule 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau 

OPM Office of Personnel Management 

SAC Special Agent-in-Charge

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-06-203
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

November 28, 2005 

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. DeFazio: 

With approximately 25,000 flights arriving or departing the United States 

each day, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) plays a critical role in 

securing our nation’s commercial aviation system by detecting, deterring, 

and defeating hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers, 

and crews. In recent years, FAMS has undergone a number of significant 

changes to its organizational structure, workforce, and mission. In 

response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FAMS was faced 

with the formidable task of ramping up its workforce—from an agency

with fewer than 50 federal air marshals to thousands—and expanding its 

mission to include the protection of both domestic and international 

flights.1

 Pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

(ATSA)—enacted in November 2001—authority over FAMS shifted from 

the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT).2

Over the next 2 years, FAMS transferred two more times. FAMS’s most 

recent transfer during that timeframe3

 occurred in November 2003, when 

FAMS moved from TSA to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Bureau (ICE)—the largest law enforcement component within the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS).4

Aviation Security

 1

The exact number of federal air marshals is classified. 

2

Pub. L. No. 107-71,115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

3

In March 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, FAMS, along with TSA, was 

transferred from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland 

Security. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 

4

FAMS was formerly located within DHS’s Border and Transportation Security Directorate

(BTS), one of five operational directorates within the department. As part of his July 2005 

reorganization announcement, the Secretary of DHS proposed the dissolution of BTS,

pending the enactment of legislation to effect this change. With the passage of the fiscal 

year 2006 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (Pub. L. No. 109-90), 

signed into law on October 18, 2005, the functions of BTS have been merged into other 

offices and component agencies throughout DHS. 

Page 1 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

There were two stated objectives related to FAMS’s transfer to ICE. 

According to the then-Secretary of Homeland Security, the first objective 

involved cross-training customs agents and immigration officers to 

function as federal air marshals during heightened threat levels, thereby 

providing a “surge” capability that could be deployed in response to an 

increased threat. In announcing the second objective, the Secretary stated

that the transfer would also provide federal air marshals a greater range of

law enforcement career options within a single agency. That is, because of 

the limited number of nonairborne (i.e., ground-based) positions within 

FAMS, federal air marshals had few career opportunities, which, if left 

unaddressed, could lead to morale and retention issues. Nearly 2 years 

after FAMS transferred to ICE—in July 2005—the newly appointed 

Secretary of DHS announced that FAMS would be transferred back to TSA 

to increase operational coordination and strengthen efforts to meet the 

common goal of aviation security. This transfer became effective in 

October 2005. 

To carry out its mission, FAMS deploys specially trained and armed 

federal air marshals on board aircraft to protect passengers, crew, and 

aircraft from terrorist activities. According to FAMS’s mission deployment 

procedures, federal air marshals are to operate as “discreet” (semicovert) 

professionals when checking-in at airports, passing through security 

screening checkpoints, and boarding the aircraft during their missions. In 

doing so, federal air marshals are to blend in with passengers while 

covering high-risk domestic and international flights on U.S. aircraft. While 

FAMS’s procedures focus on discretion, there are times when federal air 

marshals encounter mission-related situations (i.e., incidents) that affect 

their ability to conduct their missions discreetly. Such incidents may 

include miscommunication between a federal air marshal and an airline 

staff regarding the manner in which the federal air marshal can board the 

aircraft. 

In this report, we address: (1) the progress DHS made in achieving its 

stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE and the key practices that

could facilitate its efforts to return FAMS to TSA and (2) the extent to 

which FAMS has adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents 

that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly. Some 

information related to FAMS and federal air marshals’ ability to operate 

discreetly is considered sensitive security information. Accordingly, we 

Page 2 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

issued a separate restricted version of this report containing that 

information.5

To answer these questions, we reviewed applicable laws, regulations, 

operational policies and procedures, and other relevant documentation. 

We also interviewed officials from DHS, ICE, BTS, TSA, and FAMS to 

discuss FAMS’s transfer to ICE. Additionally, we considered our prior 

work on key practices used by public and private sector organizations that 

have undergone successful mergers and transformations.6

 The nine key 

practices are described in greater detail in appendix II. We did not conduct 

an in-depth analysis comparing all of these practices with the transfer of 

FAMS to ICE. However, using the documentation provided and interviews 

we conducted, we examined the information gathered in light of two of the 

nine transformation practices to determine the extent to which the agency

(1) established an overall strategy with implementation goals and a 

timeline to guide the integration effort into ICE, and (2) employed a 

communication strategy to keep employees informed of the progress of 

the integration. We selected these two practices as criteria for this review 

because they are especially important to ensuring that DHS has the 

planning framework necessary to guide and monitor its transformation 

efforts—which we have also underscored in our previous work on DHS. 

In addition, we interviewed 19 federal air marshals and 5 FAMS Special 

Agents in Charge (SAC) in 5 selected field locations around the country. 

Generally, we chose these locations on the basis of geographical 

dispersion. They included: Washington, D.C.; Dallas, Texas; New York, 

New York; Atlanta, Georgia; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Federal air 

marshals at these locations fly throughout the nation so their experiences 

potentially cover airports throughout the United States. During these 

interviews, we obtained information on a range of issues related to the

transfer of FAMS to ICE. Through these interviews, we also gained a more 

complete understanding of federal air marshals’ mission deployment 

procedures and their experiences regarding incidents that affect their 

 5

The report containing sensitive security information is GAO, Aviation Security: Federal

Air Marshal Service Could Benefit From Improved Planning and Controls, 

GAO-05-884SU (Washington D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005). 

6

GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003), and 

GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a

Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

Page 3 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

ability to operate discreetly during their mission. However, the 

information we obtained during these interviews cannot be generalized to 

all federal air marshals. A more detailed description of our scope and 

methodology is contained in appendix I. We conducted our work from 

June 2004 through August 2005 in accordance with generally accepted

government auditing standards. 

In July 2005, after we had completed most of this review, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security announced that FAMS would be transferred back to 

TSA. This transfer became effective in October 2005. We believe that 

DHS’s prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful 

information in identifying key practices for DHS to consider in effecting a

successful transition to TSA. Accordingly, this report addresses key 

lessons learned from the earlier transition to help facilitate FAMS’s 

movement back to TSA.

In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited 

progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity

through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals’ 

career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge 

capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents but suspended these 

efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the 

cross-training was an ineffective use of resources and training.7

 DHS 

indicated that it would continue to support the surge effort but had not 

determined whether and when it would resume cross-training to support 

this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals’ 

career opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand 

them by providing additional opportunities through investigative or other 

duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined how these stated transition 

objectives would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy 

to include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target 

performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any 

needed adjustments to future goals and milestones—a key practice for a 

successful merger and transformation effort. In addition, DHS had not 

developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations within 

the organization and report related progress on the transition to 

employees and other stakeholders—another key practice. Our previous 

Results in Brief 

 7

The exact number of ICE agents who received cross-training is considered sensitive 

security information and discussed in the restricted version of this report, GAO-05-884SU. 

Page 4 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

reports have underscored the importance of DHS’s adopting similar 

practices to facilitate its transformation efforts.8

 With its return of FAMS 

to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its experience, including 

how these key practices can help to facilitate FAMS’s transfer back to 

TSA. 

In addition, FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure 

that mission-related incidents that affect air marshals’ ability to operate 

discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, FAMS has 

not developed a written policy that establishes criteria for when and how 

federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on incidents they 

encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks adequate 

controls to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to address these 

incidents are communicated to the federal air marshals who originally 

reported them. Not providing such information may serve to discourage 

federal air marshals from submitting future reports. FAMS officials have 

acknowledged that FAMS lacks written policies to govern the use and 

management of mission reports and stated that FAMS plans to develop

such policies in the near future. 

To help the department in its efforts to achieve a successful 

transformation effort in returning FAMS to TSA, we are recommending 

that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security adopt, for this 

transformation, key practices for successful mergers and transformations 

that we have previously recommended to the department, which include 

developing an overall strategy with implementation goals and a timeline to

build momentum and show progress as well as a communication strategy 

to share expectations and report related progress. We are also 

recommending that the Secretary take four actions to establish better 

management controls related to recording, tracking, and addressing 

mission incidents as well as communicating the outcome of actions taken

to address these incidents. 

We provided a draft copy of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its 

written comments, agreed with the findings and recommendations in the 

report. The full text of DHS’s comments is included in appendix III. 

 8

See for example, GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformations: 

Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, 

GAO-03-293SP (Washington D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

Page 5 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

Background Originally established as the Sky Marshal program in the 1970s to counter 

hijackers, FAMS was expanded in response to the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks through the passage of ATSA. This law required a 

dramatic increase in FAMS’s mission and workforce and mandated the

deployment of federal air marshals on all high security risk flights.9

 To 

create an expanded workforce, FAA began an intensive effort on 

September 17, 2001, to recruit federal air marshals in unprecedented 

numbers. Until FAA could hire, train, and deploy the first few classes of 

federal air marshals, other federal agencies made law enforcement officers 

available to augment FAMS. Since that time, FAMS has grown from a 

relatively centralized organization with one office to a highly decentralized

agency with thousands of federal air marshals assigned to 21 field 

offices—each headed by a Special Agent in Charge, or SAC—throughout 

the United States. 

In addition to changes in its size and mission, FAMS has also undergone 

several organizational transformations since September 11, 2001, moving

from FAA to TSA in November 2001, and from DOT to DHS in March 2003. 

Several months later—in November 2003—FAMS was transferred from 

TSA to ICE, based, in part, on the conclusions reached by a BTScommissioned internal working group.10 Tasked with determining the 

merits of a potential transfer, the working group concluded that 

transferring FAMS to ICE could improve the security of the nation’s 

aviation system by providing a surge capability during times of increased 

aviation threats by augmenting federal air marshals with ICE agents. The 

working group also concluded that FAMS’s transfer to ICE could provide 

federal air marshals with the same type of law enforcement career options 

that were available to ICE agents. In July 2005—nearly 2 years after its 

transfer of FAMS from TSA to ICE—DHS announced that FAMS would be

returned to TSA to increase operational coordination and strengthen 

efforts to meet the common goal of aviation security. This transfer became 

effective in October 2005. 

To carry out its mission, FAMS deploys federal air marshals on board 

flights either destined for or originating in the United States, based on 

FAMS’s Concept of Operations. Deployed to passenger flights, federal air 

 9

§ 105 of ATSA amended title 49 of the United States Code by inserting § 44917 into chapter 

449. 

10Members of the working group included the Director of FAMS and representatives from 

BTS, DHS, TSA, and ICE. 

Page 6 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

marshals dress in plain clothes to blend in with other passengers and 

perform their duties discreetly in an effort to avoid drawing undue 

attention to themselves. Federal air marshals are subject to FAMS 

procedures for checking-in for their flights, passing through security 

screening checkpoints, and boarding aircraft.11 According to FAMS, these 

procedures were designed to enable federal air marshals to carry out their 

missions in a discreet manner in order to help protect their identities, 

while facilitating coordination and communication with crew and airline 

staff. 

While FAMS’s mission deployment procedures focus on discretion, federal 

air marshals may encounter mission-related incidents that affect their 

ability to conduct their missions discreetly.12 FAMS has directed that, in 

the event that federal air marshals encounter such incidents, they should 

contact the FAMS Mission Operations Center,13 to the extent they believe

that the incident could be evidence of a systemic problem. As we discuss 

later in this report, federal air marshals are not required to file a “mission 

report” for every incident they encounter. That is, the Mission Operations 

Center staff may or may not request that the federal air marshal who 

encountered the incident file a written mission report. 

 11Federal air marshals are also subject to certain TSA operating procedures—which vary by 

airport—and to airline procedures in boarding aircraft, which differ by air carrier. In this 

regard, federal air marshals must interact, to varying degrees, with airline and airport

personnel and TSA staff during the course of their daily mission. 

12More specific information regarding the nature of these incidents is considered sensitive 

security information and discussed in the restricted version of this report, GAO-05-884SU. 

13The Mission Operations Center controls daily operations and monitors ongoing missions

by, among other things, tracking federal air marshal teams that are in the aviation domain 

worldwide. 

Page 7 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited 

progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity

through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals’ 

career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge 

capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents,

14 but suspended these 

efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the 

cross-training was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS 

indicated that it would continue to support the surge effort, but had not 

determined whether and when it would resume cross-training to support 

this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals’ 

career opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand 

them by providing additional opportunities through investigative or other 

duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined how these stated transition 

objectives would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy 

to include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target 

performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any 

needed adjustments to future goals and milestones—a key practice for a 

successful merger and transformation effort. In addition, DHS had not 

developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations within 

the organization and report related progress on the transition to 

employees and other stakeholders—another key practice. Our previous 

reports have underscored the importance of DHS’s adopting similar 

practices to facilitate its transformation efforts.15 With its return of FAMS 

to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its experience, including 

how these key practices can facilitate FAMS’s transfer back to TSA. 

One of DHS’s objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE was to create a 

“surge capacity;” that is, strengthening aviation security in a heightened 

threat environment by tactically deploying ICE agents to supplement 

FAMS’s existing deployments of federal air marshals on U.S. aircraft. The 

Secretary of DHS announced in December 2003 that this surge capacity 

would be achieved through training the over 5,000 ICE agents from ICE’s 

DHS Made Limited 

Progress in Achieving 

Its Stated Objectives 

in Transferring FAMS

to ICE and Could 

Benefit from Key 

Transformation 

Practices in Returning 

FAMS to TSA

Some Surge Capacity Had 

Been Developed, but DHS 

Suspended Efforts to 

Cross-Train ICE Agents 

 14As we noted earlier, the exact number of ICE agents who received cross-training is

considered sensitive security information and discussed in the restricted version of this 

report, GAO-05-884SU. 

15See for example, GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformations: 

Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, 

GAO-03-293SP (Washington D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

Page 8 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

Office of Investigations.16 Specifically, these agents, who typically conduct 

immigration and customs-related investigations, could also be deployed to

supplement federal air marshals on commercial airlines, thereby providing 

a manpower reserve from which DHS could draw upon when heightened 

threat conditions warranted increased flight coverage. In March 2004, the 

Assistant Secretary for ICE testified before the Appropriations 

Committees that ICE anticipated providing this cross-training to no less 

than 800 ICE agents by the end of fiscal year 2004.17

Between December 2003 and October 2004, a number of ICE agents 

received cross-training in the skills necessary to supplement federal air 

marshals during a heightened threat level. Some of those agents were 

deployed and temporarily assigned to augment federal air marshals on 

flights in response to a heightened threat alert.18 According to FAMS, these 

ICE agents were chosen for surge deployment based on their previous 

FAMS training—including extensive firearms training—and flying 

experience as temporary federal air marshals.19 That is, these agents, 

employees of the former U.S. Customs Service, had been among the law 

enforcement officers who had previously flown as temporary federal air 

marshals to augment FAMS following the September 11, 2001, attacks, 

from October 2001 through May 2002.

20 To prepare for the surge 

 16With agents located in 27 field offices throughout the United States, ICE’s Office of 

Investigations enforces trade and immigration laws through the investigation of activities, 

persons, and incidents that may pose a threat to U.S. safety and security. These include the 

illegal trafficking in weapons, narcotics and contraband smuggling, human smuggling and

trafficking, violations of the immigration system, money laundering and other financial 

crimes, fraudulent trade practices, child pornography, and child sex tourism. Its key

missions are strengthening national security, combating smuggling and promoting public 

safety, and securing the nation’s economic system from terrorist and criminal exploitation. 

17For example, see Statement of Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, before the Senate 

Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, March 30, 2004. 

18The exact number of ICE agents who were deployed is considered sensitive security 

information and discussed in the restricted version of this report, GAO-05-884SU. 

19Once these agents completed FAMS’s 40-hour training program, they were temporarily 

assigned to the FAA’s air marshal program to augment their security mission. 

20These agents were among the federal law enforcement officers used from various 

agencies who had been trained and deployed as temporary air marshals to augment the 

small number of federal air marshals employed at that time. These officers acted as a 

stopgap measure, while FAMS selected, hired, trained, and deployed permanent air

marshals. 

Page 9 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

deployment, these ICE agents received a 3-day refresher training in 

current FAMS’s procedures, policies, and updated firearms techniques. 

Following the surge deployment in January 2004, FAMS developed and 

implemented a 40-hour cross-training curriculum for ICE agents so they 

could supplement federal air marshals during a surge deployment. This 

training was substantially similar to the training provided to federal air 

marshals, which included instruction in areas such as the use of firearms 

and boarding procedures. 

In October 2004, ICE suspended its cross-training efforts in response to 

congressional concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of 

resources and training. Specifically, in a June 2004 House Appropriations 

Committee report, the Committee expressed concerns regarding how ICE 

agents would maintain their skills as federal air marshals since they did 

not regularly perform federal air marshal duties. The Committee directed

that each cross-trained ICE agent fly missions with a federal air marshal 

for a minimum of 24 hours per quarter, beginning October 1, 2004.

21

However, in the October 2004 report that accompanied the fiscal year 2005

DHS Appropriations Act, the Conference Committee suggested that the 

cross-training provided to ICE agents was an ineffective use of resources.22

The Committee further suggested that the training of ICE agents to serve 

as federal air marshals in a surge capacity be discontinued. In response, 

DHS suspended its cross-training efforts at that time. ICE later stated that 

it would continue to support the surge effort, but had not determined 

whether and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative. 

With DHS’s transfer of FAMS to TSA, it is unclear whether or how crosstraining will be used to augment federal air marshals during heightened 

threat levels. 

 21H.R. Rep. No. 108-541, at 32, 36 (June 15, 2004). 

22H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-774, at 46 (Oct. 9, 2004). 

Page 10 GAO-06-203
Another of DHS’s objectives in its transfer of FAMS from TSA to ICE was 

to expand career opportunities for federal air marshals. Both FAMS and 

ICE officials have stated that the transfer was intended to provide federal

air marshals with ground-based assignments, such as nonflying 

supervisory or other positions and thus establish additional career 

opportunities for federal air marshals. These officials told us that federal 

air marshals cannot sustain a career in an airborne position, based on such 

factors as the frequency of flying, their irregular schedules, and the 

monotony of flying repetitive assignments. 

DHS Recognized That 

Federal Air Marshals’ 

Career Opportunities Were 

Limited but Had Not 

Developed Plans to 

Expand Them 

A study commissioned by ICE in March 2004 reflected concerns over 

federal air marshals’ limited career opportunities. Specifically, ICE 

commissioned IBM to determine, among other things, the current status of 

federal air marshals’ career development and advancement opportunities. 

The study found that the overwhelming majority of federal air marshals 

were expected to reach the highest pay level in their job position by 

August 2004, and that FAMS had only a limited number of supervisory 

opportunities beyond that pay level. The study concluded that without 

career development and promotion opportunities, FAMS could experience 

a decline in employee morale and an increase in attrition rates. 

As a means of providing expanded career opportunities, FAMS

management has advocated that federal air marshals’ current position as a

“civil aviation security specialist” be re-classified to that of a criminal 

investigator.23 Recognizing that career paths for criminal investigators 

provide greater opportunity for movement than civil aviation security 

specialists, FAMS commissioned a study by a private contractor to 

determine the feasibility of such a conversion. Among other things, the 

study concluded that because the mission of air marshals had changed 

after September 11, 2001—from enforcing FAA regulations onboard 

aircraft, to detecting, deterring, and defeating criminal acts in the aviation

domain—federal air marshals satisfied the requirements of a criminal 

investigator position. The study further stated that career opportunities 

were more prevalent for those qualified as criminal investigators because 

these positions possess knowledge, skills, and abilities that are 

 23Under OPM’s position classification standards, aviation security specialists are classified 

within the general inspection, investigation, and compliance occupational series (referred 

to as a GS-1801), which involves ensuring compliance with federal laws, regulations, or 

mandatory guidelines. Criminal investigator positions are classified within the “criminal” 

investigation occupational series (referred to as a GS-1811), which involves planning and 

investigating alleged or suspected criminal violations. 

Page 11 GAO-06-203 Aviation Security
Aviation Security

interchangeable across different agencies. In addition, the study found that 

criminal investigators could more successfully compete for similar 

positions in other law enforcement agencies and enjoyed greater 

opportunities for advancement and higher compensation in the federal 

government.

In January 2005, FAMS presented the results of the study to the 

management of DHS’s Border and Transportation Security (BTS) 

directorate for their consideration. In reviewing the study’s findings and 

additional research conducted by ICE’s legal and human resources staff, 

BTS, along with ICE management, concluded that the reclassification of 

federal air marshals from an aviation security specialist position to a 

criminal investigator position was not an appropriate course of action. In

addressing the study’s conclusions, officials maintained that the primary 

duties of a federal air marshal—to protect passengers, crews, and aircraft

from terrorist activities—were “not investigative in nature” and were 

inconsistent with the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) 

classification standards for the criminal investigator series. DHS also 

concluded that without any significant changes in the duties of federal air 

marshals, it did not see a basis for the conversion. 

In January 2005, ICE formed an Advisory Board to address issues related 

to FAMS’s transfer to ICE, including expanding federal air marshals’ 

career opportunities.24 ICE senior management officials, who served as 

members of the board, stated that they would have liked to expand career 

opportunities for federal air marshals if FAMS were to continue to reside 

in ICE, such as creating additional ground-based mission assignments. One 

of these officials said that federal air marshals could have potentially 

assumed a limited intelligence and surveillance role, such as assessing 

aircraft vulnerability and interdicting drugs and/or contraband aboard 

aircraft. As of June 2005, however, ICE had not developed any plans for 

doing so. With FAMS’s transition to TSA, it is unclear whether or how 

federal air marshals’ career opportunities may be expanded.

 24Board members included ICE’s Deputy Assistant Secretary, the senior advisor to ICE’s

Deputy Assistant Secretary, the special counsel to ICE’s Assistant Secretary, FAMS’s 

Deputy Director, and two FAMS field senior executives. 

Page 12 GAO-06-203
In light of its announcement to return FAMS to TSA, DHS has an 

opportunity to learn from its experience in transferring FAMS to ICE, 

including the importance that key practices can have in leading to 

successful transformation efforts within public and private sector 

organizations. Our July 2003 report on implementation steps to assist 

mergers and transformations identified nine key practices followed by 

public and private sector organizations that have led to successful 

transformations.25 All nine key practices and associated implementation 

steps are shown in appendix II. While all nine practices are important, we 

identified two practices that, in our view, could have enhanced DHS’s 

efforts to meet its stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE. These 

practices are (1) developing an overall strategy with implementation goals 

and a timeline to build momentum and show progress, and (2) establishing 

a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related 

progress. We believe these practices would be particularly helpful for DHS 

and could increase its likelihood for a successful transformation effort in 

returning FAMS to TSA.

Key Practices Could 

Facilitate FAMS’s Return 

to TSA 

As we discussed earlier, one of DHS’s stated objectives in transferring 

FAMS to ICE was to create a surge capacity during heightened threat 

levels. However, while DHS had indicated that it would train no less than 

800 ICE agents by the end of fiscal year 2004, it did not have an overall 

strategy to identify how it would sustain a surge capacity. Such a strategy

could have contained implementation goals, measures, and milestones to 

help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections. 

Another of DHS’s stated objectives was to expand career opportunities for 

federal air marshals. However, DHS had not identified any implementation

goals nor time frames for how and when it planned to develop these career 

opportunities, such as the types of opportunities to be provided or when 

federal air marshals could expect these opportunities to become available. 

Establishing implementation goals and associated timelines are critical to

ensuring a successful integration as well as pinpointing performance 

shortfalls and gaps and suggesting midcourse corrections. Such goals and

timelines could be contained in an overall integration strategy for a merger 

or transformation effort. Further, such a strategy typically goes beyond 

what is contained in an agency strategic plan and provides more specific 

operational and tactical information to manage a sustained effort. Our 

 25GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

Page 13 GAO-06-203 Aviation Security
Aviation Security

previous work has also underscored the importance of DHS adopting 

similar practices to help guide its overall management integration effort.26

Further, DHS had not developed a communication strategy to create 

shared expectations within the organization and report related progress on 

FAMS’s transition into ICE to employees and other stakeholders—another 

key practice of a successful merger or transformation. ICE officials shared

with us various forms of communications they had issued to employees 

over the period of a few months, between September and December 2003. 

Those communications included e-mails, broadcast messages, and agency 

press releases. Officials also provided us with an agenda for a televised 

roundtable discussion that had been broadcast to ICE employees at 

various times in October 2003 regarding aspects of the transition. The 

discussion centered on an exchange between the Director of FAMS and 

the Acting Assistant Secretary of ICE to address, among other things, 

issues related to personnel and the cross-training of ICE agents and 

federal air marshals. Beyond these efforts, ICE could not identify any 

subsequent communications made to keep ICE employees informed about 

the progress of the transition—specifically, what employees could expect 

and by when. Further, 14 of the 19 federal air marshals we interviewed 

during our review felt that ICE management had not kept them adequately 

informed about the progress of the transition. Also, 13 of the 19 federal air 

marshals said they were unclear or confused about how they would 

become integrated into ICE. 

Creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is essential to 

implementing a merger or transformation. Organizations should develop a 

communication strategy that reaches out to employees and seeks to 

genuinely engage them in the merger and transformation process and not 

just “push the message out.” For example, communication should help 

employees understand how the changes from the transformation will 

affect them and how their responsibilities might change with the new 

organization. In addition, a communication strategy is especially crucial in

the public sector where policy-making and program management demands 

transparency. For example, such a strategy should include not only what

results are to be achieved, but also which processes are to be used to 

achieve those results. 

 26For example, see GAO, Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and

Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration, GAO-05-139

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005) and GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and 

Implementation Issues, GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002). 

Page 14 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

FAMS Lacks Adequate 

Controls to Manage 

Incidents That Affect 

Federal Air Marshals’ 

Ability to Operate 

Discreetly 

FAMS lacks adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents that 

affect air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly. Internal controls comprise 

the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet organizations’ missions, 

goals, and objectives. Federal standards for internal control define the 

minimum level of quality acceptable for internal control in the federal 

government. Accordingly, these standards provide that: (1) internal 

controls and all transactions and other significant events be clearly 

documented, (2) controls be generally designed to ensure that ongoing 

monitoring occurs during the course of normal operations, and 

(3) pertinent information be communicated throughout an organization to 

allow employees to perform their duties efficiently.27 Our review of FAMS’s 

mission reporting process noted weaknesses in each of these control 

areas. 

FAMS lacks adequate controls to help ensure that incidents federal air 

marshals encounter that affect their ability to operate discreetly are 

recorded. Specifically, FAMS officials stated that FAMS does not maintain 

a record of these types of incidents unless a mission report is filed. 

Standards for internal control in the federal government require that all 

transactions and other significant events be clearly documented in a 

manner that is complete, accurate, and useful to managers and others 

involved in evaluating operations. FAMS has directed that, in the event 

that federal air marshals encounter incidents affecting their ability to 

operate discreetly, they are to contact the Mission Operations Center to 

the extent the air marshals believe that the incident could be evidence of a 

systemic problem.28 In contacting the Operations Center, the federal air 

marshal is to request guidance for resolving the incident. The Operations 

Center may then ask the federal air marshal to submit a mission report to 

FAMS’s Office of Field Operations (Field Operations) to describe the 

incident in greater detail.29 However, if the federal air marshal does not 

 27GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

28Specifically, the federal air marshal contacts a designated controller at the Mission 

Operations Center to describe the details of the incident. The controller then attempts to 

provide guidance to the federal air marshal to help resolve the incident. If the controller 

cannot resolve the situation at that point in time, he/she refers the federal air marshal to a

designated watch officer at the Operations Center who will attempt to resolve the incident

directly or provide guidance to the federal air marshal for resolving the issue. 

29According to FAMS, mission reports do not include incidents that present a direct or

imminent threat to aircraft, passengers, crew, or other persons or property. In the event

that federal air marshals encounter incidents that pose such threats, they can file an 

“incident report.” 

Page 15 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

submit a mission report, FAMS does not maintain a record of the incident.

In addition, FAMS has not developed a written policy that establishes 

criteria for when and how mission reports are to be completed and filed.

According to FAMS, instruction in the use and completion of mission 

reports is communicated orally through FAMS training and not through 

formal written guidance. Without a means for ensuring that all incidents 

are recorded, and absent written criteria that defines when and how 

mission reports are to be completed, FAMS cannot provide reasonable 

assurance that it is aware of the full extent of incidents that federal air 

marshals encounter. 

FAMS also lacks controls to help ensure that reported incidents are 

systematically tracked so that it can retrieve and analyze data on reported

incidents, thereby ensuring ongoing monitoring of incidents. Federal 

standards for internal control require that controls generally be designed

to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs during the course of normal 

operations. FAMS has acknowledged that it lacks a tool to capture and 

retrieve data on mission reports. The absence of such a tool limits FAMS’s 

ability to track and analyze relevant information and monitor trends to 

identify operational areas in need of improvement based on the reported 

incidents and thereby preventing potential incidents. 

In addition, while FAMS has developed a process for reviewing and 

addressing incidents identified in mission reports once filed, and issued 

guidance to its field offices that outlines this process, it has not 

established formal written policies and procedures to document the 

process. Federal standards for internal control require that internal 

controls are to be documented and the documentation be readily available 

for examination. According to FAMS, its process for reviewing and 

addressing incidents identified in mission reports involves Field 

Operations’ review of the mission reports to determine if further action is

warranted on the incident. FAMS officials stated that, as part of this 

review, Field Operations may deem some incidents as “local issues;” for 

example, miscommunication between a federal air marshal and an airline 

staff regarding the manner in which the air marshal can board the aircraft.

Mission reports involving local issues are forwarded to the relevant FAMS 

field office and may be resolved through the on-site airport liaisons or the 

Page 16 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

local Special Agent in Charge for the airport where the incident occurred.30

Field Operations may also deem some incidents as “national issues;” that 

is, incidents that are not unique to a specific airport, such as an incident 

involving the flight crew of a particular airline. These types of incidents 

are forwarded to FAMS’s Liaison Division (located within the Office of 

Flight Operations). In attempting to address the issue, the Liaison Division 

may contact TSA or the airline’s corporate security office, depending on 

whether the incident involved check-in, security checkpoint, or boarding 

procedures. 

Furthermore, FAMS lacks controls to help ensure that the results of 

actions taken to address incidents identified in mission reports are 

communicated to the federal air marshals who originally filed the reports. 

Not providing such information may serve to discourage federal air 

marshals from submitting future reports. Standards for internal control 

state that pertinent information should be communicated throughout an 

organization to allow employees to perform their duties efficiently. 

According to FAMS, Field Operations provides feedback to the relevant 

field office SAC on actions taken to resolve incidents in the mission 

reports. The SAC’s communication of these results to the federal air 

marshals in the particular office is discretionary. Of the 15 federal air 

marshals we interviewed who said they had filed a mission report, 12 said

they had not received feedback on the outcome of the report. Some 

federal air marshals identified the importance of having feedback on the 

outcome of the reports, noting that not having feedback discourages them 

from filing future reports. For example, one federal air marshal stated that 

he and other federal air marshals in his office had stopped filing mission 

reports because they did not receive feedback on the outcome of the 

reports they had previously filed. Another federal air marshal said that 

federal air marshals in his field office were generally dissatisfied with the 

lack of feedback on the mission reports they had filed. 

 30FAMS field offices have assigned federal air marshal supervisors to serve as on-site 

airport liaisons at various airports that are within their geographical location. In general,

these liaisons assist in establishing and maintaining effective working relationships with 

airport, law enforcement, and private industry officials. Liaison duties include, among other 

things, addressing with the local Federal Security Director at their assigned airport various

incidents identified in mission reports, providing a consistent federal air marshal presence 

at airports, performing surveillance detection and counter-surveillance in their airport, and 

following up on suspicious individuals and activities reported by federal air marshals while 

carrying out their mission. 

Page 17 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

FAMS officials stated that they recognize the importance of written 

policies to govern the use and management of these reports, and stated 

that FAMS is in the process of developing such policies to include how 

FAMS will review and address incidents identified in the reports and 

provide feedback on the outcome of these incidents in a timely manner. 

Although FAMS identified plans to strengthen controls over the 

management of these incidents, they did not identify time frames for when

these would be completed. 

In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS made only limited 

progress in achieving its stated transition objectives of creating a surge 

capacity and enhancing federal air marshals’ career opportunities. With its 

return of FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its 

experiences and adopt key practices for successful mergers and 

transformations to assist its efforts to transfer FAMS back into TSA. Such 

key practices include developing an overall strategy to include 

implementation goals, measures, and milestones to track the 

organization’s progress in achieving its goals. By showing progress 

towards these goals, DHS could build momentum and demonstrate that 

real progress is being made. In addition, having a strategy with 

implementation goals and milestones could help target performance 

shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections, including any

needed adjustments to future goals and milestones. In addition, developing 

a communication strategy would help to inform employees about the 

status of the transition and provide transparency about specific actions to

be taken and time frames for their completion. In light of the number of 

transformations FAMS has undergone in recent years, providing open 

communication to create shared expectations among all staff and 

stakeholders takes on added significance. 

Conclusions 

Further, with its critical role in helping to secure the nation’s commercial 

aviation system, it is important that FAMS has adequate controls to 

manage information regarding incidents federal air marshals encounter 

during their missions that could compromise their mission. Such controls 

take on added importance in light of FAMS’s growth from a small, 

centralized organization with only one office and the ability to cover a few 

missions to a larger decentralized organization with thousands of federal 

air marshals and a capacity to provide significantly expanded coverage. 

Absent adequate management controls, FAMS does not have a full account 

of reported incidents or a means for tracking, analyzing, and monitoring 

these incidents. Such information is necessary for identifying the full 

extent of reported incidents and for determining the operational areas in 

Page 18 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

need of improvement. In addition, such controls would help to ensure that 

actions taken to resolve these incidents are reported to the federal air 

marshals who filed them.

To help ensure that the Department of Homeland Security has the 

planning framework necessary to guide and monitor its efforts to merge 

the Federal Air Marshal Service with the Transportation Security 

Administration, we are recommending that the Secretary of the 

Department of Homeland Security adopt key practices that have led to 

successful transformation efforts within public and private sector 

organizations by taking the following two actions: 

• Develop an overall strategy with implementation goals and a timeline to

build momentum and show progress. 

• Develop a communication strategy to share expectations and report 

related progress. 

In addition, to facilitate the Federal Air Marshal Service’s management of 

incidents that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly 

during their missions, we are recommending that the Secretary of the 

Department of Homeland Security direct the Director of the Federal Air 

Marshal Service to take the following four actions: 

• Develop a means for recording all incidents reported to the Mission 

Operations Center that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate 

discreetly and criteria for determining which incidents require federal air 

marshals to complete a mission report. 

• Develop a means for tracking and retrieving data on mission reports to 

enable FAMS to analyze and monitor reported and systemic incidents. 

• Establish written policies and procedures for reviewing and addressing 

reported incidents. 

• Establish a means for providing feedback on the status and outcome of 

FAMS mission reports to the federal air marshals who submit them. 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On 

November 7, 2005, we received written comments on the draft report, 

which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS agreed with the findings 

and recommendations in the report and described actions it had started or 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

Page 19 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

planned to take to implement them. With regard to our two 

recommendations related to key practices that have led to successful 

transformation efforts, DHS stated that FAMS and TSA will work closely 

with DHS’s Under Secretary for Policy and Assistant Secretary for 

Strategic Planning to develop a comprehensive strategy with achievable 

goals and a timeline to assure progress. DHS also stated that FAMS will 

work with TSA and DHS leadership to develop a communication strategy 

intended to facilitate shared expectations and report progress. In addition, 

regarding our recommendations related to FAMS’s management of 

incidents that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly 

during their missions, DHS stated that FAMS is in the process of drafting a 

written directive to establish policies and procedures for reporting and 

managing mission incidents. The directive is intended to restructure 

FAMS’s management of mission reports to enable timely dissemination of 

and access to information, including feedback to management and 

employees. The directive will also establish a formalized tracking system 

for reporting incidents. Shortly after receiving comments from DHS, FAMS 

provided us with an official written directive that establishes policies and 

procedures for reporting and managing mission incidents. We reviewed 

this directive and believe that it addresses our recommendations related to 

(1) developing a means for recording all incidents reported to the Mission 

Operations Center that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate 

discreetly and criteria for determining which incidents require federal air 

marshals to complete a mission report and (2) establishing written policies 

and procedures for reviewing and addressing reported incidents. 

In addition to commenting on our findings and recommendations, DHS 

provided technical comments on the report under separate cover, and we 

revised the draft report where appropriate. 

We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

the TSA Administrator, and interested congressional committees as 

appropriate. We will also make copies available to others on request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 20 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to discuss 

it further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or berrickc@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made 

major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Cathleen A. Berrick 

Director, Homeland Security 

 and Justice Issues 

Page 21 GAO-06-203
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

The objectives of this report were to determine: (1) the progress DHS 

made in achieving its stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE and 

the key practices that could facilitate its efforts to return FAMS to TSA; 

and (2) the extent to which FAMS has adequate controls to manage

mission-related incidents that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate 

discreetly. To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant regulations, 

internal planning documents, agency policies and procedures, and federal 

air marshal mission reports, and interviewed a variety of federal officials

and federal air marshals in selected field office locations. Some 

information related to FAMS and federal air marshals’ ability to operate 

discreetly is considered Sensitive Security Information. Accordingly, we

issued a separate restricted version of this report.1

To determine the progress DHS made in achieving its stated objectives in

transferring FAMS to ICE, we reviewed and analyzed key documents 

about the transition effort as well as interviewed key officials from BTS, 

FAMS, and ICE management. Key documents included, but were not 

limited to, agency memorandums, various transition documents, materials 

from offices involved with implementing the transition effort, and studies 

that addressed issues related to career opportunities for federal air 

marshals. We also analyzed surge training information on the number of 

ICE agents cross-trained between December 2003 and October 2004 by

geographical location. In addition, we spoke with officials at DHS, BTS, 

ICE, and FAMS to discuss the purpose and progress related to the 

transition of FAMS to ICE, including creating a surge capacity and 

enhancing federal air marshals’ career opportunities. Further, we assessed 

DHS’s progress in meeting its stated objectives by using key practices 

consistently found at the center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and 

transformations. These practices were identified to assist DHS in its 

consolidation before the department was created and were based on 

useful practices and lessons learned from major private and public sector

organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations.2

 We selected 

two of these nine key practices as criteria for this review because they are 

especially important to ensuring that DHS has the planning framework 

 1

The report containing sensitive security information is GAO, Aviation Security: Federal

Air Marshal Service Could Benefit From Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-05-

884SU (Washington D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005). 

2

GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum, Mergers and Transformations: Lessons Learned for a

Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-292SP

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

Page 22 GAO-06-203 Aviation Security
Aviation Security

necessary to guide and monitor its efforts—which we have also 

underscored in our previous work on DHS—and to facilitating trust and 

transparency within the organization. The two selected practices were: 

setting implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show 

progress from day one and establishing a communication strategy that will 

serve to create shared expectations within the organization and at the

same time report related progress on the merger. 

In addition, we interviewed FAMS officials at their headquarters offices in 

Reston, Virginia, and their Mission Operations Center in Herndon, Virginia. 

Specifically, we spoke with officials in FAMS’ Mission Support, Flight 

Operations, Training and Development, and Field Operations offices to 

discuss the types of mission-related incidents that federal air marshals 

encounter during the course of their mission and how FAMS manages 

these incidents. Further, to determine the extent to which FAMS has 

adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents that affect federal

air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly, we used our Standards for 

Internal Controls in the Federal Government and Internal Control 

Management and Evaluation Tool.3

Furthermore, in accomplishing our objectives, we conducted structured 

interviews with FAMS officials—including 5 SACS—and 19 federal air 

marshals in 5 of FAMS’s 21 field offices. Generally, we chose these offices

on the basis of geographical dispersion. They included: Washington, D.C.; 

Dallas, Texas; New York, New York; Atlanta, Georgia; and Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania. Among other things, we asked questions about the federal

air marshals’ understanding of the transition of FAMS to ICE, including 

whether their roles and mission had changed as a result of the transition. 

We also asked the federal air marshals in these interviews a series of 

questions related to their mission experience at various airports. For 

example, we asked about the check-in, screening, and boarding practices 

 3

GAO issues standards for internal control in the federal government as required by the

Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982. See 31 U.S.C. § 3512(c). GAO first issued 

the standards in 1983. GAO revised the standards and reissued them as Standards for

Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: 

November 1999). These standards provide the overall framework for establishing and

maintaining internal control and for identifying and addressing major performance 

challenges and areas at greatest risk for fraud, waste and abuse, and mismanagement. GAO 

issued its Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G

(Washington, D.C.: August 2001) to assist agencies in maintaining or implementing effective 

internal control and, when needed, to help determine what, where, and how improvements 

can be implemented. 

Page 23 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

that they have experienced while carrying out their missions. The results 

of these interviews provide examples of FAMS officials’ and federal air 

marshals’ experiences and perspectives and cannot be generalized beyond

those we interviewed because we did not use statistical sampling 

techniques in selecting the field offices, officials, and federal air marshals. 

We conducted these interviews between October and November 2004 and

in April 2005. We also made some follow-up calls in May and July of 2005. 

We conducted our work from June 2004 through August 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 24 GAO-06-203
Appendix II: Key Practices and 

Implementation Steps for Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations 

Practice Implementation step

Ensure top leadership drives the transformation. • Define and articulate a succinct and compelling reason for change. 

• Balance continued delivery of services with merger and 

transformation activities. 

Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to 

guide the transformation. 

• Adopt leading practices for results-oriented strategic planning and 

reporting. 

Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of 

the transformation. 

• Embed core values in every aspect of the organization to reinforce

the new culture.

Set implementation goals and a timeline to build

momentum and show progress from day one. 

• Make public implementation goals and timeline. 

• Seek and monitor employee attitudes and take appropriate 

follow-up actions. 

• Identify cultural features of merging organizations to increase 

understanding of former work environments. 

• Attract and retain key talent. 

• Establish an organizationwide knowledge and skills inventory 

to allow knowledge exchange among merging organizations.

Dedicate an implementation team to manage the 

transformation process. 

• Establish networks to support implementation team. 

• Select high-performing team members. 

Use the performance management system to define the 

responsibility and assure accountability for change. 

• Adopt leading practices to implement effective performance

management systems with adequate safeguards. 

Establish a communication strategy to create shared

expectations and report related progress. 

• Communicate early and often to build trust. 

• Ensure consistency of message. 

• Encourage two-way communication.

• Provide information to meet specific needs of employees. 

Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain ownership

for the transformation. 

• Use employee teams. 

• Involve employees in planning and sharing performance 

information. 

• Incorporate employee feedback into new policies and procedures. 

• Delegate authority to appropriate organizational levels. 

Build a world-class organization. • Adopt leading practices to build a world-class organization. 

Source: GAO.

Page 25 GAO-06-203 Aviation Security
Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 26 GAO-06-203 Aviation Security
Page 27 GAO-06-203 Aviation Security
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-8777 

In addition to the individual named above, Leo Barbour, Steve Caldwell, 

Grace Coleman, Joel Grossman, Wilfred Holloway, Charles Johnson, 

Thomas Lombardi, Brenda Rabinowitz, Minette Richardson, Jack Schulze, 

Angela Thomas, Sarah Veale, and Keith Wandtke made key contributions 

to this report. 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 28 GAO-06-203 Aviation Security
Related GAO Products 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not 

Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight 

Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notices, but Has Recently Taken 

Steps to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: 

July 22, 2005.

Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of 

Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 13, 2005.

Aviation Security: TSA Screener Training and Performance 

Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. 

Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, 

but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. 

GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the 

Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Impact of Using 

Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. 

Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.

Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize 

Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow 

Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services. 

GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004. 

General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but 

Continued Partnership with the Private Sector is Critical to Long-Term 

Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of 

Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728. 

Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004. 

Page 29 GAO-06-203 Aviation Security
Aviation Security

Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed 

to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May 

28, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. 

GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004. 

Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to 

Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519. 

Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility 

to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 22, 2004. 

Budget Issues: Reprogramming of Federal Air Marshal Service Funds in 

Fiscal Year 2003. GAO-04-577R. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation 

Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of ComputerAssisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 17, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the 

Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Secure Aerial 

Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 

Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington, 

D.C.: February 12, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing 

Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,

D.C.: February 12, 2004. 

The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a 

Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development 

Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen 

Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003. 

Page 30 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges 

of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed. 

GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address 

Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003. 

Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress 

Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: 

September 24, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the 

Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security 

Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address 

Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides 

Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and LongTerm Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover 

Airports’ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 25, 2003. 

Transportation Security Administration: Action and Plans to Build a 

Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January 17,

2003. 

Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and 

DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10,

2003. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 

Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

Page 31 GAO-06-203
Aviation Security

Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and 

Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 

2002. 

Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has 

Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.: 

October 15, 2002. 

Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses 

Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces 

Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 25, 2002.

Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots. GAO-02-822R.

 Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 

Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 25, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 

Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 21, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s 

Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 

Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 

Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Page 32 GAO-06-203

(440468) 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER