At the time of th e dis trict court’ s proce eding s, the Hon. Shirley Nee ley was ser ving 1 as C ommissi oner of Education. We have substit uted her succe ssor, Robert Scott. See Tex. R. App. P. 7.2(a). 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 003 -CV

Ro be r t S c ot t, Co m m iss ion e r of Educ at ion , A ppe lla nt
v. Alphon so Crutch Life Su pport Center , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN50366 7 , HO NORAB LE LORA J. LIVI NGSTON , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N This is an appea l from an or der de ny ing the Commi ssioner of Educ ation’s plea to the 1 jur isd ic tio n. Al ph on so Cr utc h L if e Sup po rt Ce nte r ( the “ Sc ho ol” ), a c ha rt e r s c ho ol, fi le d s uit

a g a ins t the Com mis sio ne r t o c ha lle ng e the de c isi on by the Te xas E du c a tio n A g e nc y (T EA ) t o w ith ho ld s ta te funds from the School to re cover an o v er allocation of f

unds rec eived by

the cha rter sc hool due to alleg ed er

rors in its repor

ting of aver ag e daily attendanc e. The School sought a de clar ation that the Commiss ioner’s a ctions violated state law, or alternatively , t h at the applica ble statutes ar e unconstitutional and violate the school’s due proce ss rig hts by failing to provide a he aringbefor e the TEA to cha lleng e the de cision on overa llocation. The School also sought a d ec l ar ation thatNumerous pa rents, students, and e mploy ees of the School also joined the lawsuit as 2 plaintiffs, seekingdecla

ratory relief reg ardingthei r ri gh t s under the education code and T EA’s alleg ed pra ctice of discrimination a g ainst Afric an-A merica ns. The district cour

t gr anted the por

tion of the Commissioner’s plea to the jurisdiction dismissing the indi v idual plaintiffs for la ck of standing . No par

ty has appe aled this portion of the district cour t’s decision. 2 TE A’ s r ule s, po lic ie s, and

pr oc e dure s fo r fu

nd ing , a ud iti ng , and inv e sti g a tin g Te xas c ha rt e r s c ho ols
are unconstitutional. W e af firm the orde r of the d i s trict court de ny ing the Commi ssioner’s plea to the jurisdiction. 2
F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound

Appellee Alphonso Crutch L ife S upport Center is an open-enr ollment charte r school
cre ated by char ter unde r cha

pter 12, subcha

pter D of the educ ation code. An open-e nrollment char ter school is a p ar t of the state’ s public school sy stem and ca n be cr eate d by

an instituti on of hig her education, a non-profit org anization, or a g overnme ntal entity
. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 12.101(a ), .105 (West 2006).

Th e dis pu te in t

his c a se or ig inate d o ut o f t he Sc ho ol’ s o bli g a tio n to re po rt its stu de nt atte nd anc e to t

he Te xas Ed

uc a tio n Ag e nc y . Op e n- e nr oll me nt ch art e r sc ho ols re c e ive state funds under

chapte r 42 of the e ducation code
. See id. § 12.106 (West 2006). Under chapte r 42, funds ar e disbursed on the basis of ave rag e daily attendanc e. Id. § 4 2
. 1 0 1 ( W e s tS u p p . 2 0 0 8 )
. In order to report attendance information to TEA, ea ch open- enrollment chart er s ch o o l must use the Public Education I nformation Mana g ement Sy stem (PEI MS) a nd comply with a ll applicable r ules promulg ated by

TEA. Id. § 12.104(b)( 2)(A) (West 2006), § 42.006 (West Supp. 2008).3 I n 2004, TEA audited the School’s student attendance rec ords and de termined that the Scho o l h ad co m m i tted numerous er rors in its reporting and that, as a result, the School’s reported a tt e n d an c e w a s h ig h e r th an it s a c tu a l a tt e n d an c e . I n a c c o r d an c e w it h s e c ti o n 4 2
. 2 5 8 of the educ ation code, w hich re quires TEA to r ecove r any overa llocation of state f unds either by
re qu e sti ngand ob tai ni ng a re fu nd or by wi thh old ingfr om s ub se qu e nt a llo c a tio ns of state fu nd s, see id. § 42.258(a) (West 2006) , the auditors rec ommended that $1,619,813 be withheld fr o m the School to recove r the a lleg ed over allocation. The School conce ded to a mi stake in its reporting , but contested othe r finding s of t h e auditors, arg uing that only $431,500 should be withheld under sect i o n 4 2
. 2 5 8. Upon re viewing the school’s a rg uments, TEA conc luded that the withholding amount should instead be incr ease d to $1,795,230. The School reque sted a public he aringun der the Texas Administrative Code. This reque st was denied by TEA, and T E A i m mediately beg an withholding money

from the sc hool to recoup the overa llocation. I n response , t h e S ch ool filed a law suit in di strict court a g ainst the Commis sioner of Ed uc a tio n. Th e Sc ho ol s e e ks a de c laratio n th a t th e Com mis sio ne r’ s a c tio ns vio la te state l aw
— i n cl u d i n g ch ap t er

3 9 an d s ec t i o n4 2
. 2 5 8 o f t h e e d u ca t i o nco d e— b y n o tp ro v i d i n g a “due proce ss he aring ,” or in the alter native, that the statutes a

re unc onstitut ional for not providing a rig ht to a hear ing. I n addition, the School claims that TEA’s rule s, policies, and proc edure s for funding , auditing, a

nd investigating Te x as cha rter sc hools are unc onstitut ional. The Commissioner fi le d a p le a to th e ju

r is d ic ti o n b a s e d o n s o v e r e ig n im mu n it y . T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt d e n ie d th e plea a s to the School’s claims, and the Comm issioner filed this appea l contesting the district court’s de nial of his plea.4

Stand ard of Review

The Commi ssioner appea ls the district c ourt’s denial of his plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a )(8) (W es t 2 0 0 8 ), § 101.001(3) (West 2005). A plea to the jurisdiction c halleng es the trial court’s authority to de termine the subject matter of a spec ific ca

use of a ction. H

a wk in s v . E l P a s o F

ir s t H e a lt h P lans, I

nc. , 2 1 4 S.W .3d 709, 716 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction a nd whether

a plaintiff has a ffirmatively demonstrated subje ct- m at t er jurisdiction are questions of lawthat we revie w de novo. Texas De p’t o f P a r ks & W

i l dlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). I n decidinga plea

to the jurisdict i o n t h at challeng es the plea dings, w e dete rmine if the plea der has alleg ed fa cts that aff

irmativel y

demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hea r the c ause. Id. We construe the pleading s liberally in favor of

the plaintiffs an d l ook to the pleade r’s intent. Id. I f a plea to the jurisdiction cha lleng es the e x istence of jurisdictional fac ts, we c onsider re levant evide nce submitt ed by

the par ties when ne cessa

ry to resolve the jur isdictional issues raised. Id. at 227. I f the evidenc e cr eate s a fa ct question reg arding the j urisdictional issue, then the trial c ourt ca nnot gr ant the plea to the jur isdiction. Id. a t 22 7- 28 . H ow e ve r, if the re le va

nt ev ide nc e is u

nd isp ute d o r f

a ils to r a is e a f

a c t qu e s ti o n o n th e ju

r is d ic ti o n a l is s u e , th e tr ia l c o u rt s h o u ld r u le o nthe plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id. at 228. Sovereign Im m uni ty

Sov e re ig n im mun ity

e mbr a c e s tw o p rinci ple s: i mmunit y fr om s uit and immun ity from liability
. Fede ral Si g n v. Texas S. Univ. , 951 S.W .2d 401, 405 (Tex. 1997). The Com mis sio ne r a

rgue s th a t th e Sc ho ol’ s c la ims —r e qu e st for de c lara tor y re lie f r e g ard ingc e rt a inThe Commissioner specific ally attacks the School’s due proc ess claims by pointing to the 3 Texas Supreme Court’s dec ision in Fede ral Sign v . Te xas S ou the rn Un iv e rsi ty , which provide s that th e “ State ’s immunit y to s uit is, pure ly a s a ma tte r o f s ov e re ig nty , im pe rv iou s to du e pr oc e ss 5 c la ime d sta tut or

y ri g hts , r e qu e st f

or de c lara tor y re lie f r e g ard inga

c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o d

ue pr oc e ss in the se circ umstances, and reque st f or decla ratory relief that cer tain statutes, rules, or policie s are unconstitutional—are ba

rre d by immunit y

from suit and, there fore , must be dis m i s s ed for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction. A suit ag ainst a stat e o ffice r lawf ully exercising his gove rnmental functions is considere d a suit a g ainst the State and is barr ed by sovere ign immunity

absent leg islative consent. Mc

Lan e Co. v . S

tra y ho rn , 148 S.W .3d 644, 649 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied)
. I t is for the leg islature alone “to waive or abrog ate sove reig n immunit y .” Fede ral Sign , 951 S.W .2d at 409. I n addre ssing the Commissioner’s arguments, we do not we igh the merits of the School’s claims. Se e Cou nty

of C am e ro n v . B ro wn , 8 0 S. W.3 d 5 49 , 555 (Tex. 20 02 ). We d e te rm ine on ly wh e the r s ov e re ig n im mun ity ba rs the c la ims
. Claim s like those alleg ed by the School have be en found not to implicate the
so ve re ig n im mun ity

do c tr ine . Apr ivate lit ig ant d oe s n ot n e e d le g isl a tiv e pe rm iss ion to c omp e l a state off icial to comply

with state law. Fede ral Sign , 951 S.W .2d at 404. A state officia l’s illega l or unauthorized ac tions are not conside red a cts of the State. Id. Ac c or din g ly , s ov e re ig n im mun ity fr om s uit do e s n ot a

pp ly to a c a us e of a c tio n to det e rm ine or pr ote c t a pr ivate pa rt y ’s ri g hts a g a ins t a st ate official who has acted wit hout leg al or statutory authority
. Id. I n addition, “[i] t is well settled that no waiver of sovere ign immunit y is ne cessa ry befor e one may sue the State for the taking of a vested proper

ty rig ht without due course of law.” Texas St ate Employees Union v. Tex as W orkforce Comm’n , 16 S.W .3d 61, 66 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.). Assuming the truth of the School’s 3conce rns.” 951 S.W.2d 401, 411 (Tex. 1997). Howeve r, this state m en t i s not releva nt to our inquiry here . I n Fede ral Sign , the cour t considere d whether

a sover eig n immunit y

defe nse, itself, denied a plaintiff due process. See id. at 409. Her e, we consider whether sovere ign immunity bars a du e pr oc e ss c la im. Th e Sc ho ol c la ims that th e Com mis sio ne r’ s a c tio ns violat ed it s du e pr oc e ss ri g hts , no t that a

c ourt ’s a pp lic a tio n o f s ov e re ig n im mun ity to i ts c la ims wo uld

vio la te its du e pr oc e ss ri g hts
. 6 pleading s—i.e. that the School had a r ight to the disputed state f unds and the Commissioner was obligated to provide a

hear ing y et fa iled to do so—the School is entitled to se ek re dress unde r the due-c ourse- of-law

provision of the Te x as C onstitut ion. See id. at 66-67; Tex. Const. art. I , § 19. Fur ther, it is well-re cog nized that a suit seeking a declaratory judgme nt that a st ate ag ent is acting pursuant to an unconstit utional law is not barre d by sovere ign immunity
. Se e Ry lan de r v . Ca ldw e ll , 23 S.W .3d 132, 136 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.). When a par ty ’s rig hts have be en violated by a state a g e nt’ s act io n pu rsu ant t o a n unc on sti tut ion a l la

w, a s a lle g e d in

thi s c a se , th a t pa

rt y may sue to reme dy

the violation. See id. I n sum, sove reig n immunit y is ge nera lly

inapplicable to the ty pes of c laims asser

ted by the School. The Commissioner asserts, howe ver, that beca use ea ch of the School’s claims i s in essence an attempt to forc e the pa y ment of State funds, the c laims are b ar r e d b y s o v e r e i g ni m m u n i t y. I n Texas Natural Resource Conserv ation Commis s i o n v. IT-Davy , a contr actor fo r h a zar do us wa ste c le an- up ha d s ue d th e c on tr a c tin g state a g e nc y to re c ov e r pa y me nts a lle g e dly due as e quitable adjustments in connec tion with the c ontrac t. 74 S.W .3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2002)
. The
co n tr a c to r d id n o t o b ta in le g is lati v e c o n s e n t f o r it s la w s u it , an d th e a g e n c y f

il e d a p le a to the jurisdiction based on sover eig n immunit y . See id. at 852. While acknowledg ing that decla ra tory
re lie f a g a ins t a

state of fi c ia l w ho act s wi thout

le g a l or statut or y a uth or ity do e s n ot i mpl ic a teSee, e .g. , Te x a s S

. U n iv
. v . S ta te S t. B a n k & Tr u st Co. , 212 S.W .3d 893, 908-09 4 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st Dis t.] 200 7, pe t. d e nie d) (d e c larator y jud g me nt c la im c on c e rn ingva lid ity of e qu ipm e nt le a se wi th s ta te un ive rs ity ); State v. 1165 Airport Blvd. Office Bldg. , 212 S.W .3d 610, 61 7- 18 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 06 , n o p e t.) (d e c larator y jud g me nt to co ns tr

ue te rm s o f o ff

ic e le a se wi th S ta te ); Cou nty

of G alv esto n v . To lle , 176 S.W .3d 859, 862-63 (Te x . App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (dec laratory and injunctive re lief re g ardingrig hts under county ’s re tiree me dical ins ur anc e a g re e me nt) ; To wn o f H ig h la n d P a r

k v . I r o n Cr o w Co n s tr., I

nc. , 168 S.W .3d 313, 317 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 5, no pe t.) (d e c larator y jud g me nt a c tio n to e nf

or c e arb itr a tion c la

us e in c on tr a c t w ithtow n) ; Sm ith v. Lutz , 149 S.W .3d 752, 759-60 (Te x . App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (injunctive re lief to obtain retur n of intellectua l property , the ri gh t s t o whi ch we re g overne d by contra ct with state university ). 7 the doctrine of sover ei gn i m m u n ity , the supreme court in IT-Davy held that dec laratory

judgme nt suits ag ainst a state officia l se eking to impose contra ctual liabiliti es ag ainst the State are , in essence , “suits ag ainst the State” that attempt to “control state a ct i o n ” and, conse quently , cannot be maintained without leg islative permission. See id. at 855-56. The Court dismi ssed the contr actor ’s claims for w ant of jurisdiction, dec lari n g t h at “private par ties cannot c ircumvent the State’ s
sovere ign immunity

from suit by

char acte rizing a suit for money damag es, such as a contra ct dispute, as a de clar atory -judg ment claim.” Id. at 856, 860.

Courts of appea ls have followe d IT-Davy ’s holding that s o v er ei gn immunit y bars a suit for e quitable re lief that is actua lly a suit to obtain benefits al l ege d due under a contr act or oth e r agr e e me nt. I t is a dif fe re nt s itu a tio n, ho we ve r, wh e re the su it s e e kin g pa y me nt i s a su it 4 for decla ratory relief ag ainst a state of

ficial for violation of a sta tut e . As the Texas Supreme Court
rec ently stated in City of El Paso v. He inrich : “ wh e re statut or y or c on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on s c re a te an entitl em en t t o p ayment, suits seeking to require state off icer s to comply

with the law ar e not barr ed by immunit y

mere ly beca use they compel the state to make those pay ments.” No. 06-0778,8

2009 Tex. L EXI S 253, at *10 (Tex. May 1, 2009). Such a suit does not attempt to exert control over the State, but attempts to reasse rt the control of the State. Id. at *11. T h e s u p r e me c o u rt in He i nrich further considere d what spec ific reme dycan be proper ly soug ht under such a

n “ultra vire s” cla im (i.e. a c laim t h at a state of ficial ha s acte d outside his official ca

pacity ). See id. at *16. The c ourt held that, abse nt leg islative authorization,
re t ro s p ec t i v e r el i ef

co n s i s t i n g o f m o n et ary

p ay m en t s b y t h e go v ern m en ti mp l i ca t es s o v er ei gn i m m u n i t y. C o n v e r s e l y, p r o s p e c t i v e r e l i e f w o u l d n o ti mp l i c a t e i m m u n i t y, e v e ni f t h e j u d i c i a l l yenfor ced c ompliance with the applicable statutory or constitutional provisions resulted in monetary pay ments by the g overnme nt. See id. a t *2 2- 24 ; City of Round Rock v . W hiteaker , 241 S.W .3d 609, 633-34 (Te x . App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied) (prospe ctive declaratory , injunctive, and mandamus relief not barre d by

immunit y

).
Th is c omp ro mis e be tw e e n p ro sp ect iv e and re tr oa c tiv e re lie f, wh ile imp e rf e c t, b e st balanc es the g overnme nt’s immunit y with the public’s r ight to re dress in ca ses involving ultra vire s actions, and this distinction “appea r[s] in the immunit y

of the Un ite d Stat e s, and in the law of mos t sta te s’ immun ity fr om sta te -l aw cl a ims .” I t a lso comports with the modern justification f or immunit y : protec ting the pu b l i c fisc. Moreove r, it is ge nera lly consist en t wi th the way our cour

ts of appea ls have interpre ted [ City of

Houston v. ] W

illiams [ 2 1 6 S
. W
. 3 d

8 2 7 ( T e x . 2 0 0 7 ) ]
. A n d

f i n a l l y, it ensures that statutes spec ifically direc ting pay ment, like any

other statute, c an be judicially enfor ced g oing f

orwa rd.
Heinrich , 2 00 9 T e x. L EX I S 253, a t *2 2- 23 (c itatio ns omi tte d) . We a pp ly the Te xas S up re me Court’s holdings in IT-Davy and Heinrich to the School’s pleading s in this case. Firs t, we no te tha

t th e Sc ho ol s e e ks de c larator y re lie f r e g ard ingits ri g hts
u n d e r s t a tu t e s an d

t h e T e x a s C o n s t i tu t i o n , n o t u n d e r a c o n t r a c t o r o t h e r a g r e e m e n t
. C o n s e qu e n t l y,The School’s pe tition, after asse rting a cla im for dec laratory relief reg ardinga cla imed 5 du e p ro ce ss rig ht to a hear ing unde r sec tion 403.055 of the g overnme nt code a nd section 42.258 of the e ducation code , states that “[ t] he S tate is even obligate d to do this by contra ct.” To the extent that this sentence a sserted a separ ate cause of action to e nforc e a contra ct betwee n the School and the Texas State Boa

rd of Educ ation, sovere ign im m u nity to suit would bar the ca use of a ction. Ho we ve r, we do no t r e a d th e pe tit ion to a sse rt su c h a c la im. 9 sovere ign immunity

d o es n o t b ar the School’s claims under IT-Davy . I n an attempt to re late the School’s lawsuit to the fac tual situation in IT-Davy , in w hich the action was plain l y b as ed on contra ct, the Commissi oner points out that the School is subject to a cha rter with TEA. The Commi ssioner cites to languag e in the educ ation code stating that the char ter for an open- enrollment char ter school is “in the f

orm of a w ritten contra ct.” Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 12.112 ( West 2006). Howeve r, eve n assuming the written ag ree ment b et wee n the School and the State B oard of Education is a contrac t, the mere exis tence of a c ontrac t betwee n parties does n o t t ransform any possible leg al claim betwee n the par ties into a contrac t claim. Her e, the School is seekingto enforc e the constitution and statutes, not the written cha rter. Specifica lly , the ag ree ment enter ed into by the 5 School states that the cha

rter’ s terms include bo th “this contra ct” and “applica ble l aw.” Moreove r, wh ile the a g re e me nt s ets for th n ume ro us ob lig atio ns of

the Sc ho ol, the statut or

y du tie s a lle g e dly brea ched by

the Commiss ioner (e .g . failure to provide a he aring ) are neither c ontained within the char ter nor r equire d to be by

statute. See id. § 1 2. 11 1 ( Wes t 20 06 ) ( se tti ngfo rt h r e qu ir e d c on te nts of cha rter f or open- enrollment cha

rter sc hool). Next, we deter

mine whether

the School seeks r etroa cti v e re l i ef in the form of monetary pay ments, which is barr ed by

sovere ign immunity

under Heinrich . Severa l of the School’s “Causes of

Action” in its petition seek dec laratory relief that, either unde r th e co n s t i t ution or under statute, it is entitled to additional due proc ess, par ticularly a hea ring
. Be cause requiringthe10

Commi ssioner to parti ci p ate in a hear ing pr ior to imposing furthe r deduc tions from the School’s funding would be prospe ctive, non-monetar y relief , the School’s claims seeking such relief are not barr ed by sovere ign immunity
. See W hiteaker , 241 S.W .3d at 633-34. The School also see ks a dec laratory judgme nt that the Commi ssioner’s a udit and inv e sti g a tio n of the Sc ho ol vio la te d c ha pte r 39 of the e du c a tio n c od e , that the ru le s, po li c ie s, and proc edure s for the a

uditing and inve stigating of char ter schools a

re unc onstitut ional, and that all evidenc e g ener ated by the Commiss ioner’s a ctions be dee med ac cumulat ed i n v iolation of the Sc ho ol ’ s r i g h t t o d

u e p r o c e s s . T o t h e e xt e n t an y r e l i e f f r o m s u c h v i o l a t i o n s w o u l d r e su lt i n
re paymen t by

the Com mis sio ne r o f p a st a mou nts wi thh e ld f

ro m th e Sc ho ol, the se c la ims wo uld result in r etroa ctive relief that is ba rre d by sovere ign immunit y in acc ordanc e with Heinrich . On the other ha nd, to the extent any

relief from such violations would constitute a prospe ctive re calc ulation of the a mou nt o we d b y

the Sc ho ol f

or its re po rt ing e rr or s, and a re du c e d ov e ra llo c a tio n ow e d, the se
cause s of action ar e not bar red by sovere ign immunity

based on Heinrich . I t is unclear, ba sed on the School’s cur

rent plea dings a

nd the re cord befo re us, whether the decla rations soug ht by

the Sc ho ol a re re qu e sts that e ff

e c tiv e ly se e k r e tr oa cti ve or pro sp e c tiv e re lie f. We a re no t in c lin e d to d i s m i s s t h e S ch o o l ’s cl ai m s o n t h i s i s s u e wi t h o u taf fo rd i n g i tt h e o p p o rt u n i t y

t o am en d i t s p l ea d i n gs to clarify th e p re ci s e relief soug ht. See M endiola v. City of Laredo , 239 S.W .3d 344, 350-51 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.).
F ail ur e to St at e a C lai m

The Commissioner also argues that dismissal of the School’s c laims is proper for f ailure to s t at e a ca u s e of a ction within a waiver of sover eig n immunit y . The CommissionerI n addition, the C ommissi oner in the porti on of i ts plea to the jurisdiction addre ssing the 6 Sc ho ol’ s d

ue pr oc e ss c la ims did

no t argue tha

t th e Sc ho ol h a d n o p ro pe rt y int e re st f or wh ic h p ro c e ss wa s d ue , b ut a rgue d o nly

that th e Sc ho ol d id i n f

a c t r e c e ive du e pr oc e ss. 11 specific ally

addre sses the School’s due proc ess claims, its ultra vires c laims, and its reliance upon section 7.057 of the e ducation code for jurisdiction.
Due Proc ess Claims Reg ardingthe School’s due pr ocess claims, the Commi ssioner argues that the School failed to plea d the exist ence of a protec ted rig ht. Accor ding to the Commissioner, any rig ht of the Sc ho ol t o th e re c e ipt

of state fu nd s un de r i ts c ha

rt e r i s c on tin g e nt o n th e Sc ho ol’ s c omp lia nc e wi th the cha rter’ s terms, and there fore , the inacc urac ies discovere d in the School’s attendanc e re porting eliminated any rig ht to pay ment. Howeve r, this a

rg ument reve als a question of f act that ne eds to be deter mined—the extent of the inacc urac y . We decline to hold, and the Commissioner points to no
au t h o ri t y re qu i ri n g u s t o h o l d , t h at u p o nd i s co v er i n g an i n ac cu ra cy i na c h ar t er

s ch o o l ’s re p o rt i n g, t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r

m ay w i t h h o l d

ana m o u n tu n r e l a t e d

t o t h e a m o u n to f

t h e i n a c c u r a c y. 6 The Commissioner also asser ts that no as-applied due proce ss c laim ma y be broug ht beca use due pr ocess wa s in fact a ccor ded to the School. The Commi ssioner points to the School’s hiring of an a ccounting f

i rm an d s ubmitti ng a re sponse to TEA’s pr eliminary repor t as proof that both “ notice and an opportunity to be hear d” we re in fa ct g iven. See University of Tex. M ed. Sch. v. Than , 9 0 1 S
. W
. 2 d

9 2 6 , 9 3 0 (T ex . 1 9 9 5 ) ( ci t i n g Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 333 ( 1976)). The Commissioner has pre sented this iss ue to us via an a ppeal of a denia l of a plea

to the jurisdiction. Bec ause the Commi ssioner has c h o s en t h i s route, the tria l court wa s oblige d, as we12

are , t o i n d u lge ever

y rea sonable infe renc e and r esolve a ny doubts in the nonmovant’s favor
. See Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 228.

Acc or d in g to th e Sc h o o l’ s p le a d in g s , w h il e ano p p o rtu n it y to r e s p o n d

w a s in fac t provided to the School, such oppor tunity was insuffic ient to survive a due proce ss challeng e. Due pr ocess r equire s that the opportuni ty to be heard be “at a meaning ful time and in a mea ningf ul
manner .” Than , 9 0 1 S
. W
. 2 d at 9 3 0 (c i t i n g Ma the ws , 424 U.S. at 333). The amount of proce ss that is due is measure d by

a fle x ible standard t h at d ep ends on t he pra ctical r equire ments of the circ umstances. Id. (c i t i n g Ma the ws , 42 4 U. S. a t 33 3)
. Th e c ourt mus t ba lanc e (1 ) t

he pr ivate int e re st that will be a ff

e c te d by the of

fi c ia l a c tio n, (2 ) t

he ri sk of an e rr on e ou s d e pr ivatio n o f s uc h in te re st throug h the proc edure s used, and the pr obable va lue of a ddi t i o nal or substitute proce dural safe g uards, a

nd (3) the g overnme nt’s interest, including the func tion involved and the fisca l and administrative burdens that the additi onal or substitut e procedura l require ment would entail. Id. We believe in this c ase that the inquiries involved in a due proc ess ana ly sis would be better se rved by
a more complete development of the fa ctual situation, rather than throug h the proc edura l limi tations of a ple a to the jurisdiction. See M iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 2 2 7 (“W hen the c onsideration of a trial court’ s subject matter jurisdiction re quires the examination of evidenc e, the trial court e x erc ises its discretion in deciding whether the jurisdictional deter

mination should be made at a pr eliminary hear ing or

awa it a fuller development of the case . . . .”); Texas State Employe es Union , 16 S.W .3d at 67 (“ We offer

no opinion on whether sove reig n immunit y may in fac t ultim ately

bar [plaintiffs’] claim. This will depend upon the f acts a s they

are develope d.”).“A pe rson ag g rieve d by an ac tion of the ag ency

or dec ision of the commissioner may 7 appea l to a district court in Travis County .” Te x . Educ. Code Ann. § 7.057( d) (West 2006). 13 Other Claims The Commissione r cha lleng es the School’s re liance on se ction 7.057 of the education code to establish jurisdiction for its declar at o ry judgme nt claims and asse rts that the 7 School’s ultra vires c laims fail beca use the Commissione r ac t ed wi thin his st atutory authority as a matter of law. Th e Com mis sio ne r d id no t pr e se nt e ith e r a rgume nt t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt in h is p le a

to the jurisdiction. The Com missioner relies on section 51.014 of t he civil pra ctice a nd reme dies code for his a ppeal of the trial court’ s denial of his plea to the jurisdiction. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Cod e Ann. § 5 1. 01 4( a )( 8) (a llo wi nga pp e a l f ro m in te rl oc uto ry

or de r o f d is tr ic t c ourt

that “ g ra nts or denie s a plea

to the jurisdiction by

a g overnme ntal unit”). B eca use sec tion 5 1
. 0 1 4 is a narr ow exception to the ge nera l rule that only final j udg ments and orde rs ar e appe alable, w e strictly construe
w h a t ma y b e c o n s id e r e d in an in te r lo c u to r y a ppeal. S ee Cit y of Dallas v. First Trade Union Sav. Bank , 1 33 S.W. 3d

68 0, 68 6- 87 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 3, pe t. d e nie d) . We are g uid e d b y thi s Court’s holding in Au sti n I nd e pe nd e nt S c ho ol D ist

ric t v . Lo we ry :
Be cause our jurisdiction in the interlocutory appea l is limit ed, we confine our re view to t he ru lin g on

the ple a to t he jur isd ic tio n tha

t wa s a c tua lly fi le d and do no t a dd re ss whether the district court err ed in denying the plea on a g round that wa s not arg ued below. Although subject matter jurisdiction c annot be waived and may be ra ised for the first time in an appe al from a final j u d gm en t , section 51.014(a )(8) of the civil prac tice and r emedies code doe s not gr ant this Court jurisdi ction to review claims that wer e neither included in the plea to the jurisdiction nor considere d by the dis tr ic t c ourt
.14

212 S.W .3d 827, 833-34 (Te x . App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (citations omitted). Since neither the Com mis sio ne r’ s argume nts c on c e rn ing e du c a tio n c od e se c tio n 7. 05 7 no r his argume nts
conce rning ultra vires c laims were included in the C o m missioner’s plea to the jurisdiction, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d not c on sid e r t he argume nts and

did no t is su e any

int e rl oc uto ry

or de r i n r e sp on se to the arguments. Acc ording ly , we lack j urisdiction in this appea l to consider whe ther the School may rely on section 7.057 of t he education code for jurisdiction or whether the Commi ssioner ac ted
w i t h i nh i s s t a tu t o r

y a u t h o r i t y.
Conclusion A plaintiff may asser t claims for declara

tory relief reg ardingits constitut ional or statut or y ri g hts wh e re the g ra

nti ngof s uch rel ie f w ou ld n ot r e su lt i n mo ne tary pa y me nts fo r p a st violations, but rather would re sult in t he prospe ctive application of the applica ble constitutional provisions and statutes. Wit hout passing on the merits of Alphonso C rutch L ife Support Center’ s
c la ims , w e a ff

ir m the dis tr ic t court ’s or de r de nying the Com mis sio ne r’ s ple a to the jur isd ic tio n as t o t h e S ch o o l ’s cl ai m s . Int h e d i s t ri ct co u rt , t h e S ch o o l wi l l h av e t h e o p p o rt u n i t y t o am en d i t s p l ea d i n gs
as nec essar

y to clar ify the precise relief soug ht pursuant to its claims relating to the overa llocation decision.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: Jul y

2, 2009