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THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION’S PROGRESS IN

ENHANCING HOMELAND SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE 

AND BORDER SECURITY

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 12, 2004

Serial No. 108–49

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin 

W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana 

DAVID DREIER, California 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PORTER J. GOSS, Florida 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan 

LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

ERNEST J. ISTOOK, JR., Oklahoma 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York 

JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

JANE HARMAN, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., North Carolina 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

KEN LUCAS, Kentucky 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff 

STEPHEN DEVINE, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel 

THOMAS DILENGE, Chief Counsel and Policy Director 

DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director 

MARK T. MAGEE, Democrat Deputy Staff Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY

DAVE CAMP, Michigan, Chairman 

KAY GRANGER, Texas, Vice Chairwoman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

ROBERT W. GOODLATTE, Virginia 

ERNEST ISTOOK, Oklahoma 

JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona 

MARK SOUDER, Indiana 

JOHN SWEENEY, New York 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Ex Officio 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Ranking 

Member 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

JIM TURNER, TEXAS, Ex Officio

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border 

Security ................................................................................................................. 1

The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 31

The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on Homeland Security .... 2

The Honorable Donna Christensen, a Representative in Congress From the 

U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................... 39

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Oregon ..................................................................................................... 32

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 9

The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Washington ....................................................................................................... 35

The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas ................................................................................................................. 26

The Honorable Shiela Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, Prepared Statement ................................................................... 9

The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts ........................................................................................ 1

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

State of North Carolina ....................................................................................... 22

WITNESS 

Mr. Steven J. McHale, Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security 

Administration, Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14

APPENDIX 

Questions Submitted for the Record 

Responses from Mr. Steven J. McHale: 

Questions Submitted from the Honorable Dave Camp ........................................ 43

Questions Submitted from the Honorable Christopher Cox ................................ 45

Questions Submitted from the Honorable Lamar Smith ..................................... 50 

Questions Submitted from the Honorable Jim Turner ......................................... 51

(1)

THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION’S PROGRESS IN 

ENHANCING HOMELAND SECURITY 

Wednesday, May 12, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE

AND BORDER SECURITY, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:38 a.m., in Room 

1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Dave Camp [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Camp, Granger, Cox, Dunn, DeFazio, 

Markey, Dicks, Turner, Pascrell and Christensen. 

Mr. CAMP. [Presiding.] Good morning. The Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security hearing will come to order. Today’s hearing is on the Transportation Security Administration’s 

progress in enhancing homeland security. 

The subcommittee will hear from Mr. Stephen McHale, the deputy administrator for Transportation Security Administration. Mr. 

McHale, we appreciate you being here in place of the TSA Administrator Stone, who is waiting confirmation by the Senate and therefore, unable to testify. 

The chair would ask members to either waive opening statements or to give short statements and to submit their full opening 

statements for the record. The record will remain open for 10 days 

after the close of the hearing. 

Members are advised they will receive an additional three minutes during the question time if they waive their opening statement. 

At this time, I will simply submit my statement for the record. 

And I would ask Mr. Markey, as Ms. Sanchez not is here today, 

if he has an opening statement that he would like to give. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Today, we 

focus on TSA’s role in enhancing homeland security. I am going to 

focus my statement on three major flaws in the transportation sector’s security posture. 

First, cargo security. While old ladies are still being forced to 

take their shoes off and infants have to be taken out of baby carriers for screening prior to boarding flights, the Bush Administration continues to oppose efforts to screen all cargo being placed on 

passenger aircraft, even though technology to do so exists. 
2

This is an unacceptable loophole that gives Americans a completely false sense of security. I have introduced comprehensive 

aviation security legislation to remedy this problem. 

Second, rail shipments of hazardous materials. Each day, hundreds of thousands of shipments of hazardous materials, including 

materials like chlorine that kill thousands of people in a few short 

minutes, travel through densely populated areas and near critical 

infrastructure. Take, for example, this tank car full of chlorine, 

passing within view of this building and the Capitol Building. 

The U.S. Naval Research Lab had said that a successful attack 

on just one such tank car could cause 100,000 deaths in one half 

hour. An Ohio-based Al-Qa‘ida operative was even arrested for plotting to collapse a bridge in New York City or derail a train in D.C. 

And last month, just north of downtown Boston, a railroad tank 

car carrying 20,000 gallons of hydrochloric acid started to leak 

close to the Sullivan Station Rapid Transit and just yards away 

from Route I–93, causing major chaos to the morning commute; 

and thankfully, no casualties. 

Yet, there has been no national planning to reroute and better 

secure this dangerous shipment that could be used as weapons of 

mass destruction against us. I plan to introduce legislation to address this problem next week. 

And third, passenger rail security. Although we have seen an attack in Madrid, we still have deployed only a fraction of what we 

can in order to ensure that we protect against a successful attack. 

I thank the chairman. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. Does the ranking member of the full committee wish to make an opening statement? 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Deputy Administrator 

McHale, welcome to the Homeland Security Committee. I regret 

the acting administrator, Admiral Stone, was unable to be here 

with us. But we appreciate your presence. 

We know that in the months after September 11 of 2001, we 

have taken many important steps to improve our aviation security 

and our transportation security. In fact, I believe it has been said 

that 80 percent of the new dollars that we have invested in homeland security has been spent in the aviation sector. 

We know that in short order, you hired screeners and deployed 

them to our airports. And the American public has noticed the difference. I think they feel comfortable with the fact that these 

screeners are there doing the job that we all know needed to be 

done in light of the serious failures that occurred on September 11. 

Last week, Mr. Markey and many others on the Democratic side 

of this committee introduced the Safe PLANES Act to better secure 

our aviation system. It is well documented that airport screening, 

while much improved, is still not as effective as anyone would like 

it. 

The Sunday New Jersey Star Ledger had a headline on May 9 

about Newark Airport, that I am sure you are familiar with, entitled, ‘‘Security Fears at Newark Airport.’’ This article depicts serious security gaps that still remain in aviation security at the Newark Liberty Airport. 
3

Apparently, according to this report, they do not screen 100 percent of the baggage, as is required. I was reading the comments of 

one of the screeners who said, ‘‘It is all smoke and mirrors.’’

Now there may be some answers to this. But I noticed even the 

chief TSA person at the airport acknowledged that they are understaffed at that airport. So any comments that you would have 

about that; it is certainly disturbing to know, at this late date, we 

still do not have 100 percent even of the carry-on luggage and the 

checked luggage screened. 

As you know, Mr. Markey has been quite outspoken on pointing 

out that we still have yet to implement a full screening process for 

cargo. 

We are also concerned about the cap of 45,000 employees and the 

problem this has created for TSA. This cap obviously was set by 

the Congress. But we believe it is important, if this cap is too low, 

that the department speak out and let us know of this inadequacy. 

We also are concerned about the known shipper companies. Few 

of those companies apparently have ever been checked to see if 

they are who they say they are or if they are following security regulations. So that is certainly a concern that I think this committee 

has. 

The legislation that we have introduced, the Safe PLANES Act, 

closes many of these security gaps. I hope you will take a look at 

that legislation and what we have put in it. I would appreciate 

your comments regarding the merits—or lack thereof—that you 

may see in those proposals. 

I know you have a difficult task. We have security gaps not only 

in aviation security, but also in rail security, as Mr. Markey pointed out. 

We will be introducing a bill in a few days to close some of the 

security gaps that we believe still exist in rail and other public 

transportation. Any input that you could give us with regard to 

those ideas, we would very much appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Submitted for the Record.]

Security fears at Newark Airport

Screeners say too many bags elude adequate scrutiny on route to planes

Sunday, May 9, 2004 

BY RON MARSICO 

Star-Ledger Staff 

Two and a half years after 9/11, thousands of checked bags are loaded onto planes 

at Newark Liberty International Airport each day without being scanned for explosives, and security checkpoints remain seriously understaffed, according to current 

and former screeners as well as internal e-mail. 

The concerns come from six current U.S. Transportation Security Administration 

employees at the airport and eight former employees. Five former screeners spoke 

on the record, while the others—including supervisory level personnel—requested 

anonymity. The e-mail messages obtained by The Star-Ledger, discussing security 

problems, were sent by the airport’s ranking TSA officials to supervisors and other 

agency employees. 

The interviews and the e-mail portray an airport security system in which short 

staffing and the pressure to keep lines moving result in corners being cut as screeners handle up to 40,000 checked bags and at least 40,000 carry-on bags each day. 

‘‘It’s all smoke and mirrors,’’ said Dan Sabella, 40, a screener at Terminal C until 

he quit in February. ‘‘I didn’t sleep very well when I had that job. It became so routine to just have that uneasy feeling. . . . Stuff was getting through every day.’’ 

Top-level TSA officials sharply disagree with screeners’ assertions that security is 

being compromised at Newark Airport, one of the three airports used by terrorists 
4

on Sept. 11, 2001. They do concede, however, that the airport is understaffed. They 

say they are in the process of hiring hundreds of new workers. 

‘‘We’ve gone through our growing pains, and we have what I consider a stable 

work force and a growing one,’’ said Marcus Arroyo, the TSA’s federal security director at Newark Airport. 

‘‘We all take this job seriously. We’re not going to sleep at night if there’s a problem,’’ said Arroyo. ‘‘I’ll come back if there’s a problem. So will any member of my 

staff. So yes, I do feel Newark is safe.’’

MISSED DEADLINES 

The TSA was created two months after the hijacking of four planes, including a 

United Airlines flight out of Newark that crashed in a Pennsylvania field after the 

passengers resisted. 

The agency was given a daunting mission: Replace poorly trained, ineffective 

screeners who worked for private security firms with full-time, well-trained employees who worked for the federal government. 

Some airports have made the transition faster than others. Newark Airport has 

not been one of the success stories. 

Of the nation’s 429 commercial airports, only five missed the extended congressional deadline for having all checked bags either pass through bomb-detection machines or be manually testing for explosive residue. Newark was one. 

Newark missed the original deadline, at the end of 2002, while it was installing 

about 50 of the SUV-size machines required to the scan checked bags. A one-year 

extension of deadline expired this past Dec. 31 with the machines in place but not 

all checked luggage going through them. Arroyo says manpower shortages were a 

factor. To this day, the airport does not have the staff it needs to fully operate all 

of the bomb detection machines during peak hours. 

Before the deadlines expired, Congress allowed airports to meet security requirements by alternate means: by having specially trained dogs sniff bags for explosives, 

by hand-searching luggage or, as a last resort, by using a system called Positive 

Passenger Bag Match. 

Under the bag match option, airlines use computer records to ensure no checked 

bag remains on an about-to-depart plane if its owner has not boarded. This measure 

has been widely criticized because it would not deter a suicide bomber whose bag 

was in the luggage hold below him, set on a timer to explode. 

Current and former TSA screeners and supervisors say that, while there is not 

enough staff to electronically scan every bag for explosives, they do not often see 

manual searches or dogs used as an alternative. They could not say whether the 

airlines are using the bag match technique. 

John Brennan, 33, of Piermont, N.Y., who spent nearly a year as a screener of 

checked baggage in Terminal A before he resigned in October, says continuing staffing shortages make it impossible to scan every bag for explosives. 

‘‘If we physically did every bag, a lot of those planes would be delayed,’’ said Brennan. ‘‘We didn’t do every single bag. We did a percentage.’’ He said he had no idea 

what that percentage was, but ‘‘it was ridiculous. Just too few bags were being done, 

in my opinion.’’ 

Since Brennan’s departure, Terminal A has met the mandate, with all bags there 

either going through the bomb-detection machines or being swiped with a sterile 

cloth for signs of explosive residue, according to senior TSA officials. 

For example, on Nov. 26, the hectic travel day before Thanksgiving, TSA records 

show Terminal A handled 9,897 checked bags and all were electronically scanned 

for explosives. 

But Terminal B and Terminal C are still unable to electronically screen or swipe 

100 percent of checked bags. Terminal C is the airport’s busiest; Continental Airlines, which uses Newark as a hub, operates most of its flights there from that terminal. 

Arroyo disputed the screeners’ assertion that the lapses involve thousands of bags 

daily. He said alternate means of review, including the bag match technique, continue to be used for some bags. 

‘‘It’s not by anybody’s choice that we didn’t get there on Dec. 31,’’ Arroyo said, referring to the extended deadline. ‘‘I’m able to assure that every bag that gets on an 

airplane has been under some level of scrutiny.’’ 

He said all checked bags would be scanned for explosives in ‘‘the very foreseeable 

future.’’ 

A TSA spokesman said he believes Newark Airport will meet the requirement 

when the new employees are hired within a few months.
5

’MITIGATING’ LUGGAGE 

An internal e-mail message indicates that as recently as Jan. 22, one ranking airport official worried about the number of bags not being scanned. 

On that day, three weeks after the airport missed the extended deadline, Lou 

Illiano, at the time Terminal C’s screening manager, sent an e-mail to several other 

high-ranking TSA officials at the airport, warning that far too many bags were 

going onto planes unscanned. 

Illiano wrote: ‘‘I have begun to analyze the bag data. So far I’ve only look (sic) 

at one day, Jan. 19. It looks like we did about 67 percent of domestic bags.’’ 

Given that some 18,000 or more bags are checked onto domestic Continental Airlines planes at Terminal C most days, some 6,000 bags would not have been 

screened as required. 

Asked whether only two-thirds of Terminal C’s domestic bags were being properly 

scanned for explosives, Arroyo said, ‘‘I’m not going to respond to that.’’ 

Illiano wrote that the goal of screening 100 percent of bags was hampered by ‘‘insufficient EWR screeners’’ and difficulty in keeping ‘‘a consistent watch on this operation.’’ (EWR are Newark’s international air-transportation code letters.) 

Illiano added he was ‘‘not sure all the duty managers have grasped the importance of this operation.’’ 

Continental Airlines employees also bore blame, he said, because they would send 

bags directly onto the planes if they determined the TSA could not screen every bag 

for explosives without causing delays. In airport parlance, the practice is called 

‘‘mitigating’’ luggage. 

‘‘I also think Continental is too quick to decide that we can’t handle 100 percent, 

and begin mitigating. As it stands, we cannot keep track of the bags they are mitigating,’’ Illiano wrote. 

Illiano declined a request from comment. 

Airline officials said in a statement: ‘‘Continental’s highest priority is the safety 

and the security of our customers and employees, and the assertion that Continental 

is interested in anything else is baseless, ridiculous and without merit.’’ 

‘‘The airline fully supports the TSA’s multiple efforts, many of which are not visible to the traveler, to comply with all federal security standards while offering customer-friendly service,’’ the statement concluded. 

Arroyo denied that TSA loses track of any checked bags. He said the agency 

works in concert with the airlines. 

‘‘We know what we’re doing in terms of bag match, in terms of processing, in 

terms of alternative measures,’’ said Arroyo. ‘‘They don’t call the shots. We call the 

shots.’’ 

Mark Hatfield, a TSA spokesman in Washington, D.C., stressed that even if other 

luggage is subjected to Positive Passenger Bag Match, the bags of anyone deemed 

a potential security threat are scanned for explosives. 

‘‘We have several alternative screening measures available that allow us to meet 

the 100 percent checked bag screening requirement. We utilize them in random 

fashion and always ensure that risk-associated bags are electronically cleared,’’ Hatfield said late last week.

UNHAPPY CONGRESSMAN 

Rep. Robert Menendez (D-13th Dist.), a member of the House aviation subcommittee that monitors TSA effectiveness, said relying on Positive Passenger Bag 

Match at this late date does not meet ‘‘the spirit or intent’’ of the congressional 

mandate that 100 percent of checked bags be screened for explosives. 

Referring to the missed deadline, Menendez said: ‘‘It’s just unacceptable, especially when one of the flights of Sept. 11 came out of here. Technically, I would say 

they are in violation of the law.’’ 

Last May, Menendez sent a letter to TSA seeking answers about various problems 

at Newark Airport. 

‘‘Almost a year later, little has been done to address those concerns that I outlined 

in the letter,’’ said Menendez. ‘‘Clearly, they have not been responsive, and we’re 

looking for a variety of ways to (get them to) be responsive.’’ 

U.S. Sen. Jon Corzine (D–N.J.) also has asked questions about airport security. 

On Feb. 25, following a budget hearing with Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary Tom Ridge, Corzine submitted a written question to Ridge asking what 

Homeland Security—which oversees TSA—was ‘‘doing to expedite the 100 percent 

electronic screening of checked baggage’’ at Newark. More than two months later, 

Corzine said, he has yet to hear back from Ridge or his staff. 

‘‘I think it’s outrageous, and the fact that Secretary Ridge is just ignoring a request is just wrong,’’ said Corzine. ‘‘It (the airport) is vulnerable until we at least 

deal with the issue of screening luggage that goes onto airplanes.’’ 
6

But careful checking of baggage comes at a price for which the public has limited 

tolerance—delays. 

One TSA supervisor cited the case last year of a threat directed toward an Air 

India 747, carrying 400 people, before departure. Officials responded by using the 

most stringent inspection procedures, and the flight was delayed four hours. 

Similarly, threats made over the holidays to some Air France and Virgin Atlantic 

flights led to hours worth of delays, said the supervisor.

CHECKPOINT WOES 

Newark Airport is one of the nation’s busiest airports, handling 29.4 million arriving and departing passengers in 2003. 

Some 20,000 fliers depart on average each day through Terminal C. Terminal A 

or B each has about 10,000 passengers departing on average daily. Checkpoint 

lanes—where passengers walk through metal detectors, take off their shoes and put 

carry-on bags and personal items on belts that carry them through X-ray machines—are the places most passengers encounter TSA screeners. The TSA’s goal is 

to keep waits to 10 minutes or less and to treat fliers in a professional, courteous 

manner while not compromising security. 

But that mission is an elusive one at Newark Airport’s checkpoints, say TSA 

screeners and supervisors. 

Screeners operating X-ray machines are faced with a dilemma: If they follow the 

TSA’s standard operating procedure and stop the X-ray belt for every carry-on bag 

to better examine the contents over the machine’s computer monitor, the line of 

waiting passengers quickly backs up dramatically. 

Supervisors sometimes remind them of the requirement but too often demand 

they work quickly to keep the lines short, screeners say. 

‘‘The onus was put on us to increase the speed we were screening these people,’’ 

said Mick O’Donnell, 36, who worked as a Terminal A checkpoint screener from August 2002 until October 2003. ‘‘And I’ll tell you, it was a little too quick.’’ 

O’Donnell, who is now an airline mechanic supervisor in Georgia, said screeners 

often had no choice but to violate standard operating procedure. The X-ray operator 

would give cursory looks at each bag’s contents on the monitor as the parade of luggage streamed through the machine. 

‘‘We wouldn’t stop every bag. We would just let them go through—boom, boom, 

boom,’’ said O’Donnell. ‘‘There just wasn’t time to do that. . . You would get spoken 

to if you were running slow.’’ 

Several current TSA employees in supervisory positions also said X-ray operators 

still routinely flout the requirement because of pressure from top officials to move 

passengers quickly. 

Arroyo said the problem of screeners not stopping carry-on bags on X-ray machines had not been brought to his attention. 

‘‘They’re not supposed to do that,’’ said Arroyo. ‘‘If that’s somebody’s edict, it’s not 

coming from me. If we find out about it, we put a stop to it. But I’ve not had that 

reported to me.’’ 

But in an e-mail on Feb. 26, a copy of which was sent to Arroyo, a top TSA official 

called the speedy movement of carry-on bags on X-ray machines at Newark Airport 

a ‘‘serious matter’’ that must be ‘‘quickly’’ corrected. 

‘‘Apparently, it has become common practice for our X-ray operators to allow the 

belts to run continuously and not stop the belt on each image,’’ Jeffrey Candino, the 

airport’s deputy assistant federal security director, wrote to supervisors. ‘‘Anyone 

who is not doing that is in direct violation of the SCP SOP’’—screening checkpoint 

standard operating procedure—‘‘and can be disciplined.’’ 

TSA officials said Candino would not comment on his e-mail message. 

‘‘Our people can’t talk about any screening standard operating procedures due to 

the sensitivity of the material,’’ said Ann Davis, a TSA spokeswoman.

UNGLAMOROUS WORK 

Ultimately, many of Newark Airport’s security woes stem from the severe staffing 

shortages, say screeners and TSA managers. 

Screeners say there is a constant scramble to man checkpoint lanes and bombdetection machines. At times the airport will use only three screeners on a checkpoint lane and two on a bomb-detection machine, the screeners say. 

Originally, the TSA wanted seven screeners on each checkpoint lane and five 

screeners manning the bomb-detection machines. It lowered the recommended minimums to four on checkpoint lanes and three on bomb-detection machines. 

Screeners at Newark Airport generally earn slightly more than $30,000 a year. 

‘‘It’s a brutal job, screening. It’s deadly boring and it’s deadly serious,’’ said Robert 

Monetti, president of Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 Inc., who lost his son in the 
7

1988 terrorist bombing over Scotland and has lobbied since for improved aviation 

security. ‘‘And that’s a deadly combination.’’ 

Deliberate interruptions in routine, such as switching jobs on the checkpoint lane, 

are intended to keep screeners sharp-minded. But Sabella, the former screener who 

spent 1 1/2 years with the TSA, said shorthanded lanes can leave screeners unable 

to properly break the monotony of the assignments—such as staring at X-ray machine monitors to find contraband—during eight-hour shifts. 

‘‘You can’t take a break. You can’t be efficient,’’ said Sabella. ‘‘You can’t rotate 

every 30 minutes and be refreshed.’’ 

TSA officials say they are working hard to hire more screeners at Newark after 

an unsuccessful effort to attract enough part-time employees. The agency plans to 

hire as many as 400 more full-time screeners in the next two or three months, 

bringing the total security force to about 1,600. That number should be sufficient 

to meet the congressional requirement for electronic screening, Arroyo said. 

Werner Ledwon of Staten Island, who works as a screener at a Terminal A checkpoint, said the TSA is trying hard to achieve its mission and grapple with the staffing shortages. 

‘‘Like any new company, you’re going to have some rocky roads. . . . I think we’re 

doing everything we can possibly do,’’ said Ledwon, 55, an Air Force veteran. ‘‘I’m 

from the old school. You make it work, even if you were down to one guy. . . . I’m 

proud of what I’m doing.’’ 

Most of those interviewed, however, contend the problems are too severe to overcome without increased manpower. 

Menendez called for the TSA to find ways to increase staffing during peak travel 

periods. ‘‘The bottom line is there’s a very significant employee pool that is available 

in this area,’’ said Menendez, whose congressional district skirts the airport. ‘‘They 

simply say they cannot find people—which is unacceptable.’’ 

Hatfield, the TSA spokesman, said the attrition rate at Newark Airport was 16 

percent over the past year. Current and former TSA personnel counter that figure 

seems low.

THE TESTS 

TSA officials acknowledged that security at the checkpoints is not foolproof, but 

they said that is why layered levels of security have been incorporated into the system. Examples of the extra safeguards are reinforced cockpit doors in the aircraft 

and air marshals aboard many flights, they said. The agency’s leadership maintains 

that security at the nation’s airports is significantly better than it was on 9/11 and 

continues to improve. The TSA stopped 576,925 prohibited items at the nation’s airports in March alone, according to Hatfield. 

But screeners’ concerns about the chance for a weapon to bypass security echo a 

recent U.S. General Accounting Office report, which revealed that federal investigators conducted covert tests and identified weaknesses at more than 100 airports in 

the screeners’ ability to detect dangerous objects. While the GAO declined to make 

the details public, those who saw them were troubled. 

During a House aviation subcommittee hearing in Washington April 22, Inspector 

General Clark Kent Ervin said the nation’s aviation security screeners—both the 

federal employees and a handful of private contractors—‘‘performed about the same, 

which is to say, equally poorly,’’ according to an Associated Press report. 

At Newark Airport, various tests of screeners’ ability to detect dangerous objects 

have been conducted since last fall. 

In October, Lockheed Martin tested screeners on such skills as how they handwand the passengers who set off the walk-through metal detectors. In November, 

TSA agents covertly conducted tests for the GAO, returning for another round of 

undercover drills in March. 

Screeners and supervisors say Newark screeners did not fare well. 

Arroyo confirmed that some 80 percent of the screeners in half of one terminal 

failed Lockheed Martin’s first tests. But he said there were initial problems with 

the testing procedures. Within two weeks, he said, some 90 percent of screeners 

were passing. 

Screeners and their supervisors say a different battery of tests was conducted covertly by TSA investigators last November and more than half of those who were 

tested failed. 

While Arroyo would not provide specifics, he acknowledged that the November 

TSA test marks were poor, but he said the March drills produced ‘‘significantly better’’ results. 

‘‘Knowing how difficult the tests are, I was very pleased with our results,’’ said 

Arroyo. ‘‘Had we gotten the results that we had gotten back in November, I would 

have been very upset.’’ 
8

Arroyo added that test results can be misleading. The tests are supposed to be 

difficult to pass, he said, because they are seen by the TSA as teaching tool. 

‘‘So the testing is, I hate to say it, designed to create failure,’’ said Arroyo. 

Screeners and supervisors, however, also point to specific examples of repeated 

checkpoint failures and worry about what else they might be missing. 

In October, several walk-through metal detectors missed a steak knife nearly 8 

inches long, according to a screening manager’s e-mail. 

Following months of complaints by screeners about a blurry X-ray monitor at a 

Terminal A checkpoint, the unit was finally replaced in January, after a United Airlines passenger discovered he had inadvertently passed through security with a boxcutter. 

In February, 78 passengers aboard a Continental flight had to be rescreened, and 

part of Terminal A closed, when a passenger slipped past security with a carry-on 

bag containing an object that resembled a gun. 

After investigating that incident, Arroyo said, he concluded the screener who said 

he saw a possible gun was mistaken. 

In the case of the blurry monitor, Arroyo conceded there was a problem with the 

monitor in January, though he said it had passed calibration tests. 

‘‘It wasn’t a defective machine,’’ said Arroyo. ‘‘Was it as good as other machines? 

Probably not.’’ 

Arroyo said he did not recall the incident of the steak knife. 

The security director said he is always aware of Newark Airport’s 9/11 legacy and 

is committed to continued security improvements. 

‘‘We know that UAL 93 left from this airport and it perished in Pennsylvania,’’ 

said Arroyo. ‘‘If any of us could do more than what we’re doing, we would do it.’’

Ron Marsico covers Newark Liberty International Airport. He may be reached at 

rmarsico@starledger.com or (973) 392–7860. 

Copyright 2004 NJ.com. All Rights Reserved.

Security net at Newark Airport

Sunday, May 9, 2004

Here’s a breakdown of TSA screening measures used at Newark 

LibertyInternational Airport:

CHECKED BAGS • The preferred method involves sending checked luggage through aSUV-sized 

bomb-detection machine that checks the molecular content ofitems for explosives. 

• Alternatively, screeners swipe bags with a sterile cloth, which is thenput into 

a computer to check for explosive residue. 

• If neither of those methods can be used, screeners conduct hand searchesof 

bags or use bomb-sniffing dogs to check for explosives. 

• As a last resort, each bag is matched to a boarding list of passengerswho are 

on the airplane. The system is called Positive Passenger Bag Match.

0CARRY-ON BAGS. 

• All carry-on bags are sent through an X-ray machine at concoursecheckpoints.

PASSENGERS 

All departing passengers are required to pass through a walk-throughmetal detector. Passengers who set off the metal detector alarm are thensubjected to a secondary screening with a hand-held metal detector. Insome cases, pat-down searches 

can be required before the passenger canboard a plane. Some passengers may be 

advised to remove their shoes,which are also sent through the X-ray machines.

ADDITIONAL MEASURES *

TSA officials say checkpoint and baggage screeners are just one layer ina multitiered security system that also includes: • A computerized profiling system that flags passengers who might pose arisk. 

Criteria may include passengers who fly one way, pay for ticketswith cash or 

travel with little or no baggage. 

• Reinforced cockpit doors aboard planes. • Thousands of air marshals on U.S. flights daily. • Pilots allowed to carry guns.

Copyright 2004 NJ.com. All Rights Reserved.

Mr. CAMP. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Dicks, would you wish to make an opening statement? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. 
9

Mr. CAMP. So the gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. First of all, I want to associate myself 

with the remarks of Congressman Markey. The idea that we are 

not inspecting cargo, I think, is something that the administration 

has to address. 

We need to understand why that is and what the plan is to take 

care of that. Secondly, I am worried about port security and the 

lack of funding in the budget for port security. 

It has been the Congress that has had to add the money each 

year for this endeavor. And I do not get it. 

We should remember what happened with just a brief lockout on 

the West Coast when we could not get containers into the West 

Coast because of this lockout. And it all of a sudden had an immediate economic impact, not only on Los Angeles and the West Coast 

cities, but also other cities that get these containers from the West 

Coast by rail or truck. 

And we have a lot of lean production and other things that are 

done with components and parts coming in from offshore. 

Now protecting and securing these ports; yes, I know we, under 

the Maritime Security Act, had to come in with a report. But there 

is still a major question about who is going to fund security at 

these major ports. 

And Operation Safe Commerce, yes, that gives us a picture of 

what we need to do at three or four of the major ports in the country. But that certainly is not a comprehensive approach. 

So again, I really worry that we are not putting the resources 

into this that is necessary to secure an important part of the economy. And I worry about the dirty bomb scenario or something of 

that nature coming in via a container, being shipped to Chicago. 

And you have an event that then could put us in a situation where 

we cannot bring containers in on the West Coast, with an enormous potential economic disaster for the country, if that should 

ever occur. 

So again, we are not getting that part of the job done as well. 

That is why a lot of us up here are frustrated about this. 

And I have been a supporter of homeland security. I want to see 

us do the right job. And I am pleased that our chairman has had 

these hearings, so that we can at least have a chance to discuss 

this with the administration in public, so that the American people 

know that there are still major gaps in our transportation security. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. McHale, for being here. We have received your 

written statement in advance. And we ask you to summarize it in 

five minutes. 

Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHIELA JACKSON-LEE

I thank Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Turner for holding today’s hearing 

and Deputy TSA Administrator Mr. McHale for taking time out of his schedule to 

deliver testimony to this body. It is very important that we have an opportunity to 

analyze the performance of the Transportation Security Administration in light of 

the urgent needs that have arisen and that have existed in the areas of aviation 

screening and infrastructure, air cargo security, airport perimeter and site access, 

land security, and personnel. 
10

Air Cargo security will be a topic that deserves special attention from Mr. McHale 

because we have severe constraints before us with respect to the need to balance 

the integration, introduction, and training required for new screening technologies 

with our ability to provide a sufficient number of personnel to operate such technology. Without carefully balancing these issues, we will be faced with yet another 

vulnerability . 

As an attempt to address some of these problems, or at least to give our TSA some 

legislative tools with which to address these problems, I supported our Ranking 

Member Mr. Turner, Edward Markey, senior member of the Committee, and Steve 

Israel, member of the House Armed Services Committee in introducing the Safe 

Passengers and Lading in Aviation for National Enhancement of Security Act, or the 

‘‘Safe PLANES Act’’—important legislation on behalf of House Democrats to improve 

aviation security throughout the United States of which I am an original co-sponsor. 

The bill is comprised of 15 provisions that cover areas such as: 

—strengthening the screener workforce at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), installing explosive detection equipment and other technologies 

across the nation where needed, and

—the implementation of a plan to fully inspect all cargo on passenger aircraft, 

among others. 

This legislation seeks to address the serious gaps that we recognize in our current 

aviation security plan that is currently being administered by TSA. The nature of 

the vulnerabilities require immediate changes and the implementation of improved 

plans to fully screen all cargo, even-handedly install equipment and technology in 

all airports, and increase the number of trained personnel where needed. 

I contributed to this effort by drafting: 

—paragraph (a)(5) of Section 6 entitled ‘Aviation Security Technologies’ and 

—paragraph (b) of Section 7 entitled ’Inspection of Cargo Carried Aboard Passenger Aircraft.’

—Paragraph (a)(5) of the first section calls for, in connection with a report requirement made to accompany the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) 

fiscal year 2006 budget request, the gathering of information that reveals the 

Federal and airport security personnel’s capability of operating screening equipment and technology-speaking to the question of equipment interoperability and 

staff competency to operate equipment. 

—Paragraph (b) of the second section requires the Secretary of DHS to transmit 

to Congress a summary of the system implemented to screen and inspect air 

cargo in the same manner and degree as that employed to screen and inspect 

passenger baggage pursuant to Section 404 of this provision.

The language that I proposed seeks to 

—uncover weaknesses in our airport security personnel as well as 

—to give Congress a blue print with which it can better exercise its oversight 

duties with respect to the screening and inspection of air cargo. 

Among other issues, I will approach Deputy Administrator McHale to seek an answer to one of the questions that relates to the problems that plague Houston’s Airport System—namely, whether the security screener hiring cap will be lifted in the 

near future to accommodate the recent growth of airline travel in Houston’s three 

busy airports. 

Additionally, I would like to inquire as to how TSA plans to address a problem 

that was expressed to me by local administrators in my District of Houston. I had 

the opportunity to obtain information from personnel of the City of Houston’s Homeland Security Division. An issue was expressed that relates to the Urban Area Security Initiative grant that includes three phases of funding to local areas. In 2003, 

two of the three phases were paid in installments of $8.634 million and $23.7 million, and in 2004, the third phase was paid in an installment of $19 million. 

Under DHS’ funding mechanism, monies were allocated to Harris, Montgomery, 

and Ft Bend counties plus the City of Houston. County government executives—

elected officials—were given complete discretion as to how to spend these monies 

by virtue of a mandate of channeling all grants through the state. Because all counties in the state had to agree on how to allocate and spend the monies, there was 

a tremendous functional problem. 

In a recent grant allocation, the City of Houston demonstrated needs that exceeded $30 million; however, the county government executives, who have veto power 

as to how best to spend the grant monies, voted not to allocate sufficient funds to 

Houston. Houston’s three busy airports, its port, its new public transportation system, high density problems, and shopping centers have infrastructure and 

vulnerabilities that other counties don’t have; therefore, there needs to be a system 

of providing guidance as to appropriate ways to allocate the money where it really 
11

needs to go and in what quantities. A problem that exists is when several elected 

officials have veto power over the spending of grant funds, you run the risk of creating a political nightmare because every elected official can provide a justification 

for the allocation of certain amounts of funds to any project or initiative. 

In addition, with respect to Houston’s airports, there is a major concern that they 

aren’t receiving adequate funding from TSA (or from FAA). Particularly, as to the 

need to secure the airport perimeters, Airport System administrators have had to 

use some of the Urban Area Security Initiative (UAS) monies. 

Limitations have been placed on the spending of UAS monies such that construction costs cannot be paid; however, the construction projects are crucial to the securing of Houston’s airports. For example, there is a need for vehicle inspection stations, a secure and safe water treatment plant railcar (that contains chlorine) 

equipped with security features must be funded. 

Similarly, the Houston Police Department requires boats to patrol the lakes and 

dams that feed from Lake Houston. However, under the funding scheme of UAS, 

only boats that can be used at ports can be purchased. 

Moreover, relative to the baggage screening process, the Houston airports were 

promised to be among the first to be funded for the installation of the new Explosive 

Detection system (In line Explosive Detection System). According to Houston Airport 

Systems, TSA ran out of funds before Houston could receive its allocation. This system will significantly reduce staffing needs for TSA and produce more efficient operation. 

I hope that these issues, in addition to others brought up on a national scale, can 

be adequately addressed by Mr. McHale. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN McHALE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. And 

good morning, Congressman Turner and members of the subcommittee. 

I am proud to testify before you today on the significant progress 

that DHS and the Transportation Security Administration have 

made to secure our nation’s transportation systems since our agency was founded a little over 2 years ago. But before I talk about 

the specific actions that TSA and the administration have taken, 

let me first acknowledge the role of our partners. 

The nation’s transportation system, as you know, is vast and 

complex. Very few of its assets are owned or controlled by the federal government. 

The railroad and pipeline networks are largely private. So too 

are the intercity bus companies and the thousands of truck operators. 

Airlines are privately owned. And most commercial airports are 

run by local or regional authorities. 

Mass transit is owned or operated by the cities or by regional or 

state authorities. Highways are owned by the states and local governments. 

Most maritime assets, including most major port facilities, are in 

private hands. And on the inland waterways, the federal government often shares jurisdiction with the states and with regional 

and local authorities. 

Only in air is the federal jurisdiction truly exclusive. And for 

that reason, right from the very start, TSA and its parent department, DHS, have worked with our state, local, regional and private 

partners to help secure our transportation system. And our partners have risen to the challenge magnificently. 

The railroads overcame a 100-year old rivalry to form one of the 

first—and still one of the best—information sharing and analysis 
12

centers. The mass transit authorities quickly stepped up their 

spending on security after 9/11, with help for the Federal Transit 

Administration and the states. 

Trucking and pilot associations came forward with innovative 

programs to harness the observations of thousands of their members to report suspicious activity. Every part of the transportation 

sector recognized that the nation’s transportation system was itself 

a victim of the 9/11 attacks and has risen to do its part to secure 

the transportation network. 

We could not have achieved a fraction of what we have achieved 

without the help of our partners. 

That said, Mr. Chairman, I am immensely proud of what the 

men and women of TSA have achieved in such a short time. With 

the help of our many partners, TSA has created a new aviation security system that is dramatically different from the system in 

place on September 11, 2001. 

TSA’s fundamental strategy is to establish a system of rings of 

security. Each ring contributes to our overall aviation security system. But we do not rely exclusively on any one component. 

We have greatly enhanced domain awareness, gathering as much 

information as possible about the threats, vulnerabilities, trends 

and conditions of the aviation system and its environment. With 

the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security, we have strengthened the perimeter security at airports and we have conducted background checks on more than one 

million air carrier and airport employees. 

At airport checkpoints, highly trained and qualified TSA personnel screen passengers and carry-on items, using state-of-the-art 

equipment. And checked baggage is screened using explosive detection equipment. 

And Mr. Chairman, let me take a moment to come to the defense 

of our people on the front lines of our nation’s airports. A recent 

Washington Post editorial asserted that our screeners are no better 

today than before 9/11. 

That is nonsense, arising from a misunderstanding of covert test 

results and a misreading of recent testimony by the Department of 

Homeland Security inspector general. In fact, the IG has assured 

us that he believes that the differences between pre-9/11 screeners’ 

performance and the performance of our screeners today is like the 

difference between night and day. 

The basic training our screeners receive is far longer than that 

of the pre-9/11 screeners. Continuous reinforcement training is also 

part of our screeners’ daily routine. And they are required by law 

to recertify their skills every year. 

And there is no comparison between the pre-9/11 testing and the 

testing today. Pre-9/11 screeners were tested using large knives, 

guns and assembled bombs, placed obviously in bags and on the 

person. 

Today’s testers use the latest intelligence to do everything they 

can do to conceal weapons and bomb parts and to slip them past 

our screeners. Comparing pre-9/11 testing results to test results 

today is like comparing testing in elementary school to college-level 

testing. Our people are that much better. 
13

Just since the beginning of this fiscal year, TSA screeners have 

intercepted more than 300 guns at airports around the country. We 

have increased the number of explosive detection canine teams 

working throughout the airports to screen checked baggage and 

cargo, search unattended bags and vehicles and respond to bomb 

threats. 

The number of federal air marshals have increased from just a 

handful on 9/11 to thousands today on high-risk domestic and 

international flights. Cockpit doors have been hardened. And we 

have trained thousands of volunteer pilots to serve as armed, federal flight deck officers. 

On Saturday, May 1, as directed by the Congress, our first prototype class of cargo pilot FFDOs graduated. 

We are implementing our air cargo strategic plan that employs 

the tools, resources and infrastructure that are available today, as 

well as creating a foundation for future improvements as new technology becomes available. And the result of all this activity is a restoration of public confidence in the security of air travel. 

We also continue to look at the transportation sector as a whole. 

With the Department of Homeland Security, we are developing a 

national critical infrastructure protection plan. TSA has been delegated the responsibility to develop a sector specific plan for transportation. 

We are continuing to work with our federal, state, local and private partners on the development of security plans for each mode 

of transportation, with such innovations as the Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential, and are working with the surface 

and transportation modes to coordination information and threat 

sharing. 

Last year, Mr. Chairman, we activated our Transportation Security Operations Center in Herndon to serve as a single point of contact for security-related operations, incidents and crises in aviation 

and all land modes of transportation. And Mr. Chairman, I would 

be glad to invite you to come out and to visit that facility—you or 

any members of the subcommittee. 

We understand, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, that as we go forward, our strategy will continue to be to do well those things that 

the federal government does best and, when we can help our partners discharge their responsibilities, to help them do so. 

Aviation, where federal jurisdiction is paramount, must continue 

to be a primary focus of TSA activity. In those sectors where regional, state and local, and private jurisdictions prevail, TSA must 

ensure that intelligence and best practices are shared widely, that 

standards of security are set and respected, and that federal financial resources are used to even out inequalities of security across 

the sector. 

Mr. Chairman, much has been accomplished. Much remains to be 

done. And we continue to look forward to that challenge. 

That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. And I will be 

happy to answer any questions the subcommittee may have. 

[The statement of Mr. McHale follows:]
14

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN J. MCHALE

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, and Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to testify before the Subcommittee on the progress of the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in fulfilling its critical responsibilities 

to protect the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for 

people and commerce. I look forward to highlighting many of the significant advances TSA has made in the two years since the agency was established and since 

joining the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

At TSA, we are designing a security strategy for a broader spectrum of responsibilities than we considered in the pre-9/11 world, ranging from enhanced awareness and information sharing, through prevention, protection, response, consequence 

management, and recovery. DHS was created to lead the unified national effort to 

secure America. The creation of DHS has produced a force multiplier and a vast network for awareness and information sharing to protect our Nation. Working under 

the guidance of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS), TSA’s 

mission is completely aligned with the mission and goals of BTS and DHS. TSA collaborates extensively with other BTS agencies and with DHS components, such as 

the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), and the U.S. Coast Guard (CG), identifying 

opportunities to share information, resources, and expertise. We also continue to 

work closely with the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the modal administrations. They provide another vital link with transportation providers, and we communicate daily to share expertise and to ensure that we make the best use of each 

organization’s resources and opportunities. 

TSA continues to work to improve coordination with our sister agencies within 

DHS, as well as with our other Federal partners. In this regard, President Bush 

issued Home]and Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD–7) on December 17, 2003, 

which directs the establishment of ‘‘a national policy for Federal departments and 

agencies to identify and prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks.’’ HSPD 7 sets the framework for 

DHS to develop a National Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan, and TSA has 

been specifically delegated the responsibility to develop the Sector Specific Plan 

(SSP) for Transportation under the National plan. The development of this plan will 

involve intensive interaction with other DHS directorates and agencies, such as 

IAIP and CG, in addition to DOT. The plan, which will be developed over the next 

several months will: (I) identify participants in the sector, their roles and relationships, and their means of communication; (2) identify assets in the sector; (3) assess 

vulnerabilities and prioritize assets in the sector; (4) identify protective programs; 

(5) measure performance; and (6) prioritize research and development. 

To ensure security in each mode of transportation at an operational level, TSA 

is also working with our federal and other partners on the development of Modal 

Security Plans for each mode of transportation. We will expand the Transportation 

SSP to include modally-specific annexes that provide security planning guidance to 

modal security plan writers and industry stakeholders, and explicit links to the 

other National plans such as the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National 

Incident Management System (NIMS). On behalf of DHS and in conjunction with 

other federal agencies, the completed Transportation SSP will guide and integrate 

a family of transportation modal security plans to prevent, mitigate, and respond 

to intentional disruption of the Nation’s transportation systems while ensuring freedom of movement for people and commerce. 

The tragic bombings that occurred in Madrid on March 11 and in Moscow on February 6 were terrible reminders of the risk of terrorism to rail transportation. To 

that end, DHS, in conjunction with DOT, continually ascertains the threats, probabilities, and consequences of potential attacks on rail and other transportation systems using a risk management approach. Effective strategic threat-based planning 

results from an evaluation of all available intelligence and an assessment of criticality and vulnerability information to determine the overall risk environment. 

Domain awareness is the essential starting point of our overall transportation security strategy. TSA receives intelligence information from many sources, from the 

intelligence community (IC) and law enforcement and from IAIP, which as a member of the IC, routinely receives information from intelligence and law enforcement 

partners. IAIP has the overall responsibility at DHS for receipt and analysis of information related to threats to the homeland. TSA activated the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) in 2003 to serve as a single point of contact for 

security-related operations, incidents, or crises in aviation and all land modes of 

transportation. The National Capital Region Command Center is co-located with the 

TSOC and provides seamless integration in protecting the National Capital Region. 
15

TSA’s 24-hour watch routinely communicates with industry representatives about 

security events or information of potential security interest. 

TSA also has electronic connectivity to intelligence community databases and participates in daily intelligence teleconferences with other Federal agencies to discuss 

threat and incident reports. To ensure that all information pertinent to transportation security is identified and provided to TSA on a timely basis, TSA has assigned liaison officers to major intelligence and law enforcement agencies. TSA also 

receives reporting through its field personnel on security incidents that occur at airports and aboard aircraft and from local law enforcement. This information is transmitted to TSA headquarters for evaluation and appropriate dissemination to intelligence and law enforcement agencies. TSA coordinates with IAIP to disseminate 

specific warnings, advisory information, or countermeasures, where appropriate, to 

local law enforcement and the transportation industry. All threat information received by the TSA, including information not specifically mentioning transportation, 

is carefully reviewed for its potential impact on any U.S. transportation asset at 

home or overseas. TSA consults with other security and technical experts within 

DHS and in other agencies to achieve a comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment. If we conclude that warnings to industry and field operators or operational adjustments are warranted, our response can take a variety of forms. Top 

government decision makers are alerted immediately, as well as industry stakeholders. 

The next step in our threat-based, risk-managed approach is to assess the criticality of the Nation’s transportation infrastructure assets. Leveraging processes developed by IAIP, TSA developed a criticality model and is now deploying this model 

to determine criticality scores for facilities and assets. The vulnerability assessment 

process examines the overall security posture of a transportation asset as well as 

the security posture of the asset in response to identified threat scenarios. TSA has 

developed vulnerability assessment tools in concert with DOT modal administrations and industry stakeholders. For assets determined to be critical, the Transportation Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Tool (TRAVEL) will assess an asset’s 

baseline security system and that system’s effectiveness in detecting, deterring, and/

or preventing potential threats. For assets determined to be less critical, TSA recommends the use of self-assessment tools. To date, one self-assessment module has 

been developed, in conjunction with CG, for use in the maritime transportation 

mode. Additional modules will be created for the other transportation modes. For 

the aviation mode, a third tool, the Joint Vulnerability Assessment (JVA) will also 

be utilized in conjunction with the FBI at critical commercial airports. Using the 

results of the vulnerability assessments, we can collectively develop targeted, layered security measures tied to DHS threat levels, or specific intelligence, with maximum flexibility to allow for normal transportation activity even during periods of 

elevated threat.

Securing Surface Transportation 

DHS, in close coordination with our partners at DOT, state and local governments, and transit and rail operators, has taken a number of steps to address 

vulnerabilities in the rail and transit systems and improve our security posture 

against attacks. These efforts span the spectrum of security, from information sharing and awareness through prevention, response and recovery to a potential terrorist attack in the United States. 

The Department, working with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), coordinates information and threat sharing for rail and transit through the FT A-funded 

Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST–ISAC) in 

partnership with the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and the American 

Public Transportation Association. As part of the significant partnership that has 

developed, TSA hosts ST–SAC representatives at the TSOC. When appropriate, 

DHS disseminates Information Bulletins describing specific threats and providing 

suggested protective measures. In addition, DHS hosts conference calls with our 

Federal, state, local, and industry partners to communicate current information, obtain an assessment of the level of related preparedness, and determine additional 

short-term measures to be taken. For example. in the immediate aftermath of the 

Madrid attacks, the Department released two Information Bulletins and hosted National Conference Calls with federal, state and local public safety communities, all 

State and Territorial Homeland Security Advisors, officials from 50 major urban 

areas, and industry stakeholders. 

Prior to the Madrid and Moscow events, criticality assessments of rail and transit 

networks operating in high-density urban areas were performed by TSA and FTA. 

and as a result of these assessments, these systems have produced robust security 

and emergency preparedness plans. Between FY 2003 and this year, DHS has used 
16

information from these assessments to allocate $115 million to high-risk transit systems through the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) in the Office for Domestic 

Preparedness. Sixty-five million dollars ($65 million) was allocated in fiscal year 

2003 and $50 million was allocated in fiscal year 2004. Grantees may use these 

funds for such expenses as the installation of physical barricades, video surveillance 

systems, motion detectors, thermal/IR imagery and chemical/radiological material 

detection systems, integrated communications systems, and for prevention planning, 

training and exercises, among other things. 

TSA has partnered with the FTA on its ‘‘Transit Watch’’ Program, and is coordinating with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to develop a rail system inspection guide for use by rail law enforcement and security personnel to inspect 

trains for explosives and other threats. The Department’s Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center has provided security training to rail and transit operators, and 

TSA has distributed educational information to transit system employees on how to 

recognize and respond to potential terrorist attacks. 

TSA has also hosted security exercises to bring together rail carriers, federal and 

local first responders, and security experts, to address potential gaps in 

antiterrorism training among rail personnel. One such security exercise occurred at 

Union Station in Washington, DC, in July 2003, and involved stakeholders, emergency responders and enforcement agencies all working to implement the station’s 

Emergency Response Plan. In another security exercise, DHS, through TSA, 

partnered with the Naval War College Gaming Department to conduct an operation 

designed to evaluate security awareness, prevention, response and recovery of the 

national transportation system to a security incident. The lessons learned from 

these exercises are being used to enhance rail security for the entire Northeast corridor. 

The mass transit and rail industries, and State and local governments, have been 

very proactive in addressing homeland security issues. Most recently, transit and 

rail system operators enhanced their existing security plans by taking additional 

preventive measures in cooperation with the Department, including more canine 

and uniformed patrols. increased surveillance, and reporting and awareness campaigns in the passenger environment. Rail cargo companies are continuing their 

Alert Level 2, which includes increased security at designated facilities, security 

plan review, and increased spot identification checks. 

On March 22, Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge announced additional 

measures to strengthen our rail and transit systems. Building on many of the security measures recommended for mass transit and passenger rail authorities, the Department is engaging our Federal partners at DOT, the industry, and state and 

local authorities to establish base-line security measures based on current industry 

best practices. These include existing security measures currently being implemented consistently in the mass transit systems and the commuter rail environment 

and could be adjusted in consultation with transit and rail system owners and operators in response to higher threat levels or specific threats in the future. DHS will 

ensure compliance with security standards for commuter and rail lines. 

TSA is implementing a pilot program in New Carrollton, Maryland, to test the 

feasibility of using emerging technologies for screening passengers and carry-on 

items for explosives at rail stations and aboard trains. This pilot, the Transit and 

Rail Inspection Pilot (TRIP), is being conducted in partnership with AMTRAK, 

MARC, WMATA, and DOT for a 30-day period. Additional phases of the pilot program are under consideration. The pilot program does not resemble an aviation-type 

solution to transit and rail security challenges, but rather provides a venue to test 

new technologies and screening concepts. Rail stations are not self-contained, and 

passengers have the freedom to board and disembark trains throughout their 

routes. The lessons learned from the pilot could allow transit operators to deploy 

targeted screening in high threat areas or in response to specific intelligence. 

Using existing Homeland Security explosive detecting canine resources, the Department is developing a rapid deployment Mass Transit canine program. These mobile response teams will be prepared to assist local law enforcement teams. The Federal Protective Service will lead an effort to ensure canine teams from various DHS 

agencies are crosstrained for the rail and transit environment and available for augmentation of local capabilities when needed. DHS will partner with local authorities 

to provide additional training and assistance for local canine teams. The mobile program would be used predominantly in special threat environments and provide additional federal resources to augment state and local transit and rail authorities’ security measures. 

The Department also plans to leverage existing efforts to generate additional public awareness by integrating existing passenger and rail education materials and 

awareness programs developed by industry, TSA, and FTA. The Department’s Fed-
17

eral Law Enforcement Training Center will also accelerate current security training 

programs for transit law enforcement personnel. 

DHS’s Advanced Research Project Agency is developing a program that will focus 

on research and development of next generation technology for High Explosives 

Countermeasures. The goal of the program is to develop and test field equipment, 

technologies and procedures to interdict suicide bombers and car and truck bombs 

before they can reach their intended targets while minimizing the impact on the 

freedom of movement. Research and development efforts such as this will be closely 

coordinated with TSA to ensure that research and development activities lead to 

deployable solutions. 

For highway security, TSA entered into a $19.3 million cooperative agreement 

with the American Trucking Associations (ATA) to expand the Highway Watch program. The program trains highway professionals to identify and report safety and 

security situations on our Nation’s roads. The expanded program will provide training and communications infrastructure to prepare 400,000 transportation professionals to respond in the event they or their cargo are the target of a terrorist attack 

and to share valuable intelligence with TSA if they witness potential threats. 

Under the USA PATRIOT Act, TSA is also required to conduct security threat assessments on drivers holding a hazardous materials (HAZMAT) endorsement on a 

commercial driver’s license. This effort is being pursued in two phases: name-based, 

terrorist-focused checks will be conducted on all 3.5 million HAZMAT drivers by 

June 2004; and fingerprint-based criminal history records checks will begin by January 31, 2005. TSA is working closely with the States and the private sector to develop the necessary infrastructure to establish this program. TSA also plans to leverage existing capabilities and infrastructure when possible to institute the security threat assessment. 

DHS has a substantial effort under way to strengthen security credential programs across the Department. For our part, TSA is testing alternatives for a Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) to mitigate potential threats 

posed by workers and those with fraudulent identification. During the current prototype stage, beginning this summer, this credential will test the feasibility of bringing uniformity and consistency to the process of granting access to transportation 

workers entrusted to work in the most sensitive and secure areas of our national 

transportation system. 

With our Federal government’s security capabilities now under one roof, in one 

department, the level of communication and cooperation in enhancing intermodal 

cargo supply chain security among the CG and BTS agencies, including ICE, CBP, 

and TSA, is stronger than ever. BTS is leading the effort, with TSA, CBP, and the 

CG, to develop a more comprehensive framework for securing the intermodal cargo 

supply chain. This initiative wil1 also assist in meeting Maritime Transportation Security Act requirements for Secure Systems of Transportation by incorporating a 

point of origin to point of destination approach to cargo transportation. Agencies are 

reviewing cargo program, analytic tools, and other relevant resources within the Department to identify remaining supply chain vulnerabilities. 

TSA is providing CG with technical assistance in the development of methods for 

local operator inspection of passengers and vehicles using established ferry transportation systems. TSA is implementing the ‘‘Synergy Project’’ designed to test the 

long-term feasibility of screening and transferring passenger baggage from seaport 

to airport, reducing the congestion at airport security checkpoints caused by the influx of large number of passengers disembarking from cruise ships. This program 

is currently underway at the ports of Miami and Vancouver.

Securing the Civil Aviation System 

When it was created, TSA inherited a 30-year-old aviation security system. With 

the help of its many partners, TSA has created a new system that is dramatically 

different from that which was in place on September 11, 2001. TSA’s fundamental 

strategy in operating this system includes establishing a system of rings of security 

whereby each security ring contributes to our overall aviation security system, but 

we do not rely exclusively on any one component. 

As in other transportation modes, we begin aviation security with domain awareness. TSA continuously gathers as much information as possible about the threats, 

vulnerabilities, trends, and conditions of the aviation system and its environment. 

This first ring in our system-of-systems enables TSA to prioritize, direct resources, 

and take protective action. 

TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have helped fund many local 

airport projects to improve perimeter security, such as construction of perimeter access roads, installation of access control systems, electronic surveillance and intrusion detection systems, and security fencing. TSA has required background checks 
18

to be performed on more than a million air carrier and airport employees with 

unescorted access to airport secured and sterile areas. Across the country] 58 Federal Security Directors (FSDs) lead and coordinate all TSA security activities at airports, including tactical planning, execution, and operating management. At checkpoints, highly trained, qualified personnel screen passengers and carry-on items 

using state-of-the-art metal detectors. All checked baggage is screened using a combination of explosives detection systems (EDS), explosives trace detection machines 

(ETD), and where necessary, other congressionally approved methods of screening. 

Each day, TSA intercepts more than] 5,000 prohibited items at airports around 

the country. Each month more than 40 firearms are intercepted at airport checkpoints by TSA screeners. This tells us first, that we must continue to be diligent 

in our screening efforts, and second, that many passengers are not voluntarily complying with the ban on bringing prohibited items onto aircraft. While the majority 

of cases are not intentional violations, too frequently individuals are deliberately attempting to circumvent security or test the security system. We have intercepted a 

knife concealed inside a soda can, a sword hidden inside a cane, and a knife hidden 

within a prosthetic leg, just to name a few examples. TSA has held press conferences at many airports around the country to educate passengers about prohibited items. We prominently post signs in airports to help passengers understand 

which items are prohibited, and we provide detailed information on our public 

website. 

TSA uses its Special Operations Program to provide ongoing and immediate feedback to screeners, their supervisors, and TSA leadership on screener performance. 

The Special Operations Program’s overall objectives are to test the security systems 

at the airports and to introduce difficult, real-life threat items to the screener workforce. Once covert testing is completed at a checkpoint, Special Operations teams 

conduct post-test reviews with available screeners to reenact the test and provide 

training. These tests are based on the latest intelligence and are far more rigorous 

than any security testing conducted prior to 9/11. Despite continually raising the 

bar on these tests, TSA’s screeners and security systems continue to improve over 

time. However, the primary goal of these tests is not to show improvement. We 

make our system testing hard, harder, and harder still. to uncover vulnerabilities 

and to address them. 

To maintain high levels of screener proficiency, TSA’s Screening Improvement 

Plan places a strong emphasis on recurrent screener training and supervisory training. Over 700 inert Modular Bomb Set (MBS II) and weapons training kits have 

been deployed to every airport in the country as an integral part of TSA’s recurrent 

training for screeners, enabling them to see and touch the components of improvised 

explosive devices and weapons. TSA is also developing protocols to help FSDs conduct their own airport level screening testing. To blend nationally and locally developed training, TSA has established the ‘‘Excellence in Screener Performance’’ video 

training series. The third part of our recurrent training program is a series of webbased and computer-based screener training programs. Recognizing the need to provide our front line supervisors with the tools they need to manage the screener 

workforce effectively, TSA has sent more than 3500 supervisors to introductory leadership training at the Graduate School, United States Department of Agriculture. 

TSA’s Threat Image Projection (TIP) program is an essential element of TSA’s 

screening improvement plan. All checkpoint security lanes now are equipped with 

TRXs with the 2400-image TIP library, providing real-time data on screener performance. Data is available quickly at the local level and reported to headquarters 

for aggregated analysis and monitoring. Through deployment of TRX machines and 

activation of the expanded TIP image library, TSA is able to collect and analyze significant amounts of performance data that has not been previously available. TIP 

is an excellent tool for evaluating the skills of each individual screener so that we 

can focus directly on areas needing skill improvement. By regularly exposing screeners to a variety of threat object images, TIP provides continuous on-the-job training 

and immediate feedback. 

Today TSA is right-sizing and stabilizing screening operations based on security 

requirements and opportunities for increasing efficiencies in business processes. As 

part of our workforce planning, we are evolving to a business model that vests more 

hiring authority at the local level with our FSDs to address airport staffing needs. 

The original methods we used in centralizing recruitment, assessment, hiring, and 

training of screeners were necessary in the fast-paced environment to meet the 

original statutory deadlines. However, this highly centralized model is not the right 

fit for sustaining an existing workforce. 

Although the Aviation and Transportation Security Act mandated the federalization of airport security screening, it held open the possibility that airports could return to contract screening, provided the high standards required by law and insti-
19

tuted by TSA are met. TSA is currently operating a pilot program at five airports 

using private screeners that, by law, must meet TSA eligibility, training, and performance requirements and receive pay and other benefits not less than those of 

TSA screeners. Beginning on November 19, 2004, any airport operator may apply 

to have screening performed by a contract screening company under contract with 

TSA. A recent evaluation by Bearing point will assist us in assessing if and how 

to expand contract screening. The report found that the private screening pilot airports performed at essentially the same level as federally screened airports. Overall, 

we believe the report confirms that TSA has been successful in ensuring equal security at the five participating airports. We look forward to applying the insights detailed within the report and the lessons learned from the pilot program as we consider guidance and procedures for airports to opt out of Federal screening. 

EDS/ETD equipment purchase and installation is the key to compliance with statutory requirements for full electronic screening of checked baggage. TSA purchases 

and installs this equipment through a variety of mechanisms, including congressionally authorized Letters of intent (LOIs), which provide a partial reimbursement to 

airports for facility modifications required to install in-line EDS solutions. TSA has 

issued eight airport LOIs, covering nine airports. TSA is also using resources to purchase and install EDS and ETD machines at airports outside the LOI process. 

Our National Explosives Detection Canine Team program performs a critical role 

in aviation security, performing multiple tasks throughout the entire airport environment, such as screening checked baggage, searching unattended bags, searching 

vehicles approaching terminals during increased threat levels, screening cargo on a 

limited basis, screening mail at certain pilot project locations, and responding to 

bomb threats. TSA helps local law enforcement agencies by procuring and training 

selected canines, training selected law enforcement officers, and by partially reimbursing agencies for costs. 

The number of Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) was increased from just a few on 

9/11 to thousands today, and they are now deployed on high-risk domestic and international flights. With the transfer of the FAM Service from TSA to ICE, BTS has 

the flexibility to deploy additional ICE agents as a surge force to temporarily increase the number of FAMs on high-risk flights when threat conditions warrant. 

In light of security concerns, TSA is performing security checks on flight crew on 

domestic and international passenger and cargo flights bound for the U.S. TSA will 

also assume responsibility this summer for conducting background checks on aliens 

who wish to undergo flight training in the United States. Vision 100 transferred this 

requirement from the Department of Justice to TSA. 

In addition, commercial aircraft serving the U.S. are equipped with new, hardened cockpit doors. TSA, working with its U.S. government partners through the 

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), is seeking to encourage compliance of foreign carriers with the international requirement for hardened cockpit 

doors, which went into effect November 2003. 

Training of pilots who volunteer for TSA’s Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) 

program will continue at a strong pace with requested funding of $25 million in FY 

2005. On May 1, the first prototype FFDO class of cargo pilots graduated. TSA initiated the on-line application process for cargo and other flight deck crew members 

in February 2004. In January 2004, TSA began doubling the number of FFDO classes, and we plan to provide initial training and qualification for thousands of FFDOs 

by the end of this fiscal year. TSA has streamlined the process for pilots to become 

FFDOs, and candidate assessments are administered at 52 locations throughout the 

United States, with more being added. Pilots also must attend re-qualification sessions twice a year to ensure that they maintain a high level of proficiency and familiarity with program requirements. Ten private, state, and local government sites are 

available for self-scheduling of requalification training. As the number of FFDOs 

grows, TSA will consider expanding the number of recurrent training sites to meet 

their needs. 

Ensuring that flight and cabin crew members receive self-defense training will 

add another layer of security for in-flight aircraft. Each of these security enhancements is an additional obstacle that a terrorist would have to overcome in order to 

accomplish his objective. Each has been carefully developed with attention to security, customer service, and a minimum impact on the flow of commerce. 

TSA plans to institute a Registered Traveler (RT) Pilot Program in the summer 

of 2004 at a limited number of airports. RT pilots will last approximately 90 days. 

TSA anticipates that an RT program could provide both security and customer service benefits. TSA envisions that an RT Program would be voluntary and may offer 

those qualified an expedited travel experience as they go through the screening 

checkpoint. A security assessment will be conducted on each RT applicant to determine eligibility for the program. Upon conclusion of the Pilots, results will be ana-
20

lyzed to determine the best program approach for proceeding on a larger scale program. A total of $60 million is requested for FY 2005 for the second generation Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS II). CAPPS II is a limited, 

automated prescreening system authorized by Congress. Developed with the utmost 

concern for individual privacy rights, CAPPS II would modernize the prescreening 

system currently implemented by the airlines. CAPPS II is expected to employ technology and data analysis techniques to conduct an information-based identity authentication for each passenger using commercial information along with data each 

passenger provides to the airline upon making a reservation. CAPPS II will combine 

the results (scores) from the identity authentication with a risk assessment. The 

overall process will yield a recommended screening level, based on the degree of risk 

assessed, or specific identifiable terrorist threat. The commercially available data 

will not be viewed by government employees, and intelligence information will remain behind the government firewall. The entire prescreening process is expected 

to take only a few seconds to complete. 

In its recent report on CAPPS II, the GAO concluded that in most areas that Congress asked them to review, our work on CAPPS II is not yet complete. DHS has 

generally concurred in GAO’s findings, which in our view validates the fact that 

CAPPS II is a program still under development. As we resolve issues of access to 

data needed, for testing CAPPS II, and the testing phase moves forward and results 

in a more mature system, we are confident of our ability to satisfy all of the questions that Congress posed. 

Each year, U.S. air carriers transport approximately 12.5 million tons of cargo. 

To deny terrorists the opportunity to exploit our thriving air cargo system, TSA has 

developed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan that calls for the focused deployment of tools, 

resources. and infrastructure that are available today, as well as creating a foundation for future improvements as technology and resources become available. TSA 

has prohibited all ‘‘unknown shipper’’ cargo from flying aboard passenger carriers 

since September 11. 2001, thereby limiting cargo to packages from identifiable shippers under the TSA Known Shipper program. TSA has enhanced the criteria for 

participation in the Known Shipper program and is rolling out an automated Known 

Shipper database that will allow air carriers and indirect air carriers to verify immediately the status of a specific shipper. TSA has also mandated inspections of a 

certain amount of cargo transported aboard both passenger and all cargo aircraft. 

Under the Air Cargo Strategic Plan, TSA will work closely with CBP to establish 

a Cargo Pre-Screening system that identifies which cargo should be considered 

‘‘high-risk’’ and work with industry and other federal agencies and the airline and 

shipping industries to ensure that 100 percent of high-risk cargo is inspected. We 

are also partnering with stakeholders to implement enhanced background checks on 

persons with access to cargo and new procedures for securing aircraft while they are 

on the ground. TSA and CBP are working together on air cargo initiatives through 

four established work groups, making plans for future collaboration, leveraging of 

existing programs, and sharing resources and technologies. 

TSA is requesting $55 million in FY 2005 for the continuation of an aggressive 

R&D program to investigate technologies that will improve our ability to screen 

high-risk cargo. TSA will look at new technologies for screening large cargo, including pallets and containerized cargo. In January 2004, TSA issued a market survey 

requesting submissions and participation of vendors of commercial off-the-shelf explosives detection technology to support cargo inspection. A number of vendors have 

been tentatively selected for laboratory evaluation of their products against the current EDS certification criteria. TSA has issued a request for proposals (RFP) for potential inventors of explosives detection technology for the screening of containerized 

cargo and U.S. mail to be transported on passenger aircraft. This RFP, which resulted in 74 responses, will lead to the award of R&D grants to assist in the development of promising technologies. At TSA’s state-of-the-art research laboratory, the 

Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), we are conducting a cargo characterization study to determine the feasibility of using currently deployed explosives detection technology (EDS and ETD) to screen cargo while new systems are under development. 

We need to stay at least one step ahead at all times in the development of new 

security technology. The President’s FY 2005 Budget request includes $49 million 

for applied research and development and $50 million for next-generation EDS. TSA 

has a robust research and development program and works closely with DHS S&T 

to develop and deploy technology that will help make operations more effective, 

more efficient, less time consuming, and less costly. I would like to invite the Subcommittee to visit our TSL to see the full scope of efforts underway. Several screening and other security technologies are under development, including an explosives 
21

detection portal for passengers to determine if explosives are being carried on an 

individual’s person, document scanners to detect trace amounts of explosive materials on items such as boarding passes, and scanners for better screening of casts 

and prosthetic devices. 

DHS, in partnership with other federal agencies, is taking an aggressive approach 

to counter the threat of Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) to civilian 

commercial aircraft. The strategy includes proliferation control, tactical measures 

and recovery, and technical countermeasures. In January, DHS S&T announced the 

selection of teams to develop plans and test prototypes to help determine whether 

a viable technology exists that could be deployed to address the potential threat of 

MANPADS. In addition, as part of the overall MANPADS strategy, TSA is performing airport vulnerability assessments to identify and map the areas around an 

airport from which a MANPADS attack could be initiated and working with surrounding communities to coordinate the efforts of agencies responsible for responding to this type of threat. 

I appreciate this opportunity to highlight just a portion of TSA’s efforts and 

progress in improving transportation security. There is no doubt that securing our 

nation’s transportation system will be both costly and time consuming. Distributing 

these costs fairly and equitably is a constant challenge—and a constant goal. Looking ahead to Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, TSA and our many partners at the Federal, 

state, and local levels, and in the private sector, will continue to reinforce transportation security through innovation, technology and enhanced performance. In the 

two years since its creation, TSA has developed a culture of immediacy and a strong 

commitment to continual improvement. The increased variety and sophistication of 

weapons and communication tools available to modern terrorists presents a significant challenge. With preventive measures in place, the risk of terrorism is reduced, 

albeit not eliminated. TSA will continue to identify and re-evaluate threats and 

vulnerabilities and make decisions that both facilitate transportation and improve 

its security. 

I will be pleased to answer your questions.

Mr. CAMP. Thank you, Mr. McHale. The chair asks unanimous 

consent that the delegate from the Virgin Islands be allowed to 

question the witness when recognized and to remain on the dais 

when doing so. 

Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

Mr. McHale, there is an upcoming deadline for an opt-out process 

for airports to use private screeners. I realize that they would have 

to have in place a fairly strict security standard in order for that 

opt-out process to occur. 

Can you tell me what action TSA has taken to develop an application review process for that? And where in the fiscal year 2005 

budget is this represented? 

Mr. MCHALE. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have run a pilot 

really right from the beginning—a two-year pilot—on reprivatization of the airports. And we have had private contractors provide 

security at five airports around the country, ranging from San 

Francisco to Tupelo, Mississippi. 

That pilot was a great success. It showed that the private screening companies, with federal supervision provided by the Federal 

Security Directors, could maintain security at the same levels and 

at about the same cost as federal screening. 

We are now in the process of looking at what guidance to give 

airports and contractors who might want to apply to provide private screening in the future. The Aviation Transportation Security 

Act provides that, beginning on November 19 of this year, airport 

operators may apply to the Administrator to ask for private screening in lieu of federal screening. 

So we are getting that guidance out. We expect to get it out in 

the next month or so to the airports so that they can begin to make 

that decision and we can evaluate their applications. 
22

In terms of the budget, there is, I believe, in the President’s re- quest $130 million to continue screening at the five airports where 

we are doing that today privately. That is really a placeholder, 

since we do not know how many airports will apply to go private. 

The best way to look at that budget item is to aggregate it with the $2.4 billion that is set aside for federal screening at the other 

airports. That combined pot of money will be used to support either 

federal or private screening, however the airports choose to apply. 

Mr. CAMP. I am also interested in a little further comment on the 

issue of air cargo security and particularly the known shipper program, which is a program to assist in shipments transported on 

passenger planes. I believe we need a strategy of analysis and risk 

management here. But I think this program could be expanded to 

do more in terms of comprehensive background checks and other 

things. 

Mr. MCHALE. Right. 

Mr. CAMP. I am a little concerned about the lack of progress at 

TSA on this program. And I wondered if you could tell me how that 

is going specifically, if you could update us on that? 

Mr. MCHALE. I am glad to do that, Mr. Chairman. Actually, we 

have made quite a bit of progress. We have operational today a 

known shipper database. 

It contains what we believe today is, I was just told, about onethird of the known shippers that are known to carriers around the 

country. And we are continuing to populate that database. 

Right now, it is still a voluntary database. We are engaged in 

rulemaking to make that mandatory. We expect to get that rule out 

shortly. 

In addition, as we build that database, we are now running background checks on the known shippers. We are going to continue to 

make those background checks more rigorous as we get more information and are able to hook in with additional intelligence systems. 

It is a little different here because we are not so much running 

background checks on people as often as we are on concerns. That 

makes the interface a little bit more difficult. But we are working 

through that. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Pascrell may inquire. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Let’s see. Mr. McHale, I have some questions to 

ask you, specifically about Newark Airport and then the whole 

question of port security. You have seen the newspapers. 

Mr. MCHALE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You have read the stories. There are going to be 

more stories. The governor yesterday made a statement about security at Newark Airport. And in good faith, we will proceed. 

One-third of the bags at Newark Airport go on planes without 

screening. That is a pretty remarkable number. 

One former screener there said that this is all smoke and mirrors. I want to know what your plans are and what timetable you 

have for checking all the baggage with electronic detection systems. 

What plans do you have for Newark? 

Mr. MCHALE. As the Federal Security Director at Newark, 

Marcus Arroyo, who is one of our best, has said, we are in compli-
23

ance with the law at Newark and we do screen all the bags, either 

electronically or using alternate means. That said, while we do not 

talk about specific proportions of bags that are screened at any 

given airport, I can tell you that we have significantly increased 

the staffing at Newark in the last few weeks and that I believe 

that the statements in that article are grossly out of date. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You are not going to answer the question as to 

when, what is your timetable for putting into effect? I mean, I 

know Director Marcus Aroyo. I think he happens to be doing a 

great job. 

Mr. MCHALE. I think he is too. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I say that to his face and behind his back. You 

are not answering my question, though. 

Mr. MCHALE. Congressman, let me suggest this. I would be 

happy, in a non-public setting, to discuss baggage screening at any 

individual airport around the country. I cannot discuss with you alternate measures and other actions that are being taken at particular airports. That cannot be done in a public setting. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Well, let me say this. I have a lot of questions 

here. Let me say this: I do not understand, Mr. Chairman, the rationale behind not providing the public—the public has a right to 

know, let alone the Congress. 

We do have oversight. This is the homeland security. There are 

certain things that are very private. There are certain things that 

are very secret. 

Why is the number, when we said that we would have specific 

dates as to when luggage that was carried on and when luggage 

was put into the belly of an airplane would all be checked, why are 

you afraid? Or let me rephrase. Why are you reluctant to tell the 

public what percentage even of baggage is not checked at Newark 

Airport? The public uses that airport every day? 

Mr. MCHALE. Congressman, we screen over three million bags a 

day at 448 airports around the country. On any given day, there 

will be machines that are down. There will be staffing issues. 

There will be other issues at airports around the country. We 

provide a classified report to the Congress every month on the status of baggage screening at individual airports around the country. 

I cannot, in a public session, discuss that kind of classified information. I am perfectly happy to provide it either in closed session 

or to provide you with a briefing. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So you do not—. 

Mr. MCHALE. I think you will be pleased with where Newark is 

and the progress we are making. But I cannot discuss that in detail 

here. 

Mr. PASCRELL. But you do know the answer to the question. 

Mr. MCHALE. Yes, congressman, I do. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So you know the answer to the question, but you 

do not want to tell the public what the answer to the question is? 

Correct? 

Mr. MCHALE. Congressman—. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Am I putting words in your mouth? 

Mr. MCHALE. As I said, we do not discuss specific steps—. 
24

Mr. PASCRELL. Look, look, wait a minute. Mr. Chairman, I have 

asked it three times. You know, I asked it in good faith. I praise 

the director before this meeting, after this meeting. 

I mean, what the heck more can I do? I think the public has a 

right to know—has a right to know—whether the baggage at Newark Airport is being checked. I think this is preposterous. 

Let me ask you this question—. 

Mr. MCHALE. Congressman, the baggage at Newark Airport is 

being checked. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I am talking about how much is not being 

checked. How much is going on an airplane that is not being 

checked? 

If you are not going to answer the question, let me go to the second point. Are you testifying today that there are a sufficient 

amount of screeners at Newark Airport? Is that what you are testifying today? 

Mr. MCHALE. We are bringing out screeners as we speak. I 

would say that today there probably is not a sufficient number of 

screeners at Newark Airport. I expect that there will be within 

about the next 10 days to 2 weeks. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So that if we check back in 10 days or 2 weeks, 

that there would be adequate screening? And you admit that there 

are not, there were not a month ago? There were not 2 months 

ago? 

Mr. MCHALE. We have been having—. 

Mr. PASCRELL. And perhaps the 45,000 arbitrary cap that we 

placed on it was a wrong number, that we should have had more 

people or a pool of more people? The suggestion that we use former 

police officers, former law enforcement officers has still not been 

used? But you tell me that in 10 days, you will have an answer to 

that question or we will have it resolved. 

Mr. MCHALE. Within 10 days, we will have the screening at 

Newark at the level that they are authorized to have. We have 

been using a lot of overtime at Newark. We want to cut down on 

that so that our staff is not stressed. 

We have a lot of former law enforcement officers in our screening 

workforce, a lot of ex-military personnel in our screening workforce. 

In fact, we were required to give preference to them. So we have 

them out there. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Two other questions. 

Mr. CAMP. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I have not given an opening statement. Can I continue to ask some questions? 

Mr. CAMP. I will give the gentleman an additional minute. However, the additional three minutes comes for those who attend 

within five minutes of the gavel going down. And the gentleman 

was outside of that window. 

But I will extend him some more time. I do want to say—and 

this will not come out of your time—that I understand your reluctance to go into this confidential airport-specific information in this 

committee hearing. 

However, I have never seen this monthly confidential report that 

you refer to that would give us the individual status of airports. I 

would like to arrange an opportunity for that information to come 
25

to the subcommittee and we will have a classified session on that 

individual information. 

Mr. MCHALE. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 

Mr. MCHALE. I will make sure that happens. 

Mr. CAMP. And I will give the gentleman an additional minute. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. And Mr. Chairman, that is very important. I would have asked—continued to ask—if the committee 

would get those, all the members get a copy of that report. I think 

it is important that we know that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CAMP. We will have an opportunity for all of us to get that 

information. 

Mr. PASCRELL. We have no other way to measure whether we are 

going in the right direction or not. 

Now let me ask you this question: who is responsible for airport 

perimeter security? 

Mr. MCHALE. It is the combined responsibility of the Transportation Security Administration and the airport operator. 

Mr. PASCRELL. If there is a decision to have people patrolling the 

perimeter, as an example, or surveillance equipment deployed or 

new physical barriers, whose responsibility is that? 

Mr. MCHALE. The airport operator has developed a security plan 

that includes that kind of information. And that plan has to meet 

certain standards that we set and be approved by TSA. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Does every one of the major airports in this country have such a plan? 

Mr. MCHALE. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Perimeter. Is it being implemented? 

Mr. MCHALE. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You are stating for the record that every one of 

these major airports have a perimeter security plan and it is being 

implemented. 

Mr. MCHALE. They have an airport operator plan that covers perimeter security. Obviously, there are violations of those plans. And 

our job is to enforce them. 

Mr. PASCRELL. My final point is this: why do we not ask employees working within the airport to go through screening like you do 

and like I have? 

Mr. MCHALE. We do screen a lot of the vendor employees. We are 

working with the airports to improve that within the sterile area. 

All of the employees who work in the sterile area and the secured area of the airport have extensive background checks. One 

of the reasons we have looked at that as a solution is, if you think 

about the kinds of things that workers have access to on the 

ramp—the kinds of tools, the kinds of chemicals and the other sorts 

of things that they have access on the ramp—they really do not 

have to carry very much into the airport area to do harm. We need 

to know who they are and be assured about their backgrounds. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So you think we can see the day that they will 

be screened? 

Mr. MCHALE. There will be screening of the workers going into 

the sterile area, we expect. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Not the vendors? 
26

Mr. MCHALE. The vendor workers who are in the sterile area, 

but not at this point, except in certain airports, on workers going 

onto the secured area. 

Mr. CAMP. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank you. 

The gentlewoman from Texas may inquire. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

I am going to continue on the question about the screeners because Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport has now 

waits of 90 minutes with lines half a mile long. And they are saying it is a lack of screeners on hand. And you are saying that perhaps they are going to staff up. 

But at my airport, DFW International Airport, TSA has informed 

the airport it will be reducing the screener workforce by 179 positions. This future staffing level is well below the staffing level that 

TSA’s own federal security director at DFW believes is necessary 

to man the checkpoints effectively. 

DFW already has four separate security checkpoints where the 

waits extend 30 minutes during peak hours. And that is not during 

the summer travel time that we are getting ready to enter. 

So I want to know what rationale exists for reducing the screener 

workforce levels at DFW airport in particular or other large airports? 

Mr. MCHALE. I think actually DFW will probably stay at about 

the level it is today. The levels that a lot of airports are looking 

at are levels that were set when we had 49,600 screeners at the 

beginning of this fiscal year. 

So we are really now, we have actually been operating at about 

45,000 screeners, give or take a few, since right about Thanksgiving of last year, or a little after that, in the middle of the holiday season. 

Congresswoman, as you know, we did handle the holiday season, 

I think, very well. We are developing plans and working closely 

with the airports, the airlines, and our Federal Security Directors 

to deal with the summer season effectively. 

Also at DFW, thanks to your help, we are moving forward with 

the inline baggage system, which will be more efficient and more 

effective and will help us bring some of the screeners who are now 

working on baggage up to the passenger checkpoints. 

Ms. GRANGER. So you are saying you are not going to reduce it 

by 179 positions? 

Mr. MCHALE. I have to check the exact numbers for that airport. 

But my understanding is, what they have on board today is about 

what they are going to have into the future. It may be a few more, 

but I would have to double check that. I will get back to you on 

that. 

Ms. GRANGER. I think you should because that is certainly not 

the information they are giving me. And as I said, their own federal security director is saying that would be inadequate. 

Mr. MCHALE. I think it is a reduction from the 49,600 figure earlier this year. But I will get back to your office on that. 

Ms. GRANGER. Are you reducing though, intentionally reducing, 

the screener workforce levels at large airports? 

Mr. MCHALE. Not at most of the large airports, as far as I know. 

There may be some adjustments at a few of them. But generally, 
27

I think the large airports are either growing or staying about the 

same. 

Ms. GRANGER. Okay. What are you doing to address the concerns? How are you getting the information out? In other words, if 

the airport is telling me one thing, my airport that I work with 

very directly, and you are telling me something else, then where 

is the breakdown in this communication? 

Mr. MCHALE. We have not yet finalized or issued final staffing 

allocations for the 45,000 level. Frankly, we are going to be adjusting that and reshaping that and re-rightsizing that every day, 

every week, as we go on, around the country. 

I would say the breakdown that is we have not gone back to the 

airports and said, ‘‘You know, that figure you got last year based 

on 49,600, well, Congress has said we should be operating at 

45,000, so that earlier figure obviously is not the right one.’’

We need to communicate better on that. 

Ms. GRANGER. I know that Secretary Mineta stated 2 years ago 

that wait times of more than 10 minutes would be unacceptable. 

Mr. MCHALE. Right. 

Ms. GRANGER. With the federal screeners. And now we are looking at wait times of 30 minutes or more. Are we saying that is acceptable then? 

Mr. MCHALE. No, we would like to keep the wait times as far 

down as we can. We work with the airports and the airlines to reduce the overall hassle-factor in moving through an airport—

whether it is ticket check-in or wherever it might be. 

We have actually done pretty well, if you take an average across 

the country, of peak time wait times. They average about 11 minutes. 

But in almost every major airport, there is at least one peak during the day, when many flights leave within a very short period, 

and that peak is not always related to screeners. Even in Atlanta 

as you mentioned, there is a throat where there are only 18 lanes. 

Those 18 lanes can be working flat, out and you will still have a 

long line early in the morning. 

They are adding four more lanes there. We are going to staff 

them. Hopefully, that will help to ease the problem there. We are 

looking at that kind of solution, where we can, around the country. 

A lot of it is physical. Some of it is staffing. 

Ms. GRANGER. And last, what are you doing? What is the most 

immediate thing that TSA is doing to improve security on rail 

transportation? 

Mr. MCHALE. We have a lot of different programs we are doing 

there, where DHS and TSA are providing additional canine teams 

to mass transit. We have a pilot program we are running at New 

Carrollton right now called TRIP, which is primarily looking for explosives. We are trying to see how you could screen passengers for 

explosives. This is much more difficult in the rail environment than 

in the aviation environment because it is such an open system. 

We are working on additional transit inspection programs. We 

have targeted inspections going on; we are working with the transit 

authorities, looking at their security arrangements to try to improve them. We have vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructure for transit authorities that we are working on, and, we 
28

are helping them also with tools to do their own criticality assessments. And of course, there is grant funding that is going to the 

states and the cities to help them with transit security. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 

Mr. Markey may inquire. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. 

It is my understanding that in the next couple of weeks, TSA will 

be issuing a hazmat transportation security plan for the District of 

Columbia region, where we are right now, and that it will become 

a model for national hazmat transportation security. Will this plan 

include rerouting shipments of hazardous materials where possible 

so that they do not go through densely populated areas? 

Mr. MCHALE. Well, there actually may be some rerouting. But it 

will be fairly limited. 

One of the problems we have, particularly on the East Coast, is 

that all of our major rail systems typically run through city centers 

and it is not easy to go around them. There are really very few additional rail lines. So we have to work with what we have then. 

Mr. MARKEY. Let me be more specific then. Will tanker cars, full 

of hydrochloric acid, be allowed to pass as close to the Capitol as 

they are allowed today to pass in this recently taken picture? 

Mr. MCHALE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MARKEY. They will still be allowed to pass that close? 

Mr. MCHALE. There is no way to route them differently; no effective way to route them differently. 

Mr. MARKEY. Is there no other route to get that hydrochloric acid 

to its destination other than allowing it to travel right past the 

Capitol, with no additional security placed around it? 

Mr. MCHALE. There is a rail line in West Virginia that is narrower, much more curvy and raises safety concerns. And then the 

next route is west of the Appalachians. 

Mr. MARKEY. Do you support the rights of states or cities to protect their most vulnerable areas by rerouting such shipments? Or 

do you retain, to yourself, the federal government, the ability to decide what is safe enough for an individual city? 

Mr. MCHALE. I think that is part of our federal system. We need 

to look at what restrictions cities and states can put in place that 

may or may not shut down interstate commerce. So if we can work 

with the states—. 

Mr. MARKEY. In other words, would you support the city of 

Washington saying, ‘‘That is too dangerous to be allowed that close 

to the critical infrastructure of the city?’’ Or would you retain to 

yourself the right to override the city? 

Mr. MCHALE. We are working very closely with the city. 

Mr. MARKEY. Would you retain the right to override the city? 

Mr. MCHALE. Actually, I do not know that TSA has the authority 

to override the city. I would argue that the federal government 

probably does. 

Mr. MARKEY. The federal government would have the right to 

override. All right. What additional security measures is the department planning to require for shipments of hazardous materials? 
29

Mr. MCHALE. We are looking at notice. We are looking at additional security. We are looking at timing. We are looking at flow. 

It is going to be quite a well developed plan that cities—. 

Mr. MARKEY. What is the additional security? 

Mr. MCHALE. There will be inspections of the track and the routing before hazardous materials move through. That is why we need 

the notice. There will be a number of steps that will go into that 

plan. 

The city is actually working very closely with us on it and very 

effectively. 

Mr. MARKEY. How many technologies have been certified by TSA 

for inspecting cargo going onto passenger planes? 

Mr. MCHALE. We use both ETD and EDS technologies, as well 

as, of course, our canines, to do some inspections. 

Mr. MARKEY. Have you certified technologies to screen cargo 

going onto passenger planes? 

Mr. MCHALE. We certified those technologies for baggage. We 

can use them for cargo. The certification would be the same. 

Mr. MARKEY. Now last year, the Bush Administration opposed 

my amendment, which called for the full screening of cargo which 

goes onto passenger planes. Has the Bush Administration yet revisited and reversed its position? 

Or does it still maintain that, while we screen the bags of passengers which go on planes, every one of the bags, that we are not 

going to screen all of the cargo which goes on passenger planes? 

Have you reversed that position yet? Or do you still maintain that 

it is not necessary to screen the cargo which goes on passenger 

planes? 

Mr. MCHALE. No, we have not reversed that position. The technology that we have out there today is useful to screen some of the 

cargo. And it is used to screen some of the cargo. 

But we do not yet have technology—. 

Mr. MARKEY. I understand. In other words, back a year ago, you 

said you did not support my amendment because the technology 

did not exist. 

Mr. MCHALE. That is correct. 

Mr. MARKEY. Now you are saying that the technology does exist 

and that you have certified that it exists. So will you remove your 

opposition to my amendment so that we now mandate that the 

technology be used to screen all the cargo in the same way that we 

screen all of the bags of passengers? 

Mr. MCHALE. With all due respect, Congressman, that was not 

my testimony. We have technology that we can use to screen some 

of the cargo. And we do screen some of the cargo. And in fact, we 

encourage—. 

Mr. MARKEY. Let me ask you this: will you mandate that the 

technology that you have certified be used to screen all of the cargo 

that can be screened by that technology? 

Mr. MCHALE. Right now, they are screening quite a lot of it. 

Mr. MARKEY. I want to know if you support using the technology 

which you have already certified to then screen all of the cargo 

which can be screened by that technology. Do you support that? 

Mr. MCHALE. We do not believe that that is necessary at this 

time. 
30

Mr. MARKEY. You see, that is the disagreement that we have. 

Mr. MCHALE. That is correct. 

Mr. MARKEY. You keep arguing that the baggage of innocent passengers should be screened, that their shoes should be taken off, 

that their wristwatches should go through the screening, and yet 

cargo should be placed on the very same plane without the same 

level of screening, even though for most of this cargo, the technology already exists to screen it. 

And the Bush Administration continued to represent a position 

of the cargo industry and the airline industry, in opposition to the 

passengers on these planes who are placed at unnecessary risk, 

even though the technology exists to screen the vast bulk of the 

cargo which is going on next to their bags in the cargo hold of passenger planes all across America. It is unfair to passengers to put 

them at that risk, knowing that Al-Qa‘ida could exploit that weakness in our system because you do not screen cargo that you could 

screen with existing technology. 

Mr. CAMP. The gentleman’s time has expired. But I would like 

the witness to take a moment and answer, please. 

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you. Congressman, as you know, we have 

what we believe is a comprehensive approach to this. It does include the known shipper database. I know that you do not support 

that particularly. 

Mr. MARKEY. Well, I am a known tripper. And I have my ticket. 

But they still, even though I am a known tripper, make me take 

off my shoes and make me put my bag through. 

A known shipper, who is no more trustworthy than me, is allowed to put their cargo on without going through screening and 

put it right next to my bags that have been screened. And I do not 

think it is fair to American passengers to put them through that 

kind of a dual system. 

Mr. MCHALE. Well, we believe our strategy—using the known 

shipper program, enhancing that program with background checks, 

doing random screening using technology, using dogs, keeping 

quite a lot of cargo off passenger planes—together forms a comprehensive approach that balances the need for security against 

the tremendous contribution to the economy that air cargo makes 

on passenger planes. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 

Mr. MARKEY. I apologize. One-third—. 

Mr. CAMP. The gentleman has run over 2.5 minutes from his 

time, an ample amount of time. 

Mr. MARKEY. Can you give me 10 seconds? 

Mr. CAMP. Ten seconds, and then the chairman of the committee 

will be recognized. 

Mr. MARKEY. You have earlier testified that only one-third of all 

known shippers are in your database, which means that two-thirds 

of the shippers are unknown shippers. And yet, they get to put 

their cargo onto passenger planes, the same way that known shippers do. 

It is a very dangerous program that could come back to haunt 

our country and the passengers on the plane, where an explosion 

could occur. 
31

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CAMP. All right. The chair recognizes the chairman of the 

full committee, the gentleman from California. 

Mr. COX. An important part of our current examination of the department, for purposes of drafting an authorization bill, is looking 

at the organizational structure of DHS. Of course, when the Transportation Security Administration was created by Congress, there 

was no Department of Homeland Security. That has now been 

moved wholly into DHS. 

And the question that I would ask you to address—I am going 

to give you just a couple and this is the first of them—is whether 

TSA, in your view, should operate as a distinct entity within DHS. 

Or are we on a road to further organizational progress and integration? 

The second, to what degree should TSA exercise authority beyond aviation security? At least on paper, the mandate extends to 

transportation, not just to aviation. 

But I note that the 2005 budget request of $5.3 billion includes 

just two percent for anything besides aviation. Of $5.3 billion, only 

$146 million is for some other purpose. 

Third, what is the goal, in your view, of IAIP? And to what extent should the infrastructure protection mission of homeland security be coordinated with TSA and its responsibilities, particularly 

in other areas of transportation? 

Because we know, for example, IP is working with rail. We know 

that IP is working with other forms of transportation. And so how 

should be integrate all of that? 

And then, as a somewhat unrelated question, but a question in 

which I am equally interested, the Bearing Report—and Mr. Chairman, you will have to tell me whether this question has been asked 

and answered—concluded that, based on quantitative evidence, the 

Kansas City Airport outperformed its federal counterparts in Category One. And I wanted to get your thoughts on why that might 

be. 

Mr. MCHALE. Okay, Congressman. TSA as a separate entity—let 

me address that within the context of the discussion of IAIP as 

well. When Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act and created the Department, it very much encouraged the Department to 

look for synergies and integration and how to do the job better. 

The thinking on that is evolving all the time, and we have a lot 

of discussions around that. 

I am, however, aware of no plans to change TSA’s status as a 

separate entity. How we go about our job may evolve over time. 

I am not saying that such plans may not develop. But as far as 

I know, at this point, there are no plans. 

The Homeland Security Act kept TSA as a separate entity until 

November of this year. The Department could not change it. After 

that, the Secretary is free to do so. 

I think we probably will be waiting until that timeframe to look 

at that and into the years ahead. There is no deadline for doing 

anything like that. 

I think there is a lot of work still to be done within TSA, both 

in the aviation and in the non-aviation arena. I think that what we 
32

will be looking at, in considering TSA’s continuing existence, is how 

best to get that work done. 

As a separate entity, TSA brings a lot of focus to the issues. But 

more integrated, maybe we can bring to bear in a more effective 

way a lot of the other resources of the Department. So those are 

the kinds of things we will be thinking about as we go forward. 

Very similarly, IAIPs’ mission and role within the Department 

and its role with regard to infrastructure protection is still evolving. Within the government, there are many entities that have a 

role in infrastructure protection, and IAIP clearly oversees that. 

The Department of Energy, the Department of Agriculture, all have 

roles in infrastructure protection. IAIP sets the overall structure 

for that. 

Right now, TSA has been given the lead to develop the sector 

specific plan for transportation, in recognition of its important 

intermodal responsibilities. 

Briefly, on the maritime and land issue, the budget of TSA outside of aviation is small. It is a recognition that TSA only has one 

part of the mission to protection maritime and land. 

We focus particularly on maritime integration in transportation 

for the intermodal connections. We are trying to make sure that we 

identify any cracks or gaps. 

When you look at the overall budget, including a vast budget for 

the Coast Guard—perhaps not vast, the Coast Guard would probably say it was not vast, but from my perspective, it is vast—more 

of the budget calls for the Coast Guard to protect maritime. 

A lot of other agencies are involved in providing funding and 

other things. I think you need to look at the federal government 

budget as a whole in the maritime and land area, not just at the 

TSA budget. 

And briefly, lastly, at Kansas City, it is true that the study found 

that the screeners at Kansas City were better at providing security 

than federal counterparts at the few other airports they were compared to. However, they did not compare them to all Category One 

airports. They compared them to a sample. 

They found that the TSA and federal and private screeners are 

pretty much the same at other airports. Those of you who have 

been to Kansas City know it is a very different airport. It has a 

very unusual layout. 

We are very proud of the work that the screeners there did to 

get that result. But I think we probably need to drill down to a little bit more detail as to why we got that result there. 

It could be layout. It might be training. It might be motivation. 

There are a lot of things we need to look at. 

Mr. CAMP. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Oregon is recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I thank the chairman. Thank you for being here 

today. 

I am going to be meeting with a group of flight attendants shortly. And one of their concerns is that there are not uniform guidelines regarding mandatory security training for flight attendants. 

As they observed, in some airlines, they are shown a 20-minute 

video. Other airlines take this much more seriously, realizing the 

vulnerability and essentially that they are the first line of defense 
33

or first responders. And they have two days of hands-on and intensive training. 

Do you have any intention—or does the agency have any intention—of issuing guidelines that would set standards, as opposed to 

leaving it to the discretion of the airlines? 

Mr. MCHALE. Actually, this was one of the first regulatory packages that TSA issued in early 2002 to set some basic standards for 

that training. You are correct, however, to say that today, while 

those are minimum standards, the airlines do vary quite a bit as 

to how they provide that training. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. So what I would suggest is: are you looking 

at a higher floor? 

Mr. MCHALE. Right. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. If your base standards are met by a 20-minute 

video, which really I do not think anybody would think was adequate, are you looking at something that would require a higher 

base? Because what you get is the cheapo, cut-rate people say, ‘‘Oh, 

we will just show them a 20-minute video.’’ And the mainline airlines and the good operators take it seriously and say, ‘‘Well, this 

is going to cost us a lot of money, but we will do it.’’

But then they say, ‘‘I have to compete. How are we going to compete with someone who shows a 20-minute video and those flight 

attendants do not have all that down time? I guess we had better 

move from two days of training to 20-minute videos.’’ We are going 

to drag down the whole industry. 

Mr. MCHALE. Right. As you know, in the Vision 100 Act that 

Congress passed last year—. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. May. 

Mr. MCHALE. No, where we are. We are going to develop training 

for the flight attendants. We are going to have that hopefully piloted later this fiscal year and be ready to deliver it next year. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And that would be—. 

Mr. MCHALE. In that process, we are actually looking at what is 

the base level, and what would that advanced level course do, and 

how the two would fit together. So we are taking another look at 

it. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. On the allocation of screeners, I am concerned that not only are we going to see a lot of inconvenience because of the number or lack of screeners this summer, but as with 

the article that Mr. Pascrell referred to, there are screeners who 

say, because of the load that they are put through, that they are 

basically doing things that they do not think are safe. 

I mean, they are moving bags through too quickly. They are ignoring some things. They are not giving everything the scrutiny 

they should. 

Where are we in moving toward this cap, which was arbitrarily 

created out of thin air and imposed by Congress and agreed to by 

the administration, of 45,000? And where are we in reallocating to 

the airports, from that 45,000? And do you honestly believe that, 

at the level of 45,000, we can not only prevent long lines, but we 

can provide the best possible security? 

Mr. MCHALE. We have actually been right around about 45,000 

since late last calendar year. So we were there through the Christ-
34

mas holiday, pretty much, at airports around the country. We managed to get through that period. 

We recognize that that was a short period, so we were able to 

focus a lot of effort there. We have developed a plan to deal with 

the summer. The increases we are seeing—and I am proud of 

this—we are seeing quite a resurgence in air travel. I think people 

are getting back into the air, and that is a great thing. That is also 

something that is obviously of concern to us as we go forward. 

We think we can handle the loads generally that we are seeing 

today with the 45,000 level. As strain builds up on that, we would 

come back to the Congress and point out where we have issues and 

problems. 

We are redistributing the workforce. We have not yet gone back 

out to all the airports with their reallocations at the 45,000 level. 

We need to do that. Congresswoman Granger raised that with me, 

and we certainly need to do that shortly. 

We are redistributing the workforce to address precisely the 

kinds of security issues that you raise to make sure that we can 

deliver security. Security is the number one mission. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I understand. On the bag match, I have asked this 

question before, but in the modern day world where we have suicide bombers, it seems to me that bag match is not a substitute for 

and should not be used as one of the criteria for saying we have 

screened baggage for explosives. 

In fact, if I were a suicidal terrorist, I would be thrilled to know 

that my bag was on board the plane and not some other plane or 

sitting in the airport and exploding harmlessly or only killing a few 

people. So why do we think there is any utility in this anymore? 

I guess maybe there might be a few non-suicidal terrorists out 

there. But it really just does not seem to me to be a substitute for 

some harder form of screening of baggage anymore. It just really 

does not make a lot of sense. 

Mr. MCHALE. We are moving away from using bag match. We 

have been moving away for some time. We do not use it very much. 

We are trying to phase it down. 

Although I think it always should be a tool in the quiver. Even 

if it is not a substitute, it is probably something we are always 

going to be requiring at som some level. 

Of course, it is currently an alternate measure recognized by law. 

But it is one that we are moving away from. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I just question the wisdom of that. And I would assume that you, as the security experts, would be—and it sounds 

like you are moving away from it, which I am happy to hear. 

Mr. MCHALE. Right. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Then the last question would be on the air side. 

I understand I am going to get a briefing tomorrow on vendor employees and their access to the secure areas in the terminal. And 

I will be pleased to have that finally and understand where we are 

moving, because I think that is an extraordinary loophole, with 

those tens of thousands of people per day going into secure areas 

with no screening whatsoever. 

But beyond that, what about the air side? Are we moving beyond 

the cursory background checks? 
35

The last testimony we had a couple of months ago, we were not 

even requiring enhanced background checks of people who have access on the air side—caterers, cleaners, mechanics, others on that 

side. 

Mr. MCHALE. Well, we are moving forward with our plan for enhanced background checks and we will be doing that. We have 

done some, and we will continue. We will get them all through. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. When do you think we will have them all done? 

Mr. MCHALE. Congressman, actually I do not know that figure 

off the top of my head. But I will be happy to get it for you. I do 

not think it is all that long, but I will be happy to get it back to 

you. 

We are not at this time planning to significantly increase the 

amount of physical screening done for people entering the site. We 

will be obviously screening them as they pass into the sterile area, 

through the checkpoints. That will be the briefing you will have tomorrow; you will have some information about that. 

Again, this is really something of a philosophical issue. The people who work on the site have access to such tools, weapons, chemicals, things that can be used as weapons, and other things, that 

screening them is almost pointless. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. With all due respect, my time is going to expire, 

I have heard that argument before. I do not think that a primitive 

weapon fashioned from fuel or other things that are available, I 

would hope that we do not have blocks of C–4 or sheets of C–4 laying around the airport—I do not know what purpose it would 

serve—or sophisticated detonators laying around the airport that 

are based on altimeters. 

I have heard the argument before that, boy, there are a lot of 

dangerous things there. But those go more to the idea of someone 

trying to take over a plane fashioning some sort of weapon or that, 

but not to the catastrophic loss of a plane with an explosive device. 

And that is really where I am focused here. 

We all have different opinions. But I think that when we look at 

a repeat of opinions, the most likely thing is they are just going to 

take them down. 

They do not need to take them over and use them as weapons. 

They can just totally disrupt air travel by just taking them down. 

They tried that before over the Pacific, Ramzi Jusef. 

They repeat patterns. They came back to the World Trade Center. I think they will come back. 

Is it suicidal belts that people wear on the planes? Is it checked 

bags? Is it cargo, as Mr. Markey talked about? We do not know. 

But we need to be defending against all those things. 

And I am not really that worried about people fashioning bombs 

using fuel at the airport. I just do not agree with that argument, 

that they have access to the same things that the terrorists have 

access to. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 

The gentlewoman from Washington State may inquire. 

Ms. DUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McHale, we are delighted that you can be here today. We 

just had some recent activity, as you well know, at Seatac Airport. 
36

And I simply want to thank you for keeping such close watch over 

the management problems there in that airport. 

And I know that today you cannot talk about the details of that 

whole situation. But we were informed well ahead of time by Admiral Stone. We appreciated that kind of communication because that 

positioned us well to discuss the topic when it did come up, which 

it always does. And we always get the press calls. 

But I think also what you have done in replacing the top four 

managers will do a lot toward heightening the morale among the 

workers who are there. So I wanted to let you know that. 

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you. 

Ms. DUNN. This committee has focused a significant amount of 

time and energy to make sure that department-wide we are breaking down the legacy agency mentality and moving toward a forward-thinking department with a new mission. We are committed 

to supporting the department as it fills the communication gaps 

that led to the tragedy on 9/11. 

When it comes to communicating with the private sector about 

specific threats on transportation security, what responsibility does 

TSA have compared to the IAIP wing of the Department of Homeland Security or compared to any other federal agencies? 

Mr. MCHALE. TSA works very closely with our stakeholders. In 

the aviation area, we have principal security inspectors assigned to 

every carrier. 

At almost every major carrier, they have a corporate security officer who has a security clearance, with whom our transportation 

security intelligence service can share classified information. We 

talk back and forth with them all the time. 

In the other modes, we work very closely with the information 

sharing and analysis centers, some of the trade associations in the 

railroads, the railroad industry, the companies themselves and others, to get out threat information that is tailored to their threats. 

IAIP tends to look at the national level. And it gives national 

level threat guidance. 

I think one of the innovations they have developed is getting out 

some very practical kinds of things that industry or people should 

do to respond to the threat. We take that kind of guidance and try 

to tailor it to the specific industry or the specific transportation 

mode that we are dealing with, to give some practical guidance. 

Sometimes, it is pretty hard to give practical guidance to deal 

with a threat, but that is what we look to do. 

Ms. DUNN. What about, who would Sound Transit call on the 

phone if they heard of a vulnerability or a threat? Whom would 

they specifically—this is our local authority there in the Puget 

Sound area that deals with transit? 

Mr. MCHALE. Last year we started up the Transportation Security Operations Center, TSOC, out in Herndon. That is a one-stop 

shop basically, to get any information out, and we take it upon ourselves to get it around to the rest of the government. 

Sometimes though, the transit authorities in particular are very 

used to dealing with the Federal Transit Administration. The DOT 

has its own crisis response center that we are actually hooked into 

as well. 
37

We recognize that news—bad news—can come in to a lot of different places. What we are trying to do today, throughout the government, is make sure that whoever gets information spreads it 

around very quickly and gets it to everybody. 

Ms. DUNN. I understand that TSA is currently developing a registered traveler pilot program. 

Mr. MCHALE. Right. 

Ms. DUNN. And you are going to be testing it out this summer. 

Can you give us an update on that program? And if somebody is 

enlisted in that program, do they still have to be evaluated by 

CAPPS 2? 

Mr. MCHALE. No, they will not go through the CAPPS system. 

They will not be a selectee under the CAPPS system. 

It will be piloted later this summer. We expect it to run about 

90 days at a few airports around the country, probably with most 

of the carriers in those airports; maybe not all the carriers, depending on how it works out. 

We hope to learn a lot from that plot. The idea of that program 

is to gather enough information about someone so that we do not 

need to use the CAPPS system to make a determination on them. 

Then they would not be a CAPPS selectee. 

They would have to go through the basic security, and if they 

alarmed, then they would be subject to secondary security. 

Ms. DUNN. Thank you. 

As you know, Seatac is currently undergoing an extensive expansion. They started this expansion before 9/11. The airport is continuing the efforts. 

While reaching compliance with TSA regulations, I have heard 

concern about whether there is inadequate space for the exit kiosks 

in certain terminals at Seatac and at other airports that we visited 

as a committee on our forays out into the country. 

What sort of coordination is going on between your agency and 

the U.S. visit program? 

Mr. CAMP. Time has expired. Please answer, Mr. McHale. 

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Quite a lot of work has 

been done. 

In fact, U.S. VISIT has been riding on several of our contracts. 

We provide contracts that support the U.S. VISIT. And we have 

been looking at the exit side of it. 

We do not do too much on the entrance side of it. But on the exit 

side of it, we have been working very closely with U.S. VISIT. 

Some of the plans for the exit side involve TSA directly, and 

some of them will involve us indirectly. 

But we are pretty well integrated. We are on their advisory committee, and we meet with them frequently. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. The ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from Texas, is recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have three questions. 

One: why have we not required the planes that overfly the 

United States to also harden their cockpit doors, as we have other 

planes? 

Mr. MCHALE. There is an ICAO requirement that kicks in fairly 

shortly, if it has not already. For all aircraft flying in international 

space, the International Civil Aviation Organization has a require-
38

ment to do that. I will be happy to let you know exactly when that 

is going to be in place. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay, thank you. You mentioned to Congressman 

Markey that quite a lot of cargo that travels on passenger planes 

is being screened. Does this mean, when you say ‘‘quite a lot’’ that 

is being screened, does that mean that there is some that you are 

physically inspecting with the x-ray and following up with the swab 

for explosives if something is revealed? There is quite a lot of that 

going on? 

Mr. MCHALE. We are using dogs. We are using ETD when it is 

available. We do trace detection when it is available. 

We sometimes run some of the packages through the bigger explosives detection machines. And there is some physical inspection. 

Mr. TURNER. Can you clarify what ‘‘quite a lot’’ means? Does that 

mean five percent or 95 percent? 

Mr. MCHALE. There is a percentage that is a random requirement. That percentage is sensitive security information. I would be 

happy to provide that to you off the record. 

Mr. TURNER. What would it take to screen 100 percent? 

Mr. MCHALE. It would take new technology. It would take machines with bigger throats to be able to take odd shaped packages, 

long packages, large packages, large containers, to move it through. 

The technology that we have today would be very, very slow, and 

ineffective and inefficient in doing that. In fact, for some kinds of 

packages, the technology just does not exist. You would have to literally unpack and pack the cargo to do it. 

Mr. TURNER. And how long will it be before that technology is 

available? 

Mr. MCHALE. We are making progress. The department’s Science 

and Technology Directorate has some ongoing basic research on 

that. We have some ideas about how to do that. 

I do not know when we will get to 100 percent. We will get to 

technology that increases the percentage we can do as we go forward. It will depend on some developments. 

Mr. TURNER. So would you say to this committee that you are 

screening every piece of cargo that travels on passenger planes that 

technologically can be screened today? 

Mr. MCHALE. No, I would not say that. We use the known shipper program. We do not screen every single piece of cargo that 

could be screened today by technology. 

Mr. TURNER. So you really rely a lot on this known shipper program? 

Mr. MCHALE. Yes, we do. That is why we are working so hard 

to improve it. 

Mr. TURNER. And that is the program that does not verified that 

known shippers are actually doing anything to carry out the regulations that are supposed to be carried out if you are designated 

as a known shipper? 

Mr. MCHALE. Well, we do audit them. We do not audit a very 

large number of them. That is why we are hiring a bunch more 

cargo inspectors this year, to get out there and do better audits. 

Mr. TURNER. Do cargo inspectors have to come under this 45,000 

cap? 

Mr. MCHALE. No. 
39

Mr. TURNER. Okay. One final question, if my time has not expired. I notice there are no funds requested in your budget request 

for grants to rail or other transit authorities for security. And we 

all know, particularly in light of the Madrid bombing, that rail is 

a significant vulnerability. 

Why is it that the department did not request in your budget any 

funds for these types of grants? 

Mr. MCHALE. Almost all of the grant programs are being consolidated within the Office of Domestic Programs for next fiscal year, 

which is part of the Department. They are being moved out of TSA. 

Some of the maritime grants will be moved out of Coast Guard. 

There are grants in programs like the Urban Area Security Initiative and other programs that are available to be used to states 

and locals. They will be available to use for transit security and 

other kinds of developments. 

Mr. TURNER. You know the estimates range as high as $2.5 billion in terms of the needs of rail and transit for security measures? 

Mr. MCHALE. Yes. 

Mr. TURNER. And even though you are consolidating and this 

committee—in fact, has recommended some consolidation—it seems 

that in this year’s budget, you should have made some request to 

acknowledge the need that is there. And to be totally silent while 

we are asking for funds for a whole lot of other things and to not 

mention rail seems to have been a serious oversight. 

Mr. MCHALE. I think if you look at the budget as a whole, there 

will be funding. The rail industry particularly on the freight rail 

groups, has really done a tremendous amount, even starting right 

at 9/11. They are very advanced in their thinking on this. 

Amtrak has received funding over the past few years and continues to get funding separately. If you look at all the different 

pieces, there is funding out there. But there is no funding in the 

TSA budget. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 

The gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands, Ms. Christensen, may 

inquire for five minutes. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 

for allowing me to sit in on the subcommittee. 

Welcome. You have a great group of workers in the Virgin Islands. 

Mr. MCHALE. Thank you. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I cannot speak for every other airport. But 

I know ours are really—. 

Mr. MCHALE. I have not gone down there to see them yet. I 

should. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Very good. But sometimes, they are really 

stressed when we have a large number of passengers coming 

through, especially on the island of St. Croix, where we have no 

machine. 

Now I understand we are supposed to have 100 percent of luggage screened electronically hopefully by the end of the year. We 

may be a little delayed on that. 
40

So even though my airport in St. Croix is a small airport, can 

I anticipate that I am going to have one of those machines that 

would screen electronically in my airport? 

Mr. MCHALE. I will have to look at the specific situation in St. 

Croix. There are two types of machines that we use. One is a trace 

detection machine. The other are the much larger EDS machines. 

And it sounds like you are referring to one of the EDS machines. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. EDS machine. 

Mr. MCHALE. I will have to look at St. Croix. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. It is really hard on them when you have long 

lines. People actually miss flights. And they have to go through the 

luggage by hand. And there are long lines of people waiting. 

And they really do a good job. And they do a thorough job. But 

it is very, very difficult. 

So I am hoping that—. 

Mr. MCHALE. We are making some progress. As we are getting 

more and more of the larger, inline systems at the larger airports, 

we are able actually to roll down some of the machines that are 

then made redundant at those airports and move them into smaller 

airports. 

Unfortunately, I do not know the situation in St. Croix. But I 

will be happy to take a look at it. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Right, right. Because you know, the chances 

of missing something becomes much greater. And I do not want 

that to happen at my airport. 

When you are doing the studies between the private contractors 

and the TSA federal employees, are you comparing alternate methods, as well as the electronic? Is it structured so that you are comparing the checking by alternate method by alternate method? 

Mr. MCHALE. Between the private contractors and the federal 

contractors? 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Yeah. 

Mr. MCHALE. We are comparing the overall security. We are 

comparing all their operations as screeners, whether it is the baggage or the passenger checkpoints. We are looking at each of the 

operations that they do as we compare them. 

And as we said, we have basically found them to be comparable. 

We train them to the same standards, and we supervise them very 

closely. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Right. We went through an awful lot of discussion. And after September 11, we felt that it was really important to make the screening a federal responsibility. 

Can you help me to understand the thinking—and I realize we 

left it open, that we could come back and look at private screeners. 

A lot of people in my district and I am sure across the country were 

displaced and could not be rehired by TSA. 

Now we are going to go back. Could you give me some of the 

thinking that went on to now? I mean, the system is working just 

as well. 

Mr. MCHALE. The pilot program that we just completed is one 

that was mandated by Congress to do. We had to do the five airports in five different categories, but the screeners were required 

to meet exactly the same standards. 
41

They too had to be U.S. citizens, English speakers, able to pass 

the observation and discernment test, communications skills, and 

all those sorts of things. They also had to meet the same training 

standards. They had to get the same pay and benefits or equivalent 

pay and benefits, I think is the language in the statute. 

So there were a variety of things that really, within the statute, 

said that we were going after essentially the same population of 

people, whether they were federal or private. In fact, the private 

screeners, screening companies, ended up hiring about the same 

relatively small percentage of pre-9/11 screeners as we did in the 

federal workforce because they had the same requirements for the 

same standards. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Do I understand that under the LOIs that 

the match is changing from 90 to 75? If so, is that to try to reach 

more airports? 

And do you think that there are airports that, if you change the 

match—somewhere I read that—and if that match is being 

changed, do you think the airports are going to be able to meet the 

requirements under this new match that we require them to contribute more? 

Mr. MCHALE. The program, when it started, was at a 75 percent 

match. And then in the Vision 100 Act, passed last year by the 

Congress, there was language which authorized the creation of a 

fund. And part of that language changed the match to 90 percent. 

To the extent we have issued LOIs so far, they have been issued 

at the 75 percent level. We are concerned that it will strain the the 

available funding at the 90 percent level. 

The administration has proposed in its budget to roll that back 

to 75 percent. 

As to whether airports will be able to make it, to meet it, I think 

the answer is: some will. Some have already. There will be difficulties at other airports. 

At smaller airports and small to medium-sized airports typically 

we are not looking at LOIs. We fund those a little differently 

through programs that we can give direct funding to. 

Mr. CAMP. All right. 

Thank you. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

I want to thank you for your testimony here today, Mr. McHale. 

I also want to acknowledge and welcome to the committee room 

your new director of legislative affairs, who many of us know very 

well. And glad he could be here as well. 

Thank you for your testimony. This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(43)

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE DAVE CAMP

1. Recently, several reports from the DHS/OIG, GAO, and BearingPoint 

(under contract to TSA) identified a number of compelling challenges facing TSA’s screener program, including ongoing performance problems. 

What are the root causes of screener performance deficiencies noted by 

these groups? How much is attributable to technology, how much is attributable to training, and bow [sic] much is attributable to other human factors causes (e.g. supervision, fatigue)? What does TSA plan to do in response to these reports’ findings? Please explain TSA’s response plan, with 

implementation timelines. 

Answer: The GAO and OIG reports both indicate that TSA has made significant 

progress in providing enhanced training tools to the screener workforce in order to 

improve threat object detection performance. In July 2003, TSA completed a comprehensive Passenger Screening Performance Improvement Study using the tools, 

strategies and techniques associated with performance analysis. The study team 

validated desired screener performance, examined screening practices, and determined factors that influence the gap between these two states. Using this systemic 

process, TSA evaluated the nature of the screening work tasks, the screening workplace environment in which the tasks are performed, and the screeners’—performance. The outcome of this performance analysis included a list of systemic root 

causes and a set of recommended solutions linked to those causes. Although the solutions encompass the areas of technology, training, and human factors, TSA did not 

quantify the percentage of overall performance gap attributable to these areas but 

instead determined which among all the categories needed priority attention. 

In October 2003, to address passenger screening performance deficiencies identified in the Screening Performance Improvement Study, TSA developed a ‘‘ShortTerm Screening Performance Improvement Plan.’’ This plan included eight broad 

initiatives and 62 specific actions that TSA planned to pursue to provide tangible 

improvements in screening performance and security. On June 7, 2004, TSA reported to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, the completion of 57 of these actions. One 

action, is still in progress and is expected to be completed in the first quarter of 

fiscal year 2005. The remaining two actions have been deferred pending identification of appropriate resources.

2. Given the upcoming deadline to provide an ‘‘opt out’’ process for airports to use private screeners, what action has TSA taken to develop an application and review process? Where is this process represented in the 

FY05 budget? 

Answer: ATSA provides that airport operators may submit applications on or 

after November 19, 2004 to TSA to have the screening of passengers and property 

be carried out by qualified private screening companies. On June 23, 2004, TSA released its guidance setting forth the general parameters of the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) under which TSA will receive and review applications from airports to opt out of Federal screening and select contractors to provide contract 

screening services in opt out airports. While the guidance does not address every 

question relating to the Screening Partnership Program, TSA is continuing to define 

the program. For example, TSA is crafting an application template for distribution 

at the appropriate time. 

In terms of funding for the SPP, TSA’s approach is to fund Opt Out screening operations from the same budget line item as screening operations performed by TSA 

screeners. In this manner, Federal screeners and private screeners will be funded 

from the same pool of money. Costs for contracts with companies providing screen-
44

ing services in SPP airports will be funded by the cost of the Federal operations that 

are being displaced. Funding SPP in this manner is necessary because providing a 

specific program budget for SPP airports, which necessarily depends on the number 

and size of airports that will be approved to opt out, is not possible at this time.

3. What cooperation did you receive from the aviation and travel industry in developing the Registered Traveler Program? How is or can this program be coordinated with expedited pre-clearance programs run by CBP, 

such as Air Nexus? 

Answer: Cooperation with the aviation and travel industry in the development 

of the Registered Traveler program has been extensive. During the concept development phase, TSA adopted an aggressive outreach program with both industries to 

ensure key stakeholder input was available. TSA met with representatives of major 

airlines and travel associations to exchange ideas on the operational aspects of the 

program and to identify the potential benefits. Key partnerships were established 

with the 5 airports participating in the pilots (Minneapolis-Saint Paul, Los Angeles, 

Houston Bush, Boston Logan and Reagan National), as well as the participating airlines (Northwest, United, Continental, and American) to ensure effective coordination and service to passengers volunteering to participate in the Registered Traveler 

pilots. TSA also met with the National Business Travel Association and the Association of Corporate Travel Executives. We anticipate that additional meetings and 

briefings will continue with stakeholders and associations within the aviation and 

travel industries while the pilots are operating. 

TSA continues to communicate and coordinate with other expedited pre-clearance 

programs, such as Air Nexus. TSA has met with the Air Nexus staff to share ideas 

and lessons learned and to examine potential synergies. TSA arranged for Air 

Nexus staff to visit and observe the pilot currently being conducted at MinneapolisSaint Paul. We anticipate this communication and cooperation will continue into the 

future.

4. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Undersecretary for Border 

and Transportation Security Asa Hutchinson said (in a Senate Committee 

on Commerce, Science, and Transportation hearing on March 23, 2004), in 

response to a question about signing Memoranda of Understanding with 

DOT outlining responsibilities for transportation security, that such agreements were unnecessary in light of Presidential Decision Directive #7 

(signed on December 17, 2003) on critical infrastructure protection. However, this directive does not delineate responsibilities between the TSA and 

DOT; it says that DOT and DHS ‘gill collaborate on all matters relating to 

transportation security and transportation infrastructure protection’’

The GAO argues that without a clear division of responsibilities between 

TSA and the DOT modal administrations, there can be ‘‘duplication, confusion, and gaps in preparedness.’’ Moreover, an agreement delineating responsibilities would make each organization accountable for its responsibilities, and would make the separate roles and responsibilities of each 

organization clear to transportation security stakeholders. 

Why has TSA chosen not to sign Memoranda of Understanding with the 

Federal Transportation Administration (FTA), which is within DOT, as it 

did with the FAA to delineate areas of responsibility and accountability? 

How would clarifying the relationship be helpful for coordinating transportation security? 

Answer: Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)—7, sets forth the establishment of ‘‘a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify 

and prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect 

them from terrorist attack.’’ The directive instructs DHS and DOT to collaborate on 

transportation security and transportation infrastructure protection, and it directs 

DHS to take the lead role in coordinating protection activities for transportation systems, including mass transit, aviation, maritime, ground/surface, rail, and pipeline 

systems. 

Additionally, DHS and DOT have finalized a Memorandum of Understanding 

(MOU). Through the procedures agreed upon in the MOU, DHS and DOT will work 

together to achieve effective public transportation strategies and initiatives and develop appropriate funding plans. 

DHS has assigned TSA primary Sector Specific Responsibility for the Transportation Sector in implementing HSPD–7. In accordance with DHS’s implementation 

plan and in partnership with other federal stakeholders, TSA is coordinating the development of the Transportation Sector Specific Plan (TSSP) and is working under 

DHS guidance and with partners in the U.S. Coast Guard and the DOT. The TSSP 

will discuss how Federal and private-sector stakeholders will communicate and 
45

work together; how critical assets in the transportation sector will be identified, assessed, and prioritized; how protective programs will be developed; how progress in 

reducing risk will be measured; and how R&D will be prioritized in the sector. In 

the Transportation Sector, the SSP will help ensure that efforts are systematic, complete, and consistent with the efforts in the other 16 critical infrastructure and key 

resources sectors. DHS will build on the foundation of the SSP to develop the Transportation Security Operational Plan (TSOP) that will provide overall operational 

planning guidance on rail and other modal security. The TSOP will ensure that 

modal security plans are integrated into an effective concept of operations for management of security of that sector of transportation. 

DHS and DOT’s Modal Administrations are currently meeting to discuss roles and 

responsibilities and are cooperating on many issues of mutual interest, especially on 

the development of the Transportation SSP and modal security plans under the 

guidance of HSPD–7. We believe this ‘‘family of plans’’ will provide clarity to all parties on roles and responsibilities in transportation security. 

QUESTIONS BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX

1. At a March 2004 appropriations subcommittee hearing, you testified 

that TSA was employing a ‘‘system of systems’’ approach to enhance aviation security, including improving screener performance, deploying technology, and strengthening oversight and accountability. Please explain the 

specific steps being taken in implementing this systems approach, including timelines for completion and provisions for review/evaluation and improvement. This is especially important because TSA appears to have a 

large portfolio of issues to address and is taking a number of actions without an apparent proactive overall plan. 

Answer: TSA’s security strategy uses a ‘‘system of systems?’’ approach whereby 

each security ring contributes to TSA’s overall security system but the overall system does not rely exclusively on any one component. These systems includes screening of passengers and their checked and carry-on baggage, the display of valid, government-issued photo identification, Federal Air Marshals, Federal Flight Deck Officers, hardened cockpit doors, and other enhanced security practices. Each security 

measure is designed to complement the efficiency and effectiveness of the others. 

The result is a system of enhanced security systems designed to provide a layered 

security that addresses a continuum of security threats with minimal impact on airline customers and operations, and on the free flow of commerce through the nation’s commercial aviation infrastructure. 

TSA has established four strategic goals aligned with DHS goals: domain awareness; prevention/protection; response/restoration; and organizational effectiveness. 

TSA continuously gathers as much knowledge as possible about the threats, 

vulnerabilities, capabilities, status, trends, unusual circumstances, and other conditions of the transportation system and its environment. We use this knowledge to 

direct resources and protective action most effectively. 

We continue to meet the challenge of preventing terrorist attacks through a multilayered detection, deterrence and response system. We work collaboratively with intelligence and law enforcement agencies to monitor, disrupt and pre-empt emerging 

terrorist threats, and through our layered security systems, prevent terrorist attacks and incidents. We have developed plans to coordinate a rapid and effective response to any attack on, or disruption to, the air transportation system. We also 

provide expertise to assist in the development of plans for incident management, 

contingencies, and organizational continuity, such as the National Response Plan 

(NRP) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 

To ensure and improve our organizational effectiveness across the board, we have 

established performance planning and reporting mechanisms, and we continue to 

use these systems to collect data to monitor our progress toward achieving our 

goals. Our Performance Measurement Information System (PMIS) was developed to 

capture basic performance measures at U.S. airports on a daily basis and is continually being upgraded to support new capabilities. We capture and analyze data on 

our security operations and adjust operations to achieve desired performance goals. 

Random and routine inspections, plus program evaluations, are also conducted to 

supplement the information captured in PMIS. 

To measure effectiveness, TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review 

(OIAPR) has been conducting covert testing continuously since September 2002 to 

identify vulnerabilities in airport security systems. OIAPR has conducted thousands 

of checkpoint, checked baggage, access control and other tests of airport security 

systems. OIAPR conducts post test reviews with the screeners, screener supervisors, 

and Federal Security Directors (FSD) to re-enact the test and to identify opportuni-
46

ties for improvement. The information OIAPR provides to TSA management is used 

to focus attention on critical areas needing performance enhancements. 

FSDs and their staff routinely monitor passenger and baggage screening activities 

to ensure that the screener workforce is complying with TSA standard operating 

procedures and policy directives at U.S. airports. Regulated parties are also monitored and inspected for compliance with pertinent security regulations and measures. Similar monitoring takes place overseas to ensure that airlines and host government authorities also maintain a high level of effectiveness in their screening operations and application of security controls for flights to the United States. 

Terrorism is thwarted by efforts to raise or adjust the security threshold and create uncertainties in terrorists’ planning efforts. Accordingly, TSA takes a risk-based 

approach to provide effective aviation security. This is accomplished by analyzing 

the threats along various pathways of attack and vulnerabilities to those methods 

of attack, as revealed by comprehensive and continuous threat and vulnerability 

analyses of security systems.

By necessity, upon its creation, TSA focused its security efforts almost exclusively on the commercial aviation sector. Since then, it has been criticized for not paying sufficient attention to other modes of transport, such 

as rail, maritime, and surface, especially in light of recent attacks on such 

modes (e.g., Madrid). What steps is TSA taking to protect other modes of 

transport, especially in terms of the aforementioned ‘‘systems’’ approach? 

Answer: In partnership with other DHS component agencies and the Department 

of Transportation (DOT) modal administrations, TSA is identifying security 

vulnerabilities in the non-aviation modes of transportation. This security information will be used in developing and implementing, as appropriate, national performance-based security standards to improve the security of passengers, cargo, conveyances, transportation facilities and infrastructure. TSA is also working closely with 

federal, state, local, and industry partners to ensure compliance with established 

regulations and policies. 

Specific projects TSA is undertaking or that are under discussion include: 

• Partnering with Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection directorate 

(IAIP) and industry stakeholders to leverage Information Sharing Analysis Centers effectively; 

• Assessing hazardous materials (HAZMAT) transport security threats and 

identifying best practices and mitigation strategies to secure HAZMAT transport through High Threat Urban Areas (HTUA). Specifically, DHS and DOT 

joined in a collaborative effort to address security issues surrounding the movement of bulk HAZMAT by rail through the National Capital Region (NCR). 

TSA, designated as the lead Federal agency in these efforts by DHS, developed 

a pilot project centered in Washington, D.C.—known as the D.C. Rail Corridor 

Project. TSA performed a fact-based, risk-analysis approach to understand 

vulnerabilities, hazards, and the ‘‘as is conditions’’, and—based on the facts and 

analysis—IAIP developed mitigation strategies to identify threats associated 

with the movement of bulk HAZMAT that occur within the physical boundaries 

of the beltway—about 42 miles of railroad track and related assets. Some of 

those enhancements were implemented immediately, and others will be implemented overtime. The willingness of the diverse parties involved to come together for the D.C. Rail Corridor Project has been extraordinary. In a multi-disciplinary, multi-agency approach, our partners in this effort reflect the complex 

relationships, roles, and responsibilities that exist within the NCR. 

• Working with the Science and Technology directorate to develop chemical, biological, and radiological countermeasures for identifying, isolating, and defeating attacks in mass transit settings; 

• Assessing the operational feasibility and appropriateness of applying tailored 

screening standards to passengers in non-aviation environments; 

• Working under the guidance of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, and with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the USCG to 

develop the appropriate framework for securing the intermodal transport of containerized cargo in the domestic United States. 

• Working with DOT, USCG and public/private transportation owners and operators on transportation security planning efforts that are an important part 

of DHS’s overall Critical Infrastructure Protection program. 

DHS announced the following initiatives for rail and mass transit: 

• Continued engagement with industry and State and local authorities to establish base-line security measures based on current industry best practices; 

• Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot (TRIP) to test the feasibility of screening 

luggage and carry-on bags for explosives at rail stations and aboard trains; 
47

• The integration of existing public and employee awareness programs and the 

creation of new programs where necessary; 

• Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD–7) directed DHS to develop a comprehensive National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) covering 

17 sectors of the U.S. economy’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, a 

process that is being managed by DHS IAIP. For each sector, there is a federal 

agency taking the lead in developing a Sector Specific Plan (SSP) that will feed 

into the comprehensive National Plan. In the Transportation Sector, TSA has 

worked closely with IAIP to develop the Transportation Sector Specific Plan 

(TSSP). The TSSP is a process-oriented document and provides a high-level map 

for security in the Sector. TSA is now developing the Transportation Security 

Operational Plan (T–SOP). The TSOP is an operational-level extension of the 

TSSP, which will provide much greater detail on Transportation Sector initiatives and accompanying roles and responsibilities. The TSOP will consist of two 

parts: a baseline plan that details all common elements among the modes followed by mode-specific annexes, one of which will include the rail sector. 

• Investment in the research and development of technological innovations for 

biological, chemical and high explosives countermeasures.

2. Passenger and baggage screening is generally said, even by TSA, to be 

impractical for passenger rail systems, due to the openness of the system 

and the nature of their operations. Yet, TSA has undertaken test screening 

procedures in two rail stations, through a Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot 

program. Even if screening procedures that are devised for the pilot yield 

positive results, is it likely that such procedures would be transferable to 

stations where the rail systems vary significantly in design and passenger 

volume is much greater? 

Answer: TSA’s goal in the Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot (TRIP) pilot has been 

to introduce emerging technologies to the rail environment, to evaluate their effectiveness at detecting explosive material, and to assess the impact that deployment 

of such technologies have on passenger travel. Unlike aviation facilities, rail stations 

are not self-contained and passengers have a great deal of freedom to board and disembark the train throughout its route. Because screening passengers in the open 

rail environment is very different from the controlled-environment of the aviation 

sector, the pilot focuses on testing the best means to adapt screening techniques for 

this environment. TSA and its partners recognize the distinct challenges presented 

by the rail environment and are conducting this pilot to identify the best methods 

to address them. 

On May 30, TSA completed Phase I of this pilot program in New Carrollton, 

Maryland. The purpose of this phase was to test equipment in the open environment 

of a rail station and see if it is feasible as a response option for mitigating a high 

threat situation. 

Between June 7 and July 5, Amtrak passengers boarding long-distance trains at 

Washington, D.C.’s Union Station had their checked luggage screened for explosives, 

as part of Phase II of the TRIP program. The goal of Phase II was to evaluate 

emerging technologies in a rail environment to screen for explosives in checked and 

unclaimed baggage, as well as temporarily stored personal items and cargo. 

The Phase III pilot was designed to determine the operational suitability of installing screening technology in passenger rail cars to screen passengers and/or 

their carry-on baggage. Phase III began on July 19, 2004 and ran until August 20, 

2004 and examined potential issues surrounding the development of a screening 

model for Amtrak and/or a commuter rail systems. Phase III was conducted in conjunction with Connecticut’s Shoreline East commuter rail system. Screening was 

conducted in a specialized railcar equipped with on-board screening technology as 

the train was in motion. TSA tested technologies to screen passengers and their 

baggage for explosives while the train car is in motion. 

All three phases of the pilot have been completed. Results are being assessed and 

will be presented to the Department when ready.

3. In recent testimony, TSA officials have indicated that the agency is 

‘‘right-sizing’’ screening operations to a mix of no more than 45,000 fulltime and part-time FTEs. How was this number developed, especially in 

light of the findings in the recent reports on screener performance that 

concluded that such performance was impacted in part because of staff 

shortages at certain airports? Does the right-sizing drill-down to the airport level, where the level of screening personnel is a function of, among 

other things, the airport’s risk, its workload, and infrastructure configuration? 
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Answer: TSA is developing a detailed bottom-up staffing model that takes into 

account several factors to determine an adequate level of screening personnel necessary to meet our mission. This model uses airport flight information, airport hours 

of operation, baggage screening areas, checkpoint lanes, types of screener equipment, screener Standard Operating Procedures, passenger load factors and arrival 

curves, projected administrative time, and other operating criteria. 

TSA reviews the workforce requirements for each airport on a periodic basis. The 

model, once operational, will be an important asset in TSA’s efforts to ensure that 

our screeners are deployed effectively to maximize the safety and security of the 

traveling public. This analysis will also allow us to engage in further discussions 

with the relevant Committees of Congress. 

TSA is also creating additional capacity through achieving greater efficiencies in 

the scheduling of screeners. Federal Security Directors at each airport now have access to scheduling tools that provide real-time information enabling them to forecast 

periods of peak demand for screening. TSA uses mores split shifts and has restructured the workforce to reach a higher ratio of part-time screeners to maximize operational flexibility. As a result of this restructuring, TSA can more efficiently schedule screeners to match capacity with the level of demand.

4. How does TSA propose to gather and analyze relevant data to calculate 

its performance indicators? For example, what processes and controls will 

be put in place that will allow TSA to gather the data, ensure its relevance 

and quality, and ‘‘crunched?’’ How will these indicators collectively present 

TSA with a picture of its performance and trends in this performance? 

Answer: TSA has been collecting and analyzing performance data for over two 

years from a variety of sources. The backbone of the TSA performance measurement 

and indicators structure is the Performance Measurement Information System 

(PMIS), which collects data from all federalized commercial airports as well as from 

the five airports that are under private screening contracts. Source data include 

screener employee census data, payroll, passenger throughput, passenger wait times 

by screening checkpoint, items confiscated, and machine performance, among other 

data. Additionally, PMIS contains sizing information on airports, checkpoints, lanes, 

and machines that produce a number of standard and ad hoc reports. In August 

2004, TSA deployed the Performance Information Management System (PIMS), a 

business intelligence tool that allows greater ad hoc reporting using multiple TSA 

data collection systems, including PMIS and the Performance and Results Information System (PARIS), used to collect data on incidents, inspections and investigations at the Nation’s ports. 

The Threat Image Projection (TIP) systems embedded in x-ray machines at use 

in airports superimposes randomly selected threat images on x-ray screens during 

actual operations and records whether or not screeners identify the threat object. 

TSA combines the live covert testing results with the results from TIP automated 

testing for a more complete picture of TSA’s effectiveness in aviation security 

screening operations. The results of these assessment processes are analyzed for 

trends and emerging vulnerabilities in order focus training plans on areas needing 

strengthening. 

TSA also uses surveys, listening sessions, and other mechanisms to receive quantitative and qualitative information from passengers and other customers, industry 

stakeholders, and employees. This outreach ensures that the performance measurements encompass all aspects of our business, including efficiency and customer satisfaction.

5. At what percentage of airports are airport workers permitted to bypass 

screening checkpoints, relying upon identification cards for security 

checks? Are strategies being evaluated to increase the screening of airport 

workers? 

Answer: The Airport Security Plan (ASP) at each airport governs procedures for 

airport employees that require access to sterile and SIDA areas, including whether 

they are authorized to access the sterile and SIDA areas respectively upon presenting their SIDA or sterile area badges. Federal Security Directors must approve 

the ASPs for the airports that they oversee. 

TSA is actively strengthening safeguards regarding access to Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) and sterile areas of our Nation’s airports. The sheer quantity of airport workers with SIDA credentials and the fact that they would have access to a wide variety of tools and equipment within the SIDA area preclude any 

simplistic solutions. TSA’s security strategy uses a ‘‘system of systems’’ approach 

whereby each security ring contributes to TSA’s overall security system but the 

overall system does not rely exclusively on any one component. In other words, the 

different security components complement and reinforce each other. 
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1The Air Cargo Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which includes the ACSSP, was published in the Federal Register in November 2004 and is one in a series of steps of steps toward 

codifying air cargo security measures first introduced to industry in the form of security directives and emergency amendments after the 9/11 attacks. 

TSA recently completed a review of the access for airport and airline workers to 

SIDA and sterile areas of airports and has significantly strengthened security policies. Details of the policies contain sensitive security information and can be shared 

in the appropriate manner. 

An extensive background investigation is necessary for one to be issued either a 

SIDA or Sterile Area badge. The background investigation consists of 3 parts: (1) 

an FBI fingerprint based criminal history records check (CHRC) with specific outstanding arrests or convictions resulting in disqualification, (2) a name-based check 

against the TSA No Fly and Selectee lists which provide links to potential terrorists, 

and (3) a name-based security threat assessment on all SIDA and Sterile area workers. The latter component is a new requirement recently enacted by TSA. 

TSA will continue to review security processes relating to access to sensitive areas 

of airports and identify further enhancements where appropriate. While no single 

measure will provide a 100% security guarantee, TSA’s current procedures represent a significant set of mutually reinforcing safeguards when taken as a whole 

and are consistent with our layered security approach.

6. Air cargo security has received increasing scrutiny as a potential ‘‘soft’’ 

target vulnerable to some sort of terrorist action, yet thus matter has not 

received sustained attention. TSA essentially relies on the Known Shipper 

Program to ensure the security of air cargo shipments-tender this program, 

cargo from unknown shippers is declined loading aboard aircraft. However, a number of terrorism experts and others note that such programs 

could be compromised by terrorists who might pose as legitimate businesses for a period of time, establish credibility, and then strike. 

What steps is TSA taking to secure air cargo, especially cargo that originates overseas; and what is the level of cooperation and coordination with 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)? 

Answer: TSA, in coordination with CBP and the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, has taken numerous steps to strengthen air cargo security. In November, 2003, TSA issued revised security mandates requiring random inspection 

of air cargo transported on both all-cargo and passenger aircraft. In December, TSA 

adopted a comprehensive Air Cargo Security Strategic Plan (ACSSP), based on recommendations from the ASAC Air Cargo working group.1 Additionally, earlier this 

year, TSA deployed our Known Shipper Database which has centralized the collection of data on about 450,000 known shippers and enabled vetting against government databases. TSA’s Known Shipper Database will be just one element of our 

planned Freight Assessment program which will be designed to identify high risk 

cargo that will be subjected to further inspection prior to transport by passenger aircraft. 

CBP is an integral partner to TSA in the development and implementation of several important air cargo programs, including freight assessment. Currently TSA and 

CBP have four distinct working groups dedicated to the advancement of freight assessment components.

7. CAPPS II has generated considerable controversy and, as detailed by 

a recent GAO report, faces a number of technical and operational challenges. What specific steps is TSA taking to respond to the challenges that 

GAO identified-TSA had not fully addressed seven of eight key issues, including accuracy of data, prevention of unauthorized access, and privacy 

concerns; and implement the recommendations it made? 

Answer: TSA concurred with the findings of the GAO report on CAPPS II when 

it was released. One of the primary reasons for the ‘‘weaknesses’’ cited by GAO was 

the fact that, thus far, the Department has not been able to conduct any testing. 

DHS believes that once a reasonable amount of testing has been conducted, it will 

be in a far better position to address and resolve the concerns raised by the GAO 

report. 

After a review of airline passenger prescreening programs, and bearing in mind 

GAO’s findings, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has developed a 

new program for screening domestic airline passengers in order to enhance the security and safety of domestic airline travel called Secure Flight. 

The Department has learned valuable lessons regarding passenger pre-screening 

and will be incorporating these lessons into Secure Flight. During the Secure Flight 

testing phase, TSA will: 
50

• Compare historic passenger name record (PNR) information against expanded 

and consolidated watch lists held in the Terrorist Screening Center database to 

identify known or suspected terrorists. 

• TSA will also apply, within the Secure Flights system, a streamlined version 

of the existing CAPPS rule set related to suspicious indicators associated with 

travel behavior as identified in passengers’ itinerary-specific PNR. 

Additionally, on a very limited basis, TSA will also test the use of commercial 

data to determine if this approach is effective in identifying passenger information 

that is incorrect or inaccurate. 

Secure Flight will be continuously monitored to identify and delete factors that 

do not contribute to the effective and efficient assessment of terrorist risk. Additionally, the TSA Civil Rights and Privacy Offices, and when appropriate the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the DHS Privacy Office, will be involved 

in redress process for the new program. The full protection of privacy and civil liberties remains a core principle for any passenger pre-screening system. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE LAMAR SMITH

My question pertains to the Transportation Worker Identification Program (TWIC): 

As you know, Congress overwhelmingly approved and appropriated the funds necessary to study, develop, test and deploy a credentialing program that contained biometric identification procedures to require that transportation workers be authenticated before gaming access to secure areas, facilities and networks. While Congress 

has been patient through the transition of the TSA from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Severity [sic] and the subsequent change 

of its leadership, the TWIC program has unfortunately floundered and has been unnecessarily delayed.

Would you please update the Members of this Committee on the status 

of TWIC and the Department’s plans and timeline to fully deploy this biometric identification card program to all transportation workers? 

Answer: In May 2002, DOT transitioned the lead for the TWIC project to TSA. 

In August 2002, additional Congressional guidance resulted in modification of the 

TWIC implementation planning and program timeline. An extensive Technology 

Phase was inserted into the plan prior to conducting an operational prototype. The 

Technology Phase evaluated the full range of credential-based technologies. The 

Technology Phase contract was released in April 2003, and the phase was completed 

in October 2003. The results of the Technology Phase confirmed that the most appropriate technology for the core TWIC requirements was the integrated circuit chip 

(ICC) smart card. Concurrent with Technology Evaluation, planning for the Prototype Phase occurred. 

At the completion of the Technology Phase, a review of the TWIC program occurred prior to commencement of the Prototype Phase. Based upon this review, the 

Request for Proposal for the TWIC Prototype Phase was approved for release in 

June 2004, and the contract was awarded in August 2004. The Prototype Phase is 

being conducted over a seven-month period. Upon its completion, the results will be 

reviewed, and a final decision is expected to be made in the 2nd quarter of FY05 

with regards to national implementation.

Please share with us the Department’s plans to address the National policy issues surrounding the deployment of these cards including: which 

transportation workers will be issued a card and what is the plan for financing of the necessary infrastructure. 

Answer: TSA has announced plans in the Federal Register to commence the development of a rule making process that will provide more explicit guidance for specific populations that will use the TWIC to gain access to secure areas. Additionally, 

TSA is conducting the required planning and stakeholder outreach, including a detailed Privacy Impact Assessment. 

In accordance with Congressional guidance, TSA is developing a user fee-based 

funding strategy, and plans to transition to fully fee-based funding for TWIC in 

FY06.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE JIM TURNER

Responses to the following questions have not been recieved. 

1. You testified that ‘‘[a]t airport checkpoints, highly trained and qualified TSA personnel screen passengers and carry-on items, using state-ofthe-art equipment.’’ However, at a previous hearing before the House Government Reform Committee (November 20, 2003), you stated ‘‘I agree with 

you completely that the technology we’e using is somewhat better than 9/

11 but not a lot. It is the same type of technology. We’ve replaced all the 

metal detectors with the latest generation, but it is still the pre-9/11 x-ray 

and metal detection technology.’’ Please provide the Committee with a description of the types of equipment needed and timeline for expected deployment of new products under Projects Phoenix and Manhattan II.

2. Does DHS still intend to conduct a risk assessment for all cargo by the 

end of fiscal year 2005? If so, who will conduct the risk assessment, what 

information will that be based on, how and when will that information by 

provided to DHS, what will constitute a sufficiently high level of risk to 

trigger action, and what will that action be?

3. You stated that one third of the known shippers are currently in TSA’s 

database. How many companies do you ultimately expect to be in the database? What is TSA’s policy for verifying that known shipper companies are 

complying with security regulations, both in terms of written and physical 

inspections?

4. Please provide details on the background checks that are conducted 

for known shipper companies, airport workers in sterile and secure areas, 

and screeners. For each, please provide the number of checks that have 

been conducted, who conducts the checks, and what types and sources of 

information are included in the checks.

5. You testified that TSA will minimum security training for flight attendants will be ‘‘piloted later this fiscal year and be ready to deliver it next 

year.’’ Can you provide a timeline and description of the training? 

6. How many airports currently rely on positive passenger—bag match as 

the only security measure on checked baggage? When will no baggage rely 

solely on the passenger—bag match as a security measure?

7. You mentioned the exemplary work of the rail information sharing and 

analysis center (ISAC). Does TSA intend to create and use a similar structure for the aviation sector? Will there be a sector coordinator? Has there 

been interest from the aviation community in establishing an ISAC?

8. You testified that the Transportation Security Operations Center is the 

point of contact for local transit authorities with security issues, but that 

the Federal Transit Administration also plays a role. Please clarify the responsibilities of the TSOC and the FTA, and indicate any operations that 

are conducted solely at the TSOC.

9. TSA officials have testified that many airports—far beyond the current 

set of eight—have a legitimate need for letters of intent (LOIs) to better deploy EDS machines. The President’s fiscal year 2005 budget request include 

no funds to sign new LOIs. What is TSA’s long term budget plan for LOIs?

10. The GAO report on CAPPS II in February, 2004, said that only one of 

the eight criteria that TSA and DHS need to meet before implementing the 

system had been met. Since then, has GAO told determined that any of the 

remaining seven criteria have been met? When does TSA expect to be ready 

to deploy CAPPS II?

11. I understand that TSA’s pilot program on the registered traveler program may include using dedicating checkpoint screener lanes for registered travelers. Screening resources, in terms of TSA personnel, equipment, and physical airport space, are already stretched thin and can’t be 

increased in the short term. Won’t this proposal to dedicate screeners and 

detection equipment to a small percentage of the passengers mean that the 

overwhelming majority of travelers will face even longer lines, and that it 

will be even more difficult than it is now to fully screen all passengers and 

baggage? Can you explain how this system will run without compounding 

the screening problems we already have?

12. The Committee has heard from armed federal law enforcement officers traveling on commercial flights that their status is revealed at several 

points in the airport, including in conversations with airline personnel at 

check-in, in noticeable bypassing of checkpoint screening, and in pre-
52

boarding. What steps, if any, are being used to help law enforcement officers avoid being revealed as such? Are any additional authorities needed 

to help in this regard, either for the security of the federal law enforcement personnel or for aviation security? Regarding TSA’s pilot program for 

federal law enforcement officers traveling with firearms to use the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) to pre-notify 

airport personnel: What airports are involved in this study? What are the 

results of the pilot program in terms of security at the participating airports and the advisability of using NLETS for this purpose?

13. When will TSA complete any steps necessary to determine the appropriate size of the screening workforce, especially in light of increasing air 

travel?

14. Does TSA have a risk-based plan for securing rail and mass transit? 

If so, please provide the Committee with a copy. If not, when will such a 

plan be in place?

15. The American Public Transportation Association has estimated that 

public transportation authorities throughout the country would need to 

spend $6 billion to be reasonably secure. Does TSA agree with that figure? 

If not, what is TSA’s estimate of the cost for adequate transit security? 

What is TSA’s responsibility for helping transit authorities reach that security level?

16. What is TSA’s timeline for completing the requirements in Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive-7 to create an intermodal transportation security strategy? What are the timelines for finishing all the sector specific 

plans?

17. In light of the TSA publication ‘‘Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports’’ released this month: 

• Will TSA monitor, on an ongoing basis, the progress made by general 

aviation airports in reaching the recommended levels of security? 

• What TSA or FAA funds are available for general aviation airports to 

make security improvements? Has TSA coordinated with FAA to provide financial assistance to help airports implement the guidelines?

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