a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

November 2005 MILITARY 

READINESS

Navy’s Fleet Response 

Plan Would Benefit 

from a Comprehensive 

Management 

Approach and 

Rigorous Testing

GAO-06-84
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2005

MILITARY READINESS

Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would 

Benefit from a Comprehensive 

Management Approach and Rigorous 

Testing 

Highlights of GAO-06-84, a report to 

congressional committees 

The Navy has been transforming 

itself to better meet 21st century

needs. Since 2000, the Congress 

has appropriated about $50 billion 

annually for the Navy to operate

and maintain its forces and support 

around 376,000 military personnel. 

In recognizing that the Navy faces 

affordability issues in sustaining

readiness within its historical share 

of the defense budget, the Chief of

Naval Operations announced a 

concept called the Fleet Response 

Plan to enhance its deployment

readiness status. The Fleet 

Response Plan is designed to more 

rapidly prepare and sustain

readiness in ships and squadrons. 

GAO evaluated the extent to which 

the Navy has (1) employed a sound

management approach in

implementing the Fleet Response 

Plan and (2) tested and evaluated

the effectiveness of the plan and 

shared results to improve 

implementation. 

What GAO Recommends

To facilitate implementation of the 

Fleet Response Plan, GAO 

recommends that the Navy develop 

a comprehensive management plan 

with goals and performance 

measures. GAO also recommends 

that the Navy develop a 

comprehensive testing and

evaluation plan to help determine

whether the plan has been

successful. The Department of 

Defense generally agreed with 

GAO’s recommendations and 

described efforts to address them. 

In establishing the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has embraced a major 

change in the way it manages its forces. However, the Navy’s management 

approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan has not fully incorporated 

sound management practices needed to guide and assess implementation. 

These practices include (1) establishing a coherent mission and strategic 

goals, including resource commitments; (2) setting implementation goals and a 

timeline; and (3) establishing a communication strategy. While the Navy has 

taken a number of positive actions to implement the plan, it has not provided 

readiness goals for units other than carrier strike groups; resource and 

maintenance goals; performance measures and timelines; or a 

communications strategy. Sound management practices were not fully 

developed because senior leaders wanted to quickly implement the plan in 

response to changes in the security environment. However, without an overall 

management plan containing all of these elements, it may be difficult for the 

Navy to determine whether its efforts to improve the fleet’s readiness are 

achieving the desired results, adequately measuring overall progress, or 

identifying what resources are needed to implement the Fleet Response Plan.

The Navy has not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or 

developed lessons learned to identify the effectiveness of its implementation

and success over time. Systematic testing and evaluation of new concepts is an

established practice to gain insight into how systems and capabilities will 

perform in actual operations. However, instead of methodically conducting 

realistic tests to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has tried to 

demonstrate the viability of the plan by relying on loosely linked events that 

were not part of an overall test and evaluation strategy. This approach could 

impair the Navy’s ability to validate the plan and evaluate its success over 

time. In addition, the Navy has not used its lessons learned system to share the 

results of its Fleet Response Plan events or as an analytical tool to evaluate the 

progress of the plan and improve implementation, which limits the Navy’s 

ability to identify and correct weaknesses across the fleet.

The U.S.S. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Sailing to Participate in an Exercise 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-84.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 4

Fleet Response Plan Does Not Fully Incorporate Sound 

Management Practices 9 

Navy Has Not Fully Tested and Evaluated the Fleet Response Plan 

or Developed Lessons Learned 12 

Conclusions 20

Recommendations for Executive Action 21 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 22 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 26 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 28 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 33 

Figures 

Figure 1: The U.S.S. George Washington Carrier Strike Group 

Sailing to Participate in an Exercise 5 

Figure 2: Fleet Response Plan Readiness Cycle Is Intended to 

Provide Eight Carriers for Surge Deployments 8 

Figure 3: Best Practice Steps for a Methodical Study Plan Process 14 

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Page i GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

November 22, 2005 

Congressional Committees 

A key goal of Navy senior leadership is to transform the Navy to better 

meet 21st century security challenges. Since 2000, Congress has 

appropriated about $50 billion annually for the Navy to operate and 

maintain its forces and support around 376,000 active military personnel.

Nonetheless, the Navy recognizes it is facing affordability issues related to

sustaining readiness while developing and procuring several types of new 

ships within its historical share of the defense budget. One area where the 

Navy has made significant changes is in its operational posture. In March 

2003, the Chief of Naval Operations initiated the development of a 

concept, which became known as the Fleet Response Plan,1

 to enhance 

the Navy’s deployment readiness status. The Fleet Response Plan, as 

implemented by Fleet Forces Command in May 2003, is designed to more 

rapidly prepare and then sustain readiness in ships and squadrons. To 

achieve this capability, the plan alters prior manning, maintenance, and 

training practices to allow for a more responsive and ready naval force. 

The Navy expects this new readiness approach will enable its forces to 

provide not only presence and engagement in forward areas, but also 

surge a greater number of ships on short-notice in response to significant

crises without increasing the readiness budget. The Fleet Response Plan 

modifies the Navy’s pre-2001 rotational deployment policy, replacing 

6-month routine deployments with more flexible deployment options for 

as many as eight carrier strike groups when and where needed. 

The Fleet Response Plan represents a major change in the way the Navy 

manages its forces. Implementing large-scale change management 

initiatives, such as organizational transformations, can be a complex 

endeavor. Our prior work shows that failure to adequately address—and 

often even consider—a wide variety of management issues is at the heart 

of unsuccessful transformations. We have identified a number of key best

practices and lessons learned from major public and private sector 

 1

 The Fleet Response Plan is also known as the Fleet Readiness Program, or simply “FRP.” 

Page 1 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations.2

 These sound 

management practices include, for example, establishing a coherent 

mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, 

including resource commitments; setting implementation goals and a 

timeline to build momentum and show progress from day one; and 

establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations and 

report related progress. 

We prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s authority and are 

providing it to you because of your oversight of defense issues. We have 

previously reported on the maintenance aspects of the Navy’s Fleet 

Response Plan.3

 This report focuses on the following two questions: (1) To 

what extent has the Navy employed a sound management approach in 

implementing the Fleet Response Plan? (2) To what extent has the Navy 

tested and evaluated the effectiveness of its Fleet Response Plan and 

shared results to improve its implementation? 

To assess the Navy’s management approach in implementing the Fleet 

Response Plan, we obtained and analyzed key messages, briefings, and 

instructions on the Fleet Response Plan and interviewed Department of 

Defense (DOD) and Navy headquarters and fleet officials, and compared 

the Navy’s approach with best practices for transformations of large 

organizations. To assess the extent to which the Navy has tested the 

effectiveness of the Fleet Response Plan and shared results to improve its 

implementation, we obtained briefings from and interviewed Navy 

officials, reviewed and queried the Navy Lessons Learned System to 

determine relevant lessons recorded, and examined Navy guidance on test 

and evaluation efforts. We reviewed and validated the Navy Lessons 

Learned System data and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for 

our analysis. We conducted our review from January 2005 through August 

2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. The scope and methodology used in our review are described in

further detail in appendix I. 

 2

 See GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum on Mergers and Transformation: Lessons 

Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-

293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002); and Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation 

Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,

D.C.: July 2, 2003).

3

 See GAO, Defense Logistics: GAO’s Observations on Maintenance Aspects of the Navy’s

Fleet Response Plan, GAO-04-724R (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004). 

Page 2 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
While the Navy has taken a number of positive actions to establish the 

Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has not fully developed a comprehensive 

management approach to effectively guide, monitor, and assess 

implementation. Sound management practices that provide a framework 

for implementing and managing programs include (1) establishing a 

coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the 

transformation, including resource commitments; (2) establishing a 

communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related 

progress; and (3) setting implementation goals and a timeline to build 

momentum and show progress. The Navy’s implementation of the Fleet 

Response Plan has included some aspects of these practices. For example, 

the Navy has established strategic goals for progressive readiness levels 

for carrier strike groups. However, the Navy has not established specific 

readiness goals for the rest of the fleet or determined the resources 

needed to achieve its goals, although it has stated the plan will be budget 

neutral. The Navy also does not have an official written definition of the

Fleet Response Plan or communications strategy that clearly establishes a

coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the 

transformation, including resource commitments. These sound 

management practices were not fully implemented because senior leaders 

wanted to implement the Fleet Response Plan as quickly as possible in 

response to the Chief of Naval Operations’ direction. Although Navy 

officials recently tasked the Center for Naval Analyses to conduct the 

study to identify potential goals and performance measures, it is not clear 

what the study will recommend or how long it will take for the Navy to

take action. Until an overall management plan is developed, neither the 

Navy nor Congress may be able to determine whether the Fleet Response 

Plan has effectively achieved its goals, measure the plan’s overall progress, 

or determine what resources are needed to implement the plan. 

Results in Brief 

In addition, the Navy has not fully developed a comprehensive set of plans 

to test and evaluate the Fleet Response Plan and has not developed formal 

lessons learned from past exercises to evaluate the plan’s effectiveness. 

DOD has long recognized the importance of testing new concepts by using 

war games and experimentation, and recent Navy guidance stresses the 

importance of establishing a long-range plan for testing complex and novel 

problems. The Navy has identified three loosely linked events that Navy 

officials say demonstrate the viability of the plan. However, none of the 

three events cited by the Navy were part of an overall test and evaluation

strategy to assess the value of the plan in increasing readiness. The Navy

has not developed an overarching test and evaluation plan because Navy 

officials believe existing readiness reports provide adequate information 

to assess the Fleet Response Plan. However, readiness reports do not 

Page 3 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
produce information on important factors such as costs, long-term 

maintenance implications, or quality of life issues. Additionally, the Navy 

did not analyze and evaluate the results of these three events and submit 

formal lessons learned to the Navy Lessons Learned System. Without 

systematic testing and evaluation and use of the lessons learned system, 

the Navy’s ability to validate a complex change like the Fleet Response 

Plan, identify and correct problem areas, and disseminate lessons learned 

throughout the fleet is limited. This not only prevents ship and command 

staffs from learning from the experiences of others, but it also prevents 

the Navy Lessons Learned System from possibly identifying problems and 

patterns across the fleet that may require a high-level, Navy-wide response. 

To facilitate implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, we recommend 

that the Navy develop a comprehensive management plan with goals and

performance measures. We also recommend that the Navy develop a 

comprehensive testing and evaluation plan to help determine whether the 

Fleet Response Plan has been successful. In its comments on a draft of 

this report, DOD generally concurred with the report’s recommendations. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a comprehensive 

management plan with goals and performance measures, citing several 

actions it has underway or planned. DOD partially concurred with our 

recommendation to test and evaluate the Fleet Response Plan. However, 

DOD does not plan to conduct no-notice surges as we recommended 

because it views such exercises as unnecessary and costly. We continue to 

believe that no-notice surges are important because they can serve as an

effective means of gauging whether the Navy is ready to respond to real 

world events, which can occur with little notice. DOD comments and our

evaluation are discussed on pages 21 and 22. 

Carrier strike groups are typically centered around an aircraft carrier and

its air wing, and also include a guided missile cruiser; two guided missile 

destroyers; a frigate; an attack submarine; and one or more supply ships 

with ammunition, fuel, and supplies (such as food and spare parts). These 

groups are formed and disestablished on an as needed basis, and their 

compositions may differ though they contain similar types of ships. Figure 

1 shows a carrier strike group sailing in a group formation as it prepares to 

participate in an exercise. 

Background 

Composition of a Carrier 

Strike Group 

Page 4 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Figure 1: The U.S.S. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Sailing to Participate 

in an Exercise

Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, only those Navy ships 

and air squadrons at peak readiness were deployed overseas, usually for 

6 months at a time. Most of the Navy’s remaining units were not available 

because they were in early stages of their maintenance or training cycles, 

or because the Navy did not have good visibility of the readiness of these 

units. This prompted the Chief of Naval Operations in March 2003 to task 

the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, to develop the Fleet Response 

Plan concept to enhance the Navy’s surge capability. The Chief of Naval 

Operations approved the concept in May 2003 and further directed the 

Commander, Fleet Forces Command, to be responsible and accountable

for effectively implementing the plan.

The Fleet Response Plan emphasizes an increased level of readiness and 

the ability to quickly deploy naval forces to respond to crises, conflicts, or 

homeland defense needs. The plan applies broadly to the entire fleet; 

however, it only sets specific requirements for carrier strike groups. For 

example, the plan calls for eight carrier strike groups to be ready to deploy 

Origin of the Fleet 

Response Plan 

Fleet Response Plan 

Believed to Provide 

Increased and Flexible 

Readiness 

Page 5 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
within 90 days of notification. Six of them would be available to deploy 

within 30 days and the other two within 90 days. This is commonly 

referred to as the 6 + 2 goal. Under the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has 

developed a surge capability schedule that it uses to manage and identify 

the level of training a ship has completed and its readiness to deploy. The 

schedule contains three progressive readiness goals: emergency surge, 

surge-ready, and routine deployable status.4

 Each readiness goal specifies 

phases of training that must be completed to achieve the goal. To be 

placed in emergency surge status, a ship or an air squadron needs to have

completed its unit-level phase training. Achieving surge-ready status 

requires the completion of integrated phase training. Attaining routine 

deployable status requires achievement of all necessary capabilities, 

completion of underway sustainment phase training, and certification of 

the unit for forward deployed operations.5

The surge capabilities schedule provides a readiness snapshot for each 

ship, allowing decision makers to quickly determine which ships are 

available to meet the needs of the mission. Figure 2 illustrates how the 

Navy notionally identifies the eight aircraft carriers available for surge 

deployments. The carriers numbered 1 through 6 are expected to be ready 

to deploy within 30 days notice. The carriers labeled “+1” and “+2” are 

expected to able to surge within 90 days notice. The six surge-ready 

carriers include two carriers on deployment (numbered 3 and 4), one 

carrier that is part of the forward deployed naval force based in Japan 

(number 6), and three carriers in the sustainment phase (numbered 1, 2, 

and 5). These six carriers are expected to have completed postdeployment 

 4

 Emergency surge status means a unit can be employed in case of urgent need but does so

at levels of operational risk correlating to the level of capability achieved at the time of

emergency surge. Surge-ready status means that units are ready to be employed at more

acceptable levels of operational risk commensurate with the level of capability achieved at

the time of the requirement to surge. Routine deployable status means a unit has achieved

all required capabilities, completed underway training requirements, and is certified for 

forward deployed operations.

5

 Unit-level phase training focuses on completion of unit-level training requirements, 

including team training both on board and ashore; unit-level exercises in port and at sea; 

and unit inspections, assessments, certifications, and qualifications. During this phase, a 

unit becomes proficient in all required capabilities, meets the training commander’s

certification criteria, and becomes ready for more complex integrated training events. 

Integrated phase training brings individual units together to conduct strike-group-level 

integrated training and operations in a challenging operational environment as a foundation

for performing their anticipated deployed mission. Sustainment phase training exercises 

units and staffs in multimission planning and execution, including the ability to 

interoperate effectively in a wartime environment. 

Page 6 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
depot-level maintenance and their unit-level phase training. The two 

additional surge carriers are expected to have completed depot-level 

maintenance but not to have completed unit-level phase training. The 

remaining four carriers are in the maintenance phase or deep 

maintenance.6

 6

 The maintenance phase consists of depot-level shipyard maintenance for a period of 6 to 

12 months. Deep maintenance is for a period of 2 to 3 years for a nuclear-refueling 

overhaul. 

Page 7 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Figure 2: Fleet Response Plan Readiness Cycle Is Intended to Provide Eight Carriers for Surge Deployments 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Maintenance phase Unit-level phase Integrated phase

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Sustainment phase Deployment

Deep maintenance

25 27 26

Sustainment

Months of the

readiness cycle

+1 +2

1 2 3 4

5

ES SR

FDNF

6

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.

FDNF

ES

SR Surge ready

Forward deployed naval forces

Emergency surge

Revised Fleet Response 

Plan Is Being Developed 

Based on the Navy’s experiences during the past 2 years, Fleet Forces 

Command has convened a cross-functional working group to develop a 

refined version of the Fleet Response Plan. This update, known as Fleet 

Response Plan-Enhanced, is intended to further define the Fleet Response 

Plan, modify terminology for progressive readiness states to better reflect 

Page 8 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
their meaning, tie in elements such as a human capital strategy, and 

expand the focus of the plan beyond carrier strike groups to the entire 

Navy. It may also extend the Fleet Response Plan’s current employment 

cycle length of 27 months. The Fleet Response Plan-Enhanced is still 

under development at this time. 

The Navy’s management approach in establishing the Fleet Response Plan 

as its new readiness construct has not fully incorporated sound 

management practices needed to effectively guide, monitor, and assess 

implementation.7

 Studies by several organizations have shown that 

successful organizations in both the public and private sectors use sound 

management practices to assist agencies in measuring performance, 

reporting results, and achieving desired outcomes. These practices 

provide management with a framework for effectively implementing and

managing programs and shift program management focus from measuring 

program activities and processes to measuring program outcomes. Sound 

management practices include (1) establishing a coherent mission and 

integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, including resource 

commitments; (2) setting implementation goals and a timeline to build 

momentum and show progress from day one; and (3) establishing a 

communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related 

progress. 

Fleet Response Plan 

Does Not Fully 

Incorporate Sound 

Management 

Practices 

The Navy’s implementation of the Fleet Response Plan has included some 

aspects of these practices. For example, the Navy has established some 

strategic goals needed to meet the intent of the plan, such as the 

progressive readiness levels of emergency surge, surge-ready, and routine

deployable status. The Navy also has established specific training actions 

to support these goals, such as that carrier strike groups must complete 

unit-level training to be certified as emergency surge-ready. However, 

other actions taken by the Navy do not fully incorporate these practices.

For example, the Navy has identified the 6 + 2 surge capability as a 

readiness goal and performance measure for carrier strike groups, but no

such goal was established for the rest of the fleet. The Navy also has some 

unofficial goals and performance measures regarding manning and 

maintenance, but these unofficial goals and performance measures have 

 7

 The Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 to provide 

for, among other things, the establishment of strategic planning and performance 

measurement in the federal government. Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

Page 9 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
not been formally established. For example, briefings on the Fleet 

Response Plan state that the Navy desires and needs fully manned ships 

(i.e., manning at 100 percent of a ship’s requirement) for the program to be 

successful. Moreover, according to Navy officials, the Navy has not 

established milestones for achieving its results. 

In addition, 2 years after initiating implementation of the Fleet Response 

Plan, the Navy still does not have an official written definition of the Fleet 

Response Plan that clearly establishes a coherent mission and integrated 

strategic goals to guide the transformation, including resource 

commitments. This definition would describe the Fleet Response Plan’s 

total scope and contain guidance with formal goals and performance 

measures. The Navy recently has taken some action to address this area. 

In February 2005, the Navy directed the Center for Naval Analyses to 

conduct a study to develop formal definitions and guidance as well as 

identify goals and performance measures for the plan. However, it remains 

to be seen whether this study will be completed as planned by November 

2005; if it will recommend developing and implementing sound 

management practices, such as goals, measures, milestones, and timelines; 

and whether any management improvement recommendations made in the 

study will be implemented by the Fleet Forces Command, the Navy 

command responsible for implementing the Fleet Response Plan. Without

goals, performance measures, timelines, milestones, benchmarks, and 

guidance to help effectively manage implementation of the Fleet Response 

Plan and determine if the plan is achieving its goals, the Navy may find it 

more difficult to implement the Fleet Response Plan across the entire 

naval force.

Moreover, despite the Navy’s unofficial goal that the Fleet Response Plan 

be budget neutral, as articulated in briefings and by senior leaders, the 

Navy has not yet clearly identified the resources needed to achieve its 

goals or provided a rationale for how these resources will contribute to 

achieving the expected level of performance. Navy officials have said that

current operations and maintenance funding levels, as well as manning at 

100 percent of required positions, have contributed to successful 

implementation of the Fleet Response Plan. However, officials do not 

know what level of manning or funding is actually required for program 

success over the long term to avoid any unintended consequences, such as

greater amounts of deferred maintenance. According to Navy officials, it is

difficult to attribute costs to the plan because there is no single budget line 

item that tracks the costs associated with the Fleet Response Plan. 

Without knowing the funding needed, the Navy may not be able to assess 

the impact of possible future changes in funding on implementing the plan. 

Page 10 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Furthermore, without a comprehensive plan that links costs with 

performance measures and outcomes, neither the Navy nor Congress may 

be able to determine if the Fleet Response Plan is actually achieving its 

unofficial goal of being budget neutral. 

Finally, the Navy also has not developed a comprehensive 

communications strategy that reaches out to employees, customers, and 

stakeholders and seeks to genuinely engage them in a two-way exchange, 

which is a critical step in successfully implementing cultural change or 

transformation. We looked for formal mechanisms that communicated the

details of the Fleet Response Plan and spoke with personnel from carrier 

strike groups, aircraft carriers, air wings and an air squadron, one surface 

combatant ship, and other command staff.8

 We found that while the Fleet 

Response Plan was communicated extensively to senior-level officers, and 

the Navy provided numerous briefings and messages related to the plan, 

communication and understanding of the plan did not flow through to the 

lower ranks. While the concept of the Fleet Response Plan is generally

understood by some senior-level officials, many of the lower grade 

personnel on these ships were unaware of the scope, goals, and other 

aspects of the plan. In the absence of clear communication throughout the 

fleet via an overall communications strategy that could increase employee

awareness of the Fleet Response Plan, its successful implementation could 

be impeded.

Sound management practices, such as those noted above, were not fully 

used by the Navy because senior leaders wanted to quickly implement the 

Fleet Response Plan in response to the Chief of Naval Operations’ desires. 

However, without an overall management plan containing all of these 

elements to guide the implementation of such a major change, it may be

difficult for the Navy and Congress to determine the extent to which the 

Fleet Response Plan is achieving the desired results, measure its overall 

progress, or determine the resources needed to implement the plan. 

 8

 We met with people individually and in groups. Personnel included commanding officers,

executive officers, and senior and junior enlisted personnel. Additionally, we met with 

command master chiefs and command career counselors. 

Page 11 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
The Navy has not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or 

developed lessons learned to identify the effectiveness of its 

implementation and success over time. The methodical testing, exercising, 

and evaluation of new doctrines and concepts is an established practice 

throughout the military to gain insight into how systems and capabilities 

will perform in actual operations. However, instead of methodically 

conducting realistic tests to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy 

has tried to demonstrate the viability of the plan by relying on loosely 

linked events that were not part of an overall test and evaluation strategy, 

which impairs the Navy’s ability to validate the plan and evaluate its 

success over time. In addition, the Navy has not used its lessons learned 

system to share the results of its Fleet Response Plan tests or as an 

analytical tool to evaluate the progress of the plan and improve 

implementation, which limits the Navy’s ability to identify and correct 

weaknesses across the fleet. 

Methodically testing, exercising, and evaluating new doctrines and 

concepts is an important and established practice throughout the military. 

DOD has long recognized the importance of using tabletop exercises, war 

games, and experimentation9

 to explore military doctrine, operational 

concepts, and organizational arrangements. Collectively, these tests and 

experiments can provide important insight into how systems and 

capabilities will perform in actual operations. U.S. Joint Forces Command, 

which has lead responsibility for DOD experimentation on new concepts

of operation and technologies, states that its experimental efforts aim to 

foster military innovation and improvement by exploring, developing, and 

transferring new concepts and organizational ideas into operational 

reality. 

Navy Has Not Fully 

Tested and Evaluated 

the Fleet Response 

Plan or Developed 

Lessons Learned 

Methodical Tests and 

Evaluations of New 

Concepts Are Important 

Particularly large and complex issues may require long-term testing and 

evaluation that is guided by study plans. Joint Forces Command’s Joint 

Warfighting Center has an electronic handbook that provides guidance for 

conducting exercises and lays out the steps in an exercise life cycle: 

design; planning; preparation; execution; and analysis, evaluation, and 

reports. The Army also has well-established guidance10 governing service 

 9

 Tabletop exercises are analytical tools that require fewer resources than full-fledged live 

exercises. They provide a means to develop both immediate and long-term solutions among

functional areas, to develop standardization and interoperability of procedures, and to

document best practices for others to utilize.

10 Army Regulation 5-5, Army Studies and Analyses (June 30, 1996). 

Page 12 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
studies, analyses, and evaluations that the Navy feels is representative of 

best practices for military operations research. This provides an important 

mechanism through which problems pertaining to critical issues and other 

important matters are identified and explored to meet service needs. As 

shown in figure 3, the Army’s process involves six major steps that create

a methodical process for developing, conducting, documenting, and 

evaluating a study. Following a formal study process enables data 

evaluation and development of lessons learned that could be used to build 

on the existing knowledge base. In a roundtable discussion with the Fleet 

Forces Command on the rationale behind Summer Pulse 2004, the Navy’s 

major exercise for the Fleet Response Plan, a senior Navy official stated,

“From the concept, ... you need to exercise, ... you need to practice, ... 

you need to demonstrate it to know you got it right and what lessons are 

there to learn from how we did it.”11

 11 Rear Admiral John D. Stufflebeem, “Roundtable: Summer Pulse Discussions With Rear

Admiral John D. Stufflebeem,” Summer Pulse ‘04 News Archive (July 8, 2004), 

http://www.cffc.navy.mil/summerpulse04/stufflebeem-transcript.htm. 

Page 13 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Figure 3: Best Practice Steps for a Methodical Study Plan Process 

Other governmental agencies, like GAO, and the private sector also rely on 

detailed study plans, or data collection and analysis plans, to guide the

development of studies and experiments and the collection and analysis of 

data, and to provide a feedback loop that links the outcomes of the study 

or experiment event and subsequent analysis to the original goals and 

objectives of the study or event. GAO guidance states that data collection 

and analysis plans “should carry forward the overall logic of the study so

that the connection between the data that will be collected and the 

answers to the study questions will become evident.”12

 12 See GAO, Quantitative Data Analysis: An Introduction, GAO/PEMD-10.1.11, ch. 7

(Washington, D.C.: May 1992). 

Page 14 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Recent Navy guidance also recognizes the need for a thorough evaluation

of complex initiatives. In April 2005, the Navy issued a Study Planning 

and Conduct Guide assembled by the Navy Warfare Development 

Command.13 This guide stresses the importance of establishing a longrange plan for complex and novel problems and lays out the rationale for 

detailed study plans for exercises and experiments, as they establish a 

structure in which issues are explored and data are collected and analyzed 

in relation to the established goals or objectives for the event.

Furthermore, the Navy’s guide notes that random, inadequately prepared 

events and a determination just to study the problem do not lead to 

successful resolution of problems that may arise in programs and concepts

that the Navy is testing and evaluating. 

Navy Events to Show 

Viability of the Fleet 

Response Plan Have 

Lacked Methodical Testing 

and Evaluation 

The Navy has not methodically conducted realistic tests of the Fleet 

Response Plan to demonstrate the plan’s viability and evaluate its progress 

and success over time, instead relying on loosely linked events and some 

routine data to demonstrate the viability of the plan. The events identified 

by the Navy as successful tests of the Fleet Response Plan are Summer 

Pulse 2004, the emergency deployment of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, 

and Global War on Terrorism Surge 2005, but of these events only Summer 

Pulse 2004 was driven by the Fleet Response Plan with the intent of 

demonstrating that large numbers of ships could be surged. In addition, 

these events were not part of an overall test and evaluation strategy that 

yielded specific information from which to assess the value of the plan in

increasing readiness and meeting the new 6 + 2 surge capability goal for 

carrier strike groups. 

Summer Pulse 2004 encompassed a number of previously scheduled 

deployments, exercises, and training events that took place between June 

and August of 2004. The intent of Summer Pulse 2004 was to demonstrate 

the Fleet Response Plan’s new readiness construct and the Navy’s ability 

to deploy multiple carrier strike groups of varying levels of readiness. 

However, Summer Pulse 2004 was not a methodical and realistic test of 

the Fleet Response Plan for three reasons. First, Summer Pulse 2004 did 

 13 The Navy Warfare Development Command’s responsibilities include being a champion 

for Navy warfare innovation, operating concepts, and concept of operations development

in a naval, joint, and coalition environment; coordinating the planning and implementation

of the Navy’s experimentation process; managing development, approval, and rapid 

dissemination of naval, joint, and allied doctrine; and managing the Navy’s Lessons Learned 

Program. 

Page 15 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
not follow best practices regarding study plans and the ability to evaluate 

the impact and outcomes of the plan. The Navy did not develop a formal 

study plan identifying study objectives, data collection requirements, and 

analysis, or produce a comprehensive after-event report describing the 

study’s findings. Navy officials have stated that the elements of a formal 

study plan were there for the individual deployments, exercises, and 

training events constituting Summer Pulse 2004, but were not brought 

together in a single package. While the Navy may have had the study 

elements present for the individual exercises, they were not directly linked 

to testing the Fleet Response Plan. Without such a comprehensive study 

plan and overall evaluation, there is no ability to discern potential impacts 

on fleet readiness, maintenance, personnel, and other issues that are 

critical to the Fleet Response Plan’s long-term success. Second, Summer 

Pulse 2004 was not a realistic test because all participating units had 

several months’ warning of the event. As a result, five carriers were 

already scheduled to be at sea and only two had to surge. Because six 

ships are expected to be ready to deploy with as little as 30 days’ notice 

under the plan and two additional carriers within 90 days, a more realistic 

test of the Fleet Response Plan would include no-notice or short-notice 

exercises.14 Such exercises conducted without advance notification to the 

participants would provide the highest degree of challenge and realism. 

Without such exercises, the Navy might not be able to realistically practice 

and coordinate a full surge deployment. Third, Summer Pulse 2004 was not 

a sufficient test because the Navy involved only seven carriers instead of 

the eight carriers called for in the plan. Therefore, it did not fully test the 

Navy’s ability to meet deployment requirements for the expected force. 

Another event cited by the Navy as evidence of the Fleet Response Plan’s

success is the deployment of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln carrier strike 

group while it was in surge status in October 2004. Originally scheduled to

deploy in the spring of 2005, the Lincoln was deployed early to support 

operations in the Pacific Command area of operation and provide aid to 

areas devastated by a tsunami in the Indian Ocean in December 2004. Navy

officials said that the Fleet Response Plan enabled the Navy to identify a 

carrier to send to the Pacific and to quickly tailor its training package 

based on its progressive readiness status. The Navy touted this rapid 

response relief work by a strike group deployed during surge status as a 

 14 No-notice exercises demonstrate participants’ ability to rapidly respond to unexpected 

situations. This type of exercise is valued because it can lead to improvements in 

procedures by exercising participants in a near-real-world context. 

Page 16 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Fleet Response Plan success story. We agree that the Lincoln carrier 

strike group was able to respond quickly. However, the extent to which 

this event realistically tested the Fleet Response Plan’s expectations for 

surging one carrier strike group is not known. As with Summer Pulse 2004, 

the Lincoln deployment was not a methodical test of the Fleet Response 

Plan because there was no plan to systematically collect or analyze data

that would evaluate the outcomes of the Lincoln deployment against Fleet

Response Plan-related study goals. 

The Navy also pointed to a third event, its recent Global War on Terrorism 

Surge 2005,15 as an indicator that the Fleet Response Plan works. The 

Global War on Terrorism surge was a response to a request for forces16

from which the Navy is looking to glean Fleet Response Plan-related 

information about what did and did not work when the ships return. 

However, this is not a good test of the Fleet Response Plan because there 

is no plan showing what specific data are being collected or what 

analytical approaches are being employed to assess the ships’ experiences. 

As of September 2005, no other events had been scheduled to further test 

and evaluate the Fleet Response Plan.

The Navy has not developed the kind of comprehensive plans to test and 

evaluate the Fleet Response Plan as recommended by DOD and Navy 

guidance and best practices because Navy officials have stated that 

existing readiness reporting processes effectively evaluate the Fleet 

Response Plan’s success on a daily basis. They said after-action reports17

from training exercises and the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review18 assist 

 15 In the spring of 2005, the Navy surged five ships in support of the Global War on

Terrorism to work with allies to detect, disrupt, and deny international terrorist 

organizations the use of the maritime environment. These ships will also work to build 

regional security and long-term stability. The five ships are the U.S.S. Saipan (LHA 2), 

U.S.S. Nashville (LPD 13), U.S.S. Nicholas (FFG 47), the U.S.S. Gunston Hall (LSD 44), and 

the U.S.S. Philippine Sea (CG 58). 

16 A request for forces is a special request by a geographic combatant commander through 

the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for forces in addition to the normal, preapproved force

deployments or forces assigned. 

17 An after-action report is a professional discussion of an event, focused on performance

standards, that enables participants to discover for themselves what happened, why it

happened, and how to sustain strengths and address weaknesses. It is a tool that leaders,

trainers, and units can use to get maximum benefit from every mission or task. 

18 The Joint Quarterly Readiness Review is a quarterly readiness assessment that identifies 

capability shortfalls and risks in mission execution and identifies appropriate measures for 

risk reduction.

Page 17 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
with this function. Navy officials explained that they implemented the 

Fleet Response Plan the same way they had implemented the InterDeployment Training Cycle, the predecessor to the Fleet Response Plan’s

Fleet Readiness Training Plan. While this may be true, the InterDeployment Training Cycle was focused on the specific training needed to

prepare units for their next deployment, not for implementing a new 

readiness construct that emphasized surge versus routine deployments. 

Furthermore, the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle did not contain stated 

goals whose validity the Navy needed to test. In addition, ongoing 

readiness reports do not provide information on important factors such as 

costs, long-term maintenance implications, and quality of life issues. 

The Summer Pulse 2004, Lincoln surge deployment, and Global War on 

Terrorism Surge 2005 testing events were not part of a methodical test and 

evaluation approach. Therefore, the Navy is unable to convincingly use

these events to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan and determine whether 

the plan has been successful in increasing readiness or achieving other 

goals. Moreover, without effective evaluation of the Fleet Response Plan,

the Navy may be unable to identify and correct potential problem areas 

across the fleet. Without a comprehensive long-range plan that establishes 

methodical and realistic testing of the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy may 

be unable to validate the Fleet Response Plan operational concept, 

evaluate its progress and success over time, and ensure that it can 

effectively meet Navy goals over the long term without any adverse, 

unintended consequences for maintenance, quality of life, and fleet 

readiness. 

Navy Lessons Learned 

System’s Repository and 

Analytic Resources Have 

Not Been Used to Catalog 

and Share Fleet Response 

Plan Lessons 

The formal Navy repository for lessons learned, the Navy Lessons Learned 

System, has not been used to disseminate Fleet Response Plan-related 

lessons learned or to analyze test results to evaluate the progress of the 

plan and improve implementation. The Navy Lessons Learned System has 

been designated by the Chief of Naval Operations as the singular Navy 

program for the collection, validation, and distribution of unit feedback as

well as the correction of problems identified and derived from fleet 

operations, exercises, and miscellaneous events. However, there are no 

mechanisms or requirements in place to force ships, commands, and 

numbered fleet staffs to submit all lessons learned to the Navy Lessons 

Learned System, although such mechanisms exist for the submission of 

port visit and other reports. For the events that the Navy cites as tests of 

the Fleet Response Plan, it did not analyze and evaluate the results and 

produce formal lessons learned to submit to the Navy Lessons Learned 

System for recordation and analysis. Any evaluation done of the testing 

Page 18 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
events has not been incorporated into the Lessons Learned System, 

preventing comprehensive analyses of lessons learned and identification 

of problems and patterns across the fleet that may require a high-level, 

Navy-wide response. 

Some ship and carrier strike group staff informed us that they prefer 

informal means of sharing lessons learned, because they feel the process 

through which ships and commands have to submit lessons learned for 

validation and inclusion in the database can be complex and indirect. This

may prevent ship and command staffs across the fleet from learning from 

the experiences of others, but it also prevents the Navy Lessons Learned 

System from performing comprehensive analyses of the lessons learned 

and possibly identifying problems and patterns across the fleet that may 

require a high-level Navy-wide response. In addition, the lessons learned 

are recorded by mission or exercise (e.g., Operation Majestic Eagle) and 

not by operational concept (e.g., the Fleet Response Plan), making 

identification of Fleet Response Plan-specific lessons learned difficult and 

inconsistent. 

Over the last 10 years, we have issued several reports related to lessons 

learned developed by the military. We have found that service guidance 

does not always require standardized reporting of lessons learned19 and 

lessons learned are not being used in training or analyzed to identify 

trends and performance weaknesses.20 We emphasized that effective 

guidance and sharing of lessons learned are key tools used to 

institutionalize change and facilitate efficient operations. We found that 

despite the existence of lessons learned programs in the military services 

and the Joint Staff, units repeat many of the same mistakes during major 

training exercises and operations. Our current review indicates that the 

Navy still does not include all significant information in its lessons learned 

database. Therefore, Navy analysts cannot use the database to perform 

comprehensive analyses of operational concepts like the Fleet Response 

Plan to evaluate progress and improve implementation. 

 19 See GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to Establish 

Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat Training Centers, 

GAO-05-8 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2005), and Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully

Evaluate Options and Provide Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship 

Rotational Crewing, GAO-05-10 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 11, 2004). 

20 See GAO, Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past Mistakes

Is Largely Untapped, GAO/NSIAD-95-152 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 9, 1995). 

Page 19 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Officials from the Navy Warfare Development Command stated that the

Navy is currently drafting a new Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 

governing the Navy Lessons Learned System that will address some of 

these issues.21 Navy Warfare Development Command officials hope that 

the new instruction will result in several improvements over the current 

system. First, they would like to see a dual reporting system, so that 

lessons learned are simultaneously sent to the Navy Lessons Learned 

System for preliminary evaluation when they are submitted to the 

numbered fleets for validation. This would allow Navy Lessons Learned 

analysts to look at unvarnished data for patterns or issues of interest to 

the Chief of Naval Operations, without taking away the numbered fleets’ 

validation processes. In addition, officials would like to establish deadlines 

for the submission of lessons learned to ensure timeliness. Not only will 

these changes add value to the data stored in the Navy Lessons Learned 

System, but they will keep the data flowing while ensuring that data are 

actually submitted and not lost as they move up the chain of command. 

According to Navy Lessons Learned officials, other branches of the 

military already allow operators in the field to submit lessons learned 

directly to their lessons learned systems, enabling value-added analysis 

and the timely posting of information. By addressing these issues, the 

Navy can help ensure that the lessons learned process will become more 

efficient, be a command priority, and produce actionable results. 

Two years after implementing a major change in how it expects to operate

in the future, the Navy has not taken all of the steps needed to enable the

Navy or Congress to assess the effectiveness of the Fleet Response Plan. 

As the Navy prepares to implement the Fleet Response Plan across the 

entire naval force, it becomes increasingly important that the Navy 

effectively manages this organizational transformation so that it can

determine if the plan is achieving its goals. The absence of a more 

comprehensive overarching management plan to implement the Fleet 

Response Plan has left essential questions about definitions, goals, 

performance measures, guidance, timelines, milestones, benchmarks, and 

resources unanswered, even though sound management practices 

recognize the need for such elements to successfully guide activities and 

measure outcomes. The absence of these elements could impede effective

Conclusions 

 21 Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.37D, currently being drafted, would replace 

Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.37C, March 19, 2001, Navy Lessons Learned

System. 

Page 20 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
implementation of the Fleet Response Plan. Furthermore, without a 

comprehensive plan that links costs with performance measures and 

outcomes, neither the Navy nor Congress may be able to determine if the 

Fleet Response Plan is budget neutral. More effective communications 

throughout the fleet using an overall communications strategy could 

increase employee awareness of the plan and help ensure successful 

implementation. 

The Navy also has not developed a comprehensive long-range plan for 

testing and evaluating the Fleet Response Plan. Without a well-developed 

plan and methodical testing, the Navy may not be aware of all of the 

constraints to successfully surging its forces to crises in a timely manner. 

Moreover, the absence of an overarching testing and evaluation plan that

provides for data collection and analysis may impede the Navy’s ability to 

use its testing events to determine whether the Fleet Response Plan has 

been successful in increasing readiness and to identify and correct 

problem areas across the fleet. Failure to document and record the results 

of testing and evaluation efforts in the Navy Lessons Learned System 

could limit the Navy’s ability to validate the value of the concept, identify

and correct performance weaknesses and trends across the fleet, perform 

comprehensive analyses of lessons learned, and disseminate these lessons 

and analyses throughout the fleet. 

To facilitate successful implementation of the Fleet Response Plan and 

enhance readiness and ensure the Navy can determine whether the plan 

has been successful in increasing readiness and is able to identify and 

correct performance weaknesses and trends across the fleet, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive overarching 

management plan based on sound management practices that will clearly

define goals, measures, guidance, and resources needed for 

implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, to include the following 

elements: 

• establishing or revising Fleet Response Plan goals that identify what 

Fleet Response Plan results are to be expected and milestones for 

achieving these results, 

• developing implementing guidance and performance measures based 

on these goals, 

• identifying the costs and resources needed to achieve each 

performance goal, and 

• communicating this information throughout the Navy. 

Page 21 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
• Direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive plan for 

methodical and realistic testing and evaluation of the Fleet Response Plan. 

Such a comprehensive plan should include a description of the following 

elements: 

• how operational tests, exercises, war games, experiments, 

deployments, and other similar events will be used to show the 

performance of the new readiness plan under a variety of conditions, 

including no-notice surges; 

• how data will be collected and analyzed for these events and 

synthesized to evaluate program success and improvements; and 

• how the Navy Lessons Learned System will collect and synthesize 

lessons from these events to avoid repeating mistakes and improve 

future operations. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred 

with our recommendations and cited actions it will take to implement the 

recommendations. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Navy should develop a 

comprehensive overarching management plan based on sound 

management practices that would clearly define the goals, measures, 

guidance, and resources needed for successful implementation of the Fleet

Response Plan, including communicating this information throughout the 

Navy. DOD noted that the Navy has already taken action or has plans in 

place to act on this recommendation, and described several specific 

accomplishments and ongoing efforts in this regard. DOD also noted that 

the Navy intends to communicate through message traffic, white papers, 

instructions, lectures, and meetings with Navy leadership. We agree that 

these means of communication are an important part of an effective 

communication strategy; however, we do not believe that these methods 

of communication constitute a systemic strategy to ensure communication 

at all personnel levels. We believe the Navy would benefit from a 

comprehensive communication strategy that builds on its ongoing efforts, 

but encompasses additional actions to ensure awareness of the plan 

throughout the Navy. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to test and evaluate 

the Fleet Response Plan. DOD noted that it plans to use a variety of events

and war games to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan, but it does not see a 

need to conduct no-notice surges to test the Fleet Response Plan. DOD 

stated that it believes no-notice surges are expensive and unnecessary and 

could lead to penalties on overall readiness and the ability to respond to 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 22 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
emergent requirements. DOD also noted that the Navy has surged single 

carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, and individual ships or 

units under the Fleet Response Plan, and it cited several examples of such 

surges. We commend the Navy’s plans to use a variety of events to 

evaluate the Fleet Response Plan and its use of the Navy Lessons Learned

System to report and evaluate the lessons learned in the Global War on 

Terrorism Surge 2005 exercise held earlier this year. However, we 

continue to believe that no-notice surges are critical components of 

realistic testing and evaluation plans and that the benefits of such 

exercises can outweigh any additional costs associated with conducting 

such tests on a no-notice basis. Both we and Congress have long 

recognized the importance of no-notice exercises. For example, in a 1989 

report, we noted that DOD was instituting no-notice exercises to assess 

the preparedness of combatant commands’ state of training of their staffs 

and components.22 In addition, in 1990 the Department of Energy 

conducted no-notice tests of security personnel in response to our work 

and out of recognition that such tests are the best way to assess a security 

force’s ability at any given time.23 Furthermore, in recent years, the 

Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, and others have 

conducted no-notice exercises because they add realism and demonstrate 

how well organizations are actually prepared to respond to a given 

situation. Despite the importance of no-notice exercises, the Navy has not 

conducted no-notice exercises to test and evaluate the centerpiece surge 

goal of 6 + 2 for carrier strike groups. We believe that the smaller surges 

cited by DOD can provide insights into the surging process, but we do not 

believe that such surges can effectively test the Navy’s readiness for a full 

6 + 2 carrier strike group surge. 

DOD also provided technical and editorial comments, which we have 

incorporated as appropriate. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II 

of this report. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; and the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available 

 22 See GAO, Defense Reorganization: Progress and Concerns at JCS and Combatant 

Commands, GAO/NSIAD-89-83 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 1989). 

23 See GAO, Nuclear Safety: Potential Security Weaknesses at Los Alamos and Other DOE 

Facilities, GAO/RCED-91-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 11, 1990). 

Page 23 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III. 

Janet St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities 

and Management 

Page 24 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
List of Committees 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 25 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the extent to which the Navy has employed a sound 

management approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan, we 

interviewed Navy headquarters and fleet officials; received briefings from 

relevant officials; and reviewed key program documents. In the absence of 

a comprehensive planning document, we compared best practices for 

managing and implementing major efforts to key Navy messages, 

directives, instructions, and briefings, including, but not limited to, the 

Culture of Readiness message sent by the Chief of Naval Operations 

(March 2003); the Fleet Response Concept message sent by the Chief of 

Naval Operations (May 2003); the Fleet Response Plan Implementation

message sent by the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (May 2003); the

Fleet Response Plan Implementation Progress message sent by the 

Commander, Third Fleet (September 2003); and the U.S. Fleet Forces 

Command’s Fleet Training Strategy instruction (May 2002 and an undated 

draft). We also conducted meetings with several of the commanding 

officers, executive officers, and department heads of selected carrier 

strike groups, aircraft carriers, and air wings to obtain information on how 

the plan had been communicated, how the plan had changed their 

maintenance and training processes, the impact on their quality of life, the 

cost implications of the plan, and other factors. 

To assess the extent to which the Navy has tested the effectiveness of the 

Fleet Response Plan and shared results to improve its implementation, we

obtained briefings; interviewed Navy headquarters and fleet officials; and 

reviewed test and evaluation guidance for both the Navy and other federal 

agencies. To evaluate the three Fleet Response Plan demonstrations 

identified by the Navy, we interviewed officials from the Fleet Forces 

Command and the Navy Warfare Development Command, reviewed 

existing documentation on the demonstrations, queried the Navy Lessons 

Learned System for lessons learned from the demonstrations, and 

compared our findings to accepted best practices for tests and 

evaluations. Further, we reviewed Navy Lessons Learned System 

instructions and queried the system to determine recorded lessons learned 

pertaining to the Fleet Response Plan. 

We validated the Navy Lessons Learned System data and determined the 

data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We conducted our review 

from January 2005 through August 2005 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards at the following locations: 

• The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 

• U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii 

• Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C. 

Page 26 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

• Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.

• U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia 

• Offices of the Fleet Forces Command 

• Commander, U.S. Second Fleet 

• Commander, Naval Air Forces 

• Commander, Submarine Forces 

• Commander, Naval Surface Force 

• U.S. Marine Corps Forces 

• Afloat Training Group 

• Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, Rhode Island 

• Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 

• Offices of the U.S. Pacific Fleet 

• Commander, Naval Submarine Force 

• Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii 

We held group discussions with selected personnel such as commanding 

officers, executive officers/chief of staffs, department heads, and crew 

members from the following units, all located in the Norfolk, Virginia, 

area: 

• U.S.S. Bulkeley

• U.S.S. Enterprise

• U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt

• U.S.S. Harry S. Truman

• Carrier Air Wing 3 

• Carrier Air Wing 8 

• Carrier Strike Group 2 

• Carrier Strike Group 10 

Page 27 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 28 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 29 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 30 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 31 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 32 GAO-06-84 Military Readiness
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 33 GAO-06-84

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Richard Payne, Assistant Director; 

Renee Brown; Jonathan Clark; Nicole Collier; Dawn Godfrey; David 

Marroni; Bethann Ritter; Roderick Rodgers; John Van Schaik; and Rebecca 

Shea made significant contributions to this report. 

Military Readiness

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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