a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

November 2005 DRUG CONTROL

Agencies Need to Plan 

for Likely Declines in 

Drug Interdiction 

Assets, and Develop 

Better Performance 

Measures for Transit 

Zone Operations

GAO-06-200
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2005

DRUG CONTROL

Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines 

in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop 

Better Performance Measures for Transit 

Zone Operations 

Highlights of GAO-06-200, a report to 

congressional committees 

One of the U.S. National Drug 

Control Strategy’s priorities is to 

disrupt the illicit drug market. To

this end, the Departments of 

Defense and Homeland Security

provide ships and aircraft to

disrupt the flow of illicit drugs, 

primarily cocaine, shipped from 

South America through the 

Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific 

Ocean—an area known as the 

transit zone. The Office of National 

Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) 

oversees the U.S. anti-drug

strategy. The Joint Interagency 

Task Force-South (JIATF-South) 

directs most transit zone 

operations. We examined U.S. 

efforts to interdict maritime

movements of cocaine. We 

analyzed the (1) changes in cocaine 

seizures and disruptions since 

calendar year 2000, (2) trends in 

interdiction assets provided since

fiscal year 2000, (3) challenges to 

maintaining transit zone

interdiction operations, and (4) 

performance measures the 

agencies use to assess their 

progress. 

What GAO Recommends

We recommend that Defense and 

Homeland Security (1) plan for 

likely declines in interdiction assets 

and (2) develop measures with 

ONDCP to better assess 

interdiction operations. We also 

recommend that ONDCP address 

prior recommendations to improve 

drug data. The agencies generally

agreed, but did not detail when and 

how they will address these 

recommendations. 

Cocaine seizures and disruptions in the transit zone have increased about 

68 percent since calendar year 2000—from 117 metric tons in 2000 to 

196 metric tons in 2004. About two-thirds of the disruptions were in the 

western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean where the United States 

has most of its interdiction assets. JIATF-South and other cognizant officials 

attribute the increase to improved interagency cooperation and intelligence,

the introduction of armed helicopters to stop go-fast boats, and increased 

cooperation from nations in the region. 

Since fiscal year 2000, the availability of assets—ships and aircraft—to 

disrupt drug trafficking in the transit zone have varied. On-station ship days

peaked in fiscal year 2001 and flight hours peaked in 2002, but both have 

generally declined since then, primarily because the Department of Defense 

has provided fewer assets. Declines in Defense assets have been largely 

offset by the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and 

certain allied nations. Nevertheless, in recent years, JIATF-South has 

detected less than one-third of the “known and actionable” maritime illicit 

drug movements in the western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean. 

Yet, once detected, over 80 percent of the drug movements were disrupted. 

Various factors pose challenges to maintaining the current level of transit 

zone interdiction operations. The reduced availability of the U.S. Navy’s P-3 

maritime patrol aircraft due to structural problems will degrade the U.S. 

capability to detect suspect maritime movements, readiness rates of older 

Coast Guard ships have declined since fiscal year 2000, and the surface radar

system on the Coast Guard’s long-range surveillance aircraft is often 

inoperable. Coast Guard and CBP officials also noted that they may not be 

able to sustain their level of assets in light of budget constraints and other 

homeland security priorities that may arise. These officials expressed 

concern that the long-term implications of likely declines in transit zone 

assets have not been addressed. 

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to 

develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving their goals. 

The Coast Guard’s measures relate to reducing cocaine flow through the 

transit zone, CBP’s planned measures are not specific to the transit zone, 

and Defense’s planned measures focus on the number of disruptions of 

cocaine movements. But data that would help in assessing transit zone 

interdiction operations are problematic. For instance, in its assessment for 

2004, ONDCP reported that between 325 metric tons and 675 metric tons of 

cocaine may be moving towards the United States. Such a wide range is not 

useful for assessing transit zone interdiction operations. In addition, data on 

U.S. drug usage are difficult to obtain and often cannot be generalized to the 

United States. In a 2001 report for ONDCP, the National Research Council 

made similar observations and recommended ways to improve the collection 

and analysis of illicit drug data, but ONDCP has not fully addressed them. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-200.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4268 or FordJj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Several Factors Have Contributed to the Increase in Cocaine 

Seizures and Disruptions 10

Availability of Assets Provided for Interdiction Operations Have 

Varied Since Fiscal Year 2000 13

Challenges in Maintaining Interdiction Operations 17

Agencies’ Performance Measures Vary and Data for Assessing 

Performance Are Problematic 24

Conclusions 29

Recommendations for Executive Action 30

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 35

Appendix II: Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements 39

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 42

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 45

Appendix V: Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy 47

Tables Table 1: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Countries in the 

Source and Transit Zones, Fiscal Years 2000-2005 10

Table 2: Metric Tons of Cocaine Seized and Disrupted in the Transit 

Zone by Region, Calendar Years 2000-2004 11

Table 3: Detection and Disruption of Known Actionable Maritime 

Drug Movements in the Western Caribbean Sea and 

Eastern Pacific Ocean, Calendar Year 2000 through June 

2005 17

Table 4: ONDCP’s Primary Sources of Information on Illicit Drug 

Availability and Use in the United States 28

Table 5: Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements 

with Countries in the Source and Transit Zones 40

Figures Figure 1: The Transit Zone 8

Figure 2: On-Station Ship Days for Interdiction in the Transit Zone, 

Fiscal Years 2000-2005 14
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Figure 3: On-Station Flight Hours for Interdiction in the Transit 

Zone, Fiscal Years 2000-2005 16

Figure 4: Total P-3 On-Station Flight Hours in the Transit Zone, 

Fiscal Years 2000-2005 20

Abbreviations

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

CBP Bureau for Customs and Border Protection

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

IACM Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement

JIATF-South Joint Interagency Task Force-South

JIATF-West Joint Interagency Task Force-West

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

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Page 1 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

November 15, 2005 Letr

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman

Caucus on International Narcotics Control

United States Senate

The Honorable Tom Davis

Chairman

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Mark Souder

Chairman

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives 

The 2002 U.S. National Drug Control Strategy set two goals: (1) to lower the 

rate of illicit drug use by 10 percent over 2 years among both youth and 

adults and (2) to lower the rate by 25 percent over 5 years in the United 

States. One of the strategy’s three priorities for achieving these goals is to 

disrupt the illicit drug market in order to reduce the profitability of the drug 

trade.1 To this end, during fiscal years 2000-2005, the United States has 

provided more than $6 billion to Colombia and other countries in the 

region for counternarcotics, alternative development, and judicial reform 

efforts. In addition, the United States and certain allies have devoted 

assets—ships and aircraft—to disrupt the flow of illicit narcotics, primarily 

cocaine, shipped to the United States through a 6 million square mile area 

known as the transit zone.2

Between calendar years 2001 and 2004, the Office of National Drug Control 

Policy (ONDCP) reported that cocaine production was reduced by almost

1

The other two priorities are: (1) stopping illicit drug use before it starts and (2) healing 

America’s drug users.

2

The transit zone encompasses Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of 

Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. 
Page 2 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

one-third and seizures and disruptions3 of cocaine in the transit zone 

increased by over 40 percent to almost 200 metric tons. Despite these 

reported successes in disrupting cocaine trafficking, a study commissioned 

by ONDCP indicates that the retail price of cocaine in the United States 

continued to decline through the second quarter of 2003—the latest 

available data—while retail purity remained relatively high, indicating that 

the supply of cocaine had not been reduced.4

 Further, a 2004 survey on 

drug use estimated that the number of cocaine users in the United States 

had remained roughly constant at about 2 million users from 2002 to 2004.5

Other sources estimate the number of chronic and occasional cocaine 

users may be as high as 6 million. 

The Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) in Key West, 

Florida, under the U.S. Southern Command, has primary responsibility for 

U.S. detection and monitoring of drug trafficking activities in the transit 

zone.6

 The Coast Guard has primary operational control for most 

interdiction operations. The Department of Defense (Defense) provides 

maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, and ships; the Department of 

Homeland Security (Homeland Security)—primarily, the Coast Guard and 

the Bureau for Customs and Border Protection (CBP)7

—provides maritime 

patrol aircraft, ships, and law enforcement assistance; and the Department 

of Justice (Justice) provides prosecutorial and law enforcement assistance. 

JIATF-South also receives some operational support from various 

countries within the transit zone, and France, the Netherlands, and the 

United Kingdom also provide air and maritime assistance in the eastern 

Caribbean Sea.

3

Seizures are defined as taking physical possession of the cocaine. Disruptions are defined 

as forcing individuals suspected of transporting cocaine to jettison or abandon their cargo.

4

Rand Corporation, The Price and Purity of Illegal Drugs: 1981 Through the Second 

Quarter of 2003 (Washington, D.C., November 2004). Specifically, the report uses data 

compiled through June 2003 and notes that since 2001, the price of cocaine had declined.

5

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Results from the 2004 

National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings (Washington, D.C., 

September 2005). 

6

Prior to fiscal year 2004, the Joint Interagency Task Force-West, based in Alameda, 

California, had responsibility for U.S. detection and monitoring activities in the eastern 

Pacific Ocean. Beginning with fiscal year 2004, JIATF-South was given responsibility for the 

eastern Pacific Ocean.

7

On October 31, 2004, Immigration and Customs Enforcement interdiction assets were 

assigned to CBP. Throughout this report we refer to CBP.
Page 3 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

To address your interest in U.S. drug interdiction operations in the transit 

zone, we examined (1) the changes in the amounts of cocaine seized and 

disrupted since calendar year 2000 and the factors that have contributed to 

these changes, (2) trends in the assets provided by the United States and 

other nations since fiscal year 2000 to support cocaine interdiction in the 

transit zone, (3) the challenges facing these agencies in maintaining current 

levels of transit zone interdiction operations, and (4) how the principal 

agencies involved in interdiction operations assess their performance. 

To address these objectives, we focused on cocaine because nearly all the 

cocaine entering the United States comes from South America through the 

transit zone. Furthermore, we focused on maritime movements of cocaine 

through the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean because 

the United States has positioned most of its interdiction assets in these 

areas. We reviewed relevant planning and resource documents and related 

reports. We also met with cognizant officials at Defense, Homeland 

Security, and Justice in Washington, D.C.; law enforcement officers 

involved in interdiction efforts based in Jacksonville, Miami, Tampa, and 

Sarasota, Florida, and Nassau, Bahamas; and cognizant officials at JIATFSouth in Key West, Florida. We obtained and analyzed data on (1) cocaine 

seizures and disruptions for calendar years 2000 through 2004 provided by 

the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, and (2) ship days and flight hours spent 

on interdiction missions during fiscal years 2000-2005, provided by JIATFSouth and JIATF-West. Through comparisons with similar data compiled by 

the Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense, and discussions with JIATF-South and 

JIATF-West officials primarily responsible for compiling the data, we 

determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

this report. We performed our work from August 2004 through October 

2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. (See appendix I for a more complete discussion of our scope 

and methodology.) 

Results in Brief Based on data managed by the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, reported 

seizures and disruptions of cocaine in the transit zone increased over twothirds from 117 metric tons in calendar year 2000 to a record amount of 

196 metric tons in calendar year 2004. Most of the seizures and disruptions 

occurred in the western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean where 

the United States has positioned most of its ships and aircraft for 

interdiction purposes. Overall, according to JIATF-South and other 

cognizant officials, improved interagency cooperation and intelligence, the 

use of armed helicopters to assist in interdiction efforts, and improved 
Page 4 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

international cooperation contributed to the increased seizures and 

disruptions. Specifically, 

• Through the cooperation of several U.S. law enforcement agencies, 

specific information about cocaine movements has been provided to 

JIATF-South. This has permitted JIATF-South to direct operations at 

more certain targets, rather than searching wide expanses of the transit 

zone for suspicious movements of boats and small aircraft. 

• Beginning in calendar year 2000, the Coast Guard began deploying 

helicopters equipped with machine guns and 50 caliber sniper rifles to 

help interdiction efforts, in particular, pursuing and stopping speed 

boats (called “go-fast” boats) that are a principal mode of transporting 

cocaine through the transit zone. 

• Several nations in the region have increased their cooperation with U.S. 

efforts to deploy and service aircraft in their countries. For example, the 

United States has agreements to deploy aircraft in Ecuador, El Salvador, 

Aruba, and Curacao, and uses facilities in Costa Rica and Panama to 

support surveillance aircraft, expanding the duration and range of 

interdiction efforts.

Since fiscal year 2000, the availability of U.S. and allied assets spent on 

interdiction operations in the transit zone—as measured in on-station ship 

days and flight hours8

—has varied. U.S. and allied on-station ship days 

decreased from approximately 3,600 days in fiscal year 2000 to about 3,300 

in fiscal year 2005, and U.S. and allied on-station flight hours increased 

from approximately 10,500 hours in fiscal year 2000 to almost 12,900 in 

fiscal year 2005. However, on-station ship days peaked in fiscal year 2001 

and flight hours peaked in fiscal year 2002, but both have generally 

declined since then, primarily because Defense has provided fewer assets. 

Declines in Defense assets were largely offset by the Coast Guard, CBP, and 

several allied European nations—France, the Netherlands, and the United 

Kingdom. Nevertheless, with the assets available in recent years, JIATFSouth reports that it detected (made visual contact with) less than onethird of the known maritime drug movements.

8

On-station ship days and on-station flight hours are the time spent on monitoring and 

interdiction operations. The JIATF-South and JIATF-West figures do not include the time 

needed for these assets to get in position to begin operations.
Page 5 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Several challenges raise concerns about the ability of the United States to 

sustain its level of interdiction operations in the transit zone. Primarily, the 

availability of some key U.S. assets for interdiction operations, such as 

maritime patrol aircraft, is declining. Through fiscal year 2005, the number 

of hours flown by U.S. Navy P-3 maritime patrol aircraft on interdiction 

missions had decreased nearly 60 percent since fiscal year 2000 (from 

about 3,560 hours to about 1,490) primarily because of structural problems 

in the aircraft’s wings. In addition, the Netherlands removed its P-3 

maritime patrol aircraft from the transit zone in December 2004. According 

to JIATF-South and other cognizant officials, the declining availability of 

P-3 maritime patrol aircraft is the most critical challenge to the success of 

future interdiction operations. Further, the readiness rates for older Coast 

Guard vessels and maritime patrol aircraft have declined, and the surface 

radar system used to detect and monitor drug trafficking activities on its 

aircraft is often inoperable. While some short-term remedies have been 

taken, cognizant officials expressed concern that the longer-term 

implications of likely declines in transit zone monitoring and interdiction 

asset availability have not been addressed. Moreover, officials were 

concerned that:

• Drug traffickers have changed tactics. In particular, traffickers have 

taken routes further south and west into the Pacific Ocean before 

continuing on to Central America or Mexico. This is a much larger area 

to patrol and makes detection and interdiction more difficult. 

• Although most nations in the transit zone, especially countries in 

Central America and the eastern Caribbean Sea, cooperate with U.S. 

interdiction efforts, these countries lack the capability and resources to 

compensate for any decline in U.S. and European allies’ assets.

Agencies’ performance measures for transit zone interdiction operations 

vary and data for assessing their performance are problematic. While the 

Coast Guard has developed performance measures to assess their activities 

in the transit zone, Defense is currently developing them. CBP has not 

developed performance measures specifically related to its drug 

interdiction mission in the transit zone. In our previous work, we noted that 

the lack of clear measurable goals makes it difficult to link day-to-day 

efforts to achieving an agency’s intended mission.9

 Additionally, data to 

9

See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for 

Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-38 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004).
Page 6 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

assess whether operations in the transit zone contribute to the U.S. 

National Drug Control Strategy’s priority of disrupting the illicit drug 

market or the overall goal of reducing the rate of drug usage in the United 

States are problematic. For example, ONDCP’s annual assessment of 

cocaine movement for 2004 reported that between 325 to 675 metric tons of 

cocaine may be moving towards the United States. This wide range is not 

useful for assessing interdiction efforts. Data on drug availability and use in 

the United States are difficult to obtain, often cannot be generalized to the 

entire country, and takes a year or more to collect and analyze. As a result, 

even under the best of circumstances, several years of drug usage data are 

needed to show the effects of a change in drug policy. In a 2001 report 

prepared for ONDCP, the National Research Council concluded that the 

United States had neither the data systems nor the research infrastructure 

needed to assess the effectiveness of drug control enforcement policies. In 

particular, the Council highlighted the absence of adequate, reliable data on 

illicit drug prices and use. The Council made numerous recommendations 

to improve data collection and analysis; eight were addressed in full or in 

part to ONDCP, but ONDCP has not fully addressed the Council’s 

recommendations.

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security (1) 

plan for the likely decline in the future availability of ships and aircraft for 

transit zone interdiction operations; and (2) develop and coordinate 

performance measures, in conjunction with ONDCP, that take advantage of 

available data (such as the number of detections, seizures, and disruptions) 

to provide a basis for deciding how to deploy increasingly limited assets. 

We also recommend that the Director of ONDCP address each of the 

recommendations made by the National Research Council and report to 

Congress the actions taken, or that still need to be taken, to address them; 

or document why it should not do so. Overall, in commenting on a draft of 

this report, Defense, Homeland Security, and ONDCP stated that they 

generally concurred with the recommendations that applied to them, but 

did not detail when and how they will address them.

Background ONDCP expects that disrupting the illicit drug market will reduce the 

availability of illicit drugs, increase their cost, and, eventually, reduce the 

rate of drug usage. To disrupt the cocaine market, the U.S. National Drug 

Control Strategy calls for, among other things, seizing “enormous and 

unsustainable” amounts of cocaine from traffickers. One part of the 

strategy to disrupt the market focuses U.S. interdiction efforts on seizing 

cocaine and other illicit drugs bound for the United States from South 
Page 7 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

America in the transit zone. The transit zone is a six million square mile 

area that encompasses Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, the 

Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean (see fig. 1). Typically, drug 

traffickers use go-fast boats and fishing vessels to smuggle cocaine from 

Colombia to Central America and Mexico en route to the United States. Gofast boats are capable of traveling over 40 knots and are difficult to detect 

in open water. Moreover, the go-fast boats often travel at night. When they 

travel in daylight, the boats are often painted blue, or the crew can cover 

the boat with a blue tarpaulin, thereby becoming virtually impossible to 

see. Even when detected, go-fast boats can often outrun conventional ships 

deployed in the transit zone. 
Page 8 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Figure 1: The Transit Zone

The primary departments supporting interdiction operations in the transit 

zone are Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security. Defense provides 

surveillance aircraft, helicopters, and maritime vessels; Justice provides 

prosecutorial and law enforcement assistance; and Homeland Security—

primarily, the Coast Guard and CBP—provides surveillance aircraft, 

maritime vessels, and law enforcement assistance. JIATF-South also 

receives some operational support from various countries in the transit 

Source: Adapted by GAO based on a similar map in ONDCP’s 2004 Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement.

Eastern Caribbean

Corridor 

Mexico

United States

Peru

Bolivia

Colombia

Eastern Pacific

and

Western Caribbean

Corridor

Central America

Principal Cocaine Vectors to the United States
Page 9 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

zone; and France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom provide air and 

maritime detection and monitoring assistance in the eastern Caribbean 

Sea. Justice’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, and U.S. Attorney’s Office provide intelligence for operations 

and investigate and prosecute drug traffickers. Other organizations help 

guide and support interdiction efforts in the transit zone: 

• ONDCP oversees and coordinates implementation of the U.S. National 

Drug Control Strategy and reviews department and agency budget 

proposals for anti-drug programs, including interdiction efforts in the 

transit zone. 

• The U.S. Interdiction Coordinator reports to the Director, ONDCP, and 

provides strategic advice and oversight of U.S. agencies’ interdiction 

efforts in the transit zone. It also manages the Consolidated 

Counterdrug Database that records drug trafficking events, including 

detections, seizures, and disruptions. The database is vetted quarterly by 

members of the interagency counterdrug community to minimize 

duplicate or questionable reported drug movements.

• JIATF-South, under the U.S. Southern Command, is the primary 

operations center and coordinator for detecting and monitoring suspect 

air and maritime drug trafficking events in the transit zone. JIATF-South 

includes representatives from Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and 

others; nations such as France, the Netherlands, and the United 

Kingdom; and several nations in the transit and source10 zones. 

The Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense do not routinely track funds obligated 

and expended, ship days, or flight hours provided for drug interdiction in 

the transit zone.11 However, during fiscal years 2000-2005, the United States 

provided about $6.2 billion to support counternarcotics and related 

programs in the source and transit zones (see table 1).12 In the source zone, 

U.S. assistance supports eradication and interdiction efforts and related 

10The source zone includes the principal drug producing countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and 

Peru.

11See our report titled Drug Control: Difficulties in Measuring Costs and Results of 

Transit Zone Interdiction Efforts, GAO-02-13 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2002).

12For fiscal year 2006, the Administration has requested an additional $735 million for 

countries in the source zone and $77 million for countries in the transit zone. 
Page 10 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

programs for alternative development and judicial reform, primarily in 

Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. In the transit zone, the United States provided 

about $365 million in assistance—primarily to El Salvador, Guatemala, 

Haiti, and Mexico —to support interdiction and other law enforcement 

programs. 

Table 1: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Countries in the Source and Transit 

Zones, Fiscal Years 2000-2005

Sources: Congressional Research Service and the State Department.

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

a

Source zone funding includes the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and related Defense and Foreign 

Military Financing programs. The table does not include Defense assistance for activities that cannot 

be directly tied to a nation, such as the operation of ground-based radars. 

Several Factors Have 

Contributed to the 

Increase in Cocaine 

Seizures and 

Disruptions

Cocaine seizures and disruptions in the transit zone have increased over 

two-thirds from calendar year 2000 to calendar year 2004. JIATF-South and 

other cognizant agency officials pointed to a number of factors that 

contributed to the increases, such as better intelligence on cocaine 

movements that allow JIATF-South to target specific cocaine shipments; 

the introduction of armed helicopters increasing the capability to interdict 

cocaine shipments on go-fast boats; and increased cooperation from 

nations in the region, which has led to more efficient use of resources.

Cocaine Seizures and 

Disruptions Have Increased

Cocaine seizures and disruptions have increased about 68 percent since 

calendar year 2000. As shown in table 2, the United States and its allies 

seized or disrupted 157 metric tons of cocaine in calendar year 2003 and 

196 metric tons in 2004, a record amount. During this period, about twothirds of all the cocaine seized or disrupted was in the eastern Pacific 

Ocean and western Caribbean Sea, where according to JIATF-South 

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year

Region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

2005

(estimated) Total

Source zonea $1,604 $345 $774 $1,123 $964 $1,016 $5,826

Transit zone 41 41 56 52 92 83 365

Total $1,645 $386 $821 $1,175 $1,056 $1,099 $6,182
Page 11 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

officials, the United States has positioned most of its ships and aircraft for 

interdiction and other purposes. 

Table 2: Metric Tons of Cocaine Seized and Disrupted in the Transit Zone by Region, 

Calendar Years 2000-2004 

Source: ONDCP’s Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement based on the Consolidated Counterdrug Database. 

Factors Contributing to 

Increases 

Improved intelligence on cocaine shipments gained from law enforcement 

operations has allowed JIATF-South to more often target suspected drug 

shipments rather than searching wide expanses of the transit zone for 

suspicious movements of boats and small aircraft. In addition, in calendar 

year 2000, the Coast Guard began deploying armed helicopters, which has 

greatly increased the U.S. capability to stop go-fast boats. Further, several 

nations in the region have increased their cooperation with U.S. efforts 

through bilateral maritime agreements, as well as agreements to allow the 

United States to deploy and re-supply U.S. aircraft and ships on their 

territory.

Better Intelligence An interagency law enforcement investigation operation known as 

“Panama Express” has increased the amount of intelligence on drug 

trafficking activities. Panama Express is a multi-agency investigation that 

was initiated in 1995 and is jointly managed by the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, DEA, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement but also 

includes officials from several federal,13 state, and local law enforcement 

agencies. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Tampa, Florida, provides 

prosecution support for all Panama Express investigations. According to 

the U.S. Attorney’s office, Panama Express investigations have contributed 

Calendar year

Region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Eastern Pacific Ocean and western Caribbean Sea 70 88 92 91 143

Eastern Caribbean Sea 14 23 20 26 6

Mexico and Central America 33 28 26 40 47

Total for transit zone 117 139 138 157 196

13Other federal law enforcement agencies include the Internal Revenue Service, the Coast 

Guard, and representatives from JIATF-South. 
Page 12 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

to the successful prosecution of around 700 individuals, and the seizure 

and disruption of about 380 metric tons of cocaine since 2000 (or about 51 

percent of all the cocaine seized and disrupted). 

In addition, a JIATF-South official told us that, as of September 2005, 16 

embassies and consulates throughout the region had tactical analysis 

teams. These teams analyze information on drug trafficking activities and 

provide the information to JIATF-South, DEA, and other operational 

organizations for use in interdiction missions. 

Armed Helicopters Have Been 

Added

Interdiction efforts have been strengthened by the addition of armed 

helicopters. Beginning in calendar year 2000, the Coast Guard began 

deploying MH-68A helicopters equipped with 7.62 millimeter machine guns 

and 50 caliber sniper rifles from its base in Jacksonville, Florida.14 The 

helicopters’ main value is their capability to pursue and stop go-fast boats, 

which can travel over 40 knots—often outrunning U.S. and allied surface 

ships. According to Coast Guard officials, since November 2002 the armed 

helicopters have successfully stopped every go-fast boat that they have 

engaged and contributed to 77 maritime drug interdictions and the seizure 

of approximately 94 metric tons of cocaine. 

In addition, the U.S. Navy plans to deploy armed helicopters to pursue and 

stop go-fast boats in fiscal year 2006. According to Defense officials, these 

helicopters will have specialized equipment similar to the Coast Guard 

helicopters. According to the Coast Guard, it will have personnel on board 

for law enforcement purposes. 

Increased Cooperation from 

Nations in the Transit Zone 

Since 2000, the number of countries in the transit zone that have signed all 

or parts of bilateral maritime agreements increased from 21 to 25. These 

agreements permit, among other things, ship boarding rights for U.S. law 

enforcement officials and pursuit and entry into these countries’ territorial 

waters to interdict drug traffickers. In addition, several countries have 

agreed to additional provisions in the maritime agreements, in particular, 

the International Maritime Interdiction Support Clause, which allows the 

United States to fly suspected drug traffickers detained on U.S. ships 

directly to the United States for prosecution. As a result, these surface 

ships can resume patrols in the transit zone rather than transporting the 

suspects directly to the United States, or waiting in a foreign port for the 

14Also beginning in calendar year 2000, the Coast Guard began deploying “over the horizon 

boats” capable of pursuing go-fast boats.
Page 13 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

suspects to be extradited. Coast Guard officials told us that, in many cases, 

this saves up to a week of ship time. (See app. II for a list of countries that 

have signed all or parts of the bilateral maritime agreements and the 

interdiction support clause.) 

Moreover, to offset the closing of Howard Air Force Base in Panama in 

1999, the United States has reached agreements with other nations in the 

region to station U.S. military and civilian aircraft. In return, the United 

States has upgraded the facilities at these airbases. The facilities at Manta, 

Ecuador; Comalapa, El Salvador; and Curacao are used by U.S. civilian and 

military aircraft, while the facilities in Aruba; Liberia; Costa Rica; and 

Panama are used by the Coast Guard and CBP. Access to these facilities 

allows aircraft to spend more time monitoring and interdicting drug 

trafficking activities and also allows them to range further west into the 

Pacific Ocean. 

Availability of Assets 

Provided for 

Interdiction Operations 

Have Varied Since 

Fiscal Year 2000

Overall, since fiscal year 2000, the availability of U.S. and allied assets 

provided for detecting and disrupting drug trafficking activities in the 

transit zone has varied. On-station ship days peaked in fiscal year 2001 and 

flight hours peaked in fiscal year 2002, but both have declined since then, 

primarily because Defense has provided fewer assets. Declines in Defense 

assets in recent years were mostly offset by additional ship days and 

aircraft hours provided by the Coast Guard, CBP, and allied nations. 

However, the ship days and flight hours provided by the allied nations are 

primarily in the eastern Caribbean Sea where the United States does not 

usually conduct monitoring and detection activities. Nevertheless, 

according to JIATF-South, it cannot detect many of the known maritime 

cocaine movements reported in the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern 

Pacific Ocean because it cannot get ships or aircraft to the suspected 

movement in time.

On-Station Ship Days 

Generally Declined

Despite a rise in fiscal year 2001, the total number of ship days spent on 

interdiction missions in the transit zone has generally decreased since 

fiscal year 200015 from about 3,600 ship days to about 3,300 ship days (or 

15On-station ship days for the eastern Pacific Ocean for the first quarter of fiscal year 2000 

(September–December 1999) were not readily available. In fiscal year 2001, JIATF-West first 

quarter on-station ship days was about 5.4 percent of the year’s total.
Page 14 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

about 8 percent) in fiscal year 2005. U.S. Navy ship days declined from 

about 1,980 in fiscal year 2000 to about 890 in fiscal year 2005. Defense 

officials said that the Navy reduced its ship days because of other national 

security concerns; in particular, the need to provide support for the armed 

conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The reduction in U.S. Navy ship days was partly offset by increases in ship 

days by the Coast Guard. After a decline to about 1,160 ship days in fiscal 

year 2003 (compared to 1,330 days in 2002), the Coast Guard increased its 

ship days to about 1,660 in 2004 and almost 1,700 in 2005—becoming the 

primary provider of maritime surface vessels in the transit zone. Figure 2 

illustrates the total on-station ship days in the transit zone by provider for 

fiscal years 2000-2005.

Figure 2: On-Station Ship Days for Interdiction in the Transit Zone, Fiscal Years 

2000-2005 

Fiscal year

Ship days

Source: JIATF-South and JIATF-West.

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

U.S. Navy

U.S. Coast Guard

Allies

Total
Page 15 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

On-Station Flight Hours 

Generally Declined in 

Recent Years

On-station flight hours for counternarcotics activities in the transit zone 

increased about 35 percent between fiscal years 2000-2002—from about 

10,500 hours to about 14,200—but have generally declined since then to 

about 12,870 hours in 2005. Declines in the availability of Defense maritime 

patrol aircraft over the period were offset by increased support from the 

Coast Guard, CBP, and several allied nations—France, the Netherlands, 

and the United Kingdom. 

• The Coast Guard’s on-station flight hours in the transit zone decreased 

from about 2,440 in fiscal year 2000 to less than 1,300 hours in fiscal year 

2002. According to Coast Guard officials, the decline was due, in part, to 

resources being diverted to other Coast Guard missions. But the Coast 

Guard has since increased its flight hours to over 2,780 hours in fiscal 

year 2005. 

• CBP has increased its on-station flight hours for interdiction operations 

in the transit zone since fiscal year 2000—from about 180 hours in fiscal 

year 2000 to nearly 4,385 hours in fiscal year 2005. However, in fiscal 

year 2003, its flight hours declined to about 2,040 due to the diversion of 

resources for other homeland security missions. 

• Defense on-station flight hours for interdiction in the transit zone 

gradually declined from about 6,860 in fiscal year 2000 to 6,500 in fiscal 

year 2002, but declined more rapidly since then to about 2,940 flight 

hours in fiscal year 2005. JIATF-South officials attribute the recent 

declines primarily to the reduced availability of U.S. Navy P-3 maritime 

patrol aircraft because of structural problems. In addition, U.S. Air 

Force Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft were 

diverted to support homeland security missions and the armed conflicts 

in Afghanistan and Iraq.16

• Allied nations steadily increased their flight hours in support of 

interdiction operations from about 1,000 hours in fiscal year 2000 to 

4,070 hours in fiscal year 2004. However, in fiscal year 2005, the allies’ 

total hours declined to about 2,760. According to JIATF-South and U.S. 

Interdiction Coordinator officials, most of the allies’ surveillance 

16An AWACS aircraft resumed operations in the transit zone in November 2004 and a second 

AWACS aircraft was added in April 2005. 
Page 16 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

operations are in the eastern Caribbean Sea where the United States 

does not usually conduct interdiction operations. 

Figure 3 illustrates the total on-station flight hours by provider for fiscal 

years 2000-2005.

Figure 3: On-Station Flight Hours for Interdiction in the Transit Zone, Fiscal Years 

2000-2005

Increasing Number of 

Known Actionable Maritime 

Events Challenges JIATFSouth’s Detection Capability

Since calendar year 2000, JIATF-South officials report that they had 

information about more maritime drug movements than they could detect

Fiscal year

Flight hours

Source: JIATF-South and JIATF-West.

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

U.S. Coast Guard

CBP

Defense

Allies

Total
Page 17 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

(make visual contact with). The number of “known actionable”17 maritime 

events in the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean more 

than doubled from 154 in 2000 to 330 in 2004. According to JIATF-South 

officials, in many cases, the maritime event is too far away for available 

ships and aircraft to go to the area and visually locate the suspected drug 

movement. However, once JIATF-South locates a suspect movement, the 

disruption rate has significantly increased since 2000—from less than 60 

percent in 2000 and 2001 to over 80 percent in 2003 to 2005 (see table 3).

Table 3: Detection and Disruption of Known Actionable Maritime Drug Movements in the Western Caribbean Sea and Eastern 

Pacific Ocean, Calendar Year 2000 through June 2005

Source: JIATF-South based on the Consolidated Counterdrug Database.

Note: The Consolidated Counterdrug Database is managed by the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator’s 

office. Beginning with 2004, the Coordinator’s office began implementing stricter rules in vetting the 

data on drug movements, detections, and seizures and disruptions in quarterly meetings with the 

interagency drug community. The intent was to minimize potential duplication and the counting of 

events that may not have occurred. According to the database manager, however, the more careful 

review of the data did not materially affect the number of maritime drug movements counted. The 

primary differences were in the number of suspect aircraft flights. 

Challenges in 

Maintaining 

Interdiction Operations

While the United States has increased the number of seizures and 

disruptions in the transit zone since 2000, the Coast Guard, CBP, and 

Defense face several challenges in maintaining the current level of assets 

provided for transit zone interdiction operations. JIATF-South officials 

17“Known actionable” events include events that are confirmed through a seizure of some or 

all of the drugs, were deemed “actionable” by the Navy or Coast Guard (within their 

capability to seize or disrupt), or could not be reasonably attributed to anything other than 

drug trafficking (for example, jettisoning cargo or scuttling a vessel when detected by law 

enforcement officials).

Calendar years

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

2005 (through

June 2005) Total

Known actionable maritime events 154 160 178 253 330 184 1,259

Detections 59 56 77 65 92 48 397

Seizures and disruptions 35 30 53 55 80 39 292

Percentage of known events detected 38 35 43 26 28 26 31.5

Percentage of detected events 

disrupted 59 54 69 85 87 81 73.6
Page 18 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

expressed concern that continued declines in U.S. on-station ship days and 

on-station flight hours will limit their ability to monitor the transit zone and 

detect illicit drug trafficking. Specifically, according to JIATF-South and 

other Defense officials, the reduced availability of the U.S. Navy P-3 

maritime patrol aircraft will degrade JIATF-South’s ability to detect 

maritime movements. In addition, the readiness rates of older Coast Guard 

ships, which support interdiction operations in the transit zone, have 

declined since fiscal year 2000, and the surface radar system on its longrange surveillance aircraft is often inoperable. JIATF-South, Coast Guard, 

CBP, and U.S. Interdiction Coordinator officials stated that, while some 

short-term fixes have been made, the longer-term implications of the likely 

continued declines in monitoring and interdiction assets for the transit 

zone have not been addressed.

Moreover, in response to increases in cocaine seizures and disruptions, 

drug traffickers have adjusted their tactics for transporting cocaine 

through the transit zone. Finally, nations in the region lack the resources to 

offset any decline in assets. 

Declining Availability of P-3 

Aircraft Will Degrade JIATFSouth’s Maritime Detection 

Capability

According to cognizant officials with JIATF-South and U.S. Interdiction 

Coordinator officials, compensating for the reduced availability of P-3 

maritime patrol aircraft is the most critical challenge to the future success 

of interdiction operations. According to these officials, because of its 

longer range, the P-3 aircraft can monitor a much larger surface area than 

other maritime patrol aircraft and can provide covert surveillance until 

other assets arrive. 

The availability of the P-3 aircraft has declined for several reasons. In fiscal 

years 2000-2003, the U.S. Navy provided the majority of P-3 maritime patrol 

flying hours in support of interdiction efforts—about 60 percent of the onstation flight hours (or over 3,900 hours per year). However, in fiscal year 

2004, the Navy began limiting the use of its P-3 maritime patrol aircraft for 

transit zone interdiction missions because of structural problems in its 

wings18 and other worldwide commitments. Since fiscal year 2000, the 

number of hours flown by U.S. Navy P-3s has decreased nearly 60 percent 

to about 1,500 hours in fiscal year 2005. In addition, in December 2004, the 

18The P-3 is a 40-year-old aircraft and has begun to develop cracks in its wing structure. 

Currently, the Navy plans to retire the P-3 and replace it with a different aircraft. However, 

the full fleet of aircraft will not be available until 2013.
Page 19 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Netherlands removed the P-3 aircraft it used to fly interdiction missions in 

the transit zone. According to the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, the P-3s 

flown by the Netherlands were vital to interdiction efforts in the Caribbean 

Sea, averaging over 1,300 flight hours per year—or about 20 percent of all 

P-3 flight hours—during fiscal years 2000-2004. In April 2005, the 

Netherlands began using the Fokker F-60, a shorter-range twin engine 

aircraft, to fly interdiction missions; but, according to Defense officials, 

these aircraft are less capable than the P-3.

To help compensate for the reduction in the P-3 availability, CBP has 

increased its P-3 maritime patrol on-station flight hours in the transit 

zone—from about 180 flight hours in fiscal year 2000 to over 4,300 hours in 

2005. However, CBP officials told us that their aircraft cannot totally 

compensate for the loss of the Navy’s and Netherlands’ P-3 flying hours. 

Further, these officials are unsure how long CBP will be able to continue to 

provide the additional flying hours, which has been more than its allotted 

budget, because of other homeland security priorities. 

Figure 4 illustrates the recent decline in P-3 flight hours. 
Page 20 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Figure 4: Total P-3 On-Station Flight Hours in the Transit Zone, Fiscal Years 2000-

2005 

In August 2004, the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator established a working 

group to evaluate the problem of the reduction in maritime patrol aircraft 

flying hours and identify possible solutions. The group identified several 

possible alternatives, including: 

• redeploying AWACS to support an aerial interdiction program in 

Colombia, 

• substituting other Defense aircraft for the Navy P-3s, 

• extending the amount of time aircraft are deployed to forward operating 

locations throughout the region, 

• increasing the number of hours flown by the Coast Guard HC-130 

surveillance aircraft in support of interdiction, 

Fiscal year

Flight hours

Source: JIATF-South and JIATF-West.

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

U.S. Navy

CBP

The Netherlands

Total
Page 21 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

• upgrading the sensors on existing aircraft to improve their capabilities, 

• deploying aircraft to locations closer to the suspected trafficking routes, 

and 

• requesting additional funding to support the deployment of United 

Kingdom maritime patrol aircraft in the transit zone. 

According to JIATF-South officials, several of these proposals have been 

implemented. AWACS have begun flying missions in support of the aerial 

interdiction program in Colombia (also known as the “Air Bridge Denial” 

program)19—relieving CBP of much of this burden. The Coast Guard and 

CBP have deployed aircraft to locations in Costa Rica and Ecuador, and the 

Coast Guard has received funding to upgrade some of its detection and 

monitoring equipment with improved sensors. Finally, Defense is providing 

housing for United Kingdom aircrews (relieving them of the financial 

burden) that provide surveillance in the Caribbean Sea while flying training 

missions. But, JIATF-South, the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, and other 

cognizant officials noted that the longer term prospect of further declines 

in U.S. P-3 or other maritime patrol assets for interdiction operations has 

not been addressed.

Readiness Rates for Aging 

Coast Guard Ships and 

Aircraft Have Declined

During fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the readiness rates of the Coast 

Guard’s older ships and aircraft showed a general decline, although the 

rates fluctuated from year to year.20 For example, ships used to monitor 

drug trafficking activities and carry the helicopters that disable and stop 

go-fast boats were below their target levels for time free of major 

deficiencies or loss of at least one primary mission. Further, the percentage 

of time that HC-130 surveillance aircraft were available to perform 

missions was below the target level in fiscal year 2004, and the surface 

radar system on the aircraft is subject to frequent failures. In some 

instances, mission flight crews had to look out the windows of the aircraft 

for targets because the radar systems were inoperable. 

19For more information about this program, see our report titled Drug Control: Air Bridge 

Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented New Safeguards, but Its Effect on Drug 

Trafficking Is Not Clear, GAO-05-970 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).

20The Coast Guard uses these assets to perform a variety of missions, such as interdicting 

illicit drug shipments or attempted landings by illegal aliens and rescuing mariners at sea.
Page 22 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

The Coast Guard has taken several actions to keep its assets operational. 

These include establishing a compendium of information for making 

decisions regarding maintenance and upgrades; performing more extensive 

maintenance between deployments; and exploring strategies for 

prioritizing the maintenance and capability enhancement projects needed 

to provide more objective data on where to spend budget dollars and 

enhance mission capabilities. However, these additional efforts, while 

helpful in preventing a more rapid decline in the condition of existing 

assets, are unlikely to solve the problem. For fiscal year 2004, the Coast 

Guard’s estimated cost of deferred maintenance for these assets totaled 

approximately $28 million.21

Drug Traffickers Have 

Changed Tactics

Interdiction operations are further challenged by the changing tactics of 

the drug traffickers. In the eastern Pacific Ocean, JIATF-South in recent 

years has detected suspect fishing vessels and go-fast boats traveling 

further south and about 300 miles southwest of the Galapagos Islands 

before turning towards Central America and Mexico. This change in tactics 

has greatly increased the ocean surface area that must be monitored and, 

because of the distances to travel, has made it more difficult for U.S. 

surface ships and aircraft to respond to suspected cocaine movements. In 

addition:

• Drug traffickers have begun using larger go-fast boats. In the past, gofast boats typically transported 2 to 4 metric tons of cocaine, but some 

are now capable of carrying up to 8 metric tons. 

• Drug traffickers in the eastern Pacific Ocean have increasingly used 

vessels registered to countries, such as Ecuador and Mexico, with which 

the United States has no maritime boarding agreements. The use of 

these vessels complicates the process of boarding and searching for 

illicit drugs. 

Moreover, Ecuador has declared that its territorial waters extend 200 miles 

from its coastline and around the Galapagos Islands (most nations, 

21For more information about the condition of Coast Guard ships and aircraft, see Coast 

Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater Legacy Assets and 

Acquisition Management Challenges, GAO-05-651T (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005) and 

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater Legacy Assets 

and Acquisition Management Challenges, GAO-05-307T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2005).
Page 23 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

including the United States set a 12-mile territorial limit). Although the 

United States does not recognize Ecuador’s claim, U.S. ships and aircraft 

generally do not enter this area for interdiction missions to avoid the 

potentially politically sensitive issue of having to deal with the Government 

of Ecuador.

Capability of Nations in the 

Transit Zone to Assist with 

Interdiction Is Limited 

Although most nations in the transit zone—especially countries in Central 

America and the eastern Caribbean Sea—cooperate with U.S. interdiction 

efforts, JIATF-South and other officials told us that these countries lack the 

capability and resources to compensate for any decline in U.S. and allies’ 

assets. Most countries in the transit zone are able to provide only a few 

vessels or aircraft to intercept drug traffickers or lack secure 

communications equipment needed to coordinate with U.S. law 

enforcement counterparts during interdiction missions. Also, many of 

these countries do not have a civilian law enforcement or military presence 

in the coastal areas where drug traffickers work with local criminal 

organizations to offload cocaine shipments and deliver them to the United 

States. In addition, U.S. agencies are reluctant to work with law 

enforcement officials in some countries because of widespread corruption.

From fiscal year 2000 through 2005, the United States provided about 

$365 million in assistance to countries in the transit zone. Of this, Mexico 

received approximately $115 million to support its efforts to eradicate 

opium poppy and marijuana, and improve surveillance and intelligence 

capabilities. The transit zone countries in Central America and the 

Caribbean received the remainder, with most of this assistance for 

programs to assist civilian law enforcement and military agencies in El 

Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Panama. 

Assistance provided to transit zone countries in Central America and the 

Caribbean from State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs increased from approximately $18 million in fiscal 

year 2000 to about $25 million in fiscal year 2002 but has since declined to 

about $7 million in fiscal year 2005. A State official attributed the decline in 

assistance to commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. State assistance has 

been used for helicopter airlift support to Guatemala’s police 

counternarcotics units and interceptor boats for the Bahamas, among other 

things.

Assistance for transit zone countries in Central America and the Caribbean 

provided through the Foreign Military Finance and International Military 
Page 24 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Education and Training programs has increased from about $19 million in 

fiscal year 2000 to about $36 million in fiscal year 2005. This assistance has 

been used to train host country personnel and provide equipment such as 

helicopters, spare parts, and fuel to support counternarcotics training and 

missions.

Agencies’ Performance 

Measures Vary and 

Data for Assessing 

Performance Are 

Problematic

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal 

agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving 

their goals, and to communicate their results to the Congress.22 The act 

requires agencies to set multiyear strategic goals in their strategic plans 

and corresponding annual goals in their performance plans, measure 

performance toward the achievement of those goals, and report on their 

progress in their annual performance reports. These reports are intended 

to provide important information to agency managers, policymakers, and 

the public on what each agency accomplished with the resources it was 

given. Moreover, the act calls for agencies to develop performance goals 

that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and to establish 

performance measures that adequately indicate progress toward achieving 

those goals. Our previous work has noted that the lack of clear measurable 

goals makes it difficult for program managers and staff to link their day-today efforts to achieving the agency’s intended mission.23

When multiple agencies are involved in achieving the desired results, as 

with transit zone interdiction operations, agencies should coordinate the 

development of performance measures to ensure that they are 

complementary. In the case of the transit zone, performance measures and 

approaches for assessing transit zone operations vary among the Coast 

Guard, CBP, and Defense. In addition, basic information about cocaine 

production and trafficking and cocaine usage in the United States that 

would help in assessing transit zone interdiction operations is problematic. 

Further, ONDCP and other agencies involved have not fully addressed 

recommendations for improving illicit drug data collection and analysis. 

22Pub. L. 103-62, as amended.

23GAO-04-38.
Page 25 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Transit Zone Performance 

Measures Vary

According to the 2005 U.S. National Drug Control Strategy update, the 2002 

U.S. National Drug Control Strategy “clearly laid out a plan for accountable 

results in achieving a single goal—reducing drug use.” Yet specific 

measures of performance in the transit zone linking interdiction operations 

to the Strategy’s priority of disrupting the illicit drug market were not 

included in the 2002 strategy, nor subsequently developed across the 

agencies in conjunction with ONDCP. The performance measures 

developed by the Coast Guard, and the measures being developed by CBP 

and Defense, vary in their emphasis and may not be helpful in assessing 

progress in disrupting the illicit drug market. 

• The Coast Guard’s performance measures related to the transit zone set 

specific goals to reduce the flow of cocaine. For fiscal year 2004, the 

goal was to remove 15 percent of the cocaine flowing through the transit 

zone; according to Coast Guard officials, the removal goal increases to 

35 percent in 2011. 

• CBP is developing performance measures related to operational 

readiness rates (a measure of its ability to respond when requested), but 

these rates are not specific to the transit zone or to counternarcotics 

activities and do not measure results. 

• Defense is developing performance measures that focus on the number 

of disruptions of cocaine trafficking events, but it has not yet set any 

targets or goals to assess its progress.

Data for Assessing Transit 

Zone Interdiction 

Operations and Drug Use in 

the United States Are 

Problematic

Data for assessing U.S. interdiction operations in the transit zone and 

relating the results to the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy’s priority of 

disrupting the illicit drug market and to its overall goal of reducing drug 

usage in the United States are problematic. Specifically, the data for 

estimating the cocaine flowing through the transit zone towards the United 

States has been called into question, and data to demonstrate progress in 

reducing drug use are difficult to obtain in ways that can be generalized to 

the United States.

Annual Cocaine Flow 

Assessment Is Not Useful for 

Assessing Performance

The principal source of information about cocaine flow in the transit zone 

is ONDCP’s Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM). The 

IACM is prepared annually for ONDCP by an interagency group 

representing departments and agencies involved in U.S. counternarcotics
Page 26 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

efforts.24 The assessment is intended to advise policymakers and resource 

planners whose responsibilities involve detecting, monitoring, and 

interdicting illicit drug shipments. It draws on other studies and several 

datasets to estimate cocaine supply (that is, how much cocaine is produced 

and available for export to the United States) and demand (that is, how 

much cocaine is used in the United States and elsewhere). In the past, the 

IACM’s estimates of cocaine supply were close to the estimated demand in 

the United States and other world markets plus estimated losses in transit, 

source, and arrival zones. But for calendar years 2003 and 2004, according 

to the interagency group, the IACM’s estimate of the amount of cocaine 

available for export was too low in relation to estimated U.S. and non-U.S. 

demand for cocaine after taking into account seizures and disruptions. 

The interagency assessment noted that the increasing difference between 

supply and demand estimates may be the result of several different 

scenarios, a combination of which points to potential shortfalls in some or 

many of the data sets. For example:

• Production and consumption estimates could be widely off the mark. 

Production estimates are not designed to capture dynamic activities 

such as eradication, replanting, or changing processing efficiencies.

• Worldwide consumption estimates are several years old (for example, 

the U.S. estimate was developed in 2002) and may not yet show the 

effects of record eradication and interdiction efforts in recent years. 

• Time lags in estimating aspects inherent to the cocaine trade—including 

price, purity, and demand—could delay the apparent effects and 

documentation of a shortage.

As a result of the disparity between the estimated cocaine supply and 

demand, the interagency group stated that a precise estimate of cocaine 

flow was not possible for 2004, and that “a range of possible amounts was 

more intellectually and analytically honest.” The group estimated that 

between 325 and 675 metric tons of cocaine flowed towards the United 

24The interagency group is headed by the Defense Intelligence Agency and includes the U.S. 

Director of Central Intelligence, Crime and Narcotics Center; the Coast Guard; CBP; DEA; 

JIATF-South; JIATF-West; the National Security Agency; the Office of Naval Intelligence; 

State; and the U.S. Southern Command. In addition, Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise 

(United Kingdom) participates. 
Page 27 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

States in 2004, but such a wide range is not useful for assessing transit zone 

interdiction efforts. 

ONDCP and other interagency group officials agreed that the wide range 

reflects the difficulty in obtaining specific information about the 

production of cocaine and how it gets to the United States. According to 

ONDCP, the Director of ONDCP has established a working group to identify 

and, where possible, quantify the uncertainties with the IACM, and identify 

ways to improve the data and reduce uncertainty. 

Tracking Illicit Drug Use in the 

United States Is Difficult 

ONDCP uses several surveys and databases to help it assess the availability 

and rate of illicit drug use in the United States and changes in those 

measures over time, but a variety of issues affect their reliability and 

validity. According to several studies and ONDCP officials, a large portion 

of major cocaine (and other drug) users are members of generally hard-tosurvey populations, such as the homeless or incarcerated, and those who 

are questioned about illicit drug use may be inclined to provide a socially 

acceptable, and legal, response to survey questions. In addition, typical 

survey response problems, such as low response rates and failure of 

respondents to accurately recall past events, also apply. 

Moreover, according to ONDCP officials, obtaining information from and 

about persons engaged in an illegal activity is difficult at best, much of the 

available information about illicit drug use cannot be generalized to the 

United States, and the logistics of collecting meaningful data means that a 

time lag will always exist between the data collection period and the time 

when the data are available for public policy purposes. Thus, under the best 

of circumstances, the effect of a drug policy change may take a number of 

years to demonstrate. 

Table 4 lists the primary sources of information ONDCP uses to track illicit 

drug trends in the United States and highlights the latest date of data 

collection, ONDCP’s primary purpose, and selected issues about the 

information source. In some cases, the survey or database was designed for 

other purposes and ONDCP officials have adapted it for their use.
Page 28 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Table 4: ONDCP’s Primary Sources of Information on Illicit Drug Availability and Use in the United States

Source: GAO analysis of data sources.

ONDCP Has Not Fully 

Addressed Prior 

Recommendations for 

Improving Drug Data 

Collection and Analysis

In a 2001 report prepared for ONDCP, the National Research Council 

concluded that the United States had neither the data systems nor the 

research infrastructure needed to assess the effectiveness of drug control 

enforcement policies.25 In particular, the Council highlighted the absence of 

adequate, reliable data on illicit drug prices and use. The Council made 

numerous recommendations to improve data collection and analysis—

Data source

End of most 

recent data 

collection ONDCP’s primary purpose Selected issues

System to Retrieve 

Information from Drug 

Evidence (STRIDE)

June 2003 Assess price and purity of 

cocaine in the United States.

• Data cannot be generalized to the United States. 

• Designed as an inventory system for drugs turned 

into DEA by its agents and informants and other 

law enforcement agencies. 

• Trends could reflect law enforcement patterns 

rather than drug availability patterns.

Drug Abuse Warning 

Network (DAWN)

December 2003 Assess drug-related hospital 

emergency department visits 

and deaths investigated by 

medical examiners and 

coroners.

• Data cannot be generalized to the United States.

• Intended to identify new drug trends, not drug 

consumption. 

• Coverage depends on emergency departments 

and medical examiners identifying and reporting 

drug-related incidents.

Arrestee Drug Abuse 

Monitoring

(ADAM)

March 2004 Assess drug and alcohol use 

among arrestees in 39 cities 

and counties. This population 

is typically composed of hardcore drug users.

• Data cannot be generalized to the United States. 

• Cancelled in January 2004. ONDCP is attempting 

to restore funding for fiscal year 2006, but a new 

survey cannot be completed until 2008. 

Monitoring the Future (MTF) December 2004 Track drug use rates among 

8th, 10th, and 12th grade 

students; college students; 

and young adults.

• Survey does not include school dropouts and 

absentees, or others who may be institutionalized.

• Relies on self-reporting.

National Survey on Drug Use 

and Health (NSDUH)

December 2004 Track incidence and 

prevalence of substance 

abuse in the general 

population by surveying 

individuals over 12 years old 

living in households.

• The survey generally does not cover hard-core 

drug users because it excludes homeless persons 

not in shelters and individuals in jails, detention 

centers, and drug treatment centers. 

• Relies on self-reporting.

25National Research Council, Informing America’s Policy on Illegal Drugs: What We Don’t 

Know Keeps Hurting Us (Washington, D.C.: 2001). 
Page 29 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

eight were addressed in full or in part to ONDCP. Regarding interdiction, 

the Council recommended that research be done to address the following: 

• to what extent traffickers can limit the effect of interdiction operations 

by shifting their routes and modes of transportation; 

• how the deterrent effects of supply-reduction programs can be 

measured and the size of these effects; and

• how quickly drug production and trafficking adapt to supply-reduction 

activities, what happens to supply and price during the period of 

adaptation, and how long the deterrent effects of supply-reduction 

operations last before new supply sources emerge. 

ONDCP officials told us these recommendations have not been fully 

addressed. They noted that the illicit and secretive nature of the illicit drug 

market precludes the systematic collection of cultivation, production, and 

trafficking information. Furthermore, these officials emphasized that the 

economics of cocaine production and trafficking may not follow typical 

supply and demand relationships—profit margins likely remain high 

despite record coca eradiation and cocaine interdiction efforts, and drug 

traffickers can quickly react to changing interdiction tactics and 

circumstances. 

Conclusions Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided over $6 billion for 

counternarcotics and related programs in South and Central America and 

throughout the transit zone, primarily to reduce the amount of illicit drugs 

produced and transported to the United States. While the number of onstation ship days and on-station flight hours provided for monitoring and 

interdiction operations in the transit zone has varied since 2000, they have 

generally declined in recent years. JIATF-South, Coast Guard, and CBP 

officials are concerned that the current level of operations cannot be 

sustained. Defense on-station ship days and flight hours have already 

declined due to operational priorities in other parts of the world, primarily 

Afghanistan and Iraq, and structural limitations on the U.S. Navy’s primary 

maritime patrol aircraft—the P-3. The reduced availability of P-3 maritime 

patrol aircraft will degrade JIATF-South’s ability to detect and monitor gofast boats and other vessels suspected of transporting illicit drugs. JIATFSouth, Coast Guard, and CBP officials are concerned that this problem is 

likely to worsen as budget constraints and other homeland security 

priorities arise that limit the assets available for interdiction operations. 
Page 30 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

While some short-term fixes have been taken, the longer-term implications 

of further declines in the availability of monitoring and interdiction assets 

have not been addressed.

Developing performance measures—linking interdiction operations in the 

transit zone to disrupting the illicit drug market, specifically the cocaine 

market—is difficult. Nevertheless, the Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense, in 

conjunction with ONDCP, should develop and coordinate performance 

measures that more directly relate to transit zone operations. Data 

compiled by the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator and vetted by the principal 

agencies involved in transit zone interdiction efforts —data primarily 

documenting detections of drug movements and seizures and disruptions 

of illicit drugs—could serve as benchmarks for assessing progress until 

data more directly related to disrupting the illicit drug market can be 

developed.

Collecting relevant data to assess the effect of interdiction operations on 

the cocaine market and drug usage in the United States is problematic. 

Assessing how much cocaine is produced and moves towards the United 

States is not easy—as the 2004 IACM demonstrates. Most other readily 

available data on cocaine price, purity, and availability—indicators of U.S. 

demand—cannot be generalized to the United States. More systematic 

surveys on drug usage take time—sometimes several years—to complete. 

Thus, a number of years is often needed to show the effect of a drug policy 

change. The National Research Council reported similar issues in 2001. 

However, until ONDCP and other cognizant agencies fully address the 

Council’s recommendations, data to help assess U.S. drug usage will 

remain problematic.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security 

plan for the likely decline in the future availability of ships and aircraft for 

transit zone interdiction operations and, specifically, determine how they 

will compensate for the decline in P-3 maritime patrol aircraft availability. 

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security 

develop and coordinate, in conjunction with the Director of ONDCP, 

performance measures for transit zone interdiction operations that take 

advantage of available drug interdiction data (such as detections, seizures, 

and disruptions) to provide a basis for (1) assessing transit zone 

interdiction performance and (2) deciding how to deploy increasingly 

limited assets, such as the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft.
Page 31 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

We also recommend that the Director of ONDCP address each of the 

recommendations made by the National Research Council and report to the 

Congress what departments and agencies need to take action, what 

remains to be done, and when action is expected to be completed. In those 

instances where ONDCP reports that action is not necessary, we 

recommend that it document the reasons why.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

Defense, Homeland Security, and ONDCP provided written comments on a 

draft of this report. See appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. Justice and 

State did not provide written comments. However, we discussed the draft 

report with cognizant officials at each of the departments. Overall, the 

departments and ONDCP stated that they generally concurred with the 

recommendations that applied to them, but none detailed when and how 

they will address them. 

Defense and Homeland Security noted that they already have taken or are 

in the process of taking appropriate action regarding planning for drug 

interdiction asset requirements and developing relevant performance 

measures. 

• Defense specifically noted that the U.S. Navy has developed a Fleet 

Response Plan designed to transition from the P-3 to its replacement 

aircraft—the Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft, which is scheduled to be 

introduced into the fleet in fiscal year 2011. Defense added that it will 

continue to coordinate with all maritime patrol asset providers in the 

transit zone. Regarding performance measures, Defense stated that it 

has appropriate mechanisms in place to assess its efforts. Yet, Defense 

also noted that during the past year it has coordinated with its 

commands to develop performance goals, measures, and targets for the 

transit zone and continues to work with them as they prepare their 

submissions. During the course of this engagement, cognizant Defense 

officials stated on several occasions that they had not finalized 

performance measures.26 

26We also note that in 1999, we recommended that Defense develop performance measures 

for assessing its contributions to counternarcotics’ operations. See our report titled Drug 

Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply have Declined, 

GAO/NSIAD-00-9 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 1999).
Page 32 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

• Homeland Security stated it develops asset requirements as part of an 

interagency process where asset commitment is based on threat level 

and the availability of funding. While it remains committed to “robust 

support” of maritime transit zone interdiction efforts, unforeseen 

events—Hurricane Katrina, for example—can affect asset availability. 

Regarding performance measures, Homeland Security noted that as a 

result of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,27

it has undertaken an effort to develop and coordinate a performance 

measurement system to better assess Homeland Security’s 

counternarcotics’ activities, including transit zone interdiction 

operations. Homeland Security did not state when it will complete this 

effort.

ONDCP did not comment directly on interdiction asset availability, but 

overall, ONDCP agreed that developing performance measures that link 

interdiction operations to disrupting the cocaine market is difficult but 

necessary, and stated that it will work with Defense and Homeland Security 

within the framework of the Government Performance and Results Act to 

develop appropriate measures.

Our recommendation regarding planning for the likely decline in 

interdiction asset availability was intended to have Defense and Homeland 

Security work together to address asset availability; in particular, the 

decline in maritime patrol aircraft hours. However, the departments do not 

address in their comments when or how their planning efforts have been 

coordinated nor when their on-going efforts will be completed. We 

continue to believe that such a coordinated planning effort is both 

appropriate and necessary to ensure that the departments’ limited assets 

are used in the most effective manner, and encourage the departments to 

follow through with one another. 

Concerning the National Research Council’s recommendations, ONDCP 

did not specifically address our recommendation to report to Congress on 

what actions have been taken or still need to be taken. Rather, ONDCP 

referred to a 2001 study—Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement 

Operations on Drug Smuggling, 1991-1999—that it published as one of 

several steps it has taken to address the Council’s recommendations. We 

note that the ONDCP study was published the same year the Council 

published its report, and that it does not refer to the Council’s report or its 

27Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638.
Page 33 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

recommendations. The ONDCP study’s primary objective was to “measure 

the impact of drug enforcement operations on the cocaine smuggling 

industry.” Among other things and related to this report, the study 

concludes that better data was available on what drug traffickers were 

doing than on the activities of U.S. drug interdiction assets. According to 

the study’s authors, “this was most notably the case with the interdiction 

activities of the Department of Defense.” In addition, to address the 

Council’s recommendations, ONDCP also noted that it has established two 

operational priorities focused on (a) understanding the drug market and 

(b) enhancing the data sets ONDCP relies on. These priorities were 

initiated during the course of our engagement. According to ONDCP 

officials, they have not been completed. 

As we note in this report, collecting relevant data for assessing the effect of 

interdiction operations on the cocaine market and U.S. illicit drug usage is 

problematic. But more than three years after the National Research 

Council’s report addressing the illicit drug data issue was finalized, ONDCP 

cannot point to any specific action it has completed to address the 

Council’s recommendations for improving the collection of illicit drug 

trafficking and usage data. Given the importance of the illicit drug problem 

and the on-going controversy in the United States about how best to 

confront it, better data for evaluating alternative drug control policies is 

paramount. We continue to urge ONDCP to follow up on the Council’s 

findings and recommendations and take the steps necessary to address the 

continuing shortcomings in its illicit drug data and report to Congress the 

status of its efforts. 

In commenting on the IACM, Homeland Security stated that the decision by 

the interagency group to report a range for cocaine movement was a wise 

one because it acknowledged the lack of precision inherent in the data that 

is currently available. We agree, and did not intend to imply anything else. 

We also agree with Homeland Security that greater efforts need to be made 

to improve the methodology and integrity of data instruments in order to 

gain a better and more useful understanding of drug production and 

consumption.

Finally, all the departments and ONDCP provided additional information on 

various aspects of their roles regarding drug interdiction in the transit zone. 

Defense, in particular, emphasized that it is not authorized to conduct law 

enforcement operations but can support them. In addition, all the 

departments and ONDCP provided us technical comments and updates 

that we have incorporated throughout the report, as appropriate.
Page 34 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the 

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to 

interested congressional committees and the Secretaries of Defense, 

Homeland Security, Justice, and State, and the Director of ONDCP. We will 

also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report 

will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were Al Huntington, 

Joe Carney, J.J. Marzullo, José Peña, and Jim Strus. 

Jess T. Ford, Director

International Affairs and Trade
Page 35 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

Overall, to examine the status of U.S. interdiction assets and progress made 

in disrupting drug trafficking in the transit zone, we focused on U.S. (1) 

efforts to interdict cocaine because nearly all the cocaine entering the 

United States comes from South America and (2) operations in the western 

Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean because the United States has 

positioned most of its interdiction assets in these areas. We also agreed 

with the requesters to limit the scope of this engagement by examining U.S. 

operations to interdict cocaine before it reaches intermediate staging 

points in the Caribbean Sea, Central America, and Mexico on the way to the 

United States. We further narrowed our examination to U.S. efforts to 

detect and disrupt unscheduled maritime movements of cocaine—

primarily go-fast boats, but also fishing and other types of ocean-going 

vessels. Although drug traffickers use small aircraft to transport cocaine 

and other drugs, the United States essentially relies on the law enforcement 

authorities in the countries where they land to interdict them.

To track the changes in the amounts of cocaine seized and disrupted since 

calendar year 2000, we relied on the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine 

Movement (IACM). While the data sets used to prepare the IACM have been 

called into question by the interagency group that prepares it, the IACM 

data on cocaine seizures and disruptions are based on the Consolidated 

Counterdrug Database, which is managed by the Office of the U.S. 

Interdiction Coordinator. Beginning with 2004, the Coordinator’s Office 

began using stricter rules to vet the data on drug movements, detections, 

seizures, and disruptions in quarterly meetings with the interagency drug 

community. The intent was to minimize duplicate or questionable reported 

drug movements. According to the database manager, however, the more 

careful review of the data did not materially affect the categorization or 

number of maritime drug movements—our primary emphasis. Rather, 

many suspect aircraft are no longer counted as drug movement events 

unless corroborating information strongly suggests drugs were aboard the 

aircraft. We observed a quarterly vetting session and discussed the process 

for determining whether reported drug events can be “confirmed and 

substantiated” based on intelligence and other sources with several 

members of the interagency group that participate, including the Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA); the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, Crime 

and Narcotics Center; the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the 

Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South); the Coast Guard; and 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Based on the foregoing, we 

determined that the cocaine seizure and disruption data provided to us 

were sufficiently reliable for describing and documenting trends in the 

transit zone.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

To determine the factors that have contributed to the changes in cocaine 

seizures and disruptions, we reviewed the IACMs for calendar years 2000 

through 2004. We discussed the observations made in the IACMs and 

reported operational changes since 2000 with cognizant officials in the 

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the Department of 

Defense’s (Defense) Office of Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, and 

other members of the interagency counternarcotics community—namely, 

DIA, the Crime and Narcotics Center, DEA, JIATF-South, and the U.S. 

Interdiction Coordinator. 

To analyze the trends in the assets provided by the United States and its 

allies since fiscal year 2000 to support illicit drug interdiction in the transit 

zone, we relied on data provided by JIATF-South and JIATF-West that 

tabulates on-station ship days and flight hours spent on interdiction 

missions by the provider and the type of ship or aircraft.1

 Until fiscal year 

2004, JIATF-West had responsibility for U.S. drug detection and monitoring 

activities in the eastern Pacific Ocean off the coast of Mexico.2

 We analyzed 

data for fiscal years 2000 through 2005, although JIATF-West could not 

provide information about on-station ship days for the first quarter of fiscal 

year 2000 (September-December 1999).3

 Compared to the first quarter of 

2001, JIAFT-West’s contribution was about 5.4 percent of the total ship days 

on station. To determine the reliability of the JIATF-South and JIATF-West 

data, we discussed how the respective data was compiled with cognizant 

officials and compared it to available—albeit, less specific—data from the 

Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense. Through these efforts, we determined that 

1

As we reported in 2002 (GAO-02-13), none of the departments or agencies involved in 

transit zone interdiction operations track the costs directly associated with cocaine 

interdiction missions nor do they track the ship or flight time spent on interdiction versus 

other missions in the transit zone. In addition, the Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense could not 

separate the time spent traveling to the transit zone—in the case of ships this could be 

several days or a week—versus actually conducting their missions. 

2

Through fiscal year 2003, JIATF-West was located in Alameda, California. It has since 

moved to Honolulu, Hawaii.

3

We also noted that the Coast Guard conducted an operation in the eastern Caribbean Sea 

independent of JIATF-South that included illicit drug interdiction (known as “Operation 

Frontier Shield”). According to the Coast Guard, the operation was ongoing in fiscal year 

2000, but we did not include it in our analysis because the Coast Guard could not separate 

the time needed for its ships and aircraft to move to the operational area, nor could it 

identify the time its ships and aircraft spent on drug interdiction versus other objectives, 

such as stemming the flow of illegal aliens.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

the data provided to us were sufficiently reliable for describing the trends 

in asset availability during fiscal years 2000 through 2005.

To determine the challenges facing the departments and agencies in 

maintaining current levels of transit zone interdiction operations, we 

reviewed issues raised in the IACM and other department and agency 

planning and budgeting documents. We discussed these matters with 

cognizant law enforcement and military authorities at Defense, Department 

of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and headquarters in 

Washington, D.C. We also discussed operational challenges with 

• Coast Guard officials at their base in Jacksonville, Florida, where the 

Coast Guard stations armed helicopters used in interdiction operations; 

• CBP officials at their base in Jacksonville, Florida, where CPB stations 

P-3 maritime patrol aircraft used in interdiction operations; 

• DEA officials in Miami, Florida, and Nassau, Bahamas, who manage an 

ongoing drug interdiction program in the waters around the Bahamas 

called “Operation Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos;”

• JIATF-South officials in Key West, Florida, including the Commander; 

representatives from the Coast Guard, CBP, Defense, and other U.S. 

agencies; as well as the liaison officers from France, the Netherlands, 

and the United Kingdom; and

• Justice officials with the U.S. Attorney’s offices in Tampa and Sarasota, 

Florida, directly involved in the Panama Express operation.

To determine how the Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense assess their 

performance, we met with cognizant officials in their respective planning 

and budgeting offices and reviewed relevant reports and related 

documents. Since only the Coast Guard had completed developing 

performance measures, we relied on discussions with the key officials to 

document what CBP and Defense were developing. To determine what data 

are available for assessing transit zone performance, we met with the 

principals involved in preparing the IACM. We discussed issues that have 

arisen concerning cultivation and production estimates (primarily, officials 

with the Crime and Narcotics Center and DEA), as well as interdiction 

amounts (primarily, the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator’s Consolidated 

Counterdrug Database manager). In addressing usage and demand 

estimates in the United States, we asked ONDCP officials what they used to 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

measure progress against the National Drug Control Strategy’s goal of 

reducing drug usage in the United States. These officials cited the data 

sources we refer to in the body of the report (see table 4) and described 

how they used the information. We also reviewed the scope and 

methodology statements for each data source, and in the cases of the 

National Survey on Drug Use and Health and Monitoring the Future, we 

spoke with the current project directors to obtain their views.
Page 39 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Appendix II

Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement 

Agreements ApendxiI

The United States has signed Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement 

agreements with 25 countries in the transit and source zones—three since 

2000 after the United States closed its military installations in Panama. 

According to Coast Guard officials, these agreements have improved 

cooperation with nations in the region and increased U.S. and, in particular, 

the Coast Guard’s capability to board suspect vessels and detain suspected 

drug traffickers. These officials added that these agreements are one of the 

primary reasons for increased interdictions of cocaine shipments in the 

transit zone. These bilateral agreements typically have six provisions to 

them. The United States and the countries negotiate each provision 

separately, which means that some countries may agree to some provisions 

and not others. The six parts provide for the following:

• Shipboarding provisions allow U.S. agencies under certain conditions to 

stop, board, and search suspicious vessels registered in that country 

without having specific permission. 

• Shiprider provisions permit countries to place law enforcement officials 

on another’s vessels.

• Pursuit provisions allow U.S. law enforcement agencies, under very 

limited circumstances, to pursue aircraft and vessels in a country’s 

airspace and territorial waters. In particular, the provisions permit U.S. 

law enforcement agencies to board and search a suspect vessel if the 

country does not have a vessel or aircraft available to respond 

immediately.

• Entry-to-investigate provisions allow the U.S. law enforcement agencies, 

under very limited circumstances, to enter a country’s airspace or 

territorial waters to investigate aircraft or vessels suspected of illicit 

drug trafficking. Specifically, the provisions permit U.S. law 

enforcement agencies to board and search a suspect vessel if the 

country does not have a vessel or aircraft available to respond 

immediately.

• Overflight provisions permit the U.S. law enforcement aircraft to fly 

over the country’s territorial waters, with appropriate notice to the 

country’s coastal authorities.

• Relay order-to-land provisions allow U.S. law enforcement agencies to 

relay an order to land from the host country to the suspect aircraft.
Appendix II

Counternarcotics Maritime Law 

Enforcement Agreements 

Page 40 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Moreover, an additional International Maritime Interdiction Support clause 

permits U.S. law enforcement agencies, principally the Coast Guard, to 

transport suspected drug traffickers through that country to the United 

States for prosecution and provides for expedited access to that country’s 

dockside facility to search suspect vessels. Since 2000, the United States 

has entered into support clauses with eight additional countries.

The following table lists the law enforcement agreements, including the 

international maritime interdiction support clause that the United States 

has negotiated with countries in the transit and source zones. 

Table 5: Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements with Countries in the Source and Transit Zones

Country Shipboarding Shiprider Pursuit

Entry-toInvestigate Overflight

Relay

orderto-land

International

Maritime

Interdiction

Support clause

1. Antigua and Barbuda X X X X X X *

2. Bahamas X X X

3. Barbados X X X X X X

4. Belize X X X X X X

5. Colombia X

6. Costa Rica X X X X X X *

7. Dominica X X X X

8. Dominican Republic X X X X * * *

9. Ecuador X

10. El Salvador X *

11. Grenada X X X X X X

12. Guatemala * * * * * * *

13. Haiti * * X X X *

14. Honduras * * * * * * *

15. Jamaica X X X X X X

16. Netherlands Antilles

and Aruba

XX X X

17. Nicaragua * * * * * * *

18. Panama * X * * * * *

19. St. Kitts and Nevis X X X X X X

20. St. Lucia X X X X X X

21. St. Vincent and 

Grenadines

X XX X
Appendix II

Counternarcotics Maritime Law 

Enforcement Agreements 

Page 41 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Source: JIATF-South.

*Indicates that the provision or clause was agreed to since July 2000.

Country Shipboarding Shiprider Pursuit

Entry-toInvestigate Overflight

Relay

orderto-land

International

Maritime

Interdiction

Support clause

22. Suriname X X X X X X

23. Trinidad and Tobago X X X X X X

24. Turks and Caicos X

25. Venezuela X X

(Continued From Previous Page)
Page 42 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 43 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Now on page 30.

Now on page 30.
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 44 GAO-06-200 Drug Control
Page 45 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security ApendxiIV
Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

Page 46 GAO-06-200 Drug Control
Page 47 GAO-06-200 Drug Control

Appendix V

Comments from the Office of National Drug 

Control Policy ApendxiV

(320307)
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