Filed 7/31/24 In re L.L. CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re L.L., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

 D083537

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Super. Ct. No. J521208)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Marissa A. Bejarano, Judge. Affirmed. 

Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa Maldonado, Chief Deputy

County Counsel, Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and

Respondent. 
2

Then three-month-old L.L. became a dependent of the juvenile court 

because of physical abuse by her mother, A.L. (Mother). At the six-month 

review hearing, the juvenile court placed L.L. with D.L. (Father) and found 

L.L. would suffer detriment if returned to Mother’s care. On appeal, Mother 

contends the court’s detriment finding was not supported by substantial 

evidence. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Facts Leading to the Dependency Case

In early 2023,1 Mother shook newborn L.L. on multiple occasions. On 

one occasion, she took L.L. out of her car seat and shook her strongly because 

she was crying. On another occasion, Mother shook L.L. and slapped her 

across the face because she was crying while the parents argued. Then, the 

parents were on a video call when Mother tossed L.L. two to three feet across 

a bed, causing L.L. to turn 180-degrees, and hit her head on a cell phone. 

Toward the end of March, Father informed Mother he wished to end 

their relationship.2 In response, Mother screamed and ripped out her own 

hair, and she repeatedly expressed a desire to commit suicide. Father took 

Mother to the hospital where Mother admitted to hospital staff that she 

shook and threw L.L. 

Following the advice of hospital staff, Father took three-month-old L.L. 

to the hospital. Father reported that Mother shook L.L. several times over a 

period of weeks and that he believed Mother was overwhelmed in caring for 

L.L. He reported Mother was also abusive toward him and that L.L. was 

present during some of their physical altercations. 

1 All undesignated date references are to 2023. 

2 Father is not a party to this appeal and will only be referenced when 

necessary. 
3

Hospital staff reported that Mother had symptoms of anxiety, 

depression, self-harm, and impulsive behaviors. Mother’s abuse of L.L., 

however, was not directly caused by mental illness, but rather by her

impulsivity and poor decision making when facing psychosocial stressors. 

Mother reported that she did not take L.L. to the hospital because she 

believed L.L. was “fine.” She nevertheless acknowledged that she shook L.L. 

after losing control of her emotions and that she felt unsafe around L.L. 

because she worried her behaviors could recur. 

B. The Agency’s Petition and Detention Hearing

In early April, the San Diego County Health and Human Services 

Agency (Agency) filed a petition on L.L.’s behalf due to Mother’s mental 

health and physical abuse and detained L.L. in a licensed foster home. 

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court appointed counsel for the 

parents and for L.L. The court found L.L.’s petition met prima facie 

requirements and detained her in out-of-home care. It ordered supervised 

visits for the parents and vested the Agency with discretion to expand their 

visitation. 

C. The Agency’s Jurisdiction-Disposition Report

At the end of April, the Agency reported that Mother took 

accountability for the facts underlying L.L.’s petition, although she denied 

she shook L.L. more than once. She claimed that she shook L.L. due to 

feeling frustrated with Father. After L.L.’s birth, she started acting 

aggressively toward Father because she felt she was solely responsible for the 

home and L.L.’s care. In response, Father sought childcare for L.L. and 

obtained a restraining order against Mother. 

Mother reported she was being treated by a psychologist and a 

psychiatrist. While her psychologist mentioned postpartum depression, she 
4

had diagnoses of depression and anxiety. The social worker encouraged 

Mother to speak to her primary care provider about postpartum depression. 

Mother was not on medication and did not want to take medication. 

Mother’s case plan included participation in domestic violence and child 

abuse groups, as well as a parenting education program. It also 

recommended that she attend all mental health appointments and comply 

with her provider’s recommendations. 

D. Jurisdiction-Disposition Hearing

At the jurisdiction-disposition hearing, the Agency reported it had 

detained L.L. with a maternal great-aunt. The court found L.L.’s petition 

true and set disposition for trial. 

At the contested disposition hearing in May, Father informed the 

juvenile court that he had withdrawn his restraining order against Mother. 

The court removed L.L. from the parents, placed her with the maternal greataunt, and vested the Agency with discretion to allow the parents to visit 

together. 

The Agency’s addendum report noted L.L. adjusted well to the 

maternal great-aunt’s care. Mother visited L.L. five times per week for six 

hours each visit. The Agency expanded Mother’s visits to unsupervised

visits. 

E. The Agency’s Six-Month Review Report and the Initial Hearing

The Agency’s November report in advance of the six-month review 

hearing noted both parents had completed a parenting education program. 

Mother received daily support from the maternal grandfather, who lived next 

to her. 

The Agency had concerns about Mother harassing Father during the 

reporting period. She called and texted him incessantly despite his request 
5

that she stop. In July, he filed for a temporary protective order against 

Mother, and she did not contact him when it was in effect. A couple weeks 

later, however, Father terminated the protective order and the parents 

reengaged in communication. 

The social worker advised Mother to focus on L.L. during her visits 

instead of calling Father. Despite this, Mother called Father during a

September visit and was dishonest about her failure to follow the social 

worker’s advice. Otherwise, her visits with L.L. were successful and she 

actively engaged with L.L. and attended to her needs. The Agency initially 

referred Mother for coaching because she struggled to feed L.L. during visits. 

Her coach gave her positive reports, and Mother researched recipes and 

provided L.L. with homemade food. 

In October, Father filed a report with the police department claiming 

that Mother continued to harass him. Mother acknowledged she called and 

harassed Father until he “bl[e]w[ ] up” at her. The social worker expressed 

concern that Mother focused on Father instead of reunifying with L.L. 

Mother acknowledged that her decision making was irrational and that she 

distanced herself from her reunification goals when she engaged with Father. 

The Agency recommended that the parents receive reunification 

services to the 12-month review hearing date. In making this 

recommendation, the Agency wanted Mother to progress in her child abuse 

classes and to demonstrate more insight about the incidents that caused 

L.L.’s removal. 

At the six-month review hearing in November, Father set the matter 

for trial. Mother submitted on the Agency’s recommendations and did not 

join in Father’s trial set. 
6

F. The Agency’s Addendum Reports

The Agency’s addendum report noted concerns about the parents’

contact during the reporting period. On one day in December, Mother called 

Father 14 times, while he called her seven times. Mother told the social 

worker that L.L. accidentally called Father on Mother’s tablet during a visit.

Later, Mother admitted this was a lie and that she had facilitated Father’s

video visit with L.L. 

As of November, Mother self-reported enrolling in an additional 

parenting class. She also began overnight visits at her home. She admitted 

facilitating video calls between L.L. and Father during her own visitation 

time. When asked why she went against the social worker’s advice, Mother

reported she did not believe she would get caught. Mother changed her 

phone number at the social worker’s request. 

The social worker informed the parents that the Agency intended to 

recommend no contact between them. She was concerned about the parents’

lack of boundaries with each other, and she wanted them to learn how to 

successfully coparent. 

In a subsequent addendum report, the Agency noted that Mother’s 

overnight visits occurred without issue. She reported she kept her contact 

information confidential from Father. The Agency confirmed its prior 

recommendation, but additionally recommended that both parents receive 

overnight visits. It still had concerns about the parents’ lack of coparenting 

skills. They had not demonstrated an ability to communicate in a healthy 

manner, which called into question their ability to resolve parenting-related 

issues. 
7

G. Contested Six-Month Review Hearing

At the January 2024 contested six-month review hearing, the parents 

were present. The juvenile court received the Agency’s reports into evidence. 

Mother’s providers reported that she made good progress in her 

services. None of them recommended that she undergo further psychological 

assessments or treatments. Mother also never cancelled a visit due to her 

mental health. Mother argued that L.L. would not be placed at substantial 

risk of detriment if returned to her care. 

The social worker believed the parents continued to focus on conflict 

within their relationship. Before recommending placement, she wanted them 

to instead focus on L.L.’s needs. L.L. was at risk of future harm until the 

parents moved on from issues within their relationship. 

L.L.’s attorney agreed with the Agency’s recommendations. She argued 

L.L. would be placed at substantial risk of detriment if returned to the care of 

either parent. 

H. The Court’s Ruling

In January 2024, the juvenile court concluded that return of L.L. to 

Mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to her safety, protection, 

and/or physical or emotional well-being. 

The court further found that return of L.L. to Father would not create a 

substantial risk of detriment to L.L. The court ordered that L.L. be placed in 

Father’s care, with Mother’s overnight and unsupervised visitation to be 

arranged in a child and family team meeting. The court also ordered no 

contact between the parents, except when they communicated through a

parenting application, and that the parents participate in mediation. It 

continued its jurisdiction and ordered further services for the parents. 
8

DISCUSSION

I.

Relevant Legal Principles

When the juvenile court has found jurisdiction under section 300, it 

may remove a child from a parent pursuant to section 361 at a dispositional 

hearing only if it finds by clear and convincing evidence “[t]here is or would 

be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical 

or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and 

there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be 

protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parents.” (§ 361, 

subd. (c)(1); see Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248 

(Cynthia D.) [“At the dispositional hearing, the standard of proof for removal 

from a custodial parent is clear and convincing evidence.”].) 

In contrast, at the six-month review hearing, there is a statutory 

presumption that the child will be returned to parental custody “unless the 

court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to 

[his or her] parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of 

detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the 

child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1); In re Mary B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1474, 

1483 (Mary B.).) The Agency, not the parent, bears the burden of 

establishing that detriment. (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 248−249.) 

Proof by a preponderance standard at this stage sufficiently protects a 

parent’s due process rights because, as our Supreme Court has explained, the 

statutory scheme requires the juvenile court to have previously made a 

finding of detriment by clear and convincing evidence. (Cynthia D., at 

pp. 253−256.) 
9

“In evaluating detriment, the juvenile court must consider the extent to 

which the parent participated in reunification services” and “efforts or 

progress the parent has made toward eliminating the conditions that led to 

the child’s out-of-home placement.” (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 

1394, 1400.) The juvenile court “shall consider the efforts or progress, or 

both, demonstrated by the parent . . . and the extent to which they availed 

themselves of services provided . . . .” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) 

A juvenile court may find it is detrimental to return the child to the 

parent even if the parent has complied with the reunification case plan. (See 

Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 704−711 

[concluding that, although Mother had completed her program, reports by 

mental health and medical professionals and social worker supported the 

finding that returning the minors to Mother would be a substantial detriment 

to them]; In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1143 [holding that 

therapy attendance and visiting the children were not determinative, and 

that “[t]he court must also consider the parents’ progress and their capacity 

to meet the objectives of the plan”]; Ibid.; In re Jonathan R. (1989) 

211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1221 [“a finding that improvements in [a] parent[’]s 

circumstances outweigh the failures during reunification does not guarantee 

return of the child to the parents”].) The juvenile court may consider the 

parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances (In re Troy D. (1989) 

215 Cal.App.3d 889, 900), and is permitted to consider a parent’s denial of the 

protective issues when evaluating detriment in returning a child to parental 

custody (Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 865−868 

(Georgeanne G.)). “It is for the [juvenile] court to weigh [evidence of present 

circumstances] against the evidence of the parents’ efforts, accomplishments, 

and failures during the reunification period.” (In re Jonathan R., at p. 1221.) 
10

“We review the juvenile court’s finding of detriment for substantial 

evidence. [Citations.] Under that standard we inquire whether the evidence, 

contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the court’s determination.” 

(Georgeanne G., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 864–865; see Mary B., supra, 

218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1483.) “ ‘ “[W]e draw all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we 

review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; 

and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial 

court.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise 

independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to 

support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 

773.) 

II.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding of Detriment

Mother contends that the juvenile court’s finding at the six-month 

review hearing that it would be detrimental to return L.L. to her custody is 

not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. On this record, there 

was substantial evidence to support the court’s finding of detriment. 

Here, the court found it would be detrimental to L.L. to return her to 

Mother’s custody at the six-month review hearing because jurisdiction was 

“first based” on “Mother’s physical abuse” to L.L., Mother was only halfway 

through her domestic violence group sessions, she “minimiz[ed] the harm”

she caused to L.L. and she “continue[d] to lack insight into the protective 

issue as evidenced not only from the statements of the provider but the 

Mother, herself.” She also became “upset” when communicating with Father 

and, “until recently, the parents have continued to engage[ ] in verbal 

altercations via telephone, which . . . was the last setting that led . . . Mother 
11

to shake and throw [L.L.] onto the bed.” Substantial evidence supported 

these findings. 

The record before the juvenile court at the time of the six-month review 

hearing revealed that Mother had attended 16 child abuse classes and missed 

six classes. She had 36 classes remaining and had already “reached the

maximum number of absences she can have in the program.” She scored a 3

in the areas of empathy and insight, which stands for “sometimes” in the 

rating scale. She “need[ed] improvement in understanding the fear and 

trauma the abuse causes and showing insight concerning abusiveness and its 

effects on partner and children.” The instructor was still working with her on 

empathy, insight, minimization, and denial. 

Mother also completed only half of her domestic violence treatment 

classes, which was significant because the parents’ domestic violence 

dynamic precipitated Mother’s physical abuse. For example, L.L. cried 

because the parents were arguing, which caused Mother to shake L.L. and 

slap her across the face. On another occasion, Mother tossed L.L. after she 

screamed at Father on the phone. Mother also slapped Father while he held 

L.L. on several occasions. The court was correct to consider how much 

“progress” Mother made in her treatment program when determining 

whether it would be detrimental to return L.L. to Mother’s custody. 

(§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) 

Additionally, the Agency was aligned with the child abuse instructor’s

assessment that Mother “continue[d] to minimize the incident that brought 

[L.L.] into care.” Although Mother accepted that she threw and shook L.L., 
12

she stated “ ‘nothing happened’ ” to L.L.3 She also reported that her actions 

constituted an involuntary response to the stress she felt in dealing with 

Father. Mother’s minimization of the protective issues further supported the 

court’s finding there is detriment in returning L.L. to her custody. (See 

Georgeanne G., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 865–868.) 

It is Mother’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate the juvenile court’s 

order was not supported by substantial evidence (In re J.F. (2019) 

39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79), but her arguments on appeal—that she “excelled in 

all aspects of her case plan,” that her interaction with L.L. was “uniformly 

positive,” and that the “parents’ termination of their relationship allayed any 

remaining concerns about” L.L.’s safety—are not adequate to carry that 

burden. Mother overlooks that under the substantial evidence standard of 

review, we do not disturb the court’s findings if it is supported by substantial 

evidence, “even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and 

the [juvenile] court might have reached a different result had it believed 

other evidence.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 230.) 

Moreover, we do not agree with Mother that the parents’ relationship 

no longer poses a concern for L.L.’s safety. During the case, Mother contacted 

Father in hopes of reinstating their romantic relationship. She was 

sometimes dishonest about her contact with him and used her visitation time 

to call him despite being advised not to do so. The parents remained in 

contact until less than two months before the contested hearing. They

reignited contact with each other after Father obtained protective orders 

against Mother or changed his phone number to prevent her from contacting 

3 Meanwhile, a child protection doctor noted that shaking an infant could 

cause the infant to suffer brain injuries, intracranial hemorrhages, retinal 

hemorrhages, seizures, apnea, coma, and, in severe cases, death. 
13

him. This caused the social worker to question whether the parents’ 

cessation of contact would last. 

For support, Mother cites Georgeanne G., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 865–869, Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738 (Blanca 

P.) and M.G. v. Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 646 (M.G.), but none of 

those cases demonstrates that the court erred in this case. In Georgeanne G., 

the court rejected the parent’s claim that “lack of insight is not a valid ground 

for finding [the child’s] return to [the parent’s] home would create a 

substantial risk of detriment to [the child’s] safety or physical or emotional 

well-being.” (Georgeanne G., at p. 865.) After discussing several cases, 

including Blanca P., the court concluded that “[n]one of these cases holds a 

parent’s lack of insight may not be considered by the juvenile court,” so long 

as the evaluation of the parent’s insight is “ ‘based on evidence rather than an 

emotional response.’ ” (Georgeanne G., at p. 867, citing Blanca P., at p. 1750.) 

In M.G, the court “based its concerns on a hunch that was not supported by 

any evidence.” (M.G., at p. 662.) The Agency there also “failed to articulate 

specific reasons why or how the child[ ] would be at risk if placed in Mother’s 

. . . care.” (Cf. id. at pp. 661–662.) 

We reject Mother’s contention that the juvenile court’s findings and 

order were based on speculation, conjecture, or unreasonable inferences. 

(Cf. Georgeanne G., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 868–869; Blanca P., supra, 

45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1750–1751; M.G., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 661–

662.) Instead, the evidence showed that Mother’s repeated pattern of 

engaging in domestic violence precluded her from protecting L.L. and placing 

L.L.’s needs above her own. The evidence also established that Mother had 

not made sufficient progress in her case plan to substantially lessen this risk. 

She also failed to gain adequate insight into the issues that placed L.L. in 
14

danger, and the court found this failure led to a risk of harm to L.L. These 

facts are substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s detriment 

finding at the six-month review hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1); Georgeanne

G., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 865–869.) Accordingly, we affirm the court’s 

decision.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s findings and orders of January 29, 2024, are

affirmed. 

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.