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THREAT CONVERGENCE AT THE BORDER: HOW

CAN WE IMPROVE THE FEDERAL EFFORT TO

DISMANTLE CRIMINAL SMUGGLING ORGANIZATIONS?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 12, 2005

Serial No. 109–75

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian/Senior Counsel

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

DIANE E. WATSON, California

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

J. MARC WHEAT, Staff Director

MALIA HOLST, Clerk

TONY HAYWOOD, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on July 12, 2005 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Stana, Richard M., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Dan R. Burton, Assistant Director, Homeland Security and Justice ............................................ 20

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................ 10

Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Indiana, prepared statement of ............................................................... 5

Stana, Richard M., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of .............................. 23

Watson, Hon. Diane E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 16

(1)

THREAT CONVERGENCE AT THE BORDER:

HOW CAN WE IMPROVE THE FEDERAL EFFORT TO DISMANTLE CRIMINAL SMUGGLING ORGANIZATIONS?

TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,

AND HUMAN RESOURCES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Souder, Cummings, Watson,

Ruppersberger, Foxx, Sanchez, and Norton.

Staff present: J. Marc Wheat, staff director and chief counsel; Pat

DeQuattro, congressional fellow; Malia Holst, clerk; Tony Haywood,

minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SOUDER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Good afternoon, and thank you all for coming. This hearing will

continue the subcommittee’s ongoing study of how criminal smuggling organizations have impacted our ability to secure our borders.

Today’s hearing is a followup to the June 14th hearing concerning

smuggling organizations that are capable of transporting not only

drugs, but also aliens, terrorists and weapons.

Mr. Richard Stana, of the Government Accountability Office, the

investigatory arm of Congress, will help us understand the resource, management and legal gaps that frustrate our efforts of the

dismantling of these organizations. His testimony will bring further

clarity to the organization and efforts of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to

address the critical issue of alien smuggling.

It is critically important that the Department of Homeland Security and Congress address these issues. This subcommittee is very

anxious to review the administration’s ‘‘Second Stage Review’’ process and the impact it will have on the agencies and missions that

we are discussing today.

Smuggling pipelines used by unauthorized aliens and criminals

seeking to enter the United States could also be used by terrorists

to gain entrance into the United States. It is estimated that the

international alien smuggling and sex trafficking trade generates

$91⁄2 billion for criminal organizations worldwide, and the profits

are used to finance additional criminal enterprises, such as the

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trafficking of drugs, weapons, and other contraband. Nonetheless,

it is unknown how many people are smuggled into the United

States each year.

Most alien smuggling occurs along the U.S.-Mexico border. Mexico is a staging area for aliens from Mexico and other parts of the

world to attempt to illegally enter the United States. As the Border

Patrol makes it more difficult for smugglers to cross at one point

along the border, the smugglers move their operations elsewhere.

The success of Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego and Operation

Hold the Line in El Paso has been cited as one of the causes for

the increase in smuggling in the Arizona corridor.

In addition, smuggling organizations are attracted to the Arizona

corridor because the border terrain is challenging for law enforcement; the area is a major transportation hub with a highly developed highway system and an international airport; the corridor has

an extensive staging area comprised of homes, hotels and apartments; and the area has a robust financial services infrastructure.

Many policymakers are troubled by the apparent increase in the

number of organized cartels ferrying people into the country illegally. The 9/11 Commission voiced strong concerns that terrorists

use these human smuggling networks to cross borders in order to

evade detection at official points of entry.

The Department of Homeland Security is absolutely a crucial

player in our efforts to secure the borders. When DHS was created

in March 2003, it combined some of the most important border security agencies in the Federal Government: the Border Patrol, the

former INS and Customs inspectors and agents, and the U.S. Coast

Guard, all of which represented America’s front line against smugglers and drug traffickers.

Although there are certainly other Federal agencies with vital

roles in our fight to achieve some type of border control, DHS, and

specifically Customs and Border Protection [CBP], and Immigration

and Customs Enforcement [ICE], are largely responsible for manning the front lines in this mission. ICE is a primary component

for investigating alien smuggling, combating the smuggling of

aliens into the country, and the U.S. Border Patrol is the primary

front line defender between the ports of entry. Without them, we

will have little or no defense against the smugglers, people or

drugs, at our borders. It is vitally important that these DHS components be fully coordinated and integrated as they attempt to secure the borders, and that they be provided the proper tools, resources and authorities to do their job.

The Government Accountability Office recently released a study

entitled ‘‘Combating Alien Smuggling: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Federal Response,’’ which provides an in-depth review

and critique of the current issues that impact U.S. alien smuggling

enforcement efforts. The alien smuggling issues being discussed in

this report are not new nor surprising to this subcommittee. As a

matter of fact, they are the same types of issues and challenges

that we frequently hear about from DHS agencies and law enforcement officials involved in drug enforcement and interdiction efforts.

Stovepiping of responsibilities, limited information sharing and a

lack of coordinated, cohesive strategy, combined with limited resources, are all common critiques.

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Now is the time for Department of Homeland Security in general, and Immigration Customs Enforcement and Customs and

Border Protection, in particular, to establish a strategic approach

to these problems. It is vitally important that these component

agencies remain focused and adaptive to various threats as they attempt to secure the borders and that they be provided the tools and

authorities to do their jobs.

The GAO report which we are discussing today does a good job

of identifying some of the potential gaps in our current alien smuggling enforcement efforts. These gaps must be addressed to ensure

that work can be done to deal with correcting these troubled areas.

The first and most important issue centers on the strategic operating plan that DHS is employing to address this issue. If each

component agency employs a different operational structure, effective interagency cooperation cannot result. Intelligence sharing, coordinated investigations and operational deconfliction must also be

addressed if CBP and ICE are to maximize their effectiveness

along the borders and against smuggling organizations.

Second, the report discusses an apparent disconnect between ICE

and Border Patrol. That is, there is no mechanism in place for

tracking the number and the results of referrals or leads made by

CBP to ICE for investigation. Without such a mechanism, there

may be missed opportunities for identifying and developing cases

on significant alien smuggling organizations.

This subcommittee has repeatedly discussed the merits and problems facing DHS, as agencies like legacy Customs were literally

split in two. Now may be the appropriate time to ask, what are the

benefits of an ICE and CBP merger? Merging the two agencies may

be the most appropriate and necessary means to achieve a seamless enforcement effort. Would joining the two agencies strengthen

our Nation’s resolve in the fight against illegal smuggling organizations on the southwest border?

Third, why is the dismantling of alien smuggling organizations

seemingly a low priority? The primary Government agency tasked

with immigration smuggling investigations, ICE, devoted only 7

percent of all investigative hours in the last fiscal year to this

issue. This is simply not acceptable. If DHS is going to break up

alien smuggling organizations, the lead investigative agency will

need to devote greater resources for that specific mission.

Fourth, what improvements can be made to the existing immigration laws that can bring greater priority to alien smuggling

cases and more effective enforcement and prosecutions? The GAO

report highlights a concern raised by ICE and the Department of

Justice regarding the lack of adequate statutory civil forfeiture authority for seizing real property, such as ‘‘stash’’ houses where

smugglers hide aliens while awaiting payment and travel arrangements to final destinations throughout the Nation. Creating human

smuggling penalties that are parallel with drug smuggling mandatory minimums may serve to increase convictions and decrease

smuggling events. Statutory sentencing guidelines need to be enforced to send the message that the current alien smuggling situation is unacceptable.

These issues are all very important and extremely urgent, and

we look forward to hearing from our witness today about ways to

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improve them. I would like to thank again Mr. Richard Stana from

the Government Accountability Office for being here with us today

to discuss this important issue.

We thank everyone for taking the time this afternoon to join us

for this important hearing.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Now I will yield to our ranking member, Mr.

Cummings, for an opening statement.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing to examine efforts by the Department

of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies to address alien

smuggling as one among many serious threats to homeland security at the U.S.-Mexico border.

The smuggling and trafficking of people across the border has

been a serious problem for many years and was a top immigration

policy priority even prior to September 11th. But September 11th

has given new urgency to anti-smuggling efforts.

As the independent, bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, noted in its July 2004 report on the September 11th terrorist attacks, ‘‘In the decade before September 11, 2001, border security-encompassing travel, entry and immigration was not seen as

a national security matter. Public figures voiced concern about the

war on drugs, the right level and kind of immigration, problems

along the southwest border, migration crises originating in the Caribbean and elsewhere, or the growing criminal trafficking of humans. The immigration system as a whole was widely viewed as

increasingly dysfunctional and badly in need of reform. In national

security circles, however, only smuggling of weapons of mass destruction carried weight, not the entry of terrorists who might use

such weapons or the presence of associated foreign-born terrorists.’’

Today, policymakers and citizens have a greater awareness of

the prospect that terrorists could enlist the assistance of smuggling

organizations or otherwise exploit existing weaknesses in the U.S.

border security to advance deadly terrorist objectives.

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security in March

2003 has been viewed as an opportunity to use financial investigative techniques to combat alien smugglers by targeting and seizing

their monetary assets. In particular, the inclusion of the legacy

Customs Service within the Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement [ICE], equips ICE to be a primary investigative agency for dismantling criminal organizations that engage in the smuggling and/or trafficking of people across our borders. Meanwhile,

Customs and Border Protection plays a vital complementary role as

front line enforcer of immigration laws at the border.

Apart from DHS, agencies like ICE, CBP and the U.S. Coast

Guard, which enforces immigration laws at sea, numerous components within the Departments of Justice, State and Treasury play

important roles in the prosecution and investigation of alien smuggling and trafficking, and related crimes such as travel document

fraud and money laundering. International cooperation and assistance, including through bilateral U.S. agreements with Mexico and

Canada, also is crucial.

In May 2005, GAO issued a report evaluating Federal anti-smuggling efforts entitled, ‘‘Combating Alien Smuggling: Opportunities

Exist to Improve the Federal Response,’’ the report examined the

implementation status of DHS’ anti-smuggling strategy and the results of ICE anti-smuggling investigations in terms of convictions

and seized assets. According to the report, roughly 2,400 criminal

defendants were convicted in Federal district courts under the priVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Oct 26, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23850.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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mary anti-smuggling statute in fiscal year 2004, and during that

year, ICE reported seizures totaling $7.3 million from anti-smuggling operations. For the first 6 months of fiscal year 2005, ICE

anti-smuggling investigations yielded $7.8 million in seizures.

The report also identified two areas in which Federal anti-smuggling efforts might be improved. GAO found that establishing a

mechanism for tracking referrals of cases from CBP to ICE would

help to ensure that investigative leads provided by CBP are pursued by ICE, or if ICE resources are unavailable, that CBP continues to develop the information for further investigation.

In addition, anti-smuggling prosecutions by the Department of

Justice could be bolstered by augmenting civil forfeiture authority

to enable the seizure of real property assets such as stash houses

used to harbor smuggled aliens before they reach their final destinations throughout the United States. Although the Justice Department raised the concern about inadequate civil forfeiture, the

Attorney General had yet to formulate a legislative proposal at the

time of the report’s release.

Today’s hearing offers the subcommittee an opportunity to hear

from GAO concerning the findings and recommendations set forth

in the May 2005 report, as well as about any subsequent actions

taken by DHS and the Justice Department to carry out GAO’s recommendations.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to extend a warm welcome

to Richard M. Stana, GAO’s Director for Homeland Security and

Justice, who appears before us today. I look forward to hearing his

testimony.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Congresswoman Watson, do you have an opening

statement?

Ms. WATSON. Yes, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

join with my colleague and thank you for holding this critical hearing.

The Department of Homeland Security contends that in my home

State of California, we have the largest number of illegal immigrants in the Nation. Additionally, it is estimated that each year

since the end of the Immigration Reform and Control Act legalization program in 1988, the undocumented population of California

has grown by an average of about 100,000. These numbers display

the fact that human smuggling organizations are continuously succeeding in getting people into the United States illegally.

Human smuggling gangs are financially driven and are not concerned with the identity of their clients. Terrorists and criminals

have the ability to utilize these smuggling organizations as a ticket

into our Nation. Another concern with these organizations is the

increased violence of rival gangs fighting for control of the trafficking routes and clients. Some of the gangs have even taken hostages

and killed migrants in order to deny profit to their competing organizations.

The process of smuggling is putting the lives of migrants and the

American people at risk. Human smuggling and trafficking gangs

must be targeted and we must work to effectively dismantle them.

The ICE organization launched Operation ICE Storm in 2003 to

dismantle the smuggling gangs in Phoenix, AZ. One of ICE Storm’s

objectives is to target money used by these gangs in order to weaken their operational yield. Since its inception, ICE Storm has

seized more than $7.4 million in criminal currency, they have

seized 302 weapons, 387 defendants have been prosecuted and over

8,700 undocumented aliens have been detained.

Furthermore, the crime rate in the Phoenix area has dropped,

with a significant decrease in smuggling-related violence. Programs

like these should become widespread so that we can combat this

problem nationwide.

After the launch of ICE Storm, the Department of Homeland Security introduced the LAX Initiative in June 2004. LAX, as you

know, is the Los Angeles International Airport. It is a significant

West Coast transportation hub used by smuggling gangs to move

migrants across the Nation. The LAX Initiative uses ICE investigators and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to operate in various parts of the airport in hopes of preventing the service of any

human smuggling organization. We must continue to support programs like these in order to dismantle the remaining criminal

human smuggling organizations across the Nation.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for putting together

this most important hearing. I would also like to thank the witnesses that are here for their willingness to come and testify.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Diane E. Watson follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative

days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing

record and that any answers to written questions provided by the

witnesses also be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents and

other materials referred to by Members may be included in the

hearing record, that all Members be permitted to revise and extend

their remarks. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Our first and only panel is composed of Mr. Richard M. Stana,

Director of Homeland Security and Justice, Government Accountability Office. Joining Mr. Stana is Mr. Dan R. Burton, Assistant

Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues at GAO.

Would you each stand and raise your right hand? As you know,

it is our standard practice in this committee to swear all witnesses

in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that both witnesses responded

in the affirmative.

We are not going to have the light on, you are our only witnesses

today and we want to hear your summary of this important report.

Just so you know that with the policy committee led by John Shadegg and the Speaker, we are trying to work out a number of these

border issues. This is one of the primary ones, which is why we are

focusing on your study here. It seems to be one of the only documents out there right now trying to figure out the larger organizations, rather than just arresting individuals here and there, how

can we get to the larger organizations behind it.

So thank you for coming today.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND

SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY DAN R. BURTON, ASSISTANT

DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE

Mr. STANA. Chairman Souder, Mr. Cummings and members of

the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on

Federal efforts to combat alien smuggling. This transnational crime

globally generates billions of dollars annually and is a significant

and growing problem that can pose serious security threats to the

United States. Although most aliens smuggled into the country are

seeking economic opportunities, some are brought here as part of

criminal enterprises. This concern has heightened since September

11th.

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security in March

2003 presented new opportunities to more effectively combat alien

smuggling, particularly by placing in tandem the financial expertise of legacy Customs with the immigration expertise of legacy

INS to target and seize the monetary assets of smuggling organizations. Stripping away monetary assets has been done with some

success in drug trafficking investigations. At congressional hearings 2 years ago, ICE officials testified that ICE was developing a

national strategy to apply this technique to alien smuggling invesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Oct 26, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23850.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tigations. In my oral statement, I would like to highlight two points

about this from our report.

My first point is that more needs to be done to articulate strategy and working relationships. As of last week, the ICE strategy

for combating alien smuggling had not been finalized. ICE officials

gave various reasons for this. They said the draft strategy was

being adjusted to broadly cover all aspects of smuggling, including

aliens as well as drugs and other illegal contraband, and to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing follow-the-money approaches

such as the one used in Operation ICE Storm in Arizona.

Also, the working relationship of ICE and CBP is still evolving.

The strategy’s effectiveness depends partly on having clearly defined roles and responsibilities for these two DHS components. In

this regard, ICE and CBP signed a memorandum of understanding

in November 2004 to address their respective roles and responsibilities, including provisions for information sharing and intelligence.

However, there is no mechanism in place for tracking the number and results of the referrals or leads made by CBP to ICE for

investigation. Establishing a tracking mechanism could have benefits for both agencies. It would help ICE ensure that appropriate

action is taken on CBP’s referrals. Also, CBP could continue to pursue certain leads if ICE, for lack of available resources or other reasons, cannot take action on the referrals. We recommended that

DHS establish a referral-tracking mechanism, and DHS agreed to

do so.

My second point is that although the investigative results

achieved in terms of seizures of smugglers’ monetary assets have

been modest so far, this approach has potential. In fiscal year 2004,

about 2,400 criminal defendants were convicted in Federal district

courts under Section 274 of the INA, which is the primary statute

for prosecuting alien smuggling. In that same fiscal year, ICE reported seizures totaling $7.3 million from its anti-smuggling investigations, plus an additional $5.3 million generated by the State of

Arizona under Operation ICE Storm.

For the first 6 months of fiscal year 2005, ICE officials reported

seizures of $7.8 million, an upward trend. ICE officials anticipate

increased seizures from alien-smuggling investigations in future

years, as ICE continues to apply its financial expertise. The officials said, however, that there are competing demands for investigative resources and also noted that alien smuggling cases, in

contrast to drug trafficking cases, are much less likely to result in

large seizures of currency.

But even absent seizures of money or other assets from alien

smugglers, ICE officials noted the importance of applying financial

expertise to determine the scope and operational patterns of alien

smuggling organizations, to identify the principals and to obtain

evidence to build prosecutable cases.

Regarding potential forfeitures in alien smuggling cases, the

Government lacks statutory civil authority for seizing real property, such as the stash houses used to facilitate alien smuggling.

In these cases, the current civil forfeiture authority covers only personal property, such as vehicles used to facilitate the crime, but not

real property, unless it was purchased with the proceeds of the

crime.

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Justice officials told us that the Department has not developed

and submitted to Congress a legislative proposal because their legislative policy resources have been focused on other priorities. We

recommended that Justice, in collaboration with DHS, consider developing and submitting to Congress a legislative proposal, with

appropriate justification, for amending the civil forfeiture authority

for alien smuggling. Justice agreed to do this.

In closing, although our work focused mainly on ICE’s and CBP’s

roles in addressing alien smuggling, their investigations can involve numerous Federal agencies, as well as the cooperation and

assistance of foreign governments. Opportunities exist to more effectively marshal DHS resources in this important task, with the

possibility that the operations of other agencies would be enhanced

as well.

This concludes my oral statement. Dan Burton and I would be

happy to address any questions the subcommittee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stana follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Burton, did you have any opening statement?

Mr. BURTON. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. I am going to do this a little differently. I have a

whole series of policy questions, but I want to ask some particular

questions about some basic research to lay out what your study focused on before I get into a few of those broader questions.

How long did you conduct your study, the GAO?

Mr. STANA. About 10 months.

Mr. SOUDER. About 10 months. And all along the southwest border?

Mr. STANA. Yes, we visited field offices, ICE field offices and CBP

offices all along the southwest border.

Mr. SOUDER. Did you go into Mexico at all?

Mr. STANA. No, we did not.

Mr. SOUDER. Did you investigate, do any research on what was

happening on the side of Mexico and Central America?

Mr. STANA. We read reports and other publications about what

is happening on the Mexican side of the border, but we did not go

over and pursue those issues.

Mr. SOUDER. Anything on Florida?

Mr. STANA. No.

Mr. SOUDER. Was this only southwest border?

Mr. STANA. Southwest border, and that was mainly because the

ICE strategy seemed to be focusing on the southwest border.

Mr. SOUDER. Anything regarding airports or seaports, or was it

mostly the land border?

Mr. STANA. Mostly land border. But the same investigative issues

would occur whether at land, sea or airports.

Mr. SOUDER. It would also apply to the Canadian border in Florida in the case of civil forfeitures.

Mr. STANA. That is correct.

Mr. SOUDER. In other words, in the policies—but you focused predominantly on the land border. Did you notice any major differences in how organizations as opposed to individuals came

across, or did you see whether the Department of Homeland Security had such information, between those who came across at legitimate border crossings as opposed to in between the borders?

Mr. STANA. Well, I think in terms of how people get to use a

smuggler and get across the border, there is good news and there

is bad news. The good news is that there are enough interdiction

resources on the southwest border now that using an alien smuggler is the preferred way to go, if you can afford one. The prices

for using a smuggler are going up.

The bad news is that by using a smuggler, you can often defeat

or overcome the resources on the southwest border and gain entry

into the United States, mostly between ports of entry.

Mr. SOUDER. My impression, and I want to see if you believe this

is accurate, is that at San Ysidro in March they said that when I

said, since you have no effective penalties unless somebody has

other criminal activities for holding anyone you catch who crosses

illegally, and supposedly we catch 20 percent, roughly, in other

words at El Paso 2 years ago, this subcommittee held a hearing

and they said after 17 times they detained them. The last time we

were in El Paso they said they no longer have that policy; they are

41

no longer detained at all. If they are from Mexico they go back to

Mexico if they have a clean criminal record other than that.

I said, well, then why does anybody go, if you are just sent back,

why don’t you just keep coming back? They said, well, it is inefficient for criminal smuggling organizations to use the border because if we are catching 20 percent and they are bringing 20 people

across, 2 of them get caught, they have to wait a day across the

other side of the border for those 2 people to get through the next

day, and one of them might get caught again, meaning they would

have to hold up the whole group if they are headed to Indiana, my

home State, or somewhere.

That suggests that those organizations might be operating at a

higher percent between the borders. Why wouldn’t that kind of

problem be true of almost everybody, every criminal organization,

smuggling organization moving through a legitimate point of entry?

Mr. STANA. Well, first off, I don’t know if that 20 percent is

caught en masse. People just group together without a smuggler

trying to cross the border and they get caught. I suspect that there

is a lot of that. So I don’t know where that 20 percent comes from,

first point.

Mr. SOUDER. My understanding is, we have had witnesses that

estimate basically one of five illegals coming across is caught at

some point. That does not mean that if you take that percentage,

it was not talking about organizations.

Mr. STANA. Right, and my only point is, I don’t know if that 20

percent of the population is not using a smuggler. Because those

who use smugglers can have the benefit of having a very sophisticated organization, cell phones, global positioning and so on. In

talking with the border patrol, they feel that in some ways, the sophistication of that equipment is such that it is just difficult for

them to do their work.

But if your basic point is where are our resources, and are they

placed in the correct positions to combat and defeat the smuggling

operations, well, we have 10,000 people on the southwest border,

on the Border Patrol between the ports of entry. Of course, you divide that by the shifts, and you take some out for administrative

tax and so on. There is a good number of people down there devoted to this activity.

My concern is that what the southwest border strategy did, in effect, it started with San Diego and El Paso, and got control of the

border in those locations, spread along the Rio Grande, if you can

picture it along Texas, but in effect funneling folks into Arizona. So

Arizona, I think Mr. Cummings mentioned that Arizona is the

prime location to bring people through. But it is not because it is

difficult for law enforcement. It is, but the reason they funnel people into Arizona, the Border Patrol, is that they felt they had the

tactical advantage, long, flat terrain, easy to use helicopters for

interdiction and apprehension and so on.

Now, having said that, it is also easier for a smuggler to identify

where the resources are posted. This happens often. I was observing night operations last October, for example, in the Tucson sector. If you can imagine, you have been down there, you can imagine

the ridges along the mountains and the trails of people trying to

get through after dark. It is almost like ants up an anthill, so to

42

speak. I know we are talking about human beings, maybe that is

not the best analogy.

But all this goes to, the point I am trying to make here is that

it is difficult to position assets in one way to defeat all methods of

smuggling. The Border Patrol has a multi-layered approach, patrol

behind the border, check points, major regress routes from the border, they do what they can.

The bigger, I think, and this gets to the prioritization issue, is

we put an awful lot of people on the line of scrimmage, so to speak,

with 10,000 Border Patrol. Where is the interior enforcement? Is

that keeping pace? Once you penetrate the line of scrimmage, are

you going to score a touchdown?

Mr. SOUDER. Well, let me ask a couple more questions about your

report directly. Did you see, or did you investigate, my assumption

is if you are coming in between points of entry you pretty much are

going to use a smuggling organization. You can maybe cross on

your own and go through at a point of entry.

But if you are in between, you pretty much have to. Did you investigate or has anybody investigated where the vehicles are, are

there certain dealers that sell vehicles to smugglers? Is there a pattern of looking at the vehicles? Clearly vehicles are waiting as they

come up through. They are clearly coordinated. Anybody who has

been down there knows those vehicles are there.

We focus so much on individual deportation, what about the

groups? Have there been studies on the vehicles?

Mr. STANA. If you wanted to seek the services of a smuggler, if

you go to the near U.S. border Mexican towns, it is not too hard

to find one. Some cross the border on foot, and that is a good number of them, because we did set up fencing and certain brims and

barriers to try to stop vehicular traffic. But some still come across

in trucks, or they say, get 3 miles inside on this route, I will meet

you there or one of my partners will meet you there and take you

the rest of the way.

But the Border Patrol and the Federal Government do have the

legal authority to seize trucks involved in the smuggling. So either

we can seize them, they get through, or they are abandoned.

Mr. SOUDER. Do they check to see whether any of those are coordinated? What I want to know is, in a normal criminal investigation, what I assume is there are like travel agencies that are functioning here. The question is, has there been any kind of study or

do we need to request such a study of looking at, are there patterns? In my district we could not survive, bluntly put, without the

illegals coming in. They are a critical part of our manufacturing.

So clearly, to get them there, there is a system that is working.

They have taken down multiple green card manufacturing places.

So one of my questions is, has there been any investigation of

who is making the green cards that they should up with? We have

huge thefts of Social Security numbers that are on these green

cards. Is anybody doing an investigation of that? You mentioned financial.

Also, there has to be somebody putting together a job market list

that says, up in Elkhart, IN, they need people in the RV industry.

If you come in, here’s how you can be put up, here is how we will

43

get the vehicle there. Because people aren’t just going to wander

across and think of coming to Elkhart, IN.

The question is, are we breaking down the components like we

would any other, if you broke down travel, you would look at,

where is this travel agency, who do they book with, what airlines.

Are we doing that? Have we studied that?

Mr. STANA. We haven’t studied that yet, although we are in negotiations with the House Judiciary Committee to undertake such

a study. If your subcommittee would be interested in signing onto

that, you might consult with staff and members over there.

But having said that, part of contract smuggling can involve employment, it can involve getting you to a certain destination

through overnights at a series of stash houses, it can involve a

number of things, giving you a full set of documentation that looks

pretty tamper-proof. A while ago, on an identity theft review, I

happened to be in the Dallas office of the Secret Service.

Within 15 minutes, a person who had only worked there for a

week had made me a Nebraska driver’s license and a Marine Midland Bank credit card which looked pretty good to me. I’m sure a

bartender could probably pick them out as a phony, somebody who

looks at those things all the time. But for just a casual individual

like you or me, they are pretty good documents.

And I am told that you can go to Adams Morgan in the District

and buy documents like that as well for a modest amount of

money. So I don’t know if document production and phony document production is only something that’s done in connection with

a formal alien smuggling organization. It can be bought almost

anywhere.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just want to pick up where you just left off.

Travel document fraud and money laundering crimes are inextricably linked with smuggling. But they also are distinct crimes and

may involve different culprits and fall under the jurisdiction of different Federal agencies, would you agree?

Mr. STANA. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Could you discuss in general the importance of

the interagency cooperation and information sharing with regard to

anti-smuggling efforts, and in particular, the roles and effectiveness of the Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking Interagency Working Group and the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center?

Mr. STANA. Those two organizations, those two task forces, are

key components of an effective Federal response to alien smuggling. They are sort of overarching organizations, if you will, that

marshal and direct the operations of component agencies. Now,

ICE is a big player in the first you mentioned, the Interagency

Working Group. In fact, our information is that about 15 or so

kingpins of smuggling organizations have been brought down

through the efforts of that working group with ICE in control of

most of those investigations. So we are not talking about ICE working independently and not in connection, but more of that needs to

be done.

The Human Smuggling and Trafficking Group, the committee, is

less mature. It really only got underway last summer, and they are

44

not fully staffed. So I think we can expect more out of that group

than we are getting right now.

But those kinds of organizations are key. And when we talk

about priorities, 7 percent, is that the right number or the wrong

number? But these kinds of organizations, if properly run, and if

properly staffed by component agencies, can overcome some of

these resource constraints and bring to bear a whole Federal approach and the full brunt of the Federal Government to combat

this crime.

Mr. CUMMINGS. When you were talking about Arizona, I was just

wondering, did you look into whether or not there was sufficient

Border Patrol? Not just Arizona, but the southwest border.

Mr. STANA. That was not part of this particular review. But we

have looked at the numbers on the southwest border in connection

with other reviews, and the difficulty that the Border Patrol has

had over the years in recruiting and retaining people to work in

those jobs.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You talked about forfeiture, and dealing with the

forfeiture laws. How would that help you overall?

Mr. STANA. The Federal Government has this power in drug trafficking investigations. We are talking about civil forfeiture authority. For example, if I am a landlord, and I rent a house or an apartment building or something to you, I would assume that you are

going to live there and just go about your business, non-criminal

business, every day. But as the owner of that, I have some responsibility to know what goes on on my property.

If I visit my property from time to time and I see bars on the

windows and doors and I see lots of comings and goings and

strange things happening there, it is incumbent on me as a landlord to notify the authorities that maybe something illegal is going

on there. Now, if that’s a stash house and through a criminal prosecution we take down an organization that used that stash house,

you cannot now under civil authority go after the landlord who was

an enabler in that whole process.

So the kind of authority that Justice would be seeking would be

to extend the same kinds of laws and protections afforded the landlords in drug trafficking investigations to alien smuggling investigations. It is another way of attacking the whole totality of the

crime.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you see that as a way of getting—it is not just

what is forfeited, but you see that as a sort of a preventive measure?

Mr. STANA. Well, it is not preventive. It is a way of taking an

asset out of play that is used by a smuggling organization.

In our report, we have pictures on the highlights page of individuals in a stash house waiting for the next leg of the journey or

waiting, they are there waiting for payment and the smugglers

won’t let them out of the house. If you can take that out of play,

take that out of the whole organization, it makes it much more difficult to smuggle aliens into the United States.

Mr. SOUDER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, surely.

Mr. SOUDER. In Fort Wayne, we have a crack house ordinance.

They are a lot of times the abandoned homes and you can seize it

45

if the property owner does not supervise his property. Is that similar to what you are saying?

Mr. STANA. It’s similar to that. But some of these stash houses

are located in well-to-do neighborhoods, depending on who you are

trying to smuggle. If you are trying to smuggle the garden variety

guest worker, I suppose you could say they would be in certain

areas. But if you are a criminal organization looking to smuggle a

different type of person, which is the concern, I think, of the 9/11

Commission, then you don’t just look to bad neighborhoods for

stash houses. You could look to other places, places that for example, and I believe in one of the cases we found, they had property

that was nearby a country club that was used as a stash house.

So yes, it is the same principle.

Mr. CUMMINGS. We had a hearing not very long ago on this

Minute Man situation. It was very interesting that they, did you

get into that at all, the Minute people?

Mr. STANA. Not on this particular assignment. I don’t know much

more about the Minute Men than what I read in the paper and the

studies.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. Because what we found is that they seemed

like they were just the neighborhood watch—that is what they

claimed—with guns.

Mr. STANA. I don’t know about the gun part, but they struck me

as almost human sensors. They saw aliens coming across the border illegally and they notified the authorities, the same as sensors

do.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So what is it that you need, other than this forfeiture authority, that would help you do your job? Not to help you

do your job, but to make it more effective for us to deal with this

border situation? In other words, your recommendations beyond

the forfeiture provisions are what, if any?

Mr. STANA. In the report we made two recommendations. One

dealt with the tracking mechanism, so that if ICE was not going

to do anything with the referral, at least notify CBP so that they

can, or if ICE does do something with the referral, that they can

notify CBP of the types of referrals that they are interested in pursuing, and CBP can produce more of the same. So that was one of

the recommendations.

The other recommendation had to do with Justice preparing a

civil forfeiture proposal for congressional consideration. Beyond

that, and we did not get into this in too big of a way, it would seem

to me that the possibilities presented by these interagency working

groups would be an area for the Federal Government to put more

interest and resources. Having this agency do one thing and that

agency do another goes well as far as that jurisdiction goes.

But to bring the full force of the FBI, the ATF, as well as INS,

FinCEN and all the others, you can get some sort of a synergy

going that helps with these investigations, taking down the larger

ones.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do we have in law the necessary tools to do what

you just said? In other words, is this a situation where you have

all these agencies out there doing their thing and would it take, I

mean, could they just sort of come together, if the President said,

look, guys, and ladies and gentlemen, let’s work together and do

46

this thing, or do we have a situation like we appeared to have had

with the FBI and the CIA and you almost have to have a law and

create this super czar type person to bring them all together?

Mr. STANA. When you create a czar or a super type person to

bring them all together, oftentimes you are fighting against things

that aren’t the authority to undertake investigation, and oftentimes

you are trying to break down turf or just the organizational rivalries that sometimes need to be overcome.

When these working groups work well together, it is usually because you have people on the working group who get along and are

committed to the task. It is usually not a matter of having insufficient authority to pursue the crime.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But that takes somebody’s leadership, to make

that happen, though, right?

Mr. STANA. Yes, it does, and to be fair to the agencies involved,

they need to have sufficient resources to cover their own agency

priorities as well.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But you are saying that we could probably be

much more effective with regard to the borders if we had these

agencies working closer together? Is that a fair statement?

Mr. STANA. Yes. If you look at the results of the interagency

working group, the information that you cited, 15 kingpins of major

smuggling organizations being brought down by that sort of effort,

that goes beyond what we see in ICE Storm or some of the other

anti-smuggling efforts that are only ICE’s or only CBP’s.

So sure, if you can bring the full force of the Federal Government

together in an appropriate way, it would help.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. I am going to try and do this in a hurry, because

I have to leave in a few minutes. But No. 1, in the State of California, I was able to have a law passed that would fine an apartment

owner for the assessed valuation of a unit if drugs and guns and

so on are being stashed or sold from that particular facility, that

particular apartment. So we have that on the books.

I mentioned to you about the LAX Initiative, and I also mentioned to you about the ICE Storm over in Arizona, where they

picked up 304 weapons. I have a problem that is ongoing now, and

I represent Los Angeles, CA. Those of us from California see the

illegal immigration over the border constantly.

What would stop a terrorist who probably has a profile that

matches Mexicans’ profile, in terms of looks and all? I have reported an illegal gun shop right in the center of my district to AFT

and to Customs. I found out that the gun shop sells guns to foreign

governments, to the military and to LAPD. Fine. But we can’t get

them closed down. For the last 15 years, we had a hearing, they

were in violation, they are non-complaint. What is going to stop

someone coming in, putting a gun to the head of the owner and

taking all those weapons out and using them, the terrorists using

them?

I can’t get the cooperation from Customs. They are dragging

their feet. I am being stonewalled. I don’t know who they are supplying weapons to. They don’t have a conditional use permit. And

47

I was told at ATF that they, if they didn’t comply with the local

provisions, they would not have their license renewed.

Now, they were supposed to be out of there by March 5th, and

I believe that is about 4 or 5 months ago. I cannot get any of these

Federal departments to move. I have called, I have written, I have

even recorded their conversations.

So my frustration is, we see these things every day on the

streets. I cannot get the cooperation of our Federal departments.

Can you help me with trying to No. 1, have that gun shop comply

with the law? No. 2, sharing information with congressional Members, why is there that kind of block? Why is it they won’t let us

know what is going on? And I am sure this particular person is

well connected here in Washington and locally.

Mr. STANA. I can understand your concern, because having that

kind of an operation in your district or in your city would certainly

be a cause for alarm. At GAO, we have studied those kinds of gun

shops and found that oftentimes they are linked to crime.

Now, I don’t know——

Ms. WATSON. This one is.

Mr. STANA. Yes, I don’t know the particular facts and circumstances of the case that you mention. You talked in your oral

statement about California being one of the largest, if not the largest destinations——

Ms. WATSON. Exactly.

Mr. STANA [continuing]. Or inhabitance of illegal aliens. I can

also tell you, and it is not a source of comfort, I am sure, that it

is the leading location for criminal aliens, Arizona, California and

Texas. Each one of these criminal aliens, and that is another priority of ICE that maybe is perhaps understaffed, in the study that

we did, we found 8 arrests and 13 offenses, and they are still on

the street.

So I understand your concern. I don’t know what can be done to

rectify it or at least address it. But it would seem to me that you

are calling all the right locations to get some action. It is just a

shame that nothing is happening.

Ms. WATSON. Well, I just want to say that our Chair has been

very sensitive to these issues. I can’t thank him enough, because

I have sat in these hearings. I was so frustrated this morning at

4:51 a.m., I just wake up with these thoughts, and I said, well, I

am going to see if we can have a congressional hearing, if I can’t

get something happening at the local level, and I can’t get the Federal departments at least sharing information with me, maybe the

Chair, if I give you the background information, would call an oversight hearing. I want to know why Customs and Immigration will

not respond to my queries and will not respond to the fact that the

gun shop is operating illegally according to the provisions of the

municipal laws.

So I will share that with you and with that, thank you so much

for your report. We will followup with you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you.

It is always interesting to me when we talk about criminal smuggling, because I think that like the immigration debate in general,

everybody has these wonderful ideas for these proposals, but someVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Oct 26, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23850.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
48

times the proposals put the cart before the horse. By that I mean,

some people think that by simply throwing money at border security or granting law enforcement increased powers or making the

penalties for illegal immigration or smuggling more severe, that is

going to wipe out those problems.

What we find oftentimes is that despite increasingly stiffer and

stiffer penalties, the incidences do not in fact drop. And one of the

issues that I am interested in exploring with you, Mr. Stana, is the

idea that in order to eliminate sort of the incentive for criminal

smuggling, we need to sort of eliminate the incentive for illegal border crossing.

One of the questions that I have for you is, when the GAO completed its report on combating alien smuggling, did you look at how

a change in immigration law might reduce alien smuggling and

eliminate the effectiveness of criminal smuggling organizations?

Mr. STANA. No, if you are talking about neutralizing the need for

a smuggler or neutralizing the need for an illegal approach to immigration, no, that wasn’t part of our scope.

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you didn’t look at the idea that, for example,

if there were a labor program which would allow workers from

Mexico, which seems to be the primary spot, to temporarily enter

the United States legally under work visas, that the need for illegal

border crossings might actually decrease?

Mr. STANA. No, we didn’t look at that, although I am aware of

the issue. I think Mr. Souder mentioned in his question just a few

minutes ago about the realization that many people who work in

the United States and work productively and contribute in any

number of ways may be here illegally.

We did not look at the possibility of bringing a guest worker program online as a way of taking smugglers out of business, or lessening the need for any sort of a work site enforcement program.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you think that perhaps if there were some kind

of comprehensive immigration reform that would make it easier for

workers who were purely seeking employment opportunities to

come across legally and be part of a system, that might decrease

the incidence of smuggling of people?

Mr. STANA. Well, any kind of a program like what you are suggesting that would bring order to the movement of people across

the borders would obviously lessen the need for smuggling, or if

that particular individual was not part of the few who were granted work visas or some sort of status to come into the country, it

may increase it. So I am not sure exactly which direction that

would go.

I do know that the jobs magnet is really the driver here in bringing people into the country. So addressing that in some sort of a

way through either a guest worker program or other way is something that’s under consideration.

Ms. SANCHEZ. That’s my thinking on the matters, that if you

could put them into a regular process where it could be regulated

and reducing, for perhaps not all, but a large chunk of the people

who are crossing illegally, that might allow CBP and ICE to focus

their efforts on the smaller pool of people that are——

Mr. STANA. Right, from a national security standpoint, any way

that you can reduce the size of the haystack that you are looking

49

for that needle, that terrorist, any way you can do that, it is going

to serve the purposes of national security. It really wasn’t part of

our study to determine what effect any kind of a guest worker program would have on smuggling or our efforts to combat it.

Ms. SANCHEZ. One last quick question for you. The GAO report

raised concerns about how CBP and ICE are collaborating on the

alien smuggling issue. I also sit on the Immigration Subcommittee

of the Judiciary Committee. We have held hearings on alien smuggling as well.

One of the concerns that was raised was about interagency cooperation. One of the primary concerns that we had was that the

State Department has primary responsibility for dealing with the

issue of alien smuggling abroad, which is where typically the smugglers enter into the contracts with the folks that are trying to come

across and be smuggled.

What recommendations if any would you have for improving the

cooperation between CBP, ICE and the Department of State to

deter those kinds of interactions from happening prior to when it

actually becomes an issue of concern at the border?

Mr. STANA. The Department of State is working with the Department of Justice on the human smuggling and trafficking team.

That is one avenue for State to participate in these kinds of investigations and address it that way.

The other way is, and State has negotiated a number of these

mutual legal assistance treaties [MLATs]. They are rarely used,

perhaps for a good reason, but they are rarely used in these alien

smuggling investigations because oftentimes it is just easier to go

to the law enforcement authorities on the other side of the border,

whether it is Mexico or Canada or wherever, to get the assistance

that they need in these investigations. So perhaps State in those

roles could enhance the overall Government effort to combat alien

smuggling.

But State has not been a major player in anti-smuggling investigations. Now, human trafficking is a different concern. You know

the distinction between the two. With human trafficking, the Department of State publishes a report every year on efforts and

sanctions. It is much easier to get international cooperation in

human trafficking, because of the victimization of the individuals

involved.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. SOUDER. Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Actually, I was frankly surprised to learn about this gap in the

law that one couldn’t seize the real property, the stash house, as

it were. It is so obvious. It really does speak to our lack of real

strategy at the border. Because this might have been the first thing

you come to. I suspect if these houses cannot be seized, let me just

ask you while we are there, does that mean that once they are discovered they are at least vacated, they are abandoned?

Mr. STANA. We are talking about stash houses that are not

owned by the criminal organization that is doing the smuggling, a

stash house that is rented from a landlord who may or may not

know what is going on inside the house.

50

But you raised another point, which I think is really important,

and I think we probably will get to it so this is a good time to talk

about it anyway. That is the lack of a strategic plan. We have a

mission for homeland security and we have a lot of people that

work every day trying to do their best to serve the mission. But

without a strategic plan, that interprets the mission and gives

guidance to the people to do their jobs, you are just not sure that

people are focusing their efforts on the right things, or the things

with the highest priority.

With respect to stash houses, just getting back to that for a second, this authority was given for drug investigations, civil seizures,

back in the year 2000, I believe. I am not exactly sure why alien

smuggling organizations were not included with drug trafficking

organizations. I don’t know if it was an oversight or if it was intentionally dropped. But the Justice people feel that they have the justification to go forward with this proposal and it is very important

that it would help them with the smuggling investigations. It just

takes a major asset out of the equation.

Ms. NORTON. Did the 9/11 Commission recognize this, is this gap

just lying there, do you know?

Mr. STANA. I am not sure that the 9/11 Commission specifically

addressed the stash house issue. But they were very concerned

about the ability of a terrorist or someone belonging to a criminal

enterprise using a smuggling organization to gain entry into the

United States.

Ms. NORTON. Well, seizing a real property is one thing, but

again, assuming one knows that a stash house exists, is the law

powerless to do anything at the moment? Does the stash house continue to operate once it becomes a known stash house?

Mr. STANA. Once the smuggling organization is brought down, I

would imagine that the stash house would be vacated. What we are

talking about here is making sure that landlords, and these are

landlords who know what is going on, or they know that something

is going on. It is not the innocent landlords. There are provisions

in law to protect innocent landlords. And there should be. But

these are landlords who knowingly either turn a blind eye or understand what is going on in their stash houses, so it makes them

liable for the actions of people using their house.

Ms. NORTON. I am interested in, well, the Justice Department of

course had the authority for drug smuggling, because that is what

the danger was, and 4 years after September 11th, we haven’t

woken up to human smuggling and what it may mean in terms of

its crossover effects. We know that the lion’s share of this human

smuggling is exploiting people looking for jobs. They will mostly be

people from Central and Latin America.

I wonder how hard or easy you think it would be to simply cross

over, perhaps an organization who wanted to set up shop smuggling people in to do security harm of one kind or another to the

United States? Do you think that would, given the state of the law

and the absence of a strategic plan, be just as easy to do as smuggling human beings over to work in people’s gardens or to do labor?

Mr. STANA. Any type of individual, whether it is a dangerous individual or just an economic migrant, can and have been smuggled

into the country. So the idea here is to use whatever asset or law

51

we have at our disposal to not only get to the people who are most

immediately involved with the episode, but to work up the chain

to get the kingpins, so that you can take down the broader organization.

One thing that the 9/11 Commission focused on, you mentioned

that, is that one by one, we seem to be addressing a number of

these vulnerabilities that we identified through investigation of the

September 11th incident, the vulnerabilities that existed, whether

it is the loose visa laws or if it is not checking adequately at airports for bag contents, whatever. The fact that they focused on

smuggling tells you that in addition to those vulnerabilities, this is

a vulnerability that has to be addressed from that aspect, that this

isn’t anything that is out of bounds for a terrorist.

Admittedly, now that we are focusing more on regular Border Patrol operations, apprehensions are going up again, there are more

people being put to bear, like everyday economic migrants, terrorists would need to use the services of a smuggler. I think it was

just last month that there were some Middle Eastern men stopped

by Mexican authorities in Mexico, trying to get across the border.

So we know that these opportunities exist, we know that they

are known to terrorist organizations and that we need to address

those with our own law enforcement.

Ms. NORTON. I don’t know what is taking them so long to get into

this business. I think it is absolutely terrifying.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

I have a series of different questions I want to make sure I ask

for the record. According to your report, about 7 percent of ICE resource hours are devoted to alien smuggling. One of the fundamental questions is, is this resource driven or due to an agency

prioritization. One of the questions is a followup with this, despite

that it is only 7 percent, Federal law enforcement officers in Arizona told congressional staffers that ICE no longer participates in

drug interdiction in order to work alien smuggling cases.

How can it be true that only 7 percent of the resources are devoted to alien smuggling cases, yet they are telling staffers of this

committee and other committees that they have diverted from narcotics because they are doing alien smuggling.

Mr. STANA. Well, both may be true if it is episodic. In other

words, if in Arizona they are devoting themselves to alien smuggling but not in Montana or upper Michigan.

Mr. SOUDER. So do you think that figures are significantly higher

in Arizona?

Mr. STANA. It may be. Because the main smuggling corridors are

through Arizona right now. As the border is controlled in other locations, as I mentioned earlier, the funnel of aliens, illegal aliens

into the United States seems to have come through Arizona more

than anywhere else.

Mr. SOUDER. A technical question, because you do a report, but

we are dealing with this on a day to day basis. When you arrived

at the 7 percent number, can you give us how you got that number,

so that we can continue to ask them? Because presumably if they

can give you a 7 percent number, they can give us a number by

zone.

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Mr. STANA. They should be able to do that. These were numbers

generated by ICE through their agent work hours system with the

5,000 agents, and you multiply that by the number of hours in a

year, take out training and vacations and so on, you arrive at 7

percent.

I would note also that there is another 2 percent added to that

is devoted to human trafficking. So if you put the two together, it

is 9 percent. I would consider that probably a lower limit, but probably more accurate than the 29 percent that ICE claimed that it

could be as high as, because they brought in some drug trafficking

time and some financial crime time and so on. But 7 to 9 percent

is something we know about and are pretty confident in. Those are

ICE numbers.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

A CBP spokesman told a Government executive in May that

‘‘Mexican nationals caught illegally trying to enter the country are

bused back to the border if they do not have a criminal record.

Other than Mexicans, however, are sent to ICE detention centers

where they are released into the U.S. public if they do not have a

felony conviction and do not pose a threat to national security. ICE

is required by law to release illegal aliens who pose no threat.

Those migrants are given notice to appear in court. Border Patrol

agents call it a notice to disappear.’’

I have heard this at multiple border hearings. Congressman

Reyes has been bringing this up about those other than Mexicans.

What can be done to reverse the trend of having them released into

society? Second, do you know if they are screened for anything

other than a felony conviction? And why are OTMs held until repatriated? I saw several caught from Brazil that were going to be repatriated, but that presumes they are going to show up for their

hearing.

Mr. STANA. Yes, much of this hinges upon the availability of detention space. That space just is not there, particularly in the

southwest border.

I have heard those stories, too, and actually have seen it. They

will bring in people apprehended crossing the border, they will

identify them, to check to see if there are any other criminal violations, and there are stories there that we have heard of and seen

where the ident was not proof positive either. So there is a concern

there.

But they do identify them and if they, like in your example, if

it is not their 17th time, they will take them to the border and tell

them to go home, sometimes to see them another day.

With respect to OTMs, there is just no space in the detention facilities to hold them, so they will give them a notice to appear at

a certain proceeding for deportation and release them to the general population.

Mr. SOUDER. Isn’t this ironically discriminatory against Mexicans?

Mr. STANA. Well, I think, I don’t know if I would use that term.

What I would say is, what kind of protection is afforded to people?

I mean, America is a great place to live. Someone who comes from

Brazil, for example, all the way to the southwest border and gets

caught has a choice to make: do I want to show up and be deported

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or do I want to blend in with the population, knowing that chances

are I am never going to get caught, provided I don’t do anything

stupid.

Well, the fact of the matter is, you are going to stay. This is a

great place to live, you can find employment, you can wash your

car with clean water, lots of things that are great here. So again,

it all hinges on the availability of detention space.

Mr. SOUDER. From a non-illegal immigration question, from a

non-narcotics question, but from a homeland security angle, would

you say that if you were going to release somebody into the United

States, wherein they potentially are a sleeper cell or whatever, that

you would be more concerned about the OTMs than you would

about the others?

Mr. STANA. I think you are highlighting a potential vulnerability

here. Certainly if you don’t know someone, because they have no

criminal history, that does not necessarily say that they pose no

risk to our national security or our well-being.

Mr. SOUDER. While we worry that Mexicans in fact could become

the mules or carriers for biological-chemical type things, just because so many come across, and if we don’t deal with the OHIST

Act, that it is impossible to find and they may learn to use mules.

Do you know any, in studying homeland security, I certainly don’t,

being on the committee, of anybody who is a Mexican risk on our

homeland security radar. They are all pretty much OTMs.

Mr. STANA. I don’t have any basis to say one is more dangerous

than another. I think it is an individual by individual thing.

Mr. SOUDER. Except that we have, we keep data by countries of

interest and persons of interest.

Mr. STANA. Yes.

Mr. SOUDER. I think it is fairly safe to say that persons of interest are skewed to OTMs. I think it is very safe and accurate to say

that the countries of interest, none of them are Mexico. It doesn’t

mean that people are not going to hide in Mexico, that we are not

going to see that pattern developing because of the ease if we don’t

deal with our immigration question.

But the irony here is that we seem to be weaker on OTM than

we are on Mexico. Because there at least if we catch a small percentage, we send them back. They come back the next day in many

cases, but at least it is a strategy.

Mr. STANA. Yes, I didn’t mean to imply that OTMs are not dangerous or that Mexicans are.

Mr. SOUDER. And most OTMs are in fact not dangerous. I want

to say that for the record, and you are pointing that out, too. Most

people who come in from anywhere for immigration are not coming

here for terrorist purposes.

Mr. STANA. Right.

Mr. SOUDER. The question is, just release people, then totally losing track of them, where there are OTMs coming across the Mexican border, which is itself particularly, when we were down at San

Ysidro and the Texas border earlier this year, in one 30-day period

they had 128 they caught who were from countries of interest. I

think it was 18 persons of interest in just 30 days at San Ysidro.

In the homeland security question, unless we can address this

type of question, who is smuggling these people in, and the HomeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:31 Oct 26, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23850.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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land Security Department testified in front of this subcommittee

that it was $8,000 to $12,000 at that point, I think it is higher now,

was a guaranteed 7-day into the United States or money back for

a Mexican, $30,000 to $40,000 for somebody from a country of interest, predominantly in one central section of the border. But they

testified in an open hearing, a Homeland Security hearing, it was

not this committee, it was Homeland Security, that in fact $30,000

to $40,000 will guarantee you the food, overnight, passages, placement, into the United States or your money back.

Now, we have a huge problem here, and obviously the risk level

is being reflected in the price level. But if you get in and get

caught, all you have to do is show up again. Which means that the

OTMs that are willing to pay that probably are even a higher risk,

because they may not make the first felony screening or the persons of interest screening.

Mr. STANA. Yes, I understand your point. It is a good one. In fact,

I have heard of fees as high as $60,000 to $80,000 from the Far

East. But there are as many ways to get in here as there are smuggling organizations.

But the vulnerability that you discuss here, if you are an OTM

you are going to be released pending notice to appear, is a concern,

yes.

Mr. SOUDER. The Border Patrol told congressional staffers that

there are more smugglers prosecuted under 8 U.S.C. 1325, improper entry by an alien, than 8 U.S.C. 1324, bringing in and harboring certain aliens. You cited in your report 2,400 convictions

under the bringing in and harboring. Did you investigate the other

category, which would be improper entry? I presume that number

is the bulk of it.

Mr. BURTON. Yes, we reported the 1324 and have a footnote in

reference to that. There may be prosecution under other statutes,

including illegal re-entry, document fraud, that type of thing.

Mr. SOUDER. But you didn’t study that?

Mr. BURTON. No.

Mr. STANA. Do you believe it would be useful to have that data?

Mr. BURTON. I think so. Did you report, Rich, on criminal aliens,

have that?

Mr. STANA. We issued a report on criminal aliens in the United

States about 2 months ago. I can’t recall off the top of my head

whether we had that figure, but I can look and see.

Mr. SOUDER. One thing I would appreciate after the hearing, because we will followup with the Judiciary requests and also I will

talk to Chairman Lundgren at Homeland Security. Does it help if

it is a committee request to you, to get it prioritized for speed?

Mr. STANA. The priority system works that a chair or ranking

member of any committee or subcommittee has priority. But obviously the more interest that we see in a certain type of request, it

could get staffed perhaps a little faster.

Mr. SOUDER. If it comes from leadership, does it go faster?

Mr. STANA. We do what we can.

Mr. SOUDER. But could you work with our staff to see which report, often we each work in kind of our own isolated—we talk

about the Federal Government executive branch being stovepiped,

55

and then we stovepipe our committee process. But when we have

the mic, we complain about the executive branch doing that.

But could you help us work through which reports you have done

fairly recently, so we can see these as a cluster? Second, where you

see some gaps in between the different studies and also some of

those studies that might need a refresher. Because we are systematically trying to look at what we can do. Obviously Fox News has

really upped it every time the so-called Minute Men focus on this,

and anybody who works with homeland security realizes that until

you secure your borders you are not safe.

We may try to deal with the, which I believe we need to, the immigration question, because unless you get that haystack reduced,

when you are looking through 900,000 people, it is hard to find the

risk. We may or may not be able to get that. But we are going to

have the criminal smuggling organization question, which may

even become more critical, if we in fact get the workers separated

out.

But to do this, we need to ask logical questions, where are the

gaps and not each try to do this in isolation. But the leadership is

trying to pull together a working group to try to address this, and

we need to make sure we have good data.

Mr. STANA. I would be happy to work with your staff on what

we have done recently, where some of the gaps in information lie

and what would be good areas to pursue.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you know whether or not, when someone is prosecuted, there was a case of a smuggler having a car wreck and he

was getting prosecuted for killing five people in murder, do you

know if when they have somebody, if murder is a charge, whether

they also charge them with smuggling? Do they do that? Did you

look at any of that?

Mr. STANA. It depends on the facts and circumstances of the

case. We didn’t look to see what systematic methods are used to

bring different charges. In Appendix 5 in our report, we cite 23

cases, I believe, the facts and circumstances of the case, a sentence

is given. You can see there is just a range of outcomes.

Mr. SOUDER. Does the Border Patrol have a good system to track

their interviews of detained aliens? In other words, if they are just

going to detain them, check them and release them, do they at

least do any questioning about who brought them? Could something be addressed here where we say that if you are non-cooperative, that you are going to be detained and build some detention

centers particularly for non-cooperative people?

Mr. STANA. The results of those kinds of interviews should go

into their intelligence system. I am not really sure what happens

with that information once those interviews are finished. That

might be a good area to pursue.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you know whether the Border Patrol is supposed

to be doing this, have you looked at that at all?

Mr. STANA. No, we did not.

Mr. SOUDER. Because it seems like they are sitting on a lot of

information, and collecting that information would be very critical.

Because it is difficult to establish what a smuggling organization

is if you don’t pool the data that you are getting to know—because

then you are just dealing with isolated cases you are picking up,

56

from what I see in narcotics, that we are gradually building backward.

But there are obvious transportation networks. And all of a sudden we have learned that in the Yakima, Washington area, it was

showing up in three different counties in my district, and it showed

up in Nathan Deal’s district. Backward we are piecing together for

the executive branch that hey, you have a transportation system

that looks like it is coming up from Mexico, bringing up Colombian

heroin and cocaine, swapping for BC Bud, instead of coming

through Juarez, they are going way over into Indiana and Georgia,

you have a trucking company at work here.

But unless you get enough data in to kind of establish where the

networks are going, you are just randomly putting dots on a map

and trying to figure out where the dotted lines are.

Mr. STANA. I think you are bringing up a really good point. I

think CBP and ICE folks who work in this area could tell stories

along those lines. We know that this is a hub and this city is a

transit point and the job market is here and those kinds of things.

What I am not sure is happening is whether that information is

turned into intelligence and sent out to the field so it is usable and

actionable. That would be an interesting thing to pursue.

Mr. SOUDER. Last, the National Security Council has a migrant

smuggling and trafficking interagency working group. Do you know

if they are coordinating with the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center?

Mr. BURTON. I think there are some of the same players on both

of those groups.

Mr. SOUDER. But you don’t know how much they cooperate or

whether they are duplicative or whether either of them are doing

much?

Mr. BURTON. Reportedly, they are not duplicative. As Rich mentioned earlier, the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, even

though it was first announced as early as December 2000, I believe

it was, it did not become operational, partly operational, until this

past July. They are about halfway staffed. I think the total projection was about 24 or 25 staff. I think they are about halfway there

at this point in time.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you know whether this working group has

forced ICE and CBP to cooperate more? They are not even passing

the data inside the Department of Homeland Security. Can these

working groups push that? They have the data.

Mr. BURTON. I think that is a role that those groups could play.

I think the November 2004 Memorandum of Understanding between CBP and ICE is an important document. Hopefully, by this

August, we will have a better feel for how that MOU is being implemented. Our understanding is that the first initial review of

that MOU is scheduled to be completed this August. So that will

be an important milestone as to how much progress has been

made.

Mr. STANA. If I can just add to that, this is a theme that has recurred in other reports we have done about coordinating efforts

within Homeland Security among components. So it is going to be

interesting to see what the results of this MOU are. When I heard

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about the MOU for the first time, it was in connection with terror

financing investigations.

One wonders why components, these are two sub-components

within another sub-component, need an MOU to coordinate.

Mr. SOUDER. That is what I was just going to say. One of the

conclusions I have had, and don’t feel forced to agree with me, I

would really like to have your input, is that the split is not logical,

that it just, it tried to separate something that is difficult to separate. Then they are trying to do memoranda of understanding inside divisions that are in the same agency.

Mr. STANA. I put it in this context. INS was not performing to

expectations for years, and discontent with INS was exacerbated in

the mid to late 1990’s, when so much did not seem to go right. In

fact, in the homeland security legislation of a couple of years ago,

the only agency that was specifically disbanded was the INS.

So then the question became, well, how do we put these components together into an organization that can work? Well, when they

put CBP together, they put together components that were pretty

alike, or had a mission that was not too much different than the

mission they had under their old agency. Border Patrol came over

pretty much intact. Customs had its air, sea and land port operations. The former legacy INS folks that came over, they were pretty much doing many of the same duties or at the same locations

as the Customs folks. So there was not much of a new learning

process, if you will.

But ICE was a different story. It had a completely different function, it had different pay systems, it had different administrative

systems, it had a lot of things that had to be addressed.

Given that, when ICE was set up, and began operations, it also

was among the last components to get its administration in shape.

By that I mean getting its mission statements, its strategic plans,

which still are not out there yet, and getting its guidance to the

field. It is sad but true that so many of the former INS people that

landed in CBP feel a bit sorry for the folks that landed in ICE, because it has just been such a difficulty and challenge to bring it

into one functioning organization, budget-wise, administrationwise, mission-wise and so on.

Having said that, the context piece of this I want to bring out

is, the temptation is to try to put the organizations back together

again by function, immigration, customs, drugs, smuggling, and to

make it easier from that standpoint. We found in looking at mergers, and this is a merger, if you will, in the public and private sector is it takes about 5 to 7 years for the dust to settle and for the

cultures to become established. Here we are after 21⁄2 years now,

I don’t think anybody is particularly satisfied with the progress of

some of these components, but it is not unexpected that it is going

to take a little bit longer.

The other thing I would note is, one of the problems INS had in

its last decade of existence was frequent reorganization. When they

ran into problems, instead of creating managerial and organizational crosswalks between components, like you might expect here

with CBP and ICE, and having a management that says, do it or

else, they reorganized. It got to the point where there were three,

four major reorganizations in INS during the 1990’s, but the field

58

folks did not understand completely what their new mission was,

what they were supposed to do, what the guidance said and how

they were supposed to approach their interrelations with other

components within the same agency.

So Congress can do what it wishes, and there are good arguments to bring it together. But I would also point out that frequent

reorganizations sometimes, without knowing exactly why we are

reorganizing or what we are trying to fix, can be counter-productive. So I do not know what the 2 S.R. result is going to be tomorrow from Secretary Chertoff. I have heard rumors, and I am sure

you have, too.

But while we are a little impatient with the progress, I think it

is also fair to recognize that maybe a reorganization would not be

a silver bullet.

Mr. SOUDER. Let me, if I may, probe this a little bit further, because we are trying to figure out, and the reaction will be interesting, that while I find what you say very true and very interesting,

there are a couple of other things. I think part of the problem with

the INS question has to deal with, they are dealing with a much

more politically explosive question where there are deep divisions.

It is not so much necessarily traditional management type problems they are having, it is changing expectations of what the public

wants, what the different President wants, what Congress wants,

should they arrest, shouldn’t they arrest, what will it do to the

economy, what does it not do to the economy, what is the political

reaction in a different community.

It is not really going to be fixed in the immediate future, no matter where it is located. The question is, in trying, the difficulty of

that is have they messed up things that were actually working and

in fact endangered some of our—in the narcotics area, it has clearly

been problematic. One of the agencies that was working was Air

and Marine, and they are on a picket fence, so they do not fit either

one. They do investigations, they are down in Colombia, they are

in the water, they are inland. If you put them under CBP, they are

a picket fence. If you put them under ICE, they are investigators.

It has busted up the Shadow Wolves, because they want to line

them on the picket fence. It has made it very difficult to deal with

Akwesasne on the north border and develop a similar thing, because they want to patrol the Tohono O’odham, which is one of our

huge vulnerabilities right now in Arizona, you can’t really penetrate Indian nations with outside agents. You need them inside.

They are not going to line up inside the reservation inside the border. They need to be able to patrol within.

They either need some kind of accommodation inside CBP that

changes a picket fence strategy. That is one element. So in narcotics, it has actually endangered some of what we are doing, which

is probably even how the Coast Guard fits.

But then second, this stovepiping of information, because the information is being collected at the CBP, and it is needed in the investigation section. If they don’t have the same boss and they are

not promoted, you don’t have that. I am not saying immigration

does not need to be a sub-category. But when you do not view yourselves as the same effort, they start standing up different, I mean,

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ligence, is a disaster. Everybody wants their own little sub-part.

The more divisions we get, the more sub-parts we get.

Mr. STANA. You are raising a lot of interesting points, and they

go beyond, particularly in the drug area, beyond the issues that I

have studied personally. But I do know in the formulation of DHS,

one of the issues that was brought up time and again is how can

we bring the asset groups together so that we do not have two air

forces or three air forces, or why do we need five intelligence shops

or those kinds of issues.

There is always an up side and a down side to bringing things

together. The up side is maybe there are some managerial or financial efficiencies. The down side is you are leaving behind missions,

in many cases, that were effectively addressed and now we are

going into something new.

I guess my only point is, there are a number of ways to attack

this problem, and I don’t know that reorganizing is the only way

or the best way. It is one way, and it is certainly within the prerogative of the Congress to go that way. I am just not sure in the totality of the situation that is the only way.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you very much for your testimony today. If

you can help us kind of refine where our gaps are and where we

need to go, because clearly it is potentially going to be one of the

top two or three topics in the next year or two. It is clearly one of

the major vulnerabilities in homeland security, in narcotics, the

border is basically everything, not to mention immigration and

work flow questions we have in our home States.

Mr. STANA. Thank you very much, and we are glad to help out

in any future effort you have planned.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[NOTE.—The Government Accountability Office report entitled,

‘‘Combating Alien Smuggling, Opportunities Exist to Improve the

Federal Response,’’ may be found in subcommittee files, or at

www.gao.gov.]

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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