ANGELA KOELLER and ) 

JEFF HASKENHOFF, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. SD36129 

 ) Filed: May 22, 2020 

MALIBU SHORES CONDOMINIUM ) 

ASSOCIATION, INC., ) 

 ) 

 Defendant-Respondent. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMDEN COUNTY 

Honorable Aaron G. Koeppen, Associate Circuit Judge 

AFFIRMED 

 Angela Koeller and Jeff Haskenhoff appeal from the trial court’s judgment in favor 

of Malibu Shores Condominium Association, Inc. (Condo Association). Randall Koeller 

was originally a plaintiff in this case. He died during the pendency of the action. His wife, 

Angela Koeller, was substituted as a party plaintiff. To avoid confusion, we refer to 

Randall Koeller, Angela Koeller and Jeff Haskenhoff individually by their first names. We 

refer to Angela and Jeff collectively as Plaintiffs. Presenting three points, Plaintiffs 

contend the trial court erred by deciding that the Condo Association’s lien on their unit was 
2 

valid and that Plaintiffs were barred from recovery pursuant to the voluntary payment 

doctrine. Finding no merit in Plaintiffs’ contentions, we affirm. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

 This appeal involves a lien placed on Unit 3, Building 15 of the Malibu Shores 

Condominium (the Unit) in favor of the Condo Association. Before Randall and Jeff 

purchased the Unit, Michael and Wendy Halliday (the Hallidays) were the owners. The 

Hallidays also leased boat slip number 11 on dock C (the boat slip) from the Condo 

Association. Monthly maintenance fees for the Unit and the boat slip were billed by the 

Condo Association as unit assessments and dock assessments on the statements provided 

to the Hallidays. 

 The Hallidays became delinquent in the payment of their unit and dock assessment 

fees and charges. The Condo Association sued the Hallidays for past-due assessments and 

sought forfeiture of the boat slip pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement. In March 

2016, the Condo Association obtained a judgment against the Hallidays in the amount of 

$6,156.46 for assessments, late-payment penalties and interest. Pursuant to the judgment, 

the lease for the boat slip was terminated, and the Condo Association took possession of 

the boat slip. The judgment stated that it constituted a lien on the Unit.1

 At the time this 

judgment was obtained, Angela and Jeff were members of the Condo Association Board. 

 In May 2016, Randall and Jeff purchased the Unit at a sheriff’s sale for $52,000. 

Randall and Jeff knew they were not purchasing the boat slip. 

 1

 Additionally, paragraph 23 of the Condominium Declaration states that, if any 

owner fails or refuses to make a payment of the common expenses when due, the amount 

thereof shall constitute a lien on the interest of such owner. 
3 

In June 2016, Randall and Jeff asked the Condo Association about the amount of 

the lien on the Unit. The Condo Association informed Randall and Jeff that they owed 

$8,154 for the lien. This amount reflected unpaid assessments against the Unit, finance 

charges, late fees, lien charges and attorney fees. The amount also included dock 

assessment fees for May and June 2016. While Randall questioned the amount, Jeff 

insisted that the entire amount was correct and owed by them. In July 2016, Randall and 

Jeff separately and voluntarily wrote checks in the amount of $4,077 to satisfy the lien. At 

that time, Angela and Jeff were still members of the Condo Association Board. 

 In November 2016, Randall and Jeff sold the Unit. Before selling the Unit, they 

obtained a “Release of All Liens” on the Unit from the Condo Association. They sold the 

Unit free of any liens or other encumbrances and made a profit. 

 Randall and Jeff later filed suit against the Condo Association for, inter alia, 

negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation with respect to the validity 

and amount of the lien. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the 

Condo Association and against Randall and Jeff. One of the factual findings by the trial 

court stated that the “lien asserted against [the Unit] was satisfied after receipt of the 

voluntary payment” by Randall and Jeff. Another factual finding was that Randall and Jeff 

“offered no credible evidence as to any material misrepresentations made by any of the 

Board Members of [the Condo Association].” The trial court concluded, inter alia, that 

“the lien against [the Unit] was valid and owed by [Randall and Jeff] after they purchased 

[the Unit], but even if it were not, [Randall and Jeff’s] claims still fail because of the 

voluntary payment rule.” This appeal followed. 
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Standard of Review 

 In this court-tried case, our review is governed by Rule 84.13(d) and Murphy v. 

Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).2 We are required to affirm the trial court’s 

judgment unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the 

evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32. “We 

review issues of law de novo.” Denny v. Regions Bank, 527 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Mo. App. 

2017). With respect to factual determinations, we defer to the trial court’s credibility 

determinations and assessment of the weight of witness testimony. Metzger v. Franklin, 

496 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Mo. App. 2016). “The trial court is free to believe all, none, or part 

of the testimony of any witness.” Id. 

Discussion and Decision 

Points 1 and 2 

 In Points 1 and 2, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court misapplied the law by finding 

that the lien was valid and by including dock assessment and attorney fees in the amount 

of the lien. Those arguments are meritless because the trial court correctly applied the 

voluntary payment doctrine. 

 The voluntary payment doctrine “provides that a person who voluntarily pays 

money with full knowledge of all the facts in the case, and in the absence of fraud and 

duress, cannot recover it back, even though the payment is made without sufficient 

consideration and under protest.” Damon v. City of Kansas City, 419 S.W.3d 162, 192 

(Mo. App. 2013). In Huch v. Charter Communications, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. banc 

2009), our Supreme Court stated: 

 2

 All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2020). 
5 

When evaluating the rationale behind this rule of law, courts emphasize that 

a person who, induced thereto solely by a mistake of law, has conferred a 

benefit upon another to satisfy in whole or in part an honest claim of the 

other to the performance given, is not entitled to restitution. The underlying 

reason for those requirements is that it would be inequitable to give such 

person the privilege of selecting his own time and convenience for litigation 

short of the bar of the statute of limitations, and thereby subject the payee 

to the uncertainties and casualties of human affairs likely to affect his means 

of defending the claim. 

Id. at 726 (internal quotations and citations omitted; emphasis added). 

 None of the arguments advanced by Plaintiffs in Points 1 and 2 involve fraud or 

duress. Instead, the arguments are directed solely at the validity of the lien and its amount. 

These involve only a mistake of law by Randall and Jeff in voluntarily paying a sum they 

now claim they did not owe. A mistake of law occurs when a person is truly acquainted 

with the existence or nonexistence of facts, but is ignorant of, or comes to an erroneous 

conclusion as to, their legal effect. Edwards v. City of Ellisville, 426 S.W.3d 644, 666 

(Mo. App. 2013). As members of the Condo Association Board, Angela and Jeff were 

fully aware of all material facts giving rise to the assessment of the lien. Their alleged 

mistake of law falls within the voluntary payment doctrine and precludes their attempt to 

recover funds they voluntarily paid to the Condo Association. Therefore, Points 1 and 2 

are denied. 

Point 3 

 In Point 3, Plaintiffs argue the trial court’s finding that the Condo Association did 

not misrepresent the lien amount is “not supported by substantial evidence, is against the 

weight of the evidence and misapplies the law.” Because this point does not comply with 

Rule 84.04(d), it preserves nothing for appellate review. 
6 

 Point 3 presents three different legal challenges to the judgment. A point relied on 

should contain only one issue, so multiple contentions about different issues should not be 

combined into a single point. See City of Joplin v. Wallace Bajjali Dev. Partners, L.P., 

522 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Mo. App. 2017). The reason is each challenge involves a distinct 

analysis. A not-supported-by-substantial-evidence and an against-the-weight analysis are 

distinctly different. Smith v. Great Am. Assur. Co., 436 S.W.3d 700, 703-04 (Mo. App. 

2014). Each of these, in turn, is different from a claim that the trial court erroneously 

declared or applied the law. Id. “[T]his means each Murphy ground is proved differently 

from the others and is subject to different principles and procedures of appellate review.” 

Id. at 704. A point that includes multiple issues is multifarious and preserves nothing for 

appellate review. State ex rel. Schmitt v. Schier Co., Inc., 594 S.W.3d 245, 253 n.15 (Mo. 

App. 2020). 

 Additionally, Plaintiffs’ contention that the judgment is not supported by 

substantial evidence fails because they had the burden of production and persuasion on 

their claim. 

When the burden of proof is placed on a party for a claim that is denied, the 

trier of fact has the right to believe or disbelieve that party’s uncontradicted 

or uncontroverted evidence. If the trier of fact does not believe the evidence 

of the party bearing the burden, it properly can find for the other party. 

Generally, the party not having the burden of proof on an issue need not 

offer any evidence concerning it. Consequently, substantial evidence 

supporting a judgment against the party with the burden of proof is not 

required or necessary. 

Adoption of K.M.W., 516 S.W.3d 375, 382 (Mo. App. 2017) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). 

 Plaintiffs’ contention that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence is 

governed by Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178 (Mo. App. 2010): 
7 

[A]n against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge requires completion of 

four sequential steps: 

(1) identify a challenged factual proposition, the existence of which is 

necessary to sustain the judgment; 

(2) identify all of the favorable evidence in the record supporting the 

existence of that proposition; 

(3) identify the evidence in the record contrary to the belief of that 

proposition, resolving all conflicts in testimony in accordance with the trial 

court’s credibility determinations, whether explicit or implicit; and, 

(4) demonstrate why the favorable evidence, along with the reasonable 

inferences drawn from that evidence, is so lacking in probative value, when 

considered in the context of the totality of the evidence, that it fails to induce 

belief in that proposition. 

Id. at 187. Plaintiffs have not followed these mandatory requirements because they have 

not identified the favorable evidence supporting the trial court’s finding or acknowledged 

the trial court’s decisions about the credibility of the evidence presented. Instead, Plaintiffs 

have only cited the evidence favorable to their position. “Failure to follow the applicable 

framework means the appellant’s argument is analytically useless and provides no support 

for his or her challenge.” In re Marriage of Adams, 414 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Mo. App. 2013). 

For all of these reasons, Point 3 is denied. 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

JEFFREY W. BATES, C.J. – OPINION AUTHOR 

DON E. BURRELL, J. – CONCUR 

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – CONCUR