a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

December 2005 MILITARY TRAINING

Funding Requests for 

Joint Urban 

Operations Training 

and Facilities Should 

Be Based on Sound 

Strategy and 

Requirements

GAO-06-193
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

December 2005

MILITARY TRAINING

Funding Requests for Joint Urban 

Operations Training and Facilities Should 

Be Based on a Sound Strategy and 

Requirements 

Highlights of GAO-06-193, a report to 

congressional committees 

Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint 

strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training 

requirements. In response to congressional direction, Joint Forces 

Command, designated as DOD’s executive agent for urban operations 

training, contracted for a study, completed in early 2005, to identify facility 

and training requirements. In May 2005, the Command began working with 

the services to review the study’s results and to develop the detailed facility 

and training requirements needed to form the basis for a joint training 

strategy. While the draft strategy identifies some facility needs, as of October 

2005, the Command and services have not reached consensus on the level or 

types of joint training exercises needed to prepare troops for urban 

operations. As a result, the Command has been unable to finalize the 

strategy or the facility and joint training requirements that will form the 

baseline for measuring capabilities within each service and across DOD. 

DOD officials told us they will not be able to deliver the required baseline on 

time and instead plan to provide criteria for the Congress to use in 

evaluating service facility plans. Until the Command develops an overall 

strategy for joint urban operations training and related requirements, neither 

the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for 

evaluating service training and facility plans, and related funding requests. 

Despite DOD’s increasing emphasis on the importance of training for joint 

urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for 

training that places troops from different services on the ground working 

under a joint headquarters. Joint and service doctrine both require forces to 

be prepared to operate jointly across the full range of military operations. 

Various factors account for the lack of joint training opportunities, such as 

the services’ focus on service-specific skills, and the lack of an overall 

strategy requiring joint urban operations training, specific training 

requirements, and a formal mechanism to schedule joint training at service 

facilities. Without a strategy, defined requirements, and a joint scheduling 

mechanism, DOD cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will 

occur or that it will maximize the joint usage of training facilities. 

While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing 

operations into its training program, training and troop personnel GAO 

interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational experience, 

for further enhancing training. One of DOD’s training goals is to train as it 

expects to fight. Based on feedback from ongoing operations, DOD has made 

several adjustments, including constructing urban structures, using civilian 

role players, and adding training on techniques to counter emerging enemy 

tactics. Persons GAO interviewed cited the need for more live-fire capability,

larger numbers of role players, information gathering and cultural awareness 

training, and training with newly fielded equipment. While DOD plans more 

improvements, until it develops a strategy and specific requirements as 

discussed above, it lacks a solid basis to evaluate suggestions, and guide its 

improvement efforts and investment decisions. 

DOD emphasizes the need for joint

training to prepare U.S. forces to

conduct joint operations in urban 

terrain. It defines joint training as 

exercises involving the interaction of 

joint forces and/or joint staffs under a 

joint headquarters. To guide the

services’ plans to train forces for 

urban operations and construct 

related facilities, in May 2002, the

Senate Armed Services Committee

directed DOD to establish facility

requirements and, in May 2005, the 

committee directed DOD to complete 

its efforts and provide a requirements

baseline for measuring training 

capabilities within the services and 

across DOD by November 1, 2005. 

Due to DOD’s focus on joint urban 

operations and congressional interest 

in synchronizing service training and

facility plans, GAO, on the authority

of the Comptroller General, reviewed

the extent to which (1) DOD has 

developed a joint urban operations

training strategy and related 

requirements, (2) exercises offer 

opportunities for joint urban 

operations training, and (3) DOD has

incorporated lessons learned from

ongoing operations into its training. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations to

improve DOD’s approach to joint 

urban operations training. In written

comments on a draft report, DOD did

not concur with one of GAO’s two

recommendations. After reviewing 

DOD’s comments, GAO continues to 

believe that both its 

recommendations are still valid. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-193.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Sharon Pickup 

at (202) 512-9619 or PickupS@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-193 Military Training

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Consensus Has Not Been Reached on DOD’s Joint Urban Operations 

Training Strategy 8

Despite DOD’s Goals, Few Opportunities Exist for Forces to Train 

Together for Joint Urban Operations 11

While DOD Has Incorporated Lessons Learned, Troops and Training 

Personnel Suggested Further Training Enhancements 15

Conclusions 23

Recommendations for Executive Action 24

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 25

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 29

Appendix II: Major Ongoing and Planned Urban Operations Training 

Facility Enhancements 32

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 34

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36

Related GAO Products 37

Tables Table 1: Current Training Facilities that Can Support Joint Urban 

Operations Training 14

Table 2: Organizations and Locations Included on This 

Assignment 30

Figures Figure 1: Army Urban Operations Training Site at Fort Campbell, 

Kentucky 7

Figure 2: Marines Execute a Helicopter-Borne Raid Exercise Using 

Flat-Top Roofs 18

Figure 3: Army Troops Practice Communicating with Role Players 

as Part of Their Training Exercise in Hohenfels, 

Germany 19

Figure 4: Army Live-Fire Convoy Training Exercise in Germany 20
Page ii GAO-06-193 Military Training

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Page 1 GAO-06-193 Military Training

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

December 8, 2005 Letr

Congressional Committees

Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the challenges 

facing U.S. forces as they conduct military operations in urban 

environments, typically referred to as urban operations. These challenges 

include the presence of large numbers of noncombatants, a high density of 

buildings that complicate the coordination of firing weapons, a diminished 

effectiveness of communications equipment, and an increased ability of 

insurgents or guerrilla fighters to conceal their whereabouts. Based on 

ongoing operations, which often require U.S. forces to conduct urban 

operations, military commanders have increasingly called for more training 

in this area. In response, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military 

services have begun placing a higher priority on urban operations training. 

DOD has also increasingly emphasized the importance of joint training, 

including exercises to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint urban 

operations. DOD defines a joint exercise as the interaction of joint forces 

or joint staffs conducted under a joint headquarters according to joint 

doctrine that prepares forces/staffs to respond to operational 

requirements. DOD has designated the Joint Forces Command as the 

command responsible for joint training, and in particular, to act as the 

executive agent, for urban operations training. 

As the military services continue to develop plans for urban operations 

training and to construct or upgrade training facilities, and submit related 

funding requests, the Senate Armed Services Committee has directed DOD 

to develop requirements to guide the services’ plans. Specifically, in May 

2002, Senate Report 107-151, accompanying the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, directed DOD to establish facility 

requirements and, in May 2005, Senate Report 109-69, accompanying the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, directed DOD to 

complete its efforts and provide a requirements baseline for measuring 

training capabilities within each service and across DOD by November 1, 

2005. In the latter report, the Senate Armed Services Committee noted the 

services will continue to address urban operations training requirements 

and expend resources independently with minimal coordination and 

cooperation until a comprehensive joint training plan and investment 

strategy are approved and implemented within the department. In 

response, the Joint Forces Command has been working with the military 

services to develop an overall training strategy that addresses the need for 

troops to train jointly for urban operations, and related facility and training 
Page 2 GAO-06-193 Military Training

requirements. According to Joint Forces Command, this strategy and the 

related requirements, once complete, is intended to satisfy the baseline 

required by Senate Report 109-69. 

Because of DOD’s focus on joint urban operations and congressional 

interest in synchronizing service training and facility plans, we, on the 

authority of the Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which 

(1) DOD has developed a joint urban operations training strategy and 

related requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban 

operations training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned from 

ongoing operations into its training. 

To address these objectives, we interviewed knowledgeable DOD officials, 

and analyzed relevant documents including DOD training doctrine, the 

draft urban operations training strategy, and the results of joint urban 

operations working group meetings. Additionally, we visited several service 

training installations and combat training centers in the United States as 

well as overseas, observed exercises, and analyzed training documents to 

identify the extent of joint participation in exercises and improvements 

made to urban operations training as a result of lessons learned from 

ongoing operations. We also conducted interviews with training personnel 

and troops recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan to obtain their 

views on the type of urban operations training needed to realistically train 

troops as they will fight. We determined that the data we analyzed were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. We performed our work 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards from 

January 2005 through September 2005. More details on our scope and 

methodology are presented in appendix I.

Results in Brief Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint 

strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training 

requirements. In response to congressional direction, the Joint Forces 

Command contracted for a study, completed in early 2005, to identify 

facility and training requirements. In May 2005, the Joint Forces Command 

began working with the services to review the study’s results and develop 

the detailed facility and training requirements needed to form the basis for 

a joint training strategy. While the services have identified some facility 

needs, Joint Forces Command and service representatives have been 

unable to reach consensus on the level or types of joint training necessary 

to prepare troops for urban operations. As a result, Joint Forces Command 

has been unable to finalize the strategy or the facility and joint training 
Page 3 GAO-06-193 Military Training

requirements that will form the baseline for measuring capabilities within 

each service and across DOD. DOD officials told us they will not be able to 

deliver the required baseline by November 1, 2005, and instead plan to 

provide criteria for the Congress to use in evaluating service facility plans. 

Until Joint Forces Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban 

operations training and related requirements, neither the Secretary of 

Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service 

facility and training plans, and related funding requests. As a result, we are 

recommending that DOD finalize development of its joint urban operations 

training strategy, including development of training and facility 

requirements, before approving service plans to construct or upgrade 

training facilities to support urban operations training.

Despite DOD’s increased emphasis on the importance of training for joint 

urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for 

joint urban operations training that places troops from different services on 

the ground working under a joint headquarters. Joint and service doctrine 

both require forces to be prepared to operate as a joint team across the full 

range of military operations. Furthermore, DOD guidance calls for 

transforming military training to better enable joint force operations by 

increasing the level of joint context in military training. Many existing 

urban operations training exercises include some joint aspects, such as 

training on coordination between ground forces and the Air Force, and a 

few exercises have also incorporated the use of a joint headquarters to 

train its battle staff on joint command and control. However, most urban 

operations training events fall short of the definition of a joint exercise as 

articulated in DOD’s joint training policy—the interaction of joint forces or 

joint staffs conducted under a joint headquarters in a manner that prepares 

forces/staffs to respond to operational requirements. Various factors 

account for the lack of joint urban operations training opportunities, such 

as the services’ focus on service-specific skills, and the lack of an overall 

strategy requiring joint urban operations training, specific joint urban 

operations training requirements, and a formal mechanism for the services 

to schedule joint urban operations training at each other’s facilities. 

Without a strategy, defined requirements, and a joint scheduling 

mechanism, DOD cannot be assured that joint urban operations training 

will occur or that it will maximize the joint usage of training facilities. To 

increase the opportunities for joint urban operations training, we are 

recommending that DOD establish a mechanism for joint scheduling of 

joint urban operations training at major training centers. 
Page 4 GAO-06-193 Military Training

While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing 

operations into its training program, training and troop personnel we 

interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational 

experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD’s training goals is to 

train as it expects to fight. On the basis of feedback from ongoing 

operations, DOD has made several adjustments to its urban operations 

training, including expanding and upgrading its urban training structures to 

more closely reflect urban conditions that troops can expect to face in 

current operations, using civilian role players to a greater extent to 

simulate the presence of urban populations, building convoy operations 

training courses, and training troops in techniques to counter emerging 

enemy tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices. Discussions 

held with troops and training personnel revealed additional items that they 

believed could further enhance training, such as the need for additional 

live-fire capability, a larger number of civilian role players and more 

cultural awareness training to prepare troops for the required interaction 

with a large civilian populace once in theater, and training with newly 

fielded equipment such as the High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicle, the Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight, and the Blue Force 

Tracker. While DOD plans additional improvements to current training, 

until it develops specific training requirements, it will lack a solid basis to 

evaluate suggestions and make improvements and investment decisions. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation on finalizing the joint urban 

operations training strategy and related requirements. DOD did not concur 

with our recommendation for establishing a mechanism to schedule joint 

urban operations training at major training centers. Our report shows that 

the lack of a formal mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations 

training at major training centers is one of the key factors accounting for 

the limited number of joint urban operations training opportunities. Our 

recommendation is intended to facilitate increased multi-service 

participation in urban operations training events. Without implementing 

this recommendation, DOD will continue to rely on the current servicecentric scheduling systems that have resulted in few joint urban operations 

training opportunities that meet DOD’s definition of a joint exercise. 

Therefore, we continue to believe our recommendation has merit. The 

department also provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated 

as appropriate.

Background Half the world’s population lives in urban areas, and the trend towards 

global urbanization is continuing. Within the last 40 years, the United States 
Page 5 GAO-06-193 Military Training

military has conducted urban operations in locations such as Saigon, Hue, 

Beirut, Panama City, Kuwait City, Mogadishu, and the villages of the 

Balkans. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the 

trend towards urban operations and the many challenges they present U.S. 

forces. Military planners recognize this trend and acknowledge the 

likelihood that enemies will continue to draw U.S. forces into cities to 

degrade U.S. military advantages. According to DOD, in the future, U.S. 

forces will likely conduct military operations in urban areas, which are 

characterized by multiple structures, numerous noncombatants, and 

complex infrastructure. These areas are also political, cultural, and 

economic centers, as well as hubs for transportation, information, and 

manufacturing. Thus, the urban environment constrains many of the 

advantages that U.S. forces currently enjoy in open environments, 

increasing the risks of high casualties to friendly forces and 

noncombatants, and extensive collateral damage.

Moreover, once deployed, forces generally find themselves part of joint 

operations. In testimony the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Readiness reiterated comments made earlier by the Secretary of Defense:

“The wars and the conflicts of the 21st century will not be fought by individual services. 

Rather, they will be fought by joint forces, and more often than not, by combined forces. 

Therefore, we will have to think, train, and exercise jointly and combined, because let there 

be no doubt that is the way that we will fight.”1

As part of its Training Transformation Program, DOD is attempting to 

provide more of a joint context to its training.2

 DOD defines a joint exercise 

as the interaction of joint forces and/or joint staffs conducted under a joint 

headquarters according to joint doctrine that prepares forces/staffs to 

respond to operational requirements. To develop a stronger program of 

joint training, DOD designated the Joint Forces Command as the joint 

trainer for DOD to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well 

as senior commanders worldwide in meeting joint training objectives. In 

1

Testimony of Dr. Paul W. Mayberry, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness), before 

the Subcommittee on Readiness and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional 

Threats and Capabilities, House Armed Services Committee, regarding Joint National 

Training Capability (Mar. 18, 2004).

2

This program is intended to enhance training to better enable joint force operations in the 

new strategic environment, calling for dynamic, capabilities-based training in support of 

national security requirements across the full spectrum of service, joint, interagency, 

intergovernmental, and multinational operations.
Page 6 GAO-06-193 Military Training

2002, DOD published its Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations3 and, 

recognizing the need to place a stronger emphasis on urban operations 

training, assigned the role of joint urban operations executive agent for 

training to Joint Forces Command. While the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall responsibility for training 

policies, Joint Forces Command, as DOD’s executive agent, is the “primary 

DOD point of contact and proponent for joint urban operations doctrine, 

training, and equipment,” and is to lead, coordinate, and integrate the 

activities of the other DOD components on such matters. In this role, Joint 

Forces Command has conducted experiments on concepts of operations 

for joint urban operations and monitored lessons learned from ongoing 

urban operations. 

The training of U.S. forces for urban operations is primarily the 

responsibility of the services. Both the Army and Marine Corps, the 

services that conduct most urban operations, have developed fairly robust 

urban operations training programs for their ground forces. Figure 1 shows 

an Army training facility at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, with structures built 

to train troops in conducting urban operations. 

3

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations (Sept. 16, 

2002).
Page 7 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Figure 1: Army Urban Operations Training Site at Fort Campbell, Kentucky

The services train ground forces for urban operations based on a buildingblock approach beginning with specialty-focused individual training at 

their assigned installation, which normally focuses on individual basic 

skills needed to successfully conduct operations in urban terrain. Then 

they progress through collective training that sometimes includes other 

services on a limited basis. Training ends with a culminating exercise at a 

major training center, such as the Joint Readiness Training Center or 

Twenty-Nine Palms, and is based on real-time scenarios that troops may 

encounter in the urban environment. The Army and Marine Corps currently 

have plans to construct new or upgrade existing facilities to support urban 

operations training.

Source: U.S. Army.
Page 8 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Consensus Has Not 

Been Reached on 

DOD’s Joint Urban 

Operations Training 

Strategy

Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint 

strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training 

requirements. In response to direction from the Senate Armed Services 

Committee in May 2002, Joint Forces Command, designated as DOD’s 

executive agent for urban operations training, contracted for a study, 

completed in early 2005, to identify facility and training requirements. In 

May 2005, the committee directed DOD to establish joint urban operations 

facility requirements and a training requirements baseline by November 1, 

2005. In May 2005, Joint Forces Command began working with the services 

to review the study’s results and develop the detailed facility and training 

requirements needed to form the basis for a joint training strategy. While 

the services have identified some facility needs, Joint Forces Command 

and service representatives have been unable to reach consensus on the 

level or types of joint training necessary to prepare troops for urban 

operations. As a result, Joint Forces Command has been unable to finalize 

the strategy or the facility and joint training requirements that will form the 

baseline for measuring capabilities within each service and across DOD. 

DOD officials told us they will not be able to deliver the baseline as 

required by November 1, 2005, and instead plan to provide criteria for the 

Congress to use in evaluating service facility plans. Until Joint Forces 

Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training 

and related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the 

Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service facility and training 

plans, and related funding requests. 

DOD Directed to Develop 

Urban Operations Training 

and Facility Requirements

In the committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2003 National 

Defense Authorization Act,4

 the Senate Armed Services Committee 

required a report by the Secretary of Defense that would establish 

requirements for facilities that support urban operations training within 

DOD. In response to the committee’s direction, the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense and the joint urban operations executive agent, Joint Forces 

Command, contracted for a study that would examine urban operations 

training requirements and the resulting facilities that would be needed to 

conduct the necessary training. 

The study was completed in early 2005. According to DOD officials, while 

the study results have helped to inform the process, the detailed training 

4

S. Rep. No. 107-151, at 427-28 (2002).
Page 9 GAO-06-193 Military Training

and facility requirements contained in the study have not been formally 

adopted because there was not enough agreement among the services as to 

the usefulness or veracity of the identified urban operations training 

requirements in that study. Consequently, in May 2005 Joint Forces 

Command convened a working group to develop joint urban operations 

training and facilities requirements on which to base a joint urban 

operations training strategy. 

In the committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 National 

Defense Authorization Act,5

 the Senate Armed Services committee directed 

DOD to complete its efforts to establish the requirements for facilities and 

also directed it to establish, by November 1, 2005, a training requirements 

baseline against which the ability to train for urban operations within the 

services and across DOD could be measured. In the report, the committee 

expressed concern that the services would otherwise continue to address 

urban operations training requirements and expend resources 

independently with minimal coordination and that a critical opportunity to 

develop capabilities for joint training in urban operations was not being 

effectively pursued. In response to congressional direction, Joint Forces 

Command began working with the services to develop an overall strategy 

for joint urban operations and related facility and training requirements. 

According to DOD, this effort is intended to meet the congressional 

directive for a requirements baseline.

Current Strategy Focuses on 

Need for Facilities

To date, the draft Joint Urban Operations Training Strategy, as currently 

drafted, primarily focuses on the need to enhance training facilities to 

accommodate larger, more realistic joint urban operations training events. 

The current draft strategy’s focus is to identify the necessary locations for 

joint urban operations training for two audiences: (1) troops executing 

urban operations at the tactical level and (2) officers serving on the staffs 

of commanders conducting urban operations. As envisioned, the troops 

that execute the operations would undergo training that places members of 

different services together to learn to operate together and to overcome 

differences in standard practices, terms, and organizational cultures that 

can limit the effectiveness of operations. The draft strategy also envisions 

using three training range complexes comprised of existing training 

5

S. Rep. No. 109-69, at 456 (2005).
Page 10 GAO-06-193 Military Training

facilities in the western, central, and eastern United States, as well as 

improvements and expansions planned for some of these training facilities. 

For its second audience, the strategy suggested building new facilities in 

order to train staff officers in the skills associated with serving on a joint 

staff of a commander conducting urban operations. According to DOD, 

officers serving on a joint staff rarely receive significant and realistic 

training for this complex role in which they are called upon to make 

recommendations to the joint task force commander based on a myriad of 

facts and assumptions in a limited time frame. The draft strategy notes that 

many officers often spend more time in the course of their careers working 

on command staffs than they do in command of troops. In order to 

establish staff training, the strategy proposes building four new joint staff 

training centers large enough to handle battalion or combatant-commandlevel staffs to replicate the sort of command and control arrangements and 

joint staff processes they will encounter while serving as staff officers 

under a joint force commander. According to a Joint Forces Command 

official, these centers can provide adequate throughput for staff training if 

used in conjunction with the current Joint Operations Centers in 

Grafenwoehr, Germany, and at Joint Forces Command in Suffolk, Virginia. 

Lack of Consensus on Joint 

Training Requirements 

Stalls Strategy

The services have identified their respective facility needs to support urban 

operations training. However, the Joint Forces Command has not been able 

to finalize a draft joint urban operations training strategy because 

command officials and service representatives have not been able to agree 

upon joint urban operations training requirements. Specifically, there is a 

lack of agreement on the need for joint urban operations training events 

that place significant numbers of troops from different services together in 

urban settings. As Joint Forces Command officials continue to develop the 

draft strategy, they have pledged to continue working with the services and 

combatant commands to develop the joint urban operations training 

requirements through the working group process. To date, Joint Forces 

Command has provided only a very broad, overarching statement of the 

tasks that are unique to or significantly challenged by urban environments, 

with a focus on conducting joint urban operations at the operational level.

Representatives from the Army and Marine Corps in attendance at the 

second session of the joint urban operations training strategy working 

group in August 2005 repeatedly emphasized the need for more specifically 

defined training requirements for joint urban operations before they could 

evaluate the draft joint urban operations training strategy and assess their 
Page 11 GAO-06-193 Military Training

services’ commitment to it. Given the key role the services and combatant 

commands play in training forces—both troops on the ground and staff 

personnel—consensus on joint urban operations training requirements is 

necessary for the implementation of a joint urban operations training 

strategy.

Because of the lack of consensus in the draft joint urban operations 

training strategy and related requirements, DOD has not yet developed 

joint training requirements to use as a baseline against which to measure 

capabilities within and across the services. As a result, DOD officials told 

us they will not be able to deliver the requirements baseline to the Congress 

by the November 1, 2005, deadline. DOD officials stated that, instead, they 

plan to provide a set of questions for the Congress to use as interim criteria 

in considering service funding requests for urban operations training 

facilities. These questions are intended to assist the Congress in evaluating 

the potential for joint usage of proposed facilities. Until Joint Forces 

Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training 

and related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the 

Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service facility and training 

plans, and related funding requests.

Despite DOD’s Goals, 

Few Opportunities 

Exist for Forces to 

Train Together for 

Joint Urban Operations 

Despite DOD’s increasing emphasis on the importance of training for joint 

urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for 

joint urban operations training that places troops from different services on 

the ground working under a joint headquarters. Various factors account for 

the lack of joint urban operations training, such as the services’ focus on 

training service-specific skills, and the lack of an overall strategy requiring 

joint urban operations training, specific joint urban operations training 

requirements, and a formal mechanism for scheduling joint urban 

operations training at service-owned facilities. Without a training strategy, 

defined requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD cannot be 

assured that joint urban operations training will occur or that DOD will 

maximize the joint usage of urban operations training facilities.

Few Urban Operations 

Training Opportunities Exist 

that Meet DOD’s Definition 

of Joint Training

DOD’s Joint Training Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction 3500.01B, defines a joint exercise as a joint military maneuver, 

simulated wartime operation, or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff/combatant commander–designated event involving planning, 

preparation, execution, and evaluation in which forces of two or more 
Page 12 GAO-06-193 Military Training

services interact as joint forces and/or joint staffs and the event is 

conducted based on approved joint doctrine that prepares joint forces or 

staffs to respond to operational requirements established by the combatant 

commander. Although there is often some level of jointness incorporated 

into Marine Corps and Army urban operations training events, these efforts 

fall short of DOD’s definition of a joint training event because they do not 

include a joint headquarters and focus on service, rather than joint, training 

objectives. Marine Corps officials said that the Marine Corps includes some 

joint scenarios in its events and incorporates to some extent other service 

participation in performing certain specialty roles, such as air-ground 

coordination. The Army simulates some of the joint aspects of a battlefield 

in its training as well, such as the joint command and control structures 

troops are expected to encounter in theater, and it incorporates special 

operations forces when possible. According to Joint Forces Command 

officials, the Joint Operations Center at Joint Forces Command in Suffolk, 

Virginia, and the Joint Multinational Training Center in Grafenwoehr, 

Germany,6

 are used to provide some officers with the type of joint staff 

officer training called for in the draft strategy. We observed the Joint 

Operations Center, which is used to provide officers with command and 

control training, at the Joint Multinational Training Center. Officers we 

spoke with stated that this was a great addition that increased the level of 

joint urban operations training. 

Although the services are taking these actions to increase jointness, 

training exercises are still primarily focused on service-derived, rather than 

joint, training objectives and for the most part do not include a joint 

headquarters to command the exercise. For example, an Air Force 

representative who was involved in supporting the Army’s Air Warrior II 

training exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana, which was designed to prepare 

troops for urban operations before they deployed, stated that the value of 

the training was limited for the Air Force because the training was designed 

around the accomplishment of Army training objectives. Additionally, an 

Air Force representative in Germany experienced similar difficulties in 

getting Air Force training objectives added to Army exercises. 

Furthermore, the troops and training personnel we interviewed, many of 

whom had recent operational experience in ongoing operations, 

emphasized the importance of training jointly for urban operations in order 

to maximize familiarity with the services’ respective ways of operating and 

overall interoperability. 

6

This facility was formerly known as the Combat Maneuver Training Center.
Page 13 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Several Factors Contribute 

to the Lack of Joint Urban 

Operations Training

One important factor contributing to the lack of joint urban operations 

training is the services’ focus on service-specific skills training. The two 

services that perform the bulk of urban operations training, the Army and 

Marine Corps, are proactively working to ensure that their troops are 

trained in the individual skills needed for operations in urban terrain. 

Soldiers and Marines are exposed to individual urban tasks in their basic 

training and specialty schools. The Army and Marine Corps primarily 

concentrate their urban operations training on enhancing the capabilities 

of individual soldiers and small units—primarily squads, platoons, and 

companies. As noted in our June 2005 report,7

 historically, service training 

has focused on individual service competencies or mission-essential tasks, 

with less emphasis on joint operations. While this has allowed the services 

to meet their core training responsibilities, it has also contributed to the 

problem of forces often entering combat without prior experience or 

training in joint urban operations.

Second, in the absence of a joint urban operations training strategy, there is 

currently no specific requirement for the services to train jointly for urban 

operations. While it is not urban-specific, the DOD Directive 1322.18, which 

advocates joint training, states: “To the maximum extent possible, the DOD 

components shall conduct joint training in accredited events at certified 

facilities, and shall synchronize schedules to integrate training events.” 

However, the directive does not define what is meant by “to the maximum 

extent possible” and therefore provides the services much leeway in how 

much they participate in joint training. Absent a directive requiring the 

services to train for joint urban operations tasks at a specified level and 

specific joint urban operations training requirements, the services are 

likely to continue to focus their training on service-specific skills and tasks 

for which they are held accountable. As discussed earlier, Joint Forces 

Command expects the joint urban operations training strategy it is 

developing to include such requirements.

Lastly, the services own the facilities used to conduct urban operations 

training and are currently using them primarily for service-specific training 

requirements. While the services agree that joint urban operations training 

is needed, there is no formal mechanism in place to ensure that joint 

training requirements are incorporated into the different services’ training 

7

GAO, Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD’s Program to Transform Joint 

Training, GAO-05-548, (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005).
Page 14 GAO-06-193 Military Training

schedules. Urban training that involves placing two or more battalions 

together is usually reserved for the combat training centers and these 

training centers are limited in throughput capacity. For example, the Joint 

Readiness Training Center normally sponsors 10 training rotations per year 

and is limited in its ability to expand the amount of rotations it can host per 

year to increase joint usage. Even though Joint Forces Command is the 

executive agent for joint urban operations, it does not have the authority to 

direct the services or combatant commands to modify their training plans 

to accommodate joint urban operations training. It is the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness that has overall 

authority over DOD training policies. Table 1 lists those facilities that can 

currently support large joint urban operations training exercises and staff 

officer training.

Table 1: Current Training Facilities that Can Support Joint Urban Operations Training

Source: Joint Forces Command.

Note: We are using the definition of Joint Training from DOD’s joint training policy—the training event 

includes two or more forces and/or joint staffs, is conducted according to joint doctrine, and is run by a 

joint headquarters.

In a June 2002 report,8 we recommended that DOD create a database that 

identifies all ranges available to the department and what they offer, 

regardless of service ownership, so that commanders can schedule the best 

Facility Location

Facilitates joint urban 

operations training for troops 

(battalions from different 

services) 

Facilitates urban operations 

training for officers on joint 

staffs

Joint Readiness Training Center Fort Polk, Louisiana Yes Yes

Twenty-Nine Palms Twenty-Nine Palms, California Yes Yes

National Training Center Fort Irwin, California Yes Yes

Joint Multinational Training 

Center

Grafenwoehr/Hohenfels, 

Germany

Yes Yes

Joint Warfighting Center Suffolk, Virginia No Yes

Sites with ability to link into Joint 

Training and Experimentation 

Network

Various service installations No Yes

8

GAO, Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment on 

Training Ranges, GAO-02-614, (Washington D.C.: June 11, 2002).
Page 15 GAO-06-193 Military Training

available resources to provide required training. Without a mechanism to 

schedule joint urban operations training at each other’s facilities, DOD 

cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will occur or that 

DOD will maximize the joint usage of urban operations training facilities. 

While DOD Has 

Incorporated Lessons 

Learned, Troops and 

Training Personnel 

Suggested Further 

Training 

Enhancements

While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing 

operations into its training program, training and troop personnel we 

interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational 

experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD’s training goals is to 

train as it expects to fight. The services have been using both formal and 

informal means to collect and disseminate lessons learned from ongoing 

operations to be incorporated into their training events. Based on this 

feedback, during the site visits we made, we observed that the services 

have made many improvements in their urban operations training such as: 

expanding and upgrading their urban training structures, using role players 

to a greater extent to simulate the presence of urban populations, building 

convoy operations training courses, and training troops in techniques to 

counter emerging enemy tactics such as the use of improvised explosive 

devices. Our discussions held with troops and training personnel revealed 

additional items that they believed could further enhance training to better 

reflect current operating conditions such as the need for additional live-fire 

capability, adding larger numbers of role players and providing more 

cultural awareness training to adequately prepare troops for the required 

interaction with a large civilian populace once in theater, and training with 

newly fielded equipment. While DOD plans additional improvements to 

current training, until it develops a strategy and specific facility and 

training requirements as discussed previously, it will lack a solid basis to 

guide its improvement efforts.

The Services Use Both 

Formal and Informal Means 

to Collect and Disseminate 

Lessons Learned from 

Ongoing Operations 

The Army and Marine Corps utilize both formal and informal means for 

capturing and disseminating lessons learned. According to service officials, 

to obtain information from ongoing operations, they send subject matter 

experts into theater with deploying units and capture lessons learned from 

troops returning from recent ongoing operations. Both services maintain 

databases, which are used to disseminate lessons learned information 

within and among the services. These databases include numerous lessons 

learned related to ongoing urban operations. For example, the Marine 

Corps database contains lessons learned on urban operations including 

basic Arabic language training, information on convoy operations tactics, 
Page 16 GAO-06-193 Military Training

and search techniques. Additionally, Joint Forces Command also sends 

subject matter experts into theater and its Joint Center for Operational 

Analysis maintains a database of lessons learned and helps facilitate the 

sharing of joint lessons among the services. Both the Army and Marine 

Corps formally disseminated the information collected through 

publications such as handbooks, newsletters, and official Web sites. For 

example, the Army’s Center for Lessons Learned issued a tactical convoy 

operations handbook that was also used by the Marine Corps and the 

Special Operations Command, according to Army Center for Lessons 

Learned officials. Another formal method the Army uses to disseminate 

information is the “smart card,” which is a compact card that easily fits in a 

soldier’s pocket, thus providing quick access to information. The Army 

recently issued a smart card that served as a guide for knowledge about 

Iraqi culture. 

The services also utilize informal mechanisms for capturing and 

disseminating lessons learned. Officials we spoke with from the Army’s 

Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany indicated that they rely 

more heavily on informal mechanisms, such as electronic messages from 

troops in the field and the “right seat/left seat” transition program. Under 

this program, incoming commanders learn the latest urban tactics by 

shadowing outbound individuals conducting urban operations. For 

example, incoming company commanders shadow outgoing commanders 

to learn about the intricacies of the local operating area and what practices 

have proved useful in conducting missions. Further, training center 

officials and troops we talked with indicated that they shared information 

on ongoing operations via available DOD databases.

Integration of Lessons 

Learned Is Improving Urban 

Operations Training 

The Army and the Marine Corps have recently made significant 

improvements in urban operations training curriculum and facilities based 

on lessons learned from ongoing operations and training events. 

Specifically, these services have adjusted their training curriculum to place 

greater emphasis on urban operations. While the Marine Corps introduced 

its revised combined arms exercise and security and stabilization 

operations training in 2003, it was not mandatory predeployment training 

until the summer of 2005, according to Marine Corps officials. The Army 

recently incorporated urban operations tasks into its Advanced Individual 

Training Program to ensure that soldiers receive predeployment training on 

warrior tasks and battle drills regardless of their occupational specialties, 

according to officials from the Army’s Collective Training Directorate. 

Further, in June 2004, the Army issued guidance stating that it intends to 
Page 17 GAO-06-193 Military Training

provide all deploying brigade and battalion commanders and staff training 

on urban stability and support operations through its Battle Command 

Training Program. 

At training sites in Germany we visited, we found that Army trainers 

incorporated real-time scenarios from ongoing operations in their 

exercises to provide troops with training that realistically reflects the urban 

environment. For example, they incorporated Iraqi elections into the 

mission rehearsal exercise in July 2005 in anticipation of the conditions 

they would face once deployed. Other examples of curriculum changes that 

services had made to provide troops with more of the skills necessary to 

effectively face urban challenges included:

• developing mobile training teams that deploy to training sites to provide 

instruction to Marines on the handling of detainees at detention 

operations;

• placing more emphasis on search procedures related to dwellings, 

caves, and vehicles to locate insurgents or weapons;

• delivering training on how to respond to improvised explosive device 

incidents;9

 and

• training troops on how to conduct convoy operations.

During our visits to training sites, we also observed that the facilities used 

for urban operations training had been expanded and upgraded to more 

closely reflect urban conditions troops can expect to face in current 

operations. For example, we observed small towns that had been enhanced 

to replicate urban terrain by including mosques, open markets, and flatroofed dwellings. Figure 2 depicts Marines practicing raid procedures on 

flat-top roofs to simulate the type of buildings they would encounter in 

current urban operational environments.

9

This issue had received attention from all services and the Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat task force was formed to identify enemy tactics for explosive devices and 

recommend servicewide solutions. The task force, in addition to fielding detection and 

disabling equipment, also established mobile training teams to provide training on how to 

respond to ever-changing enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures related to improvised 

explosive devices.
Page 18 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Figure 2: Marines Execute a Helicopter-Borne Raid Exercise Using Flat-Top Roofs

Both services have populated these urban training facilities with role 

players that portray government officials, tribal leaders, religious leaders, 

and officials from interagency organizations. For example, the Joint 

Multinational Training Center has increased the total number of civilian 

role players to up to 600 participants, though not all are used in each 

training event. Our discussions with soldiers who had returned from 

operations in Iraq, however, stated that exercises need to include a larger 

number of role players to more realistically represent the urban 

environment. We noted that the Joint Readiness Training Center replicates 

the media and incorporates nongovernmental organizations and civilian 

role players in its training. Figure 3 shows an Army exercise that 

incorporates civilian role players to simulate local inhabitants in a Middle 

Eastern environment.

Source: U. S. Marine Corps.
Page 19 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Figure 3: Army Troops Practice Communicating with Role Players as Part of Their 

Training Exercise in Hohenfels, Germany

Furthermore, we observed that the Marine Corps and Army have included 

newly built live-fire or simulated convoy courses in some of their urban 

operations facilities. Those with live-fire courses are emphasizing the 

importance of training troops on them at night and in adverse weather. 

Figure 4 shows training on a live-fire convoy operations training course in 

Germany. The services are also updating training to reflect changes to 

enemy tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices. We saw 

incorporation of simulated improvised explosive devices at Fort Campbell, 

Kentucky, and observed the newly developed training site for explosive 

devices at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany.

Source: U.S. Army.
Page 20 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Figure 4: Army Live-Fire Convoy Training Exercise in Germany

In addition to recent improvements, the services are currently planning 

further enhancements to existing training facilities. For instance, the 

Marine Corps is requesting funds to construct a large-scale urban training 

facility at Twenty-Nine Palms, California. The new facility will have up to 

1,500 buildings, including live-fire capability, and outlying components such 

as an airfield, port, and villages. According to Marine officials, the facility 

will be large enough to accommodate joint training exercises with the 

Army. It is also expected to provide a venue from which to experiment, 

develop, and exercise joint/interagency urban operations with the Joint 

National Training Capability. The Marine Corps also plans to add a night 

driving course to pre-deployment training. Additionally, the Marines plan to 

add shoot houses at Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, and Marine Corps 

Base Quantico. Likewise, the Army is in the process of improving its 

combat training centers by adding more buildings and instrumentation, and 

its major installations by providing shoot houses, urban assault courses, 

breach facilities, and combined arms collective training facilities. Army 

officials at the Joint Multinational Training Center have initiated an effort 

to enhance training through the development of an Expeditionary 

Source: U.S. Army.
Page 21 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Instrumentation System, which is a new mobile instrumentation capability 

that provides feedback to the battalion at any training site that lacks 

instrumentation. According to its developers, the mobile nature of the 

system will also help alleviate capacity concerns throughout the Army, 

turning any location into an instrumented range. See appendix II for a 

description of major ongoing and planned urban operations training facility 

enhancements.

Troops and Training 

Personnel Identified Further 

Training Enhancements 

That They Believe Would 

Better Reflect Current 

Operating Conditions 

One of DOD’s training goals is to train as it expects to fight and discussions 

held with troops and training personnel revealed additional items that they 

believe could further enhance training to better reflect current operating 

conditions. Personnel identified enhancements such as the need for 

additional live-fire capability, adding more civilian role players in exercises 

and providing additional information gathering and cultural awareness 

training, and having newly fielded equipment available to train with at the 

training centers. 

Additional Live-Fire Training The troops we spoke with stated that the live-fire training they received 

prior to deployment was infrequent and did not sufficiently prepare them to 

use their weapons in an urban setting. Training personnel at facilities we 

visited stated that the facilities’ live-fire capability is limited due to 

environmental issues and concerns about safety when training in urban 

operations training sites with role players. In lieu of live-fire training, urban 

operations facilities have simulated shooting drills, including video and 

target instrumentation, to provide the experience of live-fire urban 

operations. 

More Role Players and Greater 

Emphasis on Cultural Awareness 

Training

Further, although we observed role players included in the training 

exercises we visited, troops noted that more were needed and additional 

cultural awareness training would be beneficial. They noted operating in an 

urban environment, against an elusive enemy with the ability to hide among 

the civilian population, requires troops to be able to work more closely 

with local people, in many cases on an individual basis, to conduct stability 

and support operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, and the 

gathering of information. Troops we spoke with indicated that the number 

of role players included in exercises is not sufficient to adequately prepare 

them for the density and level of persistent contact that is typical of 

noncombatants in the urban environment. In addition, troops and training 

personnel we interviewed wanted the role players to more actively engage 

the troops during the exercises to better replicate operational conditions. 
Page 22 GAO-06-193 Military Training

The troops and trainers also indicated that more cultural awareness 

training, which would include basic language training, would be helpful to 

establish and maintain communication with local civilians so that they 

could better interact with civilians and minimize civilian interference with 

military operations. Currently, training exercises contain some level of 

cultural awareness and civil affairs training by including role players that 

interact with troops, and exercises that we observed emphasized the use of 

translators when working with the local population. However, access to 

translators in training is limited, and officials and troops agreed that 

translators were not often available for everyday interaction with civilians 

and so further training would be beneficial. Both the Marine Corps and 

Army have taken steps to improve this training; the Marine Corps has 

established an advanced cultural awareness center and according to an 

Army official, the Army continually updates its cultural awareness training 

to reflect conditions in current operations. 

New Equipment Available for 

Training Prior to Deployment

Troops and training personnel identified a third area for further 

enhancement: the ability to train with newly fielded equipment prior to 

deployment. Troops we interviewed who had returned from ongoing 

operations stated that there were several pieces of equipment that they 

used in theater that had not been available to train with prior to 

deployment. These items had been developed to help alleviate the 

difficulties of conducting urban operations by addressing the adversaries’ 

tactics, such as improvised explosive devices, and the adversaries’ ability 

to conceal themselves in an urban environment. According to training 

personnel and DOD officials, limited production quantities and the need for 

the items in theater to respond to rapidly changing operational 

environments makes it difficult for the training centers to initially have the 

items. Some examples of newly fielded equipment that are in limited supply 

but DOD believes will improve troops’ ability to conduct urban operations 

include the following.

• Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). 

These vehicles are not available at some training facilities and only the 

soft-top HMMWVs were on hand for training exercises, according to 

officials at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Hohenfels and 

Twenty-Nine Palms. Traveling in the up-armored HMMWVs provides 

greater protection from improvised explosive devices while maintaining 

transport mobility for forces, civil affairs teams, and engineers operating 

in urban areas. However, Army and Marine Corps officials and troops 

that we interviewed stated that the up-armored HMMWVs used in 
Page 23 GAO-06-193 Military Training

theater were top-heavy, difficult to maneuver, and required different 

tactical procedures from the soft-top HMMWVs when used in combat. 

• The Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight. This gunsight is another piece 

of equipment used in conducting urban operations that has been quickly 

fielded into theater, but limited quantities prevented its use in training 

prior to deployment. Officials stated that this item greatly enhanced 

troops’ ability to precisely target long-distance hostile forces in all 

lighting conditions, which is critical to an urban setting where lighting 

plays a key role.

• New improvised explosive device detection and disabling equipment. 

These devices were not at some training facilities we visited, and some 

troops noted that their absence hampered the troops’ use of the items in 

theater because the instructions were difficult to understand. Officials 

at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Joint Multinational Training 

Center, and Camp Lejeune stated that more specific training on the use 

of improvised explosive device detection equipment would facilitate its 

use in theater. 

• Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below System, also known as 

Blue Force Tracker. Blue Force Tracker is a satellite-based tracking and 

communication system that gives an all-weather, near real-time picture 

of the battlefield. Troops we interviewed stated that they were not 

exposed to Blue Force Tracker in training, although it has been essential 

in conducting urban operations in Iraq because of its ability to 

distinguish friendly forces from adversaries. 

Officials and troops agreed that exposure to these items before arriving in 

theater would have better prepared them to operate in the urban 

environment. Training center and other DOD officials stated that they 

would like to see a greater priority given to placing high-demand items like 

the ones mentioned at the training centers to increase the troops’ level of 

exposure to this equipment before deployment. While DOD plans 

additional improvements, until it develops a strategy and specific facility 

and training requirements, it will lack a solid basis to evaluate suggestions 

and make improvements and investment decisions.

Conclusions DOD has continually emphasized the importance of joint training, including 

to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint military operations in urban 

environments. The inherent complexities of operating in urban 
Page 24 GAO-06-193 Military Training

environments, DOD’s expectation that urban environments will play a 

significant role in future military operations, and that most of these 

operations will be conducted jointly, coupled with the combatant 

commanders’ interest in ensuring U.S. forces are sufficiently prepared, are 

significant incentives for Joint Forces Command and services to develop 

and implement an overall joint training strategy and related requirements. 

In addition, the fact that U.S. forces are currently involved in urban 

operations adds a tangible sense of urgency for joint training. 

Notwithstanding these incentives, current training exercises offer few 

opportunities for U.S. forces to train jointly for urban operations. An 

overall strategy requiring joint urban operations training and clearly 

defined facility and training requirements, and a mechanism for scheduling 

joint training at training facilities, would provide a framework to assign 

accountability, synchronize the services’ training efforts to ensure they 

include joint training, and maximize the joint usage of training facilities. In 

the absence of this framework, DOD risks that the services will continue to 

pursue their respective service-specific training and facility plans. Until 

DOD develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training and 

related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress 

will have a sound basis for evaluating service training and facility plans, 

and related funding requests. To its credit, DOD and the services have 

actively sought to incorporate lessons learned during ongoing operations 

and made several adjustments to make the training environment more 

reflective of operational conditions. To further enhance training, the troops 

and training personnel we interviewed identified several additional 

adjustments that they believed would further enhance urban operations 

training. However, until DOD develops a strategy and related requirements, 

it lacks a solid basis to evaluate suggestions, and make improvements and 

investment decisions. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To improve DOD’s approach to joint urban operations training, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, Joint 

Forces Command to:

• Finalize development of the joint urban operations training strategy and 

related requirements including joint training tasks and standards, level 

and types of joint training exercises to be conducted, and facility needs. 

Once established, we envision this framework would be used to guide 

the review and approval of service training and facility plans, and to 

guide efforts to make additional improvements to existing urban 
Page 25 GAO-06-193 Military Training

operations training curriculum, including evaluating any suggestions 

from training and troop personnel. 

To increase opportunities for joint training and maximize the joint usage of 

training facilities, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense 

• direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 

establish a mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations training at 

major training centers to facilitate increased multiservice participation 

in urban operations training. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our first 

recommendation and did not concur with the second. DOD concurred with 

our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Commander, Joint Forces Command, to finalize development of the joint 

urban operations training strategy and related requirements including joint 

training tasks and standards, levels, and types of joint training exercises to 

be conducted. DOD stated that current efforts, when completed, will 

adequately address this recommendation without further direction from 

the Secretary of Defense. DOD also noted its view that we seemed to blur 

the distinction between what it characterized as two separate actions—

Joint Forces Command’s efforts to develop a joint training strategy for 

urban operations and DOD’s efforts to develop criteria for evaluating 

service plans to construct training facilities. We note that efforts to develop 

the joint strategy have been underway for some time and continue to 

believe that the lack of consensus within DOD regarding the draft strategy 

may delay the completion of this effort without further emphasis and 

monitoring from the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, we believe that 

the strategy and evaluation criteria should not be viewed as separate 

actions, but rather must be clearly linked. As discussed in our report, until 

Joint Forces Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban 

operations training and related requirements, neither the Secretary of 

Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service 

facility and training plans, and related funding requests. 

DOD did not concur with our second recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness to establish a mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations 

training at major training centers to facilitate increased multiservice 

participation in urban operations training. In its response, DOD stated that 

it remains strongly committed to a decentralized training ranges and 
Page 26 GAO-06-193 Military Training

facilities management solution in supporting the services’ Title 10 

responsibilities. DOD also noted the Office of the Secretary of Defense is 

providing planning support, oversight, and policy guidance to ensure all its 

training resources support service, cross-service, and joint needs and goals. 

DOD further stated that it is committed to maximizing system integration, 

sharing of data, and facilitation of the services' scheduling processes to 

better leverage all assets for the full benefit of military readiness. However, 

we note that, to date, DOD has not given sufficient leadership attention to 

ensuring necessary coordinated action among the services to accomplish 

these goals. We believe the lack of progress is more an issue of leadership 

to ensure coordinated action among the key stakeholders than an issue of 

usurping the services’ Title 10 responsibilities. Our report shows that the 

lack of a formal mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations training 

at major training centers is one of the key factors accounting for the limited 

number of joint urban operations training opportunities. Our 

recommendation is intended to facilitate increased multiservice 

participation in urban operations training events. Without focused 

leadership efforts on the part of DOD to ensure coordinated action among 

the services to establish a mechanism to schedule joint training, we believe 

that DOD will perpetuate the current situation in which few exercises are 

joint according to its definition. Therefore, we continue to believe our 

recommendation has merit.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided 

technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, 

Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), and the 

Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-9619. Contact points for our Offices of 
Page 27 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Sharon L. Pickup, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 28 GAO-06-193 Military Training

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives
Page 29 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To determine DOD’s overall approach to training for urban operations, we 

reviewed relevant DOD plans, policies, and guidance, and other 

documentation related to urban operations training. We discussed urban 

operations training with a variety of officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, service headquarters, Joint Forces Command, 

operational units of the Army and Marine Corps, training organizations, and 

other related organizations. Specifically, we did the following:

• To determine the extent to which DOD has made progress in 

establishing a strategy for joint urban operations training, we discussed 

with officials at Joint Forces Command and the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense the process and associated timelines for strategy 

development and approval. We attended meetings of the joint urban 

operations training working group and reviewed the draft strategy as it 

evolved to monitor progress towards strategy development and gaining 

buy-in from the services and combatant commanders. Further, we 

analyzed DOD’s draft strategy and assessed to what extent it included 

defined joint urban operations training requirements and identified who 

needed to accomplish the requirements. Lastly, we reviewed legislation 

pertaining to this issue and determined whether DOD’s draft strategy 

would address the congressional directive that DOD establish joint 

urban operations facility requirements and a training requirements 

baseline by November 1, 2005. 

• To determine the extent to which current exercises provide 

opportunities for joint urban operations training, we analyzed joint and 

service urban operations training doctrine and policy to determine how 

joint urban operations training exercises are defined, and the level of 

joint training that is required by those documents. We interviewed 

officials from Joint Forces Command and Office of the Secretary of 

Defense to determine the number of joint urban operations training 

exercises that have occurred this year. In addition, we interviewed 

troops who had returned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to 

determine how much joint urban training they receiving before 

deploying and how they felt the training prepared them for conducting 

urban operations they took part in. Lastly, we interviewed service 

trainers and observed some exercises to determine the level of joint 

urban operations training incorporated into current training events. 

• To determine the extent to which DOD has incorporated lessons learned 

into its urban operations training to reflect current operational 

conditions, we observed Army and Marine Corps urban operations 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 30 GAO-06-193 Military Training

training, reviewed changes made to course curriculum to incorporate 

real-time scenarios troops could expect to encounter in theater, 

discussed with officials from the Army and Marine Corps lessons 

learned offices and training centers the means of collecting and 

disseminating lessons learned, and obtained documentation on changes 

made to training curriculum and facilities based on these lessons. 

Further, we reviewed lessons learned publications and databases to 

assess the type and amount of information dealing with urban 

operations that are readily available to troops. Lastly, we interviewed 

troops who had returned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, many 

of whom were readying for a second deployment, to assess how lessons 

learned were shared in theater and the extent to which training had 

been updated since their first deployment.

Table 2: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment

Organizations Locations

Army Headquarters, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA

Headquarters, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA

Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS

Combat Training Center Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, KS

Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX

101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY

10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY

Joint Multinational Command Training Center, Grafenwoehr, 

Germany

Joint Multinational Readiness Group, Hohenfels, Germany

Marine Corps Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education 

Command, Quantico, VA

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Quantico, VA

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Quantico, VA

March Air Reserve Base, CAa

Marine Corps Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, CA

2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC

Air Force Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Source: GAO.

a

As of September 2005, Marine Corps training at March Air Reserve Base was moved to Twenty-Nine 

Palms.

Joint Organizations The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Programs and Readiness

Joint Training and Ranges Office, Washington, D.C.

Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, VA

• Joint Urban Operations Office

• Joint Warfighting Center, Capabilities Group

• Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned

(Continued From Previous Page)

Organizations Locations
Page 32 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Appendix II

Major Ongoing and Planned Urban Operations 

Training Facility Enhancements ApendxiI

Source: U.S. Army.

a

The Army plans to have these structures at every Brigade Combat Team home station, at the Combat 

Training Centers, and at installations identified as Power Projection Platforms and Power Support 

Platforms as prioritized by the Army Campaign Plan and the Army Training and Doctrine Command. 

ARMY

Enhancement Description

Shoot housea The shoot house is a single story, multiroom building with multiple points of entry 

designed for individual, squad, and platoon live-fire training.

Urban assault coursea The urban assault course is a five-station training facility that is designed to train 

individuals, squads, and platoons. It includes a two-story offense/defense building, 

grenadier gunnery, an underground trainer, and two individual-through-platoon 

task/technique training ranges.

Breach facilitya The breach facility includes wall, door, and window breach locations and provides training 

for individuals, teams, and squads in breaching techniques and procedures.

Combined arms collective training facilitya A complex of 20 - 26 buildings that provides combined arms collective training for platoon 

and company situational exercises and battalion task force field training exercises.

Instrumentation Shoot houses and urban assault courses have limited video capture and targetry control 

capability for enhanced safety monitoring and rapid training feedback (after action 

reviews). Combined arms collective training facilities have limited exterior and interior 

video, targetry control, and a more comprehensive after action review capability.

Additional buildings Installations plan to add structures (shanty towns) and debris (salvage cars) to the 

combined arms collective training facility for increased realism. These are added at little 

or no additional cost and require no sustainment. There is no dedicated funding for 

additional buildings at this time.
Appendix II

Major Ongoing and Planned Urban 

Operations Training Facility Enhancements

Page 33 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Source: U.S. Marine Corps.

Marine Corps

Enhancement Description

Shoot houses The Marine Corps is installing shoot houses to provide Marines with training on tactics, 

techniques, and procedures involved with urban shooting. The shoot houses will be 

installed at Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Quantico Marine Corps bases. 

Convoy operations range The live-fire convoy operations range is designed to simulate and provide live-fire convoy 

and counter-ambush training. The Marine Corps has installed a live-fire convoy range at 

Twenty-Nine Palms and Camp Lejeune Marine Corps bases. 

Non-live-fire urban operations training 

facilities

The non-live-fire urban operations training facilities are designed to support maneuver 

training, basic urban skills training, and security and stability training for battalion-sized 

units and below. The Marine Corps plans to install live-fire urban operations training 

facilities at Twenty-Nine Palms and Camp Lejeune Marine Corps bases.

Live-fire urban operations training facility The live-fire urban operations training facility is designed to provide live-fire and 

maneuver training for company-sized units and below. The Marine Corps plans to install 

a live-fire urban operations training facility, consisting of 15 - 30 buildings, at Camp 

Lejeune Marine Corps base. 

Instrumentation Adding capability at training sites to capture and record training events and to use the 

data for after action reviews, enabling the review of training events and the capture of 

lessons learned. 

Additional buildings Increasing the number of buildings at training sites to more realistically replicate the 

urban environment where density of buildings complicates military maneuver. 
Page 34 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 35 GAO-06-193 Military Training
Page 36 GAO-06-193 Military Training

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

Contact Sharon Pickup (202) 512-9619

Acknowledgments In addition to the person named above, Laura Durland, Assistant Director, 

John Beauchamp, Jonathan Clark, Gina Ruidera, Susan Tindall, Cheryl A. 

Weissman, and Tracy Whitaker made key contributions to this report. 
Page 37 GAO-06-193 Military Training

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