1

Filed 11/15/13 P. v. Contreras CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SANDRA LILLIANA CONTRERAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

E058581

(Super.Ct.No. INF1102281)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Richard A. Erwood, 

Judge. The appeal is dismissed.1

Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood and Meagan J. 

Beale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 

1

 Defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate on this issue (case No. E059200), 

which we ordered considered with this appeal. We will resolve that petition by separate 

order.
2

In this classic case of “buyer’s remorse,” defendant and appellant Sandra Lilliana 

Contreras seeks reversal of her conviction by way of guilty plea to three counts of 

assault with a deadly weapon and one count of leaving the scene of a vehicle accident. 

(Pen. Code, § 245, subd (a)(1); Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a).) 

We find that defendant’s appeal is not cognizable, because the trial court correctly 

refused to issue a certificate of probable cause. 

I

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Because the facts of the case are not in issue, we will be brief. The incident 

occurred at a nightclub parking lot.2 The victims were intending to enter their vehicles 

when another vehicle parked in the lot began to reverse in their immediate vicinity. After 

one of the victims was nearly hit and rapped defendant’s car in remonstration, defendant 

first began to drive away but then reversed towards the victims’ group. After an 

exchange of words, defendant apparently then maneuvered her vehicle back and forth, 

striking three victims, one of them twice. Victim M.F. suffered severe and permanent 

injuries to one of her legs, which was pinned between two vehicles when she was struck.

The preliminary hearing was held on March 6, 2012. After several continuances, 

trial was set for February 5, 2013.

On that date, however, defendant entered an “open plea” of guilty to all four 

counts, and admitted great bodily injury enhancements with respect to count 1 under 

 

2 The facts are taken from the evidence received at the preliminary hearing.
3

Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and permanent serious injury enhancements 

with respect to count 4 under Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b)(2). At 

sentencing, the court imposed the upper term of four years for the injury count (count 1), 

plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancements; the terms for the other three 

counts (counts 2-4) were imposed to run consecutively, for a total of 10 years.

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and requested a certificate of probable 

cause. The notice of appeal stated as grounds that “[defendant] states that she did not 

understand what she was agreeing to when she pled guilty. [Defendant] states that her 

attorney did not properly explain the plea to her.” The trial court denied the request.

II

THE PLEA FORM

In her opening brief, defendant argues that her plea was invalid because the trial 

court, in accepting the plea, did not expressly ask defendant whether she understood the 

contents of the plea form and the “[n]ature of the [c]onstitutional [w]aivers [s]et [f]orth in 

the [p]lea [f]orm [t]hat [s]he [h]ad [e]xecuted.” She does not deny that she signed a 

standard “change of plea” form, which properly advised her of the relevant constitutional 

rights, or that she placed her initials beside each listed right. She also initialed the line 

confirming that she had had “adequate time to discuss with my attorney (1) my 
4

constitutional rights, (2) the consequences of any guilty plea, and (3) any defenses I may 

have to the charges against me.”

3

In accepting the plea, the court first confirmed that defendant had signed and 

initialed the form before it. It then took defendant’s plea, and ensured that she 

understood that the great bodily injury enhancement made her ineligible for probation, 

that the three charges under Penal Code section 245 were “strikes,” and that her driver’s 

license would be permanently revoked.

III

THE APPEAL AND WRIT PETITION

Defendant simultaneously filed her opening brief and a petition for writ of 

mandate. The latter sought to have this court compel the superior court to issue a 

certificate of probable cause. Because the appeal seeks to challenge the validity of the 

plea, she recognized (and does not here contest) that the certificate is a prerequisite to her 

appeal. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75-76.) If the 

trial court has abused its discretion in denying the request for a certificate of probable

cause, a writ petition seeking to have the appellate court compel issuance of the 

certificate is the proper remedy. (People v. Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668, 676.) 

 

3 She also waived her right to appeal. The People do not rely on this waiver to 

challenge the purported appeal.
5

IV

DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A CERTIFICATE OF

PROBABLE CAUSE

The purpose of Penal Code section 1237.5’s requirement is to weed out meritless 

appeals by providing a mechanism through which the trial court can determine, in a 

“gatekeeper” function, whether the proposed appeal raises any nonfrivolous cognizable 

issue going to the legality of the proceedings. (See People v. Brown (2010) 181 

Cal.App.4th 356, 359.) The trial court must issue the certificate if the notice of appeal 

states such an issue, and once the certificate has been issued, the defendant may raise any

issues on appeal. (People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.4th 668 at p. 676.)

So let us examine the notice of appeal. It stated that “she did not understand what 

she was agreeing to” and that her attorney “did not properly explain the plea to her.” 

This stated no cognizable grounds for appeal because any such claim would necessarily 

involve evidence outside the record.

4

 Therefore, defendant would have been required to 

try and raise these issues through a procedural vehicle such as a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267; People v. 

Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 145, 153.) Thus, the trial court certainly did not abuse its 

discretion in determining that the notice of appeal stated no nonfrivolous grounds for 

appeal.

 

4 Counsel on appeal apparently recognizes this because, as we discuss below, the 

claim defendant wishes to raise on appeal is not based upon either her subjective 

understanding or the specifics of any advice, or lack of advice, by trial counsel. Rather, it 

is based upon what defendant characterizes as omissions clear from the appellate record.
6

Hence, we will summarily deny the petition for writ of mandate and the appeal 

must be dismissed.

However, out of an excess of caution, we will also very briefly explain why 

defendant’s appeal would have been unsuccessful on the merits. 

Defendant argues that her plea is facially invalid because the trial court did not 

orally confirm with her that she “understood” the contents of the change of plea form 

and the constitutional rights she waived therein. But it is well established that the trial 

court, in taking a plea of guilty, may rely on the defendant’s execution of a properly 

worded plea form to support the conclusion that the defendant has been informed of and 

agreed to waive his or her Boykin-Tahl rights.5 (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 285 

[disapproved on other grounds in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, at 

pp. 1174-1175].) Knowledge of these rights is a simple way to determine whether the 

defendant’s plea is voluntary and intelligent. (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132,

at pp. 1174-1178.) 

Defendant relies on language in Ibarra, which states that the “judge need only 

determine whether defendant had read and understood the contents of the form, and had 

discussed them with his attorney. If the questioning of defendant and his attorney leads 

the judge to believe that the defendant does not fully comprehend his rights . . . the judge 

 

5 Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must ensure that the defendant has 

been advised of three crucial constitutional rights—the privilege against selfincrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses. (Boykin v. 

Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132.)
7

must conduct further canvassing of the defendant to ensure a knowing and intelligent 

waiver of rights.” (In re Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d 277 at p. 286.) 

We do not read this as imposing a talismanic duty on the trial court to ask the 

defendant “Do you understand your rights?” or, still less to go through each right 

individually and grill the defendant as to his or her comprehension of the right. In this 

case the “felony plea form” not only lists the rights being waived, but explains them in 

simple terms. For example, the Fifth Amendment right is explained as meaning that “I 

cannot be forced to testify against myself, but I also have the right to testify in my own 

defense if I choose to do so.” The form also included counsel’s affirmation that he was 

satisfied that defendant understood her rights and that she was waiving them. At the 

change of plea hearing, defendant confirmed that she was entering the plea freely and 

voluntarily.

Under these circumstances we do not believe the trial court had any obligation to 

go further and quiz defendant concerning the level and extent of her “understanding” of 

her crucial rights before the plea could be considered intelligent and voluntary in the 

constitutional sense. Cases in which incomplete advisals were given, or in which the 

defendant never executed a change of plea form, are not applicable. (E.g., People v. 

Christian (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 688.)6

 

6

In Christian, the trial court turned the job of advisals over to the prosecutor, who 

obtained a waiver of the right to jury trial, but forgot about self-incrimination and 

confrontation of witnesses. (People v. Christian, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th 688 at pp. 692-

693.)
8

Hence, even if the notice of appeal had stated legally tenable grounds for an 

appeal, the appeal would not succeed.

V

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

HOLLENHORST

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

KING

J.