Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

September 2005 ELECTIONS

Views of Selected 

Local Election 

Officials on Managing 

Voter Registration and 

Ensuring Eligible 

Citizens Can Vote 

GAO-05-997 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-997.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William Jenkins 

at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-997, a report to 

congressional requesters 

September 2005

ELECTIONS

Views of Selected Local Election Officials 

on Managing Voter Registration and 

Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote 

GAO’s past work and the work of 

others has shown that challenges 

processing voter registration 

applications and maintaining voter 

registration lists can result in 

individuals arriving at polls on 

Election Day to find they were not 

listed as registered. GAO surveyed 

local election officials in 14 

jurisdictions in 7 states (AZ, CA, 

MI, NY, TX, VA, and WI) to obtain 

their views on managing voter 

registration for the 2004 election. 

GAO selected the 7 states 

considering characteristics relevant

to voter registration, such as 

whether a statewide voter 

registration list existed prior to the 

enactment of the Help America 

Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002. Locations 

were selected within each state to 

represent one small and one large 

election jurisdiction. 

This report discusses election 

officials’ characterization of (1) 

challenges receiving voter 

registration applications, including 

checking them for completeness; 

(2) removing voters’ names from 

voter registration lists and ensuring 

that names were not inadvertently 

removed; and (3) implementing 

HAVA’s provisional voting and 

identification requirements. HAVA, 

in part, requires that states offer 

provisional ballots to voters not 

listed as registered who declare 

eligibility and first-time voters who 

registered by mail after January 1, 

2003, and could not provide 

identification. GAO offered election

officials the opportunity to verify 

the accuracy of their responses 

used to prepare this report. 

Local election officials representing all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions GAO 

surveyed after the November 2004 election reported facing some challenges 

processing voter registration applications and took steps to address them. 

Processing applications received from voter registration drives sponsored by 

non-governmental organizations posed a challenge to election officials in 12 

of the 14 jurisdictions, while half of the officials reported challenges 

receiving applications from other external sources, such as motor vehicle 

agencies. Challenges occurred in processing these applications for reasons 

such as incomplete or inaccurate information on voter registration 

applications. Half of the officials reported that their offices faced challenges 

checking applications for completeness, accuracy, or duplicates, citing, 

among other things, insufficient staffing to check the applications. Steps 

taken by election officials to address these and other challenges included 

hiring additional staff to handle the volume of applications received and 

contacting applicants to get correct information. 

All but 1 of the 14 election officials reported that, using various sources of 

information, they removed names from voter registration lists during 2004 if, 

for example, voters had moved, were deceased, or were ineligible due to a 

felony conviction. To help ensure names of eligible voters were not 

inadvertently removed from voter registration lists, officials reported 

contacting voters to confirm removal, matched voters’ identifying 

information (such as name and address) with address changes provided by 

the U.S. Postal Service, and matched voter registration records with felony 

or death records. GAO reported in June 2005 about problems officials in 

these same jurisdictions experienced verifying voter information with death 

or felony information from existing data sources. 

GAO’s survey showed that all 14 election jurisdictions permitted citizens to 

cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. HAVA gives 

states discretion to implement provisional voting based on state voter 

eligibility requirements. According to the election officials surveyed, about 

423,000 provisional ballots were cast in 13 of the 14 jurisdictions, and 70 

percent of those votes were counted. Also, 8 of the 14 jurisdictions reported 

challenges implementing provisional voting, in part, because some poll 

workers were not familiar with provisional voting or staff did not have 

sufficient time to process provisional ballots. To address these challenges, 

election officials in these jurisdictions said they hired extra staff or provided 

training to poll workers. 

 
Page i GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 6 

Background 9 

Selected Jurisdictions Reported Challenges Processing Voter 

Registration Applications and Various Steps They Took to 

Address Them 16 

Jurisdictions Reported They Removed Voter Names from 

Registration Lists for Various Reasons, but Took Steps to Ensure 

That Eligible Voters’ Names Were Not Inadvertently Removed 26 

All Jurisdictions Reported Enabling Provisional Votes to Be Cast 

but Not All Provisional Ballots Met States’ Criteria for Whether 

These Votes Should Count 32 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 39 

Appendix II Survey of Local Election Officials 45 

Appendix III Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election 

Offices Receiving Voter Registration Applications 66

Appendix IV Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election 

Offices Checking Voter Registration Applications 71 

Appendix V Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election 

Offices Entering Information into Voter Registration 

Lists 74 

Appendix VI Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election 

Offices Removing Names from Voter Registration 

Lists 77 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Appendix VII Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election 

Offices Implementing Provisional Voting 84 

Appendix VIII Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle 

Agency Offices with Voter Registration Applications 98 

Experiences of Selected State MVA Offices 99 

Experiences of Selected Local MVA Offices 103 

Appendix IX Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials 108 

Appendix X GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 114 

Tables 

Table 1: Election Officials’ Responses to Questions about Reasons 

Why Voters’ Names Were Removed from Voter 

Registration Lists in 14 Jurisdictions during 2004 28 

Table 2: Number and Percentage of Provisional Ballots Election 

Officials Reported Cast and Counted in the November 2004 

Election in 14 Jurisdictions 33 

Table 3: Number of Provisional Ballots Cast as a Percentage of 

Total Ballots Cast for President in the November 2004 

Election in 14 Jurisdictions 35 

Table 4: State Selection Factors 40 

Figures 

Figure 1: Examples of Opportunities Citizens Have to Apply to 

Register to Vote 13 

Figure 2: Sample of Michigan’s Voter Registration Application 14 

Figure 3: Sample of Texas’ Voter Registration Application 15 

Figure 4: Extent of Challenges Reported by 14 Election 

Jurisdictions Receiving Applications from Organizations 

External to Election Offices: MVAs, Other NVRA 

Agencies, and Voter Registration Drives Sponsored by 

Non-Governmental Organizations 17 
Page iii GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Figure 5: Extent of Challenges Election Officials Reported 

Experiencing When Checking Applications for 

Completeness, Accuracy, or Duplicates 19 

Figure 6: Extent of Challenges Reported by Election Officials 

Entering Voter Information into Voter Registration Lists 

and Scanning Signatures of New Voters into Voter 

Registration Systems 21 

Figure 7: Reasons That Provisional Ballots Were Not Counted for 

the November 2004 Election in Selected Jurisdictions 36 

Figure 8: MVA Officials’ Characterization of How Difficult or Easy 

It Was for MVA Staff to Assist Clients with Completing 

Voter Registration Applications, Accept Applications from 

Clients, and Forward Applications to Election Offices 99 

Abbreviations 

FEC Federal Election Commission 

HAVA Help America Vote Act of 2002 

MVA motor vehicle agency 

NVRA National Voter Registration Act of 1993 

USPS U.S. Postal Service 

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Page 1 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

September 27, 2005 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Government Affairs and Homeland Security 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on the Judiciary 

House of Representatives 

After the November 2000 election, reports in the media and elsewhere 

have questioned the mechanics and effectiveness of voter registration and 

voter registration list maintenance by highlighting accounts of individuals 

who thought they were registered being turned away from polling places 

on Election Day. In managing the voter registration process and 

maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election officials must 

balance two goals—(1) minimizing the burden on eligible people of 

registering to vote and (2) ensuring that voter lists are accurate (limited to 

those eligible to vote), which includes ensuring that appropriately 

registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the voter registration 

lists. All the while, state and local election officials must try to ensure that 

eligible citizens have the opportunity to cast their votes and have them 

counted accurately in federal, state, and local elections. 

Over the last several years, federal legislation has been enacted to expand 

the opportunities for citizens to become registered to vote, improve the 

accuracy of voter registration lists, and ensure that eligible voters have the 

opportunity to cast their ballots. In 1993, the National Voter Registration 

Act (NVRA), commonly called the Motor Voter Act, was enacted.1

 Among 

other things, NVRA expanded the opportunity of citizens to register to 

 1

Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993). 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

vote in federal elections at state motor vehicle agencies and other public 

organizations, such as public assistance agencies and armed forces 

recruiting centers. NVRA also limited the circumstances under which 

states could remove the names of eligible voters from registration lists for 

federal elections and required states to take certain steps to accurately 

maintain such voter registration lists by removing the names of certain 

types of ineligible persons. In 2002, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) 

was enacted and, among other things, it requires states to implement 

provisional voting for elections for federal office. HAVA, in general, 

requires that individuals not listed as registered or whose eligibility is 

questioned by an election official must be notified about and permitted to 

cast a provisional ballot that is set aside for review by election officials at 

a later time so that they can determine whether the person is eligible to 

vote under state law.2

 HAVA also requires that provisional ballots be 

provided to first-time voters who had registered to vote by mail on or after 

January 1, 2003, but were unable to show photo identification or another 

qualifying identification document when voting in person or by mail in a 

federal election.3

 In addition, HAVA requires that election officials must 

provide access to information that permits voters to learn if their 

provisional ballot was counted, and, if not, why not. 

Our work, which began in January 2004, focuses on the efforts of local 

election officials in 14 jurisdictions within 7 states to manage the 

registration process, maintain accurate voter registration lists, and ensure 

that eligible citizens in those jurisdictions had the opportunity to cast 

ballots during the 2004 election. Specifically, for the 2004 election, we are 

reporting on election officials’ characterization of their experiences with 

regard to (1) managing the voter registration process and any challenges 

related to receiving voter registration applications; checking them for 

completeness, accuracy, and duplication; and entering information into 

voter registration lists; (2) removing voters’ names from voter registration 

lists and ensuring that the names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

 2

Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002). With respect to provisional voting, under HAVA, 

states that had either (1) no voter registration requirements for voters with respect of 

federal elections (North Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election Day with 

respect to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) 

in effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not subject to HAVA’s provisional voting 

requirements. 

3

Under HAVA, such individuals who desire to vote in person may cast a provisional ballot, 

whereas an individual desiring to vote by mail may cast a ballot that is to be treated as a 

provisional ballot. 
Page 3 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

removed; and (3) implementing HAVA provisional voting and identification 

requirements and addressing any challenges encountered related to these 

requirements. We are also providing information on motor vehicle agency 

(MVA)4

 officials’ characterization of their experiences assisting citizens 

who apply to register to vote at MVA offices and forwarding voter 

registration applications to election offices. This information is contained 

in appendix VIII. 

In addition to this report, we have also issued, or plan to issue this year, 

reports on other specific election issues. In June 2005, we issued a report 

on the efforts of state and local election officials in seven states—the same 

seven states and local jurisdictions covered in this report—to ensure that 

voter registration lists are accurate.5

 Later this year we plan to issue 

reports on (1) actions by nine states without HAVA waivers6

 to create and 

maintain computerized, statewide voter registration lists as of January 1, 

2004; (2) significant security and reliability concerns that have been 

identified for electronic voting systems; and (3) the Department of 

Defense’s implementation of the Federal Voting Assistance Program to 

facilitate absentee voting by military personnel during the November 2004 

election. These reports respond to congressional requests made prior to 

the November 2004 election. In addition, given concerns about the 

November 2004 election process, we are undertaking a broader, more 

comprehensive study of election administration and processes related to 

the November 2004 general election. This more comprehensive study, 

which we plan to issue in 2006, will address activities and challenges—

people, processes, and technology—associated with each major stage of 

election administration to include registration, absentee and early voting; 

Election Day preparation and activities; and vote counting and 

 4

States may refer to their motor vehicle agencies by different names. For purposes of this 

report, we will generally refer to them as “motor vehicle agencies.” 

5

GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Election Officials Maintain 

Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005). 

6

With respect to HAVA’s statewide voter registration list requirements, while HAVA 

established a deadline of January 1, 2004, for states to have a statewide voter registration 

list and verification procedures, it also provided that states could request a waiver to 

extend the deadline to January 1, 2006. Eight states did not request a waiver, 42 states and 

the District of Columbia did request and received waivers, and 1 state (North Dakota) is 

not subject to HAVA’s statewide voter registration list requirements. North Dakota is 

exempt from these requirements because it qualifies for a HAVA exemption applicable to 

any “State in which, under a State law in effect continuously on and after the date of 

enactment...there is no voter registration requirement for individuals in the State with 

respect to elections for Federal office.” Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1709 (2002). 
Page 4 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

certification. In October 2001, we issued a similar report that focused on 

how elections were conducted in the United States, and the people, 

processes and technology that were generally associated with the 

preparation for and administration of elections. Among other things, the 

report discussed the activities and challenges associated with each stage 

of election administration, including voter registration.7

To address our objectives for this report, we analyzed information 

collected from elections and motor vehicle agency offices in seven 

states—Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and 

Wisconsin.8

 Our selection of the seven states is geographically diverse, and 

took into consideration a range of voter registration-related factors and 

unique characteristics of the states that might affect the implementation of 

HAVA. Specifically, we selected states that took various approaches for 

administering elections—for example, Wisconsin has same-day 

registration, which exempts the state from the HAVA provisional voting 

requirement; Arizona has on-line registration; Michigan has a reputation as 

a model for registration practices; and some local jurisdictions administer 

elections at the county level and others at the city or township level. 

Within each of the seven states, using population data from the 2000 U.S. 

Census, we then selected two jurisdictions: a local jurisdiction with a large 

population and a local jurisdiction with a small population.9

 Other criteria 

we applied to select these jurisdictions included the proximity of the 

locations to our site visits with state election and motor vehicle officials, 

suggestions by state election officials, and proximity to a local motor 

vehicle office. The 14 jurisdictions we selected were Gila and Maricopa 

Counties, Arizona; Los Angeles and Yolo Counties, California; City of 

Detroit and Delta Township, Michigan; New York City and Rensselaer 

County, New York; Bexar and Webb Counties, Texas; Albemarle and 

Arlington Counties, Virginia; and the cities of Franklin and Madison, 

 7

GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 

8

We selected these states using a nonprobability sample—a sample in which some items in 

the population have no chance, or an unknown chance, of being selected. Results from 

nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population. Thus, the 

information we obtained cannot be generalized to state and local election jurisdictions or 

MVA offices either nationwide or at the state level. 

9

We defined a local jurisdiction with a large population as one having 150,000 or more 

people of voting age and a local jurisdiction with a small population as one having less than 

150,000 people of voting age. The population figures are based on the 2000 U.S. Census. 
Page 5 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Wisconsin. The selected states and jurisdictions are the same states and 

jurisdictions we discussed in our June 2005 report. 

We gathered information from state and local officials using a multipronged approach. First, we reviewed relevant laws, state reports, and 

documents related to the voter registration process in the seven states. 

Second, we interviewed state and local election officials in the seven 

states and 14 jurisdictions to obtain information on their registration 

processes and implementation of the HAVA requirements for provisional 

voting and voter identification. Third, we sent a survey to election officials 

in the 14 jurisdictions to gather information about their experiences with 

the November 2004 election. We developed our survey questions on the 

basis of our review of laws, reports, and documents and our interviews 

with state and local election officials in the seven states and 14 

jurisdictions. Our survey primarily asked questions on (1) challenges, if 

any, in processing voter registration applications—specifically, challenges 

receiving voter registration applications from MVAs, other NVRA agencies, 

and voter registration drives sponsored by non-governmental 

organizations; checking voter registration applications for completeness, 

accuracy, and duplicates; and entering voter information into registration 

lists or systems; (2) whether names of registrants were removed from 

voter registration lists, reasons why names were removed, and steps taken 

to ensure that names of eligible registrants were not inadvertently 

removed; and (3) HAVA’s provisional voting and first-time voter 

identification requirements—specifically, the number of provisional 

ballots cast and counted, including reasons why jurisdictions did not count 

provisional ballots if this did occur; how voters were informed about 

provisional voting and its outcome; and whether first-time voters who 

registered by mail were allowed to cast provisional ballots if they did not 

provide required identification. Appendix II provides a copy of the survey 

we sent to each jurisdiction. 

Finally, to provide information on MVA officials’ characterization of their 

experiences with voter registration applications received before the 

November 2004 election, we sent a survey to state and local MVA officials 
Page 6 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

in six of the seven states and 12 of the 14 jurisdictions.10 The survey 

primarily asked questions about the MVA offices’ experiences with 

(1) assisting citizens with completing voter registration applications, 

(2) forwarding the applications to election offices, and (3) responding to 

individuals and state or local election officials who contacted their offices 

about individuals who declared they had applied to register to vote at MVA 

offices but their names were not on voter registration lists when they went 

to vote in the November 2004 election. Appendix IX provides a copy of the 

survey we sent to the MVA officials. 

We did not independently verify the accuracy or completeness of 

responses provided from our surveys of election officials and MVA 

officials. However, local election officials and state and local MVA officials 

we surveyed were provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their 

responses for this report and, on the basis of the comments we received, 

we made technical changes, where appropriate. The results of our work 

cannot be generalized to state and local election jurisdictions and MVA 

offices at the state level or nationwide. 

We conducted our work from January 2004 through September 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I discusses our scope and methodology in greater detail. 

Election officials representing all but one of the jurisdictions we surveyed 

following the November 2004 election said they faced some challenges 

managing the voter registration process, including (1) receiving voter 

registration applications; (2) checking them for completeness, accuracy, 

and duplication; and (3) entering information into voter registration lists; 

when challenges occurred, election officials reported they took various 

steps to address them. For example, when asked whether their staff faced 

challenges receiving voter registration applications from MVAs, other 

NVRA agencies, or voter registration drives sponsored by nongovernmental organizations, election officials representing 12 of the 14 

jurisdictions responded that staff faced challenges receiving voter 

 10We did not survey MVA officials in Wisconsin regarding voter registration under NVRA; 

MVA offices in Wisconsin do not participate in voter registration because the state is 

exempt from NVRA. Wisconsin's exemption from NVRA, in general, is based upon the fact 

that it did not, and still does not, have voter registration requirements for federal elections 

under state laws that were in effect on the NVRA-specified exemption date of August 1, 

1994. 

Results in Brief 
Page 7 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

registration applications from voter registration drives; 4 faced challenges 

receiving applications from MVAs; and 4 faced challenges receiving 

applications from other NVRA agencies. Officials responded that the 

reasons these challenges occurred included applications that were 

incomplete or inaccurate, and applications that were received too close to, 

or after, their state’s registration deadline. Election officials reported that, 

to address these challenges, their jurisdictions took steps, including 

contacting applicants to resolve issues with incomplete or inaccurate 

applications or hiring staff to handle the volume of applications received 

near registration deadlines. In addition, officials in 7 of the 14 jurisdictions 

reported that their staff faced challenges checking voter registration 

applications for completeness, accuracy, or duplicates. According to these 

officials, these challenges occurred for a variety of reasons, including 

problems contacting individuals to obtain complete and accurate 

information and insufficient staffing to check the applications. They 

reported that, among other things, their staff addressed these challenges 

by sending letters or calling applicants to obtain correct information. 

Finally, 6 of the 14 election officials reported that their staff faced 

challenges entering or scanning voter information into registration lists for 

reasons such as the volume of applications received close to Election Day 

and problems with the scanning equipment. To address these challenges, 

they reported that more staff were hired and staff worked overtime. 

Challenges like those experienced by the election officials we surveyed 

are not new. Over the last few years, we and others have found that 

challenges managing the voter registration process can result in eligible 

citizens not being registered to vote on Election Day. For example, in our 

October 2001 report, we found that about 46 percent of jurisdictions 

nationwide had problems with NVRA registrations during the November 

2000 election. We cited local election officials who told us that problems 

processing late, incomplete, or illegible voter registration applications 

could result in individuals showing up at the polls and discovering they 

were never registered. 

Our survey of election officials representing the 14 jurisdictions showed 

that all but 1 of the jurisdictions reported removing names from 

registration lists during 2004 for various reasons, including that voters 

requested that their names be removed from the voter registration list; 

information from the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) showing that voters had 

moved outside the jurisdiction; felony records received from federal, state, 

or local governments identifying voters as ineligible due to felony 

convictions; and death records received from state or local vital statistics 

offices. NVRA prohibits removing a voter’s name from a registration list 

for a federal election solely for not voting, but permits removal for certain 
Page 8 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

specified reasons, including at the request of the voter, a move outside the 

voting jurisdiction, or due to ineligibility by reason of death or a felony 

conviction as provided by state law. When removing names from 

registration lists, election officials reported that they took various steps to 

ensure that the names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed 

from voter registration lists. These steps included sending letters or 

postcards to registrants to verify that voters wanted their names removed; 

matching voters’ identifying information with USPS data and sending 

voters identified by USPS as having moved outside the jurisdiction notices 

of removal; and matching voter registration records with felony records or 

death records to confirm it was the same person. Our June 2005 report 

showed that these same jurisdictions faced challenges verifying the 

accuracy of registration lists because of problems matching voter 

information with various records maintained by other organizations, such 

as records maintained by state and federal entities on felony convictions 

and deaths.11 The report echoed some of the issues highlighted in our 2001 

report, wherein, on the basis of a national survey of local election officials, 

we reported on challenges that election officials identified with voter 

registration, such as obtaining accurate and timely information to update 

voter registration lists.12

Our survey of officials in the 14 election jurisdictions showed that all of 

the jurisdictions reported that they permitted citizens to cast provisional 

ballots during the November 2004 election. In addition, 12 of the 14 

jurisdictions to which this was applicable reported that they offered 

certain first-time voters who registered by mail the opportunity to cast 

provisional ballots. HAVA, in general, requires that states provide an 

individual the opportunity to cast a provisional ballot if, for example, the 

individual’s name does not appear on the voter registration list. HAVA also 

gives states discretion to determine if an individual is eligible to vote and 

whether the provisional ballot should be counted as a vote in accordance 

with state law. For example, in one state, at least a portion of a provisional 

ballot—e.g., votes for statewide offices—may be counted when an 

individual casting the ballot was eligible to vote but not at the election 

district where the ballot was cast. In another state, a provisional ballot is 

 11GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Election Officials 

Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 

2005). 

12GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the Nation, GAO-02-3

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 
Page 9 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

not counted if the ballot is cast in a precinct other than the individual’s 

assigned precinct. Election officials in 13 of the 14 jurisdictions reported 

that 423,149 provisional ballots were cast, and 70 percent (297,662) were 

counted. Not all provisional votes were counted because, as election 

officials reported, not all provisional ballots met states’ criteria for 

determining which ballots should be counted. Reasons that provisional 

ballots cast during the 2004 election were not counted, as reported by 

election officials, included, among others, that individuals did not meet the 

residency eligibility requirements, had not registered or tried to register to 

vote with the election office, had not submitted the voter registration 

applications at motor vehicle agency offices, or election officials did not 

have time to enter information from applicants into their voter registration 

lists because applications were received at the election offices very close 

to or after the state registration deadline. HAVA requires that states 

establish means of communicating how voters who cast provisional 

ballots can learn—free of charge—whether their votes counted. Local 

election officials in 12 of the 13 jurisdictions13 we surveyed reported that 

they set up mechanisms to inform voters—without cost—about the 

outcome of their provisional votes during the November 2004 election. 

These mechanisms included toll-free telephone numbers, Web sites, and 

letters sent to the voters who cast provisional ballots. Election officials 

also reported that provisional voters in their jurisdictions received written 

information at their polling places about how to find out the outcome of 

their provisional ballots, and provisional voters in 8 of the 13 jurisdictions 

had the opportunity to access information about the outcome of their 

ballots within 10 days after the election. Finally, election officials 

representing 8 of the 14 jurisdictions reported facing challenges 

implementing provisional voting for various reasons, including some poll 

workers not being familiar with provisional voting or, in one jurisdiction 

representing a large number of precincts, staff not having sufficient time to 

process provisional ballots. To address these challenges, the officials 

reported that they provided additional training to poll workers and hired 

additional staff to count provisional ballots. 

The constitutional framework for elections contemplates both state and 

federal roles. States are responsible for the administration of both their 

 13While New York State had not passed legislation to implement provisional voting 

requirements in HAVA by the time of the November 2004 election, New York had a form of 

provisional voting in place referred to as affidavit ballots. The New York City election 

office said that letters were sent to voters whose affidavit ballots did not count. 

Background 
Page 10 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

own elections and federal elections. They also regulate various aspects of 

the elections process, including, for example, ballot access, registration 

procedures, absentee voting requirements, establishment of polling places, 

provision of Election Day workers, and counting and certifying the vote. 

Although the states are responsible for running elections, Congress has 

authority to affect the administration of elections. Congress’ authority to 

regulate elections depends upon the type of election. With regard to 

federal elections, Congress has constitutional authority over both 

congressional and presidential elections. In addition, with respect to 

federal, state, and local elections, a number of constitutional amendments 

authorize Congress to enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory 

acts. 

Under its various constitutional authorities, Congress has passed 

legislation regarding the administration of elections, including voter 

registration, voter registration list maintenance, and provisional voting. In 

1993 Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act of 1993,14 also 

known as the “motor voter” law, to establish registration procedures 

designed, in part, to “increase the number of eligible citizens who register 

to vote in elections for Federal office. . . . protect the integrity of the 

electoral process. . . . [and] ensure that accurate and current voter 

registration lists are maintained.” NVRA expanded the number of locations 

and opportunities for eligible citizens to apply to register to vote.15 Under 

NVRA, an eligible citizen conducting certain transactions at a motor 

vehicle agency—such as applying for, renewing, or changing the address 

on a driver’s license—can simultaneously apply to register to vote in 

elections for federal office or, if applicable, change the voter’s address. 

Also, various agencies, such as those involved in providing public 

assistance, U.S. armed forces recruitment offices, and offices in a state 

providing state-funded services to people with disabilities, must be 

designated as voter registration agencies. Each state may also designate 

other offices as voter registration agencies, such as public libraries, 

schools, offices of city and county governments, and unemployment 

compensation offices. In addition, NVRA requires states to accept and use 

 14Pub. L. No. 103-31, 101 Stat. 77 (1993). 

15States that had either (1) no voter registration requirement for voters with respect to 

federal elections (North Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election Day with 

respect to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) 

in effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not subject to NVRA. 

Federal Laws Affecting 

Voter Registration and 

Provisional Balloting 
Page 11 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

a mail-in registration application developed by the Federal Election 

Commission. 

NVRA also outlined various requirements for the processing of registration 

forms and maintenance of voter registration lists for elections for federal 

office. Under NVRA, agencies designated as voter registration agencies, 

such as motor vehicle agencies, are to transmit completed voter 

registration forms to the appropriate state election officials not later than 

10 days after the date of acceptance or, if accepted within 5 days before 

the end of the registration deadline for an election, the forms are to be 

transmitted not later than 5 days after acceptance. Also, under NVRA, the 

names of people who are registered to vote may not be removed from 

voter registration lists for federal elections except for the following 

reasons: upon written confirmation of a change of address outside the 

election jurisdiction; on the grounds that the voter has changed address to 

a location outside the election jurisdiction on the basis of change of 

address information from USPS, but only if there is also a failure to 

respond to confirmation mailings and a failure to vote in any election 

within two subsequent general federal elections; the request of the voter; 

the death of the voter; a criminal conviction, as provided by state law; and 

mental incapacity, as provided by state law. 

HAVA was enacted in October 2002 and, in addition to establishing 

requirements for provisional ballots for federal elections effective 2004, 

the law requires, in general, that individuals who registered by mail on or 

after January 1, 2003, and have not voted in a federal election beginning in 

2004 in the state since registering to vote to show photo identification or 

another qualifying identification document when voting in person or by 

mail in a federal election. Under HAVA, the other qualifying documents 

that can be provided to show proof of identity and residency are a copy of 

a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, pay check, or 

other government document that shows the voter’s name and address. 

Voter registration is a prerequisite in nearly all voting jurisdictions and is 

based on state designated voter eligibility requirements. Ensuring that 

eligible persons are registered to vote is an ongoing challenge for election 

officials and is complicated by factors such as jurisdiction size, mobility of 

voters, and community diversity. Communities with large student or 

military populations must manage voters constantly moving in or out of a 

jurisdiction, and communities with diverse populations must handle 

substantial numbers of new citizens and face language challenges in 

communicating voter registration requirements. U.S. citizens who meet 

Voter Registration in States 

and Local Jurisdictions 
Page 12 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

state voter eligibility requirements have numerous opportunities to 

register to vote and can do so by filling out and submitting applications by 

certain deadlines. States establish voting eligibility requirements that 

generally include that the voter is at least 18 years of age on the day of the 

election, a citizen of the United States, mentally competent, and meets 

state eligibility qualifications regarding felon status. In general, to register 

to vote, eligible citizens may apply at local election offices or at motor 

vehicle agencies and other agencies, such as public assistance agencies, 

covered by NVRA; by submitting applications to local election officials; or 

through registration drives sponsored by various groups, including 

political parties. Figure 1 illustrates some of the opportunities citizens 

have to apply to register to vote. 
Page 13 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Figure 1: Examples of Opportunities Citizens Have to Apply to Register to Vote 

a

Local election offices receive applications in different ways, such as electronically, through the mail, 

or delivered by hand. 

Information commonly requested on applications to vote can include full 

name, address, citizenship status, and signature; other information 

requested may include date of birth, social security number, gender, race, 

and/or place of birth. Figures 2 and 3 provide sample registration forms 

from two of the jurisdictions we visited. 

Local election office

Local election office

Voter goes to the local 

election office and fills 

out an application

Source: GAO site visits of local election officials.

Voter goes to the MVA 

office and fills out an 

application

Motor Vehicle Agency

Voter goes to an 

NVRA-designated 

agency, such as a public 

assistance agency, and 

fills out application

Voter gives a registration 

application to a voter 

registration drive 

sponsored by a 

non-government group

Voter goes to another 

location, such as a 

library or to the internet, 

and obtains an 

application

NVRA-designated agency Public library

Options to apply to register to vote

Applications are sent to 

the local election officea

Voter registration drives

VOTE
Page 14 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Figure 2: Sample of Michigan’s Voter Registration Application 
Page 15 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Figure 3: Sample of Texas’ Voter Registration Application 

Once an application is received and accepted, state and local jurisdictions 

compile registration applications into lists of registered voters. A citizen’s 

access to voting is based primarily on the appearance of his or her name 

on such a list. For votes cast absentee by mail (absentee voting), for votes 

cast in person prior to Election Day (early voting), and for votes cast at the 

polls on Election Day, election officials typically verify an individual’s 

eligibility using a list of registered voters or a poll book before allowing 

him or her to vote. Election officials also update and delete information 

from voter registration lists. However, NVRA’s provisions specifically 

prohibit removing a name from the voter registration list for a federal 

election solely for failure to vote or for a change of address to another 

location within the same election jurisdiction. 
Page 16 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

In our survey of election officials, all but one of the jurisdictions reported 

that they faced challenges receiving and processing voter registration 

applications and that they took various steps to address them. Most of 

these challenges occurred with applications received from voter 

registration drives sponsored by non-governmental organizations. Election 

officials in half the jurisdictions also reported challenges checking voter 

registration applications for completeness, or for accuracy, or for 

duplicates. And when asked to what extent elections staff experienced 

challenges entering voter information into voter registration lists, 4 of 14 

jurisdictions reported this as being a challenge, to some extent. Election 

officials reported taking steps to address these challenges by hiring extra 

staff, among other things. Over the past few years, our work and the work 

of others have found that challenges processing voter registration 

applications can result in eligible citizens not being registered to vote on 

Election Day. 

Our survey of election officials representing the 14 jurisdictions showed 

that staff in most of these offices reported challenges receiving voter 

registration applications from various organizations external to election 

offices and most of these challenges occurred with applications received 

from voter registration drives sponsored by non-governmental 

organizations. Citizens in the states and jurisdictions covered by our 

survey can register to vote with various organizations external to election 

offices. In all of the jurisdictions—except those in Wisconsin, which is 

exempt from NVRA because it permits voters to register at the polling 

place on Election Day—citizens can apply to register to vote at MVAs and 

other NVRA agencies. Also, as mentioned earlier, citizens can register to 

vote during registration drives sponsored by political parties. Applications 

from these organizations are then sent electronically, or by mail, or are 

hand-delivered to election offices. Figure 4 shows the extent of challenges 

encountered in the 14 jurisdictions as reported by the election officials 

representing those jurisdictions when receiving voter registration 

applications from voter registration drives sponsored by nongovernmental organizations, MVAs, and other NVRA agencies. 

Selected Jurisdictions 

Reported Challenges 

Processing Voter 

Registration 

Applications and 

Various Steps They 

Took to Address 

Them 

Jurisdictions Reported 

Challenges Receiving Voter 

Registration Applications 

from Various 

Organizations External to 

Election Offices 
Page 17 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Figure 4: Extent of Challenges Reported by 14 Election Jurisdictions Receiving Applications from Organizations External to 

Election Offices: MVAs, Other NVRA Agencies, and Voter Registration Drives Sponsored by Non-Governmental Organizations 

a

While Wisconsin is not subject to NVRA, one local jurisdiction responding to our survey—the City of 

Madison—received applications from other municipal agencies, such as public libraries or fire 

stations. 

Election officials representing the 13 jurisdictions that reported 

experiencing challenges to some extent or to a great extent receiving 

applications responded that these challenges occurred for various reasons, 

such as incomplete or inaccurate information on voter registration 

applications or applications that were received close to or after the 

registration deadline. In the states and 14 jurisdictions we selected for our 

Survey questions:

Q1: To what extent did election office staff experience challenges receiving voter registration applications 

 from motor vehicle agency offices?

Q2: To what extent did election office staff experience challenges receiving voter registration applications 

 from other National Voter Registration Act agencies?

Q3: To what extent did election office staff experience challenges receiving voter registration applications 

 from voter registration drives held by non-government organizations?

Jurisdiction

Gila County, AZ

Maricopa County, AZ

Los Angeles County, CA

Yolo County, CA

City of Detroit, MI

Delta Township, MI

New York City, NY

Rensselaer County, NY

Bexar County, TX

Webb County, TX

Albermarle County, VA

Arlington County, VA

City of Franklin, WI

City of Madison, WI

Q1: Motor vehicle agency Q2: NVRA agencies Q3: Voter registration drives

Great extent

Some extent

Little or no extent

Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected jurisdictions.

Not applicable Not applicable

Not applicable

Don't know/no basis to judge

a
Page 18 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

review, deadlines for submitting applications to vote varied by state, as 

specified by state statute. In five of the seven states—Arizona, Michigan, 

New York, Texas, and Virginia—registration applications were to be 

received at the election office about 1 month before the election. In one 

state, California, citizens could register 15 days before the election. In 

Wisconsin, which allows “same-day registration,” eligible citizens with 

required identification can register to vote at the polling place on the day 

of the election. 

Election officials also reported that they took a variety of steps to try to 

address the challenges they encountered, including contacting individual 

voters to resolve issues with incomplete or inaccurate information, adding 

staff to handle the volume of applications received near registration 

deadlines, and offering training to organizations sponsoring voter 

registration drives. (App. III discusses in greater detail responses to our 

survey with regard to receiving applications from external organizations.) 

Election officials representing 7 of the 14 jurisdictions also reported that 

their staff experienced challenges, to some extent or a great extent, 

checking voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, or 

duplicates. During interviews we conducted prior to the November 2004 

election, state and local election officials told us that they take specific 

steps to check voter registration applications before entering voter 

information into voter registration lists. All of the officials told us that they 

check applications for completeness before entering voter information 

into voter registration lists, and with regard to accuracy, took steps to 

verify eligibility when an applicant applies to register. For example, 

officials in Arizona, Texas, Virginia, and New York said that their voter 

registration computer systems are programmed to calculate the age of the 

applicant, on the basis of the date of birth the registrant provides, and 

reject applications of individuals who will be younger than 18 years of age 

on the day of the next election. At the same time, Arizona and Michigan 

match their voter registration applications against state motor vehicle 

agency records to verify information. Also, officials we spoke with in the 

seven states said that they initially verify that an applicant resides in the 

jurisdiction. Finally, to identify duplicate registrations, election officials 

said that they check existing voter lists before adding new voters to the 

registration lists. 

Our survey asked election officials in the 14 jurisdictions the extent to 

which their offices experienced challenges checking voter registration 

applications for completeness, accuracy, or duplicates and officials 

Election Officials in Half of 

the 14 Jurisdictions 

Reported Challenges 

Checking Voter 

Registration Applications 

for Completeness, 

Accuracy, or Duplicates 
Page 19 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

representing 7 of the 14 jurisdictions responded that their staff 

experienced, to some or a great extent, challenges in at least one of these 

three areas. Figure 5 shows how election officials in the 14 jurisdictions 

responded to our survey regarding checking applications for 

completeness, or accuracy, or duplicates. 

Figure 5: Extent of Challenges Election Officials Reported Experiencing When Checking Applications for Completeness, 

Accuracy, or Duplicates 

In those instances where officials responded that checking applications 

for completeness, accuracy, and duplication was a challenge to some or a 

great extent, they also identified what caused the challenges to occur and 

what actions they took to try to address them. According to officials in 7 of 

the 14 jurisdictions, challenges occurred for various reasons—including 

Survey questions:

Q1: To what extent did election office staff experience challenges checking applications for completeness?

Q2: To what extent did election office staff experience challenges checking applications for accuracy?

Q3: To what extent did election office staff experience challenges checking applications for duplicates?

Jurisdiction

Gila County, AZ

Maricopa County, AZ

Los Angeles County, CA

Yolo County, CA

City of Detroit, MI

Delta Township, MI

New York City, NY

Rensselaer County, NY

Bexar County, TX

Webb County, TX

Albermarle County, VA

Arlington County, VA

City of Franklin, WI

City of Madison, WI

Q1: Completeness Q2: Accuracy Q3: Duplicates

Great extent

Some extent

Little or no extent

Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected jurisdictions. 

Don't know/no basis to judge
Page 20 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

difficulties determining what information on the application was 

inaccurate, problems contacting individuals to obtain complete and 

accurate information, insufficient time between receiving the applications 

and the state’s registration deadline, and lack of sufficient resources or 

staff to check the applications. 

Officials from these jurisdictions reported that they tried to address these 

challenges by, among other things, sending letters or calling applicants to 

get the correct information, asking individuals to provide information at 

the polls, and hiring additional staff or having staff work additional hours. 

(App. IV discusses responses to our survey regarding checking voter 

registration applications in greater detail.) 

Our survey also showed that few of the jurisdictions experienced 

challenges entering voter information into voter registration lists and 

scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration system. Once 

election officials receive and address any issues associated with voter 

registration applications, they enter voter registration information into 

voter registration lists. In some jurisdictions with computerized 

registration lists, signatures of new voters are scanned into the voter 

registration system. 

When asked to what extent their staff experienced challenges entering 

voter information into voter registration lists, election officials 

representing 4 of the 14 jurisdictions responded that entering voter 

information into voter registration lists was, to some extent, a challenge 

and the remainder responded little or no challenge. When asked whether 

election office staff experienced challenges scanning signatures of new 

voters into their voter registration system, three of eight officials 

responded that scanning signatures was, to some extent a challenge. The 

remaining six officials responded that this question was not applicable to 

their jurisdictions. Figure 6 shows the election officials’ responses to 

questions about entering voter information into lists, and scanning 

signatures of new voters into registration systems. 

Few of the 14 Jurisdictions 

Reported That They 

Experienced Challenges 

Entering Voter Information 

into Voter Registration 

Lists 
Page 21 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Figure 6: Extent of Challenges Reported by Election Officials Entering Voter Information into Voter Registration Lists and 

Scanning Signatures of New Voters into Voter Registration Systems 

In those instances where entering voter information into the list was, to 

some extent, reported as a challenge, two of the four officials responded 

that the challenge occurred because of the high volume of registration 

applications received close to Election Day—a response consistent with 

these officials’ responses to our questions about receiving applications 

from organizations, like voter registration drives, external to the election 

office. One of these officials responded that this challenge was addressed 

by hiring additional staff or having staff work overtime. In those instances 

where scanning signatures was a challenge to some extent, one official 

responded that the challenge occurred because of the high volume of 

applications, and three officials responded that the challenge occurred 

because of problems with scanning equipment. Officials also responded 

Survey questions:

To what extent did election office staff experience challenges...

Jurisdiction

Gila County, AZ

Maricopa County, AZ

Los Angeles County, CA

Yolo County, CA

City of Detroit, MI

Delta Township, MI

New York City, NY

Rensselaer County, NY

Bexar County, TX

Webb County, TX

Albermarle County, VA

Arlington County, VA

City of Franklin, WI

City of Madison, WI

Q1: Entering voter information into 

 voter registration lists?

Q2: Scanning signatures of new voters 

 into the voter registration system?

Great extent

Some extent

Little or no extent

Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected jurisdictions.

Not applicable

Not applicable

Not applicable

Not applicable

Not applicable

Not applicable
Page 22 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

that they tried to address this challenge by hiring additional staff or, when 

problems with equipment occurred, having the equipment fixed. 

For example, an election official in one county reported that staff faced 

some challenges entering voter information into the registration list and 

scanning new voters’ signatures into the voter registration system because 

the election office (1) needed to hire additional staff to ensure information 

from voter registration applications was in the voter registration list by 

Election Day and (2) had problems with the scanning equipment. To 

address challenges associated with entering and scanning voter 

information, the county official reported that additional staff were hired, 

staff worked additional shifts, and budget requests were submitted to 

upgrade the scanning equipment. This official also reported that their 

office was challenged with having to add registration information for more 

than 400,000 prospective new voters to the voter registration list in the 15-

day period immediately prior to the November 2004 presidential election 

while also having to process more than 800,000 absentee ballot 

applications during this same 15-day period. (App. V discusses responses 

to our survey regarding entering information onto voter registration lists 

and systems in greater detail.) 

Our past work and the work of others has shown that challenges 

processing voter registration applications—including challenges receiving 

timely and accurate applications, checking them for completeness, and 

entering information into voter registration lists or systems—can have an 

effect on whether a citizen is registered to vote. In October 2001, we 

issued a report that described the operations and challenges associated 

with each stage of the election process, including voter registration.16 We 

reported that, on the basis of a telephone survey, an estimated 46 percent 

of jurisdictions nationwide had problems, in general, with NVRA 

registrations during the November 2000 election. Officials most frequently 

noted challenges with processing incomplete or illegible applications, 

applications that arrived late at the local election office, and applications 

that never arrived. We stated that, according to local officials, each of 

these three situations could result in individuals who show up at the polls 

to vote and discover that they were never registered. 

 16GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 

Past Reports Show That 

Challenges Processing 

Voter Registration 

Applications Can Result in 

Individuals Discovering 

That They Were Never 

Registered to Vote 
Page 23 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Other organizations have also reported that challenges processing voter 

registration applications can result in applicants finding that they were 

never registered to vote. In a 2001 report to the Congress, the Federal 

Election Commission (FEC) reported on the results of a survey of election 

officials in the 44 states and the District of Columbia subject to NVRA for 

the period covering 1999 through 2000 on the impact of NVRA on the 

administration of elections for federal office.17 Among other things, FEC’s 

survey showed that some election officials expressed concerns about 

problems identifying multiple registrations by the same individual or 

applicants that provided incomplete names. Also, according to FEC, 

several states reported problems with election officials receiving 

applications from MVA offices in a timely manner. Regarding the latter, 

FEC stated that: 

“Several States reported that motor vehicle offices in some areas failed to 

transmit voter registration applications or changes of address to the 

appropriate election authorities in a timely manner. The result, 

unfortunately, was the effective disenfranchisement of those citizens who 

had duly applied but whose registrations were not processed by election 

day.” 

Two years later, in another report to the Congress, FEC reported similar 

findings and said that some states also noted similar problems with other 

agencies charged with offering voter registration.18 FEC reiterated its 

conclusion about the disenfranchisement of those who had applied but 

whose registrations were not processed by election day and 

recommended, as in the earlier report, that states develop an ongoing 

training program for personnel in agencies covered by NVRA, such as 

MVAs, regarding their duties and responsibilities under NVRA. 

In 2001, the National Commission on Federal Election Reform, which was 

organized by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of 

 17Federal Election Commission, The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act on 

Federal Elections 1999 – 2000. 

18Federal Election Commission, The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act on 

Federal Elections 2001 – 2002. 
Page 24 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Virginia and The Century Foundation,19 expressed concerns through a task 

force on voter registration that delegating voter registration 

responsibilities to agencies and organizations outside of election offices, 

such as organizations that conduct voter registration drives, can result in 

citizens who thought they had registered being turned away from the polls 

on Election Day. 20 The Commission’s final report stated that voters can be 

turned away from the polls because of administrative errors by election 

offices or NVRA agencies that accept voter registration applications and 

noted that, although NVRA does not require it, 

“most states allow practically anyone to go out and register voters by 

taking and transmitting their mail-in applications. These people thus act in 

effect as deputy registrars. Election administrators we have encountered 

in every part of the country tell us of numerous cases where these 

unofficial registrars, often meaning well, mishandle or lose such 

applications. The applicants, of course, rightly believe they have 

registered. Then they show up on Election Day and find out that they are 

not on the list.” 

The task force on voter registration went on to say that “third party 

registrars—political parties, advocacy groups and citizens groups that 

conduct voter registration drives—delay to send applications or fail to 

send them at all, sometimes inadvertently, sometimes deliberately.” 

According to the task force, agencies other than election offices and third 

party registrars take applications that are incomplete or inadmissible, such 

as applications with postal boxes rather than street addresses, and 

applications that are unsigned.21

 19The National Commission on Federal Election Reform was organized by the Miller Center 

and The Century Foundation in early 2001 to formulate concrete proposals for election 

reform to “help ensure a more effective and fair democratic process in elections to come,” 

as stated in the Commission’s report, To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral 

Process, August 2001. 

20The National Commission on Federal Election Reform’s Task Force on the Federal 

Election System, July 2001. This task force report accompanied the report of the National 

Commission on Election Reform. 

21The National Commission on Federal Election Reform, To Assure Pride and Confidence 

in the Electoral Process, August 2001. 
Page 25 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

More recently, in May 2005, the National Task Force on Election Reform, 

sponsored by the non-profit Election Center,22 also known as the National 

Association of Election Officials, issued a report on various issues 

surrounding the 2004 general election, including voter registration. The 

Task Force stated that voter registration groups operated vigorously 

during the 2004 election and were recognized and welcomed by election 

officials. However, the Task Force expressed the concern that “when voter 

registration forms are delivered to registration authorities after the close 

of registration or not at all, usually at no fault of the applicant, voters find 

themselves not registered and not eligible to vote on Election Day.”23 The 

Task Force also pointed out that NVRA agencies, which have voter 

registration as a secondary responsibility, are challenged to provide voter 

registration opportunities to their clients in a consistent manner and, 

although processes for transferring registrations accurately and efficiently 

to voter registration offices have improved, breakdowns can still occur. 

We did not analyze the extent to which registration applications 

transferred from an external organization, like a voter registration drive or 

MVA office, to an election office resulted in voters’ names not appearing 

on registration lists on Election Day. However, as part of our survey of 

MVA officials in six states and 12 jurisdictions, we asked if any state or 

local election offices contacted MVA offices because individuals’ names 

were not on the list of registered voters for the November 2004 election.24

Representatives of 5 of the 18 MVA offices responded that their offices 

were contacted by state or local election officials about individuals whose 

names did not appear on the registration list, but only 2 of the 5 reported 

data on the number of individuals affected. For example, one of 

representatives who reported data on the number of individuals affected 

said that the state election board—which has access to MVA customer 

data—analyzed the MVA records for 1,288 individuals whose names did 

not appear on voter registration rolls, but who said they had registered at 

MVA locations within the state. The representative reported that the board 

of elections found that 295 (23 percent) individuals had in fact applied to 

 22The Election Center is also known as the National Association of Election Officials and is 

composed almost exclusively of officials who serve in voter registration and administration 

of elections. 

23National Task Force on Election Reform, Election 2004: Review and Recommendations 

by the Nation’s Election Administrators, May 2005. 

24Wisconsin and the two jurisdictions in Wisconsin were not included in our survey 

because, as noted in footnote 10, the state is exempt from NVRA. 
Page 26 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

register to vote and their applications were sent to the state board of 

elections office. The representative also reported that, of the remaining 

993 individuals, 591 (46 percent) had indicated that they did not wish to 

apply to register to vote and did not complete applications; 245 (19 

percent) had no record of conducting MVA business or submitting voter 

registration applications at MVA offices; 128 (10 percent) conducted 

Internet, mail, or phone transactions with the MVA but did not request that 

paper voter registration applications be mailed to them; and 29 (2 percent) 

submitted their voter registration applications after the registration 

deadline. (App. VII discusses responses to our survey of MVA officials in 6 

state and 12 local MVA offices in greater detail.) 

Election officials representing all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions we surveyed 

reported that their offices removed voters’ names from voter registration 

lists during 2004 for various reasons, including at the request of the voter 

and upon identification of the voter as ineligible due to a felony 

conviction. However, before removing names, election officials reported 

that their offices took steps to ensure that names of eligible voters were 

not inadvertently removed from lists. Our June 2005 report identified list 

maintenance challenges faced by election officials in the 14 jurisdictions 

because of problems using felony, death, and other information from 

existing data sources to verify the accuracy of voter registration data. 

As discussed earlier, NVRA prohibits removing a name from a registration 

list for a federal election solely for non-voting but permits removal for 

certain specified reasons, including at the request of the voter, by reason 

of criminal conviction or mental incapacity under state law, the death of 

the voter, or upon written confirmation by the voter regarding a move out 

of the jurisdiction. Our survey of officials in the 14 jurisdictions showed 

that all but 1 of the jurisdictions said they removed names from voter 

registration lists during 2004 for a variety of reasons, including when the 

voter requested that his or her name be removed, the jurisdiction received 

a change of address notice from USPS, or data from other federal, state, or 

local organizations showed that the voter was ineligible due to a felony 

conviction or had died. In addition, before removing names, jurisdictions 

reported they took various steps to ensure that the names of eligible voters 

Jurisdictions 

Reported They 

Removed Voter 

Names from 

Registration Lists for 

Various Reasons, but 

Took Steps to Ensure 

That Eligible Voters’ 

Names Were Not 

Inadvertently 

Removed 

Jurisdictions Reported 

They Took Various Steps to 

Ensure that Eligible Voters 

Were Not Inadvertently 

Removed from Voter 

Registration Lists 
Page 27 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

were not inadvertently removed from voter registration lists, including 

sending letters or postcards to voters to confirm that the voters wanted 

their names removed; sending follow-up notices to voters or phoning 

voters to notify them of removal; or matching voters’ identifying 

information contained in voter registration records with felony records or 

death records maintained by other government organizations. 

When asked if their offices removed names of any voters from voter 

registration lists during 2004, 13 of 14 officials responded that, in their 

jurisdictions, names were removed for a variety of reasons, including 

when the voter requested that the name be removed from the list, felony 

records received from federal/state/local courts or correction facilities 

identified the voter as ineligible due to a felony conviction, information 

received from state/county vital statistics offices identified the voter as 

deceased, and change of address information received from USPS showed 

that the voter had moved outside of the jurisdiction where registered. 

Table 1 shows the election officials’ responses to questions about reasons 

for removing names of voters from voter registration lists. 
Page 28 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Table 1: Election Officials’ Responses to Questions about Reasons Why Voters’ Names Were Removed from Voter 

Registration Lists in 14 Jurisdictions during 2004 

a

Delta Township, MI did not respond to this question because, as the election official reported, no 

names were removed from the voter registration list during 2004. 

Election officials also reported that, before removing names from voter 

registration lists during 2004, their offices took a variety of steps to ensure 

that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed from the 

voter registration list. For example, election officials representing 12 of the 

Voter requested 

that name be 

removed

Felony records 

from federal, state, 

or local courts or 

correction facilities 

identified the voter 

as a felon

Information from 

state or county vital 

statistics offices 

identified the voter 

as deceased

Change of address 

information from 

the U.S. Postal 

Service showed 

that the voter had 

moved outside the 

jurisdiction

Newspaper 

obituaries identified 

the voter as 

deceased

Information from 

federal, state, or 

local courts showed 

that the voter had 

been judged to be 

mentally 

incompetent

Voter failed to 

respond to a notice 

from voter registrar 

and had not voted or 

had not appeared to 

vote in the most 

recent two federal 

elections

Jurisdictiona

Gila 

County, AZ

Maricopa

County, AZ

Los Angeles 

County, CA

Yolo 

County, CA

City of 

Detroit, MI

New York 

City, NY

Rensselaer

County, NY

Bexar 

County, TX

Webb 

County, TX

Albermarle 

County, VA

Arlington 

County, VA

City of 

Franklin, WI

City of 

Madison, WI

Voter names were removed from voter registration lists during 2004 because:

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected jurisdictions.

Note: X = Names removed from voter registration list.

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
Page 29 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

13 jurisdictions reported that their offices removed voters’ names from 

voter registration lists at the request of the voter. However, before doing 

so, officials representing 4 of the 12 jurisdictions reported that their offices 

sent a letter or postcard to confirm that the voter wanted his or her name 

removed from the voter registration list. Representatives of 4 of the 12 

jurisdictions reported that their offices took other steps including 

matching the voter’s identifying information—e.g., name, address, date of 

birth, and driver’s license number—with voter records to confirm it was 

the same person and requiring voters to file a document to indicate that 

they were either moving out of state or, if moving to another jurisdiction in 

the state, a request to transfer to another jurisdiction so that a letter can 

be sent to confirm the new address. Election officials representing 3 of the 

12 jurisdictions reported that their offices did not take any additional steps 

before removing the names of eligible voters from registration lists. 

Election officials from 11 of the 13 jurisdictions also reported that their 

offices removed voters’ names from registration lists because felony 

records received from federal, state, or local courts or correction facilities 

identified them as ineligible due to felony convictions. Of the 11 

jurisdictions, officials representing 10 reported that, before removing 

names because of felony convictions, their offices matched the voter 

identifying information (e.g., name, date of birth, social security number, 

and address) contained in voter registration records with felony records to 

confirm it was the same person. Eight of these 11 jurisdictions also sent 

letters to the voters notifying them of removal on the basis of felony 

convictions, and 1 of the 11 also attempted to reach the voters by phone to 

notify them of removal. One of the 11 election officials reported that the 

jurisdiction did not take any additional steps before removing the names 

of these voters from registration lists. 

Regarding deceased voters, election officials in 11 of the 13 jurisdictions 

reported that they removed names from voter registration lists because 

information received from state/county vital statistics offices showed the 

voters as deceased. Before removing these names, all 11 of the election 

officials reported that they matched the voters’ identifying information 

contained in voter registration records with death records to confirm it 

was the same person. According to an election official with one 

jurisdiction, the jurisdiction also sent a letter to the deceased voter’s next 

of kin notifying them of removal and another election official reported that 

the office also asked for confirmation, and one other jurisdiction 

attempted to reach the voter’s next of kin by phone. Election officials 

representing 8 of the 13 jurisdictions used obituaries as a source of 

information for removing voters’ names from lists and 3 of the 8 reported 
Page 30 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

that, before removing names of voters, they also matched voter records 

with state or county vital statistics information. Election officials 

representing 2 of the 13 jurisdictions reported that their offices relied 

exclusively on obituaries as a reason for removing names from voter 

registration lists. 

In addition, election officials in 10 of 13 jurisdictions reported that their 

offices removed names from registration lists because information 

provided by USPS showed that the voters had moved outside the 

jurisdiction where they were registered. Of the 10 jurisdictions, 9 election 

officials reported that their offices matched the voter’s identifying 

information, such as name and address, contained in voter registration 

records with the data provided by USPS to confirm it was the same 

person; 8 reported that they sent a notice to the voter of the removal; and 1 

reported that, in addition to matching, the office sent notices and 

attempted to reach voters by phone. One election official responded that 

the jurisdiction sends a letter to voters and voters’ names are removed 

only after they sign and return the letter, indicating they no longer wish to 

be registered, and another official representing one other jurisdiction 

reported that, after receiving notices from voters, the office sends the 

voters letters asking them to confirm their current residence. Regarding 

the latter, the official reported that, if the address is outside of the state, 

voters’ names are removed from the list; if it is in the same state, the 

information is forwarded to the receiving jurisdiction. (App. VI discusses 

responses to our survey on removing names from voter registration list in 

greater detail.) 

Although officials reported that they took steps to ensure that names of 

eligible voters are not removed from registration lists, election officials 

still face challenges maintaining the accuracy of these lists. In June 2005, 

we issued a report on the efforts of state and local officials in the same 

seven states and 14 local jurisdictions to maintain accurate voter 

registration lists.25 We pointed out that officials faced challenges 

maintaining the accuracy of voter registration lists because of problems 

using existing data sources to verify the accuracy of voter registration 

data. For example: 

 25GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Election Officials 

Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 

2005). 

Jurisdictions Face 

Challenges Maintaining the 

Accuracy of Voter 

Registration Lists 
Page 31 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

• Some state and local officials were concerned about the timeliness of 

death data—with the names of some deceased voters possibly 

remaining on registration lists after the election. Also, one state official 

and local officials in two states said that problems can arise in getting 

timely records on residents who pass away out of state. In one 

jurisdiction, an official expressed the concern that the election office 

could not identify which of several voters with the same name had died 

because of the lack of a birth date on some state death records. 

• State and local officials stated that criminal information was often 

incomplete, not timely, or difficult to decipher. Information on felony 

convictions, particularly from federal sources, was not useful because 

the information was old, had limited matching criteria, or was in 

different formats. 

• State and local officials were challenged ensuring voters resided within 

an election jurisdiction because of missing information, no street 

numbers in rural areas, new streets, redistricting or untimely 

forwarding of new addresses. 

We stated that some of these challenges might be addressed as state and 

local jurisdictions implement specific HAVA provisions that require states 

to (1) develop interactive computerized statewide voter registration lists 

for federal elections and (2) perform regular list maintenance by 

comparing the voter registration list against state records on felons and 

death.26 However, we also pointed out that other challenges, such as 

identifying duplicate registrations or deceased individuals out of state, 

may continue to be issues. Our June 2005 report echoed some of the issues 

highlighted in our 2001 report, wherein, on the basis of a national survey of 

local election officials, we reported on challenges that election officials 

identified with voter registration, such as obtaining accurate and timely 

information to update voter registration lists.27

 26HAVA, in general, requires states to, among other things, (a) implement an interactive 

statewide voter registration list for federal elections; (b) perform regular list maintenance 

by comparing the voter list against state records on felons and death; (c) match applicant 

information on voter registration lists with information in state motor vehicle agency’s 

records; and (d) match voter registration application information on voter registration lists 

with Social Security Administration records, as appropriate. 

27GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the Nation, GAO-02-3

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 
Page 32 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

HAVA, in general, requires states to implement provisional voting for 

elections for federal office whereby individuals not listed as registered or 

whose eligibility is questioned by an election official must be notified 

about and permitted to cast a provisional ballot. Election officials 

representing all 14 jurisdictions reported offering provisional voting to 

voters, and 9 of the 14 jurisdictions informed voters that provisional 

ballots were available by, for example, posting signs at polling places and 

generating media announcements. In addition, election officials in 12 of 

the 14 jurisdictions reported that their jurisdictions offered certain firsttime voters—those who had registered by mail after January 1, 2003, but 

did not provide a copy of required identification when they applied to 

register to vote28—the opportunity to cast provisional ballots even if they 

were unable to provide identification at the polling place.29 Election 

officials we surveyed reported to us that, during the November 2004 

election, provisional ballots were cast in 13 of the 14 jurisdictions and in 

11 of the 13, the percentage of ballots counted ranged from none to nearly 

90 percent. Overall, on the basis of the data reported by election officials, 

the 11 jurisdictions counted 70 percent of all of the provisional ballots 

cast. Table 2 shows the number of provisional ballots cast and counted, by 

jurisdiction, during the November 2004 election, as reported by election 

officials. 

 28HAVA, in general, requires that provisional ballots be provided to first-time voters who 

registered to vote by mail on or after January 1, 2003, but were unable to show required 

identification when either voting in person or by mail in a federal election. 

29Local election officials in the two jurisdictions in Arizona said this was not applicable. In 

an April 2005 letter from the U.S. Department of Justice to the Arizona Secretary of State, 

Justice’s Civil Rights Division concluded that it was permissible for a state to mandate that 

potential voters show identification at the polls prior to receiving provisional ballots. Local 

election officials in 2 of 14 jurisdictions surveyed reported that 12,815 first-time voters cast 

provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. The election officials representing 

the remaining jurisdictions said no first-time voters cast provisional ballots. 

All Jurisdictions 

Reported Enabling 

Provisional Votes to 

Be Cast but Not All 

Provisional Ballots 

Met States’ Criteria 

for Whether These 

Votes Should Count 
Page 33 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Table 2: Number and Percentage of Provisional Ballots Election Officials Reported 

Cast and Counted in the November 2004 Election in 14 Jurisdictions 

 Number of provisional ballots 

Jurisdiction Cast Counted 

Percent of provisional 

ballots counted

Gila County, AZ 575 505 88

Maricopa County, AZ 68,642 50,719 74

Los Angeles County, CA 204,578 166,894 82

Yolo County, CA 2,050 a a 

City of Detroit, MI 1,350 123 9 

Delta Township, MI 4 1 25

New York City, NY 140,779 77,804 55

Rensselaer County, NY 1,914 972 51

Bexar County, TX 2,996 602 20

Webb County, TX 60 23 38

Albemarle County, VA 49 a a 

Arlington County, VA 147 19 13

City of Franklin, WI 0 0 b 

City of Madison, WI 5 0 0

Total 423,149 297,662 70c

Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected jurisdictions. 

a

Respondents said they did not know how many provisional ballots were counted. Thus, the 

percentage of provisional votes counted could not be computed. 

b

Not applicable since no provisional ballots were cast. 

c

Excludes Yolo County, Calif., Albemarle County, Va., and City of Franklin, Wis. because respondents 

from Yolo County, Calif., and Albemarle County, Va., said they did not know how many provisional 

ballots were counted and no provisional ballots were cast in the City of Franklin, Wis. 

To better understand what proportion of total ballots cast constituted 

provisional ballots cast, we compared the number of provisional ballots 

cast, as reported in our survey, with Web-based state and local data on 
Page 34 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

total ballots cast for president for the 2004 election.30 Our comparison 

showed that the percent of provisional ballots cast, relative to total ballots 

cast in the 13 jurisdictions, ranged from less than 1 percent in 6 of the 13 

jurisdictions to as much as 7 percent in one of the 13 jurisdictions. Table 3 

shows the number of provisional ballots cast as a percent of total ballots 

cast, by jurisdiction, for the November 2004 election. 

 30Total ballots cast does not necessarily represent the total number of votes cast and 

officially counted in any jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, total ballots cast may include 

ballots where votes cast may or may not have been counted for a variety of reasons, 

including improperly marked ballots, ballots submitted without a mark for any particular 

candidate, ballots that included a mark for two candidates in the same election, or 

provisional ballots cast that were not counted. For purposes of this analysis, total ballots 

cast can include votes cast but not counted. For example, in Maricopa County, Arizona, the 

total number of ballots cast for president during the 2004 election was 1,211,963—which 

included 19,212 votes cast but not counted for a variety reasons—and the total number of 

votes cast and counted was 1,192,751. 
Page 35 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Table 3: Number of Provisional Ballots Cast as a Percentage of Total Ballots Cast 

for President in the November 2004 Election in 14 Jurisdictions 

Jurisdiction 

Total ballots 

casta

Provisional 

ballots cast 

Provisional ballots cast 

as a percentage of total 

ballots cast

Gila County, AZ 21,158 575 3 

Maricopa County, AZ 1,211,963 68,642 6

Los Angeles County, CA 3,023,280 204,578 7

Yolo County, CA 72,269 2,050 3

City of Detroit, MI 326,098 1,350 <1

Delta Township, MI 18,060 4 <1

New York City, NY 2,459,653 140,779 6 

Rensselaer County, NY 72,983 1,914 3

Bexar County, TX 475,314 2,996 1

Webb County, TX 42,030 60 <1

Albemarle County, VA 43,726 49 <1

Arlington County, VA 94,650 147 <1

City of Franklin, WI 18,418 0 0

City of Madison, WI 138,078 5 <1

Source: GAO survey of local election officials and Web sites of respective Secretaries of State, counties, or cities. 

a

Total ballots cast does not necessarily represent the total number of votes cast and officially counted 

in any jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, total ballots cast may include ballots where votes cast may or 

may not have been counted for a variety of reasons, including improperly marked ballots, ballots 

submitted without a mark for any particular candidate, ballots that included a mark for two candidates 

in the same election, or provisional ballots cast that were not counted. For purposes of this analysis, 

total ballots cast can include votes cast but not counted. For example, in Maricopa County, Arizona, 

the total number of ballots cast for president during the 2004 election was 1,211,963—which included 

19,212 votes cast but not counted for a variety reasons—and the total number of votes cast and 

counted was 1,192,751. 

Under HAVA, states have discretion to determine if an individual is eligible 

to vote and to determine whether the provisional ballot should be counted 

as a vote in accordance with state law. When asked to report the most 

frequent reasons why provisional ballots were not counted after the 

November 2004 election, election officials reported that the most frequent 

reasons were that individuals did not meet the residency eligibility 

requirements for the precincts where the provisional votes were cast, 

election officials did not have evidence that the individuals had registered 

or tried to register to vote before the election, and local election officials 

did not have evidence that the individuals casting provisional ballots had 

applied to register to vote at motor vehicle agency offices. Figure 7 shows 

the main reasons that provisional ballots were not counted after the 
Page 36 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

November 2004 election in the 13 jurisdictions we surveyed where 

provisional ballots were cast in November 2004. 

Figure 7: Reasons That Provisional Ballots Were Not Counted for the November 2004 Election in Selected Jurisdictions 

a

Jurisdictions could select more than one reason. 

b

Other reasons included voter did not provide acceptable identification or proof of residence; voter did 

not sign voter registration form; persons casting ballots were too young; voter was a convicted felon 

whose voting rights had not been restored; voters did not provide complete information on the voter 

registration applications or on the provisional ballots. 

To enable voters who cast provisional ballots in the November 2004 

election to learn whether their votes counted, HAVA requires that state or 

local election officials establish free means of receiving the information. 

Local election officials in 12 of the 13 jurisdictions where provisional 

ballots were cast for the November 2004 election said that they set up freeaccess mechanisms to inform provisional voters about the outcome of 

their provisional votes during the November 2004 election, including tollfree telephone numbers, Web sites, and letters sent to the provisional 

voters who cast provisional ballots.31 They also said that provisional voters 

were provided written information at their polling places about how to 

 31While New York State had not passed legislation to implement provisional voting 

requirements in HAVA by the time of the November 2004 election, New York had a form of 

provisional voting in place referred to as affidavit ballots. The New York City election 

office said that letters were sent to voters whose affidavit ballots did not count. 

Reasons That Provisional Ballots Were Not Counted for the November 2004 Election in Selected Jurisdictions 

● Voter did not meet residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction

● No evidence that voter had registered or tried to register to vote at election office

● No evidence that voter had submitted voter registration application to a MVA office

● Provisional ballot and/or envelope was incomplete and/or illegible

● Otherb

● Election office received registration applications very close to or after the registration deadline

● Voter did not provide identification as required under HAVA for certain first-time voters

● Voter did not sign a sworn statement that he/she met qualifications to be eligible to vote 

● No evidence that voter had submitted voter registration application to a NVRA agency other than a MVA office

0 2 4 6 8 10

Number of jurisdictions 

reporting this as one of 

the top three reasonsa

1

2

2

3

4

4

5

5

9

Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected jurisdictions.
Page 37 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

find out about the outcome of their provisional ballots. Eight of the 13 

jurisdictions said that provisional voters had access to information about 

the outcome of their ballots within 10 days after the election. 

Local election officials in 8 of the 14 jurisdictions said that they 

experienced challenges implementing provisional voting for the November 

2004 election. In these jurisdictions, the election officials said that they 

viewed provisional voting as a challenge for various reasons, including 

some poll workers were not familiar with provisional voting or, in one 

jurisdiction representing a large number of precincts, staff reported not 

having sufficient time to process provisional ballots. To address these 

challenges, the officials reported that they provided additional training to 

poll workers and hired additional staff to count provisional ballots within 

the time frames allowed. 

In addition, local election officials in 3 of the 14 jurisdictions said that they 

experienced challenges verifying the identification of first-time voters who 

applied to register to vote after January 1, 2003, and who did not provide 

identification with their applications. Specifically, these officials said that 

this requirement was very time-consuming due to the high number of 

voters, they needed additional staff to send notices to these voters to 

notify them that they needed to provide the necessary identification, and 

the state did not have a statewide voter registration database to verify the 

voters’ identification. (App. VII discusses responses to our survey on 

HAVA provisional voting and identification requirements in greater detail.) 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the 

report date. At that time we will make copies available to others on 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for 
Page 38 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix X. 

William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 39 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Our objectives were to describe election officials’ characterization of their 

experiences in 14 jurisdictions within 7 states with regard to the 

November 2004 election: (1) managing the voter registration process and 

any challenges related to receiving voter registration applications, 

checking them for completeness, accuracy, and duplication; and entering 

information into voter registration lists; (2) removing voter names from 

voter registration lists and ensuring that the names of eligible voters were 

not inadvertently removed; and (3) implementing provisional voting and 

identification requirements in accordance with HAVA and addressing any 

challenges encountered. In addition, we describe the experiences of 

selected motor vehicle agency (MVA) offices during 2004 in carrying out 

voter registration application procedures—specifically, assisting MVA 

clients with completing voter registration applications, accepting 

applications from these clients, and forwarding application to state or 

local elections offices. 

We first selected states and, subsequently, local jurisdictions within those 

states consistent with our earlier report on maintaining accurate voter 

registration lists.1

 We selected the following states using a non-probability 

sample: Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and 

Wisconsin. Our selection of the seven states took into consideration 

several voter registration-related factors and unique characteristics of the 

states that might affect the implementation of HAVA. For example, 

Wisconsin has same day registration, which exempts the state from the 

HAVA provisional voting requirement; Arizona has on-line voter 

registration; and Michigan has a reputation as a model for registration 

practices. Also, we selected New York State because, when receiving voter 

registration applications or checking applications with voter registration 

lists, New York State may have to rely on social security number 

verification procedures more than other states because it has a large 

population who live in New York City and may not have driver’s licenses. 

We also selected states to provide geographic diversity and variation in 

election administration—some administer elections at the county level and 

others at lower levels such as city or townships. Our goal was not to target 

a particular state, but rather to identify a range of issues facing states in 

managing the voter registration process, including updating voter 

registration lists, and implementing HAVA provisional voting and 

identification requirements. Information from these seven states cannot be 

 1

GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Election Officials Maintain 

Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005) 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 40 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

generalized to all states. Table 4 describes the voter registration-related 

characteristics of each state. 

Table 4: State Selection Factors 

State Voter registration-related characteristics 

Arizona • No statewide database prior to HAVA. 

• Did not request a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements deadline of January 1, 2004. 

• Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 12.8. 

• Voter registration administered at county level. 

• Has implemented an on-line voter registration process. 

California • Statewide database prior to HAVA that is compiled from local election lists. Local jurisdictions can access entire 

list. 

• Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements deadline of January 1, 2004. 

• Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 26.2. 

• Voter registration administered at county level. 

Michigan • Unified statewide database. 

• Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements deadline of January 1, 2004. 

• Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 5.3. 

• Voter registration administered at township, city, and village level. 

• Secretary of State responsible for election and motor vehicle licensing functions. 

New York • No statewide database prior to HAVA. 

• Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements deadline of January 1, 2004. 

• Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 20.4. 

• Voter registration administered at county level. 

• Expected higher use of social security records for registrant verification due to fewer drivers in New York City. 

Texas • Statewide database prior to HAVA that is compiled from local election lists. Local jurisdictions do not have access 

to entire list. 

• Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements deadline of January 1, 2004. 

• Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 13.9. 

• Voter registration administered at county level. 

Virginia • Unified statewide database. 

• Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements deadline of January 1, 2004. 

• Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 8.1. 

• Voter registration administered at county level. 

• May use 9-digit social security number for voter registration verification (rather than 4 digits outlined by HAVA). 

Wisconsin • No statewide database prior to HAVA. Some jurisdictions currently do not maintain voter registration rolls. 

• Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements deadline of January 1, 2004. 

• Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 3.6. 

• Voter registration administered at municipal level. 

• Allows Election Day voter registration. 

Source: GAO. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 41 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Within each state, we selected the two jurisdictions using a nonprobability sample. Our selection criteria for the 14 jurisdictions (2 

jurisdictions in each of the 7 states) included population size, the 

proximity of the locations to our site visits with state election and motor 

vehicle officials, suggestions by state election and motor vehicle officials, 

and proximity to an MVA office. The local jurisdictions we selected were: 

• Maricopa County, Arizona; 

• Gila County, Arizona; 

• Los Angeles County, California; 

• Yolo County, California; 

• City of Detroit, Michigan; 

• Delta Township, Michigan; 

• New York City, New York; 

• Rensselaer County, New York; 

• Bexar County, Texas; 

• Webb County, Texas; 

• Arlington County, Virginia; 

• Albemarle County, Virginia; 

• City of Franklin City, Wisconsin; and 

• City of Madison, Wisconsin. 

To address our objectives, we used a multi-pronged approach. First, we 

reviewed HAVA and other relevant laws, state reports, and documents 

related to the voter registration process in the seven states. Second, we 

interviewed state and local election officials in the 7 states and 14 

jurisdictions to obtain information on their registration processes and 

implementation of the HAVA requirements for provisional voting and voter 

identification. Third, because so many voter registrations originate with 

applications from motor vehicle agencies, we also interviewed officials 

from these agencies in 10 jurisdictions to discuss their procedures for 

processing voter registration applications.2

 In Michigan, where we spoke 

only with Secretary of State officials, the Secretary of State’s office is 

responsible for elections and motor vehicle functions, such as issuing 

driver’s licenses. 

 2

We did not survey MVA officials in Wisconsin regarding voter registration under NVRA; 

MVA offices in Wisconsin do not participate in voter registration because the state is 

exempt from NVRA. Wisconsin's exemption from NVRA, in general, is based upon the fact 

that it did not, and still does not, have voter registration requirements for federal elections 

under state laws that were in effect on the NVRA-specified exemption date of August 1, 

1994. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 42 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Following our site visits, we sent a questionnaire to the same officials in 

the 14 local elections offices in the seven states to gather information 

about their experiences with the November 2004 election. We did not 

survey state election officials because voter registration and operations 

are carried out at the local level (e.g., county, city, or township). 

Consistent with our objectives, our survey focused primarily on (1) 

challenges, if any, processing voter registration applications, specifically, 

challenges receiving voter registration applications from MVAs, other 

NVRA agencies, and voter registration drives sponsored by nongovernmental organizations; checking voter registration applications for 

completeness, accuracy, and duplicates; and entering voter information 

into registration lists or systems; (2) whether voters names were removed 

from voter registration lists, reasons why names were removed, and steps 

taken to ensure that voters names were not inadvertently removed; and (3) 

HAVA’s provisional voting and first-time voter identification requirements, 

specifically, the number of provisional ballots cast and counted, including 

reasons, if any, why jurisdictions did not count provisional ballots; how 

voters were informed about provisional voting and its outcome; and 

whether first-time voters who registered by mail were allowed to cast 

provisional ballots if they did not provide identification. We also sent a 

survey to the state and local motor vehicle agency officials in six of the 

seven states3

 to gather information about (1) their experiences assisting 

citizens in filling out voter registration applications and forwarding 

applications to election offices and (2) their experiences with the 

November 2004 election related to voter registration applications. 

Because our surveys were not sample surveys, there are no sampling 

errors. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may 

introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For 

example, difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the 

sources of information that are available to respondents, or in how the 

responses we received are entered into a database or were analyzed, can 

introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in 

the development of the surveys, the data collection, and the data analysis 

to minimize these nonsampling errors and help ensure the accuracy of the 

answers that were obtained. For example, a social science survey 

specialist designed the surveys in collaboration with our staff with subject 

matter expertise. When the data were analyzed, a second, independent 

 3

We did not send a survey to motor vehicle agency officials in Wisconsin because of its 

exemption from NVRA. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 43 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

analyst checked all computer programs. With regard to numbers received 

as part of our surveys, such as the number of provisional ballots cast and 

counted, we determined that the data reported via the surveys were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report by asking the survey 

respondents to identify any limitations associated with using the numbers 

provided and actions taken to check the accuracy of the numbers. We did 

not independently verify the accuracy or completeness of responses 

provided from our surveys of election officials and MVA officials. Local 

election officials and state and local MVA officials we surveyed were 

provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their responses for this 

report and, on the basis of the comments we received, we made technical 

changes, where appropriate. The results of our work cannot be 

generalized to state and local election jurisdictions or MVA offices either 

nationwide or at the state level. Appendix II contains the survey we sent to 

local election officials, and appendix IX contains the survey we sent to 

state and local officials representing MVAs. 

We also reviewed state and local Internet sites, such as sites maintained by 

Secretaries of State and County and City Clerks Offices to obtain data on 

total ballots cast for president for the 2004 elections in the seven states 

and 14 jurisdictions covered by our review. We used these data to show 

the relative proportion of provisional ballots cast to total ballots cast for 

each of the jurisdictions. These data were used for limited comparison 

purposes; we asked election officials to verify the accuracy of these data 

but we did not independently asses their reliability. In addition, we 

reviewed relevant federal and state statutes pertinent to the state and local 

jurisdictions covered by our review. To obtain information on the 

challenges facing state and local election officials during the registration 

process, we reviewed our past reports on various aspects of the election 

process as well as reports by the Federal Election Commission, the 

National Commission on Federal Reform, and a Task Force Report to 

Accompany the Commission’s Report—both organized by the Miller 

Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and the Century 

Foundation—and a May 2005 report by the National Task Force on 

Election Reform, sponsored by the Election Center, which is also called 

the National Association of Election Officials. We also reviewed various 

reports developed by the Election Reform Information Project, a 

clearinghouse for election reform information and an online forum for 

learning about, discussing, and analyzing election reform issues and 

providing research on questions of interest to the election reform 

community. After the November 2000 election, the Election Reform 

Information Project received a 3-year grant from the Pew Charitable 

Trusts via the University of Richmond. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 44 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Our work was performed from January 2004 through September 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

Page 45 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

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Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

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Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

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Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

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Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

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Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

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Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

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Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

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Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

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Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

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Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

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Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

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Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

Page 58 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

Page 59 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

Page 60 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

Page 61 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

Page 62 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

Page 63 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

Page 64 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election 

Officials 

Page 65 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Receiving 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 66 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office 

representatives to questions in our survey related to challenges they 

encountered during the November 2004 election in receiving voter 

registration applications from organizations external to the election 

office—motor vehicle agencies (MVA), other National Voter Registration 

Act (NVRA) agencies, and non-governmental organizations that sponsor 

voter registration drives; why these challenges occurred; and steps that 

election officials took to try to address these challenges. The statements in 

this appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable local 

election officials and were not independently verified by us. 

Staff in the Gila County election office experienced little or no challenges 

receiving registration applications from MVA offices. However, staff faced 

some challenges receiving applications from NVRA agencies other than 

MVA offices and voter registration drives held by non-governmental 

organizations. These challenges occurred because applications from these 

sources were received after the voter registration deadline. A 

representative from the county election office reported that political 

candidates and parties that sponsored voter registration drives did not 

send all voter registration applications to the election office after receiving 

them from people who completed them. The election office tried to 

address these challenges by talking to the candidates and political parties 

about turning in applications on a timely basis. 

Staff in the Maricopa County election office experienced little or no 

challenges receiving registration applications from NVRA agencies other 

than MVA offices. However, staff faced some challenges receiving 

applications from MVA offices and faced challenges to great extent 

receiving applications from voter registration drives held by nongovernmental organizations. Receiving applications from MVA offices and 

voter registration drives was challenging because the county election 

office received applications from these sources too close to the 

registration deadline. A representative from the county election office 

reported encountering numerous occasions when individuals who 

indicated that they wanted to apply to register to vote at MVA offices were 

not given voter registration forms to complete, and consequently these 

individuals were not registered to vote. Staff in the county election office 

tried to address these challenges by (1) adding additional staff and 

resources to update the voter registration list in time for the election and 

(2) allowing the aforementioned MVA clients who showed copies of their 

applications for driver’s licenses indicating that they had requested to 

Appendix III: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Receiving 

Voter Registration Applications 

Gila County, Arizona 

Maricopa County, Arizona 
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Receiving 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 67 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

register to vote to complete voter registration forms so that they could be 

added to the voter registration list. 

Staff in the Los Angeles County election office experienced little or no 

challenges receiving registration applications from MVA and NVRA 

agencies. However, staff faced some challenges receiving applications 

from voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. 

These challenges occurred because the county election office received 

these applications close to or after the voter registration deadline. To 

address these challenges, staff from the county election office contacted 

these organizations and will be developing a training program focused on 

legal requirements for registering voters. 

Staff in the Yolo County election office faced little or no challenges 

receiving registration applications from MVA and NVRA agencies. 

However, staff faced some challenges receiving applications from voter 

registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. These 

challenges occurred because the county election office received the 

applications after the voter registration deadline, but a representative from 

the county election office said that the applications were still processed. 

Staff in the Detroit election office faced challenges to a great extent 

receiving applications from MVA offices, NVRA agencies, and voter 

registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. These 

challenges occurred because the applications were received either too 

close to or after the voter registration deadline. The representative who 

responded to our survey said that the election office did not try to address 

this challenge. 

Staff in the Delta Township election office faced little or no challenge 

receiving voter registration applications from MVA and NVRA agencies. 

However, staff faced challenges to a great extent receiving applications 

from voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. 

These challenges occurred because applications were received either too 

close to or after the voter registration deadline and were incomplete. To 

address this challenge, the office added these applications to the voter 

registration list and sent verification letters to applicants whose 

applications were incomplete. If staff in the election office was not able to 

verify incomplete information on applicants before the election, the 

Los Angeles County, 

California 

Yolo County, California 

City of Detroit, Michigan 

Delta Township, Michigan 
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Receiving 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 68 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

affected applicants’ names were coded on the voter registration lists so 

that poll workers could ask them to identify themselves before voting. 

Staff in the New York City election office faced little or no challenges 

receiving registration applications from MVA and NVRA agencies. 

However, staff faced some challenges receiving applications from voter 

registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. These 

challenges occurred because the applications were received too close to 

the voter registration deadline. To address these challenges, the city 

election office requested that non-governmental organizations submit all 

voter registration forms as soon as possible and not wait until the last 

minute. A representative from the city election office said that most of 

these groups complied with this request, but some did not. Staff in the city 

election office also addressed these challenges by hiring additional data 

entry staff to handle the large volume of registrations and by working 

extended hours to process the applications received before the deadline. 

Staff in the county election office faced little or no challenges receiving 

registration applications from MVA offices, other NVRA agencies, and 

voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. 

Staff in the county election office experienced little or no challenges 

receiving applications from MVA and other NVRA agencies. However, staff 

faced some challenges receiving applications from voter registration 

drives held by non-governmental organizations. These challenges occurred 

because these applications were not properly completed, had missing 

information, had invalid addresses, or were turned in on a Friday even 

though the county election office had asked the organizations sponsoring 

voter registration drives not to do so. According to the official, the latter 

resulted in staff having to work overtime and weekends to process 

registrations. To address these challenges, staff from the county election 

office discussed these issues with leaders of the non-governmental 

organizations, state election officials, and political parties, among others. 

Staff in the county election office faced some challenges receiving voter 

registration applications from MVA offices and faced little or no challenges 

receiving applications from other NVRA agencies. In addition, staff did not 

know or had no basis to judge whether the office faced challenges 

receiving applications from voter registration drives sponsored by nonNew York City, New York 

Rensselaer County, 

New York 

Bexar County, Texas 

Webb County, Texas 
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Receiving 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 69 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

governmental organizations. The challenges in receiving applications from 

MVA offices occurred because some applications got lost in the mail and 

were not received at the county election office. To address this challenge, 

staff reviewed information received from the Secretary of State and MVA 

offices, and mailed new applications to persons who had completed their 

applications at MVA offices. Staff also installed a lock box at the local 

MVA office so that MVA staff could keep completed voter registration 

applications in the lock box and staff from the county election office could 

pick up the applications at the MVA office 3 times a week. 

Staff in the county election office faced little or no challenges receiving 

voter registration applications from MVA offices. However, staff faced 

some challenges receiving applications from other NVRA agencies and 

voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. An 

official from the county election office said that these challenges occurred 

because (1) some NVRA agencies may not have been in compliance with 

NVRA and (2) the county election office may not have received 

applications from individuals who completed voter registration 

applications at a voter registration drive. To address these challenges, staff 

from the county election office contacted staff in NVRA agencies to 

encourage compliance with NVRA and offered training to all private 

groups who contacted the office about voter registration drives. 

Staff in the county election office faced some challenges receiving 

applications from MVA offices and faced little or no challenges receiving 

applications from other NVRA agencies. In addition, staff faced challenges 

to a great extent receiving applications from voter registration drives held 

by non-governmental organizations. The challenges in receiving 

applications from MVA offices and voter registration drives occurred 

because the county election office received applications too close to the 

voter registration deadline and the county election office did not have 

enough staff to handle the applications that were received. To address 

these challenges, staff worked extra hours and the office extended the 

hours of temporary staff to process applications and meet deadlines. 

In response to questions about receiving applications from MVAs and 

NVRA agencies other than MVAs, a representative from the city election 

office said that this was not applicable. However, staff faced challenges to 

a great extent receiving applications from voter registration drives held by 

non-governmental organizations. These challenges occurred because 

Albemarle County, Virginia 

Arlington County, Virginia 

City of Franklin, Wisconsin 
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Receiving 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 70 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

(1) the city election office received these applications too close to or after 

the registration deadline, (2) the city election office did not have enough 

resources or staff to handle the applications, and (3) the applications 

contained inaccurate information, which required staff in the election 

office to do extensive follow-up work. To address these challenges, staff in 

the city election office attempted to make direct contact with the voters. 

Staff in the city election office faced some challenges receiving voter 

registration applications from NVRA agencies other than MVA offices and 

from voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. 

These challenges occurred due to incomplete applications. In response to 

a question about receiving applications from MVAs, a representative from 

the city election office said this was not applicable. Staff in the city 

election office tried to address these challenges by sending letters to the 

applicants, if time allowed, and returning incomplete applications to staff 

in the NVRA agencies and non-governmental organizations sponsoring the 

voter registration drives. 

City of Madison, Wisconsin 
Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Checking 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 71 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office 

representatives to questions in our survey related to challenges their 

offices encountered during the November 2004 election with regard to 

checking voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, or 

duplicates, and if challenges occurred, why they occurred and any actions 

taken to overcome them. The statements in this appendix reflect the 

responses to our survey by the applicable local election officials and were 

not independently verified by us. 

Checking voter registration applications to ensure information on the 

applications was complete and accurate and to identify duplicate 

applications posed little or no challenges to staff in the election office. 

Election office staff experienced some challenges checking voter 

registration applications to ensure the information in the applications was 

complete and accurate and to identify duplicate applications. These 

challenges occurred because local election office encountered problems 

contacting the individuals to obtain complete or accurate information. 

Staff in the local election office tried to address these challenges by 

putting the applications in a suspense file and sending letters to the 

applicants requesting the missing information. 

While election staff experienced little or no challenges checking individual 

applications for completeness and duplicates, they experienced 

challenges, to some extent, checking the accuracy of voter registration 

applications because the elections office did not have sufficient time, 

resources, and staff to check them. To address this challenge, additional 

staff were hired, multiple work shifts were added, and a great deal of 

overtime was worked. 

Election office staff experienced little or no challenges checking voter 

registration applications for accuracy, completeness, or duplicates. 

Election office staff experienced challenges, to a great extent, checking 

voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates. 

The challenges they faced checking voter registration applications were 

due to problems with (1) determining what information was inaccurate, 

(2) contacting individuals to obtain complete or accurate information, and 

Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Checking 

Voter Registration Applications 

Gila County, Arizona 

Maricopa County, Arizona 

Los Angeles County, 

California 

Yolo County, California 

City of Detroit, Michigan 
Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Checking 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 72 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

(3) checking the accuracy of information in the applications against 

various databases, such as motor vehicle or Social Security Administration 

databases, or against state records. To overcome this challenge, election 

office staff attempted to reach the applicants by telephone and mailed 

response cards to them to verify the information contained in their 

applications. 

Although checking applications for accuracy or duplicates posed little or 

no challenge to election office staff, they experienced challenges, to some 

extent, checking the completeness of voter registration applications. 

These challenges occurred because hundreds of registration forms were 

received too close to the registration deadline and staff encountered 

difficulties determining what information was not accurate. To address 

these challenges, election staff added the names of the applicants to the 

voter registration lists and sent the applicants letters asking them to verify 

the information contained in their registration applications. If the 

applicants did not respond to the letters, their names were placed on the 

registration list and if they appeared at the polls to vote, they were asked 

to provide identification. 

Election office staff faced little or no challenges checking voter 

registration applications to ensure information on the applications was 

complete and accurate and to identify duplicate applications. 

Election office staff faced little or no challenges checking voter 

registration applications to ensure information on the applications was 

complete and accurate and to identify duplicate applications. 

Election office staff faced little or no challenges checking voter 

registration applications to ensure information on the applications was 

complete and accurate and to identify duplicate applications. 

Election staff experienced little or no challenges checking voter 

registration applications to ensure information on the applications was 

complete and to identify duplicate applications. The official who 

responded to our survey did not know the extent of challenges, if any, that 

staff may have experienced checking voter registration applications for 

accuracy. 

Delta Township, Michigan 

New York City, New York 

Rensselaer County, 

New York 

Bexar County, Texas 

Webb County, Texas 
Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Checking 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 73 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Election office staff faced little or no challenges checking voter 

registration applications to ensure information on the applications was 

complete and accurate and to identify duplicate applications. 

Election office staff experienced some challenges checking voter 

registration applications for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates. 

These challenges occurred because the election office did not have 

enough resources and staff to check the applications, and staff did not 

have enough time to check the applications between the registration 

deadline and when voting began. To address these challenges, staff 

worked extra hours. 

To a great extent, election office staff experienced challenges checking 

applications for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates. Staff experienced 

these challenges because of (1) difficulties determining what information 

was inaccurate, (2) problems contacting individuals to obtain complete or 

accurate information, and (3) insufficient time between the state’s 

registration deadline and when voting began to check whether 

applications were complete, accurate, or duplicates. To overcome these 

challenges, staff from the election office attempted to make direct contact 

with the voters. 

To some extent, election office staff faced challenges checking 

applications for completeness and accuracy but had little or no problems 

checking applications for duplicates. The challenges of checking the 

completeness and accuracy of applications occurred because of problems 

with contacting individuals to obtain complete and accurate information. 

To overcome these challenges, additional staff were hired. 

Albemarle County, Virginia 

Arlington County, Virginia 

City of Franklin, Wisconsin 

City of Madison, Wisconsin 
Appendix V: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Entering 

Information into Voter Registration Lists 

Page 74 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office 

representatives to questions in our survey related to challenges they 

encountered during the November 2004 election entering information on 

eligible voters into voter registration lists, and when challenges occurred, 

why they occurred and actions taken to overcome them. The statements in 

this appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable local 

election officials and were not independently verified by us. 

Entering information on eligible voters into voter registration lists posed 

little or no challenges to staff in the election office. However, scanning 

signatures of new voters into the voter registration system posed 

challenges to some extent because staff in the election office encountered 

problems with the scanning equipment. To address the challenges of 

scanning new voters’ signatures into the voter registration system, the 

equipment was repaired. 

Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering 

voter information into voter registration lists and scanning signatures of 

new voters into the voter registration system. 

To some extent, election office staff experienced challenges entering voter 

information into voter registration lists and scanning signatures of new 

voters into the voter registration system. These challenges occurred 

because the election office lacked sufficient resources and staff and had 

problems with the scanning equipment. To address these challenges, 

additional staff were hired, and staff worked additional shifts and a great 

deal of overtime. In addition, budget requests were submitted to upgrade 

the scanning equipment. 

Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering 

voter information into voter registration lists and scanning signatures of 

new voters into the voter registration system. 

To some extent, election office staff experienced challenges scanning 

signatures of new voters into the voter registration system but experience 

little or no challenges entering information on eligible voters into the voter 

registration lists. Scanning signatures of new voters into the voter 

registration system was a challenge because there were too many 

Appendix V: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Entering 

Information into Voter Registration Lists 

Gila County, Arizona 

Maricopa County, Arizona 

Los Angeles County, 

California 

Yolo County, California 

City of Detroit, Michigan 
Appendix V: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Entering 

Information into Voter Registration Lists 

Page 75 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

applications to enter into the system by the registration deadline or 

Election Day and because of problems with the scanning equipment. To 

address this challenge, election office staff scanned as many signatures as 

possible and waited until the equipment malfunctioning could be 

corrected. 

Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering 

voter information into voter registration lists and scanning signatures of 

new voters into the voter registration system. 

Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering 

voter information into voter registration lists and scanning signatures of 

new voters into the voter registration system. 

Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering 

voter information into voter registration lists and scanning signatures of 

new voters into the voter registration system. 

Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering 

voter information into voter registration lists. Scanning signatures of new 

voters into the voter registration system was not applicable to this election 

office. 

Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering 

voter information into voter registration lists. Scanning signatures of new 

voters into the voter registration system was not applicable to this election 

office. 

Election office staff experienced challenges, to little or no extent, entering 

voter information into voter registration lists. Scanning signatures of new 

voters into the voter registration system was not applicable to this election 

office. 

Election office staff experienced challenges, to some extent, entering 

information on eligible voters into voter registration lists because the 

election office lacked sufficient resources and staff to enter the 

Delta Township, Michigan 

New York City, New York 

Rensselaer County, 

New York 

Bexar County, Texas 

Webb County, Texas 

Albemarle County, Virginia 

Arlington County, Virginia 
Appendix V: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Entering 

Information into Voter Registration Lists 

Page 76 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

registration application information into these lists by registration 

deadline or Election Day. To address these challenges, election office staff 

worked extra hours to meet deadlines for entering information on eligible 

voters into the voter registration lists. Scanning signatures of new voters 

into the voter registration system was not applicable to this election office. 

To some extent, election office staff experienced challenges entering 

information on eligible voters into voter registration lists because of the 

volume of registration applications that had to be entered by the state’s 

registration deadline or Election Day. To address these challenges, staff 

worked extended hours and additional staff was hired to process 

registration applications that were required to be entered into voter 

registration lists by Election Day. Scanning signatures of new voters into 

the voter registration system was not applicable to this election office. 

To some extent, election office staff experienced challenges entering 

information on eligible voters into voter registration lists because of the 

volume of registration applications that had to be entered by the state’s 

registration deadline or Election Day. To address these challenges, staffing 

was increased and the office operated with extended hours. Scanning 

signatures of new voters into the voter registration system was not 

applicable to this election office. 

City of Franklin, Wisconsin 

City of Madison, Wisconsin 
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Removing 

Names from Voter Registration Lists 

Page 77 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

This appendix describes the responses of local election officials, 

representing 14 jurisdictions on their reported experiences removing the 

names of voters from voter registration lists during 2004. All but 1 of the 14 

local election officials responding to our survey reported that voters’ 

names were removed from registration lists during 2004 for various 

reasons, such as voter requested name be removed or records identified 

voter as deceased or as ineligible due to a felony conviction. For 

information on the reasons that election officials in each jurisdiction 

removed names of voters from registration lists, see table 1. The local 

election officials also reported steps that they took before removing 

voters’ names from the voter registration lists in order to ensure that 

names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed. The statements 

in this appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable local 

election officials and were not independently verified by us. 

Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps 

were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

removed: 

• sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal, because the voter 

failed to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted 

or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, 

but received no response to the follow-up notice; 

• sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address 

information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had 

moved to another jurisdiction or felony records identified the voter as 

ineligible due to a felony conviction; 

• sent a letter or postcard to the voter to confirm that the voter wanted 

his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested; 

• sent a letter to the voter notifying of removal because court records 

identified the voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence; 

• sent a letter to the deceased voter’s next of kin notifying of removal 

and asking for confirmation of the voter’s death; 

• contacted the funeral home to obtain the deceased voter’s identifying 

information (such as name, date of birth, and address); 

• matched information from a newspaper obituary with information from 

the state/county vital statistics offices; and 

• matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, 

date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter 

registration list with information received from various sources on 

changes of address (i.e., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of 

Address list), felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths. 

Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Removing 

Names from Voter Registration Lists 

Gila County, Arizona 
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Removing 

Names from Voter Registration Lists 

Page 78 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps 

were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

removed: 

• mailed two notices to the voter—one to the mailing address on file and 

one to the residence address, if different from the mailing address—when 

the office received information indicating that the voter had moved from 

the address on file; if both notices were returned undeliverable, moved the 

voter to an inactive registration list and if no voter activity occurred 

through two federal elections, the voter’s registration was canceled; 

• canceled the voter’s registration when the voter requested in writing that 

his/her name be removed from the registration list; 

• matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, date 

of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter registration list 

with information received from various sources on changes of address 

(i.e., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of Address list), felony 

convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths; 

• sent a letter to the voter asking if he/she wanted to remain registered in 

the county when information from the U.S. Postal Service indicated that 

the voter had moved to another jurisdiction, and if the voter signed and 

returned the letter indicating that he/she no longer wanted to be registered 

in the county, the registration was canceled; 

• sent a letter to the voter notifying of removal because court records 

identified the voter as ineligible due to a felony conviction and gave the 

voter an opportunity to inform the election office that the information 

provided from the courts was incorrect or that the felony was overturned; 

and 

• sent a letter to the deceased voter’s family asking to confirm the voter’s 

death when information provided by the state/county vital statistics offices 

or newspaper obituaries was insufficient to positively identify the voter as 

deceased. 

Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps 

were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

removed: 

• matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, 

date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter 

registration list with information received from various sources on 

changes of address (e.g., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of 

Address list), felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths; 

• sent the voter a letter and attempted to reach the voter by phone to 

notify of removal on the basis of a felony conviction; and 

Maricopa County, Arizona 

Los Angeles County, 

California 
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Removing 

Names from Voter Registration Lists 

Page 79 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

• sent the voter a letter notifying of removal because court records 

identified the voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence. 

Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps 

were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

removed: 

• matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, 

date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter 

registration list with information received from various sources on 

changes of address (i.e., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of 

Address list), felony convictions, and deaths; 

• sent the voter a letter or notice of removal to confirm that the voter 

wanted his/her name removed from the voter registration list as 

requested or to notify the voter of removal on the basis of change-ofaddress information from the U.S. Postal Service; and 

• matched information from newspaper obituaries with information from 

state/county vital statistics offices. 

Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps 

were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

removed: 

• matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, 

date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter 

registration list with information received from various sources on 

changes of address and deaths; 

• sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal because the voter 

failed to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted 

or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, 

but received no response to the follow-up notice; 

• sent the voter a notice of removal because the voter no longer resided 

in the jurisdiction; and 

• canceled the voter’s registration as requested by the voter and 

annotated the registration card with the reason the registration was 

canceled. 

No steps were taken before removing a voter’s name from the voter 

registration list when felony records identified the voter as ineligible due 

to a felony conviction. 

Yolo County, California 

City of Detroit, Michigan 
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Removing 

Names from Voter Registration Lists 

Page 80 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps 

were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

removed: 

• matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, 

date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter 

registration list with information received from various sources on 

changes of address, felony convictions, mental incompetence, and 

deaths; 

• sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address 

information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had 

moved to another jurisdiction, or felony records identified the voter as 

ineligible due to a felony conviction, or court records identified the 

voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence; and 

• sent the voter a letter or postcard to confirm that the voter wanted 

his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested. 

Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps 

were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

removed: 

• sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address 

information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had 

moved to another jurisdiction and 

• matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, 

date of birth, and social security number) contained in thevoter 

registration list with information received from various sources on 

changes of address, felony convictions, or deaths. 

No steps were taken before removing voters’ names from the voter 

registration list when voters requested that names be removed or 

newspaper obituaries identified voters as deceased. 

Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps 

were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

removed: 

• sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal because the voter 

failed to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted 

or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, 

but received no response to the follow-up notice; 

New York City, New York 

Rensselaer County, 

New York 

Bexar County, Texas 
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Removing 

Names from Voter Registration Lists 

Page 81 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

• sent a letter or postcard to the voter to confirm that the voter wanted 

his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested; 

• sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony 

conviction or mental incompetence; and 

• matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, 

date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter 

registration list with information received from various sources on 

felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths. 

Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps 

were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

removed: 

• sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal because voter failed to 

respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted or had 

not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, but 

received no response to the follow-up notice; 

• sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address 

information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had 

moved to another jurisdiction; 

• sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony 

conviction; 

• matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, 

date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter 

registration list with information received from various sources on 

felony convictions and deaths; 

• attempted to reach the deceased voter’s next of kin by phone to notify 

of removal and to ask for confirmation of voter’s death; and 

• matched information from a newspaper obituary with information from 

state/county vital statistics offices. 

Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps 

were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

removed: 

• required the voter to file a document with the election office before any 

action was taken to remove the name from registration list as the voter 

requested; 

• matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, 

date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter 

registration list with information received from various sources on 

Webb County, Texas 

Albemarle County, Virginia 
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Removing 

Names from Voter Registration Lists 

Page 82 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

felony convictions, mental incompetence, deaths, or change of 

registration notice from another state; and 

• sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony 

conviction. 

No steps were taken before removing voters’ names from the voter 

registration lists when newspaper obituaries identified voters as deceased. 

Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps 

were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

removed: 

• matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, 

date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter 

registration list with information received from various sources on 

changes of address, felony convictions, mental incompetence, and 

deaths; 

• sent a letter asking the voter to confirm current residence because 

change-of-address information from the U.S. Postal Service showed 

that the voter had moved to another jurisdiction; 

• sent the voter a postcard to confirm a request to remove his/her name 

from the voter registration list; and 

• sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony 

conviction or on the basis of court records that identified the voter as 

ineligible due to mental incompetence. 

Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following steps 

were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently 

removed: 

• matched voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, date of 

birth, and social security number) contained in the voter registration 

list with information received from the U.S. Postal Service National 

Change of Address list; 

• sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address 

information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had 

moved to another jurisdiction; and 

• attempted to reach the voter by phone to confirm that he/she had 

moved outside the jurisdiction. 

No steps were taken before removing voters’ names from the voter 

registration list when voters requested that names be removed or 

newspaper obituaries identified voters as deceased. 

Arlington County, Virginia 

City of Franklin, Wisconsin 
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Removing 

Names from Voter Registration Lists 

Page 83 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

When the office received voter cancellation cards from other 

municipalities, staff checked the voters’ dates of birth before removing 

their names from the voter registration list to ensure that names of eligible 

voters were not inadvertently removed from the list. No steps were taken 

before removing voters’ names from the voter registration lists when 

voters requested that their names be removed or newspaper obituaries 

identified voters as deceased. 

City of Madison, Wisconsin 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 84 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office 

representatives to questions in our survey and interviews about their 

experiences during the November 2004 election in implementing the 

requirements in HAVA for provisional voting and identification 

requirements for certain first-time voters who applied to register to vote 

after January 1, 2003. Unless otherwise noted, the statements in this 

appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable local 

election officials and were not independently verified by us. 

In Gila County, 575 provisional ballots were cast and 505 of these ballots—

88 percent—were counted. For a provisional vote to count, the voter had 

to be a qualified voter in the precinct. The main reasons for not counting 

the other 70 provisional ballots were that (1) the voters did not meet the 

residency eligibility requirements, (2) the election office received voter 

registration applications very close to or after the registration deadline, 

and (3) the provisional ballots or the envelopes containing those ballots 

were incomplete or illegible. The county election office did not experience 

challenges implementing the provisional voting requirements during the 

November 2004 election. 

The county election office used various means to inform voters of the 

availability of provisional ballots and the outcome of provisional votes. 

Representatives we spoke with at the county election office told us that 

they notified voters of the availability of provisional ballots by posting 

signs at polling places. Voters were also provided with written information 

at their polling places informing them that they could find out whether or 

not their provisional votes were counted and, if the votes were not 

counted, the reason they were not counted. Voters who cast provisional 

ballots could find out the outcome of their votes by calling a toll-free 

telephone number, calling the local election office, calling the state 

election office, and via a letter from the local election office informing 

voters of the outcome of their provisional votes. Information on the 

outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters 

between 6 and 10 days after the election. 

In response to a question in our survey asking if the county allowed firsttime voters who registered by mail as of January 2003 but did not provide 

a copy of identification with their applications to cast provisional ballots if 

they were not able to provide identification at the polling place, the 

Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Gila County, Arizona 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 85 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

representative who responded to the survey said this was not applicable. 

Arizona passed a ballot initiative in 2004 requiring voters to show 

identification prior to receiving ballots.1

 The county election office did not 

report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these firsttime voters. 

In Maricopa County, 68,642 provisional ballots were cast and 50,719 of 

these ballots—74 percent—were counted. For a provisional vote to count, 

the voter had to be a qualified voter in the precinct. The main reasons for 

not counting the other 17,923 provisional ballots were that (1) no evidence 

existed that the individuals who cast these ballots had registered or tried 

to register to vote directly with the elections office, (2) the voters did not 

meet the residency eligibility requirement, and (3) other reasons including 

election officials not receiving voter registration applications until after 

the state’s deadline to register to vote. In describing challenges that the 

county election office faced in implementing provisional voting for the 

November 2004 election, officials from the county election office said they 

had to modify the form and envelope used for provisional voting to 

provide a statement for the voter to sign to indicate U.S. citizenship. 

Voters were informed of the availability of provisional ballots and 

outcome of provisional votes using various means. Representatives we 

spoke with at the county election office told us that they notified voters of 

the availability of provisional ballots by posting signs at polling places. 

Voters were also provided with written information at their polling places 

informing them that they could find out whether or not their provisional 

votes were counted and, if the votes were not counted, the reason they 

were not counted. Voters who cast provisional ballots could find out the 

outcome of their votes by calling a toll-free telephone number, checking a 

Web site, calling the local election office, calling the state election office, 

visiting the local election office, and via a letter from the local election 

office informing voters of the outcome of their provisional votes. 

Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to 

the voters between 6 and 10 days after the election. 

 1

Local election officials in the two jurisdictions in Arizona said that the HAVA requirement 

to provide a provisional ballot in such instance was not applicable. In a letter from the U.S. 

Department of Justice to the Arizona Secretary of State, Justice’s Civil Rights Division 

concluded that it was permissible for a state to mandate that potential voters show 

identification at the polls prior to receiving provisional ballots. 

Maricopa County, Arizona 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 86 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

In response to a question in our survey asking if the county allowed firsttime voters who registered by mail as of January 2003 but did not provide 

a copy of identification with their applications to cast provisional ballots if 

they were not able to provide identification at the polling place, the 

representative who responded to the survey said this was not applicable. 

Arizona passed a ballot initiative in 2004 requiring voters to show 

identification prior to receiving ballots. The county election office did not 

report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these firsttime voters. 

In Los Angeles County, 204,578 provisional ballots were cast during the 

November 2004 election and 166,894 of these ballots—82 percent—were 

counted. Provisional votes are counted when they are cast by qualified 

voters in any precinct within the county. The main reasons for not 

counting the other 37,684 ballots were that (1) no evidence existed that the 

voters had registered or tried to register to vote, (2) the voters did not sign 

the voter registration forms, and (3) the voters did not provide dates or 

places of birth on the voter registration forms or the provisional ballot 

envelopes. The county election office experienced challenges 

implementing the HAVA provisional voting requirements during the 

November 2004 election and took steps to address these challenges. 

Provisional voting was a challenge because staff had to prepare duplicate 

ballots to remove ineligible or invalid contests when voters cast their 

provisional ballots at the wrong precinct. To overcome this challenge, 

staffing was increased to prepare the duplicate ballots. 

Voters were informed of the availability of provisional ballots and how to 

find out the outcome of provisional votes using various means. 

Representatives we spoke with at the county election office told us that 

voters were notified of the availability of provisional ballots by posting 

signs at polling places, conducting public education campaigns, and 

working with community-based organizations. Also, they said that 

information on provisional voting is contained in California’s Voting Bill of 

Rights and the state’s election code. Voters were provided written 

information at their polling places informing them that they could find out 

the outcome of their provisional votes by calling a toll-free telephone 

number or the local election office. Information on the outcome of the 

provisional votes was made available to the voters more than 10 days after 

the election. 

The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January 

2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications to 

Los Angeles County, 

California 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 87 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at 

the polling place; 12,264 of these first-time voters cast provisional ballots 

during the November 2004 election. To alert pollworkers and elections 

staff of first-time voters who were required to provide identification at the 

polls because they did not provide it when they registered by mail, 

notations were made to the voter file, voter roster, and absentee 

identification envelope. The county election office reported experiencing 

challenges verifying the identification of these first-time voters. 

Specifically, this proved to be a challenge because the state did not have a 

statewide voter registration database to verify the identification of these 

voters. To overcome this challenge, voters were requested to provide 

identification at the polls and absentee voters were requested to enclose 

identification with their ballots. 

In Yolo County, 2,050 provisional ballots were cast during the November 

2004 election. The representative from the election office who responded 

to our survey did not know how many of these provisional ballots were 

counted. For a provisional vote to count, the voter had to be a qualified 

voter in any precinct within the county. The most frequently cited reason 

for not counting provisional ballots were (1) a lack of evidence that the 

voters had submitted voter registration applications at MVA offices, (2) 

voters not providing identification as required by HAVA for individuals 

who registered by mail and were voting for the first time in the precinct or 

jurisdiction, and (3) voters not signing a sworn statement that they met the 

qualifications to be eligible to vote in the precinct or jurisdiction. The 

county election office did not experience challenges implementing the 

HAVA provisional voting requirement during the November 2004 election. 

The county election office used various means to inform voters of the 

availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes. 

Representatives we spoke with at the county election office told us that 

voters were notified of the availability of provisional ballots by posting 

signs at polling places and mailing sample ballots to voters. Voters were 

also provided written information at their polling places informing them 

that they could find out the outcome of their provisional votes by calling a 

toll-free telephone number or the local election office. Information on the 

outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters more 

than 10 days after the election. 

The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January 

2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications to 

cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at 

Yolo County, California 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 88 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

the polling place. The representative from the county election office who 

responded to our survey did not know how many first-time voters cast 

provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert 

pollworkers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to 

provide identification at the polls because they did not provide it when 

they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with notes, 

codes, or marks next to the voters’ names. The county election office did 

not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these 

first-time voters. 

In Detroit, 1,350 provisional ballots were cast during the November 2004 

election, and 123 of these ballots—9 percent—were counted. Provisional 

votes are counted when they are cast by qualified voters in their assigned 

precincts. The main reasons for not counting the other 1,227 provisional 

ballots were that the voters did not (1) provide acceptable identification or 

proof of residence, (2) sign sworn statements that they met the 

qualifications to be eligible to vote in the precincts or jurisdictions, or 

(3) meet the residency eligibility requirements for the precincts or 

jurisdictions. The election office experienced challenges implementing 

provisional voting during the November 2004 election. Provisional voting 

was a challenge because Detroit has the largest number of voting precincts 

in Michigan, and the 6-day time frame for processing provisional ballots 

was very challenging and unrealistic. To overcome this challenge, the 

entire department’s employees were mobilized to process provisional 

ballots. 

The election office used various means to inform voters of the availability 

of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes. Representatives 

we spoke with at the election office told us that election staff notified 

voters of the availability of provisional ballots by speaking to community 

and church groups and through a voter education program. Voters were 

provided with written information at their polling places informing them 

that they could find out the outcome of their provisional votes by 

contacting the local election office by phone and in person, and by 

receiving a letter from the election office. Information on the outcome of 

the provisional votes was made available to the voters within 6 to 10 days 

after the election. 

The city allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January 

2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications to 

cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at 

the polling place. The representatives from the city election office who 

City of Detroit, Michigan 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 89 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

responded to our survey did not know how many of these first-time voters 

cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert poll 

workers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to provide 

identification at the polls because they did not provide it when they 

registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with notes, 

codes, or marks next to the voters’ names. The city election office did not 

report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these firsttime voters. 

In Delta Township, four provisional ballots were cast during the November 

2004 election, and one of these ballots was counted. Provisional votes are 

counted when they are cast by qualified voters in their assigned precincts. 

The reason for not counting the other three ballots was that the voters’ 

registration applications were postmarked after the registration deadline. 

The township election office experienced challenges implementing the 

HAVA provisional voting requirement during the November 2004 election 

and took steps to address these challenges. Provisional voting was a 

challenge because it was viewed as too complex and time-consuming for 

poll workers to administer along with all the other issues they face on 

Election Day. To overcome this challenge, the election office provided the 

poll workers with general information on provisional voting and instructed 

staff in precincts to call the election office about each provisional 

envelope ballot being considered. 

The election office used various means to inform voters of the availability 

of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes. Representatives 

we spoke with at the election office told us that voters in the township 

were notified of the availability of provisional ballots primarily through the 

media. Voters were also provided with written information at their polling 

places informing them that they could find out the outcome of their 

provisional votes by calling a toll-free telephone number, calling the local 

or state election office telephone number, or visiting the local election 

office in person. Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was 

made available to the voters within 5 days after the election. 

Delta Township allowed first-time voters who registered by mail to cast 

provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at the 

polling place. To alert pollworkers and elections staff about first-time 

voters who needed to provide identification at the polls because they did 

not provide it when they registered by mail, the voter registration list was 

marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the voters’ names. None of 

these first-time voters cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 

Delta Township, Michigan 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 90 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

election. The county election office reported experiencing challenges 

verifying the identification of these first-time voters. Specifically, this was 

viewed as very time-consuming due to the high volume of voters, and that 

other voters suffered because this resulted in delays. To overcome these 

challenges, poll workers asked for identification as needed. 

In New York City, 140,779 provisional ballots were cast and 77,804 of these 

ballots—55 percent—were counted. Provisional votes are counted when 

they are cast by qualified voters in their precincts. The main reasons for 

not counting the other 62,975 provisional ballots were that (1) no evidence 

existed that the individuals who cast these ballots had registered or tried 

to register to vote directly with the elections office, (2) the envelopes or 

ballots were incomplete or illegible, and (3) voters did not meet the 

residency eligibility requirements. The city election office did not report 

experiencing challenges with implementing provisional voting. 

In response to a question about how the city election office notified voters 

of the availability of provisional ballots, election office representatives 

said that voters were already familiar with the system.2

 Voters were not 

provided with written information at their polling places informing them 

that they could find out whether or not their provisional votes were 

counted and, if the votes were not counted, the reason they were counted. 

Instead, the election office sent letters to only those provisional voters 

whose ballots were not counted because state election law requires 

notifying only those voters whose provisional ballots were not counted. 

Information on the outcome of the provisional ballots was made available 

to the voters more than 10 days after the election. 

The city allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January 

2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications to 

cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at 

the polling place; 551 of these first-time voters cast provisional ballots 

during the November 2004 election. The names of these voters were 

marked on the registration list so that poll workers knew that these voters 

needed to show identification. The county election office did not report 

 2

While New York State had not passed legislation to implement the provisional voting 

requirements in the Help America Vote Act by the time of the November 2004 election, New 

York had a form of provisional voting in place referred to as affidavit ballots. 

New York City, New York 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 91 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these first-time 

voters. 

In Rensselaer County, 1,914 provisional ballots were cast and 972 of these 

ballots—51 percent—were counted. For a provisional vote to count, the 

voter had to be a qualified voter in the precinct. The main reasons for not 

counting the other 942 provisional ballots were that (1) the county election 

office received registration applications after the state’s registration 

deadline, (2) no evidence that individuals had registered or tried to 

register directly with the election office, and (3) voters did not meet 

residency eligibility requirements. The county election office did not 

report experiencing challenges with implementing provisional voting. 

In response to a question about how the county election office notified 

voters of the availability of provisional ballots, election office 

representatives said that poll worker inspectors did so if they were not 

listed in the voter rolls. Voters were not provided with written information 

at their polling places informing them that they could find out whether or 

not their provisional votes were counted and, if the votes were not 

counted, the reason they were not counted. Voters who cast provisional 

ballots could find out the outcome of their votes by calling the election 

office. Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was made 

available to the voters more than 10 days after the election. 

The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January 

2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications to 

cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at 

the polling place. None of these first-time voters cast provisional ballots 

during the November 2004 election. The names of these voters were 

marked on the registration list so that poll workers knew that these voters 

needed to show identification. The county election office did not report 

experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these first-time 

voters. 

In Bexar County, 2,996 provisional ballots were cast during the November 

2004 election and 602 of these ballots—20 percent—were counted. 

Provisional votes are counted when they are cast by qualified voters in 

their assigned precincts. The main reasons that the other 2,394 provisional 

ballots were not counted were that (1) voters did not meet the residency 

eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction and (2) no evidence 

existed that the individuals had registered or tried to register directly with 

Rensselaer County, 

New York 

Bexar County, Texas 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 92 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

the elections office or had submitted their voter registration applications 

at MVA offices. The county election office reported experiencing minor 

challenges implementing provisional voting during the November 2004 

election, which included missing signatures and provisional ballots cast in 

incorrect precincts. To address this issue, efforts were made to review all 

available records for the missing or incorrect information, such as the 

voter registration database, secretary of state records, motor vehicle 

agency records, and cards containing the voters’ original signatures. 

The election office used various means to inform voters of the availability 

of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes, such as posting 

signs at polling places. This information was also made available to voters 

upon request. Voters were not provided with written information at their 

polling places informing them that they could find out whether or not their 

provisional votes were counted and, if the votes were not counted, the 

reasons they were not counted. Voters could find out the outcome of their 

provisional votes by calling the local election office or by receiving a letter 

from the election office. Information on the outcome of the provisional 

votes was made available to the voters within 6 to 10 days after the 

election. 

The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail after January 

2003 and did not send a copy of identification with their applications to 

cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at 

the polling place. The representative from the county election office did 

not know how many first-time voters cast provisional ballots during the 

November 2004 election. To alert poll workers and elections staff about 

first-time voters who needed to provide identification at the polls because 

they did not provide it when they registered by mail, the voter registration 

list was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the voters’ names. The 

county election office did not report experiencing challenges verifying the 

identification of these first-time voters. 

In Webb County, 60 provisional ballots were cast during the November 

2004 election and 23 of these ballots were counted. Provisional votes are 

counted when they are cast by qualified voters in their assigned precincts. 

The main reasons for not counting the other 37 ballots were (1) voters did 

not meet the residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or 

jurisdiction, (2) a lack of evidence that the individuals had submitted their 

voter registration applications at MVA offices, and (3) the county election 

office received voter registration applications after registration deadline. 

Webb County, Texas 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 93 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

The county election office did not report experiencing challenges with 

implementing provisional voting. 

The election office provided written information to voters who cast 

provisional ballots informing them that they would receive a letter from 

the election office notifying them of the outcome of their votes. 

Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to 

the voters in 5 days or less after the election. 

The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail after January 

2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their registrations to 

cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at 

the polling place. None of these first-time voters cast provisional ballots 

during the November 2004 election. To alert pollworkers and elections 

staff about first-time voters who needed to provide identification at the 

polls because they did not provide it when they registered by mail, the 

voter registration list was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the 

voters’ names. The county election office did not report experiencing 

challenges verifying the identification of these first-time voters. 

In Albemarle County, 49 provisional ballots were cast during the 

November 2004 election. The representative from the county election 

office who responded to our survey did not know how many provisional 

ballots were counted. For provisional votes to be counted, they must be 

cast by qualified voters in their assigned precincts. The main reasons for 

not counting provisional votes were that (1) voters did not meet the 

residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction because 

they had moved from one jurisdiction to another within Virginia and had 

not updated their voter registration records within the required time frame 

and (2) no evidence existed that the individuals had submitted their voter 

registration applications at MVA offices or at other NVRA agencies. The 

county election office reported experiencing challenges implementing 

provisional voting. Specifically, provisional voting was viewed as a 

challenge because ballots were provided to ineligible voters to placate 

them, given the common misperception among some voters that they 

could cast ballots anywhere. In addition, because various groups created a 

high level of mistrust among voters, who at times were confrontational or 

disruptive, provisional ballots were provided to placate voters and to keep 

order at the polls. To address these challenges, the county election office 

said it would expand outreach efforts to ensure individuals who were 

moving understood the need to provide the election office with a timely 

change of address. 

Albemarle County, Virginia 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 94 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

The county election office used various means to inform voters of the 

availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes. 

Representatives we spoke with at the county registrar office told us that 

voters were notified of the availability of provisional ballots through the 

media. Voters were also provided with written information at their polling 

places informing them that they could find out the outcome of their 

provisional votes by calling a toll-free telephone number, calling the local 

or state election office, contacting the local election office in person, or 

receiving a letter from the local election office. Information on the 

outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters within 6 

to 10 days after the election. 

The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail after January 

2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their registrations to 

cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at 

the polling place. None of these first-time voters cast provisional ballots 

during the November 2004 election. To alert pollworkers and elections 

staff about first-time voters who needed to provide identification at the 

polls because they did not provide it when they registered by mail, the 

voter registration list was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the 

voters’ names. The county election office did not report experiencing 

challenges verifying the identification of these first-time voters. 

In Arlington County, 147 provisional ballots were cast during the 

November 2004 election and 19 of these ballots—13 percent—were 

counted. Provisional votes are counted when they are cast by qualified 

voters in their assigned precincts. The main reasons for not counting the 

other 128 ballots were (1) a lack of evidence that the individuals had 

registered or tried to register directly with the elections office, (2) a lack of 

evidence that the individuals had submitted their voter registration 

applications at MVA offices, and (3) that they did not meet the residency 

eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction. The county 

election office reported experiencing challenges implementing provisional 

voting. Specifically, provisional voting was viewed as a challenge because 

some poll workers did not understand, according to the county election 

office, that anyone who insisted on voting a provisional ballot was entitled 

to do so and, as a result, some voters whose names were not in the 

registration list might not have been offered provisional ballots. 

Provisional voting was also a challenge because, according to the county 

election office, lawyers stationed outside the polls sometimes erroneously 

told voters that they could insist on voting a provisional ballot even though 

poll workers had directed them to their correct polling places. The 

Arlington County, Virginia 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 95 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

election office plans to address some of these issues during training 

sessions for poll workers. 

The county registrar office used various means to inform voters of the 

availability and outcome of provisional votes. Representatives we spoke 

with at the county registrar office told us that voters were notified of the 

availability of provisional ballots by posting signs at polling places. Voters 

were also provided with written information at their polling places 

informing them that they could find out the outcome of their provisional 

votes by calling a toll-free telephone number, calling the local or state 

election office telephone number, contacting the local election office in 

person, or by receiving a letter from the local election office. Information 

on the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters 

within 6 to 10 days after the election. 

The county allowed first-time voters who applied to register to vote by 

mail after January 2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with 

their registrations to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to 

provide identification at the polling place. None of these first-time voters 

cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert 

pollworkers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to 

provide identification at the polls because they did not provide it when 

they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with notes, 

codes, or marks next to the voters’ names. The county election office did 

not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these 

first-time voters. 

No provisional ballots were cast in Franklin during the November 2004 

election. If provisional ballots had been cast, voters would have been 

provided written information at their polling places informing them that 

they could find out the outcome of their provisional votes. Provisional 

votes would have been counted if the ballots were cast by qualified voters 

in their assigned precincts. The election office reported experiencing 

challenges implementing provisional voting and took steps to address 

these challenges. Specifically, providing thorough instructions to all 

election workers and voters about provisional voting during an extremely 

high-turnout election was challenging. To address this issue, the city 

election office provided thorough and repeated poll worker education. 

Provisional ballots were made available to individuals who applied to 

register to vote after January 2003 but did not send a copy of identification 

with their applications. None of these first-time voters cast provisional 

City of Franklin, Wisconsin 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 96 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert pollworkers and 

elections staff about first-time voters who needed to provide identification 

at the polls because they did not provide it when they registered by mail, 

the voter registration list was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to 

the voters’ names. The city election office did not report experiencing 

challenges verifying the identification of these first-time voters. 

In Madison, five provisional ballots were cast during the November 2004 

election but none were counted. Provisional votes are counted when they 

are cast by qualified voters in their assigned precincts. The main reason 

these provisional votes were not counted was that the voters did not 

provide identification as required by HAVA for voters who applied by mail 

after January 2003 and were voting for the first time in the precinct. These 

voters were instructed to bring their identification to the local election 

office within 24 hours after the election but did not do so. The city election 

office did not report experiencing challenges implementing provisional 

voting. 

Voters were provided with written information at their polling places 

informing them that they could contact the local election office to find out 

the outcome of their provisional votes. However, the local election office 

did not provide information to voters on the outcome of provisional votes 

since this information is only provided when provisional votes count.3

The representative from the city election office did not know if first-time 

voters who registered by mail after January 2003 but did not send a copy 

of identification with their applications were allowed to cast provisional 

ballots if they were not able to provide identification at the polling place. 

To alert poll workers and elections staff about first-time voters who 

needed to provide identification at the polls because they did not provide 

it when they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with 

notes, codes, or marks next to the voters’ names. The city election office 

reported experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these firsttime voters. Specifically, the city election office required additional staff to 

 3

With respect to provisional voting, under HAVA, states that had either (1) no voter 

registration requirements for voters with respect of federal elections (North Dakota) or 

(2) polling place registration on Election Day with respect to federal elections (Idaho, 

Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) in effect on and after August 1, 

1994, are not subject to HAVA’s provisional voting requirements. 

City of Madison, Wisconsin 
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Local Election Offices Implementing 

Provisional Voting 

Page 97 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

send notices to these voters to notify them that they needed to submit the 

necessary documentation or bring it to the polling place on Election Day. 
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 98 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

This appendix describes the responses of state and local motor vehicle 

agency (MVA) representatives to our survey about their experiences 

during 2004 in carrying out various voter registration application tasks—

specifically, assisting MVA clients with completing voter registration 

applications, accepting applications from these clients, and forwarding 

applications to state or local elections offices. It also describes actions 

MVA officials reported that they took when individuals and state or local 

election officials contacted their offices about individuals who said they 

submitted their applications to MVA offices but their names were not on 

the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 

election. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses to our 

survey by the applicable state and local MVA officials and were not 

independently verified by us. 

In 1993, NVRA, also known as the “motor voter” law, was enacted. NVRA, 

among other things, established procedures to facilitate the registration of 

eligible citizens to vote in federal elections by providing them the 

opportunity to apply to register to vote at various locations, such as motor 

vehicle and other NVRA agencies primarily in states that have a voter 

registration requirement.1

 Under NVRA, an eligible citizen conducting 

certain transactions at a motor vehicle agency (MVA)— such as applying 

for, renewing, or changing the address on a driver’s license—can 

simultaneously apply to register to vote or, if applicable, change the 

voter’s address. 

In 2001, we reported that about 46 percent of the jurisdictions responding 

to our nationwide survey expressed concerns about applications received 

from NVRA agencies. For example, officials most frequently noted 

challenges with processing incomplete or illegible applications, 

applications that arrived late at the local election office, and applications 

that never arrived. Because local election officials around the country 

expressed concerns about processing applications submitted at MVAs, as 

noted in our 2001 report, we surveyed MVA officials in six states2

 and 12 

local jurisdictions about their experiences during 2004 in carrying out 

 1

Under NVRA, states that had either (1) no voter registration requirements for voters with 

respect to federal elections (North Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election Day 

with respect to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and 

Wyoming) in effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not subject to NVRA. 

2

Wisconsin was not included in our survey because MVA offices in this state do not 

participate in voter registration because, as noted in footnote 1 in this appendix, the state is 

exempt from NVRA. 

Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with 

Voter Registration Applications 
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 99 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

voter registration application tasks and assisting voters who said they had 

submitted their applications to a MVA office but their names were missing 

from the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 

2004 election. Appendix IX provides a copy of the survey sent to MVA 

officials in each of the six states and 12 local jurisdictions. 

As figure 8 illustrates, state MVA representatives reported, for the most 

part, that during 2004 MVA staff found that helping clients complete their 

voter registration applications, accepting applications from clients, and 

forwarding applications to state or local elections offices was either very 

easy, somewhat easy, or neither difficult nor easy. 

Figure 8: MVA Officials’ Characterization of How Difficult or Easy It Was for MVA Staff to Assist Clients with Completing Voter

Registration Applications, Accept Applications from Clients, and Forward Applications to Election Offices 

a

The state MVA officials responded not applicable when asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to 

help MVA clients complete the voter registration application because they said MVA staff do not help 

clients complete the application. 

Discussed below, by state, are the reasons MVA representatives reported 

that MVA staff did not experience difficulty performing the voter 

registration application tasks and the assistance staff provided to 

individuals who said they had submitted their applications to MVA offices, 

Experiences of 

Selected State MVA 

Offices 
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 100 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

but their names were not on the voter registration lists when they went to 

vote in the November 2004 election. 

When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients 

complete the voter registration application, the state MVA representative 

responded “not applicable” because staff do not help MVA clients 

complete their voter registration applications. Accepting voter registration 

applications was easy because the electronic form walks the clients 

through each part of it. MVA clients cannot proceed through the form if all 

the required boxes have not been completed. Forwarding the applications 

to the state or local elections offices was more time consuming than 

difficult or easy. 

Twelve individuals contacted the state MVA office saying that they had 

submitted a voter registration application to their MVA office or another 

MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter registration lists 

when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office 

referred these individuals to the local election office and checked the MVA 

electronic transaction information for their voter registration applications. 

State or local election officials contacted the state MVA office about 

individuals who said they were told their names were not on the voter 

registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. 

However, the state or local election officials did not know whether the 

individuals had said that they had submitted their voter registration 

applications to the state MVA office or another MVA office. 

When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients 

complete the voter registration application, the state MVA representative 

responded not applicable because staff do not help MVA clients complete 

their voter registration applications. Accepting applications from MVA 

clients and forwarding these applications to state or local elections offices 

was very easy. 

The state MVA office was not contacted by individuals who said that their 

names were missing from the voter registration lists when they went to 

vote in the November 2004 election. But the MVA office was contacted by 

state or local elections officials who indicated that the individuals said 

they had submitted their voter registration applications to the state MVA 

office or another MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter 

registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. 

The state MVA representative, who did not know how many individuals 

Arizona 

California 
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 101 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

had contacted the state or local elections officials, reported that when the 

elections officials provided adequate information, the MVA office 

researched the driver’s license database to determine if the individuals’ 

claims could be confirmed and informed the elections officials of the 

outcome of the MVA research. 

Helping MVA clients to complete their voter registration applications and 

accepting the completed applications from them were very easy because 

the MVA offices process thousands of voter registrations annually 

following standard procedures that have not changed substantially in 

many years. Also, the voter registration applications are printed 

automatically with the voter name, address, and date of birth. The clients 

only have to verify the information in the application and sign it. 

Forwarding applications to the state or local elections offices was 

somewhat easy because clients are not always sure about their city or 

township. MVA offices are provided with pre-printed mailing labels for 

forwarding the applications to the various election jurisdictions, which 

makes the process quite simple overall. 

The state MVA representative did not know how many individuals or state 

or local elections officials had contacted the state MVA office or another 

MVA office about individuals who said that their names were not on the 

voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 

election because this information was not collected or tracked. 

The state MVA representative responded that helping MVA clients to 

complete their voter registration applications, accepting the completed 

applications from them, and forwarding the applications to state or local 

elections offices were neither difficult nor easy for MVA staff during 2004. 

The state MVA office has not been made aware of any difficulties that MVA 

staff might have encountered in carrying out these voter registration 

application tasks. 

Individuals and state or local elections officials had contacted the state 

MVA office about 421 individuals, in total, who said that they had 

submitted their voter registration applications to the state MVA office or 

another MVA office, but their names were not on the voter registration 

lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. The state MVA 

office searched its electronic files to determine whether the 421 

individuals had indicated they wanted to apply to register to vote at the 

time of the MVA transaction. Also, if necessary, the state MVA office 

Michigan 

New York 
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 102 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

pulled the original source documents to determine the individuals' intent 

to apply to register to vote. 

The state MVA representative responded that helping MVA clients to 

complete their voter registration applications was neither difficult nor 

easy for MVA staff during 2004, but this task added time to processing 

MVA transactions. Accepting the completed applications from the clients 

also was neither difficult nor easy and added time to processing MVA 

transactions. MVA staff had to review the completed applications before 

accepting them and forwarding them to the state or local elections offices. 

Forwarding the completed voter registration applications to state or local 

election offices was neither difficult nor easy. Applications were either 

mailed or hand delivered to the state or local elections offices. 

Individuals and state or local elections officials had contacted the state 

MVA office about individuals who said that they had submitted their voter 

registration applications to the state MVA office or another MVA office, 

but their names were not on the voter registration lists when they went to 

vote in the November 2004 election. However, the state MVA office did not 

know how many individuals had said that they had submitted their voter 

registration applications to the state MVA office or another MVA office. 

Helping MVA clients to complete their voter registration applications and 

accepting the completed applications from them were neither difficult nor 

easy because MVA has been handling voter registration since 1996. MVA 

staff provide the same level of service for voter registration as they do for 

other MVA transactions. Forwarding applications to the state or local 

elections offices is very easy because the applications are mailed daily to 

the state board of elections by all of the MVA offices. 

Four individuals contacted the state MVA office saying that they had 

submitted a voter registration application to their MVA office or another 

MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter registration list 

when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office(s) 

and the state board of elections office researched various automated 

systems and paper records to determine when the clients had conducted 

business with the MVA and the disposition of any voter registration 

applications. The MVA clients were advised by letter of the outcome of 

this research. Also, the state board of elections office contacted the state 

MVA office indicating that 1,288 individuals had said that they had 

submitted their voter registration applications to the MVA state office or 

Texas 

Virginia 
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 103 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

another MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter 

registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. 

MVA assisted the state board of elections office in verifying the 

individuals’ claims and determining when they submitted an application to 

a MVA office. The state board of elections office, which has access to MVA 

records and houses all voter registration information, found that 295 

individuals had applied to register to vote at a MVA office and their 

applications were sent to the state board of elections office. Of the 

remaining 993 individuals, 591 had indicated that they did not wish to 

apply to register to vote and did not complete an application; 245 had no 

record of conducting MVA business or submitting a voter registration 

application at a MVA office; 128 conducted an Internet, mail, or phone 

transaction with MVA but did not request that a paper voter registration 

application be mailed to them; and 29 submitted their voter registration 

applications after the registration deadline. 

The MVA representative responded not applicable when asked how 

difficult or easy was it for staff to help MVA clients complete the voter 

registration application because staff do not help MVA clients complete 

their voter registration applications. The customer completes the 

application and MVA staff glance at it to ensure all the information has 

been completed. Accepting applications from clients and forwarding the 

applications to the elections offices is very easy because, after the clients 

complete their applications, a copy of the application is given to them and 

the original applications are mailed daily to the elections offices. 

The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election 

officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from 

the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 

election. 

When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients 

complete the voter registration application, the MVA representative 

Experiences of 

Selected Local MVA 

Offices 

Gila County, Arizona 

Maricopa County, Arizona 
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 104 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

responded not applicable. Accepting applications from MVA clients and 

forwarding the applications to election offices was very easy. 

One individual contacted the MVA office saying that he/she had submitted 

a voter registration application to their MVA office or another MVA office, 

but his/her name was missing from the voter registration list when he/she 

went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office referred the 

individual to the local election office. No state or local election officials 

contacted the MVA office about individuals who said they were told that 

their names were not on the lists of registered voters when they went to 

vote in the November 2004 election. 

The MVA representative responded not applicable when asked how 

difficult or easy was it for staff to help MVA clients complete the voter 

registration application because staff do not help MVA clients complete 

their voter registration applications. Accepting applications from clients 

and forwarding the applications to the elections offices is very easy 

because the applications are collected and mailed to the elections offices 

daily. 

The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election 

officials about individuals who said their names were missing from the 

voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 

election. 

When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients 

complete the voter registration application, the MVA representative 

responded not applicable because MVA staff do not assist MVA clients 

with completing voter registration forms. MVA staff provide clients the 

forms, accept the completed forms from the clients and note in the MVA 

database that the forms were received, and forward the forms to the local 

voter registrars. Accepting the forms from the clients and forwarding them 

to the elections offices was very easy. Most forms are forwarded weekly to 

the local registrars by mail and a special pickup is arranged for the 

deadline day before an election. 

The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election 

officials about individuals who said their names were missing from the 

voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 

election. 

Los Angeles County, 

California 

Yolo County, California 
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 105 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Assisting clients with completing their voter registration applications and 

accepting the applications from them was very easy because the 

applications are completed by computer as part of other transactions. The 

individuals only have to sign their applications. Forwarding applications to 

the elections offices was very easy because applications are presorted and 

pre-printed labels are used for mailing them to the elections offices 

weekly. Around the time of elections, applications are forwarded daily to 

the elections offices. 

The representative from the MVA office did not know whether individuals 

or state/local election officials had contacted their MVA office about 

individuals who said their names were missing from the voter registration 

lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election because this 

information was not collected or tracked. 

Assisting clients with completing their voter registration applications and 

accepting applications from them was very easy because thousands of 

these transactions are processed yearly; the clients check the information 

in their applications and sign them. Forwarding applications to the 

elections offices was neither easy nor difficult, but it can be time 

consuming based the volume of applications and the need to separate 

them by election jurisdictions. 

The representative from the MVA office did not know whether state or 

local election officials contacted the MVA office about individuals who 

said their names were missing from the voter registration lists when they 

went to vote in the November 2004 election because this information was 

not collected or tracked. Approximately 12 individuals contacted the MVA 

office saying that they had submitted their voter registration applications 

to their MVA office or another MVA office, but their names were missing 

from the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 

2004 election. The MVA office referred the individuals to the local election 

office and tried to look up a record of the voter registration applications 

the individuals reportedly submitted. 

Assisting MVA clients with completing the voter registration form, 

accepting forms from them, and forwarding the forms to the elections 

offices was very easy. When assisting clients with completing the forms, 

MVA staff question information on the voter registration forms only if the 

clients have not filled out any of the information on the voter registration 

forms. 

City of Detroit, Michigan 

Delta Township, Michigan 

New York City, New York 
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 106 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election 

officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from 

the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 

election. 

Assisting MVA clients with completing their voter registration forms was 

very easy because MVA staff do not assist clients with completing the 

forms. Accepting the voter registration forms and forwarding them to the 

local elections offices was also very easy. The forms are mailed to the 

elections offices. 

Two individuals contacted the MVA office saying that they had submitted a 

voter registration application to their MVA office or another MVA office, 

but their names were missing from the voter registration lists when they 

went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office referred the 

individuals to the local election office. No state or local election officials 

contacted the MVA office. 

Assisting MVA clients with completing the voter registration application, 

accepting applications from them, and forwarding the applications to the 

elections offices was very easy. 

The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election 

officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from 

the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 

election. 

Assisting MVA clients with completing the voter registration application, 

accepting applications from them, and forwarding the applications to the 

elections offices is somewhat easy. The applications are very easy for the 

clients to complete, and staff forward the applications to the elections 

offices daily. MVA staff review incomplete applications for accuracy. 

The MVA office was contacted by individuals saying that their names were 

missing from the voter registration list when they went to vote in the 

November 2004 election. The representative from the MVA office did not 

know how many of these individuals contacted the MVA office. The MVA 

office was not contacted by state/local election officials about individuals 

who said they were told that their names were not on the lists of registered 

voters when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. 

Rensselaer County, 

New York 

Bexar County, Texas 

Webb County, Texas 
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with 

Voter Registration Applications 

Page 107 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Assisting MVA clients with completing their voter registration applications 

was neither difficult nor easy because MVA clerks are responsible for 

quickly reviewing the applications to ensure all parts have been completed 

and informing the clients of any parts of the application that are 

incomplete. If clients have questions about the voter registration 

application, MVA staff refer the clients to the local voter registrar or the 

state election office because the MVA is responsible for providing clients 

the opportunity to apply to register to vote, not answering voter 

registration questions or verifying clients’ responses contained in the 

applications. Accepting applications from MVA clients was somewhat easy 

because sometimes the clients do not complete all parts of their 

applications and return incomplete applications to the MVA clerk. 

Forwarding applications to elections offices was also neither difficult nor 

easy because a policy and procedure are in place for carrying out this 

activity. 

The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election 

officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from 

the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 

election. 

Assisting clients with completing their voter registration applications was 

neither difficult nor easy because MVA clerks do a quick review of the 

applications to make sure they are complete but do not verify any of the 

clients’ responses. MVA offices are tasked with providing their clients with 

the opportunity to apply to register to voter. Accepting applications from 

the clients and forwarding them to the elections offices was somewhat 

easy. Forwarding these applications is a task that is performed daily. 

The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election 

officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from 

the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 

election. 

Albemarle County, Virginia 

Arlington County, Virginia 
Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency 

Officials 

Page 108 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency 

Officials 
Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency 

Officials 

Page 109 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency 

Officials 

Page 110 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency 

Officials 

Page 111 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency 

Officials 

Page 112 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency 

Officials 

Page 113 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 
Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

 

Page 114 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration 

William O. Jenkins, Jr. (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, John Mortin and Linda Watson, 

Assistant Directors; Leo Barbour; Amy Bernstein; Katherine Davis; Gina 

Flacco; Evan Gilman; Mary Martin; and Maria Santos made key 

contributions to this report. 

Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(440203) 
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