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23–853 PDF 2005

COMBATING TERRORISM: VISAS STILL

VULNERABLE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 13, 2005

Serial No. 109–78

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

THOMAS COSTA, Professional Staff Member

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

ANDREW SU, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on September 13, 2005 ..................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Ervin, Clark Kent, director, Homeland Security Initiative, Aspen Institute; Dr. James J. Carafano, senior fellow, the Heritage Foundation;

Susan Ginsburg, former senior counsel, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission); and

John Daniel Morris, retired Consul General, U.S. Mission to Beijing,

China .............................................................................................................. 76

Carafano, Dr. James J. ............................................................................. 83

Ervin, Clark Kent ...................................................................................... 76

Ginsburg, Susan ........................................................................................ 94

Morris, John Daniel .................................................................................. 104

Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade Division; U.S.

Government Accountability Office; Ambassador John E. Lange, Deputy

Inspector General, U.S. Department of State; Tony Edson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs,

U.S. Department of State; and Elaine Dezenski, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Border and Transportation Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .................................................................. 3

Dezenski, Elaine ........................................................................................ 44

Edson, Tony ............................................................................................... 36

Ford, Jess T. .............................................................................................. 3

Lange, Ambassador John E. ..................................................................... 27

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Carafano, Dr. James J., senior fellow, the Heritage Foundation, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 85

Dezenski, Elaine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Border

and Transportation Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 47

Edson, Tony, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 38

Ervin, Clark Kent, director, Homeland Security Initiative, Aspen Institute, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 80

Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade Division, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 6

Ginsburg, Susan, former senior counsel, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 97

Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio, prepared statement of .................................................................... 129

Lange, Ambassador John E., Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department

of State, prepared statement of ................................................................... 29

Morris, John Daniel, retired Consul General, U.S. Mission to Beijing,

China, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 106

(1)

COMBATING TERRORISM: VISAS STILL

VULNERABLE

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING

THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays and Van Hollen.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel;

Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Robert A. Briggs, clerk;

Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; and Jean Gosa,

minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

hearing entitled, ‘‘Combating Terrorism: Visas Still Vulnerable,’’ is

called to order.

All 19 terrorists responsible for the September 11th attacks obtained legitimate visas to enter the United States. Many should

have been flagged as suspicious somewhere along the way, but they

were not. Would they be able to get visas today? Four years later

the answer to that question is still an unsettling ‘‘probably not, but

maybe.’’

Without question, the visa process has been strengthened as a

security tool. Without question, the Department of State has improved training of consular officers and standardized many critical

visa adjudication steps from embassy to embassy. Technology has

been deployed to improve the speed and effectiveness of a very

labor-intensive system. Fingerprints are collected. Identities are

verified, and everyone who wants to visit the United States must

be interviewed.

But weaknesses and gaps remain in the visa process that could

be exploited by those determined to do us harm. Key policies still

lack clarity. State’s consular staffing patterns often do not reflect

current threats and new workloads. Training should be more focused on terrorism travel patterns and fraud prevention. Information sharing, although significantly improved, could be better. And

the visa security program of the Department of Homeland Security

[DHS], lacks strategic direction.

In a report released by the Government Accountability Office,

GAO recommends that State Department clarify visa procedures

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and better focus consular resources on visa posts based on national

security implications and workloads; junior officers should not be

dropped into high-threat, high-volume posts without language

skills and adequate senior supervision. But that is still happening.

GAO also recommends Congress increase the limited access consular officers get to the FBI criminal history records maintained by

the National Crime Information Center [NCIC]. Consular officers

today cannot tell whether an individual hit on the NCIC data base

represents a major crime or an overdue speeding ticket. The necessary followup request to the FBI can take weeks to produce an

answer that could be retrieved in just minutes.

Recognizing the national security implications of the visa process, Congress charged DHS to set overall visa policies. As part of

that mandate, DHS was specifically tasked to place visa security

officers [VSOs], in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. But after 2 years,

DHS has no qualitative or quantitative assessments of VSO activities in Saudi Arabia. There is no strategic plan to guide deployment of VSOs elsewhere.

Balancing the demands of national security against the very real

threat to facilitate commerce, education and tourism will never be

easy. If we are to remain a welcoming and secure Nation, the visa

process must function as an efficient and effective portal, admitting

those who would enrich our culture, while denying entry to those

who would seek to destroy it.

Our witnesses bring a wealth of expertise and experience to this

discussion of visa security. We appreciate their willingness to be

here today and we look forward to their testimony.

We have two panels. Our first panel is Mr. Jess T. Ford, Director

of the International Affairs and Trade Division of the U.S. Government Accountability Office; Ambassador John E. Lange, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of State; and Mr. Tony Edson,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, Bureau of Consular

Affairs, U.S. Department of State; and Ms. Elaine Dezenski, Acting

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Border and Transportation

Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Did I pronounce your name correctly?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So let me provide the oath. If you would stand,

we will administer the oath and then we will start with testimony.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record our witnesses have responded in

the affirmative. And we will start with you Mr. Ford. And what my

practice in this subcommittee is is to do 5 minutes, but we roll over

for another 5 minutes. It’s not my preference that you take 10, but

it is my preference that you don’t try to rush the 5 and if you go

7 or 8, whatever, we are more than happy.

We invited you because we did want to hear your testimony. So,

Mr. Ford.

3

STATEMENTS OF JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS AND TRADE DIVISION; U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AMBASSADOR JOHN E. LANGE, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE;

TONY EDSON, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

VISA SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND ELAINE DEZENSKI, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, BORDER AND

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like my complete statement included in the record.

Mr. SHAYS. Absolutely.

Mr. FORD. I’m pleased to be here today to discuss two recent reports on actions that have been taken by the Department of State

and the Department of Homeland Security to strengthen the nonimmigrant visa process as an antiterrorism tool.

All 19 of the September 11th terrorists hijackers were issued a

visa, which is a U.S. travel document foreign citizens must generally obtain before entering the country temporarily for business,

tourism, or other reasons. In deciding to approve or deny a visa application, the State Department consular officers are on the front

line of defense in protecting the United States against potential

terrorists and others whose entry would likely be harmful to U.S.

national interests. But consular officers must balance this security

responsibility against the need to facilitate legitimate travel.

In October 2002, we reported on a number of shortcomings in the

visa process and made several recommendations aimed at strengthening the role of national security in the process. The recommendations called for improvements in procedures for addressing heightened border security concerns, enhanced staffing, and

counterterrorism training for consular officers. Today, I will discuss

the changes that have been made since our 2002 report to

strengthen the visa process, as well as areas that deserve additional management attention.

First, I will focus on our report issued today on changes in the

visa policy and guidance consular resources, including staffing and

training and the extent to which U.S. agencies share information

with visa adjudicators.

Second, I will discuss our July 2005 report on the placement of

DHS visa security officers at U.S. embassies and consulates overseas.

The State Department and DHS have taken many steps to

strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. Specifically,

the State Department has provided clear instructions to consular

officers on the importance of national security to the visa process.

At every post we visited, including those with special interests to

antiterrorism efforts, the consular staff viewed security as their top

priority, while recognizing the importance of facilitating legitimate

travel.

To further strengthen the visa process, the State Department has

increased the hiring of consular officers, targeted recruitment of

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foreign language-proficient officers, revamped consular training

with the focus on counterterrorism, and increased resources to combat fraud. Further, intelligence and law enforcement agencies have

shared more information for consular officers’ use in conducting

name checks on visa applicants.

Despite these improvements, we found that further actions are

needed to enhance the process. Consular officers we interviewed

said that guidance is needed on the interagency protocols regarding

DHS staff roles and responsibilities overseas. Actions are also

needed to ensure that the State Department has sufficient experienced staff with the necessary language skills at key consular

posts.

While the State Department has hired more consular officers, it

continues to experience shortages in supervisory staff. As of April

30th of this year, 26 percent of midlevel positions were either vacant or filled by junior officers. Moreover, State has not prioritized

the staffing of its more experienced officers to key posts. As an example, we found that the visa sections in critical posts, in Saudi

Arabia and Egypt, were staffed with first-year, entry-level officers

and no permanent midlevel visa chiefs to provide direct supervision

and oversight. Our report issued today calls for further improvements and training in fraud prevention as well as information

sharing with the FBI.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the assignment

of DHS employees to U.S. embassies and consulates to provide expert advice and training to consular officers regarding visa security. In September 2003, DHS assigned visa security officers to consular posts in Saudi Arabia. DHS also plans to assign staff to other

posts to strengthen the visa process at these locations.

The visa security officers assigned to Saudi Arabia review all

visa applications prior to a final adjudication by consular officers

and assist consular officers with interviews and fraud prevention.

According to senior officials in Saudi Arabia, the visa security officers in Riyadh and Jedda have strengthened the process. However,

no comprehensive data exists to measure the performance of the

visa security officers or to demonstrate their impact. In addition,

the requirement to review all visa applications in Saudi Arabia limits the officers’ ability to provide additional training and other services to consular officials, such as assisting with interviews and

training in visa fraud.

We found that DHS planned to expand the visa security program

to five overseas posts in fiscal year 2005 and intends to further expand the program in future years. However, the expansion of the

program has been delayed because embassy and State Department

officials have raised concerns about the program’s goals, staffing requirements, and coordination plans. According to DHS officials, the

Department provided sufficient responses throughout 2004 and

2005 to address these concerns. However, we noted that DHS has

not developed a strategic plan for its visa security operations in

Saudi Arabia or at any of the expanded posts, but defines mission

priorities, long-term goals and identifies outcomes expected at each

post. We have made recommendations that DHS develop such a

strategic plan to guide visa security process and to develop perVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23853.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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formance data to show what impact their agents are having overseas.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I’d be happy to answer any of your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Ford.

[NOTE.—The GAO report entitled, ‘‘Border Security, Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Staffing

and Information Sharing,’’ may be found in subcommittee files.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN E. LANGE

Mr. LANGE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to provide the Office of Inspector General’s observations about the Department of State’s progress since 2002 in strengthening the visa

process as an antiterrorism tool. For the sake of brevity, Mr. Chairman, I will today present highlights from the full statement that

I am submitting for the record.

Among OIG’s body of work on this subject over the last 4 years,

our December 2002 report on visa issuance policy and procedures

continues to serve as a baseline to measure the Department of

State’s progress in strengthening nonimmigrant operations worldwide. That report identified four areas where the visa process needed strengthening, including improved executive oversight and supervisory leadership, increased consular section staffing, specialized national security training, and the need for adequate consular

workstation facilities for implementing new visa process requirements.

We also have identified fraud prevention programs as a fifth key

topic.

Overall, in our judgment, the Department of State has made extensive strides in strengthening the visa process since September

11th, a day that profoundly changed U.S. border security policy.

Regarding executive oversight and supervisory leadership, recent

OIG reviews indicate that the Bureau of Consular Affairs has made

substantial improvements in standardizing visa policy and procedures. Since 2002, the Bureau has repeatedly reinforced the consular oversight responsibilities of chiefs of mission and has instituted a mandatory annual certification of consular management

controls.

Our recent report on the visa referral process, dated March 2005,

discussed dramatic improvement in the referral system that is now

codified, more transparent, and more accountable than before, with

Ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission clearly responsible for a

mission’s referral system and its integrity.

On consular section staffing, this office in 2002 identified inadequate staffing levels of consular sections as the single most serious impediment to effective management of nonimmigrant visa

processing worldwide. The Department of State now employs a

staffing model, updated every 2 years, that measures the increased

work loads for visa officer positions due to ongoing changes in visa

processing requirements, including more personal interviews, more

security clearances, and the new fingerprinting requirement.

Although some improvements have occurred, determining adequate staffing has been increasingly complex. OIG inspection observations would lead us to caution that a one-size-fits-all model does

not suit the differences in the type of visa clientele and mix of processing requirements found in overseas posts. The Department has

taken steps to mitigate the problem of assigning entry-level officers

to consular sections in rotational positions that involve only 1 year

of service in a consular section. And this is a matter that we continue to monitor in response to our recommendations from back in

2002.

28

Regarding national security training, the Department of State

has made substantial strides in training consular officers and has

addressed requirements spelled out in the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act. In our 2002 report, we recommended

that the Department develop special analytical interview training

to help identify visa applicants who are a potential threat to national security.

The Foreign Service Institute’s basic consular course now includes added emphasis on visa security, including a half-day program on counterterrorism at the Central Intelligence Agency. Over

95 percent of respondents to our survey for a report on standards

for refusing visa applicants reported that they had received training in analytical interviewing techniques. OIG has found that

many consular sections are following the Department’s information-sharing directive and arranging with other mission elements

to provide current region-specific training on law enforcement,

counterterrorism, and techniques for detecting possible terrorist or

criminal connections.

As noted in our 2002 report, many posts had longstanding, inadequate consular work space and facilities. Over the past 3 years,

many urgently needed renovations for consular spaces were completed, using funds from a special 3-year consular improvement initiative. OIG continues to identify consular sections with urgent

work space needs and believes this type of flexible funding is necessary to respond to rapid changes in nonimmigrant visa trends.

In November 2004, OIG issued a report on visa and passport

fraud prevention programs that lauded the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security for their joint initiative in creating

25 overseas investigative positions staffed by assistant regional security officers who have produced clear, positive results in detecting and deterring fraud and corruption. However, in spite of numerous communications to the field, some consular officers have

stated that mission management and consular managers have not

been effectively informed of the importance of antifraud efforts and

their direct bearing on border security.

In summary, it is clear from our reviews that the Department

has made substantial improvements to address gaps and

vulnerabilities in the visa process over the last 4 years, but continued progress needs to be monitored closely.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to address your

questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lange follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Edson.

STATEMENT OF TONY EDSON

Mr. EDSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss today’s GAO report and the steps the Department of State has

taken to strengthen the visa process.

Mr. SHAYS. Your mic is on, I think. Just tap, just so I know.

Yes, it’s on. We have one mic that’s a little softer than the rest.

Mr. EDSON. Thank you for having me here.

The research and recommendations the GAO makes are vital to

the Department’s work as we move with the Department of Homeland Security toward our common goal of national security and secured prosperity. We know the goal posts are never stationary.

There are always additional steps that we will take, can take, to

improve visa security.

The Department has made significant and rapid changes to the

visa process since September 11th in an effort to push out our border security beyond the United States. As the report notes, today’s

consular officers understand that national security is job one, while

they work to facilitate legitimate travel. In order to support that

work, the Department has incorporated some 8.9 million records

from the FBI National Crime Information Center into the consular

lookout and support system name-check data base, doubling the

records on file.

We have implemented new regulations requiring near-universal

personal interviews, rolled out the new tamper-resistant Lincoln

nonimmigrant visa foil and completed worldwide deployment of biometric software and facial recognition screening, and the list of improvements goes on.

As the GAO recognized, the Department has taken numerous

steps to enhance consular training. For example, we have quadrupled the number of offerings of FSI’s special course on fraud prevention for managers, allowing over 130 consular personnel to complete the course in fiscal year 2005. The content of the course has

also been revised to incorporate additional material on

counterterrorism and a briefing from the National Targeting Center.

We agree with the GAO that we must expand this training further and have already begun to do so, developing a course specifically on countering terrorist travel. Moreover, because terrorist

travel trends are inherently changeable and often country specific,

we believe that additional instructions should center on ways to access current intelligence data. Therefore, as part of the basic consular course, all new consular officers are trained to effectively access relevant information from the Department and other USG

agency sources on the SIPRNet classified Internet.

The GAO’s report cites the need for greater and more targeted

language training, FSI or the Foreign Service Institute, has already developed consular-specific modules for most of the languages it teaches and has also expanded upon our post language

programs.

In light of the security concerns raised in this report, the Department will give careful consideration to extending the current time

37

limitation on language training for entry-level officers assigned to

critical threat countries.

The report also recommends that State develop a comprehensive

worldwide staffing plan. We believe we have such a plan, and it’s

being revised on an ongoing basis.

We would be happy to brief the subcommittee in more detail on

human resource planning activities, at your convenience. For now,

allow me to note that the Department periodically reviews all consular staffing needs to ensure that workload needs are met around

the world.

Based on these work load reviews, which also take into account

priorities such as assistance to American citizens, the Department

has established over 400 new consular positions since fiscal year

2002. Our increased level of hiring in fiscal years 2002 to 2004 has

since produced our largest tenured class to date. These 152 newly

tenured generalists included approximately 70 consular officers

now eligible to compete for midlevel jobs and to help address the

midlevel gap frequently cited in the GAO report.

An important component of interagency information sharing is

access to complete information. This is especially true on the visa

interviewing line where such information is directly relevant to

fighting terrorism.

As I mentioned previously, in early 2002 and in response to the

Patriot Act, we worked closely with the FBI to transfer names from

FBI data bases into the class system culminating in an on-line

linkage of those two data bases. Since then, thousands of ineligible

visa applicants have been denied visas who otherwise might have

received visas had their names not been transferred to our lookout

system.

However, the GAO report emphasizes that consular officers need

some additional information from FBI data bases in order to increase their operational efficiency and enhance national security.

We in DHS have had fruitful discussions with FBI on this matter

and look forward to a solution that meets our needs.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your attention. At this time, I’m

available to answer any questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Edson.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Edson follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Dezenski.

STATEMENT OF ELAINE DEZENSKI

Ms. DEZENSKI. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the

opportunity to appear before you this morning.

I think, as we’re all aware, developing and implementing effective visa policy is complex and very difficult work, and it is so because we strive to achieve a balance so that the visa system cannot

be exploited by those who wish us harm, while it also provides, or

should provide, an open and inviting system that encourages and

facilitates legitimate visitors to the United States.

DHS oversight of the visa issuance process is the first component

of a layered security approach. We realize that this process must

continually be reviewed, refined, and improved; and we appreciate

the work of our partners at the State Department and the work

that both GAO and our own OIG have done to help us make our

programs as effective as possible.

Meeting our legislative mandate under section 428 of the Homeland Security Act requires us to focus on several critical areas involving visa policy oversight. This morning, I’d like to talk about

three of those areas: first, our visa security officer presence and effectiveness; second, training for consular officers; and finally, ensuring that the visa issuance process supports our Secure Borders,

Open Doors vision.

The deployment of VSOs, or visa security officers, to high-threat

areas of the world is top priority. In support of congressional mandates, the Department has established two visa security operations

in Saudi Arabia, which have made the visa issuance process in that

country more secure. In the first 9 months of this fiscal year, VSOs

reviewed 24,000 visa applications is Saudi Arabia. This additional

scrutiny has prevented ineligible applicants from receiving visas,

helped to identify new threats and fraud trends, generated new

watch list entries and led to the initiation of domestic investigations. Per GAO recommendation, we are currently creating a data

base to establish a baseline of these types of VSO contributions

that will help better quantify our success and our performance

measures.

Even as we are reviewing 100 percent of visa applications, we

have not seen a negative impact on visa processing times. In fact,

for the time period covering 2003 to 2004, State reported an improvement in processing times at these locations.

VSOs have also instituted a prescreening process that allows consular officers and VSOs to more effectively focus applicant interviews on areas of interest and concern.

Finally, VSOs work closely with consular officers during the adjudication process to closely scrutinize applications, clarify immigration law, review suspect documents, and to clarify or interpret

derogatory information the consular officer may encounter from a

data base check. Our VSOs come into the job with an average of

15 years of law enforcement and related experience, and that can

be very beneficial to consular officers who may be relatively new

to their duties.

GAO’s most recent report on visa security process identifies the

need to put the right people in the right place with the right skills.

45

We fully endorse this assessment. We are confident that the Department’s plans for expansion of the VSO program addresses the

critical human resource needs identified in the report.

In order to facilitate deployment of VSOs to new consulates, both

DHS and State will need to increase efforts to educate the embassies on the role of VSOs at the post. We concur with GAO’s recommendation that the Department develop additional guidance on

the relationship between DHS and State in the visa process and

this effort has already begun. We are moving ahead with the deployment of VSOs to five additional high-threat locations beginning

next month.

We appreciate State Department’s support of these efforts. GAO

also made specific recommendations to further integrate and share

law enforcement information. While most of the reports’ recommendations refer to the need for data base improvements, the

VSOs themselves are an important link in the information-sharing

process. Automated systems cannot substitute for human law enforcement expertise.

By expanding the Department’s presence in consulates, we can

facilitate the consular officer’s access to information and law enforcement analysis critical to their adjudication process. For example, in Saudi Arabia, the VSOs provide up-to-date information on

newly identified document vulnerabilities directly to consular officers, such as the types of counterfeit documents that have recently

been seized at U.S. ports of entry.

Now I’d like to talk a little bit about training. DHS has a statutory obligation to provide training to improve the security of the

visa process. This is a critical function that is important not only

for the consular officers already at post, but also during the basic

consular training taking place stateside. VSOs conduct training

sessions for consular officers on topics ranging from port of entry

procedures, admissibility, fingerprinting, fraudulent document detection, interview techniques and immigration and national security law.

We have also reviewed the basic consular officer training at the

Foreign Service Institute, and we are working with State to identify and develop additional homeland security modules. VSO officials conduct classes on the visa security program during consular

officer basic training, and we have participated in two Department

of State regional conferences and have participated with State in

their consular management assistance team visits to various posts.

We believe that the positive training environment developed at the

two consulates in Saudi Arabia will be a model for VSOs deployed

to new posts.

Training is but one area where we feel VSOs can offer a significant value add. In fact, by allowing for some flexibility in terms of

how we review applications and at what volume we review, as suggested by GAO, our VSOs could spend additional time on training

and other value-added oversight capabilities.

Finally, DHS and State have made a tremendous effort to combat the perception that security measures implemented to strengthen the visa process have made it too difficult for legitimate travelers to come to the United States. We’ve talked extensively with

business organizations, educational institutions and the scientific

46

community, and one of the issues consistently raised by these

groups was the lengthy timeframe for visa processing, often due to

the need for additional security checks on certain travelers. Based

on this feedback, we have worked with our interagency counterparts to identify areas of the visa issuance process, such as the security advisory opinion [SAO] process, where we can implement

more efficient and effective procedures.

One example of the type of efficiencies we have identified is the

validity of certain SAO clearances where we have extended the validity period for students, certain types of temporary workers and

certain types of business visas. This change is a significant improvement of the previous requirement of a new SAO clearance for

each individual trip.

In making this change, DHS and State carefully reviewed the existing process and set strict limitations on when the extended clearances apply. In this instance, we were able to fine-tune the process

to better facilitate travel while maintaining security. We continue

to work with State to identify other areas where we can achieve

similar results.

Visa security is an integral part of the overall border management system. It impacts the security of our citizens, our visitors,

affects billions of dollars in trade and travel, and helps define relations with our international partners. We simply can’t afford to get

it wrong.

I want to thank the subcommittee for the support, and I look forward to working in partnership with the State Department and

members of the committee on this complex and critical homeland

security task. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dezenski follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank you very much.

You had a nice way of describing really what our task is. I mean,

this is the GAO, the Inspector General, Congress, working with

DHS and the Department of State to make the system work better.

I think for the most part, the system is working better both for

GAO and Inspector General; but we are going to kind of get underneath and just have a better sense of it.

But I wanted to start out—and, Mr. Edson, I guess you would

be the person to do it; I want you to tell me. We basically have an

immigrant process and we have a nonimmigrant process, tourist,

student visas and business folks coming in and out and probably

just a whole host of others as well.

But am I correct in thinking as immigrant and nonimmigrant?

Mr. EDSON. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Walk me through what used to happen before

September 11th, before DHS, before we put this focus on how did

19, 20 people, who were not U.S. citizens, end up getting into the

United States and so on. So walk me through first the nonimmigrant, either way, immigrant or nonimmigrant.

And then I want you to tell me what it was and what it is today

or what we want it to be today. I’m trying to set the stage here.

Mr. EDSON. At a fairly high level perhaps?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. In other words, what was it before September

11th? How did the system work?

Mr. EDSON. Immigrants—actually, the system’s been pretty

standardized since the late 1990’s with the deployment of a uniform automation platform for us overseas. So beginning at about

that time, a nonimmigrant applying for a tourist or student visa

would submit an application, a printed application, a single-page

form, back and front, with a photograph attached and the passport.

A large percentage of those cases were submitted without personal appearance required. People would submit them through a,

what we call the ‘‘drop box.’’ It might be something as simple as

a wooden box with a slot in it in front of the embassy, or through

a travel agent, through a school educational group. The applications would then be reviewed.

Some people were interviewed; depending on local conditions,

threat and fraud indicators, many were not. The application was

reviewed by our local staff for completeness, then a visa record created in our system. That would kick off a name check automatically. Based on the results of the name check and a review of the

application, an officer would then approve or deny the case.

Denials only took place in person. You’d have to come in in person for an interview for a denial. But either through an interview,

or without, the case would be approved or denied, and then subsequently issued, and the issued foil placed in the passport and given

back to the applicant.

Mr. SHAYS. But when you checked names with the record thing,

what was the significance of that? Because you didn’t really have

anything to match the names with, did you?

Mr. EDSON. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. What did you have?

Mr. EDSON. Even before September 11th, the consular lookout

and support system had several million records, including the terVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23853.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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rorist lookout records that subsequently became the core of the

data base managed today by the National Counterterrorism Center. So we had that.

We did not have FBI data at that time. We had enforcement

data, most of the law enforcement data from DHS.

Mr. SHAYS. So the FBI data would be basically a criminal record?

Mr. EDSON. Criminal records we did not have at that time.

Mr. SHAYS. Basically, if you were a nonimmigrant, you could

pretty much come into the United States either as a tourist, a student, or a business? And are there a lot of other nonimmigrants?

I mean, is it countless or are those the big three?

Mr. EDSON. Those are the big three. There are varieties of working classes.

Mr. SHAYS. So you could basically come into the United States

without ever having to be interviewed, without ever making a personal appearance?

Mr. EDSON. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. And if you were to deny someone, they were given

basically the right to have an interview. You would not deny someone without at least giving them an interview?

Mr. EDSON. Correct, to make sure that we were making the correct decision.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And that’s with nonimmigrant.

Now, that was in the past. What was it with immigrant status?

Mr. EDSON. Immigrant status has always required—it’s a much

more regular, drawn-out process that begins with CIS in most

cases, the Citizens and Immigration Services at DHS, for petition.

Mr. SHAYS. They weren’t DHS then, so——

Mr. EDSON. For INS. And it began with INS at the time.

A petition that is filed, most cases will go through our National

Visa Center in New Hampshire, where we do sort of value-added

clerical support for the overseas posts, some of the early correspondence with the outposts.

Mr. SHAYS. That covers the entire United States?

Mr. EDSON. For us it covers the entire world. And when the case

was ready for interview, it would be sent overseas to our consular

sections where 100 percent of immigrants were interviewed. And

then the visa process to conclusion, if they were eligible, we did the

same sorts of name checks. Immigrants have always—well, for the

past several years, in any event, immigrants have been checked

against NCIC.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t want to do since September 11th yet. Before

then.

Mr. EDSON. Before then, they were being checked, I just don’t remember when in the 1990’s that began. But we checked immigrants against the FBI records for criminal records.

So we had that check done, and the case then would be processed

to conclusion overseas, again always with a personal interview with

an immigrant case.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So the process involved an interview, right, for

an immigrant?

Now describe to me what’s different about both nonimmigrant

today, versus what it was—you described what it was—and then

the immigrant.

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Mr. EDSON. For nonimmigrants, the differences are stark. Obviously, in addition to that flow that I described before, the most significant changes are regulatory changes that we made in August

2003 to require personal appearance from nearly all applicants.

Those changes were enacted in legislation in December 2004. So

nearly every applicant is now coming in for a personal interview.

We expanded the special screening procedures, the screening

that only a small percentage of applicants go through, but it’s a

targeted class, targeted demographics identified by law enforcement or intelligence.

The data in the matrix——

Mr. SHAYS. I’m sorry. I had my Blackberry on, and that’s why

we’re getting the feedback evidently.

I’m one step behind again, so I’m going to ask you to start over.

I apologize. I want you to start over again.

Mr. EDSON. Oh, sure.

The biggest changes, post-September 11th have been in the nonimmigrant process which, as you could tell, was slightly less formal

than the immigrant process before September 11th. Beginning in

August 2003, we published a regulation requiring additional interviews, a much higher percentage of these applicants to be interviewed. That same regulation was essentially enacted into statute

in December 2004. There are very few opportunities for waiver of

personal appearance now for nonimmigrants.

Mr. SHAYS. So basically the rule is, you interview?

Mr. EDSON. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. And that, if you don’t interview, there has to be an

exception?

Mr. EDSON. An exception in the statute.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So that is one big difference?

Mr. EDSON. That’s one big difference. Fingerprinting is a major

difference. We’re now collecting the two index finger scans from all

applicants for whom that’s required. We’re using the same standard that U.S. Visit uses at the port of entry, so the very young, the

very old and the diplomats are not scanned. That is a second big

difference.

Those fingerprints, not only are we collecting the biometric information, but we’re running it against the IDENT biometric data

base maintained by DHS that includes significant amounts of FBI

information. So we’re catching people, imposters, criminals daily.

Large numbers of people are being caught that wouldn’t have been

caught before because of the printing.

We have changed the way in which work is processed in our sections so that local employees, host nationals, host country nationals

or locally engaged American personnel, say, spouses of Foreign

Service officers, they are actually allowed to do far less today than

they were before September 11th. We’ve taken them out of anything having to do with the name check, for example. They have

very limited involvement in the biometric system. Just as a security measure, we added that in.

We expanded the special targeted screening, which doesn’t apply

to a large number of applicants, but some applicants are subject to

additional screening based on demographics identified by law enforcement and intelligence communities. That body of people has

60

actually expanded. So we are screening more people that way, and

we share more information.

The name check system that’s behind all this has more than doubled in size since September 11th, most significantly with the inclusion of the FBI data.

Mr. SHAYS. Now the FBI data this committee added to the DHS

bill, but the data is somewhat vague.

Mr. EDSON. The data is incomplete. The Department of Justice,

in their comments on the GAO report, did a nice job of summarizing some of the issues involved. Basically, they’re managing a biometric data base that we are trying to access on a name-retrievable

basis. What we get back is very limited biographic information

from NCIII. Much of the information in that data base has no direct bearing on eligibility for a visa, things like traffic violations

or——

Mr. SHAYS. But are you able to distinguish between them?

Mr. EDSON. We are not able to distinguish based on a name

check return. We need to submit a 10-print set to the FBI and get

the criminal record in order to distinguish what’s important and

what isn’t.

Mr. SHAYS. Basically, what you want is the criminal record?

Mr. EDSON. Or enough of the criminal record that we can determine whether or not it’s germane to visa adjudication.

Mr. SHAYS. And this has happened for a while. And the argument for this process working this way is what? Why would we not

streamline this?

Mr. EDSON. A couple of arguments. The Patriot Act actually requires that we submit 10 prints to access this data.

I gather that other legislation that governs how criminal data is

managed in the United States has similar impact; and then I have

been told that the FBI indicates that the way the data base is

structured makes it a little difficult to extract some of the information, like charge and disposition.

Mr. SHAYS. The bottom line, though, each one of these individuals is not an American citizen?

Mr. EDSON. Correct.

Mr. SHAYS. I mean, so we are really asking about the criminal

records of someone who is overseas?

Mr. EDSON. Correct.

Mr. SHAYS. And we are trying to protect their privacy rights?

Ms. Dezenski, basically you’re doing what INS was doing, correct,

as a general rule, at DHS?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Within the Border and Transportation directorate

most of our focus is on the nonimmigrant process. CIS and shipment services handles most of the immigrant work. But, yes, we

have the former INS function.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well, let me ask you this.

Of the people that existed before in some other named agency,

what are they doing differently today than they did before September 11th? Forget where they’re located, but INS is basically under

your jurisdiction, correct?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Correct.

Mr. SHAYS. What do they do differently now than they did before?

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Ms. DEZENSKI. I think we can probably point to a couple of major

process changes. I’m not as familiar on the immigrant side, but I

can tell you, for example, that there’s increased access to certain

types of data bases for the immigrant review process. That’s a byproduct, I think, of the work that we’ve done through U.S. Visit

and their ability to integrate numerous data bases across the Department that have both biographic and biometric information. So

not only does that help us at the port of entry, but it also can be

used in terms of the case management process with NCIS. So I

think that is one good example.

If you look more closely at the nonimmigrant side of what we do,

you know, we can point to everything from the implementation of

U.S. Visit entry and, now, exit processing to greater information

sharing with the FBI.

Tony alluded to the work that we are doing with our IDENT and

FBI’s IAFIS data bases, to bring those two biometric resources together so we have more information available at our ports of entry

and at consular posts. We’re moving toward the 10-print standard

so that as people are coming into the country, we are not going to

be taking two prints; we’re going to be moving toward 10-print.

That also applies ultimately to the visa issuance process as well.

So we can point to numerous activities that we have undertaken

to strengthen the system and a lot of these broader moves that we

have made on information sharing and data integration and management have spillover effects for both the immigrant and the nonimmigrant side of what we do.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Van Hollen has joined us and I can yield to him or I can just

proceed with some questions to Mr. Lange. But before recognizing

him, I would ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the

record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose.

And without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statements in the record. And without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank Chairman Shays for conducting these hearings

and thank all the witnesses for being here this morning. As you all

said in your testimony, we have an obvious, important mission

within the immigration’s nonimmigrant visa system to make sure,

No. 1, that we protect our security, but also to make sure that we

don’t stymie unnecessarily the ability of legitimate visitors that

come to the United States.

And there was a period of time where I think that became a very

serious issue, where our system was resulting in many legitimate

visitors not coming here. I think that continues to be an issue, but

I’m pleased with the progress that we’ve made.

I have heard a lot of complaints—I think, legitimate complaints—from those in the area of higher education, scientists, of

the delay and that, of course, has an impact on our economy here

and our ability to move forward in many areas of research. Obviously, within the business community, there were lots of comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23853.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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plaints from legitimate business travelers. So I want to thank you

for the progress that’s been made in that area.

I look forward to working with you, especially if you could pass

along, Mr. Edson, my thanks to Assistant Secretary Maura Harty

for her efforts in that area because I think she’s been working very

diligently for all of us.

Let me just ask a couple of questions about the visa security officers, if I could, because one question—I’m looking at the GAO report and maybe I should start with you, Mr. Ford. To what extent

do you believe the visa security officers are really providing value

added to our consular officers? In other words, is there duplication?

Are some of the tasks that are being performed by visa security officers tasks that can be performed by consular officers if we gave

them additional training, and would that be a better approach to

providing for our security than having another layer?

I don’t have a position on this issue. I’m really looking to you,

as someone who’s taken an independent look at it, for your advice.

Mr. FORD. Yes, sure.

I think it’s difficult to answer that question at this point because

so far they’ve only been assigned to two overseas posts in Saudi

Arabia, so the amount of information that’s available about the

value added of those positions is somewhat limited.

Clearly, we visited Saudi Arabia in the course of doing our work.

We met with all the visa security officers there. We met with all

the senior embassy officials. I think the general sense of everyone

we talked to there was that they were, in fact, bringing some value

added to the process.

We noted at the time of our visit that the State Department consular officers assigned there were largely junior people, so having

an experienced law enforcement individual there actually helped

them get their job done.

But I can’t generalize, based on one post, whether or not the

overall effort is going to be value added or not. That is one of the

reasons we recommended that the Department of Homeland Security, as they expand this program, provide more data on exactly

what the value added is for these individuals, so that one can make

a judgment as to whether or not, in fact, it’s duplicating what consular officers are already doing, or whether they’re providing some

additional law enforcement training and expertise that right now

we may not have in these posts.

So I’d say at this point in time, it’s an open issue as to whether

or not this program is going to be value added or not.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

If I could have some reaction from representatives of State Department and Homeland Security, I’d appreciate it.

Ms. DEZENSKI. Thank you.

Well, I think we feel very strongly within the Department that

the visa security oversight and officer program needs to move forward with the additional deployments and that there’s real value

added to the process. I think we need to be sure that we’re not

comparing apples to oranges.

The role of the consular officer, and Tony can speak to it better

than I can, but it’s primarily focused on visa adjudication, application review, specific skills inherent in the State Department procVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23853.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ess. We envision, and I think the way it’s working in practice in

Saudi Arabia, that the VSO role is slightly different. There is a review process of the visa application, and that is very important; but

we also bring analysis of law enforcement information. We do reviews of trends, for example; and the types of information that

we’re seeing, we’d like to have our officers play a more regional role

so that we can share information and gather trends across a region

as opposed to just simply focusing on a particular country.

We play an important role in training, whether it’s working with

the consular officers or even going out into the local community.

For example, we worked with airlines in Saudi Arabia where we

have been able to help them identify certain types of fraudulent

documents.

So I think the way to look at it is a different type of value add

in that both of these functions are critical to making the process

work. What we hope is that we can move forward with the deployments to the five additional areas that we’ve identified, recognizing

that we need to work on the performance metrics so we have a better process for reporting back to you and that we get the strategic

plan in place. However, we hope that we’re not held up because of

not having that plan completed.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Mr. EDSON. We certainly agree with our DHS colleagues, with

everything that Elaine said. The two functions are and ought to be

different; and we’ve worked very closely and will continue to work

very closely with DHS as that strategic plan is framed to ensure

that we’re not doing the same work, that there’s genuine value

added on both sides for all the activities that we undertake.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Well, let me ask you this. I mean, we obviously

have the visa security officers in one post right now, Saudi Arabia,

a plan to expand to five. We have hundreds of embassies around

the world, and it would seem to me that where we have consular

officers on the front line, I would hope that this additional training

in security areas and being able to detect fraudulent documents

and all that kind of thing is now being incorporated into the training of the consular officers.

Has there been a change since September 11th with respect to

that kind of training for consular officers? And why isn’t it better

to make sure that everybody going through the process, all the consular officers, are getting some of this more specialized training so

that they can make the kind of assessments and analysis that the

DHS folks are doing?

Mr. EDSON. Certainly, there have been significant changes in the

training since September 11th. We added 3 or 4 days to the basic

training course for consular officers to include 2 days of analytical

interviewing techniques and some significant time spent on fraudulent document identification and counterterrorism, briefings from

other agencies.

In addition, we have quadrupled the number of offerings of our

fraud managers course so that we were able to put 130 officers

through that course last fiscal year.

We have expanded an effort to get more local access; in the field

access to intelligence information, we have expanded training on

the classified Internet resources that we use to access intel. So we

64

are taking both approaches. We are trying to make sure that our

officers are as prepared as possible to deal with counterterrorism

threats and fraudulent documents and fraud in general, while

working with DHS to frame a role for the visa security officers that

is complementary and does the best it can to secure the visa process.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK. I just was a little concerned when you

talked about having these totally separate functions with no overlap. I understand where you have both individuals there; that is

important. Let’s face it, the bulk of our consular officers are right

now in stations around the world that have no visa security officer,

and I think it’s essential that they have that training so that there

is a first line of defense.

Let me ask you about the visa waiver program. I don’t know how

many countries—there are European countries where we have an

arrangement whereby, if you come from one of those countries, you

don’t require a visa; is that right?

Mr. EDSON. Twenty-seven.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK, 27 countries. And so what is required

from those countries? Show a passport? What do you need to show?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Yes, the requirement is to have a valid passport.

And as you may be aware, we have actually implemented some

new requirements in terms of what those passports need to encompass, a digital photo integrated into the data page as of October 26,

2005. In addition, we have specific statutory requirements that

countries must follow to be part of the VWP. For example, they

have to have a relatively low visa refusal rate. They have to have

a low overstay rate, so we know that folks from that country aren’t

illegally remaining. And there are a couple of other criteria in that

statute.

So it’s a combination of those statutory requirements, plus some

of the new things that we require on the biometric passport and

some refined requirements in terms of obtaining information on

lost and stolen passports, so that we have a better handle on fraudulent documents coming in.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK. I don’t have a solution to this issue, but

ultimately, I mean, it’s fair to say, isn’t it, that we are relying on

the ability of the foreign governments of these 27—I mean the governments of these 27 countries to police the validity of these documents?

Ms. DEZENSKI. We do require that they have certain standards

for the documents. Yes, we do rely on them for the issuance of

them. As VWP travelers come into the United States, they are still

subject to U.S. Visit requirements, so we are taking their fingerprints and running their information against our data bases, which

also happens when someone comes in with a visa. So there are additional measures in place at the port of entry so it is not as if

these folks are just waved in with a passport.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Right. I guess what I’m suggesting is, as we

commit lots of resources to making sure our consular officers are

trained, or our visa security officers in those posts where people are

issuing nonimmigrant visas, it’s obviously essential that we make

sure that we’re confident that the documents being provided by

those 27 countries that have waiver programs are not easily subject

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to forgery. Because it seems to me that if you’re looking for a way

to illegally enter the United States, and you believe the line of defense of the consular officers and the visa security officers is working pretty well, you’re obviously going to be looking for another

way in. And what exactly are we doing?

We have the standards, I understand. Do we go beyond that in

terms of trying to determine the extent to which these governments

are protecting against forged documents, and illegal?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Yes, absolutely. This has been a critical issue. In

fact, we’ve had a lot of congressional interest over the past 6 to 8

months in terms of biometrics with foreign passports coming from

VWP countries. And we’ve stated to those countries that not only

do you need to meet the statutory requirements, but your passports

need to encompass certain types of security features. One, of

course, is a digital photo integrated into the page so you don’t have

a problem of tampering with the passport. Sometimes you can lift

the top piece and take out the photo and put in a new photo. Very

difficult to do when the digital photo is embedded in the document.

Second, we’re moving toward linking in a biometric chip to the

passport so that the digital photo will actually be stored in the chip

along with the biographic information in the passport. So when

VWP passport holders come into the United States and the requirement is fully in place, we’ll be checking that biometric information

based on the chip in the passport.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Just realistically, what’s the timeframe for

that technology to be implemented?

Ms. DEZENSKI. The digital photo requirement, which most countries are already meeting, will come into full effect October 26,

2005, so next month. And the requirement for the biometric chip

follows 1 year later, and that will be required of all new passports

issued after that date. So it will take some time to implement that.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK, thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. Let me, before going to you,

Mr. Ford, and Mr. Lange, I have a little suspicion when my staff

tells me how to pronounce names. They do it phonetically for me

and the last two times they had it wrong, so they have credibility

only in that area with me.

I would like to add a clearer picture about both the VSOs and

the waiver. What I am not clear about the VSOs is that I felt it

was Congress’ intent that we would have a number of them in a

variety of countries.

Was that your understanding of what Congress wanted?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Yes, it was.

Mr. SHAYS. And we have how many so far?

Ms. DEZENSKI. We have—well, there are two congressionally

mandated locations in Saudi Arabia. So we met that requirement.

And then we immediately started developing——

Mr. SHAYS. Just answer the question. How many do we have

elsewhere?

Ms. DEZENSKI. We just have the two.

Mr. SHAYS. And how long has that been since the requirement,

how much——

Ms. DEZENSKI. 2003.

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Mr. SHAYS. That is pathetic, frankly. And there has to be a reason, and I want to know the reason. Is it because you have requested to have VSOs in other countries and State has said no, or

you haven’t even made the request?

Ms. DEZENSKI. We have identified five additional locations

where——

Mr. SHAYS. Just answer my question first.

The question is, have you—is it because you haven’t made the requests yet or is it because the requests were made and State

turned it down? And then you can tell me anything else after you

answer my question.

Ms. DEZENSKI. I don’t think it is as simple as saying it is State

because State denied our request.

Mr. SHAYS. Start over again, take each question. Did you make

a request to State to have VSO officers in other countries?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Yes, we did.

Mr. SHAYS. Don’t hide things from us. You know, the issue I am

having with this administration is that loyalty seems almost more

important than the truth, that we don’t get straight answers. And

we didn’t get straight answers for what we needed down in Louisiana. So straight answers matter to me. Answer my question and

then give me spin.

The question is have you requested to have VSO officers in any

other country?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Yes, we have.

Mr. SHAYS. What countries?

Ms. DEZENSKI. That is actually law enforcement sensitive information.

Mr. SHAYS. How many countries?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Five countries.

Mr. SHAYS. So you have requested in five countries. When did

you make the request? Last week or a year ago?

Ms. DEZENSKI. The requests are made starting in 2003.

Mr. SHAYS. So they were made in 2003. State Department has

so far not agreed to the VSO officers in these countries, is that correct?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Some of the NSDDs have been approved. I actually have a timeline.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Edson, why has State Department not responded

positively to these five requests?

Mr. EDSON. The requests were submitted under the National Security Decision Directive 38 procedures that charged our chief of

commission, our Ambassadors to balance security—the needs of the

Homeland Security Act to post Visa Security Officers overseas and

other directives to right size the U.S. presence abroad.

That discussion with DHS is something we have been actively involved in since 2003, when the requests were submitted, and that

discussion is going forward. In some cases, the requests were approved and the positions are——

Mr. SHAYS. Isn’t it true that State Department originally opposed

having VSOs in countries?

Mr. EDSON. Not that I am aware of, no.

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Mr. SHAYS. Did they request that there be VSOs in countries?

Did we make the requests when we were working in that station?

And if you don’t know, you don’t know.

Mr. EDSON. I am not aware that we positively requested them.

We have worked close with DHS on every request——

Mr. SHAYS. My sense is this has been a initiative of Congress

that we have wanted the VSOs. Maybe, Mr. Ford, Mr. Lange, you

can help me out here. Do either of you know? The question is, it

was my sense that we were not happy with the job State Department was doing. I think I even got a call from the Secretary of

State about some of what we wanted to have happen, and we were

looking—there were amendments in this committee about taking

away some authority from State. And I think the VSOs were the

compromise, that State would still do much of this but we would

have—we had people totally focused on security from DHS working

within State Department. That is my understanding. I mean Mr.

Ford, Mr. Lange, can you confirm it, not confirm it? You look like

you’re praying, Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Well, I can confirm that is what Congress wanted. I

think based on what we know about why there was a delay is that

the Department of Homeland Security and the individual embassies that were being considered had some disagreements about

what exactly the role of these officers would be. And as Congressman Van Hollen mentioned earlier, that was apparently unclear to

many of the Ambassadors about what exactly the role of the VSOs

was going to go overseas and it took a while for clarity to come to

the fore before they would approve these positions.

My understanding is the five posts that they planned to expand,

I think all but one of them have now been approved. So, four out

of five——

Mr. SHAYS. Why would that be an issue that we couldn’t have

an open conversation about? Just offhand? Tell me why. Without

telling what me what the discussions are, tell me why. You know,

we have had hearings about why we classify things so that no one

sees them practically except a few people see the document. Just

tell me why we can’t as Members of Congress in open forum have

a logical conversation about where these five stations would be?

What is the reason why we can’t have a discussion about that? Can

someone tell me that? Why don’t we start with State? Tell me why

we can’t have a discussion. And then DHS tell me why. What is

the logic?

Mr. EDSON. I think we certainly, DHS colleagues have determined that the locations, specific locations, need to be treated sensitively.

Mr. SHAYS. Just think about why. They needed to be treated sensitively because of what? Why?

Mr. EDSON. I would have to defer to DHS.

Mr. SHAYS. Defer to DHS. And if you don’t know, you don’t have

to give me an answer. If you don’t know, you don’t know.

Ms. DEZENSKI. I think there are a couple things going on. The

first thing is that the role of the VSO effort is to expand the footprint of the Department of Homeland Security and to expand our

ability to oversee the process. The NSDD 38 process is obviously

a legacy process. And in that process one of the goals for, and Tony

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will correct me if I am wrong, is to ensure that we are not expanding our footprint, or State isn’t expanding its footprint overly to a

size that they can’t accommodate. So there is some inherent conflict

between the two efforts, and somehow we have to get these processes to work in a more expedited fashion because the objectives

of the two processes are not always in sync. So that is the first

thing.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you, once the VSO is in a foreign country,

will it be known that they are in that foreign country?

Ms. DEZENSKI. It will certainly be known by——

Mr. SHAYS. Are VSOs like CIA agents, that we are not supposed

to let people know who they are, and so on? Maybe I don’t have

an understanding of what the classification of VSO officers are.

Ms. DEZENSKI. My understanding is that they are law enforcement classification. We have treated the locations as law enforcement sensitive information. So we have not been public about how

many people we have deployed and to what location other than

congressionally mandated locations.

Mr. SHAYS. So the answer to the question is like other law enforcement, we don’t disclose where law enforcement officials are in

various countries?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Yes. We are not going to put out a press release,

for example, that we are sending five people next month to country

X.

Mr. SHAYS. When they are in country, are they treated as State

Department employees or DHS employees? When they go to cocktails, what do you do? I work for the State Department, what is

your job?

Ms. DEZENSKI. No. I don’t think they have to say I could tell you

but I would have to shoot you. I think they are known in country

in terms of their role.

I mentioned, for example, that we have officers that have worked

with local airlines in Saudi Arabia, so it is not as if they are working under cover. But we are not public about how we identify high

threat locations and how many people we put on the job to, you

know——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me——

Ms. DEZENSKI [continuing]. For those functions.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me back up a second. I was going to ask Mr. Ford

what is the best thing, and Mr. Lange, what is the best thing that

is happening and the worst thing with immigration, nonimmigrants and immigrants? What is State doing best? What are

they doing worst? What is DHS doing best? What are they doing

worst?

I am not even to that level yet. Where I am at right now is I

came to this hearing listening to four very nice presentations

thinking, you know, we in Congress need to be fair. The Inspector

General needs to be fair. GAO needs to be fair, you know, they are

making good progress, and GAO and Inspector Generals, their job

is not to be ‘‘I gotcha’’ nor is it my job to be ‘‘I gotcha,’’ or Mr. Van

Hollen’s. But I will tell you the uneasiness I have right now, and

maybe you can sort it out. What I have is basically that we have

to kind of give the party line that DHS doesn’t want to offend

State. State doesn’t want to offend DHS. That is kind of what I am

69

getting a feeling, that it was clear as one of the lines of questions

that the VSOs were—they have said there is no clear plan on how

many you want, no time lines, I guess kind of the impression that

we were getting. And then I start to hear these kind of wobbly answers to what to me are fairly logical questions for us to ask. That

is where I am now. So I have gone from a level of feeling kind of

good about things to thinking, you know, if we peel away the onion,

I don’t like what I am seeing.

And just to continue just briefly, the VSO officers were the compromise, I believe, that Congress wanted. Now if they aren’t needed, if their job isn’t defined, then let’s have this debate and let’s

have an honest dialog from State. We don’t want them, they are

not needed, they basically don’t interview anybody, they are just

there. It is a waste. And we have too many different departments

in State as it is. That part I agree with. We have, you know, sometimes 70-plus people who have nothing to do with State in our

State Department.

But then let us know and then, you know, let’s get rid of the law.

It is pathetic to only have in two countries, and there is something

wrong about it. And I don’t know what it is. But I want an answer

to it. If State is dragging their feet, I want to know that. If it is

VSOs that aren’t needed, then let’s forget the charade about even

having them there.

So let me ask you this. Tell me why we need these VSOs. I will

start with State. And if you don’t think we need them, just say I

don’t think we need them. I don’t think you’re going to lose your

job by being honest.

Mr. EDSON. We need them because—let me start by saying——

Mr. SHAYS. Slow down.

Mr. EDSON. We are not trying to block the implementation of the

law in any way.

Mr. SHAYS. You didn’t ask for them. You didn’t say, we couldn’t

do the job. That’s true, right?

Mr. EDSON. Right. It is in the laws and we were trying to make

it work.

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough.

Mr. EDSON. We have seen in Saudi Arabia, and seen increasing

in your dialog with DHS, that there’s a potential for a real benefit

here. But as I suggested to Mr. Van Hollen, we are concerned to

make sure that we get the mission right at the ‘‘git go.’’ Those are

somewhat dangerous countries. There are already fairly small and

strained physical plants in a lot of these countries. We would like

to make sure that what the mission of the VSOs is really adds

value. It seems like it does.

Mr. SHAYS. It’s been 2 years now, right?

Mr. EDSON. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. It has been 2 years. What I am hearing you say basically, I will try to read between the lines. You didn’t ask for them.

Congress has said you have to have them. What I am hearing you

say is basically you don’t know what they are doing. And let me

finish. This is what I am hearing.

And what I am also hearing is stiff upper lip, you are going to

try to make the best of it and you will find a place to put these

folks. That is what is coming across, and that is OK.

70

Mr. EDSON. I’m a little bit misleading then perhaps.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this, could State Department do this

job?

Mr. EDSON. Yes, ultimately.

Mr. SHAYS. And I think that is what their argument was originally. But we have imposed it on you.

Now tell me, are we close to finally having an agreement that we

are going to get them into the other four countries?

Mr. EDSON. Yes. And I think that having deployed additional—

Saudi Arabia has its mission defined by statute so it’s an unusual

model. I think having deployed to those additional countries, that

deployment will end up clarifying the mission significantly and will

speed up the process down the road. I don’t think that there will

be quite as much delay in the future, certainly not in 2 years.

Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Dezenski, tell me, what is the value added of the

VSOs?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Well, let me state the tremendous value I talked

about how all of our officers have an average 15 years of law enforcement experience. So they come from a different background

than a consular officer. We are talking about folks who have

worked as port of entries, folks who have done numerous investigations, have spent time abroad working in an investigative capacity.

It is a different function.

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough. You had answered that before and so

we don’t have a problem with you believing in this, is that correct?

Ms. DEZENSKI. That’s correct.

Mr. SHAYS. OK, but we do have a problem with you not being

forceful enough in getting them in there and that I think is true

and if you do have pushback from State Department, besides going

to your superiors and so on, I think you need to come to Congress

and say we are getting the pushback and we will help push the

other way.

Maybe before going back to Mr. Van Hollen and then we will

close up, here, Mr. Ford, Ambassador, would you tell me, candidly,

did you see value in the VSO officers or is their value somewhat

of a question?

Mr. FORD. I can say, based on our observations in Saudi Arabia,

yes, they did in fact add value there. And I think, again, I think

it is important, this is linked to our other report, when we talk

about the lack of enough experienced supervisory consular officials

in several posts, one of which happens to be Saudi Arabia, having

a law enforcement official there that has capability to and experience on law enforcement matters that State Department currently

doesn’t have, basically that is a value added, and every senior official we talked to in Saudi Arabia had that view.

The real issue is whether or not you multiply that to the other

210 posts overseas, because some places are going to be different

in terms of the environment, the workload and the other factors

that go into making a decision about whether you really need a law

enforcement person there or not.

Mr. SHAYS. OK, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. LANGE. Mr. Chairman, in a recent inspection report that we

issued regarding a post in South Asia, we expressed some concern

about a proposed VSO due to the lack of specificity in what the perVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23853.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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son would be doing and we thought it was important that there be

a clarification of duties to avoid overlap with the Consular Section’s

Fraud Prevention Unit and the Assistant Regional Security Officer

for Investigations.

Mr. SHAYS. Describe to me the difference between the fraud out

of the consular’s office and VSOs? What is the difference?

Mr. LANGE. The RSO, regional security office——

Mr. SHAYS. They are under State?

Mr. LANGE. They are under State. It is part of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and they look broadly at investigations which

could be of locally hired employees, it could be of visa applicants

and its broad connection and have very little close contacts with

the local law enforcement authorities.

The Fraud Prevention Unit is more focused on—and that is in

the Consular Section that is under State. They are more focused

on the specifics of the applicants who come in, the documents that

come in, possibly false birth certificates, things such as that. And

then they work closely with the RSO to utilize those contacts with

the police authorities. And our recommendation in that report was

to try to ensure that the VSO that was proposed for this post have

a clarification what those duties are so there would be no overlap.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And not to go over

this ground too much, but let me just ask a question that really

is raised, Mr. Ford, by your response, and it raises a question. You

pointed out that in Saudi Arabia, one of the reasons the people you

talked to said that Visa Security Officers were needed, one of the

reasons you mentioned was because you didn’t have enough midlevel consular officers, which raises of course the question of staffing of consular officers generally and if Ambassador Lange and others, Mr. Ford, others, you spoke to it in your testimony in part. But

if you could just talk a little bit about to what extent we are short

staffed in key posts with regard to consular officers because that

is a separate issue. I think it is important in Saudi Arabia that

someone is helping fill that vacuum. But that doesn’t mean that we

shouldn’t be fully staffed in our other posts. Let’s go back to the

fact that this is right now one post. Even when expanded to five

we still have hundreds, lots of countries left where it is going to

be the consular officers and the consular officer is going to be on

the front line, and they need to have the training so that, you

know—where I have some trouble with all this testimony is the

suggestion that, you know, when these guys aren’t around that the

State Department consular officer isn’t in a position to adequately

protect the national security interests of the United States because

they don’t have this training. So No. 1, we are going to need consular officers that have the training in all those other posts, unless

we ultimately go to a model where in every post we have, you

know, Visa Security Officers and consular officers. So that is one

issue.

And the other issue is the short staffing; in other words both the

training of the consular officers, but also the staffing. If you could

just speak as to the adequacy of our current staffing of consular officers overseas, what needs to be done to improve it, is this a

72

money and resources issue, is this a priority allocation issue within

the department? Is it all of the above? What do we need to do?

Mr. FORD. I will start.

I think this is, for us, this is probably the most important issue

that we still think requires greater attention, particularly at the

State Department.

In the report we issued today, we cite that at the end of April

the department was short about 26 percent of their mid-level positions, overall, in Consular Affairs sections.

We visited Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and we found that at the

time of our visit we didn’t have supervisory staff there. We made

a recommendation back in 2002 that the Department address a

prioritized system of staffing to ensure that we had the right people in the right place.

The Department has, in fact, hired more people, but they haven’t

really implemented the intent of what we called for 3 years ago

and we have called for again in today’s report, and that is we believe that since they know they are going to have shortages in the

supervisory ranks they need to come up with a plan that prioritizes

posts overseas where the most senior experienced people should be

assigned. And currently, they are basically operating the way they

normally operate in the way they assign their staff, which does not

really prioritize those positions.

So that is what we would like the Department to do, is to reexamine and come up with a plan that basically over time says these

are most critical posts that we need to have our most senior people

there. So that is the issue. And they are hiring more people, and

eventually somewhere down the road hopefully all the positions

will be filled with the right people. But they are not there now.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Makes sense to me. Is that what State Department’s plan is, to prioritize posts with respect to if you have a

shortage of consular officers, make sure they are deployed to the

places where you think is most important to have them?

Mr. EDSON. Certainly. When we were discussing this with GAO

we were trying to discuss with them the sort of complexity of the

overseas staffing situation. We have to prioritize the visa function

in high security environments, obviously.

We also have to make sure we have enough people on the ground

to handle American citizens and be cognizant of the fact that there

is no such thing as a nonstrategic visa. I mean, anywhere we issue

a visa it can be misused. So we can’t afford to let any post no matter how apparently tranquil go unfilled. That doesn’t mean that the

goal is 100 percent when we only have 80 percent of our mid-level

people available for supervisory positions. But it is a balancing act

from year to year. Sometimes if we have a particularly energetic

or talented senior officer in a place it might make more sense to

leave the mid-level position vacant and assign that person to somewhere else.

We try to do our best. We do acknowledge that there is a need

here that we need to be more careful in trying to fill the positions

in places like Saudi Arabia in a more timely manner. Now most of

them in Saudi Arabia and Cairo which were vacant at the time of

the study are now filled.

73

Mr. SHAYS. Just fairly quickly, I hope, when we send people overseas, do we have to declare them to the country involved, state

what the job is? So would we declare that this person was a VSO

officer? And I believe the answer is yes, correct?

Mr. EDSON. The answer is yes that they are declared. I would

have to take the question in terms of degree of specificity that we

declare their function.

Mr. SHAYS. See, my sense is I am getting kind of sensitive to this

but if the host country knows that we have a VSO officer, I would

like to think that American citizens have a right to know. And I

would make a request to State if they are not enthusiastic for

VSOs and they are saying no, I would like them to reargue this

case before Congress and have a meaningful debate about it. And

I would make a request for State and DHS if they don’t have the

resources, don’t tell the appropriator that you have everything you

need to get the job done.

I mean, I realize you probably don’t go before the appropriators,

but we are just not being told things that we need to be told in

open discussion. And so I am certainly going to visit this issue, and

this subcommittee will as well.

Mr. Ford, Ambassador, tell us the best thing State is doing and

the worst, and the best that DHS is doing and the worst.

Mr. FORD. I think in terms of using the visa processes as a security tool, that from my perspective, the most important thing the

Department has done is they’ve made it a priority, the State Department has made it a priority in overseas operations. When you

go and talk to consular officials today overseas, and we visited 8

of them and we have contacted another 17, so we covered 25 in

total—every place we met with people or talked to people it was

clear that the visa process as a security device was critical to that

mission.

So I would say that is the most important thing, is that change

in mindset at the Department of State with regard to ensuring that

security is part of that process. So that is what I would see as

being the best thing that has happened.

I think they have done a lot of other things in regard to training,

in regard to ensuring that their procedures are more clear to their

people overseas. They have made enhancements in all of those

areas, and we want to give them credit for that.

Mr. SHAYS. What is their biggest weakness right now?

Mr. FORD. The biggest weakness, in my view is the staffing issue

we just talked about. I think at the end of the day we are talking

about individuals that have to make a judgment as to whether a

person is going to get a visa or not.

Mr. SHAYS. And part of the problem with staffing of State is that

we have underfunded them for a number of years. We lost a whole

number of years of folks who could buildup in seniority. So we have

this gap in leadership. But I am making the assumption that we

are trying to fill that gap but now we have a lot more inexperienced folks at State.

But I also want to say for the record, this subcommittee has responsibilities overseas. We oversee State and Defense and so on.

We go to a lot of places. I have met some of the finest men and

women working for the State Department. You are just an aweVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23853.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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some group of people, and I am very appreciative of the work they

do.

Ambassador, what is the biggest strength of State and the biggest weakness? If it is different or the same, you can just tell me

it is the same.

Mr. LANGE. In our perspective, the office of the Inspector General, the best improvements in addition to the culture change that

could be the single most overriding issue that Mr. Ford mentioned,

is the training. The consular training that is done by the Foreign

Service Institute in cooperation with the Bureau of Consular Affairs has really been dramatically changed. The analytic interviewing, the involvement of the CIA to help on that, anti-terrorism,

counterterrorism efforts, etc. That has really been a huge improvement and we detect that whenever we go out and visit embassies

and consular officers explain to us what kind of experiences they

have had and what kind of training.

I think consistent with the view of the GAO is that the biggest

problem is in the human resource area. And it is not that it is

going badly, but that it needs to be monitored because it is a very

complex issue, in part because of the issues that you raised, Mr.

Chairman, regarding the influx of new junior officers that occurred

over the last 4 or 5 years through what is called the Diplomatic

Readiness Initiative to make up for the insufficient hiring in the

1990’s. And as that bulge of new officers goes through the system,

there will be more and more available at the mid-level with experience who will be able to fill these positions. But in this interim period, in a sense, there are some problems with junior officers filling

jobs that really should be led by mid-level officers.

Mr. SHAYS. DHS? Biggest strength, biggest weakness?

Mr. LANGE. In terms of us I will have to defer to the DHS on

that one.

Mr. SHAYS. Are you in a position to——

Mr. FORD. Well, again, in the case of DHS——

Mr. SHAYS. As it relates to?

Mr. FORD. The Visa Security Officer program. Again our view is

it is too early to tell what the overall value added of these officers

will be. As we say in the report, we think that DHS should come

up with an overall plan for how these people will be integrated

overseas, and also they need to have better information about what

the value added is. They need to be able to say that as a consequence of having these people we have more fraud cases, we are

finding more bad people than we had before. They need to be able

to demonstrate that having these people assigned overseas is actually going to make a meaningful difference in the overall security

process, and right now they haven’t got those metrics and we think

they need to develop those. And they also need to develop them to

convince the State Department that it is useful to have these people assigned.

Mr. SHAYS. Right, OK. Mr. Edson, biggest strength, biggest

weakness right now, State.

Mr. EDSON. Biggest strength——

Mr. SHAYS. For your comfort level, I will just say biggest challenge, OK?

75

Mr. EDSON. Biggest challenge is staffing. It is not entirely in our

hands. But both filling the mid-level gap in terms of people coming

up through the ranks, a better way to address the fact that with

the changes we have made to the visa process, we have definitely

broadened the base of the pyramid. In terms of the requirement for

more entry level people or lower level visa adjudicators, is now,

real and continuing. It will be with us forever. So I think we have

created a dynamic that will probably result in imbalances in the

personnel system on an ongoing basis, and we need to figure out

how to——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me say, Congress did that. I mean, we underfunded, at a point, we allowed you not to hire certain people that

created this imbalance of——

Mr. EDSON. In addition, I am thinking in terms of things like the

interview requirements and the biometric collection requirements

which we are right now doing with consular officers, you just—we

have created a requirement for a broader base of lower level visa

officers on an ongoing basis, and we need to deal with that.

Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Dezenski.

Ms. DEZENSKI. Our biggest challenge is breaking through the

NSDD process. It has to move more quickly. We need to speed up

the deployment of our folks. They are trained and ready to go. We

won’t have meaningful performance metrics unless we have more

people to develop those metrics.

Mr. SHAYS. You’re understaffed to develop those?

Ms. DEZENSKI. I think that we are going to have a hard time putting performance metrics together if we don’t have more locations

to add into those performance metrics.

Mr. SHAYS. But I got the sense from what you were saying that

you don’t have the staff to start to develop those metrics and so on?

Ms. DEZENSKI. I think we do have the staff ready to develop that.

The issue is getting our people deployed.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well, you know, some of that fight maybe needs

to be a little more public and you need to involve Congress in this

process. OMB is not a dictatorship. It may seem like it is. But if

OMB decides what you’re allowed to say before a committee, you’re

going to have misinformed Members of Congress and we will not

provide the resources where they are needed. And there needs to

be a little more faith that if we have some knowledge that it will

benefit you all. And it is not being disloyal telling us where these

issues of disagreement are. It is what makes our job interesting.

Is there anything that you need to put on the record before we

get to the next panel? Is there any statement you want to clarify

or correct from someone else or whatever, any question that you

wish we had asked that we should have asked that would have

made this a better hearing?

Ms. DEZENSKI. Sir, I would like to add a couple comments to the

record. I have a great staff behind me. They have fed me some good

statistics that I would like to note for the record. The first is that

we want to note that the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia has actually

asked us to increase our staff. We think that is one of the best examples of the efficacy of what we are doing.

I have mentioned we had started the process on the NSDDs in

2003. That is true for Saudi Arabia, but the four additional counVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23853.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tries were submitted in June 2004. I wanted to make sure that was

understood. And in terms of revealing where we have VSO officers,

the main reason that we are quiet about it is because we don’t

what visa applicants moving to the next available post because

they know they won’t have to go through that scrutiny.

Mr. SHAYS. OK, well, I congratulate your staff on good staff

work. But I would say that we could make a list of 15 or so countries where you need to have folks. And the sooner we get that

done the better. Or State Department needs to be making sure

they are doing what the VSO folks would be doing. You all are good

people. I thank you for your service to your country, and I thank

you for participating in this hearing. Thank you very much.

Our next and final panel is the Honorable Clark Kent Ervin, Director of Homeland Security Initiative, Aspen Institute; Dr. James

J. Carafano, senior fellow of Heritage Foundation; Ms. Susan Ginsburg, former senior counsel, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, what is in fact the 9/11 Commission;

and Mr. John Daniel Morris, retired Consul General, U.S. Mission

to Beijing, China.

[Witnesses sworn.]

STATEMENTS OF CLARK KENT ERVIN, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND

SECURITY INITIATIVE, ASPEN INSTITUTE; DR. JAMES J.

CARAFANO, SENIOR FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION;

SUSAN GINSBURG, FORMER SENIOR COUNSEL, NATIONAL

COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED

STATES (THE 9/11 COMMISSION); AND JOHN DANIEL MORRIS,

RETIRED CONSUL GENERAL, U.S. MISSION TO BEIJING,

CHINA

STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN

Mr. ERVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Van

Hollen. Thank you very much for inviting me to testify today on

this critically important topic of whether 4 years after September

11th security gaps remain in our visa policy that can be exploited

by terrorists.

There is no question but that it is harder than ever before for

terrorists to get a visa into the United States. Before September

11th, it was relatively easy. Back then, even though the law required State Department officers to interview visa applicants, this

legal requirement, as you know, was routinely waived. The waivers

were to be exceptional and interviewing applicants was to be the

norm. In practice the reverse was true. Indeed, as we heard, when

an interview was granted, it was usually for the purpose of giving

an applicant, who had already been rejected on a first documentary

review, a second chance to convince the State Department that he

should be admitted to our country. And we all know now about the

notorious visa express program in Saudi Arabia and like programs

elsewhere that allowed third parties in foreign countries to review

visa applications on the State Department’s behalf.

Further, State consular officers had limited access to information

and other government agencies’ data bases, indicating whether a

given applicant might be a terrorist. There was nothing in the

State Department’s CLASS data base indicating that any of the

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September 11th hijackers was a terrorist, but there was information in other agencies’ data bases that had that information been

shared in a timely fashion with State those terrorists might never

have gained entry into our country.

Fortunately, nowadays there are no visa express programs, most

applicants are interviewed, consular officers are better trained to

spot terrorists and signs of fraud. The CLASS data base contains

21 million records of known or suspected terrorists and other people who for some reason are ineligible for visas, nearly triple the

number prior to the attacks, and about 70 percent of the data base

is based on information passed to the State Department by the

FBI, the CIA and other law enforcement intelligence agencies. So

information sharing among relevant agencies is much better than

it was 4 years ago.

But I want to focus my remarks on the issue that you focused

most on, Mr. Chairman, and that is the whole Visa Security Officer

program.

Gaps remain in the visa process that terrorists could easily exploit to readily effect. First of all, and most importantly, and I will

leave the rest of my remarks for the printed record, the Visa Security Officer program provided for in the Homeland Security Act has

not lived up to its promise. Since 15 of the 19 hijackers were from

Saudi Arabia, this provision, as you know, mandated the stationing

of Homeland Security officers in Saudi Arabia to oversee State’s administration of the visa issuance process to ensure that no more

visas are issued to terrorists, at least from that country.

The DHS officers sent were presumably to be experts in

counterterrorism, fraud detection, interview techniques and other

relevant areas. The provision, as you noted, went on to say that

Visa Security Officers should be dispatched to every visa issuing

post in the world, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security can

explain why stationing such officers in a given country would not

contribute to homeland security.

When I looked into the VSO program last year as the then Inspector General of Homeland Security, we found that it was not

making much of a difference in Saudi Arabia. There were no designated VSO slots, the positions were filled by volunteers, and the

volunteers were serving only on a temporary basis, resulting in a

rapid turnover of personnel. I think the average was about 7

months at the time. And the temporary volunteers were lacking in

the basic skills they needed to be effective. For example, one officer

had no law enforcement experience. Another had never worked outside the United States.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t usually interrupt someone who is testifying

but when you say volunteers, that has a whole meaning to me. Are

you saying someone from DHS who volunteered?

Mr. ERVIN. That’s right. Another had never worked outside of the

United States and as a result he had no idea how an embassy

works. Another had no knowledge of the visa process. And only 1

of the 10 spoke Arabic. Even though the DHS and State Department officers were located just a few feet from each other, neither

could then access the other’s data bases, so both were inputting

and then sending back to Washington for a fuller background check

essentially the same information. As a consequence, precious time

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was being wasted by State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, their respective headquarters, and other key members of the U.S. law enforcement, intelligence communities, leaving

the VSOs little time to do what they were supposedly uniquely

competent to do, review visa applications strictly from a

counterterrorism perspective.

There have been some advances in the VSO program in Saudi

Arabia since then. As for the temporary what I call volunteer turnover problem, according to the GAO as you heard, DHS has hired

and trained four permanent employees and deployed them to Saudi

Arabia in June, and they are to stay there for a 1-year period. As

for language ability, two of the four reportedly speak Arabic. I understand from other sources that the VSOs are no longer wasting

time inputting the same data and transmitting it to Washington

that consular officers at post had already input. But as you have

heard, while there is anecdotal evidence that VSOs have helped to

keep terrorists outside of the United States there is no hard and

fast evidence of that because DHS has not kept track of any data

that might shed light on it.

More troubling to me and indeed most troubling to me is that the

program, as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, has yet to be expanded

to any country other than Saudi Arabia. If VSOs are such an effective counterterrorism tool, if they have expertise and access to information that State consular officers don’t have, it is critical that

they be deployed to every visa issuing post throughout the world

as quickly as possible, otherwise terrorists could slip into the country by obtaining a visa in any of the other nearly 200 countries

with which the United States maintains diplomatic relations.

While DHS, as you heard, intends to add five posts this fiscal

year, this fiscal year is nearly over. And as you heard, VSOs have

yet to be deployed to any of them.

While DHS intends to expand the program at the rate of five

posts a year, this is troubling because at that rate it will take

about 40 years for VSOs to be deployed worldwide, giving terrorists

plenty of time to apply for a visa from countries lacking putative

protections of the program.

And I will close with this final paragraph. In my judgment we

should make VSOs as effective as possible. They should in fact be

expert in counterterrorism, fraud detection, interview techniques

and the like. They should have country and area expertise and they

should all be proficient in the local language, and then they should

be deployed throughout the world. We should not allow the State

Department to exercise an effective veto over the expansion of a

program by subjecting this program to the NSDD 38 chief admission authority process by which our Ambassadors, as you have

heard, are in power to approve or deny other agencies’ requests to

have representation in the embassy. This process may be acceptable for the Agriculture Department. It is not acceptable for the

Department of Homeland Security.

After all, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, a compromise was

reached between State and DHS to allow State to continue to process visa applications and to issue visas only on the understanding

that DHS would have the final say on visa issuance. The fear was

that absent the strong hand of a department focused exclusively on

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counterterrorism, the more diplomacy oriented State Department

might revert to a mindset that focuses more on diplomacy and customer service than counterterrorism.

I will stop there and be happy to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ervin follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

Dr. Carafano.

STATEMENT OF JAMES J. CARAFANO

Dr. CARAFANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to applaud this subcommittee on holding these hearings. I would argue

that in the area of interdicting terrorism travel this needs to absolutely be our No. 1 national priority and there is a lot of discussion

about dealing with illegal entry to the United States and making

the border safer. And while I would agree that is important, quite

frankly we know that virtually every known terrorist that has

come into the United States has used some form of travel document. And this is simply the No. 1 way terrorists seek to exploit

every way to get into this country. But this is simply the No. 1

way, and this simply needs to be our No. 1 priority in this area.

The one comment I would make is that as we look at those programs and assess since September 11th I really think we need to

be sober in our expectations. If we really want to make progress

in this area, we have to have realistic deadlines. We have to have

adequate resources. We have to have adequate human capital programs. We have to have clear standards, we have to have credible

measures of performance and we have to have integrated ID programs and if you want to know why things aren’t working better

you can look across all those areas and get the answer.

I agree with Clark. Things are absolutely much better than they

were before September 11th. I don’t think that is disputable. One

of the most important recent developments in my mind is the second stage review by Secretary Chertoff and the Department of

Homeland Security and two critical decisions he has made. One is

to create an Under Secretary for Policy and to elevate the International Affairs Office into that office and give it overall responsibility. I think one of the things that has really hamstrung DHS

since the start is that it hasn’t had a coordinated, integrated approach to its international affairs and it hasn’t had a high level

person directing overall policy integration in the Department. That

is critical. I think establishing a Chief Information Officer and

breaking him away from the IAIP and focusing just on intelligence

and just on the issue of intelligence is absolutely critical. And if

there is one recommendation I would make to the Congress, it is

to be fully supportive of the Secretary’s organizational changes that

he proposed in the second stage review.

I think here is what we can say we have learned over the last

4 years and that making progress has been incredibly difficult, very

costly and very problematic. So what I would really like to direct

this subcommittee’s attention to is I thing we ought to go back and

ask a fundamental question, is knowing that making progress in

the existing system is so difficult and so costly, we should really

ask ourselves do we want to continue on this course or do we simply want a new and different paradigm and do things very, very

differently.

I think terrorism is a long-term problem. The terrorists aren’t

going anywhere. It took 5 years to plan September 11th, it took 3

years to plan Madrid. This is going to be an endemic problem in

the 21st century. I think we should take our time and build a sysVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23853.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tem and get it right, and staying with a legacy system, which we

know fixing it and making it better is very, very difficult, may not

be the right—we may not have made the right policy choice in the

Homeland Security Act of 2002.

I would argue that we take a different course. I think it makes

no sense to divide major responsibilities between three major departments. I would consolidate them all in one, and I would argue

that should be the Department of Homeland Security and then——

Mr. SHAYS. Three major responsibilities being——

Dr. CARAFANO. Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State.

And I would argue that we go back and start with a blank sheet

of paper and envision a new program or new system on how we

want people to come in and exit this country in the 21st century.

And I will end by commenting on two things that I think should

be an important part of that strategy. One is the Visa Waiver Program, and I would simply argue as a matter of strategy that this

is the right solution. If you can get countries into the Visa Waiver

Program and have a degree of due diligence that they are operating

with the same due diligence that we are, you do two things. One

is you build more geostrategic partnerships, and there are lots of

countries that we want to be open and be stronger partners with.

And the second one is you take an enormous amount of resources

and then you can then shift them to other States that aren’t meeting that same level of due diligence.

And the second point I make is we really need the equivalent of

the Military War College’s National Defense University. We really

need a Homeland Security University that brings together these

mid-level people in the State Department and Justice and Homeland Security to really have them in an academic environment, to

really think deeply about these challenges. And one of them should

be terrorist travel. There should be an entire academic environment for these mid-level people to sit together and deep think

about this issue. So I really think we do need some kind of equivalent to the War College experience for our future leaders in these

three departments. And one of the core pieces of that curriculum—

not something in the Consular School, not something that is an

add-on course, not Tuesdays instruction, but a serious intellectual

development. As warfighters think about how to conduct a campaign, people in these other agencies should be thinking about how

to fight terrorism.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Carafano follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Is there any model of any school somewhere else? Any country has a school on homeland security?

Dr. CARAFANO. No.

Mr. SHAYS. It would be kind of like Newt Gingrich thinking out

of the box here?

Dr. CARAFANO. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Ginsburg.

Ms. GINSBURG. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. SHAYS. That is the mic that has the least amplification. If

you want to pull it closer to you.

STATEMENT OF SUSAN GINSBURG

Ms. GINSBURG. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Van Hollen. It is a privilege

to appear before the subcommittee which has maintained a consistent focus on the visa process since September 11th and acted as a

force for its continual improvement.

Let me first summarize the GAO’s key findings as follows. The

visa process must serve simultaneously as an anti-terrorism tool

and as a facilitator of legitimate travel. Consulates are still understaffed in numbers, expertise and experience levels.

Counterterrorism and counterfraud tools are improved but not optimal and DHS’s practical contribution to the visa process remains

unclear.

Each of these points calls for comments from a counterterrorism

perspective.

The visa process as an anti-terrorism tool. Visa offices are crucial

screening points for the defensive blocking of dangerous individuals. Offensively, they help detect and counter terrorist operations

and help counter the criminal infrastructure for illegal immigration, which also contributes to terrorist mobility.

All terrorist groups have to execute certain basic functions: Making decisions, communicating, recruiting, training, raising and distributing money, and moving people and material. Each facet presents a potential vulnerability.

Terrorist mobility, the need to move people, is central. When terrorists need to cross sovereign borders for any of their critical functions, their vulnerabilities and our opportunities for detecting them

are greater.

The mobility function offers opportunities for designing new offensive and defensive measures. We can create new types of information based on it, use it as points of attack or make it more difficult to carry out, especially secretly. Yet terrorist mobility has received significantly less attention than it demands. The visa process is central to this new field of terrorist mobility. The visa office

is a key location where we have the opportunity to detect and

intercept terrorists, or at least ensure that they leave a footprint.

This footprint can contribute to a larger analytic effort by consular offices and others. This information will become relevant

later when a new crew allows visa data base information to be read

as the record of terrorist passage. With other information, it can

reveal patterns and trends and speed the design of new countermeasures.

Visa offices, consulates and embassies are also critical locations

for crime control. Visa officers gain access to information that can

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lead to detecting false personas and fraudulent travel in supporting

documents. When analyzed, this information will allow investigators, intelligence officials and diplomats to take actions against the

sources of those illegal travel tactics.

This includes penetration of criminal networks, preemption and

deterrence. Visa offices must take an increasingly significant role

in crime control against such illegal travel practices and organizations. This role adds a new dimension of importance to the personnel and practices dedicated to this function.

Lack of trained personnel is unacceptable at a time when consulate affairs has a critical national security role in countering terrorist mobility. I do not believe that role can be transferred to the

DHS. The GAO reports significant growth in visa office staffing,

but also presents a troubling picture of supervisory positions filled

by entry level officers, shortages, and language training deficiencies.

Consular offices are transit points which force terrorists to surface and confront governmental authorities. There must be people

in place with experience in the region so that they are better able

to read the clues presented by the people in front of them and to

devise systems to improve information gathering.

The Intelligence Reform Act recommended additional consular officers. Until this occurs there should of course be a process for establishing priorities for filling posts critical to national security.

Part of the good news in the GAO report is that the State Department is currently developing distance learning courses in the

areas of fraud prevention and terrorist mobility. This is a good beginning as long as they are mandatory requirements. Once the

courses are distributed, consular officers must determine whether

they are adequate and what modifications are needed.

Two other points about counterterrorism are important. First,

each post’s officers must have a thorough understanding of the role

of that geographic area in terrorist mobility and in the criminal infrastructure for illegal migration. This probably means developing

specialists at posts for this purpose. These specialists would have

a career path that reflected their role such as cross-service in the

intelligence community and at ports of entry.

At present there appear to be at least 25 visa fraud investigators

deployed, but no specialists in terrorist mobility. Only specialized

knowledge, however, allows visa fraud to be recognized as terrorist

related, and it does not appear that the ability to make these assessments is a mandatory requirement for any of the fraud investigators.

Second, there still appears to be insufficient focus on travel and

supporting documents as a means of detecting terrorists. As you

know, the 9/11 Commission found that 15 of the 19 hijackers were

potentially detectable as terrorists by documentary indicators.

Information relating to potential terrorists’ travel documents is

extensive, detailed and ever changing. Rather than making information available only by classified computer, a better approach

would be to automate it.

Currently, there are no electronic screening of passport books

themselves and of accompanying documents; in other words, they

look at the passport. It doesn’t go through any kind of machine

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that can read it using technology. This can be done to determine

authenticity, to detect adulteration and terrorist and criminal indicators. Yet this capability exists and can be further augmented.

The goal should be electronic screening of foreign passports and

identification documents using these kinds of algorithms. One dimension of a terrorist mobility specialist job should be expertise

and documentary indicators just as there are forensic passport specialists today who supply the Nation with expertise on fraudulent

passports generally.

Improved fraud detection through interviews with visa applicants

and scrutiny of their documentation is a critical dimension of countering terrorist mobility, of crime control and immigration management. Once fraud of any kind is detected, there must be an additional effort to detect any links to terrorism or to a criminal organization that may have links with terrorists.

According to the GAO, what consular officers are requesting are

better counterterrorism tools and training. The basic truth here is

that DHS personnel from ICE or CBP do not have any greater expertise in terrorist mobility than consular affairs officers. The experiment of having DHS visa security officers perform this role for

which they are no better equipped than the personnel at the State

Department should end. Instead, there should be a focus on what

functions DHS officers must fulfill overseas themselves to counter

terrorist mobility.

Consideration should be given to building up at least two important roles to supplement the visa function overseas: First, a serious

program to staff airport embarkation points with DHS officers.

That’s a gap, especially for Visa waiver program countries.

Second, the creation of a team of agents from ICE, Diplomatic

Security and FBI to assist foreign law enforcement organizations in

major cases against criminal travel facilitation organizations.

To conclude, the visa process is essential to counter terrorism, to

crime control and to immigration management, including the facilitation of legitimate travel fundamental to our commitment to freedom and to our economic well being. Until visa officers and other

border control points are seen as central contributors to

counterterrorism, at least as important as the FBI, the intelligence

community and the military, their opportunities to combat terrorism will not be maximized. Visa offices need to become hybrid hubs

for counterterrorism, crime control and immigration fraud expertise.

To achieve this goal, more personnel, greater specialization, new

technology tools and cross-training and cross-service among the relevant agencies are required.

The work of this subcommittee, highlighted today by analysis of

the GAO report you commissioned continues to be a source of innovation and excellence. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ginsburg follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Morris.

STATEMENT OF JOHN DANIEL MORRIS

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity today

to present my comments on post-September 11th U.S. visa procedures from the perspective of a consular officer in the field.

As you know, I recently completed a 3-year assignment as Consul

General in Beijing. I am now retired from U.S. Government after

a number of years in the Foreign Service, primarily in consular

work. In the course of my career, I saw many changes in visa work.

As the world became more and more interconnected, demand for

U.S. visas accelerated exponentially and technological innovations

were introduced to try to help keep pace with efficiency and security needs.

As I returned to consular work in the summer of 2002, following

a period working in other Foreign Service areas of responsibility,

it was evident the Department of State was in the midst of the biggest change regarding visas I had experienced. First, Secretary

Powell had set out clear policy guidance that security is the No. 1

consideration in visa processing. While self-evident, that reality

had become blurred in the course of two decades of declining resources and visa work in relation to the growing work demands

and amidst policy admonitions to consular officers to find ways to

do more with less due to budget constraints. Secretary Powell’s definitive statement has since been a watchword to all of us in the

field as we are trying to carry out those changes.

Second, Consular Affairs Assistant Secretary Maura Harty put

forth a series of detailed guidelines and instructions for officers in

the field to ensure that the Secretary’s policies would be carried

out. These were very helpful to posts in sorting through all of their

priorities and managing their workloads.

Third, bolstered by Secretary Powell’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, which increased Foreign Service officer intake, the Department endeavored to provide sufficient personnel to posts to enable

them to actually carry out their responsibilities fully.

As a consular officer, I saw that it was the first time in at least

a decade that I experienced replacement visa interview officers beginning to arrive as the officers departed on reassignment without

lengthy staffing gaps. But staffing was then and still is insufficient

in many consular sections abroad, as you have heard already today.

In China, we discovered precisely some of the things we have

been talking about today, including, particularly, a shortfall in the

mid-level consular supervisors. And this is, as you know, an echo

from the drastic cutbacks in the intake of Foreign Service officers

in the nineties. This put a lot more responsibility than was desirable in the hands of very talented but inexperienced officers in

China.

The officers conducting visa interviews around the world today

are highly motivated and intelligent and language capable, very

aware of their important role in the front line of America’s defense.

They’re also very hard pressed to handle growing workloads of administering new security procedures which cumulatively slow down

the visa process considerably.

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From the post perspective I believe the State Department policymakers have tried very hard to improve visa security procedures

since 2001 and have made many significant improvements, among

these the inclusion of substantially more names of potentially dangerous individuals in our lookout systems and success in the biometric registration or fingerprinting of virtually all visa applicants.

Some other measures were not as carefully thought through, however, and have had the unintended effect of sending out an

unwelcoming message to the rest of the world without adding significantly necessarily to the security equation.

I provided one example of this in my written statement whereby

security advisory opinion procedures directed primarily against terrorism had the side result of stifling U.S.-China academic exchange

in the sciences. Where they can be identified these sorts of measures need to be reviewed and modified and new security initiatives

should be carefully considered, focused on concrete objectives, and

take into account the views of embassies and consular officers in

the field where the policies meet reality.

Finally and most importantly, as alluded to many times today,

it is critical that serious stock be taken by all concerned in the visa

process of present and future needs for consular resources, especially staff and facilities.

I will be happy to respond to any questions you might have on

these matters.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. All your statements will be included in the record in their full form. Mr. Van Hollen.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morris follows:]

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for

your testimony this afternoon on this very important issue, and,

you know, listening, we all agree with the mission, which is that

these people on the front lines should be protecting our security,

No. 1, but also making sure that legitimate travelers get here. But

as I listen to you there are at least three different proposals with

respect to the question of the visa security officers as I hear it. And

I don’t have a dog in this fight. I wasn’t here, I don’t think, when

Congress created the Visa Security Office, so I’m just trying to listen to figure out what makes the best sense in organizational policy. And I listened to Mr. Ervin, who said let’s continue along this

path and expand visa security officers to every—should be deployed

throughout the world, so you have the consular officers and next

to them you have the visa security officers throughout the world.

As I understand Dr. Carafano’s testimony, your long-term solution would be essentially to take the Consular Affairs away from

the State Department and place it in Diplomatic Security Department. I mean not diplomatic security, excuse me. DHS. And Ms.

Ginsburg, you’re suggesting that this has been essentially a failed

experiment, that the evidence to date suggests that these security

officers don’t have a lot more training than the consular officer and

maybe we should end that experiment, put the homeland security

folks, deploy them in other areas in terms of disrupting travel patterns, terrorist travel patterns and essentially, as I understand it,

allow the consular officer to take on that expertise. And I understand, Mr. Morris, I’ll even say you seem to be closest to Ms. Ginsburg. I wasn’t sure.

So you sort of have these different options out there. And just

looking at the situation as we see it today, noting that we only

have visa security officers in one country right now, the delay in

the expansion and the idea that we do want to make sure that at

the end of the day, although there are obviously higher risk posts,

that at the end of the day we want to make sure that there’s no

weakness in the system. We do want this emphasis on security or

security to be a paramount concern everywhere. It seems to me

that it does make sense to have one, maybe one department in

charge, except for Mr. Ervin’s point is the different institutional

sort of mandates where you have homeland security maybe focused

more on security issues as opposed to diplomacy issues would be

a counter to that.

That’s all by way of suggesting that as I understood the testimony of the Government Accountability Office, Mr. Ford, he said

that one of the main changes that he has seen with respect to the

consular officers overseas, as echoed by Mr. Morris, is that people

understand now that security should be the paramount concern

and that should be the one focus. Given that, why doesn’t it make

sense, and given the fact that we already have the Consular Affairs

within the Department of State, why doesn’t it make sense to make

sure that the consular officers who are on the front line get the

training they need? They’re already deployed to every consulate

around the world. Why don’t we make sure they get the training

they need to develop whatever expertise that we want these visa

security officers to have? Sounds like they don’t necessarily have it

right now. And we already have a sort of a deployment mechanism.

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Let’s give them the expertise and the tools to do their job and let’s

get the staffing problem, which we all, everyone on the last panel

said that was the primary issue, and yet we sort of move over it

because, yes, that means resources and all that. But why not look

at the model that we’ve got and beef up the training so that every

consular officer overseas has the training necessary?

Mr. ERVIN. May I answer that first?

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Yes.

Mr. ERVIN. Well certainly, Mr. Van Hollen, I think that all the

State Department consular officers should have that kind of

counterterrorism training, and as you say and as we heard, apparently more and more of them do all the time and certainly that’s

a step in the right direction. I think all of them should just as

quickly as possible. But I’m just afraid that at the end of the day,

there is an institutional mindset necessarily, and I don’t think

that—that’s not a normative statement on my part. I just think

that the State Department tends to focus on diplomacy and customer service.

The whole theory behind the Department of Homeland Security

is that there should be a department that is exclusively focused on

counterterrorism. And of course implicit in what I was saying is

the notion that these DHS officers actually be qualified to do work

in the counterterrorism area to the extent there are DHS officers,

VSOs who aren’t qualified, and as I said, when I looked into the

program last year as Inspector General, many of them were not.

But this presumes that they will be. But I’m just afraid that if

we’re not careful, as the months and years go by without another

attack and unless there’s some huge increase in funding for the

State Department, the institutional pressure to revert to form, to

revert to focus on diplomacy will mean that we will be back years

from now where we were before September 11th. If it were up to

me, if this were tabla raza I frankly was supportive of the notion

of giving the entire visa function wholesale to a Department of

Homeland Security, a competent Department of Homeland Security. But as a practical matter that’s not happened. I can’t envisage

that it will happen.

That being so, this present structure is the one that we’re going

to have to live with. And if that’s the case it seems to me VSOs

need to be effective and they need to be deployed throughout the

world.

Dr. CARAFANO. Putting aside the issue of which department it

should be, I would make the argument that it all needs to be in

one department based on a very simple premise. Whether it’s visa

issuance or border entry, exit, the basic functions to be performed

are exactly the same that you need, preliminary screening, secondary screening and investigation. My notion is any time you split

those apart you’ve created a seam that doesn’t need to be there and

you create potential problems. This is like the police department in

which the beat cop and the homicide investigator are in totally separate agencies. I mean, we don’t do that. It’s integrated. And so you

want to have the guy that’s doing the primary screening, or

woman, and the secondary screening and doing the investigations

that back that up all in one, all work for one person.

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You could put this to the test and say—and we could debate and

argue, make the arguments why one versus the other. But I think

if we want to move forward, rather than trying to create seams

that don’t need to be there, we need to focus all this so the person

can make the intelligent decisions about IT integration, human

capital programs, resources, infrastructure. Any time you have two

people making decisions on those things you’ve guaranteed that it’s

going to take five times as long and cost 10 times as much.

Ms. GINSBURG. Well, my comment would be that we have in the

State Department now diplomatic security agents who are gun carrying investigators who refer cases to the U.S. attorneys and that

they are fully capable of carrying out the same kinds of activities

that are being outlined for the visa security officers, the analysis,

the review of the trends, the regional expertise, the training of people like airline officials. All of those functions outlined by the witness from DHS are, in fact, what needs to be done. But in the 2

years that these people haven’t been deployed, they haven’t been

deployed because there isn’t that bench of expertise that the new

security circumstances demand. There is a function in the State

Department that can be expanded to meet this need and there’s an

intelligence function in the State Department that’s very well regarded. And there’s a deep knowledge already of immigration and

criminal fraud matters relating to passports and visas, which is

precisely the expertise that you need overseas. I would argue that

needs to be expanded, the function of the diplomatic security, the

function of units like the—I think it is called the Vulnerability Assessment Unit in Consular Affairs, which is a new analytic unit to

take the data in the consular data bases and create algorithms that

help, you know, predict where there are problems, and that we

need to do much more to support those functions, including for investigations conducted by foreign governments of human smuggling

organizations, major document forgers who are supplying and the

people who are then showing up at consulates and looking for

visas. And those teams can be integrated teams with people from

ICE and CBP, FBI, but there is no need to shift this function when

you have within the State Department a fully capable diplomatic

security service, which should indeed be involved more deeply with

the consulates in looking at the visas. They can have full access to

the NCIC data which we haven’t discussed much today, which is

one of the trouble spots. They’re fully qualified to review that data

and there’s no reason why they shouldn’t be doing that. And indeed, one of the problems was that the visa security officer hasn’t

been able to define a role that’s any different from what the diplomatic security officer can perform.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Just to sum up, I understand each of your testimony was if you had your wish, this function would be in one department. I mean, you might differ on which department it should

be in, but just organizationally, it makes sense to put this under

one department and get rid of these two people sitting side by side

with really very much the same mission at the end of the day.

I thank you. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have some other questions, but after——

Mr. SHAYS. No, no, no. Keep going.

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Well, let me just ask with respect to the waiver program because, you know, there’s no doubt ideally that if you

can be assured that the processes and protections that are in place

in each of these 27 countries are perfect, that obviously that’s the

best way to assure security in the sense that, you know, if you

could be 100 percent guaranteed. But that of course depends on us,

you know, relying on the systems that are put in place by these 27

countries, and if the list expands more than that number of countries. And at least within, in terms of your ability to travel within

at least some of these 27 countries within the European Community, you know you get issued your travel documents in one country, you can travel freely within the European Community and get

on an airplane anywhere you want. I guess the question is as we

focus so much today on our consular officers, are we focused

enough on, and have we put the time into really reviewing the security measures that are in place in the waiver countries? And I

ask this question not because I think that, you know, we need to

clamp down. I really, I don’t know the answer to the question. I

know you have all probably looked at that question. But it seems

to me it’d be a mistake to focus all our resources and attention on

closing a barn door in one place while it was wide open somewhere

else. So if you could all respond to that question.

Mr. ERVIN. If I could start on that, Mr. Van Hollen, I looked at

the security implications of the visa waiver program also when I

was the Inspector General of Homeland Security and I’m concerned

about the visa waiver program. One of the things that we recommended in that report was the U.S. Visit system be applied to

visa waiver countries and frankly the Department of Homeland Security was slow to do that. We recommended that I think in April

2004. It actually wasn’t done until the end of the year and the Department has acknowledged that there are likely terrorists who

would not have been caught had U.S. Visit not been applied to

travelers from those visa waiver countries. It’s not for nothing, for

example, that Zacharias Moussaoui, the alleged 20th hijacker,

came on a French passport, that Richard Reid, the shoe bomber,

came on a British passport, etc. So it’s very important.

Second, as you suggest, we learned when I was the Inspector

General of Homeland Security that there wasn’t sufficient oversight on the part of the Department of Homeland Security of the

bona fides of the countries participating in the program. There

wasn’t the kind of regular review that is required to make sure

that countries merit their continued participation in the visa waiver program.

The final comment I’d make, even though now, fortunately, the

U.S. Visit system is applied to visa waiver countries, there’s still

no way to match the biometrics of the travelers from the visa waiver countries with those of the applicant at the consulate because

of course the visa waiver travelers did not apply at consulates.

They did not have to obtain a visa. So it is a—there’s a potential

security gap there, needless to say, and certainly I would not expand the program.

Dr. CARAFANO. Well, of course Clark and I disagree on this. My

first comment would be that one of the key criteria that no one’s

mentioned is reciprocity. Every country that we give visa waiver

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status gives visa waiver status to us and they’re also depending on

us to keep terrorists from getting passports. And you know, we can

ask can the United States guarantee that we are never going to

give a passport to a terrorist, and the answer is probably no.

I agree with Clark that the visa waiver program was created before terrorism was a major issue and that we should look at mechanisms to strengthen the program, to add in criteria for terrorism,

to add in means of oversight. But I think the last thing we want

to do is to abolish it and I would argue we need to extend it, and

for, you know, two strategic reasons. One is, we have to get over

the notion that the visa system needs to be perfect, because we all

know that getting that last 10 percent or 15 or whatever is 80 percent of the cost. Visas are part of a layered security system, and

at the end of the day the visas are never going to stop terrorist

travel. What’s going to stop terrorists is counterterrorism operations, intelligence, where they go out and get these guys. This is

a part of the defensive system and a layered system and so it

doesn’t have to be a perfect system. It just has to be a good solid

component. And if the expectation is no terrorist gets a visa, other

than that you are not going to be a visa waiver country, then

there’s going to be no visa waiver countries.

So I think it’s a bad expectation to note that this needs to be an

ironclad perfect system. If we just don’t give passports and visas

to known terrorists, I’d be happy.

The second is we don’t have all the resources in the universe and

we have to realize that every time we add a visa waiver country,

that’s an enormous amount of resources, because most of these

countries are people that, where most of the people come from, that

we can put in other places. I mean there are proposals to end the

visa waiver program. But when you look, when people started running the numbers and what it would cost to both the economy and

in resourcing to try to give a visa to everybody that comes into this

country now that doesn’t need one, it was astronomical. So there’s

enormous resources. It’s a tough choice. It’s a strategic decision.

But it’s an enormous amount of resources that you could pull up.

And the third is, you know, we have all talked about and we

can’t give lip service to it, it’s economic growth, it’s civil society and

it’s security, and all three are important. And we can’t give economic lip service to the fact that we have growing strategic partners that fit and you know we’ve got polling, there’s people dying

in Iraq and the Czech Republic, which has been great, and India,

which is an enormously important strategic partner, and we have

had South Korea, which has been a strategic partner for 50 years,

and we have turned to these countries and we’ve said, OK, countries like France, you know, they can come and go all the time even

though they disagree with us. But you that have helped us out, you

can’t. You’re not eligible for the visa waiver program, and that’s

simply geostrategically dumb. These countries can meet these

standards. If we tighten our standards they can meet these standards and we should be—here I really disagree with Clark. We

should make a strategic choice to identify key countries, to sit

down and make a road map on what we can do to get there. If we

need to add additional measures and oversight we should do that.

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But we should be charging ahead trying to add countries on the list

and make the countries on the list do better, not take countries off.

Ms. GINSBURG. Well, I mean I agree we should strengthen the

program. And the first thing we should do is look at the airport

embarkation points with our strategic partners about what we can

do to improve the security there, including through the use of overseas DHS officers that are not that—are only in a very, very few

places.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. We appreciate your presence

at this hearing. You all have gone well, expanded what we’ve asked

this morning. But if we just go back to what we discussed this

morning, what was your reaction to the testimony you heard this

morning?

Mr. ERVIN. Well, I’ll start, Mr. Chairman. I’m very happy that

you and Mr. Van Hollen probed both the DHS and the State personnel to ultimately highlight the fact that the Department of

Homeland Security has not, apparently, pressured the State Department and enlisted the support of Congress to dispatch these

VSO personnel beyond Saudi Arabia as the law intended. And I

think it’s absolutely critical that this be done. Again, this presumes

that the VSOs know what they’re doing. But I think it is possible

to find people in our country who can serve in this capacity. I question, again, for the reasons that I’ve already said, not to beat a

dead horse, whether State Department officers can do that.

I think we need to learn from the lessons of history. After all,

there were RSOs, regional security officers, before September 11th.

There had been studies that have shown that RSOs have not focused on visa fraud to the extent that they should. I know something about that, having been the State Department’s Inspector

General and having fought jurisdictional battles frankly with the

RSOs since there’s a joint jurisdictional overlap between RSOs and

the Inspector General’s office. So I think it’s critical that this be

done, and then you highlighted the fact that it hasn’t yet been

done.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Dr. CARAFANO. I think what we heard was incredibly predictable.

I mean Congress split the baby in a not very clear way and it

forced these departments to figure out how they were going to

seamlessly integrate their operations in areas where they have tremendous human capital, resource and IT challenge. And really

they have asked them to do something that no Federal agency has

ever done, which is to come up with a cooperative interagency Federal program of a major scale with major resources on the line and

say make it all seamless and do it in 4 years and the fact that

they’re struggling with it I just think is eminently obvious. And if

it was anything less I’d question whether I was in the right country.

Mr. SHAYS. The bottom line, from your standpoint, you did it

from day one, this system is so flawed that we developed?

Dr. CARAFANO. Quite frankly I think we’re getting what we paid

for. I mean we’re getting very incremental gains.

Mr. SHAYS. The answer is yes to my question?

Dr. CARAFANO. Absolutely.

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Ms. GINSBURG. There seems to have been this morning a focus

on resources, the need for consular personnel, and this is a need

across our entire border system, the ports of entry as well. The investment in the infrastructure, in people, in the information systems, is lacking and it is just taking a long time to be built up. And

I think we have to recognize that this is now a national security

environment and there’s a great deal at stake, so that when you

are shorting consular officers, you’re shorting counterterrorism capability.

And although I don’t fully agree with the idea of full separation

between departments, I think you need fusion centers like the

Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, which is jointly run by

the Justice Department, DHS and the State Department, which is

a center of expertise on human smuggling, human trafficking and

soon I believe terrorist travel. And it’s that kind of interagency cooperation which I think is going to make a big difference in connecting dots and in understanding trends and patterns.

Mr. MORRIS. I think posts abroad certainly——

Mr. SHAYS. So the question was—I just want to make sure. The

question I first asked, before you maybe elaborate on what you just

heard, what was your reaction to the testimony this morning?

Mr. MORRIS. Reaction to the testimony this morning on?

Mr. SHAYS. When you were sitting in the audience listening to

this, what were you thinking?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I thought that as an American citizen, that I

was puzzled why something had been mandated and 2 years later

had not come about. And being a consular officer in Beijing didn’t

help me understand the bureaucratic reasons why it had not happened. So I agreed with your question.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, do you think the problem lies more with DHS

or more with the State Department?

Mr. MORRIS. I honestly have no perspective particular to give on

that. From our perspective and from everything I’ve heard in the

State Department, we were told that this was a great agreement,

we’re going to make this work. This is policy.

Mr. SHAYS. Great compromise.

Mr. MORRIS. Great compromise, and then we waited out in Beijing and nothing happened. And when we discussed this with other

DHS people, not in those types of programs, we didn’t get a very

clear—when we had chances to interact with DHS people in the

field we would ask them what’s going on because we wanted to

plan for our own sections and how to incorporate them and how

best to use them. And they couldn’t really give us any clear answers. So we’re just in a waiting mode.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m going to ask our professional staff just to ask a

few questions. And I thank Mr. Van Hollen for being here.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTA. Mr. Morris, could you expand a little bit on what you

were just talking about on how at Beijing you coordinated the policy, programs, information with the intelligence security and law

enforcement personnel? Given this open setting, what was that conversation that took place? How did you get information from the

law enforcement and intelligence folks? How do you incorporate

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that into your jobs? Were they helpful? Did you have a good relationship with those folks?

Mr. MORRIS. You mean the people at post, the representatives at

post?

Mr. COSTA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I felt we got great cooperation from all the other

elements, law enforcement elements, you know, the FBI, the DEA,

you know, on and on. One of the things that wasn’t mentioned

today is a program where each month, and more frequently if necessary, the country teams get together and they discuss sharing

the information. It’s a mandatory meeting and it’s mandatory that

we reported back to departments called the Visa Viper program,

and the purpose of that is that any information that anybody has

at post that is in any way terrorist related to a potential future application should be shared with the consular section and you know,

they may be transmitting that back to their own home agencies

where they are supposed to also give it to us. And then we, you

know, transmit it back in our channels. We got a lot of information

in Beijing. I think we got good cooperation from that. We interacted

with the agencies on the security advisory opinions related to not

just terrorism but also tech transfer, which is a big issue with

China. They’re trying to get our technology, basically, and we’re

trying to prevent it. And when it’s going to be used for potential

dual use, those sorts of things. And we worked very closely with

the Defense Attache’s office, the commercial section and others that

had expertise in certain technical areas that we in the consular

sections did not, and sought their advice when cases came in and

we weren’t sure exactly what these people were going to the United

States to try to ferret out. And if it was legitimate or not. So we

had very good cooperation on that. And we worked closely with

DHS also locally. But they were not in this particular security role.

Mr. COSTA. One of the issues that the GAO brought up was the

need to increase access to the NCIC data bases, the FBI criminal

data bases for consular offices, who now it’s my understanding essentially you get a name hit and it says call the FBI and they will

run, take a couple of weeks and run a background check. How

would that have changed your job in China, the folks in your office

in China? Would that have made life easier? Was that something

that just would have added time?

Mr. MORRIS. Sure. The more information you have on an applicant, the better. First of all, we had enough information, we were

given enough information to determine visa eligibility so that, you

know, that’s our basic function. But if you’re going beyond that to

determine, for example, if there’s fraud, a fraud scheme going on

or a terrorist scheme or something of that nature, you know, the

more information that you can get, it gives you a clue to ask another question and to go further. So sure, the more information the

better. And sometimes the information might be, oh, they had a

drunk driving conviction, you know, in Maryland. But, OK, and

then that doesn’t help. But at least, but sometimes then it may,

you may get some information that causes you to raise another

question and leads to a whole different line of inquiry.

Mr. COSTA. Then I guess my last question for all of you, but I

guess we’ll start with you, Mr. Morris, again is are there security

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steps that have been put in place since September 11th that maybe

have gone too far, that are not productive? In your testimony you

talked about the SAOs, but that seems to be something that’s fixed.

Of course there’s the mandatory interview process now, which is

fairly controversial. Are there issues like that, or you can even expand on that one if you like.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I think that there are a lot that are coming

up in the future, you know, more fingerprinting and more facial

recognition and, you know, there are many things that are coming

down the pike. And I think, my point is that the department obviously these are very, very important security issues. But posts need

to be given a heads up, this is coming down the pike, and given

an opportunity to come back and say, if you do this you may make

a policy decision to take this security step, but it’s going to have

this negative impact on tourism or business or trade or that sort

of thing. So—and then there may be ways that people, you know,

in Washington that are developing these policies, they can tweak

the proposals so that they don’t have these unintended effects. You

said the security advisory opinion problem has been resolved. Well,

it’s been resolved in fact, but in terms of the perception in China

and in the academic community and in the academic world it’ll be

years before the impact of that goes away.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you. Ms. Ginsburg.

Ms. GINSBURG. I would just say that if you’re going to add security layers and measures, many of which are very critical, then you

have to add the personnel and the technology to make sure they

work efficiently and that requires additional investments.

Dr. CARAFANO. I’m opposed to mandatory interviews. I think it’s

the same problem I have when we are doing airline security. I

mean we’re using these legacy paradigms to do this and we’re

wasting 99 percent of our resources on 99 percent of the people

that aren’t a problem. You know, this is the equivalent of if the cop

stopped everybody driving down the street and not just people

breaking the law. You know, we simply need new paradigms that

focus resources on the high risk people and quit wasting resources

on people that we have a comfort level with or that are a low risk.

Mr. ERVIN. Thank you. Well, I am a contrarian on this point. I

disagree with Dr. Carafano. I’m a hard liner on security, and I

think it’s possible to be a hard liner on security and at the same

time understand the importance of diplomacy and understand the

importance of resisting our civil rights, civil liberties tradition.

That said, I agree with Ms. Ginsburg that all of this requires resources, and I think one of our problems, and I’ve said this on

many occasions, is that we’ve underfunded homeland security.

There’s this false distinction between the security of the Nation,

where we spare no expense, a $400 billion plus defense budget and

literally a fraction of that, about a tenth of that for the Department

of Homeland Security. Certainly more resources are required.

So I’m completely for mandatory interviews. That was one of the

recommendations I made as the Inspector General of the State Department. I’m very pleased to see that’s happened today. And perhaps it’s a failure of imagination on my part, but certainly in the

visa area I cannot think of a single security measure that we’ve

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since implemented that I would take back. If anything, as you’ve

heard me say, I would increase them.

The final thing I’d say is GAO did make in its report today, as

you know, the suggestion that a lot of time is wasted reviewing applications and Saudi Arabia is the only place where VSOs are mandated and it’s the only place of course where the VSOs have to review every section of the application. I suppose it’s possible in theory to presume that some Saudi person, some Saudi who is 5 years

old, say, or some Saudi who is 99 years old probably wouldn’t pose

a security threat to the United States. But frankly, in this postSeptember 11th environment, I am skeptical about the ability of

our government, and I think Katrina showed a couple of weeks ago,

I’m skeptical of the ability of our government to draw distinctions

and to work in the gray areas. That being so, I argue for more security, recognizing that is very costly. And as I say, I for one, and

I say that incidentally as a conservative Republican, am willing to

put the resources behind it.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you, Mr. Ervin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. It’s a little off subject, but I wrestle with

it and it gets to the point of how far does your security go? We are

hearing continually from universities that the best and brightest

students are being denied opportunity to study in the United

States, and I think that is tragic. We are told that they have given

up in many cases, applied and been accepted in European schools,

in Chinese schools, in Russian schools, but not in the United

States. Is there any indication that students have been the problem

in the past, No. 1? And do you, any of you, have a strong feeling

one way or the other on this issue?

Mr. ERVIN. If I could just start. Well, of course some of the people

we were concerned about on September 11th were flight students.

You’re not talking about flight students certainly.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m talking university students going for Ph.D. programs, and so on.

Mr. ERVIN. I can’t think of any instance. But I agree with you.

Certainly there has been evidence to suggest that students who we

need for the continued economic success and the vitality of our

country are going elsewhere because of the length of time it now

takes for visas to be processed. And that’s why, as I said, I think

it’s possible for there to be security and an advance in liberty and

economic progress for our country, but that requires infinitely more

resources. I think the State Department budget should be increased rather dramatically, right along with that of the Department of Homeland Security.

Dr. CARAFANO. Known and suspected terrorists have tried to

come to the United States on student visas. But the more important point is known and suspected terrorists have tried to come

into the United States using virtually every means, asylum, illegal

entry. So if there’s a means to get here the terrorists have tried to

exploit it.

There has been a decline in foreign students coming to the

United States. Security certainly has contributed to that over the

last few years. There are other reasons as well. Other countries

have targeted foreign students and tried to bring them there, and

it’s a much more competitive world. And the United States is less

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competitive in getting students here and the security is part of it.

And it is a serious issue. It seems to have bottomed out. There’s

data coming out next month which will tell us if we have turned

the corner or not. But even before September 11th we were already

on a decline for that.

You know, we have to look at these issues strategically. If we

had infinite money to spend on everything that would be fine. But

we don’t and what we are doing is we’re spending a lot of on money

on a lot of things and not getting much of anything.

Mr. SHAYS. How does that relate to my question?

Dr. CARAFANO. It absolutely does because we need to make some

hard choices. I mean, we’re going to beat these guys in the end

anyway. The point is economic growth and competitiveness are

part of national security. Making this country strong by bringing

these foreign students here and growing our economy is part of

what makes us strong and pay for national security. So when we

said, well, we can’t sacrifice security for these things, those things

are security.

Mr. SHAYS. You’re making this point because you obviously want

me to understand something. I’m missing your point. My question

is——

Dr. CARAFANO. The point is, is that——

Mr. SHAYS. You don’t know where I have my problem, so let me

explain to you where I have my problem. You’re making an assumption. I’m understanding you based on words you’re using that

I’m not understanding. Not your fault, my fault, but it’s your fault

if you’re not listening to my problem here. I asked about whether

or not it was a cost to us to deny so many students the opportunity

to come based on either denial or taking too long. I mean, in other

words, they apply, Yale starts its program in September and they

can’t even get here until December. They’re out of the program. So

what I didn’t understand about what you said is you said it was

resources. Connect resources to that issue.

Dr. CARAFANO. Well, the answer to your question is absolutely

yes. The security procedures that are put in place since September

11th have made less students come here and it does make us less

competitive. It’s not the only reason why students are going other

places and why we are losing them but it is one of them.

Mr. SHAYS. I heard that part.

Dr. CARAFANO. The argument that we can’t make it easier for

students to come here, we can’t do this because it’s security, I don’t

buy that argument because getting them here and growing this

country and making it economically strong is equally important to

the security of the United States as it is trying to keep terrorists

out.

Mr. SHAYS. And so the problem is——

Dr. CARAFANO. The problem is you want a visa system that’s

good enough, that keeps known and suspected terrorists from getting visas. But beyond that I think you invest elsewhere in going

out in preemptive measures. So I would say in trying to—as a layer

of security, in trying to keep people coming to the United States

and trying to interdict terrorist travel, the No. 1 priority should be

illegal means of entry and exit, making sure that those documents

are secure and issued to the right people, and it should be keeping

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known and suspected terrorists from getting them. Once you’ve

done that you take your investments and you put them elsewhere.

Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Ginsburg.

Ms. GINSBURG. We clearly had a big problem at the beginning.

Mr. SHAYS. I want you to put your mic a little closer. I’m sorry.

It’s not your fault. It’s just the mic is not working as well.

Ms. GINSBURG. We clearly had a big problem at the beginning

with huge delays and are now facing the diplomatic consequences

of that. I think there is a problem, there are still long delays in

the tech visa category. But I think the answer, I definitely agreed

that known and suspected terrorists have been associated with the

student program here and in England and elsewhere in Europe and

it’s a serious consideration. So we do need security in that process.

And we need followup security by ICE using terrorism related data

bases to make sure that there is continued compliance with the

terms of the student visas.

But I mean, we need enough people to do that and we need it

to move fast and we need not to have delays, as were illustrated

by the problem with the NCIC data process. We need computerization, automation algorithms and all the things that speed up those

kinds of check.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. First of all, I would just like to note that actually

the numbers, at least from China, are bouncing back. They’re coming back after a decline. We’ve had extensive public relations campaigns, you know. We welcome, you know, legitimate Chinese students.

Mr. SHAYS. If they are increasing again, is that because they’re

just willing to wait an extra year and just—the timeframe clearly

takes longer.

Mr. MORRIS. For most students the timeframe is really not an

issue and never has been an issue, and the refusal rate has never

been an issue. It is more the perceptions. Perceptions are huge in

a place like China, where, you know, one message goes out and

they all believe that. So there are some still——

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I’ll just tell you I’ve spoken to a number of different university officials, not necessarily presidents, who they tell

me they’re losing their students and they’re losing them because

they can’t get them in here. That’s what they’re telling me.

Mr. MORRIS. I think in the years after September 11th, 2 or 3

years, that’s exactly true. But I think that if you look at the numbers recently, you’ll see that they’re beginning to come back. The

Chinese students are beginning to come back. But I absolutely

agree that we’re not only losing—if we discourage the students

from coming we’re losing not only the benefits to our universities

and the academic exchanges and our own economy in the short

term but in the long term.

I have been posted in other Asian nations where you go and you

know everybody in leadership positions in journalism and politics

and business have had American educations and they send business our way. They understand America. And I think China is such

an important place, you know, we need that sort of people going

back, bright students going back.

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Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Carafano was basically making the point that it’s

a flawed system. We have three folks involved in this process, three

different departments, and one would be better, and I think your

choice was DHS, correct?

Dr. CARAFANO. Yes, sir, that’s correct.

Mr. SHAYS. Nodding the head doesn’t get on the transcript.

Dr. CARAFANO. Yes, sir. That’s correct.

Mr. SHAYS. There’s always, you know, you dig a little deeper,

there’s always these tradeoffs and you realize why it doesn’t happen, like it seems so obvious to have DHS do it. I’m trying to recall,

but, you know, I rarely have conversations with the Secretary directly, but this was one area that he was pretty concerned that this

would be taken away from State. And then I remember having conversations with other State officials who said, you know, this is

part of the work that you do in State and it’s kind of like you have

to earn your spurs and it helps round you as a State Department

official, interaction with the communities and so on. So aside from

the fact that no one in government likes something taken from

them, there appears to be logic to why you would want them to

interface that way, at least to me.

I’d like you to react to that. In other words, if you did take it

away from State, not likely to happen, but if you did, and give this

whole process to DHS, is there a cost to State, in your judgment?

Would they suffer from it? Would our State Department officials,

when they were senior officials, have lost some experiences that

would be important to them?

Let me start with you, Mr. Morris. We’ll go that way. Do you understand the question?

Mr. MORRIS. You mean taking away the visa function from the

State Department?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. Would it—the argument, I could just tell you I

could agree with Dr. Carafano that, you know, just give it to DHS.

In other words, you want to come to the United States, you just

give it to DHS. And I see you shaking your head but I can see the

argument. But then I can see a counter argument that says State

Department, which is maybe more warm and fuzzy, may need that

process and the interacting with the community, that country, people coming in, requesting to go to the United States. The interaction may be part of what’s needed to round the State Department

experience for someone so that when they are a senior official they

went through that process. Did you go through that process as a

State Department official?

Mr. MORRIS. Absolutely. I mean, relationships between nations

are not just sitting in big meetings and talking about the six party

talks. They’re human relationships. And, I would argue that those

are the most important relationships over time that nations develop. You know, we’re close to many countries in the world because our people have an affinity for each other and they have relatives and they——

Mr. SHAYS. I’m not arguing about whether people should come

into the United States. I’m arguing whether—and I’m sorry this

seems to be so complex. I’m arguing whether there is argument

that State Department needs to be the one handling it so they have

that experience as part of being in the State Department as makVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Oct 24, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23853.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ing them a well rounded State Department official. Did you do this

process? Did you go—as a junior officer in State, did you do that?

Mr. MORRIS. Absolutely. I started as a Vice Consul.

Mr. SHAYS. If that had been taken away from you as an experience, would you be less of an official?

Mr. MORRIS. Absolutely.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. That’s the question.

Ms. Ginsburg.

Ms. GINSBURG. I think that the idea of having one department

only involved in homeland security is, you know—would be very

atypical of how our government works. We have criminal justice capacity across many agencies of government. We have intelligence

capacities across many agencies of government, including in State

and local police forces, including, increasingly, functions relating to

immigration. I think there’s a kind of seamlessness that’s needed

for terrorism that can’t be confined to one department.

So competitive intelligence, sources of information that are multiple, different takes on a problem are very, very valuable when

you’re dealing with an adversary that’s so illusive. So I think it—

you know, there is an important function.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, you’re making the argument that you’re not

concerned when more than one department gets involved in the

process. Dr. Carafano.

Dr. CARAFANO. Well, the answer to your question is no. I mean

there’s other ways that State Department officials could get the

cultural and professional development they need to proceed in their

career. And quite simply, visa processing is not central to the core

mission of what the State Department should be doing in the 21st

century and it is central to the core mission of the Department of

Homeland Security, which is preventing, which is supervising the

means of trade and travel in the United States to prevent terrorism. So it’s vital to the core competency of one department. It is

an add-on to the core competency of the other department. It’s only

there because it’s always been there since the 18th century. That’s

a poor reason to keep it there.

Mr. ERVIN. Well, I agree with my colleagues in part and I disagree with them in part. I agree with Dr. Carafano that there are

other ways, it seems to me, for State Department officers to get the

interaction with the local community that they need in order to be

effective in that country and in order to be effective later in their

careers. Of course there are political officers and embassies, there

are economic and commercial officers. There are other things that

consular officers do besides the visa functions, so there are other

ways to get that experience. Point one.

Point two, I’m actually not opposed to the present bifurcation. I

think as compromises in our government go, the logic of it, and

that’s the key word, makes a lot of sense. It’s the effectiveness of

it that I question. I’m just afraid that if in fact DHS were to have

the entire function, although if you have to choose one agency or

the other I would put it in DHS, but the problem it seems to me

with giving the entire function, not just looking at things from a

counterterrorism perspective but the whole visa function to DHS is

the opposite problem, that you need to focus on diplomacy as well.

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A DHS officer might focus unduly on counterterrorism at the expense of diplomacy.

Dr. CARAFANO. Could I just followup on that?

Mr. SHAYS. Sure.

Dr. CARAFANO. Yes. I simply think that’s a false argument. I

mean one of the arguments not to give it to DHS——

Mr. SHAYS. Which argument?

Dr. CARAFANO. The argument that security, the security culture

is going to twist this in some way. The argument against giving it

to DHS is, well, those guys only care about security. They’re not

going to care about diplomacy and trade facilitation, so that’s one

of the reasons why we have to keep that in State. But if you look

at the evidence, for example, the recent GAO investigations that

were interviews of State Department officials in Canada, and if you

talk to any State Department official that’s in the visa process,

they all tell you that their No. 1 concern is security. So I mean the

guys that were supposed to be only concerned about trade facilitation and diplomacy, they’re obsessed with security.

Mr. SHAYS. But I could use your argument and just use it

against you and make the point that to say that State Department

is one dimensional would be false, too?

Dr. CARAFANO. I absolutely agree with you, and because DHS

has people who are as concerned with trade facilitation and movement of people as well.

Mr. SHAYS. So if you agree with me, what’s your point?

Dr. CARAFANO. That there is no notion that because you put it

in one department you’re going to get this kind of insulation and

you know they’re going look at these other things.

Mr. SHAYS. But your point——

Dr. CARAFANO. It’s a false argument.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Your point to this subcommittee is though that

you would prefer, in fact you think it’s nonsensical to do it any

other way, than to have one department and the reason why we

took it away from State where we had them do it was we felt that

they were too much involved in the service side of it and not

enough involved with the security side? That’s the reason why we

did it?

Dr. CARAFANO. I think that’s the wrong argument. I don’t think

it’s—the culture argument I think is not a valid basis for the decision. The reason why I would take it away from State is I don’t

think it is a core competency of the State Department and I think

it is a core competency and a core mission of DHS.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, some day.

Dr. CARAFANO. Well, it should be.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Is there anything that we need to put on the

record, any question we should have asked, any statement you

want to put on the record before we close out?

Mr. ERVIN. Maybe just one final thing, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Sure.

Mr. ERVIN. Not to belabor the point, but I think it’s important

in this last exchange to be clear about what the ‘‘it’’ is and what

the core competencies are and what was taken away and what

wasn’t. I mean, to be precise, of course the visa function itself, the

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partment. It’s only—the question is should there be some additional layer of review strictly from a counterterrorism perspective

to make sure that in the future to the extent that can be humanly

done of course we won’t let terrorists into the country. The question

is should there that be an additional layer of review and, if so, who

should provide it.

Mr. SHAYS. And the question that we can’t answer today, which

is kind of pathetic, is we’ve had 2 years experience in Saudi Arabia.

Tell us the benefit.

Mr. ERVIN. I couldn’t agree with you more. I think it’s inexcusable that it’s taken us 2 years to determine whether the program

is effective and if the program can be as effective as Congress initially intended for it to be. Then it’s critical, as I said, that it be

expanded throughout the world because terrorists can go to any of

209 other visa issuing posts and get a visa there.

Mr. SHAYS. And at the very least do it in a few other—in a sense

that it’s become a pilot program based on the pushback of State

and the lack of aggressiveness on the part of DHS?

Mr. ERVIN. Precisely.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, you know, you’re finally getting through to me

here.

Any other comment? So with that, thank you, all four of you, for

your testimony. We appreciate it very much. And with that, this

hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

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