## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Suprem e Court

Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection Distr ict , 2012 IL 110012

Caption in S upreme Court: MI CHAEL P. GAF FNE Y, Appellant, v. THE BO ARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE OR L AN D FI RE PROTECTI ON DI STRI CT et al.
, Appellee s.–BRI AN J

. L EMMENES, Appellee
, v. THE ORL AND FI RE PROTECTI ON DI STRI CT et al. , Appellants.

Docke t Nos. 110012, 110198 cons.

Filed
Rehea ring denied Fe bruar y 17, 2012 May 29, 2012

Held ( Note : Thi s syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t o

f the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt e r of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The emer g encie s on which cata strophically injured firef ighte rs’ statutory continuing health car e benef its may be based do not exclude training
, but
must be unfore seen; and circ uit court relief could be soug ht ag ainst a fire board wher e it was not an ag ency whose ruling s wer e subject only to administrative revie w—re versa l of both circ uit court denial of awa rd for live-fire injuries and aw ard a s to a simulated fire.

Dec ision Under Review Appeal s fr o m the Appellate Court for the First District; hear d in that
court on appea ls from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, the Hon. Nanc y J . Arnold and the Hon. Richard J. Billik, J udg es, pre siding.

J udg ment No. 110012—J udg ments reve rsed; ca use re manded. No. 110198—Appellate court judg ment reve rsed.Counsel on

Appea l Thomas W. Duda an d Ad am M. Salzm an, of Arling ton Heig hts, for Michae l Gaff

ney and B rian L emmenes.

Dennis G. Walsh, J ames W

. Fe ssler, L ance C. Malina and J acob H. Kar aca , of Klein, Thor

pe & J enkins, L td., of Chicag o, for The B oard of Trustee s of the Or land Fir e Protec tion District et al.

Gilbert Fe ldman, of Cornfield & Fe ldman, of Chicag o, for amicus curiae Associated F irefighters of I llinois

.

Charles E. Her

vas, Michae l D. Be rsani and Z rinka Rukavina, of Her vas, Condon & Be rsani, P.C., of I tasca , and Donald R. Z oufal, of Springf ield, for amicus curiae the I llinois Association of Chiefs of Police.

Shawn P. Flahe rty , o f Ot t osen Br itz Kelly Cooper & Gilbert, L td., of Nape rville, for amici curiae the I llinois Association of Fire Protection Districts and the I llinois Fire Chiefs Association.

Br ian Day and Robert Huebne r, of Springf ield, for amicus curi a e t h e I llinois Municipal L eague.

R o b er t J

. Smit h, J r., and J ames J

. Powers, of Sey far th Shaw L L P
, o f Chicag o, for amicus curiae the I llinois Public Employ er L abor Relations Association.

J oel A. D’Alba and Marg are t Ang elucc i, of Asher, Gittler & D’Alba
, L td., of Chicag o, for amicus curiae the I llinois AFL -CI O.

J ustices CHI EF J USTI CE KI L BRI DE delivered the judgme nt of t he court, with opinion.
J ustices Fr eema

n, Bur ke, and Theis concur

red in t h e j u d g ment and opinion.
J ustice Gar

man concur red in part and dissented in part, with opinion, joined by J ustices Thomas and K arme ier.

-2-OP INION

¶ 1 Plaintiffs Michae l P. Gaf fney and Br ian J

. L emmenes wer e injured in the line of duty as firef ighte rs and s o u gh t continuing health cover ag e benef its under section 10 of the Public Safety Employ ee Be nefits Act (820 I L CS 320/10 (West 2006)). I n Gaffney
, th e appellate
court aff irmed the denial of the plaintiff’s application fo r b en efits. I n Lemmene s , the appellate court aff

irmed summary judgme nt in favor of the plai n t i ff o n his complaint for decla ratory judgme nt. ¶ 2 We allowed petitions for leave to appea l in both Gaffney and Lemmene s (I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010)) and consolidated the appea ls for revie w. We a lso allowed the filing of

sever al amicus curiae briefs. I ll. S. Ct. R. 345 (ef f. Dec

. 6, 2005). For the following rea sons,

we r ever se the a

ppellate c ourt’s judg ment in both Gaffney and Lemmene

s

.

¶ 3 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 A. No. 110012, Micha el P. Gaff ney ¶ 5 Gaf

fney filed a two-count complaint ag ainst the defe ndants, the board of trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District, Boa rd P resident Patrick Maher
, Boa rd Secre tary Patricia Corcora n, and the Orland Fire Protection District, seeking pay ment o f health insurance benef its under section 10 of the Act (820 I L CS 320/10 (West 2006)). Section 10, in pertinent
p art, require s employ ers of full-time firef ighte rs to pay health insurance premiums for t h e firef ighte r and his or her spouse and d ep en d en t children if the firef ighte r suffe rs a catas trophic injury under specifie d circ umstances. 820 I L CS 320/10 (West 2006). The circ umstances trig g ering elig ibilit y for section 10 benef its include when a firef

ighte r is injured as a result of a “re sponse t o what is rea sonably believe d t o b e an emer g ency .” 820 I L CS 320/ 10(b) ( West 2006). ¶ 6 I n his complaint, Gaff ney alleg ed that he w as employ ed by the Dis trict as a f irefig hter. On J uly 27, 2005, he par

ticipated in a live-fire exercise and was instructed by the battalion chief to treat it as an actua l emer g ency

. He was wea ring “full turnout g ear .” During the exercise, a fire hose beca me hooked around a “lovese at ty pe chair .” Gaf

fn ey m o v ed the loveseat with his left arm to fre e the hose, suffe ring a cata strophic car eer -ending injury to his shoulder. He was a

war ded a line- of-duty

disability pension. ¶ 7 Gaf

fney demande d pay

ment of health insurance premiums under section 10 of the Act. The board of trustees responded with a “D ec i s i o n and Order” stating it would not provide those benef

its. Gaf fney attache d a copy of the board’ s decision and incorporated it by ref ere nce into his complaint. ¶ 8 The board’ s decision indicates that Gaf fney filed an application for section 10 benef its,

asser ting that the exercise invol ved a live fire on the third floor of the building. His cre w responde d with the eng ine’s lights and siren activate d. The hose beca me entang led while his

cre w was advanc ing from the second floor to the third floor with “n o v i s i b ility ” throug h smoke and obstacles. Gaf fney followed the hose b ac k t o wh ere it was entang led in the loveseat. He moved the lo v es ea t b y flipping it backw ard, injuring his shoulder. Gaf fney

-3-asser ted his cata strophic inj u ry occur red while he was responding to what he rea sonably believed to be an eme rg ency

. ¶ 9 Gaf

fney was g iven notice that his application would be considere d at a “spec ial meeting of the Boa

rd of Trustee s.” He was acc ompanied by counsel at the specia l meeting and g ave

a statement adding that prior to the exerc ise his cre w was instructed to a dvance a hose line
to the seat of the fire and to sear ch for victims along the way

. After i n j u ri n g h is shoulder, Gaf fney went back up the hose line. When he rea ched the third fl o o r, an o ffice r noticed Gaf fney was having trouble breathing beca use of the pain and the drill e nded immediately

. Gaf fney had not worke d as a firef ighte r since that day

. I n its decision, the board emphasized that Gaf fney knew he was participating in a training exercise and the exercise was terminated af ter he was injured. The board conclude d that Gaf fney was not responding to wh at wa s

rea sonably believed to be an emer g enc y an d
, t here fore
, denied his application for benef its under se ction 10 of the Ac t. ¶ 10 I n the first count of his complaint, Gaf fney soug ht a decla

ratory judgme nt compelling the defe ndants to pa

y health insurance premiums under the Act. The second count was labeled “in the alternative.” I n that count, Gaf fney soug ht reviewof the board’ s decision under the Administrative Review L aw (735 I L CS 5/3-101 et s eq

. (W est 2006)). Gaffne y alleg ed the second count was included “pure ly for prophy lactic rea sons” and he did not ag ree or stipulate that the board’s decision was subject to revie w under the Admi nistrative R eview L aw. He further alleg ed t h at t h e board was not an administrative ag ency authorized to rende r a decision re viewable under the Administrative Review L aw. ¶ 11 The defe ndants moved to dismiss the decla ratory judgme nt count of the complaint under section 2-615 of the C o de of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-615 (West 2006)). The defe ndants asser

ted t hat Gaffney ’s factual allega tions d i d n ot fit within the pl ain l anguag e of the Act requiring a response to what was rea sonably believed to be an emer g ency

. The defe ndants also claimed that the board’ s decision was a final administrative action subject only to administrative revie w or revie w under a common law writ of certiorari

. The defe ndants attache d a copy of an ordinanc e adopted by the board on May 14, 2003, providing

a “policy re garding continuation of insurance benef its under the Public Safety Employ ee Be nefits Act.” The policy require d employ ees seeking health insurance benef its to complete

an application form that would be “re viewed to deter mine if the require ments of the Act have been met.” The application form re q u i red the employ ee to descr ibe the injury and the circ umstances r esulting in the injury

. ¶ 12 Wit h his response to the motion, Gaf fney included an aff

idavit asser

ting that a “dummy ” victim was discovere d on the second floor of the building while his cre w was advanc ing the hose l ine. Gaffney and his cre w re moved t he victim and then proce eded to the s tairwe ll to find the source of the fire on the third floor. The hose beca me entang led in an unseen object

on the second floor. Wit hout any visibil ity
, Gaf fney cra wled and followed the hose line back
to a larg e obstruction that he moved with his left arm. Plainti ff asser ted that if he had lost
contac t w ith the hose line, “he would have become disoriented in the building and perha ps unable to find his way out.” After the smoke clea red from the building, Gaf fney discovere d that the obstruction was a loveseat.

-4-¶ 13 A t ra n s cript of a tape rec ording of the board’ s meeting was also filed. The t ra n s cr i p t

indicates that Ga ffne y ’s attorne y stated he w as “c oncer

ned by the t erm he aring ” bec ause it implied that the Act “per mits a District or municip al i t y o r an y one to cre ate some sort of fac tual hear ing proce ss subject to t h e administrative revie w act.” The board’ s attorney responde d, “I t does not [,] *** but y our conc ern is noted f or the recor d.” Gaffne y was then allowed to prese nt evidenc e. He submitt ed a copy of the decision awa rding a line-of- duty disability pension and reiter ated his acc ount of the events leading to his injury

. Gaf fney also testified about his medical trea tment. Gaf

fney ’s attorney prese nted a bri ef argument in support of the application for section 10 benef its. At the end of the meetin g, Ga ff ney ’s attorney ag ain addre ssed the board’ s attorney , asking
, “[T] hen I am not to worry that this is being some sort of formal hear ing[.] [T] his is simply an investigatory proce eding for the Boa rd to consider whether to g rant him voluntarily or not.” The board’ s attorney responde d, “Rig ht. That’s exactly

the under standing Iwant y ou to have.” ¶ 14 The trial cour t ru l ed t h at the board’ s order enter ed under the proce ss adopted by its ordinanc e was a final administrative decision subject only to administrative re v i ew

. Acc ording ly
, the t rial court g rante d the m otion to dismiss t h e decla ratory judgme nt count. As for the rema ining count seeking administrative revie w, the trial court ru l ed that the Administrative Review L aw did not apply beca use it was not expressly adopted by the Fire Protection District Act (70 I L CS 705/0.01 et seq

. (West 2006)). The trial court noted that the standard of revie w under

a common law writ of certiorari is essentially the s ame as under the Administrative Review L aw. The trial court, there fore
, deter mined that it would treat the
reque st for administrative re view as a petition for a c ommon law writ of certiorari

. ¶ 15 The parties filed briefs addre ssing whether Gaf fney ’s injury resulted from a response to what he rea sonably believed to be an emer g ency under section 10 of the Act. The trial court deter mined that the issue was purely a question of statutory construction subject to de novo revie w. The trial court conclude d that the plain meaning of the statutory lang uag e could not include participation in a training exercise. Thus, as a matter of law, Gaf fney could not have

rea sonably believed he was responding to an emerg ency g iven t he undis puted facts of t his

case

. The trial court, there fore, af fi rm ed the Boa

rd’s denial of the application for health insurance benef

its. ¶ 16 The appe l l at e co u rt agr ee d that the Boa rd’s decision was subject to revie w under a

common law writ of certiorari

. Rely ing on DeRose v. City of Highland Park
, 386 I ll. App. 3d 658 (2008), the a

ppellate c ourt held that a situation is an “eme rg ency” under section 10 of the Act when it is “urg ent and calls fo r immediate action.” The fac ts established that Gaf fney believed he was responding to a training exercise, not an emer g ency

. Gaf fney was not entitled to continuing health i nsuranc e bene fits under sec tion 10 of the Act because he did not rea sonably believe he was responding to an emer g ency

. Acc ording ly
, the trial court’s judgme nt was af

firmed. Gaffney , 397 I ll. App. 3d 679. ¶ 17 J ustice Gordon dissented, asser ting that the def

in it ion of “eme rg ency

” focuse d on a thre at demanding immediate attention. J ustice Gordon conclude d that an eme rge n cy develope d during the course of the t raining exercise when t he hose beca me entangle d
, and Gaffne y ’s injury resulted from his response to that e merg ency

. He conclude d that the trial court err ed in aff irming the board’ s decision. Gaffney
, 397 I ll. App. 3d at 691 (Gordon, J
., dissenting)

.

-5-¶ 18 B. N o. 110198, Br ian J . L emmenes

¶ 19 L emmenes filed a one-c ount complaint for decla ratory judgme nt ag ainst the Orland F ire Protection District and the board of trustees of the District, al s o s ee k i ng health insurance benef its under section 10 of the Act. L emmenes alleg ed that the defe ndants had ref used his demands to continue pay ment of his health insurance premiums and he soug ht an o rder requiringthe def

endants to pay

those premiums. ¶ 20 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgme nt. In support of their motions, the parties relied upon deposition te stimony establishing that L emmenes was a lieutenant with the District. On Aug ust 17, 2001, he injured his rig ht kn ee wh i l e t esting a fire hose. On September 17, 2002, he reinjure d his rig ht knee while participating in a training exercise at an aba ndoned fa ctory

. ¶ 21 During his discovery deposition, L emmenes testified that he was require d to pa rticipate in the training exercise and he would have been disciplined if he had ref used to take part. The firef ighte rs arr ived at the abandoned building in “full turnout g ear ” with the fire eng ine’s

emer g ency lights activate d. L emmenes testified that the exe rcise was perf ormed “under

emer g ency circ umstances” and the firef ighte rs wer e instructed by the Mokena fire chief and deputy chief to “re spond as if it wer e an ac t u al em erge ncy .” The firef ighte rs wer e also instructed that “the re was a firef ighte r t hat was trappe d inside of this building, *** he wa s running out of air, that his pe rsonal distress ala rm was g oing of

f, and that [ the fire fig hters] neede d to locate him and resc ue him or he would perish.” The firef ighte rs wer e told that the trappe d firef

ighte r would actua lly die if not resc ued. L emmenes testified that “the intent of the drill was to locate and re scue him bef ore his air supply would run out.” ¶ 22 L emmenes injured his knee while “twisting and turning and pulling this individual try ing
to fre e him” from an unknown obstacle. L emmenes remove d his bunker pants and observe d that he had sustained a larg e open wound to his knee and it was swollen. He then “we nt back and did more e merg ency

training at this e x erc ise.” L emmenes was unable to return to fullduty work as a result of his injury and he was subsequently awa rded a line-of- duty disability pension. ¶ 23 I n his deposition, Howar d Stephens testified that he was assistant chief for the Mokena Fi re Protection District. He desig ned the training exercise based on an actua l fire t h at

occur red in Phoenix, Ar izona, whe re a Rapid I nterve ntion Te am of firef ighte rs was unable
to resc ue a fellow firef

ighte r from a supermar

ket fire. Stephens testified that the firef ighte rs

arr ived in “full turnout g ear .” There was no live fire during the exercise, but the firef ighte rs’ masks wer e “blac ked out” to simulate live fire conditions. The training exercise was timed with a stopwatch. I f a firef ighte r’s air supply ran out during the exe rc i s e, h e o r s he would stop an d t ak e o ff the mask. Stephens testified t hat t he “trapped” firef ighte r was not in any

rea l dang er dur ing the exercise. ¶ 24 Di s t ri ct Ba t t alion Chief Br y ant Krizik testified that the firef ighte rs wer e instructed to advanc e a hose l ine i nto t h e buil ding along a predeter mined path and to resc ue a “downe d firef ighte r.” The exercise was intended to simulate the supermar ket fire t h at occur

red in Phoenix to deter

mine whether there wer e any techniques that could be used succe ssfully in

-6-that scena rio and, if not, to re inforce the fire fig hters’ unde rstanding that the tactics used in Phoenix would not be succe ssful. The exercise was perf ormed under “contr olled conditions” and the f irefig hters knew

they wer e g oing into a tr aining drill. ¶ 25 The trial cou rt d et er m i n ed t h at L emmenes “wa s actively eng ag ed as if he [were ] responding to what c ould rea sonably have been believed to have been an emer g ency situation beca use that is what the exercise require d of him and he rea sonably believed that he was responding to an emer g ency .” The trial court, there fore
, co n cl u ded that L emmenes was elig ible for h ealth cover ag e benef its under section 10 of the Act. The trial court g rante d
summary judgme nt in favor of L emmenes and denied the defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt. ¶ 26 As in Gaffney
, the appellate court relied on DeRose and deter mined that an “eme rg ency”

occu rs when a situation is “urg ent and calls for immediate action.” The fac ts prese nted a

s i t u ation that was urg ent and called for immediate action. The appellate court, there fore
, aff irmed the trial court’s judgme nt beca use the injury occur

red in response to what L emmenes r easona

bly believed to be an eme rg ency

. Lemmene s , 399 I ll. App. 3d 644.

¶ 27 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 28 A. No. 110012, Micha el P. Gaff ney ¶ 29 1. Procedural Issue ¶ 30 Gaf

fney first raises a proce dural question that m u s t b e addre ssed prior to determining whether the trial court corr ectly ruled that he was ineligible for section 10 benef its. As noted previously
, Gaf

fney filed a two-count complaint. Count I soug ht a decla ration (see 735 I L CS 5/2-701 (West 2006)) that Gaf fney wa s elig ible for section 10 benef its as a matter of law. Count I I
, pled in the alternative, s o u gh t ad minist rative revie w of defe ndants’ decision denying Gaf

fney section 10 benef

its. The trial court dismiss ed count I upon defe ndants’ motion and treated count I I as a common law writ of certiorar i

. As we detail below, howeve r, the trial c ourt was incor rec t in procee ding in this manner

. ¶ 31 Ga ff

n ey co n t en d s that section 20 of the Act prohibits a municipality or poli t i ca l subdivision from enactingany ordinanc e inconsistent w ith pa y ment of section 10 benef

its. Under section 20, the District did not have authority to decide his claim for continuing health

cover ag e benef

its. Gaf fney argues his claim should have been decide d under the decla ratory judgme nt count of the c omplaint. ¶ 32 The defe ndants respond that Gaf fne y s u b m i t t ed wi t h o u t o b j ection to the District’s
proce dures and the t rial co u rt ’s review by writ of certiorari

. Fur ther, Gaffne y initiated the administrative revie w proce ss by filing his complaint in the trial court. Acc ording ly
, Gaf fney invited any err or by taking one position befor e the District and the trial court and a differ ent po s i t ion on appea l. The defe ndants also contend that the board is an ag ency , the decision denying continuing health cover ag e benef its is an ag ency decision, and the common law writ of certiorari is the proper means of r eviewingthe District’s dec ision in t his case. ¶ 33 The rule of invited e rror or ac quiesce nce is a form of pr ocedur al def

ault also descr ibed

as estoppel. In re Detention of Swope
, 213 I ll. 2d 210, 217 (2004). The rule prohibits a party

-7-from reque sting to proce ed in one manner and then contending on appea l that the reque sted

action was err or. People v. Harve y , 211 I ll. 2d 368, 385 (2004). The rationale for the rule is that it would be manifestly unfair to g rant a party relief based o n er ro r i n t roduce d into the
proce eding s by

that party

. In re De tention of Swope , 213 I ll. 2d at 217. ¶ 34 The rec ord in this case does not support the defe nd an t s ’ ar gu m en t t h at Ga ff ney acquie sced to the District’s proc edure s. Gaff ney ’s attorne y

asked twice for clar ification on the nature of the board’ s meeting . Gaf fney ’s attorne y

initially stated he w as “conc erne d by the term hear ing” beca

use it implied that the Act allowed the District to “cr eate some sort of fac tual hear ing proce ss subject to the ad minist rative revie w act.” The board’ s attorney responde d, “I t does not[ ,] *** but y our conce rn is noted for the rec ord.” Ag ain, at the end of the meeting Gaf

fney ’s attorney asked, “[T] hen I am not to worry that this is being some sort of for mal hear ing[.] [ T]his is simpl y an investig atory

proce eding for the B oard to c onsider whether to g rant him voluntarily or not.” T h e b oard’ s attorney responde d, “Rig ht. That’s exactly the understanding I want you to have.” The rec ord, there fore
, sh o ws that Gaf fney raised his proce dural conce rns befor e the board. Contrary to the d ef endants’ contentions, Gaf fney did not submit without objection to the board acting as an administrative ag ency in decidinghis claim for sec tion 10 benefits. ¶ 35 Ga ff

n ey also raised his proce dural arguments in the trial court. He filed a comp l ai n t seeking decla

ratory judgme nt and included a second count for administrative revie w “in the alternative” and “pure ly for prophylactic rea sons.” I n his complaint, Gaf fney asser ted he did

no t ag ree or stipulate that the board’ s decision was subject to revie w under the Administrative Review L aw

. He further alleg ed that the Act does not provide for an administrative hear ing or decision, and does not cre ate an administrative ag ency

. When the defe ndants moved to dismiss the decla ratory judgme nt coun t co n tending that the board’ s decision was a final administrative action, Gaf fney argued that the board lacke d authority to conduct a hear ing or

issue a dec ision on his eligibility for se ction 10 benef

its. ¶ 36 Gaf

fney did not acquie sce to the dismiss al of his decla ratory judgme nt count or the trial court’s revie w by writ of certiorari

. The rec ord in this case s h o ws t h at Gaf fney has consistently challeng ed the District’s authority to iss u e an administrative decision on his claim for section 10 benef its. Acc ording ly
, we reje ct the defe ndants’ argument that Gaf fney invited error

in this case. ¶ 37 I n support of their argument that the board’ s decision is an ag ency action, the def endants rely upon sections 1 and 6 of the Fire Protecti o n Di s t ri ct Act (70 I L CS 705/1, 6 (West 2006)). The defe ndants contend those statutory provisions g ave them authority to enac t the ordinanc e outlining the pr ocedur e for seekingsection 10 bene fits. ¶ 38 An administrative ag ency has no g ener al or common law power s. Alvarado v. Industrial Comm’n
, 216 I ll. 2d 547, 553 (2005). Rather, an ag ency ’s power s are limit ed to those g rante d by the l eg islature and any action mus t be specifically authorized by sta tute. Alvarado
, 216 I ll. 2d at 553. ¶ 39 Section 1 of the Fire Protection District Act cre ates fire protec tion districts and conf ers upon those districts a wide rang e of power s to p rovide fire protec tion and preve ntion. 70 I L CS 705/1 (West 2006). The board of trustees of a fire protec tion district is g iven authority

-8-to exercise all power s and control all aff airs of the district. 70 I L CS 705/6 (West 2006). The board’ s power s include providing group life, health, acc ident, hospital, and medical insurance for the district’s employ ees. 70 I L CS 705/6 (West 2006). The board is also g rante d the power to pass all nece ssary ordi n an ce s fo r the proper manag ement and conduct of its business. 70 I L CS 705/ 6 (West 2006). ¶ 40 The statutory provisions cited by the defe ndants g ener ally indicate an intent to g ive fire protec tion districts the power s nece ssary to acc omplish the objec t ive of providing fire protec tion and preve ntion. Districts are g iven the authority to provide insurance benef its for employ ees and to control the operation of their insurance prog rams. A district is, there fore
, authorized to provide benef its in employing the workfor ce nece ssary to car ry out its function. ¶ 41 T h o s e s t at u t o ry p ro v i sions do not express an intent to authorize a district to make admi n i s t rative decisions on employ ees’ elig ibilit y for section 10 benef its under the Act, howeve r. The Act provides a separ ate statutory benef it and it is not part of the Fire Protection District Act. See 70 I L CS 705/0.01 et seq

. (West 2006); 820 I L CS 320/1 et seq

. (West 2006). The deter mination of elig ibilit y for this separ ate statutory benef it under the Act is not subject to a district’s authority

to manag e and c ontrol its group insura nce pr og ram. ¶ 42 The only ref

ere nce to an administrative action in the Fire Protection Di s t ri ct Ac t is contained in section 16.13b (70 I L CS 705/16.13b (West 2006)). Under that section, a hear ing
proce dure is mandated prior to remova l or discharg e o f a fi refighte r unless a collectivebarg aining ag ree ment require s binding arbitration of disputes involving disciplinary action. 70 I L CS 705/16.13b (West 2006). The hear ing proce dure set forth in section 16.13b require s written char g es and a fair and impartial hear ing befor e the board of fire commissioners. 70 I L CS 705/16.13b (West 2006). The chief of the fire depar tment bear s the burden of proving the char g es by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. 70 I L CS 705/16.13b (West 2006). Section 16.13b specific ally states that a final admin i s trative decision of the board of fire commissioners o n r e mo v a l o r d is c h a r g e is subject to judicial revie w under the Administrative Review L aw. 70 I L CS 705/ 16.13b (West 2006). ¶ 43 Under section 16.13b, final administrative decisions by the board of fire commissioners

are limit ed to the removal or dischar g e of a firef ighte r. The le g islature did not express any intention in section 16.13b to g ive fire protec tion districts the power to make administrative decisions on elig ibilit y for section 10 benef its under the Act. The Fire Protection District Act does not otherwise ref

er to administrative decisions or state that a district’s decision on any other matter

is subject to revie w under the Admi nistrative R eview L aw. Our revie w of the Fire Protection District Act has reve aled no provision indicating that the leg islature intended the bo ar d ’s d en ial of section 10 benef its to be an administrative decision subject to administrative re view. ¶ 44 The defe ndants ag ree that the Act does not cre ate an administrative proce ss for deciding claims for section 10 benef its. The Act does not express o r i n d icate in any way that a decision on elig ibi l i t y for section 10 benef its may be made by an administrative ag ency subject onl y to administrative revie w. We note that the Ac t does not provide any g uidance on the prope r proc edure for se eking section 10 benef its. I t only

mandates tha

t an employ er shall provide the benef

its if the specifie d require ments are met. See 820 I L CS 320/10 (West

-9-2006).

¶ 45 Given our revie w of the rele vant statutory provisions, we conclude that the leg islature did not express an intent to provi de the District with the authority to make administrative decisions on its employ ees’ elig ibilit y for section 10 benef its under the Act. I n this case , the board declined Ga ff

n ey ’s reque st for section 10 benef its afte r holding a meeting to i n v es t i gat e the fac tual basis for the reque st. The board’ s decision is not an administrative
ag ency action, but is only an em p l oy er’ s objection to pay ing section 10 benef

its. We, there fore
, conclude that the trial court err ed in dismiss ing the decla ratory judgme nt count of Gaf fney ’s complaint based on its finding t h at t h e board’ s order was a final administrative decision subject only

to administrative revie w. ¶ 46 Gaf

fney ’s decla

ratory judgme nt count was the proper means of seeking a deter mination of section 10 benef

its in this case

. I n t h e decla ratory judgme nt count of his complaint, Gaf fney alleg ed that the District re fu s ed his demand for section 10 benef its in a written “De cision and Orde r.” Gaf fney soug ht a deter

mination of his rig hts under the Act. He alleg ed that the def

endants’ r efusa l to provide section 10 bene fits violate d the Act a nd he soug ht a deter mination that he is entitled to those benefits. ¶ 47 The decla

ratory judgme nt statute provides that courts may , in case s o f actua l controver sy , make binding decla

rations of rig hts, including a deter mination of the construction of a statute and a decla

ration of the rights of t he int ere sted parties. 7 3 5 I L CS 5/2-701(a) (West 2006). He re, the District made a final decision objecting to Gaf fney ’s demand for section 1 0 benef its. Gaf fney seek s a construction of the Act and a decla ration of his rig hts under the
statute. This is cer

tainly a case involving an a ctual controve rsy and a decla ratory judgme nt would resolve that controve rsy

. See 735 I L CS 5/2- 7 0 1 (a) (West 2006). Acc ording ly
, Gaf fney ’s claim fa lls squarely within the scope of the decla ratory judgme nt statute. ¶ 48 Although the trial court e rre d in dismissing count I
, we need not r emand this matter on that basis alone. W e note that afte r t he trial court determined to proce ed on the al ternative
count as a common law writ of certiorari
, the defe ndants soug ht dismissal of that count by
arguing that Gaf

fney was not entitled to benef its under section 10 of the Act. The trial court deter mined that Gaf

fney was not entitled to section 10 benef its as a matter of law. The court aff irmed t he Board’ s decision and dismiss ed Gaffne y ’s action in its entirety

. We there fore addre ss wh ether the trial court corr ectly ruled that Gaf fney was ineligible for section 10 benef its as a matter of

law.

¶ 49 2. Section 10 Be nefits ¶ 50 The dispute here focuse s on the construction of section 10 of the Act. We must c onstrue section 10 and deter

mine whether the fac ts a lleg ed by Gaf fney fit within the plain meaning of t he Act. The construction of a statute prese nts a question of l aw also subject t o de novo revie w. In re Andre w B. , 237 I ll. 2d 340, 348 (2010). ¶ 51 Gaf

fney contends that the lang uag e of the Act does not require an actua l emer g ency , but only a rea sonable belief of an emer g ency

. The statutory lang uag e does not exclude a training exercise as an emer g ency situation. He further contends that the Act should be co n s t ru ed liberally to achie ve its purpose of confe rring benef its upon public safe ty employ ees injured

-10-in the line o f d u ty

. The circ umstances of this case amounted to an “eme rg ency ” under the appellate court’s decision in DeRose beca use the situation require d urg ency and immediate action. Gaf

fney conclude s that he is entitled to continuing health cover ag e benef its under section 10 of the Act beca use his injury occur

red in response to what he rea sonably believed to be an e merg ency

. ¶ 52 The defe ndants co n t en d t h at t h e leg islature intended a firef ighte r to be elig ible for continuing health coverag e benefits un d er section 10(b) only when one of t he four narr ow and specific requirements of that section i s met. This case does not fit withi n t h e meaning of an “emerge n cy ” u n d er DeRose beca use the situation was not urg ent, it did not call for immediate action, and Gaf fney was not fac ing unfore seen circ umstances. Gaf fney could not have rea sonably believed he was responding to an emer g ency when he knew and understood that he was participating in a traini n g ex ercise. Additionally
, Gaf fney is not entitled to section 10 benef

its be cause he was responding to instruc tions on participating in a training exercise rathe r than rea cting to a call for assistance

. The defe ndants, there fore
, maintain that Gaf fney was not “re sponding” to what he rea sonably believed to be an emer g ency as require d to qualify for c ontinuing hea lth covera g e bene fits under sec tion 10(b). ¶ 53 Section 10 o f t h e Act is entitled “Require d health cover ag e benef its,” and provides in pertinent pa

rt: “(a ) An employ er who employ s a full-time law enfor ceme nt, corr ectio nal or

corr ectional probation office r, or firef ighte r, who, on or afte r the eff ective date of this Act suffe rs a cata strophic injury or is killed in the line of d u t y s h al l pay the entire premium of the employ er’ s health insurance plan for th e i n j u red employ ee, the injured employ ee’ s spouse, and for eac h depende nt child of t h e i n jured employ ee until the child rea ches the ag e of majority or until the end of the cale nder y ear in wh ich the child rea ches the ag e of 25 if the child continues to be depende nt fo r support or the child is a full-time or part-time student and is de pendent for support.

*** (b) In order for the law enfor ceme nt, corr ectional or corr ectional probation office r, firef

i gh t er, spouse, or depende nt children to be elig ible for insurance

cover ag e under this Act, the injury or death must have occ urre d as t he result of t he offic er ’s response to fre sh pursuit, the officer or firefighter’s response to what is reasonably believe d to be an eme rgency , an unlawful act perpe trated by another
, or during the investigation of a criminal act. Nothing in this Section shall be construed
to limit health insurance coverage or pension benef its for which the office r, fi re fi gh ter, spouse, or depende nt children may otherwise be elig ible.” (Emphasis added.) 820 I L CS 320/ 10 (West 2006). ¶ 54 The defe ndants ag ree that the require ments of subsection (a) have been met in this c ase. This court has held that a “ca tastrophic injury” under subsection (a) is sy nony mous with an injury that results in a line-of- duty disability under section 4-110 of the I llinois Pension Code (40 I L CS 5/4-110 (West 2000)). Krohe v. City of Bloomington
, 204 I ll. 2d 392, 394 (2003). Gaf fney alleg ed he was awa

rded a line-of- duty disability pensi o n as a result of his injury

. Thus, there is no dispute that Gaf fney suffe red a cata strophic injury in the line of duty within

-11-the meaningof sec tion 10(a) of the Act. ¶ 55 The point of contention in this case is whether the additional require ments of subsec tion (b) have been satisfied. Specifica lly
, the issue is whether the fac ts alleg ed by Gaf fney show his injury occur

red in “re sponse to what is rea sonably believed to be an emer g ency ,” within the meaningof subsec tion (b). ¶ 56 The fundame ntal objective of statutory construction is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the intent of the leg islature. Blum v. Koster
, 235 I ll. 2d 21, 29 (2009). The most reliable indicator of leg islative intent is the statutory languag e, g iven its plain and ordinary meaning

. Cinkus

v. Village of

Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board
, 228 I ll. 2d 200, 216 (2008). When the statutory lang uag e is clea r and unambig uous, it must be applied as written without resor t to ext ri n sic aids of statutory interpre tation. MidAmeric a Bank, FSB v. Charter One Bank, FSB
, 232 I ll. 2d 560, 565 (2009). We will not depar t from the plain statutory languag e by

rea ding into it exceptions, lim itations, or conditions that conflict with the ex presse d intent of the leg islature. MidAmeric a Bank, FSB , 232 I ll. 2d at 565-66. ¶ 57 The plain lang uag e of subsection (b) provides that public safe ty employ ees will rece ive section 10 benef

its when the injury or death occur s as a result of: (1 ) a re s p o nse to fre sh pursuit; (2) a response to what is rea sonably believed to be an eme rg ency ; (3) an unlawful act of another ; or (4) the investigation of a cr iminal act. 820 I L CS 320/10(b) (W est 2006). The four fa ct ors set forth differ ent ty pes of scena

rios encounte red by public safe ty employ ees. Wit h respe ct to the fac tor at issue here
, public safe ty employ ees are require d to respond to eme rg encie s, whether they are rea l or not. A

false f ire a larm provoke s the same
response from fire fig hters as a rea l one. ¶ 58 I n DeRose
, our appellate court addre ssed the construction of section 10(b). DeRose , 386 I ll. App. 3d at 660-61. The appellate court observe d that the Act does not include a definition of the word “emerge n cy ” and, there fore
, revie wed dictionary definitions of that term. De R o s e , 3 8 6 I ll. App. 3d at 660-61. The parties direc ted the appellate court to definitio n s indicating “eme rg ency” means the “urg ent need for assistance or relief ,” “an unfore seen combination of circ umstances that calls for immediate action,” and “a sudden condition or
state of aff

airs calling for immediate action.” DeRose
, 386 I ll. App. 3d at 661. The appellate
court did not identify the source s of those dictionary definitions, but added its own ref ere nce to the primary definition from Webster’s Third New I nternational Dictionary
, defining “eme rg ency” as “ ‘an unfore seen combination of circ umstances or the re s ulting state that calls for immediate action.’ ” DeRose
, 386 I ll. App. 3d at 661 (quoting Webster’s Third New I nternational D ictionary 741 (1993))

. Ba sed on those definitions, the appellate court held a situation is an “eme rg ency” under the Act when “it is urg ent and calls for immediate action.” DeRose , 386 I ll. App. 3d at 661. ¶ 59 I n this case , the appellate court relied upon the co n s t ru ct i o n o f section 10(b) f rom DeRose

. See Gaffney
, 397 I ll. Ap p

. 3 d at 689. More rec ently
, the appellate court has continued to rely upon DeRose in construing the meaning of the term “eme rg ency .” Oskroba

v. Village of Hoffman Estates
, 404 I ll. App. 3d 692 (2010); Lemmene s v. Orland Fire Protection District
, 399 I ll. App. 3d 644 (2010). Thus, following DeRose
, our appellate court has consistently construed the term “em er g ency” in section 10(b) of the Act as meaning a

-12-situation that “is urg ent and c alls for immediate a ction.”

¶ 60 When a statute contains undefine d terms, this court has used a dictionary to asce rtain the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms. People v. Davison
, 233 I ll. 2d 30, 40 (2009) (citing People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp.
, 146 I ll. 2d 1, 15-16 (1991))

. The Act does not define the term “eme rg ency” and we, there fore
, ag ree with the appellate court’s use of the dictionar

y definition of that term in its construction of sec tion 10(b). ¶ 61 The primary definition from Webster’s Third New I nternati o n al Di ct i o n ary states an “eme rg ency” is “an unfore seen combination of circ umstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate ac t i o n <they wer e far from help when the [emerg ency] overtook them>.” Webster’s Third New Interna tional Dictionary 741 (1993). As our appellate court has held,

an “eme rg ency” cle ar l y require s an urg ent and immediate response

. The definition also indicates, howeve r, that the urg ency or immediate action must result from an unfore seen circ umstance. The requirement of an unforesee n event is shown by the i llustration stating, “they wer e fa r fr om help when the [emer g ency] overtook them.” ¶ 62 The other

senses a nd illust rations also demonstrate that an unfor esee n event is integ ral
to an “eme rg ency .” Those senses and illust rations provide: “a : a pressing need : EXI GENCY
<a state of [emerg ency] exis ted during which any help was acc eptable> b : a sudden bodily alteration such as is likely to require immediate medical attention (as a ruptured appendix or surg ical s hock) c : a usu. distressing event or condition that can often be anticipated or prepa red for but seldom exactly fore seen <wa it until the [emerg ency] is over, price s will g o down then> <an [emerg ency] water supply > <[emerg ency] docking fac iliti e s > < [e me r g ency]

cre ws working to clea

r the ro ad s >. ” Webster’s Third New I nterna tional Dictionary 741 (1993). Whil e we ag ree with the appellate court that an “eme rg ency” includes an element of
urg ency and t h e n ee d for immediate action, we also believe it involves an unfore seen circ umstance or

event r equiringthat immediate ac tion. ¶ 63 Fu rt her, section 10(b) cover s situations arising in the perf ormanc e of a pu b l i c s af

et y employ ee’ s job. The four fac tors from section 10(b) involve potentially dang erous situations

occur ring in the course of employ ment. A firef

ighte r’s employ

ment includes responding to situations involving imminent dang er to a person or proper ty

. T h e term “eme rg ency” in section 10(b), as applied to a firef ighte r, connotes the sense that either a person or proper ty is in some form of imminent dang er. ¶ 64 We, there fore
, conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “eme rg ency” in section 10(b) is an unfore seen circ umstance involving imminent dang er to a person or proper ty requiring an urg ent response

. To be entitled to continuing health cover ag e benef its under se ction 10(b), the injury must occur in re sponse to what is r easona bly believed to be

an unfore seen circ umstance involving imminent dang er to a person or proper ty requiring an urg ent re sponse. ¶ 65 Gaf

fney ’s cre w was g iven instructions on how to proce ed prior to the exercise. How ever , the alleg ations show that an unfore seen circ umstance arose afte r the exercise beg an. As the firef ighte rs wer e advanc ing up the stairwell to the third floor, the hose line beca me entang led in an u n s een object. The entang lement of the hose in the unseen object is cer tainly an unfore seen circ umstance

. T h e response to this event was also unfore seen. Gaf fney was

-13-require d to follow the hose line bac k to the obstruction and free the hose with no visibili ty

and the r isk of becomingdisoriented in the smoke-f illed building. ¶ 66 The unfore seen conditions alleg ed by Gaf fney involved imminent dang er to a person or proper ty requiring an urge nt response

. The tangle d hose l ine called for an urg ent re s p o n s e beca use the cre w was stranded on the stairwell to the third floor of the burning building with

no visibil ity and no water to put out the fire. I n those minutes, the trainingexercise turned into an emer g ency

. ¶ 67 Any fire, even one set in a training exercise, car ri es the potential for a life- threa tening situation. No matter how many safe ty prec autions are taken, there is alway s a chanc e that a person may be injured or even killed in these circ umstances. Her e, Gaf fney ’s injury occur

red in response to so m et h i n g that went wrong in the training exercise, turning it into an

emer g ency

. I n fre eing the hose line from the obstruction, Gaf fney put himself at risk of becoming lost and disoriented in the smoke-filled building. Import an t l y , Ga ffne y did not have the option of ending his participation in the exercise a fter it bec ame a n emer g ency

. ¶ 68 I f t h e Gene ral Assembly intended to limit an “eme rg en cy ” o n l y t o t h o s e ev en t s repr esenting an ac t u al o r rea l threat to the public, it would not have added the modify ing lang uag e “r easona

bly believed” to the phrase

. Fur ther, the use of the w ord “e merg ency” in this context sug g ests an intent to cover dang erous situations arising in a firef ighte r’s employ ment. I t is the unforse en nature of emer g enc ies in g ener al that supports such a construction. Emerg encie s, particula rl y t hose involving fire or explos ions, can arise in a number of unexpected place s and firef ighte rs are expected to resp ond to them. An emer g ency

can a rise duringa tra ining e x erc ise, espec ially one involving a

live fire. ¶ 69 I n this case , Gaf fney ’s belief that he was responding to an emer g ency during the training exercise was rea sonable and falls within the purview of the Act. Acc ording ly
, the trial court’s judgme nt in favor of t he defenda nts on the i ssue of section 10 el i gi b ility must be reverse d and the cause rema

nded to the trial court for further proce eding s consistent with this opinion on the dec laratory

judgme nt count of Ga ffne y ’s complaint.

¶ 70 B. N o. 110198, Br ian J . L emmenes ¶ 71 L em m en es contends that the circ umstances of his case amounted to an “e merg ency” b eca use they require d urg ency and immediate action. He maintains that he is enti t l ed t o h ea l t h cover ag e benef

its under section 10(b) of the Act beca use his injury occur

red i n response to what he r easona bly believed to be an eme rg ency

. ¶ 72 The defe ndants contend that this case does not fit within the meaning of an “e merg ency” beca use the situation was not urg ent, it did not call for immediate action, and L emmenes was not fac ing unfore seen circ umstances. The defe ndants argue that L emm enes was not responding to what he rea sonably believed to be an emer g ency , as require d to qualify for health cove rag e bene fits under sec tion 10(b). ¶ 73 I n t h i s case, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgme nt on L em m en es ’ decla rato ry judgme nt action. Summary judgme nt is appropr iate when the pleading s, depositions, and admissions on file, along with any aff idavits, show that there is no g enuine i s s ue of materia l fac t and the moving party is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. 735

-14-I L CS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2006). By filing cross-motions for summary judgme nt, the parties

ag ree that no fac tual issues exis t and this case turns solely on leg al issues subject to de novo revie w. Founders InsuranceCo. v. Munoz , 237 I ll. 2d 424, 432 (2010). ¶ 74 Her e, L emmenes w as re quired to pa rticipate in a trainingexercise simulating an ac tual
supermar ket fire. The firef

ighte rs wer e instructed to advanc e a hose line into an abandone d building following a p re d et ermined path and to resc ue a “downe d firef ighte r.” The firef ighte rs’ masks wer e “blac ked out” to simulate live fire conditions, but there was no live fire during the exercise. The training exercise was timed with a stopwatch. I f a firef ighte r’s air supply ran out, he or she would stop par ticipating a

nd take of

f the mask. ¶ 75 Prior to the exercise, the firef ighte rs were inst ructe d to “re spond as i f i t were an ac tual

emer g ency” and that “ther e was a firef ighte r that was trappe d inside of this building, *** he

was running out of air, that his persona l distress alar m was g oing off, and that [t he firef ighte rs] neede d to l ocate him and resc ue him or he would perish.” The “downe d fi ref ighte r” was not in any rea l dang er, howeve r, and the exercise was perf ormed u n d er “contr olled conditions.” ¶ 76 The firef

ighte rs arr ived at the abandone d building in “f u l l t u rn o u t g ear ” with the fire
eng ine’s emer g ency lights activate d. During the exercise, L emmenes injured his knee while “twisting and tu rn ing and pulling this individual trying to fre e him” from an unknown obstacle. After injuring his knee, L emmenes remove d his bunker pants and observe d a larg e open wound. He then “we nt back a nd did more eme rg ency

training at this ex erc ise.” ¶ 77 The fac ts in this case do not establish any unfore seen circ umstance involving imminent dang er to a person or proper ty requiring an urg ent response

. L emmenes understood that he

was participating in a training exercise despite the eff orts to simulate an emer g ency situation and the order s to rea ct as if it wer e an actua l emer g ency

. The firef ighte rs wer e instructed to advanc e a hose line into the buil d i n g al o n g a prede termined path and wer e g iven specific instructions for perf

orming the exercise. The training exercise was conducte d under planned, “contr olled conditions.” No unexpected or unfore seen developments arose during this drill, unlike the situation in Gaffney wher e the hose line beca me entang led in an unknown object. ¶ 78 Fur

ther, the tra ining e x erc ise did not involve a live fire nor wa s there any smoke in the
structure

. I nstead, the firef ighte rs’ masks wer e “blac ked out” to simulate live fire conditions. No one wa s in imm inent dang er dur ing the exercise, includingthe “downe d firef ighte r.” ¶ 79 The evidence in this case does not support a findingthat L emmenes was i njured while making an urg ent re sponse t o an unforesee n circ umstance involvi ng imminent dang er to a person or proper

ty

. Rather, he was injured during a training ex er cise that proce eded as planned without any unfore seen developments. The circ umstances of this case do not satisfy the require ments of section 10(b) of t h e Ac t

. The trial court err ed in g ranting summary j u d gm en t i n favor of L emmenes on his decla ratory judgme nt claim and in denying t h e defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt. We must, there fore
, reve rse the appellate court’s judgme nt affir

ming the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

¶ 80 I I I . CONCL USI ON ¶ 81 We conclude that the trial court err ed in dismiss ing Gaf fney ’s complaint for decla ratory

-15-judgme nt and the appellate court err ed in aff irming that judgme nt. Acc ording ly
, we reve rse the circ uit and appellate court judgme nts in Gaffney and rema nd the cause to the circ uit court for further proce eding s consistent with this o p i n i o n o n Gaf fney ’s complaint seeking a decla ratory judgme nt. I n Lemmene

s , we r ever se the a

ppellate c ourt’s judg ment.

¶ 82 No. 110012—J udg ments reve rsed; ca use re manded. ¶ 83 No. 110198—Appellate court judg ment reve rsed.

¶ 84 J USTI CE GARMAN, conc urringin part and dissentingin part: ¶ 85 The majority conclude s that g iven the plain meaning of the word “eme rg ency” in section 10(b) of the Public Safety Employ ee Be nefits Ac t (820 I L CS 320/10(b) (West 2006)), plaintiff Michae l Gaf

fney is entitled to continuing health cover ag e benef its for himself and his family while plaintiff Br ian L emmenes is not. I n my opinion, the majority ’s interpre tation of section 10(b) of the Act is not consistent with our responsibility to g ive eff ect to the intent of the leg islature. I n addition, the manner in which the majority applies its interpre tation of the statute to the fac ts of the two claims obscure s the distinction betwee n an injury sustained in the l ine of duty

and a line- of-duty injury occur ring “as the result of the *** firef ighte r’s
respo n se to what is rea sonably believed to be an emer g ency .” Id. As a result, the court’s opinion does not provide clea r g u i d an ce fo r future case s. Thus, althoug h I ag ree with the result rea ched by the majority with respe ct to L emmenes’ s claim, I dissent from the portion of the opinion interpre ting section 10(b) and from the m ajorit y ’s conclusion reg arding Gaf fney ’s claim.

¶ 86 Statutory I nterpre tation ¶ 87 Section 10(a) of the Act provides that the employ er of a full-time public safe ty employ ee who “suff ers a cata strophic injury or is killed in the line of duty ” must pay the entire health insurance premium for the employ ee, his or he r spouse, a nd his or her de pendent c hildren. 820 I L CS 302/10(a) (West 2006). Not all cata strophic or fata l line-of- duty injuries, howeve r, qualify for these additional benef its. Under sec tion 10(b) of the A ct: “In order for the l aw enfor ceme nt, corr ectional or corr ectional probation office r, firef ighte r, spouse, or depende nt children to be elig ible for insurance cover ag e under this Act, the injury or death must have occur red as the result of the office r’s response to fre sh pursuit, the officer or firef ighte r’s response to wh at i s rea sonably believed
to be an emer g ency , an unlawful act perp et rate d by another
, or during the investigat i o n of a criminal act. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit health insurance cover age o r pension benef its for which the office r, firef ighte r, spouse, or depende nt children may otherwise be elig ible.” 820 I L CS 320/10(b) (West 2006). ¶ 88 The operative lang uag e in the prese nt case is the ph ra s e “the firef ighte r’s response to what is rea sonabl y b el i ev ed to be an emer g ency .” The term “emerg ency” is not define d in the statute.

-16-¶ 89 R el y i n g o n a d i ct i o n ary definition, the majority holds that an “eme rg ency” is a n

“unfor esee n circ umstance involvi ng imminent dang er to a pers o n o r property requiring an urg ent response .” Supra ¶ 64. Thus, acc ording to the majority
, for a firef ighte r to be entitled
t o t h e benef

its at issue, his injury must have occur red “in response to” someth i n g h e

rea sonably believed to be “an unfore seen circ umstan ce i nvolving imminent dang er to a person or proper ty requiring an urg ent re sponse.” Supra ¶ 64. ¶ 90 I n rea ching this conclusion, t he majority reje cts the i nterpre tation of the s tatutory term “eme rg enc y ” t h at was adopted by the appellate court in DeRose v. C ity of Highland Park
, 386 I ll. App. 3d 658, 661 (2008), and applied by the appe llate court in the present case

. I n DeRose
, the appellate court noted that three differ ent dictionaries provided three simil ar, but not ide ntical, definitions of the term. Id. The common denominator in a ll of the definitions was that a n emer g ency

is a situation that is “urg ent” and that “ca lls for immediate ac tion.” The DeRose court also quoted the definition ref ere nced by the majority
, which contains the words “an unfore seen combination of circ umstances,” but did not adopt this lang uag e as part of its interpretation of the statute. Id. ¶ 91 The majority conclude s that an “emerg ency ,” as that term i s used i n section 10(b), is a circ umstance that “cle arly require s an urg ent and immediate response .” Supra ¶ 61. I ag ree

. ¶ 92 Howeve r, the majority then goes on to say

that the “de finition also indicates, howeve r, that the urg ency or immediate action must re sult fr om an unfore seen circ umstance.” Supra ¶ 61. I n eff

ect, the majority g raf

ts the entire definition of “eme rg ency” from one sp ec i fic d ictionary onto the statute, treating the words of Webster’s Third New I nterna t i o n al Dictionary as if they wer e the words of the leg islature. This mecha nical approa ch to statutory interpre tation treats the words chosen by the editors of a dictionary as if they wer e the words of the statute itself and cre ates a new statutory require men t t h at wa s n ot intended by the leg islature—a r equire ment that may have f ar- rea ching eff

ects in future case s. ¶ 93 Nothing in section 10(b) sug g ests that a circ umstance to which a firef ighte r is r esponding
must have been “unfor esee n” to qualify as an emer g ency

. I ndeed, the majority ’s cre ation of this require ment raises more questions than it answe rs. Ex actly what circ umstance must have been unfore seen—the overa ll situation t o wh i ch the firef ighte r was responding or the particula r cause of the injury to the firef ighte r? And whose perspe ctive is examined—the injured firef

ighte r, his supervisor, or the objective rea sonable person? When i s t h e fa ct of whether the circ umstance was fore seen to be assessed—when the alar m sounds causing the fire depar tment to respond or when the firef ighte r encounte rs the person or object that cause s the injury ? Fur

ther, if the statute is inter

prete d to r equire that the circ umstance cre ating the

emer g ency have been unfore seen by the injured firef ighte r, it not only pen al i z es the individual who did fore see dang er but responde d any way but a ls o rew ards the individual who failed to see a for esee able da ng er. ¶ 94 I n my opinion, the appellate court in DeRose and in the prese nt case proper ly interpre ted the stat uto r y te r m “ e me r g ency” as a circ umstance requiring urg ent and immediate action. The majority ’s re quirement that the e merg ency circ umstance must have been unf orese en is not essential to the leg isla t u re ’s i n tent. The statute was not intended to provide additional b enefits to any firef

ighte r who is acc identally injured on the job, but only to those whos e

-17-injuries occur red as they were re s ponding to a circ umstance they rea sonably believed to

re q uire urg ent and immediate action. Requiring that the circ umstance have b ee n “unfor esee n” could result in th e d en i al o f benef its to a firef

ighte r whose injury or death

occur red under circ umstances of true emer g ency , but one that was fore seen, mere ly beca use this court unjustifiably created a judicially imposed require ment not intended by the leg islature. As this court has said on numerous occa sions, “[w]e may not ad d ex ce p t i ons, limit ations, or conditions to statutes in derog ation of their plain meaning .” Holly v. Montes
, 231 I ll. 2d 153, 159 (2008). See also People ex rel. Departme nt of Professional Regulation

v. Manos
, 202 I ll. 2d 563, 568 (2002); Lauer v. American Family Life Insurance Co.
, 199 I ll. 2d 384, 390 (2002). ¶ 95 I n addition, althoug h it is entirely appropr iate for a court to rely on a dictionary definition
to reve al the plain, ordinary
, and popularly understood meaning of an undefine d statutory term ( People v. Perry
, 224 I ll. 2d 312, 330 (2007))
, a dictionary may contain more than one definition for the s ame term and differ ent dictionaries may contain differ ent, althoug h simil ar, definitions. I t is the responsibility of the court when utiliz ing a dictionary to choose that definition that most effec tively convey s the intent of the leg islature:
“Our primary objective is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to leg islative intent, the surest and mos t reliable indicator of which is the s tatutory lang uag e it self, given i t s p l ain and ordinary meaning

. [C itation.] I n d et er m i n ing the plain meaning of statutory terms, we consider the statute in its entirety
, keeping in mind the subject it addre sses and the appar ent intent of the leg islature in enac ting it. [C i t ati on.] Where the lang uag e of the statute is clea r and unambig uous, we must apply it as written, without

resor t to ex trinsic aids to statutory construction.” Id . at 323. ¶ 96 Whil e ref

ere nce to one particu la

r d ic ti o n a r y definition of “eme rg ency ” may provide some i n s i ght into the plain and ordinary meaning of the word, it does not take into acc ount t h e entire statute or

the intent of the leg islature. F or example, the dictionary definition that the majority would g raf

t onto the statute also requir es that the c ircumstance involve imminent dang er to a person or proper ty , but it does not enlig hten us as to what persons or whose
proper ty must be in dang er. For this, we m u s t look more closely at section 10(b) and the entire statutory

scheme g overningoffice rs’ a nd firef ighte rs’ be nefits. ¶ 97 To qualify for the benef its provided by this statute, the i njury or death of the off icer or firef ighte r m ust be the r esult of one of four circumstance s listed in section 10(b): (1) fresh pursuit, (2) the individual’s response to what he rea sonably believes to be an emer g ency , (3)

an unlawful act perpe trated by another
, or (4) investigation of a criminal act. I f we are to g ive eff ect to the intent of the leg islature, we must rea d the second of these four circ umstances in

a manner consistent with the other t h ree , which descr ibe situations encounte red by police office rs and firef

ighte rs in the course of their ac t u al duties as they protec t and serve the public. ¶ 98 An office r who is injured while driving a squad car on a training course while pra cticing techniques of fre sh pursuit is not in fre sh pursuit. An officer who is injured whil e t ra i ning in techniques of subduing a suspect is not i n jured by the unl awf

ul act of another when the individual playing the role of suspect resists arr est. An office r who is injured while eng ag ing

-18-in a training exercise involving investigation o f a s t ag ed crime scene is not injured while

investigating a crime. No matter how rea listi c such training exercises may be, or how seriously the participants take their instructions to treat the trainingscena rios is if they are

rea l, any injuries that occur do no t co m e within the scope of section 10(b) beca use the participa nts are not ac tually involved in one of the enumer ated circ umstances. Simi larly
, firef ighte rs participating in a training exercise do not actually believe they are responding to a circ umstance that involves imm inent dang er to a nother pe rson or to prope rty

. ¶ 99 Thus, when rea d in context of section 10(b) as a whole, wh at an o ff i ce r or fire fig hter “re asonably believes to be an emer g ency” ref ers to a situation to which he is called upon to respond in the course of car rying out his profe ssional duties. To be entitled to benef its under section 10(a)
, the firef

ighte r must have been responding as a firef ighte r, not as a participa

nt in a training exercise, to what he rea sonably and actua lly believed t o b e an em er g ency in which there was imminent dang er of harm to another person or to proper ty

. I f his rea sonable and ac tual belief turns out to have been incorrec t, as i n the case of a false alarm, he would still be entitled to sec tion 10(a) be nefits if he w ere injured while re sponding. ¶ 100 The larg er context of the entire leg islative scheme re gar d i n g fi re fi gh t er ’s b enef its supports this rea ding. A firef ighte r who is cata strophically injured is entitled to a line-of- duty d isability pension under the I llinois Pension Code. 40 I L CS 5/4-110 (West 2006). I n addition, he is e ntitled unde r the I nsuranc e Code to maintain health insurance cover ag e for himself, his s p ouse, and his depende nts under the preva iling g roup rate

. 215 I L CS 5/367f (West 2006). Section 10(b) is desig ned to pr ovide additional benef its to a limit ed subset of firef ighte rs who ar e injured in the line of duty

. ¶ 101 The definition adopted by the majority
, howeve r, would encompa ss near ly ever yline-ofduty injury so long as the circ umstance that led to the injury was “unfor esee n.” I n eff ect, the majority has equate d an emer g ency within the meaning of section 10(b) with a mere acc ident. Acc ording to the same dictionary utiliz ed by the majority
, an acc ident is “an event or condition occur

ring by chanc e or arising from unknown or remote cause s” or “an unfore seen unplanned event or condition.” Webster’s Third New I nternational Dictionary 11 (1993). An

acc ident i s also a “sudden event or chang e occur ring without intent or volition throug h

car elessness, ignor ance , or a combination of cause s and producing an unfortunate result.” Id. The majority g raf

ts this require ment onto the statutory lang uag e even though an unfore seen

emer g ency does not nece ssarily prese nt a g rea ter risk to a firef

ighte r than a fo re s ee n

emer g ency

. The leg islature made no distinction betwee n unfore seen emer g encie s and fore seen emer g encie s. As a result, the add i t i o n al benef its of section 10(a) should not be available in one circ umstance but not the other

. ¶ 102 Consider a workplac e injury that occur s in the fire station. A piece of equipment falls and the firef ighte r l eaps out of the way to avoid being hit, falling and fra cturing his leg

. He is responding to an unfore seen circ umstance that involves imminent dang er to himself and that require s the urg ent response of a sudden movement to avoid injury

. I f the fra cture is a car eer

ending injury
, he would be entitled to secti o n 1 0 (a ) b enef its under the majority ’s rule. Howeve r, under my rea ding of the statute, this acc ident would not qualify as an emer g ency beca use he could not have rea sonably and actua l l y b el i ev ed that his response as a profe ssional firef

ighte r was nece ssary to protec t another person or proper ty from imminent

-19-dang er of harm fr om the falling equipment. ¶ 103 I n contra st, firef ighte rs could be called to sta nd by while a controlled burn of a wooded

are a i s u n dertaken. The possibili ty that the flames could sprea d is fore seen by ever y one involved. Yet, under the majority ’s rul e, if a firef ighte r suffe rs a cata strophic injury responding to the sprea d of the flames outside the intended are a, he would not be elig ible for section 10(a) benef

its beca use the circ umstance was not unfore seen and, there fore
, was not

an eme rg ency

. ¶ 104 For these rea sons, I dissent from the majority ’s interpre tation of section 10(b), which will result in t h e granting of additional benef its to some injured firef

ighte rs and the denial of additional benef

its to ot hers, a

nd, in both cases, will thwar t the will of the leg islature.

¶ 105 Application of the Rule to the F acts ¶ 106 Both Gaf

fney and L emmenes wer e responding to circ umstances they encounte red dur ing training exercises. Both wer e instructed to perf orm their duties during the exercises as if they

wer e responding to true emer g encie s. By definition, both knew that there was no rea l

emer g ency

. ¶ 107 L emmenes was injured when he tried to pull a “downe d firef ighte r” from an “unknown obstacle” u

n d e r c ir c u ms ta n c e s that wer e cre ated to “simulate” an emer g ency

. Supra ¶¶ 75-77. Under the majority ’s rule that the circumstance cre ating the emer g ency must have been “unfor esee n,” L emmenes is not entitled to additional benef its under section 10(b) of the Act beca use he “under s t o o d that he was participating in a training exercise” in which the participating firef

ighte rs wer e “instructed to advanc e a hose line into th e building along a prede termined path and wer e g iven specific instructions for perf orming the exercise.” Supra ¶ 77. Thus, the need to lift or move an unknown obstacle was not, acc ording to the majority
, unfore seen. ¶ 108 As fo r Gaffney
, the majority states that “an unfore seen circ umstance arose af t er t h e exercise beg an.” Supra ¶ 65. Gaf fney ’s prog ress was halted by the entang lement of his hose with a piece of furniture
, which the majority states was “ce rtainly an unfore seen circ umstance.” Supra ¶ 65. ¶ 109 Comparing the two case s, the maj o ri t y conclude s that “[n] o unexpected or unfor esee n developments arose ” during the Lemmene s drill, “unlike the situation in Gaffney wher e the hose line beca

me entang led in a

n unknown object.” Supra ¶ 77. Acc ording to the majority
, the “unknown” piece of furniture that beca me entang led wi th Gaf

fney ’s hose line was an “unfor esee n development ”— ev en though i t was placed in the s tructure , along the route of the hose line, by the desig ners of the exercise—but the “unknown obstacle” complicating the

resc ue of the downed firef ighte r in Lemmene

s was not unf

orese en. Yet on this require ment of the majority ’s test, the fa cts of Gaffney and Lemmene

s are almost identical. ¶ 110 I n my opinion, section 10(b) does not require that the emer g ency being responde d to be unfore seen or unfore seea ble. Howeve r, if such a require ment i s t o b e applied, neither the entang lement of Gaf

fney ’s hos e li ne nor L emmenes’ s need t o p u l l a downed firefig hter to safe ty wer e unfore seen by either the trainer s who desig ned the scena rios or the trainee s, who

wer e instructed that they wer e to enter a furnished structure and resc ue any one inside. These

-20-wer e prec isely the ty pes of occur

renc es that firef

ighte rs expect to encounte r in a rea l fire and for whic h the trainingexercises we re de signe d to prepa re the m. ¶ 111 Gaf

fney was undoubtedly awa re that such situations could arise during the exercise. He
argues, howeve r, that he was “neve r ad v i s ed as to the shape, location or identity of the various obstacles he would encounte r,” as i f an eff ective training exercise would involve entirely predic table and expected circ umstances. Gaf fney and the majority overlook the fac t that furniture and dummy “victims” are place d in training scena rios for the purpose of training firef

ighte rs to navig ate throug h unfamiliar furnished structure s and to resc ue trappe d individuals. I n Gaf

fney ’s case , the fac t that a hose could become tang led in a piece of furniture was just as for esee n as the obstac le enc ountere d by L emmenes. ¶ 112 The majority also states th at Ga ff n ey ’s “re sponse to this event was also unfore seen.” Supra ¶ 65. This adds an entirely new element to the test that the majority purports to adopt. Not only must the circ umstance to which the firef ighte r is respondi n g b e unfore seen, the
nature of his response must also be unfore seen. But why ? What purpose of the statute is advanc ed by limit ing an emer g ency to a situation in which the firef ighte r’s response is unfore seen? And by

whom? The majority

does not say

. ¶ 113 I n any event, Gaf fney ’s response to the entang lement of his hose line was not unf orese en. He responde d to a co ndition of the training exercise prec isely as he was trained to respond—he followed his hose line back to the obstruction. He then clea red the obstruction by moving a piece of hea

vy furniture

. ¶ 114 Nor was Gaf

fney ’s lack of visibil ity unfore seen ( supra ¶ 66), despite the majority ’s focus

on this fac t. L ack of visibil ity was part of the desig n of both training exercises, althoug h one involved actua l smoke produce d by a live fire and one involved the simulation of smoke by blackingout the trainee s’ masks. ¶ 115 The majority also notes that Gaf fney could have become lost or disoriented had he lost
contac t with the hose. But he did not become lost or disoriented. Nothing in the languag e of section 10(b) sug g ests t h at a circ umstance is an emer g ency if it might have become dang erous unde r hy

pothetical fa cts. ¶ 116 I n the end, the majority conclude s that these “unfor esee n conditions alleg ed by Gaf fney involved imminent dang er to a person or proper ty requiring an urg ent response .” Supra ¶ 66. As stated above, I do not ag ree that section 10(b) require s that the emer g ency have b ee n unfore seen or unfore seea

ble, but if this is a require ment of the statute, neither L emmenes nor Gaf fney meets this require ment. ¶ 117 Section 10(b) also require s that the injured fir efig hter have re asonably believed that he

was responding to an emer g ency

. I n both of these case s, howeve r, the firef ighte rs wer e fully

awa re that they wer e participat i n g i n t ra i n ing exercises t hat required them to act as if they

wer e true emer g encie s. An analog y to war g ames is helpful. I n a war g ame, service members

are instructed to treat the g ame as if it were a re al battle or othe r military mission. I n some training scena

rios, live ammunition may be used. Neve rtheless, the participa nts understand that they are not at war

. Simi larly
, both L emmenes a nd Gaf fney understood that they

wer e roleplay ing and that no one’s home or business was in da ng er of destruction by

fire and no one inside either

structure was in dang er of death or injury if he or she could not esca pe.

-21-¶ 118 As to the require ment of imminent dang er to person or proper ty , the majority states that beca use other firef

ighte rs wer e on the upper floor waiting for the arr ival of Gaf fney ’s hose, “ther e [was] a chanc e that a person may [have been] injured or even kil led.” Supra ¶ 67. Under the majority ’s own rule, howeve r, the mere chanc e of i n j u ry is not sufficie nt; there
must be imminent dang er. Fur ther, the rec ord re v eals that afte r he injured his shoulder, Gaf fney turned and followed the hose line back and then climbed up to the third floor. When he rea ched the third floor, one of the office rs inside the building noticed that he was in pain and having difficulty

brea thing. The office r immediately called a halt to the drill. This fac t contra dicts the majority ’s statement that “the cre w was stranded on the stairwell to the third floor of the burning building with no visibil ity and no water to put out the fire,” thus turning the trainingexercise into an e merg ency

. Supra ¶ 66. ¶ 119 Although one can imag ine circ umstances that m i gh t t u rn a t ra i ning exercise into an

emer g ency , this is not such a c ase. N o person a nd no proper

ty wer e in i mminent dang er of harm at the t ime Gaf

fney used hi s left arm to move a piece o f fu rn i t u re t o fre e his tang led hose. Shortly

there afte r, the e ntire exercise was terminated. Nothing in the rec ord sug g ests that the ot her participants i n the t raini n g exercise were ever in any dang er or that they had
any difficulty exit ing the structure when the e x erc ise was c alled off

. I n short, there was no imminent dang er, mere ly the remote potential for dang er ar ising from circ umstances that

never actua lly materia liz ed. ¶ 120 The final requirem en t applied by the majority is that the unfore seen circ umstance that place s a per son or prope rty in dang er must re quire a

n urg ent re sponse. This require ment is met, the majority finds, by the fac t that “[a]ny fire, even one set in a training exercise, car ries the potential for a life-thre atening situation.” Supra ¶ 67. I n such circ umstances, there is “a chanc e that a person may be injured or even killed.” Supra ¶ 67. Gaf fney qualifies for section 10(a) benef

its, acc ording to the majority
, beca use of a “cha

nce that a person may be injured

or even killed in these circ umstances.” Supra ¶ 67. In L emmenes’ s case , on the other hand, there was no live fire, only a simulated fire, an d he fac ed no “re al dang er” beca use the exercise wa s being perf

ormed “ under ‘ controlled c onditions.’ ” Supra ¶ 75. ¶ 121 Even if Iacc ept, for the sake of argument, that a tra ining e x erc ise could evolve into an

emer g ency , the majority ’s application of its rule to the fac ts of the two case s cre ates a “live fire rule” under which virtually any serious injury sustained by a firef ighte r during a live fire training exercise, reg ardle ss of the cause , will qualify for benef its un d er s ec t i on 10(b) beca use of the mere “potential” that the live fire could ca use injury or death. This is surely not what the leg islature intended when it enac ted the statute. ¶ 122 I
, th er ef

o re , d i s s en t fr o m the majority ’s conclusion reg arding Gaf fney ’s claim for additional benef

its under sec tion 10(a) of

the Act.

¶ 123 Conclusion ¶ 124 I n sum, Iag ree with the majority that there is no ambig uity in the statute and that plain

m ea ning principles apply

. Howeve r, the majority ’s plain meaning analy sis is incompl et e beca use it does not take into acc ount the statute in its entirety and the clea r leg islative intent. I n addition, the m aj o ri ty trea ts the dictionary definition as if it wer e the enac ted statutory

-22-lang uag e without critica l analy sis to deter mine whether it is consistent with the statutory intent. I
, there fore
, dissent from the portion of the maj o ri ty opinion interpre ting the term “eme rg ency” in s ection 10(b) . I n my opinion, section 10(b) g rants additional benef its only when the firef

ighte r is cata strophically injured or killed while responding in his profe ssional
capa city to a circ umstance that he rea sonably believes poses immin en t d an ger to another
person or proper ty and that re quires an ur g ent re sponse. ¶ 125 I also respe ctfully dissent from the portion of the opinion apply ing the newly interpre ted
statute to the fac ts of Gaf fney ’s case

. Under the statute as I rea d i t , b o t h Gaf fney and L emmenes suf

fer ed acc idental, car eer -ending , line-of- duty injuries, but neither oc curr ence resulted from a response to what the firef ighte r rea sonably believed t o b e an emer g ency beca use neither was responding as a firef ighte r to a circ umstance that place d another person

or proper ty in imminent dang er. Not only does the majority rea ch the wrong resu l t wi th
reg ard to Gaf

fney ’s claim, in doing so, it cre ates a rule that would encompa ss all cata strophic injuries sustained duringlive-fire training

. ¶ 126 Fire fi gh t er s k n o w al l t o o we l l that not all emer g encie s are acc idents. Arson is an

emer g ency , not an accident. Si milarly
, as i llustrated by the pre s en t case s, not all acc idents

are emer g encie s. Both Gaf fney and L emmenes suffe red car eer -ending acc idental injuries in the l ine of duty

and ar e entitled to pension and othe r bene fits as a result, i n addition to our respe ct and g ratitude for their serv i ce. They are not, howeve r, elig ible for the additional benef its provi d ed b y section 10(a) of the Act to those who are cata strophically injured or killed under c erta in limi ted circ umstances listed in section 10(b)

.

¶ 127 J US T I CES THOMAS and KARMEI ER join in this partial concur renc e an d p ar t i al dissent.

-23-